Group Title: clash between formalism and reality in the Brazilian civil service
Title: The Clash between formalism and reality in the Brazilian civil service
CITATION PDF VIEWER THUMBNAILS PAGE IMAGE ZOOMABLE
Full Citation
STANDARD VIEW MARC VIEW
Permanent Link: http://ufdc.ufl.edu/UF00098414/00001
 Material Information
Title: The Clash between formalism and reality in the Brazilian civil service
Physical Description: vi, 429 leaves : ; 28 cm.
Language: English
Creator: Graham, Lawrence Sherman, 1936-
Publication Date: 1965
Copyright Date: 1965
 Subjects
Subject: Civil service -- Brazil   ( lcsh )
Officials and employees -- Brazil   ( lcsh )
Political Science thesis Ph. D   ( lcsh )
Dissertations, Academic -- Political Science -- UF   ( lcsh )
Genre: bibliography   ( marcgt )
non-fiction   ( marcgt )
 Notes
Thesis: Thesis - University of Florida.
Bibliography: Bibliography: leaves 398-426.
General Note: Manuscript copy.
General Note: Vita.
 Record Information
Bibliographic ID: UF00098414
Volume ID: VID00001
Source Institution: University of Florida
Holding Location: University of Florida
Rights Management: All rights reserved by the source institution and holding location.
Resource Identifier: alephbibnum - 000566116
oclc - 13639342
notis - ACZ2543

Downloads

This item has the following downloads:

PDF ( 14 MBs ) ( PDF )


Full Text







THE CLASH BETWEEN FORMALISM AND

REALITY IN THE BRAZILIAN

CIVIL SERVICE


















By
LAWRENCE SHERMAN GRAHAM


A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE COUNCIL OF
THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY











UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA
December. 1965




































For Jane









ACKNOWLEDGMENTS


I wish to thank the following people for assistance

in the preparation of this dissertation: Professors Harry

Kantor (chairman), Gladys M. Kammerer, and Harry W. Hutchinson,

of the University of Florida, who served as my reading com-

mittee; Professors Manning J. Dauer, Frederick H. Hartmann,

and Alfred Hower, also of the University of Florida; Pro-

fessor Diogo Lordello de Mello, director of the research

center at the Fundayao Getilio.Vargas, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil;

Professors Edward J. Jones, Jr. (chief of party) and David

Mars, members of the University of Southern California/AID

mission in public administration at the Fundayao Getulio Var-

gas; Peter D. Bell, of the Ford Foundation, Rio de Janeiro;

the secretaries in the offices occupied by the University of

Southern California mission at the Fundayao Getulio Vargas

-- especially Dona Irene -- without whose many favors and as-

sistance in the scheduling of interviews much of the material

gathered here could not have been collected; Arminda de Campos

and Gil Vicente Soares, students in the Brazilian School of

Public Administration (EBAP) who, as research assistants, de-

voted many long hours of work to the compiling of newspaper

materials; Mrs. Clarence Singletary, of Daytona Beach, Florida,

and my wife, Jane Merrell Graham, for preliminary typing; and

Mrs. Margaret McGrade, Department of Psychology and The Amreri-

can Journal of Psychology, University of Texas, Austin, for


iii









iv

final editing and typing. Finally, I should like to express

my gratitude to the Department of Health, Education, and Wel-

fare for a grant received under the National Defense Education

Act which made this study possible.


The Winter of Our Discontent (1965) L.S.G.









TABLE OF CONTENTS


CHAPTER PAGE


I. THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK . . . . . 1

II. THE SETTING . . . . . . . . .. 39

III. THE THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE MOVEMENT TO
REFORM THE CIVIL SERVICE . . . . .. 92

IV. PERSONNEL THEORY . . . . . . .. .146

V. A MODEL FOR THE STUDY OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM 178

VI. THE POLITICAL UNDERSTRUCTURE (1945-1964). . 199

VII. THE CIVIL SERVICE AND POLITICAL PATRONAGE . 239

VIII. THE GAP BETWEEN NORMS AND REALITIES IN PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION . . . . . . . .. 303

IX. CONFLICTING PERCEPTIONS OF THE NATURE OF THE
CIVIL SERVICE . . . . . . . ... 349

X. POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION . . . . .. .371
BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . ... .. . 397
APPENDIX . . . . . . . . ... . . 427









LIST OF TABLES


Table Page


I. Reorganization of the Brazilian Civil Service. 60

II. Legislative Representation by Party ..... 211

III. Presidential Voting Totals . . . . ... .216

IV. Voter Registration (1933, 1934, and 1945). .. 218

V. Voter Registration (1950 1962) . . . .. .221

VI. Size of the Brazilian Civil Service (1938 -
1960). . . . . . . . . . 252

VII. Positions Filled, Vacant, and Abolished during
the Government of Juscelino Kubitschek . 256

VIII. Size of the Brazilian Civil Service According
to Administrative Entities (1960). ... 259

IX. Civil Servants According to Major Categories
(Prior to the Classification Law of 1960). 262

X. Proposed Three-Year Program for the Training
of Brazilians in Technical Public
Administration . . . . . . ... 315









CHAPTER I


THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK


Recently a trend has developed within public administra-

tion to establish a comparative basis for generalization with-

in the discipline and to place the field of comparative ad-

ministration within the wider context of comparative political

studies. This is, in part, a reflection of a significant

movement within the social sciences as a whole which looks

toward an integrative approach to man and the environment in

which he lives. For some time students of public administra-

tion have shown a growing awareness of the inadequacy of

traditional approaches and have expressed a need to reach into

political science and the other social sciences for new tools

and concepts.

Several reasons contribute .to the rejection by these

students of the traditional approach as being inadequate. In

general, public administration, as it has developed in the

United States, has been too culture-bound by American values

and standards, in particular, and western European ones, in

general. Legalism and formalism have characterized tradition-

al studies to the neglect of the informal and the over-all

political, social, economic, and cultural context. This

traditional approach has been descriptive and prescriptive

rather than analytic and comparative. It has failed to pro-












vide useful classifications and indicators. Previous cate-

gories have been inadequate -- almost totally normative and

confusing -- and there have been few, if any, concepts or

techniques for determining similarities or differences among

administrative systems. Consequently, empirical studies,

when they have appeared, have often been idiographic and in-

capable of generalization.

Brazil provides an important chapter in the history of

the attempts to reform and modernize administrative systems,

rooted in different cultures, with the use of traditional

concepts and techniques. This experience in administration

is of value not only for Brazil's sister republics in the

Caribbean and in Central and South America, but also for

other countries experiencing similar developmental problems

and dynamic change. Yet Latin America, in particular, has

experienced an awakening interest in civil service reform and

in the recruitment and training of public employees who are

both efficient and dedicated to the public service. It is

this interest which makes Brazilian experience since 1930

all the more important for the Latin American area.

Brazilian leaders in the public administration field

have been trying to impose concepts and techniques borrowed

from American public administration for some thirty-five

years with the objective of initiating fundamental change in

their nation's administrative system. They have attempted to









create a "modern" public personnel system which will re-

place favoritism and patronage with rational recruitment

practices and they have devoted a considerable amount of time,

energy, and effort to the operationalization of ideas and

techniques borrowed from the economy and efficiency movement

in the United States.2 But today, when one looks at the func-

tional side of the Brazilian system -- in spite of many insti-

tutional changes and much civil service legislation -- one

finds that these men have accomplished very little in the way

of economy and efficiency, even though these goals have been

the two guiding lights of the administrative reform move-

ment.

Within.the public personnel field Brazilian admini-

strative specialists have focused their attention since 1936

on the creation.of.a functioning merit system.3 Although

they have applied the techniques and concepts developed in

American public personnel administration to make a merit

system operational, they have given the merit concept a more

limited meaning than is to be found in the United States. In

American administration, the term "merit" is synonymous with

"competence," and it is generally used in a broader context

to refer to the whole attempt to recruit, train, and maintain

competent civil servants. In contrast, in Brazilian usage

it is more often restricted to mean the selection of qualified

personnel on the basis of public examination. Granted, in













both the United States and Brazil, the objective is the se-

lection of competent personnel for the public service, but

in Brazil, when the concept is attacked or defended, it is

usually done in relation to the administration of public

examinations called concursos. These concursos are re-

quired for initial entry into the career public service and

represent a mixture of American examination techniques with

an examination process more akin to the French concours.

In Brazilian experience the goal of a federal civil

service staffed exclusively by individuals recruited on the

basis of merit (qualification proven by written examination)

and competency has remained remote and somewhat unrelated

to the needs of a social, political, and economic system in

the midst of dynamic change where the problems of achieving

an integrated, modern nation-state are paramount. When the

requirement of public examination has been enforced, there

has been a tendency toward restricting the selection of can-

didates for the civil service to those who have had the

"proper" education; yet the politician has continued to eye

sectors of the public service as a means of establishing a

reward system for those who have rendered service either to

him as an individual or to his party, while others have con-

tinued to think of the public service in terms of traditional

sinecures.

The purpose of this dissertation is to analyze Brazilian









experience with the reform of its federal civil service and

to demonstrate the interrelationships which have existed be-

tween the ideas and concepts on which the reform movement

has been based and the political context within which the

federal civil service has operated. Such an approach involves

three different levels of analysis: the ideational, the idio-

graphic, and the nomothetic. At the first level, some at-

tempt must be made to define the values existing in Brazilian

society at large which have affected the character of the

civil service, to establish the values on which Brazil's po-

litical institutions are based, and to single out the values

which have been inherent in the administrative reform move-

ment. At the second level, this study is concerned with the

use of material substantially confined to Brazilian exper-

ience. In this respect, it is a study of the unique, for

the basic data have been gathered within a single country.

This material, however, gains significance only if one at-

tempts to place it in a larger context. Thus, the third

level entails the use of both intra- and cross-cultural

comparisons. Within this dissertation, these three differ-

ent levels of analysis will be placed in constant interac-

tion.

While earlier experience in Brazilian public administra-

tion is relevant and it is essential to develop a historical

perspective to understand the changing character of the civil










service across Brazilian history, the emphasis of this study

will fall on the years between 1945 and 1964. This is the

period Beatriz Wahrlich, perhaps the leading figure in Bra-

zilian public personnel administration, has called a "re-

action to reform."4 The major reason why this era has been

selected is that it offers a view of the interaction between

administration and politics within the context of an open

system of government that is readily accessible. There is,

however, a more basic reason. This period marks a particu-

larly crucial phase in the course of Brazilian "political de-

velopment" which has a definite beginning and end. The events

since April, 1964, have been such that it seems as though the

country has returned, both partially and temporarily, to a

closed system of government from which troublesome political

forces have been excluded from politics, where a Congress

subservient to the executive has been insured, and where the

development of mass-based politics has been halted. It is

much too early, however, to say where the April Revolution and

its aftermath will lead Brazil, although there are those who

suspect that a return to an emphasis on modernization within

the context of an administratively controlled state is under-

way.

It is within this setting that the following hypothesis

has been developed:










The attempt to reform the Brazilian federal civil ser-
vice through the adoption of American-style public
personnel policies has led to a system that is char-
acterized by a high degree of "formalism"6 in which
there is considerable discrepancy between norms and
reality. Related to this gap between public person-
nel policies and practices is a variety of "heterogen-
eous"7 and "overlapping"8 patterns. This situation,which
corresponds to Riggs' model of "prismatic" society,9
is the result .of three independent variables: (1) the
political understructure on which the civil service
system is based; (2) the use of norms governing ad-
ministrative behavior exogenous to the socio-political
system, and (3) the application of the techniques of
scientific management without adequate attention to
the functional requirements of the existing system
and sufficient consideration for the human elements.

Analyzing public personnel policies and practices in

Brazil, one may point to a substantial gap between the

formal structure, as expressed in legal norms and laws, and

the way the human elements involved behave. On the one hand,

there is the value commitment to a merit system and a neutral

civil service contained in the movement for administrative re-

form and subsequent legislation, while, on the other, there is

the continuance of a functioning patronage system which under-

cuts the legal requirements imposed. This gap does not exist,

however, to the same degree at all levels. This is where the

conceptualization of heterogeneous and overlapping patterns

becomes useful. Administrative contrasts are to be found at

the three levels of government (federal, state, and local)10

within the federal service and within different geographic

areas. One cannot correctly refer only to the contrast be-

tween the traditional administrative systems operating in










Brazil and the attempts at modernizing them, for variations

in political and administrative development differ greatly

from one extreme of the country to the other, and the insti-

tution of patronage operates in many ways.

The scope of.this .study, .however, wilL.be.limited to

the federal civil service. By and large, the contrasts

existing among the state administrative systems will be ex-

cluded, although one probably can observe the full range of

a developmental continuum in action at the state level --

from the administrative system functioning in Sgo Paulo to

the traditional administrative systems operating in the North-

east. Bureaucracy in Brazil, at both the national and re-

gional levels, is large and complex and has not as yet been

adequately analyzed. For this reason, it is difficult at

this stage to create a proper image of the total adminis-

trative system or systems in operation in Brazil; yet such

an attempt must be made if change in contemporary adminis-

trative practices is to be introduced and made to function.

Probably much of the difficulty in creating a centralized,

effective, coordinated national administrative system is

due precisely to this absence of an understanding of the way

in which Brazilian administration has operated in its socio-

political context. In this respect, Brazilian administration

reflects the pluralistic,l overlapping, and heterogeneous

character of Brazilian social and political institutions.








This is particularly true of developments since 1945, where,

as the bureaucracy has continued to grow in size and com-

plexity, the federal administrative structure has become

even more diffuse and uncontrollable through the decentral-

ization of politics, the emergence of multiple, competing

parties of a factional character -- divided internally along

traditional regional lines -- and the increased demands for

services from the central government as the Brazilian economy
12
has reached the .take-off state. The major characteristic

of the period between 1945 and 1964 is the failure of the

effort to develop an open administrative system responsive

and responsible to the political system.

To develop a focus for this dissertation, the central

hypothesis was derived by posing the following questions:

First, why has it been so difficult to operationalize the ob-

jectives of economy and efficiency in Brazilian public admin-

istration? Are these valid objectives in the Brazilian con-

text? Have they helped Brazil to move forward toward the

broader goal of becoming a "modern" nation-state? Secondly,

has the Brazilian .political structure changed in the last

thirty-five years? If so, what effect have these changes had

on the federal civil service? Third, are Brazilian patronage

problems unique? Does.comparative analysis enhance our under-

standing of the difficulties encountered in Brazil with civil

service reform? Fourth, why has Brazil been unable to apply









effectively a body of administrative principles -- detached

from the surrounding issues of Brazilian culture -- without

regard to spatial or temporal elements?3 These are basic

questions which must be answered if one is to come to grips

with the gap between the principles.preached and the prac-

tices observed in Brazilian administration.

In attempting to answer these questions, the following

assumptions were made: First, that politics and administration

cannot be separated in reality,4 and, secondly, that, to

understand political conflict, whether within the context

of an administrative system or not, one must pay attention to

the conflicting value systems which are brought into play.

This is especially true of the attempts at administrative

reform in Brazil since 1936. Whether we examine the creation

of the Departamento Administrativo do Serviqo Publico (DASP)15

or the efforts to institute merit system practices, we are

certain to encounter a juxtaposition of traditional Brazilian

values stemming from what Wagley calls the Brazilian Great

Traditional6 and a series of values that belong within the

Weberian framework in general and within American experience

in particular.

The values inherent in the technical reforms adopted

by the Federal Civil Service Council (the Conselho Federal

do Servico Publico Civil) from 1936 to 1938 were carried to

their fullest development in the creation of DASP late in

1937 -- into which the council was absorbed. Clearly








related to these values that developed from the American re-

form movement at the end of the nineteenth century was a

series of concepts now known as the "scientific principles

of public administration." These principles, which achieved

their clearest statement in the writings of Gulick and Ur-

wick,17 were supposedly of universal validity. They included

such notions as span of control, the unity of command, the

homogeneity of work, non-specialist administrators, a di-

chotomy of staff and line, the development of a chain of

command, the separation of administration from politics, the

specialist as "on tap, but not on top," the division of labor,

and the specialization of function.

That these principles were developed largely within the

context of Taylorisml8 and a modern, business-oriented, capi-

talistic society, and also that they were very much a part of
19
the dominant value system and the political structure of the

United States at the time was largely overlooked in their ap-

plication to the later stages of the Brazilian administrative

reform movement. Initially, Brazilians in the public admin-

istration field simply took the techniques and concepts de-

veloped in the American economy and efficiency movement and

applied them to the reform and moralization of their admin-

istrative system.

Joined with the transference of American administrative

concepts was the rejection of political science by the schools









of public administration in the United States and their

preference for a "trade school" orientation. In the Brazilian

environment this was reinforced by the fact that political sci-

ence, as a separate discipline, was underdeveloped. Separate

schools of administration were created in Brazil during the

post-war years and, in those cases in which it was necessary

to establish them within the framework of existing university

institutions, they were placed in the faculties of economic

science. This neglect of the political environment within

which administrative techniques and institutions function

received a further stimulus from the United States technical

assistance program in public administration inaugurated in

1952. The emphasis was again placed on the mechanics of

administration. This approach is reflected in the fact that

technical assistance in public and business administration

has been administered through the same division. Within this

program, the close association established between public and

business administration and the emphasis on the development

of rational techniques in the context of closed systems

analysis has meant that there has been little exposure to the

implications that the political system has had for public ad-

ministration -- except as a negative factor which should be

excluded if the "right" reforms are to take place.

Finally, it should be pointed out that the values under-

lying the American scientific management school were task-

oriented and, therefore, tended to overlook the importance of








human relations in the analysis of administrative problems.

In later empirical studies it was.pointed out that these prin-

ciples failed .to function as expected in the context of Ameri-

can public administration.20 It is no surprise that they did

not produce the desired .results of .economy and efficiency when

transferred to another society, such as Brazil, having an en-

tirely different socio-economic and political reality and

functioning at another level of economic, political, and ad-

ministrative development.

On the basis of these two assumptions, there are three

independent variables contained within the central hypothesis

which have been selected-to see if they could possibly estab-

lish a relationship with the major dependent variable: the

actual behavior of the Brazilian federal civil service

system.. These independent variables are: (1) the political

understructure on which the civil service system is based; (2)

the use of .norms governing .administrative behavior exogenous

to the socio-political system, and (3) the application of the

techniques of scientific management without adequate attention

to the functional requirements of the existing system and suf-

ficient consideration for the human elements.

The term "variable" is used here simply to state in a

systematic fashion a .concept which can be measured. The vari-

ables selected for.further analysis in the next section are

both nominal and normative. They are "nominal" in that they









are "characterized by the presence or absence of a trait,

but not by degrees of a trait" and they are "normative" in

that they are

. evaluative statements to which degrees of in-
tensity may be ascribed but which in themselves are
incapable of inter-subjective empirical confirmation
(e.g."good," "better," and "best" administratior).21

The theoretical construct which follows is developed

in terms of a series of propositions that state a hypothetical

relationship between two or more variables. These variables

are of three types: independent, dependent, and intervening.

The propositions will be developed in considerable detail

and will be tested in subsequent chapters. For this reason,

no attempt will be made here to state whether or not they

can be supported by empirical evidence; this will be done

only in the concluding chapter.

Of the three independent variables, the first is by far

the most complex and the most important in understanding

Brazilian experience with civil service reform. Involved in

the explanation of this variable are three groups of dependent

variables. The first revolves around this proposition: In

instituting any program of administrative reform in a transi-

tional society, the presence of a strong central government

which insures political stability is more important than the

style of the government, i.e. whether it is a dictatorship or

a democracy.22 This statement, in turn, leads to two sub-

propositions: First, the success in instituting merit system

practices under the first Vargas government is to be explained












in part by the presence of a strong central government com-

mitted to the reform of the federal civil service, initially

through the Federal Civil Service Council and later the DASP.

It is important to remember in looking at the events since

1945 that merit system practices in the federal civil service

as a whole were first instituted during the ambiguous phase

of semi-dictatorship prevailing before the establishment of

the Eetado Novo.

The second sub-proposition states that the problems

which emerged in Brazil after 1945, both in expanding and

defending a rationalized public personnel system, are to be

explained in part by the excessive decentralization of au-

thority (formal power) and control (informal power)3 and by

the multiplicity of competing groups in a society undergoing

fundamental change, where there is a lack of consensus on

the means for resolving conflict and on the basic goals of the

state. In the post-1945 period, the civil service system has

been based on an entirely different political understructure

-- one characterized by a multiplicity of competing parties,

divided internally along regional lines, and by little develop-

ment of national party responsibility. In contrast with Amer-

ican experience, the time span involved has been short.

The second group of dependent variables centers around

the following proposition: Any progress of basic reform in a

traditional administrative system is certain to create opposition












The way this opposition is expressed depends on the inter-

relation established between the degree of centralization or

decentralization within the bureaucracy, on the one hand, and

the style of politics, i.e. the degree to which there exists

an open or closed political group, on the other. This dis-

tinction does not, however, imply a dichotomization of two

polar styles of politics, but rather a continuum along which

various political styles can be located. The criterion used

here is the degree of participation in the political process.

It is also hypothesized that in a centralized system

of administration it is more difficult to express opposition

to reform because of the existence of a more effective con-

trol system capable of overriding traditional patterns and

values. This control is more "effective" because major policy

decisions can be made only at the top of the hierarchical

structure. In contrast, in a decentralized system of admin-

istration it is easier to express opposition to reform be-

cause of the existence of numerous semi-independent administra -

tive hierarchies, each with considerable authority for decision-

making over policy and insufficient central control over tra-

ditional patterns and values. Under a dictatorship -- that is,

a closed system of government -- the artificial no-conflict

status of politics forces opposition to administrative reform

to be internalized both within the administrative system and

the external political system. In a transitional society,











the internalization of opposition to reform is almost certain

to result in the confusing of basic issues and problems and in

the blurring of lines among traditional, elitist-oriented

groups opposed to change; liberal groups, opposed to dictator-

ship, who desire political democracy; and revolutionary groups,

opposed to continuing a capitalistic system, who are committed

to egalitarian values. Furthermore, within the framework of

an open, competitive style of politics, following immediately

after a period of dictatorship, it becomes easier not only

to isolate the forces opposed to administrative reform, but

also to understand the desire of these various groups to

emasculate such an organization as DASP and to undercut

public personnel reforms.

Further, it is hypothesized that this reaction to ad-

ministrative reform during the Vargas era is related to fear

of the bureaucracy as a control instrument in a no-party,

authoritarian system and to experience with such control.

An important motivation of the.political parties since 1945

has been their desire to make the bureaucracy responsible to

the external political system. This factor is crucial to an

understanding of the subsequent struggle between the legisla-

tive and executive branches over the control of patronage.

In this context, spoils system practices theoretically take

on a functional character and are only dysfunctional if we

look at the socio-economic pressures generated by industriali-












nation and urbanization and the subsequent need for expanded

and highly specialized public services.

An important intervening variable is the size of the

bureaucracy. The size of the governmental bureaucracy con-

stitutes an important factor which intervenes both between

the degree of centralization and decentralization and the style

of politics. Its traditional character and spoils system

practices, which are a consequence of the external political

environment, are certain to limit the impact of the reform

movement on traditional values and patterns of behavior.

There is one final dependent variable which is related

to the first independent variable: This is the role of DASP
24
as an agent of the executive. It is hypothesized that the

close association of DASP and the whole administrative reform

movement with the Vargas dictatorship was inimical to its

goals and objectives after 1945. Because reform was .administer-

ed from the top down and was not based upon any popular move-

ment outside the government, the entire program came to rely

exclusively on the executive for its success. Consequently,

once executive support in Brazil was no longer forthcoming

and a preference was shown for spoils system practices, a

strong reaction to administrative reform set in. This ex-

perience is the reverse of that of the movement for civil

service reform in the United States which began in the latter

half of the nineteenth century and was based on pressures











from many different quarters for an end to widespread cor-

ruption in government. That movement was but a part of a

more general one to reform and to moralize the whole po-

litical process, as well as to readjust basic imbalances

that had developed in the political system.25

The second independent variable -- the use of a new set

of norms and principles -- involves two dependent variables,

while the third -- the application of the techniques of sci-

entific management -- is sufficient in and of itself. The

first of the dependent variables is contained in the proposi-

tion that the gap between the formal requirements of the merit

system and the realities of current public personnel prac-

tices is to be explained to a considerable extent by the

irrelevance of these exogenous concepts to the functioning

of the bureaucratic system. The second dependent variable,

stated as a postulate, takes the following form: The imposi-

tion of these newer norms and principles upon traditional

values has led to conflict within the administrative system

as a whole. Consequently, different individuals within the

bureaucracy react in different ways. Some are committed to

the new value orientation, while others are committed to the

traditional value orientation, and still others to both.

Thus, a substantial body of intermediate or transitional in-

dividuals is attracted both to the older set of norms and

principles and .to the newer ones, as well. Riggs calls these











individuals "polynormative" or "normless." According to

another writer, such a value conflict within the individual

leads to his supporting the merit system verbally, while in

practice he depends upon a particular person to obtain govern-

ment employment for him extra-legally.26

To test the validity of the central hypothesis and the

propositions which have been built around it, an attempt will

be made to operationalize the models Riggs and Diamant have

offered for the study of comparative administration.

In constructing .a model for the analysis of adminis-

trative systems in "developing" areas, Riggs postulates that

all existing administrative systems may be evaluated by es-

tablishing what he terms a developmental continuum. At one

extreme he places a "fused" model in which all structures

are highly diffuse and undifferentiated and which can be

used for the analysis of administration in traditional agri-

cultural societies. At the other end, he places a "dif-

fracted" model in which all structures are highly specific

and specialized and which can be used for the analysis of ad-

ministration in modern .industrial societies, such as those

existing in North America and Western Europe. .He adopts

the viewpoint that in traditional societies approaching the

"fused" model,

a significant tendency exists for action . to be
predominantly ascriptive, particularistic, and diffuse;
whereas choices in modern societies are more likely to
be achievement-oriented, universalistic, and specific.27












Between these two extremes Riggs inserts what he calls a

"prismatic" model for the analysis of administration in

countries attempting to break the hold of traditional so-

ciety and to modernize. These are the countries which have

been termed "developing," if the framework developed by
28
Almond and Coleman is utilized.28 In the "prismatic" model,

Riggs hypothesizes that the contrasting patterns occurring in

the "fused" and "diffracted" models interact and overlap.

While agricultural and industrial societies would be con-

centrated to a fairly high degree around the polar extremes

of the continuum and would show a relatively homogeneous

distribution of traits, a transitional society approaching

the "prismatic" model would demonstrate "a wide variation

between its still predominantly traditional hinterland and

its 'modernized' urbanized centers." Such a society would

also show a relatively heterogeneous distribution of traits,

that is, it would combine traditional, relatively fused

traits with relatively diffraced ones.29 The extent to

which heterogeneity and overlapping patterns occur, asserts

Riggs, is an important factor, for

. the more prismatic . a society, the
greater will be the social gap between its rural
and urban sectors. In both fused and diffracted
societies the urban-rural discontinuity will not,
presumably, be so great.30

In terms of public administration, these models reflect

three different sets of conditions: In a "diffracted"













society, one would encounter "a set of concrete structures

or institutions specialized for the performance of adminis-

t'rative functions"; in a "fused" society, one would not

expect .to find ."any concrete structures .specifically oriented

toward administrative functions"; and in.a.."prismatic" so-

ciety, one would encounter "certain administrative structures

operating quite specifically and.effectively, while in other

fields or parts of the .society, no .such .structures [would be]

found.31.. As .a consequence of this situation and the in-

fluence exerted on .traditional countries by external models

or standards,

. it is easier to adopt by fiat or law a formal
organizational structure with a manifest administrative
function than it .is to institutionalize corresponding
social behavior. . Hence, many formally administra-
tive structures in transitional societies turn out to
be mere facades, while the effective administrative
work remains .a latent function of older, more .diffuse
institutions.32

Diamant offers an alternative model that complements

the work done by Riggs and can be used to offer another

perspective on the Brazilian federal civil service. Since

he is critical .of Riggs' model as being too abstract and

general, we might examine his model.to see .if his attempt at

building more components into a typology of political styles

and economic development can be operationalized in the Bra-

zilian context. Whereas Riggs visualizes three distinct

models on a continuum against which all societies may be

evaluated, Diamant conceives of political development as an












on-going process in which new goals and demands are met in

a flexible manner by a variety of patterns. While Riggs

is concerned with the formulation of functional concepts

which can be used to define relationships in transitional

societies, Diamant focuses his attention on the goals of

politics -- an element which, he says, is neglected in

Riggs' analysis because of his lack of concern with alter-

native patterns or strategies of development. At this point

Diamant's definition of political development is crucial to

our understanding .of his approach:

In its most general form . political development
is a process by which a political system acquires an
increased capacity to sustain successfully and con-
tinuously new types of organizations. For this pro-
cess to continue over time a differentiated and cen-
tralized policy must come into being which must be
able to command resources from and power over wide
spheres and regions of the society. In this most
general form political development is certainly a
multi-normative process, in which a variety of de-
mands and goals are being pursued simultaneously;
. this ability to process several major demands
and goals concurrently marks the "success" or
"failure" of modernization.33

Since political development, as he conceives of the

process, does not require the creation of particular kinds

of institutions and it can move forward, stop, or be re-

versed, the matter of goals in a particular polity is of

great importance. Diamant postulates that the two basic po-

litical goals of developing societies are nation-building

and socio-economic progress. By "nation-building" he means

the creation of an integrated political community within












fixed geographic boundaries where the nation-state is the

dominant political institution.34

To this conceptual framework he relates Almond's

idea that all political systems must acquire capacity to

deal with four sets of problems: (1) an integrative capacity,

which will provide for the creation of national unity and a

centralized bureaucracy; (2) an international accommodative

capability; (3) a participation capability, which will lead

to the creation of a political culture of civic obligation

and of a democratic political structure; and (4) a welfare

or distributive capacity, which will provide for widespread

dissemination of welfare standards and accommodation be-

tween political and social structures. Diamant states that,

except for the third element, these sets of problems fit

into his conception of political development. Breakdown or

failure in a political system, then, stems from the fact

that a particular society has had to acquire too many of

these capabilities at the same time.35

From this point he moves on to two other dimensions.

On the basis of Rustowand Ward, he builds into his model

the viewpoint that a society undergoing modernization faces

basically two types of problems: those which are beyond the

control of the leaders of that society and those which are

subject to their influence or control.36 He also postulates

that, as a developing society faces the widening range of











demands that accompany modernization, an egalitarian mass

society emerges which is independent of its democratic or
37
non-democratic character. Within this context, different

polities develop different types of public bureaucracies.

Finally, on the basis of the work done by Banks and

Textor, Diamant develops a chart organizing all the poli-

ties in existence today into categories based on two vari-

ables: (1) political system goals -- whether they are post-

developmental, development, or pre-developmental -- and (2)

political system styles -- whether they are a polyarchy,

limited polyarchy, movement regime, or traditional-auto-

cratic. According to his analysis, Brazil is a limited

polyarchy38 with developmental political system goals.39

Joined to this attempt to operationalize the models offered

by Riggs and Diamant are two techniques used throughout this

dissertation: content analysis and interviewing. Content

analysis is used in two different contexts. The first deals

with organization and personnel theory in basic materials

related to Brazilian public administration. The indicators

used for analysis of this material fall into three groups:

(1) the specific terms used in Portuguese to explain adminis-

trative phenomena .(those terms which are distinct from Amer-

ican experience and those which parallel concepts prevalent

in American public administration); (2) the value system

inherent in traditional public administration, which is im-












ported into Brazil from the United States, and subsequent

developments in this school of thought; and (3) the way

Brazilians interested in public administration handle the

conflict between the techniques and principles of adninistra-

tion, on the one hand, and the ecology of Brazilian administra-

tion, on the other.

The second manner in which content analysis is used

is to isolate issues and problems in public personnel ad-

ministration raised in the press and in articles and books.

Because of the broad time period included, the absence of

indexing, the necessity of hiring a reliable student as-

sistant to aid in gathering the material, and the lack of

funds to finance an extended stay in Sao Paulo, newspaper

research has been based almost entirely on the Jornal do

Brasii. Such a reliance upon one basic news source is open

to criticism from several viewpoints, not the least of

which is the reputation of the Latin American press for par-

tial and conflicting reporting on news stories. Recognizing

the lack of background material for the 1945-1964 period, I

consulted a well-known Brazilian historian, Jose Honorio

Rodrigues, on how one might best utilize the newspapers

available in Rio de Janeiro. He suggested that material

taken from the Jornal do BrasiL be complemented with ma-

terial from the Correi o da Nanh' and the Dia'rio de Noticias.

He stated that the Jornal do Brasil was not a good source












for the years between .1945 and.1950, but that, after that

period, because of a reorganization, the paper became a very

good general news source.

In general, the Jornal do BrasiL has had an excellent

reputation in recent years for complete and reliable news

coverage. There is one notable exception that should be men-

tioned: Within the state.of Guanabara, the JornaZ and the

Correio da Aanh" have provided very different and conflicting

reporting on Governor Carlos Lacarda's handling of the

faveZas (the hillside slums). however the years for which

the Jornal do Brasil has been most heavily relied upon fall

between 1954 and 1964, a period in which, of the news sources

available in Rio, it offers the most complete and systematic

coverage of the interrelationships between the federal civil

service and the.political system, particularly in terms of

the patronage .pressure prevalent during the governments of

Juscelino.Kubitschek,.Janio Quadros, and Joao Goulart. This

material has been supplemented by spot checks of other news

sources, examination of relevant books and articles, and in-

terviewing of knowledgeable persons on matters pertaining to

the civil service.

These various sources of material have been organized

according to two categories: the nature of the opposition to

merit system practices in the federal civil service and the

defense offered for merit system practices. In the first













case, this includes (1) the attack against DASP, particular-

ly its personnel policies, as a consequence of its close as-

sociation with the Estado Novo; (2) the justifications used

for violation of merit.system practices; and.(3) the protec-
/ 40
tion of inter-no and extranumerario interests and the de-

fense of patronage.practices. In the second.case, two sub-

categories are involved: (1) the desire to reorganize the

civilian bureaucracy along "modern" .lines .to achieve more

effective administration in keeping with the developmental

needs of the country and (2) the appearance of some public

support for merit system practices: the contrast between the

absence of such support in 1946 and its beginning in recent

years.

The second major technique, that of interviewing, was

used to get at the problem presented by the conflicting per-

ceptions of what a public personnel system entails, what

sort of civil servants are.desired, and what relation should

or does exist with the external political system. Elementary

role analysis was used to understand the perception which

different individuals,-in positions .of importance and with a

relevant interest in these matters, had of the federal civil

service. Because of the size and complexity of the adminis-

trative system and because of the multiplicity of groups

with an interest in some aspect of public administration, an

attempt was made to capture an insight into these conflicting












notions of what the federal civil service is. The sample

used, however, was too broad and too small to provide ma-

terial which was statistically reliable. Of a total of

fifty interviews scheduled, forty-one were completed. Of

these, the average length was fbrty-five.minutes,i though some

were as brief as half an hour, while others lasted nearly

two hours. Of the forty-one interviews, three were nottidi-

rectly related to the federal civil service: one was re-

stricted to the personnel system in the armed forces and in

the military ministries; one to the administrative reform

program in the.state of Minas Gerais, and one to the in-

service training program of the Banco de Lavoura de Minas

Gerais. But these three interviews, in the way they de-

veloped, were not unrelated to the project under considera-

tion.

The interview guide used was semi-structured. A de-

tailed questionnaire was prepared initially in English. It

was then reduced to eight broad topics adjusted to the par-

ticular situation at hand. The interviewer considered this

reduction necessary, first, to establish proper rapport and,

secondly to deal adequately with the variety of interviewees

selected for the sample. For example, with DASP and Fun-

dayao Getulio Vargas personnel, much more technical language

was used than with officials in public life. The majority of

the interviewing was conducted in Portuguese and as complete












notes as possible were taken during the course of each in-
41
terview.4

The interviews were used to locate these individuals

within the social matrix that has emerged around the federal

civil service and to give further light on how one might con-

ceive of the national administrative system in relation to

its social and political context. These interviews con-

firmed the researcher's impression that the administrative

system offers an important, but neglected, focal point for

understanding the political process and the course-of politi-

cal development in Brazil. Because of the absence of pre-

vious work on the administrative system which provides a

view of its interaction with the political system, and be-

cause of the absence of reliable basic data on the partici-

pants in the public service, much of the material used in

the following pages is more impressionistic than was in-

tended, and there is a lack of quantification. The nature

of the "universe" selected, the resources available, and

the limitations of time and finances imposed by the scholar-

ship held prevented the collection of more statistically re-

liable data. The only area where hard data were located and

collected is in the attempt to measure the.growth of the

numbers of public employees, according-to-the.various cate-

gories in the public service in order to.substantiate

patronage pressures.











A brief word is now in order as to how the material

collected has been organized. Chapter II sketches the broad

lines of Brazilian political and administrative development.

The following two chapters deal with the theoretical frame-

work within which the movement to reform the Brazilian

federal civil service has functioned. The subject matter

is centered around conceptual developments in Brazilian pub-

lic administration. For this reason, the various phases do

not represent strict time periods, and in one or two cases

an author is included in more than one theoretical category.

Chapters V, VI, VII, and VIII are concerned with the po-

litical environment in which the national civil service has

functioned. The material is divided into two parts: develop-

ment of a model for the study of the Brazilian political

system, based on various analytic approaches taken by Bra-

zilian authors in explaining their politics, and the years

between 1945 and 1964, where consideration of the political

understructure precedes a more detailed examination of the

federal civil service. In Chapter VIII our attention shifts

to the gap between the norms imposed in administrative

reform and the socio-political environment. Central to this

topic is the patronage problem in the national administrative

system and the use of comparative material to make this

analysis more meaningful. Chapter IX is devoted to percep-

tions of the federal civil service on the basis of interview












material, while in the final chapter conclusions are set

forth in terms of the propositions stated at the outset.


FOOTNOTES


"Idiographic" is used here in the sense established
by Riggs. That is, to describe ". . any approach which
concentrates on the unique -- the historical episode or 'case
study,' the single agency or country, the biography or the
'culture area'." It is to be contrasted with the "nomo-
thetic" approach -- one which ". . seeks generalizations,
'laws,' hypotheses that assert regularities of behavior, cor-
relations between variables. . (Fred W. Riggs, Conver-
gence in the Stud" of Comparative Public Administration and
Local Government (Gainesville: Public Administration Clear-
ing Service of the University of Florida), p. 9). A third
level in the study of any social phenomenon would be the
ideational, This approach, which deals with the values and
ideas emerging from cultural patterns, is a concern of an-
thropology and philosophy.

The economy and efficiency movement in American pub-
lic administration followed upon the general reform movement
of the late nineteenth century which was oriented toward the
moralization of governmental practices. By the turn of the
century, "'economy and efficiency,' together with other
concepts, such as 'scientific,' had replaced a 'moralistic'
approach to governmental improvement." Yet efficiency as a
dominant value and also as a goal, it seems, absorbed un-
consciously the moral imperative of the earlier movement.
"In short, a term generally regarded as descriptive, 'me-
chanical,' became in fact invested with moral significance.
To a considerable extent the exaltation of efficiency must
be regarded as the secularization, materialization of the
Protestant conscience. The tenet of efficiency is an ar-
ticle of faith of 'muscular Christianity'" (Dwight Waldo,
The Administrative State: A Study of the Political Theory
of Amer;ican Public Administration (New York: Ronald Press,
1948), pp. 392-394).

The concept of public personnel administration as a
topic for study first made its appearance in Brazil during
the mid-1930's. Asterio Dardeau Vieira is generally given
credit for having introduced this subject matter into
Brazil as a separate field for inquiry.












Beatriz Marques de Souza Wahrlich, Administrafo de
Pessoai: Princpios e Tecnicas (Rio de Janeiro: Fundapao
Getilio Vargas, 1964). Although Warhlich deals with a his-
tory of personnel administration in Brazil in her first
chapter, the treatment of the subject is also applicable
to developments in public administration as a whole. See
pp. 23 ff. for her division of personnel administration
into four periods.

5This term is used according to the definition estab-
lished by Alfred Diamant. See the discussion of Diamant's
model, p. 22 et seq.

6Formalism: a situation in which visible forms, such
as prescribed rules and laws, neither represent reality nor
correspond to human behavior (Riggs, Administration in De-
veloping Countries: The Theory of Prismatic Society (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin, 1964), p. 15). In this case the public
personnel system imposed on the Brazilian civil service is
formalistic because it neither represents reality nor cor-
responds to human behavior. For example, legally and
theoretically, personnel should be recruited only through the
administration of public examinations, but in reality pa-
tronage has prevailed as the dominant criterion for admission
to the federal civil service.

7Heterogeneous: this term is used to describe the
mixture of traditional and modern attitudes, practices, and
situations existing in the Brazilian civil service and in
the political system. See Riggs, Administration in DeveZop-
ing Countries: The Theory of Prismatic Society, op. cit.,
pp. 12-13.

Overlapping: the creation of a new formal apparatus
for the civil service which gives the impression of autono-
mousness, but which is in reality intimately related with
the social, political, and economic systems. Specifically,
Riggs uses the term to refer to the creation of a bureau
or rationalized administrative structure which "gives an
illusory impression of autonomousness, whereas in fact it
is deeply enmeshed in, and cross-influenced by, remnants
of older traditional social, economic, religious and po-
litical systems" (Riggs, Administration in Developing
Countries: The Theory of Prismatic Society, op. cit., pp.
14-15).

See the discussion of Riggs' model, p. 19 et seq.












1Throughout this dissertation, "local government" will
refer to government at the level of the munictpio. It should
be noted here that the Brazilian municipality -- the municipio
-- is closer to the county in the United States than to the
city, for it consists of a population center and its sur-
rounding rural area. Within this area a second unit of
population, the vila, may be located, but the whole area
carries the name of the major population center.

1"Pluralism" is employed here to describe a basic
alteration in the nature of the Brazilian political system.
This term is descriptive of the system which has emerged
as the traditional order, dominated by one cohesive (al-
though not necessarily harmonious) set of leaders, and has
given way to one "dominated by many different sets of
leaders (and groups), each having access to a different
combination of political resources" (Robert A. Dahl, Who
Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1963), p. 86). While there is sub-
stantial agreement in political science on the term "plur-
alism," this is not true in sociology and anthropology in
which a controversy is currently going on over the meaning
of the word. Furthermore, in anthropology, "pluralism"
is used not to describe a modern social system but rather
relationships in folk societies.
12
1The concept "take-off stage" is based on the work
of W. W. Rostow. In The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-
Communist Manifesto (Cambridge: The University Press, 1962),
Rostow states: "It is possible to identify all societies,
in their economic dimensions, as lying within one of five
categories: the traditional society, the preconditions for
take-off, the take-off, the drive to maturity, and the age
of high mass-consumption" (p. 4). According to his
analytic framework, Brazil has entered the take-off stage
of economic growth (p. 127).
1This issue was originally stated as follows:
"whether a body of principles or administration, detached from
the surrounding tissue of culture can be effectively applied
without regard to spatial or temporal elements" (Ralph
Braibanti, Trans.atzional Inducement of Administrative Reform:
A Survey of Scope and Critique of Issues (Bloomington: Com-
parative Administration Group, American Society for Public
Administration, and International Development Research
Center, Indiana University, 1964),p. 69). The gist of
the paper, however, is that Braibanti feels an affirmative
answer to this question is impossible.











14
1This statement should not, however, be construed
to mean that democratic development does not require some
separation of political and administrative roles.
15 /
The Departamento Administrativo do Serviyo Publico
-iLthe Administrative Department of the Public Service --
is a bureau of general administration created by Getulio
Vargas in 1938 as an instrument for administrative reform
and control over the national administrative system.

1Charles Wagley, An Introduction to Brazil (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1964), pp. 5-10.
17
Luther Gulick and Lyndall Urwick, Papers on the
Science of Administration (New York: Institute of Public
Administration, 1937).
18
1Taylorism: the search for the "one best way" in
administration to provide maximum efficiency and to
eliminate all unnecessary steps.
19
1This political structure, in contrast to the
Brazilian one, may be best characterized as a competitive
two-party system over a lengthy time span.

2The classic' example of these principles to function
as expected and of the failure to account for human be-
havior as an independent variable is to be found in the
1946 reorganization of the United States Patent Office. See
the discussion of this attempt at reorganization in Robert
T. Golembiewski, "The Small Group and Organization Theory:
A Revisit to the Patent Office," Behavior and Organization:
0 & M and the Cmall Group (Chicago: Rand, McNally & Co., 1962).
21
2For a discussion of the use of proposition-building
in the study of comparative administration, see Glen D.
Paige, Proposition-Building in the Study of Comparative
Administration (Papers in Comparative Administration, Spe-
cial Series: Number 4) (Chicago: Comparative Administration
Group, American Society for Public Administration, 1964),
pp. 2-3.
22This variable is based on the work of Arthur S.
Banks and Robert B. Textor (A Cross-Polity Survey (Cambridge:
MIT Press, 1963), p. 112).
23
2This distinction between formal and informal power
is based on Riggs (Administration in Developing Countries:
The Theory of Prismatic Society, op. cit., p. 209).











2The importance of this element is discussed by
Gilbert B. Siegel in "The Vicissitudes of Governmental
Reform in Brazil: A Study of the DASP" (unpublished Doctoral
dissertation, University of Pittsburgh, 1964) and in "The
DASP: A Study in the Deterioration of an Organizational
Power Base" (Robert T. Daland, Perspectives of Brazilian
Public Administration (Los Angeles: University of Southern
California Bookstore, 1963), I, esp. p. 34.

2For a discussion of the American administrative
reform, see Waldo, op. cit., and Leonard D. White, The
Republican Era: 1869-190O, A Study in Administrative His-
tory (New York, Macmillan, 1958).

2Siegel, "Administration, Values and the Merit
System in Brazil," in Perspectives of Brazilian Public Ad-
ministration, op. cit., p. 10.
27
Riggs, Administration in Developing Countries: The
Theory of Prismatic Society, op. cit., p. 23.
28
2Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman (eds.), The
Politics of Developing Areas (Princeton: Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 1960).
29
Riggs, Administration in Developing Countries: The
Theory of Prismatic Society, op. cit., p. 29.

0Ibid. pp. 32-33.
31Ibid., p. 33.
32Ibid., p. 34.

3Alfred Diamant, Bureaucracy in Developmental Move-
ment Regimes: A Bureaucratic Model for Developing Societies
(Bloomington: Comparative Administration Group, American
Society for Public Administration, and International De-
velopment Research Center, Indiana University, 1964), p. 5.
34
Ibid., pp. 6, 7, 9, 10.
35
Ibid., p. 12

36Ibid., p. 13.

37Ibid., p. 15.












38
3Ibid. Diamant used the term "polyarchy" to indi-
cate "that the political regime is broadly representative,
that power is not excessively centralized or monopolized,
that there is wide participation in making policy decision,
and that alternative policies have a chance to be heard and
considered freely"(p. 27). A limited polyarchy is one
"where polyarchal features have been restricted or elimin-
ated, or where there is an appearance of polyarchy, con-
siderable limitations have been placed on it" (p. 27). The
category "movement regime" is based on Robert Tucker's con-
cept of a "revolutionary mass-movement regime under single-
party auspices." "It is revolutionary because it attempts
to replace an existing regime and, once having achieved
that, to carry through far-reaching changes. Next its core
is an ideology which provides political orientation and gives
the leadership an organizing instrument. Third, it rests on
a 'mass' movement, that is to say, it draws on and rests on
a base of mass participation and involvement. Finally, the
revolution is guided by a militant, centralized elite or
vanguard party which tries, more or less successfully, to
construct an organization network reaching down to the grass
roots in the villages" (pp. 27, 29). The category "tradi-
tional-autocratic" refers to "those polities whose political
style has remained traditional, such as Iran and Nepal, as
well as certain modernized polities whose autocratic or mili-
taristic political style closely resembles the traditional
autocracies, such as Spain, Portugal, or Paraguay" (p. 29).
39
39bid., pp. 26-28. The rest of his paper is not ap-
plicable to the analysis of Brazil since it is oriented to-
ward the development of a model for the analysis of develop-
mental movement regimes. Such a phenomenon, as he correctly
indicates by the classification of Brazil according to another
category, has been absent in Brazilian experience. Further-
more, his development of characteristics for the movement
regime model is too specific to be able to look for cor-
responding characteristics in Brazil except according to his
three broad divisions: (1) the nature of the ideology of de-
velopment and its relation to the various subsystems of the
social system; (2) the nature of the legitimate authority,
the regime, and its functioning as a mobilization system; and
(3) the structure and functioning of the administrative staff
or bureaucracy (pp. 49-50).
40
40nterino: an employee hired temporarily, with the
understanding that he must pass the concurso (the public
civil service examination) at a later date to keep his po-
sition on a permanent basis. In practice, however, his









38


position has tended to become permanent.
Extranumerdrio: an employee who occupies a position
not created by law. This category was abolished by law in
1960; however, prior to this date, an attempt was made to
control admissions through this category by administering
a prova de habilitaqa'o (a testing of the candidate's ability
to exercise the responsibilities of a particular job).
While these positions were originally designed to be of a
transitional character, the individuals who have occupied
them tended to become permanent employees of the federal
government and created constant pressures for the same
rights and privileges as the funcionarios pdbblicos --
public functionaries -- who make up the career civil service.
41See the Appendix for the interview guide.
See the Appendix for the interview guide.








CHAPTER II


THE SETTING


If Brazil is considered within the framework of the

model and terminology proposed by Diamant, it may be ob-

served that the course of Brazilian political development

has been quite uneven. As an independent political system,

however, Brazil has experienced essentially only a single

political style: limited polyarchy. The one exception to

this statement is the Estado Novo, when Getulio Vargas ruled

according to a traditional-autocratic political style within

the framework of a state which theoretically approached a

movement regime style. Yet it was precisely during this

period that there was a change in political system goals from

pre-developmental to developmental ones. It is to a con-

sideration of these matters that we shall direct our attention.

The focus of this chapter will fall upon the broad lines of

Brazilian political development during three distinct periods:

the Empire, the First Republic, and the Vargas Era. In so

doing, we shall proceed on the basis of what was stated as an

initial assumption -- that political and administrative pro-

cesses are intertwined and that the problems of administra-

tion cannot be considered independently of the political

context within which they function. Consequently, the term

"political development" has been interpreted broadly here to











include the evolution of a national administrative system.

Since the arrival of the Portuguese Court in Rio de

Janeiro in 1808, the focal point of the Brazilian political

system has been the executive -- be he an hereditary monarch,

a self-appointed guardian, or an elected president. This

institutional continuity between past and present is perhaps

best captured in the phrase "His Majesty, The President of

Brazil." All effective government in Brazil seems to have

relied on the presence of a strong executive. In turn, the

presence of a strong executive .as crucial .to the functioning

of the political system seems to be related to the impor-

tance of personalism as a central value in Brazilian cul-

ture and to the whole notion of charisma as an essential at-
2
tribute of leadership. This fact is nowhere more clear

than in the recent experience of the Goulart .government. The

anarchy which emerged during his period of office is due, at

least to some extent, to the absence of leadership and ad-

ministrative ability on his part. Certainly, there were

many other factors at work, but the feeling is inescapable

that Goulart's lack of a means of direction was the final

element in the deterioration of events leading to the revo-

lution of March 31, 1964.3

Related to this focus on the executive as the refer-

ence point in Brazilian .politics and administration is the

theme of centralization and decentralization of authority












4
and control. While Riggs speaks of .the "disengagement" of

authority and control as characteristic of-transitional so-

cieties,5 this situation has been present in Brazil from the

time the first governor-general was sent out from Lisbon in

1549. By the end of the colonial period, an administrative

system was in existence that provided unity for the diverse

regions, constituting the Brazilian "cultural archipelago,"6

under the authority of the Portuguese Crown. Nevertheless,

many of the regions -- especially those directed by their own

audiSncias -- were quite successful in escaping central con-

trol as exercised by the viceroy. In general, the Bra-

zilian colonies were never subjected to the extremes of

monarchical absolutism from .which the Spanish colonies in

America suffered. Centralization was imposed on Brazil re-

latively late and when it did .occur, it appeared in a much

more moderate form.


Imperial Brazil

With the arrival of the court of Dom Joao VI, then prince

regent, and the conversion of Rio .de Janeiro into the seat of the

Portuguese Empire, Brazil received the full impact of four cen-

turies of Portuguese imperial institutions; among these, the

bureaucracy played a dominant role, for in the course of

creating an empire in the East, based on trade, Portugal had

found it necessary to create a vast bureaucratic apparatus.












As Raymundo Faoro has said, Portugal became essentially a

country of funcionarios pdbZicos (public functionaries).8

Consequently, many new administrative entities appeared in

Rio due to the presence of the Court, and a number of aristo-

cratic public servants, associated with the royal house,

descended on the new capital. The most inauspicious development

for the future of Brazilian administration was their rein-

forcement of the idea of public positions (cargos pdblicos)
9
as sinecures.

Although Rio's status as capital of the Empire was a

relatively short-lived one and the Court returned to Lisbon

after the Portuguese Revolution of 1820, the imperial insti-

tutional base remained and provided the foundation for the

creation of an independent monarchy in 1822, with a member

of the House of Braganya on the throne.

With independence, a change occurred in the goals of the

administrative system, although there was no alteration in the

symbol of political legitimacy as expressed in the person of

the monarch. Whereas the primary concern of the Portuguese

State was the exercise of fiscal controls of a tributary

nature and the maintenance .of an overseas empire, the new

Brazilian government turned its attention to the objective

of national unity. This goal was likewise transferred to

the civilian and military bureaucracy. For the first time,

a truly national administrative system was created. In this

process, however, the gap between formal authority and ef-












fective control remained. For all practical purposes, the im-

pact of the administrative system was still limited to the

major cities and its focus was around the Court in Rio. In
10
the provinces, clan and oligarchical style politics pre-

dominated and factional political struggles continued to be

couched in local and personal terms. Mario Wagner Vieira

da Cunha has described this situation especially well:

Except for the efforts realized to maintain social
order in the face of local revolutions and foreign
attacks, as in the case of the Paraguayan War, there
was no effective need for administrative activity.


During the Empire administration really only reached
reduced functional sectors and limited territorial
areas. The rest was handed over to the power of
local clans . .

The Imperial Government also tried to reflect the
power of the mercantile bourgeoisie. . [It was
the mercantile bourgeoisie which required the great-
est administrative activity of the government.]
Thus, the imperial administration turned its attention
more to the larger cities and to the Court than to the
countryside; it took care more of external commerce
than of internal commerce -- of the railroads and
the ports which tied the country to the outside world
rather than of the regional and local communications
and supply network. It was mostly an administration
that had a regulatory character, with limited financial
resources and a small number of employees. Its aristo-
cratic orientation was manifested in the expenses of
the Court which reached half or more of all the total
expenditures. . On the one hand, these were for
activities carried on at the service of the Court or
for its entertainment. On the other, however, these
were service activities for the dominant classes [with
a purpose] since the Monarch was interested in at-
tracting to the Court the power [and resources] of
the country's rural aristocracy and mercantile bour-
geoisie.ll











In theory, the Empire was strictly a unitary state, but,

as in the case of other traditional systems, the control of

the central government, as expressed through the administra-

tive system, over local power structures was negligible.

Given the predominance of local loyalties and the problem of

internal communications in a territory of such vast size, the

main accomplishment of the Empire was the creation and pre-

servation of union among the Portuguese-speaking provinces

and the avoidance of the emergence of a series of independent

republics. Joined with this evolution toward national unity

was the transition from a clan to an oligarchical style of

politics. Familialistic patterns of politics continued to

function, but they were brought into focus around regional

centers -- particularly after the abdication of Pedro I and
12
the publication of the Law of August 12, 1834.1

Until 1834 -- in spite of the gap between authority and

control -- it is fairly correct to speak of the Empire as a

regime centralized administratively but decentralized po-

litically. After this date, the structure of power in Brazil

became diffuse once again and the balance between the center

and the outlying areas was upset.13 A crucial element in this

process was the transference of the patronage power away from

the executive and its dispersal at the regional level. To

capture these changes, let us turn to a primary source in

this period -- the Viscount of Uruguay, the man probably most












responsible for the creation of a national administrative

system in Brazil. What is most striking about this individ-

ual is the relevance of his observations to understanding

present and past administrative problems in Brazil.

In his Essay on Administrative Law4 he emphasized

the fact that during the first phase of the Empire, the

executive had the private right to select all provincial

and municipal employees. This situation, he claimed, was

altered when the Ato AdicioraZ became effective because a

substantial part of the patronage privilege was transferred

to the provincial assemblies. The Crown, however, did re-

tain the right to name officials to the National Treasury,

the Ministry of War and Navy, and the General Post Office,

and to select the presidents of the provinces, bishops,

commanders-superior in the National Guard, members of the

higher courts (Re Zajoes e Tribunais Superiores), and the

employees of the Faculties of Medicine and Law and of the

Academies.15

Regardless of the fact that the monarch still had

important appointive powers, the Viscount was most critical

of the transfer of patronage powers to the provincial as-

semblies. He felt that all that had been accomplished was

the replacement of excessive centralization by excessive de-

centralization -- with pejorative effects for the country's

administration. At least, before the change, he observed,












the patronage power was more distant, more impartial, and

less involved in the immediate struggles and personal pas-

sions of political partisans.6 Above all, he was con-

cerned with the creation of a national administrative system

which would provide the necessary framework for order and

progress, and he saw further obstacles to this goal in the

alteration of previous political relationships. In a new-

ly emergent country such as Brazil, with an imperial heri-

tage, he was convinced,

S. good administrative institutions appropriate
to its circumstances and properly developed [were]
more important than political liberty. . The latter
without the former [could not] produce good results.17

To support this assertion, he singled out the fact that the

electoral changes and the decentralization which followed

the abdication served to introduce chaos into the system and

to nullify central power.

The Viscount reached the conclusion that the attempt

to decentralize the system and to establish local self-govern-

ment, with its inspiration in American and British sources,

had contributed only to making national control more diffi-

cult and to increasing the regional contrasts in develop-

ment. He was quite emphatic in stating that the origin of

the Brazilian system -- as in the cases of Spain, Portugal,

and Belgium -- was to be found in France. The special con-

ditions that gave rise to the American and British systems












were, he said, lacking in Brazil. Furthermore, he main-

tained that knowledge of the French system should not be

confused with imitation. If French administrative institu-

tions were to be followed in Brazil, it was essential that

they be adapted to the special conditions of the country.18

Despite serious obstacles to the creation of a central-

ized government, the Crown used its appointive powers to help

build a body of trained public servants, and isolated attempts

were made at the national level to select governmental em-

ployees on the basis of capacity. The first recorded instance

of a public examination is in 1808, when written and oral tests

were announced for the selection of surgeons for the Royal

Brigade and the Royal Navy. In general, the Portuguese king,

Dom Joao VI, has been credited with the search for qualified

elements for the public service. Similarly, when independence

was established and the first constitution was prepared in

1824, an article was included subscribing to the principle

that all public positions -- whether political, civil, or

military -- were open to all citizens on the basis of their

qualifications. Both Brazilian monarchs -- Dom Pedro I and

Dom Pedro II -- were interested in establishing a competent

higher civil service based on the educated elements in the

upper class (the bacharlis) -- especially within the Public

Treasury.19 But these attempts were made within the context

of a state which was primarily interested in integrating, in












bringing together, in providing for its elite groups. The ob-

stacles to centralization were such that an independent na-

tional civil service did not emerge. Nevertheless, the var-

ious emperors -- as a moderating power in the midst of fac-

tional politics -- have usually been credited with the main-

tenance of high standards in the selection of civil servants

and this has been contrasted with the existence of spoils

system practices at the provincial level.20


The First Republic (1889-1930)

In 1889, the attempt at creating a unitary state ended,

and in 1891, a federal republic was formed in which the

provinces, now named states, exercised almost complete autonomy.

Although there was a change in political forms, the social and

economic structure of the country remained much the same.

The country retained its agrarian character and its dependence

on foreign markets, and little was achieved in the way of es-

tablishing.an internal network of communications. Instead,

each major regional port was tied directly with its overseas
21
market. In terms of Diamant's definition,21 the First Republic

represented a step backward in political development.

Even though the formal structure of the First Republic

was based on the imitation of American political institutions,

its functioning was totally different. The real focus of poli-

tics was around a series of regional political bosses (the












corone's), some with more, some with less, power. The pre-

eminent figure in each state was the governor, who shared

his power through a system of alliances with local leaders

at the municipal level. In a sense, it might be said that

the unitary structure of the Empire was reproduced at the

regional level -- with each governor providing a point of

reference for the continuation .of factional politics. At

the national level, the president's authority (i.e. his

formal power) was broad, but his control was limited by the

autonomy of the states. As a consequence of this framework

of interlocking personal alliances, the president of the re-

public was selected according to what is known as "governor

politics" (a po"-'tica dos governzado.res) -- and its subsequent

corollary, "the politics of coffee and milk" (a po Lt-ca de
I 22
cafe comr'" ete) 2

In such a case, whereby all states enjoyed a consider-

able amount of autonomy, regional developmental contrasts

continued to grow, with obvious consequences for the distri-

bution of power among the various states.

The concept of federalism, based on North American

experience and transferred to an agrarian, regionally divided

country where personal politics predominated, served merely

to undermine the main contribution of the Empire -- the es-

tablishment of the semblance of national unity in a territory

larger than the continental United States and faced with












serious problems of communication. The comments of Oliveira

Torres add insight to this matter:

[During the Republic] Brazil was a "cultural archi-
pelago" [where] political power was for all practical
purposes concentrated in the hands of the presidents
of the states.

The federal government maintained in fact a conscious-
ness of the bid for unity in our history, but in general
it did not possess the means to accomplish this since
all [effective] power was handed over to the states.

A more profound analysis of the general conditions of
Brazilian public administration during the republican
regime before 1930 reveals this singular fact: the feder-
al government disposed of only two arms to maintain its
authority in the whole of Brazilian territory -- the
Army and the National Telegraph.23

This observation is nowhere better borne out than in the case

of the Canudos rebellion at the turn of the century, when the

federal government was only able to halt the primitively armed

movement of a religious fanatic in the hinterland of the state

of Bahia after a tremendous expenditure in men, resources, and

effort.24

Consequently, a highly diffuse network of state admini-

strative systems, at contrasting stages of development,

emerged and took priority over an only partially effective

federal administration. These regional administrative systems

were entirely at the service of the rural patriarchs who con-

trolled the patronage power. Hence, the only limiting factor

on the expansion of public jobs at this level was to be found

in the financial resources of the individual states. The












main interest of the regional political bosses was in the pro-

vision of public order and the maintenance of as much power

within the regional capitals as possible. From this situa-

tion stems the emphasis of these political bosses on the re-

inforcement of police services and their unwillingness to

allow the degree of municipal authority provided for in the
25
Constitution of 1891.

During the Empire, the attempt at creating an imperial

administrative system and tying it in with the Court in Rio,

where regional elites were to be brought together, had been

related to the objective of national unity. Once, however,

the central focus of the Empire disappeared, only two basic

functions remained for the recently created national ad-

ministrative system: the furnishing of employment for a mar-

ginal middle class on the basis of regional pressures and

the supplying of the minimum of service necessary for the

maintenance of ties with external markets. Since these func-

tions could just as well be carried out by the various state

administrations, an additional factor, which contributed to

weakening newer national administrative organs,arose.

Among the responsibilities left to the federal admin-

istration was the handling of national finances, in con-

nection with the needs of the most prosperous states, and

the supplying of public services for a rapidly growing

federal district. In these terms, the scope of the federal












administration was substantially limited to the economic and

political center of the country -- the Rio de Janeiro-Sao

Paulo-Minas Gerais triangle. It was only after 1920 that

the federal government began to attempt to establish itself

over the order created by the rural patriarchs -- in such

areas as police matters, education, public health, and com-
26
munications.2

Regardless of this situation, there was apparently a

top group of able public functionaries who continued to work

in the federal government's major ministries. According to

Loewenstein, they were attracted to these positions by re-

latively good pay and by the considerable prestige the posi-

tions offered. He accounted for the presence of these of-

ficials on the basis of the continuation of an elitist tradition

inherited from the Empire and founded .on French precedents.27


The Vargas Era (1930-1945)

The year 1930 provides a convenient dividing point in

the course of Brazilian political development because it

marks the collapse of the political order on which the First

Republic was based and the initiation of a new era in Brazilian

politics and administration. In .October of that year, Ge-

tulio Vargas achieved power through .a revolt, established a

provisional government, and, on November 11, issued a decree

suspending the Constitution of 1891. With this decree a

return to a unitary state began; it reached its conclusion












with the coup d'etat of November 10, 1937, and new groups,

hitherto restricted by the predominance of rural interests,

were given a greater voice in national politics.

The changes instituted in the decree of November 11,

1930, are significant not so much because they granted to

Vargas sufficient authority to recreate a strong executive

as because they bore a direct relationship to ample control

-- that is, with effective power to make these changes func-

tional. Article 1 granted the president not only discre-

tionary powers of an executive and legislative nature --

until a Constituent Assembly should meet to decide on the

country's reorganization -- but also the exclusive right to

decide on the appointment and dismissal of public officials.

Article 2 dissolved all representative and deliberative as-

semblies -- federal, state, and municipal -- and Article 4

stated that federal and state constitutions were to remain

in force, but subject to modification by governmental decree.

Article 5 suspended all constitutional guarantees as well

as the right of the courts to review decrees and acts of the

government. Article 11 gave the executive the authority to

appoint a federal delegate -- an interventor -- to each state

with the power to exercise all state legislative and execu-

tive powers and to appoint and dismiss all mayors under his

jurisdiction.











In November, 1933, Vargas convoked a constituent as-

sembly, and on July 16, 1934, a new constitution was pro-

mulgated which restored the federal republic in name and

granted increased powers to the federal government. The

chief characteristic of this constitution, however, was its

"autocratic presidentialism,"29 an aspect which was made

operational. Nevertheless, this period of legal "democracy"

and reconstituted federalism was short-lived, for on De-

cember 18, 1935, the Chamber and Senate passed a constitu-

tional amendment allowing them to grant authority to the

president to declare a "state of grave internal commotion"

-- under which all constitutional guarantees could be sus-

pended. Through this amendment Vargas was able to exercise

almost absolute power. Then, in late 1937, he used it to

destroy the state he had created. With presidential elec-

tions in the offing, he initiated action by demanding that Con-

gress declare the existence of a "state of grave internal com-

motion." This was followed by a Congressional act granting

him state-of-war powers for ninety days, as of October 2.

Finally, on November 10, he called in the troops, dissolved

Congress, and established a clear-cut dictatorship under the

name Estado NVoo.30

Politically, this was a period of great instability in

which Vargas took the initiative in the face of the collapse

of the system built around rurally oriented state oligarchies












and attempted to create a new basis of equilibrium and con-

sensus; economically and administratively, it was a period of

great change. Yet, the economic and social structure of

Brazil remained much the same as it had been during the Empire

and the First Republic. The economy was based on the produc-

tion of a few primary products -- among which, after the turn

of the century, coffee was chief -- and the national govern-

ment was almost entirely dependent on the taxes levied on ex-

ternal commerce. This income, however, was insufficient even

for the minimal needs of the federal government, for the

country was faced with constant budgetary deficits after 1909.

Beginning in 1930, in the face of the worldwide depression

and the loss of the country's foreign markets, the first real

push toward industrialization and diversification of the

economy was undertaken. Certainly, World War I had given an

impetus to economic growth, but it was nothing compared with

the changes destined to occur during the 1930's. With the in-

crease in the domestic prices of imported goods after 1929 and

the growth of real income after 1934, a strong incentive was

provided for the establishment of new industries. In this

process, large amounts of capital were diverted from coffee

into industry and trade. Although the agricultural sector of

the economy continued to suffer from the fall in world prices

throughout these years, the industrial sector had recovered

its 1929 level by 1933. By the end of the 1930's, in contrast











to what had occurred in many of the largely industrialized

countries, Brazil had reached a per capital income superior to

that of 1929.31

In public administration, attention was turned toward

the reorganization of the older ministries and the creation

of new administrative entities. The first ministry to suffer

modification was that of Agriculture, Industry, and Com-
32
merce. The responsibilities for industry and commerce were

passed on to a new ministry, that of Labor, Industry, and

Commerce, created by Decree 19495 of December 17, 1930; then,

through Decree 221338 of January 11, 1933, the ministry itself

was reorganized. The second ministry to undergo change was

the Ministry of Justice and Interior Affairs. Since its cre-

ation during the Empire, it had been one of the most important.

Several of its previous functions were removed and these were

combined in 1931 to create the Ministry of Education and

Health. This same year, the National Coffee Council was

formed to deal with the continuing coffee crisis. Then, in

recognition of the need for reorganization in public finance,

the structure and methods of work of the Ministry of Finance

were ordered updated under Decree 24036 of March 26, 1934.3

By mid-1934, this phase of administrative innovation

had halted with the promulgation of a new constitution and

the return to partisan politics; it was only to be resumed

with the declaration of the Estado Novo in 1937.












Yet concern for administrative reform and expanded

public service was continued in the new Congress through

the leadership of Vargas. An interparliamentary commission

of ten members was created under the name of, first, the

Mixed Commission on Economic and Financial Reform (the Comissao

Mista de Reforma Economico-Financeira) and, later, the Com-

mission for Readjustment and Tributary Reform (the Comissao

de Reajustamento e Reforma Tributaria). Under its auspices,

a subcommittee of four men was established with Joaquim

Nabuco as chairman to prepare a report on conditions in the

federal civil service and to offer proposals for its reorgan-

ization.34 This report contained several suggestions: one

for the creation of two general schedules for the federal

civil service, with a division between central and regional

administration; a second for the establishment of a uniform

classification plan, and a third for the formation of a

central personnel agency.3

The Nabuco Report, however, was suppressed and a new

subcommittee was created to deal with the problems of classi-

fication and pay in the federal civil service. From this com-

mittee came a report proposing three alternative organization

plans: a classification of positions based on performance; a

five-step pay plan independent of promotion, and a general

readjustment based on the creation of a career system within

each ministry -- providing for pay according to performance












and advancement according to qualification. Vargas

selected the third alternative.36

Out of this preparatory work came the Law of

Readjustment (Law 284 of October 23, 1936), a landmark

in the Brazilian civil service reform movement. It

contained three aspects which revolutionized the federal

administrative system: a classification plan; a central

personnel agency, and the requirement that the admis-

sion to the career civil service be made only through

selection according to public examination -- the

concurso. There was also a fourth aspect -- the

establishment of efficiency commissions -- but this

was a failure from the outset. While in theory the

basic unit of the classification plan was the position,

or cargo, and there was a logical progression from

position to class to career, to quadro, in practice

the basic criterion used consisted of the concept of

classes and a salary differentiation which lay within

them.37

The reorganization of the federal civil service as

a consequence of the Vargas-initiated reforms is summar-

ized in Table I. It is based on a chart developed by

Eduardo Pinto Pessoa Sobrinho. Although Pinto Pessoa

includes the four classes of extranumerarios as a part












of the original reorganization, Siegel states quite correct-

ly that the grouping of non-regular personnel (i.e.

extranum-rzAarics) into four categories dates from Decree-

Law 240 of February 4, 193838 and not from the original

measure.

Little effort was made to characterize the duties

and responsibilities of individual positions due to the

lack of administrative technicians trained in these skills.

Within the careers, which were, in effect, the basic units

in each ministry, advancement was made according to length

of service (aitiguidade). Not all positions, however,

were placed under careers; these were separated into a

special category and called cargos isolados -- isolated po-

sitions. Such positions were not subjected to the require-

ment of a public examination and could be filled entirely

according to the wishes of the executive; yet, many of them

-- those located at the middle management level -- were

filled by persons who had entered the civil service

through examination.3

The basic contribution of the classification part of the

new law, then, was that it provided a means for systematizing

the pay scales and for establishing a semblance of order in


(Text continued on Page 61)











TABLE I

REORGANIZATION OF THE BRAZILIAN CIVIL SERVICE


contratadosa


F I-


mensalistas'


I


extranumerarios


servidores
(public
servants)


(supernumerary
employees)


I c
diaristas



tarefeirosd
tarefeiros


cargos
isolados


funcionarios-,quadros


efetivos


em comissao


carreira classes cargo
(career) (class) (position)


Employees contracted and paid for a specific job or
for specific purposes.

Employees hired and paid by the month. Prior to the ex-
tinction of the extranurerdrio category in 1960, these public
servants were similar to the funciondrios, although they did not
enjoy their rights and privileges.

CHired and paid by the day. They consisted of both
skilled and unskilled laborers.

dEmployees hired and paid for menial tasks on a piece-
work basis.


I












unclassified positions. These are not included in
the various classes. They correspond to certain specific
responsibilities.

These civil servants are appointed to specific po-
sitions that are permanent. The term efetivo, however, is
equally applicable to positions in the career service, for
they, too, are of a permanent character.

gThese civil servants carry their ranks inherent in
their persons and are not tied to fixed positions. Salaries
are paid on the basis of the job performed.


the federal civil service. Also, in spite of numerous altera-

tions, it was the only plan in existence at the federal level

until a new classification plan was passed by Congress in 1960.

The second aspect of the new law involved the creation

of a central personnel agency, the Federal Civil Service Coun-

cil (the Conselho Federal do Servico Publico Civil). It was

organized as a collegial body consisting of five members, ap-

p-inted by the president, who were to possess specialized

knowledge of public administration and who were not to be

active in partisan politics. The council's responsibilities

included the preparation and administration of entrance ex-

aminations in the federal civil service, the expression of

opinion about the removal of public officials, and assistance

or advice in the case of plans submitted by the efficiency

commissions for the improvement of the public service.40

While this law is often referred to as the origin of the

Brazilian merit system, it instituted a merit system only in

the sense that initial entrance into the federal civil service











was to occur through selection on the basis of public examin-

ation. This matter is crucial when we reach the period be-

tween 1945 and 1964. In spite of the belief which has been

propagated that the post-war years represent a return to an

open spoils system, after the institution of a merit system

conducive to a neutral and impartial civil service, it must

be remembered that a merit system, as the term is understood

in the United States and Western Europe, did not make its

appearance at this time.

The fact that a neutral and impartial civil service

did not come into existence as a consequence of this legis-

lation may be seen by examining the functional side of the

civil service in the years between 1936 and 1945. First,

however, we must note a section of the report on administra-

41
tive reform, prepared by Barreto, Wahrlich, and Siqueira,1

which provides insight into this subject. Referring to the

public personnel system in existence from 1936 to the time

of the report, they mention that intermediate and upper level

positions of a directive character, as well as those with

42
executive and exclusive functions, are selected on the basis

of personal confidence. Prior to Law 284, these positions

were filled by promotion. The authors of the report state

that the reason for this change was the desire to open these

positions to rapid access by the new elements who had come

into the civil service through public examination.












In other words, it was desirable to prevent the
reforms contained in that same law from being
frustrated by older executives, rarely selected
according to merit, who were naturally opposed to
such reforms.

It was only afterwards, they say, that open selection of
43
men to fill these positions had a harmful effect. In

this connection, it is useful to ask who stood to benefit

most from the reforms instituted during the late 1930's,

who were in a position to lose most, and what effect this

had on political development when open political debate

was reinstituted in 1946.

The Estado Novo was essentially a highly centralized,

administrative, no-party state which followed the dictates

of the absolute ruler under a paper constitution. The

crucial section of the constitution was Article 180:

Until the National Parliament meets, the President
of the Republic shall be empowered to issue de-
crees on all matters of legislation for the
Union.44

Since a legislature was never convened, Vargas was to

govern throughout this period according to decree-law.

The governmental system was centralized to a degree

hitherto unknown in Brazil. Under an hierarchical arrange-

ment consisting of interventorgs --the representatives of

the executive, the State Departments of the Public Service
45
(the Departamentos Estaduais do Servico Publico),5 and the

Minister of Justice -- the states became little more than












administrative units under the control of Vargas. In the

municipalities, the prefects were given powers which, at the

local level, paralleled those of the interventor4. They were

directly responsible to the interventor and to the president

of the daspinho in their states.

According to Loewenstein, who has written the most

complete account of state administrative organization during

the Vargas period, these administrative departments were com-

posed of from four to ten members. The smaller states usually

had four, the middle-sized states, five, and the key states

of Minas Gerais, Sao Paulo, and Rio Grande do Sul, ten each.

They functioned both as the state legislature and as the

supervisory body for the interventor and the Minister of

Justice (in the latter case, this was when his actions fell

within the area of their jurisdiction). Although the inter-

ventor was responsible for the study, approval, and declara-

tion of all state laws and decrees, these were valid only if

sanctioned by the president of the daspinho. If the daspinho

opposed any act or decree executed by the interventor, a two-

thirds' vote by this body was sufficient to suspend action

until a decision was reached by the chief executive. In ad-

dition to this control over the interventor, the state ad-

ministrative department was responsible for reporting on all

appeals against the interventor. These appeals were sub-

mitted, through the Minister of Justice, to the President of

the Republic.












It is not difficult to understand why, under this

combination of circumstances, the president of the state

daspinho was usually more powerful than the interventor.

Loewenstein further states that during this era

. the Administrative Department [was] a team of
hard-hitting, hard-working, thoroughly efficient pro-
fessional bureaucrats -- mostly young lawyers, but
also technicians such as accountants, civil engineers,
agricultural experts, statisticians -- while in the
Interventor's office the efficiency of the staff
[was] vitiated by ineradicable patronage.46

At the national level, both formal and effective powers

were centralized in the office of the chief executive. The

principal organization through which this centralization was

achieved was the Administrative Department of the Public

Service -- the DASP, established on July 30, 1938, through

Decree-Law 579. In the absence of a deliberative assembly,

the DASP provided the legislation .necessary to bring into

effect Article 67 of the new constitution. This article

provided for the creation of a general administrative de-

partment which would undertake a detailed study of the na-

tional administrative system with the intention of instituting

changes along the lines of economy and efficiency. It also

gave to this department responsibility for the annual prepara-

tion of the budget and authority to exercise control over its

use, with the understanding that guide lines were to be pro-

vided by the executive. The decree-law, however, broadened

the new department's functions to include the institution of











central control over personnel and materiel and responsibility

for rendering assistance to the President of the Republic in

the reviewing of proposed legislation. Thus, from the out-

set, DASP was designed to function in theory as an organ of

general administration similar to that conceived by Willough-

by.47

Within the area of public personnel administration,

the collegial Federal Civil Service Council was replaced and

incorporated into the new bureau of general administration,

under the control of a single head -- the president of DASP.

Initially, the new organization functioned mainly as a central

personnel agency and the focus of attention continued to be

on establishing limitations on patronage, instituting com-

petitive entrance examinations, and creating controls to in-

sure the maintenance of these policies. DASP was also

granted authority to check on every placement, transfer, pro-

motion, leave, disciplinary measure, and any other minor

action that pertained to personnel practices in the ministries.

Further, it was given the responsibility for the maintenance

of both a pre-service and an in-service training program.48

In addition to these controls established over person-

nel in the public service, a coordinative apparatus was created

under the name of the Council of Administration of Personnel.

It was designed to promote better coordination and greater

efficiency among those organs concerned with personnel, both












within DASP and the ministries. The members of the council

were the chiefs or directors of the personnel agencies in

the ministries and, within DASP, the directors of Personnel

Orientation and Control, Personnel Research, and Selection

and Training.

In theory, DASP was designed to operate as a technical

organization. For individual ministerial organs, this meant

they were responsible to DASP for what were deemed to be

technical affairs, and to the usual hierarchy of ministerial
49
authority for general administrative patterns. In prac-

tice, DASP functioned quite differently. Since it came

into existence within the context of a dictatorship con-

ditioned to modernization without the mechanism of .a mass-

based party, it provided a convenient means for central
50
control over the national administrative system. As an

agent of the executive, it exercised responsibilities which

went beyond purely technical concerns. It is in this con-

nection that DASP became a sort of superministry, and it was

against this power that hostility developed, both within the

administrative system and outside it. This hostility was

increased by Vargas' use of the DASP as a focal point for

criticism which might have fallen more directly on his
51
regime.

The Brazilian press has always been hostile to DASP

and has criticized it on many occasions both as a super-












ministry and because of its close association with the Estado

Novo. This same attitude has frequently been expressed in

the Congress which came into existence with the return to

a representative form of government in 1946. In both in-

stances, the attempt to stress the neutral and technical

character of the organization has been treated as fictitious.

For those who found themselves excluded from the political

process during the Vargas years, there is much to justify

their position, and this line of criticism is perhaps best

summarized by Vieira da Cunha:

Without being an organ peculiar to dictatorship,
the DASP pursued a role relevant to the political
game of the Dictator. It was called upon to give
opinions on the most diverse matters. In this way
the Dictator was able to use the prestige of a "tech-
nical organ" to give weight to those decisions which
interested him most. Yet DASP brought into existence
a group of persons interested in administrative prob-
lems which was the most enlightened, if not the first,
to concern itself with these matters in that era. But
it forced this technical corps into a structure and
into lines of activity which were highly formalistic,
if not dogmatic at times. DASP's greatest defect was
that it tried to divorce -- be it innocent or not --
administration from the social and economic milieu
which it should serve. In this way it came to search
for solutions in abstract schemes, aridly repeated.
It leaned toward a dogmatism interwoven with esoteri-
cism that aided it in the imposition of its decisions.
And, from the implantation of these solutions, ad-
ministration received a discipline artificially super-
imposed over the real conditions of work and over an
honest and authentic body of objectives under the super-
vision of public organs. In spite of all that was done
to provide technical improvement and greater efficiency
in administration, DASP was in reality incapable of re-
sisting pressures brought to bear by the Dictator to
collaborate in the play of informal political forces.












Neither was it able to impose on Brazilian public
administration anything but false measures of ef-
ficiency, nor did it hinder the exaggerated increase
of a skeptical, poorly disciplined, poorly paid
bureaucracy.52

Although the goal of the administrative reform move-

ment was the introduction of efficiency, economy, and ra-

tionality into the federal civil service, actually this goal

became an instrumental objective within the context of the

more general goals of an integrated nation-state and the

institution of socio-economic changes leading to moderniza-

tion. By 1937, all this was to be accomplished within the

context of a closed bureaucratic system at the service of

a modernizing elite.53 The crucial point, then, is not so

much whether the techniques advocated were good or bad in-

herently as the way in which they were employed. After all,

since the Vargas government was one in which the administra-

tive structure of the state provided an excellent means for

the mobilization and control of energy expended in the po-

litical process, these changes were certain to be used for

the ends of that state. The notion that administration could

be separated from the surrounding political environment --

particularly when many new developments were taking place

in the social, the economic, and the political realms -- was

used at a later date to give this modernizing elite a means

of legitimizing its authority. At the outset, there was no

doubt that political and administrative matters were












inseparable. It should not be forgotten that Vargas came to

power because of the breakdown of the traditional political

system. After a brief period of experimenting with a re-

organization of political forces in a new Congress, the

higher civil service -- in conjunction with the military --

was used as an instrument of political integration to over-

come a highly divided, dispersed, rurally-dominated social

order. During the Estado Novo, the Brazilian federal civil

service became both an object and an agent of modernization.

An indication of the political goals to which civil

service reform was directed is to be found in an article
54
published by Azevedo Amaral in April, 1938. This article

offers a rather straightforward affirmation of the need for

public functionaries committed to the Estado Novo. He as-

sociates the idea of the separation of administration from

politics as a necessary concept in the liberal democratic

state in which there is a struggle for power among competing

groups. But, within the context of the Estado Novo, he con-

siders, such a concept is superfluous:

An apolitical administration is, in the atmosphere
of the Estado Novo, an absurdity which implies making
ineffective the very instruments through which the
State's objectives ought to be achieved. . .

The distinction between politics and administration
cannot exist in state organizations. . Under a
liberal democratic regime the State, in conformity
with the fictions created around promiscuous, direct
suffrage, was in reality conquered alternately by one
or another social group. These groups used the parties












as their organs of political expression. Given these
conditions, it was actually convenient and at the
same time necessary for public employees, in carrying
out the responsibilities of their positions, to keep
themselves beyond the influence of that which was
called politics, although politics was hardly more
than a contradicting and anarchical manifestation of
the representative currents of special interests.
. Today this is no longer necessary, for the State
and the Nation are identical and there is only one set
of politics.55

Under these circumstances, Amaral asserts, it is not

enough to recruit civil servants who possess "intellectual,

cultural, moral, and technical qualifications." What the

government needs is a body of civil servants in harmony with

the political goals of the state. Unless the government can

obtain a political commitment from its civil servants, he

believes, the "efficiency of state power" may well be en-

dangered.56

During the 1930's, public administration theory as it

had developed in the United States and Western Europe had

not yet come to terms with these problems of the over-all

goals of the political system and how administration fitted

into the broader social matrix of a given society. Hence,

in recognizing the need for administrative reform in the

Brazilian civil service simply to get things done, the em-

phasis was placed on the acquisition of new techniques from

abroad. Little, if any, attention was drawn to the import-

ance of the underlying societal norms and the nature of

economic and political development in the United States --












the principal country from which the technical elite took

the principles of scientific management. They accepted

and subscribed to the belief that there was in existence a

body of techniques of universal validity which, when applied

to an administrative system, would modernize it and lead to

the goals of rationality, economy, and efficiency.

In a sense, this emphasis on administrative mechanics

is understandable, for there did exist the necessity of in-

troducing new skills and techniques in the federal civil

service. For example, when the first classification plan was

attempted in 1936, Brazilians interested in public administra-

tion were quite aware of the lack of technicians properly trained

in the collection and analysis of the data required to es-

tablish a meaningful system of classification for the federal

civil service. The same may be said of other aspects of

public administration -- be it in organization and methods,

budgeting, personnel administration, or whatever. From this

awareness stems the interest in sending Brazilians abroad

for technical training in public administration, an interest

which, in the post-war era, was further stimulated by the

technical assistance program of the United States. Basic

to all this was an unquestioned premise that politics and













administration could and should be separated and that the

role of the administrator was to implement policy goals de-

cided outside the administrative system. This was a con-

venient premise both during the dictatorship and in the era

which was to follow the Estado Nooc -- particularly since it

was only too easy to equate things political with the tra-

ditional or the populist style politician.

It is questionable whether the Vargas administrative

reform% carried out under the auspices of a cosmopolitan

technical elite concentrated primarily within DASP, suc-

ceeded in altering the real character of the public service.

Of the three basic sources on administrative change in the

1930's -- Siegel, Vieira da Cunha, and Loewenstein -- only

the last provides an insight into the nature of the civil

service in that period, and his comments apply essentially

to the Estado Novo at the time of its greatest success.

Nevertheless, Loewenstein was somewhat skeptical about the

possibility of imposing a rationalized government service

upon an existing civil service in which positions were often

sought by those who wished to combine a maximum of security

with a minimum of effort. He pointed out that the civil ser-

vice was still vastly overstaffed and that the traditional

attitude of viewing public employment as a sinecure continued.

To this he joined the continued absence of time sense.5











Likewise, he hinted at the fact that the technical reforms

served merely to make the system more formalistic when he

stated that, although admission to the civil service was

subject to the theoretical rule of competitive examination,

"university diplomas . [were] still considered as official

and 'pull' as unofficial equivalents."58

In considering the diffusion of the Vargas reforms

throughout the civil service, he went on to state that there

was apparently little change in the origin of public of-

ficials. While at the middle level there was a number of

Italian- or German-descended public employees, at the higher

positions Luso-Brazilians exercised a sort of unofficial

monopoly. He also observed that, while merit was the of-

ficial criterion, many of the main positions in the ministries

continued to be filled on the basis of political appointments

and ministers and interventors selected for themselves staffs

of secretaries and advisers.59

Another indication that much of the civil service con-

tinued unchanged despite the technical reforms is discovered

in a brief reference to Jose Nazare de Teixeira Dias to the

problem of supervision. Writing in mid-1942, he pointed to

the fact that the institution of examinations for entrance

into the lower ranks was serving to increase tension within

the public service. He attributed this to the divergence in

preparation and training between the new body of individuals












selected on the basis of qualification and their supervisors,

who lacked the proper preparation for their responsibilities

and not influenced by the new standards.60 It was on this

basis that he called for the focusing of attention on the

middle ranks of the career civil service and for the use

there of individuals trained in the new techniques. Part of

the difficulty, it seems, was to be found in the fact that,

even though the technical elite was committed to the modern-

ization of the civil service according to concepts imported

from the United States, this- group was numerically too small

and its members were faced with the necessity of using many

of the same employees to man the ministerial offices.

This situation was strengthened by the continuation

of the practice of promotions within the career civil service

on the basis of seniority. AlairnCarneiro, in an article

published in February, 1945, at the end of the Vargas regime,

spoke of the difficulties involved in this connection. Ac-

cording to his analysis, two basic problems in changing the na-

ture of the civil service lay in the fact that promotions,

decided on the basis of years of service, undercut the "merit

system" and that the rate of turnover was exceptionally low.

He ascribed this latter difficulty in part to the adoption of

"efficiency bulletins" (boletins de eficiencia) and their

mechanical use without any relation to what they were de-

signed to accomplish. He claimed that these bulletins adopted











a numerical criterion which was based on the search for

mathematical precision, one that was incompatible with the

need for a subjective judgment. All this, he felt, pointed

to the necessity for a new promotions' system which was

more rational and just and which would exclude promotions

on the basis of seniority.61

Still another viewpoint on the success, or lack of it,

in altering the Brazilian civil service is offered by Urbano

C. Berquo. While this article appeared in April, 1938 --

placing it at the beginning of the dictatorship -- it is

the only one encountered that dealt with the problem of

internal resistance to the civil service reforms. It is

unique among the materials examined for this period in that

it alone raises the question of how one might change human

nature so that it will accept rationalizing reforms. He is

quite candid in referring to the authoritarian character of

the Vargas regime and the necessity for a loyal civil

service committed to its reforms:

Discontentment and incomprehension can create an
unfortunate situation. Because of hostility to the
new regime or because of a desire to make the systema-
tization of the Union's personnel administration on
the basis of professional careers unviable, many ser-
vants of the State may be led to act as retarding or
upsetting elements for governmental action.

Under the present regime in Brazil it is in no way
admissible that a functionary consider himself neutral
or indifferent and, a fortiori, that he adopt a hostile
attitude toward the path embarked upon by the national
government for the treatment and solution of public











affairs. The comfortable laissez-aZler of the era of
liberalism -- fortunately now dead -- does not coincide
at all with the responsibility which is involved in
the undertaking of any public function, however humble
it may be. Within the context of the old meaning of
the word partisan (partiddrio) -- which no longer has
any reason to exist among us -- it is evident that
every functionary should be apolitical, but, according
to the point of view of the national interest -- which
is that of the authoritarian State -- there is no doubt
that it requires of one a political consciousness in
which the higher the position occupied or the more in-
fluential it may be, the greater the understanding.
. Discontentment and incomprehension . consti-
tute the two fountains from which passive resistance
has issued forth; its clearest manifestations are such
that even the most unprepared observers do not hesitate
i4 including it within the definition of sabotage.62

In this passage, Berquo is speaking of opposition within the

federal civil service to the carrying out of the reforms

instituted by Law 284 (1936) and the Federal Civil Service

Council. He reduces those opposing the rationalization of

the public personnel system to individuals who are either un-

qualified technically to continue to occupy their positions

and feel that their security is threatened or who are opposed

to any alteration in the traditional way of doing things and

seek protection in excessive amounts of paper work.63

There is yet another approach one might take in evaluating

the success or failure of Vargas in changing the nature of the

Brazilian civil service. In this case, we might try to evaluate

the success or failure of DASP in instituting controls over one

of the more powerful traditional ministries. Such an instance

is provided by DASP's attempts to take the power to formulate











and administer the budget away from the Ministry of Finance.

In the decree-law establishing DASP, budgetary responsibili-

ties similar to those of the United States Bureau of the

Budget were included. The Ministry of Finance, however,

provided such strong resistance to this measure that DASP's

control remained largely formal. The compromise worked out

provided for the formation of a special budget commission

within the Ministry of Finance, under the chairmanship of

the president of DASP. Although this was to be merely a

temporary arrangement until DASP established its own budget

division, it continued to function until early 1945, when

Decree-Law 7416 (of March 26) created the appropriate Di-

vision of the Budget.4 By this time, however, the entire

basis of the Vargas government had begun to deteriorate and

it was not long before the dictator resigned and DASP was

faced with a new government hostile to its very existence.

With this change in regime in late 1945, what influence DASP

had over the budget, with its president as chairman of the

budget commission in the Ministry of Finance, disappeared.

The ministry regained its traditional power in full and

DASP's Division of the Budget functioned simply as part of a

formal budget process unrelated to the real decisions on how

the public moneys would be allocated.65

Aggravating what appears to have been a gap between the

formal controls (the authority structure) and the effective










power of DASP over the national administration was Law 284's

separation of public employees into two basic classes -- the

public functionaries (the funcionarios publicos) and the

extranumerarios. The notion of a career civil service

existed only in relation to the public functionary and his

rights, privileges, and obligations were codified by the

Vargas government in the 1939 statute. Of the two groups,

the first enjoyed a privileged position in terms of salary,

security, and status, but the second was numerically larger

and continued to increase in size. Entrance into the former

was restricted to selection on the basis of merit, as de-

termined by public examination, while admission to the latter

depended on political or personal favoritism. Generally

speaking, the extranumercrio was marginal to the whole pro-

cess of rationalization, carried out under the direction of

DASP.67 Such a statement, however, must be qualified, for,

according to Decree-Law 1909 (of December 26, 1939), the

requirement of a competitive public examination was extended

to extranumerarios mensatistas; also, access to the career

civil service was open to employees in this category by De-

cree-Law 5175, issued January 7, 1943.

There was, then, a very definite effort to create an

elite career service. In this instance, merit as a qualifica-

tion for entrance was completely separated from any egalitarian

values. When one considers that education was a privilege

enjoyed by a relatively small percentage of the total population,












the requirement of a public examination -- based on specific,

academic knowledge -- had the effect of closing off admission

to the career civil service for the less privileged and

channeling them into the extranumerario category. On the

other hand, those individuals with upper-class status but

without specialized knowledge could still obtain public

employment by occupying positions above or parallel to the

career service, granted they had the proper political access.

Thus, once again, Riggs' categories for analysis are helpful

in understanding interrelationships in a traditional society

such as Brazil's. He distinguishes three types of recruit-

ment norms: ascription (selection on the basis of kinship

and personal ties); achievement (selection on the basis of

technical skills and qualification), and attainment (selec-

tion on the basis of a combination of the first two types).68

If we place examinations required in the broader context

of Brazilian society, it becomes clear that they functioned

according to attainment norms and that recruitment on the

basis of ascription was by no means entirely displaced.

Yet these were years of tremendous growth in Brazilian

public administration and rapid expansion in the economy.

Ministerial staffs grew in size and their contacts through-

out the country widened; two new ministries appeared, and the

DASP apparatus emerged as a sort of superministry designed












to coordinate the whole administrative system. To this should

be added two new elements not previously mentioned but con-

tributing greatly to the expansion of federal services and

to an increase in the number of public employees: the autar-

quias (independent or semi-independent governmental entities)

and the social security institutes. At the state level, many

other new administrative bodies emerged. By 1945, integra-

tion of the public service had become ever more a necessity,

but the one organization created for that purpose -- the

DASP -- failed to provide sufficient coordination, largely

because of its desire to maintain as much control as possible

in its own hands. Still, this was the moment of its great-

est power, for it enjoyed privileged access to and influence

upon the chief executive.

Vargas was an authoritarian, and his regime was a

highly personal one. His government provided a degree of

unification hitherto unknown in Brazil; yet it also set the

country on the road to industrialization and the creation of

a national market. As dictator, Vargas substantially re-

placed the "old regime" which had existed before 1930 and

installed a new governmental apparatus, largely bureaucratic

in character, designed to impose modernization on the nation

from above. He was also responsible for the almost complete

reform and unification of Brazilian civil and criminal law.

And, when he saw the order of the New State was beginning to












crumble, he established a new party system and began the

transition back to an open system of government. Neverthe-

less, in spite of the fact that tremendous energies were

devoted to the modernization of Brazil in economics, ad-

ministration, and law, traditional socio-political forces

remained intact. Otherwise, they would not have been able

to regroup themselves in the way they did and reappear in

the years immediately after 1945 as a major political ele-

ment which had to be contended with.

In this experience with administrative reform in

Brazil, there is a certain parallel with the attempts of

Peter the Great to change the character of the Russian civil

service. Certainly, such a comparison is risky in that there

are basic differences involved -- the most obvious, for Brazil,

being the lack of an authoritarian tradition and the his-

toric drive to unite an empire of diverse peoples and na-

tions. But there are some similarities that are worth

noting here and that synthesize administrative trends in

Brazil, regardless of the fact that we are dealing with dis-

tinct periods of time and different cultures. While the

technical elite in the Vargas era tried to use North American

administrative organization and practices as a model for

modernization, Peter the Great turned to the most rational-

ized administrative system of his day -- the Swedish -- and

attempted to impose it upon the Russian system. In both











cases, one of the major factors resulting in failure to ob-

tain the desired change was that essentially the same men

were called upon to serve the state. Their values and be-

havior remained much the same despite the forcible intro-

duction of new techniques and ways of doing things. It was

impossible simply to dismiss the mass of older public

functionaries and replace them with others, given the elite

character of these societies and the lack of any system of

mass education from which new individuals might be drawn.

It was impossible to undertake the really basic changes

needed in the functioning of the civil service without

relating them to the broader problems of these societies.

Just as in the era of Peter the Great, so was the Vargas

period one in which tremendous energies were devoted to

modernization, but a traditional society and a traditional

bureaucracy largely frustrated its designs. Likewise,

the two chiefs of state were much more successful in the

economic than in the political-administrative sphere.

Finally, both reforming elites in the civil service identi-

fied their own authority with that of the executive and

found themselves largely isolated from the social forces

emerging in their respective countries.69











FOOTNOTES


Ernest Hambloch, His Majesty, The President of Brazil:
A Study of Constitutional Brazil (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1936).
2
See the discussion of personalism as a central value
in Latin America as a whole in John P. Gillin, "Some Sign-
posts for Policy," in Richard N. Adams et al., Social Change
in Latin America Today: The Implications for United States
Policy (New York: Random House, 1960), pp. 29-33. (Here-
after cited as Social Change in Latin America.)
3See Abelardo Jurema, Sexta-Feira, 13: Os (~timos Dias
do Governo Joao Goulart (Rio de Janeiro: Ediydes O Cruzeiro,
1964) and Alberto Dines and Antonio Callado, Os Idos de Nar-o
e a Queda em Abril (Rio de Janeiro: Jose'Alvaro, Editor,
1964). This point was also stressed by Orlando M. Carvalho
in an interview on February 23, 1965, in Belo Horizonte.

These last two terms are, as is indicated in Chapter
I, used according to the distinction established by Riggs;
he calls formal power "authority" and informal power "con-
trol" (Fred W. Riggs, Administration in Developing Countries:
The Theory of Prismatic Society (Boston: Houghton Mifflin
Co., 1964), p. 209).

5Ibid., p. 281.

This term is taken from Clodomir Vianna Moog, An In-
terpretation of Brazilian Literature Rio de Janeiro: Ser-
vice of Publications, 1951), pp. 16-17.

Eulalia Maria Lahmeyer Lobo, Processo Administrativo
Ibero-Americano (Aspectos Socio-Economicos -- Per-odo Co-
lonial) (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exercito, 1962), pp.
549, 559. This book offers an excellent comparative admin-
istrative history of the Spanish and Portuguese colonial
experience in the Western hemisphere.

Raymundo Faoro, Os Donos do Poder: Formagao do
Patronato Politico BrasiZeiro (Rio de Janeiro: Editora O
Globo, 1958), p. 105.

See Joao Guilherme de Aragao, "O Cargo Publico e
Seu Carater Regalista e Patrimonial na Administracao Co-
lonial," Administracao e Cultura (Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa












Nacional, 1951), pp. 163-168. He considers the development
of the idea that positions in Brazilian colonial administra-
tion were strictly sinecures, granted by royal favor, to be
used by the ruling class. For this reason, the transfer of
the Portuguese Court to Rio de Janeiro only reinforced a
situation already in existence.
1This distinction is based on concepts developed
by Guerreiro Ramos and discussed in Chapter V.
11 /
Mario Wagner Vieira da Cunha, 0 Sistema Administra-
tivo BrasiZeiro, 1930-1950 (Rio de Janeiro: Instituto Nacional
de Estudos EdPedagutgicos,u
de Estudos Pedagogicos, Ministerio de Educacao e.Cultura,
1963), pp. 32-33. (This translation from Portuguese, as well
as all subsequent .ones, is mine.)

12This.law brought into force the Ato Adicional and
on the basis of Article 71 of the Constitution of 1824 pro-
vided for changes in provincial government. The Ato de-
centralized a substantial part of the power of the central
government and, when put into effect, made it considerably
easier for regional interests to predominate. For the text
of the 1824 Constitution and amendments to it, see Fernando
H. Mendes de Almeida (ed.), Constitu9oes do Brasil (Sao
Paulo: Ediqces Saraiva, 1961).

13This complex relationship between the Emperor (as
the "moderating power"), the presidents of the Council of
State, the presidents of the provinces, and the provincial
assemblies, is described in Jo'o Camillo de Oliveira Torres,
O Presidencialismo no Brasil (Rio de Janeiro: Edicoes O
Cruzeiro, 1962), esp. pp. 87-88, 100-101, 108-109.

14Visconde do Uruguay, Ensaio sobre o Direito Ad-
ministrativo (Rio de Janeiro: Typografia Nacional, 1862).

15Ibid., p. 215.
16
Ibid., pp. 215-216.

Ibid., p. iv.

1Ibid., pp. 27, 275-276.

19 r. / /
Aragao, "O Cargo Publico no Seculo XIX e o Sis-
tema do Merito," AdministraVao e CuZtura, op. cit., pp.
169-173. For a listing of the early attempts at public
examinations based on competence, see the articles by Braga,
Lopes, and Nascimento Silva (listed in Bibliography). An












examination of these substantiates the impression that,
where public examinations were attempted, they were de-
signed to attract to the national civil service men with
a classical liberal education. Since education was a
privilege of a small minority -- the only persons who had
the means and the leisure to afford it -- any attempt to
use knowledge as a criterion of selection was certain to
insure that these individuals came from upper-4lass back-
grounds. . The bacharel is literally the graduate of
a school of law or any other school at the university
level. Here it refers to the lawyer-sons of fazendeiros.
20 ^
Oliveira Torres, op. cit., pp. 113-114.
21
2As observed in Chapter I, "political development"
refers to the "process by which a political system ac-
quires an increased capacity to sustain successfully and
continuously new types of organizations." A second es-
sential element is that "for this process to continue over
time a differentiated and centralized polity must come
into being which must be able to command resources from
and power over wide.spheres and regions of the society."
A third element is the idea that, since this process does
not require the creation of particular kinds of institutions,
it can move forward, stop, or be reversed. For a discussion
of the Diamant model, see Chapter I.
22
2This phrase refers to the alliance worked out be-
tween the two most important states in the First Republic
in which the presidency alternated between them. Minas
Gerais was at that time essentially a cattle-raising and
milk-producing state, while Sao Paulo was the center of
Brazil's coffee production.
23 0A
Oliveira Torres, A Formadao do FederaZismo no
Brasil (Sao Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1961), p. 239.
24
2The account of this rebellion under the leadership of
Antonio Conselheiro, joined with a feeling for the hostile
environment of the interior of the Northeast, is best given
in Euclides da Cunha's classic Rebellion in the Backlands
(Os Sertoes), translated by Samuel Putnam (Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 1957).
25
This statement is based on Vieira da Cunha's dis-
cussion of administration during the Republican period
(1889-1930) (p. 36). This concentration of power at the
regional level is indicative of an oligarchical style of
politics as opposed to clan-style politics.











2Vieira da Cunha, op. cit., pp. 34-35.

2While Loewenstein's reference to an elite group
in the national administrative system is very brief, it
does offer an insight which the researcher was unable to
obtain elsewhere in fuller detail. See Karl Loewenstein,
Brazi Lunder Vargas (New York: Macmillan, 1942), pp. 17-18.
28
28 Lb ..7. cit.

29 bid., p. 22.

30Ibid., pp. 28-29, 34-37.

3Brazilian Embassy, Survey of the Brazilian Economy,
1959 (Washington, D.C., 1959), pp. 2-3.
32
It was created in 1906 under Law 1906.

3This summary of administrative change is based
on information contained in Vieira da Cunha-(op. cit.,
pp. 30-60).

3Kleber Nascimento, Classificaqao de Cargos no Brasii
(Rio de Janeiro: Fundacao Getulio Vargas, 1962), pp. 32-33.

3Gilbert D. Siegel, "The Vicissitudes of Govern-
mental Reform in Brazil: A Study of the DASP" (unpublished
Doctoral dissertation, University of Pittsburgh, 1964), pp.
70-72.

36Ibid., pp. 74-76. Siegel does not make it clear who
suppressed the Nabuco Report. Most probably, it was Vargas,
but there is not sufficient information available to justify
this assertion. Siegel contrasts the approach preferred by
Mauricio Nabuco with that of Luis Simtes Lopes -- a leading
figure in this second commission, a confidant of Vargas, the
first president of DASP, and the present president of the
Fundaylo Getulio Vargas. This difference in opinion is best
expressed in the following.paragraph taken from Siegel:
"Nabuco felt that patronage was the 'life's blood' of the
politician, and that any system which ignored this
be doomed to failure. Traditionally Congress a.
dent cooperated on this . [the president
ment power and Congress control over
the organization of the bureaucrat
he r-ecognized the need for
procedure. He saw no inc











selection and patronage. Personnel objectively tested [in
his plan] were to be nominated by politicians. After en-
trance, career progression [was to take place] . .
"As the son of the famous politician from Pernambuco,
Joaquim Nabuco, he saw that a complete.break with the
reionalistic patrimony was unrealistic. A career service
had to be gradually built. By allowing the politician to
freely make appointments, but from among persons judged to
be competent, political support for a reformed civil service
would be more easily maintained. At the same time, the
careers would be closed to political appointments above the
entry level. Simoes Lopes, on the other hand, saw the need
to break suddenly and dramatically with the past. Although
Mauricio Nabuco insists that President Vargas later re-
gretted his action in permitting non-patronage based person-
nel selection, the idea of Simoes Lopes won out in the end
and it appeared 'because he was more influential upon the
President': (pp. 71-72, 79-80). It is unfortunate that
Nabuco's ideas were not utilized in the post-dictatorship
era. It appears that in the struggle to defend DASP and
the Vargas-instituted administrative reforms after 1945, in-
tellectual rigidity set in.

3The criterion.of salary differentiation was later
formalized in the 1939 statute for public functionaries.
The word quadro means literally a table or chart; however,
it is used here in the sense of a service. Because of this
meaning and because the term servi-o is used in the 1960
classification law with the same connotation, the Portuguese
word has been retained.
38
3Eduardo Pinto Pessoa Sobrinho, Curso de CZassifi-
cajYo de Cargos (Cursos de Admnistraqa'o) (Rio de Janeiro:
Departamento Administrativo do Servico Publico, 1952), pp.
28-29; Siegel, op. cit., pp. 250-251.

3Ennor de Almeida Carneiro, "Politica de Remunerapo,"
Revista do Servi-o P"blico, LXVII (April, 1955), 41, 44
(hereafter cited as RSP); Moacyr Ribeiro Briggs, "Evolu ao da
Administracao Publica Federal," ibid., III (August, 1938), 16-
17; Brazil, Ministerio Extraordinario para a Reforma Adminis-
para Preservao e Revigoramento do Sistema do
me, 1963) (mimeographed), p. 4; Siegel,











entrance into the federal civil service, the creation of
rational bases for the provision of temporary public per-
sonnel -- a group not covered under the 1936 law (the
extranumerarios), and the initial work which led to the
formation of the Civil Servants' Welfare.and Assistance
Institute (the Instituto de Previdencia e Assistncia dos
Servidores do Estado). Cf., Siegel, p. 85.
41 / /
Brazil, Ministerio Extraordinario para a Reforma
Administrative, Coordenador (Eloah M.G. Barreto, Beatriz
Warhlich, and Belmiro Siqueira, rapporteurs), Normas para
Freses va'o o e Revigo,amento do Sistema do MErito, op. cit.,
passim.

42"On cargo de direglo intermedia'ria e superior,
bem como as fun Ces de chefia e assessoramento. .," ibid.

43rbid., pp. 34-35.

4Cited in Loewenstein, op. cit., p. 48.
45
4Because these state administrative bodies were
modeled after the national Departamento Administrativo do
Serviyo Publico -- the DASP -- they became known as das-
pinhos -- little DASPs. They are also referred to as DSPs,
although Loewenstein uses the term "Administrative Depart-
ments" as an English equivalent.
46
Loewenstein, op. cit., pp. 62-68, esp. 64.
47
47Wahrlich is responsible for making this point
initially in an unpublished paper on the DASP ("An Analysis
of DASP, A Contribution to the Study of Comparative Adminis-
tration," a paper prepared for the Public Administration
Clearing Service, Chicago, February, 1955, p. 3). See also
her reference: William Franklin Willoughby, Principles of
Public Admi)niEtration, With Special Reference to the National
and State Gove-rnments of the United States (Baltimore: The
Johns Hopkins Press, 1927), pp. 360-361.

48Wahrlich, op. cit., pp. 10-11. Although the creation
of a budget division within DASP was postponed until 1945 and
even then failed to function as intended, the organization was
able to establish controls over equipment and materiel used
in the ministries and to supervise plans for the construction
of public buildings. It also undertook an active publication
program, of which the Revista do Servipo PuZblico (RSP) was but
a small part. On the other.hand, little was accomplished in










actual work simplification, intended in the creation of an
organization and methods division.
49
Discussing this relationship, Siegel maintains that
it represented the application of the early administrative
concept of the organizational separation.of ."ends" and "means"
departments and Taylor's functional management principle (p.
129).

50In this context, the word "modernization" refers
to the Vargas government's institution .of .change in the
economic and administrative.spheres with the objective of
making a sharp.break with the past and creating a nation as
"modern" as its American or Western European counterparts.

51n his dissertation on DASP, Siegel goes into con-
siderable detail about the way in which the organization was
used to draw criticism away from the executive both during
the dictatorship and afterwards. According to his interpre-
tation, this was one of the major factors later in the
destruction of its power base once executive support was
no longer forthcoming.

5Vieira da Cunha, op. cit., pp. 92-93.

In treating the reform movement, Siegel refers to
those in this elite who participated in administration as
a technical elite because of their commitment.to the means
and not the ends of rationalization in the public.service.
They are best .represented in the DASP technicians (the
tecnicos de .adminis trao). These men were considered to
be the real elite of the civil service -- a situation which
changed considerably after 1945.
54 / /
Azevedo Amaral, "Politica e Servico Publico," RSP,
II (April, 1938), 13-15.

I5 bid., 14..

56Ibid. 14-15.

57
Loewenstein, op. cit., p. 105.

5Ibid., p. 102.

59Ibid., p. 104.

60 / /
Jose Nazare de Teixeira Dias, "A FormaSao de Super-
visores," RSP, III (August, 1942), 27.











61 t
Alaim de Almeida Carneiro, "A Promoyao nos Ser-
vicos Publicos," RSP, VIII (February, 1945), 40-41.
62 / I
Urban C. Berquo, "Eficiencia Administrativa e
Sabotagem Burocr tica," RSP, (April, 1938), 5-6.
63
63 id. 7.

6Wahrlich, op. cit., pp. 1-2, 4-5.

6Siegel makes the statement that DASP was continual-
ly fighting ministerial efforts to decentralize or to
weaken the central control process; however, other than a
reference to the conflict with the Ministry of Finance, he
does not offer specific instances. He mentions that con-
flicts between the reformers and parts of the bureaucracy
were evident before the creation of DASP and that .its forma-
tion in 1937 served to increase these conflicts (pp. 138-139).

66This statute was issued by Decree-Law 1712 on October
10, 1939.

67Vieira da Cunha, op. cit., pp. 93, 100-101.
68
Riggs, op. cit., pp. 128, 135, 167.

69For a more detailed treatment of the administrative
reforms of Peter the Great, see the chapter by Merle Fainsod
in Joseph LaPalombara (ed.), Bureaucracy and Political De-
velopment(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963).








CHAPTER III


THE THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE MOVEMENT TO

REFORM THE BRAZILIAN CIVIL SERVICE


The theme of this chapter and the next -- the ideas

and personalities which have had a major influence on the

civil service reform movement -- leads us to consider initial-

ly our third independent variable: the application of the

techniques of scientific management without adequate attention

to the functional requirements of the existing administrative

system and sufficient consideration for the human elements.

In many respects, the administrative concepts imported from

abroad and the individuals who have defended them have set the

scene and conditioned the solutions offered to specific prob-

lems in the public.personnel field. Once the theoretical

foundation of the civil service reform.movement has been es-

tablished, we shall be in a better position to consider the

core of the dissertation: the civil service and its political

environment.

In this.chapter, we shall consider first the various

models useful in the analysis of American public administra-

tion,l keeping in mind their relevance to the study of

Brazilian administration. A more complete analysis will be

devoted to the ."machine model" of traditional administration

because it bears the closest relation to Brazilian organiza-












tion theory. The other models will be utilized only very

briefly. My purpose here is to capture the highlights of

American organization theory as it has evolved in the post-

war years and to illuminate .the variety of approaches that

can be utilized through models for studying organizations

in the United States. Once this has been accomplished, we

shall examine the paths organization theory has pursued in

Brazil, pointing out the similarities and the contrasts in

organization theory as it is observed in Brazil and the

United States.


The Evolution of Organizatioh Theory in
the United States


The Traditional Model

Organization theory as it first developed in the United

States is characterized by a "machine model" approach to the

study of administration. It is task-oriented and substantial-

ly excludes human behavior from the study of administration.

A basic assumption inherent .in this model is the passivity of

human interests. The human instrument in this context be-

comes little more than a communications network, a problem-

solving mechanism into which problems .are fed and from which

expected consequences result.

This mode of analysis emerged originally out of Taylor-

ism, with its concern for the search for "the one best way" in




University of Florida Home Page
© 2004 - 2010 University of Florida George A. Smathers Libraries.
All rights reserved.

Acceptable Use, Copyright, and Disclaimer Statement
Last updated October 10, 2010 - - mvs