Front Cover
 Front Matter
 Half Title
 Title Page
 Table of Contents
 List of Illustrations
 The battle of Balaclava
 Combat of the 26th of October
 Chapter III
 Chapter IV
 Back Matter
 Back Cover

Group Title: invasion of the Crimea
Title: The Invasion of the Crimea
Full Citation
Permanent Link: http://ufdc.ufl.edu/UF00098469/00001
 Material Information
Title: The Invasion of the Crimea its origin, and an account of its progress down to the death of Lord Raglan
Physical Description: 9 v. : illus. ; 19 cm.
Language: English
Creator: Kinglake, Alexander William, 1809-1891
Publisher: W. Blackwood
Place of Publication: Edinburgh
Publication Date: 1927
Copyright Date: Sixth ed.
Edition: 6th ed.
Subject: Crimean War, 1853-1856   ( lcsh )
Genre: non-fiction   ( marcgt )
General Note: Cabinet ed.
General Note: Vols. 8-9: New ed.
Statement of Responsibility: by A.W. Kinglake.
 Record Information
Bibliographic ID: UF00098469
Volume ID: VID00001
Source Institution: University of Florida
Holding Location: University of Florida
Rights Management: All rights reserved by the source institution and holding location.
Resource Identifier: oclc - 04544020
oclc - 4544020


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Table of Contents
    Front Cover
        Front Cover 1
        Front Cover 2
    Front Matter
        Front Matter 1
        Front Matter 2
        Foreword 1
        Foreword 2
    Half Title
        Half Title 1
        Half Title 2
    Title Page
        Page i
        Page ii
        Page iii
        Page iv
    Table of Contents
        Page v
        Page vi
        Page vii
        Page viii
        Page ix
        Page x
        Page xi
        Page xii
        Page xiii
        Page xiv
        Page xv
        Page xvi
        Page xvii
        Page xviii
    List of Illustrations
        Page xxi
        Page xxii
    The battle of Balaclava
        Page 1
        Page 2
        Page 3
        Page 4
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    Combat of the 26th of October
        Page 367
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    Chapter III
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    Chapter IV
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    Back Matter
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    Back Cover
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Full Text

4 ZA




THE cordial r~eception given by > tle public to the Series of "i Andlenlt
Classics for Eng lish Rcl~eades" has conftirmiied thle initenition of
thle Publ~lisher s to carry out. a kindl~ed Series, whlich it is bellieved~ w~ill
not be less usefTul or less wvel:omer, and~ in which an attempl-t will be
madl~e to intr'oduce the uireat wrliters of Europ~e inl a simiilar mnl~nrc l
to t~he mny~n~ readers who11 probablyl have a p~erfect. acquaintances wVithr
their unmes, wvithoutt muchi know'ledge of their w\or~ks, or their place
In the literature of thle miodern wrorld~. The Classics of Italy, Franice,
G~erniany, and Spanin ar~e unerer to us in timec, andZ less seplarated~ in
senitiment, than the still more famous Classics of anitiq~uity. N~o
nuamout of travel enn manke us acquaninte d~ withi Italy-, while Dante,
Tasso, anid her' greit. historians I~reain unlknow\ n to u~s; nor can thle
up:heavings' of French society and~ the mnlrtal chiaraicter~istic of the
n:-tioni be, comiprehendced without Y'oltaire, MIoliere, Rousseau, and~
otherr great names beside. Neither is G~ermlany herself w'ithrout ~oethie
andl Shiller : nor Sp~ain recognizable d~eprived of' thrat nioble tigure of
C'ervantes, inl whomi lives the very yeniuis of thle nation. Thlis great
haindi it is our delsign to g~ive such- anl account of als may! bring th~em
w:ithinu the acquaintances of' the Englishl realler, whose zeal miay not
carry himu the length of the often thlankle~s study13 of translations, andl
whose read~ings in a foreign language aree not easy enough to b~e p~lea-
sant. The audlienice t~o whlich w~e an-pire is at once wvid~er and narrowver'
thani that to which the great treasuires of Hellenic anid Romnlnl litera-
tulre ar1e unifamil iar;I and our etl'ort wvill beic to srtesent the great Italian,
the great Frenichma~n, the famous C~er~nran, to the r~eadler so as to mnake
it pslainr to him~ what andl how~ thiey~ wrote, somcthring of hiow they lived~,
andl niore or less of t~heir positions anid int~uence up~oni t~he literattue of
their country.-- From~i Prosp~ecltus.
Is nlow pub-lished, prliice ts. Gd~., b-ound~ in cloth.

YOTIR.By Col. E. B. Hamnley, P IETRARCH. By H. ReeveI~, Esq.,~
C.B. C. B.
PASCA~~L. By the~ Very ReIv. PrIinci- CEHYA~N\~TE S.l By thel Edcitolr.
pal ulloh. NNTAINE.By the Rev. W.
GOE~THE. By A8. Hayward,, Esq.,Q.C. I Luca-s Collins, Ill.A.



This day is published,

Part II. of


To be completed in Thirteen M\onthly Parts, price 1s. each.


~Satu~rday Revielo, Alay 19.
This at least seems certain, that, if he attains the success at
which he aims, his success will be very striking; and the genuine
talent he displays in many ways makes his undertaking a literary
experiment which will be followed with no little interest."

Mlorning Advlertiser.
It is impossible to ignore the fact that the story, seen even in
this imperfect fashion, promises to be one of much interest, and
exhibits marks of unquestionable pow~er."

It displays a knowvledige of human nature at once wide and
deep, and great power in the employment of that knowledge;
singular skill in the management of a plot more complicated,
surely, than novelist ever before undertook to unravel; and a swift
vigour and daring in the treatment of critical scenes and episodes
that at times rises almost to the level of genius."

W~e rise from a perusal of the book; not less startled at the
boldness than we ar~e impressed by the skill with which the plot is

Belfast N\or~thern Whig~.
Full of promise. It bears no mark of the hand of a novice.
Its style instantly attracts attention, and insures for its matter
no common treatment."
Prish Times.
If the writer be not George Eliot, and the rest of the workr be
in keeping with the magnificent sweep of design, with ordinary
analytic power and incisiveness of style, we have no hesitation in
apffir~ming that a2 new power has arisen in literature, whose fictions
will take a place beside the best novels in the Englishi language."


tabin tc t Eb it i o n









,L A CKW ~'OOD r



All Rights rescued



A. I NG~~-LAK E.

\*THE foregnoing' title-pagre hazs been kiept in
conformity with those prefixedl to the earlier
p~ortions of the work; and it therefore muay b~e
right to say that the narrative contained in this
volume is not in its Sixth, but only in its
Fo~urth Edition.

May~ 1877.




The talsk of selecting~ Eng~lish gener~lss of cava~lry, 1
Choice muade by th~e Gover~nment,, . 2
Lord~i Luca~n. . . 3
Lordi Cardligan, 11

Lo-rdl Ca1~lrdign's attitude of anltagonismls to Lordl Lucanl, 19
His compla~ints, 19
.Lord Englan'ls severe~ answver to thiem, . . 1
Lordi Raglan's appealed ~ to thle goodl feelings of Lordl Lucan andi

W\hatt. made it p~ossib~le for th~e Gover~nment to dlo als it didi, 1

Isolatedl position of thle fo~c~es d'efend2ingc Balaclava, 28a
Inicreasiing streng~th andZ boldness of the Russians inl thle valley~
of thle Teher'naya, 8
Thle Ba;lalclalv a position, . . 9
The tow~n, t
The ininer line of dlefenlce, 31)
Thle plainl of Ba1~laava,, . . . . 32
Conception of th~e outer line of defenlce, . 5


CHAPTER I. C071/2ti84eC.

The works constituting the outer line of defence, ..
Slight nature of the works, . .
Armament of the wTorks, .
How manned, .
The Kamara Height left in possession of the enemy, .
Inherent weakness of the outer line,' . .
The force immediately available for supporting thle Turks,
Sir Colin Ca2mpbell's confidence, . .
Defects in the subsidiary arrangements of the Allies, .
MIentschikoff's purpose, . .
The forces collected for this enterprise, . .
The object of the contemplated attack, . .
Distribution of the Ru.ssian force, . .
Tasks assigned to each column, . .
24ith Oct. Information of the enemy's approaching attack,

. 4


235th~ Oct. The hour before daybreak,.
Advance of Lord Lucan and his Staff, . ..
Break; of day. Two flags seen flying from the fort on (
robert's Hill, . . .
The import of this, . . .
Fire opened,. ....
Orders to our cavalry, . . . .
Vigilance evinced by the Turks, . . .
The English soldier's want of vigilance, . .
Thle outlying picket, . . . .
Lord Lucan and Sir Colin Campbell, .. ..
Intelligence sent off to Lord Raglan, . .
Lord Lucan's disposition of the cavalry and horse artillery,
The enemy pursuing his design, . . .
General Gr~ibb4 seizing Kamar~a, . . .
A~nd opening fire on the Redoubt No. 1, .. .
Advance of Semiakine, . . .
Of Levoutsky, . .
Of Scudery, . .
Of Ryjoff, ....
The emergency in which Lord Lucan had to act, ..
His decision, . . .



CHAPr~TER T.--coii;lllied..

Thle Rulssianus suffered~ to e~sta~blishl their bartteries nivlihout hlind-
racnce frloml ou~r cavanl ry~, . 5;
Artillery fir~e, 57~
31audc.e's troops senit back,. S
Thle guns on Canrobert's Hill silenlced, . . 5S
Conitinuied~ resistance of thie Turk~s, .....53
Dispositions mad~le by G~eneral Semiak~ine fori storming, 58
Can rob~ert's H ill, . . . . 5
Thle vor~k stoirmedl, 59(
O vel\llrwhehi ng strIenglthl of thle R:ussialns in piioi nt of n:umiber~s, .
Close fighlting~ betw~een the Turkl s and thle Russialns, 60il
The forit at leng~thi carrlied1, 0
A~ba~nd~olnment bjy thle Turkl~s of the three next red~oublts, 6
Their tght under fire of ar~tilleryv, and purIIsuedC in somle plafces
b! Cossalcks, 6
Thie enemy entering four of thle r~edou~bts, ....6
~nd. establishling himself in three of thiem, ....G
Fr~esh dlisposition of our cava~l~lry, . . t;3
Obser~vations up~on thie first pleriodl of thle battle, .0

Lord Raglanl, 6
His d~ispositions, o
G~enerafl Ca~nrob~ert also~ on thle ridget, 1
His diipositions, 1
Appa:-rent ldtl~erence of opinion b~etweenl himl a~ndl Lord Raglan, 71
L~ordl RaSlan's dispos"ition of our cavalryS, . . 72
G~enerfll tendency of thle Fr~enchi and English dlispositionis, .
Isolation of Balaelavaf, ;3
Positioni of Li >ra~ndi's infantry at thiis timie, .. 7
Thle Odessal regrimenlt anI index~L of thle enemy~'s cha~nging resle,
Thle Russianl cavalry''S, . . . .
Jabllrokr Iitsky'?s frc~lce, 7
'Liprandlii securle for' thle timle agalinst any1 attack; bly infantry, 7
TheIF pe'iod of lienlce thus enljoyed: by)5 himn, . .
The f'oc~es nowr threatencningr Balachr-~a, 7
Tliel St re nLt 1, . o.
Thle forces tha~t could be fo~rthw~ith oppTosed to thiem, ;O
~iprandli's inaction, t o..~


CHAPTER I. CO12il2lel~t.l


LiprTandi's supposed design, 7
The advance of the Russian cavalry, 77
Campbell's arrangeements for defending the approach by Ka~dikoii, 77
Squa"drons of Russian horse advancing towards the gorge, 8
Camlpbell's altered dispositions, 9
Flight of the Turks, . . . . 79
Position of Campbell after the flight of the Turks, 9
His words to the men, 80
Their answer to his ap~peal, 8
Continued advance of the detachedl Russian squadrllonls, 8
Camipbell wielding his 93d, . 81
The fire from their line, 1
Its effect, . . . . . 81
Altered movement of the assailing sqyuadrons. . 81
Campbell's counter-manceuv~re, 81
Its effect, . . . . . 81
Retreat of the horsemen, 1
Feebleness of the attack undertaken by these Russian sqluadrous, 82
Real nature of the trial sustained by our troops on thle hillock, 82
The newv foe encountered by the Turks in their flight, 3

V I.

WaTnt of azrrangemenlts for an effective look-out, ...85
Advance of the main body of the Russian cavalry, . 8,5
Its change of direction, . . . . 86
Its sudden discovery of a great opportunity, . . 86
March of Scarlett's dragoonls, 8
Sudden appearance of the enemy's cavalry on thle flank of Scar-
lett's dragoons, . . . . 89
Scarlett's resolve, . 90
The order he gave, 90
' Scarlett's three hundred,' . 90
Ground taken to the right, 91
The 5th Dragoon Guards, 91
The 4th Dragoon Guards and the Royals approachingg,. 91
Scarlett's dilemma, 92
His decision, ... 93



Lord ILucan, 0
Thle par't tak~en by himri after hearings~ of thie aIdvance of thie IRus-
siani caval ly, 9.3
M~eeting~ betw~een L~ord Lucan andl General Sear~lett, . 9
Th'le communicatioinsiu betw\eenl them, . 9;5
Lor~d Luican's pa:rt in the acttnek . 96
Po>sitionis of the six squaiidions at thc miomient aitei ior to Scar-
lett's charge, . . . . 9
Thec numbllers of thle Irussionl cava~lry! conlfronting~ Scar~lett, 97'
D~elib~eralte andl. well-exeritcute mnitennv e of thec RuSsianI C~\cavlry',
Thellir advance lownu thc slope~, . 93S
Theiri slalck;ening~ paice, . 991
Thieir balt, . . . . . ZI Z
Snurmise as to thie cauise of thie ha~clt, . . 1100
D~eploymentlr eff~cted. by! thie R-ussians onl ea~ch flank of their'
column I,......100)
Sear~le~t t' task;, 0
Th'le great numnberss of miilitaryr spcctator~s wh~lo w~ere w~itnesses
of thie combat, 104
D~istinicti\e colour~s of thec Iuntiiforms woiu by thec R-ussianls a~nd
thle Englishl dragoonls, . . . 104
Thie group of four hiorsemien niow\ collected in front of thie G~reys, 105
Scarlett's dleviation fromt the accustomled practice, .. 1S
The border he gav\e hiis tr~umpZeter,, .
ScarleJtt' s adlvance, 109
His dlistan~e froml his squadrlious,. . 100!
Rusfsian officer in fronit of thie columnii . 110
Sear~lett sw~ee~i ng pa~rst thie br~idle-armi of thet Runssian oiker,. and~
dliriving into thec columun, . . . 111
General Sicarlett inl the column~i, . 1
Elliot's encounters w\ithi thie Russian officers in front of thie
columlnn, 112
Thle three horsemen ridling wnith Scarlett, . . 11:3
Thie ancienlt friendship be~tw\een ther Scots Grley.S andl thle Innlis-
k~illin ~ D~ragoonis, 1'13
Thedisingishngchara~-cteristics of thie two regriments, . 114
Thie tempeir of thie Greys at this timie, . . 115;
Ulnavoidab~le slowness of thel a~dvance in its earlier momienits, 115
Progress of thie adv\nuce, 116


CHABPTER I.--CO72ftin'ued.

Involuuntry extension of our line whilst adtvancinga, . 116
The Russian horsemen resorting to firearms, . .116
Thle officers wrho charged with the Greys, . 117
Thle officers w~ho charged with the 2d squadron of thle Tunis-
killings, 117
Colonel Dalrymple WThite, 117
Major Clarke of the Greys, . . . 118
Trhe charge of the three hundred,. 118
Thle manoeuvres of the tw~o Russian wvings, . . 140
The circumstances under which they were attempted,. 141
Lord Lucan,. ..... 142
His order to the 4th Dragoon Guards, . .142
His alleged direction to another regiment, . .142
The order of narration, . .143
The 4th Dragaoon Guards, .1441
The R~oyals, .147
The 5th Dragoon Guards, .150
Change in the bearing of the combatants, .152
Effor~ts made to rally the Greys, . .153
The order given by Scarlett to ~a~jor Conolly, . .155
Hu nt's kquadr.Ilon of th e Inniskill ings,... 155
The officers present with the squadronn. . 155
Major Shute, 56
Captain Hunt, .156
Position of the squadron, 56
Major Shute's order, . . . . 156
The charge of Hunt's squadron of the Inniskillings,.. 156
The 4th Dragoon Guards, .158
The breaking of the column, .159
Retreat of the whole body, .159
Attempts of our dragoons to rally,. . 160
The pursuit of the enemy by our dragoons, . .160
Fire of artillery, 161
Results of the fight between the Russian cavalry and Scarlett's
Brigade, 161
The admiration excitedl by the exploit of Scarlett's Brigade, .162
Comments upon the fight, .163
The time occupied by the fight, .165


CHA~PTER I. CO///i, tci~e.7

Th'le Lighlt Brigadel at thle timie of Scarlett's eirngagement,, 166
Itsn neutraflit y,? 166j
Impal'tiencel of the br1iga~de, . 6

Thie surlpriss e with whlichi thc nieutranlity of thle Lighlt Dr~igade
was observed~l, . 167i
The cause whlichi palsied thle Lighlt Brigad~e at the6 time of Scar'-'
let t's engag~iemenll~lt, . 160
Iniciident manking~ the eirro~r m~or~e signa~l, 174
By bringing~l inltol publtliCC c-ontrnst tle qlualificationl s of Lord~ Crl-
Jigan" and Capl`tain Mlorris, . .175
L~ord. Lucan'ss me~ssage of repr~oof to~ Lordi C'ardligan.11 179i~

Lord Ragiila's inistanltaneousu p~er'clption of thle new~ pha1se inito
whlich the battle hadi pa~ssed, 1S0
Thle change w\roughlt in thie position of the R-ussianis by thle
d~efea~t of their cavanlry, . . . '181
Lordl~ Englan'ls purpose, . .. 8
Lordl R~Sagla Ieterminingc to~ use hlis cavalry, ...1855
' The thirdI: order,' . .15
Lordc Lucan's constructionn of it, 8
The impatience andc angler amongist mnen of the Headquarterte l
Sta ff, 8
' The focurthl border,' 189

Thle position,1 of thle R-ussian armyn! at thie timie whlen Nolanl
reached Lordl Lucan . 19_
Initentionss of Lipranldii at this pleriodl of the action, .19
Lord Raglan's p~erfect app,~rehenlsion of the sta-te of thle b~attle, 195
Tw\o points inl the enem~y's position ava\ilablle for a-ttack, 196
Thle valley thiat lay b~etweenll th~eml, ......1
Positioni of ouri c-avanlryr at thiis timie, ... .1Z'i
AIrriv~al of Nolani w\ith thle fourth order,'? . .19




The fouth rder' . .198
Lord Lucan's reception of the order, . 200
The altercation between Lord Lucan and Nolan, . .201
Lord Lucan's determination, .208
Lord Lucan's order to Lord Cardigran, . 209


Dispositions for the advance of the cavalry down the North
valley, 213
Lord Cardigan and his Staff, . .214
Advrance of Lomrd Cardigan and~ the. ~igaht Brigade,... 217
C~aptain Nolan anpparingr in front of the brigade, ...218
His probable object, .218
Nolan's fate, 220
Question as to the degree in which blame justly attached to
Nolan, 221
Significant retreat of the Odessa battalions, . .223
Cathcart, 225
Gradual awakening of the R~ussians to the opportunity offered
them, .....227
P~Powefull fire ope~ned upnn the adlvancng~ brigade from both
flalnks, :. 228
Officers acting with the twvo regiments of the first, line, ..229
Continued advance of the brigade, . .230
The pace, 230
Lord Cardigan's rigid way of leading the brigade,. . 231
Increasing difficulty of restraining the pace in the first line, 232
State of the first line, .232
Casualties in Lord Cardiigan's personal Staff, . .232
Continued advance of Lord Cardigan and his first line, ..233
TPhe n~advanc of the three regime~nts actfing in support, 37
Officers present with the 11th Hussars, . .237
With the 4th Light Dragoons, 38
WTith the 8th Hussars,. 238
The order in which the supports advanced, . 238
The near approach of our first line to the battery, . .248
Lord Cardigan's charge into thle battery at the head of his first
line, 249
Forces encountered by M~orris, .251


CH APTER I.-COlitjill~ter7.

His cha~rge, 25
Mo~rr~is w~oaundedl nd taklen p~risonler, . 05
Other incidents in this part of thec field-, . 5r
Continued Idvanuce by,3 Lorld Card'CiganI inl per'son, .
His isolaltion, 253
His advanc~ce towardls a large body of I~Russiani caLvalry, ag
Endealvour to tak~e himt prisoner, . .op
Lord Canrdligan disenga~ing~ himself fromt his C~ossack assailanlts, 260
The dev\otion with which~ he hard been1 pleading hiis brigarde,, 21
Lordl Car1digan's return through the battery~,.. 06
His Dredicament,, .
His retr~eat, 3
O~perationls by thle remnanuts of thle first linie, . og
Mren of 17thl Lan~cers, .07
enri under Cap.tain Jenynls, . 63g
Mlen of 17th Lanicers, 63
Maylow's a~ssumnption of commaindc over these, 69
Ma~yow's order to the met~n, . 8
Mlen under O~'Ha ra, 3T
MayIow's charge, 570
His advance in pursuit, . .0
Bis ha~lt, 21
Feelings withl whichl thle French saw- our Lighlt Cava~lry adva\nuce, "71
The Chasseurs d'ALfriqlue, .92
The celebra~tedl 4th reg~iment of the Cha~ss-i urs d'Afr~iquel~, 7
General M~or~ris, .03
His determiination 7
D'Alourile' attck, . .. 274
Losses sustainedl by5 the 4th Cha~sseurs dl'A fiqiue, .07
Thle br~illiancy of their a-chi~~evement, . 277
Thle 11thi Hussa~rs, . 77i
The 4ith Ligh~t D~ragoons, 7
Their entrafne inito the battery, .aO
The combat which there followredl, . .
Far1ther advance of Lordl Georg~e Paget, .. .25
The Sthi Hussatrs, 83
State of the battle aIt thiis periodt, .SS
The r~etr~eat of the Russian cavalry,, .287i
The n~eed thier~ was of frepsh troops in ordler to clenich thle victory, 2SS




Lord Lucan,. . 289
The question now forced upon his attention, . .291
His decision, 292
The Greys and the Royals ordered to fall back, . .292
Their losses at this time, . .292
The Heavy Brigade halted on ground chosen by Lord Lucan, 293
General Scarlett and Colonel Beatson, . .293
The Light Brigade fading out of their sight, . .294
The full import of Lord Lucan's decision, . .294
Our Heavy Dragoons at this time, .295
The Light Brigade, .296
Colonel Mlayowv and his fifteen lancers, . .296
Their junction with the 8th Hussars, . .296
Liprandi's battalions: on the Causeway Heights, . .297
Three squadrons of Lancers seen forming in rear of the 8th
Hussars, 29'7
Colonel Shew-ell the senior officer in this emergency,.. 298
His charge, 298
Defeat and flight of the Russian Lancers, . . 301
Shewell's retreat, . 301
The 11th Hussars and the 4th~ Light Dragoons, . 304
Their retreat, 305
Approach of the Russian cavalry in pursuit, . .305
Lord George Psaget's appeal to his regiment, . 305
Its effect, . . . . . 306
Discovery of a body of Russian cavalry formled up across the
line of retreat, 0
Means for meeting the emel~rgency, . . . 307
Position of the interposed force, . .310
Its format~ion a.nd appa~rennt srength,..... 311
Its sudden change of front, . . . 311
Advance and suddlen halt of the column, ....312'
The nature of the collision wFhich then occurred,. . 313
Comfntnued course of the two retreating regiments, . .316
Lord George Paget's inquniry as to the fate of the first line,. 320
The escape of Sir George WVombwell, . .320
The escape of Catptain Mlorris, . 321
Mlorris and Nolan, . . . . 323
The remnalnts of the brigade at this time, . 325


CH~APTER T.--Cotiffile!d.

Lordi Card'liigan's anddlress to thle mnll, .....
Thle first mnister. of thle ~ighlt 3r~igad.e after thle charg1e, .
The killing~ of thle disab~led~ horses, . . .
Thie losses sulfleredZ by\ the brigad~ce, ......
Thle supposed~ fate of Cap~tain Loc~kwroo~, ....
Thle small numbuler of' prisonlers takleni by thle Russianls, .
Thle small7 amonu111t ofloss su1stalined~ by,! out1 troops afiterl Clos3in
withi thle eiinem .
Wh'lo b:ioirougt thie first linie ouit of nctioni ? .
A~llnd who b~oughit out thle supports? ...
Interview b~etw~een L~ordl Eng~iln a7nd~ Lordc~ Card1igan, .
Lordc Rag~lau's op-inion of L~ord Cafrd~igan's clondcuc~t inl the cha~~r e,
luter~view b:etw-eie Lordi Rag~lau andl L~ord Lucaru, .
General Lip~raudi'ss questions resp:ec~ting~ the exploit of thie Lighit

D~urationi of thle ~ighlt Cava'lry' c~omb~t, .....
Lord~ Englaln's opinion of thie char~e, .....
General Bosquet's crlitic~ism on the ebalrge, ....

X I.

Liprand-i's coun~ter-manrch of thre Odc~essa bjattalions, ..
Delib~era7tions of~ GenealZ Canriob~ert and~ Lord~ R8L~la, .
The determination of thie AIllies, . . .
C'lose~ of the battle, . .


The kind of impor~tance whichl ca~n b~e attachedl to thie battle of
Balaclava, . .
Summary~ of' thle battle, . .
The loss of ground~ sustainiedl by the Allies, ....
Thle casualties re~sulltin~ fr'om the battle, ....
Trophies takleni by thie lrussians, . . .
Tr~eatment of thle p:risoner~s taken by. thle enemy!, .
Withl whlo m the vic~tor ? .. .
The effect of the bat tle up-oni thie sel f-confid~enc~~e of thle R ussians,
















CHAPTER I. C07ltfill2C861.


Lord Cardigan, .3541
His theory as to the duty of an officer circumstanced as he was, 357
His statements and explanations, . .359
His wFritten explanations of the course he took in retiring, 359
Counter statements, .361
The definite question thus raised,. . 361
The question not yet ripe for decision, . . .362


26th October, .367
Effect of the Balaclava battle upon the spirit of Liprandi's
force, . ... .367
Upon other Russian troops, . .368
Upon the garrison of Sebastopol, . .368
Object of the attack there planned, . .368
Circumstances giving an interest to the' Lesser Inkerman '
combat, ... .. 369
The enemy's dominion over the northern part of Mlount
Inkerman, . . . . . 369
His plan of attack, .37i0
General Evans and his resources, . .3'70
Troops occupyingr the Careenage Ravine, . .371
The V~ictoria Ridge, . .371
Captain Singleton's three field-pieces there placed in battery, 3'72
Federoff's advance, .3'72
His engagement wFith our pickets and continued advance to
Shell Hill, 37i3
His guns on Shell Hill, .374
And engaged by those of Evans, . .3'74
Continued pressure upon our pickets, . .374
The spirit in wThich they fought, . .375
The policy of Evans, . .376
Advance of the separate column, . .3'77
Captain Goodlake's adventure writh the enemy, . .3f7
Progress of the combat in the Careenage Ravine, . .380
Continuation of the enemy's efforts on M~Zount Inkerman, .380



CIHAPTER 11. Clillt.

Defeat of hiis columus advaicncin in support,. . 352
His entire defeat on Mrolunt Inkleirman,, ... S
The retreat and pur11suit, 33
Mr~ Hewitt's fire fr~om the LancansterI gun, .. 8
Thle enemy also dcfea~tedl in thle Canreenagre Ravine, . 3S-4
Lorid R1aglan1 on thle Victojria Ridge, ... 8
Clojse of the c~ombat, . . . ..3S5
Duratiojn of the combat, . .35
Its results, . . . . .386
Its p~ithi, . . . . .386
Its etteet uplon the sojldier~y of our~ 2d Div~ision, 35,
Incursion of Rudsian envailry hiorses, . . .3SS

Thle Dor~mant Commnnission entr~usted2 toj Sir Georjge Cathlcart, 3S9
Statte ojf Ca;thear~lt's fezelinlgs and~ te~mper on the 4ith of Octobl.er, 390
W'ithdirawal- 1 of the Dorman-iit C'ommnission, .81
Thie hig~h tone wvithi whichi C'athcarlt meltt thle annllounl~~'I cmet, 9
Lord RaglaIn's gra~tificttiojn at, the c~ha~nge, 392
Thle et'ect of the Dorm~n ant C'ommission not nelcessarilyv lremoved
by its w\ithdraw~alnl .393


26-th October~. Lordi Raglant~u prov\iding against the olccurr~ence~
of a disasters alt Ba~Ilaclava, . . 9
Thle twro plans wh']ichl seemed open~l to himn, 3041
His dlirectiojns to C'aptain Taltha~m, R:.N., .. 35
Thie advantagres of ablandoningr Ba~~laelava, 3511
JLord Raglan's inchloate re~solve, 393
Conclusive objec~tionl inter~posedl by thle C'ommiiissa~'S-ry-General, 3~6
Lordt Haglan's efottits to prov~j\id~e mleans of dlefending B~aclachra, 9
Sajc'rifilles nellessitatedl by~ the~ rtenitionl of thle plalce,.. 9
26th Octobler to 3cd Novemberci, 9
Contiuua~tion of thle enemyii's apparent dlesigns against Balaelava,39
And of Lor~d Rag~lan's exer~tiojns fori its dcfenice, .39
Thie enemy's now settled purpose, . . . 303


Note J. -Respecting the Period when Colon el Dazrby Griffith,
the Offcer commanding the Greys, received the
WTound which disabled Him, .
Note II.--Explanatory Statements laid before nIr Kiinglake

Kiinglake by Lord

Kiinglakie by Lordl

of General W~illiam

of Russian Cavalry








by Lord Lucan, .
Note III.-SStatement laid before M~r
Catrdigan, .
Note IV.--Statement laid before M~r
Cardigan .
Note V.--Recordi of M~ilitary Services
Ferguson Beatson, .
Note VI.,- Generanl Scarlett's Staff, .
Note VII.--The Strength of the Body

under General Ryjoff which engaged General
Scalrlett's Brigade, . .
Note VIII.--Papers relating to the Recall of Lord Lucan, .
Note IX.--The Nature of the Litigation in the Suit of the
Earl of Cardigan v. Lieutenant -Colonel Cal-
thorpe, .
Note X.--Alemoranda relating to Sir George Clathcar~t and
the Dormant Commlis~sion, written in 1864 by
the late Colonel the Honourable Gilbert Elliot,
who wTas Aide-de-Camp to Sir George in the
Crimea, .



rj.\ LACLAVA r~-- DvAN CE. OF TH~E R US-




I, I V. -FA\CSIMI LE O)F LoanCanin.N'

I)LAN, .
us .-THE LawH CAYA'LI:Y CjHAr:GE~, .

.. V'I.--THE ~Laurtl CjAv'nY ATTXCxi, .






,1 1 10!1

.I I. 170

11 21
n 276


,, sjcl)

1, 11 51.

~1 II :3ii




BEFORE ent~eringr upon th~e narra~tive of a battle CHA P'.
i n which t~he Englc~ish division of horse took~ a
principal part, it seems right, to speakl of the T ftns'u
selections that w~ere made by ou.r novernince Engish'
Jb b a ene~rals of
authorities w~hen t.hley under~took; to name tihe Cavalry.)'
ceneral1 officers who were to be entrusjtedl withl
cavalr'y conunanrlds inl the army despatched t~o
t~he East~. If a ministers w~ere unhappily forced
to cast his eyes over a crow~d of officers who had
none of t.hem~ rendered war1 service, andl to try
t~o drawr out fi~rom amoncr t'hem t~he three or four
oif'ted mnen wrho could best be entrusted to a~ct
in t'he field as genera~ls of cavalr~y, it, would be
sens~eless t~o blamie himl for' failine inl so hzrd a
task; but. w~hen it. so happens tha~t, within recent
years t.he State hais carried on war1, there surely
is one test of fitness which has such parat11uount
1' O V.


cHA r. value, that the neglect to apply it can hardly be
I.deserving of pardon, or even, we would say, of
indulgence: Has the offcer whose name is sub-
muitted done recent service in the field ? Has his
service been brilliant ? Has he shown his prow-
ess in action as a cavalry officer' ? Has he in anly
rank, however humble, taken part in cavalry
fights ? Is he of the age for a cavatlry man ? Is
he either under thirty-five, or else a man so fresh
come from the performance of cavalry feats that
the question of age may be waived ? If the
minister finds that all these questions must be
answered in the negative by a portion of the
candidates, w~hilst others can answer affirmlative-
ly, it would surely appear to follow that he has
already effected some progress towards a selection
of the right names, because he can thenceforth
confine his investigation to the merits of those
officers who have served in the field, and elimin-
ate those who have not. To our own countrymen,
morer especially, thep pr~inciple might, be e~xpec~te
to recommllend itself, because it so haLppened that,
notw~ithstanding the long duration of the peace
which had been existing bsetwveen the great Powers
of Europe, England had a superb list of cavalry
officers in the early prime of life who had done
brilliant service in the ~field.
enoice WVell, elimination proceeded a choice was
made by...
the Gov- made ; but it was with an actually inverting
effect that these operations took place. Incred-
ible as it may seem, it is nevertheless true that,
in nominating general offcers for cavalry com-


mlands in thle East, the names of the mlen w~ho had
done service in the field wrere all set aside, and
that from the peace-service residue exclusively
the appointments in question were mladie.
The officer entr~usted~ with the charge of our
cavalry division wa~s Lord Lucan. To his w~ant
of experience in the field there was addedi t~he
diraw~back of agre ; for he had attained to a, period
of life at which no mlan azltogrether unusedi to w~ar
service could be expected to burst into fame as a
successful cavalryr general; but by nature Lord
Lucan was giftedi with somle at least of the qua'~l-
ities essential for high commllandi; andi his fifty-
four years, after all, however surely t'heyr may
have extinguishle d thle happyr impulsiveness which
is needed for a fielder of the cavalry atrm, can
hardly be satid to have imlpairedl his efficiency in
the general business of a comman18L d er. He enjoy-
edi perfect health; he sawT lik~e a, hawkl; and~ he
retained such extraordiinary activity of both bodiy
aznd muind, that perhaps the ment~ion of his actual
age makes it; really miore difficult; than it mighlt
otherwise be to convey an idea of the tall, lithe,
slender, andi young-lookingr officer, pursuingP his
task of commlander with a kind of fierce, tearingr
energy', andc expressing byr a movement of feature
somewhat rare amllong Englishmen t~he intensity
wFith which his mliin wTor'ked. At every fr~eshl
access of strenuousness, andl especially at the mlo-
mnents preceding strenuous speech, hris face all at
once used to light up with a glittering, panther-
lik~e aspect, resulting fr'om the sudden fire of the

C H A P.

Lord Lucan.


C HA P. eye, and the sudden disclosure of the teeth, white,
I. even, and clenched.
At an early period of his life, and whilst still
almost a boy, he had the honour to be encouraged
in his career by the Duke of W7ellington, and
even to receive words of counsel and guidance
from the lips of the great captain. In later years,
he had had the spirit and enterprise to join the
R~ussian army whilst engaged in military opera-
tions, thus giving himself the advantage of see-
ing a campaign; and I cannot but believe that
the time thus spent was more conducing to
warlike efficiency than many a diligent year eml-
played in peace service at home. Independently
of the general advantage derived from a glimpse of
reality, Lord Lucan gathered from his experience
of that campaign on the Danube some knowledge
of a more special kind in regard to Russian troops ;
and there is reason for inferring that his mode
of handling the English cavalry in the Crimea
was inl some measure influenced by the impres-
sions of his earlier days. A quarter of a century
before, he had come back from the Danube cam-
paign with a low opinion of the Russian cavalry,
but with a high respect for the infantry--more
especially, it seems, for the infantry when gathered
in heavy column; and he not only carried those
opinions with him to the Crimea, but continued,

In th'e war of 1828-9 against the Sultan, Lord Lucan was
attached to the Staff of Prince Woronzoff ; and I have heard
that he was graciously chided by the Emperor Nicholas for too
freely exposing his life.


wvhen there, to hold them unchanged, and even, CHAP.
perhaps--thoughl unconsciously--to make thiem
the basis of hiis resolves.
Lor~d Lucan's intellectual abilities' w\er~e of a2
ver' hIgh~ or~delr, nd comnbined as they were w~ith
t~lhe extraol~rdilnary enle:rgy of whlic~h I hav~e spoklen,
they mlighlt seem to constitute p~owerl. Exper~i-
euce, too, hadi shown thaft h~e could apply3 these
qua'lities effectively to a~t least one gradle of mnili-
tary'3 duty, for' at the timue w~hen he exer~cised a
Lieutena~nt-Colo nlel's comma~nd his recim~lent was
in excellent orier.
No militarily duties inl peac~e-time could su~f~ee
to absor~b such energies a2s those whlichi Lor'd
Lucan possessed; and dluring~ a period of manny
yearls im~mediately precedingr the Russian warn, he
hadc en gagcedl himself in thle conduct of large
aIgricu~ltural operations, carr1iedl on upon hris ownn
estates both in Engrland and Ireland. W~it~h him~,
the imprlovemlent andl cultnure of landC' hadl not
been a mnere quiet r'esour~ce for~ dawd~lingr away~
the slow- hours, but a serious and engrossilng
business, e""b lic'iting~ sustainedl eniei~rgy In execut-
ing his designs for the im~provemenn t of his Irish
estates, hie pressed on, it, appears, w~ithi a geat
str~engthl of purpose, rhichl oer~t~hrews all inter-
posed obstacles; and that rut~hlessness perhaps
wa~s a cir~cumstanlce w~hichi might be niumbere d
aImoucest thie reasons for criviner himi a commalnd,
because the innova2tiive force of w~ill w\hichi he
evidenced wans a qua~lity~ which hlad at the time a
special aInd peculiar vanlue. A-t thie comm~ence-


mlent of operations in the field, it is difficult for
anly manl who is not of an almost violent nature
to prepare troops longs used to peace service for
the exigencies of actual war by tearing them out of
the grooves in which they have long been moving.
Of course, the grave task of choosing our cavalry
generals was converted, as it were, into guess-
work by the determination to take them exclu-
sively from the list of those officers who had
never served their country in the field; but apart
from that grave objection, and the objection
founded on age, Lord Lucan was an o~ffcer from
whom much might be reasonably hoped, if the
soundness of his judgment could be inferred from
the general force of his intellect, and if also it
could be taken for granted that 'he would prove
wPilling and able, after having long had his own
way, to accept the yoke of military subordina-
tion in the field, and to bear it with loyalty and
Lord Lucan had one quality which is of great
worth to a commander, though likely to be more
serviceable to a commander-in-chief than to one
filling a- subohrdinate~ posf. He had decision, and
decision apparently so complete that his mind
never hankered after the rejected alternative.
H~is convictions once formed were so strong, andl
his impressions of facts or supposed facts so in-
tensely vivid, that he was capable of being posi-
tive to a degree rarely equalled. WC~hen he deter-
mined that he was right and others wrong, he did
not fail also to determine that the right and the

C H A P.


wrrongr wererlighltand wr~ong withla vengeannce. C HA P.
In summing up before thle House of Lordls a7n '
argument attempting the r~efutation of a despatch
sent home by Lord Raglan, h~e spoke in a, wa'y
which wats cur~iously characteristic. He did not.
dilute his assurannces w~ith t'he lacnguage of mioler-
a2tion. My Lords,' he said, 'I believe I have
' now nsweredi every charge contained in Lordl
' Ra gln'.s let~ter. I pled edl myself to refute
' eery' accusation; 1 saidi t~ht II wouldt not leave
' a wordi unauswered.l II believe I ha~ve fully
'nfulfledi the undertakingr I oave- havn e not left
two w~ords together, but hav'e torn the letter to
I' ras and1C taCtter's.' Comlingc from Lor~d Lucan,
-thiis language wras no vrul ga.r brazenry: it re-
presented the irrepressible strength of his real
through mistaken conviction.
From the qualitiesj observTedi in this general
officer at the time of his atppointmlent, it might
hav\e b~een difficult~ perhaps for a minister to infer
the peculiar tendency which developed itself in
the field; but whalt happened was--tha~t, partly
frorn the exceeding vrigour of hlis intellect, partly
fr~om at naturally comba~cti'e, anlltalgonistic temper,
andc partly~, perhaps, from th~e circumstance of his
having been longP accustomed to rural a7nd pro-
vincial sway, Lor~d Lucan in t~he Crimea disclosed
a habit of mindl which was calcu~latedl to endianger
his efficiency as a subordci2nate commndlner. He
suffered himself to become acn invetera~te critic-
an invetera~te crlitic of the orders he r~eceivedl f~rom
H3ead~quarters ; andl, since it happened that his


CHAP. criticism almost always ended in his coming to
~a strong disapproval of his chief's directions, he
of course lost that comfort of mind which is en-
joyed by an o~ffcer who takes it for granted that
his chief must be right, and had to be constantly
executing orders with the full persuasion that
they were wrongly conceived. Plainly, that was
a state of mind which might grievously impair a
man's powers of action in the ~field, not only by
chilling him with the wretched sensation of dis-
approving what he had to do, but also by con-
fusing him in his endeavours to put right inter-
pretations upon the orders he received.
It was never from dulness or sloth, but rather
through a misaiming cleverness, that Lord Lucan
used to fall into error. With a mind almost
always apparently in a confident and positive
state, he brought it to bear in a way which so
often proved infelicitous, that his command in
the Crimea was made on the whole to appear likxe
that of a wrong-headed manl; but I imagine that
this result was in no small measure produced by
the circumstance of his being almost always in an
attitude of oppugnancy; and there is room for
believing that under other conditions, and espe-
cially if detached, and acting for the time indie-
pendently, he might have evinced a much higher
capacity for the business of war than he found
means to showv in the Crimea. There, at all
events, he was not at all happily circumstanced,
for besides being wholly unarmed with the autho-
rity which is conferred by former services in the


field, he had so yielded to hiis unfor~tunate ha~bit cHA P.
of' adver~se cr~iticisml as t~o be mor~e of ten fr~etted I
than alnimnated by thle orders which cam~e dow\n
from Headquar~ters;; and, on thle other ha~nd, he
had under himn a creneral officer comman1~1dinerr one
of his brigadles, whlo wns rathler a b.usy tnt~agonist.
thaln a zealous andl devoted lieutenant;.
It must be r~emembered, mnoreoer, that the
control of a Ilrge body of cavalry in action carries
w~ith it one pjeculiar source of embarrassment.
If the general commandingc leads a charge in
person (as \Iurat wa;-s neccust~omed to do), he loses,
of course, for a timle hris power of personally
direction the troops not included in his first line,
andl so abdlicate~s d~ur~in t~he interval one of his
principal functions as a general. If, on the other
handr he c~lingcs to his power as a general, and
declines t~o narr1ow h-is aulthornityv dulringr several
critical minutes--- byJ taking- t~he part of a leader,
hie must be content t~o for~ego a large share of the
glor~y whlich attachles to cavalry achievements.
He mayS deserve and' attain the hi h credit of
seizing thle happiest moments for successively
launchingr his squadrons; but in combats of horse,
the task~ of act.ully~ lea.dingc an attacks is plainly
so momlentous a business tha~t it would be d~iffi-
cullt. for any~ manl comingc llne to field service to
build up any1! loftyS repute as a general of cavalry,
by orde.ring otf.hel npeople to charge.
Thlerefore, for general as well as for special reaz-
sons, Lord Lucan's command was one of an em-
barrassing kind; but despite the inherent diffi-


CH AP. culties of his position--despite all the hindrances
I' created by himself, and the hindrances created
by others--he was a diligent, indefatigable com-
mander,-alwvays in health, always at his post,
always toiling to the best of his ability, and main-
taining a high, undaunted, and even buoyant spirit,
under trials the most depressing. He expended a
prodigious industry upon his duties.. It may be
that be was not perfectly conseqlutit, or that his
measures were wvrongn or ill-timed, or, again, that
he was unduly thwarted; for certainly the result
seems to have been that, in proportion to the
energy exerted, his mind left no great trace of its
action; bsut if a man's power of commanding could
be safely inferred from mere words, the collection
which has been made of Lord Lucan's divisional
orders would be a striking example of vigour
applied to the management of cavalry in a time
of the heaviest trials. Disliking apparently every
sacrifice, however temporary, of th~e controlling
power, he did not take upon himself to lead in
person any cavalry charge; and therefore the
degree in which he may have been qualified for
that very peculiar kind of duty must of course be
a subject of conjecture rather than proof ; but his
composure under heavy fire was so perfect that,
even in an army where prowess evinced in that
way was exceedingly general, it did not escape
observation. Yes, damn him, he's brave,' was
the comment pronounced on Lord Lucan by one
of his most steady haters.
This is not the place for giving the general tenor


of Lord Lucatn's services a.s comm~ander of our C HA P.
cavallry' in the Crimuea.; but. I have sought to pr~e-
pare for my account of t~he action in the plain of
Balaclazva, by conveyring beforeha.nd some imlpres-
sion of the officer wlho there comma.nded our
cavalry\. Some such glance wa~s t~he more to be
desired because Lord Luca~n's abilities w~ere evi-
dlently of a. higher order than those hle found
means to disclose by the pal~rt he took in the
It should be understood thal~t Lordi Lu~can did
not t~hrust. himself into t~he command of our divi-
sion of borse. All he hadl askedl for wa~s to ha.ve
charge of a. single infantry\ brigarde.
The English division of horse num~beredi tw~o
bri gades, one of which com~prised t~he Li ht Ca.-
valry, thle other o~ur Hea~vy Dragoons. The Light
Br1igadle, as we k;now, was collmmandedl by t~he Earll
of Cardigar~n.
Lord Cardligan, wrhen appointed to this com- Lord Car-
3 digan.
mand, wa'~.s about fift~y-seven years old, and hadl
never seen wa'~r service. Fr~oml his early day's he
hand eagerlyr longed for the profession of arms, a7nd
although prevented by his fa.ther's objections fromt
entering thle a~my a~t t~he usual per~iodl of life, hle
a~fterw~ardcs--tha is, at a.bout twnent~y-seven years
of age-wnas mad2e a. cornlet in a. cava-llry regniment.
He pursued his profession with diligence, absent-
ince himself mluch fr~om the Housje of Commllons
(of wFhic'h he wars at that, time a. memnber) for the
purpose of doing orderly dunty as a. subaltern in
th~e 8th Hussars. Aidled partly by fortune, but


CH AP. partly by the favour of the Duke of York and the
Operation of the purchase system, he rose very
quickly in the service, and at the end of about
seven years from the period of his entering the
army, he was a lieutenant-colonel.
He had a passionate love for the service--a fair
knowledge, it is believed, of so much cavalry busi-
ness as is taught by practice in England--a strong
sense of military duty--a burning desire for th~e
fame which awaits heroic actions--and, -finally,
the gift of high courage. Lord Cardigan's valour
wvas not at all of the wild, heedless kind, but the
result of strongf determination. Even froml his
wvay of riding to hounds, it was visible, they say,
that the boldness he evinced w~as that of a reso-
lute manl with a set purpose, and not a dare-devil
impulse. H~e bore himself firmly in both the
duels he fought; and upon the occasion which
opposed him7 to an officer against wThom he wTas
bitterly angered, he shot his foe through the body.*~
His mind, although singularly barren, and wvant-
ing in dimensions, wras not without force; and he
had the valuable quality of persistency. He had
been so constituted by nature, or so formed~ by
the w~atchzful care which is sometimes bestowed
upon an only son, as to have a habit of attending
to the desires and the interests of self with a
curious exactitude. The tendency, of course, wras
one which he shared with nearly all living crea-
tures; and it was only from the extraordinary
proportions in which the attribute existedi, andi
WVithout, I think, killing him.


from the absence of any attempt to mask; thle pr~o- ca e .
p~ensity,~ that it f'ormnedl a distinctive pecu~liarit y
WVhen engaged in th~e task of self-assertion or sielf
advocacy-, he adheredl to his subject w~ith the most
curious 1irigour, never going thle least bit astr'ay
from it, and separ'atingP from it all that concerned
the rest of cr~eationi as matter altog~eth~er irrlelevantt
and uninterestingr Others before himn may have
secretly concentrated upon self an eqlual amlount
of attention ; but in Lord1 Cardligar n there wars suchl
an entire absence of guile, that exactly as he,wa~s,
so be showed himself t~o thie w~orld. Of all false
pretences contrived for the purpose of feigning anl
interest in others he was as innloenlt is at horse.
Amnongst hlis good q~ualities was love of or~der;
but this w~ith hlim was in such mnorbid excess,
that it constituted a really dangerous foible, in-
V;olvingr him fr~om tim~e to time in m~ischief. One
of his quarrels w~as founded upon the colo~ur of a
bottle; another upon the size of a tea-cup>. In
each case thle grievance wa's wan81t of unliformlity'.
To his formlulated mind the distinctions b~etweenr
lawful andd right wa~s imper~ceptible. A thousand
times overl it mighjrt b.e suggested to hliml tha~t he
oughP~t niot to have been sleeping on board his,
yacht--a yacht with a French cook on board--
wrhen not only all the ofiieers and mien undler hlim,
but also his divisional chief, w-ere cheer~fully bear-
ing the harldshipss and privations of camp> life;
bu~t at thou~sand times over he wou~ld aniswer that
he indiulgedl himself thus w~ith the permlission of
Lor~d R~aglan; and the lawrfulness of the pranctice


CH AP. being thlus established, he never seemed to under-
I. stand that there could remain anly question of
propriety, or taste, or right feeling.
WJith attributes of this krind, he wvas plainly
more fitted to obey than to command. Having
no personal ascendancy, and no habitual con-
sideration for the feelings of others, he was not,
of course, at all qualified to exert easy rule over
English gentlemen, and his idea of the way to
command was to keep on commanding. There
surely was cruelty in the idea of placing human
beings under the military control of an officer at
once so arbitrary and so narrow; but the notion
of such a man having been -able to purchase for
himself a right to hold Englishmen in military
subjection is, to my mind, revolting. Lord Car-
digan incurred a series of quarrels, and was re-
moved from the command of his regiment; but
afterwards, by the special desire of the Duke of
Wellingrton, he was restored to active service.
There can hardly have been anly well-founded
expectation that Lord Cardigan would be able
to go through a campaign without engaging in
quarrels; and never, surely, by action or speech,
did he convince the dispensers of military author-
ity that he was a manl who would be competent
to meet the emergencies of war with the resources
of a fruitful mind. I imagine that the first active
Bishop or Doctor of Divinity whom the Com-
mander -in -Chief at the Horse Guards mlight
chance to have met on horseback would probably
have been much more competent than Lord Car-


diganu (whose mind work~ed always in gr~ooves) to
discover and seize the right moment for undertak-
ing a cavalry charge. Yet without t.he attributes
of at commzander, a man mlay be a resolute, fatith-
ful, heroic soldier; and that surely is the kindly of
g~lory'-it is glor'y of no mean kind~- wh~ich Ccan
btrest be claimed for Lordl Cardigan. In despite of
all thie faults which he had manifested to thle
worulld w~hen appointed to the conmmandt of the
Ligrht Br1igade, there still remained grood groundls
for trulstingc thalt, as longC as h~e should be acting
in thle p~erfol~lrmance of whalrt. he mlight clearlyr un-
derstandl t~o be his duty, he w~ouldl performl it w~ithl
precision, with vazlour, anld, if need be, w~ith uln-
sparingr devrot~ion.
If betw-een Lord Lucan andt Lord Cazrdiguan
there could be diiscoveredl any points of resem-
blance, these w~ere not of such a k~indi as to be
conducive to harmony. Thiey w\ere, both of themi,
contentious; aznd whether fl~rom natural gifts, or
froml long~ ha-bits of dispu~tation, they had both of
them powvers of a kind which ar~e comlmonly de-
veloped in lawyers, though not certainly in lawr-
y'ers of the same quality. Lord Lucan w5as tihe
able, the cogent, the strenuous, the dlaring~ advo-
cat~e, whose opponents (especially if they hap-
pened to be in the right) were to be not merely
answered but crus'hedl. Lord Cardigazn, in his
forensic aspect, waLs of the species w~hichl repeats
a hundred times over in the same words the same
version of the samlle facts, persistentlyr ignores the
whole strength of the adver~sa~ry's argumrent., and


Lordl Luc~an
and Lordl~
cardi an


which also relies a good deal upon what in the
courts are called points and 'objections.' Yet
it would seem that he must have been capable of
attaining to a higher level; for upon one occasion,
when undertaking to defend himself in the House
of Commons, he made what the House regarded
as a very good speech. Lord Lucan and Lord
Cardiganz were both of them men possessed with
exceeding self-confidence, but a self-confidence
resultingr fr'oml very different springs of thought.
]Lord Lucan's trustfulness in himself was based
upon the consciousness of great ability, and upon
that rare vividness of impression as well as that
strength of conviction of which we were just now
speaking. He was confident because he was pos-
itive. On the other hand, Lord Cardigan's assur-
ance was not, I think, founded upon anly quality
which could be rightly called self-conceit, but
rather upon the corollary which he drew from
the fact of his having a given command. He was
so extravagantly military in his notions, so or-
derly, so straight-minded, so given to narrow and
literal interpretations, that froml the mere fact of
his having been entrusted with the charge of a
brigade, he inferred his perfect fitness for the task.
By the act of appointing him his Sovereign had
declared him fit, and he took the Queen at her
wordi. WC~hen we see him, by-and-by, side by
side with a cavalry officer of warlike experience,
at a critical moment, we shall learn to how great
an absurdity a man may be brought by this army
list process of reasoning.. So far did Lord Car-

cEA Ar.


digan carr~y thet infter'ence, thait once, I see--even C HA~ P.
in wr~1it~inn- whein maintaiinin his vliew as to the '
extent of und'isturbed atuthority whlich should be
possessed by' the conmmanlder of az br~igade, hie
ma~rde bold to brack~et himself, as it, wer~e, for the
purpose of the discussion, w~ithi no less a man
than Sir Colin Cam~pbell, busing one of his argu-
mients up~on t~he tacit assumlption, that because
S~ir Colin and he both commnllned e brigad~es, they
w~ere both of them, therefore, ent~it.1ed to the same
dcriee of' latitudce.
It wa~s hardly- to be expected w~ith confidence
thant officers appointedl to high1 cav~alSry commandlc s
without halvingr learned them b ser~vine~ their
country in the field wFould al a1 t once shiow theml-
selves able to put sound constructions upon the
orders which wFere to guide t~hemi in the presence of
the enemy3; andi thle per~sonatl qu~alit.ies of Lordi
Luca~n a~nd Lor~d Card~cigan-~ were not of such~ a
k~ind as to su~pply in this point the absence of
war Ili ke experience.. With Lor~d Lucan the
daln er wafs, that his fer~tile and vi orous mind
mighlt bringlc himl inlto~ some elaborate andl sub-
versive process of reasoning. If, for instance, w~e
should hear hliml inforledi be is to be supported
byS infantry, w~e. mlust be pr~epatred to findl him
convinced that the infantr~y is to be supported by
him. On the othl-er ha~nd, Lordl Cardiga~n's en-
dleavo~urs at construincs ordlers w\ere1 sur~e to be
char~acterisedl by an exceedlingn rignidity, w~hichl
might bje preposterous in one instance, in another
superb. If ordered- to holdi a position~, her might,
YOL. V. B3


think himself planted as fast as a sentry at the
gate of a palace. If ordered to advance down a
valley without being told where to halt, he might
proudly abstain from~ supplying the omission, and
lead his brigade to destruction.
Lord Lucanz was the brother-in-law of Lord
Cardigan; but so little beloved by him that in
the eyes of cynical London, an arrangement for
coupling the one manl to the other seemed almost
a fell stroke of humour. It mrigrht have been
thought that, in a free country, the notion of
carrying official perverseness to any such extreme
length as this must have been nipped in the bud.
It was not so. If England was free, she was also
very patient of evil institutions, as well as of
official misfeasance. She trusted too much to the
-fitful anger of Parliament;, and the chances of
remonstrance mn print.
In justice to Lord Cardigan--because tending to
account for, and in some measure palliate, the act
which will be presently mentioned--it should be
stated that, some short time before the embarka-
tion, he had had to endure a bitter disappoint-
ment, under which he continued to smart during
the first two weeks of the invasion. Lord Lucan
was to have been left in Bulgaria, and, under that
arrangement, Lord Cardigan in the Crimea would
have been commander of our cavalry during
several momentous days, without being liable to
any interference except from Lord Raglan himn-
self; but Lord Lucan successfully insisted upon
his claim to be present with the portion of the



division wFhich was likely to come first, into t~he C HA P.
presence of t~he enemy; and accordingly Lord
Cardi an, thou gh commllandling the Li ht B3ri ade,
had ovrer him his dlivisiona~l genleral, aEnd wals
thlerefor~e in a? mieazsurze annulledi.
Lor'd Cardigan wais not t mal~n who would have Lor~d Car-
consciously sufferedl himself to become at all in- nttitucde or
subordinaite; but, whilst wr~ithing under the t~or- to Lo~rd
ture inflicted by1 the aunulling presence of his
divisional grenera~l, he brou ht himself to imagi~ine
tha~t thle custom of thle service set som~ethiino like
bounds to the overruling authority which should
be exercised by a divisional general over his
brigadier, andi that in some matters it least--as,
for instance, in the atrrantgem~ents of his camp--
the bri adlier had ai ri ht to expect t-hat he would
be left to hiis own discretion.
A2ccordlingly, and at a periodic of the campaign
when it mli ht be imagl~ined that t~he eter~nal clazims
of self wouldl, for a, time, be superseded by thte
warlike ardour of a., cavalr~y leader, Lordl Ca~l~rdian
applied hiis mind to the object of protecting him-
self fr~om the interference of his comm~ianding
offcer. He drew uzp in wr1iting a~ lengthy string his com.-
of complaiints on this subject, and submitted thiem lat
to Lord Rag~lan.
Lordl Raglatn judged it his dunty to anZsw'er thZiS Lo:rd Rag-
appeal with some severity. In a paper wiluch answer to
waxs addressed, it seems, to Lord Cardigan,, but '
meant to be communicateed also to Lord Lucan,
the Commrlander of t~he forces t~hus wrote:-


E ALACLAVA, Sep~t. 28, 1854.
I have perused this correspondence with the
( deepest regret, and I am bound to express my
' conviction that the Earl of Cardigan would have
' done better if he had abstained from making the
' representation which he has thought fit to sub-
' mit to my decision.
I consider him wrong in every one of the
' instances cited. A general of division may
' interfere little or much with the duties of a
' general of brigade, as he may think proper or
' see fit. His judgments may be right or wvrong,
' but the general of brigade should bear this in
' mind, that the lieutenan~t-general is the senior
' officer, and that all his orders and suggestions
' claim obedience and attention.'
Lord R~acran, however, determined to try
whether it were possible that words of entreaty
from himself, addressed alike to Lord Lucan and
Lord Cardigan, might either allay the animosity
existing between them, or render it less emlbar-
rassing to the public service; andl accordingly, in
the same paper, he addressed to both these
Generals the following appeal: The Earl of
' Lucan and the Earl of Cardigan are nearly con-
' nected. They are bothz gentlemen of high
' honour and of elevated position in the countryT,
' independently of their military rank. They
' must permit me, as the Commander of the
' Forces, 'and, I may say, the friend of both, ear-
' nestly to recommend to them to communicate
c frankly w~ith each other, and to come to such


Lord Rag-
lan' apen
feelfing o
and Lord


'LL an ~ I~CLundrtning s h there should be no CAP
'sus icion of the contempt of authority on the
' one side, and no apprehension of undue inter-
'fer~ence on the other.' (Signed) R~~GLA~N.'

It miust not be supposed, however, that the re-
latious between these tw~o officers involved' themr
in unseemly per'sona~l a~ltercaitions. Lord Lucan
withl mlore uznwelcomle commun~ications which he fromi
time to timle made to hris brig~dier should be
either in w~riting, or else conveyed by the mouth
of another; and Lordi Cardigan on the other hand
had a sense of propriety in such matters, and wa~s
not without powver of self-restraint.
But now~, why did it happen that England, what made
. .it po'ssiblle
having undler her eyes at br~ilhant hist of cavalry f~r the
officers fr~oml whoml .she ungiht maknle her choice, toaoait
determined t~o exclude all those w~ho had served
in the field, andl to place in t~he respective com-
mndsjle of whlich~~ we~' have I bee~nspeakin twor 1fp)'eer
between fifty aznd sixty years old w~ho hald neither
of thleml rendered war-service ? One answer is
this: Thcre was az divided responsibility. W'e
know~ wha~t confusions may fo~llow when the WVar
Offce andi the Horse Guardcs the clerkl nand
the co~unter-cler~k differ; but this selection of
cavalry officers wa~s the result of agreement, or
rather, one many say, of at process which goes
by~ thel namel of compoun ding.'n Froml ancient
treaties of peace between the two sides of W'hite-
hanll it resultedl that the CommaInd~lcer-in-C hieef zt.


CH AP. the Horse' Guards was the authority for advising
I' the appointment and taking the Queen's pleasure
upon it; but that the authorities responsible to
Parliament, or, in other words, the M~inistry,
might take upon themselves to interpose; and
that if they should do so, and do so persistently,
then, painful as the surrender would be, their
objection should be allowed to prevail.
From this division of power there followed, of
course, a correspondcing alleviation of responsi-
bility. Lord Hardinge could say that the pro-
posed nominations had been brought to the cog-
nisance of the Miinistry, without causing them to
interpose their authority as a positive bar to the
proceeding. The Mlinistry, on the other hand,
could declare--as, indeed, the Duke of Newcastle
very constantly did that they strongly disap-
proved the appointments, and never would have
made them if they had the full power in their
hands; but that, still, they did not feel it abso-
lutely incumbent upon them to take the somewhat
strong measure of interposing.
In the present condition of our State arrange-
ments, one of the best and most graceful uses of
an aristocracy is to supply the country in time of
war with commanders who~ have attained to dis-
tinction in presence of the enemy,~r and yet are
su~ffciently youthful. For a nation to build its
hopes upon so narrow a basis, instead of fairly
searching out from among the whole community
those men who may seem the best qualified to
lead its 'forces, this, no doubt, must be looked


upounas a rude, quaint practice, whlich is only cHA P.
savedi fr~om being preposterous by the fact thant no I
more raztional mlethodl hars hithlert~o foundc aiccept-
ance; but in thle meanltime, t~he practice, as thus
understood, has its value. The adlventitious cir-
cumstances combine w~ithl personal mierit, and lift
a maln int~o comman~2rd at the agcSe best adal;pt~ed fo
thle purpose; so that the qualities of a W'ellesley,
for instance, mayz come to be r~eco nisedl at t~hirty
instead of azt sixty-ar difference matterial to t~he
individual, but unspeaiablylS important to t~he
country; acnd in t.hat wayS (until az better methodl
can be discovered) the legitimate amb~ition olf
pow'erfu~l or wTealthy families may sublserve tihe
true interests of the State. If Lor~d Lucan~ aznd
Lor~d Car~digan had been tw-o nobles olf the age of
somue thlir~ty-three years, wrho hadC fought side by
side on the bankls of the Sutlej', w~ho hatd inspired
th2eir commallndcer~s wlith az high1 idea of t~beir ar~z-
like qualities, andi who, by asid' of these circum~-
st~ances combining with their family pretensions,
had azttainedl to such mnilitary~ rank; andl distinc-
tio n s to.obe recognized and deservingl candidates
for high connuandncs, then, indieedl, a country which
had not yet hit uponl any better mode of attiniung
the ob'ect would have hadl reason to be oranteful
for the existence of az system whlich supplied and
raised into eminence, azt the righlt time of life,
mlen capablle of wielding authority in the field-.
Far froml resting .upon any such basis, these ap-
pointments deprived t~he cou~ntry of th~e inestim-
able advazntage of seeing e qudosenrse


C HAP. to men in the prime of cavalry life who had
Sgloriously served in th~e field, and committed a
superbly great stake to twvo peers of the ages of
fifty-four, and fifty-seven, who, so far as concerns
that teaching wvhichl is imparted by responsible
war-services, were now to begin their education,
and begin it in the enemy's presence.
However, these two general officers were both
of them brave men, and in that, at all events,
there was a basis for hoping that, in spite of any
misfortunes resulting froml the appointments in
question, the honour of the service would be sus-
tained. It may be that, in professing to judge of
the seed which was sown in the spring, one is
governed too much by observing the harvest that
was reaped in the autumn but certainly this
double selection of generals does seem as though
it were fitted--and that without much help from
fortune-to involve the English Light Cavalry in
some ruinous, yet brilliant disaster.
There is a circumstance wThich tends in some
measure to account for dereliction of duty on the
part of those who were preparing our army for
foreign service :-Mnen who might be supposed
the most competent to form1 an opinion, were per-
suaded that the force would be used as a support
to negotiations, and not for actual warfare.*
I do not include the IDuke of NewTcastle amongst those
w~ho entertained the impression, but certainly the communica-
tions made to Lord Raglan-communications extending down
to the eve of his departure for Paris--compelled him almost
to believe that the period of foreign service would be extremely


The officer ap~pointedl to t~he commandc of the cu Pr~ .
Heavy D1fragoons wa~s Briadlier General the
H-onloura,~b le Jamles Scartllett.. He wa~s fifty five G'"neral'
y-ears of age, andl he too, like Lord Lucan andl
Lord Ca~rdigan, had never dlone service in t~he
field; but, besides those soldier~ly qualities of'
whichr~l weP shall bep abler to judgle whl~en w\e see him
engagning the enemiy, he was gifted w\ith tw~o quiet
attributes, w~hichi enabledl him to appreciatte the
deficiency, and do all that matn could to supply it.
He had modesty as w~ell as good sense; and
knuowingr thatt experience, va~luable in almost all1
undlertakings, is especially valuable in the great
business of war~, he did not f'or a muoment assume
that., by the magic virtue of hiis mer~e appointment
to a commn~nd, he became all at once invested
with the knuow\ledg~e or the pralct~ical skill whlichl
mien acquire in the fieldl; and h~e therefore deter-
mlined, if he could, to have men at his side w~ho
k~new of their owvn klnoledge w~hat fi ghtilz~ng s,
andc hadc even won high diistinction.
The officers wh~om Scarlett chose as hiis atide-d'e-
camp, was Lieutenant Alexanderr Elliot. Before
thelp ~pe~iriod of h~is centering~ t~he Royail Armyn?, Elliot,
had served five years in India. He was in the
Gwa:lio. r campaign, and at the battle of Punnniar
comma~nded a troop of the 8th Beunal Light
C'avalry. WTith thle same regiment he w~ent
through the whole of the eventful andi moment-
ous struggle which we call thle fir~st~ Sutlej cam~-
1,ipaign. He commlrandedl a squadrlo n at the great
battle of Fer~ozeshah; sad at a timle wh~en the


62d had been driven back and almost annihil-
ated, he executed a desperate charge, and with
his standard-bearer and five troopers penetrated
into the Sikh entrenchments. In recognition of
his brilliant cavalry service in that war, Lord
Hardinge appointed him to a command in his
body-guard, and made him honorary aide-de-camp.
Being afterwards constrained to leave India, by
the state of his health, he entered the Royal
Army, and it was owing to this necessitated
change that he bore no higher rank than that of
lieutenant. WT~ith all the special knowledge and
instincts of a brilliant cavalry officer, he had
qualifications of a more general kind; and if there
had been at the time of the invasion a minister so
strong and so resolute as to be able to do the
thing which is right, a manl such as Elliot would
have been eagerly laid hold of and entrusted with
high cavalry command.
But this wvas not all that Scarlett wvas able to
do towards arming himself with the experience of
men wvho had done good service in war. Colonel
Beatson had fought under Evans in Spain, and
had afterwvards risen to high distinction in India.
Being for the time in Europe, and yielding to the
warlike impulses of his nature, he had laid aside
those considerations of military rank which might
have governed a lower order of mind, and con-
sented to be attached to General Scarlett's Staff
as his extra aide-de-camp. Lord Lucan, with
that unhappy perversity which was so constantly
marringn his cleverness, opposed himself to this



last rangemuilent of Scarlett's, and declared, it CHA P.
seems, that Colonel Bentson must not be con- T
sideredi as havingr any ~recgnised position in the

II ha~ve sa.idi that if General Scarlett enjoyed thle
inlunense adva~ntagc e of hearing tw~o su~ch aicles-die-
carunp as these, he ow\edl the haippy idiea of thlus
strengthening himself to his owTn w~isolon> and
muodesty; but. it is w~orth while to say tha~t tbhat
latst quality of his haid a. t~eudency to w\ithdr~aw~
ojur br~i ade ojf HeavyS Dragoon0Ls fr'oml its due
sharie of public attention. Conc urri ner with~
other known caunses, General Scarlett's quiet
unobtrusiveness did much to pierevet his fellow-
counlltrymenpl f~lrom~ acqua~inting~c therolselve~s so fuilly
as they might oth~erwise ha.ve been eag.er to do
with the figh-t betw~een his bri gae and th~e mal~in
bodly of the R~ussian cavanlry.
Onl t.he day of the battle of Balaciava it was
not the destiny of G~eneral Scarlett to have to act
under any' greatt com~plexity of cir~cumstances, nor
to give rise to any kindl of public controversy,
an~d it w~ill thereforle be eansy to see and to under-
stand~ himi in action w~ith~out ha~\vint a prelimin-
ary'3 kunowledge of thle man; but in truth his
achievements correspondled so closely w~ith thle
nioble and heroic simplicity of his character, tia~t
the account of whait hie did will not fail to carryS
al1ong w~ith it a. true indiication of hi~s luality-.
WTe shall see himt leatd hris great charge.



The strength and compactness of the position
taken up by the Allies on the Chersonese upland
wvas not at all shared, as wve knowv, by the scanty
detachment of infantry which Lord Raglan1 had
been able to spare for the defence of Balaclava.
Stationed apart in the plain belowv, this small
force was in such local relation to the A~llied
army on the Chersonese as to be lying outside,
and at the foot of the natural castle from which
the main body looked dowvn.*
Yet Balaclava wvas the storehouse, the arsenal,
the port, wvhence the English drewv all their sup-
plies; and such wvas the anomalous character of
the arrangements which Lord Raglan had been
forced to adopt, that, instead of being safely en-
sconced in the rear of the main Allied camp, the
material sources of the English strength lay in-
viting the enterprise of Prince Mlentschikoffs
field army, and in charge, so to speak, of ant out-
It, however, seemed feasible to construct a
system of field-works which would enable the
troops left out in the plain belowv to wlithstand an
attack for such time as to allowv of the needed
reinforcements coming dowTn to their aid from the
upland; and the English were quickened in their
sense of the importance belonging to this part of
their task, by the always increasing strength and
See Invasion of the Crimea, vol. IV. of Cabinet Edition,
pp. 43 et seq. and 232 et seq.


Itelo es


ness of the
Rnssians in
the valley of
the wcher-


boldnless of thie Russian force whlichl had begu~n to CAP
shiow itself in thle direction of Tehocrgounl so nearly
as the 7t~h of Octob~er.
Before hearing of the battle of the 25th of Tle sala-
October, it. is w~ell to hav\e lan idea of the ground li posi-'';'
upon0 whichl the sec~urityl) of Balazclalva dependled,
andl the arrnanemlents wh~ichl had bjeen made for
its d~efence.
The sctringP of houses consCtitultin' Balaclava~ ex- thie town.n
tended alongr a7 narrow'0~ ledge between t~he easct~er~n
side of tlhe little harbhour1 andl the wrester~n acclivi-
t.ies; of Mlount Hiblak. Except atb the gPorge of
Kadcikiji towarllds thle northl, a~nd t~he narrowT~ strafit~
t~owafrds the south leading~ cr'ookedly into the
Euxine, both thle towrn and t~he harbour w~ere sur-
roundedl in all directions by steep lofty hills; andi
the hills towar~lds thie w~es being at continuattion
of thatt Chers.Eonese upland where the main .Allied
arlmies lay cramped, w~ere within t~he uznquest~ione d
dlominion of thle inlvaders.cj
Par~tly fr~om thlis ca-use, a7nd pa~t~ly fr~oml their
command of the sea including the smacll bu~t
depnlnrln ll habour,~ hih brought ships of the line close
up~ to theF ton~n-t~he E~nglish, a~t Balaclava, wer~e
secure against~ any' attalck coming either fr~om tihe
w~est or th~e south; atnd again, towardlts t~he ealst,
t6he gnro~und wns not only steep and comumanding,
bu~t otherwTise favourabtlle for defence. Alccordc-
ing~ly, forom a parlt of t~he seal-cliff' whlich is one
mile east. of Balaclava,, and thence northl and
north-west to tihe Chur~chl of St Elias, in t~he
neighbourhood of Kadik~ii, a7 curve could be


drawn, extending along a distance of betwTeen twvo
and three miles, in which nature had done so
much for the defence that, by expending upon it
a moderate amount of labour, and arming thle
works there constructed wTith a fewV naval gunls of
position, our Engineers were enabled to place all
th~is portion of the inner line in a fair state of
security, without diverting from the duties of the
siege any' very large body of men.* The guns
thus planted wvere manned, it seems, by our Miarine
Artillery ; and the only bodies of infantry which
this line of more than two miles absorbed, were
the 1200 marines from our fleet, under the com-
mand of Colonel Hunrdle, with twvo companies of
the 93d Regiment.#
Tow~Tards the north, the hills opened, and the
place could be approached by the gorge of Kadi-
koii; but even there, at intervals there were spurs
thrown out from the neighboring acclivities
which offered goodl sites for several small field-
wvorks, and by taking advantage of these, our
Engineers completed their inner line of defence.
The troops on which Sir Colin Campbell relied
for the defence of the gorg~e were the main body
-that is, six companies of the 93d Highlanders,
*t The number of guns in battery along this inner line of de-
fence was, I think, 26. The Engineers were confident in the
security of the 'inner line,' and at times certainly Sir Colin
Campbell shared their belief ; but I gather that he was brought
into an anxious state of mind by the peculiar responsibility
which weighed u~pon him, and his language in regard to the
security of the position was not always the same.
t Our Engineers put the length of the line, taken altogether,
at about three miles.'-O0fficial Journal, p. 41.




w~ith a battalion of Turks and a battery of field- C HA P.
a rtille ry.
In the~ harbour, there~y was~71 a ~n Elis'h cor~vett.e
called' t~he W~asp; and besidess a score or tw~o
of English soldiers, hiavingn duties of somue kind
which brought t~hemu to Ba~laclava on the dary of
the battle) there lay in the town some eighty~ or
a hundred En lish soldiers, w~ho, althou h in-
valid'ed, were not so p~rostrate as to be unable to
handle z mus'ket.
So great wa~is thle confidence which most of ourl
people rep)osed inl the strength of this inner line
of defence, in the equality of all the tr~oop~s which
mannetd it., andc in the prowess of thle veteran
soldiier wvho commanded the garrison, that the
safety of the ground thus covered cost them
little or no uneasiness; and, as a niot inexpressive
signl of t~he quiet efficiency w~ith which this parlt
of the dlefence was made good, I maty mention
that an officer holdings a very highl and responsible
command, andl one, too, wh'lich dild not at all
tend to divert himl froml this part of the Allliedl
position, was lo1gr able to remain unaccqualinted
WTith the exception of, a unner and a f'ew ren in charge,
the 'WSasp' at first hadl no crewr on board. The Diamond' was
lying also in the harbour, but she neither hiad guns nor crew
on board, and was in chargPe, it seems, of a single shiip-keeper.
Captain Patison, R.N., co~mmnding the Simoomt' a troop-
ship, w~as the senior nava~l officer in the barbour. WVhen he
became aware that there wa;Ls likely to be an attack;, hie ordered
his first lieutenant, Lieutenant. Selby, to collect thle w~orkingP
parties, and gett thernl on board thle asp,' thereby enablingt
the corvette, if called upon, to deliver fire from hier starboard
broadside; and hie also directed that one wTatch should follow
himn ashore, and tak~e part, in the land defence.


with the very existence of the inner line of de-
fence, and to hear of it for the first time some
ten years after the peace. To him in the Crimea
this inner line of defence was what oxygen is to
a peasant--a blessingr unperceived and unzheazrd
of, on which his existence depended.
The gorge of Kadikriji opens out into a large
tract of ground which, though marked in some
places by strong undulations, boy numberless
hillocks, and' even by features deservingo the
name of heights,' is yet, upon the whole, so
much lower, and so much more even than the
surrounding country, as to be called the plain
'of Balaclava.'
This tract of comparatively low ground is the
field of the engragemenlt, which we are accustomed
to call the battle of Balaclava, but it lies a mile
north of the town." It has an average length of
about three miles, with a breadth of about two, and
is hemmed in on almost all sides by ground of
from some 300 to 1000 feet high; for, on the north
of the plain, there are the Fedioukine Hills; on
the east, Milounzt Hasfort; on the south~, the Ka-
muara Hills and M~ount Hiblak; on the west, the
steep buttresses of the Chersonese upland.
The distinctive feature of the basin thus formed
is a low ridge of ground, which, crossing the so-
called 'plain' in the direction of its lengnth--or,
in other terms, froml east to west-divides it into

See the map; but a glance at the diagram on the following
page may aid towards an apprehension of the general features
of the field.


The plain of


tw~o narrow- valleys. So completely has this orange CHAr PI.
of heights bridgedl over the plain, that it served '
as a na~turall viaduct~, eunabling the designers of the~
Woronzoff r~oad to carrly hris trace -line across
fr~om thle Kamara Hills on the. east to the Cher-

oi I-I~ ~ ac~'




C HA P. From the foot of the Chersonese the North
SValley sloped down in an eastern direction till
it reached the embankment of the aqueduct, there
crossed, at the time, by three bridges. A yet
farther descent of only a few yards down the
valley brought a rider to the left bank; of the
river Tehernaya, and to fords by which he might
cross it. On the other side of the river, and at
a distance of less than a mile, there stood the
village of Tehorgoun, where Liprandi, as we
know, had established his Headquarters, and
gathered his main strength. This North Valley
is ground on which the memory of our country-
men has bro od ed. lIt was the scene of the
Light Cavalry charge.
The South Valley is on the Balaclava side of
the Causeway Heigrhts.' At its eastern extremity
there is a knoll between 500 and 600 feet high,
which, being joined to the Kamara Hills by a
neck of high ground, juts out over the valley as
a promlontory does over the sea, and for a feature
thus conspicuous men soon found a name. They
called it 'Cailrobert's Hill.' At the opposite or
western extremity of this valley, the road con-
nectingn Balaclava with the Chersonese passed up
by way of the Col.' It is with the slope of a hill-
side descending into this South Valley, and with
the glory of Scarlett's Dragoons, that England
will have to associate her memory of the one
great fight between cavalry and cavalry which
took place in the course of the war.
It was of so much moment to secure Balaclava


fr~om disaster, that there could not but be a desire C HA P.
to prevent the enemy from coming within the I
limits of t~he South Va2lley; anud considering, on ,Cjy~~um
the one hand, the inconvenience of diver~ting )"f'le-
t.roops froml the siege for merely defensive pur-
poses, and, on t~he other, the configuration of t~he
ground in the platin of Balazclazva, mlen thought.
that w5hat wFas wanting in bayonets might possibly
be ek~ed out. with the spade ; and this idiea was thle
more readily pursued because it happened that
--in part from t~he confidence of t~he Sultan, andZ
in part fr~om the gratciousness of t.he FErench Com-
mander-Lord R-aglan had obtained the services
of some 3000 Tur~kish soldiers, wrho miight first
be employed in constructing t.he requisite earth-
wTorks, andi t~hen in mlanning thleml. Our Engineers
saw~ thatt by t.hrow~ing up a slight w~ork on Can-
robert's Hill, and a chain of little redloubts on t.he
bosses or hillock~s which mar~lk a~t short int~ervals
the rang e of th~e Cazuseway Heights, there might.
be formued an ent1enched position which wTould
enable a force of moderate strength to hold the
ground against one much more numerous; andl
it is evident that the design~ would have had a2
great value if t~he position of Bazlaclav\a, w~hen
expecting an a tt.azck fr~oml 20,000 or 25,000 mlen,
had had a small armly of 10,000 or 12,000 men
to defend it. But no such conditions existed;
for, on the one hand, t.he A-llies, if they could
have time to come dow~n, were in no danger at
this period of being outnumbered in the plain;
and, on the other hand, there wafs not only no


C HA P. army at Balaclava of such strength as to be able
to defend an entrenched position like that which
might be formed on the line of the Causeway
Heights, but actually no army at all, and no force
of any kind that could be charged to support the
men placed in the intended works, save only a
division of cavalry, with a single troop of horse-
artillery. Our Engineers formed an entrenched
position which could only have strength upon the
supposition that several thousands of the Alied
infantry would have time to come down and
defend it. Yet, unless there should be a more
than English vigilance in the plain of Balaclava,
and unless, too, our Division of Cavalry should
be so .brilliantly wielded as to be able to check
and disconcert for some hours the marches of the
enemy's columns, there was no good ground for
imagining that the strength of this outer line,'
or the prowess of the brave Osmanlis who were
to be placed in its earthwyorks, could fairly be
brought into use.
It would seem, therefore, at first sight, that
General de To dleben' s severe criticism of the
outer line of defence m1ust have been well
enough justified; but the truth is, that the
scheme was never recommended by our Engineers
as a really trustworthy expedient. They chose it
apparently as a makeshift which light more or
less baffle a hitherto unenterprising enemy; and,
at least, their plan had the merit--the then truly
enticing merit--of diverting no English forces
from the great business of the siege; for if the


outer line of defence had not been adopted, our CHA P.
cavalry'3, withl its at~tendannt tr~oop of hor~se-arlt illery3,
would still have been cramped in thle pla~in.
On Canruobert'ss Hill there wa~s thr~own up a The worlks
con stit utinoi
sli ght breastwork;, with it~s salient towar~lds thle tile outter
3 ~line o:f de-
nlor~th-east; nd a~lone the whole line of th~e Cause- rence.
way Heighits there wvere formed as mainy as five
other ear~thworks,, each smaller andl weak~er thacn
the onle on Canr1obert'ss Hill. Of these six wvorks
some w~ere op~en at the gorgpe, andl some closed, but
they~ used to b~e all called redloubts.' '
Thle wvorkl on Canr11o bert's Hill was~~ knov n as
the Redoubt Nnumber One, andl the five others
w~orkls werle distinguish~e d by successive num-
bers J but. the one whlich, in this waly, received
the name of' Numuber Three, wa~s sometimes also
enlledi Aranbtabia.'
Thle wvorkls w~ere executed by Tur~kish lborst
nature o~f
un~der thle d~irectio n of anI Eng lishl Engineer officer.- the w~orks.
I may usefully mention once mor~e that--lik~e several other
wor~ds, as, for instance, like the wTord shlip (wlic~h may either
be used in a very general sense, or else muay be taken to desig-
nate a thr~ee-m~astedl vessel of a par1ticular r~ig), thle w~od re-
' doubt' has pra~ctically two mea~nings, one general, the other
distinctive. Lord Rag~lan--the miost accurate of mlen in~ his
language--constantly used the word redoubt' inl its general
sense, ap'plying it indliscriminately to works whlic~h wvere openl
at the gorgee as well as to those whiich wvere not; anid so did Sir
Colin Camipbell.
+ I adopt the nomenclature which obtain~ed so genlerally as to
re~nder anly other inconvenlient,; b~ut 1 ma~y usefully mlentionl
that som~e--ad amiongst thiem Lord~ Ragrlan-dlid~ not include
the w\or~k on Canr1ober~t's Hill in the nuumerical designation.
\Yith themll the worIk cointnonlyU~ ca~lled Numblel Tw~o would6 be
Numb~er One, and so on.
= Lieutenant Wa~gman, I believe, but I hear Captain Stanton


CHuA P. They were of very weak profile, and a horsemnan,
I.as was proved by the Cossacks, could well enough
ride through and through them. Indeed, one of
the works was begun, completed, and armed in a
single day.
Brmament The work on Canrobert's Hill was armed with
wYorks. three 12-pounder iron guns, supplied by Dundas
from our fleet; and the three redoubts next ad-
joining it--that is, the Redoubt Number Two, the
Aratbtabia or Redoubt Number Three, and the
Redoubt Number Four were each of them armed
with two guns of the same sort and calibre.*
The two other works--namely, the Redoubt num-
ber Five and the Redoubt Number Six -were
unarmed on the day of the battle.
H~ow The works were manned by Turkish troops, one
battalion of these being posted on Canrobert's
Hill, and a half battalion or wing in each of the
Causeway redoubts. -1
The K~amar~a The work on Canrobert's Hill was perilously
Height left
in posses- exposed to any artillery which might be placed
sion of the
enemy. in battery on the neighboring ridge of K~amara;
and no arrangements were made for preventing

also took some part. The work completed in a single day was
the Number Two.'
There is at difference between the various authorities which
record the number and place of these guns, Lord Raglan put-
ting them at seven, Todle~ben at eleven, and others at inter-
mediate numbers. I put them, as may be seen, at nine.-
Journal of Operations.' The difference is an immaterial one,
-t From information communicated to me by Lord Stanley of
Alderley, I have reason to believe that a French offcer at the
time remonstrated against the plan of leaving the Turks un-
supported in such a position.


thle enemy from seizingn thiis va7nt,?nge-ground, for CHA P.
the ridge of Karumar was itself overtopped by
cr~ests ra~n iun hi gher and h~igher in thle direction
of Baidar; and it was judged tha~t to attempt~ to
hlold miore around w~ouldi be t~o a~dd to t.he w~eatk-
niess of this outer line. As it wa~s, t~he lin~e of Iniselrent
~ealk ness
these six earthworks~ extendled over aZ space of or use 'outer
mlor~e t~han twro miles; and Canrober~t's Hill wa~s
so~ distant fr~om the groundi whience supporting
forces m-ight be expected to come, as to 08~'er the
enemy a? licence of somne hours' durationi for ainy
enter'prise in thle plain~ of Balaclava~ upon whlichl
hie might think fit to venture.*
The: only force immredia7tely available for a~t- nle frce
temptingF to give any support to thle Turks was available for
the division of Engrlishi cavalry, whiich~, alongf w~ith EtieTlrf
its att.tendant, troop of hlorse-artille ry3 (crommnded~e
by Captain Marude), wa~s under t~he orders of Lord
Luca7n. This division of caivalry3 comprised some
1500 sabres, and was inl hignh order. It lay
camped on thle southern lopes of the Caiuseway3
Heights, at a distance of not muchl less thanl
tw~o miles fr~om Courobert's Hill, but it kept an
outlying picket att at spot uner the heights of
Such, thlen, wans the outer line of defence; anld
this-onlly t~his-w\as tbhe force whiichl, except after
The distance from Canrob.ert's Hill to the camp of the
nearest English division of Infantrys was only about fo~ur~ miles
going straight; but wre shall see that, from the monlent of
first giving the alarm to that wrhen an Englishi division could
b~e got down to even the more western part of the plain, some
hours elapsed.


CHArpP. the lapse of some hours, could be expected to
Come and support it.
sir colin It is strange, but still true, that for some time
confidence. before the 25th of October, Sir Colinl Campbell
had been every day growing more and more con-
fident in the strength of the position. There wvere
moments, no doubt, when he spoke more distrust-
fully, but in his report of the 20th of October,
sent up to Headquarters, he wrote : I think we
can hold our own against anything that may
comne against us in d.aylig'ht. I am, however, a
little apprehensive about the redoubts if seri-
ously attacked during the night; and, in a later
report, he said, 'I fancy we are now very strong
as well as secure.'
It could not but be that, when so wvary and
anxious a soldier as Sir Colin reported the posi-
tion secure, he would more or less impart his
own trustfulness to Headquarters; and it is not
to be wondered at that, when thus assured, Lord
Raglan abstained fr~ont weakening his scant re-
sources by sendling; down any further detachments
of infantry;.
The Turkish redoubts, though capable of sup-
plying useful aid to an army, had no such means
of indtependent self-defence as to warrant the
notion of their holding out without support; and
it is evident that, in the absence of infantry, no-
thing short of a vigilant and brilliant use of the
cavalry a~rm would enable the Turks to wvith~stand
a determined attack. I cannot say whether Sir
Colin Campbell's sense of security was in any


hi gh die gee founded upon the cavalry~, or w\hethier,CA.
for once, he w\ent along w\ith thle hierd in his
estimalt~e of wrhat could be insurledl by a little
uIpturnI of the soil w~ithl a f'ew\ Tur1ks standing
behindi it.
Ai mrain defect in the alrra~ng!emlents of thie Allies
was the one u~nder~ which it r~esulted~ thit those
divisions of infantry onl the Chersonese which lay
thie nearest to the plalin below\ were not the tr~oops
of thie nat~ion~ which undertook; to defend B~ala-
clava. Bosquet, w~ith tw~o divisions, wans so
p~osted on the edge of the Cher~sonese uLpland,
that, jucdging froml t.heir positionl alone, his troops
might have been naturiallly looked to as the first
to descend into thie plain f'or the defence of Ba1la-
clav~a; atnd, b~esidles that Generafl Bosquet waRs an
ardcent soldiers, anld a, manR moIst loyall in a~t~ion,
there is no reason for supp,1osing~ that mler'e differ'-
enc~e of nationality alone would have madle the
Frenchl slow to comle dlown to thle alid of Sir Colin
Campbell; but the fa~ct of the inter~posedl force
beince under~ thie or~der~s of a comman ~der other
than Lord Rag lan, madte a danger~ousj break; in the
chazin by,3 which the Allies held together~. It wa~s
only3 by' per~suadling Genleral Caur~obertt to allow
it, thant the nearest of the balttalious on the Cher-
sonese could be made to par1tRake in a battle upon
the plain of Balaclava; and t~he exceed~ing scant-
iness of the infantry3 force wvhic~h Lor~d Raglan
hlad been able to spare for the inamediate defence
of the place mlade it a thing~ of gr~eat moment that
the promaptest possible despatchi of r~einforie mle ntss


should not be left dependent upon the result of
persuasions addressed to an independent com-
mlander, more especially where the commander
whose assent thus had to be gained was a manl of
a hesitating and anxious temperament.
Independently of the inherent fault that there
was in this outer line of defence, the subsidiary
arrangements were far fr~om being calculated to
avert a disaster.
One important omission was this : In all the
works constituting this outer line, the Turkish
soldiery were left without that strengthening
help which might have been afforded them by
the presence in each redoubt of one or two Eng-
lishmen accustomed to rule Orientals; and the
want was in no way supplied by sending, instead,
a non-commissioned officer of artillery.* 'Then,
again, since the cavalry was much looked to as
an arm to ward off for some time anly Russian
attack, it would have been well to avoid a sever-
ance of authority by placing under one com-
mlander the whole of the forces, whether horse, or
foot, or artillery, which were charged with the
In the mere mechanical business of working a gun the
Turkish Topdji is likely to be quite as well skilled as an Eng-
lish artilleryman. What is wanted for converting a herd of
Turks into a formidable body of warriors is the presence of a
resolute man or boy of a higher station in life, who will under-
take to lead them. The singular power that can be exerted
over a Turkish force by a dozen, by six, nay even by two young
English officers is spoken of in the Invasion of the Crimea,'
vol. ii. of Cabinet Edition, chap. xiii. Notwithstanding all
that had been achieved in the defence of Silistria and on the
field of Giurgevo, there was an entire neglect of the means
which there produced such brilliant results.


the Allies


defence of Balaclava; for excellent as was thle C HA P.
Iunderstandine between Lordl Lulcan and LSir Colinl i.
Camnpbell, their concord w~as no equivalent for the
advanta e whlich belongs to absolute unity of
Above all, if the plau of defence were to rest at
all on our cavalry, there was cogent need of an
eff'ort to neutr~alise in some measure t'he vice of
Lord Hardinge's peace-service appointments, andi
to makle arrangemenlts for givringF more or less
of initiative power in the field to mlen such as
Mrorris andl Elliot, who w~ere pr~actised in war,
and knewv by their own exper~ience w~hat it wa~s
to lead squad~crous in battle. No such effort was
It w~as against these diefences of Balaclavra that Mentsent.-
Prince 1\Ientschikoff' now resolved to direct an 2,8r~u-
attack. So nearly as the night of thle 13th of thie
m~outh, Colonel Rakovitch, with three b~attalions, the forces
four gruns,,l and a.coupl3e of hunlldrled Co8ssacks, had C( t"EP'
ventured down from the Ma~ckenzie Heights; and enterprise.
hlaving been su~ffer~ed at break of day on the fol-
10wing mor~ning~ to take possession of the village
of Tchorgoun, he there established the nucleus of
a force complete in all arms, which thenceforthl
began to gather in the valley of the Tehiernaya.
On the 23d, this force haid been definitely con-
stitu~ted as the 'Detachmuent of Teholrgonu,' andt
placed under the command of Genera~l Lipraudli.
The force comprised 17 battalions of foot, 30
squadrons of hiorse,*F andl 64 g~uns. But besides
*20 squadrons of regular cavalry, and 10 'sotnias' (or, as I


the troops under the orders of Liprandi, there was
a distinct force, commanded by General Jabro-
kritsky, andi comprising some 8 battalions,* 4
squadrons of horse, and 14 gunns, which had
orders to co-operate with the Detaclunent of
Tehorgoun. Altogether, therefore, the force set
apart for the attack upon the defences of Bala-
clava comprised 25 battalions, 34 squadrons of
horse, and 78S guns. The nzumerical strengrt~h of
the force is not to be learned with strict accu-
racy; J but it seems to have amounted to about
24, or 25,000 men.f
For a sound appreciation of the battle of Bala-
clava, it would be well to know what was the
object contemplated by the assailant. Hlis pri-
have above called them squadronsns) of Cossacks. A 'sotnia'
imported only a full hundredsl' of mounted Cossackis, but the
' squadron' of regular cavalry at the opening of a campaign ~had
a strength of about 156.
Literally, 7 and (ths.
t Because, at the period in question, the morningg states'
of the infantry had been left uncorrected since the beginning
of the month, and the 'states' of the cavalry were wanting
altogether. -Todleben, p. 388.
,* On the 25th of October 1854 the most recent 'states' of
the infantry strength were those which had been furnished
at the beginning of the month; and these, together with the
estimated reckoning of the cavalry (of which no states' had
been prepared), give a total of 23,425, without counting the
artillerymen, who (at 30 men for each gun) would number
2340, making, altogether, 25,725 ; but it is right to say that
General de Todleben (by making a guess at the deductions from
strength which may have occurred since the beginning of the
month, and by reducing the estimate of the cavalryr strength)
cuts down the total effective to 20,500 (pp. 388-390). In that
estimate, however, he does not, I believe, include the 2840


The object
of the con-


miary' design w~as to seize thie outer line of de-
fence and thle camp, of the 93d High~lalnders, as
w~ell as thle camp of th~e Tur~ks established near
Kiadiki~i." It is plain, hiowever, thlat the enter-
prise of an assa.ilant whio might attain to so iunch
as that would be strangely collapsingr if he ver~e
t~o stay7~ his v'ictor'iou1s advan~c e without doinec~ all
he couldi to briun ruinl upon the Eng~lish~ in the
small crowdcedl port fr~om which they drew their
supplies; andi t~he possession of' a spot fr~omi which
it wvouldl hatve been p~racticable to shell Balaclava7
must needs hatve been coveted. Thle dlestruction
of thie root which the English hatd tak~en in Bal-
aclavan may therefore, perhaps, b~e r~egarde d as
the r~eal, though ulterior object of thle intendedl
Thle force dlestined for the attack upon t~he
Turk~ish redoubts was divridedl inito three colum~ns.
The left columnn wa~s comma~nded byT General
Gribbi, thle centre column by\ General Semia-
kine, the r~ight~ column~ by Colonel Sccudery;
andl, w~ith that last force, Generatl Jbrl'okr'itsk'cy's
dletachment was in close co-operatbion. G~ribbd
was to issue fromt the direction of t~he Ba7id~ar
valley, seize the heights of Kamr auln and2 thence
take part in the atta-ck directed against Can-
robert's Hill. GeerllR Cemlia~kine, at the samne
time, w~as to adlvance against Canrobert's Hill,
and thle Redoubt Numlber Two, bjy the road l
w~hichl leadsl fr~om Tehorg~oun to Kdki
Colonel Sucudery's columnl wa's to issue fr~om
Todlleben, pp. 354, 357, 388.


Dist ihibulon




ca P. the Tractir road, march across the NTorth Valley,
Sand thence advance upon the Arabtabia or Re-
doubt Number Three.'
The main body of the cavalry with its attenzd-
ant batteries was to enter t~he NTorthz Valley, and
there form in columns of attack to await Liprandi's
next orders.
A battalion of the Ukraine regiment, with a
company of riflemen and a battery of field-artil-
lery, wras to constitute the reserve.
Finally, General Jabrokritsky, though not
under the orders of Liprandi, was to cover the
intended attack by descending from the region
of Miackenzie's Farm and taking post on the
Fedioukine Hills.
Nlctwvithstanding the trust they repose in the
direct intervention of Heaven, the TIlurks know
how to eke out their faith by means sufficiently
human; and being too warlike a people to be
careless of the value of foreknowvledge in regard
to the designs of the enemy, they see the use of a
scout. The officer w~ho had the merit of obtain-
ing, at this time, g~ood, decisive intelligence, was
Rustem Pasha, the Turkish Brigadier-General.
24th oct. On1 the 24th of October, a spy employed by him
of tbe brought back an account which disclosed Lip-
enemy's ap-
proaching Trandi S designs for the morrow. The man an-
nounced that troops to the number of 25,000,
and of all arms, were to march upon the plain of
Balaclava, and he even prepared his hearers to
expect an advance from the direction of Baidar.
He was carefully examlined by Lord Lucan, as well.


as by Sir Colin Campbell; andc, both generals CA P.
coming to the conclusion that t~his report wans
wvell worthy of attention, Lordi Binghalm (his
fazther's aide-die-camlp) w~s sent by Lord Lucan to
Headquarters with a letter fr1om Sir Colinl Camp-
bell conveyingr the intelligence. Lord Binghamz n
delivered the letter anrd t~he tidings it conveyed
to the Quarlterma~sterr-Ge nerllR but diid not suc-
ceed in obtaining~ an interview with Lord Rag~lau,
w\ho wans then engaged w\ith Canrobert. General
Alirey, it is true, interrupted t~he conference of the
two Commndllzcers, and shlowved Lord Raglazn the
letter; but the answer first elicited was only a
message of acknow~le dgmntel sent back in the
words, Vel~ry ell!' lf'terward~cs Lordc Rag~lan
requested that anly new occurrence ~hichi might
take place should be repor~ted to hliml; bu1t no
fresh or~der~s resultedl frloml the inlforma~itionl thlus
furnished. The tr~uth is t~hat only a. few day~s
before, Lordc Ragilan hlad been induced by a simii-
lar report to send dlown 1000 mlen of the 4~th
Division, wrho hadt to be malrched~ back w~heni it
proved that the enemy was not advantcing." He
could ill affordl to exhazust t~he time and strength
of his mlen in those marches andi countermartzches,
andl he seems to have come to thle conclusion thacit
it -wouldi be inexpedient f'or himl to b3e again
despatching reinforcements to the outer line of
defence in the plain of Balaclava, unless he
should learn that the: enemy wa~s actually ad-
vanicingr against it.
This w~as on thle 21st of October.



In accordance with its daily custom, the Eng-
lish cavalry on the morning of the 25th of Oc-
tober had turned out an hour before daybreak;
and the men were standing to their horses when
Lord Lucan, already in the saddle and followed
by his Staff, moved off at a walk towards Can-
robert's Hill. TwVo of the Divisional Staff--Lord
William Paulet, I think, and M~ajor MiL'M/ahon,
who had now, it seems, been joined by Lord
George Paget-wTere riding some distance in rear
of their chief, and had come within about 300
paces of Canrobert's Hill, when a streak of pale
light in the horizon before them began to disclose
the morning. Presently, there was grey enough to
show through the dusk that Canrobert's Hill was
not without its standard; but soon, it became
almost clear, andl presently afterwards certain,
that from the ~flag-staff of the w~ork twvo ensigns
WeTB 1/111@. 'HOl10ai' said one,'there are two
flags flying What does that mean ?' Why,
that surely,' said another,-' that surely is the
arranged signal--the signal that the enemy is ad-
vancing. Are you quite sure ? The questioner
was soon answered; for scarcely had he spoken
when the fort opened fire from one of its 12-
pounder guns. The Staff-officers hurried forward
to overtake their chief ; and Lord G~eorge Pagaet
galloped back at speed to the cavalry camp,
where (in the absence of Lord Cardigan, who had
the practice of sleeping on board his yacht, and


befo e day-
of Lord
Lucan and
his Staff.

Break of
day swo
ev~inga from
the fort on

The import
of this.

P;ire opened.


hiad niot yet come up from~ Balaclava) he took; cHAP.
upon himself to amount t~he Light Briga~de. He
had harldly done this wh~len a m~es~sengel came inl orq"
from the front wiithl an orders despatchedl by Lor~d
Lucan (then reconnoitringr with Sir Colin Camp-
bell in the direction of our advanced post) which
directed t~he immiediatte advance of the cavalry.
Thus it seems t~hat the Tur~ks not, only obtainled v'isianice
. .ev'inedl by
the earh~lest iut~ellignence of the impending att.ack, the Turks.
but were also the first t~o perceive the advance of
the enemy.. The elevation of Canr~obert's Hill
m~ay hazve aided their surlveys, bu~t without being
wa~tchful and sagnacious, they could hardly have
succeeded in b~eina beforeha~nd withi so keen a
soldier as Sir Colin Campbell.
WTe w~t~chled the sweet slumber~s of a Cabinlet
w~hilst~ assenting to t~he cogent despat~ch which
enfor~ced this invasion; but now~, in the midst of'
the campaign, andl at a moment w~hen accounts
h~ave come in, which announce an attack for t~he
morrow in the direction of the Baidlar valley, we
laty .st~eal before b~reak; of day' to the ground where
the enemy is expected, and there, seek our ideal
of vigilatnce in the outlying cavalry picket.
We shall seek in vain. Thle EngSlish soldier'S The Engilish
w5ant of vigilance is so closely allied to some of want or
. .vigilance.
lus greatest qua~lities (as, for iust.,nuce, to his pride,
atnd his sullen unwillingness to be put out of his
wpay by' mere datnger), that our countrym~en incline
to think of it w~ith indlulgence, nay, perha~ps, wit~h
an u~nconfessed liking; btut if the fault is in somie
measure natural and cha~racteristic, it has been


aggravated apparently by the empty ceremonies
of military duty in peace-time; for to go on re-
hearsing men day after day, and year after year,
in the art of giving and taking pretended alarms
about nothing, and8 to carry on these rehearsals
by means of formulated sentences, is to do all that
perverted industry can towards preventing, in-
stead of securing, the bright look-out of the
The relation that there is between standing
armies and wvar bears analogy to that which con-
nects endowed Churches with religion;* and, in
particular, the Anglican arrangements for secur-
ing the infant mind against heresy show a curious
resemblance to those wThich are made during peace
for preventing surprises in war-time. WVhether
aiming at the one or the other of these objects,
man tries to secure it by formula. Just as
through the means of set questions and answers,
the anxious theologian arms children against
' false doctrine,' in the trust that, wThen they come
to riper years, they may knowv how to treat his
opponents, so also with him who makes rules for
the governance of soldiers in peace-time, the hope,
I have been justly reminded by Dean Stanley that the prac-
tice of arming young creatures with dogma is not at all confined
to established churches; and, as now corrected, I agree that,
although not furnished by the State, any funds provided for a.
particular worship in a continuous, chronic way, have a tendi-
ency to produce the effect mentioned in the text. It seems
that in some of the churches got up by subscription the theology
professed by the children is much more bold and violent than
that which obtains in our Anglican nurseries.--Note to 3dE



it seems, is t~hat they may learn to be vigilant CHAx P.
against night surprises by r~epeatedly saying their
catechism. Thle common challenge is brief ,
but, it being~ for~eseen that he w~ho is appointed to
altch may himself require wnatching, there have
been constitu~tedl for that purpose th1e functionaries
catlled~ visiting rounds,' whose duty it. is to see
thatt the sentries arie a~t their posts andZ awake, but,
since this very task of supervision hias itself also
latpsed into f'orm, the result is, that at a military
post requir'ing great vigilance, there goes on, all
night, a r~eiterat~ion of set questions atnd atnswers,
which tends to avert real w~at~chfulness bjy suggest-
ing thlat a mlere formlnt sign of not being absolutely
asleep wrill sufficiently answer the purpose. M~en
trainedl to look out as d~o sailors, are muore likely
to p~ierce to th~e utmost of wrhatt eye andc ear can
reachi, thatn those w~ho are repeat~ing to one another,
andt repeating andi repeating all nigFht, set lessons,
of wh]ich this is one: 'Ha-lt! who goes there?'
' oundls !' ; Wha;t rounds ?) 'isitiner rounds!'
'Visitiner rounds advance Alls w~ell !' W!hen
these words haive been reiteratted2 by th~e same men
a few: th~ousand t~imies, thley~ are as lulling as the
monotone watves that bjeat and still beatt on thte
shor~e. The tr~ut~h is, that th~e object of securing
a really keen wattchfu~lness is one wlhichi lies out
of the true scope of muechianical arrangem~ents.
A man~'s wits many be easily deadlened, they canl
hardrly be sharptenedl, bJyl formla.11~
Far fr~om detecting thie earliest signs of an be out-
advatnce in force, and being at once drliven lu, our


outlying picket enjoyed its tranquillity to the
last, and w~as only, indeed, saved from capture, by
the field officer of the day,' wvho learnt, as he
rode, what wvas passing, and conveyed to the men
of the wvatch-just in time to secure their escape--
that warning of the enemy's approach which they
themselves should have given.
Lord Lucan and Sir Colin Campbell wvere to-
gether a good wvay in advance; and, as day
broke, they sawv the enemy's columns of infantry
in march--sawv them converging upon the easterly
approaches of the Causeway Heignhts froml the
directions of Tehorgoun and Baidar. It soon
became apparent that, wvhatever might be his,
ulterior design, Liprandi's first object wvas the
seizure of the Turkish defences, beginning with
Canrobert's Hill; and Lord Lucan did not fail to
despatch an aide-de-camp to Headquarters wvith
intelligence of the impending attack.*
Our cavalry wvas brought forward and the
g11DS of Maude's troop of horse-artillery were got
into battery 011 the right of the Arabtabia or
Number Three Redoubt. The Light Cavalry
regiments wTere placed in reserve under the
southern slopes of the Causewvay Heights; and
Lord Lucan, then acting in person wvith his
~Heavy Brigade, sought to check the advance of
the enemy by demonstrations; ( but-w~ith the
full approval of Sir Colin Camlpbell, wFho indeed

Captain Charteris was the officer sent.
Lord Lucan with the Heavy Cavalry moved about,
' making demonstrations and threatening the enemy.'


Lord Luean
and Sir
Colin Camp-

sent off to
Lord Rag-

of the cav-
alry and


seems to have counselled this policy--he d~ete-
mlined~ to confine himself to thrleazts. HIis threazts
failed to dieter; for the Russians pursued their
design like men wlho hiad yet found no hindrance;
aznd indeedl it seems probable that the firmllness of
purpose they soon after disclosed wans in som~e
meazsur~e occatsioned by thie circumstances of their
having detected our cavalr~y leader in a deter-
miination to threaten w~ithlout striking. Since the
grloundl, in most places, was fatvour~able for the
manoeuvringr of horsemen, w~ith no such obstruc-
tions as would prevent t~hem from attemptingr
flank attacks on the enemy's infantr~y and ar~til-
lery, it may be t~hat a cavalry officer fresh from
w~a~r- service would have been able to check
Lipranzldi, and to check~ himl, again andlC again,
without sustaining grave loss; but if a man11 can1
so w~ield a. bodiy of catvalr~y as to mlake it the
means of thus arr1estinct for az tim~e aIn attack of
infantr~y andi artillery without mluch commiitting~
his squadronis, he has attained to highr arlt in
his calling; andl to expect a peace-servrice general
to achieve such a task, is much as though one
should take a h~ouse-painterr at hazzard andlc bid
him porltra~y az Madouua. There were r~iding
amlonlgst o~ur sqjuadcrons men w~ell tried inl war-
muen fa~edl alike for their' valour and their~ skill
as cavalry officers; and although the perversity
of our State authorities labou~edl, as it wer'e, to
neutranlise the unspeakable value of such experi-
enlce~ by pult~ting the menl who1 possessed it under
peace-service gepner~ls, yet if Canmnpbell' commandr


nile lenemy


had included that cavalry arm which formed so
large a proportion of the scanty resources standing
ready at the first for defence, it is imaginable that
he would have been able to say a few words to some
such a man as M~orris or Alexander Elliot, which
would have had the effect of checking the enemy
without bringing grave loss on our squadrons."
Such a result would appear to be the more within
reach, when it is remembered that Liprandi's
advance w~as in three columns moving upon
' external lines without speedy means of inter-
communication, and that Gribbd's column -the
one upon which the whole enterprise much de-
pended-comprised only three battalions of in-
fantry. -r
The Russians had begun their advance at five
o'clock in the morning. WCIithout encountering
the least opposition, General Gribbb, moving for-
ward from the direction of the Baidar valley with
three battalions, a squadron of horse, and tenl
pieces of cannon, had been suffered to take pos-
session of the vilage of Kamara; and when there,
he was not only enabled to cover the advance of
the assailing forces on their left flank, but also on
the high ground above--ground commanding the
Object; of attack--to establish his ten guns in
battery, with the purpose of directing their fire, at
I refer to Captain M~orris (commanding the 17th Lancers)
and Lieutenant Alexander Elliot (aide-de-camp? to General
Scarlett) merely as the two war-service officers of cavalry then
in the Crimes whose names first occur to me. They were both
of them men who had earned fame in honest war.
t See, in the Appendix, Lord Lucan's view as to this.


K~amara :

ancl opening
fire on the


close range, upon the ~or~k crownin Canrobert.'S C'HAP.
H ill.*
Nearly at the same timne, Semiakine's forces Advasnce or
Semiakine :
hatving advanced froml Tehor~goun gained t~he slopes
of the ridge on the nortbh-east and north of Can-
robert's Hill. WTith five batta~lions (besides a
separate bordy of r~iflemlen) and tenl guns, General
Semiak~ine in person prepared t~o operate against
thle wTorkl on Canr~obert's Hill; J -whil~st,. on his
right~, Generanl Levoutsky took up a like position of Levout-
w~ithl three mlore ba,;ttalious andc tenl cruns ~t His
goal wa~zs the Redoubt Numlbe r Tw\o.
At the same time Colonel Scudery,? whlo with ofScudery:
thle four Odessat babttlions, a company of riflemlen,
three squadrons of Cos~sacks, andc a field-battery-,
had advanced fromu the Tractir bridge, wa~s nowr
moving upon t~he Ar1abtabia.g
The main body of the cavanlry under G~eneral ofR syorr.
Ryjoff, wTithl its attendant troops of horse-artillery,

This battery included, besides six light field-p~ieces of thle
No. 6 Li ht Battery, four guns of heavier calib~re belonging to
the Position Battery No. 4 (Liprandi's dispatch, October 26,
1854). The three battalions were the 1st, 9d, anid 3d battalions
of thle Duiep~er regiment. Thle squadron was one helongving to~
Jerop~kine's L~ancers.
t WVith four battalions of the Azoff regiment, one-vriz., thle
4th--of the Daieper battalions, the 2~d compIanly of thle Rifle
battalion, four heavy guns of thle Position Battery No. 4, and
six pieces of the Light Battery No. 6j.
SThle three Ukraine battalions, four heavy guns of thle Posi-
tion Battery No. 4, and six guns of the Light Battery No. 7.
g On1 Redoubt 'Number Three.' The riflemen formiing par~t
of Scutdery's column wFere of the 4Ith Rifle battalioni, thle Cos-
sack~s of the 53d Cossack Regiment, and thle batteryS was No. 7~
of the 12th brigade.


C HA P. was already in the NJorth Valley, and supporting
the advance of the columns.
The emer. Whilst the Russians were marching upon the
"weth Lord heights which they now occupied, and wvhilst they
Lucan had
to act: were there establishing their thirty guns in bat-
tery, Lord Lucan, as we see, was present with a
superb division of cavalry, and this upon fine
ground, which, although, it is true uneven, was
still. upon the' whole very free from formidable
obstructions; but, except his six light pieces of
horse-artillery, he was wanting in the ordnance
arm, and of infantry forces he had none. Thus,
then, by a somewhat rare concurrence of circum-
stances, there was brought about an emergency
which enforced, and enforced most cogently, the
decision of a question involving more or less the
general usefulness of the cavalry arm.
Some are chary, it seems, of acknowledging a
condition of things in which cavalry can be used
for the repression of the ordnance arm. Others
fully agreeing that a body of horse, with its great
extent of vulnerable surface, must beware of com-
ing, or at all events of remaining, under the fire
of artillery, are yet of opinion that cavalry, after
all, is the very armn which, in many contingencies,
can best be exerted against the power of ordnance.
They say that artillery in march, or engaged in
unlimbering, is good prey for horsemen; that
artillery established in battery is assailable by
horsemen at its flanks; and that, in general,
where the country is at all open, a powerful and
well-handled cavalry ought to be able to challenge
the dominion of artillery by harassing it inces-


sant~ly, by-r preventing it fr~om getting into batteryS, c H A- P.
an,?1 failingc thalt, byv d3isqulietingc its batteries w~hen I
The decision of Lord Lucan was much croverned his djcisionl.
by at sense of the gr~eatt need there wvouldl be for
the aid of our cavalry if theF eIC~nemy after~i canrrying
acll the outer defences, should come on andc attack
Balaclava;* but it would also seemu that his deter-
mination-a determination entirely approved', n~d
even, I hear,' originated by Sir C'olin Camlpbell--
involved a leaning to the first of the twno opinions
above indicated.
Be this as it may, the result waEs thait, without The Rus.
being mlet by any hindlrance on the par~t of our1 ftrt-ca to
catvalry, t~he R~ussians wrere sut~'eredl to adcvanlce their balt-
teries w~ithi-
from three points of the compass and converge e one ninl-
ruc~e I`rentl
upon the chain of little redoubts which extended our icavalry.
fr~om Canrobert's Hill to thle Arabtabia. The
thousand or twelve hundred Turks who manned
the three works thus assailed saw converging upoinn
them some eleven thousand infantry atnd thirty-
eight guns. Uponn thep heights of Kamara, which
overlooked Caunrobert's Hill from the east, and
uponn thelF pat, of t.he Cau~lseway Heighlts hi'~ch
overlookied the samue work; f'rom the north, the
enemy placed thirty gunls in batttery; aind he nowv
o~pened fire uporn the work~ crow~ni~ngn Caurlober't's
Hill, as also upon the Fort Number Twvo. He art~iner~
wars answered by the Tuirks w~ith their five 12-
poundiers; ? a~nd, fo~r az while, by our troop of

See Lord Lucan's statement in the Appendix.
i Three on Canrobert's Hill, and a couple on the Numb~er
Two Redoubt.


horse-artnlery, but apparently with little effect.
Captain M~aude, the offcer comm~anding the troop,
w~as horribly wounded by a shell which entered
the body of his horse and there burst.
M\aude's troop had come into action without a
due following of wvaggons; and, before long, its
ammunition was already so nearly exhausted as to
leave but a small supply for even one g~un.
As soon as Lord Lucanz heard this, he ordered
that the troop should be withdrawn and kept out
of fire until the want could be supplied.*
It was hardly to be expected that under the
fire of thirty guns, including eight pieces of heavy
calibre, the three 12-pounders which formed the
armament of Canrobert's H~ill would long remain
undisabled. The fort became silent, and already
th6 hapleSS battalion which manned it must have
undergone heavy slaughter; but notwithstanding
this, and although it became now apparent that
the hnl was to be attacked by largely outnumber-
ing bodies of infantry, the brave Turks were still
unconquered. They moved, indeed, from~ the un-
Sheltered part of the work to the side where more
cover was offered; but there, they stood fast, and
awaited the attack of the infantry.-f
It Was with the five battalions acting under his
peersonal direction that General Semiakine deter-
mined to storm Canzrobert's Hil. Covered by the
IbiD. aude's severe wound was the reason why Lord
Lucan instituted no inqluiry as to the cause which led to this
want of ammunition.
"r This sketch may help! to Ilustrate the attack of the eleven
battalions, with thirty guns, upon the two little works, No.

c aA P.

troops sent

The gunls
on Cauro-
bert's Hill

of the Turks.

made by
cenerai '
for storming


fir~e of the artillery, and by t~wo companies of rifle- CHA P.

muen pushed folrwar in sk~irmishing order, hre
advanced rpidly witth three bat~talions of the concoherest'.
Azoff regiment, disposed in columnns of company,
and so rang1edl in two lines of colunius as tl~hat t~he

fir~st line was only about 100C paces in adlvanice of
the second~. In a, th~irdc line, generall Semaininle

br1oughtt u~p t.hle 1st. b.t~talion of the AzoffW reg~i-
mlent a-lnd the 4t~h of t.he Innie aer ba~t.t-lious, each
f'ormedl in a column of a~tt~ack.' Advaucnc iner 2n e workl

this ordler, hre: approa~ched t.o w~ithlin about~ 100

paces of t~he hill-t~op:, anud at once gave t~he sig~nal
for t~he assa.ult. Then thie t~wo for~emost lines of

columns, led byI\ C~olonel Kr~udener, tihe connnuande r
of t.he Azofft regiment, a~nd suppor~t~edl by t.he t\\wo

Onie andl No. Twro, whlich~ wrere defended etby about 1000 or 1200
Tur1ks w\ithi five guns1.


)J o ~ i~
P ~C
5~aCP ";r
Cs P %/:I~: ~
'9 ~S ", P x
QpPg~pp py
p p
P P ..~h 'Z
Y 3 r:

~ *,=


columns of attack, moved rapidly forward. En-
countering no fire of cannon to check them, tfhe
foremost of these troops converged from their
extended front upon the small object of their
attack, swarmed in across the ditch, swarmed
over the feeble parapet, and, standing at length
within the fort, closed at once with the remnant
of the single battalion there bravely awaiting the
Onslaught. The force which thus stormed the
WOrk, and which threw itself upon the remnant
of the one Turkish battalion, consisted, as we see,
of five battalions; but on the side of KTamara, the
three other Dnieper battalions were so operating
that Sir Colin Campbell regarded them as actual
partakers in the attack; and, moreover, Levout-
sky's three Ukraine battalions, though not en-
gaged in the storming, were still so placed at the
time as to be aiding the assault by their presence.
Upon the whole, therefore, it may be said that,
after having undergone an overwhelming cross-
fire from the thirty pieces of artillery, which
hurled destruction upon them at close range from
commanding heights, the one battalion of Turks
which defended this feeble breastwork, was now
pressed by a number of battalions amo~untingr to
no less than eleven, and engaged in close conflict
with five.
It commonly happens in modern warfare that
the dominion of one body of infantry over another
is not found to depend, at the last, upon the
physical strength of man, or the quality of his
weapons, but rather upon faith, or, in other words


ing strength
of the Rus-
SIaBS 18
point of

close nogt-
ing between
the Turkis
and the


upon sense of pow~er. In1 this instance, however, CHAi P.
the assatilants and the assailed wvere both so re- T'
solute that, for once, the actual clash of arms wans
not to be averted by opinion. The many flooded
in upon thle fewr, overwhelmingn, s~urroundiung, de-
stroying, y~et still confronted withl heroic desper-
ation, and owringr all the way' they couldl make to
the sheer fighting of the men, wh3~o thlus closed
w~ith their M~ussulmaln foe, andl to the weight of
the numbers behind thiem. WTith~ much~ slaughiter he fort
of th]e devoted Turks-wsho lost, in k-illed only, cariefl
no less than 170 out, of perhaps about five or six
hundred menl-the wTork wars carriedl at half-past
seven o'clock, w~ith its standard and its guns; but
it seems that, before moving out, the English
artillerymann who had been placed in the redoubt
to assist the Turks took care to spike the guns
which had airmled it. The colours of the Azoff
regiment nows floated fr~om the summit of Can-
robert's Hill.
W'hen thie Turks in the three next redloubtS Abanrlon-
saw~F howlF it ha~d feared with their brethren on Can- theqmirs
of the
robert's Hill, and perceived that, under the eyeS three next
of some 1500 English horse, the work wans left to
fall into the enemyv's ha~nds without a sqiuadr~on
being launuched to support it by any attack on
the foe, they had wrhat to them would seem reason
for thinking ill things of the C~hristiazns, and wer~e
not wlithout warratnt for judging that th~e Engnlish
wouldi fail to support them in anyl endeavour thley
might mlake to defend the remuaining for'ts. But
wrhethler these Osmlanlis reasonedl, or whether they'


simply caught fear, as people catch plague, by
contagion, they at all events loosed their hold.*
WVithout waiting for a confic~t with the three
Ukraine battalions, then already advancing to
the assault, or the four Odessa battalions, theja
also advancing, they at once began to make off,
taking with them their quilts and the rest of their
simple camp treasures. Coming west with these
burthens upon them, they looked more like a
tribe in a state of migration than troops engaged
in retreat. In their flight they were followed for
a while by the fire of the Russian artillery; and
although Lord Lucan sought to cover their retreat
with his cavalry, the Cossacks, at some points,
pursued, and were able to spear many of the
fugitives. Captain Tatham, however, the senior
naval officer in the harbour of Balaclava, now
chanced to come up, and although he knew no
Turkish, he yet by his peculiarly cheery voice
and gesture was able to rally the fugitives who
most nearly approached him, and cause them to
align with their brethren on the right of the 93d.
Rustem Pasha had a horse shot under him.
The enemy not only established a portion of
his forces on Canrobert's Hill, but likewise in the
Number Two Redoubt, as well as in the Arabtabia
or Number Three; and he took possession of the
seven iron 12-pounder guns with which the three
works had been armed. H~e also, with the Odessa
battalions, marched into the Redoubt Number
In those redoubts, as in the Number One, the English
artilleryman present in each is said to have spiked the guns.


Their night
under fire
or arunlery,
and pursued
mn some
places by

The enemy



Fou~r; bu~t instead of underl~ta~king to hold the C:HA P.
workl, he dlid what he could to raze andi dismanntle I.
it. He then w\ithdrlewl, because he dleemedl the and estab-
position too fal rl in advance to allow of his ~under- himself in
takinct to holdi it, tliem.
Our cavalyry now became exposedl to somie
musk~etry shots w\hic~h wPere successfully dir~ectedl
against it froml the positions of the lost r~edoubt~s;
anud, as it wa~s also apparent that our hlorsemlen
wrere in t~he line of the fir~e wThich the c alongr our inner line of defence might soon have
occasion to open, Lord Lucan, in accor~dance w~ith
an ar~rangremlent to thatt effect which had been
preconcerted withl Sir Colin Campbell, dr~ew off
'his division to t.hatt part of the Southi Valley
whlich lay' opposite to the interval between the
NJumber Four and thie Number Five Redoubts.
The position he then took up wa~s across the
valley,~ his squa~dron n facingr ealstwarld. He wans prest lsd.
so placed as to be able to take in flaink an1y iCoqilPI ai
enemy's force which might bend aw'ay fr~om th~e
valley and endeavour to pass to the south~, withi
intent to assail Balaclava~.

Such, then, was the first period of the battle of ObServaR-
Balaclava; andc it munst be ack~now\ledged thant the the 6rse
pe~riodt- of
engagement, if it hadi closed at this time, w~ouldl the battle.
have furnishedi a distressing page for thle military
hlistor~y of Eungland. Wa7r often dlemalnds bjitter.
sacrifices, and mayR3 sometimes force mlen to r~e-
press--not only their generous im~pulIses, bu t- even
those appeals of the conscience wThichi a too fiery~


CHAPP. soldier might treat as the absolute dictates of
honour. It may therefore well be that Lord
Lucan performed a stern duty, when withh the
sanction of Sir Colin ,Campbell) he determined
that our cavalry must be patient of the attack
directed against Canrobert's Hill, must endure to
see Enzglish guns captured, must suffer our allies
to be slaughtered without striking a blow to de-
fend them and the (soundness of his conclusion
can hardly be determined by the casuists, but
rather by those wvho kinowv something of the con-
ditions in which the power of the cavalry arm
(when cavalry chances to be the only available
force) canl be wisely, and therefore rightly,
If our people in general had known the truth,
they would have been guilty of unspeakable
meanness when they cast off all blame from them-
selves, and laid it upon the Turkish soldiery--
upon men: who had been not only entrusted to
the honour and friendship of our army, but were
actually engaged at a post of danger in defend-
ing the first approaches to the English port of
The truth is, however, that the great bulk of
*W The opinion of our cavalry, so far as I have been able to
observe it, tends to sanction Lord Lucan's decision.
"r Lord Lucan was never one of those who thus spoke. He
could see the nature of the conflict on Canrobert's Hill, and I
believe he has always spoken generously of the firmness with
which the Turks awaited the onslaught of overpowering num-
bers. Sir Colin Campbell was also a spectator; and he says in
his despatch,--' The Turkish troops in No. One persisted as long
as they could, and then retired.'


Our' armyg (including Lordl Rglan himself) hlad C'HAP.
regarded the w~ork on Cartnobert's Hill as a fa~st~-
ness susceptible of a protra~cted defence; aind--
strange as the statement~ may seeml-w~ere, for a
longs timne, unacquainted w~ith the natture of the
convict there sustazinedl by the br~ave Turklish
soldier~y. Several causes contributed to obscure
the truth. In the first plaice, thle defence of the
work, though carried to extremity, wans still of
necessity brief ; fo\rwhen once the men, numlbered
b~y thlousandis, had swarmllled in over a feeb~le par~a-
pet on the top of an isolated hillock whlich wans
held by only some 500 or 600 mien, the end, of
course, could not be distant; and azlthlough there
wrere numbSers of our ca~valry mlen wlho hadc been
so posted as to b~e abhle to see that the T~urks
stood their gr'ound w~ith deSperntionl, and wrere in
close bodily strife w~it~h the enemylS before they
ga-rp~ve way uner' his ov'erwhelmli ngr numlber~s, yet
to thle great bulk; of the spectators, whether Eng-
lish or French, whrlo gazed fr~om th~e steeps of the
C~hersonese, no such spectacle wans presented.
Thley looked frlom the wlest; andc, the attack being
miatde upon the nor~1th-e astern~l acclivity of Cau-
rob~ert's Hill, t~hey saw nothing of t~he actual clash
thazt occurr~ed between tlhe brave few~ anld the
resolute many. They descried the enemy on the
heights of K~amara andc on the line of the Woron-
zoff r'oad~, b~ut lost slight of hlim whe9n fr'oml thalt
last position he haEd descended into the hollow to
mak~e his final assault; andc soon afterward~ts, with-
out having b~een ab~le to miake out w\hat had passed
V'OL. V. E


CHrAP.* in the interval, they saw the Turkish soldiery be-
I. ginning to stream down from the gorg-e of the
work. Then almost immediately they saw the
red fezzes pouring out from the other redoubts,
so that what they observed on the whole was a
general flight of the Turks. They saw nothing of
the fierce though short strife which ended in the
slaughter of 170 out of the 500 or 600 men on
Calirobert's Hill, and I believe it may be said
that the loss sustained by the devoted garrison of
this little field-work long remained unknown to
the English. Considering that the Turkish sol-
diery died fighting in defence of the English lines,
this may seem very strange and unnatural; but
the truth is, that between the soldiers of the
Prophet and the men of our Army List there was
so great a gulf that it proved much more than
broad enough to obstruct the transmission of
military statistics. The man temporal who would
ask for a Morning State,' with its column after
column of figures is baffled, of course, by the
man spiritual, who replies, that by the blessing of
the Almighty his servants are as the leaves of the
forest and soon ceases to apply for a list of
casualties if he only elicits an answer asserting
the goodness of G~od and an indefinite accession
of believers to the promised gardens of Para-
dise." Certainly, Lord Ra~glan remained long un-

I find in the correspondence between the French and Eng-
lish Headquarters some trace of an attempt on the part of one
of the hapless Turkish commanders to have justice done to his
people; but probably th~e remonstrant did not know how to


acquainted withl the nttlure of t~he defence whlich CHaA P.
thle Turkis had opposed to the enemy on Canr~o- ''
bert's Hill.* It was fr~om ignorance of the barte
facts, and not fr~om dishonest or ungenerous
motives, that our people thr~ew blame on the
Turk~ish soldiery.


All thiis while, the French and the English comn-
mlanders onl thle Chersonese h~ad been too distant
fr~om the scene of thle att~ack; against th~e Turk~ishl
redoubts to b~e ablZe to swa;y the result; but they,
each of them, proceeded to matke arra,ngemnents for
ulZterior op~erations.
Up~on being~ appr~isedl of the imp~ending attack,
Lord R.aglarn hadi at once ridden up to tha;t part JLora nas.
of the ridge which best overlooked thie scene of
the tbhen comm~encingr eangagem~ent. The spoet he
occupied w~as one close to thie Col, on the northl
side of the road. Th~ence he witnessed thie cap-
ture of the w~ork on Canrobert's Hill, and the
flight of the Tur~ks fr~om tlhe other r~edoubts;--
and as soon as hiis sure, rapid glace hlad enabled
him to tppre'hend thle probarble scope acnd purp~ort
of' his acssailant's dlesign, he determinedl to m~ove his dis-
state a fact in such way as to obtain for it any r~eal access to
the European mind, for it does not app~ear that hie succeeded inl
conveying any clear idea to thle mhind of General Co7nrobert.
This is shown very clearly by the tenor of his co~rrespondl-
ence. A~ny one whlo ever had means of j'udging of rLord Roglan'11s
nature must be able to imiagine the eagerness w~ithi whichi, up~on
learning thie truth, he would have hastened to redress thle
wrong: done.


C HA P. down two out of his five infantry divisions for
Ithe defence of Balaclava. The 1st Division, under
the Duke of Camlbridge, and the 4th Division,
under General Cathcart, were accordingly des-
patched upon this service.
The order to the Duke of Cambridge wya~s in
substance apparently to descend into the south
valley by a line some wvay to the right of the
WT;oronzoff road; and at all events, Lord Raglan
was well satisfied with the way in which H.R.H.
obeyed the command.
With respect to Cathcart, it wvas otherwise, and
a detailed statement is necessary. On observing
the flight of the Turks, Lord Raglan at once called
to him a staff-officer, and desired him to proceeds
as quickly as possible to Sir George Cathcart, and
to request him to move his Division immediately
to the assistance of Sir Colin Campbell.* The
officer wass just starting, wvhenz General Airey
came up to him and said, 'Remuember you are on
no account whatever to conduct thle 4th Divi-

There was, I think, some ambiguity in this order, for it
might either mean that the 4th Division was to make straight
for the immediate front of Balaclava, or for that part of Sir
Colin's ground from which the Turks had just fled; but the
very able staff-officer entrusted with the mission had no doubt
that the first of these objects was the one meant, and as a cir-
cumstance favouring that viewv it should be borne in mind that
Balaclava wras then in danger of an attack from the east as well
as from the north. M\y impression is, that the second of the
two objects was the one contemplated by Lord Raglan; but
even on that supposition--for recourse to the WToronzoff road
wvas strictly and rightly prohibited -the route by the Col
whichh was practicable for artillery) wras probably the best that
could be taken by a force marching from Cathcart's camp.


' sion by t~he WToronzoff' road~. He saidi this w~it~h CH RA P.
marked emphasis.' The officer then galloped as T
fast, as he could to the 4th D3ivision camup, and
fo~undl Sir George Catheart dr~essedd and seated
in his tent.. Then fojllowedl this colloquy:--
STIAFF-OFF;ICER.- Lor~d Rag~lan requests you~, Sir
G~eorg~e, to move your Division imm~ediately to thle
aissistance of the Turkls.
CXTHracRT.-Qu~lite impossible, sir, for t~he 4~th
1Y1~'S10l f0 IDO~e.
STAFF-OFFICER.-1\fy orders w~ere very' positive,
and thle R:ussians are advancing u son Balaelava.
CATHCART.--I can't help that, sir. It is im~-
p~ossible for m~y Division to miov~e, as thle greater
portion of thle men have only just com-ie fr'omi thle
trenches. Thle best th~ine youl can do is to sit
don1 andc tak~e some br~eakfast w~ith mie.
STAFF-OFFICER (after respectfully declining t~he
invlitat~ion).-1\Iy ordlers ar~e to request that you
wTill move y~our Division immzediately to the as-
sistance of Sir Colin Cam bell. I feel sur~e every
moment is of consequence. Sir Colin Camp~bell
has only the 93d1 Hi blaunderss with him. I saw
the Turk~s in full fligrht fr~oml the redoublt~s.
CATHCAlRT.-W~ell, sir', if y'ou will not sit. downa
in my tent, you mlay as well go back to Lord
Rag~lan, and tell him~ that I cannot move m~y

The sta-ff-officer touchedl his cazp, left the tent,
anJ rode off a fewT yatrds consideringr how he
could best act. After at fewr moments' conside~ra-
tion, he saw all the terrible consequences that


CHAP. might result from his yielding to Cathcart. His
Mind was soon made up. He returned to Sir
George Cathcart, and at once told him that he
(the staff-officer) should not return to Lord Raglan;
that he had received orders to come for the 4th
Division, and that he should remain till it was
ready to move off. He pointed out firmly but
respectfully that much valuable time had been
lost, and said he still hoped that Sir George would
give orders for the Division to fall in. Sir George
listened attentively to all the staff-officer urged,
and then to his great relief said,' Very well, sir;
I will consult with my staff-officers, and see if
anything canl be done.' Cathcart then went
away, and in a short time some bugles sounded,
and the division began to turn out. Under the
guidance of the staff-offticers (who considered that
K~adikiji was the point to make for), the Division
marched off to the Col."
Lord R~aglan, however, was not without suspi-
cion that the operations in the plain of Balaclava
mlig~ht be a feint, and that the real attack light
be made from Sebastopol upon the besieging
forces. He took care to make provision for such
a contingency; and his oral directions for the
purpose were conveyed by Lieutenant Calthorpe,
one of his aides-de-camp, to Sir Richard England,
the Commander of the 3d Division.
General Canrobert, also, upon hearing of the
*t Circumstances indicative of Cathcart's state of temper, and
in some measure tending to account for it, will be found nar-
rated post, cha~p. iii.


attack galloped up to the ridgne overlooking thle C HA P.
Balaclavan plain andi ultimately, t~hougrh not all I
at once, the French Commander moved down to ceneral
the foot of the heights both Vinoy's and Espin- "' n the"
asse's brigPades of infantry, atnd also the two his as.
cavalry reg~iments of the Chasseurs d'Afrique, pstos
regiments comprising eight squaidrons, aind comi-
mande~d by Generatl d'Adllonville.
There was, however, an evident difference Iapparent.
be~en h oiuo T-c dii'erence
betwen he oinin whch overned' the Eng- or opinion
. between him
hish Commander and th e one entertamned by and Lord
Canrobert. Keenly alive, as wars natural, to a Ragian.
danger which threatened his only seaport, and
hopingr besides, I imagine, that the somewhat
dlimmlled prospects of the siege mlighlt be clear1ed
by' a fi ht in thle plain, Lord' Ra lan, at. this
timze, had not entertained the idea, of surrend2er-
ingP ground to the enemy~, andI wa~s preparing
to recover the hleights. General Canrobert, on
the other hand, was of course less directly con-
cerned in keeping wantch over Balac~lavat nd
having become impressed with a belief that
it wFas the object of the Russiatns to diraw him
dowvn froml his vantage-ground on the Cherson-
ese, he seems to have resolved thatt he would
baffle the enemy's supposed policy by clingning
fast to the uplandi. Accordlingly, it will be seen
(if we chance to speak~l further of these French
infatntry reinforcements), that, althoughl General
Vinoy's brigade pushed forward, at oine timne, to
ground near the gorge of Kadikiji, it wats atfter-
wards withdratwn from its advanced position, and


Ordered to rejoin the other brigade of the 1st Divi-
sion close under the steeps of the Chersonese.
As a means of covering Balaclava, the position
taken up by Lord Lucan near the gorge of Kardi-
koij is believed to have been very well chosen; but
the Commander-in-Chief, at this time, wvas induilg-
ing the expectation of something like a battle to
bse fought with all arms; and he apparently de-
sired that his cavalry should not be entangled in
combat until the arrival of the two divisions of
foot then already despatched should give Lord
Lucan an opportunity of acting in co-operation
with our infantry forces. He accordingly sent
dowrn ant order which compelled Lord Lucan,
though not without reluctance, nor even, indeed,
without; anger, to w~ithdrawv his horsemen to ground
on the left of the Redoubt N~umber Six at the
foot of the Chersonese upland."
T~Then this retrograde movement of our cavalry
had been completed, the whole of the forces of all
arTS with which Canrobert and Lord Raglan pro-
posed to engage Liprandi might be regarded as
approaching to a state of concentration near the
westernmost limits of the plain. The ground,
however, upon which the Allies were thus gather-
ing lay at distances of not less than a mile fr~om
the gorge of K~adikiji; and it; not; only resulted,
from the last disposition of the cavalry, that; the
Captain Wetherall w~as the bearer of the order, which ran
thus: Cavalry to take ground to the left of second line of re-
'doubts occupied by Turks ;' and the Captain, at Lord Lucan's
request, waited to see the order executed in the way wFhich he
judged to be accordant wFith Lord Raglan's meaning.

c H A P.

Lord Rag-
lan's dis-
position of
our cavalry.

tendency of
the French
and English

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