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Walking away from Nuremberg: just war and the doctrine of command responsibility in the American military profession

University of Florida Institutional Repository
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PAGE 1

WALKING AWAY FROM NUREMBERG: JUST WAR AND THE DOCTRINE OF COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY IN THE AMERICAN MILITARY PROFESSION By LAWRENCE P. ROCKWOOD A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA 2005

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS At the University of Florida, specia l thanks go to Robert McMahon, Michael Gannon, and Paul Magnarella who all were indispen sable to this project. The chair of my doctoral committee and academic adviser fo r almost three decades, Dr. McMahon, bore the five years of my research and compos ition with patience and grace while guiding the advancement of this dissertation through many last minut e obstacles. Mike Gannons and Paul Magnarellas lifes work inspired my interest in professional ethics and human rights leading to this project. The history departments Betty Corwine, and later Joanne Fort, provided much kindhearted assistance ove r the years. Additio nally, I would like to thank the many the Freedom of Information Act (FIOA) officers who made this project possible, especially the archivists at the at the U.S. Army Military History Institute at the U.S. Army War College in Carlisle Pennsylvania. Finally, I dedicate this dissertation to the memory of my father, Lieutenant Co lonel William P. Rockwood, U.S. Air Force, graduate, Army Officer Candidate School, Class No. 1 (September 27, 1941). iii

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TABLE OF CONTENTS page ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.....................................................................................vi FIGURE................................................................................................................vii ABSTRACT.........................................................................................................viii CHAPTER INTRODUCTION...................................................................................................1 1 JUST WAR DOCTRINE AND GENERAL ORDER NO. 100 ..........................17 Origins of General Orders No. 100.......................................................................18 Augustinian Just War Doctrine.............................................................................23 Just War Doctrine and Post-Westphalian Legalism..............................................32 Just War Criteria and General Order No. 100.......................................................40 Just Cause.................................................................................................. 41 Competent Authority................................................................................42 Comparative Justice..................................................................................45 Right Intention..........................................................................................49 Last Resort................................................................................................51 Probability of Success...............................................................................53 Proportionality..........................................................................................54 Discrim ination...........................................................................................56 The Legacy of General Orders No. 100................................................................57 General Orders No. 100 and International Humanitarian Law (IHL)...... 58 The Andersonville Trial............................................................................61 Conclusion............................................................................................................67 2 THE DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE AMERICAN MILITARY PROFESSION............................................................................................70 Constitutional Allegience and the American Military Profession........................71 The Prussification of the American Military Professionalism.............................73 Clauswitze contra Lieber (political realsim vs. political ethics)..............74 Emory Upton's Love Affair with Prussia .................................................79 Elihu Root and the Birth of Military Professionalism..........................................84 iv

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The Formalization and Specialization of American Military Doctrine................90 The Field Service Regulations..................................................................91 Rules of Land Warfare..............................................................................95 The Military Professionalism Under the Tutelage of the Legal Profession..........................................................................................97 The Re-democratization of the American Military.............................................101 Conclusion......................................................................................................108 3 COMMAND RESPONSIBIITY AND TH E MEANING OF NUREMBERG110 Command Responsibility Before Nuremberg.....................................................112 The Origins of the Nuremberg............................................................................114 The International Military Tribuna l and the Nuremberg Principles...................122 The Yamashita Precedent...................................................................................127 Trials under Control Council Law No. 10..........................................................130 The High Command Case.......................................................................131 The Hostage Case...................................................................................133 Competing Standards of Co mmand Responsibility ...........................................135 International Validation and Codification .........................................................139 The Other Nuremberg ........................................................................................143 The 1957 Edition of Field Manual 27-10...........................................................149 Conclusion..............................................................................................151 4 THE AMERICAN MILITARY ET HIC IN EARLY COLD WAR...............154 Formal and Informal Norms:..............................................................................157 The Post-War Civil-Mili tary Relationship..............................................160 The Normal Theory of the American Military Professionalism.............163 The Rehabilitation of the Wehrmacht and the Re-Prussification of the American Military Profession.......................................................168 Army Doctrine and the Vietnam War.................................................................176 Conclusion..........................................................................................................182 5 COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY AND THE MY LAI MASSACRE..........183 My Lai, the Peers Commisssion, and American Military Justice.......................189 Lieutenant Calley and the Defe nse of Superior Orders..........................191 Captain Medina's Responsibility............................................................194 v

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The Taylor Thesis...................................................................................202 Yamashita v. Medina, Subjective Criteria ..........................................209 The Legacy of My Lai Massacre........................................................................213 Post My Lai Professional Reform, An Attempted Return to Just War...213 Post-Vietnam Revisionism......................................................................218 Conclusion..........................................................................................................223 6 THE 1977 GENEVA PROTOCOL I AND THE POST-VIETNAM MILITARY DOCTRINE........................................................................225 U.S. Negotiations at the Diplom atic Conference in Geneva..............................227 North / South Debate, Just War Do ctrine, and Amended Article 1........231 Comm and Responsibilit y and Protocol I................................................242 The U.S. Military Evaluation of Protocol I.........................................................244 U.S. Army War College Study of Protocols...........................................246 Department of Defense Re view of Protocol 1........................................248 A Neo-Clausewitzian Critique of International Humanitarian Law.......254 Clausewitzian Realism as Formal American Military Doctrine.........................258 Conclusion..........................................................................................................265 7 CONCLUSION:...............................................................................................269 APPENDIX: CONTEMPORARY STANDARDS OF COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY.................................................................................274 The ad hoc Criminal Tribunals...............................................................276 The International Criminal Court (ICC).................................................278 Command Responsibility and the Abu Ghraib Investigations................282 REFERENCES....................................................................................................288 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH...............................................................................314 vi

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FIGURE Figure page 1 FM 22-100 Military Leadership ....................................................................6 vii

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Abstract of Dissertation Pres ented to the Graduate School of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy WALKING AWAY FROM NUREMBERG: JUST WAR AND THE DOCTRINE OF COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY IN THE AMERICAN MILITARY PROFESSION By Lawrence P. Rockwood May 2005 Chairman: Robert J. McMahon Major Department: History On November 20, 1945, in his opening statement as the American Chief Counsel for the prosecution at the International Mi litary Tribunal (IMT) at Nuremberg, United States Supreme Court Justice Robert H. J ackson addressed the issue of whether the legacy of that tribunal would be simple victors justice or the establishment of principles of international re ciprocity in holding individuals accountable for war crimes: We must never forget that the record on which we judge these defendants is the record on which history will judge us tomorrow. To pass these defendants a poisoned chalice is to put it to our lips as well. 1 The official position of th e United States vis--vis Justice Jacksons apocalyptic challenge has been one of steady erosi on from a precise affirmative standard for holding individual commanders di rectly responsible for war crimes. 1 Quoted in Telford Taylor, The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trial, (New York: Little Br own, 1992), 168. viii

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Many of the principles of Nuremberg era trials have their origin in the U.S. Civil War era U.S. General Order No. 100 also known as the Lieber Code that incorporated all the major pr inciples of Augustinian just war doctrine. This project examines the evolution of the concept of command responsibility as U.S. military doctrine from the Lieber Code to the present. The development of military doctrine is considered in the context of contested weltanschauung (worldviews) between those who championed contrasting models of military professionalism. Although the United States Army, after Wo rld War II, incorpor ated a rigorous definition of command responsibility into it s preeminent doctrinal manual on the law of war, Field Manual 27-10, the United St ates failed to hold its own military commanders responsible for dereliction in preventing grave breaches of international humanitarian law during the course of the Vietnam War. 2 Subsequently, the United States has consistently refused to ratify in ternational treaties and protocols that would replace the passive standard of command responsibility that the United States has enforced on its own military personnel with the affirmative standards inscribed in other recent international human rights stat utes and war crime tribunal charters. Finally, this project will closely examine the relevance of the military doctrine of command responsibility to the national deci sions to oppose the ratification of such treaties. 2 U.S. Army Field Manual 27-10, Rules of Land Warfare (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, July 1956). 178-179. ix

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INTRODUCTION On loan from the U.S. Supreme Court for the purpose of negotiating the London Charter establishing the Intern ational Military Tribunal (IMT ) and later serving as the tribunals first lead prosecutor for the Unite d States, Justice Robert Jackson immediately understood that the trials he had arranged and the theory of his prosecution placed the American military profession in a historical ethical dilemma. In a 1946 article, published in what was then the professional journal of the U.S. Army, Jackson argued that the standards of liability that the IMT was hol ding as binding on the officers of the former Axis powers were, rather than novel initiatives, inherent in American military tradition and doctrine. Jackson had a formidable task, as many American military officers were concerned about preceden ts being established and the possib ility that this precedent could be used against American commanders in th e future. Although the War Department had both initiated the process a nd crafted the charges, Jack son realized it would be insufficient to portray the charter as just a binding order initiated by a competent and recognized authority. Doctrine usually assumes a longevity that exceed s the tenure of an appointed or elected leadersh ip. Jackson had to present the charter to the American military profession as part of its own tradi tion. First he had to balance the norms of military obedience to higher authority, especially civilian authority, with the concept that certain orders are by their nature manifestly illegal and should not be executed. Second, he had to address the reality that, alth ough members of the military profession are by definition the mangers of violence, they mu st abide by rules that recognized that the 1

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2 means that can be utilized in war are not unlimited and that military commanders are liable when the conduct of their subordinates exc eed those limitations. Rather than the old law journal debate over the issue of Jus tice Jacksons legal realism, this dissertation is concerned with the relationship between American military doctrine and the Nuremberg precedents over a half-century after Justice Jackson argued his case for their interdependence. 1 Conservative positivist commentators have pointed to the novelty of the Nuremberg process and criticized the tendency to equate war crimes decisions, or Nuremberg precedents, with the law of war. 2 Rather than refute the legal positivist critique of Nuremberg, my purpose is to establish the Nuremberg precedents, their antecedents, and progeny as American military doctrine. This dissertation examines the development of the concept of command responsibility as official military doctrine from the Civil War era US Army General Order 100 the Lieber Code to contemporary U. S. military doctrine. JCS Pub 1, the definitive delineator of official U.S. military terminology, defines doctrine as fundamental principles by which military forc es or elements thereo f guide their actions in support of national objectives. 3 Doctrine is distinct from law. While authoritative, a violation of doctrine does not necessarily i nvolve a violation of law. Although doctrine often results in law and law often underpins doctrine, doctrine, un like law, calls for judgment in its application rather than an automated compliance. Unlike positive law 1 Justice Robert Jackson, The Significan ce of Nuremberg to the Armed Forces in Military Affairs (Winter 1946) Vol. 10, 2-15. 2 William V. OBrien, The Law of War, Command Responsibility and Vietnam, Georgetown law Review, LX (February, 1972): 606. 3 Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Publication No. 1, Terms and Acronyms (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2000), s.v. doctrine.

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3 based simply on legal jurisdiction, doctrine is based upon a professional consensus, even though the foundation of that consensus is base d on an internal institutional validation that is hierarchical and relati vely narrow. Unlike law, doctr ine is openly historicized in that it captures the lessons of past wars, reflects the nature of war and conflict in its own time, and anticipates the intellectual and t echnological developments that will bring victory now and in the future, making it a test of professional rather than legal competence. 4 Just as doctrine is distinct from law, doctr ine is also distinct from drill. In a 1966 official doctrinal manual, Virgil Ney drew a distinction between drill manuals and modern military doctrine. He considered early manuals as "doctrine in infancy. One example of such proto-doctrine was the Regulations or Blue Book that Frederick William von Steuben developed to drill the Contin ental Army at Valley Forge in marching, weapons fire, and open field battle maneuver. Doctrine proper involves strategic and operational concerns that are for more comprehensive than mere drill. 5 Additionally, doctrine is distinct from unofficial literature, no matter how influential, in that doctrine is usually officially published and may also carry an official imprimatur similar to that found in Catholic theological works signifying doctrinal correctness. 4 The Army's doctrine lies at the heart of its profe ssional competence. See Depa rtment of the Army, Field Manual 100-5, Operations (Washington: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1990), 3. This manual described itself as the U.S. Armys keystone warfighting doctrine as it links Army roles and missions to the National Military Strategy and describes how commanders are to think about the conduct of campaigns, major operations, battles, engagements, and operations other than war. 5 Virgil Ney, The Evolution of the United States Army Field Manual: Valley Forge to Vietnam (Fort Belvior, VA: Combat Operations Research Group, 1966 ). For unofficial works claiming that drill manuals should be considered as capstone doctrine, see William O. Odom, After the Trenches: The Transformation of U.S. Army Doctrine, 1918-1939 (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1999), 3, and Walter Edward Kretchik, Peering Through The Mist: Doctrine as a Guide for U.S. Army Operations, 1775-2000 (Ph.D. diss., University of Kansas, 2001), 1-3.

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4 One benefit of a doctrinal vis--vis lega l approach to command responsibility is that it avoids the perennial debate between natural law and positive law theorists. Following the views of Hugo Grotius (1583-164 5) and the prominen t late medieval theologian, Saint Thomas Aquinas, natural law holds that there is an inescapable connection between law and morality. John Aus tin, legal positivisms leading historical proponent, countered such natural law theorist s by drawing a sharp distincti on between law and morality based on (1) the command doctr ine, that a law must constitute a threat of sanction, and (2) the doctrine of absolute so vereignty, that a law mu st be issued from a position of superiority. 6 Doctrine predates this conflict. Specifically, as an early just war concept, the specific doctrine of m ilitary necessity, underpinning command responsibility, predates the natural versus positive law argument and applies a normative criterion directly to the experience of war without any need for any philosophical discussion into the nature of law. Like law, doctrine is hierarchal. In fa ct, no two sets of doctr inal publications can be equal in any given circumstance or conti ngency. This study is only concerned with doctrine that established a foundation for the general operation of an army in which changes in just war doctrine over time would necessitate modificati ons in subsidiary doctrines and even the doctrines of other military services. Distinctions between doctrinal publications arose out of doctrinal developments starting with the promulgation of (1) the Field Service Regulations early in the twentieth ce ntury, (2) the Army Field Manuals developed during the Second World War and utilized during th e Cold War, and 6 Stanley L. Paulson, Classical Legal Positivism at Nuremberg, Philosophy and Public Affairs 4, 2 (Winter, 1975): 133-135. See also Jeffrie G. Murp hy and Jules L. Coleman, The Nature of Law, in Philosophy of Law: An Introduction to Jurisprudence revised ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), 6-33.

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5 (3) the current interservice or joint servic e regulation systems now in the process of supplementing and replacing the separate doc trinal publication sy stems of separate services. Current official doctrine places such doctrine into two major groups: Capstone Doctrine: The highest category of doctrine publications in the hierarchy of publications that link doctrine to national strategy and the guidelines of other government agencies to include other members of international alliances and coalitions. Keystone Doctrine: Doctrinal publications that provides the foundation for a series of doctrine pu blications in th e hierarchy of publication. 7 The focus of this study is on Army doctrine and publications at the expense of the Navy, and later the Air Force, derives from the Armys traditional role as the major source of both capstone and keystone doc trine. Between the promulgation of U.S. Army General Orders No. 100 in the Civil War to the belated implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, a process not yet complete, the War Department and, subsequent ly, the Department of the Army was the proponent agency for national war fighting doctrine in general and the laws of war in particular. Doctrine is also like law in that it posits a formal norm. Besides formal legal standards, regulations, and military orders, th e 1990 edition of U.S. Army Field Manual 22-100, Military Leadership, includes traditional organizational values such as doctrine as formal norms. Informal norms include actual operating organizational values, institutional pressures, and personal valu es. Unlike law, doctrinal norms do not necessarily imply uniformity or constancy. Desp ite its formal hierarchical structure, the 7 Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington: Government Printing Office, 12 April 2001, as amended 7 May 2002), 62, 82.

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6 human world of military leadership a nd subordination seldom provides for the uncontested development of formal norms. Th e process of the development of doctrine often is a complicated balancing act betw een current authorita tive policy and past tradition. Norms can be arranged along a con tinuum from rigidly formal norms such as legal standard (laws, orders, and regulations ), semi-formal norms such as basic national values and traditional organiza tional values, to informal nor ms such as actual operating organizational values, institutional pressures, and personal values. Formal norms should always trump less formal norms. FM 22-100 defines a true ethical dilemma as existing when two or more d eeply held values collide. 8 Figure 1, From FM 22-100 Military Leadership 8 See Chapter 4 in FM 22-100 Military Leadership, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1990). The draft 2000 version of FM 22-100 dropped the concept of an ethical dilemma as a result of the adoption of Aristotelia n virtue ethics as a ba se modal of ethics.

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7 Conflicts between formal norms and informal norms impact not only on the operational effectiveness of a command, but also on the moral and ethical integrity of its actions. It will be argued that the ethics a ssociated with traditional just war doctrine are formal military norms. Chapter 1 examines the establishment of the principle that there is an affirmative official duty to use force or coercion to a ssist others as predicated and conditioned by the principle of necessity formally in both capstone and keyst one doctrine. This principle of military necessity was established as a form al norm in the military during the Civil War in U.S. Army General Order 100 the Lieber Code. In many respects, the Lieber Code and other nineteenth century writings of Dr. Francis Lieber are a reiteration of the traditional concept of justum bellum or just war that originated at end of the fifth century. The work of Lieber is representative of centr al tenets of traditional just war theory and provides a modern foundation of the concept of military necessity and the related concept of command responsibility for humanitarian co nduct during armed conf lict. Just over two years after President Lincoln issued the Lieber Code, the affirmative mandate placed on commanders to ensure the minimization of human suffering was enforced by a U.S. Army military tribunal during the tria l of Confederate Captain Henry Wirz, the commandant of Andersonville Prison, for hi s failure to affirmatively address the conditions of Union prisoners during the Civil War. To make the pejorative charges that certai n historical developments are regressive relapses to a primitive just war doctrine has b een a favorite tactic of conservative critics who have opposed humanitarian initiatives fr om the Nuremberg Principles to the 1977 Geneva Protocols. Such charges are founded on a lack of knowledge of the core concepts

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8 incorporated in both early just war doctrine and the Lieber Code. Some scholars in authoritative positions of doctrine development have even attempted to portray the central just war principle of discrimination, the distinctive tr eatment of noncombatants, as obsolete. 9 The present defense of the just war concepts against contemporary charges of obsolesce will be made on the basis of doctrine rather than simplistic interpretations of positive law. U.S. Army General Order No. 100 was just as much a foundation of doctrine as it was of law. As a representa tion of a major change in national strategy affecting the conduct of Union forces, it pr ovides the first ex ample of a national operational capstone doctrine. As the initial au thoritative basis for a series of doctrinal publications on the laws of war that was bindi ng on all branches of th e service, it was the first major historical example of keystone doctrine. Chapter 2 discusses the developments of U.S. military doctrine between the Civil War and World War II. The influence of fore ign models of military professionalism will be examined as a facilitator and inhibito r of the development of uniquely American doctrine. With the development of a form al publication and training system, doctrine was increasingly specialized into distinct fiel ds of capstone and keys tone disciplines. As pressures increased to democratize the American military institution and to create a mass 9 See David E. Graham, The 1974 Diplomatic Conference on the Law of War: A Victory for Political Causes and a Return to the Just War Conc ept of the Eleventh Century in Washington and Lee Law Review xxxii (1975), 38, 63, and, William Hays Parks. Air War and the Law of War. Air Force Law Review (1990): 1:50. Parks finds the just war principle of discrimination He even went so far as to claim that it was the fundamental failure of the law of war to acknowledge that the traditional distinction between the combatant and noncombatant was obsolete, and had been for the century preceding World War II.

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9 army, military doctrine became imbued with so cietal values more facilitative of the extension of humanitarian norms in warfare. Chapter 3 outlines the historical development of the concept of command responsibility not just as law, but also as military doctrine. The Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms provides three basic official definitions of the command: 1. The authority that a commander in the Armed Forces lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank and assignment. Command includes the authority and responsibi lity for effectively using available resources and for the planning the em ployment of, organizing, directing, coordinating, and controlling military forces for the accomplishment as assigned missions. It also includes re sponsibility for the health, welfare, morale, and discipline of assigned personnel. 2. An order given by a commande r, that is, the will of the commander expressed for the purpose of bringing about a particular action. 3. A unit or units, an organizati on, or an area under the command of one individual. 10 The nuanced, overlapping meanings of co mmand, as an individual noun, a verb, or a collective noun, are often not appreciated by those outside the military and even those within the profession ar e not aware that command can re fer simultaneously to more than just one of these definitions at the same time. Although the International Mi litary Tribunal in Nuremberg is the best-known historical event in the esta blishment of individual responsibility for war crimes and crimes against humanity, it had earlier preced ents. One involved the 1940 change to the War Department Field Manual 27-10, The Rules of Land Warfare. This document 10 JP 1-02, 82.

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10 doctrinally negated the defense of superior orders for war crimes. 11 Another precedence event was the case of General Tomayuki Ya mashita, who was put on trial, found guilty, and executed for failing in his command responsib ility to prevent or punish the killing of civilians and prisoners of war during the Japanese defense against the American reconquest of the Philippines in 1945. The Yamashita conviction is the most striking example of the incorporation of just war doctrine into a Nuremberg era affirmative military ethic. The U.S. Supreme Court proclaimed th is affirmative principle of command responsibility when it upheld Yamashitas conviction and allo wed him to be executed. General Douglas MacArthur, the Commanding Gene ral of the U.S. Army Forces in the Pacific, issued a statement confirming Yama shitas sentence in which he charged the Japanese general with violating the very definition of his profession: The soldier, be he friend or foe, is charged with the protection of the weak and unarmed. It is his very essence and reason for his being. 12 The United States Army incorporated a close approximation of this affirmative standard into its post war doctrinal manual on the Law of Land Warfare, Field Manual 27-10. 13 The major standards of command liability associated with the major war crimes trials during the Nuremberg period will be compared to the principle of command res ponsibility as incorporated into 1957 edition 11 War Department. Field Manual 27-10, The Rules of Land Warfare. (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1940). 12 Action of the Confirming Authority, General Headquar ters, U.S. Army Forces, Pacific, in the case of General Tomoyuki Yamashita, Imperial Japanese Army, February 7, 1946. 13 U.S. Army Field Manual 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare (Washington D.C.: Department of the Army, July 1956). 178-179.

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11 FM 27-10, which still represents current doctrine. The rele vant passage from FM 27-10 holds a commander liable: if he has actual knowledge, or should have had knowledge, through reports received by him or through ot her means, that troops or other persons subject to his control are about to commit or have committed a war crime and he fails to take the ne cessary and reasonable steps to insure compliance with the law of war or to punish violators thereof. 14 Chapter 4 discusses in detail the de velopments concerning the doctrine of command responsibility during the period of th e Cold War in context of ideological changes within the American military profession. After the Nuremberg trials documented the complicity of the German military establishment in the rise of Hitler and the Holocaust, the founders of th e new West German Army, the Bundeswehr rejected the much of the Prussian/ Wehrmacht tradition of military professionalism. Just as it was being thoroughly rejected in Europe, a rehabilitation of the Prussian/ German military tradition was underway in the United States. This rehabilitation first took place outside formal doctrinal publications with the appearance in 1957 of Samuel P. Huntingtons seminal book, The Soldier and the State: The Theo ry and Politics Of Civil-Military Relations. Eliot A. Cohen, Professor of Strategic St udies at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, coined the te rm normal theory to describe a model of civil-military relations that rests on a conception of professionalism put forward by Huntington that was reinforced by the imp act of the Vietnam War on the American military. Written in direct response to critic ism of the aristocratic pretensions of some American military leaders in the wake of the Truman-MacArthur controversy, 14 FM 27-10, 178-179.

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12 Huntington argued for a functional military ar istocracy based on a hi storical model of development of the American military profession that emphasized the discontinuity between American civil society and an increasingly professional American military culture. Rather than a conti nuity based on shared democra tic values, Huntington argued, in his chapter, The Military Mind: Conservative Realism of the Professional Military Ethic, that professional officers ma intain a distinctive and persistent weltenschauung (worldview) that molds and influences their contemporaneous attitude s and values. After maintaining that the seeds of a professional military ethic were more resilient in the antebellum Southern culture than in the North, Huntington placed the true cultural reservoir of American military professionalism in the military ethic of nineteenth-century Germany. 15 While it would be over twenty -five years before certai n aspects of Huntingtons work would be incorporated in formal milita ry doctrine in the so-called Weinberger Doctrine, the neo-Clausewitzian realism, espoused in Soldier and the State, would have hegemonic influence on the American military profession during the Cold War. The major institutional debates affecting its tene ts would include the doctrinal initiatives regarding credible expansion of the Nuremb erg doctrine of command responsibility into an international enforcement mechanism that would be universally enforceable. 15 Eliot A. Cohen, The Unequal Dialogue in Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-Military Gap and American National Security, ed. Peter D. Feaver and Richard H. Kohn (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001), 433. Cohen is a critic of Huntingtons model of civil-military relations and argues that actual control of the military by civilian authority facilitates rather than im pedes military effectiveness. Huntingtons seminal Soldier and the State (Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Pre ss, 1957) is in its twelfth printing. Huntington also reiterated his basic model of military professionalism in The Soldier and the State in the 1970s found in The Changing World of the American Military edited by Franklin D. Margiotta (Boulder: Westview, 1978), Democ racy And Armed Forces: Reforming Civil-Military Relations, Current (February 1, 1996) pp. 15-35, Armed Fo rces and Democracy, Reforming Civil-Military Relations, Journal of Democracy (October 1995), and his response to Richard H. Kohns article in The National Interest in Exchange on Civil-Military Relations, The National Interest, No. 36 (Summer 1994), 27-29.

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13 Chapter 5 focuses on the American record of holding its own personnel to the level of command responsibility associated w ith the Nuremberg precedents. Particularly, the landmark case of Captain Ernest Medina the commander of the principal company responsible for the My Lai Ma ssacre of March 16, 1968, in Vietnam, will be addressed in the context of the standard of command responsibility associated with his trial. Medinas case has come to represent one of two principal standards used today to measure issues of command responsibility. The judge in Medinas trial instructed the jury that a commander-subordinate relationship alone wi ll not allow an inference of knowledge and that they must establish that Captai n Medina possessed actual knowledge that his subordinates were committi ng human rights violations. 16 That standard contrasts both with the Yamashita standard established in post-WW II war crimes tribunals and the standards on command responsibility found in Ad ditional Protocol I, the Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, the Statute of the Internationa l Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, and the Rome Statute fo r the International Criminal Court. The failure of America to hold its own citiz ens to the same standards it held out to its defeated enemies was unquestionably demons trated following the American militarys greatest modern professional catastrophe: the My Lai massacre and its subsequent coverup. After its revelation in 1970, Chief of Staff of the Army General William Westmoreland responded with a series of init iatives: (1) the appointment of Lieutenant General William R. Peers to head the official Army inquiry into the My Lai Massacre, in which every command level in the affected division was implicated in covering up the massacre; (2) directing the Army War Colle ge to undertake a study of the contemporary 16 United States v. Captain Medina, C.M. 427162 (A.C.M.R. 1971).

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14 state of American military professionalism to address the institutional failures brought to light by the U.S. Armys problematic c onduct of the war; and (3) ordering the establishment of the U.S. Army Vietnam War Crimes Working Group. Immediately following these negative self a ssessments carried out in the wake of the My Lai Massacre, the United States partic ipated in diplomatic conferences lasting from 1974 to 1977 concerning the expansion of humanitarian protections afforded noncombatants in international armed conflict. Chapter 6 addresses the result of this process: the Protocol Additional to the Geneva C onventions of 12 August 1949 relating to the Protection of Victims of Ar med Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977. In the direct aftermath of the lessons learned from the disa ster at My Lai, the United States took the lead in successfully negotiating the inclusi on of an affirmative de finition of command responsibility in Article 86 of Protocol I. The American delegation at these conferences comprised the author of the current edition of FM 27-10 and former head of the U.S. Army Laws of War Program, Judge Richar d Baxter, and his successor, Waldemar A. Solf. Protocol I provided an extension of the Nuremberg precedent regarding the general principle of international huma nitarian law concerning the treatment of non-combatants. However, in spite of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) giving Protocol I its tentative approval at the time of its signing in 1977 and an Army War College study supporting ratification in 1978, the Reagan administrati on and subsequent administrations have refused to submit it to the United States Senate for ratification. With the election of Reagan, U.S. policy shifted from supporting an increased standard of command responsibil ity to policies undermining attempts to establish a more rigorous standard of command responsibility. Official working groups within both the

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15 Department of the Army and the Depart ment of Defense were arranged to document a shift in the position of military prof essionals in reference to the ratification of the 1977 Protocols. The particular change in th e official military posi tion in regard to the 1977 Protocol and the American initiated sta ndard of command responsibility contained within it can only be underst ood in the context of the gene ral consolidation of a more conservative weltanschauung within the American military profession in the 1980s. Chapter 6 also addresses the antipathy of the American military profession toward humanitarian operations during the 1990s and its failure to establish a consistent doctrinal base to guide such operations. Since humanitarian military operations possess the highest level of ideological concurrence with traditional just war doctrine, they are the type of military operation that is least in harm ony with neo-Clausewitzian realism. The conflicting models of Low Intensity Conflic ts (LICs), Operations Other Than War (OOTW) and Peace Operations created a doc trinal chaos that, together with a professional animus toward such operations, led to severely comp romised humanitarian deployments to Somalia, Haiti, the Balkans, a nd the American failure to intervene in the Rwandan Genocide. The promulgation of the Weinberger Doctrine, actually authored by General Colin Luther Powell, symbolized the ascendancy of conservative realism within the American military profession. However, even when doctrinal transformations have strong political backing, they are seldom all encompassing or complete. Doctrine, like law, possesses an institutional memory that sometimes blunts political necessity. The attitudes of the contemporary American military professionals are relevant to understanding the record of American offici al indifference to noncombatant humanitarian concerns in non-traditional ope rations. The incongruity of these contemporary American

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16 positions regarding the mandates of humanitari an law cannot be examined outside of the institutional context of developments and changes in organizational core values over time. The issue of the non-ratification of Prot ocol I remains of critical contemporary interest as it is directly related to the issues underp inning the Pentagons current opposition to the 1998 Rome Treaty establishing a permanent International Criminal Court (ICC). While the United States a llowed the incorporation of standards of command responsibility compatible with Protoc ol I in Article 6 of the Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, and in Arti cle 7 of the Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (a tribunal over which a U.S. citizen presides), it continues to actively oppose th e establishment of a permanent and independent tribunal that could impose such a standard on American citizens. Unlike most other works concerned with the ge neses of American foreign policies, this study focuses on the leading historical actor in establishing and enforcing humanitarian norms in armed conflict: the American military profession.

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CHAPTER 1 JUST WAR DOCTRINE AND GENERAL ORDER NO. 100 Men who take up arms against one a nother in public war do not cease on this account to be moral beings, re sponsible to one another and to God. -General Order No. 100 During the third year of the Civil Wa r, the War Department issued the Instructions for the Government of the Ar mies of the United States in the Field -known officially as General Orders No. 100 and unofficially as the Lieber Code to the deployed forces of the United States Army. In a 1963 edition of the International Review of the Red Cross future World Court Justice Richard R. Baxter called this military order the "first modern codifica tion of the Law of War." 1 Nine years later, retired U.S. Army Brigadier General Telford Taylor, former Am erican chief prosecut or at the Nuremberg war crimes trials conducted under Allied Control Council Law No. 10, noted that General Orders No. 100 remained for half a century the official Army pronouncement on the subject, furnished much of the mate rial for the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, and today still commands attention as the germinal document for the codification of the laws of land warfare. 2 1 Instructions for the Government of Armi es of the United States in the Field (1863), originally published as General Orders No. 100 War Department, Adjutants General's Offi ce, 24 April 1863, cited hereafter as General Orders No. 100 Quote taken from the title of World Court Justice Richard R. Baxter's article on the origins of this document in The International Review of the Red Cross (April, 1963), no. 25, 171-189 and (May, 1963), no. 26, 235-250. 2 See Telford Taylors forward to Leon Friedmans ed. The Law of War: A Documentary History (New York: Random House, 1972), xvii xviii. 17

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18 The theory of war found in General Order No. 100 is distinct from the three statist philosophies aris ing in the period following the end of Europe's wars of religion: modern natural law theory; legal positivism; and political realism. The Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 not only ended the Wars of Reformation, but it is also the historical reference point for a model of international relations centered on the early modern European shibboleths of anti -interventionism and non-interference based on a theoretical equality of sovereignty between nation states. Unlike the major schools of thought associated with this Westphalian system, General Order No. 100 marked a return to traditional just war doctrine, a pre-modern and less Eurocentric philosophy of warfare that (1) viewed war as an e ssentially moral undertaking and (2) that placed affirmative humanitarian obligations on the conduct of a specialized group of individuals, the military. Origins of General Orders No. 100 Outside of Brussels at Waterloo in June 1815, the wars of the French Revolution came to an end. These wars marked the point of departure from the pre-modern to the modern in warfare. In the ge neral vicinity of the battle, at Ligny, was a soldier in the service of the King of Prussia was lying close to death from wounds he receive during the final allied final pursuit of Napoleon. Th is wounded soldier, a young Berliner named Francis Lieber, was the future drafter of U.S. Army General Order No. 100. 3 After recovering from his near mortal wounds, Lieber went on to unconventional warfare. His attempt to fight alongside Gr eek irregulars fighting the Ottoman Army was 3 The definitive biography of Francis Lieber rema ins, although somewhat dated, Frank Freidel's Francis Lieber (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1 977). Substantial biographical information is also available in John Catalano's Francis Lieber, Hermeneutics and Practical Reason (Lanham, University

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19 frustrated as a result of the treatment he received from his allies, a disillusioning experience that was shared by many other Eu ropean volunteers who fought in the Greek War of Independence. 4 Between his bouts of military serv ice, Lieber received a Doctor of Philosophy degree from the University of Jena and spent time in jail for liberal agitation against the increasingly conservative Prussian state. Immigrating to the United States in 1827, he became the Chair of Hist ory and Political Economy at South Carolina College, later relocating to Columbia College in New York because of his antipathy to slavery in 1857. He was eventually appointed to a professorship of history, political science, and law. Lieber became one of th e founding fathers of bot h American political science and, although he was never formally trained as a lawyer, American legal studies. His approach to law and politics were based upon the discipline of hermeneutics in the anti-idealistic and anti-rationalistic tradition of the German Protestant theologian Fredrich Schleirmacher and the German historian Wilhel m Dilthey. In fact, he was America's first leading exponent of cl assical hermeneutics. For Lieber, laws and policies are subject to internal interpretation because they are composed in human languages whose component parts, words, have meanings that vary according to time, place, and the subjective worldview, or weltanschauung of the original author(s). Lieber's political and legal hermeneutics resulted in a "pra ctical" ethic that contrasts sh arply with the extremes of both political realism -positing an ethical aporia that holds actions of a state, either foreign or domestic, as exis ting independent of any ethical or considerations -and Press of America, 2000), Ri chard Shelly Hartigan's Lieber's Code and the Law of War (Chicago: Precedent, 1983). 4 In 1821, Lieber's party of volunteers were not only refused the right to fight the Turks, they were robbed and denied sustenance before escaping their Greek allies turned captors. See Baxter, The International Review of the Red Cross (April 1963), n. 25, 172.

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20 legalism, dismissing the political at tributes and implications of law. 5 Lieber was a lifelong critic of the conservative regime in Prussia and was a life-long apologist for a revolutionary regime he adopted for his ow n, the United States. Liebers political principles developed, to a large extent, in opposition to Aristote lian principles of John C. Calhoun, the intellectual father of the Confederacy. In reply to the Calhouns conservative theory of 'concurrent democr acy,' Lieber develo ped the theory of 'institutional liberty' to explain the superiority of the American conception of nation to that of extreme revolutionary states such as the France, that he had fought against, or reactionary nation-states such as Prussia, that he f ought for and then rejected. 6 Reminiscent of Thomas Paine's role during the Revolutionary War, Lieber became the theoretic apologist of the Union cause during th e Civil War, even initiating the discussion that would result in the revolutionary amendm ents to the Constitution adopted at the end of the war. 7 By 1863, the Lincoln administration realized the Rules and Articles of War, then in use, were not appropriate for a conflict w ith an enemy whose sovereignty it refused to 5 Francis Lieber, Manual of Political Ethics (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co., 1838-39), reprinted 1876. Along with his Political Ethics, which served as a basic text for American law students in the until the end of the nineteenth century, Lieber's political and legal philosophy also found in On Civil Liberty and Self Government 3rd ed. (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co., 1877), Legal and Political Hermeneutics; or, Principles of Interpretation and Construction in Law and Politics 3rd ed., ed. William G. Hammond (St. Louis: F/H Thomas and Co., 1880). For a discussion of the relationship between Lieber's philosophical hermeneutics and his political ethics, see Catalano, Francis Lieber, Hermeneutics and Practical Reason For a definition of ethical aporia, see note 1. Judith Shkar defined legalism as "the ethical attitude that holds moral conduct to be a matter of rule followings, and the moral relationship to consist of duties and rights determined by rules. See Legalism: Laws, Morals, and Political Trials (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964), I. 6 Lieber, On Civil Liberty 270-346. While Calhoun's 'concurrent democracy' stressed the balance of power between minorities and majorities, Lieber's 'institu tional democracy' emphasized the balance between individual liberty and social / institutional responsibilities. 7 Francis Lieber, Amendments to the Constitution, Submitted to the Consideration of the American People (New York: Loyal Publication Society, 1865).

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21 recognize. As the eighteenthcentury Westphalian system left the responsibility for the implementation of humanitarian concerns, such as the treatment of en emy prisoners, to be worked out between theoretically equal sovereign nation states, the threat that the Confederacy would exploit human itarian practices under the cu stom and usages of war, such as granting prisoner of war status, as a defacto recognition of sovereignty was significant. To resolve this conflict, Li ncoln turned to Lieber to draft a "set of rules and definitions providing for most issues occu rring under the Law and usages of War." 8 The result was General Orders No. 100 9 As it formed the basis for similar codes in England, France, and even Prussia, it is usually viewed primarily as a legal instrument. The Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907 inco rporated the codes genera l provisions. However, it would be a grave mistake to view General Order No. 100 as only of legal significance. Like the Emancipation Proclamation a year befo re, it was a military order from a civilian Commander-in-Chief to military commanders conducting current military operations. Since the code remained in effect until it as superseded in 1917 by War Department Document No. 467, Rules of Land Warfare which was greatly influenced by the original, it should also be considered as a foundationa l document for the deve lopment of American military doctrine. 10 8 Letter, Francis Lieber to Henry W. Halleck (Nov. 13,1862). The Lieb er Halleck correspondence found in the Lieber Papers at the Hunti ngton Library, San Marino, California was reprinted in Richard Shelly Hartigan's Lieber's Code and the Laws of Law (Chicago: Precedent, 1983), 79-84. 9 See note 1. 10 War Department Document No. 467, Rules of Land Warfare (Washington: Office of the Chief of Staff, 1917). Richard R. Baxter argued that the this document "preserved much of Lieber's language." See Baxter, The International Review of the Red Cross, (May, 1963), n. 26, 249. This document was then superseded Department of Army, Field Manual 27-1, Rules of Land Warfare (Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1940) then to be replaced by the present edition of the manual of which Baxter himself was the primary author. See note 22.

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22 As the first officially promulgated doct rine that addressed the overall conduct of tactical and strategic operations "rather than specialized functions such as simple drill," General Order No. 100 constituted the U.S. military's first capstone doctrine. 11 Rather than being concerned with how to deploy tens of thousands of soldiers to march across open fields in increasingly costly battles, Lieber was concerned with why a state deploys soldiers in the first place. Next to Lieber, the most critical figure in the code's genesis was the General-in-Chief of the Uni on Armies, Henry Wager Halleck, who was responsible both for selecting Lieber and for heading the military commission tasked with reviewing and approving the code. Hallack was not only the author of the most contemporary of the privately pub lished tactical drill manuals utilized during the war, he was also the author of a major treatise on the laws of war, a work strongly influenced by Lieber's earlier writings. 12 Lieber's close collaboration with General Halleck testifies to General Order No. 100s relevance to the operational art of warfare, such as it existed during the Civil War. On June 24, 1863, Confederate Secretary of War, James A. Seddon, wrote a letter to Washington rejecting General Order No. 100. Seddon correctly detected the revolutionary tone of Liebers code, not only in regard to slavery, but Lieber's central concepts of military necessity and the right of intervention in the affairs of another sovereign state -or (in Se ddon's case) states claiming sove reignty. Seddon attacked the 11 For a discussion of foundational or "keystone" doctrine, see Introduction, n. 4. 12 See H.W. Henry Wagner Halleck Elements of Military Art And Science: or Course of Instruction in Strategy, Fortification, Tactics of Battles, ect., Embracing Actions of Staff, Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery, and Engineers adjusted to the use of Volunteers and Militia, 3d edition (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1862 and International Law; or, Rules regulating the Intercourse of States in Peace and War (New York: D. von Nostrand, 1861).

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23 code as an assertion of dogmas that were oppositional to the very foundational premises of Confederate authority. 13 Contrary to sequentialist logic, the ju stification for major wars changes during their course, especially when their course is exceptiona lly longer and bloodier than expected. General Order No. 100 represented the shift in Union war objectives from mere statist concern with th e preservation of the Union to a revolutionary war of emancipation. To establish a precedence to allow humanitarian pr otocols without the statist criteria that could be used in support of Confeder ate foreign policy objectives, Lieber was indeed guilty of resorting to the non-state centered concepts that were considered by Seddon as pre-modern. However, just as "war antedates the state," as noted by historian John Keegan, 14 efforts to establish norma tive codes for humanitarian concerns also antedate the state, at least th e modern post-Westphalian state. The articles of General Order No. 100 follow with remarkable consistency the central pre-modern principles of Augustinian just war doctrine. Augustinian Just War Doctrine The principle that there is an affirmative official duty to use force or coercion to assist others as predicated and conditioned by the principle of necessity (italics mine) was laid down by the end of the fifth century as the concept of justum bellum or just war. 15 The initial western institutional base fo r just war doctrine was as a moral teaching 13 See Letter from James A. Seddon, Confederate War Secretary, Richmond, to Robert Ould, Agent of Exchange, denouncing the: General Orders, no. 100, 24 June, 1863. Reprinted in Hartigan, Lieber's Code, 120-130. 14 Keegan, A History of Warfare 3. 15 Augustine to Boniface, Letter 189 (6). See Except for the City of God all citations from the writings of Augustine are from Augustine, Political Writing, eds. E.M. Atkins and R.J. Dodaro (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

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24 of the leading theologians of the Roman Catholic Church. This sponsorship by a recognized supra-national authority during the period of the doct rines greatest influence, gave just war doctrine a universal moral char acter. Later natural law theory, developing from just war tradition, would share this attr ibute of universality. However, because just war doctrine predates natural law theory a nd later legalist paradigms to include the Westphalian concept of the law of nations a nd the 'laws of war,' it remains conceptually distinct from the perennial debate between positive law and natural law theorists over the continuity or discontinuity be tween law and morality. Just war finds its classical foundation in the distinction between the usually interchangeable Latin words lex (law) and jus (justice). Marcus Tullius Cicero (106-43 bce) -the great civic ph ilosopher of republican Rome -in his infamous maxim, silent enim leges inters arma, argued that law is silenced in wa r in spite of his continuing to address wars in terms of being either just or unjust. 16 Saint Augustine of Hippo (354430), the pre-eminent theologian of western Christianitys first millennium, chose necessity rather than natural law as the moral foundation for any governmental use of force. The problem for Augustine in drafting th e central principles of traditional just war doctrine at the end of the fifth century was defining an ethical role for Christian officials in an empire now ruled by Christian, specifi cally Catholic, emperors. As the political triumph of Christianity had not brought a bout a change in mans basic nature, this Christian empire, like its pagan predecessor, required the use of force, or the threat thereof, to maintain itself. Augustines conundrum (italics mine) consisted of the fact 16 Cicero Pro Milone 4, 11. Although, following the Roman practice of bellum Romanum or unlimited war, Cicero placed no constraints of the co nduct of war, he distinguished a just war from a unjust war as one waged for the sole purpose of repelling or punishing aggression. See De officiis 1, 11.

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25 that there was no practical alte rnative to the requirement for individual Christians to serve in positions of coercive authority. Alt hough Augustine denied the self-defense argument for individuals, he argued for an affirmative obligation to defend others that superseded the pacifism associated with the early Church. 17 One of the Armys leading experts on ju st war doctrine defined it as the mean between the two extremes of absolu te pacifism and political realism. 18 The real demarcation between these categorical positi ons lies not in a disagreement over the nature of war, but the nature of peace. While just war doctr ine is effectively exemplified by the maxim of no peace without justice,' political realism favor s the peace even at expense of justice. Pacifism, on the ot her hand, denies any such opposition between peace and justice and posits that individuals, by avoiding the passive benefits of injustice, can work for justice as a means to gain peace. 19 Additionally, the pacifist sees war as the ultimate expression of injustice, while -for th e political realist -all claims of justice must defer to the interests of a sovereign state, usually his own. Just war answers pacifisms categorical rejection of force by de fending the use of force on the bases of the 17 For a general overview of St. Augustine and just war doctrine, see R.A. Markus, Saint Augustines Views on the Just War in The Church and War, ed. W.J. Shields (Oxford: Published for the Ecclesiastical Society by B. Blackwell, 1 983), 1-13, Paul Ramsey, The Just War According to St. Augustine in Just War Theory, ed. Jean Bethke Elshtain (New York: New York University Press, 1992), 8-22 and Simon Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), n 13, 9. 18 Class given by Colonel Glenn Weidner, U.S. Army, the last Commandant of the U.S. Army School of the Americas during Human Rights Week in January 1999 and February 2000. Weidner was formerly a student of preeminent just war theoretician, J. Bryan Hehir S.J. while a Fellow attending Harvards Center for International Affairs. 19 While leading pacifist theorists --such as Henry David Thoreau, Mahatma Mohandas Gandhi, and Martin Luther King Jr., argued that pacifi sm required an affirmative requirement for an individual to renounce and forswear the benefits received from unjust state ac tion or commerce with unjust states, such ethical consistency is less stressed among many contemporaries who claim to be pacifists.

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26 categorical value of human life, i.e. the victim's. 20 Augustine separates just war doctrine from both political realism and pacifism by pos iting that the desire for peace does not in itself entail any virtue: Just as every single human being de sires peace in the same way they desire happiness. The love of peace, therefore, is not a virtue. When those who are leading their nations sing the praise of peace they are sincere. They seek war to achieve their peace. Even violent criminals demand peace, if only for themselves. They do not love war; they aspire to an unjust peace. 21 Although not a systematic thinker in a ny modern sense, his positions on the proper conduct of those holding state author ity is directly related to the basic philosophical premises of his theology: (1) a selfless love encompassing the altruistic obligation to assist others for their own sake and (2) a human realism based upon what Hannah Arendt -one of his most famous twentieth century interpreters -calls a definite and obligatory e quality among all people." 22 Just as the desire for peace entailed no positive value in itself, love acco rding to Augustine could either be for good or evil and that is why acti ons responsibly undertaken for the welfare of others entailed a specific form of love, a selfless love or caritas. The recourse to the utilization of force in war was not based on a passive acknowledgmen t of the action of a properly Christian state or a simple license for Christian participat ion in the official actions of such a state. 20 See Richard J. Regan, S.J., Just War, Principles and Cases (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1996), 4-7. 21 Augustine City of God xix, 12. All citations from translation by Gerald G. Walsh, S.J. et al (New York: Image Books, 1958). 22 Hannah Arendts doctoral thesis on centrality of so cial obligations in Augustines ethical writings is contained in Love and Saint Augustine eds. Joanna V. Scott and Judith C. Stark, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 100.

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27 Rather, it was an affirmative requirement of love necessitating an intervention in the affairs of humanity. Following both the neo-Platonists and the Stoics, Augustine rejects the essentialism of Aristotle that legitimates war and even sl avery on the basis of supposed inferior or superior natural attri butes possessed by various human groups. The central premise of Aristotles Politics was that humans are naturally de stined from birth to either rule or be ruled, to be slave or free, and that war is justified as a means of determining the essential differences in humanity manifest ed in higher and lower degrees of virtue. 23 Unlike Aristotle, Augustine argued for a unity of a shared human nature based on a sinful disposition to place ones selfis h interests ahead of the inte rests of others. Augustines teachings on just war, like his theology in general, is based on the foundation of human equality. Rather than an equality base d on inherent human goodness, Augustine's human realism posited that humankind is inherently flawed and that this metaphysical truth accounts for both the existence of war and the re course to it. Consequently, the most that can be hoped is momentary respit es from conflicts, not their end. 24 However, despite his pessimistic assessment of human nature, Augustine considered the preservation and betterment of human society as mans highest calling in the secular realm and that a peace founded on justice -at leas t a relative justice -is possi ble and only after attaining such justice should a return to a state of peace be celebrated. 25 23 Aristotle Politics 1, 3-5. 24 Augustine City of God xv, 4. 25 Ibid., xv, 6 & xviii, 2.

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28 Augustine was concerned with Christians se rving the state in two basic functions: that of judge and that of a soldier. Duri ng the late Roman Empire both were occupations intrinsically related, the role of soldier ( miles ) being a more expansive than in contemporary societies where police and military functions are more formally separated. Unlike the latter natural law theorists and poli tical realists, Augustine spoke directly to the executioners of state authority rather than kings or statesmen. Living during the reign of Roman Emperor Theodosius who was championing Augustine's own version of Christianity, Augustine had the integrity to reject the views of many of his Catholic contemporaries who held that wars conducted in defense of such Christian states are inherently just and those conduc ted by pagan or heretical states inherently unjust. The commonly held belief attribut ing the holy war ideology of th e Crusades to Augustine is not supported in the texts of his writings. 26 The 1983 Pastoral Letter of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops, The Challenge of Peace, a document drafted under the guidance of the preeminent clerical just war authority, J. Bryan Hehir, S.J., affi rmed the centrality of St. Augustine to the establishment of just war doctrine which cons ists of eight fundamental principles or criteria. 27 Just Cause: The central tenet of trad itional just war doc trine is Augustines dictum that a war is justified only by the injustice of an aggressor. 28 Competent Authority: War is both a public and official act involving, to varying degrees, the act of judging the action of others or executing such a judgment under the orders of a superior official. 26 On the prohibition against self-defense, see Regan, Just War, 17. For a critique of the myth of Augustine as the progenitor of holy war ideology, see Markus, Saint Au gustines Views, 10-13. 27 National Conference of Catholic Bishops, The Challenge of Peace: Gods Promise and Our Response: A Pastoral Letter on War and Peace (Washington: United States Catholic Conference, 1983). 28 Augustine, City of God xix, 7.

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29 Comparative Justice: The claim of po ssessing a just cause in war is always relative and, consequently, part ies to a conflict need to limit their objectives to the relative gravity of the offense being redressed. Right Intention: While the justifica tion of war is aggression or an unjust peace, the objective of war is a just peace. Last Resort: Even when necessity dema nds it, war is a tragedy to be avoided at all costs, save justice. Probability of Success: Nothing is more obstructive to the establishment of a just peace than indecisive or ineffective military action. Proportionality: The unjust effects of wa rfare must be compensated for by the actual ends of justice attain ed by resorting to warfare. Discrimination: There is a dist inction between combatants and noncombatants and the intentiona l targeting of the latter is a criminal act, even in an otherwise just war. Although not in a systematic form, all these major principles of just war doctrine can be found in Augustine. This is because th e principles are not distinct, but inherently interconnected. For example, the principle of discrimination is already implied in the preceding criteria such as proportionality. The major just war theorist of the early Cold War period, Paul Ramsey, argued the justificati on of participation in conflict at the same time severely limits wars conduct. What justified, also limited." 29 This traditional separation of just war principles into ius ad bellum (justice before war) principles and jus in bello (justice during war) principles also overlaps. For example, in their pastoral letter, the Nationa l Conference of Catholic Bishops classified all just war principles except discrimination as ius ad bellum, with the central just war principle of proportionality as an overlapping theme between ius ad bellum and jus in bello principles. 30 To emphasize that ius ad bellum concerns are not set aside once a war is initiated, the leading secular theoretician on just war, Michael Walzer, delimits this 29 Paul Ramsey: The Just War: Force and Political Responsibility (Savage, Maryland: Littlefield Adams Quality Paperbacks, 1968, 1983 New York: Scribner, 1968), 143. 30 See The Challenge of Peace

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30 dualism as grammatical rather then linear; an unjust war can be fought justly and a just war and be fought unjustly, thereby becoming unjust. 31 This historical development of just war doctrine was more characterized by accommodation than innovation. Augustine and early just war theory is often associated primarily with ius ad bellum concerns and late just war theory with jus in bello concerns. 32 However, the innovations of ius ad bellum principle of just cause introduced by the Church in the eleventh century, such as indulgences for Cr usaders and absolution for the fallen find no basis in Augustinian just war doctrine. 33 Later just war theorists took great pains to avoid the appearance that they were adding anything to Augustine's conception of just war. Even St.Thomas Aquinas (1227-1274), the official philosopher 31 War is always judged twice, first in reference to the reasons states have for fighting, second with reference to the means they adopt. The first is adjectival: we say that a war is just or unjust. The second is adverbial: we say a war is being fought justly or unjustly. Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, (New York: Basic Books, 1977), 21. 32 This was the former view of th e author as found in Captain Lawr ence Rockwood, U.S. Army, Apology of a Buddhist Soldier Tricycle, A Buddhist Review (Spring 1996), 70-77. Others holding this position include William V. O'Brien, "The International Law of War as Related to the Western Just War Tradition" in Just War and Jihad eds, John Kelsey and James T. Johnson (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), 165, and Homes, "St. Augustine and the Just War Theory," 338. The opposite is the present view of the author and is also found in Paul Ramsey, War and the Christian Conscien ce, How Shall Modern War Be Conducted Justly? (Durham, N.C.: Duke Univ ersity Press, 1961). 33 The significant authoritative events in the eleventh century on the co nduct of war were the concept of the Truce of God, put forward in 1041 by the Ab bot Odilo of the great Benedictine motherhouse of Cluny, which called for a cessation of hostilities on Holy Days, the Peace of God, a call by the Council of Narbonne in 1054 to protect the Church and the poor from the effects of warfare, and finally the preaching of the First Crusade by Pope Urban II (also a Cluniac Monk) at the Council of Clermont on November 27, 1095. While the former two can be seen as an extension of jus in bello prohibitions. the later, with its arming of monks and priests, the indulgence giving total temporal pardon of all sin for participants (which would include war crimes committed ove r the course of the crusade), and a total absolution for those who died in battle finds no foundation in Augustinian just war tenets nor would they be authenticated by incorporation into the tenets of later just war theori sts. The slaughter of noncombatants for belonging to another faith (although the defacto crusader principle of discrimination between Christians and nonChristians was not always honored anyway) also finds no basis in writings of Augustus. Crimes against civilians was specifically a concern of later just war theorists writing in response to the sixteenth century Amerindian genocide In fact, Augustine discounted the entire ius ad bellum Cluniac rationale of Urban II, the protection religious pilgrims. Augustine, like the ear ly Greek Church, considered the act of pilgrimage to be of little importance. See Steven Runciman, A History of the Crusades, v. 1 (New York: Harper Tourchbooks, 1964), 39-40, 86. 107, and 108-109.

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31 of the Roman Catholic Church during its second millennium, admitted to only expanding on principles already found in Augustine. 34 Just as in the case of the initiatives fo llowing international communitys lack of response to the genocides in 1994 in Rwanda a nd earlier in Nazi occupied Europe, most major humanitarian initiatives are responses to historic humanitarian disasters. Such was the case for the later just war theorists who re sponded to the failure of European empires to uphold Augustinian ethics in their conquest and subsequent genocid al actions against Amerindian populations. The Debate of Valladolid in 1550 between the Dominican Bishop of Chiapas, Bartolom de Las Case s, and the Aristotelian scholar Gins de Seplveda marks the watershed between early and late just war theory. Based on his claim of the natural superior ity of Christian Europeans over the pagan Amerindians, Seplveda argued that the European conquest was just. Las Cases countered with his famous "Aristotle, farewell" response: The natural laws and rules and rights of men are common to all nations, Christian and gentile, and whatever their sect, law, state, color and condition, without any difference. 35 Continuing Las Cases' defense of Amer indian populations, a fellow Dominican, Francisco de Vitoria (1480-1520), and a Jesu it, Francisco Suarez (1548-1617), placed the jus in bello criteria of proportionality and discrimina tion at the center of their writings. 36 Vitoria, in his On the Law of War associated the attribution of innocence to noncombatants for the first time. Even so, he does not provide them an absolute 34 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae II-II. 35 Bartolom de Las Cases, quoted in Tzvetan Todorov's The Conquest of America: The Question of the Other (New York: Harper Perennial, 1992), 162. 36 Regan, Just War 17-18.

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32 dispensation against the effects of warfare, even allowing in nocents to be "enslaved as long as it is not "allowed to go beyond th e limits which the necessities of warfare demands." 37 The major differences between early and late r just war theory is one of emphasis. Just as nothing of Augustine is left out of Vitoria, nothing in Vitoria directly contradicts Augustine. As stated by Father Hehir S.J ., "the logic of th e argument from Augustine through Vitoria, Michael Walzer and Paul Ramsey has been the same." 38 This is primarily the result that each of the just wa r doctrines components parts suggests the rest of the doctrine. Just War Doctrine and Post-Westphalian Legalism With rise of the Spanish School of In ternational Law that included Vitoria, Suarez, and Hugo Grotius, the concept of the natural law was reintroduced into just war doctrine. Natural law was added to just war principles without replacing them. The major innovation of natural law theory was that it placed its empha sis of the statist conception of law over the more ethical c onception of justice. Although Aquinas is principally known as the father of modern natural law theory and for introducing the ideas of Aristotle in scholast ic philosophy, he did not apply ei ther to the concept of just war. Natural law was incorporated into just war theory by his disciple Francisco Vitoria. 39 Aquinas divided all law in to divine or eternal law or lex divina, natural law or 37 Francisco de Vitoria, On the Law of War 3, 3-4, v. 43. All citations from the works of Vitoria are from Vitoria, Political Writings, eds. Anthony Pagden and Jeremy Lawrence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 319. 38 Bryan J. Hehir S.J. Kosovo, A War of Values and the Values of War in America, v. 180 (May 15, 1999), 17, 7. 39 Vitoria, On the Law of War concl, v. 60.

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33 ius naturae, the law of nations or ius gentium, and positive law or lex humana. According to Aquinas, natural law is a rational a ppreciation of eternal law by human beings. 40 Natural Law was an opportune instrument for theorists respon ding to the failure of Christian Europeans to apply humanitarian norms in warfare w ith those who did not share their creed as was clearly demonstrated in both the conquest of the Americas and the Wars of Religion between Catholic and Protestant states culminating its bloodiest chapter, the Thirty Years War (1618-1648). Th is lack of reciprocity by Europeans in applying humanitarian norms to their enemie s of alien cultures and religions finds no bases in Augustine's actual teachings on war. Rather, it was established as precedent during the Crusades and found continued e xpression in the conduct of the Christian conquest of the Iberian Peninsula, the Protesta nt English conquest of Catholic Ireland, the destruction of the indigenous populations of the Americas, and, finally, the military and civil violence of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation. 41 In the seventeenth century, Hugo Gr otius (1583-1645), a Protestant who advocated religious toleration, in his On the Law of War and Peace attempted to secularize just war doctrine utilizing natural law theory. In addition to accepting the claims of Vitoria that the ju risdiction of natural law was universal, he added three major innovations: the relations of states could be judg ed as if they were individuals; crimes by nations can be addressed the same way as i ndividual crimes; and the reciprocity of malice among nations must be replaced by a reciprocity of trust. 42 40 Aquinas, Summa theologiae I-II. Grotius later combined the law of nations into positive law leaving the division of law into the categories: lex divina, lex naturalis, and lex humana. See Grotius in the "Prolegomena" to De Jure Belli ac Pacis. 41 In reference to Augustine application of just war criteria to non-Christians, see note 37. 42 Two authors that utilized these four principles to ch aracterize Grotius' contribution to the laws of warfare include Robert A. Kahn, "The Law of Nations and the Conduct of War in the Early Times of the Standing

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34 Grotius' optimistic view of the human condition contrasts with both Augustinian human realism and the political realism of Grotius' contemporary, Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679). Hobbes' infamous work, Leviathan, comprised a counter to optimistic premises of Grotian natural law that conti nues to be posited by legal positivists and political realists to the present. 43 As a result of viewing war -rather than God's or man's reason -as the true basis of natural law that results in a human existence where "life is solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short," H obbes preached an absolute preference for peace based an absolute deference to will of a sovereign ruler of a nation state. 44 According to Hobbes, human law is simply a authoritative enactment based upon the "coercive power, to compel equally to the perf ormance" of obligations by individuals to a sovereign who does not in turn answer to other sovereigns, their subjects, or any universal law(s) ascribed to a higher power. 45 For all their differences, both Grotius and Hobbes influenced and were influenced by the Westphalian statist centered virtues of non-intervention in interstate affairs and non-interference. Writing primarily for states men rather than for soldiers, Grotius and Hobbes took different aspects inherent in Augustinian just war theory: justice, in case of the former, and a realistic view of human natu re in the later. Successor theorists in the Westphalian tradition such as Corneliu s van Bynkershoek (1673-1743), Emmeric de Vattel (1714-1767), and Georg Friedric h von Martins (1756-1821), in various Army" in Journal of Politics, (Feb. 1944) vol. 6, no. 1, 87 and Cornelis van Vollenhoven, Grotius and Geneva (Leyden: Boekhandle en drukkerij voorheen E.J. Brill, 1926), 13-16. 43 See note 2. 44 Hobbes, Leviathan bk. i, chap. xiii & xiv. 45 Ibid., bk i. chap xv.

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35 combinations, blended the natural law concep ts of Grotius with the legal positivism and political realism of Hobbes while maintaining the statism of both. 46 Grotius is distinct from Hobbes in that he posited a universal maxim for humanitarian norms that would be binding on states regardless of their religious or ideological leaning. It is ironic that the modern concept of natural la w, originating partly as a device to deal with Europeans failure to act on the basis on hu manitarian reciprocity in dealing with populations th at they considered alien, is used contemporaneously to justify lack of action by western powers in de aling with humanitarian conflicts, to include non-interference in genocides, in non-western nations. This was exemplified in the 1990s when the western statist emphasis non-interfer ence in the internal affairs of sovereign states was cited most often in reference to humanitarian interventions in nations whose civilization norms could be portrayed not shar ing western legalist traditions. Anticipating the contemporary debate on whether uni versal human rights norms are based on culturally specific western di scourse on individual rights vis--vis norms emphasizing social obligations associated with many non-western cultures, the universality of the Grotian emphasis on passive legalisms is certainly debatable. In the context of understandable distrust of the religious sanctions so evident in the bloody conflicts of his time, Grotius sought a secular universal norm th at would transcend the religious disputes of his time. Grotius utilized the passive injunction of the pagan Roman Emperor Septimius Severus (146-211), Do not to another what you do not wish to be done to you rather than the affirmative injuncti on of the golden rule found in Matthew 7-12, 46 Kahn, "Law of Nations" 90-100.

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36 Always treat others as you w ould like them to treat you." 47 In contrast to religiously derived affirmative obligations placed upon comb atants in Augustinian just war doctrine, Grotius categorical maxim is a passive proscr iption of actions that cause harm to others, a passivity that would become idiosyncratic to the western legalistic approach to human rights. In 1758, the Swiss scholar, Emerich de Vattel, published his encyclopedic Droit des gens (1758; tr. Law of Nations, 1760). Vattel emphasized con cepts that were directly oppositional to those posited by Augustinian just war doctrine: the concepts of neutrality and of voluntary state action. Neutrality is beli ef that a state or institution can maintain an unprejudiced relationship to all parties to the co nflict. His concept of the voluntary law of nations left the final decision on whether to appl y humanitarian norms at the discretion of states whose sovere ignty Vattel considered absolute. 48 This Grotian natural law tradition of passi ve obligations reache d it apex in the categorical imperative of the eighteenth century German idealist philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724-1804): Act always in such a manne r that the immediate motive or maxim of thy will may become a universal rule in a obligatory legislation for all intelligent beings. 49 Rather than comprising a universal norm shared across time and space, the passivity of ethical imperatives of both Kant and Grotius have been characterized as 47 Grotius cited by Arthur Schopenhauer, On the Basis of Morality trans. E.F.J. Payne (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1995), n. 19, 70. 48 Emerich de Vattel, Le droit des gens. trans/ed. Joseph Chitty, ( Philadelphia: T. & J.W. Johnson & Co., 1879), bk. ii, art. 150 and bk. iii, art. 103. 49 As quoted by Lieber, Political Ethics, 56.

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37 unique to modern European philosophical and religious thought. 50 In contrast, just war doctrine is based on an affirmative obligati on for the care and protection of others acknowledged in various forms by most of the major world religions. Additionally, specific humanitarian norms placed upon combatants as individuals, similar to those articulated by Augustine, are also found in the scriptural and classi cal ethical codes of almost every major world culture. While the respective weights placed on ius ad bellum versus jus in bello vary from society to society, these two basic components of the early just war doctrine are not unique to Augustine, Christianity, or the West. However, the western emphasis on the ius ad bellum is certainly in part due to greater intere st of the post Westphalian theorists, whether natural law or positivists, in the actions of rulers and statesmen who initiate conflicts ov er the actions of soldiers who conduct them. By contrast, Islamic law stresses the conduct of war and th e mitigation of its harmful consequences" rather than the just or unjust causes of wars ; additionally, many Asian and African religious and ethical codes also emphasize jus in bellum ethics in the conduct of war. 51 50 This was the position of a critic of both Kants of Grotius ethics, the nineteenth century German philosopher, Arthur Schopenhauer who countered with universal ethic basic the natural foundation of human interconnectedness, As the foremost advocate integrating ancient Indian and modern philosophy, he posited what he considered a truly universal ethic whic h mandated an affirmative intervention in the affairs as found in the globally shared teaching of Vedic Hinduism, Budd hism, and early Christianity. Schopenhauer tried to further universalize Kants passive imperative of Neminem laede (Injure no one) into a affirmtaive imperative of Neminem laude immo omnes, quantum potes, iava (Injure no one, on the contrary, help everyone as much as you can). See On the Basis of Morality, 70. 51 For just war elements in Islamic sources, see Said El-Dakkak, International Humanitarian Law Lies Between the Islamic Concept and Positive International Law International Review of the Red Cross (1990) p. 101-116. For Buddhist sources: see Rockwood, Apology of a Buddhist Soldier, 70-77. Other non-western sources -such as Hindu texts such as the Mahabharat and Ramaajan, the ethical guidelines of the Hindu Kshatria warrior cast e, Sun Tzus Chinese classic The Art of War and several African sacred traditions place more on the conduct of war and the m itigation of its harmful consequences" rather than the just or unjust causes of wars. A review of the 1988 1994 volumes of International Review of the Red Cross on the international origins of humanitarian law reveals that the emphasis on is ad bellum is not a universal characteristic of the discussion of the morality and the ethics of violence in war. See especially Professor L. R. Pennas "Written and Customary Provision Relating to the Conduct of Hostilities and Treatment of Victims of Armed Conflict in Ancient In dia," (1989) and Mutoy Mu bialas "African States and the Promotion of Humanitarian Principles" (1989).

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38 In the west, war is a political action of the state. From Aristotle to Lieber, the intellectual analysis of warfare is usually re lated to the conception of the state holds in the worldview of the analyst. Georg Fredrich Hegel, the eminent statist philosopher of the Nineteenth Century, considered the state as a godlike manifestation of the ethical force of history. 52 Lieber, in his Political Ethics, returned to a view of the state as a living or organic institution in that it is composed of living human beings that was shared by Augustine. For both Lieber and Augustine, th e existence of a stat e always involves a certain level of societal consensus on moral a nd ideological principles that influence the means a given state utilizes to achieve it ends including war. Cons idering this shared instrumentalist understanding of the nature of the state and their antipathy to antiAristotelian views on ethics especially on slavery, the theoretical congruence on normative principles in warfare between Lieber and Augustine -although writing a millennium apart -is not so surprising. 53 The perennial debate between proponents of natural law and legal positivism has not only polarized the discussion of human itarian norms in war over the last three centuries, it underpins the current debate over the unive rsality of human rights in general. The Westphalian emphasis on law over justice pl ays into the hands of the advocates of Western exceptionalism who emphasize the West versus East dichotomies to include the western emphasis on (1) individual rights over communitarian ob ligations and (2) 52 Hegels defined the state as the concrete manifesta tion of the ethical whole and the essential being, the unity of the subjective will and the universal. See Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, trans. H.B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer sity Press, 1975; reprint 1984), 93. 53 For Augustine and other classical writers, the ba sic political unity was the city. The source of blessedness is not one thing for a human being and another for a city: a city is indeed nothing other than a like-minded mass of human beings. See Augustine to Macedonis, Letter 155. Fo r Lieber, the state is a society composed of those who have the same interest and strive unitedly for it. See Political Ethics, 147.

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39 political and civil rights over so cial, cultural, and economic rights. 54 Critics of the concept of universal norms, such as Samuel P. Huntington, have claimed that the concept of natural law, as one of the unique component s of "the rule of law," is one of the "distinguishing characteristics of Western so ciety" and that to apply it to other civilizations is a "universalist pretension. 55 This East-West dichotomy in human rights norms is a false one. Augustinian just war doctrin e, in that it is free of either form of Western legalism (either natural or positive) and its emphasis on obligations rather than rights is far more universal than the political legacy of Europe's Westphalian system. One does not have to look to other cu ltures and times to find alternatives to Westphalian legalism that follow the basic assu mptions of Augustinian just war doctrine. The Protestant theologian Reinhold Niebuhr also argued in favor of Augustinian realism over natural law. Associating the Aristote lian need to find a historical order that conforms to nature, a need that always is compromised by the forces of self-interest, Niebuhr maintained that the "supposed sanct ities of the law" are always tainted by ideology. Although he was considered the sp iritual father of Co ld War era political realism, he also differentiated his realism from the vulgar form of political realism of those who "see only their own interest and fail ing thereby to do justice to their interest where they are involved in the with the interest of others." 56 Although usually associated 54 For discussion of the East v. West dichotomy in the debate on human rights universalism, see Daniel A. Bell, East Meets West: Human Rights and Democracy in East Asia (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), Thomas M. Frick, "Are Human Rights Universal" in Foreign Affairs (Jan/Feb 2001) vol. 80, no. 1, 191-204, and Peter R. Baehr, "Controversies in the Current International Human Rights Debate" in Human Rights Review (Oct-Dec 2000), vol. 2, no. 1, 7-32. 55 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 69-70, 187. 56 Niebuhr, "Augustine's Political R ealism" 132, 134. Niebuhr reached "conclusions about the propriety of war not substantially different from those of traditional just war theorists." See Regan, Just War, 18.

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40 with the views of Catholic theologians, just war doctrine finds other non-Catholic parallels in the teachings on ethics of viol ence and war as found -for example -in the teaching of such non-Catholic forums as the National Council of Churches. 57 Just War Criteria and General Order No. 100 Richard R. Baxter, who was the author of the current successor document of General Orders No. 100 the current Department of Army, Field Manual 27-1, The Law of Armed Conflict, 58 stated that the Lieber Code was "l ittle more than an amplification of the ideas Lieber expressed twenty-five years before. 59 In his 1838-39 Manual of Political Ethics Lieber succinctly summarized tr aditional just war doctrine: A war, to be justified, must be undert aken on just grounds-that is, to repel or avert wrongful force, or to establis h a right; must be th e last resort--that is, after all other means of reparation are unavailable or have miscarried; it must be necessary--that is, the evil to be addressed should be a great one; and it must be wise--that is, there must be reasonable prospect of obtaining reparation, or the averting of the ev il, and the acquies cence in the evil must be greater than th e evils of the contest. 60 Even though Lieber, as lay leader of Anglican Church in America, would certainly have been aware of Augustine's wr iting he probably did not draw directly on Augustine in either his Manual of Political Ethics or in drafting General Order No. 100. However, his choice of international law sources indicates the aspects of the laws of war he accepted and those he did not. He was most critical of Vattel; he ignored Hobbes, and 57 For Just war doctrine and Protestant denominations, see Regan, Just War 19. 58 Department of the Army, Field Manual 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare (Washington D.C., Government Printing Office, 1 Mar. 1954) hereinafter FM 27-10. 59 Baxter, The International Review of the Red Cross (April, 1963), n. 25, 176. 60 Lieber, Political Ethics, 446.

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41 he acknowledged Kant. 61 Although the term 'just war' does not appear in Lieber's code, the substance of its 147 articles falls substant ially within the eight traditional just war principles. In that it avoids the natural la w tenets of late just war theorists and post Westphalian legalists, the articles of General Order No. 100 are more evocative of the affirmative obligations of human realism of early or Augustinian just war doctrine. Just Cause The Augustinian requirement that the war must be a response to injustice or aggression is not modified by the existence of the modern territorial state. While General Order No. 100 posits that the object of war lies be yond war in the realm of the political, the political end must be just: Article 30: Ever since the form ation and coexistence of modern nations, and ever since wars have beco me great national wars, as come to be acknowledged not for its own end, but means to attain great ends of state, or to consist in defens e against wrong; and no conventional restriction of the modes adapted to injure the enemy is any longer admitted; but the law of war imposes many limitations and restrictions on principles of justice, faith, and honor. Article 68: Modern wars are not internecine wars, in which the killing of the enemy is the object. Th e destruction of the enemy in modern, and, indeed, modern war itself, are m eans to obtain that object of the belligerent which lies beyond the war. Like Grotius, Lieber goes beyond Augustine's requirement that a just peace is war's object in claiming that peace is the normal condition of manki nd and "war is the exception." 62 However, there are some injustices that cannot be tolerated either for 61 Works cited by Lieber include Halleck's International Law as well as Grotius, Bymkershoek, Pufendorf, von Martins amongst many others less known authors on the Laws of War. See Baxter, International Review of the Red Cross, no. 26, 224. 62 "Peace is their normal condition, war is the exception. The ultimate object of all modern wars is a renews state of peace," General Order No. 100 Article 29. Grotius wrote: war is undertaken for the sake of peace," De Jure Belli ac Pacis bk. i, chap. 1.

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42 raison d' tat or tolerated in the name of peace; one such injustice, for Lieber, was slavery. Lieber must have known that his c ode's claim that "The law of nature and nations has never acknowledged it (slavery)" contradicted natural law theorists of both the Spanish School of Internati onal Law, such as Vitoria, and the notion of natural law posited by Aristotle. 63 As a resident of antebellum S outh Carolina for two decades, his code's declaratory statement on the instit ution of slavery bypassed the contemporary debate about the character of slavery. Lieb er was well acquainted with the arguments made by his contemporary intellectual rival, John C. Calhoun, to de fend the institution on the basis of Aristotelian natural law. A lthough -as evidenced by his earlier works and lectures -no one was better qualified to discuss the precedence, legal or otherwise, on the major causative issue of the American Civil War, General Order No. 100 simply established the 'just cause' of the Union cause, th e end of the slave system in the South, as self-evident. In Lieber's Political Ethics he wrote, "the state is an institution for a distinct moral end." 64 In the context of both his life's work and his code's reference to the American Civil War, the "great ends of stat e" are never morally neutral. Competent Authority Grotius, like Hobbes, spoke of authority in absolute terms of a sovereign power, whose independent actions are not subject to any other power. 65 Lieber's writings on war are dominated by a pre-Westphalian emphasis on those who execute authority rather than 63 For Vitoria's defense of limited slavery, wee note 47 For Aristotle's unlimited defense of slavery, see note 34. 64 Lieber, Political Ethics, 81. 65 Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis Book I, chap. 2, article vii.

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43 the rights and prerogatives of rulers who were more than likely to be the absolute monarchs Lieber so despise d. Lieber, like Augustine, real ized soldiers often err in correctly determining who has competent au thority over them, the result being a major proximate cause of the wars of their times Much of Augustines views on the military profession are derived from his corresponde nce with Boniface, a renegade Roman general, in which Augustine counseled to return to a proper a llegiance with Rome. 66 Lieber watched as thousands of soldiers fo llowed key American military leaders in taking up arms against the United States by bestow ing their allegiance to an authority the Confederacy -whose competence Lieber challe nged. Tragically for Lieber, one of the soldiers who made this mistake in judgme nt was his own son who died in the great historical referendum on constitutional alle giance known as the American Civil War. One of the major acts of the wartime U.S. Congress was to ensure that such a bloody referendum would never be repeated. During the course of the war, legislation was passed that clearly defined and prioritized th e criteria that soldiers must utilize in determining proper competent authority. The oath of office that soldiers take upon entering military service -pledging allegian ce to the Constitution, the President, and their appointed military leadership, in that pr ecise order -remains in use to this day. 67 For Augustine, soldiers were related to th e civil judges of his day in that they acted, not as individuals, but upon authority. Individually, as a flawed human being, a judge or soldier can at best be an imperfect in strument of justice. Although it is never a 66 Augustine wrote to the renadage Boniface that if Roman Empire provides you with goods things, even if they are ephemeral and earthly (for it is an earthly, not an heavenly, institution and can only provide what is in its power); if then it has bestowed good things upon you, do not return evil for good. See Augustine to Boniface, Letter 220 (8). 67 Edward M. Coffman, The Army Officer and the Constitution, Parameters (September 1987), 2-12.

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44 personal act, the unavoidable exercise of th e coercive prerogatives of government is always contaminated by personal hypocrisy. Therefore, according to Augustine, all officials are faced with the incongruity of exercising competent, but not credible, authority. 68 Although their official status made soldiers and judges distinct from other human beings, Augustine admonished his fellow civilians that they "must not think that no one who serves as a soldier, using ar ms for warfare, can be acceptable to God." 69 For both Lieber and Augustine, soldiers differed from murderers not merely because their acts were official. Official acts also had to be competent; specifically, they had to be competent in integrating moral and ethical concerns of justice into a professional field of expertise. Lieber went further than Augustine in approving a special sanction for those under arms for acts that w ould be criminal or sinful if based on personal motivation; he held that soldiers -owing to the trust bestowed upon them -must adhere to even higher ethical and moral standards than civilian s. In article four, discussing martial law, Lieber posited that the "principles of justice, honor, and humanity-virtues adorning a soldier even more than other men, for the very reason that he possesses the power of his arms against the unarmed. For both Lieber and Augustine, soldiers were certainly not passive beings simply following someone elses orders; rather, a soldiers competence should always be the result of an active a nd properly understood obligation. 68 See Augustine, Letter to Macedonis (a Catholic official), Letter 153. Augustines political writing are peppered with supplications to Christians officials to meditate on their own imperfection in context of their judgment of others by constant referrals to the Gospel passage in which Jesus cautions the would be executioners of the woman caught in adultery: If any of you are without sin, let him be the first to cast a stone at her See Augustine, Commentary on the gospel of John, 33, and On the feast of St. Lawrence, Sermon 302, (7). 69 Augustine to Boniface, Letter 189 (4)

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45 By Lieber and Augustine plac ing military duties in an affirmative character (italics mine) which compels action rather than inaction, the soldier -as a tool of the state -is guilty of a double injustice if the inaction leads to the harm of those he or she is bound to defend. Therefore, when soldiers commit crimes in the direct performance of their military duties, they are always crimes of omission rather than commission. Such crimes of omission are more grie vous than crimes of commission. 70 Comparative Justice The most problematic aspect of the legali stic approach to the establishment of enforceable humanitarian norms in warfare is that of the application of guilt to collective entities. Augustinian just war doctrine does not, as some have claimed, posit that only one combatant can lay total clai m to virtuous intent or conduct. 71 Virtue and guilt, as determined by imperfect human judges, are im perfectly determined. Unlike Vattel, who argued that the justice of opposing combatants are to "be considered as two individuals disputing on the truth of a pr oposition; and it is impossible that two contrary sentiments should be true at the same time," neither the Augustine nor Lieber held to either a simplistic or absolutist attribution of ju stice between the opposi ng sides of a conflict. 72 On June 1, 498, the pagan citizens of the North African own of Calama engaged in a anti-Christian riot that led to the loss of life. Nectarius, a di stinguished pagan Roman official wrote to Augustine asking him to intercede for his fellow townsmen who he 70 Arthur Schopenhauer wrote that there are actions whose mere omission is a wrong, and they are called duties. He coined the term doppelte Ungerechtigkeit or double injustice to describe the non-fulfillment of a obligation that leads to th e injury of another person. See On the Basis of Morality 156. 71 Robert L. Homes, "St. Augustine and the Just War Theory" in The Augustinian Tradition, ed. Gareth B. Matthews (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 336. 72 Vattel, Law of Nations, bk. iii, art. 39.

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46 claimed were not responsible for the act. A ugustine counseled his petitioner that he was doing his fellow citizens a disse rvice by not acknowledging that there are many levels in which individuals are guilty for collective ac ts and that it might not be possible to distinguish the innocent from the guilty out of the whole city, but only the less guilty from the more guilty. Augustine provided three levels of indi vidual complicity in collective acts: those who lack ed the offer to help to th e victims out of fear were guilty of only a minor sin; those who actually committed them are implicated more deeply; and those who instigated them most deeply of all. 73 Like Augustine, Lieber did not hold that a just cause should manifest itself as a crusade against evildoers (italics mine) or against co llective entities comprised of individuals who were equally guilty for the injustices perpetrated by the collective and, therefore, liable to uniform tr eatment by the opposing forces. In his code, no loyal citizen of the Confederacy was an inno cent entitled to be totally spared from the consequences of the war. 74 General Order No. 100 places all enemy citizens into two major categories: unarmed citizens and armed citizens. Th e former subdivided further into seven subdivisions, each with separate protectio ns accorded to their life and property: 1. Private Citizens. Noncombatants servi ng in no official capacity are protected from being murdered, enslaved, or carried off to distant parts. (article 22) 2. Magistrates and Civil Officers. Comm anding generals are allowed to force oaths of temporary allegiance or to expel those who refuse. (article 23) 3. Slaves. Those formally held in bond age are immediately entitled to the rights and privileges of a freeman. (Article 43) 4. Noncombatants Accompanying an Army. Commanders are permitted to confine and process as prisone rs of war. (Article 50) 73 Augustine to Nectariu s, Letter 91 (9). 74 General Order No. 100, art. 21.

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47 5. Heads of State and Diplomatic Agents. Unless previously granted safe passage, they are to be treated as prisoners of war. (Article 50) 6. Spies. All espionage is punish able by death. (Article 88) 7. Guides. Their treatment varies from no punishment for those forced into service to death for those intentionall y misleading a force. (Articles 94-97) General Order No. 100 subdivides enemy combatants into nineteen distinct categories, each entailing specific treatment upon capture: 1. Prisoners of War. Soldiers taken prisoner, who have committed no otherwise unlawful acts, are not subject to punis hment for being a public enemy, nor is any revenge (to be) wrecked upon him by the intentional infliction of any suffering, or disgrace, by cruel impris onment, want of food, by mutilations, death, or any other barb arity. (Article 56) 2. Deserters. Former soldiers of the U.S. Army, taken in the service of the Confederacy, are to be put to death. (Article 48) 3. Chaplains and Medical Staff. May be tr eated as prisoners of war either by a commanders determination of necess ity or their own voluntary request. (Article 53) 4. Hostages. Although rarely used in mode rn war, they are to be treated as prisoners of war. (Article 55) 5. Criminals. Enemy soldiers who have committed crimes against their own forces or people, before being cap tured, can be punished by their own authorities. (Article 59) 6. Deniers of Quarter. Those have failed to give others quarter are to be denied quarter in turn. (Articles 61-62) 7. Soldiers Captured in the Uniform of Th eir Enemy. Like spies, such soldiers are also given no quarter. (Articles 63 & 83) 8. Outposts, sentinels, and pickets. Unle ss it is determined of military necessity, opportunistic firing upon their posit ion is prohibited. (Article 69) 9. Users of Poison. Offenders are to be put to death. (Article 70) 10. Assaulters of the Injured: Offenders are to be put to death. (Article 70)

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48 11. Escapees. While firing upon prisoners in the process of escape is permitted, the attempt is not a crime unless it is part of a general conspi racy. (Article 77) 12. Partisans. Defines them as soldiers armed and wearing the uniform of their army, but detached from the main body of the enemy, they are to be treated as prisoners of war. (Article 81) 13. Brigands and Pirates. Soldiers committing acts of private violence are subject to death. (Article 82) 14. Irregulars not wearing uniforms. Armed civilians or insurrectionists, who kill, steal, or destroy infrastructure or mate rials of the occupying are not entitles to be treated as prisoners of war. (Articles 84-85) 15. War Traitor. Non-enemy personal w ho provide information to the enemy become an enemy who may be puni shed by death. (Articles 89-91). 16. Messengers. If in uniform, they are to be treated as prisoners of war. (Article 99) 17. Bearers of a flags of truce. They are to be cautiously admitted. If admitted under false pretenses, they are to be treated as spies. (Articles 104-109) 18. Breakers of Parole. Released prison ers of war, who have violated their voluntary pledge not to engage in future acts of warfare, can be put to death upon recapture. (Article 124) 19. Officers / non-commissioned officers. They are allowed special honors and treatment. (Articles 73 & 127) General Order No. 100, as it applied humanitarian c onsiderations to an enemy whose legitimacy was not recognized by th e United States was an exercise of comparative justice in its entirety. Even t hough the final article (art icle 157) defined the armed or unarmed resistance by citizens of the United States against the lawful movements of their troops as treason. Nevertheless, all enem y citizens -whether combatants or noncombatants -were entitled to certain norms of humanitarian treatment in spite of being expected to bear a higher burden of the war than manifestly loyal citizens. (Article 156).

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49 As with Augustinian just war doctrine, the natural law association of noncombatency with legal innocence is absent from General Order No. 100. Additionally, the sloppy attribution of collectiv e guilt, as defined as holding individuals responsible for the collective actions of organizations or in stitutions by mere me mbership without any evidence of an individual act, is also absent. Right Intention While the justification of war is aggre ssion or an unjust peace, for Augustine the objective of war is a just peace. Peace ought to be what you want, war only what necessity demands. 75 The hackneyed phrase, the end justifies the means, has never been an accurate description of just war doctr ine. Rather, just ends justify proportional means. Just war doctrine predates the legalist debate between naturalism and positivism; it also predates the philosophical debate between ethical normativism and ethical consequentialism. Normative, or deontological ethics, is the theory that the efficacy of moral action in reference to formal rules or norms of conduct. Consequentialist or teleological ethical theories stress that it is consequences rather than intentions that determines the correctness of any given action. Both Augustine and Lieber were seminal ethical theorists who argued that actions ar e only moral when both intention and result are integrated. 76 75 Augustine to Boniface, Letter 189 (6) 76 For both Augustine and Lieber, the basi s for ethical action is a selfless love (Augustine, see note 31) or the possession of sympathy or fellow feelings for others (Lieber, see Political Ethics, 20) that must be expressed by a constructive engagement with the world as its is rather than as it ought to be. While Lieber admired the universal tone of Kants categorical imperative, he dismissed intentionalism. passivity, and otherworldliness of Kants ethics when he wrote "Law s and institutions are nothing more than dead forms of words, unless they operate." See Lieber, Political Ethics, 78.

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50 Echoing Augustine, Lieber argued, wars ar e not internecine wars, in which the destruction of the enemy is the object; rather war is a means to obtain that object of the belligerent which lies beyond the war.(Article 68) A just wa r entered into by competent authority for a just cause can st ill be fought with unjust intent by either the leadership or the actual participants of a conflict. Soldiers cannot see into the hearts of their leaders. Sometimes, that may be fortunate. However, so ldiers can never categorically defer their consciences to higher authority. Except for cr iminal behavior, a soldiers acts on his (or her) intentions when he is armed by a sove reign government and ta kes a soldiers oath of fidelity, he (then) is a be lligerent, his killing, wounding, or other warlike acts are not individual crimes or offenses.(Article 57) Even if the decision for the soldier to enlist is often coerced, soldiers are par tially responsible for justice or injustice of the cause for which they fight at the time they first don th eir uniforms. Just as the electorate is accountable for the future actions of politicia ns they supported at the time they dropped their ballots, soldiers are responsible, as fa r as their understanding and knowledge allows, for historical justice or injustice of the m ilitary institution they are joining. Only when soldiers (or the electorate) obtain new information indicating criminality on the part of those whose authority they have previously va lidated, can they claim to be faced with a new ethical decision. 77 Consequently, soldiers must proceed not with blind faith, but with a common sense and informed faith that their superiors are acting according to the 77 The famous case of Yolanda Huet-Vaughn, a U.S. Army Reserve captain who served eight months in prison for refusing to serve in the gulf war, involved a soldier who claimed to refuse to be deployed on the basis of refusing to serve in an unjust war. Her critics emphasized that she accepted a commission and serving actively in the reserves during a period in which the U.S. military was involved in similar operations, albeit on a lesser scale. The Armys Co urt of Military Review finally overturned her conviction, ruling that she was denied the opportunity at her trial to present evidence that the gulf war was specifically illegal and immoral. See Colman McCarthy, Anti-War Doctor Under Fire in The Washington Post (November 30, 1993), Z12.

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51 stated political and ethical ends of the wa r. Unfortunately, history is replete with examples of wars lost because national and military leaders who have betrayed this trust have employed military means incongruent with the political and moral ends sought. Last Resort Even when necessity demands it, war is a tr agedy to be avoided at all costs, save justice. Augustine still demanded that no matte r how just the cause, those in positions of authority must begin by bew ailing the necessity he is under of waging wars, even just wars. 78 Augustine naturally argued that it is better to achieve justice without recourse to war. However, greater glory is still mer ited by not killing men with swords, but war with words, and acquiring or achieving p eace not through war but through peace itself. 79 Augustine reflected the position found in Sun Tzus Chinese classic, written down nine hundred years before: To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill. 80 However, if a resort to war is justified, it mu st be successful. Just as all states do not exist in a Westphalian equality, al l wars are not equal. If th e preferred level of war is no war at all, it follows that larger wars require more justification than more limited wars. It is clear that the Confederacy, with less material and human resources, would have benefited if both sides resorted to a mo re limited war. The Civil War was fought under the conflicting legacy of two previous wars: the American War of Independence and the Wars of the French Revolution. At the outbreak of the Civil War, the Confederacy styled itself as fighting th e second phase of the American War of 78 Ibid., xix, 7. 79 Augustine to Darius Letter 229 (2). 80 Sun Tzu, The Art of War trans. Samuel B. Griffith (London: Oxford University Press, 1963, reprint 1971), 76.

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52 Independence; the United States styled itself as fighting a limited statist, postWestphalian war for the preservation of the Union. Unlike the American Revolution, the French Revolution introduced not only warfare that was revolutionary in its ends, but in the level of warfare. General Order No. 100 was a testament to the new level of war that the United States government in 1863 was goi ng to resort to, a re volutionary level of war. For that reason, Liebers code was categorically rejected by the Confed eracy. In limited wars, as in the case of the campaigns of King Freder ick the Great of Prussia, the genius of a general utilizing maneuver could win out over an enemy with greater resources or, in the case of wars for independence, belligerent forc es could press the war past the threshold of cost an enemy was willing to bear. Unfortuna tely for the South, no amount of battlefield genius or even the greater human losses suffered by the other side would overcome the political and moral determination of the side with greater material and human resources to resort to more unlimited war. 81 In his June 24, 1863 letter to Washington rejecting General Order No. 100, Confederate Secretary of War James A. Seddon claimed Lieber's Code was an opportunistic justification by the United States for its resorting to a level and conduct of war he found unacceptable. Seddon could not ha ve failed to appreciate the timing of its release of General Order No. 100 (starting in May 1863), just as Lincoln was issuing a plan for the southern reconstruction based on the end of slavery and as U.S. Grant was deploying for his forces for his victory at Vicksburg (May 19-July 4) leading to the 81 In future wars, the United States Army would continue to engage in wars with the advantage of greater material resources than its adversaries, but not always with the moral determination to accept the costs that resorting to war entails. That was not the case for the United States Army in 1863 as it finally started accepting the costs required to win of a war of military attrition.

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53 ascendancy of a commanding general who was willing to expend a revolutionary level of casualties to achieve a revolutionary end. Simultaneously, Robert E. Lee was engaged in his final attempt to win the war by maneuver, resulting in his defeat at Gettysburg (July 1-4) marking the demise of the Confederate effort to win a limited war of maneuver in the face of a conflict that was rapidly b ecoming a revolutionary war of attrition. 82 Probability of Success The central concept of General Order No. 100 is the doctrine of an affirmative military responsibility based upon, rather than in contradiction wit h, military necessity. Like Lieber, Augustine understood that a just war cannot bring about justice in defeat and only when victory goes to the side that had a juster cause (is it) su rely a matter of human rejoicing, and the peace is one to be welcomed. 83 Augustine also wrote, Therefore it ought to be necessity, and not your will, th at destroys the enemy who is fighting you. 84 Nothing is more obstructive to the establis hment of a just peace than indecisive or ineffective military action. The most unjus t outcome in war -of which there are numerous contemporary examples -is one in which neither combat ant attains, or is allowed to attain, success. The doctrine of military necessity is the major conceptual link between Lieber's code and Augustinian just war doctrine. For Lieber, military necessity consisted of two major components: (1) that no conventional re striction of the modes adopted to injure the enemy is any longer admitted; but (2) the law of war imposes many limitations and 82 Letter from James A. Seddon, to Robert Ould, 24 June, 1863. See note 22. 83 Saint Augustine, The City of God, xv & 4. 84 Augustine to Boniface, Letter 189 (4).

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54 restrictions on principles of justice, faith, and honor. (art icle 30). Articles 14-16 are the most cited articles of the code and consis t of Lieber's attempt to clarify these two seemingly contradictory themes: Military necessity, as understood by m odern civilized nations, consists in the necessity of those measures whic h are indispensable for securing the ends of war, and which are lawful ac cording to the modern law and usages of war. (article 14) Military necessity admits of all de struction of life or limb of armed enemies, and of other persons w hose destruction is incidentally unavoidable in the armed contests of th e war; it allows of the capturing of every armed enemy, and every enemy of importance to the hostile government, or of particular danger to the captor; it allows of all destruction of property, and obstructi on of the ways and channels of traffic, travel, or communication, and of all withholding of sustenance or means of life from the enemy; of the appropriation of whatever an enemy's country affords necessary for the subsistence and safety of the army, and of such deception as does not invo lve the breaking of good faith either positively pledged, regarding agreements entered into during the war, or supposed by the modern law of war to exist. Men who take up arms against one another in public war do not cease on this account to be moral beings, responsible to one anot her and to God. (article 15) Military necessity does not admit of cruelty this is, the infliction of suffering for the sake of suffering or for revenge, nor of maiming or wounding except in fight, nor for torture to extort confessions. It does not admit of the use of poison in any way, nor wanton devastation of a district. It admits of deception, but disclaims acts of perfidy; and in general, military necessity does not include any act of hostility which makes the return to peace unnecessarily difficult. (Article 16). Proportionality Even success of a just war does not result in nirvana, only a more just peace. The justness of the peace sought must compensate for the suffering created by the decision to resort to warfare. Augustine wrote that faith must be kept not only with the friend, for whose sake one is fighting, but even with an enemy against whom one is waging war. 85 85 Ibid., (6).

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55 That faith is violated when the means to at tain an end are not commensurate to the end that is sought. Proportionality is impossible in the absence of a recognition of reciprocity in value of life and dignity of the human popul ations on each side that are affected by the conflict. Proportionality is based upon the hum anity of the enemy as being equal to ones own humanity. Advances in technology always challenge proportionality. The longevity of General Order No. 100 as official doctrine was likely the result of Liebers avoidance of issues related to technology. 1 For Lieber, what is proportiona l is what is simply what is necessary. Unnecessary or revengeful destruction of life is not lawful. (Article 68). During the Cold War, discussions as to whet her the use of nuclear weapons can ever be considered proportional dominated discus sions among modern just war theorists. 2 Authoritive decisions regarding proportionality and the utilization of new technologies, at least in theoretically democratic states, are made by civilians. No matter how much weight civilian leaders give to the opinion of military advisors, the decision of the Allies to firebomb cities and resort to nuclear wa rfare during the Second World War was legally and constitutionally the respons ibility of civilians. Discrimination Out of all the criteria associated with just war doctrine, it is a soldiers particular function to discriminate between the co mbatant and the noncombatant. The term 1 Liebers doctrinal longevity is also related to his avoidance of maneuver. Lieber's purpose, in spite of his direct experience of war, was not to provide general of regular forces with tactical and strategic principles to defeat other regular forces in set battles. Although he intended his code to be applicable in all In fact, his code emphasized the very aspects that regular force commanders have always tried to avoid and never have and never will succeed in avoiding, costabulalary fu nction and the handling of irregular forces. 2 See Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars 251-283; OBrien, The Challenge of War: A Christian Realist Perspective in Just War Theory, 169-196; Regan, Just War, 100-121; and Ramsey, The Just War, 211-258. It is ironic that, now that the necessity for such means has diminished, the issue of proportionality and nuclear as all but ceased in being a central concern.

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56 noncombatant refers not only to civilians, but also to disarmed combatants and other captives. Writing to a soldie r, Augustine wrote, And just as you use force against the rebel or opponent, so you ought to use me rcy towards the defeated or the captive. 88 However, just as there is nothing in Augus tine or Lieber to attribute innocence to noncombatants and guilt to combatants, there is also no categorical prohibition against actions involving unintentional noncombatant casualties. As in the case of military necessity, discrimination for Lieber consists of two distinct components. The citizen or native of a hostile coun try is thus an enemy, as one of the constituents of the hostile state or na tion, and as such is subjected to the hardships of the war. (article 21). Nevertheless, as civilizati on has advanced during the last centuries, so has likewise steadily advanced, especially in war on land, the distinction between the private individual belong ing to a hostile country and the hostile country itself, with its men in arms. The principle has been more and more acknowledged that the unarmed citizen is to be spared in person, property, and honor as much as the exig encies of war will admit. (article 22) For Lieber, the combatant / noncombatant distinction is a relative one based on a degree of participation of an individual in a war effort. Although the determination of relativity is accomplished by referring to other traditional just war cr iteria -specifically comparative justice and proportionality, the intentional, non-incidental murder of a noncombatant is always a crime. The one exception to this rule fo r Lieber was a limited form of retaliation to be used against a r eckless enemy who leav es to his opponent no other means of securing himself against the re petition of barbarous outrage.(article 27) Retaliation will, therefore, never be resorted to as a measure of mere revenge, but only as a means of protective retribution, a nd cautiously and unavoidably; that is to say, retaliation shall only be resorted to after careful inquiry into the real occurren ce, and the character of the misdeed that may demand retribution. Unjust or inconsiderate retaliation removes 88 Augustine to Boniface, Letter 189 (6).

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57 the belligerents further and further from the mitigating rules of regular war, and by rapid steps leads them nearer to the internecine war of savages. (Article 28) The Legacy of General Order No. 100 The most controversial aspects of Lieber's code include his liber al use of the death penalty for offenses proscribed by the code and his failure to categorically reject the right of retaliation and to deny quarter in cases where quarter is not reciprocated. 89 While the right to quarter was unequivocally standard ized in the Hague C onventions, retaliation was not completely outlawed from the law and usages of war until the Geneva Conventions of 1949. Until that time, retaliation was allowed in order to ensure that humanitarian norms would be followed by each side of a conflict on the basis of reciprocity. Despite Liebers failure to categorically prohibit retaliation, as he did in the use of torture, the United States Army carried out no retali atory executions of Confederate noncombatants during the war. While modern human rights activists ma y take pause at Liebers tentative endorsement of reprisal, his cate gorical prohibition of the use of torture (article 16) is far in advance of some prominent contemporary ci vil rights activists and legal scholars as well as the behavior tolerated by the contemporary international community. 90 89 For a discussion on contemporary views of General Order No. 100 on reference to reprisals and denial a quarter, see Theodor Meron, "Francis Lieber's Code and the Principles of Humanity" in The Columbia Journal of Transnational Law (1997), v. 36. 269-274. 90 Prominent civil rights attorney and Harvard Law School faculty member equivocated on a categorical prohibition against torture to extort information from those he considered terrorists, first in the case of Israel in 1988, and then in the case of the united States after September 11, 2001. See Ken Gewertz, Harvard Gazette (December 13, 2001), 8. For other contem porary equivocations of the prohibition of torture, see William V. OBrien, The Law of War, Command Responsibility and Vietnam in The Georgetown Law Journal (1972), v. 60. 648 and Michael Levin, The Case for Torture in Newsweek (June 7 1982). V. 99, 13(1), reprinted in The Norton Reader, 6 th Edition (Ontario: Penguin Books Canada, 1988), 364.

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58 General Order No. 100 and International Humanitarian Law (IHL) Only a year after Lieber's code was pr omulgated, the Swiss humanitarian JeanHenri Dunant drew upon the work of his fe llow countryman, Emmeric de Vattel, to found a code based upon the concepts of neutrality and of voluntary state action. The Geneva Convention of 1964 for the Ame lioration of the Conditions of the wounded and Sick in the Armies in the Field, based of a draf t by Dunant, provided protection of military hospitals and a protocol for medical treatme nt for wounded soldiers based on reciprocity between opposing armies. 91 Just as Liebers code is accepted as foundational in the development of the modern laws of war or laws of armed conflict, Dunants work and his establishment of the International Committ ee of the Red Cross in 1863 were pivotal to development of the modern conception known as international humanitarian law (IHL). The contemporary usage of these terms is more reflective of the institutional affiliation, military in the case of the former and non-gove rnment organizations (NGOs) for the later, than one indicating a distinct area of expert ise. However, it is possible to discern conceptual distinctions in the development of what would eventually become areas of specialization possessing so much overlapping content th at they can no longer be considered independent of the other. Unlike Lieber who wrote for soldiers, Dunant was concerned with organizing civilians to work cooperatively with military forces to mitigate unnecessary suffering. As a witness to the Battle of So lferino between French and Austrian forces on June 24, 1859, Dunant noted that neither side benefited from the suffering of wounded soldiers left unattended to die on the field. If a neutra l entity could provid e relief under such 91 Frank Newman, ed., International Human Rights: Law, Policy, and Process, 2 d ed. (Cincinnati: Anderson Publishing, 1996), 3.

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59 circumstances, why would either side not volun tarily allow the provision of such neutral humanitarian aid? Upon this logic of neut rality and voluntarism, he established the International Committee of the Red Cross. The ICRC's cherished ideal of neutrality has lost much of its luster following the Rwandan genocide in which the international community voluntarily chose to emphasize neutrality over humanitarianism as 800,000 noncombatants were slaughter ed in plain view in 1994. 92 Passive obligations easily become suppl emental or secondary to obligations considered primary or affirmative. In othe r words, passive obligations lead to passive execution. Whether one looks at the inte rnational response to the 1994 Rwandan genocide or infamous -but procedurally correct -ICRC visit to the model Theresienstadt concentration camp during the Holocaust, the twentieth-century provides ample material to those who question the eff ectiveness of passive virtues of voluntarism and neutrality in establishing humanitarian norms. 93 Dunant at least, unlike the leadership cadre of such modern human right non-government organization (NGOs) as Amnesty International and Human Rights Wa tch, did not look upon the profession of 92 One of the greatest critics of the ICRC's doctrine of neutrality and silence is Mdicins san Frontires. See Michael Ignatieff, The Warrior's Honor: Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience (New York: Metropolitan Books, 1997), 124. The most authoritative critic of the international community's and his own office's as former Under-Secret ary-General for Peacekeeping Opera tions, problematic observance of neutrality and voluntarism in humanitarian operations is Kofi Annan, Secretary-General of the United Nations. See UN Press Release SG/SM/7263 AFR/196, (16 December 1999), the Report of the Secretary General Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 53/35 (1998), Srebrenica Report, (1998), and the Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations During the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda (15 December 1999). 93 The ICRC continues to operate to this day under the protocol that it will only inspect confinement facilities upon invitation of national authorities. On June 23, 1944, the Schutzstaffel (SS) voluntarily allowed June 23, 1994, the neutral ICRC to inspect Theresienstadt. On September 27, 1944, Dr. Maurice Rossel, the ICRC delegate, attempted to inspect Auschwitz and was refused by its commandant. A positive effort by the ICRC to press the Third Reich would have violated its protocols. The ICRC now requires an invitation to inspect all confinement facilities within a prison system. See ICRC Action on behalf of Prisoners (Geneva: ICRC Publication, 1 Nov 1977).

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60 arms as an adversary incapable of humanita rian concerns. Both Lieber and Dunant appealed to soldiers sense of military honor. For Lieber, however, humanitarian norms could not be associated with passive obligations that busy military commanders could consider supplemental or sec ondary to other objectives. Just as it is clear that contemporary commentators like Howard Zinn are clear/y outside of Augustinian just war tradition when attributing absolute (italics mine) noncombatant immunity to traditional just war te aching, it would not be fair to hold Dunant responsible for the absurdities that have been associated with his conceptual framework in the late twentieth century by those claiming to be his heirs. 94 He would have likely found the modern notion that an armed force can claim neutrality even while holding ground on foreign territory as incomprehensible Despite their disparate approaches to military affairs, both Lieber and Dunant recognized the benefit of engagement with the military profession in the effort to mitigate humanitarian suffering in war and the efficacy of appealing to soldiers sense of honor. The anti-military essentialist bias found among the leadership of such modern NGOs as Am nesty International and Human Rights Watch finds its historical base in the Vietnam War era anti-war movement rather than in the influence of Dunant and his ICRC. The difference in content and emphasis for Lieber and Dunant underlie contrasting, although not necessa rily antagonistic, approaches to the end of removing unnecessary suffering in war. The 1863 General Orders No. 100 and the 1864 First Geneva Convention serve as foundational documents for the two major schools of 94 See Howard Zinn, A Just Cause, Not a Just War, in The Progressive (December 2001), v. 65, 12.

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61 modern international humanitarian law or the law of armed conflict: the Law of the Hague and the Law of Geneva. As the inspiration for The Hague Convention of 1899 and 1907, General Order No. 100 provides a historical foundation for the affirmative limits placed on conduct of war itself asso ciated with the Law of The Hague. Conversely, Dunants convention is the f oundation for the more passive and voluntary protections for specific classes of individuals such as the protections afforded wounded soldiers, prisoners of war, and medical personne l traditionally associated with the Law of Geneva. 95 The Andersonville Trial The obligatory discrimination between combatants and noncombatants is the one responsibility that a combatant cannot transfer to a noncomba tant. Rather than harming those they are bound by definition to inflict harm upon, soldiers commit war crimes by failing to render protection to thos e they are legally required to protect. While the murder of a noncombatant may be a very active a nd voluntary act, it is insofar as his affirmative obligations as a so ldier an act of omission rath er than an act of commission. A soldier does not only have an affirmativ e responsibility not to violate this most soldierly of all the just war criteria, he ha s an affirmative obligation to prevent other soldiers from violating it as well. General Order No. 100 in addressing cases of wonton violence against noncombatan ts, to include robbery, pillage, sacking, rape, wounding maiming, murder, posits that A soldier, officer or private, in the act of committing such violence, and disobeying a s uperior ordering him to abstai n from it, may be lawfully killed on the spot by such superior.(Article 44) This requirement to enforce the just war 95 See Louise Doswald-Beck and Sylv ain Vite, International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law in The International Review of the Red Cross (1993), v. 94, 293.

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62 principle of discrimination is nothing less than the historical foundation of the doctrine of command responsibility. Whoever intentionally inflicts addi tional wounds upon an enemy already wholly disabled, or kills such an enemy, or who orders or encourages soldiers to do so (italics mine), shall suffe r death, if duly convicted, whether he belongs to the Army of the United States, or is an enemy captured after having committed his misdeed. (Article 71) Telford Taylor argued that General Orders No. 100 was problematic in that it had little to say about enforcement of the laws of war, or about the bounds of superior orders and command responsibility, 96 Whether or not one accepts these principles as inherent or implied in General Orders No. 100 they certainly were central in the immediate post war court-martial of Conf ederate Major Henry Wirz, the former Commandant of the prisoner-of-war camp at Andersonville, Georgia for conspiracy to injure the health and destroy the lives of soldiers in the military service of the United States. 97 During the course of the American Civ il War, Henry Wirz was the only soldier tried as a war criminal for failing to adhere to the humanitarian standards contained in General Order No. 100. The simple answer of victors justice does not sufficiently address the complexity of the decision to try Wirz and not others. Union occupation policies and burnt earth tactic s against Southern property a nd infrastructure have often and inaccurately been compared to modern wa r crimes. While such practices were novel at the time and condemned by the Confederacy, they were authorized by General Order No. 100 and pale in comparison to permissible actions against enemy infrastructure found 96 Taylor, see Forward to the Laws of War, xvii. 97 United States House of Representatives, 40 th Congress, 2 nd Session, House Executive Document (The Andersonville Trial), Vol. 8, n. 23 (1865), 19-20.

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63 in modern norms of warfare. Despite the ludi crous claims of some apologists of the lost cause, there were no My La is perpetrated on th e population of the Confederacy during Shermans March or anywhere else. 98 Even American historian Charles Royster's recent brutal depiction of Sherman stresses " The actions of Sher man's men bore little resemblance to the killing of civilians in twentieth-century war. Few if any writers have contended that Sherman made those mass killin gs possible or necessary, that twentieth century war would have taken a differe nt course without Sherman's example. 99 While the lack of war crimes prosecutions against United States soldiers can be explained in terms of either a lack of evidence of criminal activity or an unwillingness of a sovereign power to hold its own forces accoun table for violations of the laws of war, the question why the decision was made to try Wirz for war crimes and not other senior Confederate leaders is more difficult to answer. On May 30, 1863, the Confederate Congress issued a policy allowing the ex ecution of U.S. Army officers commanding black units. Subsequently, on August 12, 1863, Confederate Secretary of War James A. Seddon sent a letter to Lieu tenant General Kirby Smith (CSA) initiating the TransMississippi command policy to kill all blacks captured in uniform Actual executions of 98 The most notorious example of falsely comparing Sh ermans March to latter war atrocities is the habeas corpus ruling by Judge Robert Elliot in a district court in Columbus Georgia in which Shermans march was used as an historical example to justify his ru ling that U.S. Army Lieutenant William Calley should be freed from confinement for the murder, rape, sodomy, and mutilation of over 500 noncombatants at My Lai in Vietnam in 1968. See Michael Bilton and Kevin, Four Hours in My Lai (New York: Viking Penguin, 1992), 356. While there was an unquestionable massacre against non-combatants by Federal forces during the period of the Civil War, it was not against citi zens of the Confederacy. In November 29, 1864, the Sand Creek or Chivington Massacre involved a slaughter of hundreds of friendly and disarmed Cheyenne Indians in southeastern Colorado Territory by a for ce of 1,200 Federal militia under Colonel John M. Chivington, a local Baptist minister. Regular Army fo rces present at the scene refused to participate. Chivington escaped court-martial by leaving Federal se rvice prior to military charges were prepared against him. 99 See Charles Royster's The Destructive War, William Tecumseh Sherman, Stonewall Jackson, and the Americans (New York: Vintage Books, 1991; First Vintage Civil War Library Edition, 1993), 358.

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64 African-American U.S. soldiers by Confederat e forces occurred on June 7, 1863 at the Battle of Millikens Bend (Louisiana) unde r General Richard Tylor (CSA), April 12, 1864, at the Fort Pillow Massacre (Tennesse e) under General Nathon Bedford Forrest (CSA), on April 18, 1864, at the Poison Spri ngs Massacre (Arkansas) under General Samuel Bell Maxey (CSA), April 17-20, 1864, during the Confeder ate recapture of Plymouth, N.C. under General R.F. Hoke (CSA), June 25, 1864, at the Battle of the Crater (Petersburg, Virginia) under Genera l William Mahone (CSA), and October 2, 1864, at the Battle of Saltville, Virginia unde r General Felix Huston Robertson, (CSA). When the United States Army discovered that its own soldiers, those of African decent, were being systemically murdered or enslaved upon capture, it chose not to retaliate in kind. Rather, it prudently chose the option of discontinuing the practice of prisoner exchange that disfavored th e interest of the manpower and labor starved Confederacy rather than implement its privileg e of retaliation under Article 28 of General Order No. 100. This breakdown of the prisoner exchange led to the creation of one of the least chivalrous realities of the Civil War: the prison conditions that took the lives of 60,194 prisoners of war, 30,218 in Confederate prison camps and 29,976 in camps run by U.S. military authorities. 100 The claim of victors justice in the case of Wirz s conviction and subsequent execution was posited by none ot her than former Confederate president, Jefferson Davis --originally named as a co-cons pirator with Wirz on the original draft indictment and later dropped who in a series on articles in 1890 clai med that the United 100 General F.C. Ainsworth, Chief of the Record and Pension Office, to James Ford Rhodes, June 29, 1903, cited in James M McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era (New York, Ballantine Books, 1989: Oxford University Press, 1988) 802.

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65 States Government was exclus ively responsible for the condi tion at Andersonville, due to its failure to continue the pr isoner exchanges, and that cond itions in Confederate camps were no more inhuman than those in the north. 101 The historian James McPherson, in his seminal Battle Cry of Freedom dismisses the often posited clam of equivalency made after the war in defense of Wirz in reference to conditions of prisone rs of war held by the Confederacy and the United States by pointing to the fact that all northern prisons had provided at least some type of shelter from the elements and that the twenty-nine percent mortality rate (13,000 out of 45,000) at Anderson ville dwarfed the mortality rates of any northern prison camp. 102 While Wirzs defense attempted to dis pute the secondary ch arge of murder, evidence that Andersonville was a de f acto death camp was presented by fellow Confederate officers and even Wirzs own defe nse witness, Father (later Bishop) Peter Whelen. 103 Wirz addressed the primary charge of c onspiracy to impair and injure and to destroy the lives of U.S. Army prisoners by the first modern use of the defense of superior orders by claiming that as a subalt ern officer (he) merely obeyed the legal orders of (his) superiors in the discharge of (his) duties and that he could not be held 101 Davis articles in Belfords Magazine in January and February of 1890 was cited and summarized by General Norton Parker Chipman in The Tragedy of Andersonville: Trial of Captain Henry Wirz, The Prison Keeper (Sacramento, CA: N.P. Chipman, 1911), 19-26. Chipman, the Judge Advocate who prosecuted Wirz, wrote this work, at the behest of the membership of the Grand Army of the Republic, to respond to the Davis articles. Subsequent pro-Confederate claims of moral relativity between U.S. and C.S.A. prison policies and conditions can be found in Facts and Figures vs. Myths and Misrepresentations: Henry Wirz and the Andersonville Prison (United Daughters of the Confederacy (UDC) Bulletin of 1921), 29. Subsequently, the Georgia chapter of the UDC proclaimed Wirz a martyr and erected a monument, originally within site of the graves of his victim s and is still standing although the Georgia Legislature refusedeven at the height of southern anti-desegregation agitation in 1958, using state funds to repair the monument. 102 McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, 706 & 802. 103 Chipman, The Tragedy of Andersonville, 22.

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66 responsible for the motives that dictated such orders. 104 Wirzs defense mirrored the sentiments he expressed in a letter writt en upon his arrest at Andersonville on May 7, 1865 that he was only the medium, or may I better say, the tool, in the hands of my superiors. 105 In response, General Chipman, Wirz pr osecutor, argued a theory of command responsibility that anticipated by eighty years the position found in 1945 London Charter for the establishment of the Internat ional Military Tribunal at Nuremberg: 106 A superior officer cannot order a subordin ate to do an illegal act, and if a subordinate obey such an order and di sastrous consequences result, the superior and the subordinate must an swer for it. General Winder (Wirzs direct superior) could no more comma nd the prisoner to violate the laws of war than could the prisoner do so wit hout orders. The conclusion is plain, that where such orders exist both are guilty. 107 Forty-six years later, Chipman admitted th at he was directly ordered by the War Department to remove the names of Presiden t Jefferson Davis, Confederate Secretary of War James A. Seddon and other high Confeder ate officials as co-conspirators on the indictment. 108 Besides the obvious poli tical expediency of this order, the case against 104 House Executive Document (The Andersonville Trial), 706. 105 Letter from Captain Henry Wirz, CSA, Andersonville, Georgia, May 7, 1865 to General J.H. Wilson, U.S. Army. Reprinted in Friedman, The Law of War, 784-785. 106 Text of Article 8 of the 1945 London Charter: The fact that the Defendant acted pursuant to order of his Government or of a superior shall not free him from responsibility, but may be considered in mitigation of punishment if the Tribunal determines that justice so requires. This article was applied by the International Military Tribunal and in the subsequent Nuremberg trials to include The Hostage Case, The Einsatzgruppen Case, and the Command Case. See Levie, Terrorism in War, 518. 107 House Executive Document (The Andersonville Trial), 773. 108 Chipman, The Tragedy of Andersonville, 28.

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67 Wirz superiors was complicated by the death of his immediate superior, General John H. Winder. 109 Almost all the major issues generally a ssociated with the American War Crime Program of the Nuremberg era war surfaced during the Andersonville Trial, including claims of victors justice and ex post facto justice. 110 The dual concepts of the command responsibility and superior orders were central in the prosecution and defense of Major Wirz. Just as in the case of subsequent prosecutions holding forth a strict level of command accountability for war crimes, some have continued to question the Andersonville Trial in terms of law. 111 It is not the purpose of the present work to present a legal treatise in defense of a stricter level of the command responsibility for war crimes implied in traditional just war doctr ine, General Orders No 100, and explicitly posited by the prosecution during th e trial. Regardless of the validity of the legalistic criticisms of the Andersonville Trial, the doctrinal significance of such cases for the American military profe ssion is not diminished (italics mine). Seven out of eight of the military panel that convicted and sentenced Wirz to be hanged were general officers. The Secretary of War and the President as Comm ander in Chief upheld both the conviction and sentence. The report of th e trial was officially publishe d and distributed by the U.S. 109 The other co-conspirators named in the final i ndictment, John H. Winde r (deceased), Richard B. Winder, Joseph Isaiah H. White, W.S. Winder, and R. R. Stevenson were not tried. A similar situation occurred during the prosecution of the perpetrators of the My Lai Massacre in Vietnam after the death of Colonel Frank Barker and the difficulties his death creat ed for the prosecution of Barkers subordinates (Captain Ernest Medina) and superiors (Colonel Oren K. Henderson, General Samuel Koster, and General George H. Young). 110 Although the United States attempted to distribute General Orders No. 100 to Confederate forces, applying its obligations to a Confederate Officer, afte r its explicit rejection by the Confederacy (see note 13), is open to criticism by those who claim such a pro cess inherently creates law af ter the fact of the crime or ex post facto. 111 As recently as 2000, Peter Maguire in his seminal Laws and War: An American Story (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 40, called the An dersonville Trial a dramatic spectacle of vengeance.

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68 government. Whether are not the definition of command responsibility utilized during the trial was based upon a proceeding comprised of good law, it was and is doctrine. Conclusion The principle that there is an affirmative official duty to use force or coercion to assist others as predicated and conditioned by the principle of necessity is found formally in the foundational document of the modern laws of war, U.S. Army General Order 100. Dr. Francis Lieber utilized the principle of necessity to reintroduce the ba sic principals of Augustinian just doctrine into U.S. Army General Order 100 the foundational document of the modern laws of war. The codes affirmative obligations to minimize human suffering was enforced by the U.S. Army milita ry tribunal that convicted and sentenced to death Henry Wirz, the commandant of Andersonville Prison, for his failure in addressing the inhuman conditions of Union prisoners during the Civil War. U.S. Army General Order No. 100 was also a pivotal milestone in the development of formal military doctrine in the American military profession. As a representation of a major ch ange in national strategy a ffecting the conduct of Union forces, it provides the first example of a na tional operational capstone doctrine. As the initial authoritative basis for a series of doctrinal publications on the laws of war that was binding on all branches of the service, it was also the first major historical example of keystone doctrine. As doctrine, it remains outside of the major traditions arising out of PostWestphalian legalism: political realism, legal positivism, and the neutral voluntarism associated with 1864 Geneva Convention and the humanitarian law tr adition of Dunant and his ICRC. Finally, it was the product of those who possessed direct experience of the

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69 reality of armed conflict; it c onsisted of an executive order by the commander in chief of the armed forces to his commanding officers in the field; and it was intended to be utilized primarily by operational military co mmanders rather than a legal manual for lawyers.

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CHAPTER 2 THE DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE AMERICAN MILITARY PROFESSION I see many soldiers: would that I saw many warriors! Uniform one calls what they wear: would that what it conceals were not uniform! 1 -Frederich Wilhelm Nietszche Between the Civil War and World War II the process of the development of military doctrine was formalized with the in troduction of a formal publication system. The period was characterized by contested visions military professionalism. Those favoring a domestic democratic concepti on of military professionalism gradually supplanted functionally aristocrat ic models of an officer corps associated with Prussia and Germany. Most discussions on the development of the military profession have centered on a presumed civil-military gap in values, attitudes, and worldviews that have developed between the military profession and civil society and especially on the political and societal consequences resulting from such a gap. Rather than addressing whether military policies and attitudes are either congrue nt or incongruent with civil society, this study incorporates the assumption that neithe r formal nor informal norms are fixed or uncontested. The point of departure for any new military doctrine is the doctrine that it replaces or modifies. The sp ecific subject of the present analysis is the changes and consistencies in the development of American military doctrine in regard to preexisting 1 Frederick Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra as found in Walter Kaufmanns translation in The Portable Nietzsche, (New York: Viking, 1954) p. 159. 70

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71 doctrine, specifically the evolution of formal doctrine from the promulgation of General Order No. 100 during the American Civil War to the present. The development of doctrine provides a historical record of the intellectual foundation of the military profession in the United States. Although certainly affected by external forces and political expediency, m ilitary doctrine is an internal system of normative values. Therefore, the well travel ed debate over the models of continuity versus discontinuity between military and civilia n professional values is pertinent to the present study only so far as it relates to th e refutation of the claim, in the case of competing doctrines, that a par ticular contested doctrine is an external imposition on the military profession. Constitutional Allegiance and the American Military Professionalism The doctrinal significance of General Order No. 100 and the just war precepts contained within it cannot be separated fr om the constitutional conflict that was contemporaneous with its publication. The Am erican Civil War was a referendum for and by the American military profession on the meaning of allegiance. From 1790 to 1861, the oaths that officers took upon accepting military commissions did not consistently mention the constitution. This changed as the result of the American Civil War ending with a decision in favor of those holding primary loyalty to the federal government and its constitution as opposed to those holdi ng primary loyalty to state governments and their constitutions. This was subsequen tly formalized by legislation. In 1862, the Radical Republicans controlling the U.S. C ongress mandated that an officers political allegiance to the constitution was to be unqualified and specified by law. From 1862 onward, the words of the Presidential oath of office found in the U.S. Constitution,

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72 support and defend the Constitution of the Unit ed States, was incorporated into all official oaths of office to include both the en listed and commissioning oath still used to this day: 2 Officers Commissioning: I, ______________, do solemnly swear (or affirms) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation fr eely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evas ion; and that I will and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on whic h I am about to enter. So help me God. 3 Enlisted: I, ______________, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; and that I will obey the orders of the President of the United States and the orders of the offi cers appointed over me, according to regulations and the Uniform Code of Military Justice. So help me God. 4 Evocative of the fifth century just wa r maxims of St. A ugustine exhorting Roman soldiers to examine the moral foundation of th eir service and conduct, these oaths forced individuals entering military service to pers onally acknowledge the ba sis of the authority under which they entered into military service and source of the legitimacy of their actions while in military service. As the oath requires allegiance to a particular constitution, the political and ideological prem ises of this constitution, especially as it was modified over the course and immediate af termath of the American Civil War, on the 2 Edward M. Coffman in his authoritive article on the subject, disputes the contention that the Constitution played a significant role in officers decision to fight for or against th e United States and argues that the post war allegiance oaths required by congress were a significant development in both military professionalism and the American civil-military relationship. See Edward M. Coffman, The Army Officer and the Constitution Parameters (September 1987), 2-12. Even Samuel P. Huntington, who held that Southern culture was more facilitating of military professionalis m, noted On the one hand, the Southern officers political allegiances drew him to the Confederacy; on th e other, his professional responsibility drew him to the Union. See Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil Military Relations (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1957), 211-212. 3 Cited in Coffman, The Army Officer and the Constitution, 5. 4 Most officers have taken this oath as an enlisted soldier or a cadet prior to their commissioning.

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73 development of the American military profession is distinct from other contemporary armies who pledged their alle giance to other arra ngements of political authority. The formal basis of military allegiance in the Unite d States, in contrast to the major European powers of the day, was also institutional rather merely national in an organic sense. However, the end of the Civil War did not result in a consensus regarding military professionalism and the nature of its historic al development. Different interpretations and views on the institutional lessons of th e Civil War and the efficacy of using foreign models of military professionalism, specifi cally that of Prussia, as a model for institutional reform divided those who w ould have the most influence over the establishment of future military doctrine in America. The Prussification of the American Military Professionalism The centrality of an individual affirmation of duty in the oaths of political allegiance resulting form the Civil War reso nates well with both Francis Liebers General Order No. 100 and the traditional just war doctrines contained within it. This, however, conflicted with the some general assumptions associated with another Prussian, Carl von Clausewitz. American scholars and member s of the American military profession have utilized Clausewitz in particular and the Pr ussian military tradition in general to ground theories of military professionalism that contrast strikingly with the democratic and just war doctrine put forward by Lieber. It is ironic that the two key individuals associated with such disparate martial legacies at one point shared the same uni form and campaign. Clausewitz, the future author of a book that would se rve as scripture for the political realists of late twentieth century American military and diplomatic officialdom, was serving as a staff officer in

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74 the rear guard of the Prussian forces seek ing to cut off the French forces trying to reinforce Napoleon at Waterloo. A few miles away, the future author of General Order No. 100, Francis Lieber, a Prussian enlisted sold ier, lay wounded near death. Many of the philosophic inclinations of Clausewitz we re the reverse of Lieb ers. In fact, their contrasting views of the nature of war would mark a key point of divergence between the informal and formal norms of the American military profession. Clausewitz contra Lieber (Political Realism vs. Political Ethics) Clausewitz is only known to history b ecause the French Revolutionary Army followed the common customs and usages of war of the time in granting him quarter and providing him medical care after he fell wounded in an earlier battle in 1806. 5 Following his recovery and parole, Clausewitz joined Field Marshals August Wilhelm Gneisenau and Gelhard Johann von Scharnhor st in modernizing and reforming the defeated and antiquated Prussian Army. Bei ng the most politically conservative and antirevolutionary of the Prussian military reform ers, Clausewitz discarded his uniform and donned a Russian one in 1812 rather than fight for Napoleon, not returning to Prussian service until his sovereign had discovered the erro r of his ways by turning on the French Emperor after his defeat in Russia. Afte r his retirement, Clau sewitz put down his military insights and observations in a book that after the Bible, would end up being one of the most selectively read texts in histor y. In 1832, he died in the midst of a major revision of his seminal On War completing only its first chapter. 6 Although he died in 5 Two recent biographies of Carl von Clausewitz include Raymond Aron's Clausewitz, the Philosopher of War (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentic e-Hall, 1985) and Michael Howard's Clausewitz (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983). 6 All references to On War ( Vom Kriege 1832) are based on the edition and translation by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), Everyman's Library 1993 edition. As far as inspiring scholarly textual st udy, the reception of this new transl ation of Clausewitz by the post

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75 relative obscurity, the sponsorship of his ideas by Field Marshals Helmuth von Moltke and Colmar von der Goltz in their late nine teenth century efforts to prepare the new nation of Germany for total war turned Clausewi tz, for the first time, into a military icon. Clausewitz's influence in Europe rose steadily until this ideal of total war was experienced first hand by Europ eans during the First World War. 7 Aside from the many questionable historical processes for which he has been either blamed or credited, it is fairly incontrovertible that, accor ding to Clausewitz, the nature of war was intrinsically violent, political, unpredictabl e, and resistant to positivistic scientific systematization. While an in depth comparison of classical Clausewitzian and neo-Clausewitzian theory is beyond the scope of this work, many neoClausewitzian writers simply supply critiques of past military actions utilizing relatively opportunistic selections from Clausewitzs lexicon of themes. 8 Naturally, neoClausewitzian writers, by responding to their own Zeitgeist, the historical events and conditions of their own times, take Clausewitz 's ideas out what was clearly a specific and limited historical context. For someone with no formal university training, the philosophical influences on Clausewitz were considerable. His posited dichotomy between absolute war and actual Vietnam War American milita ry can only be compared to the recep tion in the English speaking world of the King James Bible in the Sixteenth Century. 7 Major works of Clausewitz cr iticism published after World War I include B. H. Liddel Hart, The Ghost of Napoleon (London: Faber & Faber, 1933), J.F.C Fuller, The Reformation of War (London, Hutchinson & Co., 1932), and Generaloberst von Seeckt, Gedanken eines Soldaten (Leipzig: v. Hase & Koehler, 1935). 8 Antulio J. Echevarria reviewed five such compar isons between the works of Clausewitz and the neoClausewitzians by Werner Hahlweg, Peter Paret, Mi chael Howard, Jehuda Wallach, and Ulrich Marwedel and summarized that the neo-Clausewitz ians oversimplify Clausewitz into four narrow themes: "1) the uses and limitations of theory; 2) the impact of psychological and moral forces on war; 3) the importance of striving for a decisive battle; and, 4) the superiority of a strategy of annihilation." See Antulio J. Echevarria II, "Borrowing from the Master: Uses of Clausewitz in German Military Literature before the Great War" in War in History 3 (July 1996): 274-92.

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76 war places him in the idealist tradition of Imma nuel Kant and his reification of the nation state reflects the influenc e of Georg Friedrich Hegel. 9 In that he considered some societies more naturally virtuous than other, Clausewitz was completely Aristotelian in his views on ethical or huma nitarian conduct in warfare. For Clausewitz, normative patterns of humanitarian conduct in war were societal rather th an professional: If wars between civilized nations are far less cruel and destructive than wars between savages, the reason lies in the social conditions of the states themselves and in their relationship to one another. These are the forces that give rise to war; the same forces circumscribe and moderate it. They themselves however are not part of war; they already exist before the fighting starts. To introduce the princi ple of moderation into the theory of war itself would always lead to logical absurdity. 10 The above passage represents the two ba sic principles of neo-Clausewitzian realism: (1) war itself is amoral in its natu re and (2) war is conducted for, by, and in the sole interest of nation states. While Clausew itz discussed the moral nature of war, it was in terms of the non-material aspects such as morale and genius. Unlike Lieber and Augustine, Clausewitz separate s justice and morality from warfare. Like Thomas Hobbes, and Niccolo Machiavelli before him, his works are addressed to those working on the behalf of a self interested nation state in a zero sum competition for adjustments in 9 The most substantial treatment of the influences of German idealist philosophy on Clausewitz in found in Aron's Clausewitz, the Philosopher of War 223-232. Clausewitz's conception of 'absolute war' has been described a "Platonic ideal" outside any reference to German idealist philosophy. See Howard's Clausewitz, 49. While contemporary critics of Clausewitz stress his idealism in his characterization of 'ideal' or 'absolute' war, his contemporary apologists minimize it. See John Keegan, A History of Warfare (New York, Knopf, 1993), 16-21 for an example of the former and Bernard Brodie's introductory essay, "The Continuing Relevance of On War ," to On War 1976 ( Vom Kriege 1832), 52-53 for an example of the latter. Clausewitz is not alone among those consider ed to be political realists that have predilections toward German idealist philosophy. For the influence of Hegelian idealism on Hans Morgenthau, See Michael W. Doyle, Ways of War and Peace (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1997), 106n. 10 Clausewitz, On War 84.

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77 the balance of power at the expense of other nation states in which no other justification is required other that that of raison d' tat 11 Clausewitz, however, not translated in to English until 1873, did not became a formal influence over American military thi nking generally until the advent of the Cold War and specifically with the so-called Cl ausewitzian renaissance after the American military defeat in Vietnam. Therefore, it is historically problematic to apply this 'neoClausewitzian Weltanschauung, associated w ith so many contemporary military analysts and political pundits, as a primary direct influence on the development of American military professionalism in the late nineteenth century. 12 However, since Clausewitz was one of the major reformers of the Prussian military, a short examination of his actual writings is warranted in connect ion with the general influenc e Prussian military reform exerted on the development of American military doctrine in juxtaposition to the continuing doctrinal significance of General Order No. 100. Unlike Lieber, Clausewitz wrote a code fo r statesmen or heads of states, not only for soldiers, using his direct experience of war to integrat e his personal life experiences with selected historical refe rences. Also unlike Lieber, Clausewitz and his Napoleonic contemporaries were fixated on conventiona l warfare between la rge regular military formations. On the other hand, the genesis of Lieber's code, like most doctrinal 11 Doyle, War and Peace 19-28. 12 Works I consider belonging to this neo-Clausewitzian consensus include, but are not limited to Huntingtons The Soldier and the State, Henry A. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (New York, Harper and Brothers, 1957), Harry G. Summers, Jr. On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (Novato, CA, Presidio Press, 1982). For a discu ssion of how Clausewitz's direct influence on the American military profession intensified after the Amer ican defeat in Vietnam, see editor's introduction to Clausewitz and Modern Strategy ed. Michael Howard (London: Frank Cass & Co., 1986), 9. This book is a collection of presentations on an international c onference on Clausewitz held at the U.S. Army War College in Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania in April 198 5. The conference itself is direct evidence of the growing influence of Clausewitz over the American military profession.

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78 developments, was an effort to address contemporary doctrinal defici encies. Lieber was specifically tasked to address the aspects of war -such as constabulary functions and the handling of irregular forces -that have historically const ituted the U.S. Army's most common historical activity, although they are activities that American military professionals have historically tried to avoid or minimize, albeit unsuccessfully. The strongest consistency between Liebers and Clausewitzs view on war is the supremacy of political over purely military ends In his most famous dictum, Clausewitz wrote "that war is not merely an act of policy, but a tr ue political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on by other means. 13 In General Order No. 100, Lieber appears to have pa raphrased Clausewitz: war has come to be acknowledged not to be its own end, but the means to obtain the great ends of state. 14 This congruity between Lieber and Clausewitz in acknowledging political supremacy over the military does not extend to the self-pro claimed American heirs of Cl ausewitz. In fact, as the particular form of neo-Clausewitzianism th at would take hold in America would turn Clausewitz on his head by advocating a de fact o political deference to military ends in policy and, thereby, directly contradict not only Clausewitz, but the tradition of both General Order No. 100 and the institutionally based political allegiance mandated in the soldiers and officers commissioning oaths resu lting form the Civil War. This reversal of Clausewitzs position of political supremac y, for the purposes of this study, is one of the primary points of departure between cl assical and neo-Clausewitzianism. 13 Clausewitz, On War 99. 14 General Order No. 100 Article 30.

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79 Emory Upton's Love Affair with Prussia Although the popularity of Clausewitz among American military professionals is understandable, its historical reach is limited. Clausewitz did not have a direct individual impact on the development of the American profession during its most important period of development between the Civil War and cu lmination of World War II. The basing of the impetus of military professionalism in America on Clausewitz, as distinct from basing it on the Prussian military reformers in general, is just bad history. It was not through Clausewitz, but the French Antoine Henri, Ba ron de Jomini, that Napoleonic strategy was conveyed to America. The reason for this wa s that Jominis writings were clearer and more understandable than Clausewitz classic. 15 Clausewitz influence on the American military between the Civil War and the Second World War can only be taken in conjunction with the nineteenth century Prussi an military in general; Clausewitz can at most be considered as an usually un-cited source for a view of military professionalism that has played more of an informal, rather than formal, role in the development of American military professionalism until Americas defeat in Vietnam. This is at odds with the premier th eoretical work of American military professionalism, Samuel P. Huntingtons The Soldier and the State. Huntington argues that modern military professionalism was spawned in post-Napoleonic War Prussia and epitomized by the theories of Clausewitz. A ccordingly, prior to this, America could only claim to possess a proto military professionalism and this was to be found mainly in the slave holding south that was embodied in the efforts toward ante-bellum military 15 Russell F. Weigley noted in The American Way of War that Clausewitz writings were, compared to Jominis, difficult, circumlocutory, often apparently self-contradictory. See The American Way of War, A History of United States Military and Policy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973), 82 & 211.

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80 professionalism initiated by the policies of Secretary of War John C. Calhoun. The greatest weakness of Huntington s historical thesis is the absence of documentation concerning how the culture of professionali sm migrated from Prussia to the United States. 16 As Clausewitz could not be historically credited for the transplantation of military professionalism from Prussia to the United States, the anointed mantle usually falls on the shoulders of Major General Emory Upton. Af ter serving as commandant of the U.S. Military Academy from 1870-1875, Upton was sent by the Secretary of War on a tour of Europe in search of military organizational models worthy of imitation. Four years after the conclusion of the Franco-P russian War and the creation of a new German empire, the task of locating the belle of the ball was hardly difficult. Uptons admiration for the Prussian / new German military reinforced his preference for smaller more professional armies over larger mass armies, a prefer ence developed during his service in the American Civil War. Consequent to Lincol ns re-characterizati on of the war from a limited war to preserve the Union to a na tional war of emancipation, Upton was highly critical of what he considered the deficiencies in the Union Army resulting from the political interference of civili an leadership and the appointme nt of non-career officers to major commands. The preeminent military historian Russell F. Weigley credits Upton with the ominous distinction of first asse rting the requirement for national policy to conform to military imperatives, rather th an the other way around. Weigley wrote that Upton argued that all the defects of th e American military system rested upon a fundamental, underlying flaw, excessive civili an control of the military and that, by 16 Huntingtons The Soldier and the State, 143-62 & 172-77.

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81 proposing a military policy that the country could not accept. Consequently, Weigley credits Upton with causing lasting damage to the Army resulting from the establishment of a model of civil-military relations th at emphasized antagonism over accommodation to civilian society. 17 Uptons choice of Prussia for a model for military professionalism was not without precedence because the American m ilitary already possessed a genuine Prussian heritage since the Revolutionary War. The le gacy of Prussia precedes the advent of the Prussian military reformers of the Napol eonic period. In 1778, Frederick William von Steuben arrived at the Valley Forge encampmen t of the American Continental Army with the assignment, arranged by Benjamin Franklin in Paris, to provide a system of drill and discipline based on a model other than that of the British enemy. Drawing on his service in the army of Frederick the Great, Steuben drafted his Regulations or Blue Book that established a uniquely American manual of arms that is nominally utilized to this day. However, Steubens legacy was confined to drill and not to general or keystone doctrine and his military experience predat ed the Napoleonic era Prussian military reforms later exalted by Upton. Uptons admiration for the Prussian instit utions resulting from the reform period was generalized; his writings contain no systematic analysis of the writings of the Napoleonic War era military reformers. Uptons position on the connection between political ends and military action was the oppos ite of Lieber and Clausewitz, both sharing the honor of not being cited in his work. Specifically, it was the ideas of Liebers 17 Major Wallace E. Walker, USA, Emory Upton and the Army Officers Creed Military Review (April 1981), 65-68, and Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States Army (New York: Macmillan, 1967), 279 & 281.

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82 archrival, John C. Calhoun, which Upton dr ew as a base for his proposal for an expandable army. 18 In a time of war such an army would be comprised of personnel from the regular army, national volunteers, and the militias who would be regulars in drill, discipline, and courage and co mmanded only by professional soldiers. 19 Taking his own life in 1881, Upton despaired of ever seeing an expandable regular army free of civil interference or his seeing ideas offi cially endorsed on published by the Army. However, Upton left an unfinished manuscript, posthumously published as The Military Policy of the United States which was unofficially disseminated among the officer corps. However, it generated enough support and opposition to facilitate the creation of the first official keystone doctrine since the promulgation of General Order No. 100. 20 One doctrinal specialist who wrote in opposition to Upton was Major Arthur L. Wagner, U.S. Army, an Instructor in the Ar t of War at the U.S. Infantry and Cavalry School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. In 1866, Wagner wrote a study that strongly criticized the Prussian military for ignor ing the lessons concerning mass armies during the American civil war. Wagner argued th at foreign doctrine, especially Prussian doctrines, must cede precedence to the Republic an forms of a distin ctly American civilmilitary relationship. 21 Wagners major work, Organization and Tactics, divided the Art of War into two major divisi ons: (1) strategy, the movement and disposition of an army in a theater of operations, a nd (2) tactics, the movements of soldiers on a battlefield. 18 Weigley, History of the United States Army, 277. 19 Bvt. Maj. General Emory Upton, USA, The Military Policy of the United States, 4 th Impression (Washington D.C.: Government Pr inting Office, 1917), viii & xi. 20 For a discussion of foundational or "keystone" doctrine, see Introduction, n. 4. 21 For a discussion of Wagners criticism of the Prussi an Military tradition, see Kretchik, Peering Through the Mist, 88-92.

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83 Calling Uptons focus on drill and disciplin e to mind, Wagner fe lt that it was not sufficient that an army be composed of inte lligent, well-instructe d, brave, and obedient soldiers, well armed and equipped; he also c onsidered drill as merely one of the means, not the end of military discipline. 22 Wagner, in that he felt that there are too many diverse elements in war that keeps the ar t of war from becoming a science based on universal laws, was probably more familiar with the actual writing of Clausewitz than Upton, who believed in the existence of laws that have been in operation throughout American military history. For Wagner, the art of war was a human science rather than an exact science. 23 Wagners greatest difference with Upton was on the relative effectiveness and discipline of the republicanized United States Army during the Civil War as compared to that of contemporary professionalized European armies, Wagner favoring the former with Upton favoring the latter. 24 Wagner, unlike Upton, received official endorsement for his doctrinal positions. In 1897, the second edition of Wagners Organization and Tactics contained an official imprimatur from the Adjutant-Generals Office and was officially recommended by the Headquarters of the Army for officers undergoing examination for promotion, and contained a preface written by the Commander of the U.S. Infantry and Cavalry School, the direct precursor to th e Command and General Staff School. It was 22 Wagner, Organization and Tactics, 2 nd ed. (Kansas City, Mo.: Hudson-K imberly Publishing Co., 1897), 3, 43. 23 Upton, in his criticism that American have no military policy, and that Laws whose operation have been the same in all our wars can be utilized to sy stemically achieve the wisest policy possible. See Upton, The Military Policy of the United States, xii. Contrarily, Wagner noted that as many diverse sentiments can influence the same army, knowledge of human nature is half of the science of war. See Wagner, Organization and Tactics, 46, 49. 24 Wagner, Organization and Tactics 43-44.

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84 not until twenty-three years af ter his death that Uptons Military Policy of the United States was officially published by the Army a nd, even then, only with a tentative endorsement of its contents. While the works of Upton and Wagner made only modest headway providing a doctrinal foundation for the military profe ssion on land, Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan supplied an intellectual rationale for Ameri can naval and foreign policy that would be utilized though the twentieth century. Unlike the Army, the Navy already possessed a functional War College by 1890, the year Maha n, a faculty member of the Naval War College, had his lectures published as The Influence of Sea Powe r on History, 1660-1783. Unlike Upton, Mahan founded his naval worldvie w on the strategy of Jomini, rather then Clausewitz or other Prussian military refo rmers, and recommended Great Britain, rather than despotic Prussia, as a hi storical model for policy as Am erica assumed its role as an imperial world power. 25 The contrast between the relative level of professionalism existing between Americas naval and ground forces was clearly demonstrated in Americas first major overs eas military intervention. Elihu Root and the Birth of Military Professionalism A year after Americas sloppy victory in the Spanish American War (1898), President William McKinley appointed Wall Street lawyer Eli hu Root to be his Secretary of War to clean up the military mess in the newly acquisitioned Philippine Islands occupied by U.S. Marine and U.S. Ar my ground forces. From 1899 to 1904, Root conducted the most extensive military refo rm in American history prior to the reorganization of the milit ary under General George C. Marshall during the Second 25 Weigley, The American Way of War, 174, 177.

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85 World War. He reorganized the administrative system of the War Department and modernized promotions. He carried out many policies envi sioned by Upton including the foundation of the War College, creation of a general staff, and increased federal control over the National Guard. Root also was fo rced to address the fact that Armys performance in the Spanish-American War a nd the subsequent Philippine Insurrection (1899-1906) exposed an army in doctrinal crises. The major activity of the Army since the Civil War had been constabulary functions in the South during Reconstruc tion and on the western frontier. Morris Janowitz, an early critic of the normal theo ry of civil-military relations, argued that, although such functions have always been a pe rsistent activity for re gular military forces, they have always been a source of doctrinal neglect. 26 With its first regular military action in thirty-four years, the U.S. Ar mys performance, while victorious, was disappointing. Despite the U.S. Armys wea lth of historical experience with such operations, American forces were unable to conduct disciplined constabulary functions during the American occupation of the Philippines following the war. The worst incident followed a massacre of 59 Americans at Bala ngiga on the island of Samar. Marines under the command of U.S. Army General Jacob F. Smith, an officer who had participated in the Wounded Knee Massacre of 1890, engaged in a genocidal riot that left 165 villages burned and thousands of Philippine murdered, the majority of which were clearly non-combatants. 27 26 Janowitz in the conclusion of The Professional Soldier (1960) insisted the worth of the military profession has been deeply rooted in the importance of its non-military functions. See The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait, (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1960), 438. 27 Marine Major Littleton Waller report ed that Smith ordered him to kill everyone over ten years old. See Maguire, Laws and War, 60.

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86 On February 21, 1903, seven months after th e court martial of General Smith for the conduct of his forces on Samar, Root laid the cornerstone of the Army War College in Washington. Root used this occasion to deliver a eulogy for Upton and his quest for greater professionalism of the American military, which included the establishment of Prussian-inspired staff schools and war colleges. 28 A year later, Root agreed to the official publication of an edited version of Uptons Military Policy of the United States However, in Roots preface to the document, he gave only partial endorsement to Uptons ideas. After pointing out that many of the Uptons concer ns had already been addressed, Root pointed out that Upton failed to appreciate difficulties arising from our form of government and the habits and opini ons of our people and that Uptons views were colored by the strong fee lings natural to a man who ha d been a participant in the great conflict of the civil war. 29 Root was well aware of great divisi ons among officers during the Civil War between regular West Point trained officers like Upton and citizen soldiers elected to their commissions by their men or politically ap pointed. At the center of this controversy was General George McClellan who was first relieved as General in Chief after the failure of the Peninsula Campaign in 1862, late r reinstated commander of the Army of the Potomac, and relieved for the final time a few months later after failing to follow up the Union victory at Antietam. The traditi onal depiction of McClellans action and his removal as a controversy over civilian control of the military is misleadingly onedimensional. While McClellan strongly resented the interference in military affairs by 28 Roots address included in his preface to Uptons Military Policy of the United States (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1904), iii. 29 Ibid., iv.

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87 the Republican Congress and President Li ncoln, a resentment shared by Upton, McClellan held his military superiors in the sa me contempt as his civilian superiors; in particular, he did not hesitate going over th eir heads to civilians as in the case of Winfield Scott and Henry W. Halleck, his predecessor and successor, respectively, as general in chief. It was not the military or civilian character of his superiors that McClellan objected to; rather, it was the change in war aims from a smaller more traditionally statist war aim to preserve the Union to a larg er ideological war of emancipation. To paraphrase Clausewitz, McClellan would have no part of a war that was the continuation of policies he did not agree with. These pol icies would soon be defi nitely expressed in the Emancipation Proclamation and General Order No. 100, the later the initiative of Halleck, his general in chief. 30 While it would be unfair to call Upton a simple McClellanite, Upton clearly shared McClellans opposition to the influence of the Lincoln administration and the Republican congress on the conduct of the war. In chapter 25 of his Military Policy, Upton offers sympathetic criticism of McClellans civil-military decisions in much the sa me manner that Huntington would address MacArthurs actions in Soldier and the State following President Truman firing of that general in 1951. 31 While Upton admitted to McClellans making some errors, he definitely did not support the criticism of McClellan by those civil and military leaders 30 While McClellan called President Lincoln a gorilla, he called Scott a perfect incubus who is either a dotard or a traitor and demanded that both Halleck and Secretary of War Stanton be removed after they criticized his conduct toward the enemy. Quoted in McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, 360 & 569. Historian James McPherson also emphasized the policy differences over emancipation as being key to the motives of Stanton, Halleck, and Lincoln removing McClellan, see Battle Cry of Freedom, 502-506. 31 Upton, Military Policy. 384-387. For Huntingtons sympathetic approach to MacArthurs dismissal, see Soldier and the State, 367-389.

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88 holding a constitutional view in reference to civilian control of the military. Additionally, Upton, like McClellan, opposed the change in war aims involving the civil war becoming a larger war of emancipati on as was to be clearly defined in General Order No. 100 a document conspicuously unack nowledged and uncited by Upton. 32 Root, conversely, was acutely aware of General Order No. 100 during his tenure as Secretary of War. In 1901, an American general publicly announced that the insurgents in the Philippines had violated twenty-six articles of the Lieber Code and claimed that the United States was justifie d in not according such belligerents the protections accorded lawful co mbatants according to the most controversial doctrine contained in General Order No. 100 the doctrine of reprisal. Root did not agree. Although he accepted in general Liebers principle that soldiers fighting an enemy, itself engaging in unlawful conduct, may respond in a manner that would not otherwise be sanctioned against an enemy fighting according to the customs of war, Root cabled that the extreme form of retaliation being carried out by American forces in the Philippines was beyond any justification. Both General Jacob Smith and his direct subordinate, Marine Major Littleton Waller, unsuccessfully tried to use the Liebers doctrine of retaliation to justify the outrages on the island of Samar during their court-martials. Root was widely criticized for bei ng both too soft and too hard in what he admitted was the superficial war crimes trials of American officers in Manila. 33 On July 21, 1902, Root 32 Upton wrote: Since the Rebellion, with a fatuity pregnant with future disaster, we settled down to the conviction that out total neglect of military preparation, our defeats, our sacrifi ces in blood and treasure, were the predestined features of a war protracted thr ough four long years, in order that the minds of the people might be prepared for the extinction of slavery. These views, so comforting now, were not held during the war. See Upton, Military Policy of the United States, 385. Article 24 of General Order No. 100 addresses slavery and the war. 33 Upon hearing reports of the exaggerated level of reprisals under General Smith, Root cabled that although soldiers should occasionally regardless of th eir orders retaliate by unjustifiable severities .

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89 responded to criticism by General Granville Dodge who considered Roots decision to court-martial American personnel as being ba sed on a nave understanding of the reality of war: I think if you could read the testimony in the Waller case (who was tried prior to General Smith and established the evidentiary record subsequently used against Smith) you would change your views. I had very much the same views of the case as you expres s, but careful examination of the entire record and evidence extremely distressing to me. 34 The suspect use of the Lieber Code to defend American atrocities in the Philippines by war crimes defendants did not dampen Roots enthusiasm for General Order No. 100 and its author, Francis Li eber. Five years after the Manila court-martials, Root, as Secretary of State, directed th e American delegation to the second Hague Conference to radically expand th e reach of laws of war. Root considered the Lieber Code as the source that made possible the success of the Hague Conferences. 35 During the second Hague Conference, Roots ambition to expand the reach of international law at the expense of traditional prerogatives of the nation state was frustrated by his petit noire, Germany. It was probably Roots anti-German antagoni sm that accounts for his partiality for the anti-Prussian Lieber ove r the pro-Prussian Upton. Root took the occasion of the presidential address at th e seventh annual meeting of the American Society of International Law in 1913 to celebra te the fiftieth annive rsary of adoption of nothing can justify or will be held to justify, the us e of torture or inhuman conduct on the part of the American Army. In a personal letter to Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, Root criticized the tactic of utilizing the General Order No. 100 to justify the disproportional reprisals in the Philippines. See citations of Root as found in Maguire, Law and War, 62, 66, & 69. 34 Letter to General Genville Dodge, July 21, 1902, cited in Ibid., 308, n.88. 35 Elihu Root, Francis Lieber: Presidential Address at the seventh annual meeting of the American Society of International law, Washington, D.C., April 24, 1913 in Addresses on International Subjects, ed. Robert Bacon & James Brown Scott (Freeport, New York: Books for Libraries Press, 1916, reprinted 1969), 103.

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90 the Lieber Code. In his eulogy of Lieber, Root described Lieber as a German whose love of country urged him to the support of a government which the love of liberty urged them to condemn in that the peopl e of Prussia were held in the strictest subjection to an autocratic government of inveterate and uncompromising traditions. 36 In Roots presidential addr ess honoring Lieber, there wa s nothing of the qualified endorsement so obvious in Roots eulogy for Upton ten years earlier. Although, as Secretary of War, Root is credited for implementing many of Uptons recommendations for the professionalizing the American Militar y, Root kept his dist ance from the Uptonian celebration of Prussian efficiency and professionalism at the expense of democratic principles. Root closed his presid ential address with the following: It stirs the imagination that the boy who lay wounded on the battlefield at Namur for his countrys sake and w ho languished in pr ison for libertys sake and who left his native land that he might be free, should bind his life into the structure of Am erican self-government and leave a name honored by scholars and patriots the world over If our Society, at once national and international, were about to choose a patron saint, and the roll were to be called, my voice for one would answer Francis Lieber. 37 The Formalization and Specialization of American Military Doctrine Except for General Order No. 100 the creation of military doctrine in the United States, prior to the twentieth century, was decentralized and informal. Except for the edited doctrinal writing of Emory Upton, and Ar thur L. Wagner, doctrinal texts utilized by the American military during the nineteen th century were commercially published, sometimes with and sometimes without an imprimatur As the American military 36 Ibid., 96. Four years prior in a letter to An drew Carnegie, called Germany the obstacle to the establishment of arbitration agreements, to the preven tion of war, to disarmament, to the limitation of armaments, to all attempts to lesson the suspicions and alarm of nations toward each other, is Germany, who stands, and as persistently stood since I have been familiar with foreign affairs, against that kind of progress. Cited in Maguire, Law and War, 69. 37 Elihu Root, Francis Lieber, 103.

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91 profession underwent formaliza tion and specialization in the early twentieth century, so did American military doctrine. Field Service Regulations With the publication of Field Service Regulations in 1910, the Army under Roots successor as Secretary of War, William H. Taft, introduced what was to the first formal series of doctrinal publications. This doc ument served simultaneously as a capstone publication, officially articulating nationa l war fighting doctrine, and a keystone publication, providing a doctrinal base for all other supplemental doctrinal publications. 38 This was no product of a single author with an official imprimatur indicating official endorsement; the manual was eventually the re sponsibility of a Fiel d Service Regulations Board charged with drafting a centralized and current warfighting doctrine. It was the first example since the promulgation of General Order No. 100 during the civil war that a single volume could be described as the official military doctrine of the United States. Seven new editions of the series would be issued between 1908 and 1941 when Field Manual 100-5, Operations, would supercede the series The FM 100-5 series would remain the primary keystone doctrinal series after the creation of the Department of the Army by the National Security Act of 1947 un til the end of the twentieth century when the Armys traditional role as the major de veloper of keystone doctrine was superceded by the Department of Defense (DOD). 39 38 Department of War, Field Service Regulations; 1905 (Washington: General Staff, 1905). Capstone doctrine is the highest category of doctrine publications in the hierarchy of publications that link doctrine to national strategy and the guidelines of other government agencies to include other members of international alliances and coalitions. Keystone doctrinal publications provide the foundation for a series of doctrine publications in the hierarchy of publications. See JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms 62, 82. 39 This DOD assumption was accomplished under the incomplete and belated implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorgani zation Act of 1986. In 2001, Field Manual 3-0

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92 Lieutenant Colonel Walter Kretchik of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, a leading expe rt on the historical devel opment of Army doctrine, considered the first edition of Field Service Regulations as containing the ideas of both of the major post Napoleonic military theorists, Jomini and Clausewitz, as transmitted though the writings of Henry W. Hallack, Emory Upton, and Arthur L. Wagner. 40 The legacy of Francis Lieber also figured prominen tly in the manual. The entirety of article XII in the first edition of the manual consisted of a reprint of General Order No. 100. However, the General Order No. 100s position in subsequent editions became increasing peripheral. By the 1914 edition of Field Service Regulations only a summary of the Liebers provisions was included in an appendix entitled Extracts to from International Conventions and Conferences. 41 In both editions promulgated before and after the experience of the American Expeditionary Force in the First World War, the Field Service Regulations emphasized decisive offensive operations over passive defensive tactics. The contemporaneous reaction to the recent experience of static trench warfare in Europe reinforced the traditional American doctrinal emphasis on affirmative decisive action going back to the pre-civil war writings of Henry Wager Halleck and also found in the traditional just war requirement for a high probability of success and the principle of military necessity found in General Order No. 100 of which Halleck was the major sponsor. Major General J. L. Hines, Acting Chief of Staff, in his preface to the 1923 edition of the Field Service formally superceded the FM 100-5 series in conformity with the joint (service) numbering system. Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-0, Operations. (Washington, D.C.; Government Printing Office, 2001, accessed 1 March 2003); availabl e from http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi -bin/atdl.dll/fm/3-0/toc.htm. 40 Krtetchik, Peering Through the Mist, 99. 41 Department of War, Field Service Regulations (Washington: General Staff, July 1, 1905), 190-204.

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93 Regulations wrote, War is positive and requi res positive action. All training should, therefore, aim to develop positive qualities of character rather than to encourage negative traits. The basis of training will be the attack. 42 However, the 1923 edition was novel in th at it posited, in addition to offense, many other timeless and immutable principl es that could be a pplied to all proper military operations in all times and places. The doctrinal significance of this new dogma, which corresponded well with the major neo-Cl ausewitzian theorists of the period, was to resort to universal principl es governing warfare that c onflicted with the classical Clausewitzian emphasis on th e unpredictability of war. 43 Although such general universal principles came under criticism in the doctrinal revolution the American military underwent on the eve of its entry into the Second World War, they regained predominance in the neo-Clausewitzian doctrin al renaissance following Americas defeat in Vietnam. 44 These principles are still found in Army capstone doctrine; the current definitions found in Army Field Manual FM-3 Military Operations, the current successor manual to the Field Service Regulation, consist of: (1) The Objective: direct every military operation towards a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective. (2) The Offensive: seize, reta in, and exploit the initiative. (3) Mass: concentrate combat power at the decisive place and time. 42 Chief of Staff of the Army, Field Service Regulations, United States Army, 1923 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1924), iii. 43 Such universal principles, such as the economy of force, were prominent under different names in the prominent World War One era neo-Clausewitzian writers as General Colmar von der Golz (see note 7). See also Weigley, American Way of War, 214. 44 The principles were at the cent er of Harry Summers seminal neoClausewitzian critic of American military operation in the Vietnam War. See On Strategy, 1-27.

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94 (4) Economy of Force: allocate mi nimum essential combat power to secondary efforts. (5) Maneuver: place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the flexible application of combat power. (6) Unity of Command: For every obj ective, ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander. (7) Security: Never permit the en emy to acquire an unexpected advantage. (8) Surprise: Strike the enemy at a time, at a place, or in a manner for which he is unprepared. (9) Simplicity: Prepare clear, uncomp licated plans and clear, concise orders to ensure thorough understanding. 45 In the 1923 edition, unfortuna tely, the humanitarian signi ficance of the need for decisive action is not openly accentuated in contrast to General Order No. 100 and earlier versions of the Regulations c ontaining summarized version of General Order No. 100 This was in keeping with the concept of th e passive humanitarian obligations in war, associated with the influence of the International Committee of the Red Cross, that was gaining in influence at the expense of the affirmative obligations associated with traditional just war doctrine. By 1923, the appendix to Field Service Regulations summarizing General Order No. 100 was finally dropped from the manual. As a false dichotomy between operational decisiveness a nd humanitarian concerns in war became more accepted, officers would now have to consult more specialized manuals for guidance on the humanitarian norms of war. 45 Chapter 4, FM 3-0, accessed 1 March 2003; available from: http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgibin/atdl.dll/fm/3-0/ch4.htm. Prior to their inclusion in the 1923 edition of the Field Service Regulations, the Principles of War were initially promulgated in War Department Training Regulations 10-5 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1921).

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95 Rules of Land Warfare However, what the general precepts of General Order No. 100 lost in general capstone significance by their removal from Field Service Regulations, they gained in specialized keystone significance. In 1913, Colonel Edwin F. Glenn at the Army War College was tasked to draw up an authorit ative and updated doctrinal manual to succeed General Order No. 100. 46 Entitled Rules of Land Warfare, the manual was to be the first of an authoritative doctrinal series that w ould apply across separate military services and has yet to be superceded. In its prefix, its integration of Liebers doctrinal legacy is categorically affirmed. It will be found that everything vital contained in G. O. 100 of A. G. O. of April 24, 1863, Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, as been incorporated into this manual. Wherever practicable the original text has been used herein because it is believed that the long familiarity with this te xt and its interpretation by our officers should not be interfered with if possible to avoid doing so. 47 The Department of War issued new editions of Rules for Land Warfare in 1934 and, as Field Manual 27-10, in 1940. The Depa rtment of the Army promulgated the current edition of FM 27-10, entitled Laws of Land Warfare in 1956. Although the manual was far more specialized than either General Order No. 100 or the summation of the Lieber Code in the early editions of the Field Service Regulations the new manual was intended as a reference for all prof essional officers rather than a handbook for lawyers. As the title of the manual from the 1914 to the 1940 edition indicates, the 46 Donald A. Wells, The Laws of Land Warfare, A Guide to the Army Manuals (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1992), 6. 47 War Department, Rules of Land Warfare (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1914), 7.

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96 emphasis of normative rules rather than legali stic laws that pla ces the manual clearly within the purview of military doctrine rather then mere positive law. However, over time more and more of in ternational treaty law was incorporated into the manual. Although th e 1914 edition did not list the Geneva Conventions of 1868, the Hague Conventions of 1899, or the major ity of the Hague Conventions of 1907 as instruments binding on the American military, it fully incorporated an expansive interpretation of the modern theory of customary international law: In addition to the written rules ther e exist certain other well-recognized usages and customs that have developed into and have developed into, and have become recognized as rules of wa rfare. These usages are still in the process of development. 48 The 1940 edition added the Red Cross conventions of 1864, The Hague Conventions of 1899, and the additional Gene va Conventions of 1929, to the list of instruments being in force. 49 Despite the expanding appl icability of international humanitarian law, the most consistent f eature of the succeeding editions of the Rules of Land Warfare between 1914 and 1940 remained the verb atim reaffirmations of the major just war doctrines of General Order No. 100 to include the doctrine of military necessity, 48 Rules of Land Warfare, (1914), 13. In its appendixes, the conventions considered binding based on ratification included: (1) Convention III of The Hague, October 18, 1907, relative to openings of hostilities; (2) Convention IV of The Hague, October 18, 1907, respecting the laws and customs of war; (3) Convention V of The Hague, October 18, 1907, respecting the rights and duties of neutral powers and persons in war on land; (4) Convention VIII of The Hague, October 18, 1907, relative to the laying of automatic submarine contact mines; (5) Convention IX of The Hague, October 18, 1907, respecting bombardment by naval forces in time of war; (6) Convention XI of The Hague, October 18, 1907, relative to the right capture in naval warfare (6) Conventio n XIV of The Hague, October 18, 1907, prohibiting the discharge of projectiles and explosives from balloons; (7) Table of ratifications and adhesions of the second peace conference at The Hague in 1907; and (8) the International Conv ention for the amelioration of the condition of the wounded and sick in armies in the field at Geneva, July 6, 1906. 49 War Department, Rules of Land Warfare (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1940), iii vi.

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97 reprisals, and protections of prisoners of war 50 In other areas, the Rules of Land Warfare expanded the protections found in General Order No. 100, such as expanded prohibitions on denying quarter, collateral damage, care of prisoners, and care for sick and wounded. 51 The only major area of retreat in the maintenance and extension of the humanitarian norms of General Order No. 100 was in the area of command responsibility and superior orders. This is not surprising in the era following Secretary of State Robert Lansings embrace, at the Paris Peace C onference in 1919, of the pre-war German position that considerations of humanitarian law should be ex cluded, as actions of state, from consideration in criminal prosecutions. Lansings conservative positivistic position flies in the face of the idealis tic international pretensions associated with the policies of the Wilson administration. Lansings mini malist position would, unfortunately, hold sway until the height of the Second World War. 52 The Military Professionalism under the Tutelage of the Legal Profession Samuel P. Huntingtons normal model of military professionalism, associated with his classic, The Soldier and the State, is grounded on the asse rtion that between the Civil War and World War I the American military was socially, politically, and physically estranged from the rest of Ameri can society. This estrangement developed a balance in civil-military relations that provide d military officers the political and social 50 Verbatim quotations from General Orders No. 100 found in Rules of Land Warfare, (1914), include, but are not limited to: military necessity (articles 11-13); reprisals (articles 380-381); protecti ons of prisoners of war (article 47). In the case of Rules of Land Warfare, (1940), see military necessity (articles 23-25) and protections of prisoners of war (article 77d); 51 Relevant articles expanding the prohibitions of General Orders No. 100 found in Rules of Land Warfare, (1914): denying quarter (articles 182-183); collateral damage (articles 172, 184, 212, 217, & 218); care of prisoners (articles 49-64); and care for sick and wounded (articles 105, 108). For the Rules of Land Warfare, (1940), see: denying quarter (article 33), collateral damage (articles 26, 34, 45, 50, & 51); care of prisoners (articles 74-76, 81-90); and care for sick and wounded (articles 173-201). 52 Maguire, Laws and War 77.

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98 autonomy needed to develop the American military, for the first time, into a true profession. Huntington designated the modern o fficer as a professional, in the sense of such well-thought-of professions as physicians and lawyers, due to its possession of the three distinguishing characteristics of expertise, responsibility and corporativeness An officers expertise was in the means of warfare, an officers responsibility is to manage violence, without the distraction of economic incentives, for a client who happens to be the state, an officers corporativeness resulted from his professi ons collective ability as an autonomous social unit to restrict entrance into the profession based on historically derived universal principles. 53 Huntingtons premise that the military prof ession evolved in re lative isolation of the external influence of th e civil society it was defendi ng conflicts with the well-known ideal-type model of prof essionalism, associated with the works of the eminent sociologist Talcott Parsons th at traces professionalism itself back to the aristocratic military hierarchies found in the Middle Ages and classical antiquity. 54 More 53 See The Soldier and the State, 7-18. While the comparison of military officers to physicians and lawyers was flattering to the military profession in late fifties and early sixties, it is less so today. Public opinion polling by Louis Harris and Associates surveys revealed that from 1966 to 1983 the number of American reporting a great deal of confidence in the military fell from 62 percent to 35 percent for the military and 73 to 30 percent in medicine. After the Gulf War, according to a Gallop Poll in 1992, the percentage of Americans reporting confidence in the military soared to 67 percent, with the me dical profession at 36 percent. Although serviceableness of such statistics for historical purposes is limited, it would not be unwarranted to acknowledge the irony in Huntingtons stringent efforts to obtain for the military profession the admittance into a club of professions whose prestige has now significantly diminished. Physicians and lawyers today would love to have the public approval given the military profession. Harris Poll statistics found in Howard R. Bowen and Jack Schuster, American Professions (New York: 1978) p. 30 and cited in Nathon O. Hatch, ed. The Professions in American History (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988) p. 5. For Gallop Poll, see George Gallup Jr. and Robert Bezilla, Religious News Service, Crises in Confidence, The Phoenix Gazette (May 29, 1993), A12. 54 Talcott Parsons, The Evolution of Societies (Englewood N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1977), 191-194. In The Quest for Authority and Honor in the American Professions, 1750-1900, Samuel Haber marks a point of departure from both the general professional and military historians previously discussed. Rather than the civilian professions impacting the military, Haber addr esses the reverse, the impact of the paternalistic archetype of the English aristocrat and officer on the development of civilian professionalism While Haber

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99 importantly, Huntingtons model conflicts with the historiography of the managerial revolution of the progressive era in general. Recent historians of professionalism in America have framed professionalization as an interdisciplinary / inter-professional historical development. In democratic cultures, many occupations are conceded professional status outside of such rigid form alizations as Huntingt ons. The progressive reformers believed that bureaucratic professi onals, comprised of scientifically trained experts, served not only the need of th e professionals themselves, but also the sustainment of American democracy. 55 This culture of professionalism was facilitated by the victory of the more democratic and mi ddle class-dominated North in the Civil War over the more authoritarian and upper class-dominated sout h and, although it would have conservative consequences, it stri ved to serve democratic aims. 56 Many military historians have also criticized of Huntingtons model of professional military recognized that junior officers in the late ninet eenth century were involved in discussions closely resembling those of many of the civilian professions, the officers code still stressed an antipathy for commercial activity and disdain for society in general. Unlike Huntingtons stress on the co-origination military professionalism and attitudes of exclusiveness in the isolated Army forts of the American West, Haber attributes these attitudes of exclusiveness to the aristocratic European heritage, however faded, of the officer corps. See Haber, The Quest For Authority and Honor in the American Professions, 1750-1900 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 200-202. 55 Nathon Hatch in his introduction to The Professions in American History dubbed professional characteristics, such as Huntingtons, as clumsy instru ments for interpreting the breadth of professions in American History. Hatch argued that while Americans in general maintained a love-hate relationship with role of expert that simultaneously offered upwa rd mobility and protected vested interest and social inequality, in the later nineteenth century middle-cl ass Americans strove to enhance their occupational status to obtain the respect, power, and financial status available to those classed as experts. See Hatch, The Professions in American History, pp. 3-6. 56 Burton J. Bledstein, in The Culture of Professionalism, does not view the culture of professionalism as completely homogeneous and admits that the arrival of the trained professional served both conservative and progressive aims. This emergent middle-class veered away from th e eighteenth and nineteenth century disdain of the English gentry toward trade and commer ce. This was the budding middle-class observed by Alex Tocqueville in the 1840s mobilizing and expanding their economic opportunities. Amateurism became negative and pejorative. The middle-class id eal combined the supposed unemotionalism of the gentleman with the ambition of the entrepreneur. See Bledstein, The Culture of Professionalism: The Middle Class and the Development of Higher Education in America (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1976) pp. x-xi, 5, 18, 31, 40, & 92.

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100 devolvement as not incorporating the so cietal movement toward bureaucratic professionalism of the progressive era. In their view, military professionalism took place in emulation rather than in isolation of ot her processes of profe ssionalization in America during the progressive era as managerial a nd business practices strongly influenced young officers pursuing professionalism. 57 However, the greatest challenge to Huntingtons norm of autonomous professionalization is the fact that the pe riod of the greatest advances in military professionalism took place under the direct tute lage of celebrated personages of another entirely distinct profession, the legal profession. Between 1897 and the Second World War, eleven of the fourteen serving Secretar ies of War were lawyers; the most notable including Elihu Root (1899-1904), future Pres ident and Supreme Court Justice Robert A. Taft, and Henry Lewis Stimson (1911-1913 & 1940-1945). For the historian Robert H. Weibe, who argued that late nineteenth century witnessed the beginning of the transformation of American society from the individualized values of small towns and communities to the values of the urban middle-class dominated professional bureaucrats epitomized by the legal profession, nowhere was this transformation better embodied than in the career of the man who served as the Secretary of War from 1899-1903, the Republican statesman Elihu Root. Administ ering the most important period of the 57 Peter Karston in an article entitled Armed Progressi ves, claimed that, unlike the anti-business officers portrayed by Huntington, the Armys Young Turks insisted on the introduction of business techniques and values utilized in the managing of large corporations. See Peter Karston, Armed Progressives in Peter Karston ed., The Military in America, From Colonial Era to the Present (New York: The Free Press, 1980), 251. On how Huntingtons dichotomy between military professionalism and the American liberal and anti-military traditions was greatly exaggerated, See William B. Skelton, Samuel P. Huntington and the Roots of the American Military Tradition Journal of Military History (Fall, 1996), 337. For a defense of Huntingtons model, see Terrance C. Gough, Isolation and the Profess ionization of the Army Officer Corps: A Post-revisionist View of the Soldier and the State Social Science Quarterly, Vol. 73-2 (June 1992), 420-21.

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101 professionalization of the American military, R oot considered professional bureaucracy a necessary instrument to counter the contempor ary challenges to a pre-modern system of government. 58 As Stimson, who served twice as Secr etary of War, started his legal career in firm of Root and Clark it could even be claimed that the most critical periods of military professionalization took place unde r the tutelage of one law firm. The Re-democratization of the American Military Not all initiatives regarding the professi onalization of the armed forces can be attributed to the tutelage of members of the legal professi on. The most eminent reformer of the progressive period, following Root was Major General Leonard Wood, whose professional training was that of a medical docto r. Serving as Chief of Staff of the Army from 1912 to 1914, mostly under Roots protg, Henry Stimson, he embodied Stimsons vision of an army representing a democratic society rather than a career of a chosen class. 59 Between the immediate years prior to the First World War and the American involvement in the Second World War, a ba ttle was waged between the adherents of Emory Upton and Leonard Wood. In the words of John K. Mahon, Americas preeminent historian of the citizen soldier: Emory Upton, although long dead, gave the definitive expression to the professional position, and he supplied the ideas to which Elihu Root, as far as it was politically possible, embraced. The most influential spokesman on the other side was Major Genera l Leonard Wood. Woods insistence 58 Root wrote of the rising professional bureaucracies, we shall expand them, whether we approve theoretically or not; because such agencies furnish protection . [which] cannot be practically accomplished by the old and simple procedure of legislatures and courts. See Weibe, The Search for Order, 1877-1920 (New York: Hill & Wang, 1967), vii, viii, & 228. Elihu Root cited on 295-296. 59 Henry Stimson to Warren G. Harding, Jan 28, 1921, Henry Stimson Papers at Yale University, cited in Jack C. Lane, Armed Progressive: General Leonard Wood (San Rafael: Presidio, 1978), 154. 148-149.

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102 that citizens could be trained in a few months was unacceptable to hardcore professionals. 60 Following Leonard Wood in the non-Uptonian citizen army tradition would be Brigadier General John McAuley Palmer and fi nally General of the Army George Catlett Marshall. The professional models for all th ree would be characteri zed by the democratic ideal of universal military service (UMT) in which citizenship, like in the classical examples of the Greek and Roman republics, would be synonymous with military service. Leonard Woods program for democratization was wedded to his plan for the professionalization of the military based on the insights of the managerial revolution associated with the progressive period of American history. 61 However, Woods ideas were at odds with the conception of the ci tizen soldier champione d by the supporters of the National Guard in which individual st ate prerogatives and unit cohesion would be given greater weight than centralized managerial efficiency. For Wood, all standardizations of training, especially that of officers, had to be controlled by the War Department. In his first year as Chief of Staff, General Wood oversaw the establishment of military training camps for college student s. By 1916, this initiative would overhaul the ineffective training of students attending land-grant colleges, as required by the Morrill Act of 1862, into the modern Reserv e Officers Training Corps (ROTC). When the pool of manpower for recruitment of officers was unable to meet the requirements of the national army called into existence in the wake of the First World War, Wood 60 John K. Mahon, History of the Militia and the National Guard, (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1983), 152-153. 61 Lane, Armed Progressive, 148.

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103 supported the so-called Plattsburg idea of opening training camps for older men with professional non-military credentials. This program would provide the foundation of the formal Officer Training Schools (OTSs) established during World War One. As civilian candidates would receive training over seve ral months and then be commissioned, they bear the lasting nickname of ninety day wonders. By the year following the end of the First World War, the U.S. Army was radically democratized by the comm issioning of 80,568 line officers. This democratization was of not just quantity, but of representative quality; for the first time, African-Americans recruits were incorporat ed into the officer training system, some attending segregated and others integrated OTS training camps. 62 Leading this democratized army was General of the Armies John J. Pershing. Partly as a result of their experience as aides to Pershing during the war, Palmer and Marshall would move further than even Wood in their cr iticism of Uptonion professionalism. It was Palmer who provided the concept of the citizen soldier with a firm theoretical foundation. Being both a graduate of West Point and the son of an illustrious citizen-soldier of the Civil War, Major Ge neral John McAuley Palmer, he viewed the expandable professional army concept asso ciated with John C. Calhoun and Emory Upton as outdated in the age of national mass armies. As a mere Captain, Palmer assisted Secretary of War Stimson before the war in his attempt to gain support in the military profession for a deployable professionalized citizen army. The result of this effort was the War Department report The Organization of the Land Forces of the United States. As a colonel in 1919, Palmer testified before and worked with congress on legislation 62 Milton M. McPherson, The Ninety-Day Wonders: OCS and the Modern American Army, (Fort Benning, Ga.: U.S. Army Officer Candidate Alumni Association, 2001), 24-51.

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104 that would be influential in the creation of the National Defense Act of 1920. Like Leonard Wood before him and George C. Marshall after him, Palmer failed to establish a complete national system of universal military training (UMT) which would feed recruits into his democratized citizen army. These id eas were not exclusive to Palmer. During the war these ideas were also championed by the National Association of Universal Military Training whose advisory board incl uded former Secretaries of War Root and Stimson. What made Palmer unique was his belief that the professional Uptonian model of professionalism was not only impractical; it was inconsistent with the genius of American institutions. General Palmer wrote: The forms of military institutions must be determined on political grounds, with due regard to national genius and tradition. The military pedant may fail by proposing adequate and econom ical forces under forms that are intolerable to the national genius. 63 In 1939, the new Chief of Staff of the Army, General George C. Marshall, approved a new version of the army main capstone doctrinal manual, Field Service Regulations. Rechristianioned as Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, the manual was a watershed event in establishing the ideal of the citizen soldier as a formal norm. The manual called for instilling democratic symbolic ideals emplaced by tradition and national culture into American soldiers as basis of their military service. 64 Marshall was a great critic of the neo-Clausewitzian principles of war enshrined in the 1923 and later versions of Army capstone doctrine. In 1939 he issued an infa ntry handbook prepared under his earlier direction that stated the art of war has no traffic with rules, for the 63 John McAuley Palmer, America in Arms: The Experience of the United States with Military Organization (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1941), 136-37 and Statesmanship or War (Garden City: Doubleday, 1927), 29, cited in Weigley, History of the United States Army 398. 64 War Department, Tentative Field Manual 100-5, Operations, 1939, (Washington: Government Printing Office. 1939), 29-30. Kretchik, Peering Through the Mist, 126.

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105 infinitely varied circumstances and conditions of combat never pr oduce exactly the same situation twice 65 For Marshall, like Palmer, military operations and organization had to be both pragmatic and accord with democratic institutions. In response to the new non-isolationist foreign policy objectives contained in Roosevelts Four Freedoms address to C ongress, Marshalls primary task upon his appointment as Chief of Staff was to cr eate a nation in arms to meet both the contingencies of an armed peace or eventual war. Like Leonard Wood before him, Marshall understood that a mass citizen army had to be led primarily by professionalized citizen officers. In 1940, on the twenty-fif th anniversary of Leonard Woods original Plattsburg camp in upstate New York, Elihu Root, Henry Stimson, and retired Brigadier General Palmer met to draw up a plan for a national military draft that would follow as close as possible to their cherished vision of universal military service. Palmer took the plan to the new Army Chief of Staff, Gene ral Marshall. In the face of congressional opposition, President Roosevelt passed the Selective Service Training Act of 16 September 1940. Requiring all men between twen ty-one and thirty-fiv e to register for one year of military service, it was the closest approximation to the concept of universal military training that would ever be achieved in the United States. In order to implement what was to be the most democratized military deployment in American history, Roosevelt called Stimson back to serve a sec ond term as Secretary of War to work with Marshall. 66 65 See Infantry in Battle (Washington: Infantry Journal, 1939), 1, 14, cited in Wiegely, American Way of War, 215. 66 Weigley, History of the United States Army 426.

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106 Marshall was willing to move much furthe r than Leonard Wood or even Secretary Stimson from the Uptonian conception of prof essional officer class. For Marshall, it was common sense that an experi enced noncommissioned officer (NCO) in the infantry was far more a military professional than a civilia n manager of a bank. The selective service act would provide a constant poo l of recruits for officer ca ndidacy, far better than the training camps for businessmen in the World War I era Plattsburg type camps. However, Marshall was confronted with an even more determined resistance to his ideas on democratizing officer candidacy than he ha d faced with his doctr inal reforms. When Stimson was on the verge of instituting OTS styl e training camps for the sons of the rich without going thru the draft, Marshall informed Stimson that he considered it a colossal mistake that would have to be done without him: I went to Mr. Stimson and told him I had done my best and said the entire staff with me on this. I will tell you now I am going to resign the day you do it. 67 In 1941, two months before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, General Omar Bradley, the Commandant of the first Officer Candidate School (O CS), read a letter by Marshall for the commissioning ceremony of th e schools first graduates. The letter encapsulated the ideal of a non-Uptonian professionalized citizen army. In this Army, although there may not be a Napoleonic ma rshals baton found in every troopers rucksack, there was a possible gold lieutenan ts bar nesting under every gold sergeants strip. The words read out to the new lieutenants clearly followed the model fist 67 Interview between George Marshall his and official biographer, Forrest C. Pogue on January 22, 1957. Cited in Pogue, George C. Marshal: Ordeal and Hope (New York: Viking Press, 1966), 461, n. 33. See also McPherson, The Ninety-Day Wonders, 63.

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107 conceptualized by General Palmer and it wa s this philosophy of democratized military profession that Marshall had put hi s put his career on the line to en sure its establishment. Our Army differs from all other armies. The very characteristics which make our men potentially the best sold iers in the world can be in some respects a source of weakness. R acially we are not a homogeneous people, like the British for example, who can glorify a defeat by their stubborn and dogged discipline. We have no common racial group, and we deliberately cultivated individual initiative and independence of though and action. Our men are intelligent and resourceful to an unusual degree. These characteristics, those qualities may be, in effect explosive or potentially destructive in a military organization, especially under adverse conditions, unless leadership is wise and determined and unless the leader commands the complete respect of his me n . Your class is the first of what I believe will be the finest group of troop leaders in the world. 68 A truly democratized Army not only had to be lifted out of class-consciousness, it had to look to be more representative of Amer ican society in other major aspects as well. While the Army would remain racially segregated under Marshall during the Second World War, the positions of leadership available to Afri can-Americans would be greatly expanded, especially in aviation. The integrat ion of the American military after the war under President Truman, who was greatly und er Marshalls influence, was the only logical next step. Marshall also expanded th e role of women in the Armed forces, both commissioned and enlisted, by his support of the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps, to include granting them military status in 1943. Also during Marshalls tenure as Chief of Staff, the first Catholic priest served as chief of the Chaplains Corps. 68 General Marshalls address to the first Officer Candid ate School (OCS) class in October 1941 as read by its commandant, General Omar Bradley, and witnessed by the authors late farther standing in formation with the other graduates. Reprinted in Selected Speeches and Statements of General of the Army George C. Marshall, ed. Major H. A. DaWeed (Washington: The Infantry Journal, 1945), 175-177.

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108 Conclusion The major developments of U.S. military doctrine between the Civil War and World War II were influenced by of foreign models of military professionalism. The Prussian model a general staff corps and officer professional development incited a debate among American military theorists that left a distinctive imprint on the development of American military doctrine. With the development of a formal publication system, doctrine was increasingly speci alized into distinct fields of capstone and keystone disciplines. Af ter the Spanish-American War, pressures increased to democratize American military institutions and to create a mass army. While in conflict with earlier functionally aristo cratic conceptions of military professionalism, supporters of a democratic conception of professionalism imbued the military with societal values facilitative of the extension of humanitarian norms in warfare. When Marshall was sworn in as Chief of Staff on the day Hitler invaded Poland starting the European phas e of World War II, the Ar my comprised less than 200,000 men. By the time Marshall left that office in 1945, the Army numbered over 8,000,000. Marshall knew that the Army organization that he experien ced for most of his career, an expandable professional army, would not retu rn after the war. Although the Uptonian dream of a functional military elite officer co rps was far from dead, Marshalls concept of the professionalized citizen-soldier provided the doctrinal and intellectual foundation of the modern American Army. In the fifth century, Saint Augustine appeal ed to Christians that military service was not forbidden to them and they should conduct themselves under arms in an individual affirmation of shared Christian ethics. Generals Pa lmer and Marshall held that

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109 American military professionals should c onduct themselves under arms as individuals affirming shared democratic et hics. As in Augustinian just war doctrine, the focal point of professionalism resided in the individual soldier or commander. The enforcement mechanism to ensure that this individual affirmation would be consummated in actual military policies with the expansion of the principle of individual and command responsibility during the c ourse of World War II.

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CHAPTER 3 COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY AND THE MEANING OF NUREMBERG The commander is responsible for everything his unit does or fails to do. -Field Manual 71-100 1 Duty requires each of us to accept respons ibility not only for our own actions, but also of those entrusted to our care. -Field Manual 100-1 2 The World War II era American War Crimes Program established a standard of command responsibility as part of a wider American war crimes policy. The central tenets of command responsibility and superior orders was first initia ted as a change in military doctrine and was later imposed by U.S. Military tribunals on defendants of the defeated axis powers. After receiving intern ational validation, these standards were then reincorporated back into U.S. military doctrine. This entire process was planned and administered members of the American military profession in the U.S. War Department In the U.S. military, the word command has two separate definitions that are simultaneously both distinct and overlapping. Fi rst, command is simply the authority that a military commander lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment and, secondly, it is also a unit or units, an organization, or an area under the 1 Department of the Army, Field Manual 71-100, Division Operations 28 August 1996, Acronyms (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1996), 3-2. 2 Department of the Army, Field Manual 1001,The Army, August 1986, Acronyms (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986), 22. 110

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111 command of one individual. 3 The individuals assigned to a command are collectively and reflexively associated with the person of the commander. The word responsibility also shares two major distinct, yet reflexiv e, definitions. Responsibility is both the quality or state of being a responsible mora l agent and it is something for which one is responsible. 4 Additionally, command responsibility includes both a superiors liability for the commission of a war crime by a subordi nate and a defense by a subordinate that such as crime was the result of th e compliance with superior orders." 5 Both branches were central in the court martial of Major General Jacob Smith during the Philippine Insurrection (1899-1906). In 1901, General Smith was courtmartialed and then forced to retire for the conduct of his operations against noncombatants on the island of Samar that year. 6 Smith unsuccessfully argued that the acts of his command were permissible acts of retaliation under General Orders No. 100 still in effect at the time. Later his subordinates also argued, unsuccessfully, that their actions were permissible under the co ncept of superior orders. The future Nobel Peace Prize recipient, Ge orge Catlett Marshall, while serving as a lieutenant in the Philippines, noted that gratuitous reprisals against the civilian population of the Philippines were widespread and that, in his opinion, many more 3 Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02,, s.v. command. 4 Websters Seventh New Collegiate Dic tionary (1965), s.v. responsibility. 5 Leslie Greene, one of the leading military law scho lars in the field, posits that the legal concept of command responsibility also falls within two branches: (1) the responsibility of a commander who directly orders a subordinate to commit a breach of the law of armed conflict or whose conduct implies that he is not adverse to such a breach being committed; and (2) the defense by a subordinate that violations were the result of "compliance with superior orders. See Command Responsibility in International Humanitarian Law, Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems, (1995), 5, & 319-320. 6 During this conflict, U.S. Army troops acting in the self-interested, self-regulated mode of the irregular carried out two notorious acts of at rocity. Over one million Philippine citizens died during many as a consequence of the indiscriminate brutality of reta liatory counterinsurgency operations by the U.S. Army.

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112 soldiers should have been arrested and c ourt-martialed besides Smith and his immediate subordinates. 7 Forty-three years later, as Chief of Staff of the Army, this officer would be in position to extend and formalize the c oncept of command responsibility that would allow prosecution of military personnel regardless of claims of superior orders. On November 14, 1944, the War Department, under hi s signature, issued Change 1 to its Field Manual 27-10, The Rules of Land Warfare (1940): Liability of offending individuals and organizations who violate the accepted laws and customs of war may be punished therefore. However, the fact that the acts complained of were done pursuant to an order of a superior or government sanction ma y be taken into consideration in determining culpability, either by way of defense or in mitigation of punishment. The person giving such orders may also be punished. 8 Command Responibility Before Nuremberg This change in military doctrine supplanted the previously existing American policy positions concerning responsibility for war crimes as established at the end of World War I. Drawn up by the American dele gation under the leadership of Secretary of State Robert Lansing, the Ameri can reservations to proposed wa r crimes trials at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 articulated an unqualifie d defense of the principle of sovereign immunity. Lansing and his team also reje cted the Allied attempt to hold the German Kaiser accountable for provocation of the Firs t World War and violations of the laws and customs of war by German forces during the course of the war. Concerned over the politicized utilization of le gal innovations by the Allied pow ers at the expense of the 7 From the reminiscences of Walter General Krueger, U.S. Military Institute Archives at the Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, and cited in Leornard Mosely, Marshall: Hero for Our Times (New York: Hearst Books, 1982), p. 22. 8 Change 1 of 15 November 1944 to War Department Field Manual 27-10, The Rules of Land Warfare. (Washington: Government printing Office, 1940).

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113 defeated powers, the genera l tone of the American di ssent was couched in the conventional language of conservative legal posi tivism that included a general distrust of any movement toward establishing an intern ational regime of war crimes prosecution based on the enforcement of consistent reci procal standards and jurisprudence between nations. 9 For example, the American Memorandum of Reservations noted that there were two classes of responsibilities, those of a legal nature and those of a moral nature. Accordingly, legal offenses were liable for trial by legitimate tribunals and moral offenses, however iniquitous and infamous and however terrible in their results were outside the jurisdiction of judici al action and subject only to moral sanctions. In direct contrast to the natural law / just wa r perspective of Francis Lieber and General Orders No. 100, Lansing held that the laws and principl es of humanity vary with the individual, which, if for no other reason, should exclude th em from the consider ation in a court of justice and that there is no fixed and univers al standard of humanity. Specifically, the American delegation opposed the doctrine of negative criminality that held individuals liable who abstained form preventing, putting an end to, or repressing, violations of the laws and customs of war. Finally, the concep t that an international tribunal could have jurisdiction for the prosecution of war crim es was categorically rejected: The American representatives know of no international statute of convention making a violation of the laws and customs of war not to speak the laws or principles of humanity an international crime, affixing a punishment to it, and declaring the court that has ju risdiction over the defense. 10 9 For a detailed description of the U.S. reservations to the Commission on the Responsibility on the Authors of War and the Enforcement of Penalties, see Maguire, Law and War, 76-78. 10 Memorandum of Reservations Presented by the Repres entatives of the United States to the Report of the Commission on the Responsibility, April 1, 1919. S ee Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors

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114 The Origins of Nuremberg The American war crimes program, initiate d in the final year of the Second World War, represented not only a transformation in American policy, but also a mechanism to link that policy to international norms. The 1907 Hague Conventions restricted the application of the law s, rights, and duties of war onl y to formations commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates. 11 However, according to the view of legal positivists, military commanders could only be held responsible under the domestic laws of thier own country. The 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact criminalized the resort to aggressive war. As it ratified by the U.S. Senate, it ce rtainly created a challenge to Secretary of State Lansings conservative legal positivism at the Paris Peace Conference. However, it still contained no enforcement mechanism that could be applied to citizens of other nations. Notions of command and individual re sponsibility, without a credible threat of punitive sanctions imposed by enmities other than those benefiting from criminal behavior, provides little solace to the victim s or potential victims of war crimes or aggression. Because legal positivism cannot addr ess the possibility that a nation state can be a criminal enterprise, it cannot provide cred ible redress for criminal acts of state. The first systematic and operationally bi nding international standard that placed the individual perpetrators of state actions under the jurisdic tion of tribunals, other than those administered by the authorities of the ve ry state for whose bene fit the criminal acts were perpetrated, was initiated by a directed change to standing American military of the War and On Enforcement of Penalties, by Se cretary of State Robert Lansing and Legal Advisor James Brown Scott in The American Journal of International Law, 14 (JanuaryApril 1920), 127-149. 11 Annex to the Convention Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 1907 Hague Convention IV and Regulations in Adam s Roberts and Richard Guelff eds. Documents on the Laws of War, 2 nd editions, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 48.

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115 doctrine. Penalties placed on individuals fo r non-compliance with international standards would be imposed on the citizens of the defeated powers by the multilateral action of the victorious states by overturning one of the cen tral tenets of legal positivism. Most importantly, the victorious powers would claim they themselves would be bound, henceforth, by same universalistic standards they were imposing on the citizens of other nations. This revolutionary change in American policy was generated in the midst of the greatest inter-departmental power struggle in the U.S. government during the course of the Second World War. This conflict, which would come to be known as The Great German War on the Potomac, 12 did not result from a polic y fight between Lansings successors at the State Department and the Wa r Department. Rather, it was the result of Secretary of War Henry L. Stimsons and A ssistant Secretary of War John J. McCloys opposition to Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthaus plans for a Carthaginian peace, which was intended to economically castrate the German people, as well as Winston Churchills initial position in favor of the summary executions of some German leaders. 13 With the State Department taking a passive position in the dispute between Stimson and Morgenthau, the Department of War was at fi rst isolated in pushing for a reconstruction of Germany rather than its dismemberment. To set an example for the re-legitimization of the rule of law in Germany, Stimsons policy was to cultivate Germany as a future strategic ally by utilizing the very 12 See Bradley F. Smith chapter entitled The Great German War on the Potomac in The Road to Nuremberg: How the Allies Finally Agreed to Try Nazi Leaders Rather Than Shoot Them (New York: Basic Books, 1981), 12-47. 13 Quotation from Morgenthau diaries, reel 2, box 6, 19 August 1944 as cited in Arieh J. Kochaw, Prelude to Nuremberg: Allied War Crimes Po licy and the Question of Punishment, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998), 81.

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116 trials established to deal with German war criminals. It is hardly surprising that Germanys future role as a bulwark of demo cratic constitutionalis m against both Nazism and Communism, which would play a pivotal role in the wests victory in the Cold War, was not obvious to the many critics of Stim sons position. While the coming of Cold War may have been foreseeable to some Am erican officials, the role of a divided Germany whose border would serve as the milita ry and ideological pivot of Europe was hardly a certainty in 1944. 14 Even those who would eventu ally champion a central role for Germany in the Cold War, either as a uni fied neutral or a divided Germany with its western portion integrated into the western alliance, voiced concerns that the American War Crimes Program was an impediment, ra ther than an asset, to that process. 15 While Stimsons policies toward Germany may have been proven sound with the benefit of the post Cold War hindsight, the American War Crimes Program constituted one of the most controversial and criticiz ed policies of the imme diate post war period. Stimson was initially assisted by Army Chief of Staff Marshall and Judge Advocate Maj. Gen. Myron C. Cramer in his e fforts to fight back Morgenthaus plan for 14 Melevyn Leffler, Americas most prominent contempor ary historian of the early Cold War, places early 1946 as the point in which leading U.S. official reached the consen sus that defined the Soviet Union as the enemy, effectively marking the start of the Cold Wa r well after the initiation of the American War Crimes Program. See A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992), p.100. 15 Reinhold Niebuhr, one of the fathers of Cold War realism, warned that moving beyond the holding of individuals responsible for crimes against commonly accepted standards of humanity would lead to the dismissal of the program as vindictive victors justice, as in the case of the di scredited Morgenthau Plan to deindustialize Germany. Niebuhrs concerns over the more controversial aspects of the Nuremberg process would be addressed in the inclusion of the Ar ticles 10 12 protections against guilt by association in the 1949 Universal Declaration of Human Ri ghts. See Neibuhr, Victors Justice, in Common Sense, (January 1946), 6-9. Another of the realist theorists of the early Cold War, George F. Kennan, was more categorically dismissive of the American War Crimes Program in preferring that the Allied Commanders had standing instructions that if any of these men (the Nazi leaders) fell into the hand of Allied Forces they should, once their indent be established beyond doubt, be executed forthwith. Kennan argued that it was impossible for trials to undo crimes of such magnitude and that the inclusion of Soviet Judges who carried out Stalins purges was to make a mockery of any co nstructive purpose the trials could attempt to attain. See Kennan, Memoirs 1925-1950, (New York: Bantam Books, 1969), 274.

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117 a draconian peace and Churchills preferen ce for summary executions. In his diary, Stimson wrote that it was very interesting to find that Army officers have a better respect for the law in those matters than civi lians who talk about them and are anxious to go chop everybodys head off with out a trial or hearing. 16 The first product of the effort was the November 11, 1944 draft Memorandum fo r the President from the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy prepared by the Army lawyer Lieutenant Colonel Murry C. Bernays under the direction of John McCloy. The memorandum only preceded by four days the publication of Change 1 of 15 Nove mber 1944 to War Department Field Manual 27-10, The Rules of Land Warfare issued under Mars halls signature. 17 The November 11 memorandum included what critics and defende rs would claim to be the most legally innovative part of the initiatives that were put forward by the Department of War in establishing the foundations of the Nuremb erg trials. These Bernays additions included (1) the concept of a criminal conspiracy to wage aggressive war and (2) the concept of criminal-organizations, a novel and controversial initiativ e to collectively try the SS and other entities of the Third Reich legally responsible for war crimes. Unlike the November 11 Bernays additi ons, which would be long delayed by the indifference of the other departments and lack of clear guidance from the President, Marshalls change to FM 27-10 was eff ective immediately and did not attract interdepartmental and inter-allied opposition. The repudiation of the defense of superior orders and the standard of command res ponsibility found in the change to FM 27-10 16 Diary of Henry L. Stimson, vol. 48, 4, 7, 14, Yale University as quoted in Kochavi, Prelude to Nuremberg, 85. 17 11 November Memorandum in Papers of Samuel L. Rothman, War Crimes, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence Missouri as cited in Bradley F. Smith, The Road to Nuremberg, 72-74. For FM 27-10, see note 3.

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118 constituted the third major element, along w ith the Bernays additions in what would become the Nuremberg Ideas associated with the War Department war crimes initiatives sponsored under the l eadership of Secretary Stimson. 18 The initiatives of this Stimson Group, w ith the addition of the concept of crimes against humanity, had been discus sed without much official no tice in the deliberations of the United Nations War Crimes Commission (UNWCC), which had started meeting in London on October 20, 1943. Even after the November 1, 1943, Moscow Conference Declaration by Roosevelt, Chur chill, and Stalin of allied intentions to prosecute individuals Germans responsible for war atro cities, the UNWCC provided not much more than a platform to pacify the concerns of occupied governments in exile in reference to accountability for Axis outrages on their respec tive populations and territories. By the end of 1944, both the British and American re presentatives to the UNWCC had left the process. Sir Cecil Hurst resigned over th e British Foreign Offices opposition to a war crimes tribunal established by treaty. Herber t C. Pell, the American representative, was forced out when his position became unfunded due to his disagreement with the State Department over his support for including prew ar crimes against German Jews under the jurisdiction of any proposed allied war crimes tribunal. 19 Aided by the public outcry following the public revelation of the December 17, 1944, massacre of seventy American POWs at Malmedy, Belgium, during the Battle of 18 The Bernays Additions and the Nuremberg Ideas are phrases utilized by General Telford Taylor, the Chief American prosecutor following Justice Jackson s return to the Supreme Court, as indicating an association with those proposals initiated by the Stimson group of planners in the War Department. In the present work, these terms will mark a demarcation of the core concepts comprising the American War Crimes Program from concepts arisin g from other sources. See Taylor, A natomy of the Nuremberg Trails, 35, 39, & 639. 19 Kochavi, Prelude to Nuremberg, 118 & 161.

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119 the Bulge by members of the First SS Pan zer Regiment, the Stimson group in the War Department succeeded in obtaining an interd epartmental consensus on central points of War Crimes policy resulting in the three secret aries agreement (War, State, and Justice Departments) of 22 January 1945. The War Depa rtment still failed in both obtaining the formal approval of President Roosevelt and in overcoming opposition to formal trials by the British Foreign Office. With the U.S Wa r Department arguing for an extension of current international law and the British fore ign office objecting to war crimes trials on traditional positive legalistic grounds, the resulting respective Am erican and British positions were 180 degrees reversed from the positions taken in the immediate aftermath of World War I. Even though British oppositi on was slightly counter-balanced by the support of General Charles de Gaulle, Presiden t of the interim government of France, the impasse over war crimes policies was not broken until after Roosevelts death on April 12, 1945. Eight days later, President Truman ordered that the American War Crimes Program, as articulated in the three secretaries agreement, be acted upon as the stated policy of the United States. Truman then succeeded in convincing one of the most influential officials of the New Deal, Suprem e Court Justice Robert H. Jackson, to serve as his Representative and Chief Counsel for war crimes in the final negotiations for the trials and also to serve as the Tribunals first U.S. Chief Prosecutor. 20 With the appointment of Jackson, the di scussion of war crimes trials reverted back to the international ar ena with the War Department personnel supporting Jacksons leadership of the American effort. An im portant addition to Colonel Bernays and the Stimson group was Major General William J. Donovan, head and founder of the Office of 20 Smith, The Road to Nuremberg, 148-151, 190, & 195-196.

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120 Strategic Services (OSS). General Donova n brought the resources of the American military intelligence to relieve Jacksons acute shortage of evidentiary documentation. On June 26, 1945, Truman, Stalin, and Churchill (later to be replaced by Clement Attlee) met at the Potsdam Conference outside Berlin. Concurrently, American, British, French, and Soviet delegations met at Church H ouse in London to finalize the London Charter on the International Conference on Military Tria ls, which later came to be generally known as the Nuremberg Charter. The pressure to ha ve a general agreement in place prior to the adjournment of the Potsdam conference pushed th e representatives toward a consensus. While detailed description of the London conference is beyond the scope of this work, a few relevant factors on the resulting charter should be noted. The electoral defeat of Churchill and the Conservatives in Britain broke the American / British impasse on holding war crimes trials. Now the greatest challenge to the American policy came from the Soviet delegation. The London Conference cal led for the creation of an International Military Tribunal (IMT), with judges serving from each of the major European allied powers appointed to try the m ajor war criminals of the European Axis. Jackson was well aware of the problems relating to having Soviet participation on a tribunal in the aftermath of the Stalinist purges and the N azi-Soviet Pact. Jack sons assistant and successor, Brigadier General Te lford Taylor, called the presence of Sovi et judges as the biggest wart of the IMT. 21 The central point of contention between Jackson and the Soviets was over the wording of principles. Jackson called for the text to emphasize universal reciprocity rather than victors justice. When the Soviets insisted that only the crimes of the European Axis were of c oncern to the trials, Jackson wrote to the 21 Taylor, Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials, 639.

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121 President in Berlin on June 6 arguing that no agreement was better than sacrificing principle on this issue: If certain acts of violat ions of treaties are crimes, they are crimes whether the United States does them or whether Germany does them, and we are not prepared to lay down a rule of criminal conduct against others which we would not be willing to have inv oked against us. Therefore, we think the clause carried out by the Europe an Axis so qualifies the statement that it deprives it of all standing a nd fairness as a juridical principle. 22 Despite his lack of success of convincing the Soviets on this point, Jackson was successful in gaining eventual Soviet agreem ent on many other issues. The charges that would be brought against twenty-one defenda nts in the first trial of the Nuremberg process were condensed into four major coun ts: (1) planning crimes against peace; (2) initiation of or waging of crimes against p eace; (3) war crimes; and (4) crimes against humanity. The initiatives of the Stimson group fared well in the outcome of the London Conference. Although the Bernays Additions would be restricted only to crimes against peace for individual defendants, repudiation of th e defense of superior orders as found in Marshalls change to FM 27-10 were clearly articulated in articles 7-8 of the London Charter: Article 7. The official position of de fendants, whether as Heads of State or responsible officials in Govern ment Departments, shall not be considered as freeing them from responsibility or mitigating punishment. Article 8. The fact the a Defendant acted pursuant to order of his Government of a superior shall not free him from responsibility, bur may be considered in mitigation of the punishment if the Tribunal determines that justice so requires. 23 22 See Robert H. Jackson, International Conference of Military Trials, (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1947), 104-105. 23 The Charter of the International Military Tribunal reprinted as Appendix A in Taylor, Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials 645-653.

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122 On October 10, 1945, the representatives of the United States, France, Britain, and the Soviet Union signed the "Charter of the International M ilitary Tribunal" in Berlin. The signatures were, respectively, Robert H. Jackson, Francois de Menthon, Hartley Shawcross, and R. Rudenko. Twen ty-Four individuals were named in the indictment signed in Berlin. The International Military Tri bunal and the Nuremberg Principles Although the major precedents of command responsibility are usually associated with later Nuremberg trials under Allied C ontrol Council Law No. 10 that followed the trial of the major leaders of the Third Reich, the issue of the defense of superior orders was also central in the Intern ational Military Tr ibunal (IMT) held in Nuremberg between November 20, 1945 and September 30, 1946. The four major military defendants at the IMT included Field Marshal Wilhelm Keital, Hitlers ranking officer in the Wehrmacht; General Afred Jodl, Hitlers Chief of Staff; Admiral Erich Raeder; and Admiral Karl Doenitz, the successive commanders of the German Navy. 24 All four unsuccessfully articulated the principle of abso lute obedience to superior orders in their statements before the tribunal. In his statement give n before his sentence was read on August 31, 1946, Admiral Raeder ca tegorically argued that a refusal to follow orders was a political act that infringed upon the political neutrality he associated with military professionalism: 24 Hermann Goering and Ernst Kaltenbrunner, while holding military rank, are not included in this list of major military defendants because of the formers exte nsive non-military role as the secondary head of state for the Third Reich and the latters role as a penal administer and executioner of the Final Solution were primarily nonmilitary in function.

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123 If I have incurred guilt in any way, then this was chiefly in the sense that in spite of my purely military positio n I should perhaps have been not only a soldier, but also up to a certain poi nt a politician, which, however, was in contradiction to the entire tradition of the German Armed Forces. 25 The military defendants rejected the most re levant historical example of officers resisting Hitlers authority. Under cro ss-examination, General Jodl categorically condemned the July 20, 1944 conspiracy by General Staff German officers led by Colonel Claus Schenk Graf von Stauffenberg to a ssassinate Hitler. Jodl stated that the plot was the blackest day which German hi story has seen as ye t and will probably remain so for all times. He went on to expl ain the military code of ethics that governed his conclusion: Judge Owen J. Roberts: Why was it such a black day for Germany? Because someone tried to assassinate a man whom you now admit was a murderer? General Jodl: Should I-at a moment when I am to be blown up in a cowardly, insidious manner by one of my own comrades, together with many opponents of the regime -should I perhaps approve of it all? That was to me the worst th ing that happened. If the man with a pistol in his hand had shot the Fuehrer and had then given himself up, it would have been entire ly different. But these tactics I considered most repulsive to any officer. I spoke under the impression of those events, which are actually among the worst I know, and I maintain today what I said then. Judge Roberts: I do not want to ar gue with you, but do you think it is any more dastardly than shooting t hose 50 American soldiers who 25 Final Statement of Admiral Raeder on 31 August 1946, Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 14 November 1945 1 October 1946, Blue Series, vol. 22 (Buffalo: William S. Hein & Co, 1947; reprint 1995), 391. For the subtlety of the position on obedience held by major leaders of the Third Reich, see also Speech of Reichsfuhrer-SS Heinrich Himmler at Posen 4 October 1943, translation of Document No. I 919-PS, Nuremberg Trial, translated by Carlos Porter: If anybody believes that a command is based on mistaken perceptions on the part of a superior or on mistaken information, it is matter of course, that he--that is, every one of you--has the duty and the responsibility to speak out, stating his reasons manfully and truthfully, if he is convinced that they mitigate against the command. But once the Superior or Reichsfuehrer SS is involved--in most cases, it the Group Leadership Corps which is concerned--or, even, the Fuehrer, has decided and has given an order, it must be carried out, not just to the letter and to the text, but in keeping with the intent."

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124 landed in the north of Italy to destroy a military target, shooting them like dogs? General Jodl: That also was murder, undoubtedly. But it is not the task of a soldier to be the judge of his commander-in-chief. May history or the Almighty do that. 26 Jodl then articulated his view of the ethical profe ssional code of a soldier: And as for the ethical code of my action, I must say that it was obediencefor obedience is really the ethical ba sis of the military profession. That I was far from extending this code of obedience to the blind code of obedience imposed on the slave has, I consider, been proved beyond all manner of doubt by my previous te stimony. Nevertheless, you cannot get around the fact that, especi ally in operational matte rs of this particular kind, there can be no other course for the soldier but obedience. 27 Field Marshall Keitel, in tu rn, appeared to have some regret over his decision to serve according to the principle of absolute obedience to orders in his pre-sentencing statement. When asked how he would respond ed if placed in the same position again," he answered that he would rather choose death than to let (himself) be drawn into the net of such pernicious methods." In one of the most credible statements of remorse given by a defendant before the IMT, he admitt ed that German military honor had been compromised under the Third Reich: I believed, but I erred, and I was not in a position to prevent what ought to have been prevented. That is my guilt. It is tragic to have to realize that the best I had to give as a soldier, obedience and loyalty, was exploited for purposes which could not be recognized at the time, and that I did not see that there is a limit set even for a sold ier's performance of his duty. That is my fate. 28 26 Testimony of General Jodl on 6 June 1946, Ibid., vol. 15, 507 508. 27 Ibid., 5 June, 1946, 383. 28 Final Statement of Field Marshal Keitel on 31 August 1946, Ibid., vol 22, 377

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125 Military professionals were especially inte rested in the case of Admiral Doenitz. Although a fanatical Nazi who was appointed by Hitler as the head of state prior to his suicide, Doenitzs role in the war was seen as the most operationally military of the defendants before IMT. An argument for considering the Allied aerial bombing and use of the atom bomb, which disproportionably re sulted in civilian casua lties, as war crimes has been made, indicating that the American War Crimes Program was no more than just victors justice. 29 However, the defendants of the defeated powers were at least not charged with specific crimes that were iden tical to Allied policies, except for Admiral Doenitz who was charged for waging submarine warfare in the exact manner of the Allies. While this was technically allowe d by the London Charter which forbade the use of tu quoque (hypocrisy of the prosecution) in th e tribunal, Doenitzs lawyer, Otto Kranzbuhler, a former German naval officer and lawyer, succeeded in obtaining the cooperation of American Admiral Chester Nimitz and the British Admiralty to respond to interrogatories that the submar ine tactics in question, refusing to rescue survivors, was also a Allied practice. The success of Kranz buhler and Nimitz in avoiding a conviction of Doenitz on this specific charge was the high water mark for the ethical integrity of the Tribunal. 30 The tribunal found all four military defendants guilty of following and disseminating a particular il legal order, The Commando Order, which mandated the executions of enemy commandos. Following Article 23 of the Hague Convention, the 29 One of the better arguments for considering Allied bombing campaigns as war crimes is found in John W. Powers. War Without Mercy, Race and Power in the Pacific War, (New York: Pantheon, 1986), 37-41. 30 Maguire, Law and War, 124-125. The best source on the attitudes of contemporary American military professionals toward the trial based on press articles of the period is found in Nuremberg and the Military in William J. Boschs Judgment on Nuremberg, American A ttitudes Toward the Major German WarCrimes Trials, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1970), 166-202.

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126 Tribunal held that commando operations were a legitimate military tactic giving its participants protection as POWs if captured. Keitel and Jodl were convicted on all counts and were hanged by American soldiers. R aeder was convicted on all counts except crimes against humanity (count 4) and was gi ven a life sentence. Doenitz was convicted of planning, preparing, initia ting, and conducting a war of a ggression (count1), but not participating in a conspiracy to plan, prepare, initiate, and co nduct a war of aggression. Doenitz was also convicted of war crimes (count 3), but not crimes against humanity (count 4). Although three of the four were found guilty of counts stemming from the Bernays Additions only those major military defenda nts found guilty of crimes against humanity under the principle of command / individual responsibi lity were executed. 31 On December 11, 1946, seventy-one da ys after the IMT handed down its sentences, the newly born UN General Assembly affirmed the Principles of International Law recognized by the Charter of the Nuremb erg Tribunal that included the U.S. War Departments thesis on superior orders and command responsibility: Principle I: Any person who commits an act which constitutes a crime under international law is responsible therefore and liable to punishment. Principle II: The fact that internal law does not impose a penalty for an act which constitutes a crime under inte rnational law does not relieve the person who committed the act from responsibility under international law. Principle III: The fact that a person who committed an act which constitutes a crime under internationa l law acted as Head of State or responsible Government official does not relieve him from responsibility under international law. Principle IV: The fact that a pe rson acted pursuant to order of his Government or of a superior does not relieve him from responsibility under international law, pr ovided a moral choice was in fact possible to him. 31 Taylor, The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials, 559-570.

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127 Principle V: Any person charged with a crime under international law has the right to a fair trial on the facts and law. Principle Vl: The crimes hereinafter set out are punishable as crimes under; international law: Crimes against peace: Planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances; Participa tion in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the acts mentioned under (i). War crimes: Violations of the laws or customs of war which include, but are not limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave-labor or for any other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war, of persons on the seas, killing of hostages, pl under of public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns, or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity. Crimes against humanity: Murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation and other inhuman acts done against any civilian population, or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds, when such acts are done or such persecutions are carried on in execution of or in connection with any crime against peace or any war crime. Principle VII: Complicity in the co mmission of a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity as set forth in Principles VI is a crime under international law. 32 The Yamashita Precedent The most noted of the Nuremberg era tr ials, insofar as the standards of command responsibility are concerned, was undertaken outside of th e formal structure of the London Charter. The trial of Japane se General Tomoyuki Yamashita was contemporaneous with the IMT and was referenc ed in the subsequent trials in Europe authorized under the Allied Control Councils Control Law N o. 10. It is still the most referenced standard of command responsib ility to this day. On October 8, 1945, two days before the London Charter was signed in Berlin, General Yamashita was arraigned 32 Principles of International Law Recognized in th e Charter of the Nurember g Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal. Adopted by the International Law Commission of the United Nations, 1950:

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128 by a military tribunal consisting of vetera n American general rank officers under the direct authority of General Douglas MacArt hur as the Supreme Co mmander Asia Pacific (SCAP). Yamashita was put on trial for hi s command responsibility in failing to prevent or punish the killing of civilians and prisoners of war during the Japanese defense against the American reconquest of the Philippines in 1945. Yamashitas forces were responsible for killing 8,000 civilians, comm itting 500 rapes and other atrocities in and around Manila. Although these forces were under his formal command, his defense team argued he did not have effective control of thes e forces as the result of his inability to communicate orders or receive reports from th ese forces, which was directly the result of the actions of American forces in disrupti ng his command infrastruct ure. The tribunal charged that Yamashita unlawfully disreg arded and failed to discharge his duty as commander to control the operations of me mbers of his command, permitting them to commit brutal atrocities against people of the United States and of its allies and dependencies. 33 The American Military Commission trying Yamashita addressed the defense claim that successful American operati ons had virtually severed Yamashitas communication with his subordinates by a broadly defined standard of command responsibility that that held that a commande rs duty to act is an affirmative positive obligation: Clearly, assignment to command military troops is accompanied by broad authority and heavy respons ibility. This has been true of all armies throughout history. It is absurd, however, to consider a commander a murderer or rapist because one of his soldiers commits a murder or a vicious rape. Nevertheless, wher e murder and rape and vicious, 33 Military Commission Convened by the Commanding General United States Army Forces, Western Pacific, reprinted in A. Frank Reel, The Case of General Yamashita, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949), note 16, at 80.

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129 revengeful actions are widespread offenses, and there is no effective attempt by a commander to discover and control the criminal acts, such a commander may be held responsible, even criminally liable, for the lawless acts of his troops, de pending upon their nature and the circumstances surrounding them (italics mine). 34 This most rigorous of all standards of command responsibility, known as the Yamashita Precedent, was a complete fo rmal repudiation of the pre-World War II American legal position that neither knowledge of commission, nor ability to prevent is alone sufficient to convict a leader or commander for th e crimes of his subordinates. 35 Upon the defenses appeal to the Supreme Court, the standard was explicitly affirmed in the wording of the majority in upholding Yamashitas conviction and sentence of execution based on a breach of an active, rather than a passive, command obligation: It is evident that the conduct of military operations by troops whose excesses are unrestrained by the orde rs or efforts of their commander would almost certainly result in viol ation which it is the purpose of the law of war to prevent. Its purpose is to protect civilian populations and prisoners of war from brutality w ould largely be defeated if the commander of an invading army could with impunity neglect to take reasonable measures for their pr otection. Hence the law of war presupposes that its violation is to be avoided through the control of operations by commanders who are to some extent responsible for their subordinates. This is recognized by the Annex to the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907. Article I lays down as a condition wh ich an armed force must fulfill in order to be accorded the rights of la wful belligerents, that it must be commander by a person responsible for his subordinates. 36 34 Declaration of the President of the Military Commi ssion in the Trial of General Tomoyuki Yamashita, 4 United Nations War Crimes Commission, Law reports of crimes of War Criminals 1 (U.S. Military Command, 1946), 34-35. 35 Quoted from the position articulated by Secretary of State Lansing at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, see Memorandum of Reservations Presented by the Repr esentatives of the United States to the Report of the Commission on the Responsibility, April 1, 1919. See Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and On Enforcement of Penalties, by Secretary of State Robert Lansing and Legal Advisor James Brown Scott in The American Journal of International Law, 14 (January April 1920), 127-149. 36 Yamashita v. Styler, 327 U.S. (1946), Majority Opinion reprinted in Friedman, Documentary Hist, 1605.

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130 In the minority dissent, Supreme Court Justice Loren E. Murphy accepted the defenses claim that nowhere was it alleged that the petitioner personally committed any of the atrocities, or that he ordered their commission, or that he had any knowledge of the commission thereof by member of his comma nd and that the positive obligation of failing to take action was without prior legal precedence. 37 Justice Wiley Rutledge in his supporting dissent argued th at there is no precedence fo r imputing mass guilt to individuals in cases where the person is not charged or show n actively to have participated in or knowingly to have faile d in taking action to prevent wrongs done by others. 38 General MacArthur confirmed Yamashita s sentence to be hanged and issued a statement that articulated the ethical profe ssional obligation of comm and responsibility in keeping with the general anti-positivist tone of the American War Crimes Program. It is worthwhile repeating MacArthurs words, word s that should be familiar to any American soldier: The soldier, be he friend or foe, is charged with th e protection of the weak and unarmed. It is his very e ssence and reason for his being. When he violates this trust, he not only profanes his en tire cult but threatens the very fabric of international society. The traditions of fighting men are long and honorable. They are base d upon the noblest of human traits sacrifice. 39 Trials Under Control Council Law No. 10 On December 20, 1945, thirteen days afte r General Yamashitas sentencing, the Allied Control Council Law No. 10, establishe d the basis for "the prosecution of war 37 Ibid, Murphy minority opinion reprinted in Friedman, Documentary Hist, 1613. 38 Ibid, Rutledge minority opinion, reprinted in Friedman, Documentary Hist, 1613, -1623. 39 Action of the Confirming Authority, General Headquar ters, U.S. Army Forces, Pacific, in the case of General Tomoyuki Yamashita, Imperial Japanese Army, February 7, 1946.

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131 criminals and similar offenders" following the charges as previously outlined in the London Charter establishing the IMT. Jus tice Jacksons deputy, General Taylor took over as chief U.S. prosecutor during this next phase of the trials. During the war, Taylor served as a military intelligence officer a nd was one of the leading experts of the organization of the German armed forces duri ng the war. Taylor had the support of the Military Governor, General Lucius Cla y, and Allied High Commissioner, John McCloy, who agreed with Stimsons view of the trials as integral to the construction of a new democratic Germany. These military trials, unli ke those to be established in the Far East following the Yamashita trial, focused on trying military leaders for straightforward war crimes and avoided the more novel asp ects of the IMT associated with the Bernays Additions such as conspiracy to wage aggres sive war and membership in criminal organizations. Between 1945 and 1949, the United States prosecuted twelve major trials under Control Council No. 10. Two trials, the High Command Case and the Hostage Case, left important legal and historical pr ecedents regarding the concept of command responsibility. The German High Command Case (United States v. Wilhelm von Leeb et al) Between December 30, 1947 and October 28, 1948, Field Marshal Wilhelm von Leeb and thirteen other general officers were tried on four counts: Crimes Against Peace; War Crimes; Crimes Against Humanity; and Conspiracy to Commit Crimes Charged on Other Counts. Von Leeb, the senior defenda nt, served as the Commander in Chief of Army Group North on the Russian Front until he re signed on January 16, 1942 to protest Hitlers interference w ith the conduct of his command. The charges against von Leeb included participating in a plan or conspiracy in implementi ng the Commissars Order, an

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132 illegal order for German forces to execute Soviet Commissars and other Soviet Communist Party offi cials. Von Leeb was acquitted of this charge not only because he was able to demonstrate that he did not disseminate the orde r, but that he openly opposed it. Like Yamashita, von Leebs defense argue d that he was unaware of the criminal actions carried out by his subordinates. A ccordingly, the tribunal ruled that criminal responsibility does not attach to a commander merely on the theory of subordination and over-all command. 40 Although the Tribunal in this case qualif ied and somewhat narrowed the range of indirect command responsibility associated th e Yamashita Precedent in that it held that it recognized that the responsibility is not unlimited, it al so provided a more nuanced and detailed description of the affirmative duties placed on a commander. The Tribunal ruled that a commander cannot set aside or igno re by reasons of the activities of his own state within his area because he is the instrument by whic h the occupancy exists. The Tribunal also held that the care required fo r the civilian pop ulation in the area under the control of a commander is analogous to the protections that a co mmander must provide for combatant prisoners of war. In summary, a commander either must have knowledge or be held criminally negligent in failing to prevent crimes committed by his subordinates. Although von Leeb was not found guilty under the principle of command responsibility for the execution of the Commando Order, he was found guilty of 40 Opinion and Judgment of United States Military Tribunal at Nuremberg in United States v. Wilhelm von Leeb et al (hereinafter the German High Command Case ), 1948, reprinted in Friedman, Documentary Hist., 1456.

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133 knowingly disseminating a similar order, the Ba rbarossa Jurisdiction Order that ordered German forces to summarily execute civilians. 41 The Hostage Case (United States v. Wilhelm List et al) If the German High Command Case can be viewed as moving away from the standard of command responsib ility associated with the Yamashita Precedent, the Hostage Case undertaken between July 15, 1947 and February 19, 1948 should be viewed as moving the standard back in the direction of Yamashita. Field Marshal Wilhelm List and eleven other defendants were charged with both direct and indirect responsibility for the executions of thousands of civilians in Greece, Yugoslavia, Norway, and Albania from September 1939 to May 1945, executions that were held to be unjustified by military necessity. 42 Unlike the High Command Case the Tribunals ruling on command responsibility was written in response to the prosecution successfully making its case that the defendants claim of ignorance of the crimes committed in their area of responsibility by their subordinates was not credible. In reference to the major defendant, Field Marshall List was shown to have been aware of killings of civili ans by his forces and failing to take any disciplinary actions or preventive steps to avoid similar acts in future. List also claimed that many of the crimes were committed by forces, while in his area of operations, not under his direct command. Th e ruling clearly upheld the concept of indirect subordination: (List) contends further that many of these executions were carried our by units of the SS, the SD, and local police units which were not tactically subordinated to him. The evidence su stains this contention but it must be 41 Ibid., 1449-1451. 42 Opinion and Judgment of the United States Military Tribunal at Nuremberg in United States vs. Wilhelm List et al reprinted in Friedman, Documentary Hist, 1303.

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134 borne in mind that his capacity as commanding general of an occupied area, he is charged with the duty an d responsibility of maintaining order and safety, the protection of the lives and property of the population, and the punishment of crime. This not only implies a control of the inhabitants in the accomplishment of these purposes, but the control of other lawless persons or groups. He cannot escape re sponsibility by a claim of a want if authority. The authority is inherent in his position as commanding general of occupied territory. 43 The defense claimed that List was not res ponsible for the illegal reprisal orders that were neither issued by his superior s nor signed under his hand. The Tribunal responded by ruling that an officer is bound only by lawful orders and one who distributes, issues, or carries out a criminal order becomes criminal if he knew or should have known (my italics) of its criminal character. 44 Similarly, in contrast to claims based on legal positivism and political expediency, the Tribunal reaffirmed the central just war principle of military necessit y. Although it acknowledges the customary international law in current use during the pe riod in question that allowed the taking of hostages, the Tribunal argued that the de gree of retaliation against the civilian populations by forces under the defendants command, sometimes reaching a ratio of 100 civilians for every German soldier killed by a partisan, were criminal due to a lack of proportionality. Rather than shooting hostage s as a last resort, the defendants were shown to have conducted a campaign of intimid ation and terrorism as a substitute for additional troops. The judgment of the Tri bunal specifically noted that the German theory of expediency and military necessity (Kriegsraeson geht vor Kriegsmanier ) surpassed what was allowable under established rules of international law and reasserted 43 Ibid., 1324. 44 Ibid., 1323.

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135 what it considered a correct defini tion of military necessity. Echoing General Orders No. 100 and Augustinian Just War theory, it ruled that: Military necessity has been invoked by the defendants as justifying the killing of innocent members of the population and the destruction of villages and towns in oc cupied territory. Mili tary necessity permits a belligerent, subject to the laws of war, to apply any amount and kind of force to compel the complete subm ission of the enemy with the least possible expenditure of time, life, a nd money. In general, it sanctions measures by an occupant necessary to protect the safety of his forces and to facilitate the success of his operations It permits the destruction of life of armed enemies and other persons whose destruction is incidentally unavoidable by the armed conflicts of th e war; it allows the capturing of armed enemies and others of peculiar danger, but it does not permit the killing of innocent civilian inhabitants for the purpose of revenge or the satisfaction of a lust to kill. 45 Competing Standards of Command Responsibility Although command responsibility was perh aps contemporaneously one of the least controversial tenets of the Nuremberg Principles there was not one uniform standard utilized throughout the Nuremberg era trails. The IMT was limited as to providing such a standard by need to simultaneously prosecute senior civilian government leaders and senior military pers onnel whose professional responsibility under the Third Reich, often could not be neatly categorized into military, police, and noncoercive government functions. One legal scholar, L.C. Green, noted that the IMT was only concerned with command responsibility in the most indirect fashion, holding the accused liable for having been parties to th eir framing, or for issuing or passing on of orders which were of general application. 46 However, the IMT did assist the later trials under Allied Control Law No. 10 by determining in advance th e criminality of specific 45 Ibid., 1325, 1318-1319. 46 Green, Command Responsibility in Intl Law, 333.

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136 German military orders. Unlike the IMT, the later trials were not hampered by the most controversial provisions of London Char ter, those associated with the Bernays Additions that hold individuals responsib le for the crimes of collective human entities. Fortunately, the issue of membership of criminal organi zations was made superfluous by the Allies administrative program of denazification The Yamashita trial is still the most well known and authoritive of the Nuremberg era trials due to the validation given it by a majority ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court that upheld its jurisdiction and directly acknowledged the concept of an affirmative command responsibility. Consequently, the Yamashita Precedence was cited as authoritive in the subsequent trials under Allied Control Law No. 10 The significance of the Yamashita Principle has, however, been a source of debate betwee n legal scholars. On one side, in the writings of General Tayl or, the former U.S. Chief Prosecutor of the subsequent Nuremberg trials, Captain Frank Reel, Chief Counsel for General Yamashita, and Antonio Cassese, the former chief justice of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, have held that the Yamashita Preced ent represented an authoritive, clear, and unambiguously affirmative standard of indirect command responsibility. 47 Other conservative legal scholars claim the Yamash ita Trial has been misinterpreted as a standard of strict liability or absolute theory of command re sponsibility that is 47 Taylor, The Course of Military Justice, New York Times (February 2, 1972), A-39 and Nuremberg and Vietnam, An American Tragedy, (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970), 180-181, Reel, Case of General Yamashita, 80, Antonio Cassese, Violence and Law in the Modern Age (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 84-85.

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137 derogatorily defined as holding commanders responsible for their subordinates actions regardless of the circumstances or prev entive actions undertaken by commanders. 48 Following the revelation of the My Lai Massacre of March 16, 1968 during the Vietnam War and the subsequent failure of th e United States in holding its own officers to the same standard it held officers of def eated nations in World War II, both Taylor and Reel compared the Yamashita Precedent to th e lesser standards applied to American officers in Vietnam. Later, Justice Cassese based his view of the Yamashita precedent squarely on the working supposition that Yama shita was convicted for crimes for which he had been kept entirely in the dark and could have done little to stop. Cassese utilized the phrase of indirect (command) responsibility in describing the Yamashita precedent rather than in the emotive te rm of absolute and defined it as the responsibility of military commanders for cr imes by forces under their command (or at least under their control), if they have done nothing to prevent or have not taken steps to punish these crimes. 49 One of the most authoritive critics of th e strict liability standard, William Hays Parks, argued that many consequent lessons about command responsibility drawn from the Yamashita case are false and attribut ed to an ill-worded opinion prepared sua sponte by the lay court, which consisted of a military jury of five American generals, none of whom were lawyers. High Command and Hostage cases, according to Parks, rejected the strict liability theory associated with the Yamashita. Parks also noted that the High 48 Major Bruce D. Landrum, The Yamashita War Crimes Trials: Command Responsibility Then and Now, Military Law Review, Vol. 149 (November 1995), pp. 289-301. Quotation from Robin Moore Campbell, Military Liability For Grave Breaches of National and International Law: Absolute or Limited (Duke University, Ph.D., 1974), iv. 49 See note 43 and Cassese, Violence and Law, 84-85.

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138 Command and Hostage has a greater value as the produ ct of judicial minds rather than lay jurors. Parks, now serving as the head of the Department of the Armys Operational Law Division, also holds that Reels facts were based on popular or bad history and points to the utilization of the word perm itting in the statement of charges against Yamashita as implying that the tribunal beli eved Yamashita had knowledge of the crimes charged. In his view, the Yamashita Preced ent is widely misunderstood and that the conventional belief that Yamashita was c ondemned for offenses of which he had no knowledge is erroneous. 50 The differences between the Nuremberg er a standards of command responsibility have also been utilized to document substantial societal and cultural biases to explain inconsistencies between trials of European s and those of Asians. As the Yamashita standard was again utilized in the subsequent conviction of another Japanese general, Masaharu Homma, who was executed on Apr il 3, 1943 for his responsibility for the atrocities that occurred during the Bataan Death March, Ann Marie Prevost has claimed that the higher standard of command responsib ility utilized against the Japanese military personnel represents the application of a double standard based on racial and cultural prejudice. 51 While it is the purpose of this study to ma ke a legal argument as to the correct legal precedence to be ascribed to the Nuremberg era war crimes trials, a few 50 Parks wrote his graduate thesis on command responsibility and the Yamashita trial.. Major William Hays Parks, Command Responsibility for War Crimes, Military Law Review, Vol. 62 (Fall 1973), pp. 22, 32, 63, & 64. 51 That double standard posits that there is a difference between us and them. The wall that separates us from them is built of racism, jingoistic nationa lism, religious prejudice, gender discrimination, and, above all, indifference. An n Marie Prevost, Race and War Crimes: Th e 1945 War Crimes Trial of General Tomoyuki Yamashita, Human Rights Qu arterly, vol. 14 (1992), p. 329.

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139 observations cannot be avoided. First, whether or not one accepts the factual record provided by the Yamashitas defense counsel or not, it is clear that no other Nuremberg era trial was reviewed at a higher level of validation. Secondly, the U.S. Supreme Court, in both the majority and minority reports, clearly acknowledged that Yamashita was charged with crimes committed by his troops, rather than any crime committed by his own person, regardless of whether or not he had knowledge or ordered those crimes. 52 Thirdly, for the purpose of official doctrinal development, the fact that the military panel that tried Yamashita was composed of ge neral officers who were veteran combat commanders and not narrow legal professionals reinforces rather than delimits the significance of the precedence as a formal military professional norm in contrast to a mere legal standard. And, finally, even if the German High Command Case can be said to represent a less rigorous standa rd of command responsibility, the Hostage Case ruling moved back in the direction of Yamashita toward the known or should have known standard that is now associated with current American military doctrine. International Validation and Codification The influence of the Americ an War Crimes Program influenced every aspect of the establishment of post-war international institutions. In 1946, the UN General Assembly affirmed the Principles of Intern ational Law recognized by the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal. Later, other post war international agreements were undertaken to formalize positions on various problems that were addressed in the preparation and conduct of the Nuremberg era war crimes tria ls. As many of the crimes prosecutable 52 William Hays Parks, heading the US Army Operatio n Law Division and Department of Defense Law of War Program holds See Major William Hays Parks, Command Responsibility for War Crimes in Military Review, 1. 87 (1972), 82.

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140 under the London Charter occurred prior to declaration of war and were actions by governments against their own citizens, th e 1949 Geneva Conventions codified the universality of certain centra l tenets of international humanitarian law to be applied regardless of the state of be lligerency involved. Articles 13 to the four Geneva Conventions, also known as the common articles, bound all belligerents to apply, as a minimum, the affirmative obligations of the common articles at all times and in all circumstances to include any declared war or of any other armed conflict, regardless of whether a state of war is recognized by th e other party, and in all cases of occupation, whether the occupation is resist ed or not. These obligations constituted a core list of prohibitions in Common Article Three associat ed with the treatment of persons taking no active part in hos tilities to includ e both captured and wounded combatants and noncombatants. The prohibitions include: a. Violence to life and person, in particular, murder, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture. b. Taking of hostages. c. Outrages upon the personal dignit y, in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment. d. The passing of sentences and carryin g out executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly c onstituted court affording all judicial guarantees which are in dispensable by civilized peoples. 53 With the advent of the global calamity of World War II, non-combatants now comprised the vast majority of casualties in warfare. Accordingly, an entire convention, the Fourth Geneva Convention, was established for the protection of civilians to include 53 Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in the Armed Forces in the Field (Geneva I), August 12, 1949, arts 1-3, in International Committee of the Red Cross, The Geneva Conventions of August 12 1949 (Geneva: ICRC Publications), 23-24; Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in the Armed Forces at Sea (Geneva II), August 12. 1949, arts 1-3, reprinted Ibid., 51-53; Convention Relative to the Treat ment of Prisoners of War (Geneva III), August 12. 1949, arts 1-3, Ibid., 75-76; Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilians Persons in Times of War (Geneva IV), August 12. 1949, arts 1-3, Ibid., 153-154.

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141 the total prohibition on the ta king of hostages (Article 33). 54 However, unlike the Common Article Three prohibitions, the F ourth Convention provided no significant advancement in the protection of noncombatants. This was particularly in reference to protections from the aerial bombardment and other tactics utilized by the victors of the war. Also, like other treaties resulting from th e initiatives of the International Red Cross (ICRC), the 1949 Geneva Conventions only listed the responsibilities of states (High Contracting Parties), leaving standards of individual and command responsibility to be addressed elsewhere. 55 The Nuremberg experience in prosecuting cr imes against humanity in reference to the extermination of millions of minorities by the Third Reich, regardless of the state of belligerency in effect at the time of the o ffense, had a direct impact on development of Human Rights Law. Unlike the Geneva Conventions, the 1948 United Nations Genocide Convention, which the United States did not ratify until 1988, directly addressed both indirect and direct cr iminal responsibility. Article 1: The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law which they undertake to prevent and punish (italics mine). Article 2 In the presen t Convention, genocide mean s any of the following acts committed with the intent to destr oy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such; (a) Killings members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily harm to members of the group; 54 Ibid., 283. 55 Jean S. Pictet, ed. Commentary on the IV Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Times of War, (Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 1960), 10 and Judith Gail Gardam, Non-Combatant Immunity as a Norm of International Humanitarian Law. (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1993), 25.

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142 (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (d) Forcibly transf erring children of the group to another group. Article 3: The following acts shall be punishable: (a) Genocide; (b) Conspiracy to commit genocide; (c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide; (d) Attempt to commit genocide; (e) Complicity in genocide 56 Not all provisions of the American War Crimes Program received the same level of international validation. Th e concept of criminal-organizations as originally included in the Bernays Additions was one of the more controvers ial aspects of the London Charter in that it set precedence for guilt by a ssociation. Because the administrative denazification program superceded it, indi vidual Germans were not prosecuted for merely belonging to a criminal organizati on, even though these organizations included such infamous groups as the Schutzstaffel (SS), Sicherheitsdienst (SD), and the Geheime Staatspolizei (Gestapo). The 1948 United Nations Universal Decl aration of Human Rights (UDHR) also contains principles that effectively mitigate so me of the more controversial aspects of the Nuremberg era trials. In reference to guilt by association, Article 10 required that anyone charged with a penal offence as a right to a public trial and, in lieu of a public trial, Article 12 required that no one shall be subjected to attacks upon his honor and reputation. In relation to the Nu remberg era defense claims of ex post facto justice, Article 11 of the UDHR states : No one shall be held gui lty of any penal offense on 56 1948 United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, reprinted in Ibid., 158-159.

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143 account of any act or omission which did not constitute a penal offense, under national or international law, at the time when it was committed. 57 Perhaps the greatest validation of the Nu remberg process took place in Germany itself. By August 31, 1955, the U.S. Army held over 281 German war criminals in custody. While the documented record reveals a liberal parole policy which led to the release of 87% of prisoners held by the U.S. Army by 1955 at the behest of the government of Konrad Adenauer, the Nuremb erg era trials laid the foundation for the West German governments role in convict ing over 992 German wa r criminals between 1958 and 1985 following the resumption of its sovereignty. 58 In 1954, Justice Jackson pointed to the significance of the fact that, despite German dislike of the (Allied) war crimes trials, Western Germany has embodied in the Bonn Constitution its most basic principles. 59 The Other Nurembergs. In this present study, it is standards of individual and command responsibility, rather than definitions of aggressive wa r, that constitute the central meaning of Nuremberg. However, no in-depth study of Nuremberg era American War Crimes Program can succeed without also acknowledging the existence of the other competing legacies of Nuremberg. Two major contenders for consideration as Nurembergs central 57 1948 United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR, art 11, reprinted in Micheline R. Ishay, ed., The Human Rights Reader, (New York: Routledge, 1997), 409. 58 Maguire, Law and War 270, 285. This author reserves judgment as the so-called liberality of the Nuremberg and West German process until it can be co mpared to the record of contemporary war crimes programs currently underw ay at the present time. 59 Justice Jacksons introduction to the revised edition to Whitney R. Harris, Tyranny of Trial, The Trial of the major German War Criminals at the End of World War II at Nuremberg, Germany, 1945-1946, (Dallas, Southern Methodist University Press, 1954; revised editions, 1982, 1995, and 1999), xxxvii.

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144 legacy are the outlawing of aggressive war and the rejection of the tradition of legal positivism. Of the three types of crimes listed in Principle Six of the Charter of International Military Tribunal, standards of individual and command responsibilities in reference to war crimes and crimes against humanity have been incorporated in the four 1949 Geneva Conventions, the Convention for the Preven tion and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1977 Protocols additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the charters for International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), and the Internati onal Criminal Court (ICC). Comparatively, the charge of crimes against pe ace, also known as planning or waging an aggressive war, associated with the Bernays Additions has received far less formal international validation as an enforceable element of international law. 60 However, the crime of aggression has not been forgotten by historians and other analysts of the Nuremberg era trials, especially in regard to scholars formally outside of the military profession. Former Secretary of War Stimson, writing in Foreign Affairs in January 1947, admitted that the charge of crimes against the peace was the most controversial and novel aspect the American War Crimes Program. Nevertheless he argued that the Nuremberg era trials affirmed the central principle of peace that the man who makes or plans to 60 A generalized call for the effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace is found in Article I of the Charter of the United Nations, T.S. No. 993, signed on June 26, 1945. The General Assembly on December 4, 1977 adopted the following definition of aggression: Aggression is the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations as set out in this Definition. See General Assembly Resolution 3314, GAOR, 20 Session, Supp. No. 31, at 142, U,N. Doc. A/9631 (1974). th

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145 make aggressive war is a criminal and this is a standard that places an obligation upon the American government to apply, in turn, on its own citizens. 61 One has to look at the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 and the jus ad bellum doctrine of traditional just war doctrine to find the pre-Nuremberg precedents for this charge. Yet, neither of these sources provided sufficient precedence for th e adherents of legal positivism to accept the charge of aggression as valid law. Brigadier General Taylor, in an addendum in his Final Report to the Secretary of the Army, dated 15 August 1949, noted that the most common objection of contemporary critics of the Nuremberg trials was that the act of planning or waging aggressive war cannot be considered a crime because ther e is not single authoritive definition of aggressive war. 62 Taylor tried to address the concerns of the critics of the charge by noting that all eight of the defendants at th e Internal Military Tribunal convicted of conspiracy to wage aggressive war were al so convicted for war crimes and/or crimes against humanity and that in th e subsequent trials in Germ any, the charge failed against all military defendants. 63 The lack of such an authorit ive definition in contemporary international humanitarian law was reiterated over half a century later in the final text of the 1998 Rome Statute of the ICC that incl uded the caveat that, ev en though the Court 61 Henry L. Stimson, The Nuremberg Trial: Landmark in Law, Foreign Affairs (January 1947), 189. 62 Taylor, Nuremberg Trials: War Crimes and In ternational Law, reprinted as Appendix B of Final Report to the Secretary of the Army on the Nuer nberg War Crimes Trials Under Control Council No.10 (Washington: Department of the Army, 15 Aug 1949. 63 Ibid., 221 and Taylor, Anatomy if the Nuremberg Trials, 629. In the former, Taylor noted that the Internal Military Tribunal for the Far East, unlike the trials under Control council Law No. 10, convicted twenty-five Japanese defendant s for crimes against peace.

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146 has jurisdiction over the crime of aggression, it would not exercise such jurisdiction until the crime has been further defined. 64 While crimes against peace have played a minimal role in American military doctrine, it often a central theme for civilian critics of a governmental decision to utilize military force for the ends of state, especially when humanitarian concerns are included in a political justificatio n of a particular military action. The result is a lack of a shared reference in the discussion of what are in fact divergent Nuremberg legacies. Nevertheless, even the narrowly focused discussion of the impact of Nuremberg on military doctrine and professionalism must also include clear delineation between these competing legacies. Some critics, by considering the central premise of the Nuremberg trial as the outlawing of wars of aggression, understandabl y have declared the American War Crimes Project a failure and a fallacy. Eugene Davi dson followed this position when he argued that the Kellegg-Briand Pact was invoked at Nuremberg as the legal cornerstone of the charges of committing war in violation of treaties. In mentioning the outbreak of the civil war in Greece, he declared that in the real world of hard events the dissolution of the principles enunciated at Nuremberg began even before the start of the trial (IMT). 65 Kranzbuhler, the defense council for Ad miral Doenitz and one of the most detailed and nuanced detractors of the Nure mberg project, argued eighteen years later 64 Article Five of the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9. Even in the case of the Rome Treaty establishing an In ternational Criminal Court (ICC), aggression is to be defined at a review conference seven years after ra tification. See Donna K. Axel, Toward a Permanent International Criminal Court, in Belinda Cooper, ed., War Crimes: The Legacy of Nuremberg, (New York: TV Books, 1999), 324. 65 Eugene Davidson, The Nuremberg Fallacy (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1973; reprinted 1998), 6 & 15.

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147 that Nuremberg was conceived, and can only be understood as, a revolutionary event in the development of international law. In sp ite of the presence of Soviet jurors, he considered the program trials as consisting of political trials in which a democratic system sat in judgment of a dictatorship. Kr anzbuhler recognized two particular aspects of the trials legacy as revolutionary: (1) the attempt to find a legal basis for the crime of aggression in the Kellog-Briand Pact and (2) th e challenge to accepted legal premises that an individual owes primary allegience to th e state to whom he is subject. While he points to the continuing inability of the intern ational community in defining aggression as evidence for the failure of the former, he rec ognized the latter was in certain cases the necessary development of law, specifically in the case of holding individuals as responsible for Crimes against Humanity in spite of its being a crime of government. 66 In 1948, Quincy Write, in his editorial comment in the American Journal of Intrernational Law, wrote that both the assumptions of the London Charter of the IMT and the later Charter of the United Nations are far removed from the underlying assumptions of positive law. 67 The positivist view holds that it is only the sovereign state that is subject to international law. The two central tenets of legal positivism, (1) the command doctrine, for a law to be a la w, it must be posited by someone with authority who has the power to impose sancti ons for non-compliance, and (2) the doctrine of absolute sovereignty, holdi ng that the highest body capable of executing such authority is the nation state, were articulated in the nineteenth by John Austin. In 1975, Stanley L. Paulson, a scholar of the philosophy of law, called the rejection of both the defense of 66 Otto Kranzbuhlar, Nurembe rg Eighteen Years Later, De Paul Law Review, 14 (1964-1965), 335-347 67 Quincy Write, Positivism and the Nuremberg Judgment in The American Journal of International Law, 42 (1948), 405.

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148 superior orders and the tribunals imposition of ex post facto laws as a clear-cut rejection of classical legal positivist doctrines. 68 In fact, it would be fair to say that le gal positivism, as understood at the time, was the real defendant at Nuremberg. Six of those that sat in the dock at the IMT were some of Germanys leading lawyers. One of the mo st senior, Hans Frank, the governor general of Poland where the vast major ity of extermination programs were carried out, never tired of praising the majesty of law over the cour se of his National Socialist career. Later, sixteen leading German judges were tried under the Allied Control Law No. 10. 69 Although this study offers a narrowly focused analysis of historical developments, such as the Nuremberg principles, on the creation of military doctrine, it is nearly impossible to discuss the Nuremberg era American War Crimes Project without addressing the central issues underlying much of the existing scholarship on the subject. The centrality of such concepts as the outla wing of aggressive war and the rejection of the tradition of legal positivism, just disc ussed, is unavoidably prom inent in the existing legally centered scholarship on Nuremberg becaus e these issues have been so central to the weltanschauung of the legal scholars who are res ponsible for the majority of that scholarship. For example, scholars associ ated with the peace movement cannot be 68 During the trial Professor Hermann Jahrreiss, a defe nse council, argued form the positions associated with legal positivism, while Sir Hartley Shawcross, the Chief British prosecutor, and Justice Jackson, the Chief American prosecutor argued for positions associ ated with natural law theory, for the former, and legal realism, for the later. See Stanley L. Paul son, Classical Legal Positivism at Nuremberg, in Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol.4-2 (Winter, 1975), 69 There were six lawyers sitting in the dock at the IMT alone. Besides Hans Frank former President of the Academy of German Law, other leading members of th e Third Reichs profession of law included Wilhelm Frick, the father of the legal concept of race, Hans Frank, the former Minister of Justice for Bavaria, Constantin von Neurath, Ernst Kaltenbrunner, and Artur Seyss-Inquart. For Franks declarations in regard to the majesty of law, see Eugene Davidson, The Trial of the Germens, An Account of the Twenty-two Defendants before the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg. (Columbia, University of Missouri Press, 1966; reprinted 1997), 441. One of the trials held under Allied Control Law No. 10, was the "Justice Case" in which fourteen leading me mbers of the Nazi judicial system were tried for crimes against humanity and the legalization of extermination.

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149 expected to comment on any as pect of Nuremberg without th e influence of their wider logic of the view that Nuremberg was primarily a failed attempt to outlaw aggressive war. In the same way, it is not surprising th at conservative legal pos itivists and others concerned with preserving state sovereignty to view Nuremberg which was in their view an historical anomaly, to be more questioning of the overall legal significance of the trials. 70 The 1956 Edition of Field Manual 27-10. In July 1956, the Department of the Army issued its latest edition of Field Manual 27-10 (FM 27-10), The Law of Land Warfare. This edition constituted a comprehensive revision of the War Departments 1940 edit ion of FM 27-10 in th at it incorporated material from the four 1949 Geneva Conventi ons and from the Nuremberg era American War Crimes Program. The manual starts fr om a basic understanding of the laws of war as the limits placed on combatants to protec t noncombatants and combatants alike from unnecessary suffering, the preservation of the fundamental human rights of the same, and facilitation of the restor ation of peace. Following the London Charter, it divides crimes under international law into: (a) cr imes against peace, (b) crimes against humanity, and (c) war crimes. Following th e language of the Genocide Convention, it expands such crimes to include conspiracy, direct incitement, and attempts to commit, as well as complicity as punishable offenses. It is the prevention of war crimes that is 70 For an example of the former, see Richard A. Falk, Nuremberg: Past, Present, and Future, The Yale Law Journal, vol. 80, (1971), 1505-1528. Two contemporary critiques of the IMT from the conservative perspectives of legal positivism and English speaking concept of law are The Nuremberg Novelty by the editors of Fortune Magazine (December, 1945) and Senator Robert A. Tafts address, Equal Justice Under Law: The Heritage of the English-Speaking Pe oples and Thier Responsibility, delivered at Kenyon College, Gambier Ohio, October 5, 1946, both reprinted in Jay W. Baird, ed., From Nuremberg to My Lai, (Lexington: D.D. Heath and Co., 197 2), 101-113). For a recent exam ple of a conservative describing Nuremberg as an anomaly, see George F. Will, Lessons From Nuremberg, in The Washington Post (Monday, December 15, 2003), A31. See also "Positivism, Pragmatism, Natural Law, and Nuremberg" in Bosch, in Judgment on Nuremberg 41-52.

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150 of particular concern to military professionals and the new manual directly refers to the Grave Breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 as a comprehensive list the offenses that can be defined as war crimes. 71 The manual was primarily the result of th e efforts of Major Richard Baxter, a military lawyer. Baxter was appointed as an American negotiator at the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Developm ent of International Humanitarian Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts (1974-1977), whic h led to the negotiations that resulted in the two Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (hereafter referred to as the 1977 Protocols I and II). Baxt er was later to be selected to serve as a justice for the World Court at The Hague. In a draft copy of the Field Manual, Baxter acknowledged his incorporation of the standard command res ponsibility associated with the Hostage Case and the Yamashita Precedent 72 The passage in the final version of the manual on the Responsibility for the Acts of Subordinates provides a clear description of an affirmative standard of both direct and indirect command responsibility: In some cases, military commanders may be responsible for war crimes committed by subordinate members of the armed forces, or other persons subject to their control. This, for instance, when troops commit massacres and atrocities against the civilian population of occupied territory or against prisoners of war, the respon sibility may rest not only with the actual perpetrators but also with the commander. Such a responsibility 71 Department of the Army Field Manual 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare (Washington: Government printing Office, 1956), 3, 178-179. 72 Major Mark S. Martins, USA, while Deputy Direct or, Center for Law and Military Operations at the Judge Advocates Generals School, Charlottesville, VA, noted the direct reference in a draft copy of FM 27-10 that the language of the command responsibility standard proposed and ultimately adopted for the Army's field manual was based on the court's judgment against List ( Hostage Case ) as well as on In Re Yamashita. See Martins, War Crimes During Operations Other Than War: Military Doctrine and Law Fifty Years After NurembergAnd Beyond, Military Review 149 (summer 1995), note 42 at 154. Major Richard Baxters Draft of FM 27-10, para. 8.8A (1 Mar. 1954). Copy was on file with the library of The Judge Advocate General's School, United States Army, Charlottesville, Virginia). As a result of a Freedom of Information Act request for the document, the chief librarian reported that this document was lost as a result of flooding in 1999 and believed destroyed.

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151 arises directly when the acts in question have been committed in pursuance of an order of the commander concerned. The commander is also responsible if he has actual knowledge, or should have had knowledge (italics mine) from reports received by him or through other means, that troops or other persons subject to his control are about to commit or have committed a war crime and he fails to take the necessary and reasonable steps to insure complia nce with the law of war or to punish violators thereof. 73 Conclusion On the Fiftieth Anniversary of Nuremb erg, a conference was held at the Judge Advocate Generals School, United States Army, Charlottesville, Virginia, entitled Nuremberg and the Rule of Law: A Fifty Y ear Verdict. Major Mark Martins, U.S. Army, the deputy director of the center, in a paper presented on 18 November, 1995, noted that, although no definitive list of Nuremberg principles will ever command unanimous academic support, the trials of military personnel displayed a conservative focus on the more traditional war crimes charge s and Nurembergs chief contributions to the preexisting body of interna tional criminal law were in setting a standard by which commanders could be held responsible for the war crimes of subordinates (and in) rejecting the defense of military necessity and superior orders.... The more novel criminal theories of membership in criminal organizations and criminal conspiracy to wage an aggressive war, associated with the Bernays Additions have yet to be incorporated into official military doctrine. 74 In 1946, Justice Jackson wrote an open letter, published in the leading professional journal of the U.S. Army, discus sing the effect of the Nuremberg trial on the profession of arms. In recognizing that the armed services are naturally concerned 73 FM 27-10 (1956), 178-179. 74 Martins, War Crimes. 153, 151.

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152 as to what we are driving at in Nurember g, Jackson reminded them that the ideas of Nuremberg did not originate among theoreticia ns of the legal prof ession, rather they originated in the War Department. 75 Specifically, the central tenets of command responsibility and superior orders started as a change in military doctrine, imposed by members of the U.S. military in U.S. Military tribunals w ith U.S. soldiers carrying its capital sentances, received international validati on, and then was reincorporated back into U.S. military doctrine. Jackson was a legal realist in the traditi on of Oliver Wendell Holmes, an approach to law that held that the laws were not mere rules, but a result of an active, creative, and sometimes expedient process undertak en in the publics interest. 76 Jacksons purpose in his open letter to the American military profession was to convince them that there was nothing foreign to the U.S. military in what was created at Nuremberg. The tragedy for the American military profession is that, to date, the Nuremberg era known or should have known standard of command responsibility has never been successfully applied to an American defendant who has been or is presently a member of that profession. As claimed by Jackson, the standards of command responsibility imposed by senior officers of the United States Milita ry on officers of the Axis Powers cannot be attributed to external influences. The f act that contemporary critics challenged the legitimacy of the Nuremberg era tribunals with the charge that the Department of Wars legal creation was an example of victors ju stice magnifies, rather than mitigates, any later charge of institutional hypocrisy if the victors subsequently fail to hold their own 75 Justice Robert Jackson, The Significance of the Nuremberg Trials to the Armed Forces, Military Affairs, 10, 2 (Winter, 1946), 3. 76 See Martins, War Crimes During Operations Other Than War, 182.

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153 standards to their own officer s in later conflicts. The American War Crimes Program represented an unqualified shift in American wa r crimes policy. In the aftermath of the First World War, American policy reflected a conservative appro ach that emphasized legal positivism and statist concerns over sovereignty. After the Second World War, American war crimes policy was drafted by the Department of War rather than international lawyers on loan to the De partment of State from Wall Street. With the American War Crimes Program, the military profession can be said to have regained control of the issue. 77 The major standards of command liability associated with the major war crimes trials during the Nuremberg period were present in if he has actual knowledge, or should ha ve had knowledge language of the 1957 edition FM 27-10, which still repres ents current doctrine. 78 The standards of command responsibility associated with the American War Crimes Pr ogram were drafted of the military, executed by the military, and codified for the military. The American military profession had made its bed. 77 After the Second World War, American policy, as with the earlier histor ical example of the Civil War era Lieber Code, emphasized command and control issues that were more relatable to the worldview of military commanders than to the worldview of inte rnational lawyers. After World War One, American policy was drawn up by the Department of State, after World War Two, as with the example of the Andersonville Trial after the Civil War, it was planed and executed by the Department of War. 78 FM 27-10, 178-179.

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CHAPTER 4 THE AMERICAN MILITARY ETHIC IN THE EARLY COLD WAR Democracy can be defended only by democrats. 1 Theodor Blank. Despite what Herr Blank had to say, a democratic state is better defended by a professional force than by democratic force. 2 Samuel P. Huntington Formal institutional policies of the war and post-war period had immediate application in the military environment of the early Cold War. The American military profession was more integrated into America society and culture than ever before. It was during this triumphant period of institutiona l standing that some American intellectuals, both military and civilian, would look to forei gn models to resolve the inevitable civilmilitary tensions arising from the establishment of Americas first permanently standing military establishment. Competing models of civil-military relations were directly tied to the institutional self-image and chosen worldview of American military professionals. The institutional legacy and authority of the Nuremberg ere American War Crimes Program did not conform to the competing worl dviews equally. Especially as the PrussoGerman model of civil-military relations wa s being rejected in Germany and was being embraced in the United States, the authority of Nuremberg era trials was itself standing in the docket of judgment. 1 Cited in Huntington, Soldier and the State 123. 2 Ibid. 154

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155 On 25 July 1950, four years, six months and five days after American soldiers executed his order and placed a noose around the neck of Japanese General Tomoyuki Yamashita, General of the Army Douglas M acArthur was still serving as the Supreme Allied Commander in the Pacific. The forces under his operational control were now in the midst of fighting a new war on the Korean Peninsula. Over the past month, American forces were in full retreat as the North Korean Peoples Army (NKPA) pushed them into the southernmost tip of Korea, the Puson Perimeter. In attempting to create a viable line of defense against a superior enemy, U.S. Army personnel evacuated 500 to 600 villagers from their homes in the villages of Im Ga Ri and Joo Gok Ri and then drove them down a riverbank. The next morning, after being held overnight wi thout shelter, they were searched, then directed down railroad tracks to ward the town of No Gun Ri as retreating columns of American troops passed by. Acco rding to the January 2001 Department of the Army Inspector General Review of the in cident, American personnel then ordered an air attack on the unarmed v illagers, killing approximate ly 100 with aerial bombing and machine gun fire. The survivors of the aerial attack were then driven by American ground forces into two railroad tunnels. Ov er the next four days, American personnel, firing into both ends of the tunnels, killing approximately 300 more villagers. 3 Just as in the case of Japanese fo rces under Yamashita during the American liberation of the Philippines, MacArthurs s ubordinate commanders were facing a chaotic situation that included extremely degraded communications. As with Yamashita, the levels of command with knowledge of the massacre could not, with certainty, be determined. Unlike the case with Yamashita, the massacre at No Gun Ri had a singular 3 Department of the Army Inspector General No Gun Ri Review (January 2001).

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156 character that was not indicative of a wider or systematic lawlessness by adjacent units and the number of victims was in the hundred s instead of the thousands. However, no contemporary comparisons between No Gun Ree and Manila are to have been found because, until the Associated Press broke the story on September 29, 1999, the cover-up of the criminal action at No Gun Ri had b een successfully maintained for forty-nine years. In the half decade between Yamashitas execution and the massacre at No Gun Ri, the American War Crimes Program, consisti ng of trials in Germany and in Japan, had run their course. Although it is impossible, due to lack of evidence, to make a determination as to whether MacArthur or his subordinate commanders could be found criminally liable for No Gun Ri, it certainl y does not point to a rigorous reporting and prosecution of war crimes by MacArthurs s ubordinates. This in consistency between official American words and actual American behavior was the first indication of what would become a chronic problem of internal consistency for the American military profession in holding its personnel to the sa me standards it held foreign military to personnel at Nuremberg.. The Nuremberg Principles, largely the product of the American War Department, received international validation by a United Nations General Assembly resolution in the very same month as the No Gun Ri massacre. This resolution also directed the establishment of the International Law Commission to "formulate the principles of international law recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and in the judgment of the Tribunal that w ould eventually lead to the in corporation of a standard of command responsibility for war crimes into an international treaty, 1977 Protocol I to the

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157 Geneva Convention. 4 Unfortunately, the United States would eventually decide not to ratify this treaty and, consequently, American personnel would not be held to the single universal standard of comma nd responsibility it contained. Formal and Informal Norms: A Civil Military Dilemma The National Security Act of 1947 reorganized the National Military Establishment from the historical bi-polar structure of the Depart ments of War and the Navy into the triangular struct ure consisting of the Departme nts of the Army, Navy, and Air Force operating under the um brella of the Department of Defense. The Department of the Army inherited the task of revising both the capstone doctrinal publications of the Army, such as Field Manual 100-5, which linke d military operations to national strategy, and the keystone subject-centered doctrinal pub lications utilized across the services for a specific subject. One such keystone publications was the 1956 edition of FM 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare, containing the Nuremberg era a ffirmative standard of command responsibility as a formal norm. 5 While ten editions of FM 100-5 woul d be issued between 1945 and 2000, the 1956 edition of FM 27-10 would remain in eff ect into the next century. Consequently, FM 27-10 would remain unchanged over the c ourse of dramatic revolutions in war making doctrine throughout the early Cold Wa r. During the Eise nhower Administration, the U.S. Army adapted the Pentamic concep t of operating on a nuc lear battlefield in 4 Under General Assembly Resolu tion 177 (II), paragraph (a). English text as published in Report of the International Law Commission Covering its Second Session, 5 June-29 Duly 1950 Document A/1316, pp. 11-14. 5 Like the War Departments 1940 version of FM 27-10 and 1941 and 1944 versions, the first Department on the Army editions maintained the distinction between capstone doctrine, publications reflecting the highest authoritive doctrinal guidance reflecting the m ilitary component of national / international alliance

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158 support of national security pol icy of massive retaliation as articulated in the 1956 and 1958 editions of FM 100-5. The Kennedy years saw the introduction of a dual Army role in both conventional and non-conventional warf are associated with the 1962 FM 100-5 in support of a national policy of flexible response. 6 While it may appear counter-intuitive that there was no doctrinal linkage in linking the Laws of War to th e peculiarities of nuclear and unconventional war, updating FM 27-10 was not included in the developm ent of national capstone doctrine. While the absence of changes gave FM 27-10 an aura of timelessness and universality, it may have also led some operationally minded military professionals to regard the Laws of War as a field of knowledge not directly relevant to the operational art of warfare, leaving it as the mere specialized disc ipline of military la wyers and law school academics. While estranged from national capsto ne doctrine, FM 27-10s authority as keystone doctrine was without questi on. Although a Department of the Army publication, FM 27-10 also functioned as the Department of Defenses keystone law of war publication, with the other military depart ments issued service-specific law of war doctrinal manuals deferring to the Army ma nual on issues of ground warfare and military occupation. While the Department of the Navy issued a naval servi ce specific doctrinal strategy, and keystone doctrine, reflecting subject sp ecific foundational doctrine to which other subject area publications defer, by issuing publishing two separate publication series. 6 Kretchik, Peering Through the Midst, 154-162.

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159 manual as early as 1944, the newly created De partment of the Air Force would not issue its own manual until 1976. 7 The settling of formal professional norms in official doctrine does not, however, necessarily trump the influence of less form al factors on professional behavior and worldviews. Unlike formal doctrine, informal cultural, societal, and cu ltural norms affecting the opinions of members of the military profession toward the Nuremberg project in the early years of the Cold War remained fluid. As the contemporary public reaction to the Nuremberg trial became influenced by political partisanship as Senator Joseph McCarthy and other conservative Republican came out publicly against the trials, the generally conservative officer corps, however apolitical could not remain completely unaffected by the public debate. Even completely non-political factors cannot avoi d triggering informal professional attitudes. For example, the pr esence of civilian j udges on the tribunals, which were otherwise run by American military personnel, provided an excuse for military professionals to look upon the rulings as norms derived from sources external to the profession of arms. 8 The breadth and scope of unofficial negative military reactions to Nuremberg would be hard to quantify as military attitudes and opinions are not determined by plebiscite. However, uno fficial opinions can be we ighed by their presence in 7 For the first post-war Naval and Air Force manuals for laws of war matters: See Tentative Instructions for the Navy of the United States Governing Maritime and Aerial Warfare (Washington: Government Printing Office, May 1941. Reprinted April 1944, with changes issued to date) and U.S. Department of the Air Force, Air Force Pamphlet AFP 110-31, International Law: The Conduct of Armed Conflict and Air Operations, (Washington: Headquarters of the Air Force, 1976. 8 Lieutenant Colonel P.F. Gualt, a military lawyer writing in a civilian law review, questioned the ability civilian judges serving on military tribunals to deal with issues of military professionalism. See Gault, P.F. Prosecution of War Criminals Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 36 (September-October 1945), 180-83.

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160 authoritative semi-official and unofficial publicat ions. At the time of the sentencing at the International Military Tribunal (IMT) in Nuremberg and the Yamashita Tribunal, the editors of the Army and Navy Journal criticized the Tribunal for initiating the novel legal proposition under which professi onal soldiers, sailors and ai rmen shall be convicted as criminals on the mere grounds of member ship in High Command or General Staffs. 9 General of the Army and Army Chief of Staff Dwight David Eisenhower publicly acknowledged the authority of the IMT after reports appeari ng to indicate ambivalence on his part surfaced toward the trials. 10 Justice Jackson, in his response to the criticism by the editors of the Army and Navy Journal, not only responded on the pages of that journal, he published his substantive defens e of the trials, The Significance of the Nuremberg Trials to the Armed Forces in Military Affairs, a journal associated with the War College and the Army Command and General Staff College. 11 The Post-War Civil-Military Relationship Military officers were also exposed to criticism of Nuremberg by non-military officials and foreign policy theorists, especi ally those associated with early Cold War political realism. George F. Kennan, a State Department official assign ed as a lecturer at the National War College, was categorically dismissive of the American War Crimes Program. Preferring that the Allied Commanders ha d standing instructions that if any of 9 Army and Navy Journal (December 1, 1945), 325 commenting on the IMT and (February 9, 1946), 744 commenting on the Yamashita trial. Cited in William J. Bosch, Judgment on Nuremberg, American Attitudes Toward the Major War-Crimes Trials, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1970), 168. 10 During a tour of liberated Europe with newsmen, Eisenhower clarified earlier statements attributed to him may have indicated a luke-warm position on his part toward the trials. See Bosch, Judgment on Nuremberg 172. 11 Military Affairs, 10 (Winter 1946), 6.

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161 these men (the Nazi leaders) fell into th e hand of Allied Forces they should, once their intent be established beyond doubt, be execu ted forthwith, Kennan argued that it was impossible for trials to undo crimes of such magnitude and that the inclusion of Soviet Judges who carried out Stalins purges was to make a mockery of any constructive purpose the trials could attempt to attain. 12 Civil-military influences do not go ju st in one direction. If the 16.5 million Americans who served in World War II could be said to have democratized the armed forces, their influence also transformed American civil society as they returned to it as veterans. In contrast to Eu rope and Japan, the experience of World War II and Holocaust did not set off a reaction against to everything military within the United States. The American Jeffersonian individualistic tendency of susp icion toward governmental authority and institutions was, if anything, di minished after the war. In fact, Americans seemed more comfortable with governmental in stitutions than ever before, especially the military. The American Historian William H. Whyte, Jr, in an article appearing in Fortune magazine in 1952 entitled Groupthink, noted a major shift in American popular values from a libertarian distrust of institutions toward deference toward them. Less than seven years after American judges and soldiers placed nooses around the necks of German and Japanese officers for carrying out orders (later deemed unlawful), he noted this shift in American values from ad miration for rebellion against the status quo to respect for individual submission to systems and institutions. This dilemma for Whyte was best exemplified by Herman Wouks (year) n ovel, later to be made into a major film, The Caine Mutiny, in which a group of young Navy officers, just vindicated by a court 12 Kennan, Memoirs, 274.

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162 martial for their action relieving an incompeten t superior officer, are depicted lamenting their decision. 13 It was in the midst of this unique post-war harmony between American citizens and governmental authority that America experienced its greatest civil-military controversy since the Civil War. The Trum an-MacArthur controvers y during the Korean War highlighted the issue of military obedience and civilian control of the military from a new perspective. After being fired as Supreme Allied Commander by President Truman for exceeding his authority, MacArthur articulated a theory of military obedience that extended the range of when it is permissi ble to disobey orders beyond the Nuremberg principle of not obeying criminal orders. Allowing a military commander to question civilian authority that went against a m ilitary commanders personal assessment of the national interest, MacArthur ar gued that military personnels allegiance and loyalty to those who temporarily exercise the authority of the executive branch of government should be secondary to their allegiance to t he country and its constitution and that military members must be free to speak the truth in accordance with conviction and conscience. 14 As MacArthur was replaced by less c ontroversial and better-disciplined officers, such as Lieutenant Generals Matthew B. Ridgeway and James Van Fleet, the Truman-MacArthur controversy continued to divide Americans both in and out of uniform. 13 William H. Whyte, Jr., Groupthink, 45 (March 19 52) pp. 114-146 reprinted in Gerald N. Grob and George Athan Billas, ed., Interpretations of American History, Vol II (New York: The Free Press, 1982) 448-459. 14 Douglas MacArthur, Revitilizing a Nation: A Statem ent of Beliefs, Opinions, and Policies Embodied in the Public Pronouncements of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, edited by John Pratt, (Chicago: Heritage Foundation, 1952), 61.

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163 The American military historian, T. Harry Williams, in a 1952 article, The Macs and the Ikes: Americas Two Military Tradition, argued that the so-called Truman MacArthur debate was just a contemporaneous manifestation of a historical conflict between two irreconcilable tra ditions of civil-military relations in America. The one accepting direct civilian contro l of the military, exemplified by the Generals Eisenhower and Marshall, he termed the Ikes; and the ones that do not, exemplified by Generals MacArthur and McClellan, he termed the Macs. 15 Williams concern over recurrent historical episodes of the insubordination by leading members of th e American military profession would be echoed by other eminent military historians. Russell F. Weigley, in his Military History of the United States notes that MacArthur and his defenders exploited American misgivings over limited war to undermine the Truman administration. 16 The Normal Theory of American Military Professionalism Williams thesis of an internal division between various leaders of the American military profession initiated the greatest deba te on the proper civil-military relationship since the American Civil War. 17 Eliot A. Cohen, Professor of Strategic Studies at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced Internati onal Studies, coined the term normal theory to describe a model of civil-military relations that rests on a conception of professionalism put forward in 1957 by Samuel P. Huntington in The Soldier and the 15 T. Harry Williams, The Macs and the Ikes: Americas Two Military Traditions, American Mercury, LXXV (October 1952), 32-29. 16 Weigley, History of the United States Army, 517-519. 17 For Huntingtons critique of the Williams thesis, see The Soldier and the State, 367-373.

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164 State: The Theory and Politics Of Civil-Military Relations 18 Distributed to officer candidates in an edited form and remaining on the U.S. Army Chief of Staffs Professional Reading List for over half a century later, The Soldier and the State represents the most widely accepted paradigm of American military professionalism during the Cold War. As a result, Huntingt ons book provides an archetypal example of a publication that is both uno fficial and yet authoritive. 19 Huntingtons book was a direct response to Williams article on the Truman MacArthur controversy that made a case for a conflict model of American military professional development in which major military leaders either conformed to a democratic or an aristocratic military tr adition. In contrast, Huntington argued for a consensus model for the development of the American military profession in which discontinuity lies between American civil society and an increasingly professional American military culture. 20 In his chapter, The Mili tary Mind: Conservative Realism of the Professional Military Et hic, Huntington argues that pr ofessional officers maintain 18 Eliot A. Cohen, The Unequal Dialogue in Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-Military Gap and American National Security, ed. Peter D, Feaver and Richard H. Kohn (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001), 433. Cohen is a critic of Huntingtons model of civil-military relations and argues that actual control of the military by civilian authority facilitates rather than im pedes military effectiveness. Huntingtons seminal Soldier and the State, which is in its twelve printing. Huntington also reiterated his basic model of military professionalism in The Soldier and the State in the 1970s found in The Changing World of the American Military, edited by Franklin D. Margiotta (Boulder: Westview, 1978), Democracy And Armed Forces: Reforming Civil-Military Relations, Current (February 1, 1996) pp. 15-35, Armed Forces and Democracy, Reforming Civil-Military Relations, Journal of Democracy (October 1995) and his response to Richard H Kohn article in The National Interest in Exchange on Civil-Military Relations, The National Interest, No. 36 (Summer 1994) pp.27-29. 19 Officer candidates are usually issued Soldier and the State in an edited form such as found in Malham M. Watkins, ed., War, Morality, and the Military Profession 2nd ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985), 23-56. The most current posting of the U.S. Army Chief of Staffs Professional Reading List is available at http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/referen ce/CSAList/CSAList.htm, (accesse d 31 March 2004): Internet. 20 T. Harry Williams, The Macs and the Ikes: Americas Two Military Traditions, American Mercury, LXXV (October 1952), 32-29. For Huntingtons critique of Williams, see The Soldier and the State, 367373.

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165 a distinctive and persistent weltanschauung (world view) that molds and influences their contemporaneous attitudes and values. Huntington, a former Coordinator of Security Planning for the National Security Council, is the Eaton Professor of the Science of Government and Director of the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at the Center for International Affairs at Harvard Univ ersity. Throughout hi s scholarly career, Huntington has articulated various philosophies related to essentia lizing the differences between peoples and nations in the contem porary language of political conservatism, changing his intellectual foundations to keep pace with changes in the historical currents of American conservative thought. His more recent post-cold war writings include his 1996 work, The Clash of Civilizations and th e Remaking of the World Order which provides a post Cold War model of global conf lict that emphasizes civilizational markers between peoples. Similarly, his 2004 book, Who Are We? The Challenges of American Identity, offers a rather straightforward defens e of an American nationalism based on ethnic and religious homogeneit y. Unlike these later works, The Soldier and the State emphasizes the centrality of ideological differe nces that were typical of the American intellectual and academic currents of the early years of the Cold War. 21 His claim of an autonomous worldview possessed by American military professionals fit well into the general in tellectual current prevalent across post-war American society. He was a contemporary of Harvard historian Louis Hartz, the leading proponent of the conservative c onsensus school of American political history. Hartzs 21 Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996) and Who Are We? The Challenges of American Identity, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004). For a very brief comparativ e analysis of Huntingtons major wo rks, see Daniel Lazare, Diversity and Its Discontents, in The Nation, vol. 278-23 (June 14, 2004), 18-24.

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166 seminal The Liberal Tradition in America had appeared just two years before Soldier and the State. Huntington, in Soldier and the State, undertook to portray American society as possessing a persistent ideological base. Li ke Hartz, Huntington interpreted American political thought as inherently liberal in the conservative Lockean sense of the term. For a liberal democracy like America to be ade quately defended, Huntington argued that its liberalism, which included a deep-seated an timilitarism, had to be counterbalanced by institutions comprised of individuals possessing the weltanschauung of conservativerealism, such as a professional officer corps. 22 Along with conservative Hartzian consensus views of American political history, another academic tendency prevalent in pos t-war academia was the ascendancy of the relativistic, social view of man inspired by anthropologist s like Ruth Benedict. This interpretation holds that indi viduals systematically internal ize beliefs and norms of the social and cultural systems in which they operate. This approach fits nicely with William Whytes conception of the post-war organizatio nal man deferring his individual beliefs to a wider Groupthink. Whyte maintained that three interrelated ideas sustained this groupthink manifestation: (1 ) the relativity of morals and ethics, (2) the prominence of the need for group harmony in the selection of behavior and opinions, and (3) the utilization of scientific me thods for the study of ethics. 23 Huntingtons 1957 reduction of the proper weltanschauung of a military officer to an abstraction he called the military mind is an ideal illu stration of an hybrid blend of a conservative interpretation of American political history with the cultu ral relativism of post war social theory. 22 Huntington, The Soldier and the State, 79. 23 Whyte, Groupthink, 448-459.

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167 To Huntington, the military mind is equated with the possession of a conservative realism that emphasizes the permanence, irratio nality, weakness, and evil in human nature. It stresses the supremacy of societ y over the individual and the importance of order, hierarchy, and division of function. It stresses the continuity and value of history. It accepts the nation state as the highest form of political organization and recognizes the continuing likelihood of wa rs among nations states. 24 Huntington then asserts a model of civil-military relations that complements his esseniatialized distinction between military professionals and their civilian superiors in which a so-called objective civilian control of the military, which maximizes military professionalism by minimizing civilian interference, is preferable to a so -called subjective civilian control, which maximizes civilian control by constitutional methods. 25 To do this, Huntington is forced to turn the famous axiom war is nothing but a continuation of political intercourse by other means on its head. I have already defined this revision ist interpretation of Clausewitz as neo-Clausewitz ian in that it inverts Clause witzs axiom into it opposite, political intercourse is noth ing but a continuation of war by other means, or, in other word, making foreign policy contingent on military policy, The most internally inconsistent aspect of Huntingtons model is the proportion of the American military that it excludes. Not only are members of the Federal Reserve and National Guard forces expunged, non-commissione d officers and technical officers are 24 Huntington, The Soldier and the State, 79 25 Huntington frankly admits his concept of objective civilian control of the military is extra constitutional. Huntington is critical of constitutional allegiance because it represents cutting loose from the safe grounds of objective civilian control, which is achieved by establishing a distinct class of specialists in the management of violence, and rendering them politically sterile and neutral. 25 See Ibid., 80-85.

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168 counted among the ranks of the non-professionals. In other words, the vast majority of those who spend the greater po rtion of their professional li ves in the American Armed Forces are counted out. 26 Huntingtons views were anti thetical to the value that American military leaders dur ing the Second World War, especially Marshall, placed in enlisted and non-commissioned officers. 27 The ethical criteria place d on individual members of the profession of arms found both in traditional just war doctrine, General Orders No. 100, and the mandated constitutional allegian ce mandate by Congress after the Civil War ar e all extraneous to Huntingtons conception of a ci vil-military relationship, which he simply conceives as an association between a professional whose expert ise just happens to be the management of violence and a client who ju st happens to be the state. 28 The Rehabilitation of the Wehrmacht and the Re-Prussification of the American Military Profession The most controversial aspects of Huntingtons normal theory of military professionalism is that, one decade after the Nuremberg trials, it generally displaced the democratic ideal of the citizen soldier exemplified by General of the Army Marshall to one associated with the military traditions Prussia and Germany. Specifically, it challenged the basic Nuremberg principle pr ohibiting the defense of superior orders except as mitigation. The disobedience of a soldier, in which Huntington cited the 26 Huntington also classed those not involved in the direct application of violence such Quartermaster and Intelligence officers, as lacking the expertise of the line or combat arms officers. See The Soldier and the State, 7-18. 27 Forest C. Pogue, Marshalls official biographer, wr ote that Marshall considered the enlisted soldiers voice is the voice of a democratic army. See George C. Marshall, Organizer of Victory (New York: Viking Press, 1973), 93. 28 Ibid., 55-58.

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169 example of the July 20, 1944, conspiracy by senior German officers to assassinate Hitler, automatically transfers the actor from the r ealm of military ethics to the realm of the political. In a case where a soldier is aske d to engage in genocide, Huntington provides the maxim: As a soldier, he owes obedience; as a man, he owes disobedience. Like General Alfred Jodl in the defendants bench at the IMT in Nuremberg, Huntington placed the July 20 conspirators against Hitler beyond the pale of military professionalism. This is not to imply Huntington had any symp athy for war criminals. Rather, it simply points out the two oppositional visions of the military professional ethic, the one held by Huntington and the one that the United States and its Allies held out to the military leaders of the defeated Axis. 29 Recognizing the tragedy of profe ssional militarism in Germany, Huntington argued no other officer corps achieved such high standards of professionalism, and the officer corps of no other power was in the end so completely prostituted. 30 However, Huntington went far beyond the qualified st atement of General Eisenhower that the Wehrmacht had not lost its honor despite the crimes of many of its leaders or even Justice Jacksons declaration that the Weh rmacht was a far more decent organization than the more Nazified formations such as the SS. 31 The most authoritative historical criti que of the German military profession, published in the early years of the Cold War, was that of Brigadier General Telford 29 Huntington, The Soldier and the State 77-78 30 Ibid., 98. 31 For Eisenhowers po sition, see Bosch, Judgment on Nuremberg 174.and for Jacksons see The Significance of Nuremberg 14

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170 Taylor. Prior to serving as the chief U.S. prosecutor in the Nuremberg era trials of numerous German officers, Taylor served as the lead military intelligence officer specializing in studying the co mmand structure of the Wehrm acht during the war. In his 1952 encyclopedic history of the German military leadership, Sword and Swastika: Generals and Nazis in the Third Reich Taylor portrayed Germanys prewar and wartime military leaders as lacking the moral discip line to protect their own traditions and choosing to become, themselves, a pillar of the Third Reich in the perpetration of atrocities that beggar description. 32 Taylor dismissed the claim that military leaders are mere janitors of the military machine with no interest in the political ends of state policy. Rather, the historical lesson of the German militarys failure to stand up to Nazism is to be found in the cardinal tenet of republicanism that the milita ry are servants of the state, not an autonomous caste. For Taylor, it was not th e military defendants at Nuremberg such as Field Marshal Keitel, but General Ludwig Beck the other Ge neral Staff conspirators in the July 20, 1944 who gave their lives in the attempted assassinati on of Hitler who stood on the right side of military professionalism. Taylor ends his work by quoting Beck History will indict the highest leaders of the We hrmacht with bloodguilt if they do not act in accordance with expert and statesmanlike knowledge and assurance. Their duty of sold ierly obedience finds its limits when their knowledge, conscience and responsibility forbid the execution of the order. 33 32 Taylor, Sword and Swastika: Generals and Nazis in the Third Reich, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1952), 364, 366. 33 Ibid., 370 & 373.

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171 Huntington was far from the only Amer ican scholar to challenge negative portrayals of the professionalis m of the Wehrmacht, such as Taylors. In 1936, General Albert Coady Wedemeyer, who would later serve on the war plans division in the War Department during the World War II and late r succeed Joseph Stilwell as commander of the U.S. forces in China, attended the prestigious Kriegsakademie in Berlin for two years as an exchange student. He became acquainte d with officers who later took part in the July 20, 1944, plot to kill Hitler, includi ng Claus Graf von Stauffenberg and General Ludwig Beck, then serving as Oberkommando der Wehrmacht. In his final year in Germany, Wedemeyer was assigned to comma nd Wehrmacht antitank battalion in annual maneuvers. Wedemeyer was very impressed with German General Staff system and other German doctrines, which he documented in a 147-page report: Throughout the instruction at the Kriegsakademie and based upon my observations while serving with tr oops on maneuvers, I have been impressed with the thoroughness with which the military as a whole is being trained to seize and maintain th e initiative. An aggressive spirit is being inculcated in the leaders of all grades. 34 This report received a favorable notice by General Malin Craig, the Army chief of staff, Brigadier General George Marshall, then serving as chief of the War Plans Division, and Secretary of Wa r Stimson, who brought it to the attention of President Roosevelt. Wedemeyer served as a conduit for Ge rman historical doctri ne, especially that of Clausewitz, to American military and scholarly professionals both before and after his 34 Memorandum, Captain A.C.Wedemeyer for the Adjutant General, 3 August 1938, Subj: German General Staff School, NARA RG 165, G-2 Regional Files--Germany (6740), Washington National Record Center, Suitland, Md.

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172 retirement. 35 In a 1947 article, scholars Edward A. Shils and Morris Janowitz asserted that the wartime officer leadership retained its neo-aris tocratic social organization as compared to the SS whose officers who came mainly from the middle class and who based their esprit de corps on nationalism and devotion to the Nazi cause. 36 Colonel T. N. Dupay, U.S. Army, Ret., one of Americas most prolific mili tary historians and head of the Historical Evaluation and Research Organization (HER O), published research that claimed the Wehrmacht displayed a combat effectiveness of 10 percent superiority over other Allied armies in general during the World War II a nd 30 percent over British and American forces in the early years of the war. In his book A Genius for War: The German Army and General Staff, 1807-1945, Dupay was convinced that the cause of Wehrmacht effectiveness was the fact that the Germen Army, uniquely, discove red the secret of institutionalizing military excellence and that military was simply the instruments of policy and the creators of the aggr essive aims of their government. 37 35 Albert C. Wedemeyer, Wedemeyer Reports! (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1958), 417-418 and Forrest C. Pogue, in George C. Marshall: Ordeal and Hope. 1932-1942 (New York: The Viking Press, 1966), 141. 36 Edward A. Shils and Morris Janowitz, Cohesion an d Disintegration in the German Wehrmacht in World War II, Public Opinion Quarterly 12 (1948), 280-315. 37 Dupuy, book A Genius for War: The German Army and General Staff, 1807-1945, (New York: PrenticeHall, 1977), 2, 5, & 309. This positive view of th e Wehrmacht also found an outlet in American popular culture with the release of the 1965 film "The Battle of the Bulge," by Warner Brothers. Made with substantial assistance from the U.S. Army, the film depicts a fictional account of a handsome apolitical professional Wehrmacht officer in command of the armored spearhead during the Ardennes Counteroffensive, the last German offensive in the west ern theater. In addressing the sensitive issue of the execution of American POWs at Malmedy in Belgium, this paragon of Huntingtonian virtues is shown lecturing his military superior on how war crimes are milita rily disadvantageous because they stiffen enemy resolve. His superior responds by placing the blame for any atrocities on the presence of SS formations in the battle area. In actual fact, the offi cer who led the armored spearhead during the Ardennes Counteroffensive was Waffen SS General Josef "Sepp" Dietrich, who was tried as a war criminal for issuing the orders the led to the Malmedy massacre. The Hollywood rehabilitation of the historical record of this specific campaign and massacre symbolically illustrates the American rehabilitation of the

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173 What is ironic about all these American ge rmanophilic sentiments is that they were formally opposed by the modern German Army, the Bundeswehr. Theodor Blank, the first defense minister of the Federal Republic of Germany and an unlikely father of a professional army, was a anti-Nazi labor leader dr afted into the Wehrmacht for six years during which he earned a battlefield comm ission and the Iron Cross First Class for bravery. As head of a planning comm ittee of liberal reformers known as the Amt Blank (which in 1955 became the Federal Republic s Defense Ministry), he provided a legislative foundation of a democratic army that was based on political integration. 38 The Wehrmacht veterans leading the ne w army possessed personal experience of the rapidity with which the hyper-professional German Army exchanged in August 1934 its sworn allegiance to democratic constitu tion of the Weimar Republic to personally sworn servility to Hitler. The loyalty of the post-war Bundeswehr was to be based itself on Innere Fhrung, or inner allegiance, of a soldier to the democratic and constitutional principles of the republic. The army was to be organized on the basis of Inneres Gefuege, or the inner structure, of a democ ratic army trained in the lessons of the Third Reich, the 20 th of July 1944, and Nuremberg to ensure the demand for strict civil control of the military is met. These doctrines of Innere Fhrung and Inneres Gefuege were formal military doctrine formulated in the early 1950s by General Count Wehrmacht and the Prusso-German military tradition in general, especially among American military scholars 38 Mantecue J. Lowrey, The Forge of West German R earmament: Theodor Blank and the Amt Blank, (New York, Peter Lang, 1990), 3-4.

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174 Wolf von Baudissin and were distinctly and in tentionally in opposition to the Prussian civil-military tradition so dear to many American military scholars. 39 Huntington took issue with Blanks a ssertion that democracy can only be defended by democrats. Along with its external critics (i.e. Huntington), Innere Fhrung, and Inneres Gefuege had to contend with a right-wing opposition within Germany itself. Early resistance to General Baudissin was led by the SS veteran, General Otto Ernst Remer, over the symbolic significance of the July 20 plot to Innere Fhrung. Remer was the officer responsible for arrest ing the plotters. He then served as a subordinate under Sepp Dietrich in the Battle of the Bulge and became a leader of the neo-nazi movement after the war. 40 In the latter 1960s and early 1970s, General Ulrich de Maizire and General Eberhard Wagemann fought off a military counterreformation initially spearheaded by the conservative Defense Minister, Franz Josef Strauss. Despite successive conservative governments from 1982 -1998, Innere Fhrung remains the conventional orthodoxy of the ar med forces of todays united Germany. 41 The relationship of the Wehrmacht to th e Third Reich, its conduct during the war, and its continuity, or lack thereof, with Prusso-German military tradition become a central issue in the Historikerstriet, or historians controve rsy over German national 39 Ibid., 98-99 & 122 & 123. Theodor Blank as cited in Huntington, t he Soldier and the State, p. 123. 40 Remer was convicted in October 1992 for publicly denying the Holocaust, a cr ime in Germany and died in exile in Spain on October 4, 1997. 41 Count Wolf Baudissin, The New German Army, in Foreign Affairs, 34-1 (October 1955), 1-13 and Donald Abenheim, Reforging the Iron Cross: The Search for Tradition in the West German Armed Forces, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 258-296.

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175 identity in the Federal Republic. 42 Many German and other Eur opean scholars painted an even darker picture of the Wehrmacht th an General Taylor. Omar Bartov in his Hitlers Army: Soldiers, Nazis, and War in the Third Reich effectively debunked any claim that the Wehrmacht had possessed any pretense of distinctiveness in regard to the execution of the Final Solution, whether that distinctiveness is base d on class or tradition. Bartov also demonstrated that there was tenability to the broadly accepted belief that the Wehrmacht maintained its fighting effec tiveness and discipli ne through the worst wartime conditions, including retreat, due to its maintaining its pr ewar traditions of military professionalism, especially within th e officer corps. To the contrary, Bartov argued that the Wehrmacht was the army of the people and a willing tool of the regime, especially in regards to carry ing out the Final Solution on the Eastern Front. In fact, he agues that Nazi ideology in fact legitim ized the barbarism on the Eastern Front along with an unprecedented use of disciplinary terror, including thousands of punitive executions, of German soldiers. 43 In Germany, just as in the United Stat es, public sentiment often clashes with formal doctrine. Between 1995-1999, the Hamb urg Institute for Social Research rekindled public debate on the issue in a historical exhibition on the crimes of the Wehrmacht, Vernichtungskrieg: Verbrechen der Wehrmacht, 1941-1944 In November of 2001, about 3000 neo-Nazis held a rally to prot est the exhibits arri val in Berlin. The 42 For a general discussion of th e place of the Wehrmacht in the Historikerstriet, see Charles S. Maier, The Unmasterable Past: History, Holocaust, and Germany National Identity, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997), 19-22. A more expanded discussion by a number of scholars writing in German can be found in Rolf-Deiter Muller and Hans-Erich Volkman, eds., Die Wehrmacht: Mythos und Realitat, (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1999). 43 Omer Bartov, Hitlers Army: Soldiers, Nazis, and War in the Third Reich, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 3-11 and 59-105.

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176 neo-Nazis chanting "glory a nd honor to German soldiers" were confronted with over 1500 counter-demonstrators. A bomb exploded out side an earlier showing of the exhibit in the city of Saarbruecken in 1999 a nd was blamed on right-wing extremists. 44 While the appreciation of certain aspect s of Prusso-German military tradition, such as the general staff system, should not be taken as an endorsement of the Word War II era Wehrmacht, the Prusso-German military tradition has received markedly different treatments on either side of the Atlantic. In fact, there was a switching of legacies between the German and the American militari es during the second half of the twentieth century. In the United States, the emphasis on George Marshalls conception of the citizen soldier was superceded by a renewe d appreciation, at least informally, of the military professional caste, even in the context of a Prusso-German caste of merit. In the Federal Republic of Germany, the aristocrat ic legacy ending with the Wehrmacht was deliberately and formally exchanged for the ideal of a democrat in uniform Both exchanged usable histories with the legacy of the Nuremberg era war crimes given a separate weight by each of the competing weltanschauung Army Doctrine and the Vietnam War The legacy of the Wehrmacht sparked two separate historical debates: one in Germany, where the central question concerned what military traditions and doctrines can be an appropriate part and a usable history for the armed forces of a democratic state; and the other in America, where the issue was the proper model of civil-military relations in the conduct of ongoing military operations and when is it appropriate for a commanding 44 More to the Holocaust th an SS & Special Police Deutsche Press Agenteur in English translation in Indian Express, (July 12, 1999), 1 and Donald G. Schilling, Die Wehrmacht: Mythos and Realitate (book Review), in Journal of Modern History, vol. 73-1, (March 2001), 208).

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177 general to second guess civilian authority. At Nuremberg, the question of obedience concerned obeying illegal orders. In the Tr uman-MacArthur controversy, the issue of obedience concerned obeying the orders of civilians. While American military professionals in Europe played out set-piece tank battle scenarios on old Wehrmacht training gr ounds, recovering their equipment in old Wehrmacht motor pools, and retu rning their troops to old We hrmacht barracks, the myth of the Wehrmacht lived on. Along with the conflicts between official and unofficial models of civilian control ove r the military profession, it was part of the cultural baggage that the American military took with it to Vietnam. Actually, veterans of the Wehrmacht preceded American forces to Vietnam. Three years after MacArthur was relived of command, over 1600 veterans of the Wehrm acht were among Gen. Henri Navarres forces as they were overrun by Vietminh forces under General Vo Nguyen Giaps at Dien Bien Phu in Northern Vietnam on May 7, 1954. 45 As Americas intervention Vietnam escal ated, two American armies with two separate doctrines deployed to Vietnam. Besides a European focused mechanized army, the Kennedy administration ordered the crea tion of an American counterinsurgency capability. The Kennedy doctrine of Flexible Response was a reaction to the confining doctrine of Massive Retaliation of the Eise nhower years that limited the capability to respond to threats other than by the utilization or threat of the utilization of nuclear forces. The new policy was officially in augurated with President Kennedys National 45 10, 000 of 70,000 French soldiers who served in th e First Indochina war were veterans of the Wehrmacht or Waffen SS. Included are ethnically German French citizens who were drafted into the Wehrmacht after the fall of France and German speaking volunteers to the French Foreign Legions. See Sebastian Fellmeth, Frankreichs Stalingrad, in Die Zeit (April 3, 2003), 11.

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178 Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 2, the 1962 edition of FM 100-5, and the expansion of the Special Warfar e Center (SWC) at Fort Bragg. 46 An informal presentation of the new doctrine appeared in General Maxwell Taylors book, The Uncertain Trumpet. 47 Later serving as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff between 1962-1964, Taylor was critical of the narrow professional officer and called for a realist version of military profe ssionals closer to General George Marshalls citizen-soldier than Huntingtons prusso-germanic narrow military professional. Although defining military service in terms of just war doctrine, Taylor accepted that, in most instances, an officer has little choice but to assume the rightness of a governmental decision involving the country in a war and i f his side wins, he knows that there will be few charges of injustice saved from the vanquish ed; if he loses, the victors, following the precedent of Nuremberg. 48 Rather than a mere expert on the applica tion of violence, Kennedys and Taylors ideal counterinsurgent would be more of an ambassador of democracy. General S.L.A. Marshall, the Armys seminal official hist orian, also criticizes the over-reliance on nuclear weapons and firepower of the pre-Kennedy years. 49 Both the actual careers of 46 Andrew F. Krepinevich, The Army in Vietnam, (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press), 27-55. 47 General Maxwell Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet, (New York: Harper and Bros., 1959), 39-40. 48 By Taylors definition, a just war may be one waged for a just cause that can be achieved no other way; one capable of producing a better peace than the one exis ting before the war; one waged in self-defense or for legal rights; one to protect the nations natural right; one with a high probability of producing of producing more good consequences than bad for the human race; or one conduct ed non-aggressively in accordance with the United Nations Charter. See General Maxwell Taylor, A Do-It-Yourself Professional Code for the Military, in Parameters, Journal of the US Army War College X-4, (December, 1980), 12-13. See also A Professional Ethic in Army (May 1978), 18-21. 49 Cecil B. Currey, Edward Lansdale: The Unquiet American, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1988), 196-199. Graham Green, The Quiet American, (New York: Viking 1955), William E. Lederer and Eugene Burdick, The Ugly American, (New York: W.W. Norton, 1985).

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179 counter-insurgency experts like Sir Robert Thompson and General Edward Lansdale, U.S. Air Force, or the fictional depiction of Lansdale-like charact ers in the novels of Graham Green, The Quiet American, and William E. Lederer and Eugene Burdick, The Ugly American, represented both the ideal izations and caricatures of an early Cold War warriors winning third world he arts and minds to the third way of democracy between the extreme of Stalinism and colonialism. 50 In spite of the counterinsurgency initiativ es of the Kennedy era, the majority of the leadership of the U.S. Army maintained its historical hostility to constabulary and counterinsurgency operations -even though th e U.S. Army had extensive experience in fighting such wars. This resulted in a Army ill prepared to fight a counterinsurgency war or properly deploy unconventional forces 51 By the time Kennedy was assassinated, Army Special Forces Alpha Team deployments had been limited to training indigenous tribal militias such as the Montagnards of the Central Highlands of Vietnam. Lansdale-like clandestine operators had b een superceded by uniformed professionals flying in helicopters as advisors in air-mobility operati ons of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN). By 1961, Taylor along with Kennedy s National Security Council aid, Walt W. Rostow, returned form Vietnam with an assessment that the conflict should be regularized to the point of sending an 8,000-man task force to support ARVN 50 S,L.A. Marshall, Arms in Wonderland, Army, (November 1959), 131-132. 51 Krepinevich, The Army in Vietnam 27-55.

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180 operations. 52 On March 8, 1965, the first regular ground forces landed at Da Nang, the first of 2.5 million. As increasing organizational chaos overt ook the American mili tary during the Second Indochina War, many critics of the m ilitary policies of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations turned again to the legacy of the Wehrmacht as a positive example of an effective fighting force. During the war, th e soldier-scholars Richard Gabriel and Paul Savage compared the conditions faced by the German Wehrmacht in World War II, which they claimed remained an effectiv e and cohesive fighting force until it was completely overrun, to those faced by the U.S. Army in Vietnam. 53 General William E. Dupuy, U.S. Army, who would later take over the U.S. Armys Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) in July 1973, had come to admire the Wehrmachts efficiency as a combat commander in World War II. 54 He incorporated some German tactical doctrine in the 1968 edition of FM 100-5, the first pos t-Vietnam overhaul of Army doctrine. Dupay also started the tradit ion at the U.S. Army Comma nd and Staff College (CGSC) and U.S. Army War College (USAWC) of in tensive study of the Wehrmachts retrograde operations on the Eastern Front to provide lessons learned that could be applied to 52 Robert J. McMahan, The Limits of Empire: The United States and Southeast Asia Since World War II (New York: Columbia Univer sity Press, 1999), 110. 53 Paul L. Savage and Richard A. Gabriel, Cohesi on and Disintegration in the American Army, An Alternative Perspective, Armed Forces and Society 2 (May 1976) pp. 340-176). 54 At the time of his retirement debriefing, he noted I really was impressed with the fact that we saw the German soldier only on very rare occasions, nor were we able to suppress him very well. So the first lesson I learned was that he was a master at field craft at cover and concealment. Later, when I looked at his positions, I was impressed by the way he picked up positions where his body and head were protected from frontal fire yet he was able to defend his po sition no matter what we th rew at him. See Officer Debrief: Interview with Gen. William E. Dupuy by Lt. Cols. Bill Mullen and Les Brownlee, 26 March, 1979, v-w, reprinted as Changing an Army: An Oral History of General William E. Depuy, U.S. Army Retired, (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Army Military History Institute, 1986), 194.

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181 operations in defense of Central Europe from an attack by superior Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces, a tradition which lasted up to the end of the Cold War. At the War College, the superiority of the German General Staff Corps over American staff models is still a popular subject for military studies thesis projects. 55 However, if there was one element of Wehrmacht operations on the Eastern Front that had a direct relevance to the American experience in Vietnam, it was how NOT to conduct constabulary and counterinsurgency operations amidst a hostile population whose language and culture is alien to the in tervening forces. The dark example of the Wehrmachts counterinsurgency efforts seemed to have escaped the notice of one of its most devoted students, General William Dupuy, who was assigned as Director of Special Warfare in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plan in 1964 and later, after returning from two assignme nts in Vietnam, Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency under the Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1967. America would go to war in Vietnam as if it was the first conflict in history that featured the difficulties of facing partisan irregular tactic s. This historical amnesia would exacerbate problems such as discriminating between co mbatants and noncombatants, which were experienced by superior regular military forces operating in the midst of a hostile civilian population. 55 Examples include Lieutenant Colonel Thomas B. Cameron, FA., The German General Staff System Revisited, (USAWC Military Studies Paper, U.S. Army War College, 1989), and Colonel William H. Groening, USA, The Influence of the German Gene ral Staff and the American General Staff, (USAWC Military Studies Paper, U.S. Army War College, 1993).

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182 Conclusion The early years of the Cold War was a period of profound of ideological changes within the American military profession. Just as the founders of the new West German Army, the Bundeswehr were rejecting the Prussian / Wehrmacht tradition of military professionalism, it underwent a rehabilitation in the United States. While it would be over twenty-five years before certain as pects of Huntingtons work would be incorporated in formal milita ry doctrine in the so-called Weinberger Doctrine, the neoClausewitzian realism would have hegemonic influence on the American military profession during the Cold War. It would not only affect the decision to regularize combat operations in Vietnam, it would underp in the lessons learned process during and after the war. Most importantly, as far as the present project is concerned, it was ideologically antagonistic to the Nuremberg era doctrine of command responsibility. As part of the conflict between formal and info rmal norms would materialize under fire in Vietnam, it would be present when the American military profession would face the challenge of holding up the principles of the Nuremberg era American War Crimes Program to its own officers.

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CHAPTER 5 COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY AND THE MY LAI MASSACRE I dont think that what is done to a jap hanged in the heat of vengeance after World War II can be done to an American on an imputed theory of responsibility. F. Lee Bailey 1 While any wider examination of the hi storical significant Vietnam War must unavoidably include the of ius ad bellum premises that American leaders used to justify their decision to go to war, any analysis of the institutional breakdown of the American military profession during the period cannot avoid a jus in bello ethical consideration of American military tactics employed in genera l and incident of the My Lai Massacre in particular. The Vietnam War left the American military with two conflicting standards of command responsibility, a doctrin al standard and a standard representing the latest legal precedent. The Vietnam era failure of America to hold its own citizens to the same standards it held out to its defeated enemie s has contemporary consequences that includes the U.S. possession of a unilateralis t legal precedence concerning command responsibility that conflicts not just with its military doctrine, but also with a developing international consensus in humanitarian law. By Spring 1968, conventional doctrine and forces had largely pushed aside what General William Dupuy called Kennedys and General Maxwell Taylors counterinsurgency fad. 2 Conventional American ground fo rces, rather than specialized 1 Cited in Prevost, Race and War Crimes, 329. 2 Officer Debrief: Interview w ith Gen. William E. Dupuy, 40. 183

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184 counterinsurgency forces, were in the proce ss of mopping up after th eir tactical victory during the Tet Offensive over both regular North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and Viet Cong forces and were now in the process of taking the war to those areas of South Vietnam friendly to or under the control of th e Viet Cong. Much of what remained of the more covert specialized Landaleian counterinsurgency operations was conducted by Army Special Forces Alpha Teamsin remote tribal areas and by Operation Phoenix under the CIA Station Chief William Colby. Regul ar forces of the Army had now taken over the bulk of the counterinsurgency effort. Th e American military increasingly relied on superior firepower, rather then winning hearts and minds, to win the wa r. In the words of one of the leading military analysts of the American defeat in Vietnam, Andrew F. Krepinevich: The Army ended up trying to fi ght the kind of conventional war that it was trained, organized, and prepared (and that it wanted ) to fight instead of the counterinsurgency war it was sent to fi ght even if the Armys preferences maximizes the chances of killing civilians. 3 Developed for conventional and nuclear environments, rather than counterinsurgency, the standardized conven tional tactical operation had become the deployment of airmobile light infantry fo rces, which was usually characterized by airlifting and insertion of non-mechanized conventional infantry units into a combat zone by UH Huey helicopters. Aimed at depr iving enemy units of support areas, these search and clear operations ha d become the norm in anti-in surgency operations by both the ARVN and American forces. 3 Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam, 85 and 271.

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185 One such operation in the wake of the Tet Offensive was Operation Muscatine, which began on 26 January 1968. The purpose of this operation was to isolate areas of Viet Cong support. Named after its commande r, Lieutenant Colonel Frank Barker, the units assigned to Task Force Barker were ta sked to eliminate the base of support of the 48 th Viet Cong Battalion around the provincial cap ital of Qua Ngai, a co astal city in the central highlands. The operation would have be en dismissed as rather routine except for an assault on a village labeled on Amer ican maps as My Lai-4 on March 16, 1968. Although the village included family members of the local Viet Cong forces that operated in the area, no military or in surgent personnel here found in the village and the American forces sustained no casualties except for one self-inflicted injury. The summary findings of the official Department of the Army i nvestigation documented mass murder (between 175 and 400) including individual and group acts of mu rder, rape, sodomy, maiming, and assault on noncombatants (italics mine). 4 Although the then existing policies and dire ctives in Vietnam were clear as to the Laws of War in relation to the safeguarding of non-combatants and prisoners of war, soldiers in the units involved had not been ad equately trained in the Geneva Conventions. The report also found that a criminal cove r-up had occurred at every command level within the Americal Division. Even command chaplains failed in their obligation to report the truth by sitting on th e statements made by a scout helicopter pilot who tried to 4 Report of the Department of the Army review of the Preliminary Investigations into the My Lai incident: volume I, The Report of the Investigation. (Washington: The Department of the Army, 1970), henceforth referred to as the Peers. Reprinted as Joseph Go ldstein, Burke Marshall, and Jack Schwartz, eds., The My Lai Massacre and Its Cover Up: Beyond the Reach of law? (New York: The Free Press, 1976), 314.

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186 halt the massacre and who flew several v illagers to safety, Warrant Officer Hugh Thompson. 5 The cover-up would hold for over a year. In the summer of 1968, a Major Colin Luther Powell was assigned as the deputy assistant chief of staff fo r operations in the 11 th Light Infantry Brigade of the Americal Divisi on for his second tour of Vietnam. One of his first tasks was to write a response to the Military Advisor Command Vietnam (MACV) commander, General Creighton Abra ms, in reference to charges made by a Specialist Tom Glen, claiming that member s of the Americal Division had openly discussed violating MACV directives and the Geneva Conventions in reference to treatment of Vietnamese civilia ns. In his cursory response in defense of his superiors, Major Powell, the future Chairman of the Jo int Chief and Secretary of Defense, wrote: In direct refutation of this por trayal (Specialist Glens charges) is the fact that relations between Americal soldiers and the Vietna mese people are excellent. The cover-up finally fell apart in the spring of 1969 when another soldier, Ronald Ridenhour, sent a letter to his congressman and sent many c opies to other members of congress and the press. This time no future Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secretary of State was able to avoid, intentionally or by naivet, the inconvenient truth. 6 After commanding American forc es in Indochina from 1965 to 1968, Westmoreland was appointed to the Armys senior position where he would serve his 5 In addition to training received du ring basic training, Char lie Company personnel received the at least one MACV supplemental briefing since their arrival in country. Ibid., 320, 316, 320, 334, & 337. 6 Letter of Specialist Tom Glen, U.S. Army to MACV commander, General Creighton Abrams, 1968, reprinted in Michael Bilton and Kevin Sim, Four Hours in My Lai, (New York: Viking, 1992), 207-213. In his response to his brigades adjutant general, Powell dismisses Glen for not coming forward earlier and not providing specifications, although Powell did not directly ask Glen for further information. See Charles Lane, The Legend of Colin Powell, The New Republic 4, 187 (April 17, 1995), 20.

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187 final tour of duty before re tirement, from July 1, 1968 to June 30, 1972, as Chief of Staff of the United States Army. C onsidering the uncomfortable f act that he was in command in Vietnam in March 1968 when the My Lai massacre took place, Westmoreland was surprisingly supportive of the s ubsequent investigations and was responsive to the dark issues it raised in relation to the Armys conduct of the war. During his command in Vietnam, Westmoreland stated that he rece ived nothing but routine reports from the Americal Division in reference to its operati ons in Quang Ngai province in March 1968. He initially responded with disbelief to the claims made by Ronald Ridenhour, a former soldier who had written his congressman about the massacre. But once the Army Inspector Generals investigation substant iated Ridenhours reports, Westmoreland never equivocated on the issue of the moral respons ibility of those in command who failed to prevent and later covered up th e massacre. For Lieutenant Calley, the only officer the Army succeeded in convicting for the massacre, Westmoreland felt compassion but no sympathy. 7 In November 1969, General Westmoreland appointed Lieutenant General William R. Peers to head the official Army inquiry into the My Lai Massacre. Westmorelands choice of Peers, who was not a West Point graduate and who had career experience in nontraditional warfare, gave the investigation greater credibility than it might have had otherwise. Peers had direct command experi ence in insurgent and gue rrilla operations in Burma between 1943 and 1945 and covert operations with the OSS in China and Korea before being assigned to the CIA in 1949. P eers stood in stark contrast to many of the 7 U.S. Army War College (USAWC) Senior Lead er Oral History Program. General William C. Westmoreland interviewed by LTC Martin L. Ganderson, 1982, Vol. II (Box 15) pp. 238-239. Part of USAWC, Military History Research Collection, Willia m C. Westmoreland Papers. Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.

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188 senior officers, such as Generals Fred C. Weyend, Edward C. Meyer, and William E. DePuy, who were assigned to counterinsurgen cy operations and planning in the Office of the Joint Chiefs during the Vietnam War period even though they did not possess a background in counterinsurgency operations. Westmoreland provided Peers with the authority he needed to carry out a competent investiga tion. Immediately prior to appointing Peers, Westmoreland successfully resisted pressure, orig inating in the Nixon White House, for a watered-down investig ation. Westmoreland personally informed Peers that he had called General Alexander Haig, who was the Special Assistant to the President, to his Ft. Myers home to relay an ultimatum to the White House to back off the My Lai investigation or, if r esistance did not cease, West moreland would take the issue directly to the President under his charter as Army Chief of Staff. 8 Westmoreland received the explosive finding of the Peers Commission report on March 17, 1970. As if the grisly a ccounts of United States Army personnel committing depraved acts of rape, sodomy, and maiming before murdering their victims was not enough, the report revealed that these acts occurred in one of the most supervised company-level operations in American military history. General Peers implicated twenty-eight o fficers from the ranks of 2 nd Lieutenant to Major General, in covering up the massacre, the most senior officer, Major General Samuel W. Koster, serving as Commandant of West Point at the time of the reports release. Most damning of all, the Peers report listed pre-exis ting and ongoing attitudes among commanders and staff that contributed to the massacre and its cover-up. These included a "permissive 8 U.S. Army War College (USAWC) Senior Leader Or al History Program. Lieutenant General William R. Peers interviewed by Col. James H. Breen and Colonel Charlie B. Moore. Reel 4, 14 April 77, pp. 33-36, Presidio of Monterey. USAWC, Military History Re search Collection. The William R. Peers Papers. Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.

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189 attitude toward the treatment and safeguard ing of noncombatants, a climate of racial animosity toward the Vietnamese, and a pe rvasive willingness of officers to commit perjury in order to pr otect their superiors. 9 My Lai, the Peers Commission, a nd American Military Justice Although the Nixon Administration received numerous requests to establish a special or presidential committee to inve stigate and prosecute the American war criminals, the U.S. Army was given the chan ce to validate the integrity of its judicial process and failed. Two individuals, Lieu tenant William Calley and Sergeant David Mitchell, were charged respectively with murder and intent to murder following the completion of an initial Inspector General i nvestigation and the ini tiation of a Criminal Investigation Division (CID) inquiry in June of 1965. By the time the findings of the Peers Commission had been announced, char ges were preferred against two more company grade officers, including Calley s company commander, Captain Ernest Medina, and additional five enlisted men. By this time, of the thirty-three soldiers implicated by the Army in the massacre, ni neteen were already civilians. The first official American failure to adhere to its own Nuremberg era precedents was a national rather then specifically military one as neithe r Articles 18 and 29 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice was utilized to return these civilians to uniform for court martial nor did the U.S. Congress have the pol itical will to pass enabling le gislation to try them as civilians. 10 9 The Peers Commission Report, 314-345. 10 Bilton & Sim, Four Hours in My Lai, 320, 329, 381-384.

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190 The Investigation Subcomm ittee of the Committee of the Armed Services of the House of Representatives held hearing on My La i concurrently with Pears investigation. Rather than facilitate the Army investiga tion, the committee chaired by F. Edward Hebert chose to use its authority to obstruct the a pplication of military justice. Army pilot Lieutenant (later Captain) Hugh C. Th ompson, former Army Specialist Lawrence Colburn, and Specialist Glenn A ndreotta, who was killed in action twenty days after the massacre, were crew members of a H-23 rec onnaissance helicopter. On the day of the massacre they tried to stop the killings while they were in process, removed what civilians they could from the path of the rampaging American forces, and reported the crime to their superiors. Testifyi ng before the Subcommittee on April 17, 1970, Thompson and Colburn, who were now the chief prosecution witnesses for the government, were intimidated and browbeaten on every detail of their testimony before the committee. Rather than the mass acre itself, Congressm an Herbert and the committees legal counsels were fixated on (1) the possibility that Thompson ordered Colburn to shoot American soldiers if they continued killing women and children, (2) the possibility that the level of hostile fire cited on awards processed for Thompson, Colburn, and Andreotta, initiated after the death of the latter, may have exaggerated, and (3) baseless suggestions that Thompson might be at fault for initiating the massacre by popping the wrong colored smoke grenade to mark the location of civilians needing evacuation. 11 However, when Captain Medina provided what he later admitted to be perjured testimony, claiming he was not aware that a large number of civilians were 11 U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services, Investigation on the My Lai Massacre: Hearing of the Armed Services Investigating Subcommittee 91 st Congress., H.A.S.C. No. 94-47, Aril 15 June 22, 1970, 202-248.

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191 killed on the day of the massacre or of the existence of an investig ation immediately after the massacre, he was treated with the ut most deference by Hebert and the committee. 12 With Congress, the White House, southern governors, the American Legion, the Veterans of Foreign Wars, and American public opin ion turning against the idea of prosecuting Americans for war crimes, the Army was on its own in trying to uphold its doctrinal standards by pursuing prosecutions for My Lai. 13 The first court martial, that of Sergeant David Mitchell, was compromised by the Hebert Committees refusal to release declassify the testimony of Thompson and othe r aviators who were testifying before it and, therefore, ended in an acquittal. 14 Lieutenant Calley and the De fense of Superior Orders On November 20, 1970, three days before Mitchells acquittal, Lieutenant Calleys court-martial was convened at Fort Benning, Georgia. His defense would be simple: Calley, the baby-faced butcher who did not understand what all the fuss was about, claimed he had permission to kill civi lians. The defense theory was simple: the denial of history, precedence, and doctrine as if there never had been were Nuremberg era war crimes precedents and as if the doctrine in FM 27-10 did not exist. His claim of superior orders incriminated another defendant and witness, his commander. This claim became the central issue of fact at his trial. The military judge, Lieutenant Colonel Reid W. Kennedy, while not accepting that defense met the burden of demonstrating that 12 Ibid., 53-84. Later, upon hearing of lieutenan t Lt. Calleys conviction, Congressman Herbert would remark that it is a terrible to let Cassius Clay walk the streets of America, while William Calley, who was trying to do his duty, is incarcerated. Quoted in Mark D. Carson, F. Edward Hebert and the Congressional Investigation of the My Lai Mass acre, XXXVII-1, Louisiana History, (Winter 1976), 73. 13 Bilton & Sim, Four Hours in My Lai, 340-344. 14 Ibid., 329.

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192 Calley had indeed received an illegal order from his commande r, Captain Medina, dismissed the defenses theory of the case by in structing the jury that Calley could not be relieved of responsibility even if the existence of such an order was proven: Soldiers are taught to follow orders, and special attention is given to obedience of orders on the battlefield. Military effectiveness depends on obedience to orders. On the other ha nd, the obedience of a soldier is not the obedience of automations. A soldie r is a reasoning agent, obliged to respond, not as a machine, but as a person. The law takes these factors into account in assessing criminal responsibility for acts done in compliance with illegal orders. The acts of a subordinate done in comp liance with an unlawful order given him by his superior are excused and impose no criminal liability upon him unless the superiors orders is one (o f) which a man of ordinary sense and understanding would, under th e circumstances, know to be unlawful, or if the order in question is actually kno wn to the accused to be unlawful. 15 The American military profession at l east was able to uphold one of the major legal precedents of the Nuremberg era to one of its own officers: superior orders is no defense. Calley was sentenced to life imprisonment for premeditated murder. After this first successful trial arisi ng out of the My Lai massacre, the Army was subjected to pressures, mostly from outside the military profession, to limit or stop further My Lai prosecutions. The subsequent failure to convict other subordinate soldiers and the lenient treatment, by the Nixon and Ford Administratio ns and the Federal courts, of Calley, who ended up serving only 3 months in a military prison, was not merely an embarrassment for the profession, but for the nation. Herbert Rainwater, the national co mmander of the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW) after Call eys conviction even made the statement: There have been My Lais in every war. Now for the first time in our history we have 15 Instructions from the Military Judge to the Court Members in the United States vs. First Lieutenant Calley, Jr ., reprinted in Friedman, War Crimes: A Documentary History 1722.

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193 tried a soldier for performing his duty. 16 A study on American public opinion by the sociologists Herbert Kelman and Lee Lawren ce, found seventy percent of the American public disapproved of the Calley conviction following his trial. 17 Considering it was the reaction to the Malmedy Massacre of seventy American servicemen by the leadership of the American Legion and the American in 1944 that facilitated the political support for the establishment of the American War Crimes Program after World War II, rather than the murder of over eleven million noncombatants by the Axis, American have shown a consistent disposition to weigh the worth of lives of non-Americans vis--vis the lives of Americans. American military professionals have always had to be on guard against allowing this ugly aspect of the American ch aracter to significantly effect the their profession. At least in the case of the United States, there is one exception to the precept that a nations armed forces should be a reflection of the society it protects. 18 It is to the American military profes sions credit that thos e most outraged by My Lai and the leniency shown to Calley were not members of the peace movement or politicians or even such future human ri ghts luminaries as th e sitting governor of Georgia, Jimmy Carter, who de fended Calley, but soldiers in uniform. Those who voiced their outrage included: Captain Hugh Th ompson, who placed his crew between the murder and the victims and threatened to s hoot Calley; inspector general Colonel William C. Wilson and Lieutenant General William R. Peers, who exposed the cover-up; and 16 Wayne Greenhaw, The Making of a Hero, the Beyond-the-scenes view of the Lt. William Calley Affair, Louisville, Kentucky,: Touchstone Publishing Company, 1971), 193. 17 Herbert C. Kelman and Lee H. Lawrence, American Response to the Trial of Lt. William L. Calley, Psychology Today (June 1972), 41-45. 18 A contemporary reflection of this duplicity over human life are the extremely popular films of Stephen Spielberg. After making his epic holocaust commemorative film Schindlers List (1993), followed by two films, Saving Private Ryan (1998) and Band of Brothers (2001), which permissively depict American soldiers handling prisoners of war in a clearly criminal manner.

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194 Captain Aubrey Daniel, Calleys prosecutor, who publicly denounced President Nixons interventions in Calleys favor. 19 In the end, the relief Calle y eventually received from his sentence was the result of administrativ e actions by civilian officials, first the President and then the Secretary of the Army. The uniformed military could at least point to the integrity of some of their comrades in uniform in not allowing the superior orders defense. However, this would not be the case as far in the successfully holding an American officer to the same standard of co mmand responsibility as that associated with the Nuremberg era war-crimes trials. Captain Medina's Responsibility In August 1971, five months after the conviction of Calley, two courts-martial were convened to try Calleys commanding officer, Captain Medina, and the former commander of the 11 th Brigade of the Americal Division, Colonel Oran K. Henderson. The trials were held simultaneously, with the former at Fort McPherson in Georgia and the later at Fort Meade in Maryland. Between these officers in the chain of command was Lieutenant Colonel Frank Barker, the commander of Task Force Barker who was killed in a helicopter crash f our months after the massacre. Rather than a conspiracy protecting General Westmoreland and President Johnson, it was the deat h of Barker that left the evidentiary gap that impeded fu rther prosecution up the chain of command. Barker remains a missing and mysterious link in understanding the operation and the sequence of events in which the massacre t ook place. Although command helicopters of two higher commanders in the chain of command flew above his, he was the 19 Captain Hugh Thompson, U.S. Army Ret, interviewed by author during Human Rights Week at the U.S. Army School of the Americas on January 23, 1999; Colonel William C. Wilson, I had Prayed to God That This Was Fiction..., American Heritage, (Spring 1983), 63; General Peers, USAWC Oral History, 41; and for Captain Daniels public denunciation, see The Captain Who Told The President Off in Newsweek (April 19, 1971), 19.

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195 counterinsurgency mastermind of Operation Mu scatine who gave only informal briefings and left no paper trail. Medina claimed it was Barker who ordered him to destroy the village, to burn the houses, to destroy the food crop that belonged to the Vietcong, and to kill thier livestock. The Bravo Company Commander, Captain Earl A. Michles, responsible for another platoon taking part in the massacre, was also deceased. Medina denied Barker had ordered him to kill civilians. In fact, Medina testified before the Hebert Commission that as far as Colonel Ba rkers attitude toward the toward the South Vietnamese, he always wanted us to treat th em with proper respect, and to respect them as human beings. 20 As a result of the prosecution s inability to verify Medinas testimony concerning his orders from Barker, no direct responsibility for an illegal order for the massacre itself could be applied to a ny officer higher in the chain than Captain Medina. Unfortunately, it would be the court-ma rtial of Medina that would define the contemporary standard of command responsibil ity, at least as far as the standard successfully imposed on an American citi zen is concerned. The Peers Commissions findings concerning Medina, as the sole surv iving direct subordinate of a task force commander whose orders were a subject of disp ute, were the most comprehensive of any individual involved. The findi ngs included, like those for Barker, Henderson, and others above him in the chain of command, Medina suppressing evidence a nd, like Calley and those below him, directly ordering and even engaging in criminal acts. As the senior commander remaining continually on the ground, Medina was held responsible by the commission for planning, ordering, and superv ising the execution by his company of an 20 U.S. Congress. House. Investigation on the My Lai Massacre, 56-58.

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196 unlawful operation against inhabited hamlets in Son My Village which included the destruction of homes by burni ng, killing of livestock, and th e destruction of crops and other foodstuffs, and the closing of wells; and impliedly directed the killing of any person there. 21 By the time of his arraignment, most of these specifics ha d been dropped against him by what the prosecution cl aimed to be the custom of dropping lesser charges to concentrate on greater charges. 22 The Chief Prosecutor in the Medina case, Colonel William G, Eckhardt, would later write that at the time of the trial the prosecution did not believe that Medina, during his briefing to his company the night prior to the operation, intentionally ordered his men to kill, una rmed, unresisting, noncombatants. Rather, Colonel Eckhardt conceived Medinas role in the as a classic case of command criminal responsibility in which Medina had actual knowledge that his men were killing unresisting noncombatants and that he had the communications ability to stop it. For three hours, Medina was in an area less than ten square kilometers wide in direct proximity with his troops. According to the prosecutions theory of the case, Medina refused to face the obvious evidence of a one sided fi refight, i.e. a massacre of noncombatants, by his soldiers because of hi s loyalty was to his career instead of his duty. 23 21 The Peers Commission Report, 439-441. 22 Mary McCarthy, Medina, 59. 23 Colonel Will G. Eckhardt later described his theory of the case as follows: During these particular three hours, Captain Medina re mained on the outskirts of the village. No evidence placed Captain Medina at the scene of any of these k illings. The incident occurred in dense jungle growth. However, since the area involved was a pproximately ten thousand square yards, the size of five footballs fields, the prosecutions position was that Captain Medina knew pr ecisely what was transpiring and that he had the ability to issue orders stopping the slaughter and to seek help in controlling his men. In short, the prosecution felt that he had actual knowledge (italics mine) that unarmed, unresisting, noncombatants were being killed by

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197 Along with two military attorneys, Medina was represented by the flamboyant and theatrical F. Lee Bailey. The defenses theory of the case contended that Medina stayed out of the village because of tactical necessity and th at he never became aware of the misconduct of his men until too late. Fu rther, upon suspecting th at his orders were being misunderstood and improper acts occurring, he ordered his men to cease fire (and that he) never saw any evidence of suspici ous or unnecessary deat hs until immediately prior to the cease fire order. 24 The most critical precedent-setting event of the trial was the instructions the military judge would give regarding the law concerning what standard of command responsibility the panel (jury) would utilize in considering guilt. The Prosecution Brief on the Law of Principles quoted directly from current m ilitary doctrine, specifically the paragraph of FM 27-10 on the Responsibility fo r the Acts of Subordinates in which the known or should have known standard was articulated. 25 In complete contradiction of men under his command. The evidence was clear that he had the communications ability to stop this carnage. He had two basic choices. He could ha ve taken affirmative action, for exampl e, issuing orders or seeking help to control his men. Seeking assistan ce would, of course, have reflected poor ly on his military leadership ability. The other course of action would be to remain silent and hope that the incident would be relatively insignificant and would not be discovered. Appare ntly, he chose his military career ove r the lives of unarmed, unresisting, noncombatants who were being slaughtered by his troops within earshot. His crime, in the prosecutions eyes, was abandoning his command responsibility on the battlefield. 24 The military judge, Colonel Kenneth Howard, summarizing the evidence for the defense in United States v. Captain Medina C.M. 427162 (A.C.M.R. 1971) as cited in Ibid., 34. 25 Prosecution Brief on the Law of Principles in United States v. Captain Medina entitled A Company Commander is Responsible for Controlling and Supervising Subordinates During Combat Operations, reprinted in Ibid., 31. FM 27-10 (1956), 178-179. Military commanders may also be responsible for war crimes committed by their subordinates. When troops commit massacres and atrocities against the civilian populati on of occupied territory or against prisoners of war, the responsibility may rest not only with the actual perp etrators but also with the commander. Such a responsibility arises directly when the acts in question have been committed in pursuance of an order of the commander concerned. The commander is also responsible if he has actual knowledge, or should have had knowledge (italics mine) from reports received by him or th rough other means, that troops or other persons subject to his control are about to commit or have commi tted a war crime and he fails to take the necessary and reasonable steps to insure compliance with th e law of war or to punish violators thereof.

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198 the Nuremberg era precedent, the Military Judge instructed the jury that it must establish that Captain Medina possessed actual knowledge. 26 Although the prosecution had indeed believed that Medi na knew precisely what was taking place while the massacre was still in process, Medinas acquittal cannot simply be understood as a failure of the pr osecution to present sufficient evidence. 27 The military judges instruction retains the va lue of precedence regardless of the jurys determination of guilt. The elimination of the phrase should have known, included in both FM 27-10 and the Opinion and Judgment of the United States Mi litary Tribunal at Nuremberg in the Hostage Case, created a new le gal standard. In the case of the latter, the phrase should have known related to the ability of a commander or staff officer to comprehend the illegal character of an orde r and the likelihood th at dissemination of a criminal order resulting in criminal acts. 28 Unlike the Hostage Case the Medina precedence creates the possibility that American military commanders in future operations could avoid being held negligent even in cases where the obvious outcomes to military orders or permissive command 26 Instructions from the Military Judge to the Court Members in the United States vs. Captain Ernest L, Medina ., reprinted in Friedman, War Crimes: A Documentary History 1732: In relation to the question pertaining to the supervisor y responsibility of a Company Commander, I advise you that as a general principle of milit ary law and custom a military superior in command is responsible for and required, in the performance of his command duties, to make certain the proper perf ormance by his subordinates of their duties as assigned by him. In other words, a commander must remain alert and make timely adjustments as required by a changing situation. Furthermore, a co mmander is also responsible if he has actual knowledge that troops or other persons subject to his control are in the process of committing or about to commit a war crime and he wrongfully fails to take the necessary and reasonable steps to ensure compliance with the law of war. You will observe that these legal requirements placed on a commander require actual knowledge (italics added) plus a wrongful failure to act. Thus mere presence at the scene without knowledge will not suffice. That is, the commander-subordinate relationship alone will not allow an inference of knowledge. While it is not necessary that a commander actually see an atrocity bei ng committed, it is essential that he know that his subordinates are in the process of committing atrocities or about to commit atrocities. 27 Colonel Eckhardt, Command Criminal Responsibility, 12-13. 28 Opinion and Judgment of the United States Military Tribunal at Nuremberg in United States vs. Wilhelm List et al reprinted in Friedman, Documentary Hist, 1323.

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199 climates could be predicted. A year after Medinas trial, one legal an alyst wrote that the actual knowledge test, in the context like My Lai, is an invitation to see and hear no evil. 29 Both Medina and Henderson were, for s hort periods, on the ground at My Lai in the direct proximity of a ditch filled w ith hundreds of victims after receiving a radio inquiry into possible executions of civilian s. If Medina and Henderson had intentionally avoided looking down into the ditch to avoid seeing what they suspected was there, their act of cowardice was rewarded by Judge Howards a new standard of command responsibility that no longer held them to a should have known criteria. In an article in the New York Times that same year, the American Chief Prosecutor in the Hostage Case, then retired Brigadier General Telford Taylor, argued that the actual knowledge requirement in the military judges instructi ons to the jury was a directed order for Medinas acquittal, which in fact took place on September 22, 1971. 30 On December 17, 1971, Colonel Henderson was also found not guilty of being a party to the cover up and of lying to the Peers Commission. In Americas newspaper of record, this last My Lai trial ended in the mi dst of well deserved mockery of the inability of careerist officers to recall the actions and statements of their superiors and peers. 31 However, there are also many other factors to consider in mitigation of failures of the later My Lai trials: the compromising of witnesses by testimony and arrangements made in the earlier trials; witnesses compromised by shrewd legal maneuvers in trial or while 29 William Clark, Medina: An Essay on the Principles of Criminal Responsibility for Homicide, 5, Rutgers School of Law-Camden Law Review (1973), 59. 30 Telford Taylor, The Cour se of Military Justice, New York Times, (February 2, 1972, 37. 31 Douglas Robinson, Henderson Trial, More Is Involved than a Colonel, New York Times, (November 29, 1971) as cited in Bilton & Sim, Four Hours in My Lai ., 408.

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200 awaiting trial, especially in the Medina trial; and, most importantly, the death of key members of the command, such as Task Force commander Colonel Barker. There are also other factors that cannot be excused, such as the greater likelihood of a defendant being acquitted by a jury of hi s so-called peers with whom he shares such distinguishing characteristics as rank, race, region, and, above all, nationality. Any officer with combat experience was likely to feel some sympathy for Medina and Henderson in a number of areas: (1) the wretched intelligence briefing by the Task Force intelligence officer, Captain Eugene M. Kotouc, indicating that Vietnamese noncombatants would magically disappear from the hamlet when the clock struck 7 AM; (2) that Medina and Henderson may have been briefed by Barker that, against all Army doctrine, the task force was about to engage a VC battalion larger in size than the attacking American forces; and (3) that th e company had suffered a casualty, albeit a single casualty, in the days prior to the operation. It takes more than just a small amount of courage for officers to turn their heads to look, or admit to looking, into ditches containing bodies that demonstr ate to them the extent in which they had completely lost control of their subord inate forces during a combat operation. Considering the lack of successful convi ctions based on command responsibility in the My Lai trials, the U.S. Armys decision not to acquiesce to General Taylors call for the convening of a special war crimes tr ibunal, as in the Nuremberg era trials, was obviously a mistake. 32 When asked during an Army Wa r College Oral History Program interview prior to his retirement if he thought Armys legal effort had adequately 32 Taylor, The Course of Military Justice, 37.

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201 enforced his Commissions fi ndings, General Peers mourned the fact that so many offenses listed in his report were never brought to trial and dealt wi th administratively: I think they (the administrative actions) were totally inadequate. These sentences were so mild, that in a way it simply says that we dont like this kind of activity but in a way condone it. I believe the Army Corps, the Officers Corps, and the NCO Corps and the American public would have been better satisfied if those people had been brought to trial. Now, if they were found not guilty that is one thing, but I am not sure they would have been found not guilty. And I think it would have provided a much better precedent for something that may happen in the future. Now that we have this precedent, I would ask, if we have another conflict, what the hell are we going to do with the people who co mmit war crimes or related actions? When asked whether the Army put its best foot forward in th e individual cases that made it to trial, Peers responded he did not feel that the Army did not adequately man either the prosecution teams or the members of the court martial itself, especially in consideration the defense had la wyers of the caliber of F. Lee Bailey with major staffs to support of the defenses case. 33 The most fundamental legacy of the My Lai trials was the severance of the doctrinal standard of command responsibil ity from the contemporary legal precedent associated with the Medina court-marshal. Nowhere is the significance of this discontinuity better expressed than in the ra cist comment of Medina s attorney, F. Lee Bailey: I dont think that what is done to a jap hanged in the heat of vengeance after World War II can be done to an American on an imputed theory of responsibility. 34 33 Peers felt that even in the assignments of activ e duty officers, the case was stacked against the prosecution. In his USAWC debrief, Peers used the example of the Henderson trial where you have a Major, a fine officer, but a young officer not near as experienced as Rothblatt and the lieutenant colonel from JAG that were defending Henderson. So I do not think the Army put its best foot forward. I think they could have assigned much stronger individual s ion teams and I am not exactly pleased with the composition of some of the court-martials. I think they could have put on a more representative kind of people there people that could have understood went on in warfare and not necessarily service support kind of individuals. USAWC Senior Leader Oral History, LTG Peers, 33-36. 34 Cited in Prevost, Race and War Crimes, 329.

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202 The Taylor Thesis On January 6, 1971, Dick Cavett introduced an unusually serious guest on his television talk show that wa s usually known for light-hearted banter with celebrities. This guest was a very somber Telford Taylor. In the wake of the convening of the Calleys court-martial two months earlier, Ge neral Taylor stated, in reference to a book he just authored, Nuremberg and Vietnam: An American Tragedy, that if Dean Rusk, Robert McNamara, McGeorge Bundy, Walt Rostow, and General Westmoreland were tried for war crimes under the same standards applied in the case of General Yamashita, they would likely come to the same end. Carried the next day in the New York Times the quote became a critical weapon to those clai ming that the United States intervention in the Second Indochina War was criminal. 35 Through the course of the My Lai tr ials, Taylor authored one book and wrote three opinion editorials for the New York Times that addressed the Vietnam war in general and My Lai in particular in the cont ext of the Nuremberg era war crimes trials. His first article, printed on January 10, 1970, discussed the wider conduct of the war, especially the bombing campaigns, and discu ssed the concept of command responsibility in the context of the Yamashita standard. He accepted the premise of the Yamashitas defense as articulated in the U.S. Supreme Court ruling that Yamashita, as a commander, was condemned to death not for what hims elf did, but for failing to give and enforce orders to check the excesse s of his troops. His second article, on November 21, 1970, came out on the fourth day of the trial of Ca lley, which went unmentioned in the text of 35 General Taylors remarks during a January 8, 1971 appearance the Dick Cavett show. A condensed version of the interview, edited by Neil Sheehan appeared in the New York Times, January 9, 1971, Page 3, Column 1.

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203 the article. In this article, Taylor had gain ed access to an extremely abridged release of the Peers Report. He also noted the envir onment and assets available to the American command in Vietnam were far more favorable than what was experienced by the German Army in occupied Europe while facing conditi ons that were not totally dissimilar to those prevailing in Vietnam and called for the creation of special military tribunals to try the My Lai cases so as to insure that Americans accused of war crimes are handled in the same manner as foreigners were handled by Am ericans in the Nuremberg era trials. His 1970 book, Nuremberg and Vietnam: An American Tragedy, provides a more detailed exposition of themes addressed in his earlier articles. After a two-year break, Taylor followed up with a final New York Times article. Printed on Fe bruary 2, 1972, after the acquittal of Captain Medina Taylor addressed the gene ral failure of the My Lai prosecutions in enforcing the standard of command responsibility found both in Army doctrine and the Nuremberg era war crimes trials. 36 However, it was not in his articles, b ook, or even in the numerous panels on the war in which he participated or chaired that Taylor articulated the so-called come to the same end thesis. This Taylor thesis consisted of the belief that General Westmoreland and other officials in the Johnson Administra tion would be found guilty of war crimes if held to the Yamashita standard of comma nd responsibility. The thesis was based on a poorly summarization of a statement attributed to Taylor by Neil Sheehan in a January 9, 1971 New York Times article under the caption of Taylor Says by Yamashita Ruling Westmoreland May Be Guilty. Neil Sheehan interviewed Taylor after being granted 36 Taylor, Judgment on My Lai, New York Times (January 10, 1970), 29; Nuremberg in Son My Ibid., (November 21, 1970), 30; and The course of Military Justice, Ibid., (February 2, 1972), 39. Taylors books of the period include Nuremberg and Vietnam: An American Tragedy, (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970).

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204 pre-broadcast access to a screening of a ta ped episode of Dick Cavett Show. Sheehan interviewed Taylor for the New York Time s article that would appear on the day on which the evening broadcast of the Dick Cavett show was scheduled to be aired. Sheehan misleadingly summarized Taylors stat ement vis--vis Westmoreland in the first line of the article as follows: Telford Taylor, former Chief prosecu tor at the Nuremberg trials, has declared that Gen. William Westmorela nd, the Army Chief of Staff, might be convicted as a war criminal if war crimes standards established during World War II were applied to his co nduct of the war in Vietnam. However, later in the article Sheehan para phrases the Cavett Taylor dialogue as follows: Taylor: Well I certainly suggest very strongly in the book, and would be quite prepared to say it a little more explicity, that if you apply to the people youve mentioned (or to the hi gh commanders at Nuremberg) like General Westmoreland, if you were to apply to them the standards that were applied in the trial of General Yamashita, there would be very strong possibility that they would come to the same end as he did. Cavett: Then you imply they would be found guilty? Taylor: Could be found guilty. It wa s not the purpose of the book to say that X is guilty, or Y is guilty or Z is guilty. Thats for some court to decide if you have the evidence th ere and look at it. But it is the function of the book to say that these pr inciples were applied before and if you applied them now, such and such results might follow. And the American people (italics mine) cannot face th ier own past and cannot face the principles that they laid down and applied to Germans and Japanese unless theyre to have the pr inciples work the other way. 37 It is obvious from both Taylors actua l words in the Cavett interview and his published writings that he never tried to put forward a factual case against Westmoreland. Taylors actual words, in reference to My Lai specifically or the conduct of his command 37 Sheehan, New York Times, January 9, 1971.

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205 of U.S. ground forces in Vietnam in general, never directly equate d the words or actions of General Yamashita during the Ameri can liberation of the Philippines to Westmorelands conduct in Vietnam. In fact, in his 1970 article, Taylor admitted lacking any detailed knowledge of the My Lai Massacre, itself having been obscured by the fog of war. In fact, Taylor characterized the military directives issued by Westmorelands command on the humanitarian treatment of the Vietnamese as impeccable. 38 In his book, Westmoreland is scarcely mentioned by Taylor except to make to separate and distinct points: (1) Westmore land certainly possessed superi or assets to monitor and supervise the activities of his forces th an Yamashita and (2) Taylor associated Westmoreland with the strategy of utilizing ma ssive firepower, a violat ion of the just war doctrine of proportionality, in the conduct of the war. 39 The tone and thesis contained in the headline and introductory st atement of his 1971 New York Times article on Taylor is probably a fare representation of the view of Westmoreland held Sheehan, who would later become nationally famous as the journa list associated with the publication of the Pentagon Papers, than the view of Westmoreland held by Taylor. 40 It was only after the end of the trials th at he made a direct comparison between the conduct of Yamashita and that of an Am erican officer; that officer was Captain Medina. 41 Even then, Taylor never claimed to be making or putting forward a formal 38 Taylor, New York Times, (January 10, 1970) and (November 21, 1970). 39 Taylor, Vietnam and Nuremberg, 180-181, 191. 40 In Sheehans A Bright Shining Lie, his 1988 blockbuster epic on the war, Westmoreland is depicted in an uncomplimentary manner For Sheehan, while it was Lieutenant General William Dupuy who was the main architect of the building and deployment of the American military machine in Vietnam and the mastermind of Americas destructive tactics of prodigious firepower and failed strategy of attrition, Westmoreland was its the unimaginative and self deluded executioner. See Sheehan, A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam, (New York: Random House, 1988), 10-11, 16, and 558. 41 Taylor, New York Times, (February 2, 1972).

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206 legal argument. As a full professor of international law at Columbia University, he could have chosen from any number of prestigious law reviews as the medium for his views. Instead, he chose the medium of newspaper opeds and current affairs publishing to make a non-legalist, ethical challenge regarding the conduct of the war to the nation at large. The massive law review articles and legal dissertations written in response to a misleadingly phrased newspaper headline was an obvious literary example of asymmetrical warfare (italic mine) that missed the ta rget of Taylors central nonlegalistic argument. Thirty years later, th e mass of legal articles and dissertations that were generated in response to Taylors socalled thesis suggests the intensity of public debate crossed over into the professional discour se of the legal profession. After thirty years distance, it is far easier to appreciat e the changes in Genera l Taylors attitudes toward the war, from general s upport prior to 1965 to his late r criticism of the overuse of firepower by the United States, as very nuanced and moderate for the period. In his 1970 book, Taylor recognized the important distinc tion between the competing interpretations of the legacy of th e Nuremberg trials. While dismissive of some of the more radical legal theories associ ated with Nuremberg, he was tolerant of the fact that the Nuremberg legacy includes both what happened there and what people think happened and that the latter can be at times more prominent than the former. Taylor was specifically critical of the so-called Nuremberg defense, a defense claim that a soldier can refuse military service on the ius ad bellum argument that the war was manifestly aggressive. He also doubted th at a judicial decree could be utilized to nullify the legal resort to military actions by the Pr esident and U.S. Congress. 42 As a 42 Taylor, Nuremberg and Vietnam, 13-15, 119-121.

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207 result, more radical critics of American policies, such as Princetons eminent legal scholar, Richard A. Falk, considered Taylo rs minimalist indictment of Americas involvement in Vietnam as too conservative. 43 Criticism of Taylor by conservatives was far less deferential and at times bordered on linguistic hysteria. Waldemar A. Solf, ch ief of the International Affairs Davison of the Office of the Judge Advocate General of th e U.S. Army, was Taylors most ferocious critic. The functional successor of Richard Ba xter as far as deve loping official Army doctrine on the Laws of War, Solf, in an unofficial law review in 1972, charged that Taylors so-called thesis against Westmore land and other officials elevated Professor Taylor to the status of a first magnitude star among scapegoat m ongers and that there were so many demonstrable errors of law and contradictions in Taylors (pre-1972) writings that Taylor thereby forfeits th e opportunity to assume a place among those qualified to discuss what international law really is. 44 In his response to Taylor, Solf noted that any comparison between the Yamashita and the My Lai trials had to address the procedural disc ontinuity between a special military commission, in the case of the former, a nd a military court martial, in the latter case. If it can be shown that military commissions are weighted against defendants and military courts martial are more weighted in the interests of defendants, it is fair to point out possible ethnocentric, racist, or national biases implicit in utilizing one for the trial of foreign defendants of another race and another for the trial of ones own nationals. Solf 43 See Richard A. Falk review of Taylors Nuremberg and Vietnam The Problem With War Crimes, New York Times (December 27, 1970), 165. 44 Waldemar A. Solf, A Response to Telford Taylo rs Nuremberg and Vietnam: An American Tragedy, Akron Law Review, vol. 5-1 (Winter, 1972), 44.

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208 called Taylors call for fairness in trying the My Lai defendants before a special military tribunal a nostalgic preference for Post Wo rld War II procedures. Solf noted three major distinctions between military commissions and courts martial: procedural limitations, exclusionary rules of evidence, and due process standards associated with court martials. This placed Yamashita in th e position of being just a passive victim of bad timing in not being granted the same pro cedural protections later given to American officers tried by the United States. Solf was th e first of many legal critics of Taylor who associated Taylors criticism of the outco me of the Medina tr ial with a so-called absolute liability standard or secondary liab ility standard. These critics utilized the concepts of Substantive standards or norms, related to formal legal precedents, and Procedural standards or norms, related to the less rigorous demands placed upon the Nuremberg era prosecutors. This had the effect of playing down the significance of the contrasting instructions con cerning the standard of comma nd responsibility given by the respective judges in the Yamashita and Medina trials. 45 In summary, the attempt to attribute cate gorical support for a theory of absolute command responsibility to General Taylor, ba sed on his war time writings, is a classical example of the "straw man" fallacy in whic h one posits a counterfactual description of ones opponents position (the st raw man), attacks it, and proc laims victory as the real position of one opponent remains untouched. 45 Under Article 102 of the 1949 Prisoner of War Convention, which required that prisoners of war can be validly sentenced only if the senten ce and been pronounced by the same courts and according to the same procedure as in the case of members of the armed forces of the Detaining powers. See Solf, Ibid., 61-64. Arguments to find in the Medina trial a refinement or liberalization of jurisprudence can be found in Robyn Campbell, Military Liability For Grave Breaches of National and International Law: Absolute or Limited? (Ph.D. dissertation, Duke University, 1974), 180-214 and Major Bruce D. Landrum, The Yamashita War Crimes Trials: Command Responsibility Then and Now, Military Law Review, Vol. 149 (November 1995) 289-301.

PAGE 217

209 Yamashita v. Medina, Subjective Criteria Another authoritive critic of Taylor was Solfs successor as Americas top doctrinal authority on the law of war. William Hays Parks ascended to the dual leadership of both the offices the Law of Wa r Branch of the Department of Defense and the International and Operational Law Divi sion of the Office of the Judge Advocate General of the Army immediately prior to R onald Reagan gaining the White House. A retired Colonel in the U.S. Marines, with combat experience in Vietnam, Parks marked his entrance to the profession of law with his 1973 thesis, Command Responsibility for War Crimes, which challenged General Tayl ors characterization of the Yamashita precedent. Except for classifying the My La i Massacre as an aberration in the first sentence, Parks undertook to challenge the con cept of absolute comma nd liability that he associated with Taylor, among others, without utilizing the My Lai trials as a comparison. Unlike other contemporaneous critics of Tayl or who used the straw man of absolute liability, it is to Parks credit that he did not attempt a justification of the Medina acquittal trial in terms of the Yamashita precedent. While Parks was critical of the dominan ce of non-lawyers in the Yamashita trial, as a former combat officer he appealed to what he considered the sentiments common to the combat arms in his writing. In his thes is, Parks utilizes a non-legalistic tactic of laying out subjective criteria to determine whether or not a commander possessed a sufficient means of knowledge for war crimes, a criteria more likely to be appreciated by officers with combat command experience: (a) The rank of the commander. (b) The experience of the commander.

PAGE 218

210 (c) The training of the men under his command. (d) The age and experience of his men. (e) The size and experience of his staff. (f) The comprehensiven ess of his duties. (g) The sliding probability ra tio of unit-incident-command. (h) The duties and complexities of the co mmand by virtue of the command held. (i) Communications abilities. (j) Mobility of the commander. (k) Isolation of the commander. (l) Composition of the forces within the command. (m) Combat situation. 46 Parks utilized these criter ia to make a case that Yama shita was not held to an absolute standard of liability as a commander and could well have been convicted under the standards of the later Hostage and High Command Cases. However, if one were to use these criteria to compare the words and actions of General Yamashita and those of Captain Medina at My Lai, Ge neral Taylors specific claim that Medina was held to a completely different legal standard than that to which Yamashita was held, or any other Nuremberg era defendant, appears obvious. 47 (a-b) RANK AND EXPERIENCE: General Yamashita was proclaimed a national hero for his capture of Sing apore from the British. He was the commander of Japanese forces in Manchuria prior to being given command of the Philippines. Captain Medina was an experienced soldier who came up 46 Parks, Command Responsibility, 1 & 104. 47 Taylor, New York Times, (February 2, 1972). For background on General Yamashitas command, see Prevost, Race and War Crimes, 304-338 and for same on Captain Medinas see Bilton and Sim, Four Hours at My Lai, 47-141.

PAGE 219

211 from the ranks after excelling as a No n Commissioned Officer (NCO). He graduated fourth in a class of two hundred at Officer Candidate School and the men of his company respected him. His company was considered the best in the battalion. (c-d) THE TRAINING, SIZE, AND EXPERIENCE OF HIS COMMAND: Ten days before Yamashitas arrival in the Philippines on October 20, 1944, the United States began its reconquest by a decisive victory in the Battle of Leyte Gulf. Half of the forces Yamashita assign ed to the campaign were killed. Yamashita described the soldiers of hi s Army Group as poorly trained with low morale. The size of Yamashita s forces were approximately 100,000 personnel. In contrast, Medinas command consisted of 105 men on the day of the massacre. Charlie Company was considered average and differed little from the Army as a whole. Tw o days prior to the massacre, a patrol member stepped on a mine killing one NCO and injuring two other soldiers. On that same day his soldiers murdered an unarmed wounded woman, an act Medina failed to report or act upon. Numerous soldiers of Medinas command reported that Charlie Compa ny had stopped the practice of taking prisoners, military or civilian, well prior to My Lai. (e) THE SIZE AND EXPERIENCE OF HIS STAFF: In the later trial of Admiral Toyoda, the Army Group under Yamashita was noted has only being capable of a limited command function as a resu lt of Toyado, as the senior officer in charge of the defense of the Philippines, having removed the Japanese theater staff from Luzon prior to Yamashita s arrival. In contrast, at My Lai, the division, task force, and battalion commanders were all physically present in helicopters above their company. The My Lai Massacre was one of the most supported and supervised operations of its type in the history of the American warfare. (f) THE COMPREHENSIVENESS OF HIS DUTIES: As Yamashita felt his command, scattered across hundreds of miles of terrain, incapable of decisive action, he ordered the evacuation of Manila, an action opposed by his subordinate commanders who were simu ltaneously questioning his authority for the order. In contrast, Medina s mission was to make contact and destroy enemy forces in one specific location. However, the forces of the 48th VC Battalion, approximately 500 pe rsonnel, were falsely reported by intelligence to be at My Lai. (g) THE SLIDING PROBABILITY RATIO OF UNIT-INCIDENT-COMMAND: When U.S. forces landed on Luzon on January 9, 1945, the Japanese forces, refusing to surrender the capital of Manila engaged in murdering and torturing between 60,000 and 100,000 civilia ns. Medinas 105 soldiers murdered between 300 and 500 unarmed old men, women, and children in four hours. While the scale of the oper ations are not in any way comparable.

PAGE 220

212 Each soldier under Medina killed three to four times the average number of civilians that the soldie rs in Yamashitas army group killed. (h) THE DUTIES AND COMPLEXITIES OF THE COMMAND: The Philippines were written off by the Imperial Hea dquarters by the time Yamashita took command. Yamashitas counterattack to enable the forces in Manila to withdrawal failed and by March all Japa nese forces in the city had been killed. In contrast, the American forces at My Lai received no hostile fire from the village and sustained no casu alties except for one self-inflicted injury. (i) COMMUNICATIONS ABILITIES: Yamashitas communication with the forces in Manila was lost immediat ely upon the landing of U.S. forces on Luzon. In contrast, Medina mainta ined company command post position with his radioman in a direct physical proximity of My Lai 4 for the entire four-hour duration (except for when he entered the village proper to have lunch with his men). (j) MOBILITY OF THE COMMANDER: Yamashita was held up in a remote mountain region until he surrendered on August 15, 1945. His supplies were low and dispersed throug hout the island. In contrast, Medinas company conducted the state of the art air-m obile operation made famous in the Vietnam War. (k) ISOLATION OF THE COMMANDER: As opposed to Yamashita, Medinas forces could not approach anything resembling the isolation of Yamashita as his three higher echelon commanders tr ied to avoid colliding with one another directly overhead of his company. (l) COMPOSITION OF THE FORCES WITHIN THE COMMAND: Yamashita possessed an Army Group with virtually no naval or air support. Medina possessed an infantry company with artillery, helicopters gunships in direct support, and had massive the air support assets available to be tasked. (m) COMBAT SITUATION: Yamashita conducted retrograde operations without control of the air or functiona l communications. In contrast, Medina conducted a search and destroy operati on that was standard for American ground forces in Vietnam. It becomes obvious from the facts presen ted in the comparison utilizing Parks own subjective criteria that Yamashita w ould not have been sentenced and hanged by Captain Medinas jury if he wore the same uniform as Medina. One does not have to be a lawyer to appreciate Taylors obvious c onclusion. The contrast between these two

PAGE 221

213 trials is not the result of di ffering interpretations of legal sufficiency. Rather, it is a simple example of the lack of consiste nt institutional moral standards over time. 48 The results of the official My Lai investigations and the subsequent fa ilure to convict any officers on the basis of command liability de monstrate that the United States government failed to adhere to the standard of comma nd indirect responsibili ty affirmed both at Nuremberg and at the trial of General Yamashita. The Legacy of My Lai Massacre It is not the reaction of lawyers, military or otherwise, that is central to an analysis of the doctrinal response to My Lai. Rather, it is the acti ons of senior members of the military profession. If one were seeking a co mfortable and undemanding last tour of duty before retirement, serving as Chief of Staff of the United States from the period of July 1, 1968, to June 30, 1972, would hardly be a temp ting choice. After commanding American forces in Indochina from 1965 to 1968, West moreland was appointed to the Armys senior position. Post My Lai Professional Reform, An Attempted Return to Just War Only three days after his staff comple ted its review of the Peers report, Westmoreland directed the Army War Colle ge Commandant, in a memorandum dated April 18, 1970, to initiate a study in response to several unfa vorable events that brought into question the state of discipline, inte grity, morality, ethics, and professionalism of the Army. Westmoreland specifically reque sted the development of a concise and understandable Officers Code to enable offi cers to recognize and resist institutional pressures that could compromi se their integrity. Officers at the Army War College 48 Parks, Command Responsibility, 1 and F. Lee Bailey as cited in Luther Wests They Call it Justice : Command Influence and the Court-Martial System (New York: Viking Press, 1977), 186.

PAGE 222

214 completed the report in less than 90 days. After extensive interviews with company grade officers at various trai ning installations, the studys au thors bluntly concluded that within the Officer Corps th ere was a strong, clear, and pervasive perception that a barrier existed between the ideal values of military service and the actual and operative values of military leaders. 49 The group of officers who administered the 1970 Army War College study had been selected by the Department of the Army for grooming for eventual service as general officers. Although they found that the West Point Cadet Code of Duty-HonorCountry was espoused by officers at all levels this choice group of officers found it necessary to draft an more affirmative and co mprehensive Officers Creed to reaffirm the principle of selfless service: I will give to the selfless performance of my duty and my mission the best that effort, thought, and dedication can provide. To this end, I will not only seek co ntinually to improve my knowledge and practice of my profession, but I w ill exercise the authority entrusted to me by the President and the Congress w ith fairness, justice, and restraint, respecting the dignity and human rights (authors emphasis) of others and devoting myself to the welfare of those placed under my command. In justifying and fulfilling the trust pl aced in me, I will conduct my private life as well as my public service so as to be free both from impropriety and the appearance of impropriety, acting with candor and integrity to earn the unquestioning trust of my fellow soldiers juniors, seniors, and associates and employing my rank and position not to serve myself but to serve my country and unit. By practicing physical and moral courag e I will
Permanent Link: http://ufdc.ufl.edu/UFE0010070/00001

Material Information

Title: Walking away from Nuremberg: just war and the doctrine of command responsibility in the American military profession
Physical Description: ix, 314 p.
Language: English
Creator: Rockwood, Lawrence ( Dissertant )
McMahon, Robert J. ( Thesis advisor )
Publisher: University of Florida
Place of Publication: Gainesville, Fla.
Publication Date: 2005
Copyright Date: 2005

Subjects

Subjects / Keywords: History thesis, Ph.D
Dissertations, Academic -- UF -- History

Notes

Abstract: On November 20, 1945, in his opening statement as the American Chief Counsel for the prosecution at the International Military Tribunal (IMT) at Nuremberg, United States Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson addressed the issue of whether the legacy of that tribunal would be simple "victor's justice" or the establishment of principles of international reciprocity in holding individuals accountable for war crimes: "We must never forget that the record on which we judge these defendants is the record on which history will judge us tomorrow. To pass these defendants a poisoned chalice is to put it to our lips as well."¹ The official position of the United States vis-à-vis Justice Jackson's apocalyptic challenge has been one of steady erosion from a precise affirmative standard for holding individual commanders directly responsible for war crimes. Many of the principles of Nuremberg era trials have their origin in the U.S. Civil War era U.S. General Order No. 100, also known as the Lieber Code, that incorporated all the major principles of Augustinian just war doctrine. This project examines the evolution of the concept of command responsibility as U.S. military doctrine from the Lieber Code to the present. The development of military doctrine is considered in the context of contested weltanschauung (worldviews) between those who championed contrasting models of military professionalism. Although the United States Army, after World War II, incorporated a rigorous definition of command responsibility into its preeminent doctrinal manual on the law of war, Field Manual 27-10, the United States failed to hold its own military commanders responsible for dereliction in preventing grave breaches of international humanitarian law during the course of the Vietnam War.² Subsequently, the United States has consistently refused to ratify international treaties and protocols that would replace the passive standard of command responsibility that the United States has enforced on its own military personnel with the affirmative standards inscribed in other recent international human rights statutes and war crime tribunal charters. Finally, this project will closely examine the relevance of the military doctrine of command responsibility to the national decisions to oppose the ratification of such treaties. Footnotes ¹Quoted in Telford Taylor, The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trial, (New York: Little Brown, 1992), 168. ²U.S. Army Field Manual 27-10, Rules of Land Warfare, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, July 1956). 178-179.
Subject: Augustine, command, crimes, ethics, humanitarian, just, law, Lieber, military, Nuremberg, professional, protocol, responsibility, Rockwood, trials, war
General Note: Title from title page of source document.
General Note: Document formatted into pages; contains 322 pages.
General Note: Includes vita.
Thesis: Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Florida, 2005.
Bibliography: Includes bibliographical references.
General Note: Text (Electronic thesis) in PDF format.

Record Information

Source Institution: University of Florida
Holding Location: University of Florida
Rights Management: All rights reserved by the source institution and holding location.
System ID: UFE0010070:00001

Permanent Link: http://ufdc.ufl.edu/UFE0010070/00001

Material Information

Title: Walking away from Nuremberg: just war and the doctrine of command responsibility in the American military profession
Physical Description: ix, 314 p.
Language: English
Creator: Rockwood, Lawrence ( Dissertant )
McMahon, Robert J. ( Thesis advisor )
Publisher: University of Florida
Place of Publication: Gainesville, Fla.
Publication Date: 2005
Copyright Date: 2005

Subjects

Subjects / Keywords: History thesis, Ph.D
Dissertations, Academic -- UF -- History

Notes

Abstract: On November 20, 1945, in his opening statement as the American Chief Counsel for the prosecution at the International Military Tribunal (IMT) at Nuremberg, United States Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson addressed the issue of whether the legacy of that tribunal would be simple "victor's justice" or the establishment of principles of international reciprocity in holding individuals accountable for war crimes: "We must never forget that the record on which we judge these defendants is the record on which history will judge us tomorrow. To pass these defendants a poisoned chalice is to put it to our lips as well."¹ The official position of the United States vis-à-vis Justice Jackson's apocalyptic challenge has been one of steady erosion from a precise affirmative standard for holding individual commanders directly responsible for war crimes. Many of the principles of Nuremberg era trials have their origin in the U.S. Civil War era U.S. General Order No. 100, also known as the Lieber Code, that incorporated all the major principles of Augustinian just war doctrine. This project examines the evolution of the concept of command responsibility as U.S. military doctrine from the Lieber Code to the present. The development of military doctrine is considered in the context of contested weltanschauung (worldviews) between those who championed contrasting models of military professionalism. Although the United States Army, after World War II, incorporated a rigorous definition of command responsibility into its preeminent doctrinal manual on the law of war, Field Manual 27-10, the United States failed to hold its own military commanders responsible for dereliction in preventing grave breaches of international humanitarian law during the course of the Vietnam War.² Subsequently, the United States has consistently refused to ratify international treaties and protocols that would replace the passive standard of command responsibility that the United States has enforced on its own military personnel with the affirmative standards inscribed in other recent international human rights statutes and war crime tribunal charters. Finally, this project will closely examine the relevance of the military doctrine of command responsibility to the national decisions to oppose the ratification of such treaties. Footnotes ¹Quoted in Telford Taylor, The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trial, (New York: Little Brown, 1992), 168. ²U.S. Army Field Manual 27-10, Rules of Land Warfare, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, July 1956). 178-179.
Subject: Augustine, command, crimes, ethics, humanitarian, just, law, Lieber, military, Nuremberg, professional, protocol, responsibility, Rockwood, trials, war
General Note: Title from title page of source document.
General Note: Document formatted into pages; contains 322 pages.
General Note: Includes vita.
Thesis: Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Florida, 2005.
Bibliography: Includes bibliographical references.
General Note: Text (Electronic thesis) in PDF format.

Record Information

Source Institution: University of Florida
Holding Location: University of Florida
Rights Management: All rights reserved by the source institution and holding location.
System ID: UFE0010070:00001


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WALKING AWAY FROM NUREMBERG:
JUST WAR AND THE DOCTRINE OF COMMAND
RESPONSIBILITY IN THE AMERICAN MILITARY PROFESSION















By

LAWRENCE P. ROCKWOOD


A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA


2005















ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

At the University of Florida, special thanks go to Robert McMahon, Michael

Gannon, and Paul Magnarella who all were indispensable to this project. The chair of my

doctoral committee and academic adviser for almost three decades, Dr. McMahon, bore

the five years of my research and composition with patience and grace while guiding the

advancement of this dissertation through many last minute obstacles. Mike Gannon's

and Paul Magnarella's life's work inspired my interest in professional ethics and human

rights leading to this project. The history department's Betty Corwine, and later Joanne

Fort, provided much kindhearted assistance over the years. Additionally, I would like to

thank the many the Freedom of Information Act (FIOA) officers who made this project

possible, especially the archivists at the at the U.S. Army Military History Institute at the

U.S. Army War College in Carlisle Pennsylvania. Finally, I dedicate this dissertation to

the memory of my father, Lieutenant Colonel William P. Rockwood, U.S. Air Force,

graduate, Army Officer Candidate School, Class No. 1 (September 27, 1941).














TABLE OF CONTENTS

page

A C K N O W L E D G M EN T S ..................................................................................... vi

F IG U R E ...................................................................................................... v ii

AB STRA CT ..................................................... viii

CHAPTER

IN TR O D U C TIO N ........................ .... ........................ ........ ..... ................

1 JUST WAR DOCTRINE AND GENERAL ORDER NO. 100 ..........................17

O rigins of G general O rders N o. 100............................................. .................... 18
A ugustinian Just W ar D octrine.................................... .......................... .. ...... 23
Just W ar Doctrine and Post-W estphalian Legalism ............................................ 32
Just War Criteria and General Order No. 100........................................... 40
Ju st C au se ...................................................... 4 1
C om petent A authority ........................................ ..................... ..... 42
C om parative Justice ......... ............................................... .............. 45
R eight Intention ................ ....... ...... ........... ...... ............ 49
Last Resort ................ ......... ....... .......... 51
Probability of Success........... ................... ......... .......... .... .... .......... 53
Proportionality .................... .................................... 54
D iscrim ination................................. ............................ ........ .. .. 56
The Legacy of General Orders No. 100............................ ....................... 57
General Orders No. 100 and International Humanitarian Law (IHL)...... 58
The A ndersonville Trial .................................... ..................................... 61
Conclusion ............................................ 67


2 THE DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE AMERICAN MILITARY
PROFESSION ............................................. .. ....................... 70

Constitutional Allegience and the American Military Profession........................ 71
The Prussification of the American Military Professionalism .......................... 73
Clauswitze contra Lieber (political realsim vs. political ethics) .............. 74
Emory Upton's Love Affair with Prussia .............................................. 79
Elihu Root and the Birth of Military Professionalism .............. ...................... 84














The Formalization and Specialization of American Military Doctrine .............. 90
The Field Service Regulations .............. ........................................... 91
R ules of L and W arfare.......................................................... ................. 95
The Military Professionalism Under the Tutelage of the Legal
Profession................... .. ..... .......... ................... 97
The Re-democratization of the American Military............................. 101
C onclu sion .... ............................................................................ 108



3 COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY AND THE MEANING OF NUREMBERG 10

Command Responsibility Before Nuremberg............................ 112
The O rigins of the N urem berg........................................................ ................. 114
The International Military Tribunal and the Nuremberg Principles ................. 122
The Yamashita Precedent ........................ ................. ...... 127
Trials under Control Council Law No. 10 ................................. .............. 130
The High Command Case .... ................................... 131
The Hostage Case ........................ ............ .. .............. 133
Competing Standards of Command Responsibility ....................................... 135
International Validation and Codification ............................... ............. 139
The O their N urem berg .................................... ............................... ......... 143
The 1957 Edition of Field Manual 27-10 ................................................... 149
Conclusion......... ....................................... ...................... 151



4 THE AMERICAN MILITARY ETHIC IN EARLY COLD WAR............. 154

Form al and Inform al N orm s: ..................................................... ................... 157
The Post-W ar Civil-M military Relationship............................................ 160
The Normal Theory of the American Military Professionalism ............ 163
The Rehabilitation of the Wehrmacht and the Re-Prussification
of the Am erican M military Profession...................................................... 168
Army Doctrine and the Vietnam War.................................................... 176
C on clu sion ........................................................................................... ..... ...... 182


5 COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY AND THE MY LAI MASSACRE.......... 183

My Lai, the Peers Commisssion, and American Military Justice....................... 189
Lieutenant Calley and the Defense of Superior Orders ........................ 191
Captain M edina's Responsibility .............. ...................................... 194









The Taylor Thesis ............................... ........................ 202
Yamashita v. M edina, Subjective Criteria ....................................... 209
The Legacy of M y Lai M assacre ............................... ............ .... ................. 213
Post My Lai Professional Reform, An Attempted Return to Just War... 213
Post-V ietnam R evisionism ............................. .................. 218
Conclusion ............ ............................ ............... 223

6 THE 1977 GENEVA PROTOCOL I AND THE POST-VIETNAM
MILITARY DOCTRINE............... ........................................ 225

U.S. Negotiations at the Diplomatic Conference in Geneva ............................ 227
North / South Debate, Just War Doctrine, and Amended Article 1........ 231
Command Responsibility and Protocol I......... .... ......... ............. 242
The U.S. Military Evaluation of Protocol I................................ ............ .. 244
U.S. Army War College Study of Protocols ................................... 246
Department of Defense Review of Protocol 1 ....................................... 248
A Neo-Clausewitzian Critique of International Humanitarian Law....... 254
Clausewitzian Realism as Formal American Military Doctrine......................... 258
Conclusion ............ ............................ ............... 265


7 C O N C L U SIO N : ....................... .................................................... .... .. 269

APPENDIX: CONTEMPORARY STANDARDS OF COMMAND
RESPONSIBILITY............................ ............... .. .............. 274
The ad hoc Crim inal Tribunals ...... ... .................................. ........ 276
The International Criminal Court (ICC) ........................... .............. 278
Command Responsibility and the Abu Ghraib Investigations.............. 282

REFEREN CES ......................... ......... .. .. ..... .. ............288

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH ...... ..... ....................... ........ .... ........... 314
















FIGURE

Figure page

1 FM 22-100, M military Leadership ........._. ... ....... ................... ..... .........6
















Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the Graduate School
of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

WALKING AWAY FROM NUREMBERG:
JUST WAR AND THE DOCTRINE OF COMMAND
RESPONSIBILITY IN THE AMERICAN MILITARY PROFESSION

By

Lawrence P. Rockwood

May 2005

Chairman: Robert J. McMahon
Major Department: History

On November 20, 1945, in his opening statement as the American Chief Counsel

for the prosecution at the International Military Tribunal (IMT) at Nuremberg, United

States Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson addressed the issue of whether the

legacy of that tribunal would be simple "victor's justice" or the establishment of

principles of international reciprocity in holding individuals accountable for war crimes:

"We must never forget that the record on which we judge these defendants is the record

on which history will judge us tomorrow. To pass these defendants a poisoned chalice is

to put it to our lips as well."1 The official position of the United States vis-a-vis Justice

Jackson's apocalyptic challenge has been one of steady erosion from a precise affirmative

standard for holding individual commanders directly responsible for war crimes.





1 Quoted in Telford Taylor, The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trial, (New York: Little Brown, 1992), 168.









Many of the principles of Nuremberg era trials have their origin in the U.S.

Civil War era U.S. General Order No. 100, also known as the Lieber Code, that

incorporated all the major principles of Augustinian just war doctrine. This project

examines the evolution of the concept of command responsibility as U.S. military

doctrine from the Lieber Code to the present. The development of military doctrine is

considered in the context of contested weltanschauung worldviewss) between those

who championed contrasting models of military professionalism.

Although the United States Army, after World War II, incorporated a rigorous

definition of command responsibility into its preeminent doctrinal manual on the law

of war, Field Manual 27-10, the United States failed to hold its own military

commanders responsible for dereliction in preventing grave breaches of international

humanitarian law during the course of the Vietnam War.2 Subsequently, the United

States has consistently refused to ratify international treaties and protocols that would

replace the passive standard of command responsibility that the United States has

enforced on its own military personnel with the affirmative standards inscribed in

other recent international human rights statutes and war crime tribunal charters.

Finally, this project will closely examine the relevance of the military doctrine of

command responsibility to the national decisions to oppose the ratification of such

treaties.









2 U.S. Army Field Manual 27-10, Rules of Land Warfare, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office,
July 1956). 178-179.













INTRODUCTION

On loan from the U.S. Supreme Court for the purpose of negotiating the London

Charter establishing the International Military Tribunal (IMT) and later serving as the

tribunal's first lead prosecutor for the United States, Justice Robert Jackson immediately

understood that the trials he had arranged and the theory of his prosecution placed the

American military profession in a historical ethical dilemma. In a 1946 article, published

in what was then the professional journal of the U.S. Army, Jackson argued that the

standards of liability that the IMT was holding as binding on the officers of the former

Axis powers were, rather than novel initiatives, inherent in American military tradition

and doctrine. Jackson had a formidable task, as many American military officers were

concerned about precedents being established and the possibility that this precedent could

be used against American commanders in the future. Although the War Department had

both initiated the process and crafted the charges, Jackson realized it would be

insufficient to portray the charter as just a binding order initiated by a competent and

recognized authority. Doctrine usually assumes a longevity that exceeds the tenure of an

appointed or elected leadership. Jackson had to present the charter to the American

military profession as part of its own tradition. First he had to balance the norms of

military obedience to higher authority, especially civilian authority, with the concept that

certain orders are by their nature manifestly illegal and should not be executed. Second,

he had to address the reality that, although members of the military profession are by

definition the mangers of violence, they must abide by rules that recognized that the









means that can be utilized in war are not unlimited and that military commanders are

liable when the conduct of their subordinates exceed those limitations.

Rather than the old law journal debate over the issue of Justice Jackson's legal

realism, this dissertation is concerned with the relationship between American military

doctrine and the Nuremberg precedents over a half-century after Justice Jackson argued

his case for their interdependence. Conservative positivist commentators have pointed

to the novelty of the Nuremberg process and criticized the "tendency to equate war

crimes decisions, or Nuremberg precedents, with the law of war."2 Rather than refute the

legal positivist critique of Nuremberg, my purpose is to establish the Nuremberg

precedents, their antecedents, and progeny as American military doctrine.

This dissertation examines the development of the concept of command

responsibility as official military doctrine from the Civil War era US Army General

Order 100, the "Lieber Code" to contemporary U.S. military doctrine. JCS Pub 1, the

definitive delineator of official U.S. military terminology, defines doctrine as

"fundamental principles by which military forces or elements thereof guide their actions

in support of national objectives."3 Doctrine is distinct from law. While authoritative, a

violation of doctrine does not necessarily involve a violation of law. Although doctrine

often results in law and law often underpins doctrine, doctrine, unlike law, calls for

judgment in its application rather than an automated compliance. Unlike positive law


1 Justice Robert Jackson, "The Significance of Nuremberg to the Armed Forces" inMilitaryAffairs,
(Winter 1946) Vol. 10, 2-15.
2 William V. O'Brien, "The Law of War, Command Responsibility and Vietnam," Georgetown law
Review, LX (February, 1972): 606.

3 Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Publication No. 1, Terms andAcronyms (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 2000), s.v. "doctrine."










based simply on legal jurisdiction, doctrine is based upon a professional consensus, even

though the foundation of that consensus is based on an internal institutional validation

that is hierarchical and relatively narrow. Unlike law, doctrine is openly historicized in

that it "captures the lessons of past wars, reflects the nature of war and conflict in its own

time, and anticipates the intellectual and technological developments that will bring

victory now and in the future," making it a test of professional rather than legal

competence. 4

Just as doctrine is distinct from law, doctrine is also distinct from drill. In a 1966

official doctrinal manual, Virgil Ney drew a distinction between drill manuals and

modern military doctrine. He considered early manuals as "doctrine in infancy." One

example of such proto-doctrine was the Regulations or Blue Book that Frederick William

von Steuben developed to drill the Continental Army at Valley Forge in marching,

weapons fire, and open field battle maneuver. Doctrine proper involves strategic and

operational concerns that are for more comprehensive than mere drill.5 Additionally,

doctrine is distinct from unofficial literature, no matter how influential, in that doctrine is

usually officially published and may also carry an official imprimatur similar to that

found in Catholic theological works signifying doctrinal correctness.



4 "The Army's doctrine lies at the heart of its professional competence." See Department of the Army, Field
Manual 100-5, Operations (Washington: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1990), 3. This manual
described itself as the U.S. Army's "keystone warfighting doctrine" as it "links Army roles and missions to
the National Military Strategy" and describes how commanders are "to think about the conduct of
campaigns, major operations, battles, engagements, and operations other than war."

5 Virgil Ney, The Evolution of the United States Army Field Manual: Valley Forge to Vietnam (Fort
Belvior, VA: Combat Operations Research Group, 1966). For unofficial works claiming that drill manuals
should be considered as capstone doctrine, see William O. Odom, After the Trenches: The Transformation
of U.S. Army Doctrine, 1918-1939 (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1999), 3, and
Walter Edward Kretchik, "Peering Through The Mist: Doctrine as a Guide for U.S. Army Operations,
1775-2000" (Ph.D. diss., University of Kansas, 2001), 1-3.









One benefit of a doctrinal vis-a-vis legal approach to command responsibility is

that it avoids the perennial debate between natural law and positive law theorists.

Following the views of Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) and the prominent late medieval

theologian, Saint Thomas Aquinas, natural law holds that there is an inescapable

connection between law and morality. John Austin, legal positivism's leading historical

proponent, countered such natural law theorists by drawing a sharp distinction between

law and morality based on (1) the command doctrine, that a law must constitute a threat

of sanction, and (2) the doctrine of absolute sovereignty, that a law must be issued from a

position of superiority.6 Doctrine predates this conflict. Specifically, as an early just war

concept, the specific doctrine of military necessity, underpinning command

responsibility, predates the natural versus positive law argument and applies a normative

criterion directly to the experience of war without any need for any philosophical

discussion into the nature of law.

Like law, doctrine is hierarchal. In fact, no two sets of doctrinal publications can

be equal in any given circumstance or contingency. This study is only concerned with

doctrine that established a foundation for the general operation of an army in which

changes in just war doctrine over time would necessitate modifications in subsidiary

doctrines and even the doctrines of other military services. Distinctions between

doctrinal publications arose out of doctrinal developments starting with the promulgation

of (1) the Field Service Regulations early in the twentieth century, (2) the Army Field

Manuals developed during the Second World War and utilized during the Cold War, and


6 Stanley L. Paulson, Classical Legal Positivism at Nuremberg," Philosophy and Public. I ,no 4, 2
(Winter, 1975): 133-135. See also Jeffrie G. Murphy and Jules L. Coleman, "The Nature of Law," in
Philosophy of Law: An Introduction to Jurisprudence, revised ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), 6-33.









(3) the current interservice or "joint" service regulation systems now in the process of

supplementing and replacing the separate doctrinal publication systems of separate

services. Current official doctrine places such doctrine into two major groups:

Capstone Doctrine: The highest category of doctrine publications
in the "hierarchy of publications" that link doctrine to national strategy
and the guidelines of other government agencies to include other members
of international alliances and coalitions.

Keystone Doctrine: Doctrinal publications that provides the
foundation for a series of doctrine publications in the hierarchy of
publication.7

The focus of this study is on Army doctrine and publications at the expense of the

Navy, and later the Air Force, derives from the Army's traditional role as the major

source of both capstone and keystone doctrine. Between the promulgation of U.S. Army

General Orders No. 100 in the Civil War to the belated implementation of the

Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, a process not yet

complete, the War Department and, subsequently, the Department of the Army was the

proponent agency for national war fighting doctrine in general and the laws of war in

particular.

Doctrine is also like law in that it posits a formal norm. Besides formal legal

standards, regulations, and military orders, the 1990 edition of U.S. Army Field Manual

22-100, Military Leadership, includes traditional organizational values such as doctrine

as formal norms. Informal norms include actual operating organizational values,

institutional pressures, and personal values. Unlike law, doctrinal norms do not

necessarily imply uniformity or constancy. Despite its formal hierarchical structure, the


7 Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 12 April 2001, as amended 7 May 2002), 62, 82.









human world of military leadership and subordination seldom provides for the

uncontested development of formal norms. The process of the development of doctrine

often is a complicated balancing act between current authoritative policy and past

tradition. Norms can be arranged along a continuum from rigidly formal norms such as

legal standard (laws, orders, and regulations), semi-formal norms such as basic national

values and traditional organizational values, to informal norms such as actual operating

organizational values, institutional pressures, and personal values. Formal norms should

always trump less formal norms. FM22-100 defines a "true ethical dilemma" as

existing "when two or more deeply held values collide."8


IT ETHICAL DECISION-ALUKI PROCESS


FORMAL
NORMS


Figure 1, From FM 22-100, Military Leadership


8 See Chapter 4 in FM 22-100, Military Leadership, (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1990). The draft 2000 version of FM 22-100 dropped the concept of an ethical
dilemma as a result of the adoption of Aristotelian virtue ethics as a base modal of ethics.









Conflicts between formal norms and informal norms impact not only on the

operational effectiveness of a command, but also on the moral and ethical integrity of its

actions. It will be argued that the ethics associated with traditional just war doctrine are

formal military norms.

Chapter 1 examines the establishment of the principle that there is an affirmative

official duty to use force or coercion to assist others as predicated and conditioned by the

principle of necessity formally in both capstone and keystone doctrine. This principle of

military necessity was established as a formal norm in the military during the Civil War

in U.S. Army General Order 100, the "Lieber Code." In many respects, the "Lieber

Code" and other nineteenth century writings of Dr. Francis Lieber are a reiteration of the

traditional concept ofjustum bellum or just war that originated at end of the fifth century.

The work of Lieber is representative of central tenets of traditional just war theory and

provides a modern foundation of the concept of military necessity and the related concept

of command responsibility for humanitarian conduct during armed conflict. Just over

two years after President Lincoln issued the "Lieber Code," the affirmative mandate

placed on commanders to ensure the minimization of human suffering was enforced by a

U.S. Army military tribunal during the trial of Confederate Captain Henry Wirz, the

commandant of Andersonville Prison, for his failure to affirmatively address the

conditions of Union prisoners during the Civil War.

To make the pejorative charges that certain historical developments are regressive

relapses to a primitive just war doctrine has been a favorite tactic of conservative critics

who have opposed humanitarian initiatives from the Nuremberg Principles to the 1977

Geneva Protocols. Such charges are founded on a lack of knowledge of the core concepts









incorporated in both early just war doctrine and the "Lieber Code." Some scholars in

authoritative positions of doctrine development have even attempted to portray the

central just war principle of discrimination, the distinctive treatment of noncombatants, as

obsolete.9

The present defense of the just war concepts against contemporary charges of

obsolesce will be made on the basis of doctrine rather than simplistic interpretations of

positive law. U.S. Army General Order No. 100 was just as much a foundation of

doctrine as it was of law. As a representation of a major change in national strategy

affecting the conduct of Union forces, it provides the first example of a national

operational capstone doctrine. As the initial authoritative basis for a series of doctrinal

publications on the laws of war that was binding on all branches of the service, it was the

first major historical example of keystone doctrine.

Chapter 2 discusses the developments of U.S. military doctrine between the Civil

War and World War II. The influence of foreign models of military professionalism will

be examined as a facilitator and inhibitor of the development of uniquely American

doctrine. With the development of a formal publication and training system, doctrine

was increasingly specialized into distinct fields of capstone and keystone disciplines. As

pressures increased to democratize the American military institution and to create a mass






9 See David E. Graham, "The 1974 Diplomatic Conference on the Law of War: A Victory for Political
Causes and a Return to the "Just War" Concept of the Eleventh Century" in Washington and Lee Law
Review, xxxii, (1975), 38, 63, and, William Hays Parks. "Air War and the Law of War." Air Force Law
Review. (1990): 1:50. Parks finds the just war principle of discrimination He even went so far as to claim
that it was the "fundamental failure of the law of war to acknowledge that the traditional distinction
between the combatant and noncombatant was obsolete, and had been for the century preceding World War
II."









army, military doctrine became imbued with societal values more facilitative of the

extension of humanitarian norms in warfare.

Chapter 3 outlines the historical development of the concept of command

responsibility not just as law, but also as military doctrine. The Department of Defense

Dictionary ofMilitary and Associated Terms provides three basic official definitions of

the command:

1. The authority that a commander in the Armed Forces lawfully
exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank and assignment. Command
includes the authority and responsibility for effectively using available
resources and for the planning the employment of, organizing, directing,
coordinating, and controlling military forces for the accomplishment as
assigned missions. It also includes responsibility for the health, welfare,
morale, and discipline of assigned personnel.

2. An order given by a commander, that is, the will of the
commander expressed for the purpose of bringing about a particular
action.

3. A unit or units, an organization, or an area under the command
of one individual.10

The nuanced, overlapping meanings of command, as an individual noun, a verb,

or a collective noun, are often not appreciated by those outside the military and even

those within the profession are not aware that command can refer simultaneously to more

than just one of these definitions at the same time.

Although the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg is the best-known

historical event in the establishment of individual responsibility for war crimes and

crimes against humanity, it had earlier precedents. One involved the 1940 change to the

War Department Field Manual 27-10, The Rules ofLand Warfare. This document


10 JP 1-02, 82.









doctrinally negated the defense of superior orders for war crimes. Another precedence

event was the case of General Tomayuki Yamashita, who was put on trial, found guilty,

and executed for failing in his command responsibility to prevent or punish the killing of

civilians and prisoners of war during the Japanese defense against the American

reconquest of the Philippines in 1945. The Yamashita conviction is the most striking

example of the incorporation of just war doctrine into a Nuremberg era affirmative

military ethic.

The U.S. Supreme Court proclaimed this affirmative principle of command

responsibility when it upheld Yamashita's conviction and allowed him to be executed.

General Douglas MacArthur, the Commanding General of the U.S. Army Forces in the

Pacific, issued a statement confirming Yamashita's sentence in which he charged the

Japanese general with violating the very definition of his profession: "The soldier, be he

friend or foe, is charged with the protection of the weak and unarmed. It is his very

essence and reason for his being."12 The United States Army incorporated a close

approximation of this affirmative standard into its post war doctrinal manual on the Law

ofLand Warfare, Field Manual 27-10.13 The major standards of command liability

associated with the major war crimes trials during the Nuremberg period will be

compared to the principle of command responsibility as incorporated into 1957 edition





1 War Department. Field Manual 27-10, The Rules of Land Warfare. (Washington, Government Printing
Office, 1940).
12 Action of the Confirming Authority, General Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces, Pacific, in the case of
General Tomoyuki Yamashita, Imperial Japanese Army, February 7, 1946.

13 U.S. Army Field Manual 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare, (Washington D.C.: Department of the Army,
July 1956). 178-179.









FM 27-10, which still represents current doctrine. The relevant passage from FM 27-10

holds a commander liable:

if he has actual knowledge, or should have had knowledge, through
reports received by him or through other means, that troops or other
persons subject to his control are about to commit or have committed a
war crime and he fails to take the necessary and reasonable steps to insure
compliance with the law of war or to punish violators thereof. 14

Chapter 4 discusses in detail the developments concerning the doctrine of

command responsibility during the period of the Cold War in context of ideological

changes within the American military profession. After the Nuremberg trials

documented the complicity of the German military establishment in the rise of Hitler and

the Holocaust, the founders of the new West German Army, the Bundeswehr, rejected the

much of the Prussian/ Wehrmacht tradition of military professionalism. Just as it was

being thoroughly rejected in Europe, a rehabilitation of the Prussian/ German military

tradition was underway in the United States. This rehabilitation first took place outside

formal doctrinal publications with the appearance in 1957 of Samuel P. Huntington's

seminal book, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics Of Civil-Military

Relations.

Eliot A. Cohen, Professor of Strategic Studies at the Paul H. Nitze School of

Advanced International Studies, coined the term "normal theory" to describe a model of

civil-military relations that rests on a "conception of professionalism" put forward by

Huntington that was reinforced by the impact of the Vietnam War on the American

military. Written in direct response to criticism of the aristocratic pretensions of some

American military leaders in the wake of the Truman-MacArthur controversy,


14 FM 27-10, 178-179.










Huntington argued for a functional military aristocracy based on a historical model of

development of the American military profession that emphasized the discontinuity

between American civil society and an increasingly professional American military

culture. Rather than a continuity based on shared democratic values, Huntington argued,

in his chapter, "The Military Mind: Conservative Realism of the Professional Military

Ethic," that professional officers maintain a distinctive and persistent weltenschauung

(worldview) that molds and influences their contemporaneous attitudes and values. After

maintaining that the seeds of a professional military ethic were more resilient in the

antebellum Southern culture than in the North, Huntington placed the true cultural

reservoir of American military professionalism in the military ethic of nineteenth-century

Germany.15

While it would be over twenty-five years before certain aspects of Huntington's

work would be incorporated in formal military doctrine in the so-called Weinberger

Doctrine, the neo-Clausewitzian realism, espoused in Soldier and the State, would have

hegemonic influence on the American military profession during the Cold War. The

major institutional debates affecting its tenets would include the doctrinal initiatives

regarding credible expansion of the Nuremberg doctrine of command responsibility into

an international enforcement mechanism that would be universally enforceable.

15 Eliot A. Cohen, "The Unequal Dialogue" in Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-Military Gap and
American National Security, ed. Peter D. Feaver and Richard H. Kohn (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001), 433.
Cohen is a critic of Huntington's model of civil-military relations and argues that actual control of the
military by civilian authority facilitates rather than impedes military effectiveness. Huntington's seminal
Soldier and the State (Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press, 1957) is in its twelfth printing.
Huntington also reiterated his basic model of military professionalism in "The Soldier and the State in the
1970's found in The ( 1 i1,, i,, World of the American Military, edited by Franklin D. Margiotta
(Boulder: Westview, 1978), "Democracy And Armed Forces: Reforming Civil-Military Relations,"
Current. (February 1, 1996) pp. 15-35, "Armed Forces and Democracy, Reforming Civil-Military
Relations," Journal ofDemocracy (October 1995), and his response to Richard H. Kohn's article in The
National Interest in "Exchange on Civil-Military Relations," The National Interest, No. 36 (Summer 1994),
27-29.









Chapter 5 focuses on the American record of holding its own personnel to the

level of command responsibility associated with the Nuremberg precedents. Particularly,

the landmark case of Captain Ernest Medina, the commander of the principal company

responsible for the My Lai Massacre of March 16, 1968, in Vietnam, will be addressed in

the context of the standard of command responsibility associated with his trial. Medina's

case has come to represent one of two principal standards used today to measure issues of

command responsibility. The judge in Medina's trial instructed the jury that a

"commander-subordinate relationship alone will not allow an inference of knowledge"

and that they must establish that Captain Medina possessed actual knowledge that his

subordinates were committing human rights violations.16 That standard contrasts both

with the "Yamashita standard" established in post-WW II war crimes tribunals and the

standards on command responsibility found in Additional Protocol I, the Statute of the

International Tribunal for Rwanda, the Statute of the International Tribunal for the

Former Yugoslavia, and the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court.

The failure of America to hold its own citizens to the same standards it held out to

its defeated enemies was unquestionably demonstrated following the American military's

greatest modern professional catastrophe: the My Lai massacre and its subsequent cover-

up. After its revelation in 1970, Chief of Staff of the Army General William

Westmoreland responded with a series of initiatives: (1) the appointment of Lieutenant

General William R. Peers to head the official Army inquiry into the My Lai Massacre, in

which "every command level" in the affected division was implicated in covering up the

massacre; (2) directing the Army War College to undertake a study of the contemporary


16 United States v. Captain Medina, C.M. 427162 (A.C.M.R. 1971).









state of American military professionalism to address the institutional failures brought to

light by the U.S. Army's problematic conduct of the war; and (3) ordering the

establishment of the U.S. Army Vietnam War Crimes Working Group.

Immediately following these negative self assessments carried out in the wake of

the My Lai Massacre, the United States participated in diplomatic conferences lasting

from 1974 to 1977 concerning the expansion of humanitarian protections afforded non-

combatants in international armed conflict. Chapter 6 addresses the result of this process:

the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 relating to the

Protection of Victims of Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977. In the direct

aftermath of the lessons learned from the disaster at My Lai, the United States took the

lead in successfully negotiating the inclusion of an affirmative definition of command

responsibility in Article 86 of Protocol I. The American delegation at these conferences

comprised the author of the current edition of FM 27-10 and former head of the U.S.

Army Laws of War Program, Judge Richard Baxter, and his successor, Waldemar A.

Solf Protocol I provided an extension of the Nuremberg precedent regarding the general

principle of international humanitarian law concerning the treatment of non-combatants.

However, in spite of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) giving Protocol I its tentative

approval at the time of its signing in 1977 and an Army War College study supporting

ratification in 1978, the Reagan administration and subsequent administrations have

refused to submit it to the United States Senate for ratification.

With the election of Reagan, U.S. policy shifted from supporting an increased

standard of command responsibility to policies undermining attempts to establish a more

rigorous standard of command responsibility. Official working groups within both the









Department of the Army and the Department of Defense were arranged to

document a shift in the position of military professionals in reference to the ratification of

the 1977 Protocols. The particular change in the official military position in regard to the

1977 Protocol and the American initiated standard of command responsibility contained

within it can only be understood in the context of the general consolidation of a more

conservative weltanschauung within the American military profession in the 1980s.

Chapter 6 also addresses the antipathy of the American military profession toward

humanitarian operations during the 1990s and its failure to establish a consistent doctrinal

base to guide such operations. Since humanitarian military operations possess the highest

level of ideological concurrence with traditional just war doctrine, they are the type of

military operation that is least in harmony with neo-Clausewitzian realism. The

conflicting models of Low Intensity Conflicts (LICs), Operations Other Than War

(OOTW) and Peace Operations created a doctrinal chaos that, together with a

professional animus toward such operations, led to severely compromised humanitarian

deployments to Somalia, Haiti, the Balkans, and the American failure to intervene in the

Rwandan Genocide. The promulgation of the Weinberger Doctrine, actually authored by

General Colin Luther Powell, symbolized the ascendancy of conservative realism within

the American military profession. However, even when doctrinal transformations have

strong political backing, they are seldom all encompassing or complete. Doctrine, like

law, possesses an institutional memory that sometimes blunts political necessity. The

attitudes of the contemporary American military professionals are relevant to

understanding the record of American official indifference to noncombatant humanitarian

concerns in non-traditional operations. The incongruity of these contemporary American









positions regarding the mandates of humanitarian law cannot be examined outside of the

institutional context of developments and changes in organizational core values over

time.

The issue of the non-ratification of Protocol I remains of critical contemporary

interest as it is directly related to the issues underpinning the Pentagon's current

opposition to the 1998 Rome Treaty establishing a permanent International Criminal

Court (ICC). While the United States allowed the incorporation of standards of

command responsibility compatible with Protocol I in Article 6 of the Statute of the

International Tribunal for Rwanda, and in Article 7 of the Statute of the International

Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (a tribunal over which a U.S. citizen presides), it

continues to actively oppose the establishment of a permanent and independent tribunal

that could impose such a standard on American citizens.

Unlike most other works concerned with the geneses of American foreign policies, this

study focuses on the leading historical actor in establishing and enforcing humanitarian

norms in armed conflict: the American military profession.















CHAPTER 1
JUST WAR DOCTRINE AND GENERAL ORDER NO. 100

Men who take up arms against one another in public war do not cease on
this account to be moral beings, responsible to one another and to God.

-- General Order No. 100

During the third year of the Civil War, the War Department issued the

Instructionsfor the Government of the Armies of the United States in the Field -- known

officially as General Orders No. 100 and unofficially as the "Lieber Code" to the

deployed forces of the United States Army. In a 1963 edition of the International Review

of the Red Cross, future World Court Justice Richard R. Baxter called this military order

the "first modern codification of the Law of War." 1 Nine years later, retired U.S. Army

Brigadier General Telford Taylor, former American chief prosecutor at the Nuremberg

war crimes trials conducted under Allied Control Council Law No. 10, noted that

General Orders No. 100

remained for half a century the official Army pronouncement on the
subject, furnished much of the material for the Hague Conventions of
1899 and 1907, and today still commands attention as the germinal
document for the codification of the laws of land warfare.2





1 Instructions for the Government ofArmies of the United States in the Field (1863), originally published as
General Orders No. 100, War Department, Adjutants General's Office, 24 April 1863, cited hereafter as
General Orders No. 100. Quote taken from the title of World Court Justice Richard R. Baxter's article on
the origins of this document in The International Review of the Red Cross (April, 1963), no. 25, 171-189
and (May, 1963), no. 26, 235-250.
2 See Telford Taylor's forward to Leon Friedman's ed. The Law of War: A Documentary History (New
York: Random House, 1972), xvii xviii.









The theory of war found in General Order No. 100 is distinct from the three

statist philosophies arising in the period following the end of Europe's wars of religion:

modern natural law theory; legal positivism; and political realism. The Treaty of

Westphalia in 1648 not only ended the Wars of Reformation, but it is also the historical

reference point for a model of international relations centered on the early modern

European shibboleths of anti-interventionism and non-interference based on a theoretical

equality of sovereignty between nation states. Unlike the major schools of thought

associated with this Westphalian system, General Order No. 100 marked a return to

traditional just war doctrine, a pre-modem and less Eurocentric philosophy of warfare

that (1) viewed war as an essentially moral undertaking and (2) that placed affirmative

humanitarian obligations on the conduct of a specialized group of individuals, the

military.

Origins of General Orders No. 100

Outside of Brussels at Waterloo in June 1815, the wars of the French Revolution

came to an end. These wars marked the point of departure from the pre-modern to the

modern in warfare. In the general vicinity of the battle, at Ligny, was a soldier in the

service of the King of Prussia was lying close to death from wounds he receive during the

final allied final pursuit of Napoleon. This wounded soldier, a young Berliner named

Francis Lieber, was the future drafter of U.S. Army General Order No. 100.3

After recovering from his near mortal wounds, Lieber went on to unconventional

warfare. His attempt to fight alongside Greek irregulars fighting the Ottoman Army was


3 The definitive biography of Francis Lieber remains, although somewhat dated, Frank Freidel's Francis
Lieber (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1977). Substantial biographical information is also
available in John Catalano's Francis Lieber, Hermeneutics and Practical Reason (Lanham, University









frustrated as a result of the treatment he received from his allies, a disillusioning

experience that was shared by many other European volunteers who fought in the Greek

War of Independence.4 Between his bouts of military service, Lieber received a Doctor

of Philosophy degree from the University of Jena and spent time in jail for liberal

agitation against the increasingly conservative Prussian state. Immigrating to the United

States in 1827, he became the Chair of History and Political Economy at South Carolina

College, later relocating to Columbia College in New York because of his antipathy to

slavery in 1857. He was eventually appointed to a professorship of history, political

science, and law. Lieber became one of the founding fathers of both American political

science and, although he was never formally trained as a lawyer, American legal studies.

His approach to law and politics were based upon the discipline of hermeneutics in the

anti-idealistic and anti-rationalistic tradition of the German Protestant theologian Fredrich

Schleirmacher and the German historian Wilhelm Dilthey. In fact, he was America's first

leading exponent of classical hermeneutics. For Lieber, laws and policies are subject to

internal interpretation because they are composed in human languages whose component

parts, words, have meanings that vary according to time, place, and the subjective

worldview, or weltanschauung, of the original authorss. Lieber's political and legal

hermeneutics resulted in a "practical" ethic that contrasts sharply with the extremes of

both political realism -- positing an ethical aporia that holds actions of a state, either

foreign or domestic, as existing independent of any ethical or considerations -- and


Press of America, 2000), Richard Shelly Hartigan's Lieber's Code and the Law of War (Chicago: Precedent,
1983).

4 In 1821, Lieber's party of volunteers were not only refused the right to fight the Turks, they were robbed
and denied sustenance before escaping their Greek allies turned captors. See Baxter, The International
Review of the Red Cross (April 1963), n. 25, 172.










legalism, dismissing the political attributes and implications of law.5 Lieber was a life-

long critic of the conservative regime in Prussia and was a life-long apologist for a

revolutionary regime he adopted for his own, the United States. Lieber's political

principles developed, to a large extent, in opposition to Aristotelian principles of John C.

Calhoun, the intellectual father of the Confederacy. In reply to the Calhoun's

conservative theory of 'concurrent democracy,' Lieber developed the theory of

'institutional liberty' to explain the superiority of the American conception of nation to

that of extreme revolutionary states such as the France, that he had fought against, or

reactionary nation-states such as Prussia, that he fought for and then rejected.6

Reminiscent of Thomas Paine's role during the Revolutionary War, Lieber became the

theoretic apologist of the Union cause during the Civil War, even initiating the discussion

that would result in the revolutionary amendments to the Constitution adopted at the end

of the war.

By 1863, the Lincoln administration realized the Rules and Articles of War, then

in use, were not appropriate for a conflict with an enemy whose sovereignty it refused to


5 Francis Lieber, Manual of Political Ethics (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co., 1838-39), reprinted
1876. Along with his Political Ethics, which served as a basic text for American law students in the until
the end of the nineteenth century, Lieber's political and legal philosophy also found in On Civil Liberty and
Self Government, 3rd ed. (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co., 1877), Legal and Political Hermeneutics;
or, Principles of Interpretation and Construction in Law and Politics 3rd ed., ed. William G. Hammond
(St. Louis: F/H Thomas and Co., 1880). For a discussion of the relationship between Lieber's philosophical
hermeneutics and his political ethics, see Catalano, Francis Lieber, Hermeneutics and Practical Reason.
For a definition of ethical aporia, see note 1. Judith Shkar defined legalism as "the ethical attitude that
holds moral conduct to be a matter of rule followings, and the moral relationship to consist of duties and
rights determined by rules. See Legalism: Laws, Morals, and Political Trials (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1964), I.

6 Lieber, On Civil Liberty, 270-346. While Calhoun's 'concurrent democracy' stressed the balance of power
between minorities and majorities, Lieber's 'institutional democracy' emphasized the balance between
individual liberty and social / institutional responsibilities.

7 Francis Lieber, Amendments to the Constitution, Submitted to the Consideration of the American People
(New York: Loyal Publication Society, 1865).










recognize. As the eighteenth-century Westphalian system left the responsibility for the

implementation of humanitarian concerns, such as the treatment of enemy prisoners, to be

worked out between theoretically equal sovereign nation states, the threat that the

Confederacy would exploit humanitarian practices under the custom and usages of war,

such as granting prisoner of war status, as a defacto recognition of sovereignty was

significant.

To resolve this conflict, Lincoln turned to Lieber to draft a "set of rules and

definitions providing for most issues occurring under the Law and usages of War."8 The

result was General Orders No. 100.9 As it formed the basis for similar codes in England,

France, and even Prussia, it is usually viewed primarily as a legal instrument. The Hague

Conferences of 1899 and 1907 incorporated the code's general provisions. However, it

would be a grave mistake to view General Order No. 100 as only of legal significance.

Like the Emancipation Proclamation a year before, it was a military order from a civilian

Commander-in-Chief to military commanders conducting current military operations.

Since the code remained in effect until it as superseded in 1917 by War Department

Document No. 467, Rules ofLand Warfare, which was greatly influenced by the original,

it should also be considered as a foundational document for the development of American

military doctrine.10


8 Letter, Francis Lieber to Henry W. Halleck (Nov. 13,1862). The Lieber Halleck correspondence found
in the Lieber Papers at the Huntington Library, San Marino, California was reprinted in Richard Shelly
Hartigan's Lieber's Code and the Laws of Law (Chicago: Precedent, 1983), 79-84.

9 See note 1.

10 War Department Document No. 467, Rules of Land Warfare, (Washington: Office of the Chief of Staff,
1917). Richard R. Baxter argued that the this document "preserved much of Lieber's language." See
Baxter, The International Review of the Red Cross, (May, 1963), n. 26, 249. This document was then
superseded Department of Army, Field Manual 27-1, Rules of Land Warfare (Washington, U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1940) then to be replaced by the present edition of the manual of which
Baxter himself was the primary author. See note 22.









As the first officially promulgated doctrine that addressed the overall conduct of

tactical and strategic operations "rather than specialized functions such as simple drill,"

General Order No. 100 constituted the U.S. military's first capstone doctrine.11 Rather

than being concerned with how to deploy tens of thousands of soldiers to march across

open fields in increasingly costly battles, Lieber was concerned with why a state deploys

soldiers in the first place. Next to Lieber, the most critical figure in the code's genesis

was the General-in-Chief of the Union Armies, Henry Wager Halleck, who was

responsible both for selecting Lieber and for heading the military commission tasked with

reviewing and approving the code. Hallack was not only the author of the most

contemporary of the privately published tactical drill manuals utilized during the war, he

was also the author of a major treatise on the laws of war, a work strongly influenced by

Lieber's earlier writings. 12 Lieber's close collaboration with General Halleck testifies to

General Order No. 100 's relevance to the operational art of warfare, such as it existed

during the Civil War.

On June 24, 1863, Confederate Secretary of War, James A. Seddon, wrote a letter

to Washington rejecting General Order No. 100. Seddon correctly detected the

revolutionary tone of Lieber's code, not only in regard to slavery, but Lieber's central

concepts of military necessity and the right of intervention in the affairs of another

sovereign state -- or (in Seddon's case) states claiming sovereignty. Seddon attacked the



11 For a discussion of foundational or "keystone" doctrine, see Introduction, n. 4.
12 See H.W. Henry Wagner Halleck, Elements ofMilitary Art And Science: or Course ofInstruction in
Strategy, Fortification, Tactics of Battles, ect., Embracing Actions of Staff Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery, and
Engineers adjusted to the use of Volunteers and Militia, 3d edition (New York: D. Appleton and Company,
1862 and International Law; or, Rules i .. ~,ilii the Intercourse of States in Peace and War (New York:
D. von Nostrand, 1861).









code as an "assertion of dogmas" that were oppositional to the very foundational

premises of Confederate authority.13

Contrary to sequentialist logic, the justification for major wars changes during

their course, especially when their course is exceptionally longer and bloodier than

expected. General Order No. 100 represented the shift in Union war objectives from

mere statist concern with the preservation of the Union to a revolutionary war of

emancipation. To establish a precedence to allow humanitarian protocols without the

statist criteria that could be used in support of Confederate foreign policy objectives,

Lieber was indeed guilty of resorting to the non-state centered concepts that were

considered by Seddon as pre-modern. However, just as "war antedates the state," as

noted by historian John Keegan,14 efforts to establish normative codes for humanitarian

concerns also antedate the state, at least the modern post-Westphalian state. The articles

of General Order No. 100 follow with remarkable consistency the central pre-modern

principles of Augustinian just war doctrine.

Augustinian Just War Doctrine

The principle that there is an affirmative official duty to use force or coercion to

assist others as predicated and conditioned by the principle of necessity (italics mine)

was laid down by the end of the fifth century as the concept ofjustum bellum or just

war.15 The initial western institutional base for just war doctrine was as a moral teaching



13 See Letter from James A. Seddon, Confederate War Secretary, Richmond, to Robert Ould, Agent of
Exchange, denouncing the: General Orders, no. 100, 24 June, 1863. Reprinted in Hartigan, Lieber's Code,
120-130.

14 Keegan, A History of Warfare, 3.
15 Augustine to Boniface, Letter 189 (6). See Except for the City of God, all citations from the writings of
Augustine are flom. iin, 'lr,... Political ; i,,,o-. eds. E.M. Atkins and R.J. Dodaro (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2001).









of the leading theologians of the Roman Catholic Church. This sponsorship by a

recognized supra-national authority during the period of the doctrine's greatest influence,

gave just war doctrine a universal moral character. Later natural law theory, developing

from just war tradition, would share this attribute of universality. However, because just

war doctrine predates natural law theory and later legalist paradigms to include the

Westphalian concept of the 'law of nations' and the 'laws of war,' it remains conceptually

distinct from the perennial debate between positive law and natural law theorists over the

continuity or discontinuity between law and morality.

Just war finds its classical foundation in the distinction between the usually

interchangeable Latin words lex (law) andjus (justice). Marcus Tullius Cicero (106-43

bce) -- the great civic philosopher of republican Rome -- in his infamous maxim, silent

enim leges inters arma, argued that law is silenced in war in spite of his continuing to

address wars in terms of being either just or unjust. 16 Saint Augustine of Hippo (354-

430), the pre-eminent theologian of western Christianity's first millennium, chose

necessity rather than natural law as the moral foundation for any governmental use of

force. The problem for Augustine in drafting the central principles of traditional just war

doctrine at the end of the fifth century was defining an ethical role for Christian officials

in an empire now ruled by Christian, specifically Catholic, emperors. As the political

triumph of Christianity had not brought about a change in man's basic nature, this

Christian empire, like its pagan predecessor, required the use of force, or the threat

thereof, to maintain itself. Augustine 's conundrum (italics mine) consisted of the fact


16Cicero Pro Milone 4, 11. Although, following the Roman practice of bellum Romanum or unlimited war,
Cicero placed no constraints of the conduct of war, he distinguished a just war from a unjust war as one
waged for the sole purpose of repelling or punishing aggression. See De officiis 1, 11.










that there was no practical alternative to the requirement for individual Christians to serve

in positions of coercive authority. Although Augustine denied the self-defense argument

for individuals, he argued for an affirmative obligation to defend others that superseded

the pacifism associated with the early Church. 17

One of the Army's leading experts on just war doctrine defined it as the mean

between the two extremes of absolute pacifism and political realism.18 The real

demarcation between these categorical positions lies not in a disagreement over the

nature of war, but the nature of peace. While just war doctrine is effectively exemplified

by the maxim of 'no peace without justice,' political realism favors the peace even at

expense of justice. Pacifism, on the other hand, denies any such opposition between

peace and justice and posits that individuals, by avoiding the passive benefits of injustice,

can work for justice as a means to gain peace.19 Additionally, the pacifist sees war as the

ultimate expression of injustice, while -- for the political realist -- all claims of justice

must defer to the interests of a sovereign state, usually his own. Just war answers

pacifism's categorical rejection of force by defending the use of force on the bases of the






17 For a general overview of St. Augustine and just war doctrine, see R.A. Markus, "Saint Augustine's
Views on the Just War" in The Church and War, ed. W.J. Shields (Oxford: Published for the Ecclesiastical
Society by B. Blackwell, 1983), 1-13, Paul Ramsey, "The Just War According to St. Augustine" in Just
War Theory, ed. Jean Bethke Elshtain (New York: New York University Press, 1992), 8-22 and Simon
Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), n 13, 9.

18Class given by Colonel Glenn Weidner, U.S. Army, the last Commandant of the U.S. Army School of the
Americas during Human Rights Week in January 1999 and February 2000. Weidner was formerly a
student of preeminent just war theoretician, J. Bryan Hehir S.J. while a Fellow attending Harvard's Center
for International Affairs.

19 While leading pacifist theorists --such as Henry David Thoreau, Mahatma Mohandas Gandhi, and Martin
Luther King Jr., argued that pacifism required an affirmative requirement for an individual to renounce and
forswear the benefits received from unjust state action or commerce with unjust states, such ethical
consistency is less stressed among many contemporaries who claim to be pacifists.









categorical value of human life, i.e. the victim's.20 Augustine separates just war doctrine

from both political realism and pacifism by positing that the desire for peace does not in

itself entail any virtue:

Just as every single human being desires peace in the same way they
desire happiness. The love of peace, therefore, is not a virtue. When
those who are leading their nations sing the praise of peace they are
sincere. They seek war to achieve their peace. Even violent criminals
demand peace, if only for themselves. They do not love war; they aspire
to an unjust peace.21

Although not a systematic thinker in any modern sense, his positions on the

proper conduct of those holding state authority is directly related to the basic

philosophical premises of his theology: (1) a selfless love encompassing the altruistic

obligation to assist others for their own sake and (2) a human realism based upon what

Hannah Arendt -- one of his most famous twentieth century interpreters -- calls a

"definite and obligatory equality among all people." 22 Just as the desire for peace

entailed no positive value in itself, love according to Augustine could either be for good

or evil and that is why actions responsibly undertaken for the welfare of others entailed a

specific form of love, a selfless love or caritas. The recourse to the utilization of force in

war was not based on a passive acknowledgment of the action of a properly Christian

state or a simple license for Christian participation in the official actions of such a state.





20 See Richard J. Regan, S.J., Just War, Principles and Cases (Washington, DC: Catholic University of
America Press, 1996), 4-7.
21Augustine City of God xix, 12. All citations from translation by Gerald G. Walsh, S.J. et al (New York:
Image Books, 1958).
22 Hannah Arendt's doctoral thesis on centrality of social obligations in Augustine's ethical writings is
contained in Love and Saint iiiii,, .. eds. Joanna V. Scott and Judith C. Stark, (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1996), 100.









Rather, it was an affirmative requirement of love necessitating an intervention in the

affairs of humanity.

Following both the neo-Platonists and the Stoics, Augustine rejects the

essentialism of Aristotle that legitimates war and even slavery on the basis of supposed

inferior or superior natural attributes possessed by various human groups. The central

premise of Aristotle's Politics was that humans are naturally destined from birth to either

rule or be ruled, to be slave or free, and that war is justified as a means of determining the

essential differences in humanity manifested in higher and lower degrees of virtue.23

Unlike Aristotle, Augustine argued for a unity of a shared human nature based on a sinful

disposition to place one's selfish interests ahead of the interests of others. Augustine's

teachings on just war, like his theology in general, is based on the foundation of human

equality. Rather than an equality based on inherent human goodness, Augustine's human

realism posited that humankind is inherently flawed and that this metaphysical truth

accounts for both the existence of war and the recourse to it. Consequently, the most that

can be hoped is "momentary respites" from conflicts, not their end.24 However, despite

his pessimistic assessment of human nature, Augustine considered the preservation and

betterment of human society as man's highest calling in the secular realm and that a

peace founded on justice -- at least a relative justice -- is possible and only after attaining

such justice should a return to a state of peace be celebrated.25




23 Aristotle Politics 1, 3-5.

24 Augustine City of God xv, 4.

25 Ibid., xv, 6 & xviii, 2.









Augustine was concerned with Christians serving the state in two basic functions:

that of judge and that of a soldier. During the late Roman Empire, both were occupations

intrinsically related, the role of soldier (miles) being a more expansive than in

contemporary societies where police and military functions are more formally separated.

Unlike the latter natural law theorists and political realists, Augustine spoke directly to

the executioners of state authority rather than kings or statesmen. Living during the reign

of Roman Emperor Theodosius who was championing Augustine's own version of

Christianity, Augustine had the integrity to reject the views of many of his Catholic

contemporaries who held that wars conducted in defense of such Christian states are

inherently just and those conducted by pagan or heretical states inherently unjust. The

commonly held belief attributing the holy war ideology of the Crusades to Augustine is

not supported in the texts of his writings.26

The 1983 Pastoral Letter of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops, The

Challenge of Peace, a document drafted under the guidance of the preeminent clerical

just war authority, J. Bryan Hehir, S.J., affirmed the centrality of St. Augustine to the

establishment of just war doctrine which consists of "eight fundamental principles or

criteria."27

Just Cause: The central tenet of traditional just war doctrine is Augustine's
dictum that a war is "justified only by the injustice of an aggressor."28
Competent Authority: War is both a public and official act involving, to
varying degrees, the act of judging the action of others or executing such a
judgment under the orders of a superior official.


26 On the prohibition against self-defense, see Regan, Just War, 17. For a critique of the myth of Augustine
as the progenitor of holy war ideology, see Markus, "Saint Augustine's Views," 10-13.
27 National Conference of Catholic Bishops, The ( lill,.i.- of Peace: God's Promise and Our Response: A
Pastoral Letter on War and Peace (Washington: United States Catholic Conference, 1983).
28 Augustine, City of God xix, 7.









Comparative Justice: The claim of possessing a just cause in war is always
relative and, consequently, parties to a conflict need to limit their objectives to the
relative gravity of the offense being redressed.
Right Intention: While the justification of war is aggression or an unjust
peace, the objective of war is a just peace.
Last Resort: Even when necessity demands it, war is a tragedy to be avoided
at all costs, save justice.
Probability of Success: Nothing is more obstructive to the establishment of a
just peace than indecisive or ineffective military action.
Proportionality: The unjust effects of warfare must be compensated for by the
actual ends of justice attained by resorting to warfare.
Discrimination: There is a distinction between combatants and
noncombatants and the intentional targeting of the latter is a criminal act, even in
an otherwise just war.

Although not in a systematic form, all these major principles of just war doctrine

can be found in Augustine. This is because the principles are not distinct, but inherently

interconnected. For example, the principle of discrimination is already implied in the

preceding criteria such as proportionality. The major just war theorist of the early Cold

War period, Paul Ramsey, argued "the justification of participation in conflict at the same

time severely limits war's conduct. Whatjustified, also limited."29

This traditional separation of just war principles into ius ad bellum (justice before

war) principles andjus in bello (justice during war) principles also overlaps. For

example, in their pastoral letter, the National Conference of Catholic Bishops classified

all just war principles except discrimination as ius ad bellum, with the central just war

principle of proportionality as an overlapping theme between ius ad bellum andjus in

bello principles.30 To emphasize that ius ad bellum concerns are not set aside once a war

is initiated, the leading secular theoretician on just war, Michael Walzer, delimits this


29 Paul Ramsey: The Just War: Force and Political Responsibility (Savage, Maryland: Littlefield Adams
Quality Paperbacks, 1968, 1983 New York: Scribner, 1968), 143.

30 See The ( 1ioll,. ,-, ofPeace.










dualism as grammatical rather then linear; an unjust war can be fought justly and a just

war and be fought unjustly, thereby becoming unjust.31

This historical development of just war doctrine was more characterized by

accommodation than innovation. Augustine and early just war theory is often associated

primarily with ius ad bellum concerns and late just war theory withjus in bello

concerns.32 However, the innovations of ius ad bellum principle of just cause introduced

by the Church in the eleventh century, such as indulgences for Crusaders and absolution

for the fallen find no basis in Augustinian just war doctrine.33 Later just war theorists

took great pains to avoid the appearance that they were adding anything to Augustine's

conception of just war. Even St.Thomas Aquinas (1227-1274), the official philosopher



31 "War is always judged twice, first in reference to the reasons states have for fighting, second with
reference to the means they adopt. The first is adjectival: we say that a war is just or unjust. The second is
adverbial: we say a war is being fought justly or unjustly." Michael Walzer,_Just and Unjust Wars, A
MoralArgument with Historical Illustrations, (New York: Basic Books, 1977), 21.

32 This was the former view of the author as found in Captain Lawrence Rockwood, U.S. Army, "Apology
of a Buddhist Soldier" Tricycle, A Buddhist Review (Spring 1996), 70-77. Others holding this position
include William V. O'Brien, "The International Law of War as Related to the Western Just War Tradition"
in Just War and Jihad, eds, John Kelsey and James T. Johnson (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), 165,
and Homes, "St. Augustine and the Just War Theory," 338. The opposite is the present view of the author
and is also found in Paul Ramsey, War and the Christian Conscience, How Shall Modern War Be
Conducted Justly? (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1961).

33. The significant authoritative events in the eleventh century on the conduct of war were the concept of
the "Truce of God," put forward in 1041 by the Abbot Odilo of the great Benedictine motherhouse of
Cluny, which called for a cessation of hostilities on Holy Days, the "Peace of God, a call by the Council of
Narbonne in 1054 to protect the Church and the poor from the effects of warfare, and finally the preaching
of the First Crusade by Pope Urban II (also a Cluniac Monk) at the Council of Clermont on November 27,
1095. While the former two can be seen as an extension ofjus in bello prohibitions. the later, with its
arming of monks and priests, the indulgence giving total temporal pardon of all sin for participants (which
would include war crimes committed over the course of the crusade), and a total absolution for those who
died in battle finds no foundation in Augustinian just war tenets nor would they be authenticated by
incorporation into the tenets of later just war theorists. The slaughter of noncombatants for belonging to
another faith (although the defacto crusader principle of discrimination between Christians and non-
Christians was not always honored anyway) also finds no basis in writings of Augustus. Crimes against
civilians was specifically a concern of later just war theorists writing in response to the sixteenth century
Amerindian genocide In fact, Augustine discounted the entire ius ad bellum Cluniac rationale of Urban II,
the protection religious pilgrims. Augustine, like the early Greek Church, considered the act of pilgrimage
to be of little importance. See Steven Runciman, A History of the Crusades, v. 1 (New York: Harper
Tourchbooks, 1964), 39-40, 86. 107, and 108-109.









of the Roman Catholic Church during its second millennium, admitted to only expanding

on principles already found in Augustine.34

Just as in the case of the initiatives following international community's lack of

response to the genocides in 1994 in Rwanda and earlier in Nazi occupied Europe, most

major humanitarian initiatives are responses to historic humanitarian disasters. Such was

the case for the later just war theorists who responded to the failure of European empires

to uphold Augustinian ethics in their conquest and subsequent genocidal actions against

Amerindian populations. The Debate of Valladolid in 1550 between the Dominican

Bishop of Chiapas, Bartolome de Las Cases, and the Aristotelian scholar Gines de

Sepulveda marks the watershed between early and late just war theory. Based on his

claim of the natural superiority of Christian Europeans over the pagan Amerindians,

Sepulveda argued that the European conquest was just. Las Cases countered with his

famous "Aristotle, farewell" response:

The natural laws and rules and rights of men are common to all nations,
Christian and gentile, and whatever their sect, law, state, color and
condition, without any difference.35

Continuing Las Cases' defense of Amerindian populations, a fellow Dominican,

Francisco de Vitoria (1480-1520), and a Jesuit, Francisco Suarez (1548-1617), placed the

jus in bello criteria of proportionality and discrimination at the center of their writings.36

Vitoria, in his On the Law of War, associated the attribution of innocence to

noncombatants for the first time. Even so, he does not provide them an absolute


34 Thomas Aquinas, Summa ;i,i. '. ,.. II-II.

35 Bartolom6 de Las Cases, quoted in Tzvetan Todorov's The Conquest ofAmerica: The Question of the
Other (New York: Harper Perennial, 1992), 162.
36 Regan, Just War, 17-18.









dispensation against the effects of warfare, even allowing innocents to be "enslaved as

long as it is not "allowed to go beyond the limits which the necessities of warfare

demands."37

The major differences between early and later just war theory is one of emphasis.

Just as nothing of Augustine is left out of Vitoria, nothing in Vitoria directly contradicts

Augustine. As stated by Father Hehir S.J., "...the logic of the argument from Augustine

through Vitoria, Michael Walzer and Paul Ramsey has been the same."38 This is

primarily the result that each of the just war doctrines components parts suggests the rest

of the doctrine.

Just War Doctrine and Post-Westphalian Legalism

With rise of the Spanish School of International Law that included Vitoria,

Suarez, and Hugo Grotius, the concept of the natural law was reintroduced into just war

doctrine. Natural law was added to just war principles without replacing them. The

major innovation of natural law theory was that it placed its emphasis of the statist

conception of law over the more ethical conception of justice. Although Aquinas is

principally known as the father of modem natural law theory and for introducing the

ideas of Aristotle in scholastic philosophy, he did not apply either to the concept of just

war. Natural law was incorporated into just war theory by his disciple Francisco

Vitoria.39 Aquinas divided all law into divine or eternal law or lex divina, natural law or



7 Francisco de Vitoria, On the Law of War, 3, 3-4, v. 43. All citations from the works of Vitoria are from
Vitoria, Political ; ;,,,ia,. eds. Anthony Pagden and Jeremy Lawrence (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2001), 319.

38 Bryan J. Hehir S.J. "Kosovo, A War of Values and the Values of War" inAmerica, v. 180 (May 15,
1999), 17, 7.
39 Vitoria, On the Law of War, concl, v. 60.









ius nature, the law of nations or ius gentium, and positive law or lex humana. According

to Aquinas, natural law is a rational appreciation of eternal law by human beings.40

Natural Law was an opportune instrument for theorists responding to the failure

of Christian Europeans to apply humanitarian norms in warfare with those who did not

share their creed as was clearly demonstrated in both the conquest of the Americas and

the Wars of Religion between Catholic and Protestant states culminating its bloodiest

chapter, the Thirty Years War (1618-1648). This lack of reciprocity by Europeans in

applying humanitarian norms to their enemies of alien cultures and religions finds no

bases in Augustine's actual teachings on war. Rather, it was established as precedent

during the Crusades and found continued expression in the conduct of the Christian

conquest of the Iberian Peninsula, the Protestant English conquest of Catholic Ireland, the

destruction of the indigenous populations of the Americas, and, finally, the military and

civil violence of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation.41

In the seventeenth century, Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), a Protestant who

advocated religious toleration, in his On the Law of War andPeace attempted to

secularize just war doctrine utilizing natural law theory. In addition to accepting the

claims of Vitoria that the jurisdiction of natural law was universal, he added three major

innovations: the relations of states could be judged as if they were individuals; crimes by

nations can be addressed the same way as individual crimes; and the reciprocity of malice

among nations must be replaced by a reciprocity of trust.42


40 Aquinas, Summa ;h,.. 1.,,,,,. I-II. Grotius later combined the law of nations into positive law leaving the
division of law into the categories: lex divina, lex naturalis, and lex humana. See Grotius in the
"Prolegomena" to De Jure Belli ac Pacis.
41 In reference to Augustine application of just war criteria to non-Christians, see note 37.
42 Two authors that utilized these four principles to characterize Grotius' contribution to the laws of warfare
include Robert A. Kahn, "The Law of Nations and the Conduct of War in the Early Times of the Standing









Grotius' optimistic view of the human condition contrasts with both Augustinian

human realism and the political realism of Grotius' contemporary, Thomas Hobbes

(1588-1679). Hobbes' infamous work, Leviathan, comprised a counter to optimistic

premises of Grotian natural law that continues to be posited by legal positivists and

political realists to the present.43 As a result of viewing war -- rather than God's or man's

reason -- as the true basis of natural law that results in a human existence where "life is

solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short," Hobbes preached an absolute preference for

peace based an absolute deference to will of a sovereign ruler of a nation state. 44

According to Hobbes, human law is simply a authoritative enactment based upon the

"coercive power, to compel equally to the performance" of obligations by individuals to a

sovereign who does not in turn answer to other sovereigns, their subjects, or any

universal law(s) ascribed to a higher power.45

For all their differences, both Grotius and Hobbes influenced and were influenced

by the Westphalian statist centered virtues of non-intervention in interstate affairs and

non-interference. Writing primarily for statesmen rather than for soldiers, Grotius and

Hobbes took different aspects inherent in Augustinian just war theory: justice, in case of

the former, and a realistic view of human nature in the later. Successor theorists in the

Westphalian tradition such as Cornelius van Bynkershoek (1673-1743), Emmeric de

Vattel (1714-1767), and Georg Friedrich von Martins (1756-1821), in various



Army" in Journal ofPolitics, (Feb. 1944) vol. 6, no. 1, 87 and Cornelis van Vollenhoven, Grotius and
Geneva (Leyden: Boekhandle en drukkerij voorheen E.J. Brill, 1926), 13-16.

43 See note 2.

44 Hobbes, Leviathan bk. i, chap. xiii & xiv.

45 Ibid., bk i. chap xv.









combinations, blended the natural law concepts of Grotius with the legal positivism and

political realism of Hobbes while maintaining the statism of both.46

Grotius is distinct from Hobbes in that he posited a universal maxim for

humanitarian norms that would be binding on states regardless of their religious or

ideological leaning. It is ironic that the modern concept of natural law, originating partly

as a device to deal with European's failure to act on the basis on humanitarian reciprocity

in dealing with populations that they considered alien, is used contemporaneously to

justify lack of action by western powers in dealing with humanitarian conflicts, to include

non-interference in genocides, in non-western nations. This was exemplified in the 1990s

when the western statist emphasis non-interference in the internal affairs of sovereign

states was cited most often in reference to humanitarian interventions in nations whose

civilization norms could be portrayed not sharing western legalist traditions. Anticipating

the contemporary debate on whether universal human rights norms are based on

culturally specific western discourse on individual rights vis-a-vis norms emphasizing

social obligations associated with many non-western cultures, the universality of the

Grotian emphasis on passive legalisms is certainly debatable. In the context of

understandable distrust of the religious sanctions so evident in the bloody conflicts of his

time, Grotius sought a secular universal norm that would transcend the religious disputes

of his time. Grotius utilized the passive injunction of the pagan Roman Emperor

Septimius Severus (146-211), "Do not to another what you do not wish to be done to

you" rather than the affirmative injunction of the golden rule found in Matthew 7-12,


46 Kahn, "Law of Nations" 90-100.









"Always treat others as you would like them to treat you."47 In contrast to religiously

derived affirmative obligations placed upon combatants in Augustinian just war doctrine,

Grotius' categorical maxim is a passive proscription of actions that cause harm to others,

a passivity that would become idiosyncratic to the western legalistic approach to human

rights.

In 1758, the Swiss scholar, Emerich de Vattel, published his encyclopedic Droit

des gens (1758; tr. Law of Nations, 1760). Vattel emphasized concepts that were directly

oppositional to those posited by Augustinian just war doctrine: the concepts of neutrality

and of voluntary state action. Neutrality is belief that a state or institution can maintain

an unprejudiced relationship to all parties to the conflict. His concept of the "voluntary

law of nations" left the final decision on whether to apply humanitarian norms at the

discretion of states whose sovereignty Vattel considered absolute.48

This Grotian natural law tradition of passive obligations reached it apex in the

'categorical imperative' of the eighteenth century German idealist philosopher Immanuel

Kant (1724-1804): "Act always in such a manner that the immediate motive or maxim of

thy will may become a universal rule in a obligatory legislation for all intelligent

beings."49 Rather than comprising a universal norm shared across time and space, the

passivity of ethical imperatives of both Kant and Grotius have been characterized as






47 Grotius cited by Arthur Schopenhauer, On the Basis of Morality, trans. E.F.J. Payne (Oxford: Berghahn
Books, 1995), n. 19, 70.
48 Emerich de Vattel, Le droit des gens. trans/ed. Joseph Chitty, (Philadelphia: T. & J.W. Johnson & Co.,
1879), bk. ii, art. 150 and bk. iii, art. 103.
49 As quoted by Lieber, Political Ethics, 56.










unique to modem European philosophical and religious thought.50 In contrast, just war

doctrine is based on an affirmative obligation for the care and protection of others

acknowledged in various forms by most of the major world religions. Additionally,

specific humanitarian norms placed upon combatants as individuals, similar to those

articulated by Augustine, are also found in the scriptural and classical ethical codes of

almost every major world culture. While the respective weights placed on ius ad bellum

versusjus in bello vary from society to society, these two basic components of the early

just war doctrine are not unique to Augustine, Christianity, or the West. However, the

western emphasis on the ius ad bellum is certainly in part due to greater interest of the post

Westphalian theorists, whether natural law or positivists, in the actions of rulers and

statesmen who initiate conflicts over the actions of soldiers who conduct them. By contrast,

Islamic law stresses the conduct of war and the mitigation of its "harmful consequences"

rather than the just or unjust causes of wars; additionally, many Asian and African religious

and ethical codes also emphasizejus in bellum ethics in the conduct of war.5



50 This was the position of a critic of both Kant's of Grotius' ethics, the nineteenth century German
philosopher, Arthur Schopenhauer who countered with universal ethic basic the natural foundation of
human interconnectedness, As the foremost advocate integrating ancient Indian and modem philosophy, he
posited what he considered a truly universal ethic which mandated an affirmative intervention in the affairs
as found in the globally shared teaching of Vedic Hinduism, Buddhism, and early Christianity.
Schopenhauer tried to further universalize Kant's passive imperative of Neminem laede (Injure no one) into
a affirmtaive imperative of Neminem laude immo omnes, quantum potes, lava (Injure no one, on the
contrary, help everyone as much as you can). See On the Basis of Morality, 70.

51 Forjust war elements in Islamic sources, see Said El-Dakkak, "International Humanitarian Law Lies
Between the Islamic Concept and Positive International Law" International Review of the Red Cross
(1990) p. 101-116. For Buddhist sources: see Rockwood, "Apology of a Buddhist Soldier," 70-77. Other
non-western sources -- such as Hindu texts such as the Mahabharat and Ramaajan, the ethical guidelines of
the Hindu Kshatria warrior caste, Sun Tzu's Chinese classic The Art of War, and several African sacred
traditions place more on the conduct of war and the mitigation of its "harmful consequences" rather than
the just or unjust causes of wars. A review of the 1988 1994 volumes of International Review of the Red
Cross on the international origins of humanitarian law reveals that the emphasis on is ad bellum is not a
universal characteristic of the discussion of the morality and the ethics of violence in war. See especially
Professor L. R. Penna's "Written and Customary Provision Relating to the Conduct of Hostilities and
Treatment of Victims of Armed Conflict in Ancient India," (1989) and Mutoy Mubiala's "African States
and the Promotion of Humanitarian Principles" (1989).









In the west, war is a political action of the state. From Aristotle to Lieber, the

intellectual analysis of warfare is usually related to the conception of the state holds in

the worldview of the analyst. Georg Fredrich Hegel, the eminent statist philosopher of the

Nineteenth Century, considered the state as a godlike manifestation of the ethical force of

history.52 Lieber, in his Political Ethics, returned to a view of the state as a living or

organic institution in that it is composed of living human beings that was shared by

Augustine. For both Lieber and Augustine, the existence of a state always involves a

certain level of societal consensus on moral and ideological principles that influence the

means a given state utilizes to achieve it ends, including war. Considering this shared

instrumentalist understanding of the nature of the state and their antipathy to anti-

Aristotelian views on ethics especially on slavery, the theoretical congruence on

normative principles in warfare between Lieber and Augustine -- although writing a

millennium apart -- is not so surprising.53

The perennial debate between proponents of natural law and legal positivism has

not only polarized the discussion of humanitarian norms in war over the last three

centuries, it underpins the current debate over the universality of human rights in general.

The Westphalian emphasis on law over justice plays into the hands of the advocates of

Western exceptionalism who emphasize the West versus East dichotomies to include the

western emphasis on (1) individual rights over communitarian obligations and (2)


52 Hegel's defined the state as the "concrete manifestation of the "ethical whole" and the "essential being,
the unity of the subjective will and the universal." See Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, trans.
H.B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975; reprint 1984), 93.

53 For Augustine and other classical writers, the basic political unity was the city. "The source of
blessedness is not one thing for a human being and another for a city: a city is indeed nothing other than a
like-minded mass of human beings." See Augustine to Macedonis, Letter 155. For Lieber, the state is a
society composed of those "who have the same interest and strive unitedly for it." See Political Ethics,
147.









political and civil rights over social, cultural, and economic rights.54 Critics of the

concept of universal norms, such as Samuel P. Huntington, have claimed that the concept

of natural law, as one of the unique components of "the rule of law," is one of the

"distinguishing characteristics of Western society" and that to apply it to other

civilizations is a "universalist pretension." 55 This East-West dichotomy in human rights

norms is a false one. Augustinian just war doctrine, in that it is free of either form of

Western legalism (either natural or positive) and its emphasis on obligations rather than

rights is far more universal than the political legacy of Europe's Westphalian system.

One does not have to look to other cultures and times to find alternatives to

Westphalian legalism that follow the basic assumptions of Augustinian just war doctrine.

The Protestant theologian Reinhold Niebuhr also argued in favor of Augustinian realism

over natural law. Associating the Aristotelian need to find a historical order that

conforms to nature, a need that always is compromised by the forces of self-interest,

Niebuhr maintained that the "supposed sanctities of the law" are always tainted by

ideology. Although he was considered the spiritual father of Cold War era political

realism, he also differentiated his realism from the vulgar form of political realism of

those who "see only their own interest and failing thereby to do justice to their interest

where they are involved in the with the interest of others."56 Although usually associated


54 For discussion of the East v. West dichotomy in the debate on human rights universalism, see Daniel A.
Bell, East Meets West: Human Rights and Democracy in East Asia (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2000), Thomas M. Frick, "Are Human Rights Universal" in Foreign Itl I, (Jan/Feb 2001) vol. 80, no. 1,
191-204, and Peter R. Baehr, "Controversies in the Current International Human Rights Debate" in Human
Rights Review (Oct-Dec 2000), vol. 2, no. 1, 7-32.

55 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon
& Schuster, 1996), 69-70, 187.
56 Niebuhr, "Augustine's Political Realism" 132, 134. Niebuhr reached "conclusions about the propriety of
war not substantially different from those of traditional just war theorists." See Regan, Just War, 18.









with the views of Catholic theologians, just war doctrine finds other non-Catholic

parallels in the teachings on ethics of violence and war as found -for example -- in the

teaching of such non-Catholic forums as the National Council of Churches.57

Just War Criteria and General Order No. 100

Richard R. Baxter, who was the author of the current successor document of

General Orders No. 100, the current Department of Army, Field Manual 27-1, The Law

ofArmed Conflict,58 stated that the Lieber Code was "little more than an amplification of

the ideas" Lieber expressed twenty-five years before.59 In his 1838-39 Manual of

Political Ethics, Lieber succinctly summarized traditional just war doctrine:

A war, to be justified, must be undertaken on just grounds--that is, to repel
or avert wrongful force, or to establish a right; must be the last resort--that
is, after all other means of reparation are unavailable or have miscarried; it
must be necessary--that is, the evil to be addressed should be a great one;
and it must be wise--that is, there must be reasonable prospect of obtaining
reparation, or the averting of the evil, and the acquiescence in the evil
must be greater than the evils of the contest. 60

Even though Lieber, as lay leader of Anglican Church in America, would

certainly have been aware of Augustine's writing he probably did not draw directly on

Augustine in either his Manual of Political Ethics or in drafting General Order No. 100.

However, his choice of international law sources indicates the aspects of the laws of war

he accepted and those he did not. He was most critical of Vattel; he ignored Hobbes, and





57 For Just war doctrine and Protestant denominations, see Regan, Just War 19.

58 Department of the Army, Field Manual 27-10, The Law ofLand Warfare (Washington D.C., Government
Printing Office, 1 Mar. 1954), hereinafter FM 27-10.

59 Baxter, The International Review of the Red Cross (April, 1963), n. 25, 176.
60 Lieber, Political Ethics, 446.









he acknowledged Kant.61 Although the term 'just war' does not appear in Lieber's code,

the substance of its 147 articles falls substantially within the eight traditional just war

principles. In that it avoids the natural law tenets of late just war theorists and post

Westphalian legalists, the articles of General Order No. 100 are more evocative of the

affirmative obligations of human realism of early or Augustinian just war doctrine.

Just Cause

The Augustinian requirement that the war must be a response to injustice or

aggression is not modified by the existence of the modern territorial state. While General

Order No. 100 posits that the object of war lies beyond war in the realm of the political,

the political end must be just:

Article 30: Ever since the formation and coexistence of modern
nations, and ever since wars have become great national wars, as come to
be acknowledged not for its own end, but means to attain great ends of
state, or to consist in defense against wrong; and no conventional
restriction of the modes adapted to injure the enemy is any longer
admitted; but the law of war imposes many limitations and restrictions on
principles of justice, faith, and honor.

Article 68: Modern wars are not internecine wars, in which the
killing of the enemy is the object. The destruction of the enemy in modern,
and, indeed, modem war itself, are means to obtain that object of the
belligerent which lies beyond the war.

Like Grotius, Lieber goes beyond Augustine's requirement that a just peace is

war's object in claiming that peace is the normal condition of mankind and "war is the

exception."62 However, there are some injustices that cannot be tolerated either for


61 Works cited by Lieber include Halleck's International Law, as well as Grotius, Bymkershoek, Pufendorf,
von Martins amongst many others less known authors on the Laws of War. See Baxter, International
Review of the Red Cross, no. 26, 224.
62 "Peace is their normal condition, war is the exception. The ultimate object of all modem wars is a renews
state of peace," General Order No. 100, Article 29. Grotius wrote: ...war is undertaken for the sake of
peace," De Jure Belli ac Pacis, bk. i, chap. 1.









raison d' etat or tolerated in the name of peace; one such injustice, for Lieber, was

slavery. Lieber must have known that his code's claim that "The law of nature and

nations has never acknowledged it (slavery)" contradicted natural law theorists of both

the Spanish School of International Law, such as Vitoria, and the notion of natural law

posited by Aristotle.63 As a resident of antebellum South Carolina for two decades, his

code's declaratory statement on the institution of slavery bypassed the contemporary

debate about the character of slavery. Lieber was well acquainted with the arguments

made by his contemporary intellectual rival, John C. Calhoun, to defend the institution on

the basis of Aristotelian natural law. Although -- as evidenced by his earlier works and

lectures -- no one was better qualified to discuss the precedence, legal or otherwise, on

the major causative issue of the American Civil War, General Order No. 100 simply

established the 'just cause' of the Union cause, the end of the slave system in the South, as

self-evident.

In Lieber's Political Ethics he wrote, "the state is an institution for a distinct moral

end."64 In the context of both his life's work and his code's reference to the American

Civil War, the "great ends of state" are never morally neutral.

Competent Authority

Grotius, like Hobbes, spoke of authority in absolute terms of a sovereign power,

whose independent actions are not subject to any other power.65 Lieber's writings on war

are dominated by a pre-Westphalian emphasis on those who execute authority rather than


63 For Vitoria's defense of limited slavery, wee note 47. For Aristotle's unlimited defense of slavery, see
note 34.
64 Lieber, Political Ethics, 81.

65 Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis, Book I, chap. 2, article vii.









the rights and prerogatives of rulers who were more than likely to be the absolute

monarchs Lieber so despised. Lieber, like Augustine, realized soldiers often err in

correctly determining who has competent authority over them, the result being a major

proximate cause of the wars of their times. Much of Augustine's views on the military

profession are derived from his correspondence with Boniface, a renegade Roman

general, in which Augustine counseled to return to a proper allegiance with Rome.66

Lieber watched as thousands of soldiers followed key American military leaders in taking

up arms against the United States by bestowing their allegiance to an authority the

Confederacy -- whose competence Lieber challenged. Tragically for Lieber, one of the

soldiers who made this mistake in judgment was his own son who died in the great

historical referendum on constitutional allegiance known as the American Civil War.

One of the major acts of the wartime U.S. Congress was to ensure that such a bloody

referendum would never be repeated. During the course of the war, legislation was

passed that clearly defined and prioritized the criteria that soldiers must utilize in

determining proper competent authority. The oath of office that soldiers take upon

entering military service -- pledging allegiance to the Constitution, the President, and

their appointed military leadership, in that precise order -- remains in use to this day.67

For Augustine, soldiers were related to the civil judges of his day in that they

acted, not as individuals, but upon authority. Individually, as a flawed human being, a

judge or soldier can at best be an imperfect instrument of justice. Although it is never a


66 Augustine wrote to the renadage Boniface that "if Roman Empire provides you with goods things, even if
they are ephemeral and earthly (for it is an earthly, not an heavenly, institution and can only provide what is
in its power); if then it has bestowed good things upon you, do not return evil for good." See i,'r '"', ,..- to
Boniface, Letter 220 (8).
67Edward M. Coffman, "The Army Officer and the Constitution," Parameters (September 1987), 2-12.









personal act, the unavoidable exercise of the coercive prerogatives of government is

always contaminated by personal hypocrisy. Therefore, according to Augustine, all

officials are faced with the incongruity of exercising competent, but not credible,

authority.68 Although their official status made soldiers and judges distinct from other

human beings, Augustine admonished his fellow civilians that they "must not think that

no one who serves as a soldier, using arms for warfare, can be acceptable to God."69

For both Lieber and Augustine, soldiers differed from murderers not merely

because their acts were official. Official acts also had to be competent; specifically, they

had to be competent in integrating moral and ethical concerns of justice into a

professional field of expertise. Lieber went further than Augustine in approving a special

sanction for those under arms for acts that would be criminal or sinful if based on

personal motivation; he held that soldiers -- owing to the trust bestowed upon them --

must adhere to even higher ethical and moral standards than civilians. In article four,

discussing martial law, Lieber posited that the "principles of justice, honor, and

humanity-virtues adorning a soldier even more than other men, for the very reason that he

possesses the power of his arms against the unarmed." For both Lieber and Augustine,

soldiers were certainly not passive beings simply following someone else's orders; rather,

a soldier's competence should always be the result of an active and properly understood

obligation.


68 See Augustine, Letter to Macedonis (a Catholic official), Letter 153. Augustine's political writing are
peppered with supplications to Christians officials to meditate on their own imperfection in context of their
judgment of others by constant referrals to the Gospel passage in which Jesus cautions the would be
executioners of the woman caught in adultery: 'If any of you are without sin, let him be the first to cast a
stone at her.' See Augustine, Commentary on the gospel of John, 33, and On the feast of St. Lawrence,
Sermon 302, (7).
69 Augustine to Boniface, Letter 189 (4)









By Lieber and Augustine placing military duties in an affirmative character

(italics mine) which compels action rather than inaction, the soldier -- as a tool of the

state -- is guilty of a "double injustice" if the inaction leads to the harm of those he or she

is bound to defend. Therefore, when soldiers commit crimes in the direct performance of

their military duties, they are always crimes of omission rather than commission. Such

crimes of omission are more grievous than crimes of commission.70

Comparative Justice

The most problematic aspect of the legalistic approach to the establishment of

enforceable humanitarian norms in warfare is that of the application of guilt to collective

entities. Augustinian just war doctrine does not, as some have claimed, posit that only

one combatant can lay total claim to virtuous intent or conduct. 71 Virtue and guilt, as

determined by imperfect human judges, are imperfectly determined. Unlike Vattel, who

argued that the justice of opposing combatants are to "be considered as two individuals

disputing on the truth of a proposition; and it is impossible that two contrary sentiments

should be true at the same time," neither the Augustine nor Lieber held to either a

simplistic or absolutist attribution of justice between the opposing sides of a conflict.72

On June 1, 498, the pagan citizens of the North African own of Calama engaged

in a anti-Christian riot that led to the loss of life. Nectarius, a distinguished pagan Roman

official wrote to Augustine asking him to intercede for his fellow townsmen who he



70 Arthur Schopenhauer wrote that "there are actions whose mere omission is a wrong, and they are called
duties." He coined the term doppelte UL,. i.. ,.r,. t or "double injustice" to describe the "non-fulfillment
of a obligation" that leads to the injury of another person. See On the Basis of Morality, 156.

71 Robert L. Homes, "St. Augustine and the Just War Theory" in The i,,ii ',,,,i,, Tradition, ed. Gareth B.
Matthews (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 336.
72 Vattel, Law ofNations, bk. iii, art. 39.









claimed were not responsible for the act. Augustine counseled his petitioner that he was

doing his fellow citizens a disservice by not acknowledging that there are many levels in

which individuals are guilty for collective acts and that it might not be possible to

"distinguish the innocent from the guilty out of the whole city, but only the less guilty

from the more guilty." Augustine provided three levels of individual complicity in

collective acts: those who "lacked the offer to help" to the victims out of fear "were

guilty of only a minor sin;" those who "actually committed them are implicated more

deeply; and those who instigated them most deeply of all."73

Like Augustine, Lieber did not hold that a just cause should manifest itself as a

crusade against evildoers (italics mine) or against collective entities comprised of

individuals who were equally guilty for the injustices perpetrated by the collective and,

therefore, liable to uniform treatment by the opposing forces. In his code, no loyal citizen

of the Confederacy was an innocent entitled to be totally spared from the consequences of

the war.74 General Order No. 100 places all enemy citizens into two major categories:

unarmed citizens and armed citizens. The former subdivided further into seven

subdivisions, each with separate protections accorded to their life and property:

1. Private Citizens. Noncombatants serving in no official capacity are protected
from being "murdered, enslaved, or carried off to distant parts." (article 22)

2. Magistrates and Civil Officers. Commanding generals are allowed to force
oaths of temporary allegiance or to expel those who refuse. (article 23)

3. Slaves. Those formally held in bondage are "immediately entitled to the
rights and privileges of a freeman." (Article 43)

4. Noncombatants Accompanying an Army. Commanders are permitted to
confine and process as prisoners of war. (Article 50)

73 Augustine to Nectarius, Letter 91 (9).

74 General Order No. 100, art. 21.










5. Heads of State and Diplomatic Agents. Unless previously granted safe
passage, they are to be treated as prisoners of war. (Article 50)

6. Spies. All espionage is punishable by death. (Article 88)

7. Guides. Their treatment varies from no punishment for those forced into
service to death for those intentionally misleading a force. (Articles 94-97)

General Order No. 100 subdivides enemy combatants into nineteen distinct

categories, each entailing specific treatment upon capture:

1. Prisoners of War. Soldiers taken prisoner, who have committed no otherwise
unlawful acts, are not subject to "punishment for being a public enemy, nor is
any revenge (to be) wrecked upon him by the intentional infliction of any
suffering, or disgrace, by cruel imprisonment, want of food, by mutilations,
death, or any other barbarity." (Article 56)

2. Deserters. Former soldiers of the U.S. Army, taken in the service of the
Confederacy, are to be put to death. (Article 48)

3. Chaplains and Medical Staff. May be treated as prisoners of war either by a
commander's determination of necessity or their own voluntary request.
(Article 53)

4. Hostages. Although rarely used in modem war, they are to be treated as
prisoners of war. (Article 55)

5. Criminals. Enemy soldiers who have committed crimes against their own
forces or people, before being captured, can be punished by their own
authorities. (Article 59)

6. Deniers of Quarter. Those have failed to give others quarter are to be denied
quarter in turn. (Articles 61-62)

7. Soldiers Captured in the Uniform of Their Enemy. Like spies, such soldiers
are also given no quarter. (Articles 63 & 83)

8. Outposts, sentinels, and pickets. Unless it is determined of military necessity,
opportunistic firing upon their position is prohibited. (Article 69)

9. Users of Poison. Offenders are to be put to death. (Article 70)

10. Assaulters of the Injured: Offenders are to be put to death. (Article 70)









11. Escapees. While firing upon prisoners in the process of escape is permitted,
the attempt is not a crime unless it is part of a general conspiracy. (Article 77)

12. Partisans. Defines them as "soldiers armed and wearing the uniform of their
army," but detached from the main body of the enemy, they are to be treated
as prisoners of war. (Article 81)

13. Brigands and Pirates. Soldiers committing acts of private violence are subject
to death. (Article 82)

14. Irregulars not wearing uniforms. Armed civilians or insurrectionists, who kill,
steal, or destroy infrastructure or materials of the occupying are not entitles to
be treated as prisoners of war. (Articles 84-85)

15. War Traitor. Non-enemy personal who provide information to the enemy
become an enemy who may be punished by death. (Articles 89-91).

16. Messengers. If in uniform, they are to be treated as prisoners of war. (Article
99)

17. Bearers of a flags of truce. They are to be cautiously admitted. If admitted
under false pretenses, they are to be treated as spies. (Articles 104-109)

18. Breakers of Parole. Released prisoners of war, who have violated their
voluntary pledge not to engage in future acts of warfare, can be put to death
upon recapture. (Article 124)

19. Officers / non-commissioned officers. They are allowed special honors and
treatment. (Articles 73 & 127)

General Order No. 100, as it applied humanitarian considerations to an enemy

whose legitimacy was not recognized by the United States was an exercise of

comparative justice in its entirety. Even though the final article (article 157) defined the

"armed or unarmed resistance by citizens of the United States against the lawful

movements of their troops" as treason. Nevertheless, all enemy citizens -- whether

combatants or noncombatants -- were entitled to certain norms of humanitarian treatment

in spite of being expected to bear a higher burden of the war than "manifestly loyal

citizens." (Article 156).









As with Augustinian just war doctrine, the natural law association of non-

combatency with legal innocence is absent from General Order No. 100. Additionally,

the sloppy attribution of collective guilt, as defined as holding individuals responsible for

the collective actions of organizations or institutions by mere membership without any

evidence of an individual act, is also absent.

Right Intention

While the justification of war is aggression or an unjust peace, for Augustine the

objective of war is a just peace. "Peace ought to be what you want, war only what

necessity demands.""75 The hackneyed phrase, "the end justifies the means," has never

been an accurate description of just war doctrine. Rather, just ends justify proportional

means. Just war doctrine predates the legalist debate between naturalism and positivism;

it also predates the philosophical debate between ethical normativism and ethical

consequentialism. Normative, or deontological ethics, is the theory that the efficacy of

moral action in reference to formal rules or norms of conduct. Consequentialist or

teleological ethical theories stress that it is consequences rather than intentions that

determines the correctness of any given action. Both Augustine and Lieber were seminal

ethical theorists who argued that actions are only moral when both intention and result

are integrated.76





75 Augustine to Boniface, Letter 189 (6)

76 For both Augustine and Lieber, the basis for ethical action is a selfless love (Augustine, see note 31) or
the possession of si minpilth or fellow feelings" for others (Lieber, see Political Ethics, 20) that must be
expressed by a constructive engagement with the world as its is rather than as it ought to be. While Lieber
admired the universal tone of Kant's categorical imperative, he dismissed intentionalism. passivity, and
otherworldliness of Kant's ethics when he wrote "Laws and institutions are nothing more than dead forms
of words, unless they operate." See Lieber, Political Ethics, 78.









Echoing Augustine, Lieber argued, "wars are not internecine wars, in which the

destruction of the enemy is the object;" rather, war is a "means to obtain that object of the

belligerent which lies beyond the war."(Article 68) A just war entered into by competent

authority for a just cause can still be fought with unjust intent by either the leadership or

the actual participants of a conflict. Soldiers cannot see into the hearts of their leaders.

Sometimes, that may be fortunate. However, soldiers can never categorically defer their

consciences to higher authority. Except for criminal behavior, a soldiers acts on his (or

her) intentions when he is "armed by a sovereign government and takes a soldier's oath

of fidelity, he (then) is a belligerent, his killing, wounding, or other warlike acts are not

individual crimes or offenses."(Article 57) Even if the decision for the soldier to enlist is

often coerced, soldiers are partially responsible for justice or injustice of the cause for

which they fight at the time they first don their uniforms. Just as the electorate is

accountable for the future actions of politicians they supported at the time they dropped

their ballots, soldiers are responsible, as far as their understanding and knowledge allows,

for historical justice or injustice of the military institution they are joining. Only when

soldiers (or the electorate) obtain new information indicating criminality on the part of

those whose authority they have previously validated, can they claim to be faced with a

new ethical decision.7 Consequently, soldiers must proceed not with blind faith, but

with a common sense and informed faith that their superiors are acting according to the



7 The famous case of Yolanda Huet-Vaughn, a U.S. Army Reserve captain who served eight months in
prison for refusing to serve in the gulf war, involved a soldier who claimed to refuse to be deployed on the
basis of refusing to serve in an unjust war. Her critics emphasized that she accepted a commission and
serving actively in the reserves during a period in which the U.S. military was involved in similar
operations, albeit on a lesser scale. The Army's Court of Military Review finally overturned her
conviction, ruling that she was denied the opportunity at her trial to present evidence that the gulf war was
specifically illegal and immoral. See Colman McCarthy, "Anti-War Doctor Under Fire" in The
Washington Post (November 30, 1993), Z12.









stated political and ethical ends of the war. Unfortunately, history is replete with

examples of wars lost because national and military leaders who have betrayed this trust

have employed military means incongruent with the political and moral ends sought.

Last Resort

Even when necessity demands it, war is a tragedy to be avoided at all costs, save

justice. Augustine still demanded that no matter how just the cause, those in positions of

authority must begin by "bewailing the necessity he is under of waging wars, even just

wars."78 Augustine naturally argued that it is better to achieve justice without recourse to

war. "However, greater glory is still merited by not killing men with swords, but war

with words, and acquiring or achieving peace not through war but through peace itself79

Augustine reflected the position found in Sun Tzu's Chinese classic, written down nine

hundred years before: "To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill."80

However, if a resort to war is justified, it must be successful. Just as all states do not

exist in a Westphalian equality, all wars are not equal. If the preferred level of war is no

war at all, it follows that larger wars require more justification than more limited wars.

It is clear that the Confederacy, with less material and human resources, would

have benefited if both sides resorted to a more "limited" war. The Civil War was fought

under the conflicting legacy of two previous wars: the American War of Independence

and the Wars of the French Revolution. At the outbreak of the Civil War, the

Confederacy styled itself as fighting the second phase of the American War of


8 Ibid., xix, 7.
79 ijri l." to Darius, Letter 229 (2).

80 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (London: Oxford University Press, 1963, reprint
1971), 76.









Independence; the United States styled itself as fighting a limited statist, post-

Westphalian war for the preservation of the Union. Unlike the American Revolution, the

French Revolution introduced not only warfare that was revolutionary in its ends, but in

the level of warfare.

General Order No. 100 was a testament to the new level of war that the United

States government in 1863 was going to resort to, a revolutionary level of war. For that

reason, Lieber's code was categorically rejected by the Confederacy. In limited wars, as

in the case of the campaigns of King Frederick the Great of Prussia, the genius of a

general utilizing maneuver could win out over an enemy with greater resources or, in the

case of wars for independence, belligerent forces could press the war past the threshold of

cost an enemy was willing to bear. Unfortunately for the South, no amount of battlefield

genius or even the greater human losses suffered by the other side would overcome the

political and moral determination of the side with greater material and human resources

to resort to more unlimited war.81

In his June 24, 1863 letter to Washington rejecting General Order No. 100,

Confederate Secretary of War James A. Seddon claimed Lieber's Code was an

opportunistic justification by the United States for its resorting to a level and conduct of

war he found unacceptable. Seddon could not have failed to appreciate the timing of its

release of General Order No. 100 (starting in May 1863), just as Lincoln was issuing a

plan for the southern reconstruction based on the end of slavery and as U.S. Grant was

deploying for his forces for his victory at Vicksburg (May 19-July 4) leading to the



81 In future wars, the United States Army would continue to engage in wars with the advantage of greater
material resources than its adversaries, but not always with the moral determination to accept the costs that
resorting to war entails. That was not the case for the United States Army in 1863 as it finally started
accepting the costs required to win of a war of military attrition.









ascendancy of a commanding general who was willing to expend a revolutionary level of

casualties to achieve a revolutionary end. Simultaneously, Robert E. Lee was engaged in

his final attempt to win the war by maneuver, resulting in his defeat at Gettysburg (July

1-4) marking the demise of the Confederate effort to win a limited war of maneuver in

the face of a conflict that was rapidly becoming a revolutionary war of attrition.82

Probability of Success

The central concept of General Order No. 100 is the doctrine of an affirmative

military responsibility based upon, rather than in contradiction with, military necessity.

Like Lieber, Augustine understood that a just war cannot bring about justice in defeat and

only "when victory goes to the side that had a juster cause (is it) surely a matter of human

rejoicing, and the peace is one to be welcomed.83 Augustine also wrote, "Therefore it

ought to be necessity, and not your will, that destroys the enemy who is fighting you."84

Nothing is more obstructive to the establishment of a just peace than indecisive or

ineffective military action. The most unjust outcome in war -- of which there are

numerous contemporary examples -- is one in which neither combatant attains, or is

allowed to attain, success.

The doctrine of military necessity is the major conceptual link between Lieber's

code and Augustinian just war doctrine. For Lieber, military necessity consisted of two

major components: (1) that "no conventional restriction of the modes adopted to injure

the enemy is any longer admitted; but (2) the law of war imposes many limitations and



82 Letter from James A. Seddon, to Robert Ould, 24 June, 1863. See note 22.

83 Saint Augustine, The City of God, xv & 4.
84 Augustine to Boniface, Letter 189 (4).









restrictions on principles of justice, faith, and honor." (article 30). Articles 14-16 are the

most cited articles of the code and consist of Lieber's attempt to clarify these two

seemingly contradictory themes:

Military necessity, as understood by modern civilized nations, consists in
the necessity of those measures which are indispensable for securing the
ends of war, and which are lawful according to the modern law and usages
of war. (article 14)

Military necessity admits of all destruction of life or limb of armed
enemies, and of other persons whose destruction is incidentally
unavoidable in the armed contests of the war; it allows of the capturing of
every armed enemy, and every enemy of importance to the hostile
government, or of particular danger to the captor; it allows of all
destruction of property, and obstruction of the ways and channels of
traffic, travel, or communication, and of all withholding of sustenance or
means of life from the enemy; of the appropriation of whatever an enemy's
country affords necessary for the subsistence and safety of the army, and
of such deception as does not involve the breaking of good faith either
positively pledged, regarding agreements entered into during the war, or
supposed by the modem law of war to exist. Men who take up arms
against one another in public war do not cease on this account to be moral
beings, responsible to one another and to God. (article 15)

Military necessity does not admit of cruelty this is, the infliction of
suffering for the sake of suffering or for revenge, nor of maiming or
wounding except in fight, nor for torture to extort confessions. It does not
admit of the use of poison in any way, nor wanton devastation of a district.
It admits of deception, but disclaims acts of perfidy; and in general,
military necessity does not include any act of hostility which makes the
return to peace unnecessarily difficult. (Article 16).

Proportionality

Even success of a just war does not result in nirvana, only a more just peace. The

justness of the peace sought must compensate for the suffering created by the decision to

resort to warfare. Augustine wrote that faith must be kept not only with the "friend, for

whose sake one is fighting, but "even with an enemy against whom one is waging war."85


85 Ibid., (6).









That faith is violated when the means to attain an end are not commensurate to the end

that is sought. Proportionality is impossible in the absence of a recognition of reciprocity

in value of life and dignity of the human populations on each side that are affected by the

conflict. Proportionality is based upon the humanity of the enemy as being equal to one's

own humanity.

Advances in technology always challenge proportionality. The longevity of

General Order No. 100 as official doctrine was likely the result of Lieber's avoidance of

issues related to technology. For Lieber, what is proportional is what is simply what is

necessary. "Unnecessary or revengeful destruction of life is not lawful." (Article 68).

During the Cold War, discussions as to whether the use of nuclear weapons can ever be

considered proportional dominated discussions among modern just war theorists.2

Authoritive decisions regarding proportionality and the utilization of new technologies, at

least in theoretically democratic states, are made by civilians. No matter how much

weight civilian leaders give to the opinion of military advisors, the decision of the Allies

to firebomb cities and resort to nuclear warfare during the Second World War was legally

and constitutionally the responsibility of civilians.

Discrimination

Out of all the criteria associated with just war doctrine, it is a soldier's particular

function to discriminate between the combatant and the noncombatant. The term

1 Lieber's doctrinal longevity is also related to his avoidance of maneuver. Lieber's purpose, in spite of his
direct experience of war, was not to provide general of regular forces with tactical and strategic principles
to defeat other regular forces in set battles. Although he intended his code to be applicable in all In fact, his
code emphasized the very aspects that regular force commanders have always tried to avoid and never have
and never will succeed in avoiding, costabulalary function and the handling of irregular forces.
2 See Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 251-283; O'Brien, "The Challenge of War: A Christian Realist
Perspective" in Just War Theory, 169-196; Regan, Just War, 100-121; and Ramsey, The Just War, 211-258.
It is ironic that, now that the necessity for such means has diminished, the issue of proportionality and
nuclear as all but ceased in being a central concern.









"noncombatant" refers not only to civilians, but also to disarmed combatants and other

captives. Writing to a soldier, Augustine wrote, "And just as you use force against the

rebel or opponent, so you ought to use mercy towards the defeated or the captive.88

However, just as there is nothing in Augustine or Lieber to attribute innocence to

noncombatants and guilt to combatants, there is also no categorical prohibition against

actions involving 'unintentional' noncombatant casualties. As in the case of military

necessity, discrimination for Lieber consists of two distinct components.

The citizen or native of a hostile country is thus an enemy, as one of the
constituents of the hostile state or nation, and as such is subjected to the
hardships of the war. (article 21).

Nevertheless, as civilization has advanced during the last centuries, so has
likewise steadily advanced, especially in war on land, the distinction
between the private individual belonging to a hostile country and the
hostile country itself, with its men in arms. The principle has been more
and more acknowledged that the unarmed citizen is to be spared in person,
property, and honor as much as the exigencies of war will admit. (article
22)

For Lieber, the combatant / noncombatant distinction is a relative one based on a

degree of participation of an individual in a war effort. Although the determination of

relativity is accomplished by referring to other traditional just war criteria -- specifically

comparative justice and proportionality, the intentional, non-incidental murder of a

noncombatant is always a crime. The one exception to this rule for Lieber was a limited

form of retaliation to be used against a "reckless enemy" who leaves to "his opponent no

other means of securing himself against the repetition of barbarous outrage."(article 27)

Retaliation will, therefore, never be resorted to as a measure of mere
revenge, but only as a means of protective retribution, and cautiously and
unavoidably; that is to say, retaliation shall only be resorted to after
careful inquiry into the real occurrence, and the character of the misdeed
that may demand retribution. Unjust or inconsiderate retaliation removes

88 Augustine to Boniface, Letter 189 (6).










the belligerents further and further from the mitigating rules of regular
war, and by rapid steps leads them nearer to the internecine war of
savages. (Article 28)

The Legacy of General Order No. 100

The most controversial aspects of Lieber's code include his liberal use of the death

penalty for offenses proscribed by the code and his failure to categorically reject the right

of retaliation and to deny quarter in cases where quarter is not reciprocated.89 While the

right to quarter was unequivocally standardized in the Hague Conventions, retaliation

was not completely outlawed from the law and usages of war until the Geneva

Conventions of 1949. Until that time, retaliation was allowed in order to ensure that

humanitarian norms would be followed by each side of a conflict on the basis of

reciprocity. Despite Lieber's failure to categorically prohibit retaliation, as he did in the

use of torture, the United States Army carried out no retaliatory executions of

Confederate noncombatants during the war.

While modern human rights activists may take pause at Lieber's tentative

endorsement of reprisal, his categorical prohibition of the use of torture (article 16) is far

in advance of some prominent contemporary civil rights activists and legal scholars as

well as the behavior tolerated by the contemporary international community.90




89 For a discussion on contemporary views of General Order No. 100 on reference to reprisals and denial a
quarter, see Theodor Meron, "Francis Lieber's Code and the Principles of Humanity" in The Columbia
Journal of Transnational Law (1997), v. 36. 269-274.

90 Prominent civil rights attorney and Harvard Law School faculty member equivocated on a categorical
prohibition against torture to extort information from those he considered terrorists, first in the case of
Israel in 1988, and then in the case of the united States after September 11, 2001. See Ken Gewertz,
Harvard Gazette (December 13, 2001), 8. For other contemporary equivocations of the prohibition of
torture, see William V. O'Brien, "The Law of War, Command Responsibility and Vietnam" in The
Georgetown Law Journal (1972), v. 60. 648 and Michael Levin, "The Case for Torture" in Newsweek (June
7 1982). V. 99, 13(1), reprinted in The Norton Reader, 6th Edition (Ontario: Penguin Books Canada,
1988), 364.









General Order No. 100 and International Humanitarian Law (IHL)

Only a year after Lieber's code was promulgated, the Swiss humanitarian Jean-

Henri Dunant drew upon the work of his fellow countryman, Emmeric de Vattel, to found

a code based upon the concepts of neutrality and of voluntary state action. The Geneva

Convention of 1964 for the Amelioration of the Conditions of the wounded and Sick in

the Armies in the Field, based of a draft by Dunant, provided protection of military

hospitals and a protocol for medical treatment for wounded soldiers based on reciprocity

between opposing armies.91 Just as Lieber's code is accepted as foundational in the

development of the modern 'laws of war' or "laws of armed conflict,' Dunant's work and

his establishment of the International Committee of the Red Cross in 1863 were pivotal to

development of the modern conception known as 'international humanitarian law' (IHL).

The contemporary usage of these terms is more reflective of the institutional affiliation,

military in the case of the former and non-government organizations (NGOs) for the later,

than one indicating a distinct area of expertise. However, it is possible to discern

conceptual distinctions in the development of what would eventually become areas of

specialization possessing so much overlapping content that they can no longer be

considered independent of the other.

Unlike Lieber who wrote for soldiers, Dunant was concerned with organizing

civilians to work cooperatively with military forces to mitigate unnecessary suffering. As

a witness to the Battle of Solferino between French and Austrian forces on June 24, 1859,

Dunant noted that neither side benefited from the suffering of wounded soldiers left

unattended to die on the field. If a neutral entity could provide relief under such


91 Frank Newman, ed., International Human Rights: Law, Policy, and Process, 2d ed. (Cincinnati: Anderson
Publishing, 1996), 3.










circumstances, why would either side not voluntarily allow the provision of such neutral

humanitarian aid? Upon this logic of neutrality and voluntarism, he established the

International Committee of the Red Cross. The ICRC's cherished ideal of neutrality has

lost much of its luster following the Rwandan genocide in which the international

community voluntarily chose to emphasize neutrality over humanitarianism as 800,000

noncombatants were slaughtered in plain view in 1994.92

Passive obligations easily become supplemental or secondary to obligations

considered primary or affirmative. In other words, passive obligations lead to passive

execution. Whether one looks at the international response to the 1994 Rwandan

genocide or infamous -- but procedurally correct -- ICRC visit to the model

Theresienstadt concentration camp during the Holocaust, the twentieth-century provides

ample material to those who question the effectiveness of passive virtues of voluntarism

and neutrality in establishing humanitarian norms.93 Dunant at least, unlike the

leadership cadre of such modern human right non-government organization (NGOs) as

Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, did not look upon the profession of



92 One of the greatest critics of the ICRC's doctrine of neutrality and silence is M6dicins san Frontibres.
See Michael Ignatieff, The Warrior's Honor: Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience (New York:
Metropolitan Books, 1997), 124. The most authoritative critic of the international community's and his
own office's as former Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, problematic observance of
neutrality and voluntarism in humanitarian operations is Kofi Annan, Secretary-General of the United
Nations. See UN Press Release SG/SM/7263 AFR/196, (16 December 1999), the Report of the Secretary -
General Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 53/35 (1998), Srebrenica Report, (1998), and the Report
of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations During the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda
(15 December 1999).

93 The ICRC continues to operate to this day under the protocol that it will only inspect confinement
facilities upon invitation of national authorities. On June 23, 1944, the Schutzstaffel (SS) voluntarily
allowed June 23, 1994, the neutral ICRC to inspect Theresienstadt. On September 27, 1944, Dr. Maurice
Rossel, the ICRC delegate, attempted to inspect Auschwitz and was refused by its commandant. A positive
effort by the ICRC to press the Third Reich would have violated its protocols. The ICRC now requires an
invitation to inspect all confinement facilities within a prison system. See ICRCAction on behalf of
Prisoners (Geneva: ICRC Publication, 1 Nov 1977).









arms as an adversary incapable of humanitarian concerns. Both Lieber and Dunant

appealed to soldiers' sense of military honor. For Lieber, however, humanitarian norms

could not be associated with passive obligations that busy military commanders could

consider supplemental or secondary to other objectives.

Just as it is clear that contemporary commentators like Howard Zinn are clear/y

outside of Augustinian just war tradition when attributing absolute (italics mine) non-

combatant immunity to traditional just war teaching, it would not be fair to hold Dunant

responsible for the absurdities that have been associated with his conceptual framework

in the late twentieth century by those claiming to be his heirs.94 He would have likely

found the modem notion that an armed force can claim neutrality even while holding

ground on foreign territory as incomprehensible. Despite their disparate approaches to

military affairs, both Lieber and Dunant recognized the benefit of engagement with the

military profession in the effort to mitigate humanitarian suffering in war and the efficacy

of appealing to soldiers' sense of honor. The anti-military essentialist bias found among

the leadership of such modern NGOs as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch

finds its historical base in the Vietnam War era anti-war movement rather than in the

influence of Dunant and his ICRC.

The difference in content and emphasis for Lieber and Dunant underlie

contrasting, although not necessarily antagonistic, approaches to the end of removing

unnecessary suffering in war. The 1863 General Orders No. 100 and the 1864 First

Geneva Convention serve as foundational documents for the two major schools of


94 See Howard Zinn, "A Just Cause, Not a Just War," in The Progressive (December 2001), v. 65, 12.









modern international humanitarian law or the law of armed conflict: the Law of the

Hague and the Law of Geneva. As the inspiration for The Hague Convention of 1899

and 1907, General Order No. 100 provides a historical foundation for the affirmative

limits placed on conduct of war itself associated with the Law of The Hague.

Conversely, Dunant's convention is the foundation for the more passive and voluntary

protections for specific classes of individuals such as the protections afforded wounded

soldiers, prisoners of war, and medical personnel traditionally associated with the Law of

Geneva.95

The Andersonville Trial

The obligatory discrimination between combatants and noncombatants is the one

responsibility that a combatant cannot transfer to a noncombatant. Rather than harming

those they are bound by definition to inflict harm upon, soldiers commit war crimes by

failing to render protection to those they are legally required to protect. While the murder

of a noncombatant may be a very active and voluntary act, it is insofar as his

affirmative obligations as a soldier an act of omission rather than an act of commission.

A soldier does not only have an affirmative responsibility not to violate this most

soldierly of all the just war criteria, he has an affirmative obligation to prevent other

soldiers from violating it as well. General Order No. 100 in addressing cases of "wonton

violence" against noncombatants, to include robbery, pillage, sacking, rape, wounding

maiming, murder, posits that "A soldier, officer or private, in the act of committing such

violence, and disobeying a superior ordering him to abstain from it, may be lawfully

killed on the spot by such superior."(Article 44). This requirement to enforce the just war


95 See Louise Doswald-Beck and Sylvain Vite, International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law" in
The International Review of the Red Cross (1993), v. 94, 293.









principle of discrimination is nothing less than the historical foundation of the doctrine of

command responsibility.

Whoever intentionally inflicts additional wounds upon an enemy already
wholly disabled, or kills such an enemy, or who orders or encourages
soldiers to do so (italics mine), shall suffer death, if duly convicted,
whether he belongs to the Army of the United States, or is an enemy
captured after having committed his misdeed. (Article 71)

Telford Taylor argued that General Orders No. 100 was problematic in that it had

"little to say about enforcement of the laws of war, or about the bounds of 'superior

orders' and 'command responsibility,"'96 Whether or not one accepts these principles as

inherent or implied in General Orders No. 100, they certainly were central in the

immediate post war court-martial of Confederate Major Henry Wirz, the former

Commandant of the prisoner-of-war camp at Andersonville, Georgia for conspiracy to

"injure the health and destroy the lives of soldiers in the military service of the United

States."97

During the course of the American Civil War, Henry Wirz was the only soldier

tried as a war criminal for failing to adhere to the humanitarian standards contained in

General Order No. 100. The simple answer of "victor's justice" does not sufficiently

address the complexity of the decision to try Wirz and not others. Union occupation

policies and burnt earth tactics against Southern property and infrastructure have often

and inaccurately been compared to modem war crimes. While such practices were novel

at the time and condemned by the Confederacy, they were authorized by General Order

No. 100 and pale in comparison to permissible actions against enemy infrastructure found


96 Taylor, see Forward to the Laws of War, xvii.

97 United States House of Representatives, 40th Congress, 2nd Session, House Executive Document (The
Andersonville Trial), Vol. 8, n. 23 (1865), 19-20.










in modern norms of warfare. Despite the ludicrous claims of some apologists of the "lost

cause," there were no My Lai's perpetrated on the population of the Confederacy during

Sherman's March or anywhere else.98 Even American historian Charles Royster's recent

brutal depiction of Sherman stresses ""The actions of Sherman's men bore little

resemblance to the killing of civilians in twentieth-century war. Few if any writers have

contended that Sherman made those mass killings possible or necessary, that twentieth

century war would have taken a different course without Sherman's example."99

While the lack of war crimes prosecutions against United States soldiers can be

explained in terms of either a lack of evidence of criminal activity or an unwillingness of

a sovereign power to hold its own forces accountable for violations of the laws of war,

the question why the decision was made to try Wirz for war crimes and not other senior

Confederate leaders is more difficult to answer. On May 30, 1863, the Confederate

Congress issued a policy allowing the execution of U.S. Army officers commanding

black units. Subsequently, on August 12, 1863, Confederate Secretary of War James A.

Seddon sent a letter to Lieutenant General Kirby Smith (CSA) initiating the Trans-

Mississippi command policy to kill all blacks captured in uniform. Actual executions of




98 The most notorious example of falsely comparing Sherman's March to latter war atrocities is the habeas
corpus ruling by Judge Robert Elliot in a district court in Columbus Georgia in which Sherman's march
was used as an historical example to justify his ruling that U.S. Army Lieutenant William Calley should be
freed from confinement for the murder, rape, sodomy, and mutilation of over 500 noncombatants at My Lai
in Vietnam in 1968. See Michael Bilton and Kevin, Four Hours in My Lai (New York: Viking Penguin,
1992), 356. While there was an unquestionable massacre against non-combatants by Federal forces during
the period of the Civil War, it was not against citizens of the Confederacy. In November 29, 1864, the
Sand Creek or Chivington Massacre involved a slaughter of hundreds of friendly and disarmed Cheyenne
Indians in southeastern Colorado Territory by a force of 1,200 Federal militia under Colonel John M.
Chivington, a local Baptist minister. Regular Army forces present at the scene refused to participate.
Chivington escaped court-martial by leaving Federal service prior to military charges were prepared against
him.

99 See Charles Royster's The Destructive War, William Tecumseh Sherman, Stonewall Jackson, and the
Americans (New York: Vintage Books, 1991; First Vintage Civil War Library Edition, 1993), 358.









African-American U.S. soldiers by Confederate forces occurred on June 7, 1863 at the

Battle of Milliken's Bend (Louisiana) under General Richard Tylor (CSA), April 12,

1864, at the Fort Pillow Massacre (Tennessee) under General Nathon Bedford Forrest

(CSA), on April 18, 1864, at the Poison Springs Massacre (Arkansas) under General

Samuel Bell Maxey (CSA), April 17-20, 1864, during the Confederate recapture of

Plymouth, N.C. under General R.F. Hoke (CSA), June 25, 1864, at the Battle of the

Crater (Petersburg, Virginia) under General William Mahone (CSA), and October 2,

1864, at the Battle of Saltville, Virginia under General Felix Huston Robertson, (CSA).

When the United States Army discovered that its own soldiers, those of African decent,

were being systemically murdered or enslaved upon capture, it chose not to retaliate in

kind. Rather, it prudently chose the option of discontinuing the practice of prisoner

exchange that disfavored the interest of the manpower and labor starved Confederacy

rather than implement its privilege of retaliation under Article 28 of General Order No.

100.

This breakdown of the prisoner exchange led to the creation of one of the least

chivalrous realities of the Civil War: the prison conditions that took the lives of 60,194

prisoners of war, 30,218 in Confederate prison camps and 29,976 in camps run by U.S.

military authorities.100 The claim of victor's justice in the case of Wirz's conviction and

subsequent execution was posited by none other than former Confederate president,

Jefferson Davis --originally named as a co-conspirator with Wirz on the original draft

indictment and later dropped -who in a series on articles in 1890 claimed that the United


100 General F.C. Ainsworth, Chief of the Record and Pension Office, to James Ford Rhodes, June 29, 1903,
cited in James M McPherson, Battle Cry ofFreedom: The Civil War Era (New York, Ballantine Books,
1989: Oxford University Press, 1988) 802.










States Government was exclusively responsible for the condition at Andersonville, due to

its failure to continue the prisoner exchanges, and that conditions in Confederate camps

were no more inhuman than those in the north.101 The historian James McPherson, in his

seminal Battle Cry of Freedom, dismisses the often posited clam of equivalency made

after the war in defense of Wirz in reference to conditions of prisoners of war held by the

Confederacy and the United States by pointing to the fact that all northern prisons had

provided at least some type of shelter from the elements and that the twenty-nine percent

mortality rate (13,000 out of 45,000) at Andersonville dwarfed the mortality rates of any

northern prison camp.102

While Wirz's defense attempted to dispute the secondary charge of murder,

evidence that Andersonville was a de facto death camp was presented by fellow

Confederate officers and even Wirz's own defense witness, Father (later Bishop) Peter

Whelen.103 Wirz addressed the primary charge of conspiracy "to impair and injure and to

destroy the lives" of U.S. Army prisoners by the first modern use of the defense of

superior orders by claiming that as a "subaltern officer (he) merely obeyed the legal

orders of (his) superiors in the discharge of (his) duties" and that he could not" be held



101 Davis' articles in Belford's Magazine in January and February of 1890 was cited and summarized by
General Norton Parker Chipman in The Tragedy ofAndersonville: Trial of Captain Henry Wirz, The Prison
Keeper (Sacramento, CA: N.P. Chipman, 1911), 19-26. Chipman, the Judge Advocate who prosecuted
Wirz, wrote this work, at the behest of the membership of the Grand Army of the Republic, to respond to
the Davis articles. Subsequent pro-Confederate claims of moral relativity between U.S. and C.S.A. prison
policies and conditions can be found in Facts and Figures vs. Myths and Misrepresentations: Henry Wirz
and the Andersonville Prison (United Daughters of the Confederacy (UDC) Bulletin of 1921), 29.
Subsequently, the Georgia chapter of the UDC proclaimed Wirz a martyr and erected a monument,
originally within site of the graves of his victims and is still standing although the Georgia Legislature
refused- even at the height of southern anti-desegregation agitation in 1958, using state funds to repair the
monument.
102 McPherson, Battle Cry ofFreedom, 706 & 802.

103 Chipman, The Tragedy ofAndersonville, 22.










responsible for the motives that dictated such orders."104 Wirz's defense mirrored the

sentiments he expressed in a letter written upon his arrest at Andersonville on May 7,

1865 that he was "only the medium, or may I better say, the tool, in the hands of my

superiors."105

In response, General Chipman, Wirz' prosecutor, argued a theory of command

responsibility that anticipated by eighty years the position found in 1945 London Charter

for the establishment of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg: 106

A superior officer cannot order a subordinate to do an illegal act, and if a
subordinate obey such an order and disastrous consequences result, the
superior and the subordinate must answer for it. General Winder (Wirz's
direct superior) could no more command the prisoner to violate the laws of
war than could the prisoner do so without orders. The conclusion is plain,
that where such orders exist both are guilty. 107

Forty-six years later, Chipman admitted that he was directly ordered by the War

Department to remove the names of President Jefferson Davis, Confederate Secretary of

War James A. Seddon and other high Confederate officials as co-conspirators on the

indictment.108 Besides the obvious political expediency of this order, the case against







104 House Executive Document (The Andersonville Trial), 706.

105 Letter from Captain Henry Wirz, CSA, Andersonville, Georgia, May 7, 1865 to General J.H. Wilson,
U.S. Army. Reprinted in Friedman, The Law of War, 784-785.
106 Text of Article 8 of the 1945 London Charter: "The fact that the Defendant acted pursuant to order of
his Government or of a superior shall not free him from responsibility, but may be considered in mitigation
of punishment if the Tribunal determines that justice so requires." This article was applied by the
International Military Tribunal and in the subsequent Nuremberg trials to include The Hostage Case, The
Einsatzgruppen Case, and the Command Case. See Levie, Terrorism in War, 518.
107 House Executive Document (The Andersonville Trial), 773.


108 Chipman, The Tragedy ofAndersonville, 28.









Wirz' superiors was complicated by the death of his immediate superior, General John H.

Winder.109

Almost all the major issues generally associated with the American War Crime

Program of the Nuremberg era war surfaced during the Andersonville Trial, including

claims of victor's justice and ex post facto justice.110 The dual concepts of the command

responsibility and superior orders were central in the prosecution and defense of Major

Wirz. Just as in the case of subsequent prosecutions holding forth a strict level of

command accountability for war crimes, some have continued to question the

Andersonville Trial in terms of "law." 111 It is not the purpose of the present work to

present a legal treatise in defense of a stricter level of the command responsibility for war

crimes implied in traditional just war doctrine, General Orders No 100, and explicitly

posited by the prosecution during the trial. Regardless of the validity of the legalistic

criticisms of the Andersonville Trial, the doctrinal significance of such cases for the

American military profession is not diminished (italics mine). Seven out of eight of the

military panel that convicted and sentenced Wirz to be hanged were general officers. The

Secretary of War and the President as Commander in Chief upheld both the conviction

and sentence. The report of the trial was officially published and distributed by the U.S.


109 The other co-conspirators named in the final indictment, John H. Winder (deceased), Richard B.
Winder, Joseph Isaiah H. White, W.S. Winder, and R.R. Stevenson were not tried. A similar situation
occurred during the prosecution of the perpetrators of the My Lai Massacre in Vietnam after the death of
Colonel Frank Barker and the difficulties his death created for the prosecution of Barker's subordinates
(Captain Ernest Medina) and superiors (Colonel Oren K. Henderson, General Samuel Koster, and General
George H. Young).
110 Although the United States attempted to distribute General Orders No. 100 to Confederate forces,
applying its obligations to a Confederate Officer, after its explicit rejection by the Confederacy (see note
13), is open to criticism by those who claim such a process inherently creates law after the fact of the crime
or ex post facto.

111 As recently as 2000, Peter Maguire in his seminal Laws and War: An American Story (New York:
Columbia University Press, 2000), 40, called the Andersonville Trial a "dramatic spectacle of vengeance."









government. Whether are not the definition of command responsibility utilized during

the trial was based upon a proceeding comprised of "good law," it was and is doctrine.

Conclusion

The principle that there is an affirmative official duty to use force or coercion to

assist others as predicated and conditioned by the principle of necessity is found formally

in the foundational document of the modern laws of war, U.S. Army General Order 100.

Dr. Francis Lieber utilized the principle of necessity to reintroduce the basic principals of

Augustinian just doctrine into U.S. Army General Order 100, the foundational document

of the modern laws of war. The code's affirmative obligations to minimize human

suffering was enforced by the U.S. Army military tribunal that convicted and sentenced

to death Henry Wirz, the commandant of Andersonville Prison, for his failure in

addressing the inhuman conditions of Union prisoners during the Civil War.

U.S. Army General Order No. 100 was also a pivotal milestone in the

development of formal military doctrine in the American military profession. As a

representation of a major change in national strategy affecting the conduct of Union

forces, it provides the first example of a national operational capstone doctrine. As the

initial authoritative basis for a series of doctrinal publications on the laws of war that was

binding on all branches of the service, it was also the first major historical example of

keystone doctrine.

As doctrine, it remains outside of the major traditions arising out of Post-

Westphalian legalism: political realism, legal positivism, and the neutral voluntarism

associated with 1864 Geneva Convention and the humanitarian law tradition of Dunant

and his ICRC. Finally, it was the product of those who possessed direct experience of the






69


reality of armed conflict; it consisted of an executive order by the commander in chief of

the armed forces to his commanding officers in the field; and it was intended to be

utilized primarily by operational military commanders rather than a legal manual for

lawyers.














CHAPTER 2
THE DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE
AMERICAN MILITARY PROFESSION

I see many soldiers: would that I saw many warriors! "Uniform" one calls
what they wear: would that what it conceals were not uniform!1

-- Frederich Wilhelm Nietszche

Between the Civil War and World War II the process of the development of

military doctrine was formalized with the introduction of a formal publication system.

The period was characterized by contested visions military professionalism. Those

favoring a domestic democratic conception of military professionalism gradually

supplanted functionally aristocratic models of an officer corps associated with Prussia

and Germany.

Most discussions on the development of the military profession have centered on

a presumed "civil-military gap" in values, attitudes, and worldviews that have developed

between the military profession and civil society and especially on the political and

societal consequences resulting from such a gap. Rather than addressing whether

military policies and attitudes are either congruent or incongruent with civil society, this

study incorporates the assumption that neither formal nor informal norms are fixed or

uncontested. The point of departure for any new military doctrine is the doctrine that it

replaces or modifies. The specific subject of the present analysis is the changes and

consistencies in the development of American military doctrine in regard to preexisting



1 Frederick Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra as found in Walter Kaufmann's translation in The Portable
Nietzsche, (New York: Viking, 1954) p. 159.









doctrine, specifically the evolution of formal doctrine from the promulgation of General

Order No. 100 during the American Civil War to the present.

The development of doctrine provides a historical record of the intellectual

foundation of the military profession in the United States. Although certainly affected by

external forces and political expediency, military doctrine is an internal system of

normative values. Therefore, the well traveled debate over the models of continuity

versus discontinuity between military and civilian professional values is pertinent to the

present study only so far as it relates to the refutation of the claim, in the case of

competing doctrines, that a particular contested doctrine is an external imposition on the

military profession.

Constitutional Allegiance and the American Military Professionalism

The doctrinal significance of General Order No. 100 and the just war precepts

contained within it cannot be separated from the constitutional conflict that was

contemporaneous with its publication. The American Civil War was a referendum for and

by the American military profession on the meaning of allegiance. From 1790 to 1861,

the oaths that officers took upon accepting military commissions did not consistently

mention the constitution. This changed as the result of the American Civil War ending

with a decision in favor of those holding primary loyalty to the federal government and

its constitution as opposed to those holding primary loyalty to state governments and

their constitutions. This was subsequently formalized by legislation. In 1862, the

Radical Republicans controlling the U.S. Congress mandated that an officer's political

allegiance to the constitution was to be unqualified and specified by law. From 1862

onward, the words of the Presidential oath of office found in the U.S. Constitution,









"support and defend the Constitution of the United States," was incorporated into all

official oaths of office to include both the enlisted and commissioning oath still used to

this day:2

Officer's Commissioning: I, do solemnly swear (or
affirms) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United
States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith
and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely, without any
mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I will and faithfully
discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter. So help me
God.3

Enlisted: I, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will
support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all
enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to
the same; and that I will obey the orders of the President of the United
States and the orders of the officers appointed over me, according to
regulations and the Uniform Code of Military Justice. So help me God.4

Evocative of the fifth century just war maxims of St. Augustine exhorting Roman

soldiers to examine the moral foundation of their service and conduct, these oaths forced

individuals entering military service to personally acknowledge the basis of the authority

under which they entered into military service and source of the legitimacy of their

actions while in military service. As the oath requires allegiance to a particular

constitution, the political and ideological premises of this constitution, especially as it

was modified over the course and immediate aftermath of the American Civil War, on the


2 Edward M. Coffman in his authoritive article on the subject, disputes the contention that the Constitution
played a significant role in officers decision to fight for or against the United States and argues that the post
war allegiance oaths required by congress were a significant development in both military professionalism
and the American civil-military relationship. See Edward M. Coffman, "The Army Officer and the
Constitution" Parameters (September 1987), 2-12. Even Samuel P. Huntington, who held that Southern
culture was more facilitating of military professionalism, noted "On the one hand, the Southern officer's
political allegiance drew him to the Confederacy; on the other, his professional responsibility drew him to
the Union." See Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil Military Relations
(Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1957), 211-212.
3 Cited in Coffman, "The Army Officer and the Constitution," 5.
4 Most officers have taken this oath as an enlisted soldier or a cadet prior to their commissioning.









development of the American military profession is distinct from other contemporary

armies who pledged their allegiance to other arrangements of political authority. The

formal basis of military allegiance in the United States, in contrast to the major European

powers of the day, was also institutional rather merely national in an organic sense.

However, the end of the Civil War did not result in a consensus regarding military

professionalism and the nature of its historical development. Different interpretations

and views on the institutional lessons of the Civil War and the efficacy of using foreign

models of military professionalism, specifically that of Prussia, as a model for

institutional reform divided those who would have the most influence over the

establishment of future military doctrine in America.

The Prussification of the American Military Professionalism

The centrality of an individual affirmation of duty in the oaths of political

allegiance resulting form the Civil War resonates well with both Francis Lieber's General

Order No. 100 and the traditional just war doctrines contained within it. This, however,

conflicted with the some general assumptions associated with another Prussian, Carl von

Clausewitz. American scholars and members of the American military profession have

utilized Clausewitz in particular and the Prussian military tradition in general to ground

theories of military professionalism that contrast strikingly with the democratic and just

war doctrine put forward by Lieber.

It is ironic that the two key individuals associated with such disparate martial

legacies at one point shared the same uniform and campaign. Clausewitz, the future

author of a book that would serve as scripture for the political realists of late twentieth

century American military and diplomatic officialdom, was serving as a staff officer in









the rear guard of the Prussian forces seeking to cut off the French forces trying to

reinforce Napoleon at Waterloo. A few miles away, the future author of General Order

No. 100, Francis Lieber, a Prussian enlisted soldier, lay wounded near death. Many of

the philosophic inclinations of Clausewitz were the reverse of Lieber's. In fact, their

contrasting views of the nature of war would mark a key point of divergence between the

informal and formal norms of the American military profession.

Clausewitz contra Lieber (Political Realism vs. Political Ethics)

Clausewitz is only known to history because the French Revolutionary Army

followed the common customs and usages of war of the time in granting him quarter and

providing him medical care after he fell wounded in an earlier battle in 1806.5

Following his recovery and parole, Clausewitz joined Field Marshals August Wilhelm

Gneisenau and Gelhard Johann von Scharnhorst in modernizing and reforming the

defeated and antiquated Prussian Army. Being the most politically conservative and anti-

revolutionary of the Prussian military reformers, Clausewitz discarded his uniform and

donned a Russian one in 1812 rather than fight for Napoleon, not returning to Prussian

service until his sovereign had discovered the error of his ways by turning on the French

Emperor after his defeat in Russia. After his retirement, Clausewitz put down his

military insights and observations in a book that, after the Bible, would end up being one

of the most selectively read texts in history. In 1832, he died in the midst of a major

revision of his seminal On War, completing only its first chapter. 6 Although he died in


5 Two recent biographies of Carl von Clausewitz include Raymond Aron's Clausewitz, the Philosopher of
War (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1985) and Michael Howard's Clausewitz (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1983).
6All references to On War (Vom Kriege, 1832) are based on the edition and translation by Michael Howard
and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), Everyman's Library 1993 edition. As
far as inspiring scholarly textual study, the reception of this new translation of Clausewitz by the post










relative obscurity, the sponsorship of his ideas by Field Marshals Helmuth von Moltke

and Colmar von der Goltz in their late nineteenth century efforts to prepare the new

nation of Germany for total war turned Clausewitz, for the first time, into a military icon.

Clausewitz's influence in Europe rose steadily until this ideal of total war was

experienced first hand by Europeans during the First World War.7

Aside from the many questionable historical processes for which he has been

either blamed or credited, it is fairly incontrovertible that, according to Clausewitz, the

nature of war was intrinsically violent, political, unpredictable, and resistant to

positivistic scientific systematization. While an in depth comparison of classical

Clausewitzian and neo-Clausewitzian theory is beyond the scope of this work, many neo-

Clausewitzian writers simply supply critiques of past military actions utilizing relatively

opportunistic selections from Clausewitz's lexicon of themes.8 Naturally, neo-

Clausewitzian writers, by responding to their own Zeitgeist, the historical events and

conditions of their own times, take Clausewitz's ideas out what was clearly a specific and

limited historical context.

For someone with no formal university training, the philosophical influences on

Clausewitz were considerable. His posited dichotomy between absolute war and actual



Vietnam War American military can only be compared to the reception in the English speaking world of
the King James Bible in the Sixteenth Century.

7 Major works of Clausewitz criticism published after World War I include B. H. Liddel Hart, The Ghost of
Napoleon, (London: Faber & Faber, 1933), J.F.C Fuller, The Reformation of War_(London, Hutchinson &
Co., 1932), and Generaloberst von Seeckt, Gedanken eines Soldaten (Leipzig: v. Hase & Koehler, 1935).
8 Antulio J. Echevarria reviewed five such comparisons between the works of Clausewitz and the neo-
Clausewitzians by Werner Hahlweg, Peter Paret, Michael Howard, Jehuda Wallach, and Ulrich Marwedel
and summarized that the neo-Clausewitzians oversimplify Clausewitz into four narrow themes: "1) the uses
and limitations of theory; 2) the impact of psychological and moral forces on war; 3) the importance of
striving for a decisive battle; and, 4) the superiority of a strategy of annihilation." See Antulio J.
Echevarria II, "Borrowing from the Master: Uses of Clausewitz in German Military Literature before the
Great War" in War in History, 3 (July 1996): 274-92.










war places him in the idealist tradition of Immanuel Kant and his reification of the nation

state reflects the influence of Georg Friedrich Hegel.9 In that he considered some

societies more naturally virtuous than other, Clausewitz was completely Aristotelian in

his views on ethical or humanitarian conduct in warfare. For Clausewitz, normative

patterns of humanitarian conduct in war were societal rather than professional:

If wars between civilized nations are far less cruel and destructive than
wars between savages, the reason lies in the social conditions of the states
themselves and in their relationship to one another. These are the forces
that give rise to war; the same forces circumscribe and moderate it. They
themselves however are not part of war; they already exist before the
fighting starts. To introduce the principle of moderation into the theory of
war itself would always lead to logical absurdity. 10

The above passage represents the two basic principles of neo-Clausewitzian

realism: (1) war itself is amoral in its nature and (2) war is conducted for, by, and in the

sole interest of nation states. While Clausewitz discussed the moral nature of war, it was

in terms of the non-material aspects such as morale and genius. Unlike Lieber and

Augustine, Clausewitz separates justice and morality from warfare. Like Thomas

Hobbes, and Niccolo Machiavelli before him, his works are addressed to those working

on the behalf of a self interested nation state in a zero sum competition for adjustments in







9 The most substantial treatment of the influences of German idealist philosophy on Clausewitz in found in
Aron's Clausewitz, the Philosopher of War, 223-232. Clausewitz's conception of 'absolute war' has been
described a "Platonic ideal" outside any reference to German idealist philosophy. See Howard's
Clausewitz, 49. While contemporary critics of Clausewitz stress his idealism in his characterization of
'ideal' or 'absolute' war, his contemporary apologists minimize it. See John Keegan, A History of Warfare
(New York, Knopf, 1993), 16-21 for an example of the former and Bernard Brodie's introductory essay,
"The Continuing Relevance of On War," to On War, 1976 (Vom Kriege, 1832), 52-53 for an example of the
latter. Clausewitz is not alone among those considered to be political realists that have predilections
toward German idealist philosophy. For the influence of Hegelian idealism on Hans Morgenthau, See
Michael W. Doyle, Ways of War and Peace (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1997), 106n.


10 Clausewitz, On War, 84.










the balance of power at the expense of other nation states in which no other justification

is required other that that of raison d' etat. 1

Clausewitz, however, not translated into English until 1873, did not became a

formal influence over American military thinking generally until the advent of the Cold

War and specifically with the so-called Clausewitzian renaissance after the American

military defeat in Vietnam. Therefore, it is historically problematic to apply this "'neo-

Clausewitzian" Weltanschauung, associated with so many contemporary military analysts

and political pundits, as a primary direct influence on the development of American

military professionalism in the late nineteenth century. 12 However, since Clausewitz was

one of the major reformers of the Prussian military, a short examination of his actual

writings is warranted in connection with the general influence Prussian military reform

exerted on the development of American military doctrine in juxtaposition to the

continuing doctrinal significance of General Order No. 100.

Unlike Lieber, Clausewitz wrote a code for statesmen or heads of states, not only

for soldiers, using his direct experience of war to integrate his personal life experiences

with selected historical references. Also unlike Lieber, Clausewitz and his Napoleonic

contemporaries were fixated on conventional warfare between large regular military

formations. On the other hand, the genesis of Lieber's code, like most doctrinal



1 Doyle, War and Peace, 19-28.
12 Works I consider belonging to this neo-Clausewitzian consensus include, but are not limited to
Huntington's The Soldier and the State, Henry A. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (New
York, Harper and Brothers, 1957), Harry G. Summers, Jr. On Strategy: A CriticalAnalysis of the Vietnam
War (Novato, CA, Presidio Press, 1982). For a discussion of how Clausewitz's direct influence on the
American military profession intensified after the American defeat in Vietnam, see editor's introduction to
Clausewitz andModern Strategy, ed. Michael Howard (London: Frank Cass & Co., 1986), 9. This book is
a collection of presentations on an international conference on Clausewitz held at the U.S. Army War
College in Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania in April 1985. The conference itself is direct evidence of the
growing influence of Clausewitz over the American military profession.









developments, was an effort to address contemporary doctrinal deficiencies. Lieber was

specifically tasked to address the aspects of war -- such as constabulary functions and the

handling of irregular forces -- that have historically constituted the U.S. Army's most

common historical activity, although they are activities that American military

professionals have historically tried to avoid or minimize, albeit unsuccessfully.

The strongest consistency between Lieber's and Clausewitz's view on war is the

supremacy of political over purely military ends. In his most famous dictum, Clausewitz

wrote "that war is not merely an act of policy, but a true political instrument, a

continuation of political intercourse, carried on by other means."13 In General Order No.

100, Lieber appears to have paraphrased Clausewitz: "war has come to be acknowledged

not to be its own end, but the means to obtain the great ends of state."14 This congruity

between Lieber and Clausewitz in acknowledging political supremacy over the military

does not extend to the self-proclaimed American heirs of Clausewitz. In fact, as the

particular form of neo-Clausewitzianism that would take hold in America would turn

Clausewitz on his head by advocating a de facto political deference to military ends in

policy and, thereby, directly contradict not only Clausewitz, but the tradition of both

General Order No. 100 and the institutionally based political allegiance mandated in the

soldiers' and officers' commissioning oaths resulting form the Civil War. This reversal

of Clausewitz's position of political supremacy, for the purposes of this study, is one of

the primary points of departure between classical and neo-Clausewitzianism.





13 Clausewitz, On War, 99.
14 General Order No. 100, Article 30.









Emory Upton's Love Affair with Prussia

Although the popularity of Clausewitz among American military professionals is

understandable, its historical reach is limited. Clausewitz did not have a direct individual

impact on the development of the American profession during its most important period

of development between the Civil War and culmination of World War II. The basing of

the impetus of military professionalism in America on Clausewitz, as distinct from basing

it on the Prussian military reformers in general, is just bad history. It was not through

Clausewitz, but the French Antoine Henri, Baron de Jomini, that Napoleonic strategy was

conveyed to America. The reason for this was that Jomini's writings were clearer and

more understandable than Clausewitz' classic.15 Clausewitz' influence on the American

military between the Civil War and the Second World War can only be taken in

conjunction with the nineteenth century Prussian military in general; Clausewitz can at

most be considered as an usually un-cited source for a view of military professionalism

that has played more of an informal, rather than formal, role in the development of

American military professionalism until America's defeat in Vietnam.

This is at odds with the premier theoretical work of American military

professionalism, Samuel P. Huntington's The Soldier and the State. Huntington argues

that modern military professionalism was spawned in post-Napoleonic War Prussia and

epitomized by the theories of Clausewitz. Accordingly, prior to this, America could only

claim to possess a proto military professionalism and this was to be found mainly in the

slave holding south that was embodied in the efforts toward ante-bellum military


15 Russell F. Weigley noted in The American Way of War that Clausewitz' writings were, compared to
Jomini's, "difficult, circumlocutory, often apparently self-contradictory." See The American Way of War, A
History of United States Military and Policy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973), 82 & 211.









professionalism initiated by the policies of Secretary of War John C. Calhoun. The

greatest weakness of Huntington's historical thesis is the absence of documentation

concerning how the culture of professionalism migrated from Prussia to the United

States. 16

As Clausewitz could not be historically credited for the transplantation of military

professionalism from Prussia to the United States, the anointed mantle usually falls on the

shoulders of Major General Emory Upton. After serving as commandant of the U.S.

Military Academy from 1870-1875, Upton was sent by the Secretary of War on a tour of

Europe in search of military organizational models worthy of imitation. Four years after

the conclusion of the Franco-Prussian War and the creation of a new German empire, the

task of locating the belle of the ball was hardly difficult. Upton's admiration for the

Prussian / new German military reinforced his preference for smaller more professional

armies over larger mass armies, a preference developed during his service in the

American Civil War. Consequent to Lincoln's re-characterization of the war from a

limited war to preserve the Union to a national war of emancipation, Upton was highly

critical of what he considered the deficiencies in the Union Army resulting from the

political interference of civilian leadership and the appointment of non-career officers to

major commands. The preeminent military historian Russell F. Weigley credits Upton

with the ominous distinction of first asserting the requirement for national policy to

conform to military imperatives, rather than the other way around. Weigley wrote that

Upton "argued that all the defects of the American military system rested upon a

fundamental, underlying flaw, excessive civilian control of the military" and that, by


16 Huntington's The Soldier and the State, 143-62 & 172-77.









"proposing a military policy that the country could not accept." Consequently, Weigley

credits Upton with causing lasting damage to the Army resulting from the establishment

of a model of civil-military relations that emphasized antagonism over accommodation to

civilian society. 17

Upton's choice of Prussia for a model for military professionalism was not

without precedence because the American military already possessed a genuine Prussian

heritage since the Revolutionary War. The legacy of Prussia precedes the advent of the

Prussian military reformers of the Napoleonic period. In 1778, Frederick William von

Steuben arrived at the Valley Forge encampment of the American Continental Army with

the assignment, arranged by Benjamin Franklin in Paris, to provide a system of drill and

discipline based on a model other than that of the British enemy. Drawing on his service

in the army of Frederick the Great, Steuben drafted his Regulations or Blue Book that

established a uniquely American manual of arms that is nominally utilized to this day.

However, Steuben's legacy was confined to drill and not to general or "keystone"

doctrine and his military experience predated the Napoleonic era Prussian military

reforms later exalted by Upton.

Upton's admiration for the Prussian institutions resulting from the reform period

was generalized; his writings contain no systematic analysis of the writings of the

Napoleonic War era military reformers. Upton's position on the connection between

political ends and military action was the opposite of Lieber and Clausewitz, both sharing

the honor of not being cited in his work. Specifically, it was the ideas of Lieber's



17 Major Wallace E. Walker, USA, "Emory Upton and the Army Officer's Creed" Military Review (April
1981), 65-68, and Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States Army (New York: Macmillan, 1967),
279 & 281.









archrival, John C. Calhoun, which Upton drew as a base for his proposal for an

expandable army.18 In a time of war such an army would be comprised of personnel

from the regular army, national volunteers, and the militias who would be "regulars in

drill, discipline, and courage" and commanded only by professional soldiers.19 Taking

his own life in 1881, Upton despaired of ever seeing an expandable regular army free of

civil interference or his seeing ideas officially endorsed on published by the Army.

However, Upton left an unfinished manuscript, posthumously published as The Military

Policy of the United States, which was unofficially disseminated among the officer corps.

However, it generated enough support and opposition to facilitate the creation of the first

official keystone doctrine since the promulgation of General Order No. 100.20

One doctrinal specialist who wrote in opposition to Upton was Major Arthur L.

Wagner, U.S. Army, an Instructor in the Art of War at the U.S. Infantry and Cavalry

School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. In 1866, Wagner wrote a study that strongly

criticized the Prussian military for ignoring the lessons concerning mass armies during

the American civil war. Wagner argued that foreign doctrine, especially Prussian

doctrines, must cede precedence to the Republican forms of a distinctly American civil-

military relationship.21 Wagner's major work, Organization and Tactics, divided the Art

of War into two major divisions: (1) strategy, the movement and disposition of an army

in a "theater of operations," and (2) tactics, the movements of soldiers on a battlefield.



18 Weigley, History of the United States Army, 277.

19 Bvt. Maj. General Emory Upton, USA, The Military Policy of the United States, 4th Impression
(Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1917), viii & xi.
20 For a discussion of foundational or "keystone" doctrine, see Introduction, n. 4.

21 For a discussion of Wagner's criticism of the Prussian Military tradition, see Kretchik, "Peering Through
the Mist," 88-92.









Calling Upton's focus on drill and discipline to mind, Wagner felt that "it was not

sufficient that an army be composed of intelligent, well-instructed, brave, and obedient

soldiers, well armed and equipped;" he also considered drill as "merely one of the means,

not the end" of military discipline. 22 Wagner, in that he felt that there are too many

diverse elements in war that keeps the art of war from becoming a science based on

universal laws, was probably more familiar with the actual writing of Clausewitz than

Upton, who believed in the existence of laws that have been in operation throughout

American military history. For Wagner, the art of war was a human science rather than

an exact science.23

Wagner's greatest difference with Upton was on the relative effectiveness and

discipline of the republicanized United States Army during the Civil War as compared to

that of contemporary professionalized European armies, Wagner favoring the former with

Upton favoring the latter.24 Wagner, unlike Upton, received official endorsement for his

doctrinal positions. In 1897, the second edition of Wagner's Organization and Tactics

contained an official imprimatur from the Adjutant-General's Office and was officially

recommended by the Headquarters of the Army for officers undergoing examination for

promotion, and contained a preface written by the Commander of the U.S. Infantry and

Cavalry School, the direct precursor to the Command and General Staff School. It was



22 Wagner, O o":,,i:,. ', and Tactics, 2nd ed. (Kansas City, Mo.: Hudson-Kimberly Publishing Co., 1897),
3, 43.

23 Upton, in his criticism that American "have no military policy", and that "Laws whose operation have
been the same in all our wars" can be utilized to systemically achieve the wisest policy possible. See
Upton, The Military Policy of the United States, xii. Contrarily, Wagner noted that as "many diverse
sentiments can influence the same army," "knowledge of human nature is half of the science of war." See
Wagner, O,,,,i:.,,,.. and Tactics, 46, 49.
24 Wagner, O, ,,,ir,. and Tactics, 43-44.









not until twenty-three years after his death that Upton's Military Policy of the United

States was officially published by the Army and, even then, only with a tentative

endorsement of its contents.

While the works of Upton and Wagner made only modest headway providing a

doctrinal foundation for the military profession on land, Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan

supplied an intellectual rationale for American naval and foreign policy that would be

utilized though the twentieth century. Unlike the Army, the Navy already possessed a

functional War College by 1890, the year Mahan, a faculty member of the Naval War

College, had his lectures published as The Influence of Sea Power on History, 1660-1783.

Unlike Upton, Mahan founded his naval worldview on the strategy of Jomini, rather then

Clausewitz or other Prussian military reformers, and recommended Great Britain, rather

than despotic Prussia, as a historical model for policy as America assumed its role as an

imperial world power.25 The contrast between the relative level of professionalism

existing between America's naval and ground forces was clearly demonstrated in

America's first major overseas military intervention.

Elihu Root and the Birth of Military Professionalism

A year after America's sloppy victory in the Spanish American War (1898),

President William McKinley appointed Wall Street lawyer Elihu Root to be his Secretary

of War to clean up the military mess in the newly acquisitioned Philippine Islands

occupied by U.S. Marine and U.S. Army ground forces. From 1899 to 1904, Root

conducted the most extensive military reform in American history prior to the

reorganization of the military under General George C. Marshall during the Second


25 Weigley, The American Way of War, 174, 177.









World War. He reorganized the administrative system of the War Department and

modernized promotions. He carried out many policies envisioned by Upton including the

foundation of the War College, creation of a general staff, and increased federal control

over the National Guard. Root also was forced to address the fact that Army's

performance in the Spanish-American War and the subsequent Philippine Insurrection

(1899-1906) exposed an army in doctrinal crises.

The major activity of the Army since the Civil War had been constabulary

functions in the South during Reconstruction and on the western frontier. Morris

Janowitz, an early critic of the normal theory of civil-military relations, argued that,

although such functions have always been a persistent activity for regular military forces,

they have always been a source of doctrinal neglect.26 With its first regular military

action in thirty-four years, the U.S. Army's performance, while victorious, was

disappointing. Despite the U.S. Army's wealth of historical experience with such

operations, American forces were unable to conduct disciplined constabulary functions

during the American occupation of the Philippines following the war. The worst incident

followed a massacre of 59 Americans at Balangiga on the island of Samar. Marines

under the command of U.S. Army General Jacob F. Smith, an officer who had

participated in the Wounded Knee Massacre of 1890, engaged in a genocidal riot that left

165 villages burned and thousands of Philippine murdered, the majority of which were

clearly non-combatants.27


26Janowitz in the conclusion of The Professional Soldier (1960) insisted "the worth of the military
profession has been deeply rooted in the importance of its non-military functions." See The Professional
Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait, (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1960), 438.
27 Marine Major Littleton Waller reported that Smith ordered him to kill "everyone over ten years old." See
Maguire, Laws and War, 60.









On February 21, 1903, seven months after the court martial of General Smith for

the conduct of his forces on Samar, Root laid the cornerstone of the Army War College in

Washington. Root used this occasion to deliver a eulogy for Upton and his quest for

greater professionalism of the American military, which included the establishment of

Prussian-inspired staff schools and war colleges.28 A year later, Root agreed to the

official publication of an edited version of Upton's Military Policy of the United States.

However, in Root's preface to the document, he gave only partial endorsement to

Upton's ideas. After pointing out that many of the Upton's concerns had already been

addressed, Root pointed out that Upton failed "to appreciate difficulties arising from our

form of government and the habits and opinions of our people" and that Upton's views

were "colored by the strong feelings natural to a man who had been a participant in the

great conflict of the civil war."29

Root was well aware of great divisions among officers during the Civil War

between regular West Point trained officers like Upton and citizen soldiers elected to

their commissions by their men or politically appointed. At the center of this controversy

was General George McClellan who was first relieved as General in Chief after the

failure of the Peninsula Campaign in 1862, later reinstated commander of the Army of

the Potomac, and relieved for the final time a few months later after failing to follow up

the Union victory at Antietam. The traditional depiction of McClellan's action and his

removal as a controversy over civilian control of the military is misleadingly one-

dimensional. While McClellan strongly resented the interference in military affairs by


28 Roots address included in his preface to Upton's Military Policy of the United States (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1904), iii.
29 Ibid., iv.









the Republican Congress and President Lincoln, a resentment shared by Upton,

McClellan held his military superiors in the same contempt as his civilian superiors; in

particular, he did not hesitate going over their heads to civilians as in the case of

Winfield Scott and Henry W. Halleck, his predecessor and successor, respectively, as

general in chief.

It was not the military or civilian character of his superiors that McClellan

objected to; rather, it was the change in war aims from a smaller more traditionally statist

war aim to preserve the Union to a larger ideological war of emancipation. To

paraphrase Clausewitz, McClellan would have no part of a war that was the continuation

of policies he did not agree with. These policies would soon be definitely expressed in

the Emancipation Proclamation and General Order No. 100, the later the initiative of

Halleck, his general in chief. 30 While it would be unfair to call Upton a simple

McClellanite, Upton clearly shared McClellan's opposition to the influence of the

Lincoln administration and the Republican congress on the conduct of the war. In

chapter 25 of his Military Policy, Upton offers sympathetic criticism of McClellan's

civil-military decisions in much the same manner that Huntington would address

MacArthur's actions in Soldier and the State following President Truman firing of that

general in 1951.31 While Upton admitted to McClellan's making some errors, he

definitely did not support the criticism of McClellan by those civil and military leaders


30 While McClellan called President Lincoln a "gorilla," he called Scott a "perfect incubus" who is either a
dotardd or a traitor" and demanded that both Halleck and Secretary of War Stanton be removed after they
criticized his conduct toward the enemy. Quoted in McPherson, Battle Cry ofFreedom, 360 & 569.
Historian James McPherson also emphasized the policy differences over emancipation as being key to the
motives of Stanton, Halleck, and Lincoln removing McClellan, see Battle Cry ofFreedom, 502-506.

31 Upton, Military Policy. 384-387. For Huntington's sympathetic approach to MacArthur's dismissal, see
Soldier and the State, 367-389.









holding a constitutional view in reference to civilian control of the military.

Additionally, Upton, like McClellan, opposed the change in war aims involving the civil

war becoming a larger war of emancipation as was to be clearly defined in General

Order No. 100, a document conspicuously unacknowledged and un- cited by Upton.32

Root, conversely, was acutely aware of General Order No. 100 during his tenure

as Secretary of War. In 1901, an American general publicly announced that the

insurgents in the Philippines had violated twenty-six articles of the "Lieber Code" and

claimed that the United States was justified in not according such belligerents the

protections accorded lawful combatants according to the most controversial doctrine

contained in General Order No. 100, the doctrine of reprisal. Root did not agree.

Although he accepted in general Lieber's principle that soldiers fighting an enemy, itself

engaging in unlawful conduct, may respond in a manner that would not otherwise be

sanctioned against an enemy fighting according to the customs of war, Root cabled that

the extreme form of retaliation being carried out by American forces in the Philippines

was beyond any justification. Both General Jacob Smith and his direct subordinate,

Marine Major Littleton Waller, unsuccessfully tried to use the Lieber's doctrine of

retaliation to justify the outrages on the island of Samar during their court-martials. Root

was widely criticized for being both too soft and too hard in what he admitted was the

superficial war crimes trials of American officers in Manila.33 On July 21, 1902, Root



32 Upton wrote: "Since the Rebellion, with a fatuity pregnant with future disaster, we settled down to the
conviction that out total neglect of military preparation, our defeats, our sacrifices in blood and treasure,
were the predestined features of a war protracted through four long years, in order that the minds of the
people might be prepared for the extinction of slavery. These views, so comforting now, were not held
during the war." See Upton, Military Policy of the United States, 385. Article 24 of General Order No.
100 addresses slavery and the war.

3 Upon hearing reports of the exaggerated level of reprisals under General Smith, Root cabled that
although soldiers "should occasionally regardless of their orders retaliate by unjustifiable severities ...









responded to criticism by General Granville Dodge who considered Root's decision to

court-martial American personnel as being based on a naive understanding of the reality

of war:

I think if you could read the testimony in the Waller case (who was tried
prior to General Smith and established the evidentiary record subsequently
used against Smith) you would change your views. I had very much the
same views of the case as you express, but careful examination of the
entire record and evidence extremely distressing to me.34

The suspect use of the "Lieber Code" to defend American atrocities in the

Philippines by war crimes defendants did not dampen Root's enthusiasm for General

Order No. 100 and its author, Francis Lieber. Five years after the Manila court-martials,

Root, as Secretary of State, directed the American delegation to the second Hague

Conference to radically expand the reach of laws of war. Root considered the "Lieber

Code" as the source that "made possible the success of the Hague Conferences.35 During

the second Hague Conference, Root's ambition to expand the reach of international law

at the expense of traditional prerogatives of the nation state was frustrated by hispetit

noire, Germany. It was probably Root's anti-German antagonism that accounts for his

partiality for the anti-Prussian Lieber over the pro-Prussian Upton. Root took the

occasion of the presidential address at the seventh annual meeting of the American

Society of International Law in 1913 to celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of adoption of



nothing can justify or will be held to justify, the use of torture or inhuman conduct on the part of the
American Army." In a personal letter to Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, Root criticized the tactic of utilizing
the General Order No. 100 to justify the disproportional reprisals in the Philippines. See citations of Root
as found in Maguire, Law and War, 62, 66, & 69.

34 Letter to General Genville Dodge, July 21, 1902, cited in Ibid., 308, n.88.

35 Elihu Root, "Francis Lieber: Presidential Address at the seventh annual meeting of the American Society
of International law, Washington, D.C., April 24, 1913" inAddresses on International Subjects, ed. Robert
Bacon & James Brown Scott (Freeport, New York: Books for Libraries Press, 1916, reprinted 1969), 103.









the "Lieber Code." In his eulogy of Lieber, Root described Lieber as a German whose

love of country urged him "to the support of a government which the love of liberty

urged them to condemn" in that the "people of Prussia were held in the strictest

subjection to an autocratic government of inveterate and uncompromising traditions."36

In Root's presidential address honoring Lieber, there was nothing of the qualified

endorsement so obvious in Root's eulogy for Upton ten years earlier. Although, as

Secretary of War, Root is credited for implementing many of Upton's recommendations

for the professionalizing the American Military, Root kept his distance from the Uptonian

celebration of Prussian efficiency and professionalism at the expense of democratic

principles. Root closed his presidential address with the following:

It stirs the imagination that the boy who lay wounded on the battlefield at
Namur for his country's sake and who languished in prison for liberty's
sake and who left his native land that he might be free, should bind his life
into the structure of American self-government and leave a name honored
by scholars and patriots the world over. If our Society, at once national
and international, were about to choose a patron saint, and the roll were to
be called, my voice for one would answer "Francis Lieber."37

The Formalization and Specialization of American Military Doctrine

Except for General Order No. 100, the creation of military doctrine in the United

States, prior to the twentieth century, was decentralized and informal. Except for the

edited doctrinal writing of Emory Upton, and Arthur L. Wagner, doctrinal texts utilized

by the American military during the nineteenth century were commercially published,

sometimes with and sometimes without an imprimatur. As the American military


36 Ibid., 96. Four years prior in a letter to Andrew Carnegie, called Germany "the obstacle to the
establishment of arbitration agreements, to the prevention of war, to disarmament, to the limitation of
armaments, to all attempts to lesson the suspicions and alarm of nations toward each other, is Germany,
who stands, and as persistently stood since I have been familiar with foreign affairs, against that kind of
progress." Cited in Maguire, Law and War, 69.

7 Elihu Root, "Francis Lieber," 103.









profession underwent formalization and specialization in the early twentieth century, so

did American military doctrine.

Field Service Regulations

With the publication of Field Service Regulations in 1910, the Army under Root's

successor as Secretary of War, William H. Taft, introduced what was to the first formal

series of doctrinal publications. This document served simultaneously as a "capstone"

publication, officially articulating national war fighting doctrine, and a "keystone"

publication, providing a doctrinal base for all other supplemental doctrinal publications.38

This was no product of a single author with an official imprimatur indicating official

endorsement; the manual was eventually the responsibility of a Field Service Regulations

Board charged with drafting a centralized and current warfighting doctrine. It was the

first example since the promulgation of General Order No. 100 during the civil war that a

single volume could be described as the official military doctrine of the United States.

Seven new editions of the series would be issued between 1908 and 1941 when Field

Manual 100-5, Operations, would supercede the series. The FM 100-5 series would

remain the primary keystone doctrinal series after the creation of the Department of the

Army by the National Security Act of 1947 until the end of the twentieth century when

the Army's traditional role as the major developer of keystone doctrine was superceded

by the Department of Defense (DOD).39



38 Department of War, Field Service F. ih,/.r,. ,, 1905 (Washington: General Staff, 1905). Capstone
doctrine is the highest category of doctrine publications in the "hierarchy of publications" that link doctrine
to national strategy and the guidelines of other government agencies to include other members of
international alliances and coalitions. Keystone doctrinal publications provide the foundation for a series of
doctrine publications in the hierarchy of publications. See JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of
Military andAssociated Terms, 62, 82.

39 This DOD assumption was accomplished under the incomplete and belated implementation of the
Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. In 2001, Field Manual 3-0









Lieutenant Colonel Walter Kretchik of the U.S. Army Command and General

Staff College, a leading expert on the historical development of Army doctrine,

considered the first edition of Field Service Regulations as containing the ideas of both of

the major post Napoleonic military theorists, Jomini and Clausewitz, as "transmitted

though the writings of Henry W. Hallack, Emory Upton, and Arthur L. Wagner."40 The

legacy of Francis Lieber also figured prominently in the manual. The entirety of article

XII in the first edition of the manual consisted of a reprint of General Order No. 100.

However, the General Order No. 100 's position in subsequent editions became

increasing peripheral. By the 1914 edition of Field Service Regulations, only a summary

of the Lieber's provisions was included in an appendix entitled "Extracts to from

International Conventions and Conferences."41

In both editions promulgated before and after the experience of the American

Expeditionary Force in the First World War, the Field Service Regulations emphasized

decisive offensive operations over passive defensive tactics. The contemporaneous

reaction to the recent experience of static trench warfare in Europe reinforced the

traditional American doctrinal emphasis on affirmative decisive action going back to the

pre-civil war writings of Henry Wager Halleck and also found in the traditional just war

requirement for a high probability of success and the principle of military necessity found

in General Order No. 100, of which Halleck was the major sponsor. Major General J. L.

Hines, Acting Chief of Staff, in his preface to the 1923 edition of the Field Service


formally superceded the FM 100-5 series in conformity with the joint (service) numbering system.
Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-0, Operations. (Washington, D.C.; Government Printing Office,
2001, accessed 1 March 2003); available fom Illip \ \ \ .adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/3-0/toc.htm.
40 Krtetchik, Peering Through the Mist, 99.
41 Department of War, Field Service ,'.,I ir,. i,, (Washington: General Staff, July 1, 1905), 190-204.