• TABLE OF CONTENTS
HIDE
 Title Page
 Acknowledgement
 Table of Contents
 Abstract
 Introduction
 Jung's mental constructs
 Theory of archetypes: Part I
 Theory of archetypes: Part II
 Criticisms of the archetypal theory:...
 Jung and the scientific attitude:...
 Jung and the scientific attitude:...
 The study of archetypes as a scientific...
 References
 Biographical sketch






Title: C. G. Jung's theory of the collective unconscious
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 Material Information
Title: C. G. Jung's theory of the collective unconscious a rational reconstruction
Physical Description: viii, 206 leaves : ; 28 cm.
Language: English
Creator: Shelburne, Walter Avory, 1946-
Publisher: University of Florida
Place of Publication: Gainesville, Fla.
Publication Date: 1976
Copyright Date: 1976
 Subjects
Subject: Philosophy thesis Ph. D
Dissertations, Academic -- Philosophy -- UF
Genre: bibliography   ( marcgt )
non-fiction   ( marcgt )
 Notes
Thesis: Thesis--University of Florida.
Bibliography: Bibliography: leaves 203-205.
General Note: Typescript.
General Note: Vita.
Statement of Responsibility: by Walter Avory Shelburne.
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Bibliographic ID: UF00098133
Volume ID: VID00001
Source Institution: University of Florida
Holding Location: University of Florida
Rights Management: All rights reserved by the source institution and holding location.
Resource Identifier: alephbibnum - 000173704
oclc - 02998059
notis - AAU0158

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Table of Contents
    Title Page
        Page i
        Page i-a
        Page ii
    Acknowledgement
        Page iii
    Table of Contents
        Page iv
        Page v
    Abstract
        Page vi
        Page vii
        Page viii
    Introduction
        Page 1
        Page 2
    Jung's mental constructs
        Page 3
        Page 4
        Page 5
        Page 6
        Page 7
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    Theory of archetypes: Part I
        Page 30
        Page 31
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    Theory of archetypes: Part II
        Page 54
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    Criticisms of the archetypal theory: General considerations
        Page 89
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    Jung and the scientific attitude: Part I
        Page 116
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    Jung and the scientific attitude: Part II
        Page 146
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    The study of archetypes as a scientific discipline
        Page 174
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    References
        Page 203
        Page 204
        Page 205
    Biographical sketch
        Page 206
        Page 207
        Page 208
Full Text









C.G. JUNG'S THEORY OF THE COLLECTIVE UNCONSCIOUS:
A RATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION











By

WALTER AVORY SHELBURI.E













A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE COUNCIL OF
THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA
IN PARTIAL FUIFILJMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY










UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA

1976














































UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA


3 1262 08666 238 3









































Copyright 1976

by
It-halter Avory Shelburne














ACKNOWLEDGMKTS


I would like to gratefully acknowledge the persons of my supervisory

committee for their help in this project: labrilyn ameig, Tom Auxter,

Franz Epting, RLchard Haynes and Tom Simon. Special thanks to Iarilyn

and Tom Simon for their time, encouragement and helpful criticism. I

would also like to thank Debbie Bouers of the Graduate School, who, in

addition to her technical advice, has through her friendliness contri-

buted in an immeasurable and intangible way to the final preparation of

this manuscript.

In addition to this personal assistance, I would also like to acknou-

ledge the help of the following agencies: the spirit of Carl Gustav Jung,

the Archetype of the Self, and the three luminous beings who cleansed my

spirit.














TABLE OF CONTENTS


Page
ACIKOLEDGIMETS..................................................... ill

ABSTRACT.......... ......................... ................... .... vi

TRODUCTION.o ..... ..... ................ ................... .o... 1

CHAPTER 1 JMIG'S RENTAL CONSTRUCTS ................................. 3

Psyche................................................... 3

Unconscious........................ ...... ......*.......** 16

Collective Unconscious.................................... 19

Notes........ o ........... ............... ........ ..... 28

CHAPTER 2 THEORY OF ARCHETYPES: PART I........................... 30

Introduction ............... ............................... 30

The Symbolic Nature of the Archetypes................... 43

Archetypes and Instincts............................... 47

Notes .............. ............................. ..... 53

CHAPTER 3 THEORY OF ARCHETYPES: PART II.......................... 54

The Origin of the Archetypes............................. 54

Archetypal Image and Archetype Per Se.................... 63

The Archetypes as Autonomous Factors..................... 72

Archetypes and Synchronicity ............................. 77

Archetypes and Tbhporality............................... 82

Notes .................................... ............. 85






Page
CHAPTER I CRITICISIIS OF THE ARCIHETYPAL THEORY:
GEHERAL COINSIDERATIONS............................ .... 89

Preliminary Remarks ....................................... 89

Psychoanalytic Criticism......... ........ ................ 9

Theological Criticism....................................102

Notes... ....................................... ..... .....111

CHAPTER JUNIG AND THE SCIENTIFIC ATTITUDE: PART I................. 116

The Relevance of the Question............................116

The Charge of Iyrsticism.................................. 117

Itysticism Characterized................................. 119

Is Jung a Ny-stic? .......................................... 120

Jung's Attitude Toward Science............................. 127

Notes........ ....................... ... ... ......... ..141.

CHAPTER 6 JUIIG AMD THE SCIENTIFIC ATTITUDE: PART II................16

Can There Be A Science of Archetypes?.....................146

Jung's Ibthodology. ......................................163

Ibtes........ ........... ..................... .......... 171

CHAPTER 7 THE STUDY OF ARCHETYPES AS A SCIENTIFIC DISCIPLINE........ 174

Introduction..... ........................................ 17

Falsifiability ......................................... 176

Explanation..............................................184

Dvidence................................................. 188

Archetypes and BEolution Theory....................... 196

Loes........ ........................... * ..... ............ 199

BEFEREICES...................................................... 203

BIOGIAPHICAL SKETCH........................................206











Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the Graduate Council
of the University of Florida in Partial flfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy


C.G. JUNGIS THEORY OF THE COLLECTIVE UNCONSCIOUS:
A RATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION

By
Walter Avory Shelburne

June 1976
Chairman: !brilyn Zreig
Major Department: Philosophy

This study is an examination of Jung's idea of the collective un-

conscious being primarily concerned with the chief aspect of the collec-

tive unconscious, the concept of the archetype.

In the first half of the dissertation, an attempt is made to

understand what Jung means by the archetypes. The exposition of the

theory of archetypes begins with a look at the basic Jungian mental

constructs, psyche and unconscious, and with a sketch of Jung's theory

of mind. Then the various aspects of the idea of the archetype are

discussed treating such topics as the ontological status of the archetype,

the archetypes as a priori conditioners of experience, the symbolic

nature of archetypes, the archetypes and the instincts, the origin of

archetypes, the phenomenology of archetypes, personification of arche-

types, the archetypes and synchronicity and changes in archetypes through

time.

The exposition of the archetypal theory is undertaken with the aim

in mind of showing how the idea of archetypes can be construed as a

plausible scientific theory compatible with standard scientific








understanding. In the second half of the dissertation, we discuss

problematic aspects of our reconstruction from the point of viet of

criticisms which have been brought against the theory. After a

preliminary chapter in which criticisms of a general nature are

discussed, we treat specific problematic aspects involved with under-

standing the archetypal theory as a plausible scientific one. The

rationality of the archetypal theory is discussed in reply to the

accusation that Jung's theory is mystical rather than scientific.

In addition to the question of rationality, we treat the relationship

between the practical and theoretical aspects of the theory in order

to distinguish between a theoretical and therapeutic discourse about

archetypes, with the latter discourse being concerned with personal

meaningful interpretation of archetypal experience and hence often

justifiably employing philosophical and religious terminology. Thus

we attempt to show how the use of such terminology by Jung in dis-

cussions of archetypes does not count against the scientific nature

of theoretical claims about archetypes.

In addition to attempting to show how the archetypal theory is

a rational one and how its relationship to philosophy and religion

does not count against it as a scientific theory, we also examine

how the theory can be understood in the context of general criteria

for scientific theories. In this regard we discuss the problem of

falsification showing how the theory can not be interpreted as com-

patible with all observational states of affairs. VI also discuss

the explanations and predictions which can be expected from the

theory. Finally the evidence for the theory is discussed.

The conclusion is reached that the archetypal theory can satisfy




vili



general scientific criteria and also meet specific criticisms of it

from the scientific point of vieu and that thus the scientific plau-

sibility of the theory should be admitted.













INTRODUCTrON


In this study we attempt a rational reconstruction of Jung's

theory of archetypes with the goal in view of showing that this

theory is a scientifically plausible one. In regard to this task,

some preliminary questions need to be addressed. What is meant

by a rational reconstruction? TIy is the reconstruction undertaken

from a scientific point of view and what is the purpose of showing

that the archetypal theory is scientifically plausible?

So far as the first question is concerned, the idea of a rational

reconstruction is to clarify the meaning and interrelationship of the

basic concepts of a theory so that the theory can be shoum to be con-

sistent and to be a theory with a clearly specified meaning.

In Jung's style of theorizing, clarity and precision of basic

concepts are much less important than fullness of meaning and phe-

nonenologically accurate characterization of events. As a consequence

many of Jung s ideas are as vague and ambiguous as they are fas-

cinating and insightful. However, the purpose of a rational recon-

struction as we understand it is not to oppose the spontaneity and

richness of creativity with a simple desire for order and clarity.

Rather the aim of a rational reconstruction is the transformation

of the untidy richness of creativity into a more directly useable

form. By attempting to clarify the meaning of the archetypal theory

then, we hope to bring about a wider acknowledgement and study of








the theory so as eventually to contribute to its dissemination as a

fruitful conceptual scheme.

However, our reconstruction from the scientific point of view

needs some justification. For a survey of Jungian literature in-

dicates on the whole a tendency to emphasize the therapeutic aspect

of the theory and its immediate personal relevance.rather than its

employment in an attempt to gain scientific knowledge. But unless

the scientific plausibility of the archetypal theory can be established

on firm ground, the personal and therapeutic relevance of the theory

will be undermined. In Jung's terminology, the dilemma of modern

man is that he can no longer simply believe, he must know. The

modern individual's desire for a comprehensive understanding of

the world can thus not be satisfied by views which are incompatible

with scientific understanding.

But if the author must confess that he is attracted to the arche-

typal theory from the standpoint of its personal existential relevance,

it should not be concluded that the archetypal theory is seen only

as a therapeutic tool. For in arguing for scientific plausibility,

we have in mind a more ambitious goal of eventually showing how the

theory can be used to gain theoretical understanding in a wide range

of scientific disciplines. Vb believe that the theory is not only

scientifically plausible, but that it should be accepted and employed

as well. However, this more ambitious aim must await the outcome

of our attempt to argue for scientific plausibility. For a rational

reconstruction of the theory is necessary before its true scientific


merit can be appreciated.













CHAPTER 1
JUNG'S MENTAL CONSTRUICTS



Psyche

Preliminary Remarks

In order to gain a full understanding of Jung's theory of arche-

types, it is necessary to see his views on this matter within the con-

text of his psychology as a whole. However, within the scope of this

study of the archetypes, we can not attempt to trace the relationship

between all of Jung's views and the archetypes. A principle omission

in this regard is Jung's theory of individuation where he attempts to

examine the role which the archetypes play in the development of per-

sonality.

But if -we can not consider all of Jung's views which are related

to the archetypal theory, it is essential to gain an understanding of

his mental constructs. Thus, as a preliminary to discussing the arche-

typal theory itself, we will examine these constructs. Our approach in

this regard will be to begin with the mental constructs of the widest

application. It will consider first then the most general of the Jungian

mentalistic terms, the psyche.

Psyche-Body Relation

Jung emphasizes that his notion of the psyche is not intended to be

a precise notion in the sense that its limits are well defined. "I know

that very many people have difficulties with the word psychologicall'







To put these critics at ease, I should like to add that no one knows

what 'psyche' is, and one knows just as little how far into nature

'psyche' extends. I1

Before attempting a definitive characterization of the psyche then,

we will examine how the concept is used. For if the psyche is a vague

notion, we have, nonetheless, little trouble for the most part with

regard to deciding whether or not to apply it in specific cases.

Since by the psychic Jung has in mind something close in meaning

to mental, one fruitful way to see how Jung uses this concept is to

explore the intended .relation between psyche and body.

nh this regard then, it is clear that by psyche Jung does not

mean to imply a Cartesian dualism in which the psyche would be a

mental substance. For rather than a thing or a substance, the psyche

is to be considered in terms of a system of energy relations. The

term "libido" is used by Jung to designate the psychic energy. This

energetic viewpoint seems to suggest a reductionist position in which

the psyche understood as physical energy was seen as reducible to

physico-chemical terms or else a vitalist position in which a special

type of mind energy was postulated.

The possibility that Jung might be taking a reductive position is

suggested by the fact that the purpose of the energetic standpoint is

to enable the psychologist to understand psychological phenomena in

such terms as entropy, conservation of energy and equilization of

differences in an analogous way to the manner in which physical phe-

nomena can be so understood. Thus Jung believes that the concept of

libido "accomplishes for psychology the same advance that the concept

of energy introduced into physics" (Vol. IV, p. 112).








Th the absence of any methods of exact measurement of the energy,

quantitative estimations can be reached through appeal to the system

of psychological values, as the value intensity of psychological

phenomena idll be held to be a quantitative estimate of the amount of

psychic energy involved (Vol. VIII, p. 9).

However, Jung makes clear that the analogy between physical energy

and psychic energy cannot be taken in too literal a sense:

. in spite of the nonmeasurability of psychic
processes, the perceptible changes effected by
the psyche cannot possibly be understood except
as a phenomenon of energy. This places the
psychologist in a situation which is highly re-
pugnant to the physicist: the psychologist also
talks of energy although he has nothing measurable
to manipulate, besides which the concept of en-
ergy is a strictly defined mathematical quan-
tity which cannot be applied to anything psychic. . .
If psychology nevertheless insists on employing
its oim concept of energy for the purpose of
expressing the activity . of the psyche, it
is not of course being used as a mathematical
formula, but only as its analogy (Vol. VIII, p. 233).

Jung's energetic standpoint is then obviously not an attempt to

bring about a reduction of psychology to psychophysics. Jung in-

sists on the autonomous position of psychology in relation to

other sciences:

Since, unfortunately, we cannot prove scien-
tifically that a relation of equivalence exists
between physical and psychic energy, we have
no alternative except either to drop the ener-
getic viewpoint altogether, or else to postu-
late a special psychic energy--which would be
entirely possible as a hypothetical opera-
tion. Psychology as much as physics may avail
itself of the right to build its own concepts . .
(Vol. VII, p. 15-16).

But this characterization of libido as a "special psychic energy"

would seem to imply a vitalist position. This suspicion seems confirmed







when we read: "From a broader standpoint libido can be understood

as vital energy in general, or as Bergon's elan vital" (Vol. IV, p.

248), and . ie would probably do best to regard the psychic

process simply as a life-process. In this way we enlarge the

narrower concept of psychic energy to a broader one of life-

energy, which includes 'psychic energy' as a specific part" (Vol.

VIII, p. 17).

However, Jung makes clear that "this broader standpoint" is

a hypothetical and problematic one.2 In order to maintain its func-

tional autonomy, psychology must not conflate its concept of psychic

energy with a possible biological concept of vital energy. "I have

therefore suggested that, in view of the psychological use we intend

to make of it, we call our hypothetical life-energy 'libido.' To

this extent I have differentiated it from a concept of universal

energy, so maintaining the right of biology and psychology to form

their own concepts" (Vol. VIII, p. 17). There is also an explicit

disclaimer of the concept of vitalism: "1' shall not be disturbed

if we are met with the cry of vitalism. Ue are as far removed from

any belief in a specific life-force as from any other metaphysical

assertion" (Vol. IV, p. 125).

It see then that in regard to the question of reductionism,

Jung wants to avoid commitment to either reductionism or vitalism.

Jung's stand on this issue can then best be characterized as de

facto antireductionist. Pather,than attempting to defend the a

priori nonreduction of psychological phenomena to physics or chem-

istry, Jung holds to a de facto antireductionism. This nonreduction

as a matter of fact is supportable by the available empirical evidence







and is strictly speaking neutral with respect to the issue of reduc-

tion in principle.

Jung's noncormnital stand on reductionism is characteristic of

his psychology as a whole where he attempts to define his psycholog-

ical constructs in ways which are as free as possible from philoso-

phical controversy. However, this dislike for philosophy frequently

leads to the situation of unclarity with regard to the full implica-

tions of Jung's views. This situation of ambiguity if well e:empli-

fied when we attempt to comprehend what sort of psyche-body relation

Jung has in mind in constructing his psychology. For Jung's non-

commital views on reductionism fail to give us a definite clue as

to his position on the mind-body problem.

However, in regard to this clue, there are indications that

Jung holds to a nondualistic position in which the psyche is seen

as necessarily dependent on the brain, with psyche entailing em-

bodied psyche.

So far as our experience permits of any inference
at all about the nature of the psyche, it shows
the psychic process as a phenomenon dependent on
the nervous system (Vol. VIII, p. 322, 1926).

. the human psyche lives in indissoluble
union with the body (Vol. VIII, p. 114, 1936).

And just as the material of the body that is
ready for life has need of the psyche in order
to be capable of life, so the psyche pre-
supposes the living body in order that its
images may live (Vol. VIII, p. 326, 1926).

But Jung seems to call into question the view that the psyche is

necessarily embodied, thus suggesting a dualistic position. In a

1934 essay we read such statements as the following:







. the psyche's attachment to the brain, i.e.,
its space-time limitation, is no longer as self-
evident and incontrovertible as we have hitherto
been led to believe (Vol. VIII, p. 113).

The hypothetical possibility that the psyche
touches on a form of existence outside space
and time presents a scientific question-mark
that merits serious consideration for a long
time to come (Vol. VIII, p. 414).

[At death] we may establish with reasonable
certainty that an individual consciousness as
it relates to ourselves has come to an end.
But whether this means that the continuity of
the psychic process is also interrupted re-
mains doubtful, since the psyche's attachment
to the brain can be confirmed with far less
certitude today than it could fifty years ago.
Psychology must first digest certain para-
psychological facts, which it has hardly begun
to do yet (Vol. VIII, p. 412).

One way to come to terms with this apparent radical shift in

position is to attempt to distinguish an earlier necessary embodi-

ment view from a later view when, in the last years of his life,

Jung held to the belief in the existence of disembodied psyches. A

consideration of the dates of the above quoted statements, however,

casts doubt on the idea that Jung's position can be neatly divided

into an earlier and later period.3 Although there certainly is a slow

gradual shift away from the necessary embodiment view, the certitude

with which Jung states that the psyche has a necessary connection

with the body is never replaced with another position which Jung

can state in an unhypothetical way and which can easily be integrated

with the rest of his views.

Just as the parapsychological data have to an extent proved to

be anomalies inexplicable in terms of present physical laws, so do

the considerations concerning the related phenomena which caused

Jung to doubt the psyche's necessary connection with the brain prove







to be anomalous with respect to his psychology as a whole. In order

then to understand the place of these anomalous statements in relation

to the totality of what Jung says about the psyche, the sort of

distinction we must bear in mind is that between a well-worked out

and fruitful concept, the notion of the psyche as embodied and de-

pendent on the brain, versus tentative, hypothetical attempts to

see h]ow this view could be expanded, or perhaps revised, in order

to take into account the full range of the parapsychological phe-

nomena.

Although a full discussion of Jung's parapsychological reflec-

tions can not be attempted here, it would seem that the parapsycho-

logical data did not lead Jung to conclude that commitment to a

position of dualism, in the sense that psyche and matter are radi-

cally different types of entities, was necessary. Rather, present

in the latest as well as earlier writings is the view that psyche

and body (matter) are different aspects of a common fundamental

entity.

. it is not only possible but fairly probable,
even, that psyche and matter are two different
aspects of one and the same thing (Vol. VIII,
p. 215, 1946).

This living being appears outwardly as the ma-
terial body, but inwardly as a series of images
of the vital activities taking place within it.
They are tuo sides of the same coin, and we can-
not rid ourselves of the doubt that perhaps
this whole separation of mind and body may
finally prove to be merely a device of reason
for the purpose of conscious discrimination--
an intellectually necessary separation of one
and the same fact into two aspects, to which
we then illegitimately attribute an inde-
pendent existence (Vol. VIII, p. 326, 1926).







That even the psychic world, which is so extra-
ordinarily different from the physical world,
does not have its roots outside the one cosmos
is evident from the undeniable fact that causal
connections enist between the psyche and the
body which point to their underlying unitary
nature (Vol. XIV, p. 538, 1954).

If one is mindlling to postulate a pre-established
harmony of physical and psychic events, then
they can only be in a state of interaction. But
the latter hypothesis requires a psyche that
touches matter at some point, and, conversely,
a matter with a latent psyche, a postulate not
so very far removed from certain formulations
of modern physics (Eddington, Jeans, and others).
In this connection I would remind the reader of
the existence of parapsychic phenomena . .
(Vol. VIII, p. 234, 1946).

In order to understand Jung's theory of mind, it would seem

essential to understand two problematic aspects of Jung's views.

On the one hand, ire need to understand how Jung's essentially dou-

ble aspect approach can be made compatible with acceptance of dis-

embodied psyches. On the other hand, as exemplified in the last

quotations, Jung appears to want to hold simultaneously to a double

aspect theory and an interactionist view.5

Since we cannot attempt a full discussion of the relevant

problems in the philosophy of mind which these problems raise, we

will be content to point out that whereas the double aspect theory

and interactionisa can perhaps be shown to be compatible in principle,

it is clear that the acceptance of disembodied psyches would at least

greatly complicate such an endeavor. For if it can be shown that

psyches can exist independently of bodies, then the essentially

monistic double aspect view would be in great difficulty.

But if we have then good cause to try to construe Jung's views

on the psyche-body relation independently of the statements about







disembodied psyches, we can nonetheless understand houi Jung's views

on this matter can seem at one moment to be dualistic, while in another

instance he appears to hold to a monistic double aspect theory. For

the psyche is to be studied from the standpoint of the empirical data

as if it wore a distinct entity from the body, although this phenomeno-

logical approach does not for Jung entail a substantial dualism. He

can then say both that . we have absolutely no means of dividing

what is psychic from the biological process as such" (Vol. VIII, p.

16), and also that "so far, then, as our present !oiowledge goes,

neuroses are to be influenced or cured by approaching them not from

the proximal end, i.e., from the functioning of the glands, but from

the distal end, i.e., from the psyche, just as if the psyche were

itself a substance" (Vol. XI, p. 329).

The dualistic point of view is then assumed when we view the psyche

as phenomena. UIen we stop to consider what the psyche is essentially

and in its relation to the body, we see that the psyche is in all

probability merely another aspect of the body.

Characterization of the Psyche

Keeping these considerations about the psyche-body relation in

mind, we are now prepared to appreciate Jung's positive characteriza-

tion of the psyche. Moreover, this characterization is to serve as

a criterion of applicability of the term, defining the permissible

range of its use and giving us at least a method in principle of

discriminating the psychic from the nonpsychic. It is to be then

a sort of operational definition. From the point of view of onto-

logical considerations, we can not of course specify a psychic realm

as distinct from and uncontaminated with a nonpsychic realm.








Heuristically though we can mate such a specification in principle

as this specification is to indicate the phenomenological difference

between the psychic and nonpaychic.

Jung says then that "what I would call the psyche proper extends to

all functions which can be brought under the influence of a will" (Vol.

VIII, p. 183). Ibreover, by will is understood a form of disposable

energy (Vol. VIII, pages 182-183).

The sort of working model that emerges from this characteriza-

tion then is a separation of the psyche and the truly psychological

from the instincts and the only physiological in terms of the poss-

ibility of modification or flexibility in the otherwise rigid cr-

namisms of physiological compulsion.

An example of what is meant by the nonpsychic in terms of animal

life is perhaps instructive. For in consideration of the insect

world, there seem to be no exceptions to the rigid physiological

determinism of behavior. An insect is essentially a physiological

automaton. However, as we consider more complex forms of organisms

idth more centralized nervous systems, the hypothesis of the exis-

tence of at least a rudimentary form of consciousness becomes more

probable. WIth the higher mammals the e:dstence of psychological

processes becomes evident. Thus Jung explicitly affirms the eris-

tence of psychic processes in dogs and domestic animals (Vol. VIII,

pages 173 and 189). For Jung then the psyche is not restricted to

man but only finds its greatest development there as the outcome of

a continuous developmental sequence of gradual phylogenetic emergence.

In specifying the relationship between the instincts and the

psyche then, the instincts are conceived to be ectopsychic in origin.









Jung summarizes his argument on this point in the following way:

If we started with the hypothesis that the
psyche is absolutely identical with the state
of being alive, then we should have to accept
the existence of a psychic function even in
unicellular organisms. . .
But if we look upon the appearance of the
psyche as a relatively recent event in evo-
lutionary history, and assume that the psychic
function is a phenomenon accompanying a ner-
vous system which in some way or other has be-
come centralized, then it would be difficult
to believe that the instincts were originally
psychic in nature. And since the connection
of the psyche with the brain is a more probable
conjecture than the psychic nature of life in
general, I regard the characteristic compul-
siveness of instinct as an ectopsychic factor
(Vol. VITI, p. 115).

In stating that instincts are ectopsychic, Jung does not of

course wish to deny a psychological aspect to instinctual pheno-

mena; and thus he wishes to make clear that the instincts can be

considered from two points of view: as they appear in conscious-

ness, their psychic impact, as it were, and as physiological stim-

uli.

Instinct as a ectopsychic factor would play the
role of a stimulus merely, while instinct as a
psychic phenomenon would be an assimilation of
this stimulus to a pre-existent psychic pattern.
A name is needed for this process. I should
term it psychization. Thus, what we call in-
stinct offhand would be a datum already psychized,
but of ectopsychic origin (Vol. VIII, p. 115).

A further clarification of Jung's theoretical model of the

psyche comes into play when this ambiguous interface region between

the psychological and the physiological is explicitly considered. For

the psychological phenomena associated with the disposable energy

of the will are according to Jung's model merely the end of a con-

tinuum with the physiological at one end and the psychic at the other.







-breover, in the middle of this continuum, Jung identifies psychoid

functions which are quasi-psychic yet not merely physiological. In-

stincts are examples of these psychoid phenomena which though not

psychic in the full sense of Jung's designation yet have psychologi-

cal aspects. Jung states then that the term "psychoid" is "meant

to distinguish a category of events from merely vitalistic phenomena

on the one hand and from specifically psychic processes on the other"

(Vol. VIII, p. 177).

Since in order to be influenced by the disposable energy of the

will a function or process must be capable of becoming conscious, the

characteristic quality of those functions which are psychoid is their

incapability of reaching full consciousness. The sense in which

Jung sees the instincts as not capable of full consciousness is made

clear in the following way:

%1 speak of "instinctive actions, meaning by
that a mode of behaviour of which neither the
motive nor the aim is fully conscious and which
is prompted only by an obscure inner necessity . .
Thus instinctive action is characterized by an
unconsciousness of the psychological motive be- f
hind it, in contrast to the strictly conscious
processes which are distinguished by the conscious
continuity of their motives (Vol. VIII, p. 130).

Now the positive characterization of the psyche in terms of

functions which can become fully conscious and hence capable of being

influenced by the disposable energy of the will is not fully described

by distinguishing between the psyche and the instincts. For Jung

mal s the point that there is another type of function which limits

the will and which cannot be described as instinctual in the physio-

logical sense. This function is called spiritual. Identical with

the factors which Jung calls the archetypes, the spiritual function








is like instinct a psychoid function incapable of fuf consciousness.6

A full discussion of what Jung means by the spiritual idll be

given in Chapter 3. Here it will suffice to state that for Jung the

compulsiveness associated wirth the nonpsychic realm is due not only

to dynamisms of physiological origin, the instincts; but, in addition

to this lower limit, the psyche has an upper limit where the psychic

functions gradually fall under the influence of spiritual determinants.

"Just as, in its loner reaches, the psyche loses itself in the organic-

material substrate, so in its upper reaches it resolves itself into

a 'spiritual' form about which ie know as little as we do about the

functional basis of instinct" (Vol. VIII, p. 183).

In terms of the continuum model then, there would appear to be

psychoid processes on both sides of the psyche, and the psyche could

be figuratively said to be surrounded by psychoid processes. But

from a phylogenetic point of view, the question now arises why the

spiritual function is said to be 'higher" than the instinctual psy-

choid function, since the psyche appears to have developed out of

the psychoid processes considered as a whole and thus to be "higher"

than it in the sense of having developed later.. The solution to

this enigma seems to be that although the archetypal psychoid pro-

cesses are probably present, at least in rudimentary form, through-

out the animal kingdom, it is only with the development of the more

advanced forms of consciousness that there is a clear separation be-

tween instinctual and spiritual psychoid functions. Ioreover, it

seems to be just this separation which brings about the phenomenon

of consciousness so that "psychic processes seem to be balances of

energy flowing between spirit and instinct" (Vol. VIII, p. 207). +







Nor in this separation of spiritual and instinctual functions,

the instinctual energies seem to be channelled by the spiritual forms.

In a sense the spiritual function is then that which allows the en-

ergies of man to be employed in other than instinctual activities.

This is the sense in which the spiritual function is higher than the

instinctual. From the standpoint of phylogern, however, the desig-

nation of "higher" is misleading since both types of psychoid pro-

cesses are unconscious in relation to the later developing conscious-

ness associated with the psyche. "Spirit and instinct are by nature

autonomous and both limit in equal measure the applied field of the

will" (Vol. VIII, p. 183).


Unconscious
Now it would seem that an understanding of the positive charac-

terization of the psyche in terms of the irll leads to the conclusion

that the psyche is to be conceived as equivalent to consciousness or

awareness in opposition to the psychoid functions, the distinguishing

feature of which is their incapability of full consciousness and hence

relative autonomy from the will (Vol. VIII, p. 184). However, it is

only when we consider the attribution of an unconscious dimension to

the psyche that a full characterization of what Jung intends by his

psyche construct can be accomplished.

In order to resolve this apparent paradox of the existence of an

unconscious psyche then, it is necessary to focus on the meaning Jung

gives to the notion of the unconscious. He says that "since we per-

ceive effects whose origin cannot be found in consciousness, we are

compelled to allow hypothetical contents to the sphere of the non-

conscious, which means presupposing that the origin of those effects







lies in the unconscious precisely because it is not conscious" (Vol.

IV, p. 140). Thus . everything in the personality that is not

contained in the conscious should be found in the unconscious" (Vol.

III, p. 201).

The unconscious understood in this negative iay as the non-

conscious is relatively unproblematic. whateverr is not immediately

present in awareness is said to be unconscious. memories, for ex-

ample, can be said to be unconscious contents which can be brought

into consciousness at ill. Other unconscious contents such as re-

pressed experiences or subliminal perceptions may also be brought

into awareness, although a special effort or technique is needed.

Since the latter are not as easily recoverable to awareness as the

former, they are said to belong to a "deeper level" of the uncon-

scious. The analogy of depth then amounts operationally to a func-

tion of energy. Contents with a certain critical energy stay in

consciousness and lacking it become unconscious. Then contents

which are ordinarily unconscious become charged with energy, they

intrude themselves into conscious awareness and produce a so-called

"lowering of consciousness" with a consequent disruption of conscious

intentionalities.

The boundary or dividing point then between conscious and un-

conscious is an energy threshold. However, this idea that conscious

and unconscious are qualitatively separate should not be understood

to mean that a sort of energy membrane sharply divides conscious from

unconscious contents. For it rather the case that every psychic

content is to some degree unconscious and that consequently the

psyche is both conscious and unconscious at once.







Consequently there is a consciousness in which
unconsciousness predominates, as weIl as a con-
sciousness in which self-consciousness predomi-
nates. This paradox becomes immediately intelli-
gible when we realize that there is no conscious
content which can with absolute certainty be said
to be totally conscious . (Vol. VIII, pages
187-188).

%V must, however, accustom ourselves to the thought
that conscious and unconscious have no clear de-
marcations, the one beginning where the other
leaves off. It is rather the case that the psyche
is a conscious-unconscious whole (Vol. VIII, p. 200).

It becomes clear then how the characterization of the psyche

in terms of the iill allows for an unconscious dimension to the

psyche. For it is only the possibility of an influence by the will

that is necessary to characterize the psychic as distinct from the

psychoid. And although it is this possibility which is the distin-

guishing feature of the psyche, rather than being identical with

consciousness, the psyche is better conceptualized as for the most

part unconscious, with the conscious region being of comparatively

narrow scope.

The idea of the unconscious then adds a dimension of depth to

the notion of the psyche. Th addition to those items of immediate

awareness, there are other contents on the fringes of consciousness

or just below the threshold of awareness. Jung catalogues these

unconscious contents in the following way: . lost memories,

painful ideas that have been repressed (i.e., forgotten on purpose),

subliminal perceptions, by which are meant sense-perceptions that

were not strong enough to reach consciousness, and finally, content

that are not yet ripe for consciousness" (Vol. VII, p. 66). . .

Brerything forgotten or repressed or otherwise subliminal that has







been acquired by the individual consciously or unconsciously" (Vol.

XVII, p. 116).

Often these unconscious contents group together to form subliminal

functional units which then become sort of "splinter psyches" or "frag-

mentary personalities" (Vol. VIII, p. 97). These focal points of un-

conscious psychic activity are designated as the complexes. They are

groups of often highly emotionally charged feelings, thoughts and

images which are associated together so that, for instance, an

environmental stimulus which activates the complex results in the

entirety of the associated psychic contents coming into play and

affecting consciousness. This often leads to a response which is out

of proportion to the initiating stimulus. For Jung the ego itself is

merely a complex, "the complex of consciousness" (Vol. XIV, p. 357).

In so far as the meaning of the ego is psycho-
logically nothing but a complex of imaginings
held together and fixed by the coenesthetic im-
pressions, bodilyy feelings . the complex
of the ego may well be set parallel with and com-
pared to the secondary autonomous complex (Vol. II,
p. 601).


Collective Unconscious
V&th the description of these unconscious components to the

psyche then, the concept of the psyche according to Jung's "defini-

tion" of it in terms of the will is complete. However, Jung goes

on to describe the psychoid region of the unconscious which is desig-

nated as a collective unconscious in contrast to the region of the

unconscious in relatively close association to consciousness which

he calls the personal unconscious. "As to the no man's land which

I have called the 'personal unconscious,' it is fairly easy to prove








that its contents correspond exactly to our definition of the psychic.

But--as we define 'psychic'--is there a psychic unconscious that is

not a 'fringe of consciousness' and not personal?" (Vol. VIII, p.

200).

The above quotation should make it clear that although according

to Jung's specification of what the psyche means in the strict sense,

it should be applied only to consciousness and the personal unconscious,

Jung frequently uses the term to include the collective impersonal por-

tions of the unconscious as well. Thus Jung often speaks of a collec-

tive psyche or of an impersonal, objective psyche. Further discussion

on this point of how the collective unconscious can be said to be

psychic on the one hand and not to fit into the definition of the

psyche on the other must wait until further in the exposition. The

crucial distinction involves discriminating between the psychic con-

tents as they appear in consciousness and their postulated but unob-

served determinants which are said to be psychoid rather than psychic.

There is then for Jung an impersonal and collective aspect to

the unconscious in contrast to the personal unconscious described

above. Moreover, this collective unconscious is said to constitute

a deeper stratum of the unconscious than the personal. Whereas for

the personal unconscious the "depth" of a content represents a corres-

ponding lack of energy and hence a greater degree of nonassociation

to the central focus of awareness, the collective unconscious is

"deeper" in the additional sense of being the foundation of the

"upper" layers. Consciousness and the personal unconscious then

represent the individual and personal heterogeneity which develops

through maturation from a common and universal homogeneity.







"Individual consciousness is only the flower and the fruit of a

season, sprung from the perennial rhizome beneath the earth . .

(Vol. V, p. xxiv).

Jung then uses the term "collective" to mean the opposite of

personal or individual. "I have chosen the term 'collective' be-

cause this part of the unconscious is not individual but universal;

in contrast to the personal psyche, it has contents and modes of be-

haviour that are more or less the same everywhere and in all indivi-

duals" (Vol. IX-A, pages 3-4).

Jung argues that since the body may be said to have certain

universal features which form a common basis for the emergence of

individual differences, it would then be reasonable to expect that

the psyche, which is intimately related to the body, would also have

common and universal features: . Just as the human body shows

a common anatomy over and above all racial differences, so, too,

the human psyche possesses a common substratum transcending all

differences in culture and consciousness" (Vol. [IIl, p. 11). "For

just as there is an objective human body and not merely a subjective

and personal one, so also there is an objective psyche with its

specific structures and activities . (Vol. III, p. 267).

The idea of a collective unconscious thus understood as the

common, universal element of the psyche would seem relatively un-

problematic or perhaps even superflous as a concept since no one

would wish to deny that the psyche has foundations in the structure

of the brain which are common to all men. However, the real import

of Jung's theory of a collective unconscious is brought into clarity

when Jung states that the contents of the collective unconscious are








in fact psychic contents which come into awareness but which are not

the direct consequences of the individual's own personal experiences.

. In addition to memories from a long-distant conscious past,

completely new thoughts and creative ideas can also present themselves

from the unconscious--thoughts and ideas that have never been con-
7
scious before." The collective unconscious is then not only the

structural element common to the psyches of all men; it is also the

active source of original psychic contents.

Additional features of Jung's concept of the collective uncon-

scious come to light when we learn that . ego-consciousness

seems to be dependent on two factors: firstly, on the conditions

of the collective, i.e., the social, consciousness; and secondly,

on the archetypes, or dominants, of the collective unconscious.

The latter fall phenomenologically into two categories: instinctual

and archetypal" (Vol. VIII, pages 217-218).

Thus both instincts as well as archetypes characterize the

collective unconscious. Ibreover, there is in addition a concept

of collective consciousness which is to be distinguished from the

collective unconscious. Jung states that by collective consciousness

he has something similar in mind to Freud's idea of the superego

(Vol. LX-A, page 3, note 2). Like the superego, the collective

consciousness is partially conscious and partially unconscious.

It consists of "generally accepted truths" (Vol. VIII, p. 218),

i.e., of beliefs, values and ideals which are supposedly held in

common by members of a community and which serve as a sort of common

ideological basis or cultural idea for the community. The contempor-

ary phenomenon of the so-called counter-culture would then represent







a process of development or change in the collective consciousness

of our time.

The collective consciousness has its ultimate source in the

collective unconscious. For through the influence of the collective

unconscious on individuals, new ideals, ethical and religious sys-

tems, and basic scientific discoveries come into awareness for the

first time. However, the symbolic quality of these images from the

unconscious is eventually lost as the images and ideas are subjected

to the interpretative powers of generations in order to assimilate

them to the existing system of culture. Through this process the

manifestation of the collective unconscious in one pioneer individual

is gradually transformed into the cultural heritage and collective

consciousness of the community. The result is then often the sort

of transition that the religious insight of an individual undergoes

in the change from the teachings of the individual in his lifetime

to the formation of a doctrine of established belief by his later

followers. It is the difference between an original religious ex-

perience and the dogma of an established church. Jung states then

that . we can hardly avoid the conclusion that between collec-

tive consciousness and the collective unconscious there is an almost

unbridgeable gulf over which the subject finds himself suspended"

(Vol. VIII, p. 218).

Jung makes the point that through the process of socialization

and in attempting to adapt to the demands of society we tend to iden-

tify ourselves with the consequent roles which we must play in order

to fit smoothly into the social order. This part of the personality

Jung calls the persona. The word means mask and like a mask the







persona is the person that we pretend to be in order to have a

well-defined niche in the commmity.

I1hen we analyse the persona we strip off the mask,
and discover that what seemed to be individual
is at bottom collective; in other words, that
the persona was only a mask of the collective
psyche. Fundamentally the persona is nothing
real: it is a compromise between individual
and society as to what a man should appear to
be (Vol. VZI, p. 158).

By "collective psyche" in this context it is clear that the

collective consciousness is meant. However, there are other

passages in which the term "collective psyche" means collective

unconscious. For example:

It is therefore absolutely essential to make
the sharpest possible demarcation between the
personal and the impersonal attributes of the
psyche. This is not to deny the sometimes
very formidable existence of the contents of
collective unconscious, but only to stress that,
as contents of the collective psyche, they are
opposed to and different from the individual
psyche (Vol. VII, p. 94).

"Collective psyche" is then an ambiguous term leaving still to

be specified the amount of unconsciousness that is implied. This

formulation is sometimes preferable when speaking of the conscious-

ness of a group, particularly when there is a strong group identity.

For since the collective consciousness is grounded in the collective

unconscious, there are then correspondences between the institutions

of culture and the related archetypes. The effectiveness of the

community leader, for example, is often a function of his capacity

to fulfil the expectations brought about by the projection of the

archetype of the hero or Old Wise An upon him, and the guiding ideals

of the community remain cohesive factors for the life of that community








only so long as they remain living symbols capable of constellating

the appropriate archetypal configurations. The ambiguous "collective

psyche" is then sometimes the best description of the Zeitgeist of a

people, as it acknowledges the close relationship between the founda-

tions of culture in the collective unconscious and the embodiments

of those foundations in the accepted standards of collective life.

Ibreover, Jung's use of the ambiguous "collective psyche" be-

comes easier to appreciate when it is made clear that for him the

relationship of the personal psyche to the collective unconscious

is closely analogous to the relationship of the individual to society.

"Now, all that I have said here about the influence of society upon

the individual is identically true of the influence of the collec-

tive unconscious upon the individual psyche" (Vol. VII, p. 154).

Therefore the psychology of a community is not basically different

from the psychology of an individual: . The psyche of a

people is only a somewhat more complex structure than the psyche

of an individual" (Vol. X, p. 86).

Collective consciousness and the collective unconscious may then

both be subsumed under collective psyche due to the close relation-

ship between the two and the similAr relationship of the individual

to the collective aspect in each case. The individual has thus both

an inner and an outer relationship to the collective as he must con-

tend with society without and the collective unconscious within.

One point that should be made clear when use is made of the

term "collective psyche" is that Jung does not mean to imply that

a group consciousness exists in the sense of a psychic entity which







exists over and above the psyches of individuals. For the common

aspects of the psyches of a group can be abstractly said to represent

a group psyche without this having to mean that there is something

psychic which persists independently of the individuals involved.

In so far as the similarities rather than the differences between

collective consciousness and collective unconscious are emphasized as

in "collective psyche," questions then arise concerning the existence

of distinct kinds of group psyches. That is, to what extent is the

idea of a collective unconscious meant to be truly transcultural and

to what extent is there intended to be a different collective uncon-

for each distinct community of men?

Evidence can be found in Jung's work to support either of the

tw7o possible positions suggested above. For example, we find: "The

collective unconscious is simply the psychic expression of the iden-

tity of brain structure irrespective of all racial differences" (Vol.

XIII, p. 11). But there are also statements such as the following:

Io doubt, on an earlier and deeper level of
psychic development, where it is still imposs-
ible to distinguish between an Aryan, Semitic,
Hamitic, or Ibngolian mentality, all human
races have a common collective psyche. But
with the beginning of racial differentiation
essential differences are developed in the
collective psyche as well (Vol. VII, p. 152,
note 8).

InTasmuch as there are differentiations corres-
ponding to race, tribe, and even family, there
is also a collective psyche limited to race,
tribe, and family over and above the "universal"
collective psyche (Vol. VII, p. 275).

The difficulty of understanding is again partly the result of

the problematic interaction of form and content, of the difference

between a common universal structure and its concrete embodiment in







ways which are characteristic of individual cultures. Ibreover, the

word "collective psyche" tends to obscure these differences which

arise from the fact that the collective unconscious is an abstraction,

a theoretically postulated commonality derived from the phenomena of

concrete cultures in which the archetypes exist as actual symbols

and images.

However, this line of explanation is only partially satisfac-

tory in light of the totality of Jung's writings. It seems that

notwithstanding the differences that come about when the common

structure of the psyche is embodied in culturally characteristic

ways, Jung means that the common structure itself is different with

respect to the different ethnic and racial groups. His statements,

for example, about the inapplicability of Indian yoga practises for

the Iestern psyche (Vol. XI, p. 534) and the characteristic quality

of Jewish psychology which might not be appropriate for non-Jewish

peoples (Vol. VII, p. 152, note 8) seem to support this idea.

However, the concept of racial differences in the collective

unconscious seems one of the least defensible of all Jung's ideas on

the unconscious. For notwithstanding the lack of credibility in

the notion that Jewish psychology or Indian yoga are inapplicable to

someone with a Wlstern Christian heritage, it would seem that the

similarities of a universal structure of the psyche would greatly

overshadow any racial differences that might exist in that struc-

ture, just as the bodies of persons of different races and ethnic

groups seem to be of overwhel2dng similarity differing only in very

minor ways.

There are, of course, marked differences in the collective








psyches of distinct. human groups, if by this term is understood the

culturally distinct ways in which the collective unconscious is

developed and expressed. Ihch of what Jung says about the inherent
psychic differences of people of various human groups can be under-

stood in this way without the necessity of postulating significant

racial or ethnic differences in the structure of the collective

unconscious itself.



1 C.Gr. Jung, Collected Works Vols. I-XIX (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1977, Vol. VIII, p. 409. Quotations are from the
following editions: Vol. I, Psychiatric Studies. First Edition, 1957;
Vol. II, Eaperrimntal Fesearches, 1973; Vol. III, The Pychoeesis
of Iental disease 960; Vol. IV, Freud and Psychoanalysis, 1961;
Vol. V, Symbols of Transformation First Edition, 1956; Vol. VI,
Psychological Types 1971; Vol. VII, MT EssaysOn Analytical Psy-
cholo Second Edition, 1966; Vol. VIII, The Structure and Iynamics
of the Psych Second edition, 1969; Vol. IX, Part I, The Archetypes
and the Collective hUnconscious, Second Edition, 1968 (hereafter cited
as Vol. I-A.); Vol. IF, Part II, Aion. Second Edition, 1968 (hereafter
cited as Vol. -I-3); Vol. X, Civilization in Transition, First Edition,
1964; Vol. XI, Psychology and Peligion: 'bst and East Second Edition,
1969; Vol. XII, Psychology and Alchem Second Edition, 1968; Vol. XIII,
1968; Vol. 'IV, ITrsterium Coniunctionis, First Edition, 1963; Vol. XT,
The Spirit in ian a, and Literature 1966; Vol. VI, The Practise
of Psychothera ., Second5%ition, 1966; Vol. XVII, The IS oen
rsonality, 195h; Vol. XVIII, Iascellary; Vol. X Bibliograpl and
Index. Hereafter cited by volume number.
2 It is not in the passage where he speaks of Bergson that this
is made clear but in the essay "On Psychic Thergy," Vol. VIII, pages
3-66 where the implications of the libido theory with respect to the
problem of the mind-body relation are discussed in detail. Unfor-
tunately this seems to be characteristic of Jung's style. Mi.sunder-
standings are produced by a causal or parenthetical comment which
then require many lengthy passages or even whole essays to correct.

3 In determining the chronology of Jung's writings the volume
number of the collected works is not a reliable indicator. The
collected works are grouped by subject matter, and while this serves
as a rough guide to different periods of Jung's work, some of the
early and middle writings appear in the last volumes.







4
T's will consider anomalous facts with respect to a given theory
to be ones which fail to be explained by the theory and which after a
protracted period of such failure lead either to the ad hoc revision
of the theory or to emergence of a new more comprehensive theory which
will be able to encompass their explanation in a context which pre-
serves previously explained data. The sense of anomaly is that used
by T.H. Kuhn in his Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Second Edition
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970).
Statements about the disembodied psyche then have this anoma-
lous relationship to Jung's established theory. This becomes evident
when efforts are made to see how the statements can be made consistent
with the established theory.

5 By dual aspect theory is meant the view that mental and phys-
ical are different aspects of some third entity which is itself neither
mental nor physical. Interactionism is the view that mental events can
cause physical events and vice versa.
6 Strictly speaking the archetypes are completely incapable of
being made conscious in the sense that dwat appears in consciousness
is never the archetype per se but only an archetypal image. This
distinction between the archetype per se and the archetypal image
will be fully discussed in Chapter 3.

7 C.G. Jung, editor, Ifa d ag mbols (Iew York: Dell, 1968),
p. 25. Hereafter cited as %an and His Smbols.














CHAPTER 2
THEORY OF ARCHETYPES: PART I



Introduction


Preliminary Remarks

Our discussion of the notion of a collective unconscious serves

as an introduction to the main concern of this study, the concept

of the archetype. For in addition to the instincts, the collective

-unconscious is said to contain archetypes. It is the notion of arche-

types then which gives Jung's collective unconscious its real sub-

stance, and it is the resolution of questions concerning the arche-

types upon which the real point of a concept of a collective un-

conscious depends.

Thxny such questions inhabit the fringes of consciousness while

reading about the archetypes: What really is an archetype? What

sort of ontological status is it supposed to have? I-hat is the

relationship between the archetypes and the instincts? Were do

the archetypes come from? What is the difference between the

archetype in itself and as it appears in consciousness? 1hat are

the chief archetypes? hiat causes their appearance in consciousness?

These many questions about the archetype reflect the many aspects

and perspectives from which the idea can be considered. In order to

gain an insight into the unifying elements of these different per-

spectives on the archetypes, our exposition idll proceed with a








conceptual overview followed by a detailed discussion of the different

aspects of the concept. flth this approach we hope to gain a unified

understanding of the archetype which will make clear the reasons for

the characteristic complexity of the idea.

Characterization of the Archetype

It will be remembered from the above discussion of the collective

unconscious then, that the contents of this portion of the psyche were

said to be objective and impersonal in the sense that the collective

unconscious is the supposed source of original contents which appear

in consciousness but which seem not to have been conscious before.

For example, an individual has a dream, vision or fantasy composed

of alien images to which he has no personal associations. Ibreover,

parallels to the phenomena's basic themes can then be found in mater-

ials drawn from comparative symbology which are unknown to the person

previous to his experience of the archetypal event.

The following dream illustrates these characteristic archetypal

qualities.

In my dream, I am at an amusement park with my
wife and another couple. The first amusement
we decide to see is a sort of "haunted house."
To enter, we descend a flight of stairs into a
cool, damp cellar, consisting of an empty main
room. looking into one room I see nothing.
At this pint a ghost-like figure appears. I
recognize the "ghost" as a child dressed in a
costume, and am friendly to it. The "ghost"
then leaves. In the next room, I see a table.
Upon the table is a small, incomplete child-like
body. A large knife is hovering in the air over
the table, and proceeds to dismember the body.
Blood gushes out, spurting into the air in great
streams. I think that this "show" is a little
too much for an amusement for the general public,
although I personally am not affected by the gore.
The "body" then begins to carry on a normal con-
versation with me, while the blood continues to







spurt and gush over the table top. The htow
is then over, and the "body" disappears.-

In this particular case, it is the archetypal motif of

ritual dismemberment which is the most outstanding feature of the

dream. The dreamer had no idea as to what this image might mean

and was unfamiliar with the frequent occurrence of this theme in

the literature of alchemy.

That Jung means by an archetype then is a disposition in the

collective unconscious to produce such an image in consciousness

as the one above. Ibreover, Jung distinguishes between the actual

image, which he calls the archetypal image, and the archetype per

se, which as a disposition of the unconscious is unobservable in

principle. However, the term "archetype" is used indiscriminately

for both the archetypal manifestation and the archetypal disposition.

The archetypal image is a concrete instantiation of the hypothe-

tical, unobservable archetypal disposition. Ibreover, archetypal

contents which emerge into awareness assume a form which is a

reflection of the individual consciousness. The fact that arche-

types appear in a personal form seems to be an instance of the ten-

dency to structure awareness of unfamiliar phenomena so that they

resemble familiar forms of experience.

The unconscious supplies as it were the archetypal
form, which in itself is empty and irrepresentable.
Consciousness immediately fills it with related
or similar representational material so that it
can be perceived. For this reason archetypal
ideas are locally, temporally, and individually
conditioned (Vol. XIII, p. 3X6).

In the case of the dismemberment dream, this assimilation of the

archetypal motif into an individual context is illustrated when the







uncanny and alien ritual of dismemberment, concerning which the dreamer

had no knowledge, was represented in the familiar setting of an amuse-

ment part.

Ontological Status of the Archetype

As a disposition the archetype has then the ontological status of

a hypothetical construct. Like the electron, the archetype can be

detected only through the effects which it produces, but, as with

the electron, this unobservability is not held to make the archetype

any less real than directly perceivable objects like chairs and door-

knobs. Unlike the electron, however, the archetypes are unobservable

in principle. Since the unconscious can only be knonm indirectly

through its effect on consciousness, there is no possibility of a

direct perception of these unconscious contents. -breover, the

archetypes per se, existing as dispositions, are only possibilities

to form observable phenomena with the determinate form in which they

appear being the result of the interaction between this disposition

in the collective unconscious and the informing consciousness.

Th basing the ontology of the archetypes on a position of

scientific realism, Jung wants to carefully distinguish his unobser-

vable theoretical entities from metaphysical concepts such as Plato's

forms. The difference is that the archetypes are empirically derived

and grounded. They are the product of Jung's therapeutic work in

which he found it increasingly difficult to fit all of the phenomeno-

logical material into an explanatory framework which included only

a personal unconscious. There exists then the possibility of falsi-

fication to the extent that the archetypal theory fails to provide

adequate explanation for the observed phenomena. The relationship








between experience and the postulated concepts of metaphysics, on

the other hand, is too vague to allow for the possibility of dis-

confirmation in principle.

Relationship of Archetypes and Instincts

Since the archetypes are not the product of an individual's

personal experience, they must then be the result of inheritance.

Rather than inherited experiences or inherited images, however,

the archetypes are transmitted as the disposition to form images

and ideas. There are close parallels here with the instincts, which

rather than being inherited behaviors are instead inherited dis-

positions to produce certain behaviors when activated by the appro-

priate environmental releasing stimuli. 1'th this similarity to the

instincts in mind, Jung often refers to the archetypes as patterns

of behavior.

. they prove to be typical attitudes, modes
of action--thought-processes and impulses which
must be regarded as constituting the instinctive
behaviour typical of the human species. The
term I chose for this, namely "archetype," there-
fore coincides with the biological concept of the
"pattern of behaviour" (Vol. III, p. 261).

Just as the body develops evolutionarily conditioned modes of

responding to external and internal stimuli, Jung hypothesizes the

development of similar phylogenetic patterns for the psyche. The

archetypes are then somewhat like psychic instincts. Ibreover,

since the body is not functionally a separate entity from the mind,

these 'mental instincts" are parallel psychic counterparts to the

inherited modes of bodily response. . There is good reason

for supposing that the archetypes are the unconscious images of the

instincts themselves . (Vol. IX-A, p. 4~).








The fact that archetypes can be understood as patterns of be-

havior emphasizes then their biological aspect and their continuity

with naturalistically understood processes. With a widening of the

traditional use of "patterns of behavior," this allows for the possi-

bility of archetypes in animals. "There is nothing to prevent us from

assuming that certain archetypes exist even in animals, that they are

grounded in the pecularities of the living organism itself . "

(Vol. VII, p. 69).

Archetypes as A Priori Conditioning Factors

However, the archetypes can also be seen from the cognitive point

of view as inherent categories of apprehension (Vol. VI, p. 376).

This perspective then underlines their role as the structuring elements

of the psyche and focuses on those aspects of the archetypes which

seem least directly connected with instincts as ordinarily understood.

It may then seem difficult to grasp how the archetypes can be at once

both patterns of behavior and "a priori conditioning factors." How-

ever, man's characteristic pattern of behavior is to develop con-

sciousness which can then act at variance with or in relative in-

dependence of the instincts understood as drives of the body. And,

since for Jung, the mind and body are not really separate entities

but merely different points of view, his shift from the archetypes

as patterns of behavior to talk of archetypes as categories of the

psyche can be seen as a plausible move rather than as a logical jump.

"As a prior conditioning factors they represent a special, psycholog-

ical instance of the biological 'pattern of behaviour'" (Vol. XI, p.

l19, note 2).

Now in characterizing the archetypes as a priori conditioning







factors what Jung has in mind is similar to the idea of categories

worked out by Kant. Moreover, it sometimes appears as if Jung is

attempting to broaden Kant's concept so that in addition to

necessary forms of cognition, the archetypes will also be cate-

gories of the imagination.2 Specifically the archetypes are held

to be forms of thought, perception and imagination (Vol. IX-A, p.

44). However, the comparison of the archetypes to the Kantian

categories is only of limited usefulness. For the archetypes can

be said to be necessary only in the biological sense of being part

of our inheritance which will then necessarily influence us. They

are not necessary in the sense that they could not have been other

than they are. The archetypes are products of evolution and are

thus subject to whatever contingent environmental forces made them

an enduring part of the genotype. A hominoid on a different planet

could then conceivably develop different archetypes.3

I-breover, Kant's categories were the necessary formal aspects

to which any experience must conform whereas Jung's archetypes are

the forms of only certain types of experience. Thus, the archetypes

are more properly described as primordial images than as categories

in Kant's sense. For the archetypes as "thought-forms" (Vol. VII,

p. 66), i.e., dispositions to form certain typical images and thoughts

come into consciousness only under unusual circumstances, rather than

being the structuring aspect of experience in general. This is then

what Jung has in mind when he states: "Only, in the case of our

'forms,' we are not dealing with categories of reason but with cate-

gories of the imarienation" (Vol. XI, p. 518).

From the point of view of similarity with Kant, the archetypes

can be seen to be universal, inborn and formal elements of the psyche







(Vol. IX-A, p. 44). Ibreover, the individual and personal aspects

of the psyche are held to develop from a universal substratum in

the collective unconscious. From this perspective the ego is itself

an archetype in the sense that it is prefigured as an a priori possi-

bility in the collective unconscious of the individual before it

emerges by a process of differentiation. All of the complexes,

in fact, although they are predominantly manifestations of the

personal unconscious, have a "nuclear element" (Vol. VIII, p. 12)

which is an archetype.

. every complex, has or is a (fragmentary)
personality. At any rate, this is how it looks
from the purely observational standpoint. But
when Tie go into the matter more deeply, we
find that they are really archetypal forma-
tions (Vol. V, p. 255).

Ilat this archetypal basis of complexes amounts to is that a

complex which can be traced to events in the individual's personal

history is often "magically" complicated because the personal situa-

tion has been assimilated to the archetypal one. For example,

problems originating from the relationship with the parents are

frequently the result of the fact that the individual has since

childhood seen the parents as gods. The father is perceived as

God the Father and the mother in terms of the Archetype of the

Great oIther or Earth Ibther. The troubled individual then can

not successfully distinguish between parents as individuals and the

archetypal projections in terms of which he has habitually perceived

them.

For every typical human situation there is a corresponding

archetype so that the experience of the individual in such a situation








invariably falls under the influence of an archetypal pattern. In

this respect the description of the archetypes as "patterns of in-

stinctual behaviour" seems amply justified.

Ibwever, the archetypal notion runs the risk of being over-

generalized into triviality if the idea of the archetypes as formal

a priori conditioning factors is taken as a guide for explaining all

human behavior. For example, the archetypes can be seen as the

phylogenetic forms to which ontogeny supplies the content. But,

although this understanding of the archetypes is hypothetically

plausible, it is misleading from an operational point of view. For

although in principle all aspects of the personality are founded on

the common structure of the collective unconscious out of which

individuality emerges like an island out of the ocean, the arche-

types can not be exclusively appealed to in order to form a compre-

hensive theory of behavior. This would be an incomplete and one-

sided perspective ignoring the vitally important ontogenetic factors

influencing individual development.

In the case of the complexes, for example, Jung identifies them

trith the personal unconscious. The archetypal nucleus is called upon

as an explanatory principle only when the psychological situation

seems incomprehensible from an exclusively personal point of view.

That there is a common and universal structure to the psyche is then

a true statement but not always an informative one for all distinct

aspects of behavior.

Further Implications of Kantian Influence

On the basis of the discussion so far, it could be fairly







concluded that on the whole it is more accurate to understand the

archetypes as patterns of behavior than to think of them in terms

of Kant's theory of knowledge. This conclusion, however, would be

too hastily arrived at as the full story of Kant's influence on

Jung's idea of the archetypes has yet to be explained.

Jung's insistence on the label of empiricism to characterize his

work, for example, is a consequence of his methodological ideal of

staying within the bounds of possible experience. Ibreover, in terms

of Jung's thought, the concept of the psyche describes these bounds.

There is no possibility of getting outside the psyche to determine

how the psyche interprets the world, for all experience is most

immediately and inescapably psychic experience. The psyche is the

mediator of all experience, both from within and from without.

If a thinker comes up with a metaphysical scheme which he

thinks grasps the essential nature of reality, Jung then cautions

as to the need for a psychological critique. The claims of universal

validity which the system maker has put forth transcend possible ex-

perience and are justified on the basis of an intuitive certainty.

It is just at this point that Jung's theory of archetypes assumes a

deflationary role by explaining the appeal of the metaphysical system

on the basis of its conformity to the fundamental aspects of the

thinker himself rather than to conformity of the system with the

ultimate nature of reality.

Iten a speculative philosopher believes he has
comprehended the world once and for all in his
system, he is deceiving himself; he has merely
comprehended himself and then naively projected
that view upon the world (Vol. III, p. 185).







Archetypes and Scientific Theories

To complicate matters at this point is the fact that basic

scientific insights are held to be founded on archetypes. For

example, Robert lbyer's idea of the conservation of energy (Vol.

VII, p. 67), the concept of the atom (Vol. IX-A, p. 57) and Kekule's

discovery of the structure of the benzene ring (Man and His Symbols

pages 25-26) are all understood as illustrating the effect of arche-

types.

. we speak of "atoms" today because we have
heard, directly or indirectly, of the atomic
theory of D=eocritus. But where did Democritus,
or whoever first spoke of minimal constitutive
elements, hear of atoms? This notion had its
origin in archetypal ideas, that is, in pri-
mordial images which were never reflections of
physical events but are spontaneous products
of the psychic factor (Vol. IX-A, p. 57).

This archetypal basis of scientific theory is supported when it

is shoin that the ideas have been present in the history of diviliza-

tion for many centuries. In Kebkule's case the solution to his

theoretical dilemma came during a state of relaxation when, dozing

before his fireplace, he seemed to see snakelike atoms dancing in

the fire. Then one of the snakes formed a ring by grasping its owm

tail, the idea of the benzene ring was conceived in a flash of in-

sight.4 his image of a snake (or dragon) biting its omm tail is

called the uroboros and dates from at least as early as the third

century B.C. (Ibn and His Symbols, p. 26).

Naturally the role of the unconscious must always be seen in

proper relation to the activity of consciousness in these cases. Had

Keklle not already spent great amounts of time and energy consciously

thinking about the problem of the structure of benzene, the situation







of an insightful archetypal constellation could not have occurred.

I-breover, there was a great deal of effort necessary after the fire-

place episode before the structure of benzene was finally worked out.

Notwithstanding the well-documented and critical role of the uncon-

scious then, it should not be thought that scientific theories exist

preformed in the collective unconscious.

I, might well imitate Kant at this point and ask how this appar-

ent conformity betWeen symbols from the collective unconscious and

scientific theories is possible. Ibreover, it needs to be made clear

why scientific ideas derived from the archetypes are held to be

genuine discoveries and advances, whereas similarly derived meta-

physical ideas are restricted to a sphere of only subjective validity.

In the case of science then, the archetypal constellation some-

times proves to be instrumental in bringing about a progressive

theoretical advance for science when the image from the unconscious

is assimilated in terms of the already existing body of knowledge.

IMay other ideas from the same source are never put to scientific

use because they do not happen to be compatible with the progress of

science.

Thus with scientific theories, archetypes are sometimes an im-

portant influence within the context of discovery. Regardless of the

origin of a scientific hypothesis, however, in order for it to become

acceptable to the scientific community, it must be validated in terms

of criteria of scientific methodology. These criteria of accepta-

bility involve relating the theoretical terms of the hypothesis to

observational statements in such a way as to constitute an empiri-

cally derived decision procedure which will indicate what observational







states of affairs will count for or against the hypothesis.

Idth metaphysical theories based on archetypal experience,

on the other hand, the relationship between the theory and observa-

tions is not specified in such a way as to form the basis for an

objective decision procedure which could be used to adjudicate con-

flicting metaphysical claims.

Ibreovor, the archetypal images are always the partial result of

the individual traits of the embodying consciousness, with aspects of

personal history and cultural background being always associated rith

their appearance. Thus the personal factor can not be eliminated in

order to arrive at an objectively valid metaphysical statement. In

addition to the inevitable contamination of the personal factor, the

archetypes can be said to be unavoidably anthropomorphic. As the

product of human evolution, they mirror man and are man. Although

the archetypes represent man's relationship to the world, it is only

from the historically conditioned human standpoint reflecting how

the universe affects man.

There is for Jung, nonetheless, a possibility of evaluating the

pragmatic value of the metaphysical ideas considered from the stand-

point of their ability to further and enhance human existence. Thus

very similar to IJietzsche, Jung would judge metaphysical ideas on

their life-affirming quality, while maintaining that the final truth

of the ideas in terms of which of them mirror best the ultimate

structure of reality could not be decided.

In Jung's viewr we must be careful to distinguish subjective,

psychological truth from objective truth about the external world.

Thus, although it is an error to see the archetypes as objectively







true in the sense that they represent literal statements about objec-

tive states of affairs, yet the archetypes have a psychological

validity and are psychologically true in the sense that it is possible

to interpret them in a subjectively meaningful way. The validity of

the archetypes in terms of applicability to the human situation must

then be aclInowledged even in absence of the possibility of a scientific

validation of statements based on them. For example, the existence of

a God can not be either proved or disproved scientifically; yet the

existence of an internal God-image or its equivalent must be acknow-

ledged as a psychologically real and effective event.

The gods cannot and must not die. I said just
now that there seems to be something, a kind of
superior power, in the human psyche, and that
if this is not the idea of God, then it is the
"belly." I wanted to express the fact that one
or other basic instinct, or complex of ideas,
will invariably concentrate upon itself the
greatest sum of psychic energy and thus force
the ego into its service (Vol. VII, p. 72).


The Symbolic Hature of the Archetypes

The way in ihbich Jung characterizes the distinctive psychologi-

cal validity of the archetypes is by emphasizing the symbolic nature

of the archetypal images. The archetypes are said to be "symbolic

formulas" (Vol. VI, p. 377).

The symbol for Jung is to be sharply distinguished from the

semiotic function of signs. Signs are representations of known

things. The trademark of a compare, for example, simply represents

the compa~ itself. Symbols, on the other hand, can not be said to

be logically equivalent to their referents. The symbol points be-

yound itself to an unknown.








Thus a word or an image is symbolic when it
implies something more than its obvious and
immediate meaning. It has a wider "uncon-
scious" aspect that is never precisely defined
or fully explained. .. . As the mind explores the
symbol, it is led to ideas that lie beyond the
grasp of reason (Man and His Symbols, p. 4).

Symbols function as interconnecting links between the conscious

and the collective unconscious, as they bring into consciousness in

representable form the othe-rise unImowable archetypes. The symbols

mediate the experience of the archetypes and because of the unavoid-

able personal characteristics due to embodiment in an individual con-

sciousness are products of both the collective unconscious and con-

sciousness.

There is then in the symbol a synthesis of knamw and unknown

and of real and unreal.

If it were only real, it would not be a symbol,
for it would then be a real phenomenon and hence
unsymbolic. . And if it were altogether unreal,
it would be mere empty imagining, which, being
related to nothing real, would not be a symbol either
(Vol. VI, p. 111).

The symbol . unites the antithesis between
real and unreal, because on the one hand it is
a psychic reality (an account of its efficacy),
-while on the other it corresponds to no physical
reality (Vol. VI, pages 128-129).

To a large extent then, what we add to the picture of the

archetype by calling the archetypal images symbols is an emphasis

on the living intensity of the archetypes as they are experienced.

The archetypal images are not abstract intellectual concepts but

symbols which are not transparent to reason and the intellect. More-

over, these symbols have a certain aura of fascination. They appeal

not only to the intellect as puzzles for the understanding but to the







emotions as well. "They are as much feelings as thoughts . "

(Vol. VII, p. 66).

This characteristic quality of the symbol to evoke emotion is

termed its numinosity, the numen being the specific energy of the

archetypes.

Fifth the description of the nmidnosity of the archetypes, the

close relationship between archetypal images and religious motifs

becomes evident. For Jung accepts Rudolf Otto's characterization

of religious experience as a "careful and scrupulous observation

of . the numinosum . (Vol. XI, p. 7). "%h might say, then,

that the term 'religion' designates the attitude peculiar to a con-

sciousness which has been changed by experience of the numinosum"

(Vol. XI, p. 8).

Although originating through individual experiences of the collec-

tive unconscious, religion is, strictly speaking, a phenomenon of

collective consciousness. And since not all experiences of the

archetypes result in their being assimilated in terms of a religious

frame of reference, another wider designation is needed to character-

ize the effect of the numinous quality of archetypes. Thus the arche-

types are said to be "spiritual" factors.

In a sense spiritual and archetypal are almost equivalent and

interchangeable terms. For when we have understood the transpersonal

nature of the archetypes,5 their aura of numinosity and their ability

to generate images which serve as the foundations of culture, then

we have made definite the meaning of the spiritual.

That keeps us from asserting this equivalence of meaning, however,

is the instinctual perspective. For the archetypes are said to be







"patterns of instinctual behaviour" (Vol. IX-A, p. 4h). And it is the

instinctual aspect of man which seems to stand in sharpest contrast

to what we wish to designate as spiritual.

However, Jung points to Christian prejudice as the origin of the

apparent antithesis between spirit and nature.

. very remarkable opposition of spirit and
nature. Bven though spirit is regarded as
essentially alive and enlivening, one cannot
really feel nature as unspiritual and dead.
1t must therefore be dealing here with the
(Christian) postulate of a spirit whose life
is so vastly superior to the life of nature
that in comparison with it the latter is no
better than death (Vol. IX-4, p. 210).

A more in-depth perspective, then, reveals the paradoxical re-
lation between spirit and instinct. For they seem to be similar pro-

cesses of psychic energy which are distinguished by the application

of this energy into diametrically contrasting modes.

Moreover, it is in the description of the relation between the

spiritual and instinctual that Jung's psychological viewpoint is in

sharpest contrast to that of Freud. For Jung does not conceive all

psychic energy as being instinctual energy as does Freud. He uses

the term for psychic energy, libido, in a way which does not imply

its equivalence with instinctual energy. There is then for Jung

no need of a concept of sublimation in which instinctual energy

must be siphoned off for cultural purposes. Any diversion of the
flow of libido from its natural instinctual channels in Jung's view

leads only to neurotic maladjustment. However, there is more psychic

energy available for the human being than is utilized by the natural

instinctual processes. This excess psychic energy can then be used

for other than instinctual purposes, and we might say that this excess







energy represents a degree of freedom for man to pursue cultural

activities for their own sake. The symbolic images from the collec-

tive unconscious then serve as "transformers" of energy in the sense

that the archetypes represent inherent patterns for this energy flow

(Vol. V, p. 232).

Since the spiritual uses of psychic energy are the result of the

influence of the archetypes which are themselves the product of

evolution, it becomes evident that the development of the spirit

in man is his characteristic pattern of behavior.

In reality of course the world-spurning passion
of the "spirit" is just as natural as the
marriage-flight of insects (Vol. V, p. 396).

The spiritual appears in the psyche also as an
instinct, indeed as a real passion, a "consuming
fire" . . It is not derived from any other
instinct . but is a principle sui geris
a specific and necessary form of instinctual
power (Vol. VIII, p. 58).


Archetypes and Instincts
In order to fully understand the meaning of the term "spiritual"

then, a further clarification of the archetype-instinct relation is

necessary. For we need to grasp how the spiritual if to be of the

same type of stuff as the instincts and yet seemingly different from

and even opposed to them.

A look at animals other than man helps to gain an insight into

what Jung has in mind in this regard. For in the examples of patterns

of behavior in animals, we see clearly the unity which in man becomes

a tension of opposites between spirit and instinct.

A key word "pattern" is then the link which enables us to
cormnect the behavior of animals with the archetypes and instincts in








man. For the instinctual behavior of animals is not to be understood

as just a blind impulsion to action. Rather, for each instinctual

act there is present a total pattern which includes a sort of image

of the instinctual situation.

There are, in fact, no amorphous instincts, as
every instinct bears in itself the pattern of
its situation. Always it fulfils an image,
and the image has fixed qualities. The in-
stinct of the leaf-cutting ant fulfils the image
of ant, tree, leaf, cutting, transport, and
the little ant-garden of fungi. If any one of
these conditions is lacking, the instinct does
not function, because it cannot exist with-
out its total pattern, without its image.
Such an image is an aprioritype. It is
inborn in the ant prior to any activity, for
there can be no activity at all unless an
instinct of corresponding pattern initiates
and makes it possible (Vol. VIII, p. 201).

The instinctual acts of animals then seem to be unified by a

pattern which includes a sort of intuitive recognition of the goal

of the instinctual acts as well as the physiological mechanisms

which supply the necessary energy.

Of course, in the case of animals, our use of "image" must

be metaphorical; but it is Jung's point that this regulating prin-

ciple of the instinct, the factor which especially in the insects

makes the operation of instinctual behavior amazingly precise and

selective rather than haphazard, can be recognized.

The organizing factor of the instinct together with its

specific energy make up a unified pattern of behavior for animals.

In man, on the other hand, the representations of this formal factor

of instinct can come into awareness as actual images. Thus, whereas

in animals the archetypes and the instincts exist in a fused, undiffer-

entiated state; in man, with the formation of consciousness, they







become separable and distinct.

In the human realm then the archetypes become the forms which

regulate the instincts. Moreover, the archetypal images are said

to represent the meaning of the instincts and to be "the unconscious

images of the instincts themselves" (Vol. IX-A, p. 44). The arche-

types thus act as guiding factors for the release of instinctual

energy in appropriate ways characteristic of man as a species.

But what are these human instincts? Jung recognizes five types

of instinctual factors for man: "hunger, sexuality, activity,

reflection and creativity" (Vol. VIII, p. 118). He conceded that

any attempt to enumerate the human instincts is at least a matter

of controversy. The principle reason for this confusion as to what

constitutes an instinct in man is the complication of the psycho-

logical factor. For the criterion of what to count as psychic is

the ability of the functioning of the will to modify the otherwise

automatic and compulsive instincts. It would seem evident then

that the reason we can not decide on what to count as purely instinc-

tual in man is due to the fact that instincts are always in part

influenced by the psyche. Thus Jung says that the instincts per

se are ectopsychic and serve the function only of a stimulus,

whereas the determining factor for human behavior is always the

result of an interaction between the ectopsychic instinct and the

psychic situation of the moment (Vol. VIII, p. 115).

This mutual interaction between psyche and instinct in man has

then the result of making the instinctual element ambiguous. For,

on the one hand, all psychic processes seem to be founded on an

instinctual base, whereas, on the other hand, psychic processes







also influence the working of the instincts. . The instincts

are a condition of psychic activity, while at the same time psychic

processes seem to condition the instincts" (Vol. XI, p. 330).

Thus the twofold nature of instinct becomes most evident in

human behavior where for each instinctual action we have to take

into account both the aspect of "dynamism and compulsion" as well

as that of "specific meaning and intention" (Vol. X, p. 287). For

each instinctual action then we can pose the question as to its

meaning.

The archetypal images are these psychic factors which provide

the meaning for the instincts. They are the necessary forms of

instinctual behavior for man. The sense of saying that something

represents the meaning of an instinct for man is thus clarified by

an understanding of this process of "psychization," the assimilation

of the physiological stimulus to a preexistent psychic pattern (Vol.

VIII, p. 115).

In the animals which have no psyche there is nevertheless pre-

sent a unified pattern of behavior. The instinctual acts are the

ways in which the animal realizes its inherent nature, its possi-

bilities of becoming what it can be. The appropriate fulfilment

of the instinctual nature of an animal is its way of realizing its

meaning.

If we say then that the archetypes in man are the images of

the instincts and represent their meaning, we are emphasizing this

continuity with the lower animals. man also has his characteristic

patterns of behavior, and the archetypes act as the patterning fac-

tors for these human instincts. I11l the fulfilment of the instincts







in man then also lead to an unfoldment of his inherent human nature?

The answer to this question must of course deal with the factor

of the psyche. Hiat is only dimly prefigured in animals becomes in

man with the development of consciousness his particularly human

way of being. For a human being to realize its nature then implies

the development of consciousness.

This development is like an instinct in the sense that it comes

into being conditioned by the archetypal patterns. However, its

nature is to exist as a factor which can operate as a will and hence

control and regulate the "other" instincts. The nature of con-

sciousness contains then the possibility of being able to act

against nature.

It is recognized that man living in the state of
nature is in no sense merely "natural" like an
animal, but sees, believes, fears, worships things
whose meaning is not at all discoverable from the
conditions of his natural environment. Their
underlying meaning leads us in fact far away
from all that is natural, obvious, and easily
intelligible, and quite often contrasts most
sharply with the natural instincts. ve have
only to think of all those gruesome rites and
customs against which every natural feeling
rises in revolt, or of all those beliefs and
ideas which stand in insuperable contradiction
to the evidence of the facts. All this drives
us to the assumption that the spiritual prin-
ciple (whatever that might be) asserts itself
against the merely natural conditions with in-
credible strength. One can say that this too
is "natural," and that both have their origin
in one and the same "nature." I do not in
the least doubt this origin, but must point
out that this "natural" something consists
of a conflict between two principles, to
which you can give this or that name according
to taste, and that this opposition is the
expression, and perhaps also the basis, of
the tension we call psychic energy (Vol. VIII,
p. 52).








Thus the fact that archetypes seem to enter the human picture

on two levels-- as patterns of instinctual behavior and as spiritual

factors--is due to the fact that one of the innate human patterns,

the tendency to develop consciousness, can act against the other

lower drives and become a channel of psychic energy in its own

right independently of the instincts. Therefore the archetypes

seem to have two paradoxically opposite qualities: . The

archetype is partly a spiritual factor, and partly like a hidden

meaning immanent in the instincts . (Vol. VIII, 222). Only

in man then is there this potential split between his natural ten-

dencies and the realization of his human-most potentiality of being.

This split, which is the same as that between the conscious and

unconscious, is a state of necessary tension since the development of

awareness and the giving in to the unconsciousness of instinctual

motivations tend to work against each other and to a large extent

they are mutually exclusive activities. However, Jung's psychological

viewpoint as a whole can be understood as the attempt to show how

this necessary tension between conscious and unconscious and between

spirit and instinct need not necessarily be a conflict. For the

integrated personality is one which learns to live with a balance

between these forces of tension rather than excluding one for the

sake of the other.

But if we can reconcile ourselves to the mys-
terious truth that the spirit is the life of
the body seen from within, and the body the out-
ward manifestation of the life of the spirit--
the two being really one--then we can understand
why the striving to transcend the present level
of consciousness through acceptance of the un-
conscious must give the body its due, and why
recognition of the body cannot tolerate a philos-
oply that denies it in the name of the spirit (Vol. I, p. 94).













Notes


1
This dream was provided by a student and friend, George
Clough.
2
The fact that Kant had a strong influence on the develop-
ment of Jung' s ideas is amply evidenced by the many explicit re-
ferences to Kant scattered throughout Jung's works. Moreover,
when Jung talks of the philosophers who had been important to his
intellectual development, we again find him acknowledging the
influence of Kant: "The philosophical influence that has pre-
vailed in my education dates from Plato, Kant, Schopenhauer,
Ed. v. Hartmann, and Nietzsche. These names at least character-
ize my main studies in philosophy." C.G. Jung, Letters Vol. I
1906-1950, Vol. II 190-1961, edited by Gerhard Adler and Aniela
Jaffe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), letters
Vol. II, pages 500-501, letter to Joseph F. Rychlak dated 27
April 1959. Hereafter cited as Letters Vol. I or Vol. II.
In his autobiography Jung describes an interest in Kantian
philosophy which was part of a "philosophical development" which
"extended from mr seventeenth year until well into the period of
wr medical studies." C.G. Jung, Memories, Dreams. Reflections
(New York: Random House, 1961), p. 70. Hereafter cited as
Memories reams Reflections. The extent of that interest is
revealed when Jung relates that while a medical student "the
clinical semesters that followed kept me so busy that scarcely
any time remained for my forays into outlying fields. I was
able to study Kant only on Sundays" (Manories, reams Reflec-
tions. p. 101).

3 Jolande Jacobi, Com Archetype/ m the Psychology
of C.G. Jung (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), p. 52.

4 Carl G. Hempel, Philosophy of Natural Science (Biglewood
Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1966), p. 165

5By the transpersonal nature of the archetype, we mean to
refer to the fact that archetypal experience is not completely ex-
planable by reference to the individual's past experience or develop-
ment.














CHAPTER 3
THEORY OF ARCHETYPES: PART II



The Origin of the Archetypes

The next aspect of the archetypal theory which we must tahe up

for discussion is the question of the origin of the archetypes: there

do the archetypes cone from?

One way of approaching this problem is by considering the rela-

tionshiLp between archetypes and rythological motifs. For since myths

and fairytales are one of the most characteristic ways in which

archetypes manifest themselves, if we can discover how ryths origi-

nate, then perhaps this will shed light on the question of the

origin of the archetypes.I

14rthological motifs then are characteristic archetypal images

so that the archetypes are sometimes designated as '"ythologems" by

Jung.

The rqthological feature of archetypal manifestation can be seen

to fit in with what was previously said about the archetypal images

being symbols and having a religious or spiritual significance in

that a myth is a phenomenon of collective consciousness. It is the

end product of a conscious elaboration of the original unconscious

content, which often includes the efforts of many generations of

storytellers. In this way the numinous quality of the rsythologem,

the immediate impact of the living intensity of the unconscious

.5







revelation, is lessened, and the genuine symbolic nature of the arche-

types is expressed in a diminished degree. "The so-called religious

statement is still numLnous, a.quality which the myth has already lost

to a great extent" (Vol. XI, p. 301).

Since the religious expression of the archetypes can also suffer

the same fate as myths and cease to become "living" symbols, it would

seem that Jung's distinction between the religious and the mytholog-

ical in terms of numinoslty is not really adequate. hn addition, there

are examples from primitive cultures where the mythological and re-

ligious coincide. "A tribe's mythology is its living religion . "

(Vol. IK-A, p. 154). ~hen then does a religious statement cease to

be religious and becomes mythological? Does Jung mean that when a

religious dogma loses credibility it becomes a myth?

Ibreover, there seems to be at least in ordinary usage an im-

plied difference in content with the mythological involving more

primitive types of thought and being more concerned with naturalistic

phenomena than the religious. Religions then would seem to be more

sophisticated types of mythologies.

At any rate, it is clear that Jung is not particularly concerned

with establishing strict criteria of usage which would keep the terms

distinct as is evidenced by the following:

. ziths of a religious nature can be inter-
preted as a sort of mental therapy for the suffer-
ings and anxieties of mankind in general . .
(Ihn and His Symbols p. 68).

I was driven to ask myself in all seriousness:
"that is the myth you are living?" . So, in
the most natural way, I took it upon myself to
get to know *my" myth, and I regarded this as
the task of tasks, for--so I told myself--how
could I, when treating my patients, mate due








allowance for the personal factor, for my
personal equation, which is yet so necessary
for a laiowledge of the other person, if I was
unconscious of it? I simply had to kiow what
unconscious or preconscious myth was forming
me, from what rhizome I sprang (Vol. V, pages
xsdv-xnv).

In speaking about his personal myth as in the above, it is

evident that myths are often used as vehicles of the most symbolic

and numinous manifestations of the unconscious. Thus Jung's use

of the term "myth" deviates somewhat from the ordinary usage. Some-

times he means myth to refer to the symbolic archetypal images

themselves, and at other times he uses myth in the conventional way

to indicate the cultural product as an aspect of the collective

consciousness.

Thus both yrths and religious (spiritual) statements2 can be

original symbolic expressions of the collective unconscious.

. esoteric teaching. Ihis last is a typical
means of expression for the transmission of collec-
tive contents originally derived from the uncon-
scious.
Another well-known expression of the archetypes
is myth and fairytale (Vol. IX-A, p. 5).

In attributing a positive function to myths even in the case

of modern man, it is evident that Jung does not see yIiths as a

sort of primitive inferior science, or simply as a crude form of

prescientific explanation. This is because of the symbolic nature

of myths. For if we understand that mythological statements are

not really about the external world but are actually psychological

statements, then we are less apt to criticize the myths for their

variance with current scientific knowledge. Thus myths have a

psychological validity and accurately depict the nature of the








human situation.

The inability of primitive and other unsophisticated peoples to

distinguish between the psychological and the objective sense of

truth frequently leads then to the phenomenon of projection in

which an unconscious content is perceived as belonging to an object

and being a property of the object. Through the agency of pro-

jection natural phenomena take on qualities stemming from the

collective unconscious so that . the whole of mythology

could be taken as a sort of projection of the collective uncon-

scious" (Vol. VIII, p. 152).

In spite of this confusion about inner and outer observed in

Mythological thinking, Jung asserts that mythology should not be

understood as an attempt to formulate a type of scientific ex-

planation.

There can be no doubt that science and
philosophy have grown from this matrix, but
that primitives think up such things merely
from a need for explanation, as a sort of
physical or astronomical theory, seems to
me highly laprobable (Vol. VIII, p. 153).

It would seem rather that the anthropomorphism seen in myth-

ology, the projection of human qualities onto natural phenomena,

is an attempt to grasp the meaning of nature in human terms. It

is then the symbolic meaning of natural phenomena which captures

the interest of the myth-makers. If we look at alchemy, for exam-

ple, only as a sort of proto-chemistry, this can not explain how

the interest in it continued in spite of the failure to produce the

desired objective results over periods of hundreds of years.3 The

alchemist is of course taken in to an extent by his own projections;

but Jung points out that the hubris of assuming that our scientific







world view is thus superior to one founded on mythological projec-

tions is not justified, since if the unsophisticated mind anthropo-

morphizes the world, we have in the present era "mechanicomorphized"4

it with the result that the symbolic quality of our existence is im-

poverished. le must then avoid the mistake of trying to see mythology

as an attempt at explanation in objective terms when its explanations

are symbolic in nature.

Now since the archetypal psyche expresses itself in the language

of myth, it would seen as if the mythological interpretation of na-

ture had been somehow imprinted on the psyche so that these archaic

images reappear in modern man. %e look then to a description of this

process of how the mythological image arises in response to the phy-

sical process in order to gain what apparently is the essential clue

to the question of the origin of the archetypes.

Keeping in mind the previous discussion of the nature of myths,

it is clear that the relationship between the physical process and

images of mythological motifs is not understood by Jung as being one

of simple representation. ihen he says then that the archetypal

image is not to be understood as an allegory of the physical pro-

cess, he means that the objective content of representation is ex-

perienced symbolically and hence takes on psychic aspects due to

projection.

It is not the world as we know it that speaks
out of his unconscious, but the uniaiown world
of the psyche, of which we know that it mirrors
our empirical world only in part, and that, for
the most part, it moulds this empirical world
in accordance with its oain psychic assumptions.
Mhe archetype does not proceed from physical
facts, but describes how the psyche experiences
the physical fact, and in so doing the psyche







often behaves so autocratically that it denies
tangible reality or makes statements that fly
in the face of it (Vol. IX-A, p. 154).

Thus original archetypal (mythological) images are postulated

as being the resultant of an interaction between a physical process

and the primitive psyche, with the physical process being interpreted

in terms of a psychic fantasy content. moreover, it is the subjective

part, the fantasies which arise concomitant with the physical pro-

cess, that are the formative elements for the mythological motif.

That we can safely say about mythical images is
that the physical process imprinted itself on
the psyche in this fantastic, distorted form
and was preserved there, so that the uncon-
scious still reproduces similar images today
(Vol. VIII, p. 153).

It is not storms, not thunder and lightning,
not rain and cloud that remain as images in
the psyche, but the fantasies caused by the
effects they arouse (Vol. VIII, pages 154-155).

Still to be explained, however, is the process of psychic im-

printing through which an original mythological image becomes an

enduring aspect of the collective unconscious, which can then pro-

duce images of similar form even to the present day. then we read

Jung on this point, there seems to be an evident appeal to a theory

involving inheritance of acquired characteristics. For although

Jung is careful to make clear that it is the disposition to form

images rather than the images themselves which are inherited, yet

this inherited disposition is held to be a sort of condensation of

the repeated experiences resulting from typical human situations.

These archetypes, whose innermost nature is in-
accessible to experience, are the precipitate
of the psychic functioning of the whole ances-
tral line; the accumulated experiences of
organic life in general, a million times re-
peated, and condensed into types. In these








archetypes, therefore, all experiences are re-
presented uhich have happened on this planet
since primeval times (Vol. VI, p. 400).

The repetition of these typical human experiences leaves a sort
of function trace in the psyche which then can act to produce ana-

logous mythological images in succeeding generations. 7Thus the

archetypes are described as "mnemic deposits."

From the scientific, causal standpoint the pri-
mordial image can be conceived as a mnemic deposit,
an imprint or engram (Semon), which has arisen
through the condensation of countless processes
of a similar kind. In this respect it is a
precipitate and, therefore, a typical basic form,
of certain ever-recurring psychic experiences
(Vol. VI, p. IW3).

This reference to the influence of Richard Semon seems to clar-

ify what Jung had in mind as a mechanism by which archetypes might

be inherited. For the exposition of Semon's theory in his book

The Ih eme reveals a sort of theory of racial memory which tries to

integrate the factors of memory, habit and inheritance under one

theoretical principle and which appeals explicitly to the idea of

the inheritance of acquired characteristics. For example:

. the engraphic effects of stimulation are
not restricted to the irritable substance of
the individual, but that the offspring of that
individual maymanifest corresponding engraphic
modifications.

However, Jung's mention of Semon and use of his terminology does

not constitute a complete endorsement of his theory. In particular,

Jung is sensitive to the chicken and egg dilemma in relation to the

question of the origin of the archetypes. For the archetypes can

not only be seen as the product of past experiences but can also be

seen as themselves conditioners of experience. Instead of seeking an







explanation of where the archetypes come from by saying that they are

the result of the influence of physical processes on the psyche then,

there is the alternative of conceiving the archetypes as part of the

inherent nature of the psyche itself.

The fact that the sun or the moon or the metero-
logical processes appear, at the very least, in
allegorized form points to an independent colla-
boration of the psyche, which in that case can-
not be merely a product or sterotype of environ-
mental conditions. From whence would it draw
the capacity to adopt a standpoint outside sense
perception? . In view of such questions
Semen's naturalistic and causalistic engram
theory no longer suffices. %e are forced to
assume that the given structure of the brain
does not one its peculiar nature merely to
the influence of surrounding conditions, but
also and just as much to the peculiar and auto-
nomous quality of living matter, i.e., to a
law inherent in life itself (Vol. VI, p. 444).

Jung in the course of his work abandoned Semon's theory of

engrams and talk of mnemic deposits disappears from his later writings.

Archetypes were then simply said to be part of the inherited brain

structure, thus leaving the mechanism of hereditary transmission

unspecified.

lEth Jung's retreat from the position that archetypes are

"deposits of the constantly repeated experiences of humanity" (Vol.

VII, p. 69), we see that the simple correlations he had previously

drawn relating physical processes to the formation of mythological

images must also be reconsidered. that must then be revised in the

theory of mythology is not the concept of projection and the vital

role it plays in mythological thinldng but the implication that

myths were once original contents of consciousness, that they or-

iginate from the fantasizing of individual psyches. With the aban-

donment of the engram theory, Jung is no longer certain he can








reconstruct the process by which the objective physical process and

the interpretive psyche interact to form myths. He seems, on the

whole, in his later work (as exemplified in the quotations immediately

below) to have come to the conclusion that mythological motifs are

not amenable to a simple naturalistic explanation, as if they were

caused by physical processes. Rather the subjective part of the

process, the inherent laws of psychic apprehension, is now thought

to be the essential determining factor.

Thus even the question of how archetypes (mythologems) origi-

nate is not seen by Jung as being a legitimate question since it im-

plies the need for a special explanation of how the archetypes came

to be in the psyche, whereas Jung now sees the archetypes as devel-

oping along with the psyche as part of its inherent pattern of func-

tioning.

anpirical3y considered, however, the archetype
did not ever come into existence as a phenomenon
of organic life, but entered into the picture
with life itself (Vol. XI, p. 149, note 2).

These images are "primordial" images in so far
as they are peculiar to whole species, and if
they ever "originated" their origin must have
coincided at least with the beginning of the
species. They are the "human quality" of the
human being, the specifically human form his
activities take. This specific form is hered-
itary and is already present in the germ-plasm
(Vol. IX-A, p. 78).

The hope expressed earlier then that Jung's ideas on the way

in which myths originate would prove to be the clue to solving the

riddle of the origin of the archetypes proves to be unjustified, and

we are left without a definitive answer to where the archetypes come

from. Jung is naturally quite happy to abandon questions of ulti-

mate origin to the sphere of metaphysics: "Whether this psychic








structure and its elements, the archetypes, ever 'originated' at all

is a metaphysical question and therefore unanswerable" (Vol. IX-A,

p. 101; and . it is impossible to say where the archetype comes

from, because there is no Archimedean point outside the a prior con-

ditions it represents" (Vol. IX-A, p. 69, note 27).8

But perhaps Jung should not be let off so easily. For rather

than postulating that the archetypes are sort of an ultimate psychic

fact for which no explanation in terms of more basic psychological

theory is possible, it seems evident that, heuristically at least,

we must seek an answer to the question of how it is that the psyche

structures experiences in terms of the archetypes instead of other

simpler modes. Perhaps, as Jung seems to think, the archetypes will

eventually prove to be an ultimate mystery for human. consciousness,

but from the scientific point of view this can not be assumed.


Archetypal Tiage and Archetype Per Se
The claim that the archetypes are ultimately inaccessible must

be further examined. For many difficult points in the articulation

of Jung's theory of archetypes seem to hinge on distinguishing be-

teen the unreachable archetype per se and the archetypal image.

The archetype per se was said to be not truly part of the psyche at

all but rather psychoid and to be incapable of consciousness. As a

consequence it was said to be unobservable in principle. The essen-

tial question in this regard would seem to be how such claims as the

above can be justified from the empirical point of view.

But that nothing in principle would count as a direct observation

of an archetype is a result of the total conceptual framework of the

archetypal theory, which as a whole is grounded empirically. In this








respect it would seem not to differ significantly from other

scientific theories. Moreover, if from the behaviorist point of

view, the suggestion is made to do away with the hypothetical

construct of the archetype per se and instead speak only of arche-

typal images, the reply is that this move would mean that a theory

of archetypes is no longer possible. For there must be postulated

an underlying common collective aspect to the psyches of individuals

which idll mate the archetypal manifestations more than personalistic

and idiosyncratic products. W'hat counts as evidentially conclusive

for the presence of archetypes then is just the appearance of con-

tents which prove to constitute universal themes or motifs which can

be recognized in contexts which transcend the individual's personal

sphere of reference. Unless the archetypes are to be reduced to the

merely personal then, there must be postulated an archetype per se

which will be the transpersonal organizing principle for the personal

and culturally determined archetypal manifestation.

It is better on the whole to think of the archetype per se as

a principle or disposition rather than as an entity, i.e., something

which can be clearly distinguished as an individual thing. Thus

Jung says that the phenomenological material does not justify any-

thing other than the postulation of principles which act to form

distinct archetypal images, without it being possible to conclude

anything definite about the nature of the archetype per se.

Ttien one carefully considers this accumulation
of data, it begins to seem probable that an
archetype in its quiescent, unprojected state
has no exactly determinable form but is in it-
self an indefinite structure which can assume
definite forms only in projection (Vol. I-A,
p. 70).








Moreover, this uncertainty about the nature of the archetype per

se extends even so far as to leave undetermined the number of arche-

types and the point of differentiation between one archetype and

another.

Ehpirically speaking, we are dealing all the
time with "types," definite forms that can be
named and distinguished. But as soon as you
divest these types of the phenomenology pre-
sented by the case material, and try to ex-
amine them in relation to other archetypal forms,
they branch out into such far-reaching ramifi-
cations in the history of symbols that one comes
to the conclusion that the basic psychic ele-
ments are infinitely varied and ever changing,
so as utterly to defy our powers of imagination
(Vol. IX-A, p. 70).

Although helhe investigatoJ is forced, for
epistemological reasons, to postulate an in-
definite number of distinct and separate arche-
types, yet he is constantly overcome by doubt
as to how far they are really distinguishable
from one another. They overlap to such a de-
gree and have such a capacity for combination
that all attempts to isolate them conceptually
must appear hopeless (Vol. XI, p. 288).

In considering the problem of the nature of the archetype per

se, Kant's influence on Jung's views must again be acknowledged.

For Jung accepts the Kantian distinction between the thing-in-itself

and that which appears. In these terms then the archetype per se

is held to be inaccessible on analogy with Kant's noumenon, where-

as the archetypal image is that which appears in the phenomenal

realm.9

The existence of a transcendental reality is
indeed evident in itself . . That the world
inside and outside ourselves rests on a trans-
cendental background is as certain as our oim
existence, but it is equally certain that the
direct perception of the archetypal world inside
us is just as doubtfully correct as that of the
physical outside us (Vol. fXV, p. 551).








hien I say "atom" I am talking of the model made of
it; when I say "archetype I am talking of ideas
corresponding to it, but never of the thing-in-
itself, which in both cases is a transcendental
mystery. . One must therefore assume that
the effective archetypal ideas, including our
model of the archetype, rests on something actual
even though unknowable, just as the model of the
atom rests on certain unknowable qualities of
matter (letters, Vol. II, p. 54, letter to H.
Haberlandt dated 23 April 1952).

However, it is unnecessary to follow Jung's Kantian way of

construing the archetype per se. For rather than implicating the

archetypal theory rith a problematic phenomena/noumena distinction,

we can interpret the archetype per se as an unobservable hypothe-

tical construct. Thus, although Jung holds that the archetype

per se is an ultimate mystery, the archetypal theory only requires

that it be the unobservable and mostly unknown structuring prin-

ciple responsible for the archetypal image.

To any case, our efforts to discover the nature of the archetype

directly are frustrated since the archetypal image always reflects the

personal history of the consciousness in which it is embodied. Thus when

we attempt to abstract the archetype itself from its personal and cul-

tural matrix, the result is that the distinctiveness of the archetype

vanishes, and we can no longer say what it would be like in itself.

But if the archetype is then essentially an "irrepresentable form," the

question is how ie are to distinguish collective archetypal manifestations

from merely personal contents of consciousness. It would seem that there

must be definite phenomenological differences between the archetypal

images and other contents if we are to be justified in speaking of the

existence of a collective unconscious containing archetypes. For in the

absence of any common features which the individual archetypes manifest in








every person, we must have general criteria for recognizing what con-

stitutes an archetypal content.

As previously mentioned in the example of an archetypal dream,

archetypal images characteristically have an alien, impersonal char-

acter so that they do not appear to be contents which were once con-

scious and then forgotten or repressed. But this does not mean that

the contents attributed to the collective unconscious contain images

which the dreamer can not recognize at all. Rather it seems that

the strange and alien contents amount to fantastic rearrangements

of items of experience already knotn to the dreamer. If one dreams

of God, for example, the image may be conveyed as that of the figure

of Superman. The archetypal images are for the most part then some-

thing familiar appearing in an unfamiliar context. Thus mythological

motifs may appear in dreams but with modern substitutes for the prin-

ciple characters.

I'e have only to disregard the dependence of dream
language on environment and substitute "eagle" for
"aeroplane," "dragon" for "automobile" or "train,"
"snake-bite" for "injection," and so forth, in
order to arrive at the more universal and more
fundamental language of mythology (Vol. XI, 289).

It would be perhaps advantageous to distinguish the objective

from the subjective aspects of the phenomenology of archetypes.

Subjectively the archetypal appearance is characterized by its sym-

bolic qualities. It has an aura of numinosity and seems to point

beyond itself to an uniknom. From the third person point of view,

however, the symbolic nature of the archetype is less evident as we

have to do only with a content of consciousness whose origin is

unknown, so that what may appear objectively to be a symbol may

upon closer examination prove to be a sign with a simple representational








explanation.

In order to verify the presence of an archetype then, both the

views of introspection and extraspection are necessary.10 The sym-

bolic nature of the person's experience and his for the most part

absence of personal association to the material is taken into

account along with the presence of the sane theme or motif in mater-

ial dramu from the history of symbols. The ability of these his-

torical parallels to provide an explanation of the meaning of the

otherwise inexplicable content is then the crucial factor justifying

the employment of the archetypal hypothesis. Ihen such a procedure

provides the most plausible explanation for the presence of contents

of consciousness, we can say that an archetype is present.

Rather than taking one particular image or dream in isolation,

however, the determination of which contents are said to be arche-

typal is best arrived at with an examination of a series of dreams

or other similar experiences. In this way the margin of error in-

volved in any introspective evaluation is lessened. Then we are also

able to see how the alleged archetype functions in more than one con-

text. From the objective point of view, it is not so much how the

supposed archetype appears as what it does and how it functions that

is crucial for deciding about the presence of archetypes. This is

especially so since the archetypes often appear as images which are

themselves ordinary although the role they play in the dream as a

whole is archetypal. For example, the images of actual persons

knoun to the dreamer may function as archetypal images.11

Although there is thus no definite objective criteria by which

one can identify archetypal images out of the context of the function







they play in particular manifestations, Jung does give us an idea

of the objective features which as a matter of fact are associated

with the appearance of mary archetypes.

-An unfallible sign of collective images
seems to be the appearance of the "cosmic"
element, i.e., the images in the dream or
fantasy are connected with cosmic qualities,
such as temporal and spatial infinity, enor-
mous speed and extension of movement, "astro-
logical" associations, telluric, lunar, and
solar analogies, changes in the proportions
of the body, etc. The obvious occurrence of
oythological and religious motifs in a dream
also points to the activity of the collective
unconscious. The collective element is very
often announced by peculiar symptoms, as for
example by dreams where the dreamer is flying
through space like a comet, or feels that he
is the earth, or the sun, or a star; or else
is of immense size, or dwarfishly small; or
that he is dead, is in a strange place, is a
stranger to himself, confused, mad, etc. (Vol.
VII, p. 160).

On the whole, the fantastic nature of the archetypal imagery

often bears an alarming similarity to or even identity with the

symptoms of schizophrenia. But the schizophrenic, although he has

gained an access to the collective unconscious, has been figurative-

ly spealdng swallowed up by it, so that he has lost the ability to

function as an ego and relate in a practical iay to the objective

world. In a sense he is unable to wake from his symbolic fantasies,

so that they are more symptoms of psychic brealadown than they are

numinous symbols which can be meaningfUly integrated into the total

pattern of his life.

The difference between archetypes and the dis-
sociated products of schizophrenia is that the
former are entities endowed with personality
and charged with meaning, whereas the latter are
only fragments with vestiges of meaning--in
reality, they are products of disintegration
(Vol. VIII, p. 122).







The phenomenology of the archetypal manifestation is often of

imAediate therapeutic relevance as the contents of the unconscious

take on dark and menacing aspects when the point of view which they

represent is not being acknowledged by the conscious mind.

The guise in which these figures appear depends
on the attitude of the conscious mind: if it is
negative toward the unconscious, the animals will
be frightening; if positive, they appear as the
"helpful animals" of fairytale and legend (Vol.
V, p. 181).

In the form in which the archetypes appear is thus influenced

by the attitude of the conscious mind, it would seem that the man-

ifestation of the archetypes are not random and due to chance but

that their appearance is conditioned by certain necessary circum-

stances in the individual. Moreover, an understanding of these

conditions should shed light on the nature of the relationship

between the collective and personal aspects of the psyche. For

by calling the collective unconscious the impersonal and objective

portion of the psyche, the integral part this aspect of the uncon-

scious plays in the life of the individual is not given adequate

consideration. In this regard we find then that the archetypes

behave in an analogous fashion to other contents of the unconscious

in the sense that their appearance functions in a compensatory

fashion to consciousness. That is, the unconscious supplies con-

tents which compensate the conscious attitude by representing fea-

tures of the person's total situation which are overlooked, re-

pressed or undervalued by the conscious personality. The appearance

of the archetype then usually indicates the need for a collective

compensation. Itat this means is that the true nature of the per-

son's situation corresponds to a universal and typical human pattern,







so that what it is that is missing from the person's conscious

attitude is an understanding of the broader human perspective which

an appreciation of the basic patterns of human exd.stence would give.

The archetypal structure of the unconscious
corresponds to the average run of events. The
changes that mny befall a man are not infinitely
variable; they are variations of certain typical
occurrences which are limited in number. Ihen
therefore a distressful situation arises, the
corresponding archetype will be constellated in
the unconscious (Vol. V, p. 294).

One instructive example to make clearer the meaning of collec-

tive compensation can be drawn from Jung's work on the UFO pheno-

menon. After extensive research lasting a decade, Jung concluded

that the UFO phenomenon represented a sort of modern myth in which

the Archetype of the Self, an archetype expressing "order, deliver-

ance, salvation and wholeness" (Vol. X, p. 328), was being projected

into the heavens. Although unable to reach a definite conclusion

about the physical reality of the reported objects, Jung makes a

convincing case for the activation of the Self archetype as a com-

pensation for the ominous world situation following ltrld War II in

which nuclear annihilation seemed possible at any moment.

It have here a golden opportunity of seeing how
a legend is formed, and how in a difficult and
dark time for humanity a miraculous tale grows
up of an attempted intervention by extra-terrestial
"heavenly" powers . (Vol. X, pages 322-323).

The Archetype of the Self then functions to direct attention

within to the possibility of the realization of an inner center of

order and personal unity. V&th the world threatened with destruction,

the Self can provide an inward source of meaning and unity.

Archetypal manifestations are thus the compensatory response of







the unconscious to typical human situations, with the response being

a representation of an inherent pattern of human functioning. In

this way the archetype supplies the insight of a universal perspec-

tive to what are universally experienced problems.12 This enables

the individual then to grasp the meaning of his situation in its

more than personal aspect. If actual persons appear in archetypal

guise in dreams, for example, we can see that the activation of some

universal human pattern is complicating the personal interrelationship.

If a knotm girl appears as the archetype of the anima then, she also

represents a vehicle of symbolic projection.13


The Archetypes as Autonomous Factors

In our investigation of the conditions under which the archetypes

come into consciousness, we have emphasized the similarity of behav-

ior of archetypes to other contents of consciousness in that their

appearance is the result of the overall compensatory influence of

the unconscious. In this regard it must also be pointed out that

the archetypes behave in a similar fashion to the complexes of the

personal unconscious, i.e., they are autonomous factors. Thus,

although archetypes as a rule arise in response to the needs of the

individual, the end result of their activation may be that the arche-

type subjugates or even possesses the person.

The archetypes are then not only objects of consciousness but

also subjects which can be described as having intentionalities which

may oppose that of the ego personality.

They are spontaneous phenomena which are not subject
to our will, and we are therefore justified in
ascribing to them a certain autonomy. They are to
be regarded not only as objects but as subjects
with laws of their own. From the point of view








of consciousness, we can, of course, describe
them as objects, and even explain them up to
a point, in the same measure as we can describe
and explain a living human being. But then
we have to disregard their autonomy. If that
is considered, we are compelled to treat. them
as subjects; in other words, we have to admit
that they possess spontaneity and purposiveness,
or a kind of consciousness and free will. Ie
observe their behaviour and consider their state-
ments. This dual standpoint, which we are forced
to adopt towards every relatively independent or-
ganism, naturally has a dual result. On the
one hand it tells me what I do to the object,
and on the other hand what it does (possibly
to me) (Vol. XL, p. 362).

In describing the archetypes as autonomous factors, Jung

wants to hold to the distinction between the complexes as contents

of the personal unconscious and the archetypes of a collective un-

conscious. For the word "complex" is used primarily to refer to

the autonomous contents of personal origin, to those contents which

develop ontogenetically. The archetype, on the other hand, is in-

herited and thus seems impersonal in the sense that it can not be

explained in the terms of the person's own life history. Naturally,

this clear separation between the personal and collective aspects

of the unconscious is in reality always more or less an interrelation.

For the complexes appear to have an archetypal nucleus and the arche-

types are always manifested in images made up out of combinations

drawn from the individual's store of experience. Nevertheless, it is

still possible in practise to discriminate between those contents of

consciousness which owe their origin primarily to the individual and

his experience from those which lare impersonal and which point beyond

the individual.

The archetype behaves like a complex then in that it is a locus

of thoughts, feelings and images which function in a unified way as







a sort of personality. Rather than indicating that the archetypes

are actually entities outside man, however, the personification which

the archetypal images manifest are typical of autonomous contents which

exist in the unconscious without being integrated with the conscious

personality. The less acknowledgement and understanding an unconscious

element is accorded then, the more it tends to function independently

of the conscious personality and even assume the characteristics of a

personality itself. And since the archetypes are symbolic, numinous

factors which do not originate from one's personal experience, the

ability to integrate them into one's personality has definite limita-

tions. They are, in fact, wider than the individual; they have a

universal collective meaning which the individual can only partici-

pate in but can not hope to completely assimilate. There is often the

real danger that the archetypes will even assimilate the ego person-

ality. "It is perfectly possible, psychologically, for the uncon-

scious or an archetype to take complete possession of a man and to

determine his fate down to the smallest detail" (Vol. XI, p. 409).

Plausible examples of this phenomenon are to be seen in the lives

of Christ and Hitler.

The archetypes seem to have a dual nature, being potentialities

for both evil as well as good. Thus what to one person proves to be

a healing experience giving meaning to life, may prove to another

less stable consciousness to be a source of evil, disorientation or

madness.

Among the most common archetypes which show a distinct personality

are the shadow archetype and the anima and animus. The shadow is a

representation of the personal unconscious as a whole and usually




75


embodies the compensating values to those held by the conscious per-

sonality. Thus the shadow often represents one's dark side, those

aspects of oneself which exist but which one does not acknowledge

or identify with. In dreams it may appear as a dark figure of an

Arab or Negro of the same sex as the dreamer.14

The anima archetype appears in men and is his primordial image

of woman. It represents the man's biological expectation of women

but also is a symbol of a man's feminine possibilities, his counter-

sexual tendencies. The experiences of one's mother and other actual

women are a third contributing factor to the form of the archetype.

The anima often appears in dreams as a strange or unkn on woman.

The animus archetype, the analogous image of the masculine which

occurs in women, may appear as a series of strange men.15

The personification of the above archetypes is often of such a

distinct character that dialogues of significant therapeutic value can

be carried on between the ego and the shadow or anima/animus in the

conscious state. This form of communication with the unconscious,

popularized by the method of Gestalt Therapy, was enthusiastically

recommended by Jung (Vol. VII, p. 201).

In addition to the archetypes mentioned above, there are many

other archetypes which appear in personified form notably the Old

I.se Ien, the Great Hbther, the Earth Mother, the Divine Child and

the Archetype of the Self. However, any attempt to give an exhaus-

tive list of the archetypes would be a largely futile exercise since

the archetypes tend to combine with each other and interchange qua-

lities making it difficult to decide where one archetype stops and

another begins. For example, qualities of the shadow archetype may








be prominent in an archetypal image of the anima or animus.

One archetype may also appear in various distinct forms, thus

raising the question whether four or five distinct archetypes should

be said to be present or merely four or five forms of a single type.

There would then seem to be no decision procedure for determining the

exact boundaries of an individual archetype. For what is to count

as a typical situation and thus indicate the presence of an arche-

type can not be decided a priori, so that for instance ire can not

determine on the basis of general considerations that there must be

so many archetypes. And from the phenomenological point of view,

the appearance of distinct types of archetypal images does not per-

mit us to conclude anything definite about how many archetypes per

se there may be. Therefore, it would seem evident that the complete

cataloguing of the archetypes thereby determining their exact number

is an irresolvable matter and an unreasonable expectation of the

archetypal theory.

In addition to the personified forms mentioned above, there are

many archetypes which do not appear in personal form. For example,

the Archetype of the Self may be manifested as a stone, diamond,

flower or as a four-sided figure. Animals, plants and natural ob-

jects such as the wind, a lake or a mountain may also figure into

archetypal images. There is in fact no determinate condition re-

gulating what form an archetype must assume. This is not to say,

however, that there are not definite conditions an image must

satisfy in order to count as archetypal. But these conditions de-

pend more on the function of the image in the overall context of

the manifestation than they do on the specific form.




If


ith regard to the question of personification, a paradoxical

situation seems to exist since Jung says that all autonomous contents

of the unconscious are personified. "All autonomous psychic factors

have the character of personality . (Vol. I, p. 42). On the

other hand, the archetypes, which presumably are all more or less

capable of autonomous function in the unconscious, do not all appear

in the form of persons. It would seem clear then that personification

is being used in a general sense to mean ascription of traits of per-

sonality to an entity rather than implying that what is personified

must appear as a distinct personality or in the form of a person.


Archetypes and Synchronicity

In our discussion of the phenomenology of the archetypes, dreams

have been emphasized as a characteristic state of consciousness in

which the archetypes come into awareness. Fantasies and visions are

other altered states of consciousness in which archetypes frequently ap-

pear. But in addition to these modes of manifesting themselves,

Jung states that the archetypes may also affect nonpsychic physical

processes. This effect of the archetypes is described by Jung's

theory of synchronicity. In synchronistic events then, there is a

meaningful correspondence between a physical event and a psychic con-

tent with the possibility of a causal connection between the two

having been ruled out. These events are the often recorded meaning-

ful coincidences which seem to defy understanding in terms of either

causality or chance.

An example Jung describes from his therapeutic work serves to

illustrate these ideas.








A young woman I was treating had, at a critical
moment, a dream in which she was given a golden
scarab. Ittiile she was telling me this dream I
sat with my back to the closed window. Suddenly
I heard a noise behind me, like a gentle tapping.
I turned round and saw a flying insect knocking
against the window-pane from outside. I opened
the window and caught the creature in the air
as it flew in. It was the nearest analogy to
a golden scarab that one finds in our latitudes,
a scarabaeid beetle, the common rose-chafer
(Cetonia aurata), which contrary to its usual
habits had evidently felt an urge to get into
a dark room at this particular moment (Vol.
VIII, p. 438).

There would seem to be no plausibility of attempting a causal

explanation here, although chance seems a possible rational explana-

tion. Other examples of synchronistic events, however, seem to

eliminate the possibility of the meaningful coincidence being the

result of the chance intersection of random events. The best

illustration of synchronicity where chance is ruled out occurs in

experiments attempting to verify the phenomenon of extrasensory

perception, ESP. These tests using card guessing techniques are

sometimes structured so that the subject tries to guess the se-

quence of a deck of cards before they are shuffled by a randomizing

machine. As the subject is guessing the sequence of a future order

of the cards, this of course also eliminates the possibility that

the order of the cards can have a causal effect on the mental state

of the subject. The overall results of this type of experiment re-

vealed a probability of reproducing the same results by chance as

1:4OO,000 (Vol. VIII, p. 433). In another experiment one person

guessed all twenty-five cards in the deck correctly after they had

been shuffled, indicating a probability of 1:298,023,223,876,953,125

(Vol. VIII, p. 433).








In the ESP tests the meaningful coincidence is between a con-

tent of consciousness, the person's idea of what cards will appear,

and the actual order of the cards. The archetypal theory comes into

play then as Jung says that an archetype is manifesting itself syn-

chronously in both a psychic content and a physical process. The

term "synchronous" is used instead of simultaneous in the formulation

of the synchronistic hypothesis to indicate that the meaningful coin-

cidence between the psychic and physical events need not occur at

exactly the same time. The physical event can be slightly before

or after the psychic content.

In the ESP examples, it is the archetype of magical effect, the

expectation that a miraculous event can occur, which seems to be at

work.16 Evidence for this is the fact that the results of the ex-

periments are positively correlated with the emotional state of the

subject, so that an enthusiastic, hopeful subject can score well

above chance probability at the beginning of the experiments; and

then his score will move toward the chance probability as the novelty

of the experiments lessen, or if he becomes bored or depressed (Vol.

VIII, p. 434).

The archetypal influence is clearly seen in the first example

given. The woman patient was at a crisis point in her analysis due

to a too narrow rationalistic view which did not leave her sufficiently

open to the possibility of change which could result from tald.ng ser-

iously the irrationally produced contents of the unconscious. The

meaningful coincidence was then the turning point in this regard and

produced the needed change in attitude allowing the analysis to pro-

gress to a successful conclusion. The scarab motif, moreover, is a







classic symbol of rebirth (Vol. VIII, p. 439) so that it would seem

that the patient's situation of impasse had constellated the arche-

type of rebirth and renewal.

Jung postulates that an archetypal ordering principle is at work

in these instances of synchronicity bringing about a situation in

which an outer event and a psychic content are expressions of the

same meaning. The archetypes in these cases seem to be localized

as much in matter and in the environment as they are in the psyches

of individuals.

The psychoid archetype has a tendency to behave
as though it were not localized in one person
but were active in the whole environment (Vol.
X, pages 451l-452).
. the archetypes are not found exclusively
in the psychic sphere, but can occur just as
much in circumstances that are not psychic
(equivalence of an outward physical process
with a psychic one) (Vol. VIII, p. $15).

In using the designation "psychoid" for the archetypes, it

seems that Jung wanted to imply that the archetypes could be mani-

fested in nonpsychic ways, specifically influencing matter. This

use of "psychoid" does not have the same implications as when the
17
instincts are said to be psychoid. In the case of the instincts,

the psychoid label describes a sort of interface region between

the psyche and the physiological processes. . term 'psychoid'

. meant to distinguish a category .of events from merely vitalistic

phenomena on the one hand and from specifically psychic processes on

the other" (Vol. VIII, p. 177). ;But the archetype "with its psychoid

nature, forms the bridge to matter in general" (Vol. VIII, p. 216). The

psychoid archetype therefore seems to be "quasi-psychic" in the special







sense that it may be independent of the body.

Synchronicity postulates a meaning which is a
prior in relation to human consciousness and
apparently exists outside man. . the possi-
bility that synchronicity is not only a psycho-
physical phenomenon but might also occur without
the participation of the human psyche . .
(Vol. VIII, pages 501-502, note 71).

It may well be a prejudice to restrict the
psyche to being "inside the body" (Vol. UIV,
p. 300).

The phenomena which Jung describes in his theory of synchro-

nicity undoubtedly exist and his efforts to take account of these

events in his overall theory of the psyche seems a worthwhile and

needed endeavor. However, as we have previously stated, the notion

that there can be a psyche independent of a body and archetypes

which persist outside of man is a postulate which can not be un-

problematically integrated in a consistent way with Jung's theory

of archetypes as a whole. Perhaps the ESP phenomena and the other

events associated with synchronicity will eventually lead to a new

scientific model of the universe. But as this major revolution in

the basic theories of science has yet to come about, the best plan

for trying to gain a coherent understanding of the idea of the arche-

type is, as we have previously argued, to parenthesize the postula-

tion of archetypes existing outside man and to regard this idea as

one possible theoretical extension of the archetypal notion which

has yet to be successfully integrated into the overall theory.

Moreover, the interpretational approach we have used in trying

to grasp the meaning of Jung's archetypes has not had to assume that

archetypes exist outside of man. The overall success of this approach

in making the archetypes comprehensible is perhaps a matter to be








left to the judgment of the reader. However, in taking into account

the full panaroma of Jung' s utterances on the archetypes, it has

been necessary only twice to mention this possibility as a way of

understanding the archetypal theory.

So far as the assertion that the archetypes have a psychoid

characteristic is considered then, this may perhaps best be ren-

dered to mean that the archetypes manifest themselves in a psychic

way but seem to be more than psychic or not only psychic. Wtat this

quality may eventually prove to be would seem part of the puzzle of

the nature of the archetype per se. But this way of conceiving the

psychoid characteristic of the archetypes need not imply that they

exist outside of or independently of man.

In any event, the concept of the archetype is not logically

tied to the notion of synchronicity. Although synchronicity may

well require something like an archetypal hypothesis to make it

intelligible, the reverse is certainly not the case.18


Archetypes and Temporality

One final topic which must be taken up before our exposition of

the archetypal theory is complete is the aspect of the changes in

archetypes through time. Two distinct questions seem to be involved.

In the first place, are there emergent archetypes, that is, do new

archetypes come into being in response to the changing situation of

man? Secondly, how can we account for the changes that archetypes

manifest through time as, for example, the changes that the God

archetype undergoes when the Jehovah of the Old Testament is ex-

perienced as the Christian Trinity and Devil?








It seems evident that an answer to our first question must hinge

on our idea of the origin of the archetypes. As will be remembered,

it was concluded in this regard that the archetypes are inherited

in a similar fashion to other biological structures. If we take

changes in archetypes as being strictly analogous to the way that

the body changes through evolution, we would expect that the chance

of new archetypes coming into being through the evolutionary process

constitutes a very low probability. For the evolutionary process

works in an accumulatory fashion in the sense that the origins of

new structures occurs, as a rule, as an addition to the pattern of

the existing genotype. Highly evolved creatures then tend to be

more complex organisms. Moreover, as a structure becomes highly

evolved, there is less probability of major changes occurring in

it since the chance that single mutations in the genotype will

lead to an improvement in the overall structure compatible with

the rest of the existing genotype is very small. bb would not

expect then the appearance of human beings with new basic struc-

tures for the body, a third eye or an extra limb. These occurrences

would be monstrosities rather than improvements to be passed on to

the next generation. Analogously, the origin of new archetypes

through evolution would seem unlikely, especially in the light of

the basic structuring function that the archetypes are held to play

in the psyche. The archetypes are the phylogenetically old aspects

of the psyche and hence those parts least liable to be changed to

the overall benefit of the organism.

A contemporary man is thus genetically very similar to what man

was like ten thousand years ago, and no radical changes in the overall







pattern of inherited human behavior are to be expected, at least not

for the next few millenia. Moreover, what would a new typical human

situation be like corresponding to which a now archetype could arise?

It would seem clear that any changes in the basic human situation would

only be variations of situations which have existed cotemporously with

the emergence of man as a species.

If from phylogenetic considerations we then reject the practical

possibility of the formation of new archetypes through the evolution-

ary process, the observed changes in archetypal manifestation through

time must be explained from the ontogenetic viewpoint, as the result

of cultural and individual development. The changes in archetypal

manifestation do not thereby indicate a change in the archetype it-

self. By comparison we might consider the human brain which genet-

ically is basically the same structure as it was thousands of years

ago at the damw of civilization. fMdern man's degree of conscious-

ness and his overall conception of reality is, however, far differ-

ent today than it was then, as we see reflected in the development

of culture. The cruial importance of the ontogenetic influence in

giving shape and content to the archetypal disposition must then

not be underestimated, as the basic patterning influence of the

archetype itself can take on a seemingly limitless variety of forms.

Although there can be no new archetypes, there can be new sym-

bols and new myths. The UFO phenomenon is a particularly instruc-

tive example in this regard.

It is characteristic of our time that the
archetype, in contrast to its previous mani-
festations, should now take the form of an
object, a technological construction, in order
to avoid the odiousness of mythological per-
sonification (Vol. X, p. 328).








It is then the interaction between the conscious and uncon-

scious aspects of the psyche that accounts for the changes in arche-

types across time. For with the development of consciousness

through the agency of culture, the archetypal images undergo a

gradual transformation. This is, moreover, what would be expected

if the archetypes are to function as compensatory agents for the

conscious attitude.



1
1 As will become apparent as we proceed, this hope will, not be
fulfilled. It is only in Jung's earlier writing that he attempts to
explain how archetypes originate through ideas about the origins of
myths. However, due to the fact that Jung's views on this matter
become implicated with ideas about the inheritance of acquired
characteristics, this earlier view merits full discussion.
2
In the above we have not distinguished the spiritual from
the religious, as in the previous discussion of the spiritual when
the latter tenm referred to the archetypal manifestation and
"religious" to the product of collective consciousness. Jung does
not always use these terms in a consistent way, although from the
contert it is usually clear whether he is referring to the indivi-
dual or the collective manifestation.
3
However, it is easy to fall into the opposite error of seeing
alchemy solely as a philosophico-religious enterprise and thus fail
to appreciate the important role which alchemical work has played in
the history of chemistry. Jung, in his work with the psychological
significance of alchemical symbols, is particularly open to this
criticism that he has overemphasized the psychological aspect of
alchemy while failing to give due credit to the naturalistic and
practical aspects of the art.
The term "mechanicomorphize" is taken from Joseph F.
Pychlak, A Philosophy of Science for Personality Theory (Boston:
Houghton ILfflin, 1968, 7 p 7. is also possible to take the
opposite approach(to anthropomorphiqsj and assign non-human char-
acteristics to human organisms. Some psychologists feel that
the behaviorist does this when he 'mechanicomorphizes' man . . "

Richard Semon, RThe Te& (New York: MacMillan, 1921), p. 11.
6 Dbid., p. 12.







7
This transition apparently occurred sometime between 1925
and 1935.
It is evident that by saying in effect that the question of
the origin of the archetypes is not a useful one to ask, Jung is
attempting to avoid the stigma of the doctrine of inheritance of
acquired characteristics. For from the Lamarckian point of view,
it makes sense to ask how the archetypes come to be in the psyche
and to postulate possible environmental causative conditions. 1Ith
his withdrawal from implicit support of the Lamarckian position,
Jung sees no point to raising the question. However, asking about
the origin of archetypes need not imply a Lamarckian answer. One
might legitimately wish to know whether archetypes have a natural,
biological origin or nonnatural origin as result of intervention
by spiritual agencies. Jung speculates about the possibility of
the latter alternative in the following:
The question is nothing less than this: Does
the psychic in general--the soul or spirit or
the unconscious--originate in us, or is the
psyche, in the early stages of conscious evolu-
tion, actually outside us in the form of ar-
bitrary powers with intentions of their on, and
does it gradually take its place within us in the
course of psychic development? . This whole
idea strikes us as dangerously paradoxical, but,
at bottom, it is not altogether inconceivable
(Vol. I, pages 69-70).

The application of the Kantian phenomena/noumena distinction
to the problem of archetype per se versus archetypal image is not
unproblematic. For the appeal to the archetype per se as the prin-
ciple responsible for the archetypal image would seem to imply the
attribution of qualities to the thing-in-itself, i.e., that the latter
was real and had certain effects. Thus, if we take the archetype
per se as strictly analogous to the thing-in-itself, we end up
attributing properties to that which from Kant's viewpoint we are
not supposed to be able to attribute anything at all. See thrard
Casey's article "Towards An Archetypal Imagination" in r 1974,
p. 29).
10
I0 are using the word "extraspection" in the sense ascribed
to it by Joseph F. irchlak in A Philosonhy of Sience for Personality
eory page 27: "If a theorist takes an extraspective perspective
or frame of reference, he defines his abstractions from his vantage
point as observer, regardless of the point of view of the object of
study."

11 In this portion of a dream of Jung's, for example, the
shadow archetype appears as "Dr. Y. and his son." ~breover, the
image of Jung's father also plays an archetypal role in the dream.
3h contrast to the relationship Jung had with his real father, this
symbolic father acts as a guide to the mysteries of the unconscious.








It started with my paying a visit to my long-
deceased father. He was living in the country--
I did not knoo where. I sar a house in the
style of the eighteenth century, very roomy,
with several rather large outbuildings. . .
Itr father guarded these as custodian.
He was, as I soon discovered, not only the
custodian but also a distinguished scholar
in his omm right--which he had never been in
his lifetime. I met him in his study, and,
oddly enough, Dr. Y.--'who was about my age--
and his son, both psychiatrists, were also
present. I do not Imow whether I had asked
a question or whether my father wanted to
explain something of his own accord, but in
any case he fetched a big Bible down from a
shelf, a heavy folio volume like the Yerian
Bible in my library. The Bible my father
held was bound in shiny fishsldn. He opened
it at the Old Testament--I guessed that he
turned to the Pentateuch--and began inter-
preting a certain passage. He did this so
swiftly and so learnedly that I could not
follow him. I noted only that what he said
betrayed a vast amount of variegated knowledge,
the significance of which I dimly apprehended
but could not properly judge or grasp. I saw
that Dr. Y. understood nothing at all, and
his son began to laugh. They thought that
my father was going off the deep end and what
he said was simply senile prattle. . .
The two psychiatrists represented a limited
medical point of view which, of course, also
infects me as a physician. They represent
my shadow--first and second editions of the
shadow, father and son (Ibmories Dreams
Reflections, pages 217-218).
12
In talking in this way about the insight of a universal per-
spective, there is a temptation to speak in terms of the "wisdom"
of the unconscious. In regard to collective compensation then,
we must be careful to avoid the misunderstanding that this type of
language implies that the unconscious is a sort of higher con-
sciousness which purposively guides the personality to its destina-
tion. For the sort of "guidance" which the unconscious provides
is that which results from the worldngs of a natural process which
itself has no end in view. Jung makes this point in a discussion
concerning compensation by the unconscious.
Yet it would, in my view, be wrong to suppose that in
such cases the unconscious is wording to a deliberate
and concerted plan and is striving to realize certain
definite ends. I have found nothing to support this
assumption. The driving force, so far as it is








possible for us to grasp it, seems to be in
essence only an urge towards self-realization.
If it were a matter of some general teleologi-
cal plan, then all individuals who enjoy a sur-
plus of unconsciousness would necessarily be
driven towards higher consciousness by an
irresistible urge (Vol. VII, p. 184).
13 The anima is in part man's inner image of woman. See page 75
for further characterization of the anima archetype.
14 this generalization is primarily based on the dream material
of Caucasians. Do the shadows of Negroes and other racial groups then
appear as figures with white skin? To my knowledge this question
has not been resolved through empirical studies.
Although the content of all the archetypes is conditioned
by the individual's personal experience, the shadow and the anima/
animus differ from the other archetypes in the fact that their
content is more directly relatable to the person's personal situa-
tion than the other archetypes. In terms of the analogy of depth
then, these archetypes occupy a position intermediate between con-
sciousness and the personal unconscious and the other aspects of
the collective unconsciousness.
16 See Ira Progoff, JunM Synchronicity, and Human Destin
(Hew York: Delta, 1973), p. 106.
Since causation has been ruled out, the question might well
be raised how the "influence" of the archetype can then be made
intelligible. It would seem that some sort of larlike ordering
principle must be postulated not involving a cause and effect
relationship between the objective event and the correlated internal
state of expectancy. Ilaldng clear how the archetype is supposed to
function as this ordering principle is one of the major conceptual
ambiguities which must be resolved in order to make synchronicity
into a viable explanatory hypothesis.
17
Compare use of psychoid as discussed on page 13.

Since the position taken here is that a rational recon-
struction of the archetypal theory is not committed to the task of
a rational reconstruction of synchronicity, we will not attempt a
critical assessment of synchronicity in this study. In order to
carry out that task, several crucial questions would have to be
considered. In addition to the problem of making archetypal
"influence" intelligible, additional clarification is needed as
how the crucial distinction between coincidence and meaningful
coincidence can be made operationally sound. Questions can also
be raised as to the validity of Rhine's statistical procedures
and results. See C.E.M. Hansel's ESP (New York: Scribner, 1966).














CHAPTER 4
CRITICISMS OF THE ARCHETYPAL THEORY: GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS



Preliminary Remarks


The exposition of Jung's concept of the archetype having now

been completed, it is the objective of the second half of this study

to consider criticisms of the theory. To an extent we have anticipated

this task in the first half. For in order to rationally reconstruct

Jung's concept of the archetype, it has proved necessary on occasion

to distinguish between essential aspects of the idea and other aspects

which although linked by Jung on occasion with discussion of arche-

types would, if explored in terms of their full implications, lead

to a situation of either obvious inconsistency or hopeless obscurity

and confusion concerning what is meant to be implied by the concept

of an archetype.

As the chief case in point, we have interpreted the archetypes

naturalistically in the sense that it was assummd that they occur as

a natural phenomenon of man rather than as subsistent entities with

an ontological locus outside of man. Closely related to this natur-

alistic stance on the origin and ontological nature of the archetype

was the position taken asserting the psyche's necessary dependence

on the brain. In addition, in terms of our project of reconstruction,

it was found necessary to emphasize the logical independence of the

idea of archetypes from the hypothesis of synchronicity. The assump-

tion of an extrapsychic locus for the archetype which was entailed by


6-t







synchronicity, a locus "in matter," was considered to be an unnecessary

complication to an already cumbersome theory and to be, moreover, an

addition which is incompatible with other aspects of the archetypal

theory as we have reconstructed it.

OCe could, of course, postulate archetypal entities which are

responsible for the phenomena of synchronicity and which subsist in-

dependently of man without having to assume that they were there-

fore supernatural agencies. This supernatural agency hypothesis is

then only one of several conceivable types of nonnaturalistic inter-

pretations.1 However, this assumption of extrapsychic subsistence,

even if it need not invoke the supernatural, still has the effect of

making the archetypes into occult entities, that is, entities which

have very little in common with man as he is understood in terms of

standard scientific knowledge.2

In addition to the questions related to the naturalistic inter-

pretation of the archetypes, we have also previously discussed the in-

fluence of Kantian epistemology on Jung's archetypes (pages 35 and 38).

This topic will be further treated in the third section of this chapter.

The question of evolution theory and its possible consequences

for the plausibility of the archetypal concept, foreshadowed on page 59

will be examined further in the last section of Chapter 7.

The last of Jung's views previously critiqued concerns the ques-

tion of racial differences (page 26). Following Ibrld ar 2I, Jung

appears to have retreated from the implications for racial differences

which he drew from the idea of the collective unconscious. The

claim that different racial groups have a distinctly different collec-

tive unconscious is at any rate not emphasized by Jung in his writings








after Itrld War II, although the quotes in support of such a view
presented on page 26, from Vol. VII, were not retracted by Jung in

the "thorough revision" to which he subjected the book in the fifth

edition in 1942 (Vol. VII, p. 7)3

i.th objections from the scientific perspective and evaluation

of the archetypal concept as a scientific theory having been reserved

for later discussion (Chapters 5,6,7), what remaining criticisms must

then be considered? This question is rendered problematic by the vast

panorama of different types of critical attacks which have been directed

against Jung's views. The project of presenting conclusive counter-

arguments against each individual dissenting author could conceivably

engage one's efforts for several years. But such a volume and variety

of critical literature is not itself a reliable indication of the

inherent weakness of Jung's conceptions nor even of the result of his

violation of beliefs and presuppositions of vested professional in-

terest so much as it is an indication of the obscurity of his method

of presentation, which in its magnificent rhetorical style manages

through its all-encompassing, cosmic scope to have something to offend,

confound or confuse just about everyone. There is also, of course,

a very large and rapidly growing literature from Jungian enthusiasts.

But as the work of even the most immediate Jungian disciples (indivi-

duals such as Aniele Jaffe, Jolande Jacobi and Michael Fordham) offer

supposedly authoritative accounts of Jung's views which differ widely

in interpretational approach and emphasis at crucial points, one begins

to wonder if perhaps there is in fact a problem in that through a com-

bination of intuitive overdetermination5 and lack of precision in for-

mulating and limiting his basic constructs, Jung has tried to explain




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