Title: Deliberative and critical ethical questions and their relationship to the value dimension of the decisionmaking process in educational administration /
Full Citation
Permanent Link: http://ufdc.ufl.edu/UF00098319/00001
 Material Information
Title: Deliberative and critical ethical questions and their relationship to the value dimension of the decisionmaking process in educational administration /
Physical Description: x, 225 leaves : ; 28 cm.
Language: English
Creator: Shaffer, Edward O ( Edward Otto ), 1942-
Publication Date: 1975
Copyright Date: 1975
Subject: School management and organization -- Decision making   ( lcsh )
Decision making -- Moral and ethical aspects   ( lcsh )
Educational Administration and Supervision thesis Ph. D
Dissertations, Academic -- Educational Administration and Supervision -- UF
Genre: bibliography   ( marcgt )
non-fiction   ( marcgt )
Thesis: Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Florida, 1975.
Bibliography: Includes bibliographical references.
Statement of Responsibility: by Edward O. Shaffer.
General Note: Typescript.
General Note: Vita.
 Record Information
Bibliographic ID: UF00098319
Volume ID: VID00001
Source Institution: University of Florida
Holding Location: University of Florida
Rights Management: All rights reserved by the source institution and holding location.
Resource Identifier: alephbibnum - 000295314
oclc - 07872435
notis - ABS1659


This item has the following downloads:

deliberativecrit00shaf ( PDF )

Full Text




Edward 0. Shaffer



Copyright by
Edward 0. Shaffer




The writer would like to express his sincere gratitude to Dr.

K. Forbis Jordan and Dr. Ralph B. Kimbrough for their encouragement

and support of this study. In addition, the writer would like to

acknowledge Dr. Arthur J. Lewis for serving as a member of both his

specialist and doctoral committees. A special note of thanks is given

to Dr. Jordan who served not only as the committee chairman, but also

as a father confessor, boss, critic, expeditor, teacher, and friend.

The writer would also like to acknowledge Mrs. Elaine Buckley for

typing the manuscript and Mr. William Sparkman for his inspiration dur-

ing the writing phase of the study, and he would like to recognize the

Educational Resource Management Specialists group with which he was

associated for their comradeship and competition.

The most special forms of recognition and acknowledgment are

extended to the writer's wife Bonnie for her unfailing support and

love during the periods of separation due to the demands of the course

work and the writing of the dissertation. She not only maintained the

home and care of the children, but held a full-time position as music

teacher in an elementary school in Tampa, while the writer sequestered

himself in Gainesville. Therefore, this study is dedicated to Bonnie

Jean Shaffer for her pioneer spirit and determination, because without

her this study would not exist.



ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .. .. .. .. .. ... . .. .. . ... iv

ABSTRACT. .. .. .. .. . .. .... .. .. .. .viii


I INTRODUCTION. .. .. .. ... .. .. .. .. . 1

The Scope of Ethics. ... ... .. .. .. 1
Ethics and the Decisionmaking Process. .. .. 3

Definitions of Decisionmaking . .. .. 3
Decisionmaking and Moral Valuing. .. .. 5

Bases of Valuing in Educational Administration . 6

Technical Valuing .. ... .. .. .. 7
Political Valuing .. .. . ... .. .. 9
Scientific Valuing. . ... .. .. ... 11
Ethical Valuing . .... .. .. .. .. 12

The Importance of a Philosophic Orientation. .. 14
The Need for a Value Framework in Educational
Administration .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 16
The Problem. .. .. .. ... ... .. .. 18

Statement of the Problem. . ... .. .. 18
Delimitations . .... .. .. .. .. 19
Limitations .. ... . .... ... 19
-Justification for the Study ... .. .. 20

Definition of Terms. .. ... .. .. .. .. 29
Procedures .. .. ... .. . ... ... 32
Organization of the Study... .. .. . ... 33

II NORMATIVE ETHICAL SYSTEMS ... .. .. .. .. .. 34

Elements of a Normative Theory . ... .. .. 34

Criteria for Assaying Normative Ethical
Theories. . ... ... .... .. 35
A Typology of Normative Ethics. ... .. 39


Utilitarian Ethics ...; .. . .. ... 44

The Principle of Utility. . .. .. .. .. 44
Pleasures and Pains ... .. . ... .. 46
Actions and Consequences. .. .. ... . 49
Morals and Legislation. .....5
Mill's Corrections of Utilitarianism .. 56
Sunrnary of Utilitarian Ethics . ... .- . 61

Deweyan Ethics .. ... .. .. . .. .. .. 65

Theory of Valuation ..... .. ....65
The Dynamic Force of Habit. ..... ..69
The Place of Impulse in Conduct .. ;. . 72
The Place of Intelligence in Conduct. .. 73
Sumrmary of Deweyan Ethics .. .. .; ... 77

K~antian Ethics . .. .. ..... . ... 80

The Roots of Morality . .. .. ... .. 80
The Concept of Duty .. .. .. .. . 83
A Realm of Ends ... .. ... . .. .. 87
The Nature of Justice .. .. .. ;.. 89
Summary of Kantian Ethics .. ... .. 93

Aristotelian Ethics. .. ... ... .. .. 96

Aristotle's Virtues and Vices .. . ... 96
The Nature of Justice .. .. .. .. .. 101
Responsibility for Decisions and Actions. . 106
Summary of Aristotelian Ethics. .. ... 108

Existentialist Ethics. . .. .. . .. 111

The Meaning of Existentialism .. .. . 111
Existence and Freedom . .. .. .. . .. 113
Freedom, Responsibility, and Guilt. ... .. 116
Intrapersonal and Interpersonal Definitions
of Existence'. .. . .. .; . . .. 120
Source of Moral Values. .. . . .. .. 122
Summary of Existentialist Ethics. .. . .. 126.


Critical Tasks and Ethical Valuing . .. . 129
Critical Task Areas and Ethical Questions. . .. 131

Curriculum and Instruction. .. .. . .. 131
Pupil Personnel Service . .. .. . 141
Personnel Development and Administration. . 148
Finance and Fiscal Management .. . .. 159
School and Commnunity Relations. . . . 172


Moral Autonomy in an Organizational Setting .. 180


Developing an Integrated Value System .. .. 184

The Nature of Values ... .. .. .. 184
Sources of Ethical Values. .. .. .. .. 188
Strategies for Developing a Scale of Values. 191

Developing a Value Framework for Educational
Administration. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 197

Normative Decisionmaking Methods . .. .. 197
Moral Assessments of Actions and Decisions 201

RECOMMENDATIONS. .. .. ... .. ... .. 211

Sumpmary . . . . . . . . . . 211
Implications for Professional Training. . ... 213
Conclusions .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 222
Recommendations . .... .. .. .. ... 223

General Recommendations. .. .. .. .. 223
Recommendations for Further Study. . ... 224

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH. ... .. .. .. ... .. .. .. 225

Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the Graduate Council of
the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy


Edward 0. Shaffer

June, 1975

Chairman: K. Forbis Jordan
Major Department: Educational Administration

The purpose of this study was to develop deliberative and criti-

cal ethical questions which could serve as guidelines in the adminis-

trative decisionmaking process. A review of the literature related to

the value dimension of decisionmaking in educational administration

revealed an inadequate concern for ethics as an applied science capable

of helping practicing school administrators make morally defensible

decisions. In addition, the profession of educational administration

was criticized for its lack of a distinctive value framework and its

reliance upon published codes to insure ethical valuing by administra-

tors. This study was undertaken to help lessen these problems by the

identification of critical ethical questions, value concepts, and

decisionmaking methods appropriate to educational administration.

The study provided an analysis of four types of ethical valuing--

act-teleological, rule-teleological, act-deontological, and rule-

deontological--by an explication of selected leading ethical systems

of thought. Included in the discussion were the ethical theories of


Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, John Dewey, Immanuel Kant, Aristotle,

and leading existentialists. The deliberative and critical ethical

questions which related to the administrative decisionmaking process
were then examined in relation to identified critical task areas in

educational administration. The selected task areas included curricu-

lum and instruction, pupil personnel services, personnel development

and administration, finance and fiscal management, and school and com-

munity relations.

The study also provided a discussion of the importance of develop-

ing an ethical framework for both individual administrators and the

profession as a body. A scaling of values was suggested as an import-

ant task for each administrator in attempting to cope with commonly

miet problems of school administration. Strategies for developing a

hierarchy of values were suggested in the study. In addition, the

critical elements for the development of a systematic value framework

for the profession were identified. The major value concepts suggested

for educational administration included beneficence, dignity and

duty, equity, distributive justice, and probity. Moral autonomy was

also suggested as important for the development of professionals.

The complementary elements deemed as the most logical, consistent,

comprehensive, and workable positions for educational administration

ethics included libertarianism, act-deontology, and a partial form

of situationism.

The adoption of these elements in an ethical framework for educa-

tional administration would not involve the abandonment of the "easy"

ethics now embodied in professional codes, but it would mean that the

rules for ethical conduct and decisionmaking would be treated as sum-

mative and not constitutive in nature.

The most important observation was that administrators have tended

to legitimize their ethical decisions by reference to the consideration

of predicted consequences of an action. While this is an important

consideration in formulating and executing policy decisions, the posi-

tion neglects the importance of intentions and motives. The assumption

of an act-deontological perspective by administrators would, in large

measure, help to overcome the weaknesses associated with only viewing

the consequences of an action as the criterion for evaluating moral

decisions. Implications for the training of professional administra-

tors wrere stated in the study, and a course in ethical decisionmaking

was suggested as a possible method for helping to insure the importance

of ethical valuing by the leaders in the profession.



The Scope of Ethics

Ethics is commonly viewed as the study of human conduct. The

concern is with human behavior which is susceptible to the ascriptives

"right" and "wrong." Lillie has defined ethics as a "science which

judges this conduct to be right or wrong, to be good or bad, or in

some similar way."1 Higgins has defined ethics as a philosophical

science which "establishes the absolutely necessary forms of free acts

whose realization in practice truly makes us men."2

The study of ethics exists at two levels of thought and under-

standing. Russell outlined one dimension of ethics when he wrote:

The study of ethics is perhaps most commonly con-
ceived as being concerned with the questions "W~hat
sort of actions ought men to perform?" and "What
sort of actions ought men to avoid?" It is con-
ceived, that is to say, as dealing with human con-
duct, and as deciding what is virtuous and what
vicious among the kinds of conduct between which,
in practice, people are called upon to choose

.1William Lillie, An Introduction to Ethics, 3rd ed. (London:
Methuen & Co., 1955, University Paperbacks, 1961), pp. 1-2.

2Thomas J. Higgins, S. J., Basic Ethics (Milwaukee, Wisconsin:
Bruce Publishing, 1968), p. 7.

3Bertrand Russell, "The Elements of Ethics," in Readings i'n
Ethical Theory, ed. Wilfrid Sellars and John Hospers (New York:
Appl eton-Century-Crofts 1970), p. 3.

At this level of thought the subject matter of ethics is interpersonal

behavior. However, ethicists usually do not mean all interpersonal

behavior, but only that which can be described as moral or immoral.

The scope of ethics at the level described by Russell can be termed

normative. At this level ethics seeks to examine assertations about

human conduct which affect the general well-being of another person.

A second dimension of ethics deals with the theoretical constructs

which undergird the normative assertions. The scope of ethics at this

level is concerned with such questions as, "What do we mean by our

ethical terms such as 'good,' 'ought,' 'right,' and so forth?" While

ethics is concerned with assertions about human conduct, it also

investigates those "assertions about that property of things which is

noted by the term 'good,' and the converse property denoted by the

term 'bad.'" According to Fagothery, "current terminology distinguishes

between normative ethics, or the setting up of a code of rules for moral

living, and metaethics, or the critical examination of the concepts,

judgments, and reasoning processes in ethics."5

In summary, the modes of ethical thought occur at two distinct

levels--normative ethics and metaethics. Normative ethics is concerned

with the justification of particular moral judgments. At this level

we seek to justify a particular judgment by appealing to "general norma-

tive principles. Metaethics, on the other hand, goes beyond this level

with its deliberate analysis of those principles which support our


--- -4GUG~,-iJe `Edwifi~-d Moore, 'The Indefinability of Good," in-Readings-.-
in Ethical Theory, ibid., p. 53.

5Austi'n Fagothery, S. J., Right and Reason: Ethics in Theory and
Practice, 5th ed. (Saint Louis, Missouri: C. V. Mosby, 1972), p. 5.

Ethics and the Decisionmaking Process

Decisionmaking is often considered to consist of problem solving,

or planning, or organizing, and is sometimes extended to include all

aspects of thinking and acting. However, the literature in educational

and business administration has stressed choice making as the key fea-

ture. Choice may be exercised in a simple situation, as in the selec-

tion of a shirt from a well stocked department store, or it may require

a complicated decision about a situation that involves conflicting

goals and values, as in the collective bargaining process with teacher

organizations. Although the consequences of these decisions are not

of the same magnitude, they do involve selection of the best alterna-

tive among several choices. Thus, selection among alternatives seems

to be the key concept in the term decisionmaking.

Definitions of Decisionmaking

This concept of decisionmaking has been frequently expressed in

the literature on the subject. The philosopher-sociologist Ofstad

stated that "to make a decision means to make a judgment regarding

what one ought to do in a certain situation after having deliberated

on some alternative course of. action."6 Many writers have agreed on

definitions similar to that of Ofstad. Irwin Bross stated: "The

process of selecting one action from a number of alternatives is what

I shall mean by decision."7 Feldman and Kanter suggested that "the

decision problem is that of selecting a path which will move the

----6Harald Ofstad, An Inquiry Into the -Freedom of Decision (Oslo,-
Norway: Norwegian Uni versities Press, 191), 15

7Irwin Bross, Design for Decision (New York: Macmillan, 1953),
p. 1.

system--individual, computer program, or organization--from some initial
state to some terminal state.8

Many writers, however, have not limited their definition of

decisionmaking to a selection or choice among alternatives. Although

they may agree that the "choice step" is the characteristic step in
the decisionmaking process, they have defined decisionmaking in a much

broader sense. Griffiths stated that "decision-making is the process

which one goes through in order to be able to pass judgment and termi-

nate a controversy."' Taylor suggested that "decision making is that

thinking which results in the choice among alternative courses of

action."IO Simon summarized this broader view of decisionmaking when

he considered decisionmaking synonymous with managing: "In treating

decision-making as synonymous with managing, I shall be referring not

merely to the final act of choice among alternatives, but rather to

the whole process of decisions."11 Sayles also referred to a process

when he stated: "Decision making is an organizational process. It is

shaped as much by the pattern of interaction of managers as it is by
.the contemplation and cognitive processes of the individual.nl2 I

this view, :the primary concern of decisionmaking goes beyond the point

8Julian Feldman and Herschel E.~ Kanter, "Organizational Decision
Making," in Handbook of Organizations, ed. James G. March (Chicago:
Rand McNally, 1965), .pp. 614-15.

9Daniel E. Griffiths, Human Relations in School Administration
(New York: Appl eton-Century-Cro~fts, 1956)T-;l, p.202
10Donald W. Taylor, '!Decision Making and Problem Sol'ving," in
Handbook of Organizations, op. cit., p. 48.
'F1Nerb~ert~:-Simon .New Sc~ience of~ Man~ageqment ~Deci5sionls (New York:
Harper & Row, 1960), p. 1
12Leonard Sayles, Managerial Behavior (New York: McGraw-Hill,
1964), p. 207.

of choice and includes the whole process of the administrator function-

ing in his environment.

Decisionmaking and Moral Valuing

In both the narrow and broad views of the process of decision-

making the critical notion of valuing was implicit. Valuing was con-

sidered an important ingredient in defining and selecting final choices.

In nearly every case of decisionmaking there is usually a relationship

between means and-ends, plans and goals. These means and ends are

always connected to an existing valuing framework of valuing activities.
Therefore, valuation and valuing actions ultimately help to shape the

decisions of organizations and individuals.

Ethics can be viewed as the science of moral values. According to

Kneller ethics "is concerned with providing 'right' values as the basis

for 'right' actions."13 While legal and technical rules can govern

large controllable areas of human conduct, they oftentimes do not pro-

vide an adequate or proper direction in solving moral problems. In the

simple relations of individuals to one another there is a need for
ethical solutions. A moral problem has been defined by Kurtzl4 as hav-

ing to choose between alternative courses of action affecting two or

more people. To solve such problems the administrator needs to be able

to call upon a set of moral rules or guidelines. Moral rules help to

:establish order in our social situations and settings. Kurtz stated

that moral rules "are the most fundamental social rules, and they

- ---- 1 3eor~ge E. -Knel-ler.,J introduction .to .the .Philosophy o~fEducation_,~
2nd ed. (New York: John Wil~ey & :~TSon, 97),.29

14Paul Kurtz, Decision and the Condition of Man (Seattle, Washing-
_ton.:.._University of WashTJington Press, 1965), p. 261

exemplify the demands of reciprocity. Without some such guides, life

as we know if would be virtually impossible."15

Philosophical ethics is a disciplined inquiry into such questions

as: "Is there a moral law which is definitive for human beings in their

choices and decisions?"16 The relationship between decisionmaking and

ethics is direct. The study of ethics can help the administrator to

establish a "moral point of view" when attempting decisions on the

"best thing to do."I7

Bases of Valuing in Educational Administration

This section has adapted four of the five value frameworks iden-

tified by Huebnerl8 for assessing classroom activities and the learn-

ing environment provided by schools. The value frameworks suggested

by Huebner included technical, political, scientific, ethical and
aesthetic forms of valuing. By utilizing these same forms of valuing,

one can also begin to assess the tasks and ongoing activities of the

administrator's world, with the possible exception of aesthetic valuing.

According to Huebner, each of the value bases has its own language of

legitimation and control; and when these languages are translated into

the conceptual understandings of administrators it becomes apparent

that each of the value frameworks serves a critical purpose in

15Ibid., p. 265.

16Robert N. Beck and John B. Orr, Ethical Choice: A Case Study
Approach (New York: The Free Press, 1970), p xvii
1Kurt Baier, The Moral Point of View: A Rational Basis of Ethics
(New YoFk, `Random House, 1965), pp. 27-50.
180wayne Huebner, "Curriculum as a Field of Study," in Precedents
and Promise in the Curriculum Field, ed. Helen F. Robinson (New York:
Teachers College Press, 196~6).

administration which should not be neglected by those who hold leader-

ship positions in education.

Technical Valuing

Technical valuing is probably the most dominant form of valuing

in educational administration. In many areas of school management,

particularly in finance, and increasingly in curricular matters, there
is manifested a means-end rationality that approaches an economic model.

End states, end products, or objectives are specified as carefully and

as accurately as possible. The critical second phase calls for these

ends to be stated in performance or behavioral terms. Lucio and

McNeil represented the essence of technical valuing when they stated:

There are signs that we have passed the time
when schools can get by with pious hopes and
high-sounding shibboleths. Supervisors are
beginning (1) to state what schools should
strive for, (2) to determine the capabilities
needed for attaining these objectives, and (3)
to lay concrete plans for their implementa-

Objectives, many believe, need to be operational and tactics and

strategies should be consistent with the performance objectives.

However, some authorities believe that this means-end rationality

assumes that one knows what the most effective means are to achieve

the desired ends. Walton cautioned those who were enamored by this

model, and who would transfer a means-end relationship to the instruc-

tional process when he stated: "Actually, our knowledge of the relations

19Wi111am H. Lucio and John D. McNeil, Supervision: A Synthesis
of Thought and Action (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969), p. 100.

between means and ends in instruction is very undependable, in spite

of decades of so-called scientific research."20

Within the framework of technical valuing the organization's

costs are carefully scrutinized and-some effort at economy is made.

The control of the inputs of materials and human resources is a major

source of control of this means-end system. Educational administrators,

however, have recognized that they often have little control over the


Evaluation, from the point of view of the technical-valuing sys-

tem, may be considered a type of quality control. Unfortunately,

evaluation is usually concerned solely with the product and rarely

does it concern itself with the quality of those activities in the

producing sequences. Feedback from the evaluation of the product is

delivered to the control system, which in turn alters the process if

the end-states are not what they should be. Elaborate models and flow

charts often decorate the administrator's office walls. The primary

language systems of legitimation and control are psychological and

sociological. The ends, o. .';?jectives, are usually identified by a

sociological analysis of the individual or organizational system in

the present or future social order. These ends, or objectives, are

then translated into psychological language--usually in terms of con-

cepts, skills, attitudes, or behaviors. Psychological language is

further used to sanction certain activities which can produce these

defined ends.

20John Walton, "Ethics of the Means: A Consideration of the
Values Involved in Administrative Decisions," in Ethics and the School
Administrator, ed'. Glenn L. Immegart and John M. Burroughs (Danville,
Illinois: Interstate Printers & Publishers, 1970), p. 62.

Technical valuing and its economic rationality are necessary in

administrative thought and practices, for problems of scarcity and

of institutional purpose do exist. However, this is but one form of

administrative valuing and to reduce all administrative functions to

this one is to weaken the administrator's -power to pull himself out

of the mysteriously complex phenomena of human life.

Political Valuing

The second form of valuing is that of political valuing. This

category exists because the administrator has a position of power and

control. He influences others directly or through the manipulation

of -resources. Persons in education are in a life-influencing business

and should recognize this central fact. Too often, however, political

thinking and valuing interferes with the central purpose.21 To remain

in a position of power one must seek the support of those in positions

of power to reward or influence his behavior in some way. This often-
times involves those who are termed informal influentials.22 The

administrator's work becomes the vehicle by which people judge -the

worth. of his influence and decide whether he is worthy of their respect,

support, or posi-tive sanctions. For those who operate from a political

valuing framework, educational activity is valued for the support or

respectet that it brings him or his organization. This search for

increased recognition is not inherently bad. An administrator must

.have power~to influence others. There is nothing immoral or evil

.2Robert L. Shannon, Where the Truth Comes Out: Humanistic
Edutht~-~5i on TColuimbus,~0hio E~' Charles E. Merr ill, 1 971 ), p. 7. .. --

22Mlrichael Y. Nunnery and Ralph B. Kimbrough, Politiccs,Power,
Polls and School Elections (Berkeley, California: McCutchan Publish-

about political rationality of valuing. Indeed, it is a necessary

attitude if personal influence and organizational responsibility

are to be maximized. Education cannot be separated from the political

activities of a community.

Writing on political valuing, Gregg23 concluded that educational

administrators do indeed live and work in a thoroughly political

environment. School districts are political systems where educational

administrators play a central role .as educational policy makers. Aware-

ness of politics, power, and influence in community decisionmaking

should lead educational administrators to accept the political nature

of the job and the importance of political knowledge and skills. It

should also lead to understanding and developing skills in using com-

munity influentials while still maintaining high professional expertise

as the greatest source of power. Nunnery and Kimbrough suggested that:

School officials must build potential influence
for education. They must understand the political
system and the exercise of political power in
decisionmaking. They must earn respect in that
system through their involvement and eventual

Of course, if power and prestige are sought as ends, rather than as

means for responsible and creative influence, evil and imm~orality may

be produced. Nunnery and Kimbrough cautioned against the use of

Machiavellian expediency and the need for morally-defensible strategies.

They stated: "Political activities that are based on deceit, lies, the

23Russell T. Gregg, "Political Dimensions of Educational Adminis-
tration," in Teachers College Record 67 (November 1956): 118-128.

24Nunnery~and Kimbrough, Politics, Power, Polls and School
Elections, op. cit., p. 3.

half-truth, appeals to prejudice, and other undemocratic principles

are obviously unsatisfactory."25

Scientific Valuing

The third form of valuing in educational administration is scien-

tific. Scientific activity may be broadly designated as that activity

which produces new knowledge with an empirical basis. Administrators

are always in need of more and better-warranted assertions about edu-

cational activity. The attempt of science has been to produce more

precise knowledge which would tend to reduce error in the operational

management of our schools. The methodologies found in the social and
behavioral sciences also serve as useful models for administrators to

use in problem-solving situations. Educational administrators need

to become more empirical-minded, and they need to know if their admin-

istrative practices can be ~justified based on empirically-based examin-

ations. The discovery of functional relationships between phenomena

and the organization of the.facts which make them meaningful are two

of the chief aims of science.' Rationality is a major virtue in scien-

tific valuing, and it should be important to educational administrators.

Getzels, Lipham, and Campbell claimed that the .right to authority in

educational administration "is not based on a superior sanctified

status or on the manifestation of superior general wisdom or high

moral. character. It is based rather on superior knowledge."26

25Ibid., p. 169.

26Jacob W. Getzels, James M. Lipham, and Roald F. Campbell,
Educati onal -Admi ni strati on as-a Soc ial Proces s -(New -York: -Harper- & --
Row, 1968), p. 134.

Ethical Valuing

Finally, administrative activity may be valued in terms of

ethics-. Ethical valuing uses metaphysical and religious languages

as the primary vehicles for legitimatizing and thinking through of

an administrative activity. Its chief value to administrators is

that it focuses on the importance of decisionmaking and responsibility.

Gregg27 concluded that decisionmaking was one of the primary adminis-
trative processes, and -held that sound decisions were characterized

by purposive and rational behavior. Ostrander and Dethey,28 in a

more direct fashion, recognized the importance of value systems when

decisions were to be made which involved comparative worth among the

alternatives. They also stated that while behavioral science knowledge

could enable the administrator to predict human behavior, it could not
choose the course of action for the administrator:

What it [behavioral science knowledge] clearly does
not do is to guide the decision maker in terms of
desired objectives of the organization. The value
_ --~ system of the decision maker must guide him in
deciding which of several alternative courses of
action has the greatest comparative worth.29

Unfortunately, Ostrander and Dethey did not suggest either that a value

framework or even that perhaps a study of ethical theories could aid

` idmiiinfitra~'tos ini'n ma ki ng better dec isi ons i n those matters i nvol v ing

co~mparativre worth.

27Russell T. Gregg, "The Administrative Process," in Adminis-
trative Behavior in Education, ed. Roald F. Campbell and Rus~ieTT T
Gregg (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957), p. 275.

28Raymond H. Ostrander and Ray C. Dethey, A Values Approach to
Edotat-dn~ ionk `PAdmini'istrti'on (New ~iYork-? Am7ler:~ic an oo Cmpay,198
p. 77.
29Ibid., p. 78.

An administrative act is usually an act of influence: one man

-trying- to influence another man. The administrator who operates from

an ethical valuing base is less concerned with the significance of the

administrative act for other ends, or the realization of other values,

but the value of the administrative act per se. Sachs30,discussed this

.aspect of -ethical valuing when he attempted to analyze the quality of

-an act. He judged that quality acts (those which revealed "empathic

insights") would lead -to greater acceptance than whose which could be

labeled as nonquality acts (those which were sympathetic or indifferent

in their intentions). Sachs stated that it was the quality of the act

that "establishes the kinds of decisions that will be made by persons

who are most concerned."31 The main emphasis of Sachs analysis- was

concerned with the major virtue of empathy. The lack of this quality
in administrative acts and decisions led to destructiveness in inter-

personal relationships which were essential to the success of groups

and organizations. The opposite of empathy is indifference, and this

vice is.accompanied by noninvolvement, or at best, a mechanistic ap-

-proach to decisionmaking.32 According to Sachs, an administrator must

examine the quality of his interactions at all times. He stated: "If

either indifference or sympathy shapes his basic perceptions he may be

destructive. If identification and empathy are his premises, the inter-

action will enhance all concerned."3 Awareness of the power to

30Benjamin M. Sachs, Educational Administration: A Behavioral
Approach (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1966), pp. 142-53.
31bid., p. 153.

32Ibid., p. 176.

33'Ibid., p. 153.

influence may lead to hubris, the demonic state of false pride in one's

akinipotence, or it may lead to the humbling recognition that with the

power to influence comes the life giving possibility of being influ-

The Importance of a Philosophic Orientation

Ethical valuing in administration, and indeed the other forms

of valuing, requires a philosophic orientation among our educational

leaders. They need to have deeper insight and sensitivity to the

complex milieu of events, situations, and problems constantly con-
fronting those involved in the decisionmaking process. Graff et al.34

claimed that .the lack of a philosophical orientation resulted in three

possible alternatives. In the first alternative the administrator

without a philosophic orientation"relinguishes his leadership role,

expends his energies in dealing with the routines of management, and
deludes himself that this is really his chief function."3 The second

alternative suggested by Graff et al. was that the administrator be-

comes a "manipulator of people and builds personal and professional

strength by surrounding, himself wit~h satellites. and yes-men."36

While some may find this alternative attractive, the administrator

who engages in such activity "becomes a- satellite himself for some

strong political figure in the community."3 Most administrators,

however, are not as prone to the first two alternatives as they are

340rin B. Graff, Calvin M. Street, Ralph B. Kimbrough, and Archie
R. Dykes, Philosophic Theory and Practice in Educational Administra-

35Ibid., p. 10.
36Ibid., p. 11.

to the third form. The administrators in this group who lack philosophic-

mindedness are those who possess self-esteem and personal integrity, but

who find it difficult "to make adequate judgments, to stimulate and

direct the proper development of the schools, to take an intelligent

stand on the important issues of the day, and like matters.n38

The lack of a philosophic orientation is due to a number of reasons,

but the institutions which can make a critical difference are the univer-

sities which are responsible for the professional training programs for

adm in is tra tors. Immegart and Burroughs39 expressed a deep concern for

the lack of training in ethical valuing in the professional preparation

programs for administrators. They stated:
The ethical dimension of the administrative
practice deserves its rightful place along
side of the human, technical, and conceptual
dimensions which are already a part of admin-
istrative training. In the end, it is the
ethic which in large measure determines the
choice in solving the larger problems con-
fronting educational administrators today.40

Smith41 in a study of philosophic-mindedness in educational admin-

istration concluded that school administrators who possessed the attrib-

utes of comprehensiveness, penetration, and flexibility, exerted a more

positive influence than those who lacked these qualities. Smith argued

that the preparation of school administrators should not be overly

taslk-oriented. It should also include in the curriculum courses which


3981enn L. Immegart and John M. Burroughs, eds., Ethics and
the School Administrator, op. cit., p. 10.
... - 40Ibid. -- -

y 41 Phil ip G. Smith, Phi losophic-Mindedness in Educational Adminis-
tration (Columbus, Ohio: -College of Education, Ohio State University,
196,p. 91.

involve reflective thought conducive towards generating philosophic-

mindedness. He stated:

It is believed that the truly philosophic educa-
tor makes decisions concerning problems of edu-
cation in the light of a relatively systematic
and carefully formulated set of philosophic in-
sights. It is the insights which supply the
basic structure for attacking problems with
comprehensiveness, penetration, and flexibility.
These insights enable the administrator to view
his particular problems in terms of long-range
goals, the creative generalizations, the funda-
mental4 deas, [and] the wide range of alterna-

Smith further argued that if educational administrators are to

have a higher degree of these qualities it would be beneficial to

have a course in philosophic-mindedness and its bearing on school

administration.43 This reflective activity would enhance the develop-

ment of a greater dialog about the nature of educational purposes.

Smith quoted a statement of the Educational Policies Commission which


Every statement of educational purposes...
depends upon the judgment of some person or
group as to what is good and what is bad,
what is true and what is false, what is ugly
and what is beautiful, what is valuable and
what is worthless, in the conduct of human

The Need for a Value Framework in
Educational Administration

Education is a moral concept. It is concerned with standards and

principles of a moral nature which enjoin what ought to be done. It

42Ibid., p. 93.

43Ibid., p. 90.


endeavors to fit people for something and in so doing it presupposes

either an ideal of a person or alternatively an ideal of a society.45

Inherent in this description of education is the notion of a norm or

set of norms which provide purpose to education. Logically, this

involves a moral view of society and man. However, after reviewing the

literature in educational administration devoted to ethics and making

moral judgments, one cannot help but feel that there is a major weak-

ness in administrative thought and practices. Certainly, there has been

a concern for ethics, but there has been little effort in developing a

systematic value framework for educational administrators. Immegart
and Burroughs noted that other professions have accelerated their

efforts at developing value frameworks.46 They noted particularly

the efforts in the medical profession, the business profession, the

field of public administration, the clergy, the military, and social

science research itself.4

While many professors and scholars in educational administration

have recognized the importance of the value dimension in decision-

making, they have seemingly failed to establish a viable dialog on

the role of ethics in administration of our schools. Graff and Street4

have stressed the importance of establishing an adequate value theory

45T. F. Daveney, "Education--A Moral Concept," in New Essays in
the Philos~ophy of Education, ed. Glenn Langford and D. J. O'Connor
(Lno: Routle~dge & Keagan Paul, 1973), p. 79.

46Gl1enn L. Immegart and John M. Burroughs, eds., Ethijcsand the
School Administrator, op. cit., p. 4.


480rin B. Graff and Calvin M. Street, "Developing a Value.Frame-
work for Educational Administration," in Administ'rative Behavior 'in
Education, op. cit., pp. 120-52.

as a necessary element in the professionalization of educational

administration. They have urged administrators to examine the major

value theories in order to develop a distinctive value framework for

educational administration. Such avalue framework was judged to be

necessary because "educational administration appears to have greater

responsibility for the cherished human values than do many other kinds

of administration."49

After reviewing a number of critical studies, Graff and Street

stated that an adequate value framework was not sufficiently in evi-

dence in the general practice of educational administration. The intent

of this study was to aid administrators in constructing such a frame-


The Problem

Statement of the Problem

The problem in this study was to develop deliberative and critical

ethical questions which could serve as guidelines in the administra-

tive decisionmaking process. Related problems to be considered were:

1.; To explicate selected normative ethical systems of thought.

.-2.- To examine the functioning of these ethical systems as they

relate to categories of identified critical tasks in educa-

tional administration.

3. To recommend strategies for practicing school administrators

in commonly met problems of right and wrong in educational


491bid,, p. 121 .

4. To state implications for the training of educational admin-

i stra tors .


1~. The normative ethical systems discussed in this study were

selected from classic and contemporary Western philosophies.

The basis of selection involved- the following criteria: (a)

dissim~ilarity in their approaches and rationality to provide

a range of possible views on the subject, and (b) selection

of framers of various -ethical systems of the highest rank to

assure types of ethical theory worthy of serious consideration.

2. The administrative task areas wuere selected from leading text-

books in educational administration. Selected task areas

examined included: (a) curriculum and instruction, (b)

.pupil personnel services, (c) personnel development and admin-

istration, (d) finance and fiscal management, and (e) school

and community relations.


1. The review of the literature was limited to- those sources

available in English.

2. T7he design was dependent upon .the adequacy of information

available as a basis for drawing valid conclusions.

'3. The study lacked the basic elements of control necessary to

produce data directly related to the administrative decision-

making process.

4. The frame of reference for the research was primarily shaped

by the researcher's academic and professional training in

the areas of the social sciences and educational adminis-


Justification for the Study

In the administration of the nation's schools educators are

constantly making value decisions which affect the welfare of others

and themselves., Unfortunately, the value dimension of decisionmaking

has not been stressed in the training institutions of educational

administration. Administrative and policy decisions are oftentimes

concerned with moral problems which demand the selection of moral

choices. If educational administrators are to make good judgments

they must begin by asking deliberative and critical ethical questions.

This study has attempted to justify that a study of ethics could bene-

fit educational administrators by raising critical questions with

which they may correct some sources of bad judgments.

Educational administration currently enjoys a high degree of

prestige and status in relationship to other professional occupations.

The Watergate scandal and related activities has certainly crippled

public confidence in the legal and political professions. The miasma

created by the Watergate scandal has also prompted investigations of

illegal and unethical activities in public administration agencies at

both the state and national levels. Gross stated that the partici-

pants in the Watergate scandal were able to perpetrate their nonethical

deeds by objectifying "the enemy" into -something less than human. This

tendency combined with an "authority syndrome" was similar to that

displayed by German officers and officials during the Hitler regime.

50Dorothy W. Gross, "Watergate: Implications for Moral Develop-
ment," Childhood Education 50 (October 1973): 54-56.

The testimony of the participants revealed a rationality based on the

belief that their actions were in the interest of security for the

nation's welfare, and that the actions were legal and ethical because

they had been endorsed and sanctioned by higher levels of authority.

Gross stated: "In a significant perversion of the democratic ideal ,

the true patriot was one who followed the leader and kept his mouth

Two prominent American historians in their analysis of the
Watergate scandal have concluded that educators have a professional

and moral responsibility for the rectification of such nonethical forms

of conduct. Commager52 postulated that an indirect source of the

"new morality" displayed by the participants in the Watergate scandal

was the result of society's educational system. He described public

education today as a "massive exercise in hypocrisy" because schools

teach a set of moral standards which are almost antithetical to those

practiced in society. To lessen the disparity in the value structures

of the society, Commager argued that educators have a moral and pro-

fessional obligation to influence policy decisions through associa-

tional activity. The aims of -such activity should be directed toward:

(1) conservation of natural resources; (2) creation of a just society;

(3) conservation of life; (4) preservation of constitutional freedoms;

-and (5) a restoration of faith in participatory democracy. The result

of such activity would be that educators should serve as society's

conscience by exercising a special moral duty to demand society's

:5Ibid., p. 55.

52Henry Steele Commager, "Watergate and the Schools," Todjg_'j
Education 63 (September October 1974): 20-24.

attention to the dichotomy between its expressed ideals and the

existent realities.

Schlesinger,53 in a similar vein, stated that educators have the

responsibility to combat the corruption of society's moral standards

of conduct. He contended educators should specifically challenge

those who would invoke rationalizations for nonethical forms of con-

duct based on military-bureaucratic jargon. This type of activity

has led not only to the corruption of the language, but also to the

impairment of society's sense of morality.

However, the "new morality" displayed by the participants in the

Watergate scandal, with its emphasis on Machivellian expediency, can

be found in-a large number of organizations and institutions of our

society--including education. The negative public reaction to those

who participated in Watergate could be easily generalized to all those

who hold authority and power in our public agencies.

In his study of chief school administrators Dexheimer54 found

evidenCe that they were prone to more nonethical forms of accommoda-

tion than -to ethical forms in critical situations. Those who responded

to the questionnaire which related to actual and hypothetical situations

chose more nonethical than ethical responses by nearly a two-to-one

margin. Other notable results were:

1. The-age of the respondents was not a critical factor.

2. The humanities majors of undergraduate years had relatively

low (nonethical) scores.

53Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., "Watergate and the Corruption of
Language," Today's Education 63 (September October 1974): 25-27.

54Roy Dexheimer, "The Ethics of Chief School Administrators: A
Study in Accommodation," paper presented at the 101st meeting of the
American Association of School Administrators, Atlantic City, N.J.,
February 15-19, 1969.

3. Ethical responses were negatively related to career longevity.

4`. Professional' membership ps, rel igious convictions, and graduate

studies were not significant factors.

5. Salary and size of the district were positively related to

ethical responses.5

Dexheimer concluded that ethical standards were internalized personally

and were not affected by public codes. Dexheimer's study adds justifi-

cation for this study of ethics and its role in educational administra-


Ethical valuing has been referred to as a style of decisionmaking

which reflects the attributes of comprehensivensss, penetration, and

flexibility. In addition, it has been suggested that ethical valuing

is a quality which should govern the other forms of valuing which

exist in educational administration, because the neglect of ethical

valuing in administrative decisionmaking can only increase mistrust

and disenchantment with the value of schooling by the society at large.

The response of educational leaders to the critics of public education

should be tempered by the realization that the quality of the response-

will, in large measure, determine its acceptance or rejection.

If administrators are to meet with success in generating support

for- a system's- goals, they must enjoy a fair amount of credibility

-with client systems served by the system. Where loss of confidence in

organizational and institutional authority exists, it has primarily
resulted from the lack of concern for ethical conduct and decision-

making on.the part .of those who hold leadership positions. Therefore,

to achieve credibility and maintain trust, administrators should dem-

onstrate a commitment to a value framework which recognizes that other


sources and rationalities exist for decisions besides those of an

organization. If this line of reasoning is correct, the establish-

ment and maintenance of support for organizational goals can more

fully be achieved when those who govern combine practical wisdom and

intelligence with a philosophical orientation which provokes a deeper

insight into, and a sensitivity for, the complex milieu of events,

situations, and problems which impinge upon a system both internally

and- externally.

A recent lecture by Griffiths56 provides an example of why ethical

valuing is necessary for practicing school administrators. Griffiths

has suggested that the fractionalization of communities along ethnic

lines, the popularization of fundamentalist and mystical religious

cults, the decentralization of political systems, the resurgence of

localism and regionalism, and the manifestation of a phenomenological

perspective have all combined as causal forces in the collapse of a

consensus necessary for administrative decisionmaking. Griffiths

further suggested that the collapse has been precipitated by a wide-

spread feeling of alienation and disenchantment among people with

all. forms of authorityI. He then posed the central problem: "The

issue is what is the emerging role of the administrator, given a

society that does not want to be administered and that values education

less than it did previously," or more specifically, "How does one lead

an organization when its members do not acknowledge its goals?"57 To

56Daniel E. Griffiths, The Collapse of Consensus: Can Adminis-
trators Survive? (Buffalo, New York: Society of Educational Admin-
istrators of Western New York [Sixth Annual George E. Holloway, Jr.,
Lecture Series], 1974).

571bid., p. 5.

Griffiths, a possible solution to the problem would be for "education

to abandon its traditional status as a separate, autonomous branch

of government and consider joining with the regular political struc-

The solution offered by Griffiths to the current "crisis" is

inadequate and illogical for administrators. Certainly, educational

administrators need to be involved in the decisionmaking processes of

a given political community, but it is indeed doubtful that the type
of involvement envisaged by Griffiths would enable educators to main-

tain or restore a belief in the efficacy of schooling. He suggested

the development of a "corporate management" concept which would involve

the creation of a management team representative of various governmental

functions such as housing, health, social work, and police services.

The purpose of such a management team would be to "cut down some of
the variation in goals and make possible the setting of objectives that

can be accepted and toward which administrators can work."59 However,

this "solution" fails to recognize the original causes cited by Griffiths

himself for the discontent toward institutional and organizational

authority. It is indeed paradoxical that Griffiths has suggested for

administrators to become more politically involved in established

political frameworks, which are no longer themselves a credible or

viable force in shaping the values and goals of the client systems.

Another argument against such a position as advocated by Griffiths

is that the consensus which Griffiths would hope to reconstruct was

an illusory form of valuing in its original form.

581bid., p. 8.

59Ibid. p. 9.

The important issue which Griffiths failed to confront was the

question which asks why people have become more disenchanted with,

and alienated toward, institutional and organizational forms of

authority. Perhaps, a major part of the answer to this question re-

sides in the apparent lack of ethical valuing forms in administrative

decisionmaking. Until institutions, organizations, and the "king's

men" recognize this condition, the efforts to reconstruct a consensus

will be futile, unproductive, and meaningless gestures reminiscent of

the efforts of some to recreate a social order based on the model of

the Pax Romana.

The arguments of Griffiths were directed toward a return to the

security of the "old ethic" with its collectivized values and goals'.

He stated:

I believe that the schools were a crucial factor
in the growth of America from a trackless wilder-
ness to the greatest nation on the planet Earth.
If the teachers and administrators are of a mind,
they could do it again. .. America must become
once more a country with clear national goals,
with social and moral standards that are incul-
cated in the young by schools, and we must assume
a new stance of international leadership.60

'If the societal~ conditions that Griffiths described are accurate, how

ran he realistically expect a return to "Camelot"? The dynamic and

motivational forces of administrators should not be directed toward

the return of the "old ethic" and its social order, but rather they

should be directed toward the development of inclusive forms of valu-

ing which can more readily accommodate diversity and pluralism.

The answer to Griffiths' question, "can administrators survive?"

can be answered in the affirmative, provided they improve the quality

60Ibid., p. 6.

of administrative decisions by infusing ethical concerns and questions

-during the deliberations of -various alternative solutions Administra-

tors simply cannot afford to cast themselves as an embodiment of a

"Prince" who only concerns himself with the ends sought and cares not

how they are achieved.

The lack of commonly held goals and values was a problem which

disturbed Griffiths,. and it is a critical problem for any practicing

administrator. To overcome this problem and foster a consensus within

an organizational setting, Griffiths proposed that administrators

"shape the reward system so that it benefits those who advance the

school's objectives."61 The implications of this statement can be

construed as basically nonethical in character and intent; and it is

representative of those forms of valuing which have fostered the dis-

enchantment with administrative authority. -Rather than "shape" behav-

ior by establishing a "reward system", administrators should seek to

:promote cooperation and identification with organizational goals through

such processes as identified by Lippitt.62! The basic technique sug-

gested bytLippitt was termed interfacing. Lippitt defined interfacing
as follows:

Interfacing is primarily a process by which human
S" beings confront common areas of Iconcern, engage in
meaningfully related dialogue, actively search for
-solutions to mutual ~probl~ems,-and cope -with these
solutions purposefully. Interfacing may also in-
volve confrontation between human beings and machine
processes or technological systems.63

61.Ibid,.,p. 7.

62Gordon 1. Lippitt Organization Renewal .(New York: Appleton-
Century-Crofts, 1969).

63Ibid., p. 2.

The elements identified by Lippitt in the interfacing process

included understanding; communicating in one's own way; lack of

judgmental behavior; establishing trust; minimum effort to control;

preserving autonomy; problem-solving approach; and experimentation,

flexibility, and spontaneity.64 Lippitt also recognized the ethical

implications of attempting "organization renewal" through purposeful

and systemtaic change processes. He indicated that planned change

could be successful provided administrators established ethical

standards of conduct and dec~isionmaking. He stated:

Planned change does have ethical implications
which should be thoroughly considered by the
whole body of practitioners. The moral and
ethical standards that have become involved in
this problem of individual and social responsi-
bility should be the key to the future advance-
ment in both the private and public sectors of
society. The responsibility for establishing
and maintaining high ethical standards rests
heavily upon managers and consultants in all
kinds of organizations.65

Practicing- school administrators, particularly principals and

superintendents, are vested with organizational authority and

responsibility for making and executing policy decisions. Often-

times, they are confronted with having to choose among alternatives

which are all undesirable. In districts with declining revenues and/

or student populations, the decisions as to which programs are to be

reduced in scope, and the problem of reduction in personnel needs are

real problems which do not have easy solutions. The decisionmaking

process related to these problems has to be imbued with major ethical

questions and concerns. The intentions and motives of administrators

64Ibid., pp. 134-35.

65Ibid., p. 180.

in situations of this nature should reflect a real concern for

-the ethical values that were judged worthy of professional adminis-

trators. To facilitate decisions of this nature. objective guide-

lines need to be established and even-handedly applied in order to

avoid-gross forms of injustice to both programs and personnel. While

the solutions effectuated will not be to the satisfaction of all con-

-cerned, the important point is that they were arrived at by a thorough

consideration of the moral questions involved.

'The current sociopolitical forces in society demand a thorough

consideration of ethical valuing. The study should have practical

:value in assisting those involved in the decisionmaking process.

Good judgment should require more than correct opinions: it should

require that the opinions be on the right subjects. This study has

attempted to improve and systematize practical judgment by determin-

ing whether the right questions were being asked in order to aid

deliberations and make morally defensible policy decisions. The study

has .a~lso attempted to establish foundations of a value framework for

tl' :1 involved in the professional training of educational adminis-


~Definition of Terms

Every effort has been made to limit the technical jargon of

philosophers to provide for better readability and understanding by

the readers. The technical nature and the personalized use of key

.tenns in .ethics have been discussed in the context of usage. Certain

ethical concepts have been given a glossary-type definition to

facilitate readers' efforts in understanding those terms which, in the

opinion of the author, are not a part of the lexicon of practicing
school administrators.

Categorical Imperative--the law of the pure practical reason which

as a priori (i.e., underived from experience) has the marks of univer-

sality and necessity, thus asserting the autonomy of the rational will

in its freedom from extrinsic matters.

Consequentialism--the determination of actions as right or wrong

in accordance with their tendency to produce desirable or undesirable


Casuistry--a strict application of general ethical principles and

rules, which have been externally mandated, to particular cases of

conscience or conduct.

Deontological Ethics--the view of obligation as immediately per-

ceived and therefore independent of any reasons which may be offered

in support of one duty as against another. This form of ethics stresses

an evaluation of the quality of an act rather than its consequences.

Equity--that aspect of justice, related to the-function of the

judge, which seeks to supplement the generality of the laws through

attention to cases which are exceptions to the rule.

Ethical Naturalism--any view of ethics in which the meanings of

moral terms are expressed within the language of an empirical science

such as psychology or sociology.

Ethical Rationalism--the view that moral notions such as "good"

and "right" are adopted by the mind through the apprehensive or

regulative functions of reason. The propositions which embrace such

notions are either self-evident or imposed by reason itself according

to its owrn canons.

Facticity--the fact that freedom is not able to be free, i.e.,

autonomy of choice is limited by such conditions as a person's place,

past, environment, fellowman, and death. If freedom is defined as

the escape from the given, from fact, then there is a fact of escape

from fact. This is the facticity of freedom.

'Hedonism--the definition of "good" in terms of pleasure or the

pleasant. Distinction is made between pyschological hedonism (the

individual desires only pleasure or the pleasant), ethical hedonism

(t'he individual's good is to be found in pleasures of purity and

duration or in pleasures which correspond with one's capabilities),

and universalistic hedonsim (the individual's good is part of the

total good of the community, which is.the genuine end of all deliberate


Hedonistic Calculus--the estimation of the probable pleasures or

-pains to flow from doing or abstaining from some action, according to

the measures or values of intensity, duration, certainty, propinquity,

fecundity, purity, and extent.

Hypothetical Imperative--any imperative or command in morals
wh'ich depends -for its sanction upon the attachment of the will to an

extrinsic purpose; the action commanded is related to such a purpose

-as a means to an end.

Maxim--any subjective interest which is the content of an indi-

;vidual's volition as distinct from its form as universalizable or

nonun~iversalizable. A maxim which is universalizable conforms to

:.the..moral law, and is thus objective.

Phenomenology--the approach to experience in terms of its

structure, i.e., consciousness and its objectives whether real or

possible or consciousness and its transcendence. As a science of

phenomena, it stresses the careful description of phenomena (things

as they appear or are construed by individuals) in all domains of

experience without regard to traditional epistemological questions

(those which relate to the origin, nature, methods, and limits of

human knowing).

Pure Practical Reaso--the reason in its capacity to provide a

principle or law of conduct which is not conditioned by empirical

matters, as distinct from practical reason in its involvement- with

the empirical.

Teleological Ethics--the view of "good" as the primary notion

-of ethics and of "right" as a derivative notion to be defined as

what is productive of good. This form of ethics stresses an evalua-

tion of the results or consequences of an act rather than its motives.

Utility--the principle of estimation of actions and laws in terms

of their tendency to augment or diminish happiness.

Virtue--the goodness or excellence in all human functions, both

:of thought and of action, in individual conduct and in civic life.

Virtuous ideals are defined by the nature of the ethical system or

-culture involved in their determination.


This logical study was conceptual nd valuational in nature, and

took a nonquantitative approach in its procedures.- However, the study

should have suggested areas for empirical-type research studies. In

some respects the study was similar to the procedures used in historical

research. The study involved a description of the research, an

interpretation of the research, and a summary of how the data could

be applied to present and future hypotheses.66

Organization of the Study .

This study consisted of five integral parts. In Chapter I the

literature related to the value dimension of the decisionmaking process

in educational administration was reviewed. Chapter II contains a

review and discussion of selected leading systems of normative ethics,

and Chapter III has related the critical and deliberative questions

found in these systems to identified critical tasks in educational

administration. In Chapter IV selected concepts found in normative

ethical systems have been discussed in relation to problems commonly

met by practicing school administrators. Chapter V contains some

conclusions as to how ethical valuing could more readily relate to

the training of professional educational administrators, and a summary

of the critical and deliberative questions posed by the ethical

66David J. Fox, The Research Process in Education (New York:
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969), p. 416.



Elements of a Normative Theory

The purposes of a theory are (1) to synthesize isolated bits of

empirical data into a broader conceptual scheme, (2) to permit the

prediction of the occurrence of phenomena, (3) to act as a guide in

discovering facts, and (4) to establish general laws which govern a

certain field or set of phenomena.l Ethical theories generally con-

sist of first and second level principles, judgments, and rules.

These theories are no different from other scientific theories in

their attempt to coherently, consistently, and completely show the

:relationships which -exist among its various elements. Ethical theories

are concerned with moral principles, moral judgments, and moral rules.

A well-developed ethical theory validates its moral judgments in terms

of the -theory's rules and principles. In turn, its moral principles

justify the moral rules. Moral principles are the most general state-

-ments of judgments and represent the ultimate moral commitment. Moral

rules generally refer to classes of individuals, actions, and situa-

tions; moral judgments are simply statements that a certain action is

-right-or wrong--for-a -specified individual in a concrete situation.

1George J. Mouly, The Science of Educational Research (New York:
American Book Company, 1963), p. 51.

Normative judgments are singular in the sense that they generally

refer to a single action either contemplated or accomplished by a

particular individual in a specified situation. Some ethical theories

include second-level principles which specify the principles which

take precedence when a conflict exists between principles, and the

rules which take precedence when a conflict is found between the rules.

Figure 1 shows the relationship of the elements found in fully-developed
ethical theories.

SFirst-Level Principles
Rue ------------I Judgments
Second-Level Principles C

Figure 1. Elements of an Ethical Theory

Criteria for Assaying Normative Ethical Theories

Graff and Street2 have identified three major criteria for assay-

ing a normative theory--consistency, comprehensiveness, and workability.
This list should also include the criterion of universalizability be-

cause of its importance in ethical discourses. Some writers have also

included parsimony as a criterion, but it has not been generally recog-

nized as being of major importance in practice. In the first place,

any number of principles may logically be reduced to one principle by
connecting the principles with conjunctions. Secondly, most theories

with one or two principles tend to be so vague that the principle is

inapplicable or the theory is incomplete.

20rin B. Graff and Calvin M. Street, "Developing a Value Frame-
work for Educational Administration," in Administrative Behavior in
Education, ed. Road F. Campbell and Russell T. Gregg (New York:
H~arpe & Brothers, 1957), pp. 143-45.

The first criterion was consistency. According to Graff and

'Street, "Values need to be consistent in the internal structure of

a value system, and there also needs to be consistency in choosing

values which most effectively use the facts that are available."3

Consistency is an essential criterion in assaying any theory. In

this respect, ethical -theories do not differ from other scientific

theories. An inconsistent theory--one having contradictory principles

or principles from which a contradiction can be inferred--is simply

not a truly valid theory. One of the major purposes of a theory is

to rationally account for some set of experiences; however, it is

-rare that any theory is entirely consistent. In most cases scien-

:tists and philosophers have operated on the premise that a theory was

not so much true or false as it was useful or useless and that an

inadequate theory was probably better than no theory at all. Gener-

ally, a contradiction calls for some adjustment in a theory rather

than its complete abandonment. Conant has stated that a theory is

never discarded merely because of a few stubborn facts with which it

cannot be reconciled but is "either modified or replaced ~by a better

one, never abandoned with nothing to take its place.4

The second criterion suggested by Graff and Street for assaying

a value theory was comprehensiveness. "One function of a value sys-

tem is to provide a system of values which will be appropriate for
use as the basis for activities in all kinds of life situations.5

3Ibid., p. 144.

.4James. B. Conant, Science and Common Sense (New Haven, Connect-
icut: Yale University Press, 1951), p. 170.

5G aff and Street, Administrative Behavior in Education, op.
-cit.,-'~p. j144.

Comprehensiveness is essential in order to provide for a system that

will operate in all observable situations. This criteria is a very

difficult test because it means that a system in order to be a com-

plete theory.must account for all segments of moral behavior. The
criterion of comprehensiveness should be viewed relatively since it

may be impossible for a theory ~to be absolutely complete and to ful-

fill all of the other criteria at the same time. Actually, a theory

is rarely, if ever, complete; as new facts appear--and in most theories

new facts appear endlessly--theories have to undergo some modification.

Comprehensiveness is relative in respect to other theories. If one
of two competing theories is more comprehensive it is more preferable

to~ the less complete theory. Thus, theories can be said to be less

comprehensive only with respect to other theories.

,iThe third criterion was workabil ity. Graff and Street listed
two basic elements involved in this criterion. The first element was

concerned with providing focus and meaning for actions. They stated:

~~~To be workable the pattern must provide direction
for actions; and further, it must be capable of
expansion so as to furnish a set of evaluative~
questions by which the individual may more accu-
:. rately evaluate the appropriateness of his

The second major element which the criterion of workability suggested

was that each individual should be able to internalize the value sys-

tem. Graff and Street stated that each individual, and particularly

the administrator, has "a moral obligation to do the things necessary

t~o achieve a usable kind of value structure."7

-'6Ibid., p. 145.


The criteria suggested by Graff and Street--consistency com-

prehensiveness, and workability--represented an attempt on their part

to develop a cyclic pattern, or value system, of integrated human

behavior for use in educational administration. However, they over-

looked a vital criterion usually encompassed in assaying ethical

theories, and it is particularly relevant to those involved in the

enterprise termed education. The criterion is called universalizability

and it refers to the notion that what is right for one individual is

right for anyone else in like circumstances. Thus, if one wishes to

argue that a specific action is right for an individual but wrong for
another, he must exhibit a relevant difference between the two persons

or between the circumstances which surround the situations. According

to Hare,8 moral judgments are not tied to individual people as agents,

but are tied to features of individuals and of their situations. In

a rather colloquial fashion Hare stated:

I am not saying that what is sauce for the goose
is sauce for the gander; for it might conceivably
make a difference to the morality of the act that
it was done by a gander, not a goose; but at least,
what is sauce for the goose must be sauce for any
precisely similar goose in any precisely similar

The problem was in determining what are relevant differences. Certainly,

each individual is different. They have different histories, different

physical characteristics and abilities, different families, and occupy
different spatial locations. Thus, it has been argued, universaliz-

ability is absurd because each person is different from another and the

-- R. M. .Hare, "Language and Mloral Education," in New Es~says in the
Philosophyof Education, ed. Glenn Langford and D. J. O~'Connor(L~ondon:
Routledge &Kegan Paul, 1973), p. 160.

circumstances must necessarily be different from each other. Admit-

tedly, differences exist among agents, actions, and circumstances, but

these are not necessarily ethically relevant. Mere differences, in

and of themselves, do not necessarily invalidate normative generaliza-

tions. However, relevant differences are important in that they lead

us to change or modify our normative judgments. A sound normative

theory should make an effort to specify the exact nature of the circum-

stances and of the actions to that generalizations can apply to all

those in a particular class. Normative generalizations apply to all

men doing the specified action in the specified circumstances unless

it can be shown that some ethically relevant differences do indeed-

exist. If ethical judgments are not universalizable they will be of

no practical value.

A Typology of Normative Ethics

The classic work by C. D. Broad,10 Five Types of Ethical Theory,

provided the basic framework for this section. According to Broad,

ethical theories can be divided into two major classes--deontological

and teleological. "Deontological theories hold that there are propo-

sitions of the form: Such and such a kind of action would always be

right (or wrong) in such and such circumstances, no matter what its

consequences might be."11 The emphasis from the deontological per-

spective has been on judging actions on the basis of what type of
action it is--not its results. On the other hand, if we evaluate

actions on the basis of the state of affairs the action produces

10C. D. Broad, Five Types of Ethical Theory (London: Routledge
& Keagan Paul, 1930).

11Ibid., p. 206.

than we assume a teleological perspective. Broad added further clarifi-

cation when he stated: "Teleological theories hold that the rightness

or wrongness of an act is always determined by its tendency to produce

certain consequences which are intrinsically good or bad."12

The distinction between teleological and deontological can be

given more meaning by examining a particular situation sometimes common

to building administrators. An upset teacher brings a student to the

office for willfull misconduct and demands that the principal take

immediate disciplinary action against the student. The principal gives

his solemn promise to suspend the student from school, but he later

realizes that, because of other circumstances, consequences will be

better if the student is not suspended. What would be the advice of

the deontologist and the teleologist in this circumstance? A deontol-

ogist would advise the principal to keep his promise and suspend the

student, since keeping one's promises is the kind of action that ought

to be done. The deontologist would justify this advice by pointing

out the principle that we ought to keep our promises. A teleologist,

on the other hand, would advise us to do that action which would pro-

duce the best effect, and if this meant breaking a promise to do so,

then we should break the promise. In sum, then, the teleologist

evaluates actions and principles on the basis of their effects, while

the deontologist evaluates them as to the kind of action involved.

Philosophers of ethics have also developed a second classificatory

distinction based on the criteria of rule and act.1 These criteria

12Ibid., p. 207.

13Richard T. Garner and Bernard Rosen, Moral Philosophy: A
Systematic Introduction to Normative Ethics and Metaethics (New York:
Macmillan, 16)

determine whether an action is judged on the basis of that particular

action in those particular circumstances or on the grounds that it is

a member of a particular class of actions. Thus, an act-teleologist

would judge an action on the basis of the effects of that particular

action. The rightness or wrongness of an action is solely a function

of its consequences.14 A rule-teleologist, however, would evaluate an

action on the basis of the effects of having a rule obliging us to do

a whole class of actions in question. In other words, a rule-teleologist

holds that a particular action is right or wrong if it follows or breaks

some rule, and the correctness of the rule is a function of the con-

sequences that follow from the rule's being adopted, accepted, recog-

nized, or followed.15 On the other hand, a rule-deontologist looks to

the nature of the whole class of actions of which a specific action is

a member. The rightness or wrongness of an action or the correctness

of a rule is a function solely of factors other than the consequences

of that action or rule. An act-deontologist, however, evaluates actions

according to the type of specific action it is. In this case the

rightness or wrongness of an action or the correctness of a rule is

a function of many factors, some of which are or may be the consequences

of that action or rule.1

Table I shows the relationships among the criteria that have been

established for classifying nonnative ethical theories.

14Ibid., p. 56.


16Ibid., p. 83.



Deontological Teleological (Utilitarianism)
(Concerned with Actions) (Concerned with Results)

Justification is by Justification is by
appealing to general appealing to the
considerations. An effects of a rule.
Rule act is right because An act is right because
it is in accordance it is in accordance
with a general rule. with a rule which pro-
duces the greatest good.

Justification is by f Justification is by
appealing to particu- | appealing to the
Act lar considerations. | effects of particular
An act is right because actions. An act is
it has certain character-i right because it leads
istics. to the greatest good.

The remainder of the chapter has been arranged according to the

typology established. It should be noted that teleological theories

are generally divided into two types--egoism and utilitarianism. Ego-

istic ethics are concerned with those values and obligations which pro-

duce the greatest good for an individual. Simply, the view is that the

only obligation or right anyone has is to provide the greatest good

for himself. Not all teleogists hold to this view, for many believe

that there is an obligation to provide good for other persons as well

as for oneself. In that educational administrators are not generally

concerne~adonly for themselves, but for an organization, specific

groups,and other people in general, an example of egoistic ethics has

-not been provided. Of the two teleological theories, utilitarianism

has been reviewed and discussed because it is more in line with most

administrators' beliefs about obligation.

Jeremy Bentham's form of act-utilitarianism has been reviewed

first because it is basically a simple ethic which stressed the great-

est good for the greatest number. As an example of rule-utilitarianism,

the pragmatism of John Dewey has been reviewed. Dewey's ethic stressed

a denial of intrinsic value and ultimate ends. The deontological

theories selected included the ethics of Immanuel Kant as a representa-

tive of rule-deontological theories and the ethics of Aristotle and

the existentialists as forms of act-deontological systems. Kantian

ethics focused on duty and obligation as well as the rights of indi-

viduals. The Aristotelian system spoke of the nature and function of

man and of the virtues which brought to fulfillment what a man was able

to become. In existentialism, there was the recognition of the moral

situation as centering in the decision of the individual with respect

to the course of his own life and that of others.

The systems of ethics selected do not exhaust all forms of

normative ethical thought, but are only representative of the typology

and the delimitations established. The framers of these various

ethical theories were the originators of ethical thoughts and questions

which are of paramount concern not only to moral philosophers, but

also to policy formulators and executors as well. The sections on

representative ethical systems have been chosen to illustrate that a

critical examination of fundamental moral questions can be beneficial

in formulating and executing administrative decisions by educational


Utilitarian Ethics

The Principle of Utility

The concept of utility in ethical thought can, in large measure,

be attributed to the Scottish philosopher David Hume.17 In his writings

he espoused a theory of value which found its expression in modern

positivism. This positivistic value was reflected in Hume's sentiment

towards the practicality or usefulness of abstract thought. Hume made

the classic statement that:

If we take in our hand any volume; of divinity or
school metaphysics, for instance; let us ask, does
it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quan-
tity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental
reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence?
No. Commnit it then to the flames for it can contain
nothing but sophistry and illusion.18

Hume's major efforts were directed towards the establishment of

universal principles from which all ethical decisions and actions

could be justly derived. However, the science of ethics had to be

founded upon fact and observation resulting from the experimental

method, not through the use of deductive reasoning. For making judg-

ments of censure and approbation in moral matters, Hume invoked the

principle of utility. Those virtues and rules which maintained a

harmonious social network of relations and transactions were judged

to be good, while those matters which were divergent from general

happiness were judged to be bad. It was in this context that Hume

170rin B. Graff, Calvin M. Street, Ralph B. Kimbrough, and Archie
R. Dykes, Philosophic Theory and Practice in Educational Administration
(Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publish~ing, 1966), pp.14~5-46.

18David Hume, as quoted in Philosophic Theory and Practice in
Educational Administration, ibid.

called upon individuals to adopt a public affection which could help

to establish the happiness of society. Since, to Hume, the origin of

morality resided in the usefulness of those actions which promoted

the interests of mankind and society, he concluded that benevolence

~was the chief social virtue because it communicated pleasure and

happiness for others, and this ultimately benefited each person him-

The principle of utility fostered by Hume was adopted and expanded
in the ethical system of Jeremy Bentham.20 In essence, Bentham merged

the principle of utility with Cesare Beccaria's notion of "the great-

est happiness of the greatest number."21 Bentham's theory of morals,

however, was original in the precise form in which "utilitarianism"

appeared in his writings. Bentham's expansion upon the principle of
utility reflected his interest in the precision with which this prin-

ciple could .be applied as a guide in morals and legislation. Because

Bentham was committed to the reform of law and society, he attempted

to provide the foundations for a theory of legislation by establish-

ing the premise that policies were to be determined by a principle

which could measure the practical end of the greatest happiness for

the greatest number. Such a determinate was the principle of utility.

-19David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals
(LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing, 1953; reprinted from
the original edition of-1777), p. 7.

20OJeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles ofMorals
and Legislation (Londn:clareon res, 197; eprntedfro th
revised edition of 1823).

Cesare Beccaria, Treatise on Crimes and Punishments, trans.
Henry Paolucci (Indianapol~is, Ind~fiana: ibealArs res Bobbs-
Merrill,: 1963), p. 8.

If a science of legislation and morals is to be directed toward

the practical end of the greatest happiness, first, a science must

exist by which actions, from which pleasure and pains flowed, could

be judged as to whether they contributed to the end of happiness, or

whether they led to malice and mischievousness. The determinate of

utility was the proper measure, because the initial reason for estab-

lishing policies was simply to ensure pleasure. To Bentham, actions

enjoined by legislation should be grounded in the belief that the

greatest happiness was being preserved and strengthened. He argued

that mankind was governed by two masters--pleasure and pain. Bentham

equated happiness with pleasure. In his introductory comment he

Nature has placed mankind under the governance
of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure.
It is for them alone to point out what we ought
to do, as well as to determine what we shall do.
On the one hand the standard of right and wrong,
on the other the chain of causes and effects,
are fastened to their throne. They govern us in
all we do, in all we say, in all we think:
every effort-we can make to throw off our sub-
jection, will serve but to demonstrate and con-
firm it. In words a man may pretend to abjure
their empire: but in reality he will remain
subject to it all the while. The principle of
utility recognizes this subjection, and assumes
it for the foundation of that system, the object
of which is to rear the fabric of felicity by
the hands of reason and of law. Systems which
attempt to question it, deal in sounds instead
of sense, in caprice instead of reason, in
darkness instead of light.22

Pleasures and Pains

...-A policymaker in his capacity as a moralist should know the

value of various pleasures and pains. To determine such value

22Bentham, Principles of Morals and Legislation, op. cit.,
pp. 1-2.

Bentham identified four critical "elements" that were to be taken

into account when estimating the value of a pleasure or pain:

intensity, duration, certainty or uncertainty, and propinquity or

remoteness. The intensity was just~the strength of the pleasure or

pain, its duration was the length of time it lasted, its certainty

was the probability that it would in fact occur, and its propinquity

or remoteness was the nearness or distance in time of it. (Apparently

a pleasure that would come soon was better than one that was far off,

just as one that was sure to come was--all things being equal--to be

preferred to one that was not.)

In giving a total evaluation of the pleasures for the purpose of

evaluating an action, Bentham held that there were two other character-

istics of the pleasure or pain to be considered: its fecundity and

its purity. Fecundity was defined by Bentham as the chance an action

had of being followed by sensations of the same kind, i.e., pleasure

followed by pleasure and pain followed by pain. Purity was defined as

that element which determined the probability that an action would be

followed by sensations of the opposite kind. These considerations

allowed for the decision of the value of an action insofar as it con-

cerned one person alone. ~However, Bentham added another consideration:

the extent of the pleasure or pain. The element of extent simply

referred to the number of persons who would be affected by an action.

Bentham's calculus for determining the value of an action was stated


Sum up all the values of all the pleasures on the
one side, and those of all the pains on the other.
The balance, if it be on the side of pleasure,
will give the good tendency of the act upon the
whole, with respect to the interests of that

individual person; if on the side 3f pain, the
bad tendency of it upon the whole.

Pleasures and pains were, to Bentham, the result of the action

of certain causes. However, the quantity of the results was not

always proportional to the quantity of the force exerted by a partic-
ular cause. Each person possessed an individual "sensibility" which

biased the amount of pleasure or pain he felt. The situation or con-

ditions in which the person found himself when being subjected to an

exciting cause also had an influence on the degree of sensibility of

the person. The variables which most influenced the sensibility factor
of individuals were: health, strength, endurance, and quantity and

quality of knowledge. Other secondary-level variables which have an

effect on sensibility were: sex, age, rank, education, and climate.24

What was central in Bentham's analysis of morals was the treat-

ment of pleasure as the end and measure of effective actions, and the

treatment of pleasure and pain as the motives or sanctions for pro-

ducing such effective action. An individual acted wisely and properly

only when he acted in a way which was productive of pleasure and free

of pain,. and he was prompter:~to act in this way only through the fact

or expectation of pleasure or pain. The implication was that the

experience or expectation of pleasures and pains was the natural and

-i-nfallible-guide to happiness, and that such experience was also part

of the total balance or imbalance of pleasure and pain which was in

fact happiness or misery. Pleasure as a motive never prompted the

individual to what was against his interest, inasmuch as this interest

23Ibid., p. 31.

24Ibid., pp. 43-69.

could not really be expressed in terms other than pleasure itself.

Any awareness of an opposition between the individual's good and

pleasure as a principle was traceable by Bentham to confusions con-

cerning pleasures and pains. Bentham simply rejected as mistaken the

view that one may desire an end other than pleasure.25 Table 2

provides a summary of the kinds of pleasures and pains discussed by

Actions and Consequences

Bentham gave attention to actions in terms of their motives, and

consequences, so far as actions were intentional, i.e., voluntary or

in accordance with the individual's own determination.27 An inten-

tional act was distinguishable from its consequences, although the

intention of an act always embraced considerations of consequences

of some sort. An individual could only be responsible for what he

did and for the consequences which he had before him in committing

an act. The actual consequences of an act depended upon circumstances,

which were never intended by the individual. Circumstances were

strictly objects of the understanding, not of the will; and, with

respect to circumstances, an act was either advised or unadvised. An

individual, however, did jrill- his own free act and, according to his

understanding, its presumed consequences; in this respect his inten-

tion was good or bad. The actual consequences of an act which are

of importance to the legislator were pleasures or pains, as increasing

25Ibid., pp. 8-28.

26Ibid-., pp. 34-42.

27Ibid. pp. 82-83.

Source Kind of Pleasure Kind of Pain Source



Sense Pleasure which results from the
sensory features, such as taste,
smell, touch, hearing, sight,
and sex. Also the satisfaction
of hunger and thirst, and intox-

Wealth Pleasures which result from the
possession of articles of enjoy-
ment. Pleasure of acquisition.

Skill Pleasure which results from the
application of particular in-
struments for enjoyment and
security .

Amity Pleasures which result from the
spontaneous and gratuitous serv-
ices of others in a friendly

Good Pleasures which result from the
Reputation esteem and love of others who
hold .a person in honor.

Pains which result from the
sensory features, such as taste,
smell, touch, hearing, and sight.
" Also the pains associated with
hunger and thirst,

The absence of pleasure in its
many forms, which results in pains
of desire, disappointment, and
Pains which result from unsuccess-
ful endeavors of applying instru-
ments to their uses.

Pains which result from a man's
being on ill terms with others.

Pains whtch result from being in
ill repute, dishonor, or the pains
of the moral sanction.






Source Kind of Pleasure Kind of Pain Source

TABLE 2 -- Continued

Power Pleasures which result from
having the ability to command
the benefit of the services
of others.'

Piety Pleasures which result from
the possession of the good-
will or favor of the Supreme
Benevolence Pleasures which result from
sympathy and social affections,

Malevolence Pleasures which flow from the
feeling of ill will toward
others, and also the pleasures
of antipathy, and dissocial

Memory Pleasures which result from
simple recollection and recall
of events.

Imagination Pleasures derived from contempla-
tion of one's present, past, or

Pains which result from a
person being obnoxious to
,n the displeasuge of a Supreme

Pains associated with goodwill,
sympathy, or the pains of so-
cial affections.

Pains which result from having
an object of displeasure enjoy-
ing some form of pleasure, and
also the pains of ill will,
antipathy, and dissocial affec-

Pains associated with recalling
previous painful events.

Pains derived from contemplation
of one's present, past, or






Source Kind of Pleasure Kind of Pain Source

Expectation Pleasures which result from con- Pains which result from the fear Expectation
templation of the future when of impending events. Pains of
accompanied by the sentiment of apprehension.

Association Pleasures which result from the Pains which result from the con- Association
connection in the mind of plea- nection in the mind of pains
sures with certain objects or with certain objects or incidents.

Rel ief Pleasures which result from the
abatement of pain.

TABLE 2 -- Continued

or diminishing the happiness of the community. In terms of such con-

sequences, the tendency of an act was regarded as beneficent or mis-

chi evous.28

The intention of an act was also termed good or bad with respect

to the motive or motives from which it arose, and the motive of an

intention could be good when the presumed consequences of the same

intention were bad; also, the consequences could be good when the

motive was bad. When Bentham regarded himself as speaking of motives

in a strict way, he denied that they were either good or bad except

in terms of their general tendency to involve good or bad effects.

Rather, the individual's disposition was either good or bad. A dis-

position was beneficent when the tendency of an individual's act was

good and the motive was that of good-will; a mischievous disposition

was the conjunction of a bad tendency of an act and the self-regarding

motive. Thus, it was to the beneficent disposition that the moralist

or legislator must look in seeking to support the good of the com-

munity.29 Bentham clearly stated the consequences of his theory of

action which held that the estimation of action and motive was ultim-

ately determined in terms of good and bad effects as pleasures and

pains in these words:

The only way, it should seem, in which a motive
can with safety and propriety be styled good or
bad, is with reference to its effects in each
individual instance; and principally from the
intention it gives birth to: from which arise
...the most material part of its effects.
A motive is good, when the intention it gives
birth.to is good or bad, according to the

28Ibid., p. 133.

2Ibid., p. 121.

material consequences that are the objects of

Morals and Legislation

Bentham devoted considerable thought and discussion to the

treatment of the relation of morals to legislation. The relation-

ship of morals and legislation was based on the commonalityl of inter-
est in the happiness of every member of the community. Bentham

defined ethics as "the art of directing men's actions to the produc-

tion of the greatest possible quantity of happiness, on the part of

those whose interest is in view."3 Each person was responsible to

"private ethics" which acted as an "art of self-government." Private
ethics were concerned with legislation and administration of conduct

in relation to the embracing rules of prudence (duties to oneself)

and the rules of probity and beneficence (duties to others). Legis-

lation, as the promulgation of external rules, must assist private

ethics in ways which support the happiness of the whole community

and not in ways which subtract from this happiness.32 The sanctions

of legislation, as distinct from those of ethics, would apply least

in matters of prudence; because, popular (moral) sanctions would

operate mainly in these matters. In matters of probity (avoiding

injury to others), legislation could both dissuade and restrain the

individual from harming others, and it could define the character of

the offenses against property and against society itself. In matters

of beneficence (increasing the happiness of others) the major

301bid., p. 120

31Ibid., p. 310.

32Ibid., pp. 312-13.

jurisdiction belonged to ethics and not legislation. The effects

of laws in this area were limited, but Bentham felt that they should

be extended beyond what custom had dictated. In essence, he felt that

our duties to others, as beneficence, could be legislated so that,

for example,

In cases where the person is in danger, why
should it not be made the duty of every man
to save another from mischief, when it can
be done without prejudicing oneself, as well
as to abstain from bringing it on him.33

This last point, on the function of legislation, captured the

spirit of Benthamism. It was according to Bentham, "the idea pursued

in the body of this work."3 The utilitarianism of Bentham reflected

a concern for the individual members of society, who had equal claims

upon well-being. The recognition of the individual and his interests

constituted the center of moral investigation and the focus of reform.

Each should count for one and none for more than one. If indeed an

individual was to be benefited in his own situation, he must be con-

sulted or at least kept in mind in the calculations of the legislator.

The individual's estimate of pleasures and pains, as guided by his

concern for his own good, was to be matched by the estimates of the

legislator in his efforts to reduce mischief or pain and to increase

pleasure for the greatest number. The contention was that there was

more to human existence than a simple balance of pleasure over pain;

this did not really overturn an approach to social morality in terms

of increasing happiness and diminishing misery. John Stuart Mill

33Ibid., p. 323.


strongly supported this position in his defense of utilitarian-


Mill's Corrections of Utilitarianism

Mill directed his efforts toward the clarification and correc-

tion of what appeared to him to be misunderstandings and trivializa-

tions. The definitional problems and the improper applications of

utilitarian concepts were the result of a shallow understanding of

utilitarianism. Mill argued that utilitarianism was not to be mis-

construed as an ethic which neglected beauty, ornament, or amusement,

and neither was it to be misrepresented as an ethic which fastened

the enjoyment of momentary pleasures and frivolity to the neglect

of more substantive pursuits. Utilitarianism was, to Mill, correct

in its basic premise that pleasure and freedom from pain were the

only things desirable as ends, and that all desirable things were

desirable either for pleasure inherent in themselves or as means to

the promotion of pleasure and the prevention of pain.36
Wlhat Mill took strong objection to were the things the utilitar-

ian theory included in the ideas of pleasure and pain, and to what

extent this was left an open question. A major concern was whether

pleasures and pains were homogeneous in their intrinsic value,

assuming that the objective elanents were equal, or whether they

were to be judged according to their source of derivation, i.e.,

were pleasures and pains associated with the higher faculties preferable

35John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism (1863). [Reprinted in its
complete .form in Writers on Ethics: Classic and Contemporary, ed.
Joseph Katz, Philip Nochlin, and Robert Stover (Princeton, New Jersey:
D. Van Nostrand, 1962).]

36Ibid., p. 113.

in kind to those of which the animal nature of man was susceptible?

Mill held that the concept of utility was to be considered as a

directive rule of human conduct and, therefore, was concerned with

the cultivation of nobleness of character, even if some form of dis-

satisfaction or pain resulted from the pursuit. Mill stated:

It is better to be a human being dissatisfied
than a pig satisfied; better to be a Socrates
dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. An if the
fool, or the pig, are of a different opinion,
it is because they only know their own side
of the question. The other party to the com-
parison knows both sides.37

Apparently, Mill was not only concerned with the quantity of pleasures,

but, also with the quality of individual and societal existence.

Mill, in his recognition of kinds of pleasure in relation to the

fulfillment of distinct human capabilities, meant to say that good,

as good objects, was something different from the experience or

experiences of pleasantness. Then, the basis of Mill's utilitarian-

ism was not simply the fact of pleasure as an experience of whatever

number of individuals or the desiring of pleasantness, but the

desirable and pleasurable in the sense of precise human realizations

which were in the very nature of the case intrinsically satisfying.

Mill's treatment of morality as an order of action involved less

perplexity than his treatment of the nature of good. If the greatest

happiness secured to the greatest number was the end or good of the
community, then "right action" was whatever was conducive to this end.

Mill thought of actions simply as efficient causes which were found

to produce positive goods, such as the enjoyment of art and music,

and the decrease or removal of positive evils, such as poverty and


disease. Inasmuch as all actions have consequences, Mill (following

Bentham) wanted to stress the responsibility of the moralist to under-

take the determination of the consequences of action as a matter capable

of empirical investigation. This responsibility was in accord with both

intelligence and generosity.

SMill was aware that moral sensibility embraced more than the recog-

nition of the efficacy of action ~which was conducive to general happi-

ness. While right action could only be understood in terms of the good

which it produced, or was believed to have produced, the very disposition

to act for the sake of the good was morally significant. To act from

such a disposition was to act virtuously, even where desirable con-

sequences did not flow from a given act itself. Mill included virtue

as an aggregate of "ingredients of happiness." The virtuous man was

not one who was indifferent to the consequences of his action. Mill

concluded that since right action was always a means to the end of

general happiness, virtue was- never simply a means.
Mill's attention to virtue, or the virtuous disposition, was part

of-a broad concern with the conscientious roots.of right action.

Bentham rested the promotion of the greatest good of the community

upon the somewhat unsure foundation of the purely social motive of-

symp'athy together with the semi-social motives of love of amity and

love of reputation. The efficacy of these motives, to Bentham, was

a function of the bias and quantum of sensibility. It was to this-

sensibility that Mill directly appealed in speaking of the "con-

scientipus feelings of mankind."38 Mill maintained that the moral
feelings were natural but not innate. The faculty consisting of the

38Ibid., p. 126.

moral feelings was natural in being an outgrowth of human nature,

either in springing up spontaneously or in being brought to develop-

ment by cultivation.39 This faculty was flexible and was capable of

conferring the authority of conscience upon very diverse moral con-

tents. At the very root of the moral faculty was a natural basis of

social sentiment, namely the "social feelings of mankind, the desire

to be in unity with our fellow creatures," through which the feelings

of one individual were more and more identified with the good of

others.40 Thus, the support of the well-being of others was an ex-

pression of a natural want, of an internal force which was independent
of external sanctions, selfish interests, and influences of bad educa-


The social feelings provided the sanction for the highest require-

ments in the scale of social utility, namely those which come under the

name of justice. Justice was the recognition not simply of duties in

support of general happiness, but also of claims which individuals

have upon one another, and thus upon society. The idea of justice

embraced, accordingly, two things, namely a rule of fairness or reciprocity,

and a sentiment which moves the individual to be just. The sentiment of

justice was the moral, or social, feeling which softens and enlarges the

somewhat primitive desire to retaliate an injury, so as to enable the

individual to act for the interest of society rather than for himself.

and for those with whom he sympathized.41

39Ibid., p. 127.


41Ibid., p. 140.

In Mill's view, the idea of justice made implicit the whole

intention of the greatest happiness principle, namely to give an

individual his due as the minimum of service to him. Justice was

respecting the personal happiness of another as at least equal to

one's own happiness. This rule recognized the claims of others to

happiness and to all of its means.42 These claims or rights were

but expressions of the fundamental right of the individual to equality

of treatment. For every right a corresponding duty existed, although

some duties, such as generosity and beneficence, did not have corres-

ponding rights, i.e., one individual had no moral claim upon another's

generosity or beneficence.

Although justice was not the whole of morality, the duties re-

lated to rights were "more paramount .. than any others." Equality

with its rights and duties was that "abstract standard of social and

distributive justice" toward which "all institutions, and the efforts

of all virtuous citizens" should be directed. The rights of indivi-

duals were indefeasible, although the exercise of a particular right

could be affected by the demands of "some recognized social expediency."

Equality was the very sense of the principle of utility and of Benthamls

dictum, "everybody to count for one, nobody for more than one."43

The sentiment o~f justice of which Mill spoke of as resting upon

"the human capacity of enlarged sympathy and the human conception of

intelligent self-interest" was in many respects the sentiment and

spirit of nineteenth-century liberalism. The works which emanated

from this period abound with convictions concerning the capability of


43Ibid., p. 148.

the individual for self-determination in seeking to achieve a satis-

factory existence and the possibilities open to community in seeking

to support the welfare of its members.

In Mill's defense, the moral philosopher's proper concern was

with the character of individual life and with the excellence which

an individual could achieve in himself while at the same time extend-

ing assistance to others. Society is not, of course, an idealized

unity of thought and purpose, and it is doubtful that Mill or any

utilitarian thought this to be the case. However, while society is

not a substantial unity existing above and beyond the individual man-

bers, the conscious purposes of individuals must always be consulted

and respected in any projection of the good of the community as a

whole. Social reform is not so much a reordering of individuals, as

it has become in collectivist societies, as it is a reordering of the

conditions of personal freedom and fulfillment.

Summary of Utilitarian Ethics
Utilitarianism in Bentham and Mill combined the defense of hedon-

ism with the advocacy of social and political reform. The good was

pleasure or the pleasant because no one ever desired anything but

pleasure. Good was simply what was desired and pleasure alone is

desired, whatever the disguises which appetition might take. Pleasure

could be measured or estimated, as Bentham suggested, by a number of

values of "elements" (such as intensity, duration, fecundity, and

purity), and these values were to be "always kept in view" when

seeking to determine the good or evil tendency of action which yielded

pleasure or pain. At the same time, the recognition of pleasure as

the good did not favor pleasures of the moment, or pleasures whose

enjoyment by one individual interfere with or detract from the

felicity of others. The calculus of pleasures and pains was governed

by the "greatest happiness principle," according to which each indi-
vidual should count for one in the determination of whether the

tendency of an action augmented or diminished the happiness 'of the


The place of pleasure in the hedonism of Bentham suggested the

general argument that the life of pleasure without knowledge was to

be rejected as the good for man. Mill sought to keep uppermost the

rational or intuitionistt" element in hedonism in contending that dis-

tinctions among pleasures are qualitative as well as quantitative, in

accordance with the sensibility which was bound up with man's higher

faculties. To this sensibility were to be attributed the interests of

the cultivated mind and the moral feelings which supported social

existence and the duties of justice in society. Mill's attention to

the "Imoral sense" brought him into the company of intuitionists who

had maintained that the differences among goods were immediately per-

ceived, and that right was not simply what was conducive to or pro-

ductive of happiness.

The tensions in utilitarianism between hedonism and intuitionism,

with respect to the good, and between consequentialism and intuitionism,

with respect to right action, remained after Mill. These tensions were

to be exhibited in various ways in the writings of later theorists,

such as Sidgwick,44 Moore,45 and Perry.46 While the dialog among the
utilitarians was interesting, it will not be discussed here, but some

of the views of Moore will be discussed. Opposed to all forms of

hedonistic utilitarianism, Moore insisted upon approaching the basic

ethical issues from the question of the cognition and definability of

"good." Good was a simple quality,.Moore maintained, which was known
or intuited simply as what it was. Any attempt at definition which

represented good as "another thing," as in holding that "good" means

"pleasure," comnntted the "naturalistic fallacy."47 Moore recognized

pleasure as a necessary ingredient of things which were good, but he
.denied that pleasure was what good meant. Of the things which were

good, Moore distinguished chiefly the enjoyment of beautiful objects
and the pleasures of association. He argued, with respect to the pro-

duction of such goods, that action was to be recognized as "good as a

means" or right.48 Moore's version of utilitarianism combined the

definition of "right" in terms of utility with the indefinability of

"good" in order to avoid what he believed to be errors committed by
moral philosophers in the past. Moore's liberation of utilitarianism

from hedonism was in a certain way latent in the thoughts of Mill..

44Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed. (London:
Macmillan, 1962), chap. 4.

45George Edward Moore, Principia Ethica (Cambridge, England:
Cambridge University Press, 1929), pp. 59-109.
46Ralph Barton Perry, Realms of Va-lue.(Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1954), chap. 8.

47Moore, Principia Ethica, op. cit., pp. 9-21.
48George Edward Moore, Ethics (London: Oxford University Press,
1912, reprinted as a Galaxy Book, 1965), pp. 27-49.

The critical questions developed in utilitarian ethics which

relate to the administrative decisionmaking process include:

1. What are the probable consequences of the alternative


2. Which policy alternative would result in the greatest happi-

ness for the greatest number?

3. How would the consequences of the alternative proposals com-

pare in relation to the value elements of intensity, duration,

certainty, propinquity, fecundity, purity, and extent of

pleasures and pains?

4. Should policy decisionmakers legislate a person's duty

towards helping others, or should the matters of beneficence

be determined by one's "private ethics"?

5. How should an organization foster pleasures and diminish pains

of its members, and thereby contribute to the end happiness?

6. What types of qualitative pleasures are provided for or

encouraged by an organization, as opposed to quantitative


7. What is the factual evidence based upon empirical investiga-

tions for assertions about benefits and disadvantages, pleasures,

and pains?

8. Does the organization and its administration provide for

equality of treatment, or do some individuals count for more
than their fair share?

Deweyan Ethics

Theory of Valuation

The pragmatic ethics of John Dewey49 took as a major concern

the problem of valuing and valuing expressions: they related to all

planned or deliberated human conduct, personal and collective. Value

was, to Dewey, defined as those estimates of worth which were associ-

ated with human activities and relations.50 Dewey strongly objected

to what he termed ejaculatoryy" value expressions which did not state

anything about contexts and feelings. Expressions such as "good,"

"bad," "right," and "wrong" were regarded by Dewey as mere interjec-

tions, because they did not state anything of substance. They were

considered as "phenomena like blushing, smiling, weeping; or as stimuli

to move others in certain ways--much as one says 'Gee' to oxen or 'Whoa'

to a horse."5

Dewey desired a theory of valuation which would provide for the

possibility of developing genuine propositions about the direction of
human affairs. He discounted theories of valuation which (1) denied

that value assertions could not be subjected to experimental tests,

(2) relegated value categories to only the mental field to the exclusion

of the physical area, or (3) found that value expressions were absent

in the physical sciences. The implication of this action was that value

categories were supreme over factual existence.52

49John Dewey, Theory of Vraliation (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1939). [Reprinted in its complete form in Writers of Ethics:
Classic and Contemporary, op. cit., pp. 574-614.]

50Ibid., p. 575.

51Ibid., p. 578.

52Ibid., pp. 575-576.

The concept of value, as an estimate of human conduct, could only

be found in a contextual setting, according to Dewey. Therefore, it

was important that the context, in which a value question was encount-

ered, be made clear; otherwise, the stated value expressions would be

meaningless. Only with an understanding of the contextual setting

could propositions be assigned a value. Dewey also held that situa-

tions which prompted value expressions developed only when one was

confronted with a desire to avoid an existing situation, and when there

was an attraction towards another possible prospective situation. At

the same time, a "specifiable and testable relation between the latter

(a prospective situation) as an end and certain activities as means

for accomplishing it" should develop.53 Therefore, according to

Dewey, dissatisfaction with one's present condition stimulated the

individual toward making value decisions involving likes and dis-

likes, desires and interests, and means and ends.

Valuational activities, as outlined, were marked by three suc-

cessive circumstances and motives--dissatisfaction with the present

context, attraction to a prospective alternative, and a determination

of means to accomplish the end sought. Valuation, within such a

model, could be analyzed and verified by the observation of behaviors

associated with such circumstances. For example, one could assign

such qualifying adjectives as "slight" and "great" when the amount

of energy expended and the length of time over which a behavior

persisted were observed. In such an instance, it was also possible

to demarcate what was designated by likes and dislikes from things

53Ibid., p. 581.

prefixed by such an ambiguous term as "enjoy."54 Value statements,

or what Dewey termed "propositions of appraisal", should only refer

to a valuation of things with respect to their "serviceability or

usefulness." While this notion concentrated on the valuation of

things as means, Dewey contended such a relational theory of value

inherently involved the evaluation of ends.55

In Dewey's theory of valuation the existential relation described

and defined certain things as good, fit, or proper valuations. The

existential relation in question was that of means-ends or means-

consequences, and the propositions which flowed from such a relation,

to Dewey, could be tested by observation of results actually attained

as compared with those intended. "Prizings" constituted desires and

interests likingss) which could not exist independent of the appraisal

of things (means), but rather were intimately influenced by appraisals.

Thus, while Dewey discriminated between the appraisal of things as

means, and the prizingg" of things as ends, he held that deliberative

activity, which weighed various alternative end states, was always

couched in terms of the conditions which were the means of their

securement. Dewey stated that:

The more overtly and emphatically the valuation
of objects as ends in connected with desire and
interest, the more evident it should be that,
since desire and interest are ineffectual save
as they co-operatively interact with environing
conditions, valuation of desire and interest, as
means correlated with other means, is the sole
condition for value appraisal of objects as
ends .56

54Ibid. pp. 582-83.

55Ibid., p. 587.

~56Ibid., p. 591.

Dewey's pragmatic ethics stressed that valuation took place only

when something was wrong, or when there was "some trouble to be done

away with, some need, lack or privation to be made good, some conflict

of tendencies to be resolved by means of changing existing conditions."57

This fact in turn proved that the intellectual factor of inquiry was

present. The adequacy with which inquiry was exercised resulted in
the difference in different desires and their correlative ends-in-

view. Dewey stated:

Propositions in which things (acts and materials)
are appraised as means enter necessarily into .
desires and interests that determine end-values.
Hence the importance of the inquiries that result
in.the appraisal of things and means.58

Dewey did not accept any a priori standard for determining the

value of a proposed solution in relation to concrete cases. To Dewey,

a proposed solution either performed the function of resolution of

a problem, as an end-in-view, or it did not. Therefore, Dewey rejected

not only the hedonistic principle of pleasure as the ultimate good,

but all forms of monistic definitions of good. The only valid test of

the existence of a valuation was actual behavior that was subject to

observation. The acceptance or rejection of such behavior was deter-

mined by the examination of the concrete situation in respect to the

conditions that constituted the need or lack, the attainable ends or

outcomes desired formulated as means, and the consequences that

mutually ensued.59 Therefore, the only purpose of a theory` of valua-

tion was to set forth the conditions by which a method of formation

-~571bid;,~ ., p 594.

58Ibid., p. 595.

5Ibid., pp. 606-7.

of desires and interests could be observed in concrete situations.

The concepts of "good" and "right" were defined by Dewey in the

following fashion:

The view that value in the sense of good is inher-
ently connected with that which promotes, furthers,
assists, a course of activity, and that value in
the sense of right: is inherently connected with
that which is needed, required, in the maintenance
of a course of activity.0

The Dynamic Force of Habit

The purpose of ethics, as a philosophical science, was "to state

problems in such forms that action could be courageously and intelli-

gently directed to their solution."61 With this purpose in mind, Dewey
held that one needed to recognize the role that habit, impulse, and

intelligence performed in the determination of human conduct. Habit,

to Dewey, was defined as an acquired predisposition which was projective,

dynamic in quality, and ready for overt manifestation.62 This predis-

position to ways or modes of response dictated the formation of ideas
as well as their execution, and in its overt manifestation, it was not

limited to a particular set of activities, but could take a variety of-

forms. Habits were also viewed by Dewey as acquired social functions

which performed as "working adaptations of personal capacities with

environing forces."63 Thus, Dewey held that-the habits acquired as a

result of the interaction of personal and environmental elements could

60Ibid. p., 609.

.61John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct: An Introduction to .Social
Psychology (New York: Henry Holt, 1922; Random House, The Modern
Library, 1950), p. 12.

62Ibid., p. 4T'.

63Ibid., p. 16.

be expressed as virtues and vices, and they could also be equated with

human will.

A habit, as a special sensitiveness to certain classes of stimuli,

when taken in connection with the continuity of other habits with one

another explained the unity of human character and conduct, motive and

act, and will and deed.64 Dewey's moral theory held that an under-

standing of those active dispositions which make a man do what he does

could result in the prescription of meaningful remedies for undesirable

tendencies. When making moral judgments of character, Dewey cautioned

that one should not make wholesale judgments, but should discriminate

among "the complex of acts and habits into tendencies which were to be

specifically cultivated and condemned."65 A thorough understanding of
the conditions which promoted the development of human character and

a thorough study of the consequences which flowed from their activity'

were essential if there was to be a modification of those factors which

contributed toward the development of undesirable tendencies. Dewey

believed that human character could be changed provided one could change

certain conditions. Dewey stated:

To change the working character or will of another
we have to alter objective conditions which enter
into his habits. Our own schemes of judgment, of
assigning blame and praise, of awarding punishment
and honor, are part of these conditions.6

Morals were defined in Deweyan ethics as customs, folkways, or

established collective habits. Customs constituted the moral standards,

64bid., p. -43.

---65Ibid. p.- 48.

66Ibid., D. 19.

because they cultivated demands for certain modes of overt behavior.67

An individual acquired morality through the assimilation of the estab-

lished cultural patterns to which he had been subjected. Therefore,

the social groups or associations with which one was involved, and the

degree of one's interactions with such systems nurtured not only one's

moral development, but also one's sense of morality. These interacting

arrangements, in many cases, came into conflict with one another, and,

in this diversity of models, individuality could assert itself to foster

progress. Dewey stated that, because of the present mobility and inter-

minglings of custom, an individual could exercise personal ingenuity

in selecting and rearranging the elements of custom patterns in order

to remake them.68 According to Dewey, this relationship of custom and

morality established standards which were sanctioned by life itself.

The basic question which flowed from this nexus of custom and morality

was how individuals were going to use and be used by these standards,

not whether they were going to be used. Therefore, the significant

problem to be resolved did not involve a choice between moral authority

outside customr and one within it, but between adopting more or less

intelligent and significant customs. Dewey stated:

Reason, moral principles, cannot in any case be
showed behind these affairs, for reason and morality
grow out of them. They are there as part of them.
No one can escape them if he wants to. He cannot
escape the problem of how to engage in life, since
in any case he must engage in it in some way or
other--or else quit and get out.69

-67Ibid., p. 75.

-- 681bid. --- --- --

691bid., p. 81.

The Place of Impulse in Conduct

Impulses were an integral part of Deweyan ethics, because they

represented the raw materials of human nature and conduct. Dewey

viewed impulses as the starting points for the assimilation of knowl-

edge and skill, and as agencies for the transfer of existing social

power into personal ability. In other words, they were the organs of

reorganization and readjustment.70 Impulses were not to be thought of

as secondary and dependent upon formed habits and customs. Instincts

or impulses were, according to Dewey, modified by their interaction

with the environment. Dewey in his discussion on the plasticity of

impulses commented that: "Any impulse may become organized into almost

any disposition according to the way it interacts with surroundings."71

This fact was a central tenet in Dewey's philosophy of education, be-

cause he felt that a "truly humane education consists of an intelligent

direction of native activities in the light of the possibilities and

necessities of the social situation."" Unfortunately, schools have

generally demanded "an impatient premature mechanization of impulsive

activity after the fixed pattern of adult habits of thought and


Dewey believed that while some inventive impulses of the young

worked toward accommodation, assimilation, or reproduction, other

impulses worked toward exploration, discovery, and creation. However,

the weight of adult customs strengthened the tendency toward conformity

70Ibid., p. 94.

72Ibid., p. 96.


rather than toward ~the development of variation and independence. Dewey,

of course, recognized that not all creative impulses could be woven

into a smooth pattern of habits; but, upon the onslaught of circumstance

and stimuli, "the emotional outbreak and rush of instincts dominating

all activity show how superficial is the modification which a rigid

habit has been able to effect."74 Impulses~ were, therefore, sources

of liberation, and by giving habits pertinence and freshness they could

liberate an individual's potential. Impulses were also intermediaries

of human conduct, because morality was an endeavor to find for the

manifestation of impulse an office of refreshment and renewal. If not

used in such forms impulses could become pathological and barbaric.

Impulsive activities should be treated as opportunities for imagination

and invention, not as ends in themselves. Dewey stated: "Impulse is

needed to arouse thought, incite reflection and enliven belief."75

The Place of Intelligence in Conduct

In Deweyan ethics intelligence was a necessary element in order

to achieve a balance between habit and impulse. This balance of habit

and impulse was requisite for observation, memory, and judgment; habits

by themselves were too organized, insistent, and determinate to indulge

in inquiry or imagination; and impulses taken as themselves were too

chaotic, tumultous, and confused to be able to know what they even

wanted.76 Intellectual activity was a necessary link with the conjoint

operation of habit and impulse, because it engendered experiment and

741bid., p. 101.

75Ibid., pp. 170-71.
76Ibid.. n_177.

deliberation when a person was confronted with a felt difficulty or


The intellectual activity of deliberation served as an experiment

"in finding out what the various lines of possible action are really

like."77 The purpose of deliberation was, therefore, to make various

combinations of habit and impulse to determine what the resultant

action would be if the various alternatives were put into action. By

this use of imagination and reflection, a person was able to follow out

a course of action without committing final or fatal actions. Delibera-

tion, to Dewey, ceased when a choice or decision was finally arrived at

by the person. Dewey defined the term choice as "simply hitting upon

an object which furnishes an adequate stimulus to the recovery of an

overt action."78 The point of decision was settled upon when the vari-

ous factors in action fitted harmoniously together so that the course

of action chosen would be fully released. To secure reasonable choices

a person should not allow his thoughts to be consumed by a particular

habit or impulse. Proper deliberation should consider a number of

preferences so that all of the facts were properly considered. If

one followed this maxim,Dewey claimed that decisions could be con-

sidered reasonable. He added: "There may be error in result, but it

comes from lack of data not from ineptitude in handling them."79

Dewey rejected hedonistic utilitarian theory which consisted of

calculations on the basis of pleasure and pain or profit and loss

resulting from proposed courses of action. Dewey postulated that

--77Ibid. p.- 190. -

781bid., p. 192.

791bid., p. 194.

deliberation had its beginning in troubled activity, and contended

that its conclusion in choice of action should be based upon that

which could resolve the problem. He stated:

It [deliberation] no more resembles the casting-
up of accounts of profit and loss, pleasures and
pains, than an actor engaged in drama resembles
a clerk recording debit and credit items in his

The pleasure principle of the utilitarians was too indeterminate,
individualistic, and elusive to lend itself to calculation and

decisionmaking, particularly since future pleasures were being con-

sidered. The problem of deliberation was not to calculate future

happenings but to appraise present proposed actions, and to judge

habits and desires by their tendency to produce certain consequences.

Dewey's pragmatic ethics were present-minded, not based on the calcu-
lation of indeterminate future results. Dewey listed the reflective

qualities that each person should possess when he stated:

The moral is to develop conscientiousness, ability
to judge the significance of what we are doing and
to use that judgment in directing what we do, not
by means of direct cultivation of something called
conscience, or reason, or a faculty or moral knowl-
edge, but by fostering those impulses and habits-
which experience has shown to make us sensitive,
generous, imaginative, impartial in receiving the
tendency of our inchoate dawning activities.
Therefore the important thing is the fostering of
those habits and impulses which lead to a broad,
just, sympathetic survey of situations.81l

Impulse and habit were the primary determinants of human conduct,
and reflective intelligence was required for the determination of

foreseeable consequences and direction of activity. Dewey rejected

80Ibid., p. 199.

81Ibid., p. 207.

the notion of fixed ends and fixed goods. Ends or aims were ways of

defining and deepening present activity, and were established to pro-

vide direction, effectiveness, and significance. Ends were directive

stimuli to present choice and should not be treated as frozen and iso-

lated goals.82 Dewey believed that persons should not fasten upon

some single end or consequence which was desired, or permit that aim

to blot from perception all other considerations, for the decision

would lead not only to narrowness but also perhaps to fanaticism.

Ends, rather, should be viewed as means to the unification and libera-

tion of present conflicting and confused impulses and habits.83 The

doctrine of fixed ends diverted attention from the examination of

consequences and rendered persons careless in their inspection of

existing conditions. The doctrine also neglected the task of intelli-

gence which was to grasp and realize genuine opportunity, based upon

the critical examination of the conditions of the given situation.

Dewey also rejected having fixed general rules, principles, com-

mandments, and laws. Such fixed antecedents of measure were merely

contrivances to avoid the strain of genuine uncertainty and perplexity

found in actual moral situations. However, Dewey did not completely

reject the value of general principles as instruments or tools to be

used in analyzing circumstances and conditions. Generalizations were

to be used as hypotheses for conducting observations or experiments

and for organizing special-facts. Dewey believed that knowledge of

general moral principles was instrumental toward developing the

82Ibid., p. 227.

83Ibid., p. 229.

individualized meaning of situations.84 Moral generalizations based

upon the continuity of habit directed attention to resemblances and
differences in each new case, and therefore economized the effort of

deliberation. Reasonable judgments., to Dewey, were made effective

when those habits and dispositions which lead to impartial foresight

of consequences were developed. As Dewey stated: "Then our judgments

are reasonable; we are then reasonable creatures."85

Summary of ~Deweyan Ethics

The ethics of Dewey stressed the critical role of reflective

intelligence in moral conduct, choice, and self-mak~ing. This vital

disposition encouraged deliberation and controlled impulses and habits
to develop more inclusive aims and execute a course of action in a

reasonable manner. The pattern of reflective thinking envisioned by

Dewey exemplified the problem-solving method of modern experimental
science. A description of the pattern was found in his famous work,

Democracy and Education:86 (1) there was a felt difficulty or problem

recognized; (2) the problem must be clarified and defined; (3) tentative

hypotheses or alternative courses of action need to be formulated; (4)
their consequences and implications must be envisaged and deduced; (5)

the selection of an alternative must be made and acted upon; and, (6)

the consequences which flowed from the selected course of action must

be evaluated to determine whether the desired aims have been fully


84Ibid., p. 243.

85Ibid., p. 247.

86John Dewey, Democracy and Education (New York: Macmillan, 1916;
The Free Press, 1966), pp. 139-63.

The practice of reflective intelligence and its conclusions were

~to be the basis of all attitudes, beliefs, and actions. Although not

expressed directly, it became clear that Dewey did have a criterion

or standard by which actions were to be approved or disapproved. That

criterion was a teleological utilitarian one: the promotion of the

general welfare or happiness. In his aversion to fixed principles and

final ends, Dewey tried to establish his ethical system between a sub-

jective or atomistic position and a casuist position which operated

from fixed rules and aims. While Dewey's "general welfare" principle

r; ected all casuist and atomistic conceptions of its content, it did

establish a basic standard for the development of a "cautionary direc-

tion."8 Such a standard, to Dewey, "provides a consistent point of

view to be taken in all deliberation, but it.does not pretend to deter-

mine in advance precisely what constitutes the general welfare or

common good."88

By rejecting hedonism, the notion that pleasure was the end or

the chief good, Dewey seemingly defined good as that which was success-

ful in solving a problem. This "doctrine of success" was, however, not

to be treated as an end-in-itself, but was simply a consequence of

sound deliberative achievement. In regards to Dewey's conception of

the good life, he felt that it was a harmonious whole consisting of

good experiences or values. These good experiences were achieved
through intelligent action and were approved after reflection in the

light of full knowledge of their conditions and consequences. By

87John Dewey, Theory of the Moral Life (New York: Holt, Rinehart
& Winston, 1960), p. 42

being achieved and approved, such experiences were enjoyed as "con-

summatory experiences." Therefore, the happy life was one which could

be approved upon an intelligent review which considered it in all its


Morals, to Dewey, were the most humane of all subjects, because

they were "ineradicably empirical, not theological nor metaphysical

nor mathematical."8 Since human nature existed and operated in an

environment, the subjects of physics, chemistry, history, statistics,

and even engineering science were part of disciplined moral knowledge,

so far as they enabled persons to understand the conditions and agencies

through which man lived, formed, and executed plans. Moral science did

not distinguish between intellectual and moral virtues or excellences,

but rather it encompassed physical, biological, and historic knowledge

which, when placed in a human context, guided and illuminated the

activities of men.90 The development of a more adequate science of

human nature was a matter of first-rate importance to Dewey. Such a

science could provide for a more informed and intelligent determina-

tion of particular acts. Dewey in his conclusion stated:

We need a permeation of judgments on conduct by
the method and materials of a science of human
nature. Without such enlightenment even the
best-intentioned attempts at moral guidance and
improvement of others often eventuate in trag-
edies of misunderstanding and division.91

The critical questions developed in Deweyan ethics which relate

to the administrative decisionmaking process include:

89Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, op. cit., p. 295.

90Ibid., p. 296.

91Ibid., p. 321.

1. What is the felt difficulty or problem that has prompted

the need for deliberative activity?

2. Which of the active dispositions of habit and impulse are

in conflict?

3. What will satisfactorily terminate deliberation or relieve

the conflicts and tensions of the situation? Has the

proposed solution taken into consideration all of the

pertinent facts of the situation? Does the proposed solu-

tion anticipate the consequences in the larger environment

as well as the immediate situation?

4. Is the deliberation directed toward future happenings, or

is it concerned with the appraisal of present conditions?

5. Are the desired ends or aims to be viewed as ends-in-

themselves, or as means for resolving present problems?

6. How should a system alter, modify, or change individual. habits

and impulses in an ethical manner so that democratic values

may be accommodated and the intellectual activity of

deliberation increased?

Kantian Ethics

The Roots of Morality

The Kantian ethical system stressed the belief in the dignity

of individual men, and that dignity gave each man an intrinsic worth.

Dignity was viewed as the source of man's innate right to freedom,

legal and political rights, and the belief that all men are equal.

In emphasizing the rights of individuals Kantian ethics opposed

every form of utilitarianism. Legal and moral systems could not be

based on social utility, general happiness, or the common good.

Rather, they should be founded on the rights of individual men.

Any course of action which conflicted with these rights was ipso

facto wrong; and it was wrong regardless of the amount of good which

may have resulted from it. In this sense, Kantian ethics categorically

rejected the principle that the end justifies the means, however good

and worthwhile the end might have been.92 The ends sought were ir-

relevant when one judged an act involving moral variables. An action

was not truly moral unless it was done in the belief and because of

the belief that it was right intrinsically. Whether the action suc-

ceeded in its purposes or not, if it was done with a "good will", it

was morally acceptable. Thus, Immanuel Kant93 established that~ the

only absolute good was "good will." In the first remarks of the

Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals Kant phrased his belief in

the absoluteness of good will, and then he continued to give his

reasons why other chief aims were to be discounted and held to the

level of secondary considerations when determining morality. Kant

Nothing in the world--indeed nothing even beyond
the world--can possibly be conceived which could
be called good without qualification except aod
will. Intelligence, wit, judgment, and the ote
talents of the mind, however they be named, or
courage, resoluteness, and perserverance as qualities
of temperament, are doubtless in many respects good
and desirable. But they can become extremely bad
and harmful if the will, which is to make use of-

92John Ladd, Introduction to The Metaphysical Elements of Justice
(Part I of The Metaphysics of Morals), by Immanuel Kant (Indianapolis,
Indiana: Library of Liba Ats, Bobbs-Merrill, 1965), p. ix.

9Immanuel Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, trans.
with an Arts Press, Bobbs-Merrill, 1959), p. 9.

these gifts of nature and which in its special
constitution is called character, is not good.
It is the same with the gifts of fortune. Power,
riches, honor, even health, general well-being,
and the contentment with one's condition which
is called happiness, made for pride and even
arrogance if there is not a good will to correct
their influence on the mind and on its principles
of action so as to make it universally conformable
to its end. It need hardly be mentioned that the
sight of a being adorned with no feature of a pure
and good will, yet enjoying uninterrupted pros-
perity, can never give pleasure to a rational
impartial observer. Thus the good will seems to
constitute the indispensable condition even of
worthiness to be happy.94

Based on the absoluteness of good will as the chief virtue Kant

established the supreme principle of morality. This principle had

to be a formal principle which was valid for rational beings no matter

what their desires or ends, and it could not be an external command

to promote a certain end. The command had to come from.reason, because

"reason's proper function must be to produce a will good in itself and

not one good merely as a means, for to the former reason is absolutely

essential."95 The measure adopted by Kant as one which would "produce

a will good in itself" was duty, "for it is easily decided whether

an action in accord with duty is performed from duty or for some self-

ish purpose."96 Thus, the first proposition of morality offered by

Kant was that "to have moral worth an action must be done from duty."9

His second proposition was that an action performed from duty did not

have its moral worth in the purpose which was to be achieved but in


95Ibid., p. 12.

96Ibid., p. 13.

97Ibid., p. 16.

the maxim by which it was determined.- The third proposition was that

duty was the necessary element of an action executed from respect for
law. By this statement Kant implied that moral values could consist

only in some conception of the law, and that this conception determined
actions without reference to the expected results. With the rationale

of his second-level principles secured, Kant stated that the supreme

principle of morality was: "Act as though the maxim of your action
were by your-will to become a universal law of nature."98

The Concept of Duty

Duty was a central concept in Kantian ethics, because of its

significance to the determination of desires and actions. To Kant,

duty could only be defined in terms of an objective principle which
constrained the will, i.e., practical reason. The formula for such

a command was termed an imperative, which stated what would be good

to do or to refrain from doing. The purpose of an imperative was to

command the will which "does not always do something simply because

it is presented as a good thing to do."9

Kant divided imperatives into two types. The first type was

termed a hypothetical imperative. According to Kant, these "present

the practical necessity of a possible action as a means to achieving

something else which one desires (or which one may possible desire)."100

The second type of imperative was termed categorical .imperative, and
it was defined as "one which presented an action as of itself

98Ibid., p. 39.

991bid., p. 30.

100Ibid., p. 31.

objectively necessary, without regard to any other end."101 The

latter type of imperative was to Kant best fitted for moral matters.

The reason for this assignment rested on the basic difference between

the two different types of imperatives. In the case of the categorical

imperative knowledge of the ends sought and of the means to these ends

did not determine how the imperative was to be applied. The categori-

cal imperative, unlike the hypothetical, could be applied independently

of any particular desire~ for a particular end. There was only one

categorical imperative and it was: "Act only according to the maxim

by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal

law."0 In Kant's Critique of Practical Reason the formula was put in

a more elaborate fashion:

Ask yourself whether you could regard your pro-
posed action as a possible object ofyourwill
if it were to take place in accordance with a
law of nature in a system of nature of which you
were yourself a part.103

To enhance the concept of duty Kant gave examples of four dif-

ferent types of duties: duties to ourselves, and duties to others as

they exist as perfect duties and imperfect duties. In relation to a

perfect duty to ourselves, Kant discussed the question of suicide. He

held that even though a person believed that the continuance of his

life threatened more evil than satisfaction, the act of self-destruction

contradicted the supreme principle. "One immediately sees a contra-

diction in a system of nature whose law would be to destroy life by


102Ibid., p. 39.

103Immanuel Kant, quoted in H. J. Paton, The Categorical Imperative:
A Study in Kant's Moral Philosophy, 5th ed. (London: Hutchinson, 1965),
p. 146.

the feeling whose special of-fice* 's to impel the improvement of life."104

In regards to perfect duties to others Kant gave an example of a person

who borrowed money knowing full well that he would not be able to repay

it, but the person still promised to repay in order to obtain the loan.

In this situation Kant asked the question, "How would it be if my

maxim became a universal law?" He answered by stating:

The universality of a law which says that anyone
who believes himself to be in need could promise
what he pleased with the intention of not fulfill-
ing it would make the promise itself and the end
to be accomplished by it impossible; no one would
believe what was promised to him but would only
laugh at any such assertion as vain pretense.105
In the two cases cited, Kant held that the persons were bound by per-

fect duties. In the first case, one should not commit suicide; and,

in the second case, one should repay his debts. Perfect duties did

not admit of any exception, and they obligated the person to perform

a definite act in accordance with duty.

In the final two cases involving duties discussed by Kant,

examples of imperfect duties as they related to oneself and to others
revealed the difference between perfect and imperfect duties. The

third example sketched a scenario in which the person who had a natural

talent and could have become a useful person if he had only cultivated

his talent. However, the person decided to engage in pleasurable

activities rather than to improve his natural gifts. Idleness, indul-

gence, and propagation were preferred to a life devote t~o developing

one's talents. Kant-held that such a person could, sifbly will

104Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, op. cit.,
p. 40.

that this should become a universal law of nature. "For, as a

rational being, he necessarily wills that all faculties should be

developed, inasmuch as they are given to him for all sorts of pos-

sible purposes."106 In the final scenario Kant was concerned with

imperfect duties as they related to others. In this situation a

person was confronted with the knowledge that while things were

going well for himself, others had to struggle with great hardship.

The person in the case did not recognize his duty to others and

asked, "What concern of mine -is it? Let each one be as happy as

heaven wills, or as he can make himself."' Kant asserted that, if

such a rationality was used for not assisting others in time of need,

the concept of mutual aid would be destroyed. Kant stated that even

though the human race could continue to exist without the benefit of

mutual aid, the person who so willed it would no doubt regret his


Instances often arise when he would need the love
and sympathy of others, and in which he would have
robbed himself, by such a law of nature springing
dfF~rohs own will, of all hope of the aid he

Imperfect duties bind persons only to the maxim that they ought to

take some form of positive action, but it was left to the discretion-

of each to decide on the extent of the concern either for one's self

or for others. While maxims opposed to imperfect duties could be

conceived, they could not be willed without contradiction. Whereas,

maxims opposed to perfect duties could not even be conceived. A

106Ibid., p. 41.

summary of Kant's various types of duties and obligations is pro-

vided ihffab~le 3.108



Duties to Oneself

Duties to Others

Respect oneself. Pre- Keep promises. Be. truth-
serve oneself, i.e., do ful, do not lie. Re-
not commit suicide, mu- spect others. Repay
tilate, defile, or stup- debts. Seek to establish
ify oneself. Be truth- a system of positive laws
ful, do not lie. Do and obey them.
not be miserly.

Seek one's own perfec- Promote happiness. Be
tion; natural perfec- grateful. Be sympa-
tion and moral perfec- thetic. Be friendly
tion. Develop one's and socialable. Be be-
natural talents. i nevolent and loving.



A Realm of Ends

If there was a categorical imperative, it must have enjoined upon

persons objective and absolute ends. -Since these ends must have

absolute worth, they could not be relative ends which persons sought

to produce. The ends must have been rational agents or, for practical

purposes, men. Subjective ends rested upon incentives while objec-

tive ends depended upon "motives valid for every rational being."109

108Immanuel Kant, The Doctrine of Virtue (Part II of The Meta-
physics of Morals), trans. Mary J. Gregor (New York: Harper Torchbacks,
Harper & Row, Publishers, 1964), pp. 45f.

109Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, op. cit., p. 45.

To establish universal principles there exists an.absolute worth,

and absolute worth resided in man. Kant stated:

Every rational being exists as an end in himself
and not merely as a means to be arbitrarily used
by -this or that will. In all his actions, whether
they~ are directed to himself or to other rational
beings, he must always be regarded at the same
time as an end.110

Individuals were to be an object of respect and were not to be treated

as means to subjective ends. The ground for this principle was that,

"rational nature exists as an -end in itself."111 This condition led

Kant to derive a practical imperative which stated: "Act so that you .

treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another,

always as an end and never as a means only.~"112

The concept of each person as a rational agent who must be

regarded as legislating law through the maxims of each will led to

the notion of a realm of ends. Kant defined this concept as:

A whole of all ends in systematic connection, a
whole of all rational beings as ends in themselves
as well as of the particular ends which each may
set for himself. This is a realm of ends which is
possible .. [because] all rational beings stand
under the law that each of them should treat him-
self and all others never merely as means but in
every case as an end in himself.113

The "realm of ends" gave rise to objective commoon laws which should

consider the proper relations of persons to each other.~ Within this

"realm of ends" everything had either a price or a dignity. Whatever

had a price could be replaced by something else or its equivalent.

110Ibid., p. 46.

1111bid., p. 47.


113Ibid., op. 51-52.

That which was related to general human inclinations and needs had

a market price, while that which was in accord with certain tastes

had an affective price. "But that which constitutes the condition

under which alone something can be an end in itself does not have

mere relative worth, i.e., a price, but an intrinsic worth, i.e.,

dignity."114l Kant believed that morality and humanity alone had

dignity. He stated:
Skill and diligence in work have a market value;
wit, lively imagination, and humor have an affec-
tive price; but fidelity in promises and benevolence
as principle (not from instinct) have Intrinsic

Only through morality could a rational agent become a law-

making member of a "realm of ends" and consequently become an end

in himself. From this Kant concluded that only morality, and humanity,

so far as it was capable of morality, could have dignity or intrinsic

worth. A "realm of ends" could only become an actuality when all

rational agents acted in accordance with the supreme principle and

cooperated in the effort to realize the perfect good, i.e., good

The Nature of Justice

Kant defined justice as the "aggregate of those conditions under

which the will of one person can be conjoined with the will of another

in accordance with a universal law of freedom."7 The concept of

114Ibid., p. 53.


116Paton, The Categorical Imperative, op. cit., pp. 189-92.

11?Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of Justice, op. cit., p. 34.

justice was to Kant related more to ethics than jurisprudence. To

apply this morally defined concept of justice Kant established three

conditions for its application. The first condition was when the

relationship of one person to another could exert an influence by their

actions, either directly or indirectly, on each other. The second

condition was that the concept only applied to the relationship of

a person's will to another person's will when benevolence and charity

were involved. The third condition was that the concept of justice

did not take into consideration the content of the will, i.e., the

ends that a person intended to accomplish by means of the object that

he willed. When applying the concept of justice Kant only took into


The form of the relationship between the wills
insofar as they are regarded as free, and whether
the action of one of them can be conjoined with
the freedom of the other in accordance with a
universal law.118

The universal principle of justice referred to by Kant was stated as

follows: "Act externally in such a way that the free use of your will

is compatible with the freedom of everyone according to a universal

law."119 The universal law of freedom imposed the condition that an

individual could not be ordered to act from a motive of duty (a

virtuous disposition), but he could be expected to act from a prin-

ciple of "reciprocal freedom" within the range of his public life.120

This principle of "reciprocal freedom" was the one innate right to

118Ibid., p. 34.

119Ibid., p. 35.

120Kant, The Doctrine of Virtue, op. cit., p. 38.

University of Florida Home Page
© 2004 - 2010 University of Florida George A. Smathers Libraries.
All rights reserved.

Acceptable Use, Copyright, and Disclaimer Statement
Last updated October 10, 2010 - Version 2.9.7 - mvs