Title: Inspection and control of nuclear armaments in a nation-state system
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Title: Inspection and control of nuclear armaments in a nation-state system United States-Russian disarmament negotiations, 1945-1962
Alternate Title: United States-Russian disarmament negotiations, 1945-1962
Physical Description: iv, 310 leaves. : ill. ; 28 cm.
Language: English
Creator: Bailey, Terrell Wayne, 1935-
Publication Date: 1963
Copyright Date: 1963
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Subject: International relations   ( lcsh )
Nuclear disarmament   ( lcsh )
Political Science thesis Ph. D   ( lcsh )
Dissertations, Academic -- Political Science -- UF   ( lcsh )
Genre: bibliography   ( marcgt )
non-fiction   ( marcgt )
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Thesis: Thesis -- University of Florida.
Bibliography: Bibliography: leaves 282-309.
Additional Physical Form: Also available on World Wide Web
General Note: Manuscript copy.
General Note: Vita.
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Bibliographic ID: UF00097953
Volume ID: VID00001
Source Institution: University of Florida
Holding Location: University of Florida
Rights Management: All rights reserved by the source institution and holding location.
Resource Identifier: alephbibnum - 000546137
oclc - 13177344
notis - ACX0096

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INSPECTION AND CONTROL OF NUCLEAR

ARMAMENTS IN A NATION-STATE

SYSTEM: UNITED STATES-RUSSIAN

DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS,

1945-1962








By
TERRELL WAYNE BAILEY


A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE COUNCIL OF
THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY









UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA
August, 1963


































Copyright by

Terrell Wayne Bailey

1963











ACCiOTCht-E DCi1EU NTS


The author wishes to express his appreciation for the assistance

and encouragement which he received in carrying out this study. He is

indebted, above all, to Dr. Frederick H. Hartmann iho supervised the

preparation of the manuscript. lot only have Dr. lartmann's suggestions

been invaluable in improving the clarity and organization of the text,

but also the insight gained from his classes over the years, both as

an undergraduate and graduate student, has profoundly influenced the

author's ideas about international relations. Special thanks are also

due to the other meYbers of the Supervisory Committee, Dr. Ernest R.

Bartley, Dr. Manning J. Dauer, Dr. Gladys II. Kammerer, and Dr. Kimball

Wiles. Both in the early and late stages of the writing of the manu-

script, they offered unusually helpful comments and suggestions. In

addition, the study profited from the critical comments of Dr. Arnold

J. lleidenheiner. Credit for the final typing of the manuscript goes

to Itcrs. Phyllis Durell. Finally, without the understanding and support

of his rife, Frances, the author never could have completed this project.












TABLE OF CONTENTS


ACHMOLEDGrIENTS ......................... iii

INTRODUCTIO . . . . . . . . . . . 1

CHAPTER

I THE PROBLEM OF DISAMAMENT . . . . . . . 3

II THE ROLE OF DISARMAMENT IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS . 26

III THE RECORD OF THIE NEGOTIATIONS, 1945-1954. ..... 55

IV THE RECORD OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, 1954-1957. . . ... 101

V THE RECORD OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, 1953-1962. . . . 162

VI INSPECTION AND CONTROL DIFFICULTIES: !SECPANICAL AND
OPERATIONAL ASPECTS. . . . . . . . ... 215

VII INSPECTION AND CONTROL DIFFICULTIES: COLD WAR
CONFLICT ASPECTS . . . . . . . . ... 277

BIBLIOGRAPHY. . ......................... 292

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH ....................... 31.
















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the negotiations have failed to make any substantial progress although

both the Soviet Union and the Western powers have at times evidenced a

serious interest in reaching an agreement on disarmament. Thus whether

arms control ultimately proves to be a feasible practice in the mili-

tary relations of states will depend for the most part on the resolu-

tion of the issue of inspection and control. This is the central pre-

mise on which the present study is based.

From this point of view, inspection is the cru; of the larger

problem of disarmament and therefore cannot be examined apart from it.

Consequently, in Chapters I and II we shall consider the totality of

disarmament as a theoretical concept, relating inspection and control

to it. Shifting from a theoretical to an historical frame of reference,

we shall then in Chapters III, IV, and V analyze the disarmament negoti-

ations since 1945 in order to view the problem of inspection and control

within that contest. The first five chapters, which constitute Part I

of the study, are focused on the problem of disarmament as a whole,

with inspection as the major aspect. Part II, utilizing the theore-

tical and historical perspective achieved in Part I, concentrates on

the difficulties which have blocked agreement on an inspection system.

Chapter VI deals with the mechanical and operational complications im-

plicit in inspection and control, and Chapter VII examines the American-

Soviet frictions which have multiplied these complications.











CHAPTER I

TIE PROBLEII OF DISARMAMENT


The disarmament negotiations are one of the few threads that run

all the way through the fabric of international relations in the twenti-

eth century. Even so, statesmen and scholars today are no more united

in evaluating their relevance to international security than they were

in 1899 when the first multilateral disarmament conference convened at

the Hague. One point of view, based largely on past experience with the

regulation of armaments, holds that "any attempt at disarmament must . .

necessarily fail."1 Still another, influenced mainly by the implica-

tions of the military-technological revolution, assumes that disarmament

in some form can make an invaluable contribution to international stabil-

ity and order. Obviously, whether the substantive content of the negoti-

ations on arms control is really to be taken seriously depends very much

on which of these premises serves as a point of departure.

So an analysis of the problem of disarmament logically begins with

a consideration of this question: In what way, if at all, is it possible

for international agreements controlling the amounts, kinds, and deploy-

ment of weapons to enhance the mutual security of nations? After con-

sidering the validity of disarmament as a theoretical concept, we shall

then turn to a discussion of the role it has played in the military and

political relations of states. With the larger picture of the problem


1Salvador de Hadariaga, The Blowing Up of the Parthenon (New York:
Frederick A. Praeger, 1960), p. 72.












before us, we can then proceed with greater understanding to unravel the

tangled maze of difficulties encountered by negotiations on concrete ar-

rangements that would translate the idea into a program of practical

action.


The Tradition of Politically Unbounded Military Competition

Since it first became an issue in international relations at the

beginning of this century, the disarmament movement has been shaped with-

in two matrixes. One is political and the other is technological. The

political factor includes, first, the fundamental system of the organiza-

tion of power in international relations and, second, within that system,

the interests or objectives which power is used to achieve. The techno-

logical factor is used here to denote the nature of the armanents and the

characteristics of the scientific instruments and procedures proposed for

controlling them under a possible disarmament agreement.

On the one hand, the kind of political response which nations have

made to the problem of disarmament has shown remarkable historical con-

tinuity in different periods under varying patterns of military rivalry.

But, in contrast, military technology changed gradually up to World War

II when it spurted forward at a progressively faster rate of development.


1
It is not proposed here that political and technological influ-
ences can be isolated and treated separately except in the abstract. To
cite one example, the problem of the detection of underground nuclear
weapon testing is a technical problem inasmuch as it is concerned with
limitations of scientific instruments and procedures for identifying
nuclear explosions below a certain threshold. It is also political in-
sofar as it involves a distrust of Soviet actions and the refusal of the
Soviet Union to permit enough ground inspections to compensate for the
deficiencies of seismological detection techniques.











Before analyzing the impact of the technological revolution on the prob-

lem of disarmament, let us see how it has affected the existing pattern

of the military relations of nations.

One of the important trends in recent times has been a gradual

growth in institutionalized cooperation between states in more and more

areas of their relationships. In their military relations, however,

countries have always been wary of accepting any limitation upon their

freedom of action to determine the nature of their defense establishments

and strategies. To be sure, nations sometimes enter into military alli-

ances and thereby voluntarily accept controls on their military policies,

such as obligations to maintain certain miniumm force levels.1 But

Aiere the relations of states are essentially antagonistic and the mili-

tary capability of one is perceived as an aggressive threat to the other,

armaments policies are nearly always strictly unilateral. Seldom is

there any reciprocation, either tacit or explicit, regarding limitations

on military preparations. Military power in this situation is a reflec-

tion of the absence rather than the presence of a basis for cooperative

action. Consequently, the multilateral approach to the determination of

armaments policies between opposing countries, which is the theme of dis-

armament, has been largely,although not altogether, unsuccessful.

Rather, at any given time the overall military configuration has

been the product of the free interplay of different national policies

and not the result of direct planning at the international level. In


1
Hedley Bull, The Control of the Arms Race (London: Institute
for Strategic Studies, 1961), p. 77.












the latter case, whenever nations agree--formally or informally, tacitly

or explicitly--to certain restraints on the forces-in-being they will

maintain, the military environment is managed and military competition

is bounded. In the former case, which coincides more with historical

experience, the completion of the military environment is determined

mainly by unilateral actions of governments, and military competition is

unbounded. That is, military programs are not influenced substantially

by negotiated or unnegotiated reciprocal restrictions.

In general the unstructured, uncontrolled military environment

tends to obey certain "natural laus" of its own which make it orderly

and predictable to a degree. Normally, it can be assumed that within

the limits of its power potential, a nation's military capability will

be maintained at a level reflecting the extent to which the security of

its vital interests is believed to be endangered, and no higher. Alter-

nately, when the threat that originally prompted a military build-up has

subsided, a natural lowering of force levels generally takes place. Thus

it should be kept in mind that :

The lowering of the level of armaments, the disbandment
of forces, the abandonment of particular categories of
armament, the withdrawal of armies from advanced posi-
tions, the diversion of resources away from armaments and
towards other purposes, are practices as familiar in
military history as their opposites.1

As an example, the United States in 1945 reduced its military per-

sonnel from twelve million down to about three million. Also, in May,

1956, in making the transition from a predominantly conventional strategy

to a greater reliance on nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union announced a


llbid., p. x.










unilateral troop cut of 1.3 million men. Basically, then, in a laissez-

faire pattern of military relations, the ebb and flow of armaments levels

is a reflection of the confidence or lack of confidence by states in each

other's intentions.

Granted that military increases are primarily a response to the

stimulus of political conflict, nevertheless, in themselves they may also

affect the political environment in a manner not anticipated when the ex-

pansion was initiated. In the first place, the armed strength required

by a country to protect and promote its important interests is relative

to the armaments of others. Secondly, in striving for military adequacy,

governments err on the side of caution by seeking a margin of safety in

armaments.2 Consequently, whenever a serious conflict of interest de-

velops between nations, one of the by-products typically is an arms race,

marked by a struggle for relative military superiority, first, through a

quantitative buildup of existing weapons types or, second, through the

qualitative development of new or improved weaponry. As the opposing

powers respond to one another's stepped-up mobilization, frequently a

huge escalation in general force levels takes place.

The need for disarmament is predicated upon the supposition that,

once triggered off, the dynamics of unbounded military competition in a

laissez-faire military environment lead inexorably toward a war that may

not really be wanted by either side in the first place. The arms-tension


1
Quincy Wright, A Study of War (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1942), II, 801.

21adariaga, The Blowing Up of the Parthenon, p. 74.












spiral, it is maintained, becomes self-generating and divorced from the

political disputes as its source. Thereby, the dimensions of the mili-

tary rivalry grow far out of proportion to the political goals originally
1
at stake.

Care must be taken not to exaggerate out of its right proportions

the exacerbating influence of an arms race on the tension level. Before

World War II, indeed, politically unbounded military competition was

tolerable because restricted technological capabilities circumscribed

national military programs. Even if munitions industries were operat-

ing at full capacity, the rate at which weapons were manufactured was

much slower compared with later automated techniques of mass production.

Then, too, with the exception of chemical and biological agents there

were no weapons of mass destruction. Considering the limited destructive-

ness of the weapons that were available, the military balance could not

be drastically altered except by a huge arms program stretching over a

period of time. Finally, the low level of technological development of

the tools of war severely restricted the kinds of military preparations

that could be undertaken, quite apart from what general staffs may have

wanted to do.

Therefore, the overall military environment was less susceptible


1
Alastair Buchan, for example, notes that ". the Soviet-
American contest in missiles, in submarines, and in the means of defence
against them has reached a pitch of intensity which now makes the contest
self-generating and independent of the level of political tension be-
tween the two countries and their allies." "Their Bomb and Ours: Some
Concluding Remarks on the Paradox of Force," Nuclear Weapons, flissiles,
and Future U r, ed. Charles A. IcClelland (San Francisco: Chandler Pub-
lishing Company, 1960), p. 131.











to being severely destabilized by an all-out arms race. Ordinarily,

large concentrations of forces-in-being were not held in readiness over

prolonged periods of time during which conflict just short of war per-

sisted. On the contrary, in general wars involving the big powers the

decisive factor most often was the war potential of countries which

could be mobilized after the initial blow had been struck.1

Furthermore, in the era of conventional weapons lightning surprise

attacks were less probable. It was next to impossible to carry out

secretly a large-scale program of naval construction. Likewise, put-

ting together massive conscripted armies required a lengthy mobiliza-

tion process which gave adversary countries adequate warning to build up

their armed forces before it was too late. Usually, this lead time also

provided an opportunity for the disputants to communicate their inten-
2
tions to one another and to make a final effort to avert a showdown.

To sum up, prior to the arrival of the atomic age, in peacetime

military rivalry a decisive advantage was sought principally by stepping

up production of arms already in use instead of concentrating on the de-

velopment of more efficient military equipment. The disarmament movement,


1
Henry A. Kissinger, The Necessity for Choice: Prospects of
American Foreign Policy (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1960), p. 210.

2An example where this failed was the outbreak of World War I,
which many military strategists regard as an "accidental war." Thomas
C. Schelling and Morton H. Halperin write that: "The final weeks, and
especially days, before the declaration of war in 1914 showed that with
the decision procedures and communications of that era, governments were
incapable of seeing their way and talking their way out of a war that
was neither intended nor desired by any major participant." Strategy
and Arms Control (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1961), p. 27. See
also Bruce M. Russett, "Cause, Surprise, and No Escape," Journal of
Politics, XXIV (February, 1962), 3-22.












as a result, was preoccupied largely with reducing or limiting the

amounts of armaments. The assumption was that if arms increased in-

definitely, war would result.1 Regarddless of the merits of this assump-

tion, it is significant that in the past the incentive to negotiate dis-

armament agreements has not been strong enough to bring about disarma-

nent other than in a few isolated instances. In retrospect, the need

for arms control measures during the era of conventional weapons was not

so compelling because the upper limits of the technological capacities of

nations already served reasonably well as boundaries to channelize and

temper their hostile military relations. But the military technological

revolution gradually widened these boundaries through erosion until
2
Uorld War II when they were all but swept away.

The Dininishing Technological Boundaries of Military Force

In earlier times the limited capacity of weapons in terns of

destructive force and deliverability, as a matter of course, imposed

certain restraints on the kinds of wars states could prepare to fight

even as political-psychological checks on the use of force declined with

the development of integral nationalism. But within a single generation

we have seen many of these technological limitations lifted through a

series of scientific breakthroughs of monumental proportions.


1This hypothesis is explored through the use of mathematical equa-
tions in Lewis F. Richardson, Arms and Insecurity: A Mathematical Study
of the Causes and Origins of War, eds. Nicholas Rashevsky and Ernesto
Trucco (Pittsburgh: Bo::wood Press, 1960). See also Samuel P. :Iuntin ':on,
"Arms Race: Prerequisites and Results," Public Policy, eds. Carl J.
Friedrich and Seymour Harris (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1' ),
VIII, 41-86.

2issinger, The Necessity for Choice, p. 21'.










The first revolution occurred in the destructive power of weapons.

The twenty kiloton-yield atomic weapons dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki

on August 6 and August 9, 1945, killed 106,000 people and injured

100,000 others.1 At the end of 1960, 4,500 of these casualties were

still hospitalized and approximately 230,000 other living persons were

suffering ill-effects, ranging from burns to cancer, that have been at-

tributed to the atomic blasts.2

These first atomic bombs were 1,000 tines more powerful than the

TNT blockbusters used in strategic bombing during World War II.3 With

the development of thermonuclear weapons in 1952, the destructive force

of atomic explosives was multiplied by another factor of 1,000.4 Iore-

over, there is technically no upper limit on the size of hydrogen bombs

that can be manufactured. In the fall of 1961, for example, the Soviet

Union is known to have tested a weapon with an energy yield equivalent to

58 million tons of TNiT, which, had it utilized a uranium instead of a

lead casing, would have been in excess of 100 megatons.5

Estimates of the damages that an all-out nuclear attack on the


1
U. S., Atomic Energy Commission, The Effects of Nuclear Weapons
(Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1957), p. 455. The ex-
plosive force released by a nuclear detonation is expressed as being
equivalent to a given number of tons of the chemical high explosive, TU'T.

2Facts on File, 1961, p. 62.

3Hlarrison Brown and James Real, Community of Fear (Santa Barbara,
Calif.: Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, 1960), p. 7.

Ibid.

5Charles J. V. Murphy, "Now the President Will Decide on His Own,"
Life, LII (February 16, 1962), 76.











United States would cause are highly conjectural. Herman Kahn has cal-

culated that a 20,000 megaton strike on 1. major American cities in the

1960's would kill between 3 and 160 million out of a total population of

10O million, depending on the degree of civil defense preparations and

the amount of warning-time. In hearings before the Congressional Joint

Atomic Energy Committee in 1959, it was estimated that a hypothetical

1,446 megaton attack would leave 50 million dead and 20 million seriously

injured.2 Thus in the 1960's a surprise attack probably would kill or

critically injure at least one-third of the population of this country.3

The second revolution has centered around the systems for deliver-

ing weapons to their targets. With the development of ballistic and

guided missiles, against which there is no known defense, the two major

nuclear powers are now technically capable of striking and virtually an-

nihilating each other at will.

The disappearing technological boundaries on military power has

left a vacuum which can be filled only by such political limitations on

the use of force as states may establish tacitly or explicitly.4 Stated


1Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1961), p. 113.

2U. S., Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearings, Bi-
ological and Envirocamental Effects of iNuclear War, C6th Cong., lst Sess.,
1959, pp. 644-645.

JThe effects of nuclear weapons are also analyzed in John H. Fow-
ler (ed.), Fallout (New York: Basic Books, 1C''); and Linus Paulln-, No
Iore War (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1. ).

Although the present study is limited to a consideration of mili-
tary competition in peacetime, this generalization applies to all grada-
tions of the use of force, from pressure to armed conflict. For a study
of reciprocal restraints in war, see Henry A. Kissinger's hypothetical











another way, if in the future there is to be bounded military rivalry

between nations, it will have to be deliberately contrived through the

creation of a political consensus. Political will rather than techno-

logical capacity must be relied upon as the limiting factor in military

programs.

Here, then, is a tentative foundation for arms control agreements

that materialized only with the coming of the era of weapons of mass de-

struction. In the period of quantitative arms races disarmament empha-

sized quantitative restrictions, as we have seen. By the same token, in

the present arms race where a "complete technological revolution in the

art of war" occurs every five years, a general reorientation of the dis-

armament movement has taken place in this country. Overall, the prin-

cipal concern in official disarmament policy has shifted from a preoccu-

pation with lowering or limiting the size of conventional and nuclear

weapons stockpiles to either slowing down or offsetting the effects of

the technological improvement of weapons.2 This reflects a perceptible

change in thinking as to how arms are related to political tension and

the outbreak of war. Now it is widely held that the worst hazards are

those which are inherent in the nature of modern weapons systems (the

decrease in strategic warning time to practically zero with the coming of


model for a limited nuclear war in Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy
(New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957), pp. 227-230. Among other things,
the warring countries would exchange inspectors to verify adherence to
the rules under which the war is being fought.

1Kahn, p. 316.

2robert E. Osgood, "Stabilizing the Military Environment," Ameri-
can Political Science Review, LV (March, 1961), 24.












the military missile, necessitating constant readiness for all-out war,

and so on) and the rate of technological innovation (the haunting fear

of both sides of a decisive breakthrough by the other).

Efforts to achieve political restraints on the arming process can

be directed through three different channels: (1) unilateral action by

the United States or the Soviet Union to make its military posture less

menacing (which in the language of deterrence means an emphasis on more

expensive, less efficient "second strike" weapons, such as the Polaris

system, that are relatively invulnerable to surprise attack); (2) tacit

understandings where both sides reciprocally limit their military poli-

cies (e.g., the voluntary moratorium on nuclear weapon tests from Novem-

ber, 1958, to September, 1961, and Soviet-American refusal to assist

their allies in developing or acquiring nuclear weapons); and (3) formal

negotiated agreements, with which the present study is concerned.1

A wide range of possible approaches to regulating the militariza-

tion of the power potential of nations by formal agreements has been con-

sidered in negotiations between governments. To illustrate, the generic

field of disarmament (and since 1958, arms control) was described by the

1961 statute creating the United States Arms Control and Disarmament

Agency as encompassing

. the identification, verification, inspection, limita-
tion, control, reduction, or elimination, of armed forces
and armaments of all kinds under international agreement
including the necessary steps taken under such an agreement


1
Ernest W. Lefever (ed.), Arms and Arms Control (New York:
Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), p. r:iii.











to establish an effective system of international control,
or to create and strengthen international organizations
for the maintenance of peace.1

Because it is such a broad concept, disarmament cannot be identi-

fied exclusively with any one particular course of action or ultimate

political objective. Accordingly, generalizations about disarmament are

ambiguous and misleading unless the kinds of arms limitations being con-

sidered are made clear. For analytical purposes, the diverse approaches

to dealing with the technological crisis of military force through arms

control, however, may be classified under two general theoretical models

of international relations. The first is the world-government model

which encompasses disarmament plans drastically limiting the force levels

of national military establishments, if not abolishing them altogether.

The distinctive characteristic of proposals that fit into this category

is that they necessitate an alteration of the present structure of inter-

national relations in the direction of either limited or general world

government.2 The second is the nation-state model which assumes the


U. S., Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Documents on Disarma-
ment, 1961, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Publication No. 5 (Wash-
ington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1962), p. 483. (Hereafter
cited as Documents on Disarmament, 1961).

2The most prominent advocates of disarmament schemes which presup-
pose a lorld-government framework are Grenville Clark and Louis Sohn,
World Peace through World Law (Cambridge: Harvard Uniersity Press, 1958);
Norman Cousins, In Place of Folly (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1961);
Erich Fromn, Hay I-an Prevail? (Garden City, N .Y.: Doubleday and Company,
1961); Seymour elman, The Peace Race O~me York: George Braziller, 1962);
Philip Noel-Baker, The Arms Race: A Programme for Uorld Disarmanent (few
York: Occana Publications, 1958); Bertrand Russell, Has Man a Future?
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1962); James Warburg, Disarmament: The
Challenge of the Nineteen Sixties (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday and
Company, 1961).












continuation of the present international political system substantially

unchanged and attempts to adapt the idea of disarmament to the organiza-

tion of power along the lines of autonomous territorial units.

Since these models are based on fundamentally different promises,

the solutions to the problem of disarmament which they envisage are very

dissimilar and sometimes even contradictory, as we shall now see.


The World-Government Model of Disarmament

To a greater extent than during the League period, the disarmament

negotiations since World War II have been dominated by the ideal of a dis-

armed world. Roughly from 1946 to 1954 the deliberations in United Na-

tions organs centered around the concept of total disarmament projected

into a single field isolated from all others--the field of atomic energy.2


1
The trend in this country since 1958 has been to associate the
term "arms control" with the nation-state model (i.e., schemes for regu-
lating but not drastically curtailing national military capabilities)
while identifying "disarmament" with the world government model (i.e.,
dismantling or severely limiting military establishments). Yet another
trend among those trying to develop a precise system of classification of
disarmament plans is to use "arms control" as the generic term and "disarma-
ment" as one particular approach (i.e., the reduction or abolition of
armaments). But the Soviets will not accept "arms control" because it
implies, they say, approval of the idea of inspection without disarmament.
In U. S. official practice "disarma=mnt" and "arms control" are used
synonymously; this is also the practice that will be followed in the
present study. For a discussion of the problems created by the lack of
precision in disarmament terminology, see Bernhard G. Bechhoefer, Postwar
Negotiations for Arms Control (Washington: The Broolings Institution,
1961), pp. 7-3.

2For an analysis of the 1946 American proposal for an Atomic De-
velopment Authority with a monopoly over "all atomic energy activities
potentially dangerous to world security, see infra, Chapt. III. Of this
plan, Inis L. Claude, Jr. has noted that it "has been rightly described
as a proposal of limited world government, in the sense that it envisaged











After 1954, however, the United States showed less enthusiasm for the

drastic approach while the Soviet Union made more and more use of it.

Since the Soviet plan for general and complete disarmamcnt was presented

to the United Nations in September, 1959, the general negotiations have

been conducted within the context of a number of phases or stages which,

if adopted, would lead over a period of years to total disarmarnnt.

(Both Western and Russian plans for comprehensive disarmament, however,

provide for the retention of internal security forces.) Ho doubt par-

tially because of the wide popular appeal of the grandiose Soviet scheme,

the United States in 1961 responded with a detailed comprehensive disarma-

ment proposal of its own.2

Yet the apparent concern of the great powers for total disara-

ment is deceiving. TWhat this approach has amounted to in practice has

been the concentration of the negotiations on the partial measures to be

carried out during the first stage only.3


an international agency with functions and powers cutting deeply into the
traditional preserve of national sovereignty." 3'ords into Plowshares:
The Problems and Progress of International OraanLzation [2d ed. rev.;
New York: Random House, 1959], p. 312.

U. S., Department of State, Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959,
Department of State Publication Ho. 7000 (Washington: U. S. Government
Printing Office, 1960), II, 1460-1474. (Hereafter cited as Documents
on Disarmament, 1945-1959.)

2U. S., Department of State, Freedom from War: The United States
ProZran for General and Conplete Disamn.ient in a Peaceful Uorld, Depart-
ment of State Publication No. 7277 (Washington: U. S. Government Print-
ing Office, 1961).

3James E. Dougherty, "The Disarmament Debate: A Review of Cur-
rent Literature," Orbis, V (Winter, 1962), 492-493.











This is just as well because the obstacles to the negotiation

of such an arrangement are formidable. The contraction of national

military forces down to a level incapable of providing security from e::-

ternal challenges cannot be willed into :existence by nations through

direct consultations on the question. Rather, it can come about only

indirectly as international anarchy is replaced by world law embodied

in an institutional structure capable of providing the security that is

now dependent upon national military pocwr. In short, nothing less than

a basic change in deeply-ingrained patterns of international political

behavior can bring about the abolition or the severe limitation of na-

tional war-making capabilities.

Thus when applied to a system of sovereign nation-states, the con-

cept of disarmament in its doctrinally pure forn beconms internally in-

consistent; it is a paradox. It is inconceivable that states, while

retaining the authority to act as the final judge in matters involving

their interests, would willingly surrender the means by which they e::er-

cisc this authority.2

Salvador de Ikadariaga, writing in 1929, pinpointed the dichotomy

facing those who seriously propose to solve the problem of military force

by abolishing it:


1
militaryy force is inherent in national power and national power
is inherent in the e.:istence of independent states," asserts Samuel P.
IIuntington. Huntington, p. 31.

2r.aynond Aron, On War, trans. Terence Kilnartin (Garden City,
N. Y.: Doubleday and Company, 1959), p. 18.











It is evident, therefore, that no disarmament is possible
as long as no alternative instrument of policy to arma-
ments is devised, and no reduction of armaments is possible
as long as the utility of arr-aments as instruments of
policy has not been reduced.1

As Madariaga sees it, before there can be disarmament the political frame-

work of international relations must first be changed over to world

government.

How that military competition is no longer technologically con-

fined, it may be plausibly argued that it is necessary for international

political institutions to be adapted to technological changes. Hans J.

Morgenthau, the leading exponent of the realist view of international

politics, has gone so far as to suggest that "the nation-state is too

small and weak a mold to contain atomic power."

For the e::istential threat atomic power poses to all
nations of the world cannot be answered at all from
within a state system whose basic unit is the nation
state.
The most elementary function of the nation state is
the defense of the life of its citizens and of their
civilization. A political organization that is no longer
able to defend these values and even puts them in jeopardy
must yield, either through peaceful transformation or vi-
olent destruction, to one capable of that defense. Thus,
under the impact of the invention of gunpowder and of the
first industrial revolution, the feudal order had to yield
to the dynastic and the nation state. Under the technologi-
cal conditions of the pre-atomic age, the stronger nation
states could, as it were, erect walls behind which their
citizens could live in security. . .
The feasibility of an all-out atomic war has completely
destroyed this protective function of the nation state.2


Salvador de Madariaga, Disarmament (New York: Coward-lcCann,
1929), p. 60.

2lans J. Morgenthau, The Purpose of American Politics (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1960), p. 175.












Reasoning exclusively from the implications of technological re-

alities, the idea of "national security" appears to be anachronistic.

In the atomic age, according to Norman Cousins, "no national security is

possible. Either there is a workable world security system or there is

nothing."l

Those who are unwilling to postpone the negotiation of "general

and complete disarmament" until the conditions are ripe for world govern-

ment maintain that these conditions cannot develop unless there is sub-

stantial progress toward disarmament. They also stress the advantages of

moving ahead with drastic first-stage reductions of all classes of weapons

over taking the partial measures approach. Since all states would have

totally divested themselves of their armed power upon the implementation

of the final stage of the disarmament treaty, two stubborn problems would

be minimized: the determination, first, of the ratio of forces to be re-

tained by countries and, second, of the equivalency of different kinds of

weapons (e.g., the number of tanks it takes to equal a battleship in mili-

tary value).2

In addition, the argument is made that the task of inspection and

control would be rore manageable in a dcmilitarizcd world for at least

three reasons: (1) Violations of a prohibition of all military activi-

ties would be more easily detected than evasions of prescribed limits on

armed forces. (2) Since a variety of inspection methods would be needed


ICousins, pp. 97-93.


2
Warburg, pp. 155-156.











in carrying out a comprehensive disarmament arrangement, any subversion

of the agreement would more likely be uncovered than if only one kind of

verification procedure were being used. (3) If states no longer acted

under the assumption that they may become involved in a war with one

another, the need for extreme military secrecy would be less urgent, thus

creating conditions more favorable to the acceptance of the idea of in-

spection.

Mechanically, the comprehensive approach to disarmament has con-

siderable merit. But to seriously expect diplomatic negotiations to pro-

duce an international agreement maximizing disarmament in all three of

its dimensions--the number of countries participating, the categories of

weapons affected, and the degree to which they are reduced--necessitates

another assumption. The negotiations would also have to create the poli-

tical conditions required to sustain the agreement. As has already been

indicated, this would mean the political reconstruction of the interna-

tional comrrcunity as we now know it. A supranational political setting is

the prerequisite of all radical disarmament plans whether or not this is

acknowledged explicitly, as in the case of the American blueprint for

general and complete disarmament of September, 1961, or ignored, as in

the case of the Soviet proposal of 1959 for achieving complete disarma-

ment in four years.

Supposing for the moment that states were willing to accept major

reductions in their armaments without altering the international power

structure, the possibility of armed conflict would still remain. For as


Bull, pp. 137-144.












long as the sovereign prerogative to resort to war inheres in national

states, "we can prohibit every weapon, even penlkives, and people will

beat out each other's brains with clubs. .. ."1 Furthermore, although

it is conceivable that nuclear weapons might be outlawed completely, as

was contemplated by the Baruch Plan of 1946, the technological know-how

for constructing them cannot be eliminated. Consequently, if nuclear

weapons were abolished, when the need to have them again became suffi-

ciently compelling, the arms race would be renewed, probably with greater

intensity than ever.

It emerges clearly, then, that in order to do away with war, dis-

armament must be coupled with an alteration of the organization of payer

at the international level. This, of course, is a tack which lies out-

side the realm of what diplomatic negotiations can accomplish. Indeed,

it is sometimes suggested that the international disarmament debate further

exacerbates the tensions between rival powers instead of improving the

climate of their political relations.

There is little evidence to suggest that this situation will

change in the foreseeable future. Atomic-age technology, contrary to

widespread expectations, has not initiated any revolutionary transforma-

tion in the substance of international politics. Pre-atomic and atomic

age political thoughtways exhibit the same fundamental characteristics.

Alternative courses of action continue to be viewed within the frame of

reference of their probable effect on national interests rather than in


1Emery Reves, "Why Waste Time Discussing Disarmament?" Look, XXV
(March 28, 1961), 69.










terms of solving the problems of the universe. Nor does it now appear

that the international system is evolving inexorably toward the pooling

of sovereignty at a supranational level. On the contrary, the fragmenta-

tion of the world into autonomous territorial units has speeded up since

the last world war, as is reflected in the growth in United Nations member-

ship from 52 countries in 1945 to 110 in 1963.

The conclusion follows that during the decades immediately ahead

the solution of the power problem engendered by the sovereign state system

by doing away with the system itself is not a practicable one. Whatever

its merits normatively, it does not appear to lie within the range of

available alternatives. Iost likely, any practical results in the disarma-

ment negotiations will come in the area of more limited, modest measures

made possible by favorable political and technological circumstances within

the existing political framework. We next turn our attention to this

approach to the control and reduction of armaments.


The Nation-State Model of Disarmament

A realistic consideration of the problem of disarmament proceeds

from the fundamental premise that any arrangement for controlling arma-

ments must be initiated and maintained by governments of sovereign

states. From that premise can be deduced both the limitations and the



The most important sources to consult on the nation-state frame-
work of disarmament are Donald G. Brennan (ed.), Arms Control, Disarma-
ment, and National Security (New York: George Braziller, 1961); Bull;
David H. Frisch (ed.), Arms Reduction: Program and Issues (New York:
Twentieth Century Fund, 1961); Arthur T. Hadley, The Nation's Safety and
Arms Control:(Nbw York: Viking Press, 1961); Louis Henkin (ed.), Arms
Control: Issues for the Public (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall,
1961); Lefever, '7 .. "elman (ed.), Inspection for Disarmament (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1958); Schelling and Halperin.











promise of arms control as a means of bolstering the mutual security of

nations. In the final analysis, the policies of states are not geared

to the realization of such universals as peace and disarmament but to the

course of action which is thought will best serve their national interests.

By the same token, the purpose of disarmament is not to disarm

(which is the presumption of the idealist conception of disarmament dis-

cussed above) but to advance the interests which nations deem vital to

their security. In all fields of policy, the overriding concern of states

is at least to preserve their relative security position vis-a-vis each

other and at best to strengthen it. Thus disarmament, both at the level

of negotiation and the level of practice, has consistently been treated

as a means of achieving national gains. But the gains that are sought

may be either unilateral or mutual in nature.

Because by definition the problem of disarmament is a matter of

concern only when an adversary relationship exists between states, it is

not surprising that the proposals of one side are regarded with monumen-

tal fear and suspicion by the other, often for good reasons. For if a

country had a choice, it would doubtlessly prefer to eliminate rather

than mitigate what it perceives to be a threat to its legitimate inter-

ests. To that extent, there is validity to the deeply entrenched assump-

tion in American policy-making circles that "our Communist enemies .


The best analysis of the national interest theory of interna-
tional relations can be found in Hans J. Morgenthau, In Defense of the
National Interest (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1952) and in the article
by the same author: "Another 'Great Debate': The National Interest of
the United States," American Political Science Review, XLVI (December,
1952), 961-983.










are dedicated to the single goal of world domination." But like the

United States, the Soviet Union cannot deal with the world strictly on

its own terms. It must act within the range of alternatives that are

available to it.

Often, too, even though a sharp divergence of interests divides

them, countries may still share important areas of common interests. In

the sphere of disarmament, if these overlapping interests are sufficient-

ly important, a guid pro guo agreement mutually beneficial to the posi-

tions of all parties may be negotiated. As such, nothing in the essence

of the political process of a national state system precludes states from

entering into an agreement regulating their military competition. Just

as national policy is not oriented ultimately toward achieving disarma-

ment, neither is it guided inevitably by the opposite course of action.

This point is explored further in the next chapter which examines the

different ways in which states have used disarmament to further their

national interests.

















1
Edward Teller, "Plan for Survival," Saturday Evening Post, CCXXXV
(February 17, l:C2, :4.











CHAPTER II

THE ROLE OF DISAR1AMENT IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS


Although disarmament by and large has remained an untried theore-

tical approach to international peace and security, nations traditionally

have attached high priority to it in their foreign policy. Since 1945

this question has received far more attention at the diplomatic confer-

ence table than the territorial problems which, after all, are the heart

of Cold War political tensions. That disarmament is an important instru-

ment of national policy we can be certain. But in view of the repeated

failure of the postwar negotiations to yield any significant tangible re-

sults, it is much more difficult to discern precisely what the govern-

ments of the big powers are trying to accomplish.

One school of thought holds that unilateral gains are the main

goal of disarmament diplomacy. Negotiating tactics, so it is argued, are

calculated to achieve a propaganda advantage and to bring about a shift

in the military balance of power unfavorable to the opposing side. The

other school maintains that ordinarily when governments engage in negoti-

ations they are seriously interested in reaching a mutual agreement if,

of course, the benefits outweigh the costs.

It is tempting to identify one or the other of these usages of

disarmament as the exclusive theme of policy to which other goals are

subordinated. But this artificially simplifies the reality of the nego-

tiations. A much safer assumption is that the actions of governments re-

garding disarmament are influenced significantly by both of these con-

siderations much of the time. Hedley Bull notes perceptively that











. it would be quite mistaken to regard arms control
negotiations as an elaborate charade enacted by governments
of the world for the benefit of the peoples of the world.
Though they want other things more, most governments in
most negotiations want an agreement, if it can be had on
their own terms. Usually, each government is divided as
to how seriously an agreement should be sought: as the
United States government has been regularly and publicly
divided over the feasibility of a ban on nuclear tests.T

Before moving on to examine the operation of disarmament under a

formal international agreement, which is the focus of the present study,

let us briefly consider the ways in which the issue is utilized by states

to their unilateral advantage.


The Use of Disarmament To Gain a Propaganda Advantage

With the development of mass political consciousness and active

popular participation in national and international affairs, world public
2
opinion has become an increasingly important element of a nation's power.

Here the ideology of disarmament, because of its powerful moral and emotion-

al appeal, lends itself well to use as an instrument of psychological war-

fare through which states try to cultivate a favorable image of them-

selves in the eyes of the world. While appearing to support the elimina-

tion of the instrumentalities of war, an attempt is made to discredit the

enemy by placing the onus of the failure of disarmament on him.

One interpretation suggests that Russian and American disarmament

plans since 1945 have been formulated so as to be unacceptable to the


1
Bull, p. 66.

2ouis J. Halle, "Is War Obsolete?" Hew Republic, CXLVI (April
2, 1962), 15.











other side. Moreover, in this view, the objectionable provisions (some-

times called "jokers") written into the plans are not necessarily a

logical extension of the sponsoring state's national interests since they

are inserted for the specific purpose of forestalling an agreement.

Rather than striving to reach an accommodation between their conflict-

ing positions (as is the case with bona fide negotiations), plans are

offered in the full knowledge that they will have to be rejected, the

aim being to make the rejector appear in a bad light before world public

opinion.

Doubts have been raised, for instance, as to whether the United

States would accept a treaty incorporating the rigorous inspection and

control apparatus it now advocates, even in the absence of Soviet op-

position. Premier Khrushchev, in an address before the UN General As-

sembly in September, 1959, asserted that:

The opponents of disarmament can easily make any measure
conditioned upon demands for control which are of such a
nature that, in the circumstances of a universal arms race,
other States cannot meet them. It is plain that even those
States which, for one reason or another, press such far-
reaching demands for control would themselves have no in-
clination to accept those demands in practice if it came to
the point of implementing them.1

The United States reacted along the same lines to the Soviet proposal

for complete disarmament mentioned earlier.

Joseph Nogee describes this as the "'gamesmanship' of the disar a-

ment negotiations":


1Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959, II, 1456.















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a substantial delivery capability, but it was not until the early 1960's

that the two countries approached a position of nuclear parity in terms

of weapons and delivery systems.

As long as the military power relationships between the United

States and the Soviet Union were so utterly asymmetrical, there was

little coincidence between their interests, militarily speaking. As a

result, no foundation for serious negotiations existed for almost a

decade after 1945. During that period, when the negotiations revolved

around the international control of atomic energy, Russian policy was not

directed at reaching an acco-modation with the position of the Western

powers on the problem. Rather, through the exploitation of the disarma-

nent motif, the Kremlin was able to further its own objectives, foremost

of which apparently was to mobilize world public opinion in favor of its
2
position and to inhibit the credibility of the American atomic threat.

In short, Russian policy sought to counterbalance the effects of Ameri-

can nuclear superiority while the Soviet nuclear development program went

ahead at full throttle:

By its world-wide campaign about the horrors of atomic war-
fare, the Kremlin had undermined the willingness to resist
in many areas of the non-Soviet world and made very difficult
the employment of the chief weapon in the Western arsenal.3


IThe stages in the changing strategic relationships between the
United States and the Soviet Union are discussed in Kissinger, The
Necessity for Choice, p. 13.

2See the well-documented study: Joseph L. Nogee, Soviet Policy
Toward International Control of Atomic Energy (Notre Dame, Ind.: Uni-
versity of Notre Dame Press, 1961), esp. pp. 259-285.

3Kissinger, Inuclear weapons and Forci-n Policy, p. 378.














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the same motivations that are believed to be responsible for the arms race

itself.

Drawing on his first-hand experience as director of the Disarma-

ment Section of the League of Nations, Salvador de Madariaga avers that

disarmament conferences are more in the nature of armament conferences

because

no nation is really interested in keeping intact any
pattern of power whatsoever; everyone of them wants it al-
tered in such a way that will increase her own share of
power. It follows that every 'disarmament' talk will in the
nature of things develop so as to increase the real or rela-
tive armaments of the nations concerned even though it may
appear to reduce their nominal or absolute armaments. For
in actual fact the true if unavowed aim of every nation that
goes into a disarmament conference is to increase her real
or relative armament to the detriment of her rivals. Thus
'Disarmament' turns out to be but one of the forms the arma-
ments race can take.1

An examination of disarmament proposals going all the way back to

the Hague Conference of 1899 confirms that states habitually have proposed

limitati-ns and reductions of armaments complementary to their own mili-

tary interests. One of the influences prompting Czar Alexander II to

call the first Hague Conference was the need to prevent the modernization

of the German army with rapid-firing artillery, a step which Russia found

difficult to match because of economic limitations.2 Similarly, during

the League period



Madariaga, The Blowing Up of the Parthenon, pp. 74-75.

'Merze Tate, The Disarmament Illusion: The Movement for a Limita-
tion of Armaments to 1907 (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1942), pp.
178-179.











Britain and the United States, as great naval powers, wished
to abolish the submarine but retain battleships and aircraft
carriers; the lesser naval powers wished to retain the sub-
marine. France, a great land power, wished to retain tanks
and heavy guns; the lesser land powers favored restriction
of them.

The affinity between arms control proposals and military interests

is also recognizable in the negotiations since 1945. In 1946 the United

States, then holding an atomic monopoly, insisted on the establishment of

a control system prior to the abolition of atomic weapons. On the other

hand, the Soviet Union, with nothing to lose, demanded that the American

atomic stockpile be destroyed first. Operating at a distinct disadvantage

vis-a-vis the Soviet Union in the field of military intelligence, the

United States has emphasized the importance of inspection. For its part,

the Soviet Union regards the string of American military bases around its

territory as an aggressive threat and accordingly in its proposals has

given priority to their removal. France, having developed nuclear

weapons but without the advanced means of delivering them, stresses the

need for abolishing military missiles.2

Doubtlessly, if they had the opportunity, states would prefer to

bring about the unilateral disarmament of the opposing side in relative,

if not in absolute, terms. The extremely cautionary attitude of the par-

ticipants in disarmament conferences becomes more understandable when it

is realized how serious the issues at stake really are. Yet it would be

incorrect to single out the disarmament negotiations as the only area


1
Bull, p. 67.

Ibid., p. 68.










where states promote their self-interests to the limit. In disarmament,

as in other questions for which a negotiated settlement is sought, ulti-

mately the most important consideration is not what the parties want but

what they are willing to accept. A government may wish to strengthen

its relative power position, but for reasons that we shall discuss in the

ne:t section it also may be satisfied to stabilize the existing balance.

This is the necessary precondition for the successful negotiation of any

disarmament agreement since no arrangement resulting in unequal advan-

tages or disadvantages can legitimately be accepted.

Thus the following analysis by Harry T. Willetts of the basis of

Russian disarmament policy provides one more piece of the puzzle that

goes to make up the full picture of what disarmament is about:

Whatever the West imagines itself to be talking about, the
Soviet Union will in fact be talking about the abolition of
Western alliances, the isolation of the United States, the
reorganization of international organization to ensure Soviet
preponderance--and not, for a long time, about disarmament at
all.1

While a large part of the attention given to disarmament by na-

tions is directed at influencing world public opinion and at trying to

unilaterally disarm the opposing side of its most potent weapon, not all

objectives are conflicting ones. Under certain conditions states may

also find it useful to cooperate multilaterally in limiting the scope of

their military competition. It is to this use that we now direct our

attention.


1larry T. Willetts, "Dicarmament and Soviet Foreign Policy," Arms
Control: Issues for the Public, ed. Louis HIenkin (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice-Hall, 1961), p. 173.










The Use of Disarmament to Stabilize the Military Environment

Historically, most of the activity relating to disarmament has

been confined to the negotiation stage in .which, as was noted above,

states attempt unilaterally to better their position at the expense of

the interests of other countries. In several instances, however, arms

control agreements have been successfully negotiated. A glance back:ward

at past experience with the regulation of military capabilities is the

logical point to begin a consideration of the function of disarmament in

a nation-state system .


The Historical Background of Disarmament

By far the most successful examples of arms control, however,

have been those instances in which neighboring countries have managed to

conclude bilateral arms control agreements dealing with limitations on

the militarization of their frontiers. Of these, the most famous was

the Rush-Bagot Agreement of 1817 under which the United States and Great

Britain limited their naval armaments on the Great Lakes.1 But more im-

portant as far as international security is concerned, out of the long

trail of multilateral disarmament conferences in this century have come

only three formal agreements, all of them materializing during the inter-

war years and pertaining solely to naval armaments.

In the Washington Treaty of 1922, the only instance where multi-

lateral disarmament has ever become operative to any significant extent,


1
A complete listing of bilateral agreements containing disarmament
provisions can be found in Denys P. 1fyers, World Disarmament: Its Prob-
lems and Prospects (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1932), pp. 52-56.











the United States, Great Britain, Japan, France, and Italy agreed to:

(1) a ratio of 5: 5: 3: 1.67: 1.67, respectively, in their relative

capital ship strength (with the United States, Britain, and Japan scrap-

ping about 40 per cent of their battleships); (2) limitations on the size

and number of aircraft carriers; and (3) a moratorium on the construction

of capital ships until 1931, except in certain specified instances. Sig-

nificantly, these limitations were coupled with other agreements stabiliz-

ing the political status quo in the Western Pacific.

The other two naval treaties were not nearly so influential. The

London Treaty of 1930, ratified by the United States, Great Britain, and

Japan, in addition to extending the moratorium on naval construction to

1936, fixed their maximum allowable tonnage strengths in the categories

of vessels not covered by the Washington Treaty. The three countries

were to have parity in submarines, but Japan was permitted only about

two-thirds of the cruiser and destroyer tonnage of America or England.2

Finally, the London Naval Treaty of 1936 between the United States, Great

Britain, and France attempted to limit the maximum size of different

kinds of naval vessels and provided a system for the exchange of inforna-

tion between governments on naval construction. Nothing was said about


1The most incisive study of the Washington Conference on the
Limitation of Armament is Raymond L. Buell, The Washington Conference
(New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1922). The text of the Washington
Treaty is printed on pages 372-393.

"The text of the London Treaty on the Limitation and Reduction of
Haval Armament (April 22, 1930) is printed in U. S., Senate, Disarmament
Subcommittee of Committee on Foreign Relations, Disarmament and Security:
A Collection of Documents, 1919-1955, 34th Cong., 2d Sess., 1956, pp.
w0-43. (Cited hereafter as Disarmament and Security.)













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armanents is not to disarm as such but to mitigate the effects of what-

ever armaments do e::ist." Throughout the past, whenever a formal agree-

ment has been successfully negotiated or whenever the negotiations have

arrived at substantial areas of agreement, this has almost invariably

been true. No matter how horrendous they are, strictly speaking, weapons

per se do not constitute a threat to security; it is the likelihood that

they will be used that is feared. Moreover, it should be noted that the

perception by a nation of a threat to its security is bi-dimensional.

There is apprehension over, first, what a potential enemy is capable of

accomplishing in a military operation and, second, what his intentions

are. A disarmament agreement, while it pertains directly to a readjust-

ment of national military capabilities, is to be judged as a success or

failure in terms of whether it assures the participants of the intention

by one not to attack the other, and not by the magnitude of the actual

reduction in armaments.

Beyond the generalization that the emphasis in disarmament is on

alleviating the destabilizing influences of weapons systems in the hands

of states hostile to one another, it is difficult to draw any parallels

between past e:-perience with arms control and the present crisis of power

which nations are facing. Heretofore, arms control has played a very

small role in the military relations of states. Aside from the inherently


1Frederick H. Hartmann, The Relationc of Nations (2d ed. rev.;
elo York: The Macmillan Company, 1962), p. 276. See also Samuel P.
Huntington's statement to the effect that "disarmament agreements sel-
dom actually disarm states. ,What they do is to eoclude certain specified
areas from competition and thereby direct that competition into other
channels." IHuttington, p. 31.











complicated nature of the problems encountered in regulating armaments,

neither political nor military-technological conditions have favored the

acceptance of arms control as an established practice. Indeed, since

armaments in thmcsclves did not appear to c::accrbate political tensions

grossly, the influence arms limitation could have was also necessarily

minimal. Furthermore, in conventional arms races additional increments

of military power usually meant increased security. States therefore

had a large measure of unilateral control over the maintenance of their

own security, limited only by the power they could muster through the

mobilization of their human and material resources and through strategic

alliances. In brief, the accepted formula for security during the era of

conventional weapons was to push ahead ma::imally in pursuit of a pre-

ponderance of military strength.


Disarmament in the Nuclear Age

Shifting the focus from the past to the present and future, let us

recall the two fundamental characteristics of contemporary international

relations that were c:plored in Chapter I. First, national governments

today view the world politically in much the same terms as they have for

centuries. Second, at the same time the equation through which they seek

security has been drastically altered by technological change. Stated

simply, we have entered the dawn of an age in which, paradoxically, power

is becoming increasingly more abundant but less and less usable.

As early as November, 1953, Winston Churchill recognized that the

accumulating stocks of offensive power of the United States and the

Soviet Union night well have a salutary effect:











Indeed, I have sometimes the odd thought that the
annihilating character of these agencies may bring an
utterly unforeseeable security to mankind. . It may
be that . when the advance of destructive weapons
enables everyone to kill everybody else no one will want
to kill anyone at all. At any rate it seems pretty safe
to say that a war which begins by both sides suffering
what they dread most--and that is undoubtedly the case
now--is less likely to occur than one which dangle the
lurid prizes of former days before ambitious eyes.

It is now generally accepted that armaments in the atomi- age,

with their immensely greater destructive potential, have restrained the

actions of the great powers to a degree previously unknown. Quite poss-

ibly, in a preatomic military-technological setting, the severe political

instability in Europe and Asia since 1945 would have provoked a major war
2
before now. As it is, a major war is not a very likely contingency

despite such crisis points as Berlin, Germany, and China which periodi-

cally approach the boiling point without ever quite reaching it.

The effect of the paralysis of force as an instrument of policy

for directing political change has been to perpetuate these basic East-

West differences from year to year without any kind of a settlement. The

corollary of the nuclear stalemate has been a political stalemate. Yet

the recurrent crises over the future of Berlin and German reunification

vividly demonstrate that the status quo being perpetuated is an unviable

one. Even in the face of the almost certain catastrophic outcome of a

nuclear war, it seems doubtful that the present uneasy equilibrium in


1
Front a speech in the House of Coraons on November 3, 1953;
quoted fiori John Slessor, Strategy for the West (New1 York: William
Morrow and Company, 1954), p. 1.

2Halle, p. 13.










Central Europe can be prolonged indefinitely.

Whether international agreements on disarmament can contribute

toward making the e-:isting military and political environments more

manageable remains to be seen. The timeless difficulties inevitably

encountered in negotiating disarmament, such as how to provide security

along with arms limitation, may well continue to prevent arms control

from becoming a reality to any significant extent. On the other hand, a

substantially stronger raison d'etre underlies the disarmament negotia-

tions now than during the era of conventional weapons. How disarmament

is related to the problem of stabilizing the nuclear age military and

political environments will be examined further in the pages that follo-;.


The lHilitary-Technological Environnant

The strategic model of deterrence, which serves as the frame of

reference for military thinking both in the United States and Russia, as-

sumes that rational action prevails in military decision-making. It fol-

lows that if one side believes that the other, after being attacked in a

surprise "first-strike," would still possess a sufficient nuclear capa-

bility to strike back and inflict unacceptable damage on the aggressor,

the incentive, although not the capability, for a deliberate surprise at-

tack will have been removed.1 A war initiated under these circumstances


For a fuller description of the theory of deterrence, the follow-
ing may be consulted: Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959); Kahn; Kissinger, The
Necessity for Choice; Basil H. Liddell-Hart, Deterrent or Defense: A
Fresh Look at the West's Military Position (New York: Frederick A.
Praeger, 1960); Thomas C. Schelling, lhe Stratcey of Conflict (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1960).











for anticipated positive gains would not rmn!e cense. The criterion,

then, for military preparatio-n is no- so r.uch to ma.-iise available

destructive power as i iis to build a strategic force that can with-

stand a surprise attack and then retaliate. This is i-no. ac the do,-

trine of the invulnerable deterrent.'

If these two prenises--that governucnts act rationally in mral:ins

decisions pertain.in to war and peace and that strategic nuclear var is,

indeed, irrational as long as deterrent forces on both sides are invulner-

able--were entirely sound, we could be optimistic about the prospects for

the "pa.: atomica" Dut even though r modern weapon systems have produced a

sort of uneasy stability in the military enviroPnent, they have also

generated destabilizing pressures which increase the probability of an

eventual thermonuclear war in spite of the obvious concern of the United
1
States and the Soviet Union to avoid it.

The possibility haunts each pouer that the other may make some de-

cisive technological breakthrough giving it a temporary position of mili-

tary preponderance which would enable it to "win" a war through a surprise

attack. At that point, a deliberate attack might be considered feasible,

especially if the nation holding the advantageous position were convinced

that war is inevitable sooner or later anyhow. This is referred to as

"preventive war." Similarly, a nation may attack and initiate a "pre-

emptive war" if it believes strongly that a nuclear first-strike against

it is imminent, based on its interpretations of the enemy s actions. Or


See, for e.:arple, Albert Uohlsletter, "The Delicate Balance of
Terror," Foreign Affairs, 1-'VII (January, 1:. '), 211-234.










war may be triggered by some accidental cause (human or mechanical error,

false alarm, or unauthorized behavior). It nay also result from miscal-

culation by one country of hou far another is willing to commit itself

militarily before backing down from its position. Or it may be started

by the action of some third power that wants to involve the two major

powers in war in order to advance its own interests (thus the term "cata-

lytic war"). Finally, a conventional war or a limited nuclear war nay

escalate into an all-out thermonuclear duel.1

True, the likelihood of nuclear ;ar can probably be reduced further

by making it even less practicable through adding more e.plosive punch to

deterrent forces, but the possibility of such a var, although lessened,

would still remain. Furthermore, the price of decreasing the probability

of a nuclear showdown in this way would be a much higher level of destruc-
2
tion in case a war actually took place.

Consequently, here formerly a state or a power bloc met the

danger of :ar by unilaterally ma::imising its military capability, now

security has tended to become more of a collaborative effort between ad-

versaries. Decausc neither side can any longer directly restrain a mili-

tary strike by its adversary, each is dependent for its security on the

actions of the other to an unprecedented e::tcnt. In effect, "as long as


This classification of the different ways war can start is taken
from Kahn, pp. 226-229.

2Te reader's attention is directed to Herman Kahn's caricature of
the ultimate in deterrence. He hypothesizes that a "Doomsday lIachine"
securely hidden underground could be rigged so that after a certain
number of nuclear botmbs e.ploded over the United States, it uould be
triggered, destroying the earth. Kahn, pp. 144-143.











each side has the manifest power to destroy a nation and its population

in response to an attack by the other, the 'balance of terror' amounts

to a tacit understanding backed by a total exchange of all conceivable
1
hostages."

So quite independently of the arena of political conflict, there

has evolved an important field of latent common interests between the

United States and the Soviet Union, based on what Reinhold Nicbuhr has

called the "minimal community [that] has been established through the
2
sense of an involvement in a common predicament and peril." JWhat are

these common interests? Certainly, at a minimum it is in the objective

national interest of the Soviets and the Americans to mitigate the hazards

mentioned above that could very well trigger an unwanted all-out nuclear

war. In addition, the tacit agreement operating between the United States

and the Soviet Union not to transfer nuclear weapons to allies that have

not developed then indicates a common interest in preventing the spread

of these weapons among non-nuclear nations. Not only would the instabi-

lities of deterrence be compounded in a world with many nuclear powers

instead of only four, but more importantly, the diffusion of nuclear

weapons also promises to blur the distinction between the greater and

the lesser powers.


Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, p. 239.

Foreword by Reinhold Niebuhr in Brown and Real, p. 5.

Bernard Baruch reports telling Andrei Vyshinsky in a private con-
versation that "there was an old saying on our western frontier that the
Smith and Wesson revolver made all men equal. Once the smaller nations
have atomic weapons they will be able to threaten even the strongest
power." Bernard Baruch, Baruch: My Story (rew York: Henry Holt and
Company, 1957), p. 325.











In order not to overestimate or underestimate the significance

of this apparent coanunity of interests as a basis for positive action

on the control and limitation of armaments, it is necessary to be clear

about its characteristics. First, it is rooted in mutual fear rather

than in mutual confidence between East and West. Should either side

through some unforeseen means gain overwhelming superiority and break

the nuclear stalemate or should the present instabilities of deterrence

be lessened through the building of invulnerable retaliatory forces, the

mutuality of interests discussed here would diminish. Second, these

parallel interests represent a "negative consensus" in that the United

States and Russia are agreed on what they do not want to happen (a

strategic nuclear war), as distinguished from a "positive consensus" or

agreement between their wider national purposes and interests. If there

is a low degree of "positive consensus," the range of identical interests

covered by the "negative consensus" as a rule will be overriden by these

more substantive conflicting interests. Just how strong the "positive

consensus" must be before an agreement embodying a "negative consensus"

can be negotiated will be treated in detail later.

The substitution of political boundaries through arms control

agreements for the disappearing technological limitations on the nature

of war and the preparation for war, in effect, acknowledges that security

is still dependent on national military power. Under this approach, dis-

armament operates as an adjunct of national military policy with the ob-

ject of lessening (but not doing away with) the likelihood of war and of

limiting the destructiveness of any war that does occur. This coincides











with the historic usage of disarmament by governments as a means of

buttressing national military interests and not of surrendering them.

Up to now, we have been considering how hostile states, without

first necessarily settling their differences, may be led to agree on

political "rules of the game" to serve as boundaries within which their

military rivalry can be carried on. It was noted that ironically the

potential common interests America and Russia may have in declaring cer-

tain spheres of military activity out of bounds (such as, say, nuclear

weapon testing and the militarization of outer space) actually arise out

of the severe political antagonism between them.

Yet the fact remains that despite the build-up of strong pressures

to bring the arms race under control, by their actions the United States

and the Soviet Union have indicated that the risks accompanying any poss-

ible disarmament agreement they could obtain would be greater than the

risks posed by an uncontrolled nuclear arms race. Consequently, it is

doubtful that the "negative consensus" born out of mutual fear of a su-

icidal war can by itself serve as a suitable basis for any real progress

towards arms control. In the final analysis, it is the conditions of

the wider political environment which set the limits of the practica-

bility of measures for arms limitation and reduction. To that point we

now direct our attention.

The political environment. As we have already seen, the political

prerequisite for drastic or total disarmament is an alteration of the

fundamental organizational arrangement of international relations. In

contrast, the acceptability of more limited controls on armaments depends










on the compatibility between the concrete national interests of the

negotiating states. Where national interests are generally harmonious,

as in the case of American-British relations, disarmament, however, is

superfluous. Alternately, beyond a certain degree of political conflict,

when it approaches the brink of war, disarmament is also doubtlessly im-

practicable. Paradoxically, as political tensions mount and the pressure

for disarmament becomes stronger, the obstacles to the successful negoti-

ation of arms reductions are multiplied. Thus it is frequently asserted

that either a disarmament agreement is not needed or else it is imposs-

ible to obtain:

If disagreements on specific issues had been tractable, the
armaments race would never have started. Since negotiations
on outstanding disputes have proved unavailing, it is im-
probable that a disarmament scheme acceptable to all parties
can be negotiated.1

To be sure, the logic of disarmament is inherently paradoxical.

But while a firm "positive consensus" (a coincidence between political

purposes) is more conducive to agreement on disarmament, unless an cle-

ment of "negative consensus" is present there is no incentive to negoti-

ate. When there is an incentive to seek an agreement, hostile states

inevitably find themselves caught on the horns of this dilemma: No

disarmament is possible without mutual confidence engendered by the

settlement of territorial questions and other grievances. Conversely,

there can be no mutual confidence as long as opposing armed forces face

each other menacingly. Hence, an arms pact can be sought in conjunction

with a settlement of political differences or in advance of a political


1
Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, p. 208.











rapprochement.

Disarmament with political settlement. In the past voluntary

disarmament agreements have depended almost entirely on the achievement

of a political dAtente between the parties involved in the negotiations.

The adjustment of conflicting national interests was coupled with provi-

sions for adjusting military capabilities also. This was the case with

both the Rush-Bagot Agreement of 1817 and the Washington Treaty of 1922,

the two notable achievements of disarmament in modern times. Of course,

a political settlement, whether or not a treaty stipulated it, would

probably lead to a gradual reduction in the forces-in-being on both

sides in any event. Here a formal agreement would serve the useful func-

tion of expediting the readjustment of military force levels to conform

to the new political conditions created by the liquidation of tension
1
sources.

In view of the enormously greater complexity of the military fac-

tor in the present age, almost certainly arms control will be an indis-

pensable ingredient of any future peaceful settlement of major world

problems, such as the Berlin situation and German reunification.2 Even

though the Soviet bloc and the Western alliance may come to the point

where they may genuinely wish to arrive at a political accommodation by

negotiating their differences, this does not automatically mean that they


1
Hartmann, p. 300.

2Huntington suggests that "Just as the problem of armaments can-
not be settled without reference to political issues, so is it also im-
possible to resolve these issues without facing up to the relative
balance of military power." I-untington, p. 79.











be able to do so.

hld on one ano


ritual o10-r' tl

Sfor Spcars is a delicate


l11




as

al!


Shat











To sum up, in comparison with earlier periods in the disarmament

movement, the political setting in which the negotiations now take place

is marked, first, by a lower level of "positive consensus" and, second,

by a higher level of "negative consensus," generally speaking. Tradi-

tionally, states have entered into agreements limiting their armed power

only when their vital national interests were consonant. In the main,

good faith of the participants, achieved prior to or in conjunction with

the disarmament arrangements, was relied on to guarantee that the provi-

sions would be carried out. It was not deemed necessary to write provi-

sions into disarmament treaties setting up machinery for implementation,

verification, and control. They were self-executing. Accordingly, here-

tofore, all voluntary disarmament agreements have been administratively

unstructured and not highly formalized.

Conversely, in the present era there is potentially a stronger

rationale for arms limitation agreements than previously. But there is

insufficient mutual trust and confidence to allow the negotiation of a

treaty where the parties are left on their own to execute the agreement.

The United States and the Soviet Union allocate a substantial part of

their economic resources to military purposes (about 10 per cent and 15

per cent, respectively, of their gross national products), which they

would prefer to reduce. Both are anxious to avoid nuclear war. And both

have a common interest in preventing the dillution of their power as the

result of the diffusion of nuclear weapons. On the other hand, they are

unwilling to enter into any agreement at the price of abandoning vital

interests to which a greater priority is attached.











Since disarmament based primarily on mutual trust resulting from

political acco odation appears incompatible with the contemporary poli-

tical environment, there has arisen a need to devise an acceptable sub-

stitute for mutual confidence as a basis for arms control. Mainly for

that reason, a reliable inspection and control apparatus (sometimes

described as "institutionalized distrust") has emerged since 1945 as the

sine qua non of any agreement regulating armaments. In short, this ques-

tion is at the heart of the problem of negotiating disarmament.


Conclusion: The Problem of Inspection and Control

Having viewed the problem of disarmament from the perspective of

how it is related to international affairs as a whole, we are now in a

better position to look at the problem narrowly as it is manifested in

the concrete issues that are the subject of bargaining in the negotia-

tions.

The negotiation process is concerned with two different kinds of

questions: (1) those relating to program (specific limitations and re-

ductions of armaments or restraints on military activities) and (2) those

relating to administration (the machinery and procedures for implementing

and maintaining the substantive provisions of an agreement).

One area of problems in the negotiations, then, has to do with

what disarmament. Proposals are designed primarily either to place re-

strictions on armaments or on the use of armaments (which entails no dis-

armament at all in a literal sense). Limitations on armaments may be

quantitative (the ratio of capital ships allotted to the United States,

Britain, Japan, France, and Italy under the Washington Treaty of 1922) or












qualitative (as were the restrictions imposed directly on the size and

armament of submarines by the London Treaty of 1930, or as would be the

indirect restriction of the development of nuclear weapons by prohibiting

the testing of those weapons). Limitations on the use of armaments,

rather than regulating the kinds and amounts of weapons states can have,

seek to restrict the ways in which military capability is actually em-

ployed. Hypothetically, this may be accomplished directly through an

agreement on the deployment and activities of military forces or indirectly

such as through mutual inspection for the purpose of inhibiting surprise

attack.

The other area of problems in the negotiations revolve around the

means of ensuring that all parties abide by the terms of the disarmament

agreement. Aside from relying on the honor of the participants, three ap-

proaches may be followed: (1) Countries may depend on their unilateral

intelligence resources to assure themselves that the other participants

are not cheating. (2) They may agree only to measures where compliance

is self-evident, such as the banning of negaton nuclear detonations in

the atmosphere. (3) Or an institutionalized inspection and control

system may be established.1

On both the question of the program and administration of disarma-

nmnt, the negotiations more often than not have been stalemated. In the

1Another point of semantic confusion needs clarification here.
Through their usage in the negotiations, the distinction between the
terms "inspection" and "control" has become blurred. They are now gener-
ally used interchangeably. But technically "inspection" implies only the
performance of intelligence functions such as surveillance, disclosure,
and verification while "control" identifies the source of ultimate enforce-
ment authority. This source is either the individual states or some
supranational agency.































2*l-





54





In this chapter ;e have seen hoij inspection and control fits into

the total disarmanrent picture on a theoretical plane. Uext, uw shift our

attention to an historical plane in order to observe the problem of in-

spection and control within the operational setting of the negotiations

cince 1945.












CHAPTER III

THE RECORD OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, 1945-1954


The institutional and political issues of inspection and control

over which the United States and the Soviet Union are divided in the

1960's go all the way back to 1946 when the first attempts were made to

bring atonic-age weapons under international control. This--the histori-

cal dimencion of American and Soviet policies on disarmament controls--

will be the subject of the ubc o next three chapters. Specifically, we shall

be concerned with two questions: first, the part that inspection and con-

trol has played in the disarmament negotiations as a whole and, second, the

positions that the United States and the Soviet Union have taken over the

years.


The Phases of the Negotiations

The postwar negotiations on disarmament have gone through some five

different phases. Before taking them up in detail, let us briefly trace

their chronological progression. From 1946 to 1950--the first phase--the

focus of attention was on the internationalization of atomic energy. The

Atonic Energy Commission (established by the General Assembly on January

24, 1946) and the Commission for Conventional Armaments (created by the

1The following sources may be consulted for a more detailed diplo-
matic history of the disarmament negotiations since World War II: Bech-
hocfcr, Post War negotiations for Arms Control; Yves Collart, Disarmament:
A Study Guide and Bibliography on the Efforts of the United Nations (The
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1958); Joseph P. Morray, From Yalta to Disarma-
mnnt (New York: Honthly Review Press, 1961); Nogee, Soviet Policy Towards
International Control of Atomic Energy; Anthony Nutting, Disarmament: An
Outline of the Nc-otiations (New York: O::ford University Press, 1959).












Security Council on February 13, 1)47) furnished the main setting for

the deliberations.

From 1950 to 1952 the formal negotiations were broken off, mainly

as a result of the Korean War. But with the merger of the Atomic Energy

Commission and the Comission for Conventional Arnmcents into a single

disarmament commission on January 11, 1952, the second phase of the dis-

armament conversations was inaugurated. Later, during the third phase,

the forum of the negotiations shifted from the Disarmamnnt Commission to

the Subcomnittee of Five which it established on April 19, 1954.

After the Soviet Union withdrew from the Subcommittee of Five in

September, 1957, there were no further negotiations on general disarma-

ment for more than two years. There uere, however, a number of confer-

ences on specialized arms control measures during this interval--the fourth

phase. East-Uest technical experts held tLo conferences in Geneva during

1953: from July 1 to August 21 to consider the possibility of detecting

violations of a nuclear test ban and from Hovember 10 to December 13 to

consider measures to prevent a surprise attack. ACditionally, the Geneva

Conference on the Discontinuance of Iuclear Weapon Tests net from October

31, 1958, through January 29, 1962. Finally, in the fifth phase, the

talks on comprehensive disarmament were resumed by the Ten Nation Cornit-

tee on Disarmament which net from liarch 15 through June 27, 1960. It wac,

in turn, supplanted by the Eighteen Nation Comittee on Disarmament which

began work in llarch, 1962.

With this road map of the disarmament negotiations in mind, let us

now return to the beginning.










Phase I: The United Nations Atomic Energy Commission

The interval between the successful testing of the atomic bomb on

July 15, 1945, near Alamogordo, HNew Mexico, and the opening session of

the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission on June 14, 1946, Was es-

pccially crucial. Many of the basic policies of the United States and

the Soviet Union, including their general approaches to the problem of

disarmament, were molded by what took place during those few months. On

June 26--a few days before the Alanogordo experiment--the representatives

of fifty countries, meeting at San Francisco, had signed the United Na-

tions Charter, a pre-atomic age document. On August 6 and 9 atomic

bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The next day the Japanese

Government offered to surrender, thus bringing an end to the hostilities

almost immediately after the Soviet Union had declared war on Japan.

Later, after five days of intensive consultations in Washington,

President Truman, Prime Minister Attlee, and Prime Minister King issued

a joint declaration on November 15 calling fa: the establishment of a

commission under the United Nations to prepare recommendations for attain-

ing

S. the most effective means of entirely eliminating
the use of atomic energy for destructive purposes and
promoting its widest use for industrial and humanitarian
purposes.

Three assumptions about atomic technology were cited by the Tr.man-

Attlee-King Declaration in support of the need for a revolutionary politi-


kJoint Declaration by the Heads of Government of the United States,
the United Kingdom, and Canada, November 15, 1945," in Documents on Dis-
armament, 1945-1949, I, 2.











cal approach: (1) Atomic weapons, because they have "placed at the

disposal of mankind means of destruction hitherto unknown," are in a

special class by themselves. (2) There can be no adequate military de-

fense against them. (3) Lastly, no nation can for long maintain a

monopoly over these weapons. With modifications, these premises have

continued to guide American thinking on the question of nuclear disarma-

ment.

Next, the proposal made by the Truman-Attlee-King Declaration was

presented at the Big Three Council of Foreign Ministers meeting at Hoscow

in December in order to gain the concurrence of the Soviet Union. In the

communique issued on December 27, Foreign Minister Molotov agreed to Rus-

sian co-sponsorship of a resolution in the General Assembly creating a

commission along the lines proposed by the United States, the United King-

dom, and Canada. For reasons that were not entirely apparent at the time,

however, he was insistent on one point--that it be clearly understood that

the commission was to be under the direction of the Security Council "in
.2
matters affecting security.

Following the e:act wording of the Moscow communiqu6, at its first

session in London the General Assembly unanimously passed a resolution es-

tablishing a commission for the control of atomic energy composed of the

members of the Security Council and Canada when Canada was not a member


1
Ibid., p. 1.

Ioscow Communiqu6 by the Foreign Ministers of the United States,
the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union [extracts], December 27, 1945,
in ibid., p. 5.
























r --
CT: ~~"`"`
kr,, :J~












To assist it in "analyzing and appraising all the relevant facts and

formulating proposals," the Secretary of State's Committee, in turn,

appointed a Board of Consultants with David E. Lilicnthal as chairman.

The labors of the Secretary of State's Committee and the Board of

Consultants culminated in the issuance of A Report on the International

Control of Atomic Energy (otherwise known as the Achcson-Lilienthal Re-

port) which was made public on March 28, 1946, ten days after Bernard

Baruch was designated as the United States representative on the United
9
Nations Atomic Energy Commission." The Acheson-Lilienthal Report did not

purport to lay out the plan to be presented to the Atomic Energy Commis-

sion. But with the exception of the provisions for enforcement tacked on

by Baruch, it turned out to be the American blueprint for atomic energy

development.

Therefore, from the tone of official statements, the Soviet govern-

ment months in advance undoubtedly gained a clear picture of what the

line of American policy would be when the AEC began its work in June.

On the other hand, the Russians gave no prior indications of the stand

they would take although American policymakers were fully aware of the


U. S. Government Printing Office, 1946), p. 34. (Cited hereafter as
Growth of a Policy.) Others named to the Committee were John J. McCloy,
Dr. Vonat., T i Bush, Dr. James Conant, and General Leslie R. Groves.
1
The Board of Consultants also included Chester I. Barnard, Dr.
Robert Oppenheimer, Dr. Charles Allen Thomas, and Harry A. Uinne. Ibid.

2U. S., Department of State, A Report on the International Con-
trol of Atomic Ener Department of State Publication No. 2493 (Wash-
ington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1946).











Soviet aversion to the foreign intrusions necessitated by any system

of international control.1

Indeed, the Kremlin seemed to be carefully refraining from making

any significant pronouncements on atomic policy at this juncture. Ameri-

can officials were puzzled by the apparent nonchalance shown by Soviet

leaders toward atomic weapons. When President Truman informed Stalin on

July 24, 1945, at the Potsdam Conference that the United States had per-

fected the atomic bomb, Stalin's only comment was that "he was glad to
2
hear of the bomb and hoped we would use it." At the Moscow foreign

ministers meeting in December, 1946, Molotov requested that the proposal

for a United Nations commission on atomic energy be placed at the bottom

of the agenda, as if to further play down the importance attached to the

new supercwapon by the Soviet Union. Even after the actual negotiations

commenced, Soviet statements on atomic energy for the most part continued

to be enigmatic and shadowy.


The Baruch Plan

As the representative of the host country, Bernard Baruch served

as chairman of the first meeting of the Atomic Energy Comission on June

14, 1946, at Hunter College in New York City. Quickly brushing aside


IBernard Baruch pondered whether it was reasonable to expect that
the Russians would ever allow inspection of their atomic resources when
they "would not even allow American newspapermen behind the Iron Curtain."
Margaret L. Coit, Mr. Baruch (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1957),
i.. 563.

James F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly (New York: Harper and Brothers,
1947), p. 263.
3
Ibid., p. 266.











the formalities, he rushed into a detailed exposition of the American

plan for dealing with the problem of atomic energy. He introduced it

with this solemn warning:

Wle are here to make a choice between the quick and the
dead. That is our business. Behind the black portent
of the new atomic age lies a hope which, seized upon
with faith, can work our salvation. If we fail, then
we have damned every man to be the slave of Fear. Let
us not deceive ourselves: He must elect World Peace or
World Destruction.1

At the center of the scheme proposed by Baruch was an International

Atonic Development Authority, to be entrusted with "all phases of the de-

velopment and use of atomic energy."2 Dual control functions were envis-

aged: (1) It would exercise direct "managerial control or ownership of

all atomic-energy activities potentially dangerous to world security."

(2) It would supervise all other uses of atomic energy indirectly
,,3
through the "power to control, inspect, and license. The first sector

of atomic energy would be wholly internationalized while the second would

be carried on at the national level. In addition to its negative regula-

tory responsibilities, the ADA was vested with two positive functions:

first, fostering the beneficial uses of atomic energy and, second, "re-

search and developmental activities of an affirmative character to put

the Authority in the forefront of atomic knowledge."4 This was to en-

able it to better comprehend and detect the misuses of atomic energy.


Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959, I, 7-3.

2Ibid., p. 10.

3Ibid., pp. 10-11.

Ibid., p. 11.

































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::Pectnntly. The first signs had seemed to point to an eventual agree-

mont.1 Baruch and his associates were optimistic about the possibilities
2
of coming to terms with the Russians. But as Gromyko began to speak,

these hopes were dashed.

In contrast to the minute mechanical details spelled out by the

Baruch Plan, Gromyko limited himself to the presentation and elaboration

of two draft resolutions. One called for a prohibition of atomic weapons

and another sought to establish a conzittce for the exchange of atomic

information and a committee "for the prevention of the use of atomic

energy to the detriment of mankind."3

As "one of the primary measures to be taken," Gromyko proposed

the conclusion of

. an international convention prohibiting the produc-
tion and employment of weapons based on the use of atomic
energy for the purpose of macs destruction.4

Specifically, the parties to the convention would obligate themselves

(a) not to use atomic weapons in any circumstances what-
soever;
(b) to prohibit the production and storing of weapons
based on the use of atomic energy;
(c) to destroy, within a period of three months from the
day of the entry into force of the present convention,
all stocks of atomic energy weapons whether in finished
or unfinished condition.5


1
Colt, p. 589.
2
Baruch, Baruch: The Public Years, p. 374.
3
Documcnts on Disarmament, 1945-1959, I, 22-23.

Ibid., p. 18.

5Ibid., p. 21.











Gromyko then added portentously that:

This act should be followed by other mccaures aiming at
the establishment of methods to ensure the strict observance
of the terms and obligations contained in the above-mentioned
convention. .

In no event, however, was this to include the modification of the veto

power in the Security Council for such a move o uld be "incompatible

with the interests of the United Nations" and therefore "must be rejected."2

Instead of international enforcement, it was urged that national legisla-

tion "providing severe penalties for violators of the statutes of the

present convention" be passed within six months after the treaty came

into effect.

On three critical points the Gromyko statement was at variance

with the provisions in the Baruch proposals. First, and most important,

on the question of the priority of the outlawing of atomic weapons as

against the establishment of a system of international controls, the

Soviet and American positions were diametrically opposed. In effect,

the Russians wanted to begin by prohibiting the bomb as the essential

precondition for beginning discussions of the matter of effective safe-

guards. Conversely, the Americans were unwilling to talk in definite

terms about dismantling their atomic stockpile until the Russians accepted

the idea of international control. The sequence of the steps to be taken

became the dominant issue in subsequent atomic energy negotiations.


Ibid., p. 18. Italics added.

Ibid., p. 24.

Ibid., p. 21.











Ne::t, it was apparent from Gronyko's remarks that the Soviet Union

favored the overall development of atomic energy under the aegis of na-

tional governments rather than under an international organization of

the type outlined by Baruch.

Finally, Gromyko let it be kno~m from the beginning that the

Soviet Union would not countenance any change in the voting formula in

the Security Council. The veto privilege on questions of substance al-

lowed the Soviet Union to protect its interests in the face of a poten-

tially hostile Security Council majority.


The Exploratory Negotiations: 1946

By the time the Atomic Energy Commission terminated its work on

July 29, 1949, a total of 24 plenary sessions and 179 meetings of its

various committees had been held. Yet during all of that time neither

the United States nor the Soviet Union retreated from any of the funda-

mental principles that each had enunciated during the initial meetings

of the AEC. Substantively speaking, neither party had anything new to

say to the other after the opening round of the talks. The first few

months of the deliberations, however, did serve the useful function of

clarifying and bringing into sharp focus the divergences between the ap-

proaches of the two sides. But the sane cannot be said about the later

phases of the discussions which, with increasing frequency, degenerated

into acrimonious debates only remotely related to the substantive issues

of atomic energy control.

In the negotiations during 1946 some semblance of allied unity had

carried over from the recently ended war. Simultaneously with the atomic











energy deliberations going on in Zc,; York, the Council of Foreign Minis-

ters from July 29 to October 13 were laboring in Paris on draft treaties
1
with Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, Italy, and Rumania. Most likely, this

was a key factor behind the Soviet strategy of avoiding a showdown over

the atomic-energy question by steering clear of a definitive repudiation

of all of the basic concepts contained in the Baruch Plan.

To no avail, other members of the AEC attempted to elicit from the

Soviet delegate further details spelling out exactly what the Russians

had in mind. Finally, at the second meeting of Committee Two on July 24,

over a month after the American plan had been tabled, Gromyko addressed

himself directly to the Baruch proposals. Arguing that under the Charter

the Security Council already was "empowered to deal with matters relat-

ing to the control of atomic energy" and that abandonment of the prin-

ciple of unanimity of the permanent members of the S-curity Council

would violate national sovereignty, he concluded that

. the American proposals as they are presented now
cannot be accepted by the Soviet Union either as a whole
or in their separate parts.2

Making no headway in bridging the political gap between the Ameri-

can and Soviet viewpoints, the Commission at the end of July decided to

turn to an exploration of the technical basis of international control

in hopes of moving the negotiations off dead center. The Scientific and

Technical Committee, made up of prominent scientists representing each

of the twelve members of the AEC, was directed to submit a report on


1Facts on File, 19M6, p. 331.

2Growth of a Policy, pp. 81-82.











. the question whether effective control of atomic
energy is possible, together with an indication of I
methods by which . .effective control can be achieved.

In a series of eighteen informal closed-door meetings during

August, the Committee hammered out a unanimous report that was sub-

mitted to Committee Two of the AEC on October 2. This was the only

formal agreement of substance reached between the United States and the

Soviet Union during three years of extensive negotiations. The report

stated guardedly that

. we do not find any basis in the available scientific
facts for supposing that effective control is not techno-
logically feasible.2

Accepting the report of the Scientific and Technical CoIzittee

as the basis for future discussions, Committee T7o between October 15

and December 13 continued the deliberations on a technical plane by con-

sidering specific safeguards against the three general kinds of possible

violations: the diversion of materials, clandestine operations, and the

open seizure of materials or atomic facilities. Progress was made in

the sense of defining technically sound procedures, but that ignored the

vital question of what was politically acceptable.


Ibid., p. 85. This created a precedent for two later confer-
ences of experts in 1953 to consider the technical aspects of nuclear
test detection and surprise attack prevention. See infra, Chapter V.

2U. I., Atomic Energy Commission, Official Records: Special Sup-
plement, Report to the Security Council, 1946, p. 37.

3U. S., Department of State, International Control of Atomic
Energy: Policy at the Crossroads, Department of State Publication No.
3161 (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 19-" ), p. 44.
(Cited hereafter as Policy at the Crossroads.)





































C~-



















i`.












margin (Poland and the Soviet Union abstaining).

The bulk of the material in the First Report grew out of the

work by the Scientific and Technical Committea and Committee Two on

technical safeguards, reflecting a tendency to shun the basic politi-

cal cleavages which threatened to wreck the negotiations altogether.

Here again the Commission was prodded by Baruch to choose between the

American and Russian plans. On December 5 he made a series of specific

proposals for inclusion as "General Findings" and "Recommendations" in

the AEC report.2 With only minor changes these were ultimately incor-

porated into the document presented to the Security Council.

In essence, the "General Findings" and "Recommendations" were

nothing more than a recapitulation of the points enunciated in the ini-

tial Baruch statementto the AEC. Six months of diligent negotiations

had neither added to nor subtracted from the Baruch Plan.

Ordinarily, after clarifying the positions of the two sides and

showing then to be irreconcilable, there would have been no reason for

continuing to negotiate further. But on an issue so Nital as the control


1
U. H., Atomic Energy Commission, Official Records: Special Sup-
plement, Report to the Security Council, 1946. The voting figures cited
in this study list the number for, against, and abstaining, in that order
2
U. N., Atomic Energy Commission, Official Records, Seventh Meet-
ing, December 5, 1946, pp. 39-92. For the text of Baruch's proposals see
U. N., Atomic Energy Commission, Official Records: Supplement No. 3,
Annex 4, 1946, pp. 13-17.

3Although the American proposal continued to be known as the
Baruch Plan, on January 4, 1947, Baruch resigned as United States Repre-
sentative on the Atomic Energy Cormission. In March, 1947, Frederich
Osborn vas appointed as Deputy Representative on the Commission and
served until the spring of 1949.












of atomic energy, the world was unwilling to accept the verdict of the

first months of the Uestern-Soviet negotiations, and great pressure was

brought to bear for their continuance.


The Stalemated Negotiations: 1947-1949

In the background of the proceedings of the Atomic Energy Commis-

sion from 1947 through 1949 were mounting East-West political tensions

which provided an atmosphere less and less conducive to any meaningful

diplomatic discussions. Consideration of the First Report by the Security

Council was held up from January to February 14, 1947, by procedural

wrangling over whether to take up the AEC Report or the question of

general disarmament first, and then by a deadlock over the terms of

reference of the new Cormission for Conventional Armaments. When the

Security Council finally got around to considering the recommendations

made by the Atomic Energy Commission, it was met by a Russian counter-

proposal in the form of twelve amendments to the First Report. These

amendments, presented on February 18, constituted the most important

Russian policy pronouncement since the Gromyko speech on June 19 of the
1
previous year.

Although the language of the document was equivocal, two apparent

"concessions" that went beyond the initial Russian proposal were advanced:

1. Acceptance of the principle of international control:



1"Soviet Proposal Introduced in the Security Council: Draft Amend-
nents and Additions to the First Report of the United Uations Atomic
Energy Comiiscon, february 13, 1947," in Documents on Disarnment, 19L5-
1959, I, 61-64.












To be effective, such a convention outlawingg the produc-
tion, possession, and use of atomic weapons must provide
for the establishment of a comprehensive system of inter-
national control including supervision and inspection to
ensure the carrying out of the terms of the convention and
to protect complying states against the hazards of viola-
tions.1

The system of control, however, "must be administered within the

framework of the Security Council" (where the veto would be applicable).

Moreover, it was implied that there would be two separate conventions,

one outlawing atomic weapons followed by one setting up the control

machinery.2

2. Acceptance of majority decisions in the control organ in day

to day operations:

The control organs and the organs of inspection should
carry out their control and inspection functions, act-
ing on the basis of their own rules which should provide
for the adoption of decisions, in appropriate cases, by
a majority vote.3

It was perfectly clear that the invoking of sanctions was not one of the

"appropriate" cases.

Although the substantive position of the Soviet Union had changed

little, if at all, an element of flexibility was introduced, which pro-



Ibid., p. 62.

2Frederick Osborn, "The USSR and the Atom," Ncgotiating with the
Russians, eds. Raymond Dennett and Joseph E. Johnson (Boston: World
Peace Foundation, 1951), pp. 219-220.

Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1i :, I, 63. Italics added.
3oth of these concessions were first revealed by Foreign Minister Molotov
in a speech before the First Committee of the United Nations General As-
sembly on December 4, 1946, the day before Baruch began to push for a
vote by the AEC on the American plan. (The te:xt of the speech is
printed in New York Times, December 5, 1946, p. 23.)











vided an impetus to renew the negotiations. Thus after seven inconclu-

sive meetings devoted largely to a debate of the Russian amendments, the

Security Council on larch 19, 1947, unanimously passed a resolution re-

turning the First Report, along with the Soviet amendments to it, to

the Atomic Energy Commnission for further study. A second report, to be

submitted before the beginning of the second session of the General As-

sembly the following September, was requested.

For the first time since adopting its report to the Security Coun-

cil at the end of December, the AEC reassembled on llarch 9, 1947, to re-

sume its world during an especially crisis-ridden period. On larch 12

the Truman Doctrine (enunciated in a presidential address before Congress

requesting aid to Greece and Turkey) declared ideological war on Communism

by proclaiming that "at the present moment in history nearly every nation
2
must choose between alternative ways of life.' On llay 31 the non-

communist government of Hungary was overthrown. On July 2 at a confer-

ence of British, French, and Russian foreign ministers in Paris, M1olotov

rejected the proposal for an overall American program of economic aid to

Europe made by Secretary of State Marshall on June 5 in his now famous

Harvard address. The effect was more or less to solidify the break be-

tween Eastern and Western Europe and to crystallize the formation of

rival blocs.


1
U. N., Security Council, Official Records, 117th Meeting, March
10, 1947, pp. 437-40C.

2U. S., Department of State Bulletin, XVI (March 23, 1947), 536.












The doterioracion of Ancrican-Soviet relations was reflected in

the growing obstrepcrousness of Russian behavior in the deliberations

of the AEC during 1947. In carrying out the instructions of the Security

Council, the Cormission had divided its ;ork between two standing com-

mittees--the Uorking Comnittee and CoeiLttee Tuo. The Working Comrittee

in some twenty ccetings from April G to mid-July examined the twelve

amendients preferred l. the Soviet Union. Committee T.:o was charged

wiith the task of elaborating the concrete details of a control plan for

atomic energy based on the principles contained in the First Report. Al-

together, ro. April 3 to September W oE-itte. Two and its seven work-

ing groups held ninety-one meetings. But the Soviet Union refused to

participate actively in these proceedings on the grounds that it had not

accepted the First Report. So there was not even a facade of negotiations

there. And in the Working Corraittec, uhcre the Soviets tool: the initia-

tive, their propaganda tactics ;wre more blatant and transparent than in

earlier : :'., s .

Amid the flurry of activity of the corraittees, as t,: strove to

meet the deadline for reporting set by the Security Council, Andrei

Gronyko requested a plenary meeting of the Comnission on June 11 at which

he outlined the only definitive plan of his government since the talks

began. Basically, he proposed that


1
Policy at the Crossroads, pp. 1 7-190.

2For an interesting account of Russian propaganda maneuvers, see
Osborn, pp. 2 :-236.

-"Soviet Proposals Introduced in the United Nations Atonic Energy









































/
~I



(_ _I











r-






I:8
'-*
















;r .























c
i,:






















"'


































i, i











i




r;












directed at clarifying the contents of the recent proposal. Gromyko's

reply was the most unambiguous official statement of Russian policy made

during the course of the negotiations. He confirmed that:

The conclusion of a convention prohibiting atomic weapons
is a foremost and urgent task in the establishment of
international control of atomic energy. After the con-
clusion of [the] convention on the prohibition of atomic
weapons, another convention can and must be concluded, to
provide for the creation of an international control com-
mission and for the establishment of other measures of
control and inspection.2

He also revealed that what the Soviet Government had in mind was

inspection of declared plants and facilities only; that supervision,

management, and licensing could not be considered as legitimate forms

of "strict and effective international control"; that the proposed Inter-

national Control Commission would have no compulsory powers over national

governments; and that the Soviet Union would entertain no move to modify

the unanimity principle of the great powers in the Security Council.

In short, the Soviets were willing to accept in principle the

doctrine of international inspection which became the major thcre of

the negotiations on partial disarmament measures in the 1950's. But,

at the same time, they continued to reject out of hand the two concepts

that formed the nucleus of the Baruch Plan-.-managerial control or owner-

ship of "dangerous" atomic-energy activities and sanctions meted out by

the Security Council without the prerogative of the veto.


1
The tex:t of the Cadogan-Gromyko letters is printed in ibid., pp.
90-93.


2
Ibid., p. 91. Italics added.











Only Poland received the Soviet plan warmly and hopefully. The

other members of the AEC felt that the technical studies already com-

pleted clearly demonstrated the inadequacy of the Soviet approach. Ac-

cordingly, on August 15, 1947, in Committee Two they passed a resolu-

tion expressing the conviction that "these proposals do not provide an

adequate basis for the development by the Committee of specific proposals
1
for an effective system of international control of atomic energy."

Having turned back the Soviet attempt to elicit a compromise on

basic principles, the Commission then proceeded to follow through with

its original intention of presenting a detailed international control

program to the Security Council grounded on the principles stated in its

First Report. This it did in the bulky Second Report approved on Sep-

tember 11, 19':7, by a 10-1-1 vote (Russia opposing and Poland abstain-

ing).2

For fifteen months the Comm.ission had managed to avoid total

paralysis by confining its activities largely to an investigation of

the scientific and technical requirements of a system for the interna-

tional control of atomic energy. In effect, the Second Report marked

the completion of that task. It reiterated three technically irrefut-

able principles of atomic control:

1. Decisions concerning the production and use of atomic
energy should not be left in the hands of nations.


1
Policy at the Crossroads, p. 115.

2U. N., Atomic Energy Comnission, Official Records, Second Year:
Special Supplement, Second Report to the Security Council, U. N. Docu-
ment AEC/26, September 11, 1947.











2. Policies concerning the production and use of atomic
energy which substantially affect world security
should be governed by principles established in the
treaty or convention which the agency would be ob-
ligated to carry out.
3. Nations oust undertake in the treaty or convention
to grant to the agency rights of inspection of any
part of their territory, subject to appropriate
procedural requirements and limitations.1

It also spelled out the following basic measures for implementing

these principles:

(a) production quotas based on principles and policies
specified in the treaty or convention;
(b) ownership by the agency of nuclear fuel and source
material;
(c) ownership, management, and operation by the agency
of dangerous facilities;
(d) licensing by the agency of non-dangerous facilities
to be operated by nations; and
(e) inspection by the agency to prevent or detect
clandestine activities

Because the technical aspects of the problem had been pursued

as far as possible, the fundamental divergence between East-West politi-

cal views on the functions and powers of the international agency had

to be reconciled before the AEC could move any further. That this was

nore unlikely than ever was reflected in the agenda of the Security

Council which wac so crowded with security questions that the Second

Report was never considered formally. The stream of political events,

too, seemed to be moving toward a showdown between the Soviet Union

and the Western powers. Between September, 1947, and February, 1940,

the Communist hold over Bulgaria, Rumania, Poland, and Czechoslovakia



Ibid., p. 2.

2Ibid.












was solidified through coups and the suppression of opposition groups.

Western apprehensions were further magnified in June, 1943, when the

Berlin Blockade was instituted and kept in effect until May, 1949, by

the Russians.

In the meantime, from January through March, 1948, the AEC

probed the Soviet position further without a particle of success.

Committee Two, after two formal meetings and a number of informal con-

sultations on the subject of the organizational structure of the proposed
1
control agency, adjourned sine die." Concurrently, the Working Committee

subjected the Soviet plan of June 11, 1947, to careful scrutiny. After

ten futile meetings, the Comittec passed a resolution on April 5, 1940,

stating that "no useful purpose can be served by further discussion" of

the Soviet proposals because they "ignore the existing technical knowl-

edge of the problem of atomic energy control [and! do not provide an
2
adequate basis for the international control of atomic energy. . .

On 1ay 17, 1948, over the opposition of the Soviet Union and the

Ukraine, the Atomic Energy Conaission approved a Third Report to the

Security Council stating that "it has reached an impasse" and recommend-

ing that further negotiations at the Commission level be suspended.3 The

United States on June 22 sponsored a draft resolution in the Security

1
U. N., Department of Public Information, Yearbook of the United
Nations, 1947-40, p. 463.
2
Ibid., p. 470.

3U. H., Atomic Energy Cocmission, Official Records: Special Sup-
plement, Third Report to the Sccurit,- Council, May 17, 1940, p. 1.












Council which would have accepted the three AEC reports as the basis for

the international control of atomic oner, As expected, the Soviet Union

cast a negative vote, which vetoed the proposal since it was a substantive

question. The Council then proceeded to adopt a procedural resolution

(which requires only a majority vote) referring the AEC reports to the
1
General Assembly "as a matter of special concern."

During the General Assembly debate on these reports, which lasted

from September 2- to Iovember 4, 19- the Soviet Union introduced a draft

resolution embodying the most significant concession it had rade yet in

the negotiations. In June, 1946, a convention outlawing atomic weapons

was proposed, with no mention of international controls; and in February,

1947, this was modified by the call for a convention of prohibition to be

followed by the conclusion of a convention on control. Now, on October 2,

1943, the Soviet Union further extended its position by recommending that

the Atomic Energy Commission be directed to

. prepare a Draft Convention on the prohibition of
atomic ucapons and a Draft Convention on the establish-
ment of effective international control oi atomic energy,
both the Convention on the prohibition of atonic weapons
and the Convention on the establishment of international
control over atomic energy to be signed and brought into
operation simultaneously.2

The Western countries saw this move as a propaganda maneuver rather

than a gesture that could lead to bona fide negotiations, 'udLing from


1
U.N. Document S/336, June 11, 1940, and U. N. Document S/G51,
June 22, 1941, in Docutents on Disarmament, 1945-1959, I, 172-173.

2U. N. Document A/C.1/310, October 2, 1943, in ibid., pp. 177-17 .
Italics added.











menacing Soviet actions in Europe at that time. Furthermorc, there :as

no hint that the Russians were willin- to go beyond their earlier offer

of periodic inspection of declared facilities, which was entirely unac-

ceptable to the Uest. Although some of the Trpresentatives of sZallcr

states, such as Bclgium, c:pressed a :ceen interest in what the Russians

had proposed, the United States and Great Britain lined up ovcrwh1elming

support in defeating the Soviet draft resolution on Io- .cmber 4 by a vote

of 6-40-3. By a similar margin (40-6-4), the General Assembly on the same

day adopted a resolution approving the reco-nendations of the AEC majority

"as constituting the necessary basis for establishing an effective system

of international control of atomic energy to ensure its use only for

peaceful purposes and for the elimination from national armaments of

atomic weapons . .

Upon the insistence of the smaller nations, the resolution also re-

quested the si:x permanent members of the Atomic Energy Commission to enter

into consultations "in order to determine if there exists a basis for
2
agreement on the international control of atoic energy. .. ."

In accordance with the General Asscmbly's request, the AEC recon-

vened on February 13, IE19, for the first time since llay, 1943. The four-

teen meetings that followed were marked by come of the most strident de-

bates and sharp verbal attacks of any of the American-Russian negotiations

during the Cold War. The Russians rcintrodu.cd and pressed relentlessly


1
General Asscably Resolution 191 (III), November 4, 19'-, in ibid.,
p. 178.


2
Ibid.











their proposal for simultaneous conventions in an attempt to shou up

the unreasonablenesss" and "inflexibility" of the Western position.

Finally, in exasperation the CorOission on July 29, 1949, adopted two

resolutions. By a vote of 7-2-2 (the Soviet Union and the Ukraine

opposing, Argentina and Egypt abstaining) it sur.-arily rejected the

Russian proposal to instruct the AEC to prepare two separate conven-

tions to be executed simultaneously. Over the opposition of the Soviet

Union and the Ukraine, it also reported to the Security Council that an

impasse still e:.isted in the Corrission and again reconm.ended that there

be no further discussions in the Atomic Energy Commission "until such

time as the sponsoring powers have reported that there e.:ists a basis

for agreement."

In turn, the Security Council again brought the matter to the at-

tention of the General Assembly and called on the permanent members to

engage in special private consultations to seeCl a basic for an agreement.

Fourteen private meetings were held, beginning on August 9, 1949. Dur-

ing the course of these meetings, two fateful events occurred, presaging

the final breakdown of the atomic energy negotiations. On September 23

President Truman announced that the United States had detected an atomic

explosion in the Soviet Union "within recent weeks."2 And in Hovember

the Chiang Kai-shce government fled front mainland China to Formosa.


1
U. U Documents AEC/42 and AEC/43, July 29, 1949, in ibid., p.
2,.-
9
"Statement by President Truman Regarding Atomic E::plosion in
the Soviet Union, September 23, 1949," in ibid., p. 207.











At the fourteenth meeting of the si'.-poJcr consultation group

on January 19, 19:0, the Soviet demand that the Chinese representative

be excluded was refused. The Soviet representative then walked out of

the meeting (following the lead of Russian delegations in several other

United Nations organs which began with a boycott of the Security Council
1
on January 10). Neither the Atonic Energy Com-ission nor any of its

committees ever met again.


Phase I: The Comnission for Conventional Armanents

While the United States seized the initiative in the negotiations

for the international control of atomic energy by advancing most of the

proposals that wore considered, the Soviet Union took the lead in push-

ing for the reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces. Here

the United States was on the defensive since it was in a distinctly in-

ferior bargaining position, having unilaterally trinned its forces from
2
12 million men in 19'. dowi to 1.- million in 1940. The Soviet Union,

on the other hand, continued to maintain large conventional forces. Con-

sequently, the roles occupied by the protagonists in the Atomic Energy

Commission were reversed in the Commission for Conventional Armaments.

Initially, the question of general disarmament was raised in the

United Nations by Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov in a speech before the

General Assembly on October 29, 1946. After attacking the motivation of



U. S., Department of State, United States Participation in the
United Nations: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year
1950, Department of State Publication No. 4178 (Washington: U. S.
Government Printing Office, 1950), p. 112.

LU. S., Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Statistical
Abstract of the United States, 1961, p. 240.











the Baruch Plan, he submitted a draft resolution stating that "the General

Assembly considers a general reduction of armaments necessary" and that

the primary objective of such a reduction should be "the prohibition of
1I
the production and use of atomic cncrgy for military purposes." It

also recommended that the Security Council take action to provide for

the practical achievemnt of these objectives. This draft resolution

implied that the reduction and elimination of atomic and non-atomic

armaments should be considered jointly and that the Atomic Energy Com-

mission (where Russian proposals were then faring badly) would be by-

passed in doing so.

A further Soviet draft resolution, introduced on November 29,

confirmed these implications.2 Two "organs of inspection" would be es-

tablished "within the framework of the Security Council"--one for e:ecut-

ing the decision regarding the reduction of conventional armaments and

one for executing the decision regarding the prohibition of atomic

weapons.

Ultimately, the Soviet Union accepted an amended version of a

vaguely worded American draft resolution covering the general principles

of both atomic and non-atomic disarmament, uhich mas adopted unanimously

by the General Assembly on December 14, 1946. Among other things, the

resolution recognized "the necessity of an early general regulation and


Policy at the Crossroads, pp. 59-'

2"Soviet Draft Resolution Introduced in the First Corrittee of the
General Asscmbly: Regulation and Reduction of Armaments, November 29,
1946," U. I. Document A/C.1/87, November 29, 1946, in Documents on Dis-
armament, 1945-1959, I, 42-43.

SGeneral Asscebly Resolution 41 (I),Dcccmber 14, 1946, in ibid.,
pp. 34-05.












reduction of armaments and armed forces" and recommended that the

Security Council formulate practical r.iasurcs to be considered by the

Assembly and ratified by the individual states. Moreover, it affirmed

that an essential part of the regulation of armaments and armed forces

"is the provision of practical and effective safeguards by way of inspec-

tion and other means to protect complying States against the hazards of

violations and evasions."1

Pursuant to the above-mentioned resolution, the Security Council

on February 13, 1947, adopted a resolution by a 10-0-1 vote (Russia ab-

staining) setting up a Commission for Conventional Armaments after a

sharp clash over the terms of reference of the new organ. The United

States insisted that its jurisdiction must not overlap with that of the

AEC. The Soviet Union, however, maintntaed that no qualitative distinc-

tion could be made between atomic and conventional weapons and that they

should therefore be considered together. The resolution, whichh accepted

the American viewpoint, directed the Commission for Conventional Arma-

ments (CCA) to prepare proposals for the general regulation and reduc-

tion of armaments in areas outside the competence of the Atomic Energy

Commission and "for practical and effective safeguards" in connection

with these measures.


Ibid., p. 40.

2U. N. Documents S/26G/Rev. 1, February 13, 19':7, and Corr. 1,
February 14, in ibid., pp. 60-61. The Commission for Conventional Arma-
ments was composed of members of the Security Council.

Ibid., p. 60.












The CCA convened on March 24, 1947, and immediately bogged down

over the question of what its plan of work and rules of procedure should

be. A subcommittee of the five permanent members, meeting from April 24

to June 6, failed to iron out the differences between the American and

Russian stands. The United States objected particularly to the Soviet

draft plan of work because it would have allowed the Commission to take

"into account the prohibition of atomic weapons"--a matter beyond the

scope of its inquiry.I In the end, the Commission (with the Soviet

Union and Poland abstaining) accepted the American work plan which was

identical with the terms of reference already set by the Security Coun-
2
cil. The Soviet representative, however, indicated that he would not

abide by the terms set by the majority, and he, in fact, did not. This

was the sun total of the results of the first nine meetings of the CCA.

On July 16, 1947, the Commission created a Working Committee of

the whole which, between August 20, 1947,and September 21, 1943, held

twenty meetings. Here, too, the debate was on a superficial level, un-

like the first part of the proceedings of the Atomic Energy Commission.

During the first four meetings, the definition of the weapons under the

jurisdiction of the Commission was hotly contested.3

The only other tangible product of the Working Committee's efforts


1
U. I. Document S/C.3/SC.2/4, llay 21, 1947, in ibid., pp. !-35.

2U. N. Document S/387, June 13, 1947, in ibid., p. 89.

3"Resolution of the Commission for Conventional Armaments: Defi-
nition of Armaments, August 12, 194'," U. N. Document S/C.3/30, August
13, 1943, in ibid., p. 176.











was a general statement on principles for the regulation of armaments

that was endorsed on August 12, 1948, by the ten non-conmunict states

and rejected by the Soviet Union and the Ukraine. The resolution, with

the strong backing of the United States, took the position that:

A system of regulation and reduction of armaments and
armed forces can only be put into effect in an atmos-
phere of international confidence and security.1

Three specific e::amples of conditions essential to such confidence were

cited: the establishment of a United Nations military force under

Article 43 of the Charter; the establishment of international control

of atomic energy; and the conclusion of peace settlements with Germany

and Japan. Unlike the Baruch Plan which was not linked with political

settlement as a prerequisite, the Western powers set up stringent con-

ditions to be met before engaging in detailed negotiations on conven-

tional disarmament. Indeed, not a single definite proposal for arms

reduction was brought forth by the West during this period, and the

Soviet Union came up with only one.

Encountering a hostile majority in the CCA, the Soviets took

their proposal directly to the General Assembly. On September 25, 194C,

a draft resolution was introdu-cd, recommending a one-third reduction in

the land, naval, and air forces of the United States, the United Kingdom

and the Soviet Union, France, and China within one year's time, coupled

with an unconditional prohibition of nuclear weapons. An international

control body "within the framework of the Security Council" was also


U. N. Document S/C.3/31, August 15, 1943, in ibid., pp. 174-175.












recommended to supervise the implementation of these measures. A reduc-

tion of one-third proportionately would have strengthened the relative

power position of Russia since any cut in the already dangerously 10o

conventional force levels in the Western countries would have produced

dire consequences. At any rate, the failure to agree on a system of

verification and disclosure made fractional reductions meaningless.

Finally, agreement on lowering the level of conventional forces was

tied to an acceptance of a ban on atomic weapons, which was unthinkable

in the Western nations since nuclear armaments at an early date became

the mainstay of their security.

The General Assembly in a 6-39-6 vote on November 17, 1948, re-

jected the Soviet proposal and adopted instead a modified French draft

resolution asserting that conventional disarmament "can be attained

only in an atmosphere of real and lasting improvement in international
2
relations." The resolution xent on to note that mutual confidence would

be enhanced if states e.:changed "precise and verified data as to the level

of their respective conventional arms and armed forces." Accordingly, it

implored the Cormission for Conventional Anaments to

. devote its first attention to formulating proposals
for the receipt, checking and publication, by an interna-
tional organ of control within the framoork of the


1
U. N. Document S/C.3/30, August 13, 1940, in ibid., pp. 176-177.
It was a revised version with the same provisions that was actually voted
on: U. N. Document A/723, ITovember 17, 1943, in ibid., pp. 107-103.

2
General Assembly Resolution 192 (III), November 19, 1941', in
ibid., p. 109.













._.., c.,,~. -e. o-~; r?: _-e











resolution was passed, transferring the Comicsion's proposals to the

General Assembly.1 There the Uest won another empty parliamentary vic-

tory when on December 5 the General Assembly in a lopsided vote (44-5-5),

placed its stamp of approval on the French plan for an international cen-
2
sus and verification of conventional armaments and armed forces. The

resolution also requested the Commission for Conventional Armaments to

continue its study.

At the twentieth meeting of the Commission, which was convened

on April 27, 1950, to consider the General Assembly's December resolution,

the Russian representative walked out and never returned after his move

to unseat the Nationalist Chinese representative failed. The Working

Committee met several ties after that, and despite the absence of the

Russians, the American representative went ahead and introduced four

working papers, the contents of which will be discussed more fully in

Chapter VI. The first dealt with the essential principles of a system

of effective safeguards. The second presented a skeletal framework for

a proposed Conventional Armaments Administration to administer interna-

tional agreements on the regulation and reduction of conventional arms


1
U. N. Documents S/1399, October 11, 1949, and S/1403, October 11,
1949, in ibid., p. 203.

2General Assembly Resolution 300 (IV), December 5, 19: 9, in ibid.,
pp. 230-231.

"United States Paper Submitted to the Working Committee of the
Commission for Conventional Armaments: General Vie:s on Item 3 ("Safe-
guards") of Plan of Uork Adopted by the CoWaission, lay 18, 12. ," U. I.
Document S/C.3/SC.3/23, !iy 1G, 1950, in ibid., pp. 233-235.










and armed forces. The third detailed the kinds of military informra-

tion to be reported in connection with an arms census.2 The fourth

suggested industrial information as one possible means of verifying

compliance with an arms control agreement.

Thus the work of the Commission for Conventional Armaments ended

before it ever really began.


Phase II: The Disarmanent Com-uission

Ho further formal negotiations occurred during the nc::t two years

in a period when American-Soviet relations deteriorated to their lowest

point since the Cold Uar began. The invasion of South Korea by Iorth

Korean forces on June 25, 1950, touched off American and, later, United

Nations and Co-munist Chinese intervention and killed any chance of re-

viving the two faltering U.N. arms control bodies. In the meantime, the

United States had embarked on a crash rcarmacent program. On January 31,

1950, President Truman ordered the continuation of world: on the development

of the hydrogen bomb, resulting in the successful testing of the new


l"United States Paper Submitted to the Working Committee of the
Commission for Conventional Armaments; Proposed Conventional Armaments
Administration, June 22, 1950," U. N. Document SIC.3/SC.3/24, June 22,
1960, in ibid., pp. 235-239.

2"United States Paper Submitted to the Working Comnittee of the
Commission for Conventional Armaments: General Views on the Nature aod
Scope of 'Military Safeguards'--Information on the military and Para-
Military Establishments To Be Reported, Inspected, and Verified, July
13, 1950," U. U. Document S/C.3/SC.3/25, July 13, 1950, in ibid., pp.
240-247.

3"United States Paper Submitted to the Working Committee of the
Coraiission for Conventional Armaments: General Views on the Nature and
Scope of 'Industrial Safeguards'--Safeguards Through Industrial Informm-
tion," U. N. Document S/C.3/SC.3/26, July 13, 1950, in ibid., pp. 247-243.











superweapon in November, 1952.1 Less than ten months later, it was

revealed that the Soviet Union, too, had tested a hydrogen device.2

iieaminilc, on October 3, 1952, the United Kingdom became the third full-

fledged atomic power by testing its own atomic bomb.

Even though East-West disarmament negotiators did not mect during

this period, both sides continued to tall: about disa-mament. In 1950 the

Russians capitalized on world-wide fears of nuclear war and fostered the

"Stockholm Appeal," a widely circulated petition which demanded an abso-

lute ban on nuclear weapons.' And on October 24, 1950--at the height of

the Korean War--President Truman made an important address before the

General Assembly redefining the basic principles of United States dis-

armament policy and ushering in the era of the comprehensive approach to

disarmament.

Three fundamental principles for a successful plan of disarmament

were laid doun by President Truman. (1) All kinds of weapons must be

included, leading the President to recommend the consolidation of the

Atomic Energy Commission and the Comission for Conventional Armaments,

a major tactical concession to the Russians. (2) It must be based on



"Statement by President Truman Regarding Research on the Hydrogen
Bomb, January 31, 19-"," in ibid., p. 232.

2The Russian Goverrment announcement was made on August 20, 1953.
The actual date of the successful test c:plosion, according to the U. S.
Atomic Energy Cormission, was August 12, 1953. (New York Times, August
20, 1953, p. 5.)

"Stockholm Appeal of the World Peace Council, lIarch 19, 1950," in
Documents on Disarmament, 1945-199, I, 232.

4"Address by President Truman to the General Assembly [Extract ,
October 24, 1950," in ibid., pp. 257-259.











unanimous agreement, prompting the United States to refrain henceforth

from pushing the passage of sterile General Assembly disarmament resolu-

tions over Soviet opposition. (3) Finally, the plan must be foolproof,

with safeguards "adequate to give immediate warning of any threatened

violation." This signalled a shift of emphasis from the supranational

controls envisaged by the Baruch Plan to a system of verification de-

signed solely to provide a reliable warning of violations of a disarma-
1
cent agreement.

Subsequently, the General Assembly on December 13, 1950, appointed

a Committee of Twelve (the members of the Security Council and Canada) to

consider the advisability of merging the two existing commissions on dis-
2
armament as President Truman had suggested. The Coraittee on October 23,

1951, recommended that a single commission be set up under the Security
3
Council but said nothing about its terms of reference. The Soviet Union

stubbornly resisted this recommendation, thus reversing the position it

had clung to tenaciously since 1946.

Despite Soviet opposition, the General Assembly nevertheless ap-

proved a resolution on January 11, 19 2, establishing a Disarmament Com-

mission made up of members of the Security Council and Canada when Canada

is not a member of the Council.4 The resolution also incorporated the

libid., p. 258.

2General Assembly Resolution 496 (V), December 13, 1950, in ibid.,
pp. 269-270.

3Resolution of the Conmittee of Twelve, August 29, 1951, U. N. Docu-
ment A/AC.50/6, August 29, 1951, in ibid., pp. 273-274.

4General Assembly Resolution 502 (VI), January 11, 1952, in ibid.,
pp. 337-339. The vote uas 42-3-7, with only the Soviet bloc opposing.












terms of reference for the Disarmament Coznission urged in a joint

Anerican-British-Frcnch draft resolution on Novcaber 19, 1951. It

proclaimed that:

Unless a better or no less effective system is devised,
the United Nations plan for the international control of
atomic energy and the prohibition of atomic weapons should
continue to serve as the basis for the international con-
trol of atomic energy to ensure the prohibition of atomic
weapons .

Furthermore, the Disarmament Comiission was directed to prepare

proposed measures for "the regulation, limitation, and balanced reduction

of all armed forces and armaments" and to consider plans for the "progres-

sive disclosure and verification on a continuing basis of all armed forces."3

The concept of phasing was thus introduced as a new dimension in the dis-

armament negotiations.

From February 4 to October 9, 1952, the Disarmanent Comission held

thirty meetings.4 The first eight sessions debated nothing but the program

of work to be followed by the Commission, thus '-erapitulating the history

of the earlier Commission for Conventional Armaments.

What was ostensibly a procedural work plan submitted by the Soviet

delegate would have coz-mitted the Disarmament Commission to the tine-worn


1U. I.Document A/C ..1/667, November 19, 1951, in ibid., pp. 307-309.

Ibid., p. 338.

3Ibid.

The best official account of the negotiations during 1952 is the
report made by the American representative to the President: U. S.,
Department of State, United Statec Efforts toward Disarmament, Department
of State Publication No. 4902 (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Of-
fice, 1953).











proposals presented to and rejected by the United nations every year

since 1940: the prohibition of atomic weapons with "strict international

control" to come into effect along with prohibition; a one-third reduc-

tion in all other armaments and armed forces by the five major powers

within one year; the furnishing by all countries of full official infor-

mation on the state of all their armaments and armed forces; and the es-

tablishment under the jurisdiction of the Security Council of a control

organ wiith the authority "to carry out inspection on a continuing basis,

[but] without the right to interfere in the domestic affairs of States."l

One new item was included in these proposals--a request for the investi-

gation of violations of the prohibition of bacterial warfare, which re-

ferred to Soviet charges that the United States was waging germ warfare

in ilorth Korea and Comusnist China.

In the end, the Conmission majority overruled the Russian insistence

that their proposals should serve as the basis for discussion and decided

that three areas of inquiry would be pursued: the disclosure and verifi-

cation of armaments; the elimination of atomic weapons and other weapons

of mass destruction and the limitation and regulation of others; and the

development of a procedure and timetable for putting the disarmament pro-

gram into effect. Tihe Corsission then divided its work between two com-

mittees: one to consider the regulation or armaments and armed forces


"Soviet Draft Plan of Work Introduced in the Disarmament Conmis-
sion, March 19, 1952," U. N.Document DC/4/Rev. 1, March 19, 1952, in Docu-
ments on Disarmanent, 1945-1959, I, 344-345.

2'Disfarmnment Comnission Plan of Work, March 23, 1952," U. N.
Document DC/6, lMrch 23, 1952, in ibid., pp. 345-346. The vote was 11-1
(the So--let bnion opposing)




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