Group Title: U.S. Armed Services' examination of their role, 1945-1950
Title: The U.S. Armed Services' examination of their role, 1945-1950
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 Material Information
Title: The U.S. Armed Services' examination of their role, 1945-1950
Physical Description: x, 189 leaves. : ; 28 cm.
Language: English
Creator: Benson, Charles Dunlap, 1939- ( Dissertant )
Mahon, John K. ( Thesis advisor )
Daves, M. J. ( Reviewer )
Publisher: University of Florida
Place of Publication: Gainesville, Fla.
Publication Date: 1970
Copyright Date: 1970
Subjects / Keywords: History thesis Ph. D   ( lcsh )
Militarism -- United States   ( lcsh )
Military policy -- United States   ( lcsh )
Dissertations, Academic -- History -- UF   ( lcsh )
Genre: bibliography   ( marcgt )
non-fiction   ( marcgt )
Abstract: The flash over Hiroshima presaged revolutionary changes in the art of war. Many people, both civilian and military, questioned any further need for one or more of the Armed Services. Despite their recent honors, American military leaders v/sre forced to rationalize future service roles. This dissertation attempts to delineate the examination of service roles from V-J Day up to the Korean Conflict. During the 1945-1950 period, there were im.portant areas of agreemeot and conflict v;ithin the U. S. Military Establishment. Nearly all officers considered m.odern war total. General agreement existed that materiel rather than men determined war's outcome; this belief iv'as reflected in the emphasis placed on research. A consensu; acknowledged that control of the air was a prerequisite to successful military operations. While these points of agreement served as a framework for service thought, elements of conflict received greater attention. Disagreement centered on air power: how it would be employed^ what degree of eff ecf-iveness could be expected, and who v;ould control its various aspects. Four factors were paramounc in shaping post\;ar service doctrine: one_. the personal experiences of World War II; two, the technological advances of the war years and postwar period; three, world pov;er relationships (i.e., the Cold War); and four, the domestic political process which determined national defense policy. The first two factors had the effect of strengthening individual service doctrine. Thus the Pacific experience and a belief in a slow rate of technological advance produced a Navy doctrine of balanced conventional forces and a flexible response. The strategic bombing campaigns coupled with a view of rapid technological change fostered an Air Force doctrine of atomic air power with little need for land or sea forces. The Cold War and domestic politics exerted a powerful influence for strategic bombing. Along with the military, Congress considered Russia the only likely enemy. In the event of war, strategic bo~bing (atomic) appeared to be the most effective means of defeating Russia. These beliefs not only strengthened the Air Force position, but they also had considerable impact on the other services. Army postwar doctrine never enjoyed a consensus of service opinion; therefore it appears confused and inconsistent. During the first eighteen months, General Marshall's UMT program was official service policy. By 1947 Army leaders were placing less stress on mobilization and the citizen-soldier, more emphasis on immediate ready forces. General Eisenhower's Final Report (February, 1943) expvessed the prevailing service view that ground forces should be employed primarily as defen-sive forces for air power. A reaction to this acceptance of a secondary role was evident by 1949. Several conditions proTiOted a unified front among Navy leaders in 1945. Service doctrine called for a balanced fleet v^ith mobile air (fast carrier task forces)^ amoliibious operations, and submarine capabilities emphasized. V^hile Navy leaders continued to call for a flexible response, the Department made a serious effort to gain a p3.rt of the strategic bombing role. When the super carrier was cancelled in 1949, service leaders responded with a severe attack on national defense policy (B-36 hearings). Initially, Air Force doctrine stressed the importance of air superiority. Effective strategic bombing depended upon continuous and sustained operations, hence a need to control the air. Despite strong Congressional support, the Air Force was unable to secure appropriations for a balanced seventy group force level. By 1948 many service leaders questioned the need for sustained strategic operations. Accordingly, emphasis vjas placed on SAC's role of delivering the A-bomb. Tactical air was relegated to a secondary position.
Thesis: Thesis--University of Florida, 1970.
Bibliography: Bibliography: leaves 168-188.
Additional Physical Form: Also available on World Wide Web
General Note: Manuscript copy.
General Note: Vita.
 Record Information
Bibliographic ID: UF00097703
Volume ID: VID00001
Source Institution: University of Florida
Holding Location: University of Florida
Rights Management: All rights reserved by the source institution and holding location.
Resource Identifier: alephbibnum - 000554413
oclc - 13404306
notis - ACX9253


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