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 Front Cover
 Title Page
 Table of Contents
 Introduction
 Love, its differentiation, and...
 Justice and related concepts
 History and its place
 Conclusion






Title: Love and justice in political theory;
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Title: Love and justice in political theory; a study of Augustine's definition of the commonwealth ..
Physical Description: iii, 79 p. : diagrs. ; 23 cm.
Language: English
Creator: Friberg, Hans Daniel, 1908-
Publisher: The University of Chicago
Place of Publication: Chicago
Publication Date: 1944
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Subject: Political science -- History -- To 1500   ( lcsh )
Love   ( lcsh )
Justice   ( lcsh )
State, The   ( lcsh )
Genre: theses   ( marcgt )
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Thesis: Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Chicago, 1944.
General Note: Reproduced from type-written copy.
Statement of Responsibility: by Hans Daniel Friberg.
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Table of Contents
    Front Cover
        Front Cover 1
        Front Cover 2
    Title Page
        Page i
        Page ii
    Table of Contents
        Page iii
        Page iv
    Introduction
        Page 1
        Page 2
        Page 3
        Page 4
    Love, its differentiation, and its associations
        Page 5
        Page 6
        Page 7
        Page 8
        Page 9
        Page 10
        Page 11
        Page 12
        Page 13
        Page 14
        Page 15
        Page 16
        Page 17
        Page 18
        Page 19
        Page 20
        Page 21
        Page 22
        Page 23
        Page 24
        Page 25
        Page 26
        Page 27
        Page 28
    Justice and related concepts
        Page 29
        Page 30
        Page 31
        Page 32
        Page 33
        Page 34
        Page 35
        Page 36
        Page 37
        Page 38
        Page 39
        Page 40
        Page 41
        Page 42
        Page 43
        Page 44
        Page 45
        Page 46
    History and its place
        Page 47
        Page 48
        Page 49
        Page 50
        Page 51
        Page 52
        Page 53
        Page 54
        Page 55
        Page 56
        Page 57
        Page 58
        Page 59
        Page 60
        Page 61
        Page 62
        Page 63
        Page 64
        Page 65
        Page 66
        Page 67
        Page 68
        Page 69
        Page 70
        Page 71
        Page 72
        Page 73
    Conclusion
        Page 74
        Page 75
        Page 76
        Page 77
        Page 78
        Page 79
        Page 80
Full Text












UNIVERSITY
OF FLORIDA
LIBRARY








tbe Ilntverstts of Gbicago


LOVE AND JUSTICE IN POLITICAL

THEORY

A STUDY OF AUGUSTINE'S DEFINITION
OF THE COMMONWEALTH



A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY
OF THE DIVISION OF THE HUMANITIES IN
CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF
PHILOSOPHY

DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY
DECEMBER, 1944




By
HANS DANIEL FRIBERG












CHICAGO, ILLINOIS
1944


























ACKNOWLEDGMENT


Dean McKeon's kind direction and
generous help in the carrying out
of this study are acknowledged
with particular gratitude.













TABLE OF CONTENTS


Page
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Chapter

I. LOVE, ITS DIFFERENTIATION, AND ITS ASSOCIATIONS . 5

II. JUSTICE AND RELATED CONCEPTS . . . . . 29

III. HISTORY AND ITS PLACE . . . . . . . 47

CONCLUSION ........... . .** **.............. 74


' 7 .' .'


UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA


3 1262 08645 481 5











INTRODUCTION


Cloiro defines state or the affair of the public as the
affair of the people.1 People, In turn, he defines as "not every
grwam of men brought together In any fashion but a group of the
multitude associated by agreement as to right and by community of
utility..2
To tkis definition Augustine objects In the nineteenth
Book of Do civitate Del, indicating at the same time the grounds
of his objection.
This, then, is the place where I should fulfill the prom-
ise given in the second book of this work, and explain, as
briefly and clearly as possible, that if we are to aooept the
definitions laid down by Solpio in Cioero's Do re publioa,
there never was a Roman republic; for he briefly defines a
republic as the weal of the people. And if this definition
be true, there never was a Roman republic, for the people's
weal was never attained among the Romans. For the people,
according to the definition, is an assemblage associated by
a common acknowledgment of right and by a community of inter-
ests. And what he means by a common acknowledgment of right
he explains at large, showing that a republic cannot be ad-
ministered without justice. .. . Where, then, is the jus-
tioe of man when he deserts the true God and yields himself
to impure demons? Is this to give every one his due? Or is
he who keeps back a piece of ground from the purchaser, and
gives it to a man who haio right to it, unjust, while he
who keeps back himself o the God who made him, and serves
wicked spirits, is Jus

1De re public 1. 25. 39: "res publioa res populi." Ibid.
111ii. 32. 44: ". . Piraeus lle magniflous rem publicam effi-
olebat? 'minime vero' Laellus 'quoniam quides popull res non
erat.'" Vid. ibid. 111. 34. 45, 46.
2Ibid. 1. 25. 39: "'Est igitur,' Inquit Africanus, 'res
publioa res popull, populus autem non omnis hominum ooetus quoquo
modo oongregatus, sed ooetus multitudinis luris consensus et utill-
tatis eommunione soolatus." Ibid. 111. 33. 45:0populus non est, ut
tu optime definisti Solpio, nisi qui oonsensu iuris oontinetur."
De oivitate Dei xix. 21, Patrologlae Latinae (henoeforth
cited as PL), xll. 648, 649; Ni ene and Post-Nioene father,
(henceforth cited as NPNF), ed. Bohaff (Buffalo: Christian Liter-
ature Co. 1887), II, 414. The term which Dr. Marous Dods, trans-
lator of De oivltate Del In NPNF, renders "weal" is that which is
translated "affair supra, res. "Affair" is a happy rendering
that Babine and Smith adopt from Carlyle. On the Commonwealth,
1









Rejecting the Ciceronian definition of state Augustine substi-
tutes his own:
But if we discard this definition of a people, and, as-
suming another, say that a people is an assemblage of reason-
able beings bound together by a common agreement as to the
objects of their love, then, in order to discover the charac-
ter of a people, we have only to observe what they love. Yet
whatever it loves, if only it is an assemblage of reasonable
beings and not of beasts, and is bound together by an agree-
ment as to the objects of love, It is reasonably called a
people; and it will be a superior people in proportion as it
is bound together by higher intep jts, inferior in proportion
as it is bound together by lowe .
For Cicero, then,
res publioa res popull
populus = ooetus fmultitudinis
lsoclatus {utilitatis oom-
munione
1juris consensus
while for Augustine
res public = ree popull
Dopulus ooetus (multitudinis rationalism
isociatus rerum qua. dili-
git conoordi commune
It is to be observed that as regards the synonymity of
res public and res populi there is perfect agreement between
Cicero and Augustine. The important difference concerns the mode
whereby a people is associated and it is at this point the sub-
stitution of consequence is made.
In De officials Cicero deplores the notion that there can
be any true utility apart from Justice, though base men entertain
the notion. The determinative qualification of association for
Cicero is therefore agreement as to justice, which being secured
utility is also secured. Augustine also denies that advantage
can be truly secured apart from justice inasmuch as he asserts
that "if you choose to regard the matter attentively, you will
see that there is nothing advantageous to those who live godless-
ly, as every one lives who does not serve God but demons, whose
wickedness you may measure by their desire to receive the worship
of men though they are most impure spirits."2 It is then at the

G. H. Sabine and S. B. Smith, trans. (Columbus: Ohio State UnivwR.
sity Press, 1929), p. 51. In the present study some departures
from th form of the quoted renditions are made without indication.
(De civitate Dei xix. 2i 7PL xll. 655; NPNF, II, 418.
2De civitate Dei xix. 21; PL.xli. 649; NPNF, II, 415.









point of Juris oonsensu that Augustine takes up his chief oon-
tention with Cioero in regard to the definition of populus.
In contrast to Cicero Augustine employs the term Ju1
sparingly. On the other hand Justitia ooours very frequently In
the Augustinian writings and happily the relation of the two
terms is established in the very chapter of De oivitate Del
wherein objection is made to Cicero's definition of state and the
advantageousness of injustice is denied (xix. 21) and this rela-
tion is set forth, we may be certain, In a way quite unexoeption-
al to Cicero.
And what he means by a common acknowledgment of right he ex-
plains at large, showing that a republic cannot be adminis-
tered without justice. Where, therefore, there is no true
justice there can be no right. For that which is done by
right is justly done, and what is unjustly done cannot be
done by right.L
What is Jure is Jutse, and though the conversion is not made in
this citation it is safe to say that what is Jute is .lure, that
"in accordance with right' and 'in accordance with justice" are
synonymous terms.
In this study an attempt is made to met forth that dif-
ference in the doctrines of Cicero and Augustine in regard to jus-
tioe whereby the same Rome that in the view of the former is emi-
nently just is pronounced grossly unjust by the latter, with the
consequence that justice is discarded by Augustine as that con-
cerning which there is the agreement which constitutes the bond
of political association. Furthermore an attempt Is made to ao-
count for Augustine's substitution of love for the justice that
is thus discarded.
In the first chapter an examination is made of the doc- /
trines of the two men in regard to love, its moral qualification,
and its associative property. In the second chapter the dootrines
of the two writers in regard to justice and order are set forth.
Cicero is found to teach a universal order of right reason; Augus-
tine, an order of being that is hierarchical with a transcendent
Being at its head and that imposes on men the duty of loving con-
formably to the character of this order, with the result that jus-
tioe, which In Cicero's system is the pronounoement of what he re-

1De civitate Del xix. 21; PL xli. 648; NPMF, II, 414:
'Quod enia Jure fit, profeoto just fit: quod auto fit injuste,
neo jure fieri potent.'







4
garden a universal right reason, is in the Augustinian a rightly
ordered love--which love is far from universal. In the last chap-
ter a study is made of the place of history in the argument of the
two writers. Finally in the Conolusion there is a summary com-
parison of the two systemsand a concluding statement of the rea-
son forAugustine's subs ttution of love for justice in the defini-
tion of state as well as a statement of the present writer's re-
jeotion of the Ciceronian system and his adoption of the Augustin-
ian, together with the reason therefore, relation to the teaching
of the Bible.












CHAPTER I


LOVE, ITS DIFFERENTIATION, AND ITS ASSOCIATIONS


The repetition by so consummate a stylist as Cicero of
the notice of the derivation of amicitia--he is saved from sheer
reiteration by a difference of expression as well as by deriving
both amor and amioitia from amare in the second instance amorr
sive amicitia; utrumque enim dictum est ab amandol), whereas
amicitia had been directly related to amor in the first amorr
enim, ex quo amicitia nominate est 2)--fortifies in one the sense
that not a little of Cicero's doctrine of love is to be found in
the essay On Friendship. It is well that resort to the maxims
concerning amicitia in one's search for Cicero's teaching about
love is thus authenticated, for his employment of the concept of
love is, as we shall see, restricted in contrast to St. Augus-
tine's.
Twice in De amicitia Cicero speaks of the love of animals,
i.e., of animals as subjects. Friendship's character "may be
discerned even in some classes of animals, which up to a certain
time so love their offspring, and are so loved by them, that the
mutual feeling is plainly seen,-a feeling which is much more
clearly manifest in man, first, in the affection [caritate] which
exists between children and parents."4 Of this passage it is to
be remarked that whereas oaritas is used only on the human level
amare is used both on the animal level and, in the cognate form
of amor, on the human, though the use of it in reference to men
falls outside the limits of the quotation. Nevertheless, the
clause, "which is much more clearly manifest in man," indicates

1De amicitia 27. 100. 2Ibid. 8. 26.

3Cf. the conjunction of amioum and amantis in"suis autem
Incommodis graviter angi non amicum, sed se ipsum amantis est."
Ibid. 3. 10.
4Ibid. 8. 27; "Cicero De Amicitia and Solpio's Dream,"
Ethical Writings of Cicero, Andrew P. Peabody, trans. (Boston:
Little, Brown, and Co., 1887), pp. 23, 24.
5









that Cicero is concerned in setting forth a difference in degree
rather than in kind in the comparison of human and animal love.
In the second passage, however, only a likeness between human and
animal love is set forth: "But if it is seen in beasts, birds,
fishes, animals tame and wild, that they love diligentt] them-
selves (for self-love is born with everything that lives) and
that they require and seek those of their own kind to whom they
may attach themselves, and do so with desire and with a certain
semblance of human love Eamoris], how much more is this natural
in man!"1 Here deligere is used of animals, and if on the one
hand amor is not used of them without the words, "a certain sem-
blance of," it is just as true that neither is it so used without
the qualifier "human."
While love is in these two passages extended to irrational
subjects, it is in neither of them attributed to the insensate.
Cicero does, however, note in another place that "it is said that
a certain philosopher of Agrigentum sang in Greek verse that it is
friendship that draws together and discord that parts all things
which subsist In harmony, and which have their various movements
in nature and in the whole universe."2 But this salute to Empe-
dooles and his universal love metaphysics is certainly insuffi-
cient to place Cicero permanently in the company of the Greek. In
fact, even when he speaks of the love of the sensate yet irration-
al, Cicero passes outside of his usual bounds. The universality
of cohesiveness or attachment is not central to his thought nor
does this peripheral notion find him analogizing its lower to its
superior forms and calling them all love. For if despite the em-
phasis we have placed upon the derivation of amioitia from amare
nothing conclusive can be said about the scope of amor from the
definition of amioitia, still that definition itself goes far to
place Cicero among those who conceive of love as proper to ra-
tional beings. "For friendship is nothing else than fellow feel-
ing in regard to all matters divine and human, with goodwill and
with charity."3 Now feelings in regard to all things human and
divine are certainly not shared by irrational creatures, to say

1De amicitia 21. 81; Peabody, trans., op. cit., p. 57.
2De amicitia 7. 24; Peabody, trans., op. cit., p. 20.

3De amioltia 6. 20.







7
nothing of the insensate, for the reason that they do not appre-
hend the existence of these two departments.
We have now to consider the outgoing of love in order to
establish its character by reference to its object. That fellow
feeling which is friendship can exist only among the good,1 and
while this statement indicates that the same persons are good
also in the role of agents of love, let it be here noticed that
they are good in the role of objects, i.e., that the love to be
found in friendship is toward the good. Indeed, virtue surpasses
all else in lovableness, whereas "strong and generally just aver-
sion also springs up when anything morally wrong is required of a
friend.'3 Virtue and probity, then, are the objects toward which
the love of friends is drawn.
Having found virtue and probity to be the objects to which
the love that is felt in friendship is attracted it is in order to
inquire how these are determined for Cicero. Whether he is dis-
cussing love, justice, or the state, Cicero is cognizant that
there are those who contend for absolute principles. And, in
fact, basic to his own system is the declaration of the universal-
ity of that regimen of right and order which he calls nature. Nev-
ertheless, whatever the problem in which he is engaged, it is
characteristic of him that he looks for its solution not to pure
speculation but to the realization of principles in time and
space. As the best statecraft is to be known by expounding the
historical development of Rome, so the virtue of friendship that

1De ualoitia 5. 18: "Bed hoc primum sentio, nisi in bonis
azioitias ease non posse."
2Ibid. 8. 28: "Nihil eat enim virtute amablllus, nihil
quod magis adliciat ad diligendun, quippe cun propter virtutem et
probitatem etiam eos, quos nuaquam vidimus, quodam modo diligamus."
3Ibid. 10. 35; Peabody, trans., op. cit., p. 29. Vid. Do
saloiti. 11. 37; Peabody, trans., o]. olt., p. 31: "Indeed, since
it may have been a belief in your virtue that has made one your
friend, it is hard for friendship to last if you fall away from
virtue.' Vid. De azioitia 14. 48; Peabody, trans., op. oit., pp.
38, 39: "Since virtue attracts friendship, as I have said, if
there shines forth any manifestation of virtue with which a mind
similarly disposed can come into contact and union, from such in-
tercourse love must of necessity spring.' De aaloitia 22. 83;
Peabody, trans., op. olt., p. 658: "Friendship is given by nature,
not as a companion of the vices, but as a helper of the virtues,
that, as solitary virtue might not be able to attain the summit
of excellence, united and associated with another it might reach
that eminence.'








8
he extols is that exhibited beat in the lives of men whom all men
acclaim as eminently Just. As Solpio (in De republioa) is repre-
sented as saying that the Roman constitution sprang not from the
genius of one individual, even as it could not have sprung from a
mind composed of all geniuses and unrestricted by the bounds of a
single lifetime, were it "without seniority and practice in mat-
ters"; as he is commended by Laelius for uniting the method of
Plato, who "chose an open plain on which to build an imaginary
oity after his own taste,-a city admirably conceived, as none
can deny, but remote from the real life and manners of men"--,
and the method of others who, "without proposing for themselves
any model or type of government whatever, have argued on the con-
stitutions and forms of states";2 as Soipio further declares that
Plato "has given us a description of a city, rather to be desired
than expected; . . not such an one as can really exist, but
one in which the principles of practical affairs may be discern-
ed," whereas he will himself seek "to reduce . . Plato's
principles Crationibus] to experience and practice, not in the
shadow and picture of a state, but in a real and actual common-
wealth, of unrivalled amplitude and power"; --so also does Laelius
in De amicitia in treating of virtue shy away from the rigidity
in definition of those
who establish specially subtle distinctions, with literal
truth it may be, but with little benefit to the common mind;
. . For they understand by wisdom a state which no mortal
has yet attained; while we ought to look at those qualities
which are to be found in actual exercise and in common life,
not at those which exist only in fancy or in aspiration. .
. I therefore adopt the standard of common sense. . .
Men like those whom I have named, while they ought to be re-
garded as good, ought to be so called, because to the utmost
of human capacity they follow nature, who is the best guide
in living well.'

1De republic 11. 1. 2.
2De republioa 11. 11. 21, 22; The Treatises of M. T.
Cicero, 0. D. Yonge, trans. ("Bohn's Class. Libr."; London: Geo.
Bell and Sons, 1892), p. 327.
3De republioa 11. 30. 52; Yonge, trans., op. cit., p. 338.

4De amiiotia 5. 18, 19; Peabody, trans., op. clt., pp. 15,
16. Vid. De amloitia 6. 21; Peabody, trans., op. Oit., pp. 17,
18: "I would interpret virtue in accordance with our habits of
speech and of life; not defining it, as some philosophers do, by
highsounding words, but numbering on the list of good men those







9
Distrustful of verborum magnificentia Cicero turns to the solid-
ity of vita oommunis1 to derive the insight into virtue that is
required for an exposition of duties; that common life is accord-
ing to nature. Consequently in its attraction to the good the
love that is to be found in friendship pursues that which it reo-
ognizes by nature to be such.2 This nature is universal. There-
fore the evaluation of virtue is independent of locality. And
since nature is for Cicero fixed, true friendships derive from it
the quality of eternity. In support of the simplicity and the
genuineness of friendship's attachment (in contrast to alleged
regard for the ulterior) Cicero adduces the striking argument
that, after all, self is loved simply and directly. "One loves
himself, not in order to exact from himself any wages for such
love, but because he is in himself dear to himself. Now unless
this same property be transferred to friendship, a true friend
will never be found; for such a friend is, as it were, another
self,"4 in which characterization of "friend" Cicero follows the
Greeks.
It is therefore to goodness that the love that is in
friendship is attracted and recognition of the good is according


who are commonly so regarded. . ... Mankind in general are con-
tent with these. Let us then leave out of account such good men
as are nowhere to be found"; De amioitia 11. 38; Peabody, trans.,
oF. oit., p. 31: "We are speaking, however, of such friends as we
ave before our eyes, or as we have seen or have known by re-
port,-of such as are found in common life. It is from these that
we must take our examples, especially from such of them as make
the nearest approach to perfect wisdom."
1Vid. p. 8, n. 4.

2De amioloti 9. 32; Peabody,trans., op. oit., pp. 26, 27:
"But let us have it well understood that the feeling of love and
the endearments of mutual affection spring up from nature naturala
gigni sensum diligendi et benevolentlae oaritatem], in case there
s a well-established assurance of moral worth in the person of
the loved"- De offiolip 11. 9. 32; Peabody, trans., op. oit., pp.
123, 124; "For since that very style of character which we call
right and becoming, in itself gives us pleasure, and by its nature
and aspect captivates the minds of all, and shines forth with the
greatest lustre from the virtues that I have named, we are there-
fore compelled by nature herself to love the persons in whom we
think that these virtues are found [a nature ipsa diligere cogi-
mur]."
3De aaloitia 9. 32.

4De amicitis 21. 80; Peabody, trans., op. olt., p. 57.









to nature.
The love expounded by Cicero having thus been found to be
one of virtue according to nature, it may be asked with perti-
nence, especially in view of what will be set forth as Augustine's
doctrine of love, if this is the only love that Cicero recognizes.
In one passage he catches himself having somehow "digressed from
the friendships of the perfect, that is, wise men,-wise, I mean,
so far as wisdom can fall to the lot of man,-to friendships of
a lighter sort."' There are, then, inferior friendships unworthy
of perfect men, that is, men with such perfection of wisdom as is
attainable. Nor is it surprising that there should be for Cicero
both a relatively perfect love and an imperfect love; for with
the Stoic's regard for the prudence of the wise man Cicero could
scarcely say that the love of that wise man was no better than
that of those who fell short of the sage's wisdom. Moreover,
there would be little cause for writing the moral treatises on
which Cicero expended so much labor were there no distinction of
attachments. He would then have only to say, Love ardently with
the only love wherewith there can be any love; instead he coun-
sels: Contract your friendships prudently.
The objects of the love that discriminates in accordance
with nature are the honest, the honorable and the noble. Cicero
teaches that whether, according to his own view, virtue be the
sole good, or, according to the Peripatetics, it be the chief
good, it is certain that whatever is virtuous is of utility and
he deplores that a separation of the two in order to compare them
was ever made. But such separation is made by the agent of the
inferior love, who, abandoning virtue as the sole object of his
pursuit, hankers after utility and misjudging of the latter--for
only the virtuous is truly of utility-he loves with a base
love.2
The community of virtue whereby the virtuous hall in one
another that which they recognize by nature as good and conse-
quently cherish so as to be drawn thereto and to one another is
an aspect of the Ciceronian doctrine that calls for a closer ex-
amination, especially in view of the Importance of the assoola-


De amloltia 26. 100; Peabody, trans., op. oit., p. 68.

2De offlolis ill.









tion-forming quality of love in Augustine. For neither author is
love the sole assooiative link; both recognize, for instance, the
force of consanguinity. Nevertheless even for Cicero love effects
a powerful drawing together. Indeed, Cicero has uttered nearly
the ultimate in praise of love's conquest of allentation; he does
so in declaring that "man . . craves another whose soul he may
so blend with his own as almost to make one of the two!"1 Now
the loved is loved because of his virtue and when the lover in
turn is virtuous he is also in turn loved and that delectable
reciprocity of love arises which Cicero takes such pleasure in
celebrating. Once virtue has primed the outgoing of love not
only is there an effusion of amare, but a reciprocity of affec-
tion comes into being for which the resourceful Roman coins the
word redamare.2 In order to bring Cicero and Augustine as close
together as possible before indicating differences between them
it must be remarked that the affection-inviting virtue may itself
be love, as is clear from the passage: "For it is not so much
benefit obtained through a friend as it is the very love of the
friend that gives delight,03 i.e., attracts love. Now whether
love be attracted by a virtue that is itself an instance of af-
fection or by some other virtue, there is for the lovers a com-
munity of interests. Cicero counsels "to choose for a friend one
who is . . interested in the same things with ourselves"4 in-
asmuch as dissimilarity of pursuits disengages friendships and the
only thing which keeps the good and the bad apart is the morum
studiorumque distantia, greater than which distantia none can be
found.b It is on account of the unity of the nature which Cicero
expounds and on account of the constancy and universality of its
regime over love and Its objects that for Cicero love cannot vio-

1De amioitia 21. 81; Peabody, trans., op. cit., p. 67.
2De amioitia 14. 49. In ibid. 27. 100, Peabody, trans.,
S ot., "Cicero de Amioltia," p. 69, Cicero asserts with char-
aoteristio felicity of expression that "when . . [virtue] has
put itself forth and shown its light, and has seen and recognized
the same light in another, It draws near to that light, and re-
osives in return what the other has to give; and from this inter-
course love, or friendship,-oall it what you may,--is kindled
[ex quo exardescit sive amor sive amioitia]."
3De amioitia 14. 51; Peabody, trans., op. cit., p. 40.
4De amioitia 18. 65; Peabody, trans., op. cit., p. 49.
5De amioitia 20. 74.









late the principle, "friends have all things in common, and that
a conflict between expediency or utility and unoalculating love
cannot arise, but a man "loves himself not more dearly than he
loves his friend."I
Nevertheless, it is one thing to agree on what kind of
object is lovable and quite another to actually love the lovable.
Indeed, agreement as to what kind of thing is lovable is only one
condition of friendship and, in virtue of being according to na-
ture, perhaps in some sense the most facile. So exacting are the
other conditions of the effective cultivation of friendship that
Cicero teaches that one can have at the most only a few friends.
Consequently, though agreement as to what kind of thing is lovable
actually is coextensive with the universe, the loves of friend-
ship never lay hold effectively on any large circles; in fact,
they embrace nothing more than the parties to friendship, and
therefore the bond of love as expounded by Cicero fails to accom-
plish associations of political scope. Because of its coexten-
siveness, in the view of Cicero, with the world, agreement as to
what deserves being loved with the love of friendship is for him
a bond sufficiently capacious for application to politics. But
agreement as to what kind of thing is worthy of the love of
friendship is agreement as to what is virtuous and therefore as
to what is just. Whereas, then, Augustine's associations, as we
shall see, are those of operating loves, Cicero's associations,
not excluding the limited friendships which he defines in terms
of fellow feeling, are formed by agreement as to right. And
though the right of nature is so universally recognized that all
the world is thereby formed into one commonwealth, still the right
that is agreed to can be so qualified by local legislation as to
be exactly of the scope required for the determination of particu-
lar commonwealths.
The practice of philosophers to subsume under certain no-
tions, chiefly the few organizing concepts of their systems, a
large range of subjects is readily illustrated by Augustine. For
him even knowledge, which must be limited to intelligent beings,
is in a manner extended beyond that limitation inasmuch as plants
"and all other bodily things' in virtue of their perceptible forms

De leglbus i. xil. 33, 34; Yonge, trans., op. oit., p.
413. Vid. De amioltia 14. 50: "eadem bonitas ad multitudinea
pertinet."









"seem to wish to compensate for their own want of knowledge by
providing us with knowledge."1 In the nature of the case the
subsumption of a universal range under the notion of the desire
of perpetuity2 and the notion of love withoutt any qualification)
is more readily accomplished. Augustine applies the latter no-
tion to the whole range of subrational beings not properly in-
cluded in the scope of the love expounded, as we have just ob-
served, by Cicero, from beasts at the top to rooks at the bottom.
For if we were beasts, we should love the fleshly and sensual
life, and this would be our sufficient good; and when it was
well with us in respect of it, we should seek nothing beyond.
In like manner, if we were trees, we could not, indeed, in
the striot sense of the word, love anything; nevertheless we
should seem, as it were, to long for that by which we might
become more abundantly and luxuriantly fruitful. If we were
stones, or waves, or wind, or flame, or anything of that kind,
we should want, indeed, both sensation and life, yet should
possess a kind of attraction towards our own proper position
and natural order. For the specific gravity of bodies is, as
it were, their love, whether they are carried downwards by
their weight, or upwards by their levity. For the body is
borne by its gravity, as the spirit by love, whithersoever it
is borne.
Repeatedly there occurs in Augustine this analogizing of the
spiritual movement of love to aspects of bodily life and behavior.
Not only is love to the soul as weight and moving force are to
the body, in a number of passages in addition to the one just
cited,--in the commentary on Psalm 39 is found the striking state-
ment, ipse amor oursus est4--but love is declared to be the hand
and the foot5 of the spirit. In this analogizing of the several
kinds of movements and appetites Augustine is distinguished from
Cicero despite the notice we have seen the latter take of Empedo-
oles. Even such a nonanalogioal explication of the term as is

1De civitate Del xi. xxvii. 2; PL, XLI, 341; NPNF, II,
221.
2De oivitate Dei xi. xxvii. 1; PL, XLI, 341; NPNF, II,
220: "In fine, even the lifeless bodies, which want not only sen-
sation but seminal life, yet either seek the upper air or sink
deep, or are balanced in an intermediate position, so that they
may protect their existence in that situation where they can exist
in most accordance with their nature."
3De olvitate Dei xi. xxvill; PL, XLI, 342; NPNF, II, 221.

4Enarratio in Psalmum xxxix. 11; PL, XXXVI, 441.

5Enarratio in Psalmum ix. 16; PL, XXXVI, 124.









found in the definition wherein Augustine denies that "love is
anything else than to desire a thing on Its own account"1 is not
unsusceptible of a nonhuman application; it might be pointed out
that just as possessing an attraction has already been used of
the insensate, so the addition of "for Its own sake" or "not for
its own sake" might be made with no great strain on the under-
standing. Nor does the example from the relation of husband and
wife that is used to enforce the gratuitousness of love preclude
the application of the notion of the simplicity of love to the
attraction of one insensate thing for another. For "he does not
love his wife who loves her on account of her dowry; nor does
she love her husband chastely who loves him on this account that
he has Iiven her something or because he has given something
great." As things that cannot possess knowledge yet seem to
compensate for this lack by causing us to know, so things that
are unconscious of the attraction to which they are subjected by
other things can nevertheless seem to us to be either simply at-
tracted or else attracted for the sake of something ulterior.
But when Augustine inquires, "What Is gratuitously?" and answers,
"Himself on His own account, not on that of anything else. For
if you praise God in order that He might give you anything else,
you do not yet love Him freely,,3 it is clear that he is thinking
of rational subjects when he speaks of the freedom of love, for
as the irrational is incapable of being blessed,4 so is it in-
capable, in the proper sense, of praising God either freely or in
consideration of an ulterior object. The conjunction of the as-
sertion, "Since one cannot be blessed through oneself, one loves
something else whence one is blessed,"5 together with the denial
of capacity of beatitude in the irrational shows that in addition
to his analogical conception of love whereby all the world is in
love, there is also, for Augustine, a use of the term which he
restricts entirely to reference to rational beings, viz., God,

1De diversis quaestionibus lxxxiii. xxxv. 1; PL, XL, 23.

Enarratio in Psalmum lv. 17; PL, XXXVI, 658.

3Enarratio in Psalmum 1111. 10; PL, XXXVI, 628.
4Do olvitate Dei xii. 1. 2; PL, XLI, 349; NPNF, II, 226.

%Sermo de discipline Christiana vi. 6; PL, XL, 672.









angels, and men.
Although what one loves is always what one regards as
the fountain of his joy, nevertheless inasmuch as it is possible
to be mistaken as to what is the source of one's happiness, loves
are distinguished as to whether they are directed to the true
source or to a false one. And although the false sources of hap-
piness are many, in the important characteristic of their being
false they are regarded as one, with the result that there is a
sharp bifurcation of love in the doctrine of Augustine. Whereas
in Cioero the tendency is to minimize or treat faintly the lower
element of his division of love, in Augustine both the love that
is directed to what ought to be loved and that which pursues a
false spring of beatitude receive a very ample treatment. There
is, then, the love for the true source of good, an ascending love,
and a love for false sources of good, a descending love. And al-
though Augustine is not rigidly consistent as to the names he ap-
plies to the rigidly distinguished loves, caritas designates the
ascending kind, oupiditas the descending.2 The two loves are in-
compatible3 and the increase of the one is the decrease of the
other.4 On the other hand, not only are the two incompatible
loves able to coexist in a man, but the coexistence is beneficial
to the end that the higher may displace the lower.5
Caritas is the virtue by which the proper object of love


1Enarratio in Psalmum oxxii. 1; PL, XXXVII, 1629, 1630:
"Omnis amor aut asoendit, aut descendit. Desiderio enim bono
levamur ad Deum, et desiderio malo ad ima praeolpitamur."

2Enarratio in Psalmum ix. 15; PL, XXXVI, 124: amorr: qui
oum pravus est, vooatur oupiditas aut libido; cum autem rectus,
dileotio vel caritas."' Enarratio in Psalmum xxxi. 5: PL, XXXVI,
260: "Amor Dei, amor proximi, oaritas dioitur; amor mundi, amor
huius *aeculi, cupiditas dioitur."

3Sermo cxxv. 7; PL, XLVIII, 694; "Amor maeouli non com-
patitur amorem Dei.... Non enim protest amare quod aeternum est,
nisi destiterit amare quod temporale est."

4De diversis uaestionibus ixxxxili. xxxvi. 1; PL, XL,
25;"Nutrimentum elus Loaritatis] est, imminutio oupiditatis; per-
feotio, nulla oupiditaa."

6De oivitate Dei xi. xxvii; PL, XLI, 342: "Possunt enim
ambo [amores] esse in uno homine, et hoc bonum est homini, ut
illo proflolente quo bene vivimus, iste deficit quo male vivimus,
donee ad perfeotum sanetur, et in bonum oommutetur omne quod vivi-
mus."









is loved, the affection of joy in the Lord on His own account
and in one's neighbor also on God's account.2 The only one who
grants charity is God, the true object of love, and He does so
for the sake of Jesus Christ3 through the Holy Ghost.4
Cupiditas is the enjoyment of creatures which is not on
God's account.5 It is the love of that of which one can be un-
willingly dispossessed.6 And designating a love that disregards
the Creator Who is to be loved and through Whom alone any of His
creatures is to be desired, the word is used, as has been inti-
mated, in a bad sense. If the origin of oupiditas be inquired
after, caritas having been found to be the gift of God, the an-
swer is of course that it is not from God, being, indeed, unique
in all the universe in the characteristic of not being from Him.8
Cupiditas is defective, arising from a failure to appropriate
God's gift of oaritas whereby He alone is loved. For, to tran-
scribe the heading of the seventh chapter of Book XII of De civi-
tate Dei, "the efficient cause of an evil will is not to be in-

1Epistolarum olassis III olxvii. iv. 15; PL, XXXIII, 739:
"Virtus eat caritas, qua id quod diligendum est diligitur."
2De dootrina Christiana 111. 10. 16; PL, XXXIV, 72: "Carl-
tatem vooo motum animi ad fruendum Dec propter Ipsum, et se atque
proximo propter Deum."
3De civitate Dei xxi. 16; PL, XLI, 730: "[Dei amorem]
quem nisi Deus Ipse non donat, nee aliter nisi per Mediatorem Dei
et hominum hominem Jesum Christum, qui factus est partioeps mor-
talitatis nostrae, ut nos participes faceret divinitatis suae."
4Epistolarum olassis III ooxviii. 2; PL, XXXIII, 990:
"Quia et ipsa oaritas Del, quae perfect foras mittit timorem (I
Joan. IV, 18), non per vires nostras, id eat humans, diffunditur
in cordibus nostrils, sed slout diolt Apostolus, per Spiritum sano-
tum qui datus est nobis (Rom. V, 5)."
5De doctrina Christiana 111. 10. 16; PL, XXXIV, 72:
"Cupiditatem autem [vooo], motum animi ad fruendum se et proximo
et quolibet corpore non propter Deum."
6De libero arbitrio 1. 4. 10; PL, XXXII, 1227: "Quam
[oupiditatem] ease jam apparent earum rerum amorem, quas potest
quisque invitus amittere."

7De sermon Domini in monte 11. 22. 75; PL, XXXIV, 1303:
"Nam in malis flagitiosisque faotis oupiditas proprie dicitur."

8Enarratio in Psalmum xxxii. 12; PL, XXXVI, 291: "Est
enim mala oupiditas, quae non est a Dec."










quired after.' The causes of the bad will are deficient, not ef-
fiolent, and a desire to know them is as erring as the desire to
see darkness, which, while Indeed known to the eye, is known non
sane in specie, sed in species privatione.1
The word "enjoyment," fruit, has occurred in what has been
set forth as Augustine's explication of the notions of caritas
and oupiditas and this is the place in which to note its relation
to those notions as well as to uti in the Augustinian usage,
which usage is illustrated in a statement that occurs appropri-
ately in the chapter in De civitate Del entitled "Concerning the
Cause and Obstinacy of Cain's Crime, Whom the Word of God Did Not
Recall From His Atrocious Thought": "The good indeed so use the
world that they might enjoy God, but the evil on the other hand
wish to make use of God in order that they might enjoy the
world."2 God is to be enjoyed, only enjoyed, and alone enjoyed;
creatures are to be used, only used, and alone used, except that
one may enjoy oneself and one's neighbor,3 but only propter Deum.
For while insisting upon the preeminence of God, the great bipar-
tite commandment orders man to love his neighbor as himself, thus
imposing the requirement of love for three objects. And that
Augustine takes seriously the commandment to love oneself he
shows by making it an argument for the abandonment of evil in
that he asks: "If therefore you love iniquity, do you think that
you love yourself?"4 Frui and uti, then, are related to each
other in such a way that the objects of oaritas are properly the
objects of fruit and those of oupiditas the proper objects of uti,
uti, however, thus defined being in some range necessary to good
men, whereas oupiditas is altogether forbidden.
Such being the character of oaritas and oupiditas it fol-
lows that they are respectively the roots of all good and of all
evil. The emotions and affections that spring from a holy and

De oivitate Del xii. 7; PL, XLI, 355.

De ocivitate Del xv. 7. 1; PL, XLI, 443, 444: "Boni
quippe ad hoe utuntur mundo, ut fruantur Deo: mall autem contra,
ut fruantur mundo, uti volunt Dec."
3Vid. supra, p. 16, n. 2.
4Enarratio in Psalmum cxl. 2; PL, XXXVII, 1816.

5Enarratio in Psalmum xo. 8; PL, XXXVII, 1154: "Quomodo
enia radix omnium malorum oupiditas (TTim. VI, 10), sic radix
omnium bonorum caritas est."









18
charitable heart, although they are associated with the weakness
of this present life, are nevertheless good regardless of how the
Stoics decry them.1 On the other hand continence is good only
2
when practised seoundum fidem summit boni, which good is God. So
necessary is oaritas to the goodness of affections that even the
love of members of one's family must be according to Christ in
order to pass Judgment. In the absence of charity knowledge it-
self "does no good, but inflates a man or magnifies him with an
empty windiness."3
It is natural, then, that virtue should be defined in re-
lation to love even as the order of love, for to love God, Who is
supreme and alone good in Himself, and whatever else is loved,
only on His account, this is good love and all other loves are
bad.
When the miser prefers his gold to Justice [itself a term, as
we shall see, to be defined in terms of order], it is through
no fault of the gold, but of the man; and so with every cre-
ated thing. For though it be good, it may be loved with an
evil as well as with a good love: it is loved rightly when it
is loved ordinately; evilly, when inordinately. It is this
which some one has briefly said in these verses in praise of
the Creator: "These are Thine, they are good, because Thou
art good who didst create them. There is in them nothing of
ours, unless the sin which we commit when we forget the order
of things, and instead of Thee love that which Thou hast
made."
But if the Creator is truly loved, that is, if He Himself
is loved and not another thing in His stead, He cannot be
evilly loved; for love itself is to be ordinately loved, be-
cause we do well to love that which, when we love it, makes
us live well and virtuously. So that it seems to me that it
is a brief but true definition of virtue to say, it is the
order of love; and on this account, in the Canticles, the
bride of Christ, the city of God, sings, "Order love within
me."4
Indeed, the two terms of love and order in which this
definition of virtue is made are the two concepts about which the
material in the larger part of this study is organized. So far
love has been considered; next will be considered order, not
without reference to that love which is in such great need of

1De civitate Dei xiv. 8, 9; PL, XLI, 411-417.

De civitate Dei xv. 20. 1; PL, XLI, 463.

3De oivitate Dei ix. 20; PL, XLI, 273; NPNF, II, 177.

*De civitate Dei xv. 22; PL, XLI, 467; NPNF, II, 303.










ordering. But before passing from the one to the other we have
yet to see if the two loves that we have found to be sharply dis-
tinguished by Augustine, i.e., caritas and oupiditas, are oharao-
terized as the former of associations.
Despite the foreknown event that by the advent of sin has
made mankind, though propagated from one individual--"if they are
men they are from Adam"l--more bellicose within its species than
are lions and dragons within theirs, though propagated from many
individuals, God does so prize unity that that propagation from
one individual was nevertheless instituted for the edification of
those who through remission of sins are joined again into a bliss-
ful unity,, inasmuch as the carnal are divided among themselves,
whereas the spiritual are in no way sundered." For
God created only one single man, not, certainly, that he
might be a solitary, bereft of all society, but that by this
means the unity of society and the bond of concord might be
be more effectually commended to him, men being bound to-
gether not only by similarity of nature, but by family affec-
tion. And indeed He did not even create the woman who was to
be given him as wife, as He created man, but created her out
of the man, that the whole race might derive from one man.4
So inadequate a moment of unification has that "certain communion
of a single and identical nature" become that although bound to-
gether by it
the society of mortals spread abroad throughout the earth
everywhere, and in the most diverse places, . . is yet
for the most part divided against itself, and the strongest
oppress the others, because all follow after their own Inter-
ests and lusts, while what is longed for either suffices for
none, or not for all, because it is not the very thing. For
the vanquished succumb to the victorious, preferring any sort
of peace and safety to freedom itself; so that they who choose
to die rather than be slaves have been greatly wondered at.
For in almost all nations the very voice of nature somehow
proclaims, that those who happen to be conquered should choose
rather to be subject to their conquerors than be killed by all
kinds of warlike destruction.5
Nevertheless, despite the inequity and oppression of governments,
government is itself another moment of unification. For by Rome,

1De civitate Del xvi. 8. 2; PLL, XLI, 487; NPNF, II, 315.

De civltate Dei xil. 22; PL, XLI, 372, 373; NPNF, II,
241.
3De oivitate Dei xvi. 24. 2; PL, XLI, 502.
4De oivitate Dei xll. 21; PL, XLI, 372; NPNF, II, 241.

5De oivitate Del xviii. 2. 1; PL, XLI, 560; NPNF, II, 361,
362.










"a second Babylon,""God was pleased to conquer the whole world,
and subdue it far and wide by bringing it into one fellowship of
government and laws."1 Augustine's high regard for the civic
moment of unification he reveals in a comment made in connection
with an account of David, the musician-king: "For the rational
and well ordered concord of diverse sounds in harmonious variety
suggests the compact unity of the well-ordered city."2 Certainly
one in whose reflections the concept "orchestra" drew after it
that of "municipal" or "metropolitan" not because of the sponsor-
ship but because of the sheer order of municipal organization and
function had a very high opinion of the latter.
But it is evident that for Augustine even this choicest
bond of governmental and legal association has been vitiated by
sin and that something stronger still is required to bind men to-
gether.
The most potent bond of all is love. "Charity . .
does not sunder unity, whose strongest chain she herself is."3
Something of the appropriative and transferential power of love
as Augustine expounds the term is suggested by an assertion in
the admonitory conclusion of an epistle to a Roman woman refugee:
"Let each of you do what she can: what the one cannot do she does
in her who can, if in the other she loves what that other in like
manner does not do because she is unable."4
Even in the absence of explicit statement in Augustine
that it is love which exerts the greatest associative force, one
might conclude as much from the rest of his doctrine. For "those
who have this good [that of drawing nigh to God] in common, have,
both with Him to whom they draw near, and with one another, a
holy fellowship, and form one city of God--His living sacrifice,
and His living temple."5 If, then, a holy society is realized in

1De civitate Del xvlli. 22; PL, XLI, 578; NPNF, II, 372.

De civitate Dei xvii. 14; PL. XLI 547; NPNF, II, 352.
There is thus a sense in which the phrase "municipal orchestra"
is redundant.
3De diversis quaestionibus ad Simpliclanum 11. 10; PL,
XL, 137.

4Epistolarum classics III oxxx. 16. 31; PL, XXXIII, 607.

5Epistolarum olassis IV oclviii. 1; PL, XXXIII, 1071.







21
them that draw nigh unto God; if all who absent themselves from
His do so by defect of love; if as they have defective loves they
are also associated in unities vitiated by divisiveness; if,
finally, all other moments of association are impotent to hold
men together, it must be that love binds and that perfect love
binds perfectly.
In explication of the structure of Augustine's love asso-
ciation we submit three passages:
Of amioltia, regarding Cicero's definition of which Augus-
tine observes that it is expressed "most truly,"1 the latter as-
serts that "it has its being not apart from mutual love."2 With
the mutual love of this statement is to be compared the words sub-
stituted by Augustine for Cicero's in the definition of "people":
"associated by common agreement concerning the things which it
desires."3 The latter expression, to be sure, does not contain
the phrase "common love," nevertheless if there is agreement as
to the objects of love there is common love, for love is common
in virtue of being directed toward one object and being felt by
several subjects. We have, then, from the first passage a mutual
love, and from the second a common love. The relation of these
two is set forth in a third passage, in which Augustine illustrates
by the theater, which he rightly deplores, the genesis and charac-
ter of a love association.
For in the theaters, dens of iniquity though they be, if a man
is fond of a particular actor, and enjoys his art as a great
or even as the very greatest good, he is fond of all who join
with him in admiration of his favorite, not for their own
sakes, but for the sake of him whom they admire in common;
and the more fervent he is in his admiration, the more he
works in every way to assure new admirers for him, and the
more anxious he becomes to show him to others; and if he find
anyone comparatively indifferent, he does all he can to ex-
cite his interest by urging his favorite merits: itf, however,
he meet with any one who opposes him, he is exceedingly dis-
pleased by such a man's contempt 2f his favorite, and strives
in every way he can to remove it.
Let us seek in a comparison of relations of varying in-

1Epistolarum classis IV oolvii. 1; PL, XXXIII, 1071.

2De fide rerum guae non videntur 1. 2. 4; PL, XL, 173.

aDe oivitate Dei xix. 24; PL, XLI, 655. Vid. supra, p.


4De dootrina Christiana i. 29. 30; PL, XXXIV, 30; NPNF,


II, 5530.










volvement to understand the structure of a love association as
formed between two principals.



A ------- B


Fig. 1

If A loves B for the sake, for instance, of B's prodigal-
ity, a friendly association cannot merely on this account be af-
firmed to exist between them, for B may avoid A.


A B


Fig. 2

If A continues in that love for B and B loves A on ac-
count of, for instance, his musical talent, a friendly associa-
tion of one kind exists, for there is mutual love. But there is
no common love.








A B

Fig. 3

If A and B love the same object a common love exists, but
not a mutual love without their recognizing and loving, laterally,
each the other's love for the primary object, which may be called
the frontal love.







A -------.-- B


Fig. 4









If A recognizes and loves B's love for the object of a
common love but B fails to love A with a like love, conceivably
out of Ignorance that there is a common love, then a friendly as-
soolation exists no more than in the first situation.










Fig. 5

If A loves B for B's love of an object loved in common
and B loves A for A's love of another object loved in common, then
mutual love exists, and, In virtue of a mutual love, a friendly
association. But the lateral loves being due to different common
loves, an association more complex than necessary for friendship
has arisen. The fifth structure Is really a compound of two of
the second kind of structures, with the relations turned about.







A B

Fig. 6

The simplest love association in Xirtue of a common love
is one in which the lateral loves are due to a single common love.
Augustine's love association formed by oaritas is obvi-
ously of the sixth type of relation, for all who love God neces-
sarily love the same being. Even oupiditae associations may be
of this type, as that of the theater-goers in the citation, for
they love the same actor.
Let us now examine the friendships expounded by Cicero in
order to ascertain their type. Consider his statement: "Since
virtue attracts friendship, as I have said, if there shines forth
any manifestation of virtue with which a mind similarly disposed
can come Into contact and union, from such intercourse love must








24
of necessity spring."1 It is perhaps easily assumed that Cicero's
love structure corresponds to Augustine's in the important char-
acteristic of including both, to repeat the use of terms we have
already adopted, frontal and lateral affections and to proceed to
the question whether there is anything to prevent the "significa-
tion of virtue" which attracts the friend from being that of a
specific virtue rather than of the generic goodness which includes
all virtues. If the virtue loved is generic goodness itself the
structure would be of the simple sixth type and an association
structure identical to Augustine's were in being. But if the sig-
nification of virtue in A loved by B is his cherishing benevolence
and that in B loved by A is B's pursuing peace with all men, then
we should have a structure of the fifth type. It should be re-
marked that if this were the case Cicero would still supply for
the two objects each of a common love a nexus in the universal and
constant nature which proclaims its standard in every heart; that,
In fact, difference of the common loves in consideration of which
the lateral loves come into being is precluded by the community of
this nature which makes all men recognize and value the same ob-
jects. For whereas in another system it is conceivable that while
two men actually loved the same two virtues they yet thought each
the other to love only one, the one supposing the other to love
the one virtue and the other supposing this one to love the other
virtue, so that the friendship would be of the fifth type of rela-
tion, this cannot be the case In Cicero's system, or at least it
cannot be among men who not only act according to nature but also
know that nature prescribes the same for all men, for nature pre-
scribes that all men should esteem alike. Since Cicero further-
more speaks elsewhere of the common interests of friends it would
seem clear that his love associations, like those of Augustine,
are of the sixth type, of which simple associations it is to be
remarked that for Augustine any number may be superimposed one
upon another. However, it is exceedingly important to observe
that the distinction between what we have called frontal and lat-
eral loves is, in fact, at least not clear in Cicero's system.
What lovers love in each other is not, as it is for Augustine,
their loving common objects of love but it is their virtue, which
may indeed be that of a virtuous love. Since it is on account of


1Vid. p. 7, n. 3; of. p. 9, n. 2.










the virtue of the beloved that he is loved, Cicero's love struc-
ture is of types one and two rather than of the more elaborate
kinds, in which distinction is made between the so-called frontal
and lateral affections, and is thus simpler than Augustine's. If
A loves B for the sake of B's virtue, unilateral love exists. If
at the same time B loves A for the sake of the same virtue or of
some other virtue, love is requited and friendship is in being.
While for Augustine the lateral bonds of a common so-called fron-
tal love draw together all lovers sharing the frontal love, for
Cicero love has only the frontal aspect and is directed to the
man in whom is recognized an embodiment or "signification" of vir-
tue. Now although judgment as to what is virtuous is for Cicero
uniform in all creatures, nevertheless embodiment of virtue is
not universal nor is it uniform in those who are virtuous. In-
deed, the embodiment, exhibition, and appreciation of virtue in
friends requires such attention that, as we have observed, a man
can have but few friends. Furthermore, whether the embodiment be
facile or not,the very fact that it is embodiment of virtue rather
than love of some common object of love that is loved--the love
thus loved being loved in addition to the object of frontal love--
limits the scope of the Ciceronian love association to two princi-
pals, whereas in Augustine the scope is illimitable, except as
competition over a finite object disrupts love associations.
Thus the scope of love associations is different for
Cicero from what it is for Augustine by virtue of the difference
of the structure of their associations. Furthermore there is a
difference between the presentations of the two writers in regard
to the quality of love associations. Cicero insists so strongly
upon the virtuous conditions of friendship that it is by the co-
hesiveness of the good love according to his system that his love
associations, friendships, are formed. In Augustine, on the other
hand, associations are formed as easily by inordinate love as by
orderly love, except that where the love is for the proper object,
the Highest, there is no competition, whereas associations formed
by cupiditas have their cohesion disturbed and counteracted by
sundering moments, the common love of any object other than God
being a competitive love because of the private pull of each lov-
er's self.
For the possession of goodness is by no means diminished by
being shared with a partner either permanent or temporarily










assumed; on the contrary the possession of goodness is in-
creased in proportion to the concord and charity of each of
those who share it. In short, he who is unwilling to share
his possession cannot have it; and he who is most willing to
admit others to a share of it will have the greatest abun-
dance to himself. The quarrel, then, between Romulus and
Remus shows how the earthly city is divided against itself;
that which fell out between Cain and Abel illustrated the
hatred that subsists between the two cities, that of God and
that of men. The wicked war with the wicked; the good also
war with the wicked. But with the good, good men, or at
least perfectly good men, cannot war; though, while only go-
ing on towards perfection, they war to this extent, that
every good man resists others in those points in which he re-
sists himself. And in each individual "the flesh lustith
against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh.'"
For Augustine there is just as fundamental a bifurcation
of association among rational beings as there is of love. For it
is precisely the point of this section of our study that the basic
twofold classification of society is exactly the consequence of
the grand division of amor into caritas and cupiditas. If caritas
is essentially distinct from all other love, the individuals who
possess it must be formed by its associative power into a community
distinct from all others. And if cupiditas in the great multitude
of its forms in the disordered race of usurpations is principally
distinct from caritas, then there must be a homogeneity of un-
heavenliness in all the discordant fragments that fall outside
the celestial community. For whatever communities, i.e., sharing,
of love there are, they must, in consequence of the associative-
ness of each love, result in as many societies.
That, after the basic distinction has been made, there
should be many societies for Augustine is obvious when one consid-
ers that beside the rationality of its citizens community of love
is made the only earmark of being a people--and certainly the au-
thor of De civitate Dei had a lively sense of the ethnic diversity
of mankind. Of the subdivisions that follow upon the basic bi-
furcation of society into the city of God and the city terrestrial
are those formed by taking account of the distinction between be-
ings human and angelic. The angelic beings, as we shall observe
in the next chapter, differ from men in being without earthly

1De oivitate Dei xv. 5; PL, XLI, 441, 442; NPNF, II, 287.
Cf. De civitate Dei v. 24; PL, XET, 170, 171; NPNF,--I, 105:
Kings "are happy . . if they fear, love, and worship God; if
more than their own they love that kingdom in which they are not
afraid to have partners."










bodies--Augustine asserts they have aerial-, in being immortal,
and in the possession of a higher mode of knowledge, the "noonday
knowledge" of apprehension "in the wisdom of God."1 By the in-
tersection of the line separating the angelic nature from the
human and of that between the two loves four groups are distin-
guished, those of blessed angels and of reprobate, and those of
devout human beings and of wilful. It must be noted, however,
that the distinction between the human and angelica natures is for
Augustine so secondary in comparison with the distinction of loves
that he asserts,
I see that I must first, so far as I can, adduce what may
demonstrate that it is not incongruous and unsuitable to speak
of a society composed of angels and men together; so that
there are not four cities or sooieties,--two, namely, of an-
gels and as many of men,-but rather two in all, one composed
of the good, the other of the wicked, angels or men indiffer-
ently.2
Our study of the Augustinian doctrine of love and itr as-
sociations leads us, then, to a recognition of two societies, the
distinction of which and, naturally, the praise and felicitation
of the glorious one of which, are the purpose of the composition
of De oivitate Dei.
Accordingly, two cities have been formed by two loves: the
earthly by the love of self, even to the contempt of God; the
heavenly by the love of God, even to the contempt of self.
The former, in a word, glories in itself, the latter in the
Lord. .. . The one lifts up its head in its own glory; the
other says to its God, "Thou art my glory and the lifter up
of my head." In the one, the princes and the nations it sub-
dues are ruled by the love of ruling; in the other, the
princes and the subjects serve one another in love, the lat-
ter obeying, while the former take thought for all. The one
delights in its own strength, represented in the persons of
its rulers; the other says to its God, "I love Thee, 0 Lord,
my strength." And therefore the wise men of the one city,
living according to man, have sought for profit to their own
bodies or souls, or both, and those who have known God "glor-
ified Him not as God, neither were thankful, but became vain
in their imaginations, and their foolish heart was darkened;
professing themselves to be wise,"-that is, glorying in
their own wisdom, and being possessed by pride,-- they became
fools, and changed the glory of the incorruptible God into an
image made like to corruptible man, and to birds, and four-
footed beasts, and creeping things." For they were either
leaders or followers of the people in adoring images, "and
worshipped and served the creature more than the Creator, who

1De oivitate Dei xi. 29; PL, XLI, 343; NPNF, II, 222.

2e oivitate Dei xii. 1. 1, PL, XLI, 349; NPNF, II, 226.









28
is blessed for ever."
It is on the score of the prevalence of this very idolatry that
Augustine is obliged to deny the justice of the Roman state and
to alter the definition of nationality.
But in the other city there is no human wisdom, but only god-
liness, which offers due worship to the true God, and looks
for its reward in the society of the saints, of holy angels
as well as holy men, "that God might be all in all.T1

1De civitate Dei xiv. 28; PL, XLI, 436; NPNF, II, 282,
283.












CHAPTER II


JUSTICE AND RELATED CONCEPTS


The foregoing study of love is germane to this inquiry
because of the importance of love for Augustine rather than for
Cicero, and the latter's doctrine of love is treated in order to
set forth the difference. Cicero recognizes, as we have seen,
both a qualitative distinction of attachments and their cohesive-
ness but is preoccupied with the natural regime that dictates
universally what ought to be loved by saying what is good and,
particularly, what is just. Indeed, it is agreement as to what
is just--together with common advantage--that for him binds to-
gether a people. Augustine, on the other hand, is obliged to re-
ject a definition of "people" in terms of justice and to substi-
tute one in terms of the notion that in Cicero is quite secondary.
In turning from love to justice we take up the examination of a
concept prominent for both authors: for Cicero because he, as we
have just remarked, uses it in the definition of the state; for
Augustine because he, though rejecting such use of it, goes to
considerable length in explicating the term he is obliged to re-
ject in the definition of "people. Justice is then of importance
to both authors if only because it is central to the earlier,
while the latter has given us an avowedly self-comparing study in
relation to the earlier. Nevertheless, even in a non-comparative
study by Augustine, in a work even on the two civitates wherein
he set forth his doctrine independently of consideration of any
other political philosophy, justice would figure, if not neces-
sarily in its own part strictly, at least by its connection with
order, which is eminently an important concept for Augustine.
The preceding explanation of Augustine's doctrine of love has
been made of necessity not without some regard for the place of
order; to set forth with any fulness his doctrine of order is to
expound a large part of his thought and to make evident why jus-
tice is so different for Augustine from what it is for Cicero
that whereas pagan Rome was, in Cicero's view, eminently just in
29









its best days, for Augustine it never could be just.
But first we must expound the Ciceronian doctrine of jus-
tioe.
In defining justice as"the distributing to each the
things that are his," Cicero adopts a description of great our-
renoy among the ancients. This description Augustine himself
adopts; therefore even if there were any disinclination to pro-
ceed with the inquiry how that which is due each one is to be
determined, Augustine's acceptance of this definition compels us
to go on.
Justice is determined by law. Laelius the lawyer is an
adept in the profession "without which . . no one can know
what is his own and what is another's."1 Law, in turn, is of two
kinds, the civil (lex oivilis), for example, that of the Quirites,
and the natural (lex naturee, "that common law of nature which
forbids," for instance, "that anything should belong to anyone,
except to a man who knows how to use and employ it wisely.'2
Philus, speaking in De re public in the assumed manner of Car-
neades, argues at some length that the civil law of particular
states is inconsistent; ranging from country to country or from
period to period one finds opposites in force. It is, however,
Cicero's doctrine that opposition of civil law or private conver-
sation to the law of nature can not be successfully maintained.
The constancy and universality of that law Laelius celebrates in
the much-quoted passage:
There is in fact a true law--namely, right reason--which
is in accordance with nature, applies to all men, and is un-
changeable and eternal. By its commands this law summons men
to the performance of their duties; by its prohibitions it re-
strains them from doing wrong. Its commands and prohibitions
always influence good men, but are without effect upon the bad.
To invalidate this law by human legislation is never morally

1De re publioa 1. 13, 20; On the Commonwealth, G. H. Sa-
bine and D. B. Smith, trans. (Columbus: Ohio State Univ. Press,
1929), p. 118. Of. De re public v. 2. 3, where it is asserted
that in the most kingly function of expounding justice was em-
braced the interpretation of lus. "(Nihil esse tam) regale quan
explanationem aequitatis, in qua luris erat interpretation That
lus is here to be related to the Judiciary is apparent from the
context, wherein Cicero observes, 'neo vero quisquam privatus erat
disceptator aut arbiter litis, sed omnia oonficiebantur iudiliis
reglea."
2De re publioa 1. 17. 27; Sabine and Smith, trans.,. o2.
oit., p. 122.









right, nor is it permissible ever to restrict its operation,
and to annul it is wholly impossible. Neither the senate nor
the people oan absolve us from our obligation to obey this
law, and it requires no Sextius Aellus to expound and inter-
pret it. It will not lay down one rule at Rome and another
at Athens, nor will it be one rule today and another tomorrow.
But there will be one law, eternal and unchangeable, binding
at all times upon all peoples; and there will be, as it were,
one common master and ruler of men, namely God, who is the
author of this law, its interpreter, and sponsor. The man
who will not obey it will abandon his better self, and, in
denying the true nature of a man, will thereby suffer the se-
verest of penalties, though he has e caped all the other con-
sequences which men oall punishment.
Our search for the determination of justice thus brings
us to right reason. There is no place nor time outside the regime
of right reason, and right reason is always and everywhere con-
sistent with itself, it being "unchangeable and eternal" and leg-
islating with a single voice. Now if universal right reason
yields one universal statement of what is just and if a people is
such in virtue of agreement as to what is justice, then there is
but one people or political order and its affair is one common-
wealth. This consequence of the one commonwealth, however, does
not preclude the formation of various associations therein by
agreement regarding particular ius determined-by-olvil law, such
as that of the Romans. But the associations formed by agreement
concerning particular ius never fall without the whole of the one
commonwealth and no degree of particularization of the local iuM
divests or excuses him who consents to it from participation in
the affair of the one universal order, of which he is necessarily
and immediately a member.
In regard to universal reasonableneps of men it is very
important to observe that Cicero is confident in the operation of
this right judgment of men not when they sit down in reflection
but when they are active in the interests of the state. Nor can
he be certain of the reasonableness of any single individual--nor
indeed of a single era--; such certainty as we can have as to the
correctness of any judgment or the prudence of any action is to be
had only by viewing them in the light of the wisdom embodied in
the exceedingly venerable and richly composite Roman empire.
There are Platonic strains in Cicero's thought, even Pythagorean

1De re publioa ill. 22. 33; Sabine and Smith, trans., OE.
dit., pp. 215, 216.










echoes, as in Scipio's Dream. There is the "eternal and divine'
the sole reflection on which, with a contempt for all things hu-
man and inferior to wisdom, is so exalted as not to be excelled
even by the kingly prerogative.1 There are the mathematically
organized heavens and there is the number seven, the knot with
which the universe is tied.2 Scipio pronounces them 'the common
teachers of educated men, who see with their eyes, as it were,
those things which we hardly know by hearsay.' In reply to Lae-
lius' inquiry who these might be he answers, "Those who by their
investigations into natural philosophy have come to the conclusion
that the whole world (is governed) by (a single) mind."3 On the
other hand passages which either deny the adequacy of contempla-
tion or disparage its exercise in the making of a statesman not
only occur in De re public but are more in accord with its gen-
eral tenor. Thus the studies of the Greeks, while it is conceded
that they have a bearing on the commonwealth, are conceived to do
so by slightly sharpening the wit of boys that they might the more
easily learn what is of greater consequence.4 Service to the
state is "the chief mark or duty of the good"; consequently the
matters of major consequence, of greater concern even than events
in the heavens, are those at hand in the Roman community.8 "There-
- fore," pleads Oicero by the mouth of the interlocutor, 'if you "
1 please, bring down your conversation from the remote heavens to
these nearer topics of earth."7 To be carefully remarked is the
sharp antithesis between "discussions" and "acts and accomplish-
ments" in such a statement of Cioero's as the following:

IDe re public i. 17. 28; Sabine and Smith, trans., op.
cit., p. 123.
2De re publioa vi. 18. 18.

3De re public 1. 36, 56; Sabine and Smith, trans., og.
cit., p. 141.
4De re publioa i. 18. 30.

De re publioa 1. 20. 35; Sabine and Smith, trans., op.
olt., p. 126.
6De re publioa i. 19. 32; Sabine and Smith, trans., op.
cit., p. 126.
7
De re publics 1. 21. 34; Sabine and Smith, trans., op.
cit., p. 127.








33
Certainly, though all the discussions of philosophers
contain abundant sources of excellence and knowledge, never-
theless I fear that, if their arguments be compared with the
acts and aooomplishments of statesmen, they will seem to have
brought less profit to men's serious concerns than delight to
their leisure.
In contrast to the republic of Plato, which we have already seen
the Roman characterize as fanciful and umbrageous,2 Cicero is
certain that there is nothing shadowy about his own ideal state,
concrete, historical Rome. Nor is it clumsy and bungling for all
its historicity. What Solpio describes by his narrative of the
Roman kings, Laelius acclaims "as it were a perfect common-
wealth."3 Not only is Rome for Cicero the perfect state; she is
the perfecting state, for her borrowed Institutions--Rome being
the handiwork not exclusively of Romana--were perfected In the
appropriation.4 If it be said that the construction of the Romans
was superior to Plato's republic because more men had worked on
the Roman constitution than on that of the dialogue, the answer
is that this Is only part of the reason. For, as we have ob-
served,5 not even a synthetic genius of unwonted years could
without practice create the Roman constitution. The criticism
of Plato's description, therefore, is not merely that he had
written too hurriedly--the longest lifetime would not have suf-
ficed-Plato had also looked in the wrong direction, or, more ao-
curately, he had looked too exclusively to the heavens.
This statement of Cicero's distrust of speculation is con-
firmed by his prescribing for the perfect state not a rule by
philosophers but a mixed constitution such as that of Rome, in
which were joined monarchy and democracy with aristocracy in order
that permanence of the state might be achieved through tension and
equilibrium of forces.
Thus Cicero is seen to have regarded the Roman ordinances
worked out by many individuals through a long succession of years
as the highest expression of the legislation of right reason.
Therefore, for him the question, What is just? becomes the in-
quiry, What has Rome said and done about it?

1De re publioa 1. FRG. 5; Sabine and Smith, trans., oR.
cit., p. 153.
2Vid. supra, p. 8. 3De re public 11. 11. 22.
4Ibid. 11. 16. 30. 5Vid. supra, p. 8.










For Augustine justice is determined by order, it being
the virtue by which natural order is preserved.1 "Order," in
turn, "is the disposition that assigns to each of things equal
and unequal its proper place."2 Order, then, is the allotment of
places that takes into account equality and inequality of nature,
Order is natural rank, i.e., gradation according to excellence of
natures. Through Its determination by order.justice is the vir-
tue which makes allotment according to being. Gradation is so
eminently important a characteristic of Augustine's thought that
its principle and the hierarchy that it recognizes call for spe-
cial attention.
Gradation is according to degree of being.
For since God is the supreme essence, that is to say, su-
premely is, and is therefore unchangeable, the things that He
created out of nothing He granted that they should be, but
not to be supremely, as He Himself is [supremely]; to some He
gave to be more amply, to others less; and thus He ordered
natures by grades of essence. .. . Consequently, to the
nature which supremely is, and which created all else that is,
no nature is contrary save that which is not.3
But degree of being is not the only principle of gradation em-
ployed by Augustine; for instance, he asserts that were the an-
gels without certitude of their participation of eternal bliss,
men, who may have such assurance, would be their superiors. How-
ever, such other principles are reducible to that of degree of
being, as all inferiority Is privation of being.
From this assertion of the being and the principle of the
hierarchy let us proceed to its exposition.
There is a Good Whose simplicity and unchangeability set
Him off from all other goods,5 that Is, from all else that Is,

1Cf. De olvitate Dei xix. 4. 4; PL, XLI, 629: ".... Jus-
titia, oulus munus est sua ouique tribuere (unde fit in ipso
homine quidam justus ordo naturae, ut anima subdatur Dec et ani-
mae caro, ao per hoc Dec et anima et oaro)."
2De oivitate Dei xix.-13. 1; PL, XLI, 640: "Ordo est parl-
um dispariumque rerum sua ouique looaTrilbuens disposition "
3De civitate Del xil. 2; PL, XLI, 350: NPNF, II, 227.

4De oivitate Dei xi. 13; PL, XLI, 329:"Porro autem sl nos
oerti sumus, nunquam nos ex illa Immortali felicitate casuros,
illi vero certi non sunt; jam potiores, non aequales els erimus."
5De civitate Dei xi. 10. 1; PL, XLI, 325: "Est itaque
bonum solum simplex, et ob hoc solum Incommutabile, quod est









Inasmuch as whatever is is good in so far as it is. By simplicity
Augustine means identity of having and being.1 This unique Good
is further set off from all other beings by His incapacity for de-
feotiveness. It is by His "one and unchangeable will" that God
causes creatures to come into being when they do and nowise be-
fore that time, "and thus, perhaps, He would show, in a very
striking way, to those who have eyes for such things, how inde-
pendent He is of what He makes, and how it is of His own gratuitous
goodness He creates, since from eternity He dwelt without creatures
in no less perfect a blessedness." The distinctness of the God-
head from all creatures sl clearly asserted despite the doctrine
of His presence in every creature and His acting in all that acts,
in so far as the act Is.
But these things the one and true God makes and does, but as
the same God,--that is, as He who is wholly everywhere, in-
cluded in no space, bound by no chains, mutable in no part of
His being, filling heaven and earth with omnipresent power,
not with a needy nature. Therefore He governs all things in
such a manner as to allow them to perform and exercise their
own proper movements. For although they can be nothing with-
out Him, they are not what He Is.1
Now although the eternal Godhead, Who has His being in virtue of
Himself alone, is so much set off from all other beings by His
perfection that He is as incommensurable in relation to them as
infinity and finitude, on the other hand He is so related to all
His creatures that none of them, as we have observed, is contrary
to Him in so far as it is.
Besides the master distinction of the creature and the
Creator there are subordinate distinctions,of creatures, whereby
it is possible to order one to another according to degree of be-
ing,the creatures which as a genus are placed according to the
same principle between the incomparable perfection and repleteness

Deus. Ab hoo bono create sunt omnia bona, sed non simplioia, et
ob hoo mutabilla.
1De oivitate Dei xi. 10; PL, XLI, 325; NPNF, II, 210: "But
we msa it is simple, because it Is what it has [quod habet, hoo
est].
2De oivitate Del xil. 8; PL, XLI, 355; NPNF, II, 230:
"This I know, that the nature of God can never, nowhere, nowise be
defective, and that natures made of nothing oan."
3De oivitate Dei xil. 17. 2; PL, XLI, 367; NPNF, II, 238.

4De civitate Del vii. 30; PL, XLI, 220; NPNF, II, 140.









of being on the one hand and non-being on the other.
Next to the creature-Creator division the two most im-
portant in the hierarchy expounded by Augustine are those between
body and soul and between reason and the passions. The distinc-
tion between soul and body is that between life-imparting creature
and life-receiving creature. Of course God is Himself a soul, but
not as thus conceived, for he is no creature; in the important and
oft-recurring order of God soul body, by soul is meant finite,
created soul. The mind-passions division is an advance in parti-
cularity over the body-soul distinction inasmuch as not all life
is intelligent life; in fact the God mind passions proportion
is a drawing out of the ratio of the first and second terms of the
God soul body proportion, the supreme term remaining tran-
scendent and alone infinitely perfect. Proof of the being of that
which is above the material as well as of distinction within the
supramaterial is offered In the following antimateriallstic pas-
sage from De clvitate Dei:
But this representation in thought [of a body which might hot
be even] is no longer a body, but only the similitude of a
body; and the faculty of the mind by which this similitude of
a body is seen is neither a body nor the similitude of a body;
and the faculty which Judges whether the representation is
beautiful or ugly is without doubt superior to the object
judged. This mind of man and of the rational spirit is a na-
ture, and it is certainly not a body, since that similitude
of a body which it beholds and judges of is itself not a
body.1
Now the union of mind with an earthly body makes man, and
whereas principles of distinction between what is God and what is
but is not God have already been given, specific differences be-
tween God and man are the gulf between an earthly body and pure
spirit and that between the highest and lowest orders of mind.
For between God and men are the angels, of aerial bodies, accord-
ing to Augustine, in contrast to both the earthly bodies of men
and God's pure spirituality, and of rare intelligence, inferior
to God's to be sure, but far superior to man's. Such is their
mediating position-though they are not mediators between God and
men in respect of being saviors-and such is Augustine's exposi-
tion of that position that a consideration of his angelology is
fruitful for both a grasp of anthropology and such understanding
of theology as It is accorded men to have. Of the angels' knowl-

iDe civitate Dei viii. 5; PL, XLI, 230; NPNF, II, 148.










edge he teaches: "Therefore they have a more certain knowledge
even of those temporal and mutable things, because they contem-
plate their principles and causes in the Word of God, by which
the world was made,--those causes by which one thing is approved,
another rejected, and all arranged"' Of the mode of their attain-
ment of knowledge Augustine teaches
They are not themselves the truth; but partaking in the ore-
ative Truth, they are moved toward it as the fountain of
life. .. . And to these angels God does not speak, as we
speak one to another, or to God, or to angels, or as the an-
gels speak to us, or as God speaks to us through them: He
speaks to them in an ineffable manner of His own, and that
which He says is conveyed to us in a manner suited to our oa-
paoity. For the speaking of God antecedent and superior to
all His works, is the immutable reason of His work: it has
no noisy and passing sound, but an energy eternally abiding
and producing results in time. Thus He speaks to the holy
angels; but to us, who are afar off, He speaks otherwise.
When, however, we hear with the inner ear some part of the
word of God, we approximate to the angels.i
As to the distinction between angelic immortality and the eternity
of God Augustine asserts
Though the immortality of the angels does not pass in time,
does not become past as if now it were not, nor has a future
as if now it were not yet, still their movements, which are
the basis of time, do pass from future to past; and there-
fore they cannot be co-eternal with the Creator, in Whose
movement we cannot say that there has b en that which now is
not, or shall be that which is not yet.9
Thus far our discussion of hierarchy has been concerned
with natures, that Is, with objects which, while they have not
indeed all been simple, have nevertheless been considered singly.
But Individual objects are banded together into societies of va-
rious character, and according to the character of the societies
is their ordering. Society as such on the human level, regarding
the virtue of which there had been dispute among the ancients,
has the hearty approval of Christians. "For whence should that
city of God . . be given a start, or make progress, or attain
to its proper end were not the life of the saints a social one?"4

1De civitate Del ix. 22; PL, XLI, 274; NPNF, II, 177.

2De civitate Del xvi. 6; PL., XLI, 484; NPNF, II, 313,
314.

3De civitate Dei xil. 15. 2; PL, XLI, 364, 365; NPNF, II,
De .tate Dei x. ; PL, XLI, 6,
4De civitate Del xIx. 5; PL, XLI, 631, 632.









In the nineteenth Book of De oivitate Del, an eminently political
portion of the writings of St. Augustine, there is cited the
fourfold division of society into the family, the city, the ag-
gregation of the nations, and the universe at large,1 and this
division is the basis on which is organized Augustine's eloquent
lamentation over the woes of life. That he recognized in it at
least some ordering in addition to distinction is borne out by
the fact that he asserts the obligation of the paterfamilias to
subordinate his rule to that of the state.
Since, then, the house ought to be the beginning or element
of the city, and every beginning bears reference to some end
of its own kind, and every element to the integrity of which
it is an element, it follows plainly enough that domestic
peace has a relation to oivic peace,--in other words, that
the well-ordered concord of domestic obedience and domestic
rule has a relation to the well-ordered concord of civic
obedience to civic rule. And therefore it follows further,
that the father of the family ought to frame his domestic
rule in accordance with the law of the city, so that the
household may be in harmony with the civic order.
In his enumeration of nine kinds of peace, the parts between
which the distinct peace exist are either parts of individuals
in the hierarchy of beings or parts of associations in the grada-
tion of kinds of society, i.e., the two hierarchies are brought
together.3 However, the associations are not identical with
those of the passage Just cited, those of the pax passage being
the association of God and man, and the societies of the family,
the state, and the celestial state. A tenth peace, "of all
things," is simply peace generic.
When all creatures conform to the order instituted by the
sovereign God out of His pure goodness all is well. But nonoon-

1De civitate Dei xix. 3. 2; PL, XLI, 627.

2De civitate Dei xix. 16; PL, XLI, 644, 645; NPNF, II,
412.
3De oivitate Dei xix. 13; PL, XLI, 640: "Pax itaque cor-
porls, est ordinata temperature partium. Pax animae irrationalis,
ordinata requires appetitionum. Pax animae rationales, ordinata
oognitionis aotionisque oonsensio. Pax corporis et animae, ordi-
nata vita et salus animantis. Pax hominis mortalis et Del, ordi-
nata in fide sub aeterna lege obedientia. Pax hominum, ordinata
ooncordia. Pax domus, ordinata imperandi atque obediendi oonoor-
dia cohabitantium. Pax oivitatis, ordinata imperandi atque obedi-
endi conoordia oivium. Pax ooelestis olvitatie, ordinatissima et
concordissima societas fruendi Deo et invioem in Deo. Pax omnium
rerun, tranquillitas ordinis."









formity has not been impossible inasmuch as rational creatures,
*en. and angels, have been granted freedom of will whereby It was
both possible, indeed obligatory, for them by acceptance of di-
vine grace and strength to leave to His as the perfectly good,
and also possible for them to fail to accept such strength and
grace and thus failing, to fall away from Him by cherishing an
inferior good as the supreme good.
Having expounded the order of objects we have now to con-
sider more thoroughly than was done in the previous chapter, on
love, the determination of love by the order of objects.
There being such a thing as love and such a thing as
hierarchy of beings, In the nature of the case there must be a
distinction of loves into good and bad. For love entails either
an acceptance of the true hierarchy of beings as that according
to which Its pursuit proceeds or else the setting up of an order
different from it. The individual loves, as we have seen Augus-
tine declare, what he regards as the source of his beatitude.
(This definition is not followed rigidly, however. Though I re-
gard God the sole source of my happiness I am still to love my
neighbor out of love for God and when this Is done the neighbor
is loved without my regarding him as the source of beatitude; but
all illicit love as well as the good love which is directed toward
God is directed toward objects regarded as sources of happiness.)
But to regard anything as source of happiness is to subordinate
all else to that. Therefore love entails either the acceptance
of the true order of beings or the setting up of a false one.
It is now apparent why the moral question is one of the
ordering of love. Whatever God has done, including the setting
up of the hierarchy of being, is good Inasmuch as there is no
principle of His creating the world superior to that of His good-
ness. Beings are good in the degree that being has been granted
to them by the good Creator and in the degree that they, if they
are on the rational level, conform to the true order of being by
adhering to Him as the Head of being. The evil will is such be-
cause "it has not willed to conserve the order of nature."1 Nat-
urally Augustine is able to define every vioe in terms of disor-

1De oivitate Dei xi. 23. 1; PL, XLI, 336. Cf. the asser-
tion that the defection of the will is itself evil quia contra
ordinem naturarun. De oivitate Dei xii. 8; PL, XLI, 355.










der. As regards pride "what is it but an appetite for perverted
elevation?"1 than which characterization none could more suo-
oinctly convey the notion not only of disorder but of disordered
hierarchy. Though veiled in comparison with the outright asser-
tions of disorderliness in some of the definitions, there is cer-
tainly an intimation of inordinateness even in the characteriza-
tion of sin whereby it is said to have come from our audacity.2
Very clear cognizance is taken of the gradation of thelhberarohy
in the description of lust, for it is said to subdue the soul by
a thralldom more abundantly "Inordinate" inasmuch as other shame-
ful subjugation of the soul are accomplished by parts of the
soul, all of which are superior to the body.3
Not only is the goodness of virtue defined in terms of
order as the ordering of love but even that which is not deter-
mined at the same time in terms of love is good, as we have al-
ready intimated, only so long as it is orderly. Peace, which
Augustine finds threatened on many levels but cherished on all,
is nothing but the undlsturbanoe of order. In fact, nothing is,
except with order, and the more it is, the more order it must
have. Goodness, order, and being are inseparable, both in the
Creator and in the creature; in the former all of them are su-
premely, in the latter imperfectly.4
It was the definition of justice, consisting of the giv-
ing to each his due, that started us on this inquiry into the or-
der of being, which in turn is found to be an hierarchy. Having
considered the latter and having found order to be determinative
for virtue we may now affirm the connection between justice and
order by regarding it as a part of virtue, which being determined
by order, justice must itself be so determined.
There is, however, something unique about the virtue of
justice and about its orderliness. Other virtues and excellences
may be had relatively if not absolutely, but not justice. We

1De oivitate Del xiv. 13. 1; PL, XLI, 420.

2De oivitate Del xxill. 24. 1; PL, XLI, 788.
3De civitate Del xiv. 23. 2; PL, XLI, 431.
4Cf. De oivitate Del xi. 28; PL, XLI, 342: "ipsa neo all-
quo modo essent, neo aliqua specie continerentur, neo aliquem
ordinem vel appeterent, vel tenerent, nisi ab illo fact essent
qui summe est, qui summer sapiens eat, qui summer bonus est."








41
have spoken of relative being, also of the concomitant variation
of goodness, order, and being; consequently goodness and order,
too, can be found even in a limited degree. And in the degree
that order is disturbed, peace, by its definition, is lost-but
neither is entirely lost except in the destruction of the things
of this world. In a striking illustration of an inverted and sus-
pended human being Augustine traces the progressive loss of being
and the supplanting of one kind of peace by another until finally
the mere elements of the man are in harmony with the earth upon
which he had walked.1 Of some of the order and peace of rational
creatures there will always be a trace, since even the wicked
will retain something of these as a punishable relio.2 Had Cicero
chosen consent to order or to the terms of peace as the bond of
association Augustine could not have objected to his definition.
But justice is the order that violates no part of order; it is
the virtue that in the characteristic of rendering to each his
due considers every level in the hierarchy, moreover does so in
the light of the whole of it. Rational beings must love with
oarltas, the only love that does no violence to the hierarchy of
beings, if they are to love justly. Pagan Rome failed to love
with oariase; to speak of its justice is an error and in order to
apply to Rome, a definition of "people" must be in terms of some
other bond of association.
The required bond Augustine finds in love. The only so-
oiety to which is applicable a definition of state in terms of
consent to justice--the city of God--is also covered by a defini-
tion in terms of love--its love being oaritas. In addition, all
other societies, despite their injustice, are covered by the same
definition, their love being oupiditas. Even in the case of the
subrational societies, whose love is neither oaritas nor oupiditas,
love is a true bond of association. All creation being, according
to Augustine, in love, therefore with the term love,-unspecified
in regard to its quality, hence inclusive of that which conforms
to the hierarchy of being and that which perverts it by giving
primacy to some lesser object as well as that which incapable of
knowing the hierarchy pursues some lesser object suited to its

De oivitate Del xix. 12; PL, XLI, 639, 640.

2D olvitate Del xix. 13; PL, XLI, 640, 641.










level of being-all associations may be defined.
Now that expositions of the doctrines of Cicero and Au-
gustine about justice have been made more or less without refer-
ence from the one system to the other, we proceed to bring them
together in order to exhibit the differences as well as to add to
the expositions that which the comparison suggests in order to
greater completeness.
Oloero made common consent to justice the bond of associ-
ation. But justice is according to right reason, and this, Cicero,
as we have seen, asserts to be universal and of its legislation he
regards the ordinances of the Roman empire a practical norm.
For Augustine, on the other hand, justice is ordering ao-
cording to the hierarchy of being, and agreement as to justice
being the ground of being a people according to the disputed defi-
nition, only the city of God can be so defined, as we have ob-
served. The point of agreement is of importance, for if justice
alone were the basis, even with the majority of men in uprising
against the hierarchy of being, God's unsearchable resource of
wisdom and power nevertheless brings order out of disorder and
His inscrutable and adorable sovereignty puts even the injustice
of insurrectionist natures justly into its place. For "the sin-
ful will, though it violated the order of its own nature, did not
on that account escape the laws of God, Who justly orders all
things for good." Therefore Augustine, even with his recognition
of the hierarchy and of the presence of oupiditas, knows a uni-
versal realm of justice--but not of agreement to justice. Be-
cause of the "agreement" In the definition there was the recourse
to love as the bond of association.
But throughout, the justice of Augustine is different from
that of Cicero. While for the latter justice is what is in ac-
cordance with the dictum of reason, particularly the dictum of the
Roman state as asserted with increasing clarity over a long time,
the justice recognized by Augustine is ever that which conforms to
the hierarchy of being.
How does Augustine prove the reality of the hierarchy of
being?
The De oivitate Dei citation on page 36 of this chapter
refuting materialism illustrates Augustine's use of the judging-
judged pair In establishing superiority. Its use in the second
Book of De libero arbitrio is more extensive and is there made









with the object of demonstrating the existence of the hierarchy,
chiefly the existence of the absolutely perfect at its top, God.
By the principle of the superiority of the judge to the Judged
Augustine advances from body to sense to inner sense to under-
standing and to eternal truth, or from the inanimate to the ani-
mate but irrational (possessed of both outer and inner senses) to
man and to God. For the sight judges of the external object, the
inner sense judges of the sense of sight, whether it does or ought
to function, the reason Judges of that which was transmitted to
it by the inner sense from sight, and reason in turn judges of
this not by itself, for in all but God--and He employs none of
the subordinate processes, indeed, "process" is Itself not ap-
plicable to Him--it is mutable whereas that by which it judges is
immutable. Thus unity is immutable because indivisible, and the
apprehension of it is quite beyond the powers of the subrational.
It is thoroughly Augustinian to say that the fish from whose
mouth Peter was commanded by our Lord to take a state never knew
how many was that state though it did well judge that the ooin
was not good for food. For the notion of unity is applied to the
material, mutable, and infinitely divisible by being taken from
the immaterial, changeless and indivisible; it is accessible only
to reason and.by it the mind Judges even of itself as mutable.
Therefore the absolute exists, for judgment is part of reality
and the highest judgment can be made only by the absolute. The
whole hierarchy exists, and it is a hierarchy depending from the
Absolute.
Cicero denies absolute knowledge; an Academician, he de-
nies that one can attain anything beyond probability. In yield-
ing to the demonstration that has just been made he would have to
repudiate this denial.
Speaking of the benefits to the weak of the rule of the
best, Cicero asks in De re publioa, "Is it not for this reason
that god rules the man, that the soul commands the body, and that
reason governs desire, anger, and all the other defective elements
of the soul?" Here is hierarchy. But Cicero is able so to vio-
late the claims of the hierarchy of being as to uphold as an ex-
emplar of justice that pagan Rome which Augustine rightly charges

1
De re public ill. 24. 36; Sabine and Smith, trans., op.
olt., p. 218.









with oupiditas because of the grossest nonconformity to the hier-
arohy of being. He does so by his own polytheism and by his pre-
suming to call the judgment of pagans in regard to what was just,
the ruling of reason. Their dictum it was, but not the dictum of
even their darkened reason-for in so far as their reason had
light, they contravened it, as witness Romans I, significantly
written to Cicero's compatriots of but two generations later--
much less of true reason.
By defining"people" in terms of love Augustine does more
than merely indicate a bond that makes many associations. He is
also enabled to judge the virtue of the association by that of
the bond that relates the parts. The city of God is adjudged
good by the oaritas which unites it in one just fellowship. All
the oupiditas associations are together the inordinate city ter-
restrial because of the generic inordinate love and each of the
oupiditas associations is an evil association because bound to-
gether by the oupiditas of its specificity. In fact, if the
hierarchy of being Is recognized there is no other way of defin-
ing virtue than as the ordering of love. Consideration of acts
done to this object or that is inconclusive for the reason that
the same act may spring from totally different loves and in no
way demonstrates whether the agent in his pursuit of objects con-
forms to the hierarchy of being or violates it. The father who
devoutly fears God may set before his child exactly the same kind
of food as does the parent who idolizes his son. Abraham, prepar-
ing to slay Isaac at God's command, acted with eminent virtue, as,
in the same circumstances, he would obviously have acted repre-
hensibly had he tried to spare him; and, again obviously, as he
would have done ill to slay him if God had commanded preservation,
so would he have done well to save him, God still ordering pres-
ervation. Since the hierarchy of being is a relation of such a
kind as to impose the obligation that the love of agents be such
as to be directed to objects in their true station in relation to
the rest of hierarchical reality, virtue cannot be established by
regard only to a point. If there were no hierarchy of this kind
there would be no question of relation to the Highest in the mo-
tivation of acts, and acts could be adjudged virtuous or not with-
out regard to anything but the acts.
We conclude this chapter with a little schematizing.









I. Let us suppose justice to consist of fitting each X
with an x (capital, object; small letter, act done to object).
Let it also be supposed that all who call the same object an X
and the same act done to an object an x form one company and all
who call the same other object an X and the same other act done to
an object an x a second company, and so forth, each company being
distinct by deviating from the course of others in regard to the
characterization of at least either some object as an X or some
act done to an object as an x. Now for one who believes that in
judging whether an object be an X and whether an act done to an
object be an x all men by a common principle come to the same con-
olusion, for him there is but one company. This, abstracting
from national peculiarities, is Cicero's view of the case and his
common principle Is right reason, which he regards as laudably
and normatively worked out in the Roman constitution and legisla-
tion.
Since Cicero defines a people as a community bound to-
gether by agreement as to justice he has no doubt Rome was a peo-
ple, for the Romans agreed as to what should be regarded as just.
He moreover regards what they regarded as just to have been truly
just, for that Is just which right reason legislates, and right
reason Cicero regards as universally operative in men, notably in
those who set up the Roman constitution and ordinances.
The essential factor of Rome's being a people according
to Cicero's definition is not, however, that the same reason
should be operative in all men; had the Romans had one kind of
reason in distinction to all the tribes beyond the marches of the
empire, Rome would still be a people, if only all Romans had the
same reason whether that reason were right or wrong; that is to
say, if only the condition were secured that what one Roman called
justice was not called injustice by another. But the fact that
Cicero regarded all men as judging of justice according to right
reason guaranteed for him both that there would be no lack of the
same reason in all Romans--together with such local specification
of justice as would impart to the association the Roman particu-
larity--and that the reason would be right reason. Thus for him
it was secured that the Roman commonwealth should be a part of the
one commonwealth of all men.
II. Let us suppose the property of a circle's being con-
tained In another circle to represent being loved for the sake of









46
another and the property of not being so contained to represent
being loved for its own sake. Let us also suppose a large circle
to represent that which ought to be loved for its own sake and a
small circle to represent that which ought to be loved for the
sake of another. Further let an arrow represent the relation of
love for the object immediately before it.
Then -----) ( represents a permissible love and

------" ) 0 represents an illicit love. Sup-

pose also that all who have the same love form one association.
Then all the subjects that can be placed at the agent end of the
one arrow are one community and all the subjects that can be
placed at the agent end of the other arrow are another community
and as are the relations entered into, so are the communities in
point of virtue.
This is the structure of Augustine's politics of the two
oivitates. Specification within this framework takes care of his
detailed politics, for his defining "people" in terms of common
love does not make Babylonians indistinguishable from Ethiopians.
Love is a relation-of pursuit as toward source of happi-
ness. It is either good or bad and its virtue depends on whether
its object is loved as standing in the relation to the remainder
of being in which it actually stands. The relation in which be-
ings actually stand to one another is one of hierarchy. And love
being the bond of unity there is no necessary recourse to the
pronouncement of reason in the having of a bond. Reason is not
the basis of being in association. There is no agreement required
as to what is justice. There is agreement as to participating of
the same love--that is the only condition of association.
It is to be noted that whereas also in this summary state-
ment "hierarchy" has been used, the essential thing about hier-
archy for the determination of love is not more-than-two-ness but
the fact of there being something to be loved for its own sake and
something else to be loved not for its own sake but for the sake
of that which is loved for its own sake. That this is so derives
from the nature of beings.












CHAPTER III


HISTORY AND ITS PLACE


With love and order being prominent in the disoussion,
we have set forth some of the points in which the doctrines of
Cioere and Augustine differ from each other. Whereas the lovable-
ness of virtue and the virtue of love are all-important for Cicero
in the forming of friendships, his political associations are
based not upon love but upon common consent as to what is just.
In regard to the fundamentals of justice Cicero regards all men
as being in natural agreement by the possession of right reason.
Because of his recognition of the transcendence of being with its
consequence of the obligation to order love in aooordance with
this transeondence and the fact that in most commonwealths love
is not so ordered, Augustine is forced to discard agreement con-
oerning justice as the bond of association, common consent being
nla fact not to justice but to injustioe, except in the perfect
community, the city of God, where alone love is just, i.e., duly
ordered according to the transcendence of being. But if there is
no agreement as to justice in imperfect sooieties because of the
disordered condition of love there is nevertheless association by
ommon love. For whether oreaturee love with an orderly or dis-
orderly love, they love, and by the love of a oommon object they
are formed into a community, good or bad according to the orderli-
ness or disorderliness of the love.
We have now to observe the place of history in the argu-
ment of the two writers.
Cicero's dependence upon history was observed in the ex-
position both of his doctrine of love1 and of his teaching con-
cerning justice.2 In his treatment of love, which for Cicero is
a private virtue and is accordingly discussed in a treatise on
private virtue, De amioltia, he makes clear that he is expounding
not the standard arrived at by 'subtle distinotionse and existing

1Vid. supra, pp. 7 ff. 2Tid. upra, pp. 31 ff.









"only In fancy or aspiration" but that of commonn sense' and dis-
ooverable In "actual exercise and in common life.'1 The only vir-
tue that Cicero is concerned to describe is that not of detached
speculators but of active wise men whose lives have been of such
quality and eminence that men by the natural tendency of their be-
ing acclaim them to be possessed of such perfection as there is
any hope of attaining, the perfection of such men as Africanus
and other illustrious Romans--but though chiefly Romans, not ex-
olusively such, so that Cyrus, for Instance, is conceded to have
attained a very high place. Thus the answers to questions concern-
ing norms of private morality are furnished not by speculators but
by historiographers who set forth the attainments and record the
maxims of historical characters.
Cicero's procedure, as has been pointed out, is exactly
the same when treating of public virtue, of the conditions of
civic well-being, i.e., of justice. For an answer to the question
what justice is he turns not to Plato and other heaven-gazers,
even while conceding the value of their speculations as illustrat-
ing and even declaring the principles Crationes] of politics,2 but
to the same historical characters who furnished the norms of pri-
vate virtue-only now he considers them in their public role of
legislators and constitutors of state. For as the speculator in
the former department is an exponent of fanciful virtue, so the
speculator in the present department is the institutor of "an
imaginary city" and shadowy republics. Cicero does not withhold
his admiration from castles and cities of air but he is anxious
that his city shall be not only desirable but realizable as well.
Indeed, so anxious is Cicero to ground his principles in experi-
ence and so fearful is he of that which is, for him, taken out of
the air, that he rejoices and glories in his ideal's basis being
not even the active work of merely one constitutor of state but
the composite experience of all the Roman commonwealth makers and
of all the people throughout the whole of Roman history.
In both departments Cicero is a probabilist. All he claims
for the historical standard, whether of virtuous love or of jus-
tice, is that a high degree of confidence can be placed in it.

1Vid. esupra, p. 8, n. 4. 2De re public 11. 30. 52.

3Vid. supra, p. 8.










But for Cicero on the one hand nothing more can be asked, on the
other nothing more is required. He denies that any one can at-
tain absolute certainty; he affirms that by reliance on history
one can get close enough to certainty.
It is to be observed, then, that the right reason which
Cicero affirms to be universal and to which he appeals for the
answers to questions of norm is not the organ of speculation but
what he conceives of as the seat of a natural tendency to the
good and a natural capacity to judge of the fitting and the fair.
It is also to be observed that in his reliance upon history he is
not Introducing a factor Independent of this tendency and capacity
whose existence he affirms. He is merely taking thee, the alleged
tendency and judgment, In a wideness of operation: in many indi-
viduals and through a long time. It is not that men's tendencies
and natural judgment give an answer and that history gives. an an-
swer and that the answers chance to be the same. It is rather
that Cicero, looking to what he regards a natural tendency and a
natural judgment rather than to speculation, looks to them in
their functioning over a wide area and through a long period in
order that that functioning might be the more fully ascertained
to be authentic.
The standard of both private and public virtue being
sought, by Cicero, in such an operation and the wideness thereof,
he is retrospective. That is not to say that he is not keenly in-
terested In the future or that he excuses the statesman from a
consuming concern over the future. In fact, the virtue of states-
manship is precisely the capacity to recognize beforehand the is-
sues of tendencies and to expedite the development of the good
and to head off that of the bad. Of course a man cannot act ex-
cept in the present nor does he act except for the future, the
past being fixed. But the point is that the past offers to Cicero
a relative perfection that does not contrast itself with an abso-
lute perfection in the future but is itself almost or quite all
that will ever be attained. The past does not contrast itself
with any perfection in the future different from itself as the ab-
solute differs from the relative, for there is, for Cicero, no ab-
solute; indeed, nothing can be known of the future except by the
past and in accordance with the past. Actually the future pre-
dicted by Cicero is one of infinite recurrences of the past. The
cyolio theory of history dominates his thought. For though state-









50
oraft consists in anticipation of the turn of events and in fore-
stalling the lapending-speoifically it consists In emulation of
the politically wise founders of the Roman commonwealth, who knew
how to ail at permanency by checking the inevitable dissolution
of each particular constitution by resort to the equilibrium ef a
composite constitution-nevertheless Cicero expects the cycles to
go on revolving eternally all the same.1
For his standards Cicero thus looks to the past and re-
lies upon history, and the history that he finds particularly In-
structive is Roman history. His principal work dealing with the
constitution of states, De re publioa, is avowedly an exposition
of the principles realized In the Rome of Romualus and his suooes-
sors and asserts Its own worth above all other political treatises
on this ground alone.
Augustine, too, is distrustful of speculation. In De doo-
trina Christiana he advises the Christian student in the appropri-
ation of the learning of the pagans to keep within the bounds of
the senses, except that the study of nonsuperstitious and non-
luxurious "human arrangements" "which are of convenience for the
necessary Intercourse of life,' particularly language, is to be
pursued In so far as pursuit of greater objects permits, and that
he recognizes two sciences that abstract from matter, mathematics
and logic, the former in so far as It concerns numbers used In
the Bible and the latter not without the Judiiolous comment that
its serioeableness is limited and that It is better to have ar-
rived at an invalid oonolusion which states a truth than at a
valid one which is not a statement of fact. For he asserts most
clearly that the silence of reasoning can only exhibit the laws


1De re publioa 1. 29. 45: 'For there are marvellous cir-
cles and as it were circuits of changes and vicissitudes of gov-
ernments." Ibid. 11. 25. 45: "Now in such a case there will be a
change in the cycle, whose natural movement and circuit It be-
hooves you to learn from the very start. For it is the head of
civic prudence . . to see the paths and turns of governments,
in order that knowing whither each of them inclines you might be
able beforehand either to hold back or to anticipate it." Indeed,
the Roman mixed constitution is so highly estimable exactly be-
cause the quo cuaeaue res inolinet is balanced in an equilibrium
which persist so long as watchful statesmen maintain that mixed
constitution. It is certain, however, that Cicero's confidence
In staying power of statesmen was anything but absolute; Afri-
oanus, in the 'dream' of his grandson, makes an utterance con-
cerning eluviones exustionesque terrarum, quas acoidere tempore
certo necesse est. Ibid. vi. 21. 23.










of valid inference and in no way furnish any knowledge of the
truth of premises.1
In the matter of certitude there is in De olvitate Del a
brief chapter wherein Augustine. not only states the possibility
and conditions of it but does so in avowed contrast to the denial
of certainty on the part of the school of thought represented by
Cioero, thereby making oitation of the chapter particularly per-
tinent at this point.
As regards the uncertainty about everything which Yarro
alleges to be the differentiating characteristic of the New
Academy, the city of God thoroughly detests such doubt as
madness. Regarding matters which it apprehends by the mind
and reason it has most absolute certainty, although its knowl-
edge is limited because of the corruptible body pressing down
the mind, for, as the apostle says, 'We know in part." It
believes also the evidence of the senses which the mind uses
by the aid of the body; for [if one who trusts his senses Is
sometimes deceived], he is more wretchedly deceived who fan-
oies he should never trust them. It believes also the Holy
Scriptures, old and new, which we call canonical, and which
are the source of the faith by which the just lives and by
which we walk without doubting whilst we are absent from the
Lord. So long as this faith remains inviolate and firm, we
may without blame entertain doubts regarding some things
which we have neither perceived by sense nor by reason, and
which have not been revealed to us by the canonical Scrip-
tures, nor come to our knowledge through witnesses whom it is
absurd to disbelieve.2
There are thus several categories of things about which it is ab-
surd to entertain doubt. First there is that which is apprehended
by the mind and of which there is immediate certainty, the eternal
principle by which It must be so being apparent to the mind. Next
there Is that which Is believed through the senses, distrust of
which Is to err miserabilius. Finally the canonical Scriptures
are to be trusted and they are the ground of justifying faith. In
the recapitulation Augustine adds to senses, reason, and Scrip-
tures as grounds of assurance that it is culpable to challenge,
the testimony of "witnesses whom it is absurd to disbelieve." The
special position of the Scriptures as credible witnesses is es-
tablished by their unique record of entirely accurate prediction,
of which more will be said presently.

1De dootrina Christians i1. 16 ff.; PL, XXXIV, 46 ff.;
MPNF, II, 543 ff.

2De oivitate Dei xix. 18; PL, XLI, 646, 647; NPNF, II,
413.









52
There is, then, that which is incontestable by its truth
being directly apparent to the mind and there is that which is
believed on the testimony of witnesses, among whom the Soriptures
are inerrant and therefore never to be doubted.
For the perception of things as they are by the principle
of their being, i.e., God, the mind is disabled by sin.
It is a great and very rare thing for a man, after he has
contemplated the whole creation, corporeal and incorporeal,
and has discerned its mutability, to pass beyond it, and, by
the continued soaring of his mind, to attain to the unchange-
able substance of God, and, in that height of contemplation,
to learn from God Himself that none but He has made all that
is not of the divine essence. For God speaks with a man not
by means of some audible creature dinning in his ears . .
nor even by means of a spiritual being with the semblance of
a body. . ... Not by these, then, does God speak, but by
the truth itself, if any one is prepared to hear with the
mind rather than with the body. .. . But since the mind
itself, though naturally capable of reason and intelligence,
is disabled by besotting and Inveterate vices not merely from
delighting in, but even from tolerating His unchangeable
light, until it has been gradually healed, and renewed, and
made capable of such felicity, it had, in the first place, to
be impregnated with faith, and so purified. And that in this
faith it might advance.more confidently towards the truth it-
self, God, God's Son, assuming humanity without destroying
His divinity, established and founded this faith, that there
might be a way for man to man's God through a God-man. For
this is the Mediator between God and man, the man Christ
Jesus.1
In order, then, to that cleansing and healing of the mind whereby
it soars to God, the truth itself and the principle of all that
is in so far as it is, there must be faith, and this faith is in
the witness of the Scriptures, particularly the witness to the
Redemption that is in Christ, His Cross being "the boat borne by
which one is able to cross the sea to the fatherland from pere-
grinating in this age," and to the righteousness of God which is
nothing else than Christ Himself being granted freely and apart
from merits to those who abandoning the establishment of their
own righteousness accept that which is thus imputed to them.3 But

1De civitate Dei xi. 2; PL, XLI, 317, 318; NPNF, II, 205,
206.
28ermones lxxv. ii. 28 PL, XXXVIII, 475. Cf. In Joannis
Evangellum Traotatus 1xxiv (a$ Traotatus 11. 2; PL, XXXV, 1389;
Enarratio in Psalmum lix. 9; PL, XXXVI, 720.
3De civitate Dei xxi. 24. 5; PL, XLI, 740: ". . this
righteousness [justitlam] of God which grace grants apart from







53
though the Justifioation of the sinner by faith for the make of
nothing but Christ's Atonement is complete, the soaring of the
Justified and regenerate is not without hindrances and weights
and the perception of all truth as It is in God remains in this
life dark and indistinct. However, what vision fails of attain-
ing, faith lays hold upon in that it rests upon the record and
prediction of Soripture.
The occasion of the writing of De olvitate Del was the
attack on Christianity by pagan oalumniators who charged the fall
of Rome and attendant disasters to the supplanting of paganism by
Christianity. Against such perverted use of history as the pagans
made in support of their charge and In order to defend the Chris-
tian faith Augustine himself refers to Rome's past. In the saze
past that the pagans looked to for support for the reestablish-
ment of paganism Augustine finds Christianity vindicated. He ar-
gues that it is not true that Christianity is wrong and paganism
right by the witness of the oalamities of the Christian era in-
asmuch as catastrophes occurring sinoe Christ was worshipped in
place of Idols and demons were not greater than those of pagan
times; indeed, catastrophes of pagan times were the more dire.
Augustine, however, Is not satisfied merely to meet embarrassment
with greater embarrassment; In addition to affirming the exist-
ence of greater calamities in pagan times he proceeds to resolve
his own embarrassment and to give credit to the true God for what
was other than embarrassment in pagan times. For in the contem-
porary sack of Rome such meroy as was shown was due to "the name
of Christ' while such wlokedness as there was was due to "the
custom of wars."1 The very straits experienced under Christ
serve the function of punishing evil and proving goodness.2
Christians "turned [the famine] to good uses by a pious endurance

merits (quam donat gratia sine meritss, they do not know who wish
to establish Coonstituere] their own righteousness (suam Justiti-
am], and likewise have not subjected themselves to the righteous-
ness of God, which is Christ." De oivitate DeN xxi. 27. 4* PL,
XLI, 749. There are no Just persons Cjustij who have not been
mercifully set free by Him Who Justifies the ungodly [Justifloat
impium], Imputing the reward according to grace, not according to
debt (imputans meroedem secundum gratiam, non seoundum debitum]."
1De olvitate Dei 1. 7; PL, XLI, 19, 20; NPNF, II, 5.

2De olvitate Dei 1. 9; PL, XLI, 21-23; NPNF, II, 6, 7.









of it. For those whom the famine killed outright it rescued from
the ills of this life, as a . . disease would have done; and
those who were only hunger-bitten were taught to live more apar-
ingly, and inured to longer fasts."1 Even for the violation of
Christians in the taking of Rome he finds a lofty explanation in
the suppression of actual pride and forestalling of possible ar-
rogance.2 So sublime is the distinction between the two worlds
and between time and eternity that Augustine could amply justify
God's governance did He let the ungodly have all the prosperity
to be found in this world, and have it all to themselves. In re-
spect to the wicked such a disposition might be in order to either
delusion or consolation; in respect to the godly the reason might
be either chastisement or stimulation.3 What good there was in
pagan Rome was all from God, the true God.4 In fact, Augustine
ascribes all credit to God and all blame to idols.
So forceful an argument for the truth of Christianity is
found in balancing the disasters of pagan eras against the bless-
ings of Christian times that Augustine, with a goodly portion of
the De olvitate Del--inoluding that in which the pagan charge is
expressly met--already composed, admonishes Paulus Orosius to use
it to the full.
You bade me reply [says the young Spaniard in the Dedica-
tion of the Seven Books of History Against the Pagans to his
African host and proeeptor] to the empty chatter and perver-
sity of those who, aliens to the City of God . . charge
that the present times are unusually beset with calamities
for the sole reason that men believe in Christ and worship
God while idols are increasingly neglected. You bade me,
therefore, discover from all the available data of histories
and annals whatever instances of past ages have afforded of
the burdens of war, the ravages of disease, the horrors of
famine, of terrible earthquakes, extraordinary floods, dread-
ful eruptions of fire, thunderbolts and hailstorms, and also
instances of the cruel miseries caused by parricides and dis-
gusting crimes. I was to set .these forth systematically and


1De civitate Dei i. 10. 4; PL, XLI, 25; NPNF, II, 8.

2De oivitate Del i. 28. 1; PL, XLI, 41; NPNF, II, 19.
3De oivitate Dei xx. 2; PL, XLI, 660; NPNF, II, 422.

4Vid. De clvitate Dei v. 11; PL, XLI, 153, 154; NPNF, II,
93; De oivitate D v. 13; PL, XLI 1586 NPNF, II 98; De olvi-
tate Dei v. 19; PL, XLI, 1-6; NPF, li, 1T, 10i.








55
briefly In the course of my book.1
For the Roman department of profane history Augustine and
Oroslus of course use the same annals as Cicero. They denounce
pagan Rome on the same record which Cicero interprets as evidence
of the practical perfection of Rose.
The history Augustine employs is, however, chiefly sacred.
The credibleness of the Scriptures he establishes by adducing the
fulfillment of their prophecies, not least that of the general
giving of credit to the "Incredibles" of Soripture.
And now we have three inoredibles, all of which have yet come
to pass. It is incredible that Jesus Christ should have risen
in the flesh and ascended with flesh into heaven; it is in-
credible that the world should have believed so incredible a
thing; it is incredible that a very few men, of mean birth
and the lowest rank, and no education, should have been able
so effectually to have persuaded the world, and even its
learned men, of so incredible a thing. Of these three in-
oredibles, the parties with whom we are debating refuse to
believe the first; they cannot refuse to see the second,
which they are unable to account for If they do not believe
the third.2
The force of the argument of authentication by the fulfillment of
prediction is urged by the consideration that even Porphyry and
the Platonists, properly rejectors of soothsaying, must recognize
non-superstitious prediction, whether it operates through "fore-
sight of subsidiary causes" or through demons having divulged
their purposes. "For the purpose of commending the faith" the
believers in Christ predicted chiefly not mundane matters beyond
the foreknowledge of men but "divine events," the Incarnation and
deeds of Christ, the repentance, conversion, forgiveness, and
faith of multitudes and their acceptance of "the grace of righte-
ousness," "the overthrow of idolatry and demon worship," the
progress of the saints,
the day of judgment, the resurrection of the dead, the eter-
nal damnation of the community of the ungodly, and the eter-
nal kingdom of the most glorious city of God, ever-blessed in
the enjoyment of the vision of God,--these things were pre-
dicted and promised in the Scriptures of this way; and of
these we see so many fulfilled, that we justly and piously
trust that the rest will also come to pass.3

li. W. Raymond, Seven Books of History against the Pagans,
Vol. XXVI of Records of Civilliation, ed. A. P. Evans (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1936), p. 30.
2De oivitate Dei xll. 5; PL, XLI, 756; NPNF, II, 482.

3De olvitate Dei x. 32. 3; PL, XLI, 315, 316; NPNF, II,







56
The Scriptures thus authenticated enable Augustine to -set
forth the hierarchy of being with its gradation according to ex-
cellence of natures and the origins, in angelic associations, of
two cities bound together by hierarchy-conforming and hierarchy-
violating loves. The scope of the Scriptural revelation is such
as to furnish knowledge not merely of that which precedes what is
recorded in profane history but also of the whole future, so that
by the aid of the-Soriptures Augustine describes the whole course
of the two cities down to their "end"--in the endless eternity.
Indeed, the Scriptures furnish knowledge even of that which tran-
scends history in the most inclusive sense. Whereas Augustine
finds profane history corroborative of sacred history, or even
uniquely informing--although there is relatively little specifi-
cally Roman history in the Bible Augustine recognizes the great
importance of pagan Rome in the history of the city terrestrial
and adduces, as has been seen, material concerning the city from
profane sources that is not found in the Scriptures--, in regard
to a part of the development of the two cities, he can find the
beginnings and the ends of the two communities only in Scripture.
The universal sweep of the Scriptures from the creation account
in Genesis to the Revelation visions of the consummation of all
things, which, indeed, besides going back authentically beyond
authentic profane history and uniquely staking out the future
also supplies the key for the reading of such profane history as
may be found, is one that exhibits an hierarchy of being of which
the steps are clearly defined and a progress that is without gaps
right through to perfection on the part of the peregrinating por-
tion of the celestial city. The same hierarchy which in De libero
arbitrio is demonstrated by recourse to the judging-judged argu-
ment is declared by everything in the infallible Scriptures, which


204. Vid. De iovitate Dei xil. 10. 8 PL, XLI 359; NPNF, II,
233; De civitate Dei xi. 4. 1; PL, XL 19; NNF, II7- 7; cf.
De civitate Del xxil. 7; PL, XLI, 760; NPNF, II, 484; De civitate
Dei xxii. 25; PL, XLI, 793; NPNF, II, 505.
1De civitate Dei vii. 32; PL, XLI, 221; NPNF, II, 140,
141: "In that republic [the Hebrew populus] was foretold, some-
times through men who understood what they spake, and sometimes
by men who understood not [whence it is certain that God's revela-
tion has an objectivity independent of receptivity and not limited
by the capacity of the receiver], all that had transpired since
the advent of Christ until now, and all that will transpire."







57
brand as sin all love not in aooordance with the hierarchy and
exalt as justice everything in accordance with it.
Whereas, therefore, in Cicero the historical argument is
retrospective, Augustine supports the doctrine of the hierarchy
of being and the virtue of the conforming love and the destiny of
perfection of the association it binds, by adducing the whole
range of time from the beginning of its flow in the creation of
the first mutable1 to the supplanting of change by eternity, which
replacement is still future. The historical argument in the hands
of Augustine thus draws upon both past and future, though by his
use of the word "history" he intends preterition. Therefore in
his avoidance of speculation Augustine grounds his doctrine in
what is revealed of both past and future as well as of eternity,
being able to do so since in Scripture future facts are authorita-
tively predicted and eternal truths authoritatively declared.
Nevertheless it is not merely that Augustine by his de-
pendence on Scriptures is able to ground his doctrine on events
and circumstances both past and future and on eternal facts; as
is intimated by the notice just taken of there being a destiny of
perfection for the peregrinating portion of the celestial city,
he looks forward to something which he distinguishes from present
and past in point of quality. Cicero, it was observed, is able

1In regard to mutability constituting the essence of time,
consider De civitate Dei xi. 6; PL, XLI, 321, 322; NPNF, II, 208:
"For if eternity and time are rightly distinguished by this, that
time does not exist without some movement and transition [tempus
sine aliqua mobile mutabilitate non est], while in eternity there
is no change [in aeternitate autem nulla mutatio est), who does
not see that there could have been no time had not some creature
been made temperaa non fuissent, nisi oreatura fieret], which by
some motion could give birth to change [quae aliquid aliqua motion
mutaret],--the various parts of which motion and change, as they
cannot be simultaneous, succeed one another,--and thus, in these
shorter or longer Intervals of duration, time would begin [culus
motions et mutations oum aliud atque aliud, quae simul esse non
possunt, oedit atque sucoedit, in brevioribus vel productioribus
morarum intervallis tempus sequeretur)?.... But simultaneously with
time the world was made, if in the world's creation change and mo-
tion were created ([Cum tempore autem faotus est mundus, si in elus
oonditione faotus est mutabilis motus], as seems evident from the
order of the first six or seven days.' Of. Confessionum libri tre-
decia xi; PL, XXXII, 809 ff.
2De dootrina Christiana 11. 28. 42; PL, XXXIV, 55: 'Quid-
quid igitur de ordine temporum transactorum indicat ea quae appel-
atur historia. De dootrina Christiana 11. 28. 44; PL, XXXIV, 56:
"Historia faota narrat.'







58
only to commend with hope of relative suooess some arresting of
the oyclic succession of governmental forms by recourse to a
nicely poised equilibrium of oomposite rule derived from the best
in the past; that is to say, the beat he can do for the future is
to perpetuate or recover the beat in the past. Anything else,
though interesting, is precarious guesswork. It is thus that he
is retrospective. For Augustine not only is the doctrine of eter-
nal cycles eternally shattered1 but the future different from the
present and the past toward which progress is being made is one
of perfection in contrast to the imperfection of even the beat in
the present. In its heavenly aspect the city of God is already
perfect. But as it exists among those of its citizens who are
still in the midst of their peregrinating it remains imperfect.
Throughout this life there is need of the healing of repentance;2
this life is beset with infirmity;3 the righteous does not live as
he desires until he has arrived at immortality, invulnerability,
and the certitude that he will not defect;4 the glory of the pres-
ent house, though greater than that of the Old Testament house,
will be enhanced at its dedication,5 when the chaff will have been
winnowed away from the seed, the permanent citizens;6 for now
within the net there swim alongside Indiscriminately those which
will be separated, when God will "be all in all" "in the good, as
in His temple";7 the Church now progresses "amid the persecutions
of the world and the consolations of God"; now a man is blessed
more in hope than in reality;9 peace, proper to God's own, is now

1De olvitate Dei xii. 17. 2; PL XLI, 336; NPNF, II, 237.
As regards argumentations concerning endless circuits whereby the
wicked seek to divert the righteous, Augustine asserts si ratio
refutare non posset, fides irridere deberet. But by God's assist-
anoe ratio makes quick work of breaking up these figmentary circles.
2De oivitate Dei i. 26; PL, XLI, 40; NPNF, II, 17.
3De oivitate Dei ix. 5; PL, XLI, 261; NPNF, II, 169.
4De oivitate Dei xiv. 25; PL, XLI, 433; NPNF, II, 281.

5De oivitate Del xviii. 48; PL, XLI, 611; NPNF, II, 390.

6De oivitate Deli xvili. 48; PL, XLI, 611; NPNF, II, 391.

7De oivitate Dei xviilli. 49; PL, XLI, 611; NPNF, II, 391.

8De ivitate Dei xviii. 51. 2; PL, XLI, 614; NPNF, II, 392.
9De civitate Del xix. 20; PL, XLI, 648; NPNF, II, 414.







59
by faith rather than by sight, and their righteousness consistss
rather in the remission of sins than in the perfecting of vir-
tues' and the oonfliot against sin is still doubtful;1 the "king-
dom militant" cannot shake itself loose from the enemy; the
holler the present holiness, the more tearful; tlis is a period
of "the old shadows of time";4 now "we rather taste than partake
of to satiety";5--in this age 'not even . . [the] justified
and sanotified ora. be free" from sins.8
On the other hand, it is affirmed of the oity of God that
it is without any but the good and that It possesses 'full felioi-
ty';7 the society of the angels longed for by present pilgrims en-
joys perfectt facility of knowledge and feliolty o-f rest,'8 and
they are without wrath, misery, or fear; the bodies of the blest
are freed from all traoe of corruptibility and slowness and they
are beyond the requirement of any nourishment;10 there God's rule
of man and reason's rule of the body is sweet with the passing of
bondage, for there will be no vice that requires rule;11 there
exists the kingdom of the heavenlies aooording to the mode wherein
is only the performer and not both performer and transgressor;12
there subordination of the inferior is everlasting;13 there the
steadfast angels are endowed with the "prize of their steadfast-

1De civitate Del xx. 27; PL, XLI, 657, 658; NPNF, II, 419.

2De oivitate Dei xx. 9. 2; PL, XLI, 673; NPNF, II, 430.

3De oivitate Dei xx. 17; PL, XLI, 683; NPNF, II, 436.

4De oivitate Dei xx. 22; PL, XLI, 694; NPNF, II, 443.

5De civitate Del xxi. 24. 5; PL, XLI, 740; NPNF, II, 471.

6De oivitate Dei xxi. 27. 4; PL, XLI, 749; NPNF, II, 477.
De oivitate Dei v. 16; PL, XLI, 160; NPNF, II, 98.

8De oivitate Dei xi. 31; PL, XLI, 345; NPNF, II, 223.

9De oivitate Dei ix. 5; PL, XLI, 261; NPNF, II, 169.

10De oivitate Dei xiii. 20; PL, XLI, 393, 394; NPNF, II,
255, 256.
11De oivitate Del xix. 27; PL, XLI, 658; NPNF, II, 419.

12De clvitate Dei xx. 9. 1; PL, XLI, 673; NPNT, II, 430.

13De oivitate Del xxi. 15; PL, XLI, 720, 730; NPNF, II, 445.







60
ness in order that they might be certain of their everlasting
steadfastness";1 there, where all struggle is over, will be per-
footion "by the most pacified virtue," knowledge "certain, with-
out any error or labor," and "the wisdom of God" imbibed at "its
very spring"; there the bodies though flesh in substance are
nevertheless free from corruption and able "forthwith" to take
the positions desired by the spirits and the spirits are desirous
only of that which is fitting to both body and soul;3 there will
be enjoyed the perfect freedom of non posse peceare derived from
God by participation in Him;4 there will be the "intellectual re-
membrance of past ills" without any memory of "sensible experi-
ence" of it; and there will be the eternal seventh day of God's
rest shared by His children as regards both their souls and their
bodies.6
In its temporal aspect, then, the city of God-lovers is
imperfect, struggling, progressing, yet never sinless nor are its
members even sure of attaining that reality which is now possessed
only in spe, per fidem, and by a Pignus, but which will be pos-
sessed in actuality and with repleteness of joy and certainty of
continuation for ever and ever by the city of God in its eternal
aspect. To be sure, the imperfection of the divine city as she
is described by men at this time is due in part to the fact that
to human beings still in the flesh the exact delimitations of her
material extent are not known because of the intermingling of the
two cities; the city of God as discerned by men must yet undergo
a riddance of such citizens as are chaff; the bad fish caught in
the dragnet have yet to be cast aside. But the divine city in
its temporal aspect even as correctly recognized by her King and
Lord is grievously imperfect, each of its true citizens being as
yet only in the process of healing and restoration. In the an-

1De olvitate Dei xxii. 1. 2; PL, XLI, 752.
2De oivitate Dei xxii. 24. 5; PL, XLI, 792.

3De civitate Del xxii. 30. 1; P XLI, 801; NPNF, II, 510.

4De oivitate Dei xxii. 30. 3; PL, XLI, 802; NPNF, II, 510.

5De oivitate Dei xxii. 30. 4; PL, XLI, 802, 803; NPNF, II,
510, 511.
6De civitate Del xxii. 30. 5; PL, XLI, 804; NPNF, II, 511.







61
gelio element which has persisted in the good order there has
been no change, except perhaps the attainment of certitude of
everlasting conformity to order--not that there can now be among
the blessed angels any lack of assurance; but there may have been
at an earlier stage. In the human part great change is discern-
ed-from man's original state of good order by complete obedience
and devotion to God, though not without the possibility of a fall,
to the state of faith and struggle (with an intervening period of
reprobation while he was lost and did not constitute a part of
the divine city and while he was not yet saved by faith In the
Gospel of God's offer to the sinful of righteousness in Christ
Jesus) and thence to the true felicity of eternal bliss. Now if
mutation be the essence of history, then the portion of man's ex-
perience from his fall to the consummation of his restoration is
in a particular degree historical, though even in Paradise the
change from posse non peccare to non posse pecoare would have
taken place. The fruition of the full actuality of bliss and
certainty of eternal right ordering is, in contrast to the pres-
ent conjunction of faith, hope, and love in the period of pere-
grination, something that approaches the termination of history.
For then the human lovers of God will share the incorruptibility
of the angels and will be completely well-ordered and perfectly
pacified. But even if after a manner the history of the divine
city will be ended by the passage of its citizens into a state of
undeviating and unfluctuating love,--if, in a manner, the city of
God in its perfection lies beyond history-nevertheless it is to
be remarked that Augustine ascribes absolute immutability only to
God, Who is of Himself and Who Is with a uniqueness of being.
Both to the blessed angels and to perfected men eternally paci-
fied, Augustine ascribes movements, for the glorified bodies of
saints will be responsive to their spirits with an entirely new
spontaneity and facility. But the devotion of saints to God in
the ordering of their love will be, as is that bf the blessed an-
gels, complete and eternally fixed. And if there is a sense in
which the city of God is beyond history, it is correspondingly
true that the terrestrial city is in a sense peculiarly histori-
cal. As the city of God is constituted of men and angels whose
affections are fixed on God, so the terrestrial city consists of
those whose desires have wandered away from God and who therefore
experience, besides what is common to all creatures as being other







682
than the alone absolutely immutable Creator, the mutations suf-
fered by pursuing the changing rather than the Changeless.
In the foregoing we have witnessed Cicero's distrust of
speculation and his dependence on history. Augustine has been
found to derive his doctrine from the Scriptures. Furthermore,
whereas Cicero is seen to know of no future different from the
past or in any way to be managed except by the instruction of the
past, Augustine looks forward to a future for the city of God
transcending anything realized or realizable in time. We shall
now proceed to set forth somewhat more fully the course of events
of which some indication was given in pointing out that Augustine
recognizes a progress in perfection on the part of the city of
God in its peregrination.
Relating the course of events he derives from the profane
and the sacred record of the past and the sacred prediction of
the future Augustine commences with the origins of the two cities
in the creation of the devoted angels and the defection of the un-
steadfast. He proceeds to treat of the society of men here upon
earth, which is part of one city or the other, indeed, is always
part of both, since it is always constituted of some that besides
their participation in earthly society are members of the kingdom
of God and of others that failing to belong to the celestial city
are citizens of the reprobate city.1 This society of men upon
the earth he treats according to successive national manifesta-
tions, naturally observing in the treating of them the point which
is of chief importance, their orientation to what is God or what
is not God, i.e., their constituting a portion of the one city or
the other. Finally he expounds the judgment of the world and the
condition of the citizens of the city of God in the life that is
eternal and the condition of the citizens of the reprobate city
after life upon this earth has ceased.
The reprobate city commenced with Satan's failure to
"abide in the truth,"2 upon which there was a separation of the

lDe oivitate Dei xv. 20. 1; PL, XLI, 462: "For this ter-
restrial city and society of men living according to man cannot
cease to be even until the end of this age, of which the Lord
says 'the sons of this age generate and are generated' (Luke XX.
34). De oivitate Del xvi. 10. 3; PL, XLI, 489: "It is neverthe-
less to be held that never was either race of men extinct upon
the earth."
2Vid. De civitate Dei xi. 14; PL, XLI, 330; NPNF, II, 213.







63
angels which became darkness by doing likewise, from those that
remained light.1 Sinning they "were thrust down to the lowest
parts of this world."2
Man, who was created a citizen of the heavenly oity be-
came a part of the reprehensible city through the Fall.3 Of the
first two children Cain belonged to "the city of sen" and Abel to
that of God.
Accordingly, it is recorded of Cain that he built a oity, but
Abel, being a sojourner, built none. For the city of the
saints is above, although here below it begets citizens, in
whom it sojourns till the time of its reign arrives when it
shall gather together all in the day of resurrection; and
then shall the promised kingdom be given unto them, in which
they shall reign with their Prince, the King of the ages, time
without end.
After the murder of Abel the heavenly city had its earthly being
in Seth, "the father of generations registered apart from the
others."5 But "when the human race . . increased and ad-
vanced, there arose a mixture of the two cities by their partici-
pation in a common iniquity"6 which brought the judgment of the
Deluge, when all were destroyed but the household of Noah.
The city of God is perpetuated through the line of Shem,
then through that of Heber,8 that of Abraham, "from whose time it
['the progress of the city of God"] begins to be more conspicuous,
and the divine promises which are now fulfilled in Christ are more
clearly revealed,"9 that of Isaao, "born through the proemlse," who
"therefore rightly signifies the sons of grace, citizens of the
free city, associates of the eternal peace,"10 and Jacob, whose-


1De civitate Dei

2De oivitate Deli

3De civitate Deli
4De oivitate Dsi
284, 285.
5De civitate Dei

6De oivitate Dei

7De civitate Dei
8De civitate Deli
9De olvitate Deli
10De oivitate Dei


xl. 20; PL, XLI, 333.

xi. 33; PL, XLI, 346; XPMF, II, 224.

xiv. 11 ff.; PL, XLI, 418 ff.

xv. 1. 2; PL, XLI, 437, 438; NPNF, II,

xv. 17; PL, XLI, 451; WPXF, II, 299.

xv. 22; PL, XLI, 467; NPNF, II, 302, 303.
xvi. 10. 1; PL, XLI, 488.
xvi. 11. 1, 2; PL, XLI, 490.
xvi. 12; PL, XLI, 492; NPNF, II, 318.
xv. 3; PL, XLI, 440.








64
line "distinctively and eminently constituted God's people.'1
However, true to his principle Augustine ascribes oelestiality of
citizenship on the basis of faith and devotion to God and not on
that of carnal descent. Therefore his evaluation of the Jewish
people varies. Whereas in relation to Esau Jacob was the younger
served by the elder, In relation to Christians Jews are the elder
2
serving the younger. There are two kinds of Jews, those who are
merely of Abraham's flesh and those who, together with Gentile be-
lievers, constitute "true Israelites, citizens of the supernal
fatherland."3 Thus the Hebrew 'republico4 in its defection from
God's promises was not the heavenly city. Nevertheless the earth-
ly city of Jerusalem, which is identified as "part . of a
certain terrestrial city," prefigures the heavenly Jerusalem, and
Hagar, in the character of a type of Jerusalem, 'was a certain
image of this image."5 In fact, so rigidly and, of course, per-
sonally is the criterion of love to God applied in the distinc-
tion of the two cities that Augustine discriminates between the
Hebrew kings, noting that in Jerusalem, "the bond woman," "some
also reigned who were children of the free woman, holding that
kingdom in temporary stewardship, but holding the kingdom of the
heavenly Jerusalem, whose children they were, in true faith, and
hoping in the true Christ.'"
The city of the reprobate in its temporal and earthly as-
pect existed after the Deluge in a succession of nations, such as
those of the Assyrians and the Babylonians. Chief of the temporal
manifestations of the reprehensible city are Babylon and Rome, the
one an eastern and earlier Rome, the other a western and later
Babylon.7 Despite the closeness of the similarity, however, the

1De civitate Dei xvi. 11. 2; PL, XLI, 490, 491; NPNF, II,
317.
2De civitate Dei xvi. 35; PL, XLI, 513.

3De civitate Dei xviii. 47; PL, XLI, 609; of. De civitate
Del xvii. 3. 1; PL, XLI, 525; NPNF, II, 338.
4De civitate Dei vii. 32; PL, XLI, 221.

5De civitate Dei. xv. 2; PL, XLI, 439.

6De civitate Dei xvii. 10; PL. XLI, 544; NPNF, II, 350.

7De civitate Del xvi. 4; PL, XLI, 482; NPNF, II, 312; De
oivitate Dei xviii. 2. 2; PL, XLI, 561.









increasing difficulties of conquest made Roman unique in all his-
tory in respect to the lustre of mundane aoomplishment. Augus-
tine says more about Rome than he does about any other secular
nation and what he teaches about the mundane state both as ex-
isting in order to earthly peace and as constituting a part of
the city of reprobates is best illustrated by what he says about
Rome.
On the one hand, Rome, like the reprehensible city in Its
over-all earthly existence, was founded by a fratricide, the acts
of Romulus and Cain being analogized.1 Much is adduced from popu-
lar belief, theatrical performances, and state religion to estab-
lish the impiety of Rome. Now the very comparison of Rome with
Babylon is condemning, for by the tower of that city of confusion
"was signified an ungodly pride."2 On the other hand, Rome, like
other temporal kingdoms, was set up by divine providence.3 And
though the Romans did not attain unto eternal life, nevertheless
such was their virtue, including that of subordinating private
benefit to that of the republic, that it brought to them the
highest honor in the world and even a due need of divine reward.
A temporal reward they deserved, and it was not withholden by
God.4 A striking example of Augustine's fidelity to the prinoi-
ple of reserving the characterization of true virtue only for the
love that loves God alone on His own account is found in a pas-
sage in which are brought together the Jewish and Roman peoples,
the former having been at one time, as we observed, the city of
God on earth and the latter a noteworthy manifestation of the
reprobate city. Now despite this prior characterization Augustine
does not hesitate to notice "We see that the Jews were most right-
eously given as trophy to the glory of the Romans; for we see that
these Romans, who acquired earthly glory, and sought to obtain it

1De oivitate Dei xv. 5; PL, XLI, 441.

2De olvitate Dei xvi. 4; PL, XLI, 483.

3De civitate Del v. 1; PL, XLI, 141; NPNF, II, 103: "He,
therefore, Who is the one true Md, Who never leaves the human
race without just judgment and help, gave a kingdom to the Romans;
when He would, and as great as He would, as He did also to the As-
syrians, and even the Persians, by whom, as their own books testi-
fy, only two gods are worshipped, the one good and the other evil.'
4De olvitate Dei v. 15; PL, XLI, 160.









by virtues, such as they were, conquered those who, in their great
depravity, slew and rejected the giver of true glory, and of the
eternal oity."1 To be sure Rome is not here declared to be a
part of the city of God; in fact, It is part of the city of the
reprobate by failing to look for any glory higher than the tea-
poral. Nevertheless Augustine indicates elsewhere very clearly
that Rome might become a part of the olity of God:
If the kings of the earth and all their subjects, if all
princes and Judges of the earth, If young men and maidens,
old and young, every age, and both sexes; If they whom the
Baptist addressed, the publicans and the soldiers, were al-
together to hearken to and observe the precepts of the Chris-
tian religion regarding a Just and virtuous life, then should
the republic adorn the whole earth with its own felicity, and
attain in life everlasting to the pinnacle of kingly glory.2
For though the general heedlessness of Romans compels Augustine
to commend a toleration if necessary of the most wicked . .
and most shameless republic" in order to the securing of a most
prominent position "in that certain most holy and most august as-
sembly of angels and republic of heaven, in which the will of God
is the law'3 nevertheless he knows no necessity of Rome's remain-
ing a part of the reprobate city. Indeed, how could he when he
was not an anarchist and yet burned to extend the city of God?
When finally the shadows of this world give place to the
"lights of eternity, 4 then the society of men here upon earth,
wherein are mixed the citizens of the celestial city and those of
the community of the reprobate, will exist no more. In complete-
ness of separation the blessed will enjoy God and each other in
God with a constancy that cannot permit of defection from the
true Good nor of forfeiture of genuine bliss, and the wicked shall
be tormented in the baleful balance of damnation wherein neither
does life prevail so as to heal nor does death triumph so as to
extinguish.
Now throughout this course of events, both those which
are past and those which are still future, though not for that in

iDe civItate Dei v. 18. 3; PL, XLI, 165; NPNF, II, 101.

2De civitate Dei 11. 19; PL, XLI, 64; NPNF, II, 34.

3De oivitate Dei 11. 19; PL, XLI, 64, 65; NPNF, II, 34.

4De civitate Dei xx. 22; PL, XLI, 694; NPNF, II, 443.
Vid. supra, p. 59.









the least uncertain of fulfillment, there is a distinction of
associations according to a discrimination of loves and the dis-
orimination of loves is made according to their ordering, whether
in their direction to objects they are order-conforming or order-
violating. Particularly for the purposes of this study it is to
be remarked that all nations in their occupation of this temporal
ground wherein are mixed the citizens of the cities of wrath and
of bliss either orient themselves to the supreme good, God, or
fall to do so and that while there are many states that fall to
love God above all things there is no state that failing to do so
is at the same time just.
Having seen something of Augustine's treatment of various
nations, particularly the Hebrew and Roman, we proceed to describe
more precisely the relation of the political community to the so-
oieties of the blessed and of the reprobate in the doctrine of
Augustine.
The celestial city consists, as we have observed, of men
and of angels bound together by a well-ordered love, i.e., a love
that conforms to the principle of the transcendence of God. The
terrestrial oity is through and through one of impious men and
angels.1 The two cities are thus mutually exclusive. A part of
the celestial city, that part which is the Church militant, lives
its life of piety upon this earth and subject to the conditions
of life upon this earth. Of the terrestrial city, too, a portion
dwells upon earth as men and leads a life subject to the condi-
tions of life upon the earth. The conditions of life upon the
earth include political association for the purpose of attaining
political peace, the concord of rulers and ruled in a civic oom-
munity. This peace is a good of no mean degree and as such it is
esteemed and pursued by both the blessed and the reprobate, but
differently. The pious desire it in order that by Its attainment
the earthly political condition of a life centred on God as the
ultimate object of enjoyment might be secured; thus they desire
earthly peace ordinately. The community of the reprobate "de-
sires earthly peace for the sake of enjoying earthly goods";E in

1De oivitate Del xviii. 18. 1; PL, XLI, 574: ".... huius
saeouli civitate, quae profeoto et angelorum et hominum societal
impiorum est."

2De olvitate Del xv. 4; PL, XLI, 440; NPU', II, 286.









thus having objects inferior to the transcendent God as its ulti-
mate aix it covets political ascendency and peace inordinately,
and since inordinately therefore also less successfully, inasmuch
as that which is disordered in its supreme relationship necessa-
rily suffers from disorder in the subordinate relationships. Nev-
ertheless some political peace is always attained by the reprobate
city in the mundane phase of its existence. There is at least the
peace enjoyed by the victors in the unending succession of wars
and Augustine further notes that such is the propensity of the
vanquished to come to terms with their conquerors that those who
allow themselves to be destroyed are considered, as we have seen,
a great wonder. The political peace of the reprobate is enjoyed
more or less unrighteously. The victory of those who are greatly
exercised by the extreme perishableness of their triumph is "of a
higher kind" than that of those who gloat over victory; neverthe-
less even so it is short-lived. But though the pursuit of politi-
cal peace by the reprobate is evil, the object is good in itself.
But the things which this city desires cannot be justly
said to be evil, for it is Itself, in its own kind, better
than all other human good.L1] For it desires earthly peace
for the sake of enjoying earthly goods, and it makes war in
order to attain to this peace; since, if it has conquered,
and there remains no one to resist it, it enjoys a peace which
it had not while-there were opposing parties who contested for
those things which were too small to satisfy both. This peace
is purchased.by toilsome wars; it is obtained by what they
style a glorious victory. Now, when the victory remains with
the party which had the juster cause, who hesitates to con-
gratulate the victor, and style it a desirable peace? These
things, then, are good things, and without doubt the gifts of
God. But if they neglect the better things of the heavenly
city, which are secured by eternal victory and peace never-
ending, and so inordinately covet these present good things
that they believe them to be the only desirable things, or
love them better than those things which are believed to be
better,-if this be so then it is necessary that misery fol-
low and ever increased
Political organization with its object of political peace,
then, is something not only esteemed, though differently, by the
citizens of both cities but it is also a condition of their
earthly sojourn. The condition of political organization being

1Non autea rooted diountur ea bona non esse, quae oonoupis-
oit haeo oivitas, quando est et ipsa in suo genere human melior.
2
De oivitate Del xv. 4; PL, XLI, 440, 441; NPNF, II, 286.










common to them, the question arises, Can the citizens of cities
so different and associated by loves so different that one is
ordered and the other disordered take part in a common political
association? Augustine teaches not merely that they can but that
they are not to avoid doing so. Like Abel, who built no city,
the citizens of the celestial oity are not concerned to build
upon the earth a olity exclusively their own, for their proper city
is in heaven.1 Of course if all the citizens of a state became
pious there would be no reason that any of its citizens should de-
sire participation in any other state, one without impious citi-
zens. But even as regards the state wherein some are reprobate--
as are most citizens in all states--Augustine teaches those citi-
zens which are concurrently citizens of the divine city to be con-
tent with being the compatriots of the wicked, though of course he
does not commend contentment with their wickedness.
It is thus that the intermingling of the citizens of the
blessed and reprobate cities extends not merely to their physical
location and certain private dealings but also to their civio re-
lationships; indeed, in the latter department it is to be so com-
plete as to eradicate all difference except where the fear of God
compels the pious to hold out against those who have not that
fear.
As this mortal life is common to both cities, so there is a
harmony between them in regard to what belongs to it. . .
[But] it has come to pass that the two cities could not have
common laws of religion, and that the heavenly city has been
compelled in this matter to dissent, and to become obnoxious
to those who think differently. .. . This heavenly city,
then, while it sojourns on earth, calls citizens out of all
nations, and gathers together a society of pilgrims of all
languages, not scrupling about diversities in the manners,
laws, and institutions whereby earthly peace is secured and
maintained, but recognizing that, however various these are,
they all tend to one and the same end of earthly peace. It
is therefore so far from rescinding and abolishing these di-
versities, that it even preserves and adopts them, so long
only as no hindrance to the worship of the one supreme and
true God is thus introduced.3

1De olvitate Dei xv. 1. 2; PL, XLI, 438.

2De oivitate Dei xviii. 54. 2; PL, XLI, 620: ".... duarum
olvitatum, ooelestis atque terrenae, ab initio usque in fine
permixtarum mortalis excursus." Vid. De civitate Dei xi. 1; PL,
XLI, 317; NPNF, II, 205.
3De civitate Deo xix. 17; PL, X1.I, 645, 646; NPNF, II,
412, 413.








70
Participation In the state, then, there being abstraction
from consideration of the ultimate object of participation in it,
does not determine whether the participant is a citizen of the
celestial or of the terrestrial city. It is therefore that men
of both camps can participate together. Furthermore, however
participated in, it is itself a good, for by its peace it promotes
life upon this earth, which is a good and used well bears favor-
ably upon eternal life, though abuse of the goodness of earthly
life is prejudicial to the enjoyment of eternal life.
But though there is thus a favorable evaluation of the
state considered by itself, there can be no participation of it
without the pursuit of its peace in order to the enjoyment of ei-
ther God or something illicitly held to be the final good. There-
fore citizenship in any political state cannot be enjoyed apart
from concurrent citizenship in one or other of the cities of bliss
and damnation; in fact, concurrent citizenship in the states po-
litical and terrestrial, the latter term meaning reprobate, is en-
tailed by default of participation in the city of God. This is
so completely true that even the citizen who would know no other
state than the political is, by his very denial of any other, con-
currently a citizen of the reprobate community.
The relation of the political to the two cities is, how-
ever, not merely such that concurrent membership of its citizens
is in the one or the other of the two cities, it is also such
that the character of the state and its attainment of political
peace varies according to the predominance of celestial or terres-
trial citizens on its roster. In any case some goodness of civic
association and some tranquillity of political order is actually
had, even in robber kingdoms. But the more pious citizens there
are in it, the better the state, the more reprobate citizens there
are, the worse the state; the more citizens whose love of Rome is
a well-ordered love, the better the empire, the more citizens
whose love of Rome is disordered, the more desperate its decay.
The relation of the political state to the two cities is
finally such that its membership does not exhaust that of the two
cities, which, in contrast to its transolenoy, have citizens ei-
ther doomed or blessed for ever and ever. For neither the blessed
nor the reprobate angels have ever participated in the political
state in the way that men have; and such men as have departed this
life, though they are unalterably the citizens of the one or the









71
other of the cities celestial and terrestrial, are no longer oiti-
zens of the political state.
In this connection the naming of the reprobate community
"terrestrial" is not without its Interest. The community of the
blessed is destined to eternal felicity in heaven. The city of
the reprobate is destined to eternal damnation in hell. Both
cities have in the persons of its human members an earthly repre-
sentation. This phase is limited both as regards time and the
personnel of participation. The city celestial is named with
great appropriateness according to the unlimited phase of its ex-
istence, the heavenly and angel-inoluding. The city of the repro-
bate Is named after the limited phase of its existence, and is
moreover so named according to a term not without some appropri-
ate application to the limited phase of the heavenly city's exist-
ence as well, i.e., its peregrination upon earth. Augustine
might have reserved "terrestrial" for the political state and
named the community of the reprobate the city diabolic. There
would then be three cities: the city of God, the generic city of
the earth, particularized in political Nineveh, Babylon, Rome,
etc., and the city of the devil. Augustine's employment of the
two term division in the naming is more appropriate, however, be-
cause it emphasizes the fact that despite the difference between
the political state and the city of the reprobate a man is repro-
bate if he is not of the celestial community. Then as regards
the naming of the second city "terrestrial" the choice is appro-
priate because it indicates that participation in the community
of the reprobate takes place by the pursuit of some earthly and
inferior good as an ultimate good. Furthermore most of the citi-
zens of the political state abuse its goodness by not sanctifying
the political relationship to the service of God, so that the
concurrent citizenship of most members of the political state of
this earth is in fact in the city diabolic rather than the city
celestial. Finally, although the demonic portion of the terres-
trial city has no ordinary human membership in the political state
despite its being cast down to earth and its seduction of men,
nevertheless the evil society to which it belongs is fittingly
called terrestrial inasmuch as also the devils choose themselves
before God, and for us who consider these facts the choice of
something to be ultimate before God, particularly the exaltation
of self, is the choice of something terrestrial.









72
The structure before us, then, is primarily one of two
unearthly cities, one God-fearing, the other God-abandoning.
Both have a beginning, the beginning in the one case being the
coming into being of angels that adhere to God, in the other, the
turning of angels away from God. Each of these cities continues
without cessation. Having a beginning subsequent to those already
mentioned and having an end--at the Last Day--is the society of
men organized to secure the peace of this world and particularized
in the several historic nations. But such is the relation of this
passing society to the two unending societies that its citizens
are also the citizens of one or the other of the unending socie-
ties; moreover such that unless a man loves God foremost, by which
love the heavenly city Is constituted, he is without further qual-
ification a citizen of the everlasting society of those who aban-
don God--so that despite a man's professing to know nothing beyond
the enjoyment of a temporal good, indeed, eo Ipso, he is associ-
ated with those who suffer far beyond the confines of temporal
existence, in fact, eternally, the penalty of defection from the
Highest--; finally such that only as men are members of the God-
loving society can they secure in the greatest possible degree a
political peace of this world, even those failing to attain it in
the highest degree who make that very peace their highest aim.
And yet failure to attain this highest possible degree by failure
to aim at the Highest does not, as we have seen, deprive of all
attainment of earthly order so long as this earthly life contin-
ues. The order which is justice exists only in such members of
the temporal society as are also members of the heavenly-and
therefore not of the terrestrial society. Nevertheless, such
citizens of the political state as are also citizens of heaven
always have something in common with the other citizens; and yet,
since the others always fail of attaining justice by the failure
to be citizens of heaven as well, there is therefore always also
that in the earthly state which those citizens who are also citi-
zens of heaven at least deplore or in addition rest. Thus in
the character of a loyal Roman Augustine deplores Roman conquests
for the sake of glory and praises the holy martyrs who resisted
the imperial command to practise idolatry.
Returning from this summarizing of the history of the two
cities and from a consideration of the nature of the historical
commonwealth and of its relation to the cities celestial and ter-










restrial in the light of that history to the topio of the place
of history in the systems of the two writers, we observe that
they both make much reference to experience in order to support
their doctrines. Cicero voices with sharpness distrust of specu-
lation and claims that his doctrine is grounded in experience,
particularly that of the Roman people. Augustine requires regen-
eration of the sinful soul in order that It should understand the
truth, and regeneration is neither speculation nor the mere ap-
prehension of data but a work of the divine Spirit operating
through the means of grace, including the infallible Word, to the
bestowal of repentance and faith. For Cicero the whole of politi-
cal experience exhibits only communities bound together by agree-
ment as to the right, this right being declared by right reason
shared by men universally. For him no absolutely perfect common-
wealth has been known; nor will such a one ever exist, inasmuch
as the future will be largely what the past has been. On the
other hand there was never, according to his view, a commonwealth
in which the members failed to share in the rational characteri-
zation of Justice; indeed, in each commonwealth it is for Cicero
precisely this agreement that associates the members. Augustine,
on the other hand, finds no community that is not associated by
agreement as to what should be pursued, and the pursuit, except in
the case of the celestial community, is never in accordance with
the principle of God's transcendence and is therefore disordered
and unjust. Whereas Cicero denies the existence-at any time, in-
cluding the future--of an absolutely perfect commonwealth, Augus-
tine recognizes its existence now in full reality in heaven, also
now by faith among the believers, and finally in full reality also
.among them who now believe. Experience is not an endless series
of cycles but progress is being made toward the descent of the New
Jerusalem from heaven.













CONCLUSION


The difference in the definitions of commonwealth sub-
mitted by Cicero and Augustine is not a chance variation nor a
difference of small importance. Althoug definition acceptable by the mere substitution of objectss of
love' for "Justice "as that in regard to which there is the agree-
ment that binds together a people--or, roughly, by the substitu-
tion of "love' for "Justice"-the whole opposition of their sys-
tems is behind this substitution.
The substitution raises the four questions why justice is
the politically associative bond for Cicero, why it is not the
same for Augustine, why love is the politically associative bond
for Augustine, and why it is not the same for Cicero.
For Cicero justice, as we have seen, is the giving to
each his due as legislated by right reason and right reason
Cicero conceives to be such'that it is universally shared, for it
is to its legislation that all men are agreed.
For Augustine Justice is something else, something so dif-
ferent that men are not in universal agreement as to what is just.
For his it is the giving to each his due by a right ordered love,
a right ordered love being such in virtue of conforming to the
hierarchy of being. The hierarchy of being is such that God is
supreme in it with a transcendence of being that makes Him alone
the proper ultimate object of love.
Thus while Cicero refers to men's thinking for an answer
to the question, What is just? and holds that men think generally
the same thing, Augustine refers to their loving and judges their
loving according to the order of being. Knowing is of importance
to him in the determination of justice not directly, as for
Cicero--universal reason supplying for the latter the standard of
justice-but indirectly, inasmuch as one of the proofs of the
hierarchy of being is derived from an examination of knowledge.
But whether one understands or believes, if only one loves con-
formably to the order of being one is just. Besides its presence
in the holy angels orderly love is found only in those who are
74







75
regenerated through the Holy Spirit by the gift of faith in the
sole merits of the Mediator Jesus Christ. Therefore agreement as
to justice ie far from universal; only those who are citizens of
the city of God are just.
~ It is thus seen that for his determination of justice
Cicero looks to the reason that is shared by all men, that for
his determination of the same term Augustine looks to the ordering
of love according to the order of being, and that therefore the
two writers mean different things by justice. To Cicero's refer-
ence to universal reason Augustine objects that men's participa-
tion is not generally such as to give them true knowledge, for
true knowledge as well as just loving must conform to the hier-
archy of being, in which only the Supreme is lovable as ultimate
good. The knowledge Augustine characterizes as true, Cicero, the
probabilist, considers uncertain; there can be no knowledge, says
he, of the Absolute. There is however, for him, a knowledge com-
mon to all men possessed in virtue of their participation in uni-
versal reason and though it declares nothing positive about the
absolute it does declare with one voice throughout all times and
spaces what is just. On the basis of this universal pronouncement
there is, for Cicero, one commonwealth of all men and on the basis
of such modification of the pronouncement as any part of mankind
shall agree to, that part is constituted a particular commonwealth.
To this Augustine answers that though the Absolute cannot be known
so as to be comprehended by the finite mind, any assertion con-
cerning Him except that of His existence as Absolute being a limi-
tation of His infinity, it can be known, e.g., by the requirement
of an unchangeable in judging the changeable, that the Absolute
exists.
We have given both Cicero's reason for associating his po-
litical groups on the basil of common agreement as to justice and
Augustine's reason for rejecting this basis. His determination
of justice in terms of love and of love in terms of order of being
has already been noted. It remains to consider why agreement as
to objects of love is for Augustine the bond of political associa-
tion as well as to ask why Cicero did not so regard love. The
reasons for Augustine's use of love are the failure of agreement
as to justice to be such a bond by the failure of all communities
'but the city of God to attain justice and Augustine's conceiving
love as exerting a lateral attraction for other lovers of a common







76
object regardless of the quality of the love. Thus he is sup-
plied with a principle of association which is operative in all
communities; whether men are good or bad In virtue of the order-
liness or disorderliness of their loves they are eligible for
grouping by the application of this principle which operates in
both good and bad. That there are many communities and that there
are communities good and bad Cicero denies, for by making agree-
ment as to justice the bond of political association and by con-
ceiving all men to answer with one voice what is just he makes of
all men but one virtuous community, except that particularization
(5 of the legislation makes for division of commonwealth*, which are,
despite difference in the degree of their attainment of justice,
nevertheless all ust. To the objection that some have been very
%ad he would answer, Very bad only by an impossible standard, and
if really bad, then subject to dissolution, since their statehood
could not continue except by agreement as to justice. So long as
it continues there must be agreement by and large to the only
justice worth talking about. States which despite their continu-
ation can be shown to love both things and men as ultimate objects
of pursuit are pronounced unjust by Augustine, for whom they are
associated by agreement as to the object of their love although
that love is disorderly.
As to the question why Cicero did not use love as the
bond of political association the reason appears to be on the one
hand that he does not regard himself in need of it: concerning
justice as he defines it there is, in his view, agreement of all
men, so that no community is found to exist apart from it and such
particularizations of the larger community as there are are in
virtue of the specification of this universal agreement; on the
other hand it is difficult to find a single passage in Cicero in-
dicating that he conceived love as possessing the laterally draw-
ing virtue that we have spoken of. It is the virtue of the friend,
even if it be the virtue of his loving virtue, rather than the
love of the friend that attracts. But if this is the case, very
limited is the membership of a love association for Cicero, and
for political associations a more widely embracing principle is
required. But conceiving love as possessing illimitable lateral
attractions Augustine finds the greatest "people" united by means
of love of a common object. Whether uicero would concede the in-
fluence or the fact or not it is furthermore true that it is more









ploa~ant to tell men that all communities exist by agreement as
to justice, a virtue, than to say that communities exist as suoh
in virtue of agreement between members as to what they should pur-
sue whether the pursuit be good or bad.
It is to be observed that by making love the bond of all
communities Augustine extends to politics the sharp distinction
he makes in personal virtue. A man is good or bad. righteous or
unjust, according to the orderliness of his love. Exactly so
with the community, for the same qualification of the Individual
by the orderliness of his love extends to the group in virtue of
the group's existing through agreement as to what it will love.
Private and public righteousness is the same. For Cicero there
are noble and ignoble lovers. But community association being for
him by agreement as to what is right and the voice of right reason
as to what is right--up to what he regards the limits of practioa-
bleness and asoertainability--always prevailing, the existence of
a community as such is for Cicero evidence of the reign of virtue.
For the verification of their systems both Cicero and
Augustine appeal to experience, though neither of them to experi-
ence only but also to reason and, in the case of Augustine, to
Scripture, and, in the case of Cicero, to heathen belief. It is
to be remarked, however, that although a believer in the official
pagan doctrine is confirmed in his error by Cicero, he receives a
shock from him in the matter of the apotheosis of Romulus the
fratricide, whereas, on the other hand, a believer in the deity
of Christ, which the present writer is happy to be, is gladdened
by tha-Christology of Augustine. The course of events is con-
ceived by Cicer to be one in which the experience of the relative
is exhaustive. For Augustine there is a history both of the king-
dom of this w r-d and of the perfect community in heaven.i The
terrestrial kingdom runs its visible course, the celestial its
course invisible except through a partial realization in the per-
egrinating Church. The same events are judged differently by
Cicero and Augustine. The one claims support in Rome's greatness
for his declaration that she was eminently just; the other finds
in the same grandeur a concession by God to a community grossly
unjust by loving herself and her own name more than God. The one
regards events past and present as proving the claim that all
communities are constituted by agreement of the members in regard
to the conception of justice, the latter term being used as by a









probabilist, the other regards events past, present, and future
as denying the claim that there is agreement among men universally
in regard to justice, the same term being interpreted as by a
transcendentalist, communities being instead found to be drawn
together by love of a common object. A community righteous even
by the transcendentalist's standard, though future in regard to
its perfection in point of human participation, is nevertheless
present among men even now through faith.
I have tried both to interpret according to his own sys-
tem the important terms used by each writer and to interpret that
interpretation according to the system of the other. The result
is that Augustine's substitution of love for justice in the defi-
nition of commonwealth, though a matter of a mere couple of words,
is shown to have been necessitated by the great opposition of the
systems of the two writers.
Failure to make such interpretation has led to misunder-
standing of the politics of Augustine and, strangely, it has even
been denied, though cautiously, that he did do what he obviously
has done, the exchanging of love for justice in Cicero's deflni-....
tion of commonwealth. So indispensable to the commonwealth is
justice--without satisfactory consideration of the meaning of the"
term-regarded to be and so essential has seemed the retention of
Augustine in the tradition of justice politics that it is as-
serted that the substitution of love for justice in the defini-
tion of the commonwealth could not have followed from the true
thought of Augustine. Thus we find Professor Mollwaine, toward
the close of his discussion of Augustine in The Growth of Politi-
cal Thought in the West, saying
I can see little ground for assuming that when the author sets
forth a conception of the state "according to the definition
of Cicero" and then follows it with another of contrary char-
acter, it must be taken as proved that his own personal pref-
erences must be against the first and in favor of the second.
And yet this seems to be all the proof adducible for the con-
fident assertion thai St. Augustine practically alone of all
medieval thinkers dispensed with the need of justice in a com-
monwealth \
Butf St. Augustine did not thus discard justice, what
was his real belief on this important subject? The conclu-
sions to be culled from the general argument of the City of
God I should summarize thus: Justice and justice alone is the
only possible bond which can unite men as true populus in a
real res publica1
C. H. Mollwaine, The Growth of Political Thought in the









79
Mcllwaine attempts a solution of Augustine's disagreement with
Cicero by differentiating between Augustine's conceptions of
civitas and res public. The former might exist without justice
but not the latter. Actually Augustine makes no such differentia-
tion. Civitas, res publioa, populus, indeed all communities, even
the familial and that of friendship, are bound together by love
and are in respect to love's being the bond of association alike.
Furthermore all communities, the political, the familial, and that
of friendly association, are alike just if the object of love by
the agreement about which it is constituted a community be loved
with a love that conforms to the transcendent order of being in
which God is alone the ultimate object of love.
But though Augustine did thus "discard" justice in the
sense of substituting for it love as that about which there is the
agreement that associates, the justice thus discarded is quite
another justice than the Ciceronian.
Of the two systems which have been related to each other
I reject the Ciceronian and accept the Augustinian chiefly be-
cause only the latter conform to the Christian teaching, accord-
ng to which, while there is indeed justification of the sinner
"'nly through faith in the merits solely of Christ Jesus, there is
no righteousness of either individuals or communities so long as
ti'," flaunt the Commandments, of which the first is "I am the
ilrd thy God . thou shalt have no other gods before me"1
and, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and
with all thy soul, and with all thy mind, and with all thy
strength."2 As regards the majority of men the knowledge of this
commandment is a knowledge that is impaired; as regards the atti-
tude of most men to this commandment, it is one of complete non-
conformity.


West (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1932), p. 158. G. H. Sabine
asserts in A History of Political Theory (New York: Henry Holt and
Co., 19357), p. 192, n. 14, "The meaning of Augustine in question-
ing Cicero's definition of the state has been the subject of con-
troversy. C. H. McIlwaine . . has taken exception, I believe
rightly, to the interpretation given by A. J. Carlyle and J. N.
Figgis."


iExodus 20: 2, 3.


2Mark 12: 30.




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