• TABLE OF CONTENTS
HIDE
 Front Cover
 Front Matter
 Title Page
 Table of Contents
 Der Krieg gegen den Mullah Abdullah...
 Der Aschantikrieg im Jahre...
 Verhandlungen uber die Mandschurei...
 Verhandlungen zwischen Grofsbritannien...
 Aktenstucke zur Geschichte des...
 Back Matter
 Back Cover














Group Title: Staatsarchiv
Title: Das Staatsarchiv
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Permanent Link: http://ufdc.ufl.edu/UF00098568/00033
 Material Information
Title: Das Staatsarchiv
Physical Description: v. : ; 24-25 cm.
Language: German
Creator: Institut für Auswärtige Politik (Germany)
Institut für Ausländisches Öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht (Germany)
Germany -- Auswärtiges Amt
Publisher: Akademische Verlagsgesellschaft etc.
Place of Publication: Leipzig etc
Leipzig etc
 Subjects
Subject: History, Modern -- Sources -- Periodicals   ( lcsh )
Genre: periodical   ( marcgt )
 Notes
Additional Physical Form: Also issued online.
Dates or Sequential Designation: 1.-86. Bd., Juli 1861-1919; n.F., 1.- Bd., 1928-
Numbering Peculiarities: Publication suspended 1920-1927.
General Note: "Sammlung der offiziellen Aktenstücke zur Aussenpolitik der Gegenwart."
General Note: "In Verbindung mit dem Institut für Auswärtige Politik, Hamburg, und dem Institut für Ausländisches Öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht, Berlin, und mit Unterstützung des Auswärtigen Amtes herausgegeben von Friedrich Thimme.
General Note: Has occasional supplements.
 Record Information
Bibliographic ID: UF00098568
Volume ID: VID00033
Source Institution: University of Florida
Holding Location: University of Florida
Rights Management: All rights reserved by the source institution and holding location.
Resource Identifier: oclc - 01766397

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Table of Contents
    Front Cover
        Front Cover 1
        Front Cover 2
    Front Matter
        Front Matter 1
        Front Matter 2
        Front Matter 3
        Front Matter 4
    Title Page
        Page i
        Page ii
    Table of Contents
        Page iii
        Page iv
        Page v
        Page vi
        Page vii
        Page viii
        Page ix
        Page x
        Page xi
        Page xii
    Der Krieg gegen den Mullah Abdullah im Somalilande 1899-1901
        Page 1
        Page 2
        Page 3
        Page 4
        Page 5
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    Der Aschantikrieg im Jahre 1900
        Page 54
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    Verhandlungen uber die Mandschurei 1900-1901
        Page 129
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    Verhandlungen zwischen Grofsbritannien und den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika etc.
        Page 183
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    Aktenstucke zur Geschichte des Sudafrikanischen Krieges
        Page 216
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    Back Matter
        Page 309
        Page 310
        Page 311
        Page 312
    Back Cover
        Page 313
        Page 314
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Das Staats-archiv.



Sammlung

der offiziellen Aktenstiicke
zur

Geschichte der Gegenwart.


Begrndet
von
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Inhaltsverzeichnis.


Bndnisse, Vertrge, Konventionen, Protokolle etc.
Nr. Seite
1887. Januar 21.
1900.Febr ula .) Grofsbritannien und Honduras. Handelsvertrag . 12663. 300
1901. Mrz 11. Belgien und Luxemburg. Telegraphenabkommen .. 12661. 297
16. Belgien und Niederlande, Telegraphenabkommen . 12662. 299
August 15. Grofsbritannien und Dnemark. Vertrag ber die Be-
frderung von Prefstelegrammen . . . 12660. 295
1902. Mrz 5. Vertragsstaaten. Vertrag ber die Behandlung des
Zuckers . . . . . . 12659. 265

Aktenstcke zur Geschichte des Sdafrikanischen Krieges.
I. Korrespondeni der englischen Heeresleitung mit
den Burengeneralen ber die Zerstrung von Eigentum.
1900. Februar 3. Orangefreistaat und Sdafrikanische Republik, Die
Prsidenten des Orangefreistaates und der Sd-
afrikanischen Republik an den englischen Ober-
general. Beschwerden ber Zerstrung von Farmen. 12639. 216
5. Grofsbritannien, Der Obergeneral an die Prsidenten
der beiden Republiken. Antwort auf das Vorige. 12640. 217
12. Derselbe an Dieselben. Dasselbe . . . 12641. 218
Mai 13. Derselbe an Dieselben. Proklamation gegen will-
krliche Zerstrungen . . . . . 12642. 218
S 16. Sdafrikanische Republik. Der Generalkommandant
an den englischen Obergeneral. Weitere Beschwerden 12643. 218
S18. Grofsbritannien. Der Obergeneral an den General-
kommandanten der Sdafrikanischen Republik.
Antwort auf das Vorige . . . . . 12644. 219
Juli 4. Sdafrikanische Republik. Der Generalkommandant
an den englischen Obergeneral. Neue Beschwerden 12645. 219
10. Orangefreistaat. Der Kommandant De Wet an den
englischen Obergeneral. Dasselbe . . . 12646. 220
,, 24. Grofsbritannien, Auszug eines Berichtes von General
Sir Redvers Buller . . . . . . 12648. 223
28. Antworten des Obergenerals au Botha und De Wet 12647. 221







IV Sachregister: Aktenstcke zur Geschichte des Sdafrik. Krieges. -- Der Asehantikrieg.
Nr. Seite
1900. August 15. Sdafrikanische Republik, Der Generalkommandant
an den englischen Obergeneral. Antworten und
Beschwerden . . . . . . . 12650. 224
23. Grofsbritannien, Der Obergeneral an den Generalkom-
mandanten der Sdafrikanischen Republik. Grnde
fr die Vertreibung der Familien und Zerstrung
der Huser . . . . . . 12651. 225
Septhr. 2. Derselbe an Denselben. Dasselbe. Guerillakrieg. 12652. 226
S5. Sdafrikanische Republik. Der Generalkommandant
an den englischen Obergeneral. Antwort auf die
beiden vorigen . . . . . 12653. 227
Oktober 17. Derselbe an Denselben. Protest gegen die eng-
lische Kriegfhrung . . . . . 12654. 227
S22. Grofsbritannien, Der Obergeneral an den Generalkom-
mandanten der Sdafrikanischen Republik. Der
Guerillakrieg erfordert aufserordentliehe Mittel . 12655. 228

11. Bericht des Frauenkomitees ber die Konzentrationslager.
1901. Dezbr. 12. Grofsbritannien, Report on the concentration eamps in
South-Africa by the committee of Ladies appointed
by the secretary of state for war . . .. 12656. 228

111. Verhandlung zwischen den Niederlanden und Grofsbritannien
ber eine Vermittlung im Sdafrikanischen Kriege.
1902. Januar 25. Niederlande. Der Gesandte in London an den englischen
Minister des Ausw. Bietet die guten Dienste der
niederlndischen Regierung an, um eine Friedens-
verhandlung herbeizufhren. . . . .. 12657. 264
29. Grofsbritannien, Der Staatssekretr des Ausw. an den
Gesandten der Niederlande in-London. Die Initia-
tive zu Verhandlungen mufs von den Buren in
Sdafrika ausgehen . . . . ... 12658. 265


Der Aschantikrieg imi Jahre 1900.
1900. April 6. Grofsbritannien, Der Kolonialminister Sir F.M.Hodgson
an den Gouverneur der Goldkste. Giebt es Un-
ruhen in Asehanti? . . . . 12545. 54
7. Mr. Low an den Kolonialminister. Der Gouverneur
der Goldkste bereitet Truppensendungen nach
Kumassi vor . . . . . . 12546. 54
7. Derselbe an Denselben. Verhandlungen des Gou-
verneurs mit den Huptlingen . . . . 12547. 55
S7. Der Gouverneur der Goldkste an den Kolonial-
minister. Genauerer Bericht ber seine Reise nach
Kumassi und ber die IIaltung der Eingeborenen 12558. 00
11. Der Gouverneur der Goldkste an den Kolonial-
minister. Weitere Nachrichten ber die Verhand-
lung mit den Huptlingen . . . . 12559. 72
12. Derselbe an Denselben. Die Verhandlung mit den
Huptlingen ist ohne Ergebnis . . . 12548. 55







Sachregister: Der Aschantikrieg. Der Krieg gegen Mullah Abdullah im Somalilande. V
Nr. Seite
1900 April 13. Grofsbritannien, DerKolonialminister an den Gouverneur
der Goldkste. Soll nach den Umstnden handeln 12549. 56
15. Mr. Low an den Kolonialminister . . . 12550. 56
16. Der Gouverneur der Goldkste an den Kolonial-
minister. Derselbe Gegenstand . . . 12560. 74
19. Mr. Low an den Kolonialminister. Tumulte unter
den Aschantis . . . . . . 12551. 56
S19. Der Kolonialminister an Mr. Low. Verstrkungen
sind unterwegs . . . . . . 12552. 57
S24. Mr. Low an den Kolonialminister. In Kumassi
sind Verstrkungen eingetroffen . . . 12553. 57
S30. Derselbe an Denselben. Kumassi ist abgeschnitten 12554. 58
Mai 5. Mr. Low an den Kolonialminister. Nachrichten
vom Gouverneur aus Kumassi ber Angriffe der
Aschantis auf die Stadt . . . . . 12555. 59
5. Der Kolonialminister an den General Lugard (Nord-
Nigeria). Verstrkungen nach der Goldkste 12556. 60
S9. Der Kolonialminister an Mr. Low. Verstrkungen
kommen von Lagos . . . . . 12557. 60
S27. Oberst Willcocks an den Kolonialminister. Lage
auf dem Kriegsschauplatze . . . . 12561. 79
Juni 10. Derselbe an Denselben. Ernste militrische Lage.
Truppenbewegungen . . . . . 12562. 80
15. Der Kolonialminister an den Oberst Willcocks.
Verstrkungen sind unterwegs . . .. 12563. 80
S 30. Oberst Willcocks an den Kolonialminister. Ant-
wort auf das Vorige. Er braucht weitere Ver-
strkungen . . . . . . . 12564. 81
Juli 5. Mr. Low an den Kolonialminister. Der Gouverneur
hat Kumassi verlassen. . . . . 12565. 82
13. Oberst Willcocks an den Kolonialminister. Milit-
rische Mafsregeln . . . . . . 12566. 83
14. Der Gouverneur der Goldkste an den Kolonial-
minister. Bericht ber die Belagerung von Kumassi
und militrische Expeditionen . . . . 12568. 85
23. Derselbe an Denselben. Entsatz Kumassis . 12567. 83
24. Der Gouverneur der Goldkste an den Kolonial-
minister. Bericht ber den Abzug von Kumassi 12569. 96
August 14. Oberst Willcocks an den Kolonialminister. Genauerer
Bericht ber seine Operationen bis zum 14. Au-
gust 1900 . . ............. 12570. 105
l Dezbr. 28. Oberst Willcocks au den Kolonialminister. Smtliche
Insurgentenchefs sind gefangen . . . 12571. 120
1901. Januar 29. Der Gouverneur der Goldkste an den Kolonial-
minister. Rckblick auf den Aufstand . . 12572. 120

Der Krieg gegen den Mullah Abdullah im Somialilande
1899-1901.
18)9. April 12. Grofsbritannien. Der Generalkonsul Sadler an derSomali-
kiste an den Minister des Ausw. Berichtet ber
das Auftreten eines Mullah Abdullah als Propheten
in Dolbahanta. Er schlgt eine Expedition vor 12490. 1







VI Der Krieg gegen den Mullah Abdullah im Somalilande 1899-1901.
Nr. Seite
1899. Juni 5. Grofsbritannien. Der Generalkonsul Sadler an den
Minister des Ausw. Die Macht Abdullahs breitet
sich aus . . . . . . . 12491. 4
Juli 16. Derselbe an Denselben. Dasselbe. Haltung des
Sultans Nur . . . . . . 12492. 4
17. Kapitn Harrington an Lord Cromer, Sirdar in
gypten. Hat dem Knig Menelek die Umtriebe
Abdullahs mitgeteilt . . . . . 12493. 8
22. Der Generalkonsul Sadler an den Minister des Ausw.
Frage einer abyssinischen Expedition gegen den
Mullah . . . . . . .. 12494. 8
August 31. Derselbe an Denselben. Der Mullah erklrt sich
zum Mabdi. Verstrkungen sind ntig . . 12495. 9
Septbr. 5. Der Minister des Ausw. an den Generalkonsul Sad-
ler. Verstrkungen sind abgeschickt . . 12496. 10
10. Der Generalkonsul Sadler bersendet dem Minister
des Ausw. einen Brief des Mullah. (Erhalten in
Berbera, 1. September) . . . . . 12500. 11
S12. Der Generalkonsul Sadler an den Minister des Ausw.
Schnelles Handeln ist ntig . . . . 12497. 10
14. Generalkonsul Sadler an den Minister des Ausw.
Weitere Nachrichten ber den Mullah und die Hal-
tung der Stmme . . . . . . 12504. 13
S 19. Der Minister des Ausw. an den Generalkonsul Sadler.
Wie ist die Lage? . . . . . . 12498. 11
,, 20. Generalkonsul Sadler an den Minister des Ausw.
Antwort auf das Vorige . . . . . 12499. 11
S21. Denkschrift ber die Expedition gegen den Mullah 12501. 11
,29. Der Generalkonsul Sadler an den Minister des Ausw
Neue Nachricht ber den Mullah . . . 12502. 12
S 30. Der Minister des Ausw. an den Generalkonsul Sad-
ler. Indische Truppen nach Berbera. Mitwirkung
Abyssiniens . . . . . . . 12503. 12
Oktober 9. Generalkonsul Sadler an den Minister des Ausw.
Der Anhang des Mullah zerstreut sich . . 12505. 17
12. Generalkonsul Sadler an den Minister des Ausw.
Beschleunigung der Expedition ist erwnscht. Mit-
wirkung Abyssiniens . . . . .. . 12508. 18
19. Der Minister des Ausw. an Generalkonsul Sadler.
Verschiebung der Expedition gegen den Mullah 12506. 17
,, 22. Generalkonsul Sadler an den Minister des Ausw.
Antwort auf das Vorige . . . . . 12507. 17
S23. Der Minister des Ausw. an Generalkonsul Sadler.
Beschrnkung der militrischen Unternehmungen 12509. 21
27. Generalkonsul Sadler an den Minister des Ausw.
Abyssinien wnscht die Expedition . . . 12510. 21
Novbr. 23. Generalkonsul Sadler an den Minister des Ausw.
bersendet eine Korrespondenz mit abyssinischen
Behrden ber Rubereien abyssinischer Stmme 12511. 22
SDezbr. 27. Der Minister des Ausw. an den Geschftstrger in
Abyssinien. Die britische Grenze soll respektiert
werden . . . . . . ... 12512. 25






Der Krieg gegen den Mullah Abdullal im Somalilande 1899-1901. VII
Nr. Seite
1900. Mrz 16C. Grofsbritannien. Generalkonsul Sadler an den Minister
des Ausw. Abyssinische Expedition gegen den
Mullall . . . . . . . 12513. 25
a1 l1 31. Derselbe au Denselben. Niederlage des Mullah 12514. 26
I, April 21. Derselbe an Denselben. Nachrichten ber den Mullah 12515. 27
Juni 9. Der Geschftstrger in Abyssinien an den Sirdar
von gypten. Menelek schlgt eine englisch-abys-
sinische Expedition vor . . . . . 12517. 28
9. Derselbe an Denselben. Dasselbe . . . 12518. 28
,, 15. Generalkonsul Sadler an den Minister des Ausw.
Englisch-Abyssinische Expedition . . . 12516. 28
August 5. Generalkonsul Sadler an den Minister des Ausw.
Die Lage wird unertrglich . . . . 12519. 29
S 5. Derselbe an Denselben. Weitere Nachrichten. Die
Stmme fordern Bekmpfung des Mullah . . 12520. 29
Septbr. 12. Derselbe an Denselben. Bericht ber die Expedition
nach Burao . . . . . . 12521. 34
Oktober 26. Derselbe an Denselben. Englisch-abyssinische Ope-
rationen . . . . . . . 12522. 36
Novbr. 3. Derselbe an Denselben. Dasselbe . . .. 12523. 37
S9. Das Auw. Amt an das Kriegsamt. Anwerbung von
1000 Somalis . . . . . . 12524. 38
16. Das Ausw. Amt an den Generalkonsul Sadler. Soll
mit der Werbung der Somalis beginnen . . 12525. 38
S16. Das Kriegsamt an das Ausw. Amt. Denkschrift ber
die Expedition gegen den Mullah. Geschichte des
Mullah und seiner Rubereien . . . . 12526. 38
24. Generalkonsul Sadler an das Ausw. Amt. Antwort
auf No. 12525 .. . . . . . .. 12527. 42
S 29. Der Geschftstrger in Abyssinien an den Minister
des Ausw. Abyssinion wird gegen den Mullah nicht
auf eigene Hand vorgehen . . . . 12531. 43
S 30. Das Ausw. Amt an den Generalkonsul Sadler Ex-
pedition gegen die Ogadenstmme . . . 12528. 42
Dezbr. 6. Generalkonsul Sadler an das Ausw. Amt. Der Mullah
kauft Waffen im italienischen Gebiet . . 12529. 43
S8. Das Ausw. Amt an den Botschafter in Rom. Ita-
lien soll Waffenlieferung an den Mullah verhten 12530. 43
S 28. Generalkonsul Sadler an das Ausw. Amt. Feldzugs-
plan gegen den Mullah . . . . . 12533. 45
1901. Januar 1. Das Ausw. Amt an Generalkonsul Sadler. Ver-
langt Bericht ber die gnstigste Zeit fr die
Operationen . . . . . . 12532. 44
S 12. Derselbe an Dasselbe. Antwort auf Nr. 12532 . 12534. 47
29. Der Sirdar von gypten an das Ausw. Amt. Ab-
kommen mit Abyssinien fr den Feldzug. . 12535. 48
Februar 10. Generalkonsul Sadler an das Ausw. Amt. Milserfolg
der Abyssinier . . . . . . 12536. 48
,, 25. Das Ausw. Amt an den Major Hambury Tracy.
Er soll zur abyssinischen Armee abgehen . 12537. 49
Mrz 8. Das Ausw. Amt an Generalkonsul Sadler. Aufent-
halt des Mullah und Feldzugsplan . . . 12538. 50







VIII Verhandlungen ber die Mandschurei 1900-1901.
Nr. Seite
1901. Mrz 15 Grofsbritannien, Generalkonsul Sadler an das Ausw.
Amt. Die Expedition mufs sofort beginnen . 12539. 50
S ,, 18. Das Ausw. Amt an den Generalkonsul Sadler. Ant-
wort auf das Vorige . . . . . 12540. 51
April 4. Proklamation an die Dolbahautastmme . . 12543. 52
Mai 1. Generalkonsul Sadler an das Ausw. Amt. Strke
des Mullah . . . . . . 12541. 51
24. Derselbe an Dasselbe. Fortschritte der Expedition 12542. 52
Juni 13. Generalkonsul Sadler an das Ausw. Amt. Erfolge
ber den Mullah. . . . . . 12544. 52


Verhandlungen iiber die Mandschurei 1900-1901.

1900. Oktober 1. Grofsbritannien. Die Botschaft in Petersburg an den
Minister des Ausw. Rufsland hat nicht die Absicht,
die Mandschurei zu annektieren . . . 12573. 129
,1. Dieselbe an Denselben. Derselbe Gegenstand. Ver-
waltungsmafsregeln der Russen in der Mandschurei 12574. 129
S ,, 10. Die Botschaft in Petersburg an den Minister des
Ausw. Rufsland verlangt nur Sicherheit fr Eisen-
bahnen und Schiffahrt in der Mandschurei . 12575. 132
S 22. Der Gesandte in Peking an den Minister des Ausw.
Die ganze Mandschurei ist in russischer Gewalt 12576. 133
1901. Januar 2. Der Gesandte in Peking an den Minister des Ausw.
Teilt den Text eines russisch-chinesischen Ab-
kommens ber die Mandschurei mit . . 12577. 133
S ,, 3. Der Minister des Ausw. an den Botschafter in Peters-
burg. Soll ber ein angebliches Mandschureiab-
kommen Erkundigung einziehen . . . 12578. 137
S3. Der Minister des Ausw. an den Gesandten in Peking.
Weifs er etwas von dem Maudschureiabkommen? 12579. 137
S4. Der Gesandte in Peking an den Minister des Ausw.
Antwort auf das Vorige . . . . . 12580. 137
S 5. Der Botschafter in Petersburg an den Minister des
Ausw. Antwort auf Nr. 12578 . . . 12582. 138
6. Derselbe an Denselben. Dasselbe . . . 12581. 138
8. Der Botschafter in Petersburg an den Minister des
Ausw. Ausffhrliche Antwort auf Nr.12578. Haltung
der russischen Presse . . . . . 12584. 139
S12. Der Minister des Ausw. an den Gesandten in Japan.
Die japanische Regierung hat die russische Regierung
ber das Mandschureiabkommen befragt . . 12583. 138
S15. Der Minister des Ausw. an den Gesandten in Peking.
Der chinesische Gesandte verleugnet das Man-
dschureiabkommen . . . . . . 12585. 140
S22. Der Botschafter in Petersburg an den Minister des
Ausw. Russisch-chinesische Verhandlungen. Keine
Landabtretung . . . . . . 12580. 140
22. Der Minister des Ausw. an den Botschafter in
Petersburg. Soll den russischen Minister inter-
pellieren . . . . . ... 12587. 141







Verhandlungen ber die Mandschurei 1900- 1901. IX
Nr. Seite
1901. Februar 5. Grofsbritannien. Der Gesandte in Peking an den
Minister des Ausw. Rufsland verlangt die sofortige
Ratifikation des Mandschurei-Abkommens . 12588. 141
S5. Der Gesandte in Peking an den Minister des Ausw.
Nachrichten ber die Verwaltung der Mandschurei
durch die Russen . . . . . . 12626. 168
G 6. Der Botschafter in Petersburg an den Minister des
Ausw. Unterredung mit Lamsdorff. Rufsland sucht
einen modus vivendi mit China . . . 12589. 142
S13. Der Minister des Ausw. an die Vertretungen in
Tokio, Peking und Berlin. China soll kein Separat-
abkommen mit einer Macht schliefsen . . 12590. 143
S15. Der Gesandte in Japan an den Minister des Ausw.
Antwort auf das Vorige . . . . . 12591. 144
S15. Der Minister des Ausw. an den Gesandten in Peking.
Er hat dem chinesischen Gesandten ein Separat-
abkommen widerraten . . . . . 12592. 144
17. Der Botschafter in Petersburg an den Minister des
Ausw. Lamsdorff verleugnet jede territoriale Er-
werbung in der Mandschurei . . . . 12593. 144
S19. Der Gesandte in Peking an den Minister des Ausw.
Antwort auf 12590 . . . . . . 12594. 145
S27. Derselbe an Denselben. Die chinesische Regierung
bittet um Untersttzung gegen die russischen
Forderungen in der Mandschurei . . . 12595. 145
28. Der Botschafter in Petersburg an den Minister des
Ausw. Lamsdorff ber die Rckkehr des chine-
sischen Hofes nach Peking und den modus vivendi
in der Mandschurei . . . . . . 12596. 146
,, 28. Der Gesandte in Peking an den Minister des Ausw.
Ergnzung zu Nr. 12595 . . . . . 12597. 147
Mrz 1. 'Der Minister des Ausw. an den Gesandten in Peking.
Die chinesische Regierung wnscht Vermittelung in
der Mandschureifrage . . . . . 12598. 148
2. Der Gesandte in Peking an den Minister des Ausw.
Der Gesandte der Verein. Staaten protestiert eben-
falls gegen ein Separatabkommen . . . 12599. 148
2. Der Minister des Ausw. an den Gesandten in Peking.
Vermittlungsfrage . . . . . . 12600. 149
S4. Der Minister des Ausw. an den Botschafter in
Petersburg. Die englische Regierung wnscht den
Text des Mandschureiabkommens zu erhalten . 12601. 149
S5. Der Minister des Ausw. an den Botschafter in
Berlin. Die deutsche Regierung wnscht die Mand-
schureifrage vor die Gesandtenkonferenz zu ziehen. 12602. 150
S5. Der Minister des Ausw. an den Gesandten in Peking.
Die chinesische Regierung soll dem deutschen Vor-
schlage im vorigen zustimmen . . . . 12603. 150
.. 6. Der Gesandte in Peking an den Minister des Ausw.
bersendet den Text des Mandschureiabkommens 12604. 151







X Verhandlungen iiber die Mandschurei 1900-1901.
Nr. Seite
1901 Mrz 6. Grofsbritannien, Der Minister des Ausw. an den Bot-
schafter in Washington. Unterredung mit dem
amerikanischen Botschafter ber chinesische Sonder-
abkommen . . . . . . . 12605. 152
6. Der Minister des Ausw. an den Gesandten in
Peking. Hat dem chinesischen Gesandten in London
jedes Separatabkommen widerraten . . . 12606. 153
7. Der Botschafter in Petersburg an den Minister des
Ausw. Lamsdorff verweigert die Mitteilung des
Mandschureivertrages . . . . . 12607. 154
9. Der Minister des Ausw. an den Botschafter in Peters-
burg. Soll dem Grafen Lamsdorff den Text des
Mandschureiabkommens vorlegen . . . 12608. 155
11. Der Botschafter in Petersburg an den Minister des
Ausw. Lamsdorff lehnt eine Diskussion des Man-
dschureiabkommens ab . . . . . 12609. 156
11. Der Gesandte in Peking an den Minister des Ausw.
Die chinesische Regierung fordert in Petersburg
nderung des Mandschureiabkommens . . 12610. 157
13. Der Botschafter in Petersburg an den Minister des
Ausw. Antwort auf Nr. 12608. Unterredung mit
Lamsdorff . . . . . . . 12611. 157
S13. Der Minister des Ausw. an den Gesandten in Peking.
Haltung Li Hung-Tschangs . . . . 12612. 158
S16. Der Minister des Ausw. an die Vertreter in
Petersburg, Peking, Tokio. Die chinesische Re-
gierung hat eine nderung des Abkommens in
Petersburg vorgeschlagen . . . .. 12G13. 158
S 17. Der Gesandte in Peking an den Minister des Ausw.
Modifikation des Mandschureiabkommens . . 12614. 159
S18. Der Botschafter in Petersburg an den Minister des
Ausw. Unterredung mit Lamsdorff. Er lehnt die
Mitteilung des Vertrags ab . . . . 12623. 163
,18. Der Botschafter in Petersburg an den Minister des
Ausw. Besttigung von Nr. 12613 . . . 12615 159
19. Der Gesandte in Peking an den Minister des Ausw.
Nheres ber die Modifikation des Mandschurei-
abkommens . . . . . . . 12616. 160
20. China. Kaiserliches Dekret vom 20. Mrz. Der Ge-
sandte in London soll die englische Regierung um
Hilfe bitten . . . . . .... 12617. 160
,, 20. Grofsbritannien. Der Generalkonsul in Schanghai an
den Minister des Ausw. Dasselbe . . . 12618. 161
S21. China, Kaiserliches Dekret an den Gesandten in Lon-
don. Neues Ersuchen um Vermittlung in der
Mandschureifrage . . . . . . 12619. 161
23. Grofsbritannien, Der Generalkonsul in Schanghai an
den Minister des Ausw. China ist eventuell bereit,
das Mandschureiabkommen abzulehnen . . 12620. 162







Verhandlungen zwischen Grofsbritannien und den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika. XI
Nr. Seite
1901. Mrz 23. Grofsbritannien, Der Minister des Ausw. an den
chinesischen Gesandten in London. Antwort auf
Nr. 12617. Lehnt die chinesische Bitte ab. -
Bemerkung zu Nr. 12620 . . . . . 12621. 162
24. Der Gesandte in Peking an den Minister des Ausw.
Li HIung Tschang wnscht dringend die englische
Vermittlung . . . . . . . 12622. 163
24. China. Vizeknige Lew Kwun Yih und Chang Chih
Tung an den Gesandten in London. Der Man-
dschureivertrag soll dem Schiedsspruch der Mchte
vorgelegt werden . . . . . . 12624. 166
25. Grofsbritannien, Der Minister des Ausw. an den chine-
sischen Gesandten in London. Antwort auf das
Vorige . . . . . . . 12625. 168
April 5. Der Minister des Ausw. an den Botschafter in
Petersburg. Ruland verzichtet auf das Man-
dschureiabkommen . . . . . 12627. 169
6. Der Botschafter in Petersburg an den Minister des
Ausw. bersendet einen Auszug aus dem ,Messager
Officiel" iiber die russische Politik in China. . 12628. 170
12. Der Botschafter in Petersburg an den Minister des
Ausw. Unterredung mit Lamsdorff ber die Man-
dschurei. Es habe nie ein Abkommen, sondern nur
ein Programm existiert . . . . . 12629. 180


Verhandlungen zwischen Grofsbritannien und den Vereinigten
Staaten von Amerika iiber einen Kanal zwischen deinm Atlantischen
und Stillen Ozean.

1900. Februar 5. Grofsbritannien und Vereinigte Staaten. Zusatz zu
dem Vertrage vom 19. April 1850 ber einen Schiff-
fahrtskanal zwischen dem Atlantischen und Stillen
Ozean . . . . . . . 12630. 183
Dezbr. 22. Vereinigte Staaten. Der Staatssekretr des Ausw. an
den englischen Botschafter in Washington. Der
Senat hat den Vertrag vom 5. Februar gendert 12631. 190
1901. Februar 22. Grofsbritannien. Der Staatssekretr des Ausw. an den
Botschafter in Washington. Rckblick auf die Ver-
handlungen. Der amerikanische Vorschlag ist un-
annehmbar. . . . . . . . 12632. 193
April 25. Der Botschafter in Washington an den Staats-
sekretr des Ausw. Der amerikanische Staats-
sekretr hat ihm einen neuen Vertragsentwurf ber-
geben . . . . . . . 12633. 200
August 3. Der Staatssekretr des Ausw. an den Botschafter
in Washington. bersendet eine Denkschrift und
verlangt nderung des Vertragsentwurfs . . 12634. 202
Septbr. 12. Der Staatssekretr des Ausw. an den amerikanischen
Botschafter in London. Weitere Verhandlungen
ber die Vorschlge vom 3. August . . 12635. 210






XII Verhandlungen zwischen Grofsbritannien und den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika.
Nr. Seite
1901. Oktober 23. Grofsbritannien, Der Staatssekretr des Ausw. an den it
Botschafter in Washington. Die englische Regierung
nimmt die amerikanischen Vorschlge an . . 12636. 211
Novbr. 6. Vereinigte Staaten. Der Staatssekretr des Ausw. an
den engl. Botschafter in Washington. bersendet
den definitiven Vertragsentwurf . . . 12637. 212
S18. Grofsbritannien und Vereinigte Staaten, Vertrag ber
die Erbauung eines Schiffahrtskanals zwischen dem
Atlantischen und Stillen Ozean. . . .. 12638. 213



































4


















Der Krieg gegen den Mullah Abdullah im
Somalilande 1899-1901.*)

Nr. 12490. GROSSBRITANNIEN. Der Generalkonsul Sadler
an der Somalikste an den Minister des Ausw.
Berichtet iber das Auftreten eines Mullah Ab-
dullah als Propheten in Dolbahanta. Er schlgt
eine Expedition vor.
Berbera, April 12, 1899. (April 27.**)
(Extract.) 1I On my return from Zeyla in the middle of last month
I found conflicting reports current in Berbera regarding the doings of a
Mullah, by name Haji Muhammad Abdullah, in the Dolbahanta country,
who, it was said, was collecting arms and men with a view to establishing
his authority over the south-eastern portion of the Protectorate. It was
also freely rumoured that it was his ultimate object, should he find himself
strong enough, to head a religious expedition against the Abyssinians. |
This Haji Muhammad Abdullah belongs to the Habr Suleiman Ogaden
tribe; he married into the Dolbahanta Ali Gheri, amongst whom he now
lives. His place of residence is Kob Fardod, a village inhabited by Mullahs,
a day's march east of Kerritt, and distant about 170 miles from Berbera.
He is a man in the prime of life, and in person is described as dark-
coloured, tall, and thin, with a small goat's beard. He has made several
pilgrimages to Mecca during the last three years. At Mecca he attached
himself to the sect of Muhammad Salih, whose deputy he claims to be
in Somaliland. I| This sect was established in Berbera about twelve years
ago. It preaches more regularity in the hour of prayer, strieter attention
to the forms of religion, and the interdiction of Kat a leaf the Arabs
and coast Somalis are much addieted to chewing on account of its strengthen-
*) Blaubuch Cd. 597. 1901.
**) Die eingeklammerten Daten geben das Datum der Ankunft in London an. Red,
Staatsarchiv LXVI. 1






2 Der Krieg gegen den Mullah Abdullah

ing and intoxicating properties. This teaching has not found much
favour with tle people of the town. It has been known for some time
that Haji Muhainmad Abdullah had acquired considerable influence over
the Habr Toljaala and Dolbahanta tribes inhabiting the remoter parts of
the Protectorate, but hitherto it had always been thought that this influence
had been exerted for good; he settled disputes amongst the tribes in his
vicinity, kept them from raiding each other, and was generally thought
to be on the side of law and order. Several communications had passed
between him and the Vice-Consul (Berbera), all written in proper terms,
and three months ago he sent a prisoner into Berbera, against whom
a complaint had been laid of robbery and violence in the interior. 11 In-
quiries were at once set on foot to ascertain what the rumours and reports
conccrning this individual meant, on what they were founded, and what
his possible intentions mnight be. The result, and bis own communications
made within the last few days to the Vice-Consul, leave no room to
doubt but that he is now organizing a religious movement antagonistic
to the Administration. 11 It is difficult to get accurate information regarding
bis doings and future intentions, both on account of the distance he is
off, and because all those who willingly or under compulsion join bis seet.
are sworn to say nothing about him, and an oath, though not usually
binding on a Somali, is so when administered by a man of such reputed
sanctity and power as this Mullah. The position, though, as I gather
it after sifting the various reports I have heard, is as follows: -
The Mullah has abandoned his former practiee of merely redressing
grievances, and has commenced to proelaim himself a power in the land.
He forces all within his reach to join his sect, and threatens expeditions
against the Dolbahanta tribes who hold aloof. He levies blackmail for
the support of his followers when supplies, which are freely given by
the tribes whom he has brought under his influence, fail. jj He has
amongst his followers several bad and suspicious characters, who probably
use his name for their own purposes. He lays claim to the possession
of supernatural powers, such as being able to hear with his own ears in
the Dolbahanta what is being said of him in Berbera, witli the usual
story of being able to turn bullets into water. |1 This is believed in by
more ignorant people of that far-off district. It is to this belief in his
supernatural powers, coupled with the fact that he has undoubtedly done
much to preserve the peace in the Dolbahanta, and the power he now
has of enforcing his orders through a large following, and the possession
of fire-arms, that his hold over the Dolbahanta country has become so
strong. II The tribes over whom this Mullah has more immediately con-






im Somalilande 1899-1901. 3

solidated his influence are: in the Dolbahanta, the Bahr-as-Samah, the
Arar Samah, and the Ali Gheri; other sections of the Girad Farah are
under his sway, and the powerful Mahmood Girad, against whom he
threatened to send an expedition, are now said to have sent him a de-
putation of 300 horsemen. In the Habr Toljaala country the Aden
Madoba and tlhe Yesaf have joined themselves to him, and possibly other
tribes in that vicinity. jj In the Habr Gerhajis country, beyond espousing
the cause of Madar Hirsi, he failed to effect anything they would have
none of him. I do not think there is any chance of his extending his
influence over the two large Ishak tribes the Habr Gerhajis and the
Habr Awal these might be depended on to operate against him. With
the tribes under his sway we have no quarrel. |1 Owing to its distance
from the coast, we have hitherto exercised no effeetive control over the
Dolbahanta country, and have interfered but little in its affairs. Dol-
bahanta caravans come with regularity into Berbera, but beyond this we
have but little information available as to the country and the character
of its inhabitants. Since 1891, when, for various reasons, it was decided
not to enter into engagements with the Dolbahanta tribes, their country
has been visited but twice once by Captain Welby in 1895, and once
by Captain Merewether in 1896-97. On each occasion these parties
were received well, but their object was a friendly one. What the
attitude of these tribes would be in a move against this Mullah is as yet
doubtful. According to some reports which have reached me, the ad-
hesion of some of these tribes is due more to fear than in any particular
interest in the Mullah's cause, and some might be glad to be rid of
him. l1 The Dolbahanta is now an integral portion of our Protectorate,
and though we have not hitherto exerted our influence there, we cannot
tolerate such a state of affairs as would follow the cstablishment of this
Mullah's rule, under the conditions which are now apparent. Nor can
we permit this man to import arms against our orders, and use them
to terrorize our unarmed tribes. At the same time, it would be a diffi-
cult business at present to seize this Mullah or to disarm himr. | The
best means of meeting this situation in the Dolbahanta would, 1 think,
be to organize a military promenade. It seems necessary in Somaliland
to make a display of force in the interior every four or five years, and
such a display has never been made in the eastern portions of our
Protectorate. All the people there know of us is what they have seen
of the few small parties that have visited their country and what they
have heard from their caravans frequenting our ports. lt is now four
years sinev the Rer Harad expedition was undertaken, and the good
1*






4 Der Krieg gegen den Mullah Abdullah

effeet it produced is wearing off. || So far as is known, the Mullah has
some 3000 men. After the rains fall in this month and May the tribes
now round him will be moving to the Haud, and he will be left with
a comparatively small following. This is the time I should choose for
an expedition. No opposition would be met with unless operations were
direetly taken against this man, and as regards that I should have to
be guided by the circumstances as I find them.


Nr. 12491. GROSSBRITANNIEN. Derselbe an Denselben. Die
Macht Abdullahs breitet sich aus.
Camp Sheikh, June 5, 1899. (June 27.)
(Extract.) [| The position of affairs in the Dolbahanta shows no
improvement, and the reports which reach me point to a further extension
of Mullah Abdullah's influence. || He is now on bis way back from an
expedition against the Mahmood Girad, who lately raided the Ali Gheri.
He is said to have been well received by this tribe, who returned the
looted property and gave him a present of fifty horses. How far they
bave otherwise come under bis influence is not reported. || Mullah Ab-
dullah has emissaries in the Habr Toljaala and Habr Yunis countrics
endeavouring to win over the more influential persons of the tribes; our
Akils have been tampered with, and in one or two instances overtures
have been made to our offieials to join the Mullah's cause. There are
further direct signs in the direction of the Dolbahanta of enmity to all
those in the service of the Protectorate. It is no yet known how far
this is to be attributed directly to the Mullah, or to those of bis immediate
following who have been expelled from Aden, or who, for other reasons,
are not in the favour of the Administration. II My present object is to
confine this movement, if possible, to the eastern districts and prevent
its spreading to the Ishak tribes, and with this view I am now on my
way to visit the nearer seetions of the Habr Yunis and Habr Gerhajis
tribes, who have not yet migrated to the Haud.


Nr. 12492. GROSSBRITANNIEN. Derselbe an Denselben. Das-
selbe. Haltung des Sultans Nur.
Hargaisa, July 16, 1899. (July 31.)
My Lord, |j In my despatch of the 16th ultimo, I informed your
Lordship of the state of affairs amongst the Habr Yunis tribes, and






im Somalilande 1899-1901.

noted that I was awaiting an opportunity of ascertaining the attitude that
would be assumed by Sultan Nur. |] This, I regret to say, is one of
declared hostility. 1 I waited for some time after he had returned to bis
country, and then sent him a civil letter, pointing out that he had not
as yet conme to visit me, as is usual when my camp is in his limits,
and desiring himr to come in, as there were several matters I wished to
discuss with him. This was on the 27th ultimo, and my camp was then
at Bagan, in Habr Yunis territory. || No reply was sent to this letter;
but on the l0th instant the camel sowar who had conveyed it to Sultan
Nur returned to my camp near Hargaisa without his camel, arms, and
uniform, of which he reported he had been stripped by order of Sultan
Nur. According to bis statement, he made his escape just as he was
about to be sent to the Mullah Muhammad Abdullah. 11 I at once wrote
Sultan Nur a stern letter of warning, which I dispatched by an Aida
galleh messenger. In this letter I demanded the immediate return of the
sowar's effects, pointed out to Sultan Nur that he could not contend
against us, and that it was foolish of him to be led away by the ill-advice
of designing persons, adding that if he takes heed in time, and comes
into my camp now, he will be given ,aman" to come and go, otherwise,
if he continues this attitude he has assumed, the consequences will fall
on his own shoulders, and they will be severe. || I thought it better to
give hirn another chance of clearing himself, if he would, for several
reasons. In the first place, we are not prepared for active measures yet,
and it was necessary to take notice of such an act as he had just committed;
again, I know hirn to be a weak, vain man, easily led, whose lihead has
been turned by the praise and flattery showered upon him by the Mullah,
and by the position he imagines he has attained of supremacy over his
tribe through the Mullah's influence. || If he comes -in, propose to inflict
a fine on himrn for his conduct to the sowar who took hirn my letter. If
he continues bis present attitude of hostility, and the measures I shall
take at our port towns in stopping his supplies do not bring him to
reason, I can see no other course open but to proceed against him actively
early in the cold season, if he be still within our reach. 11 I have already
informed your Lordship that the Habr Yunis are divided, and that this
time last mouth only the eastern sections of the tribe had so far been
affected by the Mullah's movement, the western section awaiting the return
of Sultan Nur. Nur had called a large meeting of the tribe for the 22nd
instant at Odweina, and I had arranged to have a man present to report
what takes place. Yesterday I received letters from Haji Musa, the Head
of the Mullah community of Hahiya, informing me that the westerly







o Der Krieg gegen den Mullah Abdullab

sections of the Habr Yunis, including the principal portion of Sultan Nur's
own tribe, the Rer Segullah, together with the Ishak sections, bordering
on the Golis, amongst whomn I passed, and whose Elders I interviewed
on miy way here had bound themselves together to keep clear of all distur-
bance. They are said to have told Sultan Nur that they are dependent
on Berbera for their supplies, and that they do not intend to get into
difficulties with us on bis account, and to have told him pointedly that
if he does not cease from making strife in the country, and oppressing
people by his exactions, he had better clear off, as they would oppose hinm.
If he reinained quiet, and did not oppose the Government, they would
accept him as Sultan, otherwise they would have nothing to do either
with hirn or with Madhar Hirsi. As regards the Mullah, they are said
to have declared that they belong to the Kadiriyah sect, that of Haji
Musa, of Hahiya, and Sheikh Mattar, of Hargaisa, as opposed to the
Salihiyay, that of the Dolbahanta Mullah, and that they intended to ad-
here to it. The reports went on to say that, finding himself opposed in
this quarter, and by his own section, Sultan Nur hastily left eastwards,
and is supposed to have repaired to Burao, whence he will probably re-
join the Mullah.
The eastern sections of the Habr Yunis are still with the Mullah,
but the position has so far improved that the westerly sections, whose
attitude had before been doubtful, are now said to have definitely declared
against Sultan Nur and the Mullah. At this point there is now every
reason to helieve this movement will now stop in its movement west-
wards, leaving the line of division as reported in my previous despatch. L[
The Aidagalleh the other large division of the Habr Gerhajis are re-
ported to be unaffected by the movement. They came freely into my
camp on my way to Hargaisa, and 1 am expecting their Sultan Sultan
Deria here in a few days. The Habr Awal are coming in from miles
around. 1 have now the leading men of several of their sections in here
to perform the feudal custom of ,dibaltig," or mounted parade of allegi-
ance. 11 Sheikh Mattar, the Head of the religious community here, is entirely
on the side of law and order, and exerts considerable influence over the
Habr Awal tribes in this direction, one and all of whom are opposed to
the Mullah's faction. 1| Meanwhile, 1 hear of dissensions between the
Mullah and Sultan Nur, partly owing to the latter having raided the
Habr Toljaala Gashanbur. Madhar Hirsi, Nur's rival, is said to have
again gone to the Mullah with a present of sixty camels, and it is possible
that ie may be again declared Sultan of the Habr Yunis, to the detriment
of Nur. Whether he is so declared or not will not affect the position






im Somalilande 1899-1901. 7

to any great extent so long as the westerly sections of the tribe hold
aloof. | From the Dolbahanta reports have been received that the Mullalt
las arrested two of our Akils, and seized the rifles of four Biladiyahs
who happened to be in the vicinity with caravans. Whether the Akils
went to the Mullah of their own accord, or whether they were seized
by their tribes, who are hostile, and sent to himr, has not yet been as-
certained. || In consequence of this seizure of arms, I have had to prohi-
bit Biladiyahs from accompanying caravans to the eastern provinces, and
warnings have been issued to caravans to avoid that route. || Steps have
also been taken to prevent, as far as possible, supplies reaching the
Mullah from our coast towns. || Reports from the Dolbahanta are also
current in Berbera that the Mullah and Sultan Nur between them are
bent on stopping all caravans entering Berbera for the next six months,
with a view to starve the trade of the town. This they will not be able
to do. || The main caravan route to the Ogaden from the Jerato Pass
through Adadleh is in the hands of sections of the Habr Yunis opposed
to Sultan Nur, and caravans using this road could, if necessary, take a
more westerly one through Habr Awal country, whilst caravans using the
road from Bohotele to Sheikh could diverge either to the Jerato route,
or eastwards through the country of the Mahmood Girad. We may, how-
ever, expect to hear that some caravans have been looted or detained in
the direction of the Dolbahanta. || Reports continue to reach me that the
Mullah Muhammad Abdullah has received letters from the Sheikh Salih,
in Mecca, bringing him to task for his proceecdings, and warning him
against creating disturbances in the country, or moving in any way
against us. It is further said that Sultan Nur has been told by the
Mullah to put a check on his actions. |1 Reports in Somaliland are
generally so various and so conflicting that considerable caution has to
be exercised in giving them credence; but I am inclined to believe that
there is some truth in these reports about the attitude of Sheikh Salih
and the religious sects who are opposed to the Mullah, some of whose
representatives, such as Haji Musa, went to Mecca for the purpose of
ascertaining how matters stand, assure that they are true. How far the
Mullah's attitude will be affeeted remains to be seen. |1 A Habr Awal man
returning from the Ogaden reports that about ten days ago a party of
thirty of the Mullah's followers, some armed with fire-arms, appeared
amongst the Ogaden Rer Haroun, told them that the Mullah would soon
b)e with them, and requiring them to collect a number of eating camels,
which they proceeded to do. He further stated that the Mullahs of the
Rer Ali, the neighbouring tribe to the Rer Haroun had declared against






8 Der Krieg gegen den Mullah Abdullah

the Mullah. || If this information is true, it would point to what we have
heard before that this movement is directed against the Abyssinians.
I have communicated this information to Mr. Gerolimato, and suggested
that- he should give it to the Governor of Harrar for what it is worth.
Raids and counter-raids are taking place between the Mahomed Aysa and
the Habr Toljaala Noh in connection with the agitation raised by this
Mullah, and one result of the unsettled feeling in the eastern portion of
the Protectorate will be that the troublesome sections of the Noh, who
were unusually quiet and well-behaved last year, will break out anew,
and give us further trouble on their own account.
J. Hayes Sadler.


Nr. 12493. GROSSBRITANNIEN. Kapitn Harrington an Lord
Cromer, Sirdar in gypten. Hat dem Knig Mene-
lek die Umtriebe Abdullahs mitgeteilt.
Zeyla, July 17, 1899.
(Extract.) |1 I have communicated to King Menelek the religions
movement on the borders of the Somali Coast Protectorate, which the
Mullah, HIaji Mahomed Ahmed is conducting. 1| This movement is referred
to in Consul-General Sadler's despatch to Lord Salisbnry, dated the
14tl April, 1899. 1| The King informed me that he would take steps to
stifle this movement should the Mullah move into Abyssinian territory.
On arrival at Harrar I found that Dejasmatch Birratu, nephew of Ras
Makunan, had been detailed to watch the Mullah's movements, and capture
him if possible.


Nr. 12494. GROSSBRITANNIEN. Der Generalkonsul Sadler
an den Minister des Ausw. Frage einer abys-
sinischen Expedition gegen den Mullah.
Hargaisi, July 22, 1899. (August 12.)
My Lord, |1 1 have received a demi-officeial communication, dated
the 4th instant, from Mr. Gerolimato, our Consular Agent in Harrar,
telling me that the King has given orders to Dejasmatch Biratu, who is now
acting as Governor of Harrar, to do nothing in the Ogaden withont bis
(Mr. Gerolimato's) advice. 3r. Gerolimato accordingly asks me what to
do in connection with an expedition the Abyssinians are prepariug to
send to the Ogaden: whether to let them go, or indirectly endeavour to
stop them. From what is written, it would seem that the Dejasmatch is
not over anxions to proceed with the expedition. 1 I can offer no opinion






im Somalilande 1899-1901. 9

as to the expediency of sending a force into the Ogaden from an Abys-
sinian point of view; all I know bout the force is that it is to be employed
against a somewhat distant tribe, and that it is to catch the Mullah
Muhammad Abdullah if it can. |1 But so far as the interests of this
Protectorate are concerned, and the position with regard to the Mullah
affccted thereby, I am of opinion that an Abyssinian move to the Ogaden
at the present time would not help us, and might be productive of an
opposite effect. Were we moving ourselves directly against the Mullah,
and had the Ogaden tribes declared against us, a simultaneous move on
the part of the Abyssinians would certainly assist our operations. Neither
of these conditions, however, exist at present. We are not moving acti-
vely against the Mullah, and the Ogaden tribes, so far as I am aware,
are quite friendly to us. Their caravans are coming in from the interior
to our ports, and since writing my despatch of last weeck I have receiv-
cd, through one of our Akils returning from the Ogaden friendly
messages from the Rer All nd Rer Haroun, assuring me that they are
dependent on our ports for their supplies, and that they will not mix
themselves up with the disturbances in the Dolbahanta. This Akil further
told ine that horsemen from the Mullah were expected to arrive amongst
the Her Haroun, but had not done so yet, thus contradicting the reports
noted in the concluding portion of my despatch above referred to. I| Ware
an Abyssinian expedition to appear in the Ogaden it would be the signal for
the rising of all the Ogaden tribes, and probably throw them at once
into the hands of the Mullah, the very contingency we wish to avoid.
1 do not tlihink that this expedition is likely to catch the Mullah, and if
it mct with a reverse, which is quite on the cards, the prestige and in-
fluence of the Mullah would be greatly enhanced, whether he had any-
thing to do with it or not. [| For these reasons I should prefer the dis-
patch of this expedition postponed for the present.
I have, &c.
(Signed) J. Hayes Sadler.

Nr. 12495. GROSSBRITANNIEN. Derselbe an Denselben. Der
Mullah erklrt sich zum Mahdi. Verstrkungen
sind ntig.
[Via Aden.]
Jerato, August 81, 1899. (September 3.)
(Telegraphic.) || The Mullah has suddenly arrived at Burao with a
force of 1500 men, and has declared himself Mahdi. || He intends to ad-
vance on Hargaisa, and possibly Berbera, and with that object is collecting






10 Der Krieg gegen den Mullah Abdullah

the eastern tribes. |l The movement is directed against us, and the position
is serious, fr, though the western tribes are loyal, they cannot be depend-
ed upon to check the advance unaided. 11 The employment of troops is,
in my opinion, absolutely necessary: 100 mounted and 300 foot, with the
co-operation of friendlies, should be suffieient to suppress the rising, and
l would request the services of such a force. ]| The Mnllah must be dis-
lodged from Burao if he remains there, and a post must be established.
The country to the west of Burao is known, and the water supply suffi-
cient. If he moves in that direction, he must be driven back. l] It is
desirable that Berbera should be watched by a man-of-war. 1 am return-
ing there at once.



Nr. 12496. GROSSBRITANNIEN. Der Minister des Ausw. an
den Generalkonsul Sadler. Verstrkungen sind
abgeschickt.
Foreign Office, September 5, 1899,
(Telegraphic.) jl I have received your telegram of the 31st nltimo.||
The Resident at Aden has, I understand, dispatched to Berbera 200 native
infantry, and thie Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty have been ask-
ed to send a ship of war there. I presume that, for defensive purposes,
these ineasures will be sufficient. We must be certain that we have an
adequate force, and we ought to know exactly what the plan is before
we embark on offensive operations.



Nr. 12497. GROSSBRITANNIEN. Der Generalkonsul Sadler
an den Minister des Ausw. Schnelles Handeln
ist ntig.
Berbera, September 12, 1899. (September 13.)
(Telegraphic.) |i The Mullah Muhammad Abdullah, is now in Western
IIabr Yunis, at Odweina. I estimate his force at 500 cavalry and
possibly 1000 infantry. The fricndly tribes have collected to oppose his
march, but they lack cohesion. However, as soon as our troops take the
field the whole of the western country will rise against the Mullah. If
we do nothing now the Mullah's influence will extend, and the people
will believe that he has taken tlie Hinterland from the Protectorate.






im Somalilande 1899-1901. 11

Nr. 12498. GROSSBRITANNIEN. Der Minister des Ausw. an
den Generalkonsul Sadler. Wie ist die Lage?
Foreign Office, September 19, 1899.
(Telegraphic.) || Is there any alteration in the situation with regard
to the Mullah? Do you still regard military operations as necessary?

Nr. 12499. GROSSBRITANNIEN. Generalkonsul Sadler an den
Minister des Ausw. Antwort auf das Vorige.
Aden, September 20, 1899. (September 20.)
(Telegraphie.) || The situation remains unchanged except that the
Mullah has returned to Burao, and has burned a village at Sheikh Pass.
It is most necessary to begin military operations at an early date.

Nr. 12500. GROSSBRITANNIEN. Der Generalkonsul Sadler
bersendet dem Minister des Ausw. einen Brief
des Mullah. (Erhalten in Berbera 1. September.)
Berbera, 10. September. (23. September.)
From Muhammad-bin-Abdullah to the English.
This is to inform you that you have done whatever you have desir-
ed, and oppressed our well-known religion without any cause. Further,
to inform you that whatever people bring to you they are liars and
slanderers. jj Further, to inform you that Mahomed, your Akil, came to
ask from us the arms; we therefore, send you this letter. Now choose for
yourself; if you want war we accept it, if you want peace pay the fine. |
This and salaam.

Nr. 12501. GROSSBRITANNIEN. Denkschrift iber die Ex-
pedition gegen den Mullah.
P.U.S., 11 I have very little to add to the letter sent by you to the
Foreign Office on the 18th instant. [I Consul-General Sadler's remark that
,,Military operations are very necessary, and at an early date", appears
to be a suffieient answer to the reeommendation made by Lord Lansdowne
that Sadler should be again referred to before the final deeision was
taken. 11 As regards the force, the capture of the Mullah can be best
achieved by using cavalry as the bulk of the force to be employed. ]
Consul-General Sadler, in a letter to the Foreign Office, dated the
31st August also, says: 1 ,This Mullah is actually at Burao with a
force from the Dolbahanta and the Ogaden, which, from the varions ac-
counts received, may be put down at 1500 men, with a large proportion






12 Der Krieg gegen den Mullah Abdullah

of horse. It is not believed that he has more than forty or fifty rifles
with hirn." This confirms our information that the Mullah's following
is well equipped with cavalry. [I The Mullah's foot following would, in
addition, be far more mobile than any regular infantry we could employ.||
Consequently, there would, in my .opinion, be little chance of catching
the Mullah, without the employment of a force of cavalry sufficiently
strong to act alone if necessary. 1I The report that the Mullah had sent
his belongings to the Dolbahanta country, which is south and south-east
of Burao, points to his contemplating retirement there himself if his
present operations are unsuccessfll. To frustrate such an attempt a
strong force of cavalry is clearly necessary. I1 After carefully considering
the matter I hold to niy opinion that the force suggested in your letter
to the Foreign Office of the 18th instant is the most suitable to be em-
ployed.
For Director of Military Intelligence,
(Signed) William Everett,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
September 21, 1899.

Nr. 12502. GROSSBRITANNIEN. Der Generalkonsul Sadler
an den Minister des Ausw. Neue Nachricht ber
den Mullah.
Aden, September 29, 1899. (September 29.)
(Telegraphic.) |1 It is reported that the Mullah, who has evacuated
Burao, is now at Behotele, 100 miles south, from which he says that he
will advance north again whcn he has collected reinforcements. Whether
he really intends to do so, or has made the- announcenent in order to
retain his hold on the vacated country, is not known. Under favourable
conditions, the Mullah, now that hie is back in the Dolbahanta country,
may collect from 3000 to 10000 followers; but until we occupy Burao
we can ascertain nothing definite as to the attitude of the tribes south
oftthat place. 11 It is now more than ever necessary to effect the occupation.

Nr. 12503. GROSSBRITANNIEN. Der Minister des Ausw. an
den Generalkonsul Sadler. Indische Truppen
nach Berbera.. Mitwirkung Abyssiniens.
Foreign Office, September 30, 1899.
(Telegraphic.) || War office have considered the composition of the
force to operate against the Mullah. In their opinion the troops to be
employed should be furnished from India, and not drawn from Aden,






im Somalihande 1899-1901. 13

and should consist of four companics of native infantry, a specially-select-
ed native cavalry regiment, and the two machine-guns which should have
arrived at Aden on the 22nd instant. || The Government of India will be
instructed to dispatch this force to Berbera, and to put in command a
fully qualified officer, to whom you should allow a free hand as far as
possible. l1 The Abyssinians may offer to assist, but Her Majesty's Government
do not consider it desirable that Abyssinian troops should operate within
the limits of the British Somali Coast Protectorate.


Nr. 12504. GROSSBRITANNIEN. Generalkonsul Sadler an den
Minister des Ausw. Weitere Nachrichten ber
den Mullah und die Haltung der Stmme.
Berbera, September 14, 1899. (October 2.)
My Lord, || On the llth instant information was received that the
Mullah Muhammad Abdullah, had left Burao and occupied Odweina, in
the western Habr Yunis country. He is there coereing the western
Habr Yunis tribes who water at Odweina, Adadleh, and Syk, and who
had declared themselves against him and Sultan Nur. He has seized
some of their principal men and a considerable quantity of their live-
stock grazing in the Arori and Toyio Plains. His methods are as follows:
He seizes the best men of the tribes who have not declared for him
and all the property he can collect. These men he beats until they agree
to obey him. They are then released and sent to collect their tribesmen.
These are all sworn by the triple divorce oath, and if the Mullah is
satisfied, in some cases he returns the looted property, retaining what he
requires for victualling his followers. A quantity of loot is reported to
have been sent off to the Dolbahanta. || These are the measures in process
with the western Habr Yunis tribes. They have not, however, as yet
gone over to himr, and still profess their readiness to oppose him. Next
the turn of the Aidagalleh will come, and if all these tribes actively join
the Mullah, the attitude of the Habr Awal tribes, who are now quite
loyal, and who are collecting to oppose the Mullah, will in the face of
such a coalition, and in the absence of any move on our part, become
questionable. I1 Thiscoercion is, ofcourse, but temporary, but it is very effective
as long as it lasts. As soon as this pressure is removed the tribes will return
to us; and if we now take the field, at the first sign of a backward
movement on the Mullah's part, the tribes will be on him, and I am in-
formed from several quarters that many of bis following will at once
turn against him. |1 The position of the employ6s of the Administration is






14 Der Krieg gegen den Mullah Abdullah

particularly hard. The Mullah is seizing the karias, families, and property
of all our servants ie can find in the interior. Not content with this,
I am informed that he has issued' a Proclamation making the wives of
all connected with the Administration lawful to his followers. The wife
of one of our police who fell into bis hands was divorced from her hus-
band by the Mullah and appropriated to himself. Yesterday it was re-
ported that a party of 200 men is being sent to seize the karia of the
Ressaldar of our Camel Corps at Megag, in the Aidagalleh country. The
Headmen employed by shooting expeditions have mostly had pressure
put upon them. In one case a Headman sent the Mullah four camel-
loads of provisions from Berbera. He was questioned about it to-day.
and openly said that he had eaten the Sirkar's salt for a number of
years and was not disloyal, but that he had to propitiate the Mullah to
save his karia and property, which were all at the Mullah's mercy in the
jungle. Many of these facts are only now coming to light. |I Such a state
of affairs, I would submit, cannot be allowed to continue in the British
Protectorate. It will last till we move actively ourselves, for, though the
tribes are partly collected to oppose thlie Mullah, it is doubtful whether
they can of themselves be counted upon to offer any effective resistance,
such is the fear this man, who is looked upon as a sorcerer, has inspired
in the country. l| It is unfortunate that we could not get earlier intimation
of the Mullah's intention to move to Burao. I have before alluded to
the secrecy which covers bis proceedings, and to the difficulty of ob-
taining reliable information from the Dolbahanta. It will be observed
from late reports that I considered the movement was subsiding, and,
although we were aware that Sultan Nur had sent several letters to the
Mullah to assist him in coercing the western Habr Yunis tribes, our in-
formation was to the effeet that all attempts to raise a force had failed.
Such was certainly the opinion of Sheikh Mattar, of Hargaisa, whose
means of obtaining information are probably unequalled in the Protecto-
rate, and whose good faith therc is no reason to question. He did not
consider there was any probability of a move on the Mullah's part till
next spring rains, when he thought that, if he found himself strong
enough, he would then create trouble in the western part of the Pro-
tectorate, or move into the Ogaden. This opinion was expressed the day
I left Hargaisa on my return journey. There seems to have been an
altercation, too, between the Mullah and Sultan Nur, the latter saying
that he had not collected men and supplies at Burao, as the Mullah had
moved earlier than he had expected. 1| From persons acquainted with the
Habr Toljaala, I gather that the tribes actively supporting the Mullah





im Somalilande 1899-1901. 15

from that quarter are the Adan Madoba, ihe Rer Yusuf, and the Ahmed
Farih. Mcnmbers of other Habr Toljaala tribes are with the Mullah's
following, but they are believed to be there more or less under compul-
sion. All tle Habr Toljaala are now afraid that they will bc looted by
the Dolbahanta horsemen when the Mullah returns eastwards. Of the
Dolbahanta following, too, somne are said to bave come under compulsion,
but it would soem that the majority have been attracted by the prospect
of loot.
As regards the strength of the Mullah's following, accounts differ
considerably. I doubt if he has more than 1500 men with him, of which
500 would be horse. And possibly this estimation may be found to be
above the mark. It is, however, most diffieult to form an accurate opinion
on this point. Il I consider that a properly equipped force of 300 infantry
100 cavalry, and two Maxims, which I would suppleinent by fifteen of
our Camel Corps, and thirty police, sufficient to drive the Mullah back,
with or without the assistance of friendlies, and to punish him severely
if he stands. I do not think there would be any risk in moving such
a force anywhere through the country between this, Burao, and Habr
Yunis country; and I may safely say there will be no risk of a reverse.
The tribesmen the Mullah has with hirn have never met anything more
formidable than their own spearmoen; they have a great dread offire-arms, and
are by all reports in no way to be compared with the Aysa, whom we
encountered in 1890. il What is urgently wanted now is an advance by
our troops, for which the whole country is waiting. Our first object
would naturally be to catch him, and put an end once for all to these
disturbances. Unfortunately, it is very doubtful if he will stand. If he
is mad, as he is said to be, he may; otherwise, he will probably fall back
as soon as he hears of our force leaving Berbera. We should not in this
case succeed in capturing him, unless this could be effectcd by the friend-
lies, who would be certain to harass bis rear. But we should put a stop
to the present insupportable state of affairs in the nearer portions of the
Protectorate, and the reduction of the trucculent tribes about Burao and
the Habr Toljaala would be easily effected; they would most of them
come in to us of their own accord. An early move is urgently called
for. The longer we delay the more difficult will the matter be to deal
with, and a continuation of the present position eannot but be detrimen-
tal to our influence over the tribes throughout the Protectorate. 11 If the
Mullah is allowed to cstablish himself for long in this portion of the
Protectorate, we may have to reckon with an increase to bis numbers
from the Dolbahanta, and the matter may assume wider dimensions than






16 Der Krieg gegen den Mullah Abdullah

it has hitherto done. |] It is most difficult to lay down any detailed plan
of action beyond the general lines. The condition of affairs is continu-
ally changing, and we can never say where the Mullah will be a week
hence. I have before me two main lines. To drive the Mullah back
from this portion of the Protectorate, catching him if we can, and to
occupy Burao, afterwards moving through the Habr Toljaala country,
partly to show a force in that direction, and partly, if necessary, to fine
the Adan Madoba and the Rer Yusuf for their share in these distur-
bances. This scheme would have to be modified in accordance with the
Mullah's movements. For instance, reports have been received that he
intends to advance to Syk, near the Jerato Pass. If this is the case we
should have to march straight on that position from Berbera, and leave
the occupation of Burao till after he has been driven back. Burao is a
position of considerable strategical importance. It commands the water
supply of the eastern Habr Yunis tribes, and of the Adan Madoba and
Rer Yusuf tribes of the Habr Toljaala. With this position in our hands
we could exereise a powerful control over the surrounding country. I
have suggested that 100 infantry, 25 cavalry, with one Maxim entrenched
and protected by the wire zariba, would be sufficient to hold Bnrao. |1 I
liave lately been over the country dose up to Burao, and have found
that by marching vi Warren and Wissil there would only be one march
between Sheikh and Burao withont water. I would propose to make
arrangements to have two days' supply of water to be carried with the
column. Sufficient transport can be collected here within ten days to a
fortnight. Ij The friendly Mahomed Aysa are now collected at the Sheikh
Pass; the Ayal Ahmed and Ayal Yunis have sent out men to muster at
Argan to the west of the Jerato Pass, near which are also. the hill tribes
of the Habr Ynnis, who have always been against Sultan Nur, and the
Adan Aysa. On both sides friendlies could be mustered in thousands,
but the difficulty would be to keep them together for more than a few
days away from their karias and supplies. The strongest coalition will
be that of the Habr Awal tribes near Hargaisa under Sheikh Mattar,
but it is questionable whether they will go so far as to join the Habr
Yunis in an attack on the Mullah at Odweina, they will probably con-
tent themselves with protecting Sheikh Mattar and Hargaisa. I have
written to Sheikh Mattar on this point.
I have, &c.
(Signed) J. Hayes Sadler.






im Somalilande 1899-1901. 17

Nr. 12505. GROSSBRITANNIEN. Generalkonsul Sadler an den
Minister des Ausw. Der Anhang des Mullah zer-
streut sich.
Aden, October 9, 1899. (October 9.)
(Telegraphic.) || Reports are confirmed that the following of the Mullah
has dispersed. The Mullah is said to have moved towards the eastern
portion of the Dolbahanta, but news is vagne and meagre. lt is report-
ed that the nearer tribes are anxious to come in. 1| To control the tribes
and to quash influence of Mullah I still consider it necessary to occupy
Burao. Opposition is not likely to be met, but we have to guard against
the contingency of the Mullah moving north again. |1 lt is no longer
necessary to retain a man-of-war at Berbera. 1| 1 am anxious as soon as
possible to return to the coast.

Nr. 12506. GROSSBRITANNIEN.- Der Minister des Auswrtigen
an Generalkonsul Sadler. Verschiebung der Ex-
pedition gegen den Mullah.
Foreign Office, October 19, 1899.
(Telegraphic.) || I am in receipt of your telegram of 16th instant.
Taking into consideration the demands for the employment of Her Ma-
jesty's forces elsewhere, I have come to the conclusion that any expedition
against the Mullah or among the tribes must be postponed, and that
operations must, in any case, be restricted to the occupation of Burao. ||
If you remain of opinion that such occupation is really necessary, please
state what force you require for this purpose beyond that already at
your disposal.

Nr. 12507. GROSSBRITANNIEN. Generalkonsul Sadler an den
Minister des Auswrtigen. Antwortauf das Vorige.
Aden, October 22, 1899. (October 22.)
(Telegraphic.) lt It would be desirable to take 11 cavalry and 600 in-
fantry with 20 sappers to occupy Burao. There are only 50 infantry
available at Berbera. l| It is not absolutely necessary to occupy Burao,
but a show of force for a month or six weeks among the nearer tribes
is necessary. In the latter case we could reduce the infantry to 300.
The force should be composcd of selected Mahommedans. |1 I can manage
for the present if troops cannot be spared, but it would be inadvisable
to delay the expedition for long. Please sec my despatch of the 12th
October. 'j It is desirable that 1 should return to Berbera without delay.
Staatsarchiv LXVI. 2






18 Der Krieg gegen den Mullah Abdullah

Nr. 12508. GROSSBRITANNIEN. Generalkonsul Sadler an den
Minister des Answ. Beschlennigung der Ex-
pedition ist erwnscht. Mitwirkung Abys-
siniens.
Aden, October 12, 1899. (October 23.)
My Lord, |I The only information of any importance received in Ber-
bera p to the 6th instant was the confirmation of previous reports that the
Mullah's following had dispersed, and that he himself was supposed to
have left Bohntele for a place further east, so as to be within easy reach
of Lasader. Reports regarding hirn are becoming day by day more vague
and meagre. |1 It is pretty generally believed that a Goverinment expedition
is on foot, and the Habr Toljaala and eastern Habr Yunis tribes are now
reported to be anxious to make their peace with the Administration
Some of the sections are coming surreptitiously into Berbera and posing
as peaceful citizens; others are sending in Petitions to show that they
had nothing to do with the Mullah, or liad suffered at his hands. 1I This
is all very well. It is a natural sequence to the Mullah's retirement.
But wo have to guard, as far as possible, against a repetition of recent
events in thc nearer portions of our Hinterland: and show the tribes by
a display of force in their country, of which they have hitherto had no
experience, that we will not allow them to play fast and loose with us,
and that the nmeans of punishing them are at hand if they do. II Her
Majesty's Goverument will doubtless consider whether it is worth while
to incur the cost of an expedition now that the Mullah's following hlas
dispersed, and he may be said to be ont of our reach. This view of the
situation has not escaped me. Personally, 1 lave never had much hope
of catching the Mullah. It could only bc done had he stood his ground
and awaited our advance, or were he to remain with a small following
in the nearer portions of the Protectorate long enough for a surprise to
be effected. jj Neither of t.hese eventualities were at any time to be depend-
ed upon. He is said to have taken extraordinary precantions to safe-
guard his person, amongst others retaining a bodyguard of Midgans with
poisoned arrows, and these precautions wonld point to bis not exposing
himself in a position where he would be liable to be canght. 1| With the
Habr Toljaala and the eastern Habr Yunis the events of the past few
montbs now force us to exercise greater interference than I should have
contemplated for some time to come. Our hands have,' so to say, been
forced by this movement which originated in the Dolbahanta, and by the
necessity which has now arisen of breaking tle Mullah's influence over
the Isbak tribes. |i As the situation at present is, it is most important to






im Somalilande 1899-1901. 19

seeure a proper control over the Habr Toljaala and the eastern Habr
Yunis. This ean partly be done from Berbera by checking their supplies,
but we see that measures taken from Berbera are not of themselves
effeetive when the tribes move south, and are for the time being inde-
pendent of our port towns. To effect this control we should for a time
hold the water supply it Burao, and by a show of force in that direction
and in parts of the Halir Toljaala country make it evident to the people
that we will not allow any of the Ishak seetion to be with us at one
tirne of the year when they are dependent on us for supplies and against
us at another when they are not so dependent. The control of the
wells at Bnrao and the move of an expedition will at onee make this
position elear to them. |1 How long we should hold Burao, and whether
or not it will be neeessary to keep a permanent post there, will depend
upon cireumstances. The present is an opportune time to occupy the
wells, as the neighbouring tribes are dependent on them till next March.
If we do not move now and content ourselves with taking action against
those who hold aloof fromn us in our coast towns, we shall have no
guarantee against thle repetition in Ishak territory of recent events as
soon as the next spring rains fall, or indeed, at any time it may suit-
the Mullahl to again atftempt an ineursion into Ishlak country. The people
will think us apathetie, and when the Mullah appears again, as he is
certain to do unless it is made plain thlat he will be opposed by us, the
people, uneertain as to whether we will employ force or not, will be apt
to think they are left to themselves, with the result that they will be
more or less thrown into his hands. Although most of the Ishak seetions
who have been att'ected by this miovement have sulfered thereby, the way
has, in a manner, been paved for a fresh ineursion by the Mullah against
them, and for thlie extension of hiis influence over thein; it is these re-
snlts we have now to counteraet. II There is another reason why any
delay in the dispatch of an expedition would be inadvisable. For some
timne past 1 have been aware of a feeling in the Protectorate thlat with its
severance fromn Aden the Administration has been left to its own resour-
ces, and thlat troops would not be available for offensive operations. An
impression has also gained gronnd amongst tlie Somalis fliat the ex-
pedition of friendlics against the lter Hared in 1895 was not approved
by Governmnent, and that that was to be the last expedition into tlihe
interior. These ideas are mischievous, they may have had somlething to
do with the late troubles, and the sooner they are dispelled thlie better.
For tlie above reasons 1 am of opinion tlhat the retireient of tfie Mullah
has not materially altered the situation, except in so faiu that he no
2*






20 Der Krieg gegen den Mullah Abdullah

longer threatens Berbera, and that it is necessary to proceed with the
expedition on the general line of operations submitted in my despatch
of the 5th instant. |[ This leaves the Dolbahanta out of the question for
the time being. The settlement of that part of the country is not so
important to us at present as that of the nearer Habr Toljaala, and it
would be difficilt to devise measures by which this could be effected
withont great cost, certainly till we know more abont the attitude of the
tribes than we do now. As matters stand, the gradual weaning of the
tribes from the influence of tlie Mullah, coupled with the closing of our
ports to those who shelter him or afford hiin assistance, are the measures
I would rely on for the present in dealing with tle Dolbahanta.
Later on, other means may, perhaps, be found practicable, but in the
first instance we nmist make sure of tle Habr Toljaala. This done, and
our hold established over the Ishak country, many of tlie Darod (Dolba-
hanta) seetions may be expected to see that they have more to gain by
peacefully trading with our ports than by following in the wake of this
fanatical priest. | It has been ascertained tlihat the rainfall has not been
sufficient to raise a fresh crop of grass between Sheikh and Burao. I1 As
regards the possible co-o])eration of the Abyssinians in any offensive
movenient against the Mullah, it is to be observed that this line of
retreat throngh the Ogaden, only one of liis lines of retreat, would be
at a considerable distance from the Harrar frontier, that it would be
difficult for an Abyssinian force to effectually guard our frontier at that
distance from its base. || An Abyssinian force carries no rations, and
depends for its supplies on what it can make thle country snpply. It is
true that some of the Ogaden were with the Mullah at Burao, these
were probably fromn tribes situated within the inliediate range of his
influence; on the other hand the Ogadens are sending in their caravans
much as usual, and I have no grounds for assnming that the tribes of
the Ogaden are, as a bedy, in any way opposed to us. Under these cir-
cumstances, it appears to nie very questionable whether the reasons ad-
vanced in my despatch of the 22nd July last against an early movement
of the Abyssinians in the Ogaden would not still ontweigh any advan-
tage we might hope to gain from the appearance of their force to the
south of our Protectorate with thle view of cutting off tlie Mullah's re-
treat. Such is my opinion at present; it may be modified if any further
development takes place. 1| As a matter of fact, 1 hear from IIarrar that
a force of 4000 men llas been assembled at Jiga Jiga. I had previously
heard that an expedition was comtemplated against the Rer Ali and
Rer Haronn Ogaden, who had failed to comply with the demands of the






im Somalilande 1899-1901. 21

Abyssinians to restore certain loot to our tribes which lately formed the
subject of correspondence. But this number is in excess of what would
be required for this purpose, and it is probable that the force was con-
centrated on news reaching Harrar through Hargaisa of a probable ad-
vance of the Mullah in the direcction of Hargaisa. 1 I have kept Mr. Gero-
linato informed of the Mullah's iovements as reported from tiime to
time. 1| A copy of this despatchl and of previous despatches in this connection
is being sent to Viscount Cromer.
J. Hayes Sadler.

Nr. 12509. GROSSBRITANNIEN. Der Minister des Ausw. an
Generalkonsul Sadler. Beschrnkung der mili-
trischen Unternehmungen.
Foreign Office, October 23, 1899.
(Telegraphic.) || I have received your despatch of the 12th instant,
and your telegram of the 22nd instant. |1 Her Majesty's Government are
of opinion that in the eireumstances described you should for the present
confine all military measures to what is requisite for insuring the security
of the ports, and that any operations in the interior of the Protectorate
should be deferred. i You may, with the concurrence of the Resident at
Aden, ask for troops not exceeding 100 cavalry and 300 infantry if you
consider any reinforcements from India necessary for the security of the
ports. 11 It is the liope of Her Majesty's Government that with such
assistance as Aden can furnish, you will find it possible to manage until
next spring. If so, you should inform me in order that the transports
which lave been taken up to convey troops to Berbera may be quietly
released by the Government of India.

Nr. 12510. GROSSBRITANNIEN. Generalkonsul Sadler an den
Minister dos Ausw. Abyssinien wnscht die Ex-
pedition.
Aden, October 27, 1899. (Ocetober 27.)
(Telegraphic.) || King Menelek has sent me a message that he is
anxious that operations against the Mullah should be postponed, as he
wishes to co-operate. I am instructing Mr. Gerolimato to inform King
Menelek through the telephone that the expedition is postponed for the
present, and thlat I will communicate His Majesty's desire to co-operate
with us to Her Majesty's Governmeint. |1 The preparations by the Abyssinians
point to an effective occupation of the Ogaden.






22 Der Krieg gegen den Mullah Abdullah

Nr. 12511. GROSSBRITANNIEN. Generalkonsul Sadler an den
Minister desAusw. IThersendeteineKorrespondenz
mit abyssinischen Behrden ber Rubereien
abyssinischer Stmme.
Berbera, November 23, 1899. (December 7.)
My Lord, 11 1 have the honour to submit, for yonr Lordship's in-
formation, copy of a letter, with three inclosures, received from our
Consular Agent in Harrar, and of my reply thereto. |I It is extraordinary
that the Acting Governor of Harrar should have taken upon himself to
announce, as a probable fact, that Abyssinian troops will perhaps cross
our frontier in pursnit of Ogaden tribes, and to request that the au-
thorities at Berbera be informed in the matter. j TI need hardly say that
if there be any question of an Abyssinian force crossing the border of
the British Protectorate, which it would be most inadvisable to allow in
the present instance, the matter could only be considered by Her Majesty's
Government on a representation made in a formal manner by the King
Menelek. || I would submit, for your Lordship's consideration, whether it
would not be desirable that Her Majesty's Agent in Abyssinia should
take an early opportunity of drawing the King's attention to Gurasmatch
Bante's procednre in this matter. || A copy of this despatch is being sent
to Lord Cromer and to Captain Harrington.
J. Hayes Sadler.

Anlage 1.
LMr. Gerolimato to Consul-General Sadler.
Harrar, November 7, 1899.
Sir, |1 I have the honour to forward to you herewith the copy of
two letters I have addressed to Gurasmatch Bante, Aeting Governor of
Harrar, and tlie translation of a letter I received from his Excellency
concerning tle camels looted by Ogaden tribes from our tribes.
.. Gerolimato.
Her Britannic Majesty's Consular Agent, Harrar.

Anlage 2.
11Mr. Gerolimato to the Acting Governor of Harrar.
Harrar, le 31 Octobre, 1899.
Excellence, || Conformement la demande verbale de votre Excellence,
j'ai l'honneur de vous envoyer ei-jointe une liste des chameaux vol6s par
les tribus de Rer Ali et Rer Haroun, aux tribus Somalis, sujets Anglais. 1|






im Somalilande 1899-1901. 23

Le montant de cette liste est de 605 chameaux, et dernibrement ont vold
encore les Ogadens 135 chameaux des tribus de Habr Yunis Gamboor,
prvs de la place Toyo, le total donc est de 740 chameaux. 1 Je viens
d'apprendre que les Ogadens ont pris encore beaucoup de chameaux des Habr
Awal, et 413 cllameaux de Ahu-bakr-Musa, mais pour cela je n'ai pas
encore des nouvelles des autorit6s de Berbera.
J. Gerolimato.



Anlage 3.
The Acting Governor of Harrar to 1Mr. Gerolimato.
Harrar, 22 Tamkat, 1892. (November 1, 1899.)
(Translation from Amharic.) || Peace be unto you, |1 The letter you
addressed to me yesterday, 31st October, 1899 (Enropean date), 21st Tam-
kat, 1892 (Ethiopian date), and tle list of the eamels looted by Rer Ali
and Rer Haroun, [ received, and 1 have to thank you. |1 From our side
our tribes are asking for some camels looted ly your tribes. 1 Thle camels
looted by Rer Ali and Rer Haroun, friendly or by fhrce, I will restore
theim; but 1 beg to inform yon that for this result I am forced to send
in Ogaden somne troops, and I fear that when our troops arrive there
Ogaden tribes will escape, and perhaps, will eross the British frontier,
and 1 will be obliged then to follow them, and 1 ask you to be good
enongh to inform about that the autlhorities of Berbera. || Soon or late 1
will restore the camels looted. |] Salntation.
Gurasmateh Bante.


Anlage 4.
Mr. Gerolimato to the Acting Governor of Harrar.
Harrar, le 4 Novembre, 1899.
Excellence, || J'ai reun la lettre -t la date du 22 Tamkat, 1892
(1 Novembre, 1899), que votre Excellence m'a adressi et par l-quelle je suis
tres content d'apprendre qIue votre Excellence est dEeidd de nous rendre
les chameanx pillMs aux tribus Somalis, sujets Anglais, par les Rer Ali
et Rer Haroun. || De cette ninme lettre j'ai compris que votre Excellence,
confornimient a l'Article l"r du Traite entre la Grande-Bretagne et
1' thiopie, demande la permission les Rer Ali et Rer Haroun &happant devant les troupes Abyssines
entreraient dans le territoire Anglais. Votre Excellence nime pric d'informer






24 Der Krieg gegen den Mullah Abdullah

les autoritgs de Berbera de cette demande, ce que je ferais par le
courrier prochain, informant aussi Mr. J. L. Harrington, Agent Diplomatique
de Sa Majest6 Britannique en Ethiopie, et qui doit arriver anjourd'hni
i Zeyla. || Certainement votre Excellence, pour 6viter tontes les graves
consgquences, donnera nn ordre formei anx troupes Abyssines de ne pas
passer la frontire avant la r4ponse de l'Agent Diplomatiqne de Sa Majestd
Britannique et des autorit6s de Berbera soit re9ue. || Quant la reclama-
tion des tribus d'Ogaden pour les chamieaux pillMs par nos tribus je
m'6tonne, et c'est la premiere fois que j'entends parler, n'ayant janiais en
aucunne nouvelle de cette allaire et je crois qne les tribus d'Ogaden font
maintenant cette reelaination exprbs pour contrebalancer notre r6clamation,
et je prie votre Excellence de bien noter qne [sic] je vons ai envoy6 con-
cerne les chameaux pilles par les Rer Ali et Rer Haroun seulenient cette
ann6e, et qn'il a beaucoup des chameaux pill4s nos tribus les ann6es
precedentes par les memes tribus Ogaden et que nons n'avons pas re-
clami et pour lesqnelles nons rPservons nos droits.
J. Gerolimato.


Anlage 5.
Conesul-General Sadler to Mr. Gerolim ato.
Berbera, November 23, 1899.
Sir, Il 1 have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter
of the 7th instant, witl inclosures. I1 lt would be undesirable in every
respect that the Abyssinian foree operating in the Ogaden should cross
the frontier of the British Protectorate, and 1 approve of the connnuni-
cation you made to the Acting Governor of Harrar on the subject in
your letter of the 4th instant. | Captain Harrington, to whoin yon have
also referred tle matter, shonld arrive in IIarrar within the next few
days, and before this reaches yon he will doubtless have taken steps to
impress on Gnrasmatch Bante the necessity of strictly adhering to the
ternms of the Treaty. |1 I shall address you again on tle subject of the
return of the loot claimed by our tribes Further cases of raids by the
Rer Ali and Rer Haronn Ogaden on our tribes have been reported to
me, in connection with which inquiries are being instituted to ascertain
correctly the number of animals raided and damage done.
I have, &c.
(Signed) J. Hayes Sadler.






im Somalilande 1899-1901. 25

Nr. 12512. GROSSBRITANNIEN. Der Minister des Ausw. an
den Geschftstrger in Abyssinien. Die britische
Grenze soll respektiert werden.
Foreign Office, December 27, 1899.
Sir, 11 You will have received from Her Majesty's Consul-General on
the Somali Coast a copy of his despatch of the 23rd ultimo, inelosing
correspondence with Mr. Gerolimato, from which it appears that the
Acting Governor of Harrar announced the probability of Abyssinian
troops crossing the frontier of the British Protectorate in pursuit of
Ogaden tribes. || You are authorized to draw the Emperor Menelek's
attention to this matter if you should think it desirable to do so, and
to request that strict orders may be given that the Abyssinian forces
shall not cross the British frontier.
Salisbury.


Nr. 12513. GROSSBRITANNIEN.- Generalkonsul Sadler an den
MinisterdesAnsw. AbyssinischeExpeditiongegen
den Mullabh.
Berbera, March 16, 1900. (March 31.)
My Lord, 1| Mr. Gerolimato, writing froni Harrar on the Gth instant,
reports as follows: l Garazmach Bante, the Acting Governor of Harrar,
left Harrar nine days ago on an expedition against'thie Mullah Muhammad-
bin-Abdullah, who is at Daghabur, two days' march from Milmil. He
has with himn about 1200 mnen. || Yesterday, Dejach Beroo arrived from
Addis Abbaba with about 1200 inen, and is going to join Garazmach
Bante. ii It is also reported that the Governor of Bali, in the Arussa
country, is moving on the Ogaden. || Some of the Arussa have revolted,
and the news is confirmed that, they have killed twenty-six Abyssinians,
all small Chiefs. || Azaz Wold Jadik, Governor of the Dankali Province,
has arrived at Errer; he is to punish the Aussa Dankalis on account of
the loot of some caravans, in which it seems some Somalis were also
concerned. 1| The Daghabur referred to by Mr. Gerolimato is about 30 miles
east of Milmil I heard of the Mullah lately at Bulaleh, about the same
distance south of Milmil. I| Reports have been brought in that the
Abyssinians have punished the Rer All, seizing all the animals of twenty-
five of their karias. || The whereabouts of the Mullah have not been
accurately known for some days past, nor is it yet known how he is
meeting the advance of the Abyssinian expedition. Information, on both
these points will be shortly forthcoming, and will be communicated by






26 Der Krieg gegen den Mullah Abdullah

telegram. U| The Ogaden tribes are tired of the Mullah's exactions; they
have but few rifles, and are deficient in ammunition, and they fear retri-
bution at the hands of the Abyssinians; native opinion, accordingly,
inelines to the view that they will not coalesce to support the Mullah,
and that the latter will try and eseape. || If there is truth in the latest
reports which liave come in that the Abyssinians are in close pursuit of
the Mullah, there would seeim to be a fair chance of his being caught,
as the Abyssinians are mostly mounted; they have taken supplies of
water on ponies, and they have been joined by horsemen from the Habr
Awal tribes living outside our territory, notably the Rer Ahmed Abdillah.]|
The most unfortunate position would be for the Mullah to flee eastwards
and rejoin his old allies, the Ali Ghieri, sonth of Bohotele, where he
would be difficult to get at, either by the Abyssinians or ourselves. The
country about Bohotele is now very dry. I| Owing to the rmnours of
expeditions against the Dankalis and Aysa, all trade between Zeyla and
Harrar is at a standstill.
J. Hayes Sadler.


Nr. 12514. GROSSBRITANNIEN. Derselbe an Denselben. Nie-
derlage des Mullah.
Berbera, March 31, 1900. (April 16.)
My Lord, I] have the honour to submiit copy of an Intelligence
Report by Captain Johnston Stewart of the 2nd British Central Africa
Rifles, reporting on the movements of thie Mullah Mluhaninad-bin-Abdullah;
and extract from a note to my address from Her Britannie Majesty's
Consular Agent at Harrar, dated the 20th instant; and translation of a
letter 1 received this morning from Garazmnach Bante, the Acting Go-
vernor of Harrar, intimating the result of an eugagement which took place
at Jiga Jiga, on the 21st instant, between the Abyssinians and the
Mullah's forees.*) | It seems thliat after raiding the Rer Ali the Abyssi-
nians did not, as was at first supposed, advance on Daghaulr, but re-
mained at Jiga Jiga, where they were attacked by a large force of the
31ullah's followers on the 21st instant, with tle result described in Ga-
razmach Bante's letter. | Tlie Mullah seems to have taken care to keep
in the background; no certain information as to his whereabouts is avai-
lable. It is said that, previous to the fight at Jiga Jiga, the Ogaden had
risen en masse to oppose the Abyssinians, which would account for the
large force of Dervishes reported by Garazmach Baute. It is also said

*) Diese Aktenstcke sind hier fortgelassen. Red.






im Somalilande 1899-1901. 27

that the Mullah's influence now extends to the Webbe Schebele, where
the tribes, including the Negro Adone, have joined his cause and sent
hirn assistance in men and snpplies. || The messenger who brought in
Garazmach Bante's letter, reports that after the defeat of the Mullah's
force the survivors were set upon by the Rer Ali and Rer Haroun, who
said that they and the Mullah had led them to destruction by falsely
representing that the arms of the Abyssinians were powerless against
themi. I1 [t is further reported that the Mullah left all his followers fromi
the Dolbahanta, and his rifles, said to number 500, at Harradiggit, and
sent on tLe Ogaden tribes with spears to attack the Abyssinians at Jiga
Jiga. This is confirmed by news which has just been brought in, that
a raiding party of the Habr Yunis who were out in tle Ogaden after
the Her All, stumbled on the Mnllah's force near Harradiggit, and lost
from 100 to 150 men, all killed by rifle fire. || The defeat at Jiga Jiga
has doubtless dealt a heavy blow to the Mullah's movemient in the Oga-
den, but if he gets away with the number of rifles he is supposed to
have, bis power for evil will have been by no means checked.
I have, &c.
(Signed) J. Hayes Sadler.



Nr. 12515. GROSSBRITANNIEN.-Derselbe an Denselben. Nach-
richten ber den Mullah.
Berbera, April 21, 1900. (May 5.)
My Lord, 1| I have but little news to report in connection with the
progress of events in the Ogaden. 11 The Mullah is reported to be inactive
at Harradiggit, having failed to induce the tribes to make another ven-
ture in the direction of Jiga Jiga, where the Abyssinian expedition re-
mains intrenched. Native reports are that the Mullah will return towards
Bohotele, but nothing certain is known as to his plans or intentions.
It is reported froin Harrar that the reinforcements from Addis Abbaba
have been countcrmanded, and that, as the hot weather is approaching,
the Abyssinians do not propose to make any further expeditions into the
Ogaden. || A few caravans from the Rer Ali have commenced to come into
Bulhar. || A copy of this despatch is being sent to Viscount Cromer, Cap-
tain Harrington, and the Intelligence Branch, Simla.
J. Ilayes Sadler.






28 Der Krieg gegen den Mullah Abdullah

Nr. 12516. GROSSBRITANNIEN. Generalkonsul Sadler an
den Minister des Ausw. Englisch-Abyssinische
Expedition.
Camp, Sheikh, June 15, 1900. (June 15.)
(Telegraphic.) || Please see Harrington's telegrams. Tle Governor
of Harrar returned to Harrar on the 5th instant, and reported that the
runmours were untrne as to the advance of the Mullah. 11 The latter is at
Daghaboor, near Milhnil. Two companies of the British Central Africa
Rifles are proceeding with a Maximi to Hargaisa at onee, and, if necessary,
three more can follow. |1 I could take all available forces towards
Hargaisa should the Mullah advance, but infantry could not be safely
pushed into the Hand. Tribal levies could be collected; to be of any
use they would require active support. 1 A strong force of camelry, such
as the Bikanir Camel Corps, would be wanted if we are to co-operate
with the Abyssinians in the Ogaden. 11 Repeated to Harrington.



Nr. 12517. GROSSBRITANNIEN. Der Geschftstrger in
Abyssinien an den Sirdar von gypten. Menelek
schlgt eineenglisch-abyssinischeExpedition vor.
Jibuti, June 9, 1900.
(Telegraphic.) 1] Menelek has suggested that Her Majesty's Government
combine with him in suppressing the Somaliland Mullah. The Mullah
is reported to be threatening a movement on Harrar at present. ci If it
is possible to attempt diversion on Mullah's flank with forces now at
disposal of Consul-General, such action is to be recommended. |1 Copy of
this telegram sent to Consul-General for Somali Coast.



Nr. 12518. GROSSBRITANNIEN. Derselbe an Denselben.
Dasselbe.
Jibuti, June 9, 1900.
(Telegraphie.) || Since my previons telegrain of to-day 1 have seen
Menelek. He informs me that he has delayed moving against the Mullah
until he receives reply of Her M\Iajesty's Government. I have explained
that present season is unfavourable for operations, which would be easy
in cold season. If Mullah continues his advance it would be advisable
to attempt diversion. 11 (Sent to Sadler.)






im Somalilande 1899-1901. 29

Nr. 12519. GROSSBRITANNIEN. Generalkonsul Sadler an den
Minister des Ausw. Die Lage wird unertrglich.
Hargaisa, August 5, 1900. (August 5.)
(Telegraphic.) || Yao half-battalion einbarked on the 21st July; the
other half-battalion cannot be spared. The Mullah's followers have raided
property froln the Protectorate valued at 160000 Indian rupees; there
is a panic among our Ishak tribes, and reports are cnrrent of further
niove by Mullah against our tribes. Il Our tribes have all descrted their
grazing-grounds in the Hand, and are cranmped up round their water
places, and are clamouring for assistance. I1 Thle position, owing to the
Mullah's movcment, is becomning insupportable, and may be critical if it
continues. Unless \we can soon operate witli Abyssinia to snppress the
Mullah, 1 shall lave to ereate a diversion by inoving with available
forces, supported by trilal levies, to pinish tribes who are Mullah's
principal supporters round Bohotele. This could be safely done, as the
eastern Ishak tribes are friendly and united.



Nr. 12520. GROSSBRITANNIEN. Derselbe an Denselben.
Weitere Nachrichte'n. Die Stmme fordern Be-
kmpfung des Mullah.
Camp, Hargaisa, August 5, 1900. (September 3.)
My Lord, || In continuation of my telegram of this day's date, I have
the honour to report that tle raid by the Mullah's horsemen, mentioned
in my despatch of the 24th July, has spread consternation over this
portion of the Protectorate. From Odweina to Jefir Mledir the tribes
have hurried back en masse from the Hand with their herds of camels
and flocks into their winter grazing-grounds, where they are crowded up
with the tribes npon wliom they have fallen back, with the inevitable
result of disorder and panic in the heart of the Protectorate. ]| Shortly
after nmy despatch above mentioned was written the Habr Yunis came
rushing back from Odweina with reports that the water at Haradiggit
had fallen short, and that the Mullah was preparing to attack Hargaisa,
or to make a rush for the Odweina water. Without attaching eredence
to these reports of an advance 1 could not altogether, ignore them, and
made preparations to move to Odweina with a company of the Central
Africa Regiment to secure the water supply, after reassuring the Habr
Yunis, who agreed to return to Odweina if I proceeded there. I| In the
meanwhile the reports I reccivcd from Captain Swayne, who was at






30 Der Krieg gegen den Mullah Abdullah

Hargaisa, as to the position of affairs lere, was so disquieting that 1
determined to ask Major Plunkett to proceed with the company to Od-
weina whilst 1 came on here. This he has done, and I have since lieard
that the Habr Ynnis have returned to their grazing-grounds in the
vieinity of that place. i[ At Hargaisa the position on my arrival was
briefly this: The Aidagalla had come right back from the Hand on to
Au Barkadleh and Hargaisa, occupying the grazing-gronnds at present
tenanted by the Ayal Ahmed, with whom they are on bad tcerms; more
to the west the Samanter Abdillah have fallen back to Usbali; some of
the sections of the Ahmed Abdillah have retired on tlie Jibril Abokr,
others lave scattered towards the Abyssinians; Sheikh Mattar las remov-
ed all his karias and property towards tlie G0ban, and most of the in-
habitants of Hargaisa have fled. Owing to the crowding of tlie tribes
at tliis tinie of the year in thfliese scanty grazing-grounds there is con-
tinual quarrelling amiongst them, and close lere there have already been
two fights in which a numnber of people have been wonnded. II Numerons
Akils and deputations from the tribes came in to see me as soon as they
heard of my arrival. Althongh they were somnewhat ealmer than they
appear to have been before Captain Swayne some days previous they
were still in a very excited state, clamouring for arms and to le at once
led on to tle Mullah. 1| They openly say that we do not protect them
on their smmenr grazing-gronids, and that if these are closed to them
by tlie arined freces of the MInllah they must lose all their live-stock by
starvation as the nearer grazing-grounds their winter resort cannot
hold them all at this season of the year, and if the grass there is now
consumed they will have nothing tu fall back upon at the conclusion of
the summer rains. This is all perfectly true. They attach no importance
whatever to our holding the water places of Adadleh, Odweina, and
Hargaisa, as they say that troops located there are useless to proteet
them on their summer grazing-grounds, which is also true. Had we ten
times the number of troops here we could not insure the protection of
the tribes' herds over tle vast waterless area they frequent miles to the
south of our positions, though I am pretty certain that were we not
holding Hargaisa now the tribes in the neighbourhood would have all
rushed back on the Guban.
The tribes urge that formerly they were at times at war with the
Ogaden, and at times at peace, and that the fights mattered very little,
as in the end the losses adjusted ihemnselves; but now, sinee the Mullah
has appeared on the scene, all this is altered, and they are exposed to
attacks by raiding parties armed with rifles, against which they cannot






im Somalilande 199--1901. 31

contend. |1 One and all, they wanted to know whether we were going to
help themn, and, if so, how? |1 Some immediate arrangement was abso-
lutely necessary to separate the tribes, and get the Aidagalla, Samanter
Abdillah, and Almed Abdillah on to the nearer grazing-gronnds to the
south of this. At the present moment there is not a soul south of a
line drawn from Odweina to Hargaisa, and thence along the Hargaisa
River. 1 decided to issue a limited number of old Snider rifles which
1 h;ad obtained from Berbern, with a small amount of ammnnition, as a
temporary measure to protect the nearer grazing-grounds. Ten rifles,
with twenty rounds of amnnunition, were inade over to tle Akils of thie
Ha])r Yunis, Sanianter Abdillah, and Ahmed Abdillah, to be given to
selected men whose names have been recorded, aund the Akils of each
trile are made personally responsible for the safc cnstody of the ten
weapons given to each tribe, and that no improper use is made of then. |[
The Aidagalla, the most important tribe to get to mave a bit south, I
was unable to trust with the arms in their hands, both on acconnt of
internal fends and dissensions, and beeanse the attitnde of Sultan Deira
is very doubtful. He is known to have been in communication with the
Mullah; and the Abdi Bari section of the Aidagalla, who were tle chief
sufferers by the raid, have received letters from the 3Mullah offering to
restore themn their property if they will join himr. 1 deeided in the case
of the Aidagalla to entertain twenty Baladiyahs, and distribnte themi aniong
the different sections to protect their lierds. They will be required for
one or two months, according to whether the autminmal rains fall or .not.
The cost will be between 300 and 600 rnpees, for which, under the ex-
treme nrgency of the ease, 1 would soliceit your Lordship's sanction. 11 This
mneasure had the effect of partly allaying the excitement, and I am hope-
ful the tribes will now move sonth again for a short distance sufficient
to get grazing. There were, of course, many more demands for arms
which I was unable to meet. | But it would be idic to imagine that this
temporary expedient in any way satisfied the tribes as to thie general
position. They wanted to know whether we would make a general issue
of arms for the protection of the grazing-grounds, or whetlier we would
at once lead them against the Mullah, saying that tle state of affairs had
now become nnbearable, and that they were all ready to follow ns, or
go by themselves if wo would arm them. That the Mullalh is a long way
outside onr territory, and that it is the business of the Abyssinians to
deal with him in the conntry he now occupies, are facts which they
would not comprehend. They look upon the Mullah as being practieally
master of tle situation, allowed to do as he pleases, and they do not






32 Der Krieg gegen den Mullah Abdullah

understand our hesitation in taking steps to snppress him. II Your Lord-
ship will have seen from my telegram of this day that I consider the
position to be serious. The trihes are losing confidence in our ability
to protect them, and unless that confidence is maintained we shall not
be ahle to count on thcir allegiance, and they will be driven to make
the lest terms they can. with the Mullah for tihe safety of their herds
and flocks, on which their very life depends. I1 If we cannot soon co-
operate with the Abyssinians to put an end to the Mullah's movement,
I have proposed to punish the Ali Gheri, who are the Mullah's chief
supporters in the Protectorate, and who will probably be found between
Ber and Bohotele. In such a move we could count on the support of
all our Ishak tribes, and it would have the effect of drawing off fromn the
Mullah his Dolbahanfa contingent, by whose aid he is overawing the
Ogaden. 1| I am proceeding as soon as 1 can to Odweina, and thence to
Burao, where the tribes have been awaiting my arrival for some time
past. II 1 will report by telegram from Burao what steps I propose to
take against the Ali Gheri should they still prove refractory. 1| The fact
of my being expected at Burao has had the effect of keeping that part
of the country quiet, and when I am there 1 hope to be able to make
such arrangements as will result in the Dolbahanta trade resuming its
normal course. For some months past that part of the country has been
so unsafe that the Dolbahanta tribes have been unable to secure the
safety of their own caravans, and this is the reason I prohibited our
triljes nearer Berbera from trading with themn, insisting that their
Headmen should come in themselves, as until they do so no satisfactory
settlement is possible. 1| If a scare occurs on the eastern side of the
Protectorate, such as there has been here, we shall at once have a back-
ward rush of the tribes, and a recurrence of a good deal of the trouble
we bad last year.
T have said in my despatch of 24th July that the Aidagalla have
themselves to blame for this raid from the Ogaden. This is trne to a
great extent, but it is impossible to get the tribe to see the matter in
this light, especially the Abdi Bari, who are the principal sufferers.
They had little to do with previous raids by the Aidagalla on the Oga-
den, and they were the one section of the Aidagalla who complied with
my instructions to return the animals they looted. I have, acecordingly,
handed them over the Aidagalla share of the animals returned by the
Abyssinians. 1| The real cause of the panic here is the danger which the
Hadr Gerhajis and Habr Awal tribes, consequent on the recent raid, see
their 'summer grazing-grounds to be in from organized attacks by the






im Somalilande 1899-1901. 33

Mullah's followers; and in this connection, as well as the Mullah's move-
ment in general, I have had to assure the tribes that we are not unmind-
ful of their interests, and that we would consider what is best to be
done, but that what action is taken, and when, must be left for the de-
cision of the Government. || The question is a difficult one. If the Mullah's
movement does not collapse of itself, or he is not suppressed by the
Abyssinians, with or without our help, it will arise in an aggravated
form next April, when the summer rains draw the tribes to the Haud.
If the present position then still continues, we shall have to seriously
consider the question of issuing some 200 or 300 Sniders to the tribes
for the protection of their herds. There will be risk in this both of
some of the arms reaching the Mullah, and of improper use being made
of them by our people. But if we do not succeed in suppressing the
Mullah before the spring, 1. do not at present see that we have any other
alternative, as the Abyssinians, so long as the Mullah's movement con-
tinues, can afford our tribes no protection on the border, and we could
not establish a cordon of posts in these waterless tracts. |1 It is absolutely
necessary, if our position in the Protectorate is to be tenable, that our
tribes be reinstated in their southern grazing-grounds, at least, in the
nearer portions within our border. || For the present 1 am hopeful that
the measures which have been taken will suffice to protect our tribes
in the nearer grazing-grounds; it is late in the season, and they will not
now venture far south. 1l Sheikh Mattar, the Chief of Hargaisa, has ex-
pressed himself as most grateful for the assistance rendered him by the
presence here of the company of the 2nd Central Africa Regiment, and
has begged that when it is withdrawn it may be replaced by a post of
our police. |i Owing to the 2nd Central Africa Regiment being under
strength, and to the companies which proceeded to Ashantee being made
up to full strength, and leaving unfits, the half batallion remaining in
the Protectorate' now consists of 6 officers (including the medical officer),
7 Sikhs, and 4 weak companies of 84 Africans each, with a large pro-
portion of sick. 1| Their present location is as follows: j| Berbera, 1 officer,
1 Sikh, and 42 Africans. || Sheikh, 1 Sikh, and 30 Africans. || Adadleb,
2 officers, 1 Sikh, and 83 Africans. || Odweina, 2 officers, 2 Sikhs, and
111 Africans, with Maxim. |i Hargaisa, 1 officer, 1 Sikh, and 100 Africans. |
As soon as 1 can safely do so 1 propose to withdraw the companies
from Hargaisa and Odweina, leave a police post at the former place, and
concentrate our strength on the Sheikh-Burao line to anticipate any move
by the Mullah on the eastern side of the Protectorate. 11 When the water
fails in the Haud he must either move west to the Abyssinian frontier,
Staataarchiv LXVJ. 3






34 Der Krieg gegen den Mullah Abdullah

east of Walwal and Wardair or Bohotele, or south to the Webbe
Schebele. A move west would bring hirn within the reach of the
Abyssinians; with the exception of the Ali Gheri tribe, he has now but
little hold over the Dolbahanta, and it seems donhtful if he will venture
back to Bohotele, thongh it is quite possible he may do so. There is
always water at Walwal and Wardair, in the centre of the Ogaden, and
the probability seems to be that he will make his winter quarters there
as he did last year. 11 A copy of this despatch is being sent to Viscount
Cromer and to Her Majesty's Agent at Addis Abbaba.
1 have, &c.
(Signed) J. Hayes Sadler.

Nr. 12521. GROSSBRITANNIEN. Derselbe an Denselben. Be-
richt ber die Expedition nach Burao.
Camp, Dubbur, September 12, 1900. (October 1.)
My Lord, I| On the 18th ultimo 1 procccded to Odweina. The pre-
sence of the Compnany of tle 2nd Central AFrica Regiment had restored
confidencce in that direction so far as bringing the tribes back, and the
Habr Yunis were on their grazing-gronnds in the Toyo Plain. 1| As Od-
weina is quite destitute of grass and niy animals had suffered ftoom want
ofl' forage in a two days' march thirough a parched-up country, 1 decided
to move on the same afternoon towards Burao, the company of the 2nd
Central Africa Regiment following nime as soon as transport could be
collected. Major Plunkett at the saine time returning to hieid-quarters
at Adadleh. ]| At Gubatto, the first day's nuarch towards Burao, I found
an oasis of grass with sonie rain-water collccted in ditch-like depressions
in the ground. Here unnerois deputations of the Habr Ynnis came in,
and 1 halted for thirce days. At one time there must have bcen be-
tween 400 and 500 tribesmen collected, of whiom many were horsemen. ][
Here, as at Hargaisa, the great cry was for arms for tle protection of
the grazing-grounds. There had been no serious scare since the tribes
liad returned to Toyo, but the Elders were very uneasy and feared a
raid at any moment; and both Haji Musa of Haliia and the leading
tribesmen urged tihat the company be left at Odweina till the situation
was a bit clearer. 1] Therc were niany matters for settlenient between the
various seetions of thlie Habr Yunis who came in to meet us, and my
time and that of the Viee-Consul were fully occupied in adjusting long-stand-
ing differences whieh both parties werm anxious should be settled through
our mediation. 11 Amongst other questions that of thlie Sultanship of the
Habr Yunis came up, all sections present admitting their allegiance to





im 'Somalilande 1899-1901. 35

Madr Hirsi Nur's old rival in place of Nur, who is hopelessly
committed with the Mullah's movement. |1 Before leaving Gubatto 1 issu-
ed four rifles to Haji Musa for the protection of the Habia Tarikha,
and ten to Madr Hirsi for the protection of the grazing-grounds. These
were given out on the same eonditions as those issued at Hargaisa, and
eomplete the number I intend to issue at present. 1I In all forty-four old
Sniders were issued at Hargaisa and Gubatto. They are all in the hands
of Elders who ean fairly well be trusted. The number is small con-
sidering the vast area the tribes frequent, but the effeet of this measure,
eertainly for the time, will be out of proportion to the number of arms
given out. Exaggerated accounts of the arming of our people are certain
to reach the Ogaden, and a certain measure of eonfidenee has
been assured to our people, who look to us for assistance. || A
guard was placed over the rain water at Gubatto to keep it for
the company of the 2nd Central Africa Regiment, none being found
till Burao is reached. This was just as well, for this water eame in
very handy, and after the Africans had replenished their barrels the
water was rapidly exhausted by herds of eamels and flocks brought in
on the news circulated by the tribesmen who eame in to us to their
karias that water was to be found at Gulatto. [I At Burao 1 found the
eountry as burnt up as at Odweina, and every animal in my camp had
to be sent 6 miles off to the edge of the Arori Plain to get grazing. ||
On the arrival of the company of the 2nd Central Afriea Regiment, it
took up a position on high ground on the right bank of the river eommanding
the permanent wells. These wells are not as is usually the case in
Somaliland dug in the bed of the river, bhut are sunk through slightly
elevated ground on the left bank of the river. Water is found through-
out the year at a depth of abont 60 feet. || The Habr Yunis, Musa Ismai'l,
came in, and a few representatives of the Rer Ynsuf, the prineipal seetion
of the Dahir Farib, one of the two large sub-divisions of the Habr Tol-
jaala. A few of their karias were in the neighbourhood in the Arori
Plain with the Habr Yunis, but owing to the drought the tribe was
much scattered. I| Leaving the detachment at Burao 1 proceeded with the
Vice-Consul 20 miiles to the south to Ber, the prineipal watering-place
of the Habr Toljaala tribes after Burao. Here the Tug Der had ehanged
its channel, rendering the old wells useless, and owing to the drought
no karias were to be found. Several deputations of the Adan Madoba
came in a day's journey distance to meet us, and a settlement regarding
the return of looted property was elleeted between this tribe and a
deputation of the Mahomed Aysa, who had joined us at Bnrao from
3*





36 Der Krieg gegen den Mullah Abdullah

Sheikh, and who came on with us to Ber. || We returned quickly to
Burao, as Ber was destitute of vegetation, and though its name implies
a garden, such was the effect of the drought that the trees were all
black, and not a leaf was to be seen. Ilt was here ascertained that the
Ali Gheri Lad moved south of Bohotele, and were in the Abyssinian
Ogaden, and not between Ber and Bohotele, as had been previously
reported. Any move to punish this tribe will therefore not be advisable
at present, more especially as we cannot withdraw the Hargaisa detachment
so long as the Mullah is near Milmil, and it is also desirable to hold
Odweina. 11 The country round Burao is quiet, and as there are no signs
yet of the Mullah returning in the direction of Bohotele, the company
of the 2nd Central Africa Regiment is now returning to Odweina. A
blockbouse las been completed in the walled inclosure made by the
Africans at Sheikb. lt will be sufficient for the present to hold this
post with a guard of our military police. The detachment of the
2nd Central Africa Regiment is accordingly returning to head-quarters
at Abdallah, wbere the Berbera detachment of the regiment has already
been moved owing to sickness among the men in Berbera. 1] The impression
which my tour to Burao and Ber has given me .is that with the ex-
ception of the Gashanboor section, but little reliance can be placed on
the attitude of the Habr Toljaala tribes. Should the Mullah return to
the eastern districts thliey would either join hirn or us, whichever they
found the stronger. The Musa [smaYl section of the Habr Yunis, too,
as well as the Abdi Hirsi and Weid Hirsi, would probably follow the
lead of the Rer Yusuf, with whom they are more in touch than with
their kindred sections of the Habr Yunis. || Since leaving Burao reports
have been received that plentiful showers of rain liave fallen there and
at Odweina.
J. Hayes Sadler.
P.S. A copy of this despatch is being sent to Viscount Cromer.
J. H. S.


Nr. 12522. GROSSBRITANNIEN. Derselbe an Denselben.
Englisch-abyssinische Operationen.
Berbera, October 26, 1900. (October 26.)
(Telegraphic.) 1I Our Somalis have combined with Somalis under
Abyssinia to attack the Mullah. Despatch follows. The Yaos are
watehing the border.







im Somalilande 1899-1901. 37

Nr. 12523. GROSSBRITANNIEN. Derselbe an Denselben.
Dasselbe.
Aden, November 3, 1900. (November 3.)
(Telegraphic.) j| 1 reported by last mail that the situation was
intolerable, and suggested co-operating with Abyssinia to suppress the
Mullah and raising a temporary levy of Somalis 1000 strong under British
officers. 1I Since then 1 have seen Harrington. His latest information
from Abyssinia is that King Menelek is anxiously desirons of aeting in
concert with us with a strong force. 1 strongly recommend operating
in concert, and propose that the Miullah be driven out of the Ogaden by
Abyssinians. We would attack hirn from Burao should he retire to
Bohotele. In order to do this it will be necessary to raise at least
half the proposed levy at once, and have 1000 rifles with which to arm
the friendlies. || With Swayne's knowledge of the country and people, 1
consider it indispensable that he be given local rank to command. |I The
cost will be small compared with the employment of regulars.




Nr. 12524. GROSSBRITANNIEN.- Das Ausw. Amt an das Kriegs-
amt. Anwerbung von 1000 Somnalis.
Foreign Office, November 9, 1900.
Sir, l1 I am directed by the Marquess of Salisbury to transmit to you
the accompanying copy of a telegram from Her Majesty's Consul-General
in the Somaliland Protectorate, asking for authority to proceed at once to
raise and organize a temporary levy of 1000 Somalis under British
officers, for the purpose of co-operating with tlie Abyssinian forces in the
suppression of the movement which, under the leadership of the Mullah,
has caused continuous trouble and distnrbances on the Protectorate
frontiers. 1 The plan of a local levy has been for some time under con-
sideration, and Lord Salisbury is of opinion that tle organization of
such a force has become a necessity. His Lordship therefore proposes
to authorize Colonel Hayes Sadler to take at once the necessary steps
for raising at least so many men as will make it possible for himi to
dispense with the services of the half-battalion Central Africa Rifles. |I lf,
as is hoped, this object can be attained witliont serious delay, it would
Sbecome possible to transfer the Vaos to Ashantee without resorting to
the plan of replacing them by troops from Aden. 1| Before sending the







38 Der Krieg gegen den Mullah Abdullah

proposed instruetion to Colonel Hayes Sadler, Lord Salisbury would be
glad to receive tle observations of the Marquess of Lansdowne in regard
to this matter.
St. John Brodrick.



Nr. 12525. GROSSBRITANNIEN.-DasAusw.AmtandenGeneral-
konsul Sadler. Soll mit der Werbung der Somalis
beginnen.
Foreign Office, November 16, 1900.
(Telegraphic.) ]| 1 anthorize you to proceed withont delay with the
levy of 1000 Somalis, as proposed in your telegram of the 3rd November
and your despatch of the 26th October. |I With regard to the snpply of
officers, arms, and equipment, and the arming of friendlies, 1 am in
communnication with the War Office. || In order tu release the Yaos for
service in Ashanti at once, Colonel Brake suggests their being replaced
by troops froin Aden. The War Office support this idea. 11 What would
this cost, if it is feasible?



Nr. 12526. GROSSBRITANNIEN. Das Kriegsamint an das
Answ. Amt. Denkschrift ber die Expedition
gegen den Mullal. Geschichte des Mullah und
seiner Rubereien.
Haji AMuhammed Abdullah belongs to the Habi Sulieman Ogaden
tribe; e nmarried into tle Dolbahanta Ali Gheri. He is a man still in
the prime of life, but has only recently become a dominant factor in the
military and political situation of the Protectorate. During tle years 1896-99
the Mullah made several pilgrimages to Mecca, where he attached him-
self to the sect of Muhammed Salih, whose deputy he claims to be in
Somaliland. This seet was established in Berbera about the year 1887,
but has not found much favonr with the people of the town. Muhammed
Abdul]ab had, however, for some time enjoyed considerable influence
over the Habr Toljaala and Dolbahanta tribes inhabiting the more
remote portions of the Protectorate, and at first this influence appears
to have been exercised for good. 1] At tle beginning of last year, how-
ever, the Mullah, on the plea of a theft of camels comnmltted by the Habr
Yunis (who live within the Protectorate), raided the territory of that
tribe, occupied the town of Burao, and assumed an attitude antagonistic






im Somalilande 1899-1901. 39

to the Protectorate Governmcnt, giving out that ihe intended to rule the
interior, leaving tle coast to the Europeans. He is stated to have forced
persons to join his sect, to have threatened expeditions against tribes
which opposed him, and to have levied blackmail generally. By these
means he, for the moment, established liimself as a considerable power
in the Dolbahanta country, an integral part of the Protectorate. |1 In
April 1899 the Mullah's immediate following was estimated by Colonel
Sadler as 3000 men, but he was then believed to be in possession of
only sixty modern rifles und a small quantity of ammunition. lu the
previous month he had retired from Burao to Kob Fardod. j| In the follow-
ing August the Mullah again raided the eastern sections of Habr Yani
tribes, and reoccupied Burao with a force estimated at 1500 men, with
a large proportion of horse", and was then believed to possess about
200 rifles and a limited amount of ammunition. || His following was
composed of men from the Ogaden. 1| Ibrahim, Ba Awadle, and Dolbahanta
tribes. He gave himself out as the Mahdi, and dispatched men to all the
Hahr Toljaala tribes, ordering them to join him at Burao. lt was even
rumnoured that he intended tu advance on Berbera. On this the dispatch
of a British expedition to deal with the Mullah was proposed by the
Consul-General, who then considered that a force of ,100 mounted men
and 300 infantry would be adequate". It was calculated that the Mullah
could have concentrated 4000 men to meet this force, for which Burao
was proposed as the objective. It was thought in the Intelligence
Division that the force proposed 1)y the Consul-General would, if
supplemented by levies from friendly tribes, be sufficient at that time to
deal with the Mullah; but it was pointed out that the latter's power
would probably increase if the expedition were delayed. Delay was,
however, deemed expedient by Her Majesty's Government, having regard
to the state of affairs in ohlier parts of the world. || At tlie end of October
the Chief of the Dolbahanta tribe was murdered by order of the Mullah
for opposition to hiiin. The Mullah was reported still to be in the
recesses of that country and to be contemplating seizing the twelve
principal Sheikhs of the district. He is further stated to have impressed
several hundred horses. HIe may be said, therefore, to lave practically
superseded British anthority in a portion of the Protectorate. The pro-
ject of an advance on Berbera appears, however, to have been abandoned.
Early in the saine month (October) a boat from Jibuti conveyed a
consignment of arms, reported to consist of eitlier 240 or 400 rifles and
of 40000 rounds of ammunition, to the Italian Protectorate, where,
without the consent of the Italian authorities, tley were bought by the






40 Der Krieg gegen den Mullah Abdullah

Sultan Othman Mahmood. It was thought probable by the Consul-General
that the Sultan bought these arms not for bis own use, but to sell
again in the interior, in which case the Mullah, who, nine months later,
was still offering camels for a cheap rifle, and one camel for fifteen
rounds of ammunition, may reasonably be supposed to have been bis
eustomer. 1i In December 1899 the Mullah's following dwindled: ,there
were indications that the Dolbahanta was getting too hot for hinm", and
he retired across the Protectorate frontier to three or four days' niarch
sooth of Bohotele, in the Ogaden country. Here he busied himself in
trying to combine the Ogaden tribes against the tribes in the Protecto-
rate, who had abandoned his cause, and in looting caravans. |1 By the
beginning of February of the present year the aspect of affairs in Ogaden
had ,ehanged for the worse". It appeared doubtful whether all tle tribes
in the southern Protectorate had severed their connection with the
Mullah, who was reported to have acqnired 140 more rifles, to have
collected large supplies of grain and live-stock, and to ineditate another
raid into the Protectorate; this intention was, however, abandoned on the
rumour of the advance of an Abyssinian force tu protect the French
railway, and the Mullah retired towards the Webbe Schebele. || The
Mullah's immediate following at this time (about the 14th February)
was reported to be about 1200 men, but it was said by an escaped
prisoner that all the Ogadens had submitted to him. 11 In March an
Abyssinian expedition of about 1500 well-armed men was dispatched
from Harrar into the Ogaden country to deal with the Mullah, but bis
forces evaded it. The Abyssinians then fell back, after looting the
country. |1 On this the Mullah, retaining withll him his own immediate
following of 1000 men (half of whom were by now equipped with rifles),
and his ponies, sent forward 6000 spearmen (clihiefly of the Gallas and
Harrari tribes) to attack the Abyssinian force, which had halted at a
watering-place, and there intrenched in a strong double zareba. In the
attack, which was delivered in broad dayliglit with much boldness, the
Somalis are reported to have retaken all the looted stock, and, although
they had not a single rifle, even to have penetrated the zareba, btt they
were eventnally beaten off with a loss of 2650 men. The Abyssinians
made no attempt to pursue, and are reported to have been inspired with
a wholesomne dread of the Somalis. II Early in June the Consul-General
reports that the Mullah is quieseent, and states that ,the religious
bubble, with which the movement commenced, has burst so far as the
large majority of our tribes are concerned"; but Colonel Sadler points
out that ,the movement has thrown the country back several stages in






im Somalilande 1899-1901. 41

its civilizing advance, and has given a rude shock to our anthority over
a large area of the Protectorate". 1| On the 9th June Colonel Harrington
telegraphs from Jibnti that Menelek proposes a combined movement of
British and Abyssinian forees against tle Mullah. Harrington recom-
mends the acceptance of this proposal, as ,our political opponents
represent us as encouraging the Mullah's action". I1 On the 24th the
Consul-General of the Protectorate reports that the position in Ogaden
is not improving. The Mullah dominates the whole country, and bhis
position is, from all accounts, stronger now than it was before the attack
on the Abyssinians", which the Ogadens are said to be confident would
have succeeded, had it been made by night. The Mullah is still making
strennous efforts to acquire more rifles and ammunition. In the same
month a raid of 1000 of his horsemen succeeded in earrying off
2000 camels, valned at 160000 rupees, and created great consternation
over the southern portion of the Protectorate. In August the tribes
affected by this raid complained bitterly to the Consul-General, that un-
less we protect their summer graziug-grounds from the attacks of the
Mullah their stock will starve, as tlie grass on the winter grazing-ground
is insufficient for both summer and winter requirements. These tribes
had fallen back from their grazing-ground, and were far from satisfied
with the few rifles which the Consul-General issued to defend their stock.
Colonel Sadler, indeed, reports that ,they are losing confidence in our
ability to proteet them, and unless that confidence is maintained we shall
not be able to count on their allegiance, and they will be driven to make
the best terms they can with the Mullah". [] On the day following the
despatch above quoted, the Consul-General telegraphs that the ,position,
owing to the Mullah's movement, is unsupportable", and that if joint
operations with the Abyssinians cannot be arranged, he must move out
alone with all available forces and tribal levies from the Ishak tribe to
punish the Mullah's allies round Bohotele. |l On the 26th October the
Consul-General reports that the tribes who have suffered from the Mullah
can no longer be restrained, and are collecting to attack him near Milmil,
and that in consequence of this the half-battalion 2nd Central Africa
Regiment had been moved up towards Hargaisa. The Mullah was
continnally raiding the tribes in Abyssinian territory, practising many
barbarities, and but for the Central Africa Regiment would probably
have attacked Hargaisa. || Colonel Sadler suggests raising native levies
to deal with the ,intolerable situation". 1| On the 3rd November the
Consul-General telegraphs that he hears from Harrington that Menelek
will co-operate with a strong force, and he therefore strongly recommends






42 Der Krieg gegen den Mullab Abdullah

immediate concerted ction to drive the Mullah ont of Ogaden. He
proposes to raise a levy of 1000 men (of whom two companies would
be mounted), with a proper complement of British officers; Captain Swayne
to be given local rank to command the whole force.
E. A. Altham, D.A.A.G.
Intelligence Division, War Office,
November 16, 1900.


Nr. 12527. GROSSBRITANNIEN. Generalkonsul Sadler an
das Ausw. Amt. Antwort auf Nr. 12525.
Berbera, November 24, 1900. (November 26.)
(Telegraphlic.) lI It will cost, exelusive of British officers, approximate-
ly 250001. to arm the friendlies, and to raise, arm, and equnip a levy of 1000 So-
malis and maintain them for four months, after which the upkeep will be
about 2500 1. per mensem. || This provides for 100 camelry, 400 mounted
militia, and 500 infantry. Proposed increase in mounted branch is con-
sidered desirable. The largest item is 8200 1. for arms and amumunition.
Would it not be possible to lend the rifles? || One hundred and fifty
Martini Lee Metford rifles and 200000 rounds of ammunition can be
left by the Yaos. 1| The estimato for the levy includes cost of operations
and transport.



Nr. 12528. GROSSBRITANNIEN. Das Ausw. Amt an den
Generalkonsul Sadler. Expedition gegen die
Ogadenstmme.
Foreign Office, November 30, 1900.
(Telegraphic.) || The Ogadens lihave risen in the Juba River district.
Mr. Jenner, Her Majesty's Sub-Commissioner, has been murdered, and
his escort out up. lt is estimated that the revolted tribes muster about
6000 figliting men. || A punitive expedition will be immediately organized
under the command of Colonel Ternan, the Acting Commissioner, who
has proceeded to Kismayu for this purpose to stiffen the forces there
available; he has applied for half-a-battalion of Indian troops, rationed
for three months. il Instead of bringing troops from India, it would be
less expensive and simpler, generally, to employ detachments of the
Central Africa Regiment, drawn partly from Zomba and partly from the
force now stationed in your Protectorate. || Would any considerable






im Somalilainde 1899-1901. 43

portion of the half-battalion in Somaliland now awaiting removal to
Ashantec be available for this expedition, and, if so, how many could
be sent at once? All accounts of Jubaland agree as to complete absence
of fruit and fresh vegetables, so that the troops employed there will
have to depend on India and Zanzibar for the necessary supplies.



Nr. 12529. GROSSBRITANNIEN. Generalkonsul Sadler an
das Ausw. Amt. Der Mullah kauft Waffen im
italienischen Gebiet.
Berbera, December 6, 1900. (December 6.)
(Telegraphic.) 1| Reports have been received that the Mullah has sent
emissaries and money to the Italian Benadir Coast, to purchase arms.
The exact locality is unknown.


Nr. 12530. GROSSBRITANNIEN. Das Ausw. Amt an den
Botschafter in Rom. Italien soll Waffenlieferung
an den Mullah verhten.
Foreign Office, December 8, 1900.
(Telegrapliie.) || Communicate to Italian Government substance of
Lientenant-Colonel Hayes Sadler's telegram of the Gth instant, which has
been repeated to you, and urge them to give instructions to their Agents
on the Benadir Coast to do their ntmost to prevent the sale of arms to
the Mullah.


Nr. 12531. GROSSBRITANNIEN. Der Geschftstrger in
Abyssinien an den Minister des Answ. Abyssinien
wird gegen den Mullah nicht auf eigene Hand
vorgehen.
Harrar, November 29, 1900. (December 29.)
My Lord, 1| I have the honour to inform your Lordship that on
arrival at Harrar 1 found that the Abyssinians had taken no steps to
capture the Somaliland Mullah, but under orders from King Menelek
were still awaiting some action on our part in combination with a
movement froni their side against him. |1 During my halt at Harrar, Ras
Makunan sent two Ogaden Somalis who had recently escaped from the
Mullah's camp near Harradiggit to my camp. |1 From these men's reports






44 Der Krieg gegen den Mullah Abdullah

it appears that the 1Mullah has at present a following of about 500 per-
sons and about 300 rifles, with less than 10 rounds of ammunition per
rifle. [| The Ogaden are said to be tired of his exactions and cruelties,
and are ready to desert him should an expedition be sent against him.r]
The two Somalis whom 1 interrogated expressed their willingness to
undertake the Mullah's capture were a force of 150 rifles sent with thein.
They stated that witl the exception of the Mullah's own Jillib (i. e., sub-
tribe), all his followers -would disperse were an expedition in the field. |I
In an interview with Ras Makunan, I suggested without avail that he
should attempt such an expedition, and in case of failure, we could
afterwards arrange some combined expedition against the Mullah. I| In
course of conversation with the Ras, it appears that he favours an
Abyssinian expedition from Harrar to drive the Mullah from Harradiggit
and Milmil towards Bohotele, where an expedition from Somali Protectorate
could attack hirn. | The Ras seemed to regard any single expedition
eitlier from Harrar or our side destined to failure. j| 1 promised to lay
the Ras' views before Her MIajesty's Government and the Consul-General,
Berbera, when, if any action were decided on, he would be communicated
with. j1 Thcre is no doubt in my mind that the Abyssinians have no
intention of taking any action single handed against tle Mullah. i| The
situation in the Protectorate is becoming intolerable, and delay tends to
increase the Mullab's following to such an extent that a costly expedition
may be eventually needed, whereas at present a smail Somali levy, with
the assistance of the friendly tribes, should suiffice to put an end to the
tronbles dne to the Mullah. || Failing combined action with the Abyssinians,
should the Mullah's raids into our Protectorate be repeated, and his
interference with the Ogaden trade continue, we shall be obliged to in-
sist on the Abyssinians suppressing him, he being in their territory, a
course which might lead to results much more serious tlan any expedition
against the Mullah would be. |] A copy of this despatch has been sent to
the Consul-General, Berbera; Consul, Zeyla; and Vice-Consul, Harrar.
J. L. Harrington.

Nr. 12532. GROSSBRITANINIEN. Das Ausw. Amt an General-
konsul Sadler. VerlangtBerichtberdiegignstigste
Zeit fr die Operationen.
Foreign Office, January 1, 1901.
(Telegraphic.) || There are several considerations which must govern
the decision as to timing our movement against Mullah (see Lieutenant-
Colonel Harrington's despatch of the 29 th November, of which a copy






im Somalilande 1899-1901. 45

has been sent to you direct). || A punitive expedition against the Southern
Ogadens on the Juba is now actually in progress. It is expected that
the operations connected with it will last till the end of March. |1 It
would be desirable to defer, if possible, the Somaliland expedition until
our hands are free in Jnbaland, unless it should appear that the Mullah's
movement is connected with the rising on the Juba, of which so far
there is no indication. |1 Time would also be given by this postponement
to get your levy in thorough state of efficiency, though 1 under-
stand you would be in a position to move much sooner should this
become necessary owing to pressure from the Abyssinians or for any
other reasons. || It is important to consider, on the other hand, whether
it wonld be any advantagc to us or the reverse if the operations against
the Mullah were timed to begin at a particular season. The rainy season
would perhaps be best from the point of view of our transport and
water supply; yet if we could roly on keeping np an efficient system of
water transport we might hope for considerable advantage over the
enemy if we moved in the dry season, when bis mobility would probably
be impaired for lack of water. On the other hand, however, we should
not perhaps in the latter case be able to count with elual certainty upon
the Abyssinians for effective co-operation. II Report your view as to the
most favourable season for operations, and your opinions generally after
you have consulted Lieutenant-Colonel Swayne.



Nr. 12533. GROSSBRITANNIEN. Generalkonsul Sadler an
das Ausw. Amt. Feldzugsplan gegen den Mullah.
Berbera, December 28, 1900. (January 14, 1901.)
My Lord, || In connection with the plan and probable date of opera-
tions against the Mullah Mnhammad-bin-Abdullah, it is difficult at this
stage to lay down definitely any lines beyond those already indicated, viz.,
that the Abyssinians should drive the Mullah eastwards towards Bohotele,
where our expedition should attack him. [| These are the general lines
accepted by Ras Makunan. |1 The actual plan of campaign will depend
on two considerations, neither of which are yet determined: (1) where
the Mullah may be at the time operations are commenced; and (2) how
far the Abyssinians will allow us a free hand in the Ogaden. 11 We
cannot tell where the Mullah may be. My information at present is that
he is returning to Bohotele after the Ramzan, which would be about
the 21st January. In this case our expedition would move straight on






46 Der Krieg gegen den Mullah Abdullah

that place. || If he stands fast in ihe direction of Harradiggit, which
liardly seems probable in the face of an Abyssinian advance and report-
ed dissensions among the Ogaden, wc should have to either wait till he
is driven eastwards, or move to intercept his retreat towards Bohotele.
We could not move at once on Bohotele, as this wonuld uncover the
whole of the Habr Yunis country. |i But if there is any delay in the
Abyssinian advance once the time for the commencement of operations
is decided, the temper of our tribes will have to be taken into account;
they arc very impatient as it is, and if the Mullah is, say, at Harradig-
git, and our force is collected at Odweina, any protracted delay on our
part would be certain to be misconstrued. ] It is possible that the Abyssinians
will not look with favour on our operations in a direction so immediate-
ly within tleir own sphere of action; but after all we are combining
with them to rid the country of the Mullah, and 1 think that, if possible,
it should be arranged so that we have a free hand to join in an attack
in the direction of Harradiggit if necessary. jI As 1 have observed 1 do
not think this contingency probable, but we onght to be prepared for
all possible devclopments. | When our preparations are more advanced,
I propose to depute Captain Swayne, who will then be in the direction
of Hargaisa enlisting Habr Awal horsemien, to confer personally with
Ras Makunan and come to a conunon understanding as to the time and
place of operations. || As regards the time, 1 suggested early in November
that we should be ready in Jamuary. Wo were then only dealing with
a levy of 500 and 1000 armed friendlies. To get a levy of 1500 into
some training and discipline Captain Swayne would require two nmonths
after the arrival of the arms and officers, hut we could manage to move
in one month if the Abyssinians are then ready. It will take a few
days to get the arms up country. We have nearly completed the enlist-
ment of half the infantry portion of the levy, and it is useless to do
more till we havc more officers, and the arms are ready to be handed
out. l1 The most favonrable time for operations in the Ogaden, from our
point of view, would be after the 18th April, whcn the rains gcnerally
fall in the Haud. On the other hand, the Abyssinians would probably
prefer the dry season for their advance, as the Mullah will then be con-
fined to the line of wells. Our arrangements are being made on the
assumption that we move in the dry season; independently of a large
supply of watcer casks, we shall have assistance from the tribes in the
shape of native water vessels and camels to carry them, and they have
freely come forward with offers in this respeet. I1 We are now waiting
for arms and officers. If these are reeeived in the next three weeks we






im Somalilande 1899-1901. 47

should be able to move at the end of February or the commencement
of March if the Abyssinians are ready by then. 11 The sooner we do
move and put an end to the Mullah's movement the better. If then the
necessary preparations are all completed on both sides, I consider that
we should commience operations at the time indicated, in preference to
waiting for the niore favourable season of the rains. This will be
arranged by Captain Swayne with Ras 3Makunan. 11 In the event of the
Mullah returning to Bohotele before we advance and attempting to
escape through the Dolbahanta to the coast, 1 will arrange with the
Mahmood Girad to be on the look out and effect bis capture. 11 Witli
regard to tle friendlies, it is probable that, wlether we wish it or not,
our expedition will be accompanied by horsemen of the tribes who have
suffered so severely at the Mullah's hands, and it will not be politie to
prevent tliem. They will not now be armed. They could be usefully
emnployed in scouting and perhaps in diverting the attenlion of the
enemy on the left flank in a move on Bohotele. 1| A copy of tlis des-
patch is being sent to Viscount Cromer and to Lieutenant-Colonel Harrington.
J. Hayes Sadler.




Nr. 12534. GROSSBRITANNIEN. Derselbe an Dasselbe. Ant-
wort auf Nr. 12532.
Berbera, January 12, 1901. (January 14.)
(Telegraphie.) 1| Your Lordship's telegram of 1st January. || Please
see my despatch of the 28tli ultimo. 11 April will be the most favourable
time to commence operations, and I will try to arrange so. |I With regard
to submitting details of discnssion with the Abyssinian authorities, 1
would note that conditions are continually changing, and that owing to
difficulties of communication it might well be that modification of details
may be required before they could be sanctioned by Her Majesty's
Governmnent. || Full diseretion is necessary for us to act generally on thie
lines already reported, or on any modification of them that may
commend itself to your Lordship, as we may be compelled to move at
any time if our hands are forced. 11 Tt is reported that the western
Ogaden tribes have left tlie Mullah and lave fought against hirn. He
is moving to the east out of the probable reacli of an Abyssinian ex-
pedition, and everything at present points to our being able to act as
originally suggestcd and deal with hirn in thle direction of Bohotele. (|






48 Der Krieg gegen den Mullah Abdullah

I should doubt there being any connection between the rising in Juba-
land and the Mullah's movement. I have no information pointing to
such connection,



Nr. 12535. GROSSBRITANNIEN. Der Sirdar von gypten an
das Ausw. Amt. Abkommen mit Abyssinien fr
den Feldzug.
Cairo, January 29, 1901. (January 29.)
(Telegraphic.) || The Somaliland Mullah. il I received last night the
following telegram from Colonel Harrington, dated the 23rd instant:-|
1 have arranged with King Meneolek that for the purposes of the ex-
pedition to be made against the 31ullah, the frontier shall be regarded
as non-existent; our force will thus be able to follow him wherever he
goes. An Abyssinian officer will be appointed to accompany our force,
and we are invited to detail an officer to accompany theirs. Further
details are left to be arranged by Swayne and the Head of the Abyssinian
force when they meet. lt is desirable that Swayne should arrive as
soon as possible, as delay on our part is liable to misconstruction." [t
1 have informed Colonel Hayes Sadler, MAr. Gerolimato, and the Vice-
Consul at Zeyla.



Nr. 12536. GROSSBRITANNIEN. Generalkonsul Sadler an das
Ausw. Amt. Misserfolg der Abyssinier.
Zeyla, February 10, 1901. (February 10.)
(Telegraphic.) 11 ]t is reported by the Vice-Consul at Harrar that the
Abyssinians made an advance into the Ogaden, and that from want of
water and supplies some 2000 men deserted and returned to Harrar in
terrible plight. I| Jt does not appear that the expedition got anywhere
near the Mullah, who is now said to be in the Ibrahim country. [| Until
plans are arranged, it is very unadvisable that the Abyssinians should
make any further forward movement. I hope that Swayne will leave
Berbera to arrange plans with the Abyssinian Commander in a
week's time.






im Somalilande 1899-1901. 49



Nr. 12537. GROSSBRITANNIEN. Das Ausw. Amt an den
Major IIambury Traey. Er soll zur abyssinischen
Armee abgehen.

Foreign Office, February 25, 1901.
(Extract.) l] IIis Majesty's Government have had to consider the
question of undertaking military operations agaiist a eertain Mullah
Mahomet ben Abdullah, who, having declared himself to be a Mahdi,
has for sonie time harassed the southern borders of the British Protee-
torate in Somaliland, as well as the neighbouring Abyssinian distriets.
A levy of native troops is being raised and organized into a field force
by Colonel Hayes Sadler, His Majesty's Consul-General at Berbera. It
will be under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel E. J. Swayne, and it
is understood that it will receive, in the proposed advance against the
Mullah, the co-operation of an Abyssinian force which the Emperor
Menelek is prepared to employ with the same object. l| In order to
facilitate such co-operation, it appears to His Majesty's Government
expedient that a British officer should, with the sanetion of the Emperor
Menelek, aceompany the Abyssinian force destined to aet against the
Mullah, for the purpose of facilitating their concerted action with the
movements of the British force under Lieutenant-Colonel Swayne. rI The
Marquess of Lansdowne has, with the approval of the Secretary of State
for War, seleeted you for this duty. 1 am accordingly direeted by his
Lordship to request that you will start for Abyssinia with the least
possible delay. His Majesty's Diplomatie Representative at the Court of
the Emperor Menelek has been directed, by telegraph, to take such steps
as may be necessary in order to enable you to carry out your mission.
You will proeeed to Zeyla, and, if necessary, to Berbera, before starting
for the interior, in order to communicate with His Majesty's Consul-
General, Colonel Hayes Sadler, and with Lieutenant-Colonel Swayne,
froni whom you will take your instructions as regards your military
duties, and whose wishes you will carry out so far as cireumstances
will permnit. 11 Your further movenients will depend on the arrangements
whielh will be made in direct consultation between Colonel Hayes Sad-
ler and His Majesty's Agent in Abyssinia, who has been directed to
obtain the necessary authority for your accompanying the Abyssinian
forees.


Staatsarchiv LXVI. 4






50 Der Krieg gegen den Mullah Abdullah

Nr. 12538. GROSSBRITANNIEN. Das Ausw. Amt an General-
konsul Sadler. Aufenthalt des Mullah und Feld-
zugsplan.
Foreign Office, March 8, 1901.
(Telegraphie.) il Mullah was reported in your telegram of the 10th
February to be in Ibrahim country. |I I' this is the oase, his movement
to so southerly a region may signify that his forces are becoming
disintegrated, and, even if this is not so, may call for an alteration in
our plan of campaign. l[ Moreover, we are still ignorant of the effect of
Colonel Tornan's movement round Afmadu. |1 His Majesty's Government
are therefore all the more desirous that iuvemeits shlonld not be precipi-
tated without the most careful consideration. [l Before Swayne commits
his force, it is necessary that he should consalt the Abyssinians and
obtain aceurate intelligence as to their intentions and resourcos. || In any
case, His Majesty's Government would not eare that Swayne's advance
south should extend much further than was originally contemplated. |] It
is only on the distinet understanding that a risk of premature operations
against the Mullah is not involved, that operations against Rer Ali can
be sanctioned. Ij If Swayne desires, he may, subjeet to the above con-
siderations, move his headquarters to Hargaisa to conmplete his required
establishment of mounted troops. 11 It is of the greatest importance that
the best information regarding the Mullah's strength, novements, and
future dispositions should be obtained.


Nr. 12539. GROSSBRITANNIEN. Generalkonsul Sadler an das
Ausw. Amt. Die Expedition muss sofort beginnen.
Berbera, March 15, 1901. (March 15.)
(Telegraphie.) 11 Please see your Lordship's telegram of the 9 th instant.
The situation has quite ehanged; the Mullah has been driven by the
Abyssinians to the Dolbahanta, and is now between Bohotele and Lasa-
der, which is 60 miles east of it. I| We cannot now be dependent on the
termination of the expedition in East Africa, nor on oo-operation with
the Abyssinian force, the whereabouts of which are still unknown. 11 We
have now sufficiently trained 1000 infantry and 100 eamelry. We are
purchasing 100 ponies at 25 1. owing to the difficulty of procuring
horsemen, and I would solicit sanetion to buy, if neeessary, 100 more;
on these trained infantry will be mounted, infantry being completed up
to its numbers. When the expedition moves 300 or more horsemen will






im Somalilande 1899-1901. 51

join; these will be used as seouts, but rilles will not be given them.
It is essuntial we should not permit the Mullah to establish his power
again in the eastern portion of the Protectorate, and our presence in the
Dolbahanta will give assurance to any tribes who now waver. Swayne
proposes tuo move to Burao early next month and to proceed thence
against the Mullah down the Ain Valley. || The force is sufficient, and
it is, 1 consider, absolutely necessary to take iinmediate action. NativC
reports are to the effect that the Mullah suffered severely at the hands
of the Abyssinians in the Ogaden, whose western tribes turned against
himn. We should strike before he has time to rally. || If we wait for
regulars and operations are indefinitely postponed the effeet, particnlarly
in view of the activity of the Abyssiniani force, will be projudicial to our
tribes and the levy, by whoni any further delay will not be understood. |
The levy urgently wants a medical offieer. I propose to ask for the
temporary services of Surgeon Captain Anderson from Aden if Roberts
is longer delayed.



Nr. 12540. GROSSBRITANNIEN. Das Ausw. Amt an den
Generalkonsul Sadler. Antwort auf das Vorige.
Foreign Office, March 18, 1901.
(Telegraphic.) 1| Your telegram of the 15th March. 11 Proposal for
early advance to Burao with view to offensive operations down Ain
Valley sanctioned. But while we attach importance to capture or defeat
of Mullah, you should understand that it would be imipossible to rein-
force you, and we should therefore deprecate extension of operations
far into the Haud which might involve your force in any serious risk. |
Purchase of 200 horses approved. 11 Aden asked to lend Surgeon-Captain
Anderson if Roberts is delayed.



Nr. 12541. GROSSBRITANNIEN. Generalkonsul Sadler an
das Ausw. Amt. Strke des Mullah.
Sheikh, May 1, 1901. (May 1.)
(Telegraphic.) jj Owing to the drought, there has been delay in ad-
vance of our expedition. || The Mullah's strength, according to the latest
accounts, is about 1200 horse and 6000 foot, with 300 rifles. It is
reported that he has withdrawn his advanced force froin Ain to Yahel,
where he now is. 11 A transport corps of 250 men has been formed, and
4*






52 Der Krieg gegen den Mullah Abdullah

1000 friendly spearsmen will accompany the expedition in view of Mullah's
reported accession of strength. || Within the next fortnight an advance
may take place. 11 (Repeated to Cairo and Harrington.)


Nr. 12542. GROSSBRITANNIEN. Derselbe an Dasselbe. Fort-
schritte der Expedition.
Berbera, May 24, 1901. (May 25.)
(Telegraphic.) || Ber was reached on tle 21st instant by the ex-
pedition. There has been a general rainfall, and, although grass is still
scarce, the conditions are now more favourable for an advance. A fresh
force of Abyssinians, whose troops have returned from the Ogaden, left Harrar
on the 15th May for the Webbe River. 11 The above information has
been repeated to His Majesty's Agents in Cairo and Addis Abbaba.


Nr. 12543. GROSSBRITANNIEN. Proklamation an die Dolba-
hantastmme.
Be it known to all concerned among the Dolbahanta tribes that the
expedition now abont to be dispatched by the Government is not against
the Darod tribes of the Dolbahanta; it is to operate against the Mullah
Muhammad-bin-Abdullah and those who are affording him assistance. ||
All persons found supporting this Mullah will be considered as hostile
to the Government and will be treated as such; and tribes will be held
answerable for their individual members. |1 All tribes are therefore re-
quired to refrain from any dealings or communications with the Mullah,
to leave that part of the country in which he now is and his followers
are, and to warn any of their members who may be with the Mullah to
leave him at once as they will be held responsible for any acts committ-
ed by such against the Administration.
J. Hayes Sadler,
His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General, Somali
Coast Protectorate.
April 30, 1901.


Nr. 12544. GROSSBRITANNIEN. Generalkonsul Sadler an
das Ausw. Amt. Erfolge ber den Mullah.
[Vi Aden.]
Sheikh, June 13, 1901. (June 16.)
(Telegraphie.) |1 Latest reports from Swayne are: |I Expedition
reached Sanala, one day south-east of Eldab, on Ist June, having eap-






im Somalilande 1899-1901. 53

tured 3500 of enemy's live-stock. ile left on 2nd with main body
against Mullah's camp at Yahel, leaving 300 men under Macneill to
guard zariba at Sanala. Since then Sharp reports from Burao on 9th
that who attacks made on Macneill's zariba by 500 horse and 1500 foot.
Both attacks repulsed. At 9 A. M. on 3rd, determined attack by largely
increased force made by Mullah on Macneill. This was finally repelled
with loss -to enemy of from 400 to 500; 141 dead left outside zariba.
Our casualties 10 of levy killed, 9 wounded. Up to 4th nothing further
happened at Sanala. Messengers report Mullah cleared where not known.
As Swayne has got between Mullah and his camp news of decisive action
should soon be received. |l (Repeated to Cairo and Harrington.)



















Der Aschantikrieg im Jahre 1900.*)

Nr. 12545. GROSSBRITANNIEN. Der Kolonialminister Sir
F. Ml. Hodgson an den Gouverneur der Goldkiste.
Giebt es Unruhen in Aschanti?
(Sent 3 p. m., April 6, 1000.)
(Telegram.) || Is there any truth in report contained in press tele-
gram of serious disturhances Aslianti and despatch of troops from Accra?


Nr. 12546. GROSSBRITANNIEN. Mr. Low an den Kolonial-
minister. Der Gouverneur der Goldkste bereitet
Truppensendungen nach Kumassi vor.
(Received 2.40 p. m., April 7, 1900.)
(Telegram.) |1 In reply to your telegrain of yesterday's date, following
telegram received from Governor of Gold Coast, at Kumasi, on 2nd April: 1
Telegram begins: Inform mc, after making enqniries Inspector-General
of Constahnlary, what number native troops he can send to Kumnasi should
I require assistance. He would have to send all available force of Con-
stabulary, duties being carried on teniporarily by police force. Give in-
strnetions hold them in readiness to mareh on receipt of instructions.
Telegram ends. 11 Telegraph line destroyed by Ashantis between Prahsu
and Kumasi, since 2nd April. Further information will be sent as soon
as possible.


Nr. 12547. GROSSBRITANNIEN. Derselbe an Denselben. Ver-
handlungen des Gouverneurs mit den Huptlingen.
(Received 11.28 p.m., April 7, 1900.)
(Telegram.) U| Following telegram received from Governor of Gold
Coast, Kumasi: Telegrati begins: Arrived at Kumasi 26 March. All

*) Blaubuch, Cd. 501. 1901.






Der Aschantikrieg im Jahre 1900. 55

Native Chiefs were present. On 31st March, from information received,
sent detachment Constabulary under Inspectors Armitage (and) Leggett
make an attempt to obtain golden stool. Quest failed. In the meantime
Kumassis, having obtained knowledge of quest, organised opposition. It
was too late recall detachment (and) cancel instructions, and letter of
advice sent to Armitage failed to reach. Regret to report occurrence of
collision of forees. One constabulary killed, one missing, two dangerons-
ly woundled, nineteen slightly wounded, including Armitage and Leggett.
2 carriers severely wounded, 4 earriers slightly wounded, 7 carriers
missing. Condition of wounded satisfactory, with exception of one
dangerons case. Native Chiefs express loyalty to British Government
and decline to join Kumassis. Have ordered Commissioner and Comman-
dant Northern Territories send 1 Company for purpose of inerease of
garrison here and have ordered 1 Company from Accra. Hope
to effect peaceful settlement and obtain all ringleaders. Active
operations not necessary for the present. Will stay here pending settle-
ment, whieh doing all in my power to arrive at. Hopeful of satisfactory
result. Will report result by telegraph. Telegraph interrupted between
here and Accra. Hodgson. Telegrani ends.


Nr. 12548. GROSSBRITANNIEN. Derselbe an Denselben. Die
Verhandlung mit den Huptlingen ist ohne Er-
gebnis.
(Received 11.5 p.m., April 12, 1900.)
(Telegram.) l Following telegram received from Governor 12th April: -
Telegram begins: Kumassi, lOth April. Regret to inform you tliat negotiations
with rebel chiefs unsuccessful. Kumassis absolutely refuse to lay down
arms. It will be necessary, nnder the eircumstances, in order to prevent
rebellion spreading, and to keep open trade route, and afford protection
of life and property, for me to make display of superior force. Have ordered
Commiissioner and Conimandant of Northern Territories to bring over two
companies Constabulary as soon as possible. Suggest that three companies
come from Jebba or Lagos. Latter preferred, as being more expeditions,
and utmost expedition necessary owing to proximity of rainy season. One
company of the three to remain temporarily Accra to replaee Constabnlary
now on the way to Kumassi. Consider there would be then suffieient
force bring to a conelusion. Fort renders Kumassi quite safe; suffieient
provisions. Hodgson. Telegram ends.






56 Der Aschantikrieg im Jahre 1900.

Nr. 12549. GROSSBRITANNIEN. Der Kolonialminister an
den Gouverneur der Goldkste. Soll nach den
Umstnden handeln.
(Sent 6 p. m., April 13, 1900.)
(Telegram.) jj In answer to your telegram of lOth April, I leave you
diseretion to act according to circumstances. Reinforcements should be
ample, and I have telegraphed to Governor of Lagos to send all avai-
lable troops not exceeding six companies. Communicate with hirn at
once and, if necessary, with Lugard.


Nr. 12550. GROSSBRITANNIEN. Mr. Low an den Kolonial-
minister.
(Received 8.15 p. m., April 15, 1900.)
(Telegram.) || Following telegram received from Governor of Gold
Coast: || Telegram begins: Kumassi, 14th April. Received your tele-
gram on the 11 th April. No change in situation of affairs. Kings of
Bekwai, Juabin, Kmnawn, Agona, Nkwanta, Bompata, loyal. Had grave
doubts as to loyalty of Mampon and Kokofu but they have been induc-
ed to live at Kumassi-and will reinain quiet. All Kumassis fully armed
and refuse to disperse. 1 company constabulary expected to arrive from
Accra to-day. Loyal native chiefs express readiness to afford assistance
if required. Force referred to in my telegram, Kumassi, lOth April, will
be sufficient as far as can see at present without requiring further
assistance. Hodgson. Telegram ends.


Nr. 12551. GROSSBRITANNIEN. Mr. Low an den Kolonial-
minister. Tumulte unter den Aschantis.
(Received 1.23 p.m., April 19, 1900.)
(Telegram.) ]| Following telegram received 18th April from Assistant
Inspector Soden, Officer Commanding in British Gaman, dated 14th April: ||
,Regret to inform you that two men Gold Coast Constabulary killed at
Adunassi, large number of natives murdered there. Have sent to Northern
Territories asking for reinforeements. Concentration of Ashantees in
great numbers at Adumassi. I am now proceeding with all available
forces to join Officer Commanding at Sefwhi. Will try to seize and hold
Berekum, keeping back enemy by threatening attack from Berekum and
Janokrum. Reinforcements urgently required. British Gaman loyal and






Der Aschantikrieg im Jahre 1900. 57

quiet. 1 anm indebted to friendliness of French Government for placing
at disposal commiiunication through French Possessions." || From informa-
tion received from Governor of Gold Coast, 18th April, dated Knmasi,
16th April, insurgent bands every day becoming bolder.


Nr. 12552. GROSSBRITANNIEN. Der Kolonialniinister an
Mr. Low. Verstirkungen sind unterwegs.
(Sent 4.31 p.m., April 19, 1900.)
(Telegram.) 1I April 19. Lugard is sending 450 Frontier Force to
Lagos, of whom 150 will proceed at once to Gold Coast, and rest will
remain at Lagos pending instructions.



Nr. 12553. GROSSBRITANNIEN. Mr. Low an den Kolonial-
minister. In Kumassi sind Verstrkungen ein-
getroffen.
(Received 5.30 p.m., April 24, 1900.)
(Telegram.) j1 Following telegram received from Governor of Gold
Coast, 24th April: jj Telegram begins: Kumasi, 21st April; one Com-
pany of Constabulary, three British officers, of a total strength of 100,
arrived from Accra, 18th April; same date, Ijisus left neighbourhood of
Kumasi and freed eastern side of town. Insurgent bands on the road
to Cape Coast, under Asamoa Kwami also left. Insurgent bands concen-
trating north-easterly direction and north-westerly direction. Nkoranzas
reported to be joining with Kumasi, and roads impassable to Northern
Territories. Have heard Parmeter, Inspector of Constabulary, on the way
to coast invalided home, was attacked at Sekedumassi, a Kumasi town,
but escaped, and is all safe Kintampo. Information received that Euro-
pean has been murdered at Nyawa in Atchimia country, probably belong-
ing to Captain Way's goldfields. Do not know name of European. No
news of Lagos and Jebba forces, which are anxiously expected. Active
operations in neighbourhood of Kumasi have been commenced with good
result. Several native Chiefs apply for permission to submit. I insist
that guns taust be delivered. Several have been received. On arrival of
reinforcements insurgent bands in Atchima country will be attacked in
force. Dispersion of these rebels and capture of ringleaders will end
rebellion. Hodgson. Telegram ends.






58 Der Aschantikrieg im Jahre 1900.

Nr. 12554. GROSSBRITANNIEN. Derselbe an Denselben.
Kumassi ist abgeschnitten.
(Received 6.35 p.m., April 30, 1900.)
(Telegram.) 11 No news from Governor, Gold Coast, since 21 st April.
Serious attack on Branch of the telegraph staff whilst employed repairing
telegraph wires near Esumeja, 25th April, slightly wounded and severely
beaten. Telegraph clerk reports elfective blockade of road to Kumasi
sinee 25th April; impassable even to Bekwai. Special inessenger of Post-
]master-General reports no mail en route for coast from Kumasi, and
that one mail-bag for Kumasi has been destroyed. Lagos Constabulary
left Esunieja for Kumasi 6 o'clock in the morning of 28th April, accom-
panied by Branch. Hope that they will succeed in reopening communi-
cations.



Nr. 12555. GROSSBRITANNIEN. Mr. Low an den Kolonial-
minister. Nachrichten vom Gouverneur ans Ku-
massi ber Angriffe der Aschantis auf die Stadt.
(Received 12.20 a. m., May 5, 1900.)
(Telegram.) 1| Following telegrams received from Governor Gold
Coast: II Telegram begins: Kumasi, April 22. Beg convey cordial thanks
for complying with my reqnirements. In view of reported defection of
Nkoranzas and disquieting reports from Officer Commanding [in] British
Gaman as to state of affairs in neighbourhood of Berekinm, 1 have applied
for second company fri'om Lugard, making twu companies of West
African Frontier Force. These, with Lagos Constabulary and local for-
ces, should be sofficient, as at present advised. Hear that Lagos Con-
stabulary will arrive at Kumasi 25th April. Telegram ends.
Telegram begins: Kumasi, April 27. Since my last telegram situa-
tion of alfairs at Kumasi, regret to inform yon, changed for the worse.
On 23rd April force sent out to elear rebel forces to the eastward. Four
Gold Coast Constabulary killed. Large number of rebel forces killed and
wounded. On 25th April Ashantis surrounded town in great force, pro-
bably [?10000] mien made determined attack on fort. At half-past
ten o'clock in the morning attack on Bantama threatened, and Basel mis-
sionaries withdrawn to place in safety. Rebel force in great numbers that
Hausas obliged to evacnate cantonment and concentrate round fort.
Severe engagement took place 2 o'clock in the afternoon and lasted until
6 o'clock. Native allies rendered every assistance and preventive measures






Der Aseiantikrieg im Jahre 1900. 59

against nearing the fort by rebel force taken with complete success.
Twenty native allies and two Hausas killed, Assistant Inspector Leggett
slightly wounded. Present number occupants of fort 358, inclusive of
18 Europeans, of whom 6 are missionaries. Very anxionsly awaiting
arrival of reinforcements. Lagos Constabulary expected 28thi April, if
able to get through. Kings of ainmpon, Juabin, and Aguna, in the fort,
and have urged Bekwais to send men. It will be necessary under all
the circumstances further reinforcements should h1e sent to Gold Coast.
Telegram begins: Kumasi, April 30. Yesterday serions attack on
fort made by rebels. They advanced niore than unce into the open.
Engagement took place half-past twelve and lasted till half-past three,
wlhen the rebels were routed on all sides with great loss. Their pro-
visions, stores, as well as several guns and warlike stores, got into our
hands. Two constabulary killed and ten wounded; Medical Officer Tweedy
slightly wounded. Native levies rendered every assistance. Great praise
dne to Marshall, Special Service Officer, who took conuinand, Inspector
Middleomist having been taken ill, and Inspector Artnitage, who took
command of native levies of all ranks worked well. Confidence is being
restored and persons are returning to their houses. At six o'clock in
the evening contingent Lagos Constabulary, under Inspector-General
Aplin, arrived after two days' severe fighting. Column attacked at Asagu,
which Constabulary took with loss of one killed, twenty-three wounded;
amongst the latter, Assistant-lnspector Cochrane severely wonnded, and
[nspeetor-General Aplin and Medical Officer AlacffaIlane very slightly.
Following day contingent was attacked at tw'o miles friom Knumasi by
force of 8 000 rebels. Great loss took place in taking stockade placed
across road. Several Ashantis there have arms of precision. After fight-
ing desperately, forees routed Ashantis, who fled. Two constabulary
killed and 133 wounded, including Assistant Inspector Read and native
oflicer Dankufi severely wounded, Assistant Inspector Ralph slightly
wounded. Of remainder, six dangeronsly wounded and 124 slightly
wounded. Am advised that Cochrane and Read displayed conspicuous
gallantry. 1 have been unable to get letters or telegrams sent through.
Intended if possible to open road to Kumasi fromn River (rdah by means
of loyal Kokofns, who have elected new King, and frotm Ordah to Adansi
by means of Bekwais, who are so far thlorougly loyal. Adansis still
loyal. All well excepting Middlrnist on siek list. Telegramn ends.
Have requested Governor of Lagos send at once the 300 West
African Frontier Force now at Lagos.






60 Der Aschantikrieg im Jahre 1900.

Nr. 12556. GROSSBRITANNIEN. Der Kolonialminister an
den General Lugard (Nord-Nigeria). Verstr-
kungen nach der Goldkste.
(Sent 5.5 p.m., May 5, 1900.)
(Telegrani.) || May 5. Referring to my telegrani of 19th April, Go-
vernor of Lagos informs nie 300 inen froni Jebba sailed for Gold Coast
to-day. As the situation of affairs at Coomassie serious, and force on
Gold Coast will consist of 450 West African Frontier Force, 350 Lagos
Constabulary, 50 Sierra Leone Frontier Police, 250 Southern Nigeria Force,
in addition to Gold Coast Constabulary, consider it desirable that Colonel
Willcocks proceed to Gold Coast to take conmiand of activc operations
in Ashanti. Trust that can be spared witliont serions inconvenionce.
Let me know when he will start, so that Governor of Gold Coast may
be infornned.


Nr. 12557. GROSSBRITANNIEN. Der Kolonialminister an
Mr. Low. VerstIrkungen kommen von Lagos.
(Sent 11.45 a.m., May 9, 1900.)
(Telegram.) !| May 9. Colonel Willcocks has been selected to take
command of combined forces, and will proceed to Gold Coast as soon as
possible. You should ascertain from Lugard at what port Willcocks will
embark and should send to meet hirn all available information on posi-
tion of affairs at Coomassie, and as to distribution of troops, &c.
Wilkinson should reinain at Cape Coast pending arrival of Will-
cocks, and should organise system of supply from tlihe base and protection
of lines of communication, snbject to any orders which he may receive
from Governor of Gold Coast. Communicate this to Wilkinson and
Willcocks as well as Governor.


Nr. 12558. GROSSBRITANNIEN. Der Gouverneur der Gold-
kste an den Kolonialminister. Genauerer Be-
richt ber seine Reise nach Kumassi und ber
die Haltung der Eingeborenen.
Kumassi, April 7, 1900. (May 11, 1900.*)
Sir, 11 In view of the telegram which I had to despatch to you on
the 4th instant, you wvill, 1 doubt not, be anxious to receive from me as
soon as possible a report upon the condition of affairs in Ashanti, and
the state of feeling on the part of the several tribes towards the British
*) Die eingeklammerten Daten geben das Datum der Ankunft in London. Red.






Der Aschantikrieg im Jahre 1900. 61

Government at the present time, and I therefore hasten to give you as
full information as I can with respect to themn. |1 2. 1 crossed the Prah
on the 22nd March, and reached Knmassi at 3 p.m. on Sunday, the
25th March. In passing through Adansi and Bekwai, 1 was received at
all the villages along the route with the usual outward demonstrations
of loyalty and goodwill. At Kwisa, Inkansa, the blind and very old
King of Adansi, met me, and after presenting me with an address of
welcome, handed nie a list of grievances. Somie of these I was able to
deal with at once, and none of them were of any political importance,
excepting, perhaps, one which referred to the compulsory supply of
carriers. I was not, I nmust say, favourable impressed with the attitude
and demeanour of the Adansis as represented by the King's Court. ,
3. At Kumassi all the principal Kings and Chiefs, with the exeeption
of the King and Chiefs of Nkoranza, who arrived later, had assenmbled
to meet nme. They, with their followers, were drawn up on either side
of the road leading to the Fort. The spectacle was a very imnposing
one. After I had reached the Fort they all filed past nie, and exchang-
ed salutations. |I 4. A rumour had been circulated in Kumassi, so the
Aeting Resident informed me, that I was coniing to Ashanti for the pur-
pose of announeing that Prempeh's rival Prince Atcheriboanda who
has for some years been under surveillance at Accra, was to be install-
ed as King of Ashanti. The Kumassis are all strong adherents of
Prempeh, and upon the circulation of the rumiour many of the Chiefs
and their people had cleared out of the town, and gone to the neigh-
bouring Kumassi bush villages of Atchima to arm themselves. They
had, however, returned before iny arrival. 1| 5. On Monday I was engag-
ed in dealing with and settling the claim of the King of Western Akinm
to be King paramonnt over the disfrict iof Asanti Akim, and the question
of the ownership of what are known as the Biposu lands; and on Tues-
day I was engaged in listening to the claimns of rival candidates to the
stool of Nsuta. These are matters which 1 will deal with in separate
despatches as soon as I can find time to do so. || 6. The Kings and
Chiefs had been snnimoned to meet me at 4 p. m. on Wednesday. 1
transmit a copy of the shorthand writer's notes of my remarks to them.
In addition to making to them an announcement as regards the payment
of interest upon the snm due to the British Government under the treaty
of Fomena, and the expenses ineurred in connection with the Expedition
of 1895-6, I had dccided as 1 was well aware that the Kumassis and
their immediate adherents, the Ejisus and Ofinsus, were nursing the idea
that Prempeh would sooner or later be restored to rule over them, while






62 Der Aschantikrieg im Jahre 1900.

others thonght the return ofAteheriboanda was only a question of time tb
teil themn definitely and decisively that they were not to expeet either
one or the other, and that the Queen is now the paramount power in
Ashanti. Although 1 felt sure that this announcement would not he a
palatable one to many, it appeared to ine to be necessary to make it,
having regard to the large nmnber of gold mining concessions which are
being obtained and also worked in Ashanti, and so that there nmight be
no minsapprehension in the minds of the Kings and Chiefs as to the
position which the Govornment holds towards thein. I 7. I referred also
to the Guolden Stool, which I now feel certain exists, and which is in
the custody of the Knmassis. It is, 1 consider, much to be regretted
that when the troops occnpied Kumassi in force the Kumassis were not
inade to prodnee tle stool. It forms a rallying point for malcontents
against the Governmient, and 1 am certain that until the Governiment
pussesses this symbol of power, which is regarded by all Ashantis withli
the utmost veneration, it will not bu whoully secure against intrigues and
trouble. It is the possession of the stool which enables the Kmnassis
to niaintain a spirit of defiance, wbieh is only kept in sb1jection by the
presence of an armed force and the armnament of the Fort. |1 8. There
is no donbt whatever, and now that 1 have seen niatters for myself and
come into immdieiate contaet with the Kings and Chiefs, I can speak
with knowledge, that the force now garrisoning Kumnassi is wholly in-
unfficient and dangerously so. It consists of a company and a half of
Hansas, nomninally 225 privates, bnut the companies are not at their full
strength, and soine of the men are on detachment duty in Attabubu
and British Ganian. The result is that not niore than 130 privates are
actually available for garrison work. The Fort imust always be manned,
and this being so, there is no available force of suffieient overawing
strength to send through the country if a demonstratioii in force at any
place shonld be reqnired. In fact, tlie Ashantis are not overawed as
they onugth to be, and niust be. |1 9. The armament of the Fort is sufli-
cient, but there nmust be at least 21/2 companies of Hausas in Ashanti
for some time to come. I am taking steps to place niatters on a proper
footing, and instructions have already been issued in the matter. It will
be nueessary to withdraw from the Northern Territories some of the
force now serving there, but 1 had intended to propose a reduction, and
1 think a rednetion can be made. |1 10. I was informed on the 4th in-
stant by the King of M ampon that the notification as to the payment
of interest was most distasteful and had been received with intense
dissatisfaction. it appears that after the public nieeting on the 28th nltimo






Der Aschantikrieg im Jahre 1900. 63

he and the Kings of Juabin, Knumawu, and others suggested a meeting
among theminselves to disciiss the situation, but the Kulmassis declined to
attend, and stated that, as they now knew that Prempeh would not
be restored to thein, they were not going to discuss the question of
payment, but would at once arm thcnisclves, and set themselvus in
opposition to the British Government. They were, I havu since diseover-
cd, joined by the Ejisus and Ofinsus, and had also persuaded the Koko-
fus to act witl themn by promising King Asibi, who, it appears, is the
nearest blood relative to Prempeh, that hle should be placed on the Golden
Stool. 1 11. 1 comne now to thei occrrence which gave rise to a collision
between a detachment of Hausas on the one hand and the Kunmassis,
Ejisus, and Ofinsus on the other, in the bush villages of Atchima, with
tho serious and very regrettable result reported in my telegrani. In
December last an Ashanti lad canme down to Accra to report to the
Government that he had been sent bly one of the guardians of the
Golden Stool to reveal th stool to thc Governnment, and to give it up
with such treasure as is buried witl it, if the Governinent would ensure
the lives of the guardians and reward themn handsomely. He said that
they had been guarding the stool in tho buish for four years, and were
tired of the wvork. Upon consideration 1 determined to make an elfort
to gut thle stool, and sent my Private Secretary, Captain ArmIitage, by
a circuitous route to the spot. He failed. 1 transmit a copy of his re-
port. |i 12. 1 brought the lad with mnie to Kuniassi, disguised as a Hausa.
It appeared to nie desirable, if the Acting Resident were of the sanme
opinion, that the Atchinna villagus of Bali and Nkwanta should he visit-
cd fromi Kumnassi in force, in order to let the people there see that the
Governuient had its eye upon them, and would not tolerate their 1)-
coming a inenaue to the peace of Ashanti by arming themnselves and
collecting munitions of war in large quantities. I thought that it might
he possible if the villages were visited to give the lad another chance of
revealing the hiding place of the Golden Stool. The Acting Resident
liaving informed me that the visit of an armed detachment of Hausas
to the two villages in question was very necessary, 1 gave him the in-
structions, of which 1 transmit a copy. The detachlnent started at
daylight on the 31 st March. It was not then known that the Knmassis
and their friends, the Ejisns and Ofinsus, had arnied themselves and had
proceeded to the very district into which the detachment was being sent,
the rendezvous of tle Kumassis being the village of Atchiassi, near
Nkwanta. It was known on Sunday, and an endeavour was made to
get a letter of warning d-livered to Captain Arnitage. The messenger






64 Der Aschantikrieg im Jahre 1900.

failed to get through. || 13. The detachment reached Bali without any
knowledge of the position of affairs. They were attacked tihere, and liad
practically to fight their way back to Kumassi. T will let Captain
Armitage and Assistant-Inspector Leggett, who accompanied him, tell their
own story, as they do in the reports of which 1 transmit copies. |] 14. This is
the first occasion since Sir Garnet Wolseley's Expedition that there has
been an engagement between tlie Ashantis and the forces of the Govern-
ment. The casualties among the Hansas which 1 very greatly de-
plore were vcry heavy, hut those among the Knmassis mnist have
been nuchli heavier (reports brought in say so), and the Ashantis have
seen that, although in overwhelming force, they are unable to snccess-
fnlly cope with even a small detachment of Government Hansas. I| 15. The
Hausas fought splendidly, and were well and coolly led, and it was due
to Captain Armitage's pluck and courage and to the coolness under fire
of Assistant-Inspector Leggett and Sergeant-Major Anadu Fulani that the
detachment managed to get back to Knmassi. | 16. Snnday, the 1 st April,
was a day of extreme anxiety to me. The town of Kumassi was desert-
ed. Two of the three members of the Government Native Committee -
Chiefs Nantchi and Afifa had openly joined the rebel Knmassis, with
all their people; indeed, the latter is said to have been one of the prin-
eipal instigators of the movement, and 1 feared that the movement might
spread anmong the Ashanti tribes. Unfortnnately, the Basel MIissionaries,
headed by Mr. Riamseyer, took fright, and in the afternoon poured down
the road with their belongings to seek refuge in the Fort. They were
stopped at the honse I am occupying here with Lady Hodgson, and told
that nntil the Governor thonght it necessary to seek the safety of the
Fort they coild not be admitted. They returned, but their action could
not but have added to the courage of the malcontents, as every matter
occurring here would be dnly reported by spies. On Monday, which
was another very anxious day for me, the King of Nkoranza arrived
fromn his country, and I hcard that the Kings of Mampon, Juabin, and
Kmnawn had not left the neighbourhood. 1| 17. On Tnesday (the letter is
mis-dated the 4th April) I reccived from the Kings of Mampon, Juabin,
and Kumawu, the letter of which 1 enelose a copy, in which they ask
permission to be allowed to get their guns, to render assistance to the
Government, and i returned the reply, copy enclosed. On Wednesday
morning, as soon as they heard that there had been fighting between
the Hausas and Kumassis, they, together with the King of Aguna, came
to the Fort. The King of Mampon is one of the most influential Kings
in Ashanti, and, with perhaps the single exception of Bekwai, there are






Der Aschantikrieg im Jahre 1900. 65

no more powerful Kings in the country than the Kings of M iampon,
Juabin, and Kumawu. This action on their part hoded well for bringing
matters to a satisfactory issue without the use of forcee, which was not
at hand. I1 18. When I heard on Sunday of the Kmnassis having armed
themselves and rendezvoused in the Atehima villages, where i had sent
the detachment under Captain Armiitage, niy first thought was to send
reinforcein'ents to his aid, but they did not exist. There were only
enough Ilausas left to properly garrison the Fort, and, having regard
to the existing state of affairs, Captain Davidson-Houston considered it
imperative not to weaken tlie force in Kumassi, especially as the Kumassis
might take it into their heads to attack the town. 11 19. What should he
done, of course, is to send a punitivo foree against tlhe Kumassis and
their allies, strronnd themi in their bush villages, break up their strength,
and read a lesson to the Ashanti tribes generally. It is very bitter to
nie to be unable to adopt this course, on account of the weakness of
the garrison here; 350 inen would have sufficed, but tlhey are not here.
I liave ordered up a company of Hausas from Accra, and another from
the Northern Territories, Sbt to get Hausas from the Northern Territo-
ries takes at least six weeks, as the headquarters are at Gambaga, and
there is no telegraphie connunication with that station. The comparative
proximity of Kintampo to Knmassi was one of the reasons which led
me to suggest Kintampo as the headquarters of the Northern Territories.
20. I have had no alternative b1t to fall back on diplomacy, and to use
the Kings of Maiampon, Juabin, and Kumawu, as well as the King of
Aguna, wlio has joined them, to bring the matter to an end. After
having arranged for the despatch to you of iny telegram of thdie 4th April,
I interviewed these Kings at the Fort. The King of Mampon spoke for
the otihers. He commenced b)y assuring nie of the loyalty of himself
and the others, and proceeded to mention what I have stated in para-
graph 10 of this despatch, asking mne to annul the announcement as re-
gards the annual payments to be niade by thein, and then stated that
he and the other Kings were prepared to assist the Government against
thie Kumassis. 1 informed thiem in reply that I would tako care that
the representation they had miade withl respect to thle annual paynients
should be b)rought to your notiee, and at the same tinme their loyalty to
the Queen, and that I should not order the collection of the interest
until after 1 liad received your further instructions. Further, that l
desired tlhem to see tliat tle Kumassis, as well as tlhe Chiefs with theim,
abandoned their hostile attitude towards the Government, and returned
to Kumassi to pursue their usual avocations. They all stated that they
Staatsarchiv LXVI. 5






66 Der Aschantikrieg im Jahre 1900.

had only waited for my sanction in order to adopt this course. They
then asked me to promise to spare the lives of the young men and of
the Chiefs. I told them that the young mien had been led away by evil
counsel, and that 1 should not punish t.hem, but thliat the conduct of the
Chiefs must be a matter of investigation, and that any action with re-
gard to them would depend upon the result of it. |1 21. M3cssengers were
provided by the Kuniassi Chief Opoku Mensah the senior and now the
only representative of the Native Conmmittee who liad ben brought
into the Fort when it was found that his colleagues, Nantchi and Afifa,
had joined the rebels, and these, with messengers from the Kings, left
yesterday evening for the Atchinia villages. The Kings say that the
Kumassis and tlieir allies will under their orders disperse, but I consider
it very donbtfuil if the Chiefs will come in. They niust come sooner or
later, voluntarily or comipulsorily. 1 am rather hoping that they imay
not come in volnntarily, as the Governument will then, when it has a
sufficiently strong force at hand, have an excellent reason for dealing
with the Kumassis once for all, and reading themni a lesson. This is essen-
tial in the interests of Ashanti generally. || 22. Nantclii and Afifa will be
deposed from their position as Native Councillors to the Government, and
1 am thinking of giving their places to Chiefs Kwabina Kokofn and Kofi
Sencheri. IBoth these Chiefs have remained irmi in their loyalty to the
Governnent. 1 shall, however, defer action in this matter for a time, as,
if no action is taken, it is just possible that Nantclii and Afifa may come
in, and ean thin be arrested. Later it may be necessary to reconsider
tlie arrangeiment of a Native Committee, bnt 1 think it neeessary to have
one in somne form or other at present. | 23. I hope to find it possible to
settle matters quietly and withont the use of force, as the Kumassis and
their adherents are stated to be less confident of themselves sinte the
engagement with tlie Hausas, and if the Kings 1 have referred to can
be induced to reinain loyal and helpful. [| 24. The discontent of the Ku-
massis, and of their adherents, the Ejisus and Ofinsus, is not a sudden
creation. lt has, I find, exis.ted from the first, and has only been kept
in check by the Fort and garrison, and by their firm belief in the return
of Prempeh at no distant date. I am strengthened in my view by re-
niarks made to me by Captain Davidson-HIouston, who teills nie that
rmnours of threatened risings were heard of in April, 1896, when Captain
Larymore, C.IM.G., reported that the Achimas were disaffected; that
again in June-July, 1897, similar reports were bruited; that in December,
1898, the Kings of Bekwai and Mampong informed Captain Stewart t4hat
the Kumassis talked of taking np arms against us; and, further, that in






Der Aschaiitikrieg im Jahre 1900. 67

November last (1899) the runiours sueliied so althentic that he callec
all the Kiinassi and Achinia Chiefs to Ku(mntsi, and made thin all swear
oatlhs of loyalty to tlhe Iritish Governmuent tliughli the Native Cotiniit-
tee. This latter allair was not, I regret, reportid to me. || 25. It is very
inifortinate, :and I regret iL uxtriemely, tiht Imy lirst visit to Ashanti
should have been iarked ly tle events whlich 1 have now reported to
you. Jtut it was as wull that if they were to (ccur I shounl be here
tu dcal witli thuin, ;nd tliuy have shown, at any rate, wvith some clear-
ness whieh of thel tribes iiay be trustcd and whiich may not, ;aid how
ititters stand with respect to them. [] 26. 1 hope it iniy le hfound possiblu
to induce t e lKuinassis to hly down their arms. In tlhat casa 1 sliall
be able to leave Klumassi next wck, in ordhr to visit tle Oluassi Mines,
aiind at tle same time to quiet the King of Beikwai, whose people have
been disturbed by the proceedings of tle Kiiinassis. Should tle negotia-
tions fail, 1 shall have to apply for reinlforceiments, ;s without thim 1
shall 1Je unable to g'et matters into order, and 1 shall reinain here until
1 liave dono so, unless yon order to the contrary. |[ 27. 1 shall addruss
you as soon as possible upun the subject of' the introduction of a better
system of aidministration of Ashanti, and 1 will then refer to the
question of tlie annual paynients by tle Kings and Chiefs on aecounit of
interest. |1 28. In all this hazardons and anxions time I haave lben very
ably assisted by the Acting Resident, CJaptain )Davidson-llouston. lis
knowledge of the ways of the Ashaiuti Kings has becn of the greatest
service to nie, and his coolness and discretion iave assisted iiie very
iimaterilly. || 29. (TelegrIapihic couiiinnication with Kumssi lias been
interrupted for some days, the wires laving probably been eut by the
rebel Kumassis. As soon as th contidence of the native lineinen has
been restored, 1 will get the line into working order.

I lave, &K.,
F. M. 11 odgson, Governor.




: Anlage.
Notes tikeit ae a Public Plavw'er of Xutive Kings mnld lChiefs held in front
of the Fort at KwIuassi, at I p.m., on WVcdnesday, .Sth March, 1900.
The Kings and ClJiefs mhving been |presnted by the liesidInt to the
Governor, wlio spoke to each separately, the Govetrnr I, ddressd thle
uieetiig as follows: || It is a very great pluasure to ime, and 1 also
5*






68 Der Aschantikrieg im Jahre 1900.

hope it is a pleasnre to you, that we should meet here together to-day,
and become more acquainted with one another. It has long been my
wish that I should come to Kumassi, and see the Kings and Chiefs of
Ashanti, for 1 knew many of you in the old days, before you becanme
the sunbjeets of our great Queen, and I have known you for four years
since youn have been her subjeets. Let mie thank youn for the welcome
which yon gave nie when I entered this town last Sunday. I am not
going to take the whole of that welcome as personal to iyself, because
1 think it was a public denionstration on your part of yonr loyalty to
the great Queen the Queen of England. It .is possible that the
loyalty of some of you is obscnred by thle thought that some day your
old King King Prempeh may return and reign over you. If any
of yon hold that thought, let ne tell hirn that it is a vain thought.
Let nie tell you once and for all that Preinpeh will never again rnle
over this country of Ashanti. lt may be also that the loyalty of some
of yon is obseured by the thonght that perhaps the rival of King
Prenipeh, namely, Achereboanda, now at Accra, may some day come here
again. If any of you think that this is likely, 1 tell him to-day definite-
ly and once for all, that Achereboanda is never likely to leave Accra
to come here with the consent of the Government. Yon minst take it
for granted, and you nmust believe e when 1 tell you that neither
Prenipeh nor Achereboanda will ever return to rule over this conntry
of Ashanti. Knowing that, we must look at facts in the face. What
are those facts? When the Government assmned the eontrol of this
great conntry of Ashanti it took over also the powers which were
previously possessed by King Prempeh. The paramonnt authority of
Ashanti is now the great Queen of England, whose representative 1 am
at this moment. In order that the powers of tlie King paramount may
be exereised properly, inasmuch as the seat of the Government is far
away at the Coast, it is neeessary to place here a white officer, who
bears the title of ,Resident". Under the Governor the Resident at
Kumassi exereises the powers of King paramonnt. Yon know perfeetly
well what those powers are, but for a moment 1 should like to refer to
thein. You know perfeetly well that with the cntry of the British
Govermnent into Ashanti the power of making human sacrifices eeased;
that your lives are now safe. Yon have only to advise the white officer
who is resident in Kumassi when there is any danger, and you have
the strong arm of the British Governnient to defend yon. There is one
other matter that came to an end at the same time, that was the buying
and selling of human beings as if they were cattle or bales of goods.






Der Aschantikrieg im Jahre 1900. 69

In all countries of the Queen everybody is free. Now what are the
powers which were formerly exercised by the King paramount which the
Government now exereises. You will recollect that whenever there was
any fighting to be done the King paramount had the power of calling
out the young men to come and assist hirn. The Queen is not likely
to solicit yonr assistance in that way. But the Queen reserves to her-
self thc right of calling out the 1n n of the tribes for peacefil plirposes,
for example, to serve as carriers, to make roads, and to build houses.
Then, again, the King paramonnt lihad the power when there was any
great enterprise on hand to eall his Couneil together, and say that he
wanted to carry out such and such an enterprise, and the cost of it had
to be provided for in such proportions as are well known to yon all by
the heads of the tribes. Now tle British Governlient has been in charge
here for four years, and it has not as yet disturbed yon with any request
for money. Why is that? If your country had been conquered by a
stronger tribe than all of you put together, youn know what wonld have
happened to you you wonld have been required to pay a heavy
tribute, such as your wealth would enable yon to pay. Why, then, has
the great Queen not distnrbed you, and asked you for money? Because
she knew that iany of tle tribes hiad been drivcn ont of their country,
and wished all of you to have time to retnrn to yonr conntry to rebuild
your villages, and to get aeeustomed to the kind of life which you are
ablc to lead under Britisli rule. Yon know by this time what the state
of things is under the Britisli Government. You have had four
years of it, and 1 venture to say that if you were to speak out what
is in your hearts you would say that yon do not want to return to the
old dissensions aniong yourselves, and that, in faet, youn do not want to
return to the old state of things. [i Now youn will recolleet that after the
war which was conducted on our side by Sir Garnet Wolseley there was
a treaty signed at Fomena. In that treaty there was a clause in which
yon Ashanti Chiefs undertook to pay to the British Governiment a sum1
of 50000 ounces of gold 25000 pereguins. To that sinn has to be
added the expenses ineiiurred in connection with the last expedition, which
amounted also to npwards of 25000 pereguins. I dare say you are
wondering amongst yourselves what I am going to say next. Somne of
you are saying amongst yourselves, Is the Government going to ask us
to pay thle money down at one time? To this I say, No, but what 1
am going to say to you is this, that there inust be paid annually to tlie
Resident a sum which will be called interest on this expenditure by the
Britishi Government. You uinst understand this also, that in order to






70 Der Aschantikrieg im Jabre 1900.

provide you witli the protection which tlie British Govermnent can give
you, nainely, secrity to your lives and peace among yonrselves, there is
a large annual expenditnre of inoney by the British Government. The
snm to be paid as interest is 2000 pereguins. I| Spread aniongst you all
this suminn is very small. 1 have a list here, which 1 will read ont to
yon, in order to show each of yon exactly what your obligations will be
henceforward to the Governmeint in the matter of interest.
(Hiernach soll Kumassi dem Residenten jhrlich 125 Pereguins be-
zahlen, 1Mampon 150, Adansi 150, Jnabin 75, N'Suta 110, Bekwai 150,
Kokofl 110, Ofinsu 35, Ejisu 35, N'Korraa 150, Kiumawn 35, Aguna 110,
Tekiman 75, Wanki 35, Abodom 35, I3echem 75, N'Kwanta 75, Mansu
N'Kwanta 150, Ahafu 35, Warn 75, Bonpata 75, Agogo 20, Obogu 35,
TBritish Gaman 100.)
This may, perhaps, be an unexpected announcement to you. But
yon will get to learn that in all yonr dealings with me I keep nothing
in the lackground. 1 speak to you face to face, and let you know in
full what your oldigations are. (| There is one matter which 1 should like
to talk to you about. 1 want first to ask a question of the King of
Bekwai. |1 (The King comes forward.) || King, 1 want to ask yon this
question. You were put on the stool not very long ago. What would
yon liave done to a man sitting on yonr right hand who kept hack part
of the stool ei uipment when you were enstooled? |1 A. 1 have no power
myself; miy power is the Government. |] Q. Then you wonld have reported
the matter to me to dcal with? 11 A. Yes. I| Q. And yon would have ex-
peeted nme eitler to get yon the equipment or to punish tle man? ||
A. Yes. || Now, Kings and Chiefs, you have heard what the King of Bekwai
las said npon the point 1 raised. Wliat must 1 do to the man, wihoever
he is, who has failed to give to the Queen, who is the paramonnt power
in this counntry, the stool to which she is entitled? Where is tlie
Golden Stool ? Why ami 1 not sitting on tlie Golden Stool at this
moment ? 1 am the representative of the paranmonnt power; why liave
you relegated nie to this chair? Why did yon not take tle opportunity
of muy coming to Knnassi to bring the Golden Stool, and give it to nie
to sit npon? However, you may be quite sire that, altlihough the
Government has not as yet received tlie Golden Stool at your lands, it
will rnle over yon witl the same impartiality, and with the same firmneess
as if you had produced it.
Now, what 1 want yon to do and I speak in the name of the
Qneen is this, that you will on your part rule ovrer younr respeetive
districts with firnness and impartiality. || It is a very great pleasure to






Der Aschantikrieg im Jahre 1900. 71

me to see the old King of Adansi sitting quite close to his old enemy,
the King of Bekwai, to sece the Ejisus and the Kokofus together. I
think you have begnn well, and what 1 want you to do is to forget
altogether those tribal enmities which you have had in the past, to wipe
the slate clean, and to begin afresh. Your conntry has a great future.
lt is fuill of wealth. You have kola in profusion, and you have gold in
great quantity, and you are all of you aware that the white man is
coming to show yonu how that gold can be got at to tle best advantage,
not only to the white man himself, but to yon Kings and Chiefs. Kings
and Chiefs, 1 want you to look to nie as your friend. I have been in
this country for a long time; 1 have had the advantage of mixing with
the natives of the country, and I know a good deal of yonr native
uestoims. That will help ie a great deal, and although at times I may
have to do certain things that may not be altogether palatable to yon,
as perhaps the announnement whieh I have niade to you to-day with
regard to the payment of money may not be, yet I shall try to do all
I can to be your friend, and to let yon see that yon have some one to
turn to if you have any difienulties. Devote yonrselves to peaceful pur-
suits, and remember this, that never again will you have Prempeh as
your head chief, nor may you expect to see Achereboanda here this
slonuld be clearly understood onee and for all. I am perfeetly well
aware that there liave been commuinications with Prempeh at Sierra
Leone, and I am perfeetly well aware that he has reeeived money from
this conntry, but that does not signify at all. We are quite prepared
to let that pass, but the time may come, if those comnmunications in-
erease, for us to send Prempeh to a more distant land, where no com-
imunications can reaclh limni, but 1 liave a sort of fellow-feeling for
Preimpel. 1 should like hirn to renmain in West Africa so long as he
respeetse his position. 111 I think 1 have said everything that 1 have to say,
both on behalf of tlhe Queen and on behalf of myself. l repeat again,
that it las been a great pleasure to me to meet all the Kings and
Chiefs of Ashanti, to see their faces, and to be able to recognise them
when I meet them again. 11 There are two things which 1 must not,
however, forget to nmention to you. One is that 1 liave presents for you,
and the other is that in conuection with the collection of the interest
every Chief, in order to defray expenses, will get one peregnin out of
every ten that he collects. 11 The Governor then distribnted the following
presents: (folgen die Namnen der Stmmue und die Sunmmen).






72 Der Aschantikrieg im Jahre 1900.

Nr. 12559. GROSSBRITANNIEN. Der Gouverneur der Gold-
kste an den Kolonialminister. Weitere Nach-
richten iiber die Verhandlung init den Hiipt-
lingen.
Kumassi, April 11, 1900. (May 11, 1900.)
Sir, I1 In continuation of my despatch of the 7 th April, with regard
to the situation in Ashanti, it was with the greatest regret that I had
to inform you yesterday by telegraph of the failure of the negotiations
on tbe part of the Kings of Mamnpon, Jnabin, Kumawn, and Agnna, with
the rebel Chiefs of Kumassi. They have had a series of meetings to-
gether, but thle Kumassis have proved obdurate. The Kings acquainted
the Acting Resident with their failire in the letter of which T transmit
a copy. || 2. Upon receipt of this letter 1 directed the Acting Resident to
request the Kings to mneet nie at thie fort. They came in during the
afternoon, and 1 saw them yesterday at 4.30 p.m. They were accom-
panied by the King of Kokofu, who had also come in to say that the
rmuours abont his lack of loyalty were false. The Kings repeated what
they had said in their letter, and after thanking themi for their efforts
I told them that the matter would now be dealt with by the Govern-
ment, and that 1 required them to remain with ine in Knmassi, so as to
let their ow'n people and the Kmnuassis see that they had ranged them-
selves on the side of the Governnent, and were loyal. 1 did this also
in order to prevent their arming their tribes, which they would assuredly
do if they returned. I stated that if iny order were disobeyed I shonld
regard the King disobeying it as disloyal, and he would be dealt with
accordingly when the timne came. The King of Mampon, who had inform-
ed ine that he bad refised an offer niade to hirn by the Kmnassis that
he shonild be the conunander of their forces, was the only King who
cavilled at the order, but I declined to relax it in his favour. 11 3. I trans-
mit copies of telegrams which 1 addressed to the Commissioner and
Commandant of the Northern Territories and to the Colonial Secretary
ininediately npon the conelnsion of the mieeting and simniultanously with
the despateh of my telegrami to yon. || 4. I greatly deplore that at a tinme
when it is so necessary to have no troubles in any part of Her Majesty's
dominions this serions tronble slonld have arisen here. But I am con-
vinced now that this uprising by thie Kumassis has been a settled matter
for somine time, to be undertaken at the first favourable opportunity,
an opportunity which my arrival here and the announcenients I made
when I addressed the Ashanti Kings on the 28th March nnfortunately
afforded them. I] 5. The reinforeement from Lagos, which I have suggested






Der Aschantikrieg im Jahre 1900. 73

should be sent, with the two companies ordered from the Northern Ter-
ritories, will, I am confident, suffice to put a stop to the rebellion of the
Kuniassis. So far it has, 1 am glad to be able to report, not spread, and
I understand that the Qneen of Ejisu, whose people are with the Kumassis,
is anxious to separate froni the rebels. ]| G6. Foodstiffs are coming into
the Kumassi market every niorning, and that is a sure sign that tlhe
people are not united in their opposition to established rule. || 7. With the
arrival of the reinforcenents from Lagos and the Northern Territories
aetive operations against the Kunnassis will be taken. The rains niay
interfere to soine extent to prevent those operations being contiinIous,
but they will be sufficiently so to admit of tlie Kumassis being so harass-
ed and tronbled in their surrounding villages as to break up any com-
bination against tle Governmient, and to read all the Ashantis a lesson.
8. I consider it to be my duty to remain liere until all troubles are at an
end, and tlie ringleaders given np. My presence will be required to give
effect to a proper submission by the recaleitrant elhiefs, and to place
matters on a proper footing after the troubles are at an end, and al-
thongh ineonvenience niay be caused by my absence in connection with
other matters, it is, I consider, essential in the interests of trade and of
the gold mining concessions that what has to be done liere should be
of a permanent and lasting charaeter. If tlie reinforcements arrive quick-
ly, I should not be detained here later than the end of June. 11 9. 1
shall entrust the condnct of tlie operations against tlie Kumassis to Ma-
jor Morris, D.S.O., and slall give hirn an entirely free land in the matter
of details.
P. I3. Hodgson, Governor.


Anlage.
A'sokori 1Manpon, April 11, 1900.
To Yonr Worship,
Sir, 1I Wo have the honour most respeetfilly to subinit through to
Your Worship for IHis Excellency the Governor's infornmation || That
we lihve sent several mcssengers to Kiniassi, Dwcso, and Aehumna people
to stop their foolishness or evil doing. They said tlhey will not stop.
But whatever it may be, tlhcy will fight witli thle British Government.
Therefore, the King of Manpon inust come and be their head. Hut as
for ns we are not in their favour, and wo cannot join tlein. We are
in the favonr of the British Goverumient. Therefore we beg to ask per-
mission from His Excellency, and go back to our countries. And if they






74 Der Aschantikrieg im Jahre 1900

mean indeed to figlit, then, we too will figlt themn at their back. || Your
Worship may know rcally tlihat if not the British Government the Ku-
mnassi people will not allow any one of us to stay our countries. There-
fore we cannot join thein in anyhow. We beg to let Your Worship
know that tle Knmassi people las sent for all their troops to surround
us, and they said thcy will attack ns, and force ns to join thenm. Bit
we cannot do so. For this purpose we ask leave froin His Excellency.
Bnt we swear before o0r grandfather, who, under graves, that we can
never join them in any way. \Ve beg to let Your Worship know that
the Governor may send some troop)s to pass Obogo road to comne help ns.
We lave, &c.,
Yaw Sapon His X Mark, King of Jnabin.
Qnarsi Sechere Ilis X Mark, King of Manpon.
Qnarminei Adomakn Ilis X Mark, King of Kmniawoo.
Yaw Afrimi Ilis X Mark, Chief of Nsnta.
Quarjoe Daqunal His X Mark, Chief of Bomnpata.
Writer Prince Moses Q. Adjaye. To the Acting Resident, Kumassi.


Nr. 12560. GROSSBRITANNIEN. Der Gouverneur der Gold-
kste an den Kolonialminister, Derselbe Gegen-
stand.
The Fort, Kumassi, April 10, 1900. (May 24, 1900.)
Sir, I1I bave tlie hononr to acquaint yon with tle events which
have occurred since 1 wrote to you on the lltl instant. ] 2. Late on
thie 12th instint, the King of Aguna came to ime with linguists from
the Kings of Mampon, Jnabin, and Kumnnawu, to say that they were
afraid to obey iny order that tley were to remain in Kmniassi, as they
had heard that the Kuinassis intended to niolest their people. I stated
that the Kniuassis did not dare to do anything of the sort, and I then
said to the linguists, as it appeared to nme that the time liad come to
speak very plainly, that if the Kings went back to their conntries with-
out my permission tbey wvould go as the declared enemiies of the Queen,
and would be so dealt with, but that if they renmained their loyalty
would not be forgotten. I spoke very firmly and decisively, and tle next
niorning the Kings came themselves to say that they had received nmy
message, and that they had definitely deeided to remain with ine. Since
then there has been no wavering on their part, and I think that the
attempt to set aside tle order given to thein on the 6th April, as re-
ported in paragraph 2 of my despatch, was entirely due to the vacillation






Der Aschantikrieg im Jahre 1900. 75

of the King of Manipon, who is very weak and, 1 think, also unreliable.
3. 1 have assigned the premises of Opoku Mensa, the senior member of
the Native Commnittee, who is now detaited in the Fort, to the King of
.lualin, and those of the rebel Chief Nantchi to the King of Kutuawn,
these Kings having told nie that they had no honses to live in. || 4. On.
the l3th April, I heard that a section of thie rebel Chiefs, headed by
Osei Kanyassi, the Chief of the Owiku, or loyal, tribe a man who
holds a high position in Kuniassi wanted t sever themnselves from
the rebels and come in, and yesterday his nepliew, Kofi Senchere, one
of the two Kumassi Chiiefs who have reniained loyal, eanme to me to ne-
gotiate. He asked me to pardon bis unele and let hirn return to Kumassi.
My reply was that if Osei Kanyassi would send his linguist to mie
would acquaint hirn with my terms. It was my intention to find out
as far as possible what followers Osei Kanyassi had, what Chiefs were
with hini, and whether, if he made public submission and brought in a
certain nuniber of arms, it would be worth whbile to grant a pardon in
hiis case. I| 5. Slortly after this interview with Kofl Seneheore, I saw Yow
Awua, whom 1 had sent for (Yow Awua was a politieal prisoner in El-
miina Castle for some ten years, nnd was released by nie in, [ think, 1893.
IIe has b)een living in some state in Kuinassi since the ocenpation in
1896, and regards himself as my particular friend), and in the course of
conversation he told me that he liad seen Osei Kanyassi in the town
that morning (15th April), and liad spoken to hirn; further, that he under-
stood he was coming back again in the evening. I tlierenpon arrang-
ed that if lie did come, Yow Awna shonld acquaint me. Shortly before
6 p.mn., Y)ow Awua eame liniself to report that Osei Kanyassi had re-
turned and had gone to his house. He was at onee quietly arrested by
Captains Davidson-Hounston and Arinitage, marched up under a Hausa
guard, and lodged in the Fort. This is tlie first of the rebel Chiefs ta-
ken. 1 think the news was soon known among the rebels around Ku-
massi, becanse, last night, there was more drum-beating and shouting
than for many niglits previously, but no semblance of an attack was
made. 1 have had all the jnngle ent down right up to tlhe swamnps on
both sides of the town, beyond whieh the rebels are grouped, and they
are afraid to emerge into the open now that they know, froin experience
gained by the attack on Captain Armitage and liis detachment, that, as
has been said to me, ,,the white man has bullets whieh kill three men
at one slot". I6 G. On the 14tli April, the Kings of Mampon, Juabin, and
Kumawu asked specially to be allowed to go to Dentasu, a place just
outside Kumassi, and where fromn time imniemorial meetings have been






76 Der Aschantikrieg im Jahre 1900.

held, to hear what the rebel Chiefs had to say, the latter having asked
them to come. 1 consented. On Sunday evening, the 15th instant, they
reported that tbey had just returned from a meeting at which most of
the rebel Chiefs were present. The King of lnampon, acting as spokes-
man, said that the rebel Chiefs and their people were divided into two
parties one headed by Osei Kanyassi, was desirons of laying down
their arms and returning to their allegiance if they could be pardoned.
The otlier and larger party had determined to figlit unless the Governor
complied with the following conditions, which they had been reqnested
to state: 1 l. Prempeh to be given back, and to regnulate and collect
any annnal payment to be made; |l 2. Permission to bny and seil slaves
as in the old timne; |1 3. To be freed from demands for carricrs; |
4. To be freed froiii the obligation of bnilding houses and supplying thatch;
5. All hnxters and strangers to be sent away. Il 7. I told the King of
Mampon that 1 was surprised that he had dared to bring such a message
to the Governor, or that ie had allowed the rebel Chiefs to soil bis
hands with it; that he should ihave told themni that if they wanted such
dirty work done they shonld do it themselves; that he had, in fact, been
treated by the relbel Chiefs as if lie were a person of little or no con-
sequence instead of being one of the principal Kings of Ashanti. l| 8. 1
said to the three Kings that if any of tle rebel Chiefs wanted to come
in they wonld have to treat with nie and agree to termns which 1 wonld
name. Thlat, as regards the termns proposed, they were, on the face of
them, absurd. P'rempleh, I had stated at the meeting held on the 28tli March,
would never coime back to rule over Ashanti, and that statement was a
correct one and would not be changed. That, as regards the buying and
selling of slaves, black nmen inight regard themselves as no better than
cattle, to be bonght and sold as opportunity ollered or as circuinstances
dictated, Ibt that the white man did not and wonld not so regard them;
they had been told when Knmassi was occiipied, in Jannary, 1896, that
slavery had ceased, and that annonncement wonld never be cancelled or
altered. They would not be freed from the obligation of snpplying
carriers or finding labonr and material for honse-building, but that, in
tlie matter of carriers, 1 had found since 1 had been in Knmassi that
there was some hardship caused, and that 1 intended to find a remedy.
That, as regards hnxters and strangers, Ashanti was a portion of the
British Enimpire, in which all persons are free to live and trade where
they please, and that no exception would be made in the case of Kn-
inassi. 1 then told the Chiefs that I had taken notice of the terms
proposed by the rebels only to make the views of the Government clear






Der Aschantikrieg im Jahre 1000. 77

to them personally, as they were loyal and desirous of assisting; that I
now forbade them to have any more meetings or intercourse with the
rebel Chiefs; and that should the latter send messages to thein, they
were to be sent away and referred to the Governor. I have to-day
heard that messengers arrived this morning, and were sent away. j1 9. All
the three Kings thanked nie for what 1 had said, and told nie that they
fully understood and would earefnlly carry out my instrnctions. i| 10. Be-
fore the ineeting closed, 1 was able to informi the Kings that Osei Kan-
yassi, having come into Knmassi without mny permission, had been seized,
and was, as I spoke, within the Fort. I stated that he was only the
first of a series of rebel Chiefs who would be taken by the Government,
and by force, if they did not submit or were not given up voluntarily.1|
11. lt is, I think, elear from the terms sent to nme by the Kunmassis that
the rebellion has been brewing for some tinie, and 1 think that this is
made miore elear from the letter addressed by the King of Juabin to the
Acting Resident on the 27th March, of whieh I enclose a copy. 1 inter-
viewed Yow Sapon, King of Junain, with regard to the ieaning of bis
letter, and 1 attach a copy of a minute which 1 wrote at the time. |
12. 1 regret to say that I hear tlhat the Nkoranzas have joined the re-
bels, as well as the Tekimans and Bechem Ahafus. If this information
is correet, the rebels inelnde the Kumassis, Ofinsus, Ejisus, iNkoranzas,
Tekimans, and Bechem Ahafus. The Becheins aru stated to have taken
part in the attack on Captain Armitage's detachnient. 1 ean hardly
eredit the statement that the Nkoranzas have taken np arms against the
Government, but Captain Davidson-IIonston tells me that sinee the ac-
cession of the new King their demeanonr has on niore than one occasion
not been satisfactory. |1 13. The Kokofn tribe seems to be divided in its
allegiance. The yonng King Asibi leans towards tlie rebels, the more
so now that he was compelled by Iis princeipal Chiefs to abandon the
offer niade to him by the Kuniassis that lie should be placed on the
Golden Stool. They have secretly decided to depose hirn when the
troubles lier arc over, and 1 think he has heard this. 1 was advised
to-day that hl n meditated fliglit to the rebels at Karsi, having been in
connmmunication with the Knuiassi Chief, Asanioa Kwami, who is com-
manding there. His moveinents are being watcheod, and 1 hope to he
able to restrain himu without actually arresting him a step which
would frighten tlhe loyal Kings who are here with nie, and would do
more harm than good. I 14. Nr. Daw and Mr. Leslie Gordon came to
Knmassi ycsterday to sec nie. They report all quiet at Obnassi, although
the Bekwais are under arms for the purpose of repelling any attack by






78 Der Aschantikrieg im Jabre 1900.

their old eneinies, the Adansis. At present the Kumassis do not molest
persons passing to and froim Bekwai, possibly because they fear the re-
sentment of the Bekwais, who they know are not with themi. There
were many arined inen upon tlhe road and the villages were, Mr. Daw
tells ine, deserted. There are many niatters that 1 wanted to discuss
with Mr. Daw, and I am glad that he has beeii able to respond to my
invitation to comne liere, ws 1 eould not go to the imines. 15. I learn
fronl more than one source that Captaini Parieter, who was on his way
to the coast invalidd fromn the Northern Territories, was attacked at
Sekidunasi a Kinmassi village on the Kintamupo-Kminassi road and
hiad to seek refuge in the bush. Ile is stated to lave got safely back
to Nkoranza, anl thence to Kintanipo, Captain Benson liaving come with
Hansas to Nkoranza to mieet hirn. I have heard n0 details, and cannot
say if thle hailmuock-men and carriers were killed. 16. The hev. F. Raim-
seyer tells nme that he has heard that the Basel Mission Catechist, na1m-
ed Dansu, at Sekidmuinsi, has been seized and, with his wife, put in
log at a neighbouring village. || 17. 1 have. written to Major Morris,
warning himn about the attitude of the Nkoranzas, and requesting hin
to read themu a lessoun if his force is strong enongh to do it (1 have
asked lhin to conme here with not less than 300 minen), and to bnrn Seki-
dmuiasi, and, if possible, release tle Catechist at tlie sanie tinie. ]] 18. There
are many rumulors of isolated amrders and seizures, many ofi which are,
I fear, true, and 1 shall be very glad when 1 get a large enongl force
lere to be ale to assume thie offensive. 19. 19. I expected tlie detachment
from Accra, munder Captain Middlemist, on VWednesday, the 18th instant,
bhut am told that he is detained at Prahsu in consequence of his
carriers having deserted. I have sent himn a letter informing hiin that
it is imiperative that he should conie here at the earliest possible date
(the Kunmassis are begliining to say that troops are not coming), and he
will, 1 hope, find it possible to leave his loads and push on. The insur-
gents, the King of Manmpon teils me, intend to attack the detachment by
means of ambnshes at Karsi, a village on the Cape Coast rouad, about
four lmiles from here. 1 have warned Captain Middlemnist. 3[y letters
are taken by Bekwais, somne tbirty of whom the loyal King of that tribe
has sent to ine. || 20. Your telegramn of the 14th April reached me
yestcrday. I transmit a copy of a telegram which tle Colonial Secretary
informs nie he sent to the Governor of Lagos upon its arrival at Accra,
a copy of the reply, and a copy of a telegram which 1 sent yesterday
to tle Colonial Secretary. || 21. The [orce here, npon the arrival of all
the troops ordered up, will be as follows: -






Der Aschantikrieg im Jahre 1900. 79

Garrison at Kumassi (including Hausas broughmt up by
the Governor) . . . . . . 150
Detachment under Captain Middlemist 100
> froni Lagos under Captain Aplin 200
front Jebba . . . . 150
,, fronm Northern Territories . 300
900
1 have also accepted the offer of the services of 50 licked men from
the Gold Coast Volniteer Corps. || 22. 1 consider this force will he
sufficient for the purposes in hand. There will also be the following
gnns: -
In Garrison. 3 Maxims, 1 N,,rdenfelt, 4 7-pounders.
With Accra Detachment. 1 Maxim.
With Lagos Detaclhment. 2 Maxims, 2 7-pounders.
With Jebba Detachment. 1 Maxim.
With Northern T'rritories Detacliment. 2 Maximns.
Total. 9 Maxims, 1 Nordenfelt, 6 7-pounders.
Of these, 3 Maxims, 1 Nordenfelt, and 4 7-pounders will remain as
the arinament of the Fort.
T have, &c.,
F. M. Hodgson, Governor.
P.S. I transmit copies of two telegrams which 1 have just receiv-
ed from the Colonial Secretary, and of a telcgram which I amn sending
to hinm.
F. M. 1Ho(dgson.


Nr. 12561. GROSSBRITANNIEN. Oberst Willcoeks an den
Kolonialminister. Lage auf dem Kriegsschau-
platze.
(Rccived 11.45 a.m., May 27, 1900.)
(Telegram.) || May 26. Cape Coast Castle. Arrived to-day. Tele-
gram arrived from Wilkinson, Prahsu; Lieutenaut Slater, 3rd Lancashire,
wounded, Moinsi Hills, which are surrounded by the enemy, Wilkinson
marching (to) relief. 21st May, Hall was to the north of Moinsi Hills
witli express intention of advancing to Kumnassi. Military situation
complicated; all the troops scattercd, lines of commnunication, in absence
of orders, but I will concentrate as soon as possible. Colonel Carter
and Niger Coast protectorate Force will be moved to-day, and 1 shall
follow them with 300 West African Frontier Force expected to arrive
very soon.






80 Der Aschantikrieg im Jahre 1900.

Nr. 12562. GROSSBRITANNIEN, Derselbe an Denselben.
Ernste militrische Lage. Truppenbewegungen.
(Reccived 11.35 p.m., June 10, 1900.)
(Telwgram.) li Prahsu, June 9. Just received message from Colonel
Carter, dated from Kwisa, Sth June, reporting advanced from Kwisa 6th
June, effected junetion with Captain Hall (at) Bekwai, found rebel forces
strongly fortified Dompoassi, fight continued for a long time, dislodged
enemy, but on account of losses sustained, namely, seven European officers
wounded, one dangerously, and also ninety other casualties, was quite
unable to advance; returned to Kwisa. Position of affairs as follows.
No news froin Coomassie. Hall at Esumeja and Bekwai, which is friendly.
Kokofu and Adansi in state of rebellion; Dengiassi most probably joining
with rebel forces. jj In my opinion military situation bas become very
serious and steady increase rebel forces. Strongly recommend 400 West
African Regiment and 400 some other Colonial Corps or Indian troops,
and also four 7-pounder R.M.L. guns of 150 lbs. should be sent at once,
also 5000 earriers from Sierra Leone, 3000 Gold Coast, and 2000 from
Lagos and Nigeria. Thirty special service officers urgently required re-
place casualties, transport purposes, and several cases of sickness white
men. Ample supplies medical stores and some more medical officers
will be necessary, also European rations and rice and reserve ammunition.
lt is evident that extensive character of rebellion greatly in excess of
what was to be understood from previous correspondence. After all lines
of communication are open, road to Northern Territories must be opened.
Owing to want of carriers and delay caused by this, rebellion has as-
sumed present state. As soon as carriers arrive from Cape Coast, 31elliss,
Beddoes, all available forces shall be advanced to Kwisa en route for
Coomassie.


Nr. 12563. GROSSBRITANNIEN. Der Kolonialminister an
den Oberst Willcocks. Verstrkungen sind unter-
wegs.
(Sent 1.45. p.m., June 15, 1900.)
(Telegram.) |I 15th June. As you have been informed in my telegrams
of 29th May and 12th June, 300 West African Frontier Force, 200 Southern
Nigeria Force, and four companies of West African Regiment have
been ordered to Gold Coast and should arrive very soon. These are all
the troops available immediately, hut 300 Central Africa Regiment with
50 Sikhs are being sent from East Africa, and should reach Cape Coast






Der Aschantikrieg im Jahre 1900. 81

about the beginning of August. By that date or a little later probably
further reinforcements could be made available if you think that larger
force will be required. If you will give fill estimate of force required
for punishment of rebels and say by what date furtlier reinforcements
should arrive, arrangemenits will be made to meet your requireinents.

Nr. 12564 GROSSBRITANNIEN. Oberst Willeocks an den Kolo-
nialminister. Antwort auf das Vorige. Er braucht
weitere Verstrkungen.
(Received 1.20 a.im., June 30, 19i0.)
(Telegram.) 1| Prahsu, 29th June. 1 have not replied to your telegram
of 15th June as I have been waiting for news from north. 1 have now
from Bekwai to Cape Coast inclusive 1500 troops of all ranks, and three
75-millimetre, five 7-pounder guns of 150 lbs. One Company (and) oue
gun from Northern Nigeria arrival expected 15th July at Cape Coast
and 350 Central Africa Regiment about lOth August. Abont 15ith Au-
gust I calculate I shall bave, deducting losses and eases of siekness,
about 1700 troops nine guns. Above estimate does not incluide Coomas-
sie garrison nor remaining Northern Territories (forces). Of the troops
in garrison Coomassie quite impossible to caleulate how many will be
fit or available for performance of duty, and Northern Territories will
be in need of all their local troops; bnt still I reckon upon 300 from
Coomassie as I am sure they will not have any more fit for service.
This will give about a total of 2000 troops. 1000 troops will be re-
quired for Coomassie and lines of communication and also (to) give sup-
port to native levies and therefore I might have 1000 troops for punitive
work. This basis of calculation is (made) on what in my opinion seems
likely and 1 am quite unable to give in greater detail till it is known
what is our loss in carrying out relief (of) Coomassie. If Her Majesty's
Governmient consider that Adansis, Ashantis, Kokufus, that portion of
Nkoranza as may be in state of rebellion, and other native tribes who
lave given encouragement to rebel forces, are to be severely punished,
their country gonile through, and lasting punishment administered, it will
take another 1500 troops to do it. Distances are great; healthy season
too short; and those at tlie present time serving are having trying times
and a great many cases of siekness. With this extra number (of) troops
I am of opinion that the whole of rebel Chiefs' country could be searched
and severe punishment meted out, but 1 would again repeat that quite
possible somine alteration may be required in estimate of which 1 will not
fail to inform you.
Staatsarchiv LXVL G






82 Der Aschantikrieg im Jahre 1900.

Nr. 12565. GROSSBRITANNIEN. Mr. Low an den Kolonial-
minister. Der Gouverneur hat Kumassi verlassen.
(Received 10.15 p.m., July 5, 1900.)
(Telegram.) |[ Following telegram reeeived from Governor of Gold Coast,
dated Ekwanta, 26 th June: [] Telegram begins: Have the honour to
inform you that in consequencoe of column for relief not arriving and
reduction of food supplies to three days and a-half it was necessary to
make an attempt to push through rebel forces. Taking two days' supply
of rations and leaving remainder for force of 100 left to guard the
fort under Assistant-Tnspectors Bishop and Ralph sufficeient for twenty-
four days, the column, 600 strong, left Coomassie at 5.45 a.m., 23rd June,
under the command of Major Morris, D.S.O., accompanied by 700 carriers,
loyal Kings of Mampon, Juabin, Aguna, Akwanta, and Nsuta, with their
followers, and all Europeans, inelusive of members of Basel Mission. I
was able to remain at Coomassie till the 23rd June only by reduction
of supply of rations to a minimum. The force too weak to attempt to
break ont by the Prahsu road where the rebel forees were in great num-
bers, but it was given out that I should take that road and the rebel
forces, hearing this, fortunately remained to await arrival. The route
deeided on after full consideration was that tbrough Potasi and Terra-
bum to Ekwanta. At Potasi there was a stockade, which was captured
by a flank movement, with loss of one killed and several wounded, in-
clusive of Captains Marshall and Leggett, both severely wounded. At
every village passed through the advanced guard (was) attacked and the
rearguard harassed, but Terrabum was reached with only loss of six
killed and several slightly wounded, many of the carriers, weakened by
hunger, threw away their loads, and nearly all of us have lost clothing
and such provisions as we had. The march to Ekwanta has been one
of great difficulty and privation, tie hammock-men being too weak to
perform duty and the column hampered with large numbers of persons
who followed from Coomassie. We are halting here for two days to
recruit and we hope to reach Cape Coast in ten days' time. We have
had letters sent to Officer Commanding column for relief who, from
what I hear, has reached Bekwai, acquainting him with situation, and
saying that it is absolutely necessary to relieve Fort not later than 15th
July. The people eneamped round the Fort suffercd from starvation ter-
ribly, and the rate of mortality was at least upwards of 30 per diem.
The scenes witnessed were terrible. I could not attack the rebel forees
with any determination owing to insufficient ammunition, and we marched
out of Coomassie on 23rd June with only 150 rounds of ammunition




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