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Group Title: Bicentennial Floridiana facsimile series
Title: An Impartial account of the late expedition against St. Augustine under General Oglethorpe
Publisher: University Press of Florida
Full Citation
External Link: http://www.upf.com
 Material Information
Title: An Impartial account of the late expedition against St. Augustine under General Oglethorpe a facsimile reproduction of the 1742 edition : with an introduction and indexes
Series Title: Bicentennial Floridiana facsimile series
Physical Description: l, 68 p. : ; 21 cm.
Language: English
Creator: Topping, Aileen Moore
Kirkpatrick, J ( James ), ca. 1696-1770
Publisher: University Presses of Florida
Place of Publication: Gainesville, Fla.
Publication Date: 1978
Copyright Date: 1978
Subject: Saint Augustine Expedition, Fla., 1740   ( lcsh )
Genre: bibliography   ( marcgt )
non-fiction   ( marcgt )
Spatial Coverage: United States of America -- Florida
Bibliography: Includes bibliographical references and indexes.
Statement of Responsibility: by Aileen Moore Topping.
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Bibliographic ID: UF00100331
Volume ID: VID00001
Source Institution: University Press of Florida
Holding Location: University Press of Florida
Rights Management: A facsimile reproduction of the 1742 edition with prefatory material, introduction, and indexes added. New material copyright 1978 by the Board of Regents of the State of Florida. This work is licensed under a modified Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 Unported License. To view a copy of this license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/. You are free to electronically copy, distribute, and transmit this work if you attribute authorship. However, all printing rights are reserved by the University Press of Florida (http://www.upf.com). Please contact UPF for information about how to obtain copies of the work for print distribution. You must attribute the work in the manner specified by the author or licensor (but not in any way that suggests that they endorse you or your use of the work). For any reuse or distribution, you must make clear to others the license terms of this work. Any of the above conditions can be waived if you get permission from the University Press of Florida. Nothing in this license impairs or restricts the author's moral rights.
Resource Identifier: oclc - 04497144
lccn - 78021956
isbn - 0813004209 :
alephbibnum - 000069825
oclc - 4497144

Table of Contents
    Title Page
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    Bicentennial commission of Florida
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    Title Page
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    A narrative of the conduct of the forces on the expedition against St. Augustine
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    Index to introduction
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    Index to impartial account
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Full Text

Impartial Account





BY Aileen Moore Topping.



A University of Florida Book.
University Presses of Florida.
Gainesville 1978.

published under the sponsorship of the
SAMUEL PROCTOR, General Editor.



-All rights reserved.


Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Main entry under title:

An Impartial account of the late expedition against
St. Augustine under General Oglethorpe.

(Bicentennial Floridiana facsimile series)
Includes bibliographical references.
1. St. Augustine Expedition, 1740. 2. Oglethorpe, James
Edward, 1696-1785. I. Topping, Aileen Moore. II. Series.
F314.134 1978 973.2'6 78'-21956
ISBN 0-8130-0420-9


Governor Reubin O'D. Askew, Honorary Chairman
Lieutenant Governor J. H. Williams, Chairman
Harold W. Stayman, Jr., Vice Chairman
William R. Adams, Executive Director

Dick J. Batchelor, Orlando
Johnnie Ruth Clarke, St. Petersburg
A. H. "Gus" Craig, St. Augustine
James J. Gardener, Fort Lauderdale
Jim Glisson, Tavares
Mattox Hair, Jacksonville
Thomas L. Hazouri, Jacksonville
Ney C. Landrum, Tallahassee
Mrs. Raymond Mason, Jacksonville
Carl C. Mertins, Jr., Pensacola
Charles E. Perry, Miami
W. E. Potter, Orlando
F. Blair Reeves, Gainesville
Richard R. Renick, Coral Gables
Jane W. Robinson, Cocoa
Mrs. Robert L. Shevin, Tallahassee
Don Shoemaker, Miami
Mary L. Singleton, Jacksonville
Bruce A. Smathers, Tallahassee
Alan Trask, Fort Meade
Edward J. Trombetta, Tallahassee
Ralph D. Turlington, Tallahassee
William S. Turnbull, Orlando
Robert Williams, Tallahassee
Lori Wilson, Merritt Island


THE war of words, threats, and ultimatums
between Spain and England which finally
erupted into bloody conflict in 1739 was
fought not only on the great battlefields of Europe
but also in the pine forests and the swamps and
along the salt marshes and on the white sand
beaches of South Georgia and Northeast Florida.
Spain's la Florida had once extended from the
Keys north to the Chesapeake Bay. The explora-
tions and discoveries of the sixteenth-century con-
quistadores provided the basis for Spain's claim to
this vast territory. Then in 1607 England threw
down a daring gauntlet when a group of her col-
onists under the leadership of Captain John Smith
established a settlement at Jamestown. England
claimed this territory as her own and named it
Virginia in honor of her queen. Spain postured and
threatened, but took no decisive action, and the
die was cast. Her royal banners began their slow
but inexorable retreat southward. In 1629 Charles I
granted part of what is now North Carolina to
Sir Robert Heath, and Charles II named the area
in 1663. Charleston was settled soon after, and in


1733 James Edward Oglethorpe arrived with
thirty-five families aboard the galley Anne off the
Atlantic coast. He selected a townsite on a high
bluff overlooking the Savannah River, increasing
the threat to the Spanish in St. Augustine and
along the St. Johns River. The situation became
even more perilous when a settlement was estab-
lished at Darien, Georgia, to guard the mouth of
the Altamaha River, and a number of forts and
outposts were erected along the coast. Frederica
on St. Simons Island was to become the main bas-
tion on the water route leading from St. Augustine
to Savannah. Then there were Fort St. Andrews
on Cumberland Island and Fort St. George at the
mouth of the St. Johns River itself, just a few
miles from the gates of St. Augustine.
It did not matter to Oglethorpe that these forti-
fications were not on Georgia soil, and Spain's
anxieties multiplied. Tension was building, and
the relationship between England and Spain was
becoming more tenuous, more dangerous with
each passing incident. Spain's power was declining,
but she was still a force to be reckoned with, and
this threat to her Florida borderlands would have
to be met. The English forts along the Georgia
coast were undermanned and undergunned; they
could not resist a Spanish attack. Oglethorpe re-
turned to England in the fall of 1736 to raise a
regiment. He was named general of all the British
military forces in South Carolina and Georgia, and


he was given 600 men, some of whom were sta-
tioned on Cumberland Island.
Robert Jenkins, an English seaman and smug-
gler, was responsible for the name of the conflict,
the War of Jenkins' Ear, which began in 1739 be-
tween Britain and Spain. The year before, Jenkins
had displayed his ear to the members of Parlia-
ment, claiming that it had been cut off by his
Spanish captors. England's good citizens were
outraged at this shameless atrocity and demanded
vengeance against the Spanish barbarians. Actually
the war was the outgrowth of bitter commercial
rivalry, a contest for world dominion, for com-
mand of the seas, and for international trade. Ogle-
thorpe had seen it coming for some time and had
sought desperately for an alliance with the Creek
Indians. In the summer of 1739 he made the long
journey to their town, Coweta, on the Chatta-
hoochee River, and secured the pledge of a thou-
sand warriors. Afterwards, Oglethorpe begged
South Carolina for money, men, and supplies, but
for many reasons, including a dislike of the peti-
tioner, the South Carolinians were slow to respond.
The South Carolina General Assembly finally au-
thorized 600 men to come south on a four-month
Supported by some 900 regulars and militia, and
nearly 1,000 Indians, Oglethorpe moved against
Florida in the late spring of 1740. His long siege
of St. Augustine failed. The ill-fated expedition


further inflamed the enmity which Georgians and
Carolinians held for each other, and there were
innumerable charges and countercharges. Ogle-
thorpe held that if Charleston support had come
earlier, his venture would have been successful.
Citizens of Charleston and the South Carolina
General Assembly argued otherwise, and they
prepared a report which set forth the degree of
their support of Oglethorpe. When this document
was suppressed for political reasons, it generated
still another report, An Impartial Account of the
Late Expedition against St. Augustine under Gen-
eral Oglethorpe, which was published in 1742. It
is this important document, long out of print, that
Aileen Moore Topping has edited for publication
in the Bicentennial Floridiana Facsimile Series. Al-
though the Impartial Account was published anon-
ymously in London in 1742, Mrs. Topping's pains-
taking research shows that its author was James
Killpatrick, a former resident of Charleston, who
also paid the printing bill. This volume comple-
ments the Relation, or Journal, of a Late Expedi-
tion to the Gates of St. Augustine, on Florida
which was earlier edited for publication by John
Jay TePaske for the same series, published by Uni-
versity Presses of Florida for the American Revo-
lution Bicentennial Commission of Florida.
Aileen Moore Topping is a graduate of Agnes
Scott College and Middlebury College and has
taught at the University of Miami. She has worked


extensively in the Spanish archives at the Archivo
General de Simancas, the Archivo Historico Na-
cional, and the Archivo General de Indias. Mrs.
Topping is continuing her research and writing of
Florida colonial history at her residence in Orange
Park, Florida.

General Editor of the


THROUGHOUT the year 1737 reports
reached London of an expeditionary force
being prepared in Havana for a descent
upon Georgia to expel that new colony from
Spanish territory. Those reports had important
effects. For several years the British Crown had
ignored Spanish protests against the encroachment
on Florida by English colonists and Spanish de-
mands that the territorial boundary between
Florida and the English colonies be fixed. In Sep-
tember 1737 the government of Prime Minister
Robert Walpole answered the latest demand by
proposing that the question of boundaries and
other disputes which had arisen between the two
nations be settled in a conference of commission-
ers to be named by the two sovereigns.
Thomas Geraldino, Spanish minister plenipo-
tentiary, was no match for the Duke of New-
castle, British foreign secretary. Geraldino was
later reprimanded for having accepted on behalf
of his Court the proposal conveyed to him, with-
out at the same time insisting upon certain condi-
tions stipulated by his sovereign-that the forts



built in Spanish territory by Mr. James Edward
Oglethorpe be demolished, that the disputed ter-
ritory be evacuated, and that the conference of
commissioners be limited to a period of not more
than six months.
King Philip V immediately canceled the expedi-
tion against Georgia. Although his order to that
effect was issued on 28 November 1737, it was not
received in Havana until 21 March 1738, a few
hours before the main body of the expeditionary
force was to set sail.2 Commissioners met at El
Pardo in January 1739, only to suspend their
deliberations in October of that year when En-
gland declared war on Spain. The conflict was
called the War of Jenkins' Ear, because in 1738
Captain Robert Jenkins, a British seaman, exhibited
to the House of Commons his ear, which he said
had been slit off seven years earlier by a Spanish
guardacostas captain who had arrested him for
smuggling in the West Indies.
Another effect of the rumors of imminent dan-
ger to Georgia was an increase in the influence of
the twenty-four members of Parliament who were
Trustees of Georgia. Together with powerful
mercantile interests, they were able to contravene
Walpole's pacific policy toward Spain. In a meet-
ing of the Privy Council on 24 April 1737, the
Georgia Trustees were denied permission to form
an infantry regiment with the command and a
commission as colonel to be given to Oglethorpe.


That decision was soon reversed, so that when
Oglethorpe returned to Georgia it was as a major
general with a regiment of 700 men and the com-
mand of British forces in South Carolina and
During Oglethorpe's previous sojourns in
America, from January 1733 to May 1734 and
from February to November 1736, he had built a
line of forts southward: Forts Frederica and St.
Simons on St. Simons Island, Forts William and
St. Andrews on Cumberland Island, and Fort St.
George on the north shore at the mouth of the
St. Johns River. The Trustees for the Establish-
ment of the Colony of Georgia had been author-
ized on 9 June 1732 to settle the territory between
the Savannah and Altamaha rivers. Only the two
forts on St. Simons Island were within the Georgia
grant. All of the forts were on islands which for
more than a century had been the sites of flourish-
ing Spanish missions until, in the last years of the
seventeenth century and the first of the eighteenth,
the depredations of hostile Indians, corsairs, and
Carolina traders forced the governors of St. Augus-
tine to withdraw the missions from Guale.
Oglethorpe's fort at the mouth of the St. Johns
was intolerable to Spain. In July 1736 Juan Fran-
cisco de Giiemes y Horcasitas, governor of Ha-
vana, sent the engineer Antonio de Arredondo to
convey to Oglethorpe a demand that Fort St.
George be demolished. Arredondo also had orders


to examine the colony of Georgia and to deter-
mine what reinforcements and new fortifications
were needed in Florida. Giiemes sent Oglethorpe
copies of Article VII of the Treaty of Madrid,
which in 1670 recognized England's possession of
lands in America which she held at that time, and
of Article VIII of the Anglo-Spanish treaty, which
was part of the Peace of Utrecht in 1713. In the
Treaty of Utretcht, Queen Anne of Great Britain
promised to aid the Spaniards in order that the
former boundaries of their dominions in America
be restored and established as they were in the time
of the Spanish king Charles II (1661-1700), if it
were found that they had suffered any infraction
after his death. Giiemes asked that English en-
croachment on Spanish lands be stopped and that
usurped territory be evacuated.
In reply, Oglethorpe cited King Charles II's
charter to the Lords Proprietors of Carolina,
which in 1665 granted to them territory south-
ward to 29 degrees of latitude, and included St.
Augustine, then one hundred years old. Ogle-
thorpe insisted that he had not enlarged the do-
minions of his sovereign but had only regulated
them, and that without further orders he could
not change his policy. He agreed to demolish Fort
St. George, but said that the question of boundar-
ies could be settled only by the two Crowns.3
Later Oglethorpe sent his aide, Charles Dempsey,
to St. Augustine. Dempsey was able to arrange on


18 October 1736 a so-called treaty with the gov-
ernor of Florida, Francisco del Moral Sanchez
Villegas, which temporarily accepted the status
quo. Giiemes considered the "treaty" a breach of
faith on the part of Oglethorpe and a ploy de-
signed only to gain time. The Spanish king im-
mediately declared the agreement void because
neither party had authority to make a treaty, and
Moral Sanchez was removed from office forth-
Colonel Manuel de Montiano, late of the in-
fantry of Arag6n, was appointed governor of
Florida by the same royal cedula of 12 April 1737
which dismissed Moral Sanchez.5 From the time of
his arrival at St. Augustine, Montiano sought in-
telligence about the English colonies to the north.
In July 17 38 he sent Juan Ignazio de los Reyes, an
astute Iguaja Indian who lived at Pocotalaca near
St. Augustine, to reconnoiter the Georgia coast.
The scout went in a small canoe from Picolata to
Cumberland Island, where he asked for asylum,
saying that he had killed another Indian in St.
Augustine and was fleeing from Spanish authori-
ties. He was taken to Fort St. Andrews and then
to St. Simons, where the commanding officer,
Lieutenant Colonel Cochran, asked him many
questions about the Spanish expedition which had
been canceled in March of that year, and about
the defenses of St. Augustine. Cochran wanted to
know if the castillo could be mined, if there was


water inside the fort, if there was much money in
the town, and so on, saying that soon all would
belong to the king of Great Britain.
Cochran had just returned from England. He
told the Indian scout that as soon as General Ogle-
thorpe arrived with his 700 men, they and the 900
divided between St. Simons, St. Andrews, and
Savannah and the 5,000 to 6,000 Indians who could
be called up within two months would lay siege to
St. Augustine. They would begin the operation by
capturing a small fort on the St. Johns River seven
leagues from the presidio. Cochran said that the
soldiers then in Georgia had been brought there to
capture St. Augustine, but when news of the
Spanish expeditionary force in Havana reached
Georgia, Oglethorpe changed his plan and went to
England to procure more men. The Indian's re-
port was corroborated by sworn depositions taken
from three deserters from St. Simons, who had
come to the village of Nombre de Dios de Atacaris.
At about the same time the quartermaster, Cap-
tain Sebastian Sanchez, went up the coast as far as
Port Royal with 16 men in a piragua in search of 8
forced laborers who had escaped from a lime kiln
where they were working. He reported to Mon-
tiano that he had seen no new fortifications on
the coast but that there were many soldiers in
Georgia. At Frederica he was told that 400 sol-
diers and 200 laborers had just arrived there.6


Meanwhile Governor Giiemes had sent to St.
Augustine the 8 pickets of 50 men each who had
come from Spain to Havana for the Georgia expe-
dition, and with them 12 cannon. He had also sent
from Havana the engineers Arredondo and Ruiz
de Olano, a master mason, a master ironworker, 2
carpenters, 6 stonecutters, and 82 forced laborers
to improve the fortifications at St. Augustine and
Early in 1739 Captain Pedro Lamberto went
from Florida to Charleston, ostensibly to consult
a physician. There he learned that there was
friction between Oglethorpe and the South Caro-
linians, who refused to recognize him as their
commander-in-chief.8 In July of that year Juan
Castelnau, assistant paymaster at Pensacola, gave
information about Georgia to the governor of
Havana. While traveling with permission from
St. Augustine to Charleston, Castelnau had been
arrested in Georgia. During the eighteen months
that he spent in prison there, he learned that in
July 1738 Colonel Cochran had brought to St.
Simons 300 men whom he had taken out of Gibral-
tar, and that two months later Oglethorpe had ar-
rived with three transports, one warship, and a
packet, all loaded with men and munitions. Castel-
nau had heard officers of General Oglethorpe's
regiment say that they had come to America to
take St. Augustine.9


Throughout 1739 Oglethorpe reinforced his gar-
risons with militia and Indians who were sent with
increasing frequency on border raids into Florida.
In March, when a committee from the South Car-
olina General Assembly stopped at St. Simons en
route to St. Augustine to demand the return of
runaway slaves, Oglethorpe took advantage of the
opportunity to send with them Lieutenant Ray-
mond Demere "to present his compliments to the
governor." Demere's efforts to obtain intelligence
for his superior were frustrated by Montiano's in-
sistence upon entertaining all the Englishmen as
his houseguests.10
Later that year the general himself traveled to
Coweta, deep in the interior of the country, to
enlist the assistance of the Creek and Cherokee
nations in an attack on St. Augustine. On 5 Octo-
ber he informed the Trustees of Georgia that he
had sent Toonahowi against the Spaniards with
200 men. Toonahowi was one of the Indians who
had been entertained by the Trustees in London
when he was taken there by Oglethorpe in 1734.
Oglethorpe told the Trustees that the Cherokees
were raising 600 men and the Creeks 400, "who
will act with me.""
On 27 September 1739 Oglethorpe informed
Lieutenant Governor William Bull of South Caro-
lina that he had orders "to annoy the Subjects of
the King of Spain." He asked that the province of
South Carolina join him in an expedition against


St. Augustine, warning, "If we do not attack, we
shall be attacked."12 South Carolina had no reason
to fear an attack from Florida. In a letter dated 27
March 1738, the day before the scheduled launch-
ing of the expedition against Georgia, Governor
Giiemes had assured the governor of South Caro-
lina, quoting the pertinent articles of the treaties
of Madrid and Utrecht, that the operation was to
be directed only against usurped territory, not
against lands legally held by Great Britain as was
the case with Carolina.13
But the people of South Carolina had another
reason to desire the destruction of St. Augustine.
Since 1727 there had been in effect in Florida
royal orders which protected fugitive Negro slaves.
The provisions of those orders were changed sev-
eral times. At first the royal officials of St. Augus-
tine were authorized to pay the owners for fugitive
slaves who had been converted to the Roman
Catholic faith, and the slaves became the property
of the Crown. By a royal cedula of 22 October
1733, Philip V granted freedom to runaway slaves
who adopted the Catholic faith and served a term
of four years of labor for the state. Later this labor
requirement was removed. St. Augustine was par-
ticularly attractive to Negroes who had been
brought to South Carolina from Portuguese An-
gola, where they had learned something of the
Portuguese language and of the Roman church.
The slaves who were responsible for several deaths


in an insurrection at Stono in South Carolina in
September 1739 were identified by General Ogle-
thorpe as natives of Angola.14 Spanish agents and
missionary priests were accused of inciting them
to rebellion and desertion.
Eager as they may have been to destroy St.
Augustine, the members of the South Carolina
General Assembly were obliged to consider very
carefully the question of joining Oglethorpe in
the enterprise he proposed. Funds in the provincial
treasury were low, Charleston had suffered an
epidemic of smallpox, and the danger of insurrec-
tion made it unwise to send many men away from
the province. After studying the matter, the Com-
mons House resolved on 12 December, the coun-
cil concurring, "In case General Oglethorpe should
think it proper to form a Design of besieging St.
Augustine and should communicate his Scheme to
the General Assembly, and should make it appear
that the same was probable of being attended with
the Success of taking or demolishing that Garri-
son, that then the Public of this Province would
engage to give General Oglethorpe the best As-
sistance they reasonably could to put his Scheme
into Execution."
Oglethorpe's reply, dated 29 December 1739
and received on 30 January 1740, contained a list
of the things he thought reasonable and necessary
for South Carolina to provide. He did not men-
tion the number of men to be supplied by the


province. The general promised to "spare no per-
sonal Labour or Danger towards freeing Carolina
of a Place from whence their Negroes were en-
couraged to massacre their Masters, and were
openly harboured after such Attempts." Because
two men had been killed on Amelia Island by
Yamasee Indians who were allies of the Spaniards,
Oglethorpe had already made a raid into Florida.
On 4 February the assembly received two let-
ters from Oglethorpe, written on 23 January. He
reported that a detachment of British soldiers and
Indians had captured the two small Spanish forts
called Picolata and San Francisco de Pupo, on op-
posite shores of the St. Johns River, and he sent a
list of the assistance he would require for an ex-
pedition against St. Augustine. The assembly de-
cided that the province could not afford the esti-
mated cost of the supplies, 209,492 pounds, 10
shillings (Carolina currency), but that, "If the
General would certify . that the same [expedi-
tion] was probable of being attended with the
Success of taking that Garrison with an assistance
from this Government of an Expence amounting
to the sum of 120,000 pounds . that then the
Public of this Province would be willing to be at
that Expence." General Oglethorpe replied with
the promise that he would come to Charleston.
In Charleston on 26 March, Oglethorpe wrote
to Bull: "It would be best immediately to make a
sudden Attempt which might be done with an


Expence of only Part of the Sum intended. If this
Attempt could not be immediately made, that the
only Measure would be the giving him at present
such Part of the Assistance proposed as might keep
the War on the other Side of St. John's or St.
Mattheo's River until the Fall, during which Time
Preparations might be made for the Siege at an
Expence within the Sum voted by the Assembly."
He added that if neither course could be followed,
the two provinces must prepare to defend them-
selves, and that the Spaniards would regain control
of the St. Johns River and the lines of communica-
tion with Apalache and the French at Mobile.
When the Commons House asked for an esti-
mate of what would be needed for a sudden
attempt, Oglethorpe gave a list of the men and
materiel he would expect. He added, "If these
Preparations could not be made within fourteen
Days so as to set out from Charlestown within
that Time, the Enterprize would hardly succeed."
Having found that the supplies could not be ready
that quickly, the house wanted to know from the
general, "What Supplies he thought necessary to
keep the War on the other Side of St. John's
River." Oglethorpe then offered to wait longer
for supplies in order to make the sudden attempt
that he preferred.
In a conference with members of both houses,
Oglethorpe assured them that he did not doubt his
being able to capture St. Augustine quickly.


Aware of the longstanding enmity between the
Carolina traders and the French at Mobile, he
warned that "in Case the Havanna was taken, the
Spaniards would in all Probability, rather call in
the French to Augustine, than let it fall into our
Hands." Captain Vincent Pearse, commodore of
British naval forces in the area, who was present
at the conference, promised that "he would answer
for it the Place would have no relief by Sea, and
that they all ought to be hanged if they did not
take it in a very short time." On 5 April both
houses accepted the general's plan, and prepara-
tions for the expedition were begun immediately.'"
It appears that misunderstandings as to the pur-
pose of the enterprise, the plan of campaign, the
conduct of operations, and the division of au-
thority and command existed from the inception
of the undertaking. When the expedition failed,
recriminations were inevitable. Members of the
South Carolina General Assembly and the local
citizens were incensed to learn that Oglethorpe
had claimed that the contributions of South Caro-
lina were tardy and insufficient and that certain
Carolina officers were guilty of insubordination,
among them the experienced Indian fighter Col-
onel John Palmer and Colonel Alexander Vander-
dussen, commanding officer of the South Carolina
On 18 July, two weeks after Oglethorpe had
ordered withdrawal of the expeditionary forces


from Florida, the Commons House resolved "That
a Representation should be immediately prepared,
and laid before His Majesty, in which should be
set forth, in a particular Manner, what Measures
have been taken lately by this Province for the
Reduction of St. Augustine, in which we have
exerted ourselves to the Utmost, and brought a
greater Debt on the Public than our present Cir-
cumstances are well able to bear."
The house appointed Attorney General James
Abercromby, Captain Robert Austin, Colonel
Robert Brewton, John Dart, Thomas Drayton,
William Elliot, Captain Henry Hyrne, Isaac
Mazyck, Captain Samuel Morris, Jacob Motte,
and Major William Pinckney as a committee "to
enquire into the Causes of the Disappointment of
Success in the late Expedition against St. Augus-
tine under the Command of General Oglethorpe."
That committee conscientiously based its findings
solely upon "Extracts of Journals . Examina-
tions on Oath, and original Letters." The report
submitted almost one year after the appointment
of the committee was accompanied by an appendix
of 139 corroborating documents. After consider-
ing the "principal and most apparent Causes of the
ill Success that attended this most extraordinary
Expedition," the committee had found that
"neither the General nor the Commodore have
taken any proper or vigorous Steps toward the Re-
duction of St. Augustine or done what they en-


gaged to do, and therefore they are of Opinion
that this Government hath been greatly misled by
After approving the report, the General Assem-
bly engaged the local printer Peter Timothy to
publish it. Some three months later, impatient with
the slow progress of the printer, the assembly sent
the documents to Peregrine Fury, London agent
of the province, with orders to have both report
and appendix published in England. By that time
the bitter dispute between General Oglethorpe
and South Carolina had spread to London, where
both adversaries had their advocates. More delay
James Glen, the newly appointed governor of
South Carolina, had not yet left England for
America. Peregrine Fury turned to Glen for guid-
ance and when he found that in Glen's opinion the
report was "not calculated for the meridian of
London," Fury further delayed the printing. On
18 May 1742 Lieutenant Governor Bull sent the
commons a letter dated 29 January from Fury in
which the agent promised that "His Excellency
Governor Glen would acquaint the Committee
with the particular Reasons that had prevailed
with the Agent to desist from printing and pub-
lishing the Report of the Committee appointed to
enquire into the Causes of the Disappointment of
Success in the late Expedition against St. Augus-
tine, etc."


The Commons House immediately ordered the
documents to be printed in Charleston and ap-
pointed a committee "to enquire into the Reasons
given by Mr. Fury ... and [his] conduct... in
the Dispute between this Province and the Colony
of Georgia." On 1 June 1742 the house was told,
"Your Committee are apprehensive that our
Agent has private Reasons to dissuade him from
publishing any printed Papers, wherein the least
Imputation of Blame can any way be laid on Gen-
eral Oglethorpe, who, your Committee are in-
formed, employs Mr. Fury as Agent for his Regi-
ment of Foot at Georgia." Consideration of the
committee's report was postponed, and it was not
until May 1744 that the house reprimanded the
agent for ignoring its instructions.6
The surgeon James Killpatrick, a former resi-
dent of Charleston, was living in London in the
summer of 1742. Little is known of Killpatrick's
early life; it has been conjectured that he was edu-
cated at Edinburgh, as a student of that name was
enrolled there in 1708-9. Killpatrick made an
ocean crossing in 1717 or 1718, which may have
been his emigration to America. In South Carolina
his name appears in the will books: in 1724, as ex-
ecutor of the will of David Kilpatrick [sic]; in
1727, as executor of the will of Thomas Hep-
worth, secretary of the province and Killpatrick's
father-in-law; in 1732, in the will of Thomas
Cooper, Gentleman, who bequeathed to him a


gift of Greek, Latin, and English books; and in
1734, in the will of Benjamin Godfrey, Berkeley
County planter, which mentions a parcel of land
sold to Dr. David Kilpatrick [sic], executors to
convey said land to James Kilpatrick [sic], son of
said David Kilpatrick [sic]. His purchases and sales
of land are recorded in Charleston. His name is
mentioned in the South Carolina Gazette several
times after 1734 in connection with the practice
of medicine.
The death of Killpatrick's son Thomas in the
smallpox epidemic of 1738 may have caused him
to persist in the use of inoculation against the
disease in spite of widespread criticism. The prac-
tice of inoculation was denounced by the South
Carolina Gazette and by Dr. Thomas Dale, a
prominent physician, and was finally prohibited
by the General Assembly. In 1739 Killpatrick
published in Charleston a pamphlet, A Full and
Clear Reply to Doctor T. Dale, which he later
developed into a longer paper, The Analysis of
Inoculation, published in London in 1754, and
later translated into several European languages.
Having changed his name and acquired the degree,
he signed the name Dr. J. Kirkpatrick to the es-
says, translations, and Latin and English poetry he
published from 1749 to 1772.17
It is thought that Killpatrick was established in
London by July 1742, several weeks after the as-
sembly had received the letter in which Fury gave


his reasons for not publishing the report of the
committee "appointed to enquire into the Causes
of the Disappointment of Success in the late Ex-
pedition against St. Augustine under the Com-
mand of General Oglethorpe." In a letter dated 7
September 1742 the South Carolina Committee of
Correspondence instructed Fury to deliver the
copy of the report which was in his possession to
Colonel Alexander Vanderdussen who was going
to London, "in order to make what Use of it he
should find in his Power for the Service of this
Province." Whether Killpatrick first read the re-
port and the appendix in Charleston or in London,
he certainly had access to a copy of the report
when he took it upon himself to write and publish
a faithful abstract of it. Killpatrick did not prepare
an abstract of the appendix, which was at that time
"in the Hands of their Agent, Mr. Fury," but in
his preface he wrote, "No Proof or Paper is cited
in this, of which the Relator has not, by the
Favour of Friends, seen the Original, or authentic
Killpatrick's Impartial Account ... Occasioned
by The Suppression of the Report, made by a
Committee of the General Assembly in South-
Carolina was published anonymously and at the
author's expense. It is a skillful precis of the report
which omits no important circumstance, and it is
the work of an accomplished polemicist. The few
discrepancies either are minor or are readily dis-


cernible, as for example the substitution of the
name "Pupa" for "Picolata" on page 32 of the
Impartial Account. Where new facts are intro-
duced, the Impartial Account makes more vivid
the sense of the report. An example of this intensi-
fication of meaning is the paragraph on pages 27-28
concerning General Oglethorpe's offer to show his
orders to Colonel Vanderdussen and "another
Gentleman then present," after the colonel had
expressed his "great Dissatisfaction at this mortify-
ing Retreat," when Oglethorpe said that "he had
done all that was expected from his Orders . .
intimating that the Design was only to draw the
Spaniards Attention from Cuba."
Killpatrick regretted that the two gentlemen
had not examined those orders, and he suggested
that perusal of them was still desirable. It was un-
reasonable to think that they were the orders of 15
June 1739 "to annoy" the Spaniards and that
Oglethorpe had received no further directions,
particularly after the declaration of war. Kill-
patrick suggested that from the beginning Ogle-
thorpe had not taken the government and the of-
ficers of South Carolina into his confidence, "Nor
indeed can it be supposed at all improbable from
the whole Conduct of this Affair, that it was in-
fluenced by such Orders [to draw attention from
Cuba].... And if this Siege were in Truth but a
Feint, might not that have been effected without
such an Expence ... ?"


Killpatrick's Impartial Account was attacked by
George Cadogan, a lieutenant in Oglethorpe's
regiment, in a pamphlet entitled The Spanish
Hireling Detected: Being a Refutation of the Sev-
eral Calumnies and Falsehoods in a late Pamphlet,
etc. (London, 1743). Still writing anonymously,
in A Full Reply to Lieut. Cadogan's Spanish Hire-
ling, etc. (London, 1743), and in articles pub-
lished in the Champion and the London Magazine,
Killpatrick answered Cadogan and other critics.1
General Oglethorpe gave his explanation for
the failure of the expedition in a letter to William
Bull: "Sir, To satisfy our Friends, though I have
but little Time, I shall trouble you with a long
Letter which I believe will clear up all Objections
concerning the Management of the present Ex-
pedition. Augustine cannot be closely shut up
without dividing the Troops that besiege it. There
must be one Party on the Main, one on St. Anasta-
tia, and one on Quartell; which I could not do un-
til the Seas spared the 200 from the Island. You
must remember that I mentioned that Augustine
was scarce of Food, the Entrenchment around the
Town weak, and the Garrison not completed. I
therefore insisted to attack it immediately since all
Hope of Success lay in Speed, and that, as I appre-
hended, if we delayed, Succours would come from
Cuba. . After I left Charles Town and before
the Troops got to the Rendezvous, six Half Gal-


leys with long brass Nine-Pounders got into
Augustine with two Sloops loaded with Provisions.
... It was impossible to carry heavy Cannon, and
mount them, and make Trenches without Pio-
neers. And you know when I proposed 400 of
them, Whites or Negroes, it was an Expence the
Province could not afford. . The Commodore
and the Sea Officers agreed with me that they
would attack the Galleys, which, if taken, was to
be followed by Colonel Vander Dussen attacking
the Town on the Water-side at the same Time as
I was to attack it on the Land. I accordingly went
on the Main .... The Commodore acquainted me
that the Council of War found it impracticable to
attack the Half Galleys, and that they were obliged
to leave the Coast on the 5th Day of July, and
that several Vessels loaded with Provisions were
got into the Metanzas for the Spaniards. .. With
respect to the Affair at Moosa ... the Occasion of
losing that Party was the disobeying my Orders."'"
In Spanish accounts Oglethorpe's attempt to
capture St. Augustine is called a siege. One report
was written by Captain Domingo de la Cruz, naval
commandant and chief pilot of St. Augustine, who
in May 1740 was captured by an English war frig-
ate when he went out from the presidio bound
for Guarico, carrying 6,000 pesos with which to
buy food for the garrison of St. Augustine. The
Spanish money was confiscated, and captain and


crew were taken to Charleston as prisoners. Cruz
was released on 13 August with license to take
ship for England. He disembarked at Bayonne and
went overland to Madrid, where on 9 October he
presented to the king a journal of what he had
observed in South Carolina. He began his report
with the departure from Charleston on 25 May of
six 20-gun frigates and two packets with 1,400
men, and concluded it with the return of the
Carolinians on 2 August. "Because this enterprise
did not have the effect they had confidently ex-
pected, the whole province has been thrown into
a state of great consternation. After six days of
meetings they have decided to represent to their
king the great effort they had made for the con-
quest of St. Augustine ... and to beg for assistance
so that they can again lay siege to that plaza."20
The engineer Pedro Ruiz de Olano sent to the
king on 8 August a report of the siege in which he
said that in twenty-seven days of continuous fire
only the parapets of the castillo had been dam-
aged badly, recommending that they be made
thicker at once, because it was logical that if Gen-
eral Oglethorpe again lay siege to St. Augustine,
he would place his batteries on the mainland to
give him more effective firepower.21
Franciscan Fray Francisco de San Buenaventura
y Tejada, auxiliary bishop of Santiago de Cuba,
was in St. Augustine at the time of the siege. After


the departure of the English, he sent a day-by-day
account of the ordeal to Dr. Joseph Ortigoza of
Seville, Spain, who had the letter published in that
city. The bishop stated that when the attack began,
the people of St. Augustine took as their protector
the Most Holy Mary of the Rosary and decided
that at every shot, whether fired by the enemy or
by the defenders, no sound should be heard in the
city except the Hail Mary. He claimed that the
miraculous protection enjoyed by the people was
demonstrated in several ways: the camp at Moze
was recovered with minimal losses, valuable infor-
mation about the English encampment was given
by a deserter who came into the plaza, cannonballs
fired from Anastasia Island by the enemy fell
harmlessly into the bay, and although the convoy
of provisions which came from Havana was ob-
served by the enemy, he made no effort to capture
it, which could have been done with ease.22
Governor Montiano reported to Havana and
Madrid in a series of letters. As early as November
1739 he feared that a siege was imminent, because
the previous month a 24-gun English frigate had
captured an advice boat that he had dispatched
for Havana. Later the same frigate had been
sighted off Matanzas Inlet. Montiano urgently
requested that provisions be sent from Cuba and
Mexico, because the English merchants of New
York who had been purveying food to the presidio


would undoubtedly be ordered to stop their ship-
ments to Florida. Work on the castillo, he noted,
was progressing, but it still lacked a covered way
which could serve as a refuge for the civilians of
the town.23
On 31 January 1740 Montiano reported that in
the previous month two outriders of Captain Lam-
berto's dragoons had been killed while returning
from Apalache, the garrison at Picolata had re-
pulsed an attack led by a British officer, and parties
of white men and Indians had been sighted in the
grasslands south of the St. Johns River. He had
decided to reinforce the small fort on Diego de
Espinosa's ranch and had sent men out to round up
cattle and move them to Santa Anastasia Island
and to bring horses into the plaza. On 18 January,
Juan Ignazio de los Reyes had reported seeing 12
vessels and about 700 men at San Nicolas, and on
21 January he had brought news that Fort Picolata
had been burned to the ground and Fort Francisco
de Pupo captured. Diego de Espinosa and six
soldiers had been sent to examine all harbors near
the mouth of the St. Johns; at San Nicolas they
saw three campaign tents on the north shore.
Montiano described the great river as "an arm
of the sea three-quarters of a league wide." With-
out naval power, he pointed out, he could do ab-
solutely nothing: the English had control of the
St. Johns River; they had vessels large enough to


transport artillery of moderate size; and they could
be reinforced at any time by way of the channels
which stretched from port to port as far north as
Port Royal. No attempt against them without sea
power would be effective.24
Montiano informed Giiemes on 23 February
that on the St. Johns was a place called Mojoloa
where the channel was very close to the shore;
there all boats attempting to go south to Pupo
would be exposed to gunfire. He had decided to
build a small fort there with six or seven 8-pound
guns and 50 men under a captain. To enable him
to do that, he required three or four of the galliots
which had been built in the Havana shipyards for
the aborted 1738 expedition. He hoped that with
the galliots he could recover Pupo and re-establish
communication with Apalache. Later Ruiz de
Olano and Pedro Lamberto chose the narrows at
San Nicol6s as a more advantageous place, but the
scarcity of food at St. Augustine was so extreme
that Montiano had to abandon the idea of sending
a detachment to build and man a fort there.25
On 25 March, Montiano dispatched to Havana
a list of the men he had available for the defense
of the presidio: 462 soldiers, 61 militia, 50 Indians,
and 40 free Negroes.26 On 27 April he reported
the safe arrival on 14 April of 6 galliots with a
complement of 122 men under the command of
Captain Juan de Le6n Fandino and Captain Fran-


cisco del Castillo, and of two launches laden with
food and ammunition brought from Havana by
Captain Domingo de la Cruz.27
By late June, Montiano had reported that the
port was blockaded, although Matanzas Inlet was
still open, and that the English had occupied Fort
San Diego, Santa Anastasia Island, the settlement
of Gracia Real (also called Moze), and San Matheo
Point. Families of the town had taken refuge under
the protection of the guns of the fort. Despite the
gravity of the situation, Montiano wrote, "Noth-
ing causes me anxiety except the want of provi-
sions . if we get no more supplies we shall die
of hunger."28
When Montiano reported that he had recovered
the camp at Moze, he sent the king a paper found
earlier near there: "To whom it may concern,
greetings: You are informed that as the King of
Great Britain has declared war on Philip of Bor-
b6n, King of Spain, because of cruelties committed
against English traders, . and because many
Spanish subjects, especially Catalonians, have given
reason to believe that they will not obey a bad
government if their ancient privileges are not re-
stored, if there is any Catalonian, or other Span-
iard, Indian, or Negro, who wishes to pass from
the garrison of St. Augustine to this camp, the
Spaniard will be treated as such, the Negro or
Indian will be freed.... And if they wish to join
us they will be accepted."29


Montiano's report to the king dated 9 August
was a review of the siege:

Sire: I bring to Your Majesty's attention that
several English frigates and other vessels of
different classes having stood offshore before
this port from 31 March until a few days ago,
it happened that on 13 June this plaza was be-
sieged by the generals James Oglethorpe, com-
mandant of the land forces, and Vincent Pierse
[sic], commodore of the maritime forces. The
former brought 500 men and many banners to
the village of Gracia Real where I had placed
the free Negroes, 300 men to the shore at San
Matheo, and an equal number to the island of
Santa Anastasia. The latter came with seven
warships of different burdens, one of them a
50-gun ship, one with 40 guns, another with
28, and four with 20; three sloops, twelve
schooners, twenty-three launches and boats, a
few piraguas, and three packets. The besieging
force comprised 450 soldiers of General Ogle-
thorpe's regiment, 40 horse, 600 militia from
Carolina and Georgia, 130 Indians of various
nations, 200 armed sailors encamped on Santa
Anastasia Island and 200 who manned the
schooners and sloops, and the piraguas which
were used to transport food and ammunition
from one place to another within the bar.
They set up three batteries against us, one
opposite the fort in the place called the Loza
on Santa Anastasia Island with four 18-pound


guns and one 9-pounder with which they fired
on the galliots; a second on the wooded point
of the same island with two 18-pounders; and
another on San Matheo Point with seven 6-
pounders, five of them made of iron, the others
of bronze. In those three batteries they placed
four mortars for firing grenades weighing half
a hundred-weight and about one hundred-
weight, and three small mortars for firing hand
grenades and grenades weighing 6, 8, 10, and
12 pounds.
Bombardment and firing from the batteries
continued for twenty-seven consecutive days,
from 24 June until 20 July, whereupon the
besiegers set out in precipitate ignominious
flight. They left behind four 6-pound guns,
one schooner, several rifles and muskets, a quan-
tity of cannon balls and grenades, two barrels
of powder, and some gun carriages for use on
sea and land. They set fire to several barrels of
meat, cheese and butter, dried meat, rice, and
beans, and to a schooner, and a beautiful mor-
tar carriage. Our people salvaged some barrels
of flour, butter, rice, biscuits, and bacon. We
experienced some damage in the fortress which
must be repaired at once. One artilleryman and
one convict were killed by cannon balls. One
soldier and one Negro slave were wounded by
grenades; the latter has recovered completely;
the former has a good chance of surviving, but
with the loss of one leg.
I must tell Your Majesty without delay that
the right hand of the Omnipotent has miracu-


lously inspired in this garrison and civilian pop-
ulation such spirit, zeal, and valor, that besides
having persevered tirelessly with weapons in
their hands day and night throughout the
siege, even the Negro slaves, whom I had also
armed with rifles and bayonets, longed to rush
out to meet the enemy's attacks.
These ardent Spaniards distinguished them-
selves on the following occasion. Having been
assured by my spies that in the quarters at the
village of Gracia Real, also called Moze, there
was a detachment of little more than 100 men,
I sent out of the plaza at midnight on 25 June
a party of about 300 men, dragoons, convicts,
Indians, and free Negroes, under the command
of Captain Antonio Salgado. Moving slowly
and cautiously they were able by two o'clock
in the morning to lie in ambush near the camp.
At three o'clock the Scots called out the
watchword, and our men, who were ready for
action, realized that they had already been per-
ceived. They showed themselves all at once,
and met a heavy fire from the enemy. Taking
advantage of this juncture, they advanced with
such impetus that in less than three quarters of
an hour, the duration of the skirmish, there sur-
rendered at bayonet point a company of 72
Scots, chosen men who were General Ogle-
thorpe's guards, 15 infantrymen and a sergeant
from General Oglethorpe's regiment, 40 horse,
and 35 Indians, Yuchis and Uchises.
That detachment or garrison, which was
commanded by Colonel Palma [sic], the man


who in the year '28 dared to approach within
the distance of two rifle shots of this fortress
to make certain demands of Field Marshal Don
Antonio de Benavides, was entirely undone
and destroyed. Our men left 75 dead and took
out 35 prisoners and their flag, among the
prisoners a captain and three subalterns, all
Scots; among the dead, Colonel Palma and his
son, a cavalry captain. I think that many others
went out to die in the thickets of the forests,
as afterwards several bodies were found there,
and on the river bank we have found the cloth-
ing of others who threw themselves into the
stream. I have learned of the escape of only 11
Indians and 7 horse who were out on patrol
and did not meet our party, perhaps by special
The six galliots with 122 crewmen sent to
me by the governor of Havana for the purpose
of recovering Pupo have prevented schooners
and other smaller vessels from entering the bay
which lies before this city. In summary, Sire,
I can report to Your Majesty that amid the in-
tense stubborn persistence of the fire of cannon
and mortars and the anxiety naturally aroused
by the multitude of vessels of every burden
which were in our sight, that not only did no
Spaniard desert in all the time of the siege, but
no one complained, although all these faithful
soldiers and subjects were supplied only one
pound of bread, half rations for the infantry,
and everyone knew that from the 15th day of


July there were rations for no more than an-
other fortnight.
On 27 July there came into this port by way
of Matanzas Inlet three sloops and two schoon-
ers laden with food sent to me by the governor
of Havana, and with casava, corn, rice, and
700-weight of flour sent by the viceroy of
New Spain and the governor and royal officials
of Vera Cruz. Because of my repeated requests
made in view of Your Majesty's royal orders
and the needs of this plaza, I expect more suc-
cor. Those ships could not come into this port
earlier because of the danger posed by the
enemy warships which except for a few inter-
vals have stood off this port since 2 October of
last year. I received a message from Mosquito
Inlet on the night of 7 July that those vessels
had put in there on the previous day, but I took
no steps toward transporting those provisions
for important reasons, especially because of in-
telligence given me by a deserter that the
enemy intended to advance on the city by sea
and land with one of the spring tides.
As soon as the spring tides had ended, I sent
Ensign Don Antonio Nieto de Carvajal with
two launches, one boat, and a piragua to fetch
the victuals. On the lee shore of Matanzas Inlet
he encountered a frigate and a packet which
fired on him persistently and put out two
launches and two boats to pursue him. He de-
fended himself bravely, and returned here with
almost 800-weight of flour. This method of


transporting the food was continued safely
until the ships mentioned above could put in
here, after the retreat of the enemies and the
departure of the frigate and packet which re-
mained on this coast for four days after the
siege was lifted.
All the nineteen English deserters who are
here have assured me that General Oglethorpe
is now at the mouth of the St. Johns River
with his troops, militia, and marine forces.
They say that at times he states that he intends
to attack this plaza again soon, at other times
that he will continue the retreat to his colony,
and again that he will lay siege to this plaza
next spring. Some of the deserters say that he
will have 2,000 men for the second siege;
others say that he will conduct the operation
with 2 regiments which are to come from
London. Although I am persuaded that the re-
buff he has suffered and his disgraceful flight
can afford him nothing but universal disrespect,
nonetheless, because of the influence that gen-
eral can exert over personalities consonant with
his restless and captious nature, I humbly beg
Your Majesty to send me a reinforcement of
men, ordnance, and warlike stores.
In the present war the English have dimin-
ished my garrison as follows: in the capture of
Pupo, one sergeant, ten soldiers, and one In-
dian; in the sloop which belonged to this plaza
they captured forty-eight men, among them
gunners, sailors, and the naval officers of this


presidio, and six thousand pesos; at Fort San
Diego twenty-four soldiers, two sergeants,
nine horse, and three Indians, at the moment
when one watch was about to relieve the
other; at Matanzas three soldiers who were
carrying messages; another courier dispatched
to me from Apalache; in the sally to Moze one
ensign and eleven soldiers killed, two wounded;
two men killed outside the plaza; and in the
siege one gunner killed and one soldier
wounded. I again assure Your Majesty that in
the meantime, until Your Majesty orders to be
sent here the assistance which this plaza needs
for its defense, I shall defend the plaza dili-
gently as is my duty, even to giving my life in
its defense.

The enclosed instruments are word for word
copies of a summons from the generals Ogle-
thorpe and Pierse and of the response made to
To His Excellency Don Manuel de Mon-
tiano, Governor and Captain General of Flor-
ida and the garrison of St. Augustine, the Very
Illustrious and Very Reverend Bishop and
Father in God, the Honourable War Council,
officers, soldiers, and citizens of this Plaza: We
the undersigned James Oglethorpe, General of
the Army of His Britannic Majesty, and Vin-
cent Pierse, Commodore of the warships and
naval forces of His Britannic Majesty which at
present are before the city of St. Augustine,


summon you to surrender to His Most Excel-
lent Majesty George II, King of Great Britain,
France, and Ireland, etc., the fortress of St.
Augustine with everything which pertains to
Florida, in order to prevent the shedding of
Christian blood and the evil consequences
which may result from the unrestrained fury
of the several nations when they capture a
plaza by force of arms. The British Camp in
Florida. 20 June 1740 OS. James Oglethorpe-
Vincent Pierse.

To Their Excellencies James Oglethorpe,
General of the Army of His Britannic Majesty,
and Vincent Pierse, Commodore of the war-
ships and naval forces of His Britannic Majesty
which at present are before the city of St.
Augustine: We the undersigned Colonel Man-
uel de Montiano, Governor and Captain Gen-
eral of this city of St. Augustine and its prov-
inces, Very Illustrious and Very Reverend
Bishop of Tricale and Auxiliary Bishop of
Cuba, officers and captains of the garrison of
this plaza, in reply to the letter of summons of
20 June OS calling upon us to surrender this
royal fortress and all that pertains to Florida to
His Majesty George II, King of Great Britain,
in order to prevent the shedding of Christian
blood, we respond that we are entirely pre-
pared and resolved to shed Christian blood in
defense of this fort and this plaza to the glory
of the sacred name of God and the honour of


the armed forces of the King of all Spains, so
that the dominion of His Majesty King Philip
V our natural Lord may always prevail in
them. St. Augustine, 2 July 1740 [NS]. Don
Manuel de Montiano-Fray Francisco de San
Buenaventura, Bishop of Tricale-Don Fran-
cisco Menendez Marquez-Don Sebastiin
Sanchez-Don Ludovico Rodriguez Rozo-
Don Miguel de Ribas-Don Fulgencio de Al-
faros-Don Juan Durana-Don Isidro de Le6n
-Don Antonio Salgado-Don Feliz de Uriza
Alonso-Don Alonso Izquierdo-Don Pedro
Ram6n Barrera-Don Pedro Lamberto Benedit
Horruitiner-Don Sebastiin L6pez de Toledo
-for my captain his lieutenant Don Antonio
Izquierdo-for my captain Don Domingo
Jacinto Rodriguez.30

In his letters to Giiemes after the withdrawal of
the English forces, Montiano thanked the gover-
nor of Havana particularly for having sent the six
galliots which had been so useful to him. Montiano
said that he had not yet been able to comprehend
General Oglethorpe's conduct or his methods, and
he marveled that with so strong a force the general
should have ordered a retreat so precipitate as to
abandon a wealth of provisions.3" Montiano had
resisted a temptation to pursue the English rear
guard because his men were few and were very
tired, and he did not wish to risk the ruin of the
presidio after having saved it from disaster.32


Montiano thought that Oglethorpe's talk about
a second siege might have been calculated to pla-
cate the Carolinians. He thought it unlikely that
they would follow Oglethorpe a second time, and
that any assistance the general might get from
South Carolina would be slow. However, all the
schemes of the citizenry of South Carolina and
Georgia seemed to proceed from their desire to
capture St. Augustine, since it was the obstacle
which prevented them from exterminating the
Indians of Apalache in order to occupy all of
Florida unopposed. If their intense distrust of
Oglethorpe continued, the Carolinians might peti-
tion their king to give the command to another
soldier. On the other hand, Oglethorpe might be
clever enough to bewitch them again. In any case,
it was necessary that the St. Augustine garrison be
strongly reinforced, because if there was another
attack, it would be with at least twice the number
of men. Montiano added, "I must immediately
send a messenger to the Uchizes so that in view of
all this intelligence they will release themselves
from friendship and obedience to the English, and
I shall promise to reward them well if they care
to come to visit us.""
As a reward for his defense of St. Augustine,
Montiano was praised by King Philip V and made
a brigadier. Before the end of the War of Jenkins'
Ear, however, the governor would be reprimanded
by his superiors for the failure of his expedition


against Georgia in 1742, and for not having taken
action against Oglethorpe when he made his final
ineffectual invasion of Florida in March 1743. By
the end of Montiano's term of office in 1749, he
had greatly improved the fortifications of St.
Augustine and Apalache, had built a stone fort at
Matanzas Inlet, and had made an alliance with the
Uchize Indians which persisted until 1763, when
Great Britain took possession of the province by

1. Dispatch to Don Thomais Geraldino, Madrid, 27
November 1737, Archivo General de Indias: Audi-
encia de Santo Domingo, Legajo 2592, Document 96
(hereafter cited as AGI:SD, followed by legajo and
document numbers). Dates in the Spanish documents
used in the introduction are from the Gregorian cal-
endar (NS); those in the English documents are from
the Julian (OS); the discrepancy between the two cal-
endars at the time the documents were written was ten
or eleven days.
2. Juan Francisco de Giiemes y Horcasitas to the
Marques de Torrenueva, Havana, 18 April 1738, AGI:
SD 2593/43.
3. Giiemes to Don Joseph Patifio, Havana, 12 Decem-
ber 1736, AGI:SD 2591/58.
4. Geraldino to Torrenueva, London, 31 January
1737, AGI:SD 2592/5. Oglethorpe told Geraldino that
he had left Georgia "in a perfect understanding with the


commandant of Florida." For useful studies of the Flor-
ida-Georgia territorial question one should consult Verne
E. Chatelaine, The Defenses of Spanish Florida, 1565-
1763 (Washington, 1941); Verner W. Crane, The South-
ern Frontier, 1670-1732 (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1929); John
Jay TePaske, The Governorship of Spanish Florida,
1700-1763 (Durham, N.C., 1964); J. Leitch Wright, Jr.,
Anglo-Spanish Rivalry in North America (Athens, Ga.,
1971). A Spanish document recommended in the report
of the Conde de Montijo to the Marques de Torrenueva
relative to Florida and Georgia affairs, San Lorenzo, 9
November 1737, AGI:SD 2592/92, 165 pp.
5. Real cedula, Madrid, 12 April 1737, AGI:SD 851/77.
6. Manuel de Montiano to the king, St. Augustine, 31
August 1738, AGI:SD 2541/47; Consejo de Indias to
the king, Madrid, 14 February 1739, AGI:SD 838/44.
7. Giiemes to Montiano, Havana, 24 March 1738
AGI:SD 2593/32.
8. Montiano to Giiemes, St. Augustine, 14 August
1739, Library of Congress, East Florida Papers, Bundle
no. 37, Letters of Montiano to the Captain General of
Cuba, no. 156 (hereafter cited as EFP, 37, followed by
letter number).
9. Giiemes to Don Joseph de la Quintana, Havana,
18, 24 July 1739, AGI:SD 2593/59; enclosure: deposi-
tion of Juan Castelnau.
10. Montiano to Giiemes, St. Augustine, 3 April 1739,
EFP, 37, no. 133.
11. James Edward Oglethorpe to the Trustees of
Georgia, Savannah, 5 October 1739, in The Colonial
Records of the State of Georgia, ed. Allen D. Candler
et al. (Atlanta, 1913), vol. 22, pt. 2, p. 217 (hereafter
cited as CRG).
12. Oglethorpe to William Bull, Georgia, 27 Septem-
ber 1739, The St. Augustine Expedition of 1740, A Re-


port to the South Carolina General Assembly, Reprinted
from the Colonial Records of South Carolina, with an
Introduction by John Tate Lanning (Columbia, South
Carolina Archives Department, 1954), appendix no. 1,
p. 91 (hereafter cited as Report).
13. Giiemes to the governor of South Carolina, Ha-
vana, 28 March 1738, a copy enclosed in Giiemes to
Torrenueva, Havana, 18 April 1738, AGI:SD 2593/34.
14. Oglethorpe to the Accountant Harman Verelst,
Savannah, 9 October 1739, CRG, p. 231.
15. Report, pp. 10-18.
16. Ibid., introduction, pp. xii-xiv.
17. Joseph floor Waring, M.D., James Killpatrick and
Smallpox Inoculation in Charlestown, Annals of Medical
History, New-Series X (1938); Carolyn T. Moore, Ab-
stract of the Wills of the State of South Carolina 1670-
1740, vol. 2 (Charlotte, 1960), pp. 133, 143, 201-2, 229.
18. Report, introduction, p. xxvii.
19. Oglethorpe to Bull, British Camp in Florida, 19
July 1740, Report, appendix 129, pp. 169-70. For a useful
analysis of the campaign see Phinizy Spalding, Ogle-
thorpe in America (Chicago, 1977), pp. 110-26.
20. Journal of Don Domingo de la Cruz, 1740, AGI:
SD 2584/28.
21. Pedro Ruiz de Olano to the king, St. Augustine,
8 August 1740, AGI:SD 2658/20.
22. Fray Francisco de San Buenaventura y Tejada to
Dr. Joseph Ortigoza, St. Augustine, 1740 (Seville, Spain,
23. Montiano to Quintana, St. Augustine, 21 Novem-
ber 1739, AGI:SD 2584/18.
24. Montiano to the king, St. Augustine, 31 January
1740, AGI:SD 2658/8.
25. Montiano to Giiemes, St. Augustine, 23 February
1740, EFP, 37, no. 190, no. 191.

26. Montiano to Giiemes, St. Augustine, 25 March
1740, ibid., no. 192.
27. Montiano to Giiemes, St. Augustine, 27 April
1740, AGI:SD 2658/11; EFP, 37, no. 193.
28. Montiano to Giiemes, St. Augustine, 24 June 1740,
EFP, 37, no. 200.
29. Copy of a paper found near Moze, 14 June 1740,
AGI:SD 2658/23.
30. Montiano to the king, St. Augustine, 9 August
1740, AGI:SD 845/8; AGI:SD 2658/12; enclosures. At
Moze, Colonel John Palmer was killed, but his son, Cap-
tain William Palmer, was not.
31. Montiano to Giiemes, St. Augustine, 28 July 1740,
AGI:SD 2541/55; EFP, 37, no. 205.
32. Montiano to Giiemes, St. Augustine, 3 August
1740, EFP, 37, no. 207.
33. Montiano to Giiemes, St. Augustine, 7 August
1740, AGI:SD 2658/20; EFP, 37, no. 210.


Impartial Account



General Oglethorpe.
Occafioned by
The Supprefion of the REPORT, made by
a Committee of the General Ajfmnbly in
SOUTH CAROLINA, tranfinitted, under the
Great Seal of that Province, to their Agent in
ENGLAN D, in order to be printed.
Exa& PL A N of the Town, Caftle and Harbour
of St. Augufline, and the adjacent Coaft of Florida ;
fhewing the Difpofition of our Forces on that
The SuppreJion of Evidence is the flrongefl Evidence of Guilt.

LO ND 0 N:
Printed for J. H u G G o N s N, in Sword-and-Buckler.
Court, over-againft the Crown-Tavern on Ludgate.
Hill, 1742. (Price One Shilling)

T HE Reafon of publiing thefe Sheets
being manifefl from the Ttle Page, I
fall not pretend to a Knowledge of thofe
fecret and extraordinary Motives, that could
induce the Agent of a Province to difpenfe
with the DireElions of that Province, by
fuppreffing their Senfe of a public Affair,
a very important one to them, and perhaps not
without fome Significance to the Kingdom itself.
I have read it, and am convinced by common
Senfe, that it contains no Treafon, nor affirms
any thing without clear and fufficient Proof.
And without doubt, the Legflature of that
Province did not conceive the Publication of
it to be a very indifferent Thing, either for
their owvn juflification, or the Information of
Great-Britain, when the Enquiries they en-
ter'd upon in order to it, and the Digeflion of
the Report afterwards employed fo much time
there, and the Impreffln of it here muft ne-
ceTarily expofe them to a farther Expence,when
A z they

they had but little Inclination to add to that
extraordinary one, fo fruitlefly advanced to-
wardr the Expedition.
But whatever Motives may have deter-
mined the Condui of another in this Affair, a
Sincere Love of Iruth, and a hearty Attach.
meot to the general Interefi of that Govern-
ment that Jecures nmy juf and natural Freedom,
are the real Caufes of my endeavouring to ob.
viate any Evils that might arife from the Sup-
prefion of fo feafonable an Information as that
Report might have furnished our Superiors with.
If any Errors hall appear in the Condut of
this Siege, the Reprefentation of them is the
furefl Way to prevent their Repetition, if a fe-
cond Attack should be enterpriz'd : And what-
ever Steps of it may be approved, will naturally
recommend rhemfelves to thofe fuch Enterprize
hall be committed to. Befides, as a Spirit of
Enquiry into public Affairs Jeems to prevail
noaw, and will, no doubt, be attended with
proper and fpeedy Meafuresfor regifying what-
ever needs it; it was imagined that no Junc-
ture could ever prove more feafonable and cri-
tical than the present, for tendering this Nar-
rative to the Public.

7his Pamphlet may jufily be confider'd as a
very fair Abflrad of that full and authentic
Report, whofe Suppreflion has produced it. The
chief Difference is, that the Report contains
much more, federal Examinations, Depofitions,
and Proofs being annexed to it, which this has
not. However to give a right Idea of this,
the Author is satisfied it contains the greatefj
Part of the material FaFfs mentioned in the
Report; the Narrative of the Expedition is
nearly in the fame Terms; and the Reflexions
on the fame Meafures, frequently itmilar, as
they naturally muft. No Proof or Paper is
cited in this, of which the Relator has not,
by the Favour of Friends, feen the Original, or
authentic Copies. And if he has ever fet down
any thing upon other Information or Rumour,
he has fpecifed fuch Information or Rumour as
the Foundation of it.
It is not expefEed that a Thing of this Na-
ture can efcape the Cenfure of thoje who will
imagine themselves or their Friends aefdfed by
it: Neverthelefs the Relator thinks he is not
without Reafon in calling it, An impartial
Narrative, fince he has firiElly related fuch
Falls as he had a regular Information of and

his Reflexions on them appear to himfelf fo
obvious and unflrained, that he muf have made
the fame on the Jame Fagts, if every Perfon
concerned in them had been unknown to him.
That others of equal Impartiality and bet-
ter Judgment, may jujfly differ from him in
many of them may be owing to his Incapacity,
but not to any finifler Intention. He has
at leafl the good Fortune of having a little
Intimacy with his abundant Defels, he has
not the leafl Enmity againfl any Perfon men-
tioned in the Affair, and is at this time as
little interefled about that Expedition as moJl
of his Readers.
In brief, whoever is offended 'with this
Narrative, muff be at Enmity with Truth:
Tho' 'when Fags are extravagant and unac-
countable, the mofi impartial Relator of them
contraLs an Air of Prejudice with superficial
Readers, and even People of Difcernment, who
are affe~ed by it, will at leafl consider him as
offcious, and tell him, that when he had con-
jeffd fo little Interefl in the affair, he might
have left it to thofe who had more. To this
the Anfer is obvious, that in all disputed Ca.
fes it is the real Duty of every Man, to contri-



bute whatever he knows towards the Attain-
ment and Difcovery of Truth, especially where
he has been a Witnefs to any ungenerous En.
deavour to fupprefs it, whether he is called
upon or not, or whether he has any Interefl or
no in the Difcovery : Nay, the lefs he is af-
feSed by the Ifue, he is the better qualified for
an impartial Evidence. Whatever the Sen-
timents of fuch may be, who make SELF the
invariable Rule of ConduUt, a Promptitude to
this cannot be impertinent in any Man, and it
were well for every Community if a greater
Majority were of fuch an honefi, generous Dif.
If I fould be inadvertently guilty of mif.
representing any thing, I know there is the au-
thentic Senfe of a large Committee of no incon-
fiderable Province, properly exemplify'd in the
Hands of their Agent, who may convi& me of
fuch Difagreement by printing it. Andif the
FaEfs herein averted hall be fairly difprov'd, the
Relator will think himself obliged by Truth and
Honefly to acknowledge his Mijfakes, and to de-
clare the Reafons that enforced him to receive
them for Truths. This indeed he has not the
leaft Apprehenfion he Jhall be reduced to ; but if

viii The PREFACE.
ever he is, he will obferve his Engagement vith
afenjible Satisfaffion. For notwithflanding
the Multitude of Contentions in the World, no-
thing but Truth and Liberty can be worth the
Contention of a confederate Man, and Liberty
indeed, as it is Truth. And wherever the
Ambition of others attempts to invade and ef.
face that natural, popular Truth, they #fould
be considered as the 'wanton and wicked Enemies
of Human Nature it felf, and be entitled to as
little quarter from the Species, as thofe Beafls
'who are sometimes fo by Necefty.
I need not inform any military Reader
'who may perufe this 7rfle, that the Re-
lator is not of that honourable Profeflon.
My 'want of proper Terms, and perhaps of
proper Obfervations, will make it but too evi-
dent. I hope it may appear intelligible ; and if
the Performance can pretend to any Excellence,
it is owing to its ruth, a Circumfiance very
favourable to the Author's many Defefs; as it
needs wery little Capacity to illuffrate, 'very
little Elegance to adorn it.
Ipfa fuis pollens opibus, nihil indiga noftri.


DUCT of the Forces on the
Expedition againfl St. Av-
IN order to conceive the cleared Idea
of this unfortunate Affair, and to
evince the real Importance of it, it
feems requisite to attend a little to the
Motives that induced the Province of South-
Carolina to engage in an Expedition againlft
the Town and Caltle of St. Augufline.
The Refolutions and Meafures they entered
on in Confequence of fuch Motives, will,
next be related. To which a jufl and fuc-
cind Enumeration of the Steps this Enter-
prize was conduded with in the Field will
neceffarily fucceed: And fome fair un-
ftrained Reflexions on the moft evident
Caules of this unhappy Dilappointment,
will naturally conclude this Impartial En-
quiry on the Subjet.
It feems no ways neceflary here to de-
fcend to every minute Inconvenience, the
Province received from the Neighbour-
B hood

hood of that Garrifon in its early Settle
ment, nor to specify what particular Per-
fons were fenfibly injured by it. The
Expedition of Colonel fames Moore against
it in 170 is fuffcicnC to convince us,
that the Carolinians were very cnfdble then
of their Infecurity from it; when the Set-
tlement, lefs extended and populous than
at percent, undertook the Siege of it with
a smallerr Number of Troops than were
on this Expedition, and without any Bombs
or Veffels of Force to prevent the arrival
of Supplies, which two Dcfects Tccrn to
have been the fole Reafons of their )if-
appointment then, as they entirely dcflroyed
the Town, and drove all the Inhabitants
into the Caffle, with little or no Lofs on
their Part. Indeed, on this Occaion they
entrenched on the Main, and clofe about
the Town, having their little Force toge-
ther, and not being fcperated by Water, a
Mile or two from the GarriCon they be(icged.
And about twelve or thirteen Years ago,
after fome Mifchlif done by thofe Ihdias,
they corrupted and protccEed, Colonel
Palmer, with about 00 Men, to the belf

C 11 ]
of my Recolletion, a great part of whom
were Indians, deltroyed and plundered the
Town; driving all the Inhabitants into
the Caftle, killing ten or twelve Tamafees,
and returning without Lots to Charles To-wn.
Indeed their Booty was never considerable
enough to prove a Motive for fuch At-
tempts; but as that Garrifon, even in
Times of Peace, was a continualRecep-
tacle of criminal and fugitive Slaves, who
might prove very injurious to Carolina, as
Guides and Pilots to the Spaniards in Times
of Holtiiity and as they were conti-
nually doing their utmoll to corrupt the
Indians, and encourage the Slaves to deferc
wi-h the Hopes of Freedom, &c. it be-
caine neccffiry for that Province to secure
themfclves by the carlieft Precautions from
fuch evil Confequences, as the difhoneft
Condua of fuch a Neighbour might pro-
duce. There was formerly a Stipulation
between them, by which the Garrifon ob-
liged themselves to give up every fugitive
Slave that should run there but this was
foon evaded, as they faid they were made
Chbriians, and become the King of Spain's
B3 z Subjeats;

Subje&s; and thofe who could obtain any
Consideration for their Slaves, were ob-
liged to accept a pecuniary one, and they
were but a few who ever had that.
When we reflect that Rice, the chief
Staple of Caro!ina, is manufactured by
Negroes, (European Conflitutions being
really unequal to the Culture of it in that
Climate, or indeed to the general Culture
of the Climate) it muff be evident, that
a great Number of Slaves are neceffary to
produce the yearly Quantities of that and
other Commodities exported from that
Province; and, without entering into a
firict Calculation, it is certain they greatly
out-number the white People there. Now,
if, even in Times of Peace with Spain,
they have been harraffed with Infurredions
and Maffacres from them, what can they
expe6t in cafe of an Invafion, when their
Enemies would certainly encourage their
Revolt; and what Refilfance could a thin,
yetvaluable Colony make to a Foe with-
out, when they had fuch numerous and
cruel ones within, at whole Mercies the
Lives of their Families mufl lie, upon

[ 113 ]
their exerting any rigorous Oppofition
against the public Enemy. In fhort, if
it be considered, that the late Expedition
was undertaken immediately after the great
Mortality of the Years 7 3 8 and 3 9, by
the Small Pox and bilious Fevers, and how
much a thin Colony, and not in its moll
flourifling Circumltances, contributed, by
their Perfons and Fortunes, in hopes of re-
ducing that Fortrefs, their Senfe of the
Necclrity of reducing it muff have been
very strongly exprefled in the Meafures they
entered on for that Purpofe.
It cannot furprize us, that a People fo
peculiarly circumiftanced should liften very
favourably to every Propofal, and should
be inclined to hope the beft from every
Argument that was ufed as a further Incite-
ment to fuch an Undertaking: For, how-
ever heartily they muft defire the Removal
of fo inconvenient a Neighbour, fo unge-
nerous an Enemy, they were convinced
their single Power was insufficient to dif.
lodge him. But what firll engaged their
public Deliberations on this Subje6, was
a Letter from his Excellency General Ogle-

[ 14]
thorpe, dated September z I 7 3 9, to the
Honourable Willian Bull, Elq; Lieute-
nant-Governor of that Province, where-
in he acquaints him, That he had re-
" ceived Orders from his Majelly to an-
" noy the Subjeps of the King of Spain
c" in the bef Manner he was able, and
" that he hoped the People of Carolina
" would give the necellary Aflitance,
" that they might begin with the Siege of
SAugufline, before more Troops arrived
", from Cuba." The Contents of which
being communicated to the Commons
Houfe of Affcmbly, by the Lieutenanc-
Governor, in a Meflagc on the 8 th of
November following, a Committee was
appointed to take the fame under Coni-
deration, who, in their Report thereon
recommended, That, in cafe General
" Oglethorpe fliould think proper to form
" a Defign of befieging Augufine, and
" should communicate his Scheme to the
" General Affembly, and fliould make it
c" appear, that the fame might probably
" be attended with Succefs, that then the
" Public of this Province wou'd en-
cc cyacre

" gage to give General Oglethorpe the belt
" Afliitance they reasonably could, to put
" his Scheme in Execution." To this
the Houfe agreed, and, in Confequence
thereof, fenta Meffage to the Upper Houfe,
" to defire their Concurrence, and that
" they would apply to the Governor to
" communicate the fame to General Ogle.
"c thorpe".
On the ith of February following, the
Lieutenant-Governor fent down to the
Lower Houfe an Account of the Afliflance
the General expected from this Province,
confifling of fuch Forces, Prelfnts for In-
dians, Ammunition, Provifions for fuch
Forces, and for 400 Men of his own Re-
giment for three Months, and fich other
Scores as he thought reasonable and necef-
fary for this Province to furnifl- towards
the Siege, Which Propofil having been
considered by a Committee of both Hou-
fes, they reported, That the atme would
" exceed the Sum of zoo,ooo Pounds
" Carolina Currency, which they were of
" Opinion was too large an Expence for
" the Province to bear ; but recommend-

[ i6 ]
" ed that, if the General would under-
" take the Expedition against St. Augufline,
" and would certify to the General Affem-
"c bly of the Province, that the fame was
" likely to be attended with the Succefs
( of taking that Garrifon, with fuch an
SAfliftance from this Province, as flould
'i not exceed i zo,ooo Pounds; that the
" Public of this Province were willing
" to be at that Expence, and would pro-
"C vide for the fame;" which was agreed
to by the Houfe. And that Committee
being dire&ed to calculate, what Number
of Forces, what Prefens for Indians, what
Provisions, &c. might be transported to
Augufine for that Sum, reported, "That
" the fame was sufficient for a Regiment
" of Foot, containing eight Companies
" of 60 Men each; for 300 Pioneers,
" Presents for o000 Indians, and Provifi-
" ons for the Whole for fix Months."
This was alfo communicated to the Ge-
neral by the Lieutenant Governor, at the
Requcit of both Houfes, together with
certain Articles proposed to be flipulated
with the General, for conducing the Ex-
pedition. The

[ 17]
The General coming foon afcer to Charles
Town, dlfired the Lieutenant-Governor,
in a Letter of March 26", 1741, to ac-
quaint the Aflembly, That he had re-
" ceiv'd their Plan, proposing the AfG-
" fiance of i o0,00o Pounds towards the
" Siege of Augufline, and that he was
' come to consult Meafures with them,
" for bringing that Enterprize to a happy
" Conclusion, with the fmallefl Expence
" of Men and Money. For which Pur-
" pofe it would be beft immediately,
c" with what Men could be had, to make
on the z9th of the fame Month, the
Lieutenant-Governor fent down to the
Commons Houfe of Affembly, the Ge-
neral's Plan of Affiftance, for a fudden
Attack upon Augufiine ; propofing, That
'c one Regiment of 400 Men should be
" raised, a Troop of Rangers or Cattle
" Hunters, Prefents for 5 oo Indians, Pro-
c visions for the Whole for three Months,
" and Arms, Ammunition, Tools and
cc Utenfils, adding, that unlefs the fame
" could be furnished fo as to flt out from
C Charles-

[ i8]
C Charles-To n in fourteen Days, tlhe EFn-
" terprize would not be likely to (iac-
" ceed." It was the untanimous Opinion
of the Houfe, upon considering thefe Pro-
pofals, That the Particulars therein fpe-
c cified could not pollibly be provided
"' by this Government in fofhort aTerm."
And as they had then the greatest Reafon
to think the Enterprize would be declined,
they directed their Committee to join a
Committee of the Upper Houfe, and de-
fired the General might be asked, What
" Supplies he thought would be neceffary
<' to keep the War on the other Side of
" St. John's River.
There was accordingly a Conference of
a large Committee of both Houfes the
fame Day, at which the General and Capt.
Vincent Pearfe, Commodore of his Ma-
jefly's Ships of War in thofe Parts, and
moft of the Members of both Houfes
were present. When the General proposing
to the Committee to flay a longer Time for
the Supplies, and representing to them,
That he had private Intelligence from
Auguline, that they were in the greater
\ Want

[ I9 ]
" Want of Provifions; that he was cer-
" rain many of the Garrifon would de-
c" fer, and that he did not doubt making
" himself Mafer of the Town the FIRST
" NI G H T : That the M altitude of Wo-
" men and Children who would be forced
" from thence into the Caftle, muffne-
"C ceflarily diffrefs it; which, being fol-
" lowed with the throwing in of several
" Bombs, would undoubtedly produce a
" fpcedy Surrender: That in care the Ha-
C" rvanna was taken, the Spaniards would
cc in all Probability, rather call in the
" French to Augufline, than let it fall in-
cc to our Hands." In brief, both he and
the Commodore giving the greatest En-
couragement to the Committee to report
in Favour of the Enterprize, the latter of
whom faid, they ought all to be hang'd
" if they did not take it in a very thort
" Time ; and the General further repre-
fenting, that he had fent for several In-
"c dians who were daily expected down
" to the Expedition," the Committee in-
duced by fuch Reafons, recommended it
in their Report, c to aflift him with fuch
C z Forces

[ 20]
" Forces and NecefTaries as were thought
" sufficient to the Enterprize, according
" to his own Plan laft mentioned, and
" to continue the fame for one Month
c longer than he had proposed;" being
only prevented from continuing them
for fix Months in the Whole, by the
Captains of his Majefty's Ships declaring,
" they could not venture to flay fo long,
'c as they apprehended the Hurricane Sea-
" fon would approach before the Expi-
ing approved by both Houfes, an Ad
was paffed, April 5, 1741, for carrying
the fame into Execution.
Thefe Engagements were not only punc-
tually fulfilled by that Province, except
the Article of Rangers, who could not be
procured, and indeed could have been of
no important Service, but left they flould
not prove sufficient for the End proposed,
the Affembly afterwards voted an Addition
of zco Men more for it. Befidcs which,
the Lieutenant-Governor purchaCed by their
Allowance, a large Schooner with ten
Carriage and 16 Swivel Guns, in which

[21 ]
they put 5 o Men under the Command of
Capt. Tyrrell, and having thus even exceeded
the General's laft Demands, they pleaded
themselves with the agreeable Profpedt of
Succefs, no ways doubting his Excellency's
Zeal and Capacity for his Majefty's Ser-
vice, and the Security and Happinefs of his
Fellow Subjeas in Georgia and Carolina.
The Contributions of South Carolina
towards this Enterprize, being thus fpe-
cify'd, the Meafures pursued at the Siege,
or in the Field, demand our next Confi-
deration. It appears then by the several
Letters and Papers fent by the General
and Col. VawderduJen, who commanded the
Carolina Regiment, and by the Examina-
tions of the Colonel, the Lieutenant-Co-
lonel and Major of the faid Regiment, and
several other Gentlemen employed in that
Expedition, (the proper Extrads of which
and all other neceflary Proofs, are con-
tained in the Appendix of the Report, un-
der the Sanltion of the public Seal of
the Province, now in the Hands of their
Agent, Mr. Fuiry,) that the Place of Ren-
dezvous was at the Mouth of St. John's

[ 22]
River, on the Florida Shore, where the Ge-
neral arrived with his Forces, a Detach-
ment of the Carolina Regiment, and the
Cherokee Indians on the 9th of May ; from
whence they marched on the i oth, to at-
tack Fort Diego, about .o Miles diftant,
whichFort had9 Swivel, 2. Carriage Guns of
two Pound Shot, and 5 o Men. And having
surrounded it on the i zth, they lent in a Spa-
wifJ Prifoner with a Drum, to fummon the
Garrifon, who immediately capitulated on
the following Conditions. The Garrifon to
surrender Prifoners of War, and deliver up
the Fort with the Guns and Stores to the
King of Great-Britain. zdly, That they
should have Liberty to keep their Baggage,
and not be plundered. 3dly, That Seignior
Diego Spinofa, to whom the Fort belonged,
being built at his Expence, and on his
Lands, should hold his Lands, Slaves, and
fuch other Effeds, as were not already
plundered in the Field. 4thly, That no
Defercers or Runaways from Carolina,fhould
have the Benefit of this Capitulation, but
be surrendered at Difcretion. This Fort was
garriloned by 6o of the General's Forces,

and from thence they returned to the Place
of Rendezvous, where they were joined
by Colonel Vanderdufen with the reft of
the Carolina Regiment on the i 9th of May,
whence they marched again to Diego the
3 1 f, and from thence in two Days to Fort
Moofa, in View of, and near two Miles
diftant from Auguftine, and z 3 from Diego.
The Spaniards having defeated Moofa,
the General ordered the Gates to be burnt,
and three Breaches to be made in the Walls.
They then proceeded with the whole
Army to reconnoitre the Town and Caftle,
after which they returned back to Diego.
From thence the General ordered Colonel
Vanderduffen to march with his Regiment,
and take Poffeflion of Point juartell, ly-
ing to the North of the Bar, and separated
from Fort Moofa by a Creek; while the
General with about z6o Men of his Regi-
ment, and the greatest part of the Indians
embarked on Board the Men of War, and
arrived at the Ifland of Anaflatia, opposite
to the Caftle; leaving behind him on the
Main, but between 9o and Ioo white
Men, Highlanders and others in his Pay,

with 42. Indians and two commiflioned
Officers, to alarm the Spaniards on that
Side, as he laid; but gave a verbal Com-
mand of the Whole to Colonel Palmer, a
Volunteer from that Province. About
the fame Time zoo Sailors from the Ships
were landed upon that Ifland, which the
Spaniards directly abandoned, under the
Command of Captain Warren, Captain
Laws, and the Honourable Captain rown-
fiend, who were all very inftrurnental, by
their exemplary Courage and Diligence in
inciting their Men to ered Batteries, and
do fuch other Services as presented.
While the Troops were thus difpofed, a
strong Detachment iffued from the Cattle
of Augufline, June 15, between three
and four in the Morning; and attacking
the Party under the Command of Colo-
nel Palmer, then at Fort Moofa, defeated
them, killing the Colonel, with several
others, and taking many Prifoners, after
which the Carolina Regiment was ordered
over to Anaffatia.
Two Batteries were thrown up on the
Iflafid ofAnaflatia, one a Mile and Quarter,

[ 25 ]
the other a Mile and Half, and a Third at
Point uartel, a Mile and Quarter from
the Catfle of Augufline. From thefe Bat-
teries they fired at the Cattle and Town,
and threw off a great Number of Shells.
The Fire was returned from the Cattle, and
from fix Spani/h Half Gallies in the Har-
bour that chiefly annoyed our Forces:
Upon which it was proposed to attack the
Gallies, and was agreed to by the 3 Sea
Commanders ashore, and fuch of the Land-
Officers as consulted with them, and a
Time was appointed to put it in Execution.
But the final Omiflion of this important
Service will be more properly mentioned,
when we come to relate the ConduCt of
the Maritime Forces affembled on this Ex-
Soon after this, the Garrifon received a
Supply of Provifions, -c. from Cuba,
which was discovered by Capt. Fanfhaw,
of his Majefty's Ship Phbnix, after they
were got within the Mofquito's; from
whence they were conveyed up the Met-
tanfas, and landed to the Southward of
the Town, where there was no Battery to
D annoy,

[z6 ]
annoy, or Force to intercept them. And
now the Seafon of the Year approaching,
in which the Captains of the King's Ships
fuppofed it might be dangerous to con-
tinue on the Coaft, they resolved to fail
on the 5 th of July, and in order thereto,
commanded their Men from Anaflatia on
Board. Whereupon the General, July 4.
fent Orders to Col. VanderduJfen, and
Lieutenant-Colonel Cooke, to raife the Block-
ade, and bring off the Train and Troops,
with the leaft Lofs they could; and to
fpoil the Artillery if they could not fetch
it off. Accordingly the Colonels made a
Retreat, carrying off every thing entire,
but one Cannon which was fplit, tho' the
General burnt a great Qu antity of Provi-
fions, Arms, &c. on his Retreat, not-
wichtfanding there were two empty Boats
at hand, which might have carry'd them
off. After this Col. Vanderdufen joined
the General's Regiment on the Main, from
whence they retreated to St. John's; feve-
ral of the General's Regiment having de-
ferred. And thus ended this moft difgrace-
ful and unfortunate Expedition.

[ 27 1]
Upon the Colonel's exprefling his great
Difflaisfadion at this mortifying Retreat,
the General told him and another Gentle-
man then present, that he had done all that
was expected from his Orders, and offered
to fhew them; intimating, that the Defign
was only to draw the Spaniards Attention
from Cuba. But as well as I can remem-
ber, they told me, they did not give them-
felves the Trouble to fee them. I con-
fefs I should have had the Curiofity,
and poffibly fuch extraordinary Orders
may even be worth the Infpedion of
our Superiors. Nor indeed can it be fup-
pofed at all improbable from the whole
Condud of this Affair, that it was influ-
enced by fuch Orders, for as I remember,
the Committee very juftly observe, That
'c from the Day the General left Charles-
" 7orwn, to that memorable Day of his
c" appearing with his Forces before Au-
C" gufline, every Step he took had a ma-
Cc nifeft Tendency to alarm the Place be-
"( forehand, and to prevent that Surprize,
" that was the profeffed Defign, and on
" which, they greatly depended for Succefs.
D z This

[ 28 ]
This I had from both there Gentlemen.
And if this Siege were in Truth but a
Feint, might not that have been effe&ed
without fuch an Expence to a Colony,
who had appropriated her Rum Duty,
and made other considerable Contributions
to the Benefit of Georgia, on its firll Settle-
ment ?
Tho' it may be fuppofed this brief De-
tail of the Enterprize will present many
obvious Errors to an intelligent Perfon,
without any particular Animadverfions,
yet is it difficult for the mofl indifferent
Relator to fupprefs the Refletions which
occur fpontaneoufly on this Occafion.
Our Minds are conflituted in fuch a Man-
ner, that it feems scarcely in our Ele&ion,
whether we will refleA or not, on Sub-
jeas important in themselves, or their Con-
fequences, when we have once entered on
them. But in fuch Cafes, we are to have
the fame inviolable Regard toJuftice in our
Observations, that we muff to Truth in
our Narrative. And fill there will be
this material Difference, that Fa&ts, upon
due Proof, muft be admitted by every
Person ;

[ 29 ]
Perfon; tho' the Refledions of different
Minds upon the fame Fads, will frequent-
ly vary. Notwithstanding which, he may
be confider'd, methinks, as a fair Animad-
verter, who utters no Remarks but fuch
as appear to himself to result neceffarily
from fuch Fads, in the very Nature and
Reafon of Things j who can diveft him-
felf of every partial Prepoffeflion and Pre-
judice, and considers the A6ions rather
than the A6tors. 'Tis poffible, I may
very partially Miltake this to be my own
Cafe, but I am certain and conscious it is
my Defire and Endeavour that it should.
No Man can well be fuppofed willing to
deceive himself, where he can acquire no-
thing but Difcredit by it; and I should
judge it a real Immorality to intend the
Deception of another. Some Readers
who might not consider the Subjed as in-
tereling enough for their Reflexions, may
yet be willing to hear another's; and tho(e
who hall judicioufly difapprove mine, will
make fuch as appear jufter to themselves.
'Tis too certain indeed, that the bell
Reflexions in the present Cafe, are but a

[ 30 ]
kind of Phrygian Wifdom, and incapable
of preventing the Evils the adjacent Co-
lonies may be exposed to from this Dif.
appointment. For as the Vicinity of Au,
gufline can be no bad Reafon for difallow-
ing Negroes in Georgia, fo any Perfon,
generally acquainted with thofe Climates,
may venture to affirm, that Georgia can
fcarcely make a Figure, as a Colony, with-
out them. And the Defertion of the Ca.
rolina Slaves, may not improbably be fur-
ther increased by this impotent Attempt
upon that Fortrefs, whereby our Arms
are certainly become contemptible both
to them and the neighboring Indians.
Yet if it fall appear, upon a fair Difquifi-
tion, that this Enterprize was not defeat-
ed by any fuch Events as were fortuitous,
and could not eafily be forefeen or pre-
vented; but that it evidently resulted from
our own Overfight or Mifconducr, a
plain Evition of the particular Errors
muff effedually prevent a Repetition of
them upon any future Revival of the like
Attempt. Other Errors may occur, for
who is infallible? The fame scarcelyy can,

[ 31 ]
and many Perfons who have carefully con-
fidered there, have conceived it difficult
to device others, that could in any wife
resemble a Siege, and operate Co direEly
to the Difappointment of it.
Firft then it appears, that the taking
Fort St. Francis de Pupa, wherein were i z
Soldiers and a Serjeant, before any Mea.
fures were concerted with the Province of
South-Carolina, for the Siege of Augufline,
was a very unfeafonable Step, which served
only to Alarm the Spaniards, and put
them on the fpeedieft Methods of con-
fulting their future Security. This was
proved beyond all Difpute by the Letters
found on Board a Spanifh Veffel bound
from St. Augufline to Cuba, taken by Capt.
Warren ; in one of which, the Spanijh Go-
vernor relates the taking this very Fort,
and his daily Expe&ation of a Siege; prel.
fing for an immediate Supply of Provifi-
on, Ammunition, &c. to enable him to
maintain the Place. And in Confequence
of this early Alarm, thofe Supplies finally
arrived, which determined the Beficgers to
abandon the Enterprize. Yet this Over-

[ 32]
fiht, however material, might probably
have been redeemed by a proper Vigour
in the Field afterwards, as it appeared by
fome intercepted Letters from the Gover-
nor of Augufine to the Commander of St.
Marks, about aoo Miles beyond St. Au-
guflive, that they had not above three Days
Bread at the Arrival of thole Supplies ,
which they considered as a miraculous De-
liverance effected by St. Rofana, or the
Virgin of the Apalaches.
It may well be fuppofed, that landing
the Forces at the Mouth of St. John's River,
and marching them thence to Augufine by
Fort Diego, which was about 45 Miles
very bad Way, where they were obliged to
leave a 4 Pounder behind them, was very in-
judicious, in Comparifon to landing them at
Pupa, which is about i 5, and a very good
Road. Undoubtedly at fuch a hot Seafon
of the Year, and in a Climate fo generally
intemperate and fickly during that Seafon,
good Condud and Humanity muft have
fuggefted the Neceffity of eating the Army,
as far as might be, without Detriment to
the Service. And indeed it appears by

[ 33 1]
Colonel Barvvell's Examination, that the
General acknowledged to him, he was
9" advised in Carolina to rendezvous them
c" there, as the properefl Place." And this
was the Advice of fuch Gentlemen there,
as were beft acquainted with the Situation
of Auguliie, and the adjacent Country.
The Reafon aligned in Juftification of this
March of 3 o Miles extraordinary, is really
frivolous, viz. Left the Forces should
" be discouraged for want of feeing the
" Men of War" It is difficult to con-
ceive that a Body of Veterans, or of any
Soldiers, should be dejected by a fhort Se-
paration from Veflels, which they muff be
fitisfied, were engaged in, and actually
had proceeded on the Expedition; efpeci-
ally as no Weather intervened to endanger
or delay their Arrival. But it is unde-
niably clear, that many fich hafly, unpro-
fitable Marches (to give them the mildeft
Name) had greatly enfeebled and dispirited
the Soldiery, when fome of them dy'd under
the Fatigue, and others were utterly unable
to proceed; especially as there were con-
tinual Complaints of miserable Oeconomy,
E and

and a moft fcanty Diftribution of Provi-
fions to them. Humanity to our Fellow
Creatures and Fellow Subjeds might be
thought a sufficient Motive for a generous
Mind to allow no Ground for Diffatif-
fadion and Complaints of this Nature;
or a very Zeal for the Service fliould pre-
vent fuch severee Hardlhips, in time of
A&ion, as muft be deftrudive of it. Yet
is it in Truth notorious, that there were
continual Complaints on this Occafion in
the General's Regiment; and in Fa6t, it
appeared that there unneceffary Marches
and unjuft Reftraint of Food was attended
with a very early Defertion from the Ge-
neral's Regiment, whereby the Garrifon
was fully apprized of our Force and Dif-
pofition. During this Campagne they
had no Leifure to regale at their Vi6tualling
Office, as the Oyfter Banks (very com-
mon in thofe Countries, and very unwhole-
fome in Summer) were familiarly called
by the Soldiers of Frederica. As his Ex-
cellency proposed this for a SUDDEN
ATTEMPT, and was undoubtedly fen-
fible, that Difpatch and Secrecy are ne-

[ 35 ]
ceffary to a Surprize, it is very difficult
to reconcile fuch seeming Hurry, and
fuch effedtual Delay and impolitic Rigour
with martial Skill and Fore(ight. People
who think they are very hardly dealt with,
will often Hazard the Lofs of a very mi-
ferable Life, for the meer Chance of bet-
tering it. As on the other hand, thofe
who might have yielded to the firft Im-
preflions of their Fear and Panic, recolle6e
their Judgment, and their Courage too,
when they have a regular Apprehen(ion
of the Dangers that threaten them. We
have already observed GeneralOglethorpe told
the Committee of Conference, it was very
likely he might carry the Town the FIRST
NI G H T; and indeed by all Appear-
ances it is probable he might, if he had
then attempted it, when the whole Army,
with which he reconnoitred it, expected
that Service, and exprefs'd an Ardor for
it. But instead of that we are told,
" that himself and fome other Officers
" went up to the Walls, with federal
'< Drums, and after alarming the Garri-
f" fon, marched back to Diego with flying
E z Colours."

[ 36 ]
"C Colours." 'Tis ferioufly difficult to
be grave on fuch an extraordinary Incident,
fuch a significant Parade! Were the Forces
marched back to Diego, 25 Miles off,
purely that they might measure the fame
Diflance thence again, to air and refrefl
them at this fulcry Seafon? For ought
that appears here, they might have pro-
ceeded direcly to entrench themselves, to
the real Inveffment of the Place, and Di-
ftrefs of the Befiegcd. If fuch Mearures
had a serious Tendency to reduce this For-
trefs, it muff be acknowledged they were
profound beyond Example; but People,
who are unacquainted with the Depths of
martial Policy, muff consider this loud
Alarm, and sudden Retreat inftead of
Attempt, as a Contrivance more likely to
put the Garrifon on their Guard, than to
furprize them. A March of 5o Miles
muff have allowed them a convenient Lei-
fure to recover from their Panic, and
make them better prepared for a second
Alarm. In fhiort, to charatcrize fuch ex-
traordinary Condu6t with the itri6deft Pro-
priety, w mufft admit, it has more the Air
of a Farce than of a Siege. Tlhe

[ 37 ]
The Garrifoning and Guarding every
insignificant Hut and Sandhill, and the
frequent unneceflary Marches and Coun-
termarches were nearly of the fame Strain,
being compared by an experienced and wor-
thy Officer on the Spot, to Squirrel
" Hunting rather than War." As the
Forces then under the General's Com-
mand were fhort of what he firft propo-
fed as neceffary to the Enterprize, was it
very confident to weaken his little Army,
by fuch frequent Detachments, however
fmall ? And as this was to be a SUDDEN
ATTEMP T, how were fuch reiterated
Motions and Counter-motions reconcilea-
ble with fuch an Intention ? As they did
make a circuitous March to Augufine by
Fort Diego, it might very probably be pru-
dent to take it in; if it were only, by the
Capture of fo many PriConers, to deprive
the Garrifon of a Reinforcement of 5o
Men, whenever they shouldd incline to
draw them thence. But it may be doubt-
ed, whether leaving a Detachment of 6o
of our Men to Garrfon it, was altogether
prudent in our Circumftances. We find

[ 38 ]
this Fort a5 Miles from Augufline gar-
rifoned, and further ftrengthned by a
Ditch; but Fort Moofa, within two Miles
of the Caftle, difinantled. Now certainly
we had lefs to apprehend at the former than
the latter: The Spaniards would undoubt-
edly be more cautious of hazarding their
Men at fuch a Diftance, where Parties
might interpofe to cut them off, than
where they had a continual View of the
Place, and could receive an hourly Intel-
ligence of our Force and Difpofition. But
it has been fuggefled, that garrifoning
Diego was very commodious as a Place of
Retreat; and we muft acknowledge, that
as Matters were afterwards conduced, it
looked like a timely Precaution and Fore-
Having already observed the Impru-
dence of retreating from the Town, which
gave the Spaniards an Opportunity of en-
trenching round it, which we ought and
neglected to do; the employing the main
Body of the Troops on Anafatia and
Point uartel, may juffly be considered
rather as a neceffary Confequence of that

[ 39]
Neglect, than an original Blunder. The
Cattle could not readily be formed from
fuch a Difpofition of the Troops, and as
Lieutenant-Colonel Cook, an experienced
Engineer and Officer, declared our Batteries
too diflant for any effectual Service, it was
very unlikely they should ever be reduced
to capitulate from thence. The Spanif
Shot, which seemed generally well direcl-
ed, fell frequently very near our Forces,
but dead, and never killed or wounded
one Man from the Caffle. It was not
then to be imagined that ours, from a
like Diftance, should batter heavy Walls
to any Purpofe. By this Diftance of the
Forces from the Caftle, and their Sepa-
ration from it, and from each other by
Water, the whole Main was left open to
the Befieged, if they might truly be called
fo, for themselves and their Cattle. Was this
diftrefling them, or likely to produce the
fpeedy Surrender fo valiantly talked of? Did
not this leave a free Paffage to the Caftle
for any Supplies that flould be landed on
the Main ? Whereas, if the Town had
been carried, or even closely invested, and
a Bat-

a Battery erected to the Southward of it,
to command the River there, which Co-
lonel Vanderduffen proposed, and Lieute-
nant-Colonel Cook approved to no Pur-
pofe, the Supplies that arrived, in (pight
of fo many Men of War, muff, with
the greatest Probability, have been either
driven back, funk, or taken by the Be-
fiegers, as they were attended with no fuf-
ficient Strength to force thro' them into
the Place; in which Cafe it seemss paft
doubt, that the Garrifon mult be fpeedily
reduced to capitulate.
But if it were thought unadvifed or
improper to hazard the Body of the
Forces on the Main, 'tis hard to conceive
the Prudence of fending Colonel Palmer
there, with lefs than i oo Whites, and but
4 Indians, within two Miles of the Cal-
tie, when the fironger Corps upon Ana-
fatia and Point cartell, were as secure from
the Enemy as they were incapable of an-
noying them. Colonel Barnwell declared
on his Examination, he heard Colonel
Palmer, who was a good Judge of the
Situation, tell the General, the Party he

[41 ]
" Cent him over on the Main with, was
"' took weak ;" but upon the General's
telling him One of his Officers would
" undertake it with the fame Number,
" and that he would fend him over a
c Reinforcement when he had taken
" Anafatia (which he never did) the
gallant Colonel accepted it, and proved
the Truth of his Affertion by the Defeat
of his Party, dying bravely himself, as
he had lived, in the Service of his Coun-
try. It has never been even fuggelted,
that any Meafures were ever taken to
have supported this fmall Number in Cafe
of an Attack, tho' they were separated by
Water, both from the General's and Co-
lonel's Regiments, and the few who escaped
being flain or taken Prifoners, owed their
Preservation to a Boat that was acci-
dentally paffing by, which they hail'd
to fetch them over. Was it to be fup-
pofed they could continue to alarm the
Caftle frequently, for which it feems they
were Cent there, without having their Num-
bers discovered ? And was it to be thought
the Spaniards would not determine, as they
F did,

did, to cut them off by a superior Detach-
ment, when they found them fo effectu-
ally divided from the main Body? But
we are told in the General's Letter, That
" this Misfortune happened thro' a Neg-
" le6t of thofe Orders by which they were
" enjoined to encamp every Night in a
" different Place." Was a Compliance
with fuch Orders truly likely to have pre-
vented this ill Event ? Can it reasonably
be fuppofed the Enemy was without Spa-
nijh or Indian Scouts, to discover their
Force and Situation at fo fmall a Diftance ?
And there being once discovered, what
availed it where a handful of Men en-
camped, that were daily employed to catch
Horfes at fo much per Head, and had then
caught about a Hundred ? Muft not their
Fatigue enervate them for Aaion, compel
them to fleep, and expose them to Surprize,
as it actually happened ? If the Caftle
was once taken, would not thefe precious
Horfes, and all the Stock have fallen of
Courfe; and could it be prudent to har-
rals the Forces by an Employment that
embarafs'd the main Defign ? Were not

[43 ]
this mall Party capable of making the
fame Defence at Moofa as elsewhere ? Nay,
pofflibly if this Fort had not been un-
feafonably dismantled, they might have
been able to repulfe the Enemy. Ten
Creek Indians who came to affift at the
Siege, the Day before this Defeat, flop-
ping at Moofa, asked Colonel Palmer
where the General was; and when he told
them he was upon Anaflatia, they asked
him If the General lent them few Men
" with their little Guns to fight againfl
" fo many Men, and fuch a firong Fort,"
flying, They looked like something put
" into a great Mouth, that was to be de-
" voured as foon as the Mouth was fhut."
Common Reafon made thefe untaught
impolitick Savages true Prophets on this
Occafion, which indeed required no Con-
jurer to foretel. Much might be added
very pertinently, on the Madnefs or Bar-
barity of exposing fuch a fall unfupporc-
ed Party to fuch a superior Enemy; but in
brief, if it were intended to have facrifi
ced them, nothing lefs than a present Maffa-
cre could have done it more effectually.


F z

Tho' nothing can appear furprizing af-
ter fuch Condu&, I cannot avoid men-
tioning the Injuftice and Imprudence of
difguffing the Indians in Amity with the
Englijh, who had travelled fo far to aflift
at the Siege. Some of the Chickefaws
meeting with a Spanijh Indian in one of
their Excurfions, killed him, and bring-
ing his Head in Triumph to the Camp af-
ter their Manner, presented it to the Ge-
neral, who reje&ed it with Indignation,
calling them "barbarous Dogs, and bid-
( ding them be gone:" Upon which they
faid, If they had carried the Head of
" an Englijbman to the French, they should
' not be treated in that Manner." And
Squirrel, their King, faid, If he had
" carried one of our Heads to the Go-
" vernor of Augufline, he should have
' been ufed by him like a Man, as he
" had been now ufed by the General like
c a Dog." Thefe very brave People,
dreaded by the French and Spaniards, and
our constant Friends, came to fight and
aflift in good Earneft at the Siege; nor
could they be juffly blamed, if it had been

[45 1
all a Joke, for having never been let into
it, they could never have dreamt of fuch
a warlike Refinement. This Step fo con-
trary to Juflice and Policy, made them
refolve to return Home; and it was at
the earnest Intreaty and Inflance of the
Carolina Officers, they were prevailed on
to flay. And this will appear the more
unaccountable, when we recollet, that
upon the Arrival of fome Indians in the
General's Camp, he wrote to Colonel
Vanderdufen to fend him fome Prefents for
them, with a Power to distribute them,
because (to ufe his own Words) much
" depends on the Nations." Certainly
then fome Indulgence to them was at leaft
necejary; and this extreme, romantic Ten-
dernefs, upon a due Confideration of all
Circumftances, mutt have been truly in-
judicious and unfeafonable.
What can be thought of the Capitula-
tion of Diego, a Palifade Fort, whereby
the Garrifon were to be Prifoners of War,
and the Cattle free and facred, especially
when his own Regiment had been fo fcan-
tily fubfifled before? A Carolina Seder

and Soldier, who made bold with a Kid-
ney of one of thofe who were faid to be
purchased from Signior Diego, very nar-
rowly escaped Punifhment for it, at the
earnell Interceflion of his Officers. They
are ufed to Plenty of Meat in their own
Country, and could not conceive the lealt
Reafon for being denied it in an Enemy's.
It may be observed by the Way, that this
fame Signior, this Diego, was a Negro or
Mulatto, who had been a considerable Time
a Prisoner at large in the Camp, and
whofe Parole was afterwards taken for his
Return from Augufline; but this Grand
PerTon who had capitulated in fuch Form,
and obtained fuch honourable Conditions
for his Bullocks, forgot his personal Ho-
nour, and was content to be as cunning
as thofe who depended on it. Two other
Spanijf Prifoners were fent into Augufline
before this by the General, to induce the
Garrifon to defert, as he faid, who never
returned to inform us of their Succefs.
Many other Failures, tho' very evident
and pernicious, are purposely omitted here;
and indeed the Number and Magnitude of

[47 1]
thefe are leFs furprizing, when we observe
they were not the Confequences of any
Councils of War, but the fole Refult of
the Opinion and arbitrary Will of the
Chief Commander, whofe Orders were
binding on all others. He never called a
single Council throughout the Expedition
(for which it was well known in Charles-
ITown he quoted the Conduaf of cefar) tho'
his own Regiment contained brave Officers
of undoubted Zeal and long Experience.
And the Carolina Regiment defired nothing
more than fome right Plan of A6ion, in
which they were prepared to co-operate at
the utmoft Hazard. It is acknowledged,
that in fome Letters from the General to
Colonel Vanderdufen, he tells him, He
" thanks him for his Advice, which will
" always have great Weight with him,"
and the like. But how can we fuppofe
this beyond meer Compliment, if it were
not an Artifice, in fome degree to co-
lour over this grofs Negledt of martial
Councils. It does not appear that the
Measures purfued were the Advice of any
other Officer, but it may be very confi-

dently affirmed, that as many as had Judg-
ment in fuch Affairs, and were zealous for
the Succefs of this Expedion, conflantly
disapproved them : And fome of the molf
experienced made an early Predi&ion of the
ill Event, from the backward Steps that
were made to a good one. But in Mat-
ters thus fituated, who will venture to
difobey or contend ? The Subordinate
can only be fafe in executing Commands
they may observe with Relutance, or by
acquiescing to fuch Ination as they muft
consider with Contempt. And whenever
any Commander has loft the Confidence,
the Efteem and Love of his Forces, what
Good can be expected, what Evil may
not be prefumed, when his Courage a-
gainft a public Enemy may be reltrain-
ed by his Horror of concealed ones ?
Neither is it at all improbable that this
Mifcarriage might have been prevented by
free Deliberation, and a timely Purfuit of
different Councils. For it appears, that
at a Conference in Colonel Vanderdufen's
Tent, on Anaflatia, June 22 where be-
fides himself and Lieutenant Colonel Cook,

[49 ]
Commodore Pearfe, Captain WaJrren, and
Captain Laws were present, it was their
unanimous Opinion, That the General
( rather retarded than forwarded Matters,
" and that they should proceed with more
" Vigour, when he was gone over on
" the Main." And indeed it appears that
Captain tWarren was very uneafy at his
Conduct before, complaining, that he
" was not two Minutes of one Mind "
for which Reafon he faid, (c he would
" take no Notice of any but written Or-
" ders from him, adding, That the
" General was come there without any
" Ammunition, Provifions, or other Ne-
" ceffaries but what he had from him, "
which Lieutenant Colonel Cook very juftly
called, a new Syftem of War, and be-
" ginning it at the wrong End."
Having thus enumerated the principal
Errors that occurred in the Management
of the Land Forces, it remains to consider,
with the fame Truth and Impartiality, if
any thing tranfaded or omitted by the
Fleet may be judged to have contributed
to this Diappointment.



[ 5so ]
Here then we readily acknowledge that
whatever Meafures were taken, or not taken,
feem in Confequence of fome Confulta.
tion of the Commanders, and were
founded on the Unanimity or Majority
of the Board, which muff in fome Mea-
fure alter the Complexion of their Pro.
And firfl it feems, that not attacking
the half Gallies, which are allowed to have
chiefly affected our Forces, was an Er-
ror of great Importance. It appears that
Commodore Pearfe, in a Letter to Co-
lonel Vanderduffen, of June z 5, recom-
" mends the Affair of attacking the Half-
c Gallies to the Confideration of the Sea
" Commanders on Shore; and the Land
" Officers." In purfuance of which Re-
commendation, it appears, that June 26.
a Conference was held in Colonel Vander-
dufen's Tent, where himself, Lieutenant.
Colonel Cook, Capt. Warren, Capt. Town-
Jend, and Capt. Laws being present, it
was refolved to attack the Gallies pro-
vided there was Water enough on the
Swjaf opposite to the Caftle, for the Boats

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