Group Title: communications model of democratic political development in the United States
Title: A communications model of democratic political development in the United States
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Title: A communications model of democratic political development in the United States 1870-1960
Physical Description: x, 170 leaves. : ill. ; 28 cm.
Language: English
Creator: Marquette, Jesse F., 1945-
Publication Date: 1971
Copyright Date: 1971
 Subjects
Subject: Democracy   ( lcsh )
Political science -- History -- United States   ( lcsh )
Politics and government -- United States   ( lcsh )
Political Science thesis Ph. D   ( lcsh )
Dissertations, Academic -- Political Science -- UF   ( lcsh )
Genre: bibliography   ( marcgt )
non-fiction   ( marcgt )
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Thesis: Thesis -- University of Florida.
Bibliography: Bibliography: leaves 164-169.
Additional Physical Form: Also available on World Wide Web
General Note: Manuscript copy.
General Note: Vita.
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Bibliographic ID: UF00097679
Volume ID: VID00001
Source Institution: University of Florida
Holding Location: University of Florida
Rights Management: All rights reserved by the source institution and holding location.
Resource Identifier: alephbibnum - 000559132
oclc - 13439798
notis - ACY4578

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A Cor.cunications Model of Democratic Political Develocrment
in the United States: 1870 1960













.By

JESSE F. MiARQUETTE












A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO 'liE GrADUATei 2 COUNCIL OF
Ti1E UNIVERSITY OF FP LRI IN PARTIAL
FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIRE S FOR THE -DEGREl-E OF
DOCTOR O1 PIl LOSOPtY


UNIVERSITY OF 'LORIDA
1971













ACKNOWLEDGMENTS


Two people provided the support and encouragement which

enabled me to complete this work: Dr. Alfred Clubok, the Chairman

of n.y Dissertation Committee, and Penny Marquette, my best friend.

T wold also like to thank the members of my Con iitteo,

Professors Frank Mlunger, Manning Dauer, John Spanier and Joseph

Vandiver for giving me their suggestions and their time.











TABLE OF CONTENTS



ACK"NOiL EDGMENTS ............... ................. ................ ii

LIST OF TABLES...... ........ ................ ... ............. iv

LIST OF FIGURES........................................ vi

ABSTRACT.. . ............... ........ .. ... .. ....... ....... x

INTRODUCTION. ..................................... ..... ........ .

CHAPTER I: A Philosophical Framework and a Definition of
Political Development................................4

CHAPTER II: Social Change and the Insatiable Personality..........29

CHAPTER III: Indices and Methodology ..................... .....55

Data Sources ....................... .............. 57

Variables .......................... .............. 59

Methodology.. ............ ......... ..... ......94

CHIAPTER IV: Models of Political Development .......................99

Basic Hypotheses.................. ............... 100

An Inter-Temporal Test of the Model of Development...133

CHAPTER V: Discussion and Conclusions ......................... 140

Conclusions...................................... .. 149

APPENDIX.......... .... .. ... ................... ...... ....... 161

BIBLIOGRAPHY....................................... ....... ... .... 164

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH ..................... .............. .......... 170










iii











LIST OF TABLES


I Decennial Correlations of Inter-Party
Competition and Education ......................55

II Number of Observations for Each
Decennial Census Period.......................57

III Original Variables Selected as
Possible Indicators ............................60

IV Means and Standard Deviations of Indicators
of Urbanization by Census Years................67

V iMans and Standard Deviations of the Index
of Government Activity by Census Years......... 71

VI Variables Included in Each Final Index
with Years of Inclusion............. ..........93

VII Causal Inference Prediction Equations
for Each Hypothesis ............................ 101

VIII Aggregate Correlation Matrix of the Six
Indices for the Period 1870 to 1960.............102

IX Aggregate Correlation Matrix of Six Indices
for the Period, 1870 to 1910...................108

X Aggregate Correlation Matrix of Six Indices
for the Period, 1910 to 1960...................110

XI Prediction Equations for the First and Second
Models of Development ......................... 113

XII Inter-Censal Correlations of Governmcut
Activity at T1 with Political Participation
at T2 for the Period, 1870 to 1960.............. 119

XIII Multiple Correlation Coefficients of Political
Participation with Indices of Education, Media
Consumption, Government Activity, Urbanization
and Industrialization by Census Years..........120












XIV Multiple Correlation Coefficients of
Government Activity with Media Consumption,
Urbanization and Industrialization by
Census Years ...................... ........... 321

XV Cross Year Correlation Matrix for the
Period 1870 to 1960............................122

XVI Correlation Matrix of Original Variables
with Logarithmic Transformed Counterparts......126

XVII Correlation Matrix of Six Variables
Using All Observations.......................129

XVIII Multiple Correlation Coefficients for the
Three Models of Development....................132

XIX Aggregate Correlation Matrix of the Inter-
Temporal Correlations: 1870 to 1910.............134

XX Aggregate Correlation Matrix of the Inter-
Temporal Correlations: 1920 to 1960........... 136

XXI Correlation Matrix of Media Consumption,
Government Activity, and Political
Participation, 1960.......................... 146

XXII Relationships of Mobilization Levels and
System Types as Crisis Outcomes in Six Nations.153













LIST OF FIGURES


1 Total Pig Iron Shipments in the United
States: 1820 1960 ...........................45

2 Causal Model of Three Concepts with
Simultaneous Interactions...................... 46

3 Causal Model of Three Concepts with One-Way
Causation...................................... 46

4 Causal Model of Three Concepts with Inter-
Temporal Effects ............................. 47

5 Inter-Temporal Effects of Three Operational
Indicators.................................... 50

6 Inter-Temporal Effects of Four Socio-
Economic Indicators ........................... 51

7 Causal Relations of Four Variables
and Government Activity.........................52

8 Final Representation of a Six-Variable
Model of Political Development.................54

9 Mean Per Capita Productivity from
Manufacturing.................................... 64

10 Mean Percent of Population in Cities over
2,500 and over 25,000 by Census Years..........66

11 Mean Values of the Index of Urbanization
by Census Years ............................... 70

12 Mean Daily Newspaper Circulation per 1,000
Population by Census Years....................73

13 Mean Per Capita Postal Receipts by Census
Years .............. ... ............ ...........75

14 Mean Number of Telephones per 1,000
Population by Census Years ..................... 77








15 :loan Values of the Index of Media
Constu option by Census Years ................... 79

16 %lean Per Capita Government Expenditures
by Census Years ...............................81

17 'an Percent of Population Who Are Literate
and Mean Percent of Population Attending
Iligh School by Census Years ................... .81

18 Mean Values of the Indcx of Education
by Census Years................................ 86

19 Mean Values ot Turnout in Presidential
Elections by Census Years ...................... 90

20 Mean Values of Congressional Election
Turnout by Census Years ........................ 92

21 Empirically Identified Causal lodel of
Development in the United States for the
Period 1870 to 1960............................104

22 Plot of Correlation Coefficients of Media
Consumption, Government Activity, Education,
and Political Participation Versus Time:
1870 1960....................................107

23 Empirically Identified Model of the
Development Process in the United States:
Phase I 1870 to 1910......................... 110

24 Summary Presentation of Both Phases of the
Causal Mode 1 ................................ 114

25 Mean Values of the Index of Education:
1370 to 1960 .................................. 124

26 Logarithmic Transformations of the Mean Values
of Media Consumption, Industrialization and
Government Activity: 1870 to 1960............... 128

27 Empirically Identified Model of the Development
Process in the United States Using All
Observations as Data Base. ... ..................131


vii












28 Empirically Identified Model of the
Development Process in Phase I, 1870 to
1910, Using Inter-Temporal Correlations ........135

29 Empirically Identified Model of the
Development Process in Phase II, 1920 to
1960, Using Inter-Temporal Correlations ........138

30 First Section Causal Model Resulting
from Total Observations Test.................. 141

31 Summary Presentation of Phase I Model,
1870 to 1910 .................................143

32 Summary Presentation of Phase II Model,
1920 to 1960................ .................144

33 Summary Presentation of Model Generated
from Total Observations Matrix ............... 144

34 Model of Expected Third Phase Relations ........146


viii
















Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the
Graduate Council of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy


A COMMUNICATIONS MODEL OF DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT
IN THE UNITED STATES: 1870 1960

By

Jesse F. Marquette

August, 1971

Chairman: Dr. Alfred B. Clubok
Major Department: Political Science

Political development theory has consistently suffered from

a lack of reliable empirical referents against which to check proposed

concepts. One major reason has been that comparative research has

generally been cross-sectional. A second major reason has been that

thes research has been performed rising nations as data points. From

this cross-societal sample, attempts have been made to infer intra-

societal developmental sequences.

This research has attempted to overcome these failings. Only

one society, the United States, is used as a referent. Data points are

the states of the United States. The time period of the research

extends from 1870 to 1960. Obviously, generalizing from one society's

past experiences with change to the experiences of other societies is







somewhat questionable, but certainly less so than the opposite

process. The time period used is adequately long to justify expecta-

tions that thi generalizations will be reliable. Explanations of the

relationships examined are as parsimonious as possible, and generally

refer only to the physical necessity of certain processes. A constant

attempt is made to avoid any explanations which are ethnocentric

despite the obviously culture-bound basis of the data.

The primary objective has been to develop a causal model of the

relationship amongst four social variables: industrialization, urban-

ization, media consumption, and education; and two political variables,

government expenditures and political participation. In essence, ten

tests of the proposed model were made, one test for each decennial

census period from 1870 to 1960.

Two now, consistent, sequential and simple models of develop-

ment are apparent. The first phase model extends from 1870 to 1910,

and the second extends from 1920 to 1960.

A reformulation of developmental theory is undertaken in the

light of these findings.












INTRODUCTION


Theories of political development have consistently suffered

from a lack of reliable empirical referents against which to check

proposed concepts. One methodological failing has been that while

development implies change, most comparative research has been cross-

sectional. A second major failing relates to the use of nations as

data points, attempting to infer intra-societal sequences of development

from cross-societal samples. When both these failings occur in the

same research the results are, at best, confusing.

The research reported here attempts to overcome these failings.

Only one society, the United States, is used as a referent. The time

period of the research extends from 1870 to 1960. with the individual

states as data points.

Although generalizing from one society's experiences with change

to the experiences of other societies is somewhat questionable, it is

certainly less questionable than the opposite process. This research

has attempted to deal with these problems of cross-societal comparisons

in several ways. The time period used is adequately long to give the

generalizations high reliability. Further, the explanations of the

relationships found are as parsimonious as possible, and generally

refer only to the existential necessity of certain processes. In

addition, a conscious attempt has been made to avoid explanations which










are ethnocentric despite the obviously culture bound basis of the

data.

The objective of this research is the development of a causal

model of the relationship among four social variables (industrialization,

urbanization, media consumption, and education) and two political

variables (government activity and political participation).

The study is founded on a proposed model derived from work by

Cnudde and McCronel and an earlier work by this author,2 while the

theoretical basis is derived from a conceptualization advanced by

Lerner.3 In essence, ten tests of the proposed model were made, one

test for each decennial census period from 1870 to 1960.

Empirical research quickly proved both the model and the theory

to be unfounded. However, two new, consistent, sequential and simple

alternative models became apparent. Using these two models an attempt

is made to reformulate developmental theory in the light of the findings.

Chapters one and two present part of this reformulated theory as a

basis for understanding the models which follow. After presenting

the reformulated theory and the static models, a series of hypotheses

will be presented regarding the relations of rates of change. These

hypotheses will then be tested over the full hundred year time span.



Donald J. McCrone and Charles F. Cnudde, "Toward a Communications Theory
of Democratic Political Development: A Causal Model," American Political
Science Review (March, 1967), 72-79.

Jesse F. Marquette, "Social Mobilization and the Philippine Political
System," Comparative Political Studies (July, 1971), in press.

Daniel Lerner, "Communications Systems and Social Systems. A Statistical
Exploration in History and Policy," Behavioral Science (March, 1957),
266-275.





3





In this manner, an attempt is made to maintain a constant and reinforcing

interaction between theory and research.











CHAPTER I

A PHILOSOPHICAL FRAMEWORK AND A DEFINITION
OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT



An effective definition of political development requires an

effective definition of a developed polity. Development implies change

fr1o one state of political reality to another and we should be able

to define both states. Definitions of political development have

proliferated due to an inability to settle on one definition of a

developed polity.1 This results from the generally accepted opinion

that no fully developed polity currently exists. If, in fact, there is

no fully developed polity, then our definitions and descriptions must

be prescriptive; not what is, but what should be. The referents of

"what sho-ld be" ere highly conditioned by the intellectual heritage from

which we proceed. Thus, an economist like Rostow2 sees political change

primarily as an epiphenomenon of social change. A political scientist

like Organski3 sees political development as a necessary concomitant of



Lucian W. Pye, Aspects of Political Development (Boston: Little, Brown
and Compmny, 1966), 31-48.
2
Walter I. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist
n;lfe sto (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1966).

A.F.K. Organski, The Stages of Political Development (New York: Alfred
A. Knopf, 1965).











economic development. A psychologist like McClelland4 views

development as a result of altered personality patterns, while a

political sociologist like Apter5 sees development as changing

patterns of group conflict.

There are many other ways to categorize existing definitions

of development, and rather than examining them as above, they can be

categorized according to the type of explanation used. Holt and Turner6

argue that the works of Pye, Hagen and McClelland are reductive

explanations;7 attempts to explain macro-social phenomena in terms of

generalizations founded on micro-social phenomena. Holt and Turner

argue that this form of explanation is ineffective because it lacks

composition laws. They suggest that emergent explanations are the best

currently available in social research.8

Depending upon the purpose, many more systems of categorization

can be developed. In developing a causal model of the socio-economic

bases for political change, there is one system of categorization which

clarifies much of the previous work. This system of categorization is

4

David MicClelland, The Achieving Society (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand
Company, Inc., 1961).
5
David Apter, The Politics of Modernization (Chicago: Chicago University
Press, 1965).
6
Robert T. Holt and John E. Turner, The Political Basis of Economic
Development (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1966).
7
Ibid., 26-27.
8I
Ibid., 28.









based on the alternative perceptions of the social locus of political

change held by various authors. These divergent perceptions lead to two

different models of the causal relations between social change and

the political order.9 One alternative emphasizes the significance

of minority innovation and support of change. The minority emphasis

sees either an elite or a special minority group as a continuous element

in the process of modernization. This minority constantly provides the

drive for modernization over long periods of time. Mass behavior is

affected by minority desires, but the mass is not expected to become a

causal agent in further change.

A second alternative sees each newly mobilized individual as

a causal agent in the further process of mobilizing even more individuals.

This opposite perception emphasizes the significance of mass attitudinal

and behavioral change as fundamental to continuous political change.

Generally, the practice has been to emphasize one view or the other;

however, two authors, Nettl and Apter, have attempted to synthesize

these divergent perceptions.

J.P. Nettl outlines two alternative forms of political mobiliza-

tion, one referred to as stalactite and the other as stalagmite.10 In

stalactite mobilization an elite is responsible for deliberately moving


9
The minority emphasis is represented by such authors as Daniel Lerner,
E.E. Hagen and Lucian Pye, while the mass emphasis is represented by
Karl Deutsch, David Mc.Clelland and Gabriel Almond.
10
J.P. Nettl, Political Mobilization: A Sociological Analysis of Methods
and Concepts (New York: Basic Books, 1967), 288-316.










the mass of the populace toward political activity. This activity is

directed and focused according to the desires of the mobilizing elite.

Stalagmite mobilization, on the other hand, is mass-based and anti-

elitist; it is the awakening of the mass of the populace, shaped by

other forces. The institutional forms of political life resulting from

these alternative forms of mobilization are radically different. While

stalactite mobilization is seen as eventuating in undifferentiated,

elitist polities, stalagmite mobilization results in differentiated,

constitutionally based polities.11

David Apter attempts a similar synthesis with his concepts of

the reconciliation system12 and the mobilization system.13 In Apter's

rubric, the term reconciliation system is analogous to Nettl's

stalagmite mobilization. Here an attempt is being made to gradually

accommodate to the rising demands of the populace. Over a period of

time, demands are articulated by more and more groups in the system.

Since the general value orientation of this system is pragmatic and

meets already extant problems, Apter regards the value system as

instrumental.14 Apter's mobilization system is analogous to Nettl's


11
Ibid., 315.
12
Apter, op.cit., 391-421.
13
ibid., 357-390.
14
Apter defines an instrumental value system as one vhich emphasizes
the solutions to relatively mundane problems. Here, politics is
viewed as the process of solving short-term, existing problems. A
consumatory value system, on the other hand, is expected to place
great emphasis on realizing potentiality, and the ethical basis of
politics lies in the activity of achieving specified ultimate goals.









stalactite mobilization. Mobilization systems are driven by elite

desires to achieve certain goals, notably the political mobilization of

the mass. Insofar as the system is not responding to, but rather

initiating, demands, the structures which evolve tend to be undifferen-

tiated. The value system is seen by Apter to be consummatory ---

ultimate-goal oriented.

Both Apter and Nettl are unusual in that they include opposite

perceptions of the social locus of political change in their schema.

While other authors have, to some degree, discussed mass and minority

loci, they have generally emphasized one at the expense of the other.

The work of Daniel Lorner,15 E.E. Hagen,16 and Lucian Pye17

emphasize the significance of minority or-elite activity in the process

of modernization. Lerner and Pye are expressly concerned with the

activities of elites in initiating and sustaining modern behavior.

Lerner's emphasis on elite activity seems to stem from the focus of

his investigation: the significance of mass communication in the

developmental process.18 Since'the production and dissemination of


15
Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the
Middle East (New York: The Free Press, 1958).
16
E.E. Hagen, On the Theory of Social Change (Homewood, Ill.: 'The
Dorsey Press, 1962).
17
Lucian Pye, Politics, Personality and Nation-Building: Burma's Search
for Identity (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962).
1i
Lorner, The Passing of Traditional Society; Lerner's research centers
on the Miiddle Eastern countries, all with relatively new mass
communications nets.










iass media is an elite activity, Lerner has tended to emphasize elite

behavior in explaining the process of development. Pye has also
19
suggested elite significance in the developmental process,9 equating

the identity crisis of the elite with the identity crisis of the nation.

Hagen,20 on the other hand, does not limit minority interpretation to

a discussion of elites. The minority groups which Hagen sees as

instrumental in the process of change are characterized by radically

different attitudes, but not by elevated position.

An opposite emphasis on social locus is represented by the

conceptual schema of Karl Deutsch,21 David McClelland22 and Gabriel

Almond.23 Their theoretical concern is with the significance of mass

attitudinal and behavioral changes in effecting the process of modern-

ization. Deutsch dwells on the exposure of unnobilized individuals

to aspects of modernity.24 lie is clearly concerned with the process

of mobilization, the spread of attitudes which are distinctly non-

traditional. Deutsch stresses the necessity of mass attitudinal change,

believing that while a minority .may provide the spark, significant change



19
Pye, Pc!litics, Personality and Nation Building; Pye's research group
consisted of a small sample of Burmese national government figures.
20
Hagen, op. cit.
21
Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development,"
American Political Science Review (September, 1961), 493-514.
22
McClelland, ao. cit.
23
Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political
Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (Boston: Little, Brown and
Company, 1965).
24
Deutsch, op. cit.





10


is obtained only through mass mobilization. Gabriel Almond's presen-

tation25 is typological and little concerned with the process of

change. His primary effort involves the explication of possible

political system states, which he arrays in a sequence from less to

more developed. He attempts to describe development in terms of

mass attitudes conducive to democratic forms of political organization.

Both Netti26 and Holt and Turner27 have specifically criticized Almond

for this rather myopic view of development.

McClelland's theory of the basis of economic development is

clearly one of the most effective explanations yet offered.28 It

combines both an emphasis on the necessity of group change (cultural

values) and psychological patterns (socialization). McClelland has

attempted to combine both the forms of explanation described by Holt

and Turner; the analysis of cultural values is an attempt at emergent

explanation, while the analysis of socialization patterns is an attempt

at reductive explanation. McClelland expects different patterns of

socialization to lead to different levels of n-achievement. It is not

clear why some families adopt one pattern of socialization instead of



25
Almond and Verba, op. cit.; and also Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham
Powell, Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston: Little,
Brown and Company, 1965), especially 16-41.
26
Nettl, oD. cit., 110.
27
Holt and Turner, op. cit., 13-16.
28
McCleiland, op. cit., 1-62.











another, unless there is a differential diffusion of cultural values.

At this point it is obvious that Holt and Turner's argument for the

necessity of composition laws is well taken.29 Had McClellard been

able to produce an effective explanation for the differential diffusion

of socialization patterns, his theory would have been immeasurably more

powerful. The degree of success which McClelland achieved, using a

combination of types of explanations, suggests that Holt and Turner's

use of only emergent explanations is unnecessarily restrictive.

As suggested earlier, alternative perceptions of the social

locus of change lead to different expected causal paths of change.

This contention may be illustrated using the formulations of Lerner30

and Deutsch.31 Cnudde and McCrone32 have attempted to test a causal

model derived from Lerner's work using data drawn from Cutright's

seventy-six nation study.33 Using Cutright's operational indicators of

urbanization, education, media consumption and political development,

they test a causal path represented by urbanization (U) education (E)-

media consumption (M) political development (D), conceptually derived



29
Holt and Turner, op. cit., 28.
30
Daniel Lerner, "Communications Systems and Social Systems: A Statistical
Exploration in History and Policy," Behavioral Science (March, 1957).
31
Deutsch, op. cit.
32
Donald J. McCrone and Charles F. Cnudde, "Toward a Communications Theory
of Democratic Political Development: A Causal Model," American Political
Science Review (March, 1967), 72-79.
33
Philips Cutright, "National Political Development: Measurement and
Analysis," in Nelson Polsby et al. (editors), Politics and Social Life
(Boston: Houghron Mifflin, 1963), 569-582.




12


from the following passage from Lerner.

...urbanization requires rising literacy for
individual participation. At a certain point, when
urbanization has done its work, literacy becomes the
independent variable in the process of growth and a new
phase of modernization begins. But the growth of literacy
itself, in this phase, soon becomes closely associated
with the growth of media. The media teach literacy and
growing literacy develops the market which consumes the
media product.34

The opposite path of U M -I E D, is implicit in the work of Karl

Deutsch.

...two distinct stages of the process: (1) the stage
of uprboting or breaking away from old settings, habits and
commitments; and (2) the induction of the mobilized persons
into some relatively stable new patterns of group membership,
organization and commitmentt.5

Here, the first stage is represented by exposure to aspects of modernity,

an essentially passive process. The second stage suggests a more

institutionalized resocialization of the individual. In the society

as a whole, the second stage suggests the process of education.

Although education as envisioned here is not necessarily formal education,

it must be relatively formalized (represented by stable and accepted

socialization processes), if the individuals are to be inducted into

stable new patterns of group commitments. Over time, the best measure

of this process would be the spread of formal education.


34
Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society, 60.
35 c, ct.,
Deutsch, op. cit., 494.










These different perceptions of the path of change could have

arisen either from the authors' opposing views of the relation between

media consumption and education, or from the authors' different emphases

on social loci.

First, it is questionable that media consumption requires literacy

on any significant scale. Lerner himself describes an effective

melding of the modern media form of radio and the traditional oral

communication network when he describes the Chieftain of Balgat.36

As the nddel individual in an oral communication net, the Chief's

possession of a radio carried the entire net into a media system. There

is no reason why one literate individual could not substitute for the

Chieftain's radio in the communication network of Balgat, or any other

village.

Secondly, if the primary function of media consumption and

education is to increase individual empathy, there is no reason why

education must precede media consumption. An alternative formulation

might substitute "aspects of modernity" for "media consumption," as

does Deutsch. In Deutsch's formulation, media consumption is merely

one method of exposing the individual to modern behavior patterns.

Having become socially mobilized through exposure to aspects of modernity,

the individual would be expected to become politically mobilized after

exposure to educational opportunity. This substitution does no serious


36
Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society, Chapter 1.




14


damage to Lerner's argument and, viewed in this way, the authors do not

seem to have fundamentally opposed views of the significance of media

consumption and education.

The preceding discussion was designed to emphasize the necessity

of delineating why a particular problem is approached in a specific

manner when evaluating the resultant conclusions. IWhen there are many

descriptions of an object, many definitions of a concept, there are

two choices in explaining the multiplicity. Either the object or

concept is extremely complex and invites many partial descriptions, or

there are many opposing viewpoints about the nature of the object.

In the case of political development theory, the existence of many view-

points has created a lengthy catalog of definitions.37

A definition is a brief description, adequate to the degree that

the thing described becomes generally recognizable. It is possible to

define political development in many ways. Certain aspects may be

chosen while others are ignored, depending upon our perceptual vantage

point. To advance a generally useful definition of political develop-

ment, the primary concern must be not only with the definition itself,

but also with making explicit the viewpoint from which the definition

emerges. In this sense the definition is a road map; if others are


37
Pye, Aspects of Political Development, 33-42.










to follow the definition and reach a specified goal, they must start

from the same point as the writer. Therefore, the following short

excursion into epistemology will attempt to clarify this author's

basic viewpoints.

The closer we are to an object or event, either in space or time,

the more important the object or event appears. When considering a

social fact, it is important to place it in proper temporal context

to avoid overly inflating its significance. As we include greater

reaches of the past in our research we are able to eliminate the evanescent

from consideration. Perhaps Davis gives the best illustration of the

significance of time.3 When we plot the mean values of socio-economic

attributes for many points in time we usually observe an extremely

ragged curve. It is possible to reduce the raggedness of the curve by

examining the trend line; the general tendency of the curve to increase

or decrease through time. The longer the time period examined, the

more reliable the trend line becomes. Conversely, the more foreshortened

the time frame, the more likely we are to read too great a significance

into transient events and the more inaccurate our generalizations will be.

The number of individuals included in the data base is at least

as important as the time frame used. The adequacy of our generalizations

can be as adversely affected by concentration on elite behavior as by



38
Harold T. Davis, The Analysis of Economic Time Series (Bloomington,
Indiana: The Principia Press, 1941), Chapter I.










concentration on too short a time span.

Political development theory must have the total society as its

basic referent; it must refer to the effects of political and social

change on the mass of men in society. Political change has occurred in

many different ways in many different societies. Many of these patterns

of change have benefited some members of the societies where they

occurred, but until political change benefits a significant proportion of

all the members of a society we are not justified in talking about

political development. Our ability to compare levels of development

will be severely hampered if the same measuring stick is not used to

make the comparison.

In this author's view, social theories are useful only to the

degree to which they aid us in explaining why some social act renders an

individual or group more or less content with its existence. As the

work of the psychologically oriented theorists demonstrates, whatever

the first cause, the ferment of social change lies within individuals.

Society is the primary environment of the individual and the texture

of his life is predominantly the texture of his social surroundings.

Yet his social environment is the totality of the characteristics of

socially relevant others. It seems reasonable that social science should

view the world primarily in terms of the benefit or harm individuals

may expect in a social situation. In this view, the individual is one

element in a social ratio. He.is part of the social whole, yet in

terms of enumerable attributes he is always a subset. Concentration

on either the individual or the society ignores the relation between




17


the two .-- the ratio which is the basis of social change.

In order to proceed from a useful vantage point it will be

necessary to specify the characteristics of our basic perceptual matrix.

First, it must force us to focus on the process of social change, and

not merely on static situations. Hence, it should allow us to follow

the transition of a society through time, and should be generalizable

to other societies. (Unfortunately, most of the comparative, empirical

work done to date focuses on different societies in different stages

of change.)39 Secondly, it must force us to focus our attention on

the relation between the individual and society rather than on one or

the other. It should allow us to discuss social change in terms of

individual satisfactions, forwhatever the first cause, social change

results from the frustrations or satisfactions of individuals. Finally,

the basic elements of the matrix should be abstracted, not culture

bound; a problem which most of the systems theorists have encountered.

A usable vantage point, partially specified and clarified, has

been advanced, first by Weber40 and later others,41 as the concept of



39
See, for example, Cnudde and McCrone, op. cit.; Cutright, op. cit.;
Arthur K. Smith, Jr., "Socioeconomic Development and Political
Democracy: A Causal Analysis," Midwest Journal of Political Science
(February, 1969), 95-125.
40
Max Weber, "Class, Status and Party," in R. Bendix and S.M. Lipset (eds),
Class, Status and Power (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1953),
63-75.
41
Melvin M. Tumin, Social Stratification: The Forms and Functions of
Inequality (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967); Gerhard
E. Lenski, Power and Privilege: A Theory of Social Stratification (New
York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1966); and ioan Davies, Social Mobility
and Political Change (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970).





18


life chances. Weber describes life chances as "the typical chances for

a supply of goods, external living conditions and personal life exper-

iences."42 Ieber used the concept of shared life chances as a basis for

defining social class. Later theorists have used the distribution of

available life chances for defining the social stratification system.

When we describe the range of life chances accessed by an individual,

we are describing the texture of his life. We are assessing the general

possibility of his happiness and the range of gratifying activities

open to him. In determining the degree of social stability, two variables

must be considered: the distribution of available life chances and the

normative justification for the distribution.

An existing distribution of life chances is supported by values
43
and norms which tend to legitimize the distribution.43 Hence, the

life chances available to any individual are, in part, socially determined,

for no society conforms to complete achievement orientation. Essentially,

the concept of life chances rests on the relation between total available

possibilities for individual satisfaction and the possibilities actually

available to each individual. Since social systems are hierarchical, the

norm structure must legitimize inequality. Norm structures supportive of

a particular stratification system must provide the justification for



42
Weber, op. cit.
43
Tumin, op. cit., 14.










restricting life chances.

Stable social systems result from mutual reinforcement between the

actual distribution of life chances and the normative support for that

distribution. Norm and value support are the key determinants within a

wide range of actual distributions.44 While the society's norms and

values convey a sense of "oughtness" for the stratification system, the

distribution of life chances remains authoritative.45' 46, 47, 48 If

available opportunities are sufficient, and the distribution accepted,

the average individual will remain passive and the social system will

remain generally stable and slow to change. In truth, no social system

is stable in the sense of stasis; some change is always occurring, even

if that change is only biological replacement. There is no general reason

to expect a society to be stable as a besic tendency. The purpose of

developmental theory is to explain why some societies change and others

do not, and why some societies follow one path of change and others a

different path.



44
Ibid., 44.
45
David Easton, The Political System: An Inquiry into the State of
Political Science (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1953), 129-134.
46
Lenski, op. cit., 3 (footnote).
47
Harold D. Lasswell, Politics: Iho Gets What, When and How (New York:
McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1936).
48
Easton's definition of politics as "the authoritative allocation of
values" (op. cit.) is really a description of the stratification system.
Lenski (op. cit.) also argues that Lasswell ibidd.) has come to recognize
that his definition of politics as deciding "who gets what, when and how"
is also a description of the stratification system.




20


Morton's discussion of anomie49 as the incongruent relation

between cultural goals and institutional means for goal achievement

illustrates the necessity of balance.50 Lerner discusses the same

interaction under the intriguing title of the "Want/Get Ratio."51 The

result of an imbalance between the elements of Lerner's ratio is

individual frustration. Both authors argue that each individual's

reference groups and socialized values establish the basic goal expec-

tations appropriate to that individual's original position in the stratif-

ication system. The sanctions available to the roles occupied by the

individual provide the possibility for the satisfaction of the goal

expectations. Alterations in the elements of the ratio will lead to

individual frustration; widespread alterations will lead to social

stress.

Social stress can be defined as the result of interrupting the

mutual reinforcement between distribution and norm structure. Group

response to social stress is the simultaneous response of individuals

following existing patterns of orientation for or against change.



49
Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (Glencoe, Ill.:
The Frce Press of Glencoe, 1949), 125-149.
50
Balance here refers not only to the elements of Merton's paradigm, but
to the preceding discussion of the relationship between available
life chances and the normative justification for the current distribution.
51
Daniel Lerner, "Toward a Communications Theory of Modernization," in
Lucian W. Pye (ed), Communications and Political Development (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1965), 333-335.




21


Generally, the response to increased social stress tends to be

increased opportunity, due to a lack of any guidelines which could

dictate a new norm justification for the alternate distribution.

Essentially, the response to social stress is increased social mobility,

and social mobility is the redistribution of life chances. As the old

norm structure breaks down there is less support for traditional disabil-

ities and so the tendency is toward greater achievement orientation.

There is no expected shift in values toward a more favorable view of

mobility, rather there is simply no effective traditional inhibition on

the achievement motivation in individuals.

System accommodation to stress may be supported by elements of

the traditional norm structure. There are, of course, many forms of

mobility. Some forms of social mobility may be accepted, accommodative

modes. Either individual or group mobility may be valued.52 If mobility

is accepted, then stress may be relieved by a partial redistribution of

life chances under the aegis of tradition. Aspirant individuals may be

relieved of traditional disabilities and accommodated within traditionally

supported roles with concomitant sanctions.53 An alternative form of

mobility is the increase of sanctions for previously non-valued roles.54



52
Neil J. Smelser and Seymour M. Lipset, "Social Structure, Mobility and
Development," in Smelser and Lipset (eds), Social Structure and Mobility
in Economic Development (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1966), 1-50.
53
Ibid., 7.
54
Ibid., 7.





22


ilcre, the individual remains in the same .roles, but increases life

chances by virtue of increased sanctions. Or, lastly, neither the roles

nor the sanctions may be traditional and the individuals occupying

the new roles will attempt to insure high status for them.

The latter case provides the most interesting form of mobility

for political theorists. If neither the new role structure, nor the new

distribution of sanctions has general normative support, then purposive

system action is necessary to accommodate social stress. Purposive

action is required because neither the roles nor the sanctions have

normative support, and,therefore, there is no traditional justification

for the accommodative distribution. Whether or not this action occurs

will depend on the rate of change in the social stratification system.

Slow change may allow adaptation by the system even without traditional

support. The more rapid the rate of change, the less likely social

accommodation will become. Social acceptance of such a new distribution

of life chances may result from a generalized belief in its inherent

rectitude, or from the futility Of opposing the forces supporting it.

Social change and/or progress is rationally ordered only in

part. The bulk results from the interaction of many individuals

engaged in activities oriented toward personal rather than community

goals. This does not mean that change is not explainable or predictable --

it is. But, it must be kept clearly in mind that the paths discussed

are merely some of several alternatives, and this explanation attempts

only to make clear why one path eventuated rather than another. Social

change is deterministic only within the limits of the antecedent conditions

the theory will specify.










Although social systems are not purposive entities, obviously

a social group may exercise sufficient influence to affect the

behavior patterns of most individuals in a society. A group may force

general acceptance of a new distribution, thereby creating a semblance

of purposeful activity by a non-purposive entity.

In summary, social mobility may be sanctioned by traditional

norms and values or may occur so slowly that it does not cause significant

social stress; in either case it is not of particular interest to a

political scientist. Our interest focuses on social mobility which is

not sanctioned by traditional norms and values, and which occurs

rapidly enough to out-pace evolutionary accommodation.

A political act will be defined as -the attempted or actual use of

the authority of the state to redistribute the life chance matrix of a

society in an innovative manner. This definition has general significance

since it focuses on the redistribution of life chances, and therefore

will lead us to consider the effect of politics on all members of the

society. The more rapidly a system is changing, the more necessary

political activity becomes, since the re-institutionalization of norma-

tive support for a distribution becomes less likely as change occurs

more rapidly. There is absolutely no provision in this definition for an

expectation of either stability, equilibrium or success. It is only

suggested that political activity becomes necessary in an attempt to

accommodate to certain forms of social change. 'her. is no theoretical

basis for expecting this attempt to be successful in terms of contributing

to the reduction of stress.





24


In this definition, the state is understood to have geographically

defined jurisdiction. Any set of individuals who claim binding

jurisdiction over decision making for all individuals within a geograph-

ically delimited area, by virtue of their presence in that area, will be

considered a state. Only de facto jurisdiction is relevant; either the

claimants exercise effective decision making capacity or they do not

constitute a state.

Political activity will be sub-classified as either assumptive

or expansive. Assumptive political activity is an attempt to assume

distributive authority over a new area of life chances. For example,

the original struggle over whether the state would assume responsibility

for education constitutes assumptive political activity. An entirely

new range of life chances would be affected by the state's claim over

providing educational opportunity. Expansive political activity, on the

other hand, is the extension of previously accepted functions of

redistribution to larger subsets of the society. Continuing the example

of education, expansive political activity would be an attempt to

include more individuals within the state's education system. In most

societies, routine political activity will center on expansive politics.

It is, by its very nature, amenable to the Wildavskian treatment of

incrementalism.55



55
Otto A. Davis, M.A.H. Dempster and Aaron Wildavsky, "A Theory of the
Budgetary Process," American Political Science Review (September, 1966),
529-547.










Increasing the scope of either assumptive or expwasive politics

will increase the proportion of available life chances which the state

is attempting to redistribute. An increase in the scope of life chances

redistributed by political system activity will be termed political

permeance growth.5 Permeance growth is an obviously significant

element of political development. A political system is of consequence

to the degree that it affects the life chances of the average individual

in the society. One element of system consequence is the range of life

chances over which the state has assumed authority.

From the definition of politics it should be very clear that the

vast majority of activities undertaken by the state are not political.

Most state activities simply support the outcomes of previous political

acts. The level of earlier permeance growth may be measured by the

current level of government activity, for the range of activities

undertaken by the state as a result of previous political acts tends to

accrete like a palimpsest, layer upon layer.

There is no inherent expectation in this definition of politics

that political activity will tend toward greater equality of opportunity.

If the redistribution of life chances does result in a general tendency

toward greater equality of opportunity, then this tendency will be

termed congruent growth. This tendency toward equality is understood as



56
For an excellent essay on the concept of growth, see Karl De Schweinitz,
Jr., "Growth, Development and Political Modernization," World Politics
(July, 1970), 518-540.










growth simply because equality of opportunity is soon as socially

efficient. It is assumed that the most socially efficient utilization

of human ability is to be found in the achievement oriented society.

Congruent growth, therefore, employs a utopian referent; absolute

equality of opportunity. Thus, as traditional disabilities are removed,

the society more closely approximates the intelligent utilization of

individual talent.

Simultaneous growth on both the permeance and congruence dimensions

will be termed political development. Political development is the

activity of the state as it insures equality of opportunity over ever

larger ranges of life chances. This definition of political develop-

ment follows from the earlier definition of political activity.

Political activity is a response to patterns of social change which have

bred social stress. If the patterns of behavior undertaken in response

to that change do not relieve the original stress, this behavior cannot

be considered as conducive to further development. A good example of

inappropriate behavior patterns is the symbol manipulation of the

elites of many "developing" nations. Airlines, highways and modern

armies, all symbols of modern industrial societies, are resorted to in

response to the stresses found in the new nation.57 These manipulations

do not deal with the root causes of stress; rather like the individual



57
Herbert Feith, "Indonesia's Political Symbols and Their Wielders,"
World Politics (October, 1963), 79-97.










neurotic, they represent a retreat into compulsive symbolic activity

to relieve anxiety.

If political activity results from stress, then the more widespread

the stress, the more widespread will be the attempts to cope with it.

Hence, political permeance growth flows directly from social change.

On the other hand, congruence growth does not follow directly from

social change. Congruence growth is deemed necessary to development because

only by increasing equality of opportunity can there be effective relief

of stress. Since stress results from disruption of the ratio of

distribution to norm support, permeance growth alone is not sufficient

to reduce stress. Since re-institutionalization of normative supports

for a limited distribution is also unlikely during rapid change, the only

consistently effective stress reducing alternative is toward equality

of opportunity. In a modern industrial society, or in any rapidly

changing society, the individual will have no socialized limitiation on

goal expectations. Any socially supported disability of means will

perpetuate stress. Thus, permeance growth which does not tend toward

equality of opportunity will not only not relieve stress, it will

perpetuate stress.

It is by now obvious that political development cannot occur

without social development. By social development we mean an expansion

of the total range of available life chances in a society, both roles and

sanctions. Social development may, for a time, occur without political

development, but not vice versa.





28




We have now developed a linkage. Social change is social mobility,

widespread social mobility is social mobilization, and political

development is inextricably linked to social change. Our concern at this

point is to explain the process by which social change is generalized

and accelerated, and to explain why and how different rates of social

change lead to different forms of political change.












CHAPTER II

SOCIAL CHANGE AND THE INSATIABLE PERSONALITY



Deutschl and others2 inake the implicit assumption that social

mobilization has some positive end product. Deutsch defines social

mobilization as "The process in which major clusters of old social,

economic and psychological commitments are eroded or broken and people

become available for new patterns of socialization and behavior."3

Yet, the socialization of new values need have no particular signifi-

cance. In the Deutsch argument, these new values are supposedly

more "modern" and, therefore, more conducive to continued social

change.

However, the process of mobilization is significant, not

because it replaces traditional norms and values with new norms and

values, but rather because the essence of the process consists of

destroying certain specific, yet apparently universal elements of the




Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development,"
.American Political Science Review (September, 1961), 493-514.
2
Bert F. Hoselitz, "Economic Growth and Development: Non-Economic
Factors in Economic Development," American Economic Review (May, 1957),
28- 41; and Manning Nash, Primitive and Peasant Economic Systems
(San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1966), 131-135.
3
Deutsch, op. cit. 494.


29




30


traditional norm structure and never replacing them.4

In discussing past periods of great economic expansion and

cultural prominence, IIagenS makes the simplistic, but significant obser-

vation that they have all come to an end. In explaining the current

development of societies, however, he is faced with a long standing

period of progress which has not ended, and perhaps may never end.

Hagen searches for a positive form of personality type, a "modern" man

who is in some way responsible for this sustained growth.6

An alternative explanation is that some particular set of char-

acteristics exists in traditional society placing limitations on social

change. Here, the elimination of certain strictures, rather than the

creation of a particular personality type, produces the original climate

for sustained growth. Although a new form of personality type is

produced, this personality type does not have any predisposition toward

positive new modes of behavior. Rather, the behaviors engaged in by this

individual will be largely dependent on his current social situation.

The individual's attempt to function in an alien social matrix may, in

fact, lead him to attempt to define his identity in socially dysfunctional



4
For a brief discussion of the social disorganization wrought by the in-
dustrialization of a traditional society, see George A. Theodorson,
"Acceptance of Industrialization and Its Attendant Consequences for
the Social Pattenms of Non-Western Societies," American Sociological
Review (October, 1953), 477-484.
5
E.E. Hagen, On the Theory of Social Change (Homewood, Ill.: The Dorsey
Press, 1962).
6
Hagen describes the developmentally conducive individual as the
"innovative personality."










modes of behavior.

Aside from occasional bursts of development, most societies

are marked by very low rates of social change. Through most of history,

this sub-culture of the peasantry has been the dominant culture of

society. Rogers7 has developed a list of attributes which apply to the

sub-culture of peasantry.8 In traditional peasant societies the

individual functions in a world frame of "perceived limited good."

In Rogers' argument, the individual assumes that there is an absolute

limit on the quantity of valued good. This perception is quite realistic

for the average peasant. Most traditional societies based on peasant

agriculture deal with fundamentally inelastic supplies of valued

goods. Both the quantity and variety of life chances and life styles

are highly restricted and the distribution of available life chances

is legitimized by tradition and religious sanctions. Although Rogers

sees "perceived limited good" as merely one element of a peasant sub-

culture,j0 it is this author's argument that given the other elements



7
Everett M. Rogers, Modernization Among Peasants: The Impact of
Communication (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1969),24-39.
8
According to Rogers, "Central elements in this subculture of peasantry
are: (1) mutual distrust in interpersonal relations; (2) perceived
limited good; (3) dependence on and hostility toward government author-
ity; (4) family m; (5) lack of innovativeness; (6) fatalism; (7) limited
aspirations; (8) lack of deferred gratification; (9) limited view of
the world; (10) low empathy."
9
See for instance, Gerhard Lenski, Power and Frivilege: A 'Theory of Social
Stratification (New York: McGraw-Hill Book C0o.anlny, 1966); 'nd Xadcl De
Schweinitz, "Growth, Development and Political Modernizarion," Wlorld
Politics (July, 1970), 513-S40.
10
Rogers, op. cit., 25.











of the proposed sub-culture, "perceived limited good" is the central

factor defining peasant culture.

It should not be surprising that social mobility is very low in

a society where it is unrealistic to expect advancement and impious to

want it. Lenski has argued that "the fact is, unhappily, that in the

long run, in all of these societies, downward mobility was much more

frequent than upward."11 The other elements of the peasant sub-culture,

fatalism, amoral familism, distrust of others, all are closely related

to these two factors: the limited range of available good and the

rprpetually sanctioned inequality of distribution. In a peasant society

an individual's personal identity is largely defined by his position at

birth. The development of his self-concept consists of developing

subjectivee public identities" which are products of the roles he

occupies. With the stratification system rigidly restricting role assign-

ment, the individual's identity definition is also restricted. If

nothing else, the traditionally defined identity of the peasant leaves

him secure in his disadvantage.' The traditional individual knows who

he is and what is expected of him merely on the basis of his existence.

This form of identity definition will be called traditional identity.

Under the norm structures of perceived limited good, the vast majority

of any population experiences traditional identity.

If perceived limited good is the central element of a peasant



11
Gerhard E. Lenski, Power and Privilege: A Theory of Social Stratification
(New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1966).





33


culture, we would expect to find a fatalistic, inward turned individual

with little capacity to visualize alternative life styles simply because

they are unrealistic. We would expect this individual to be primarily a

familist, if not an amoral familist, for in the struggle for survival,

few others are to be trusted. Finally, we would expect this individual

to be highly traditionalistic, not only because tradition is the

basis for his existence, but because sameness tends to reinforce itself.

It is reasonable, therefore, to accept that the peasant has, in fact,

managed to adapt realistically to his environment. Despite his

"ignorance," the culture of the traditional peasant is a realistic

reflection of the central fact of physical existence; good is, in

reality, limited, and the peasant culture, whatever its ethnic variations,

has the same central elements as a reflection of the restricted range

of life chances.

If a restricted range of life chances results in traditional

stasis, then change and growth could be based on increasing the range of

life chances. The norm structure of perceived limited good may be

disturbed in one of two ways: an alteration in the range of available

life chances, necessitating redistribution of the social matrix; or

some disturbance which destroys the old norm structure. Before the

industrial revolution, such redistributions were most frequently caused

by war and trade expansion, both of which acted against each element of

the social ratiu -- distribution and justification. After such a period

of expansion, there would necessarily be a re-traditionalization of the

norm structure of perceived limit d good simply because gcod, even between




34


societies, was limited. Most brilliant periods of human culture

closely accompany periods of conquest or trade expansion. General

social development, on the other hand, tended to be glacial until the

onslaught of the industrial revolution. Under the impact of industry

there has been an almost continuous expansion in the range of life

chances with a corresponding shift from traditional to situational

identity.

Modernization is the reinforcing interaction of social mobilization

and economic growth, destroying the norm structure of perceived limited

good for progressively more and more individuals. This process also

destroys the individual's social identity. For the peasant, social

identity is closely linked to the stratification system which is, in

turn, a product of perceived limited good. The difference between

situational and traditional identity lies in the rate of social change.

While the social situation is always changing, for the peasant the

change is so slow as to be almost imperceptible. For an individual in

a rapidly changing society, on the other hand, the elements of his

identity definition are changing at a very rapid rate; his identity is

no longer secure because his situation is no longer secure. The

socially mobilized individual has neither a secure identity, nor the

limitation on goal expectations which flow from the peasant's percep-

tion of limited good. It is this social situation which gives rise to the

"modern" man; an individual I call the Insatiable Personality. The

Insatiable Personality's primary characteristic is non-directed striving,

for only by striving can he develop a sense of selfless. He is, at once,





35


Hagen's innovative personality,12 McClelland's high n-achiever,13 Lerner's

high empathy type,14 and Pye's confused identity.15,16 He has high

empathy because the mobilization process has destroyed the blinders

of social strictures. He is innovative and achievement oriented

because he has no limitation on expectations. He is a confused identi-

ty because his social referents are in constant flux -- the more he

succeeds the more he has to strive. With no limitation on good

expectations, his reference groups and standards constantly rise as

each new goal is reached.



12
Hagen, op. cit.
13
David McClelland, The Achieving Society (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand
Company, Inc., 1961).
14
Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the
Middle East (New York: The Free Press, 1958).
15
Lucian W. Pye, Politics, Personality and Nation-Building:Burma's
Search for Identity (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962).
16
Hagen uses status-deprived groups such as the Antioquenos of Latin
America and the Samurai of Japan as examples of highly innovative
groups. Yet, all that is unique about these groups is that they
were mobilized at an earlier date than other members of their
society. By virtue of their mobilization, they had no traditional
role to which they were still committed, and they were, therefore,
generally willing to take advantage of new situations as they arose.
The important point here is simply that these individuals did not
create the situations from which they profited. Their innovativeness
is passive not active. Lerner's concept of empathy also is generally
passive not active. This individual is able to consider new modes
of behavior, but he does not necessarily seek them out. McClelland's
high n-achiever, on the other hand, is aggressive in his striving
and he comes closer to the economically modernizing individual we
seek. Yet, McClelland's high n-achiever is willing to strive in
whatever social context he finds himself; he is success oriented,
but not necessarily innovative.










The Insatiable Personality exists in a social matrix which

places no normative or value limits on what he may expect from life.

His identity is insecure because it is defined by comparison; he sees

himself as he believes others see him. He strives constantly in an

attempt to obtain a more gratifying self-perception.17 Where

one peasant may be envious but not threatened by another peasant's

bigger harvest, one machinist will be both envious and threatened if

another machinist receives a raise. In both cases, identities are

defined relative to other people, but in the peasant case the relations

are fixed, while for the modern man they are variable and insecure.



17
There is an interesting parallel here between Lenski's discussion
of institutional evolution of stratification systems, the cultural
perception of limited good (op. cit.), and Veblen's discussion of
conspicuous consumption as a cultural artifact (Thorstein Veblen,
The Theory of the Leisure Class (New York: Viking Press, 1912),
60-70). At both ends of Lenski's spectrum, hunting and gathering
societies and mature industrial societies, we find relatively loose
stratification systems. Veblen's discussion of conspicuous consumption
suggests that in primitive societies and industrial societies,
conspicuous consumption is a right,whereas in traditional societies
(Lenski's agrarian societies) it is a privilege. In both forms
of society where conspicuous consumption is a cultural artifact of
the mass, we find loose stratification systems and no perception of
limited good. Given the absence of limited good and the flexibility
of the stratification systems, conspicuous consumption is an obvious
and probably necessary means of identity definition. Veblen argues
that conspicuous consumption is a means of maintaining reputation,
hence a primary component of individual identity. Reismaa's
discussion of the "other-directed" individual in modern society
(David Reisman, The Lonely Crowd: A Study of the Changing American
Character (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964))parallels the
discussion of conspicuous consumption as a means of reputation building.
The other-directed individual is oriented to identity definition
by continuous comparison of outward cues.










In terms of individual economic behavior, modernization is, in

large degree, a potluck process. Not all Antiquenos, all Samurai, or

all Puritans were moderizers.18 However, if enough individuals attain

the characteristics of the Insatiable Personality, then it is probable

that some of them will engage in modernizing behavior. Including

a large number of Insatiable Personalities in a society is a necessary,

but not sufficient, condition for modernization; neither does the

mobilization of a group guarantee their future high economic activity.

As more and more individuals are socially mobilized, the

process becomes largely self-sustaining. Once this point is reached,

the key factor is no longer the destruction of the norm structure

of perceived limited good, but its general absence. An individual

socialized in modern industrial society automatically defines his

identity by comparison and his self-esteem by striving. In terms of

sustained social change, there is a continuous interaction between the

individual and society so that the individual may, at the same time,

be both cause and effect. By his very existence, the Insatiable Person-

ality creates an unstable social situation for other individuals since

he is, for them, part of society.

The significance of the Insatiable Personality as a conceptual

tool in explaining social and political change lies in its ability to

help us understand the generalized striving of mobilized individuals.


18
Hagen, op. cit.





38


Nash19 relates an interesting anecdote about New Guinea tribesmen

presented with metal knives. The resulting increase in efficiency was

expended, not in increased productivity, but in increased leisure. It

is hard to imagine an Insatiable Personality not putting a comparable

advantage to use to increase his productivity and thereby increase

his status. Productivity here is not confined to simple economic

increase, but to general efficiency in any line of endeavor. The

New Guinea natives were secure in their current situation, and even

presented with an aspect of modernity took a long time to use it.

The limitations of the psychologically oriented theories result

partially from their attempt to identify a first cause for modernization.

The first cause of modernization in any society is really unimportant.

From the point of view of the mass of men, the process of social change

is always one of diffusion. In examining a modern society there is

little consequence in discovering what came first, the chicken or the

egg -- our concern is with understanding how we got a whole flock.

While the process of social mobilization results in Insatiable

Personalities, social mobilization cannot long continue without continued

economic advancement. As previously stated, through most of history

the only way to increase wealth was by horizontal economic expansion.

In terms of any given area of population there was no significant

increase in the total quantity of valued goods. Horizontal expansion


19
Nash, oa. cit., 42-57.









led to a redistribution of wealth which could produce an increase in

the total available life chances for members of one social system.

However, since the total supply of goods was inelastic, there was

necessary deprivation of members of other systems. This inelasticity in

agrarian economic orders was the primary basis for the re-traditionaliza-

tion of the norm structure of perceived limited good, since all members

of competing societies were faced with what amounted to a zero-sum

game. (It should be noted that the situation in the United States

did not result in a zero-sum game due to the availability of unoccupied

land.)

Increasing wealth after the industrial revolution created a

non-zero-sum game. Economic expansion became a process of largely

vertical growth, increasing not only the quantity of life chances in

terms of real goods (growth), but the quantity of life chances in

terms of available roles (differentiation).20 The special increase in

wealth provided the necessary reinforcement for a continuous process

of social mobilization. Since a continuous increase in the range of

available life chances existed, the Insatiable Personality was not

faced with the reassertion of the social strictures resulting from the

former inelasticity of valued goods. There was the possibility for the

reinforcing interaction through time between the Insatiable Personality



20
Wilbert E. Moore, "Changes in Occupational Structures," in Neil J.
Smelser and Seymour M. Lipset (eds), Social Structure and Mobility in
Economic Development (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1966), 194-
248.




110


and increasing life chances which we have called modernization..

Social modernization is not a necessary result of either the

increase in the number of Insatiable Personalities nor the inception of

economic growth. Although aspiration is enough to ensure striving for

a limited period of time, ignorance can provide as effective a deterrent

to continued striving as did the formerly inelastic supply of valued

goods. We have argued that the Insatiable Personality is willing to

engage in new modes of behavior and to strive to achieve in order to

secure his identity. Enabling him to pursue achievement is a primary

linkage between politics and society.

We have defined politics as the attempted or actual use of the

authority of the state to redistribute the life chance matrix of a

society in an innovative manner. Social pressure for an increased

ability to satisfy current aspirations will lead to pressure for

greater educational opportunities, and in terms of increased

permeance, government activity will proceed in a very special direction

-- toward increased education. -There is no expectation that either

the pressure on the government, or its activity will be successful.

Success (in the sense of increased education) will depend upon the rate

of change in the society and the rate ef demand with which the political

situation can cope.21 If the pressure for greater education results

in higher levels of educational attainment, then the probability of



21.
Later discussion will outline the effect on political development
of very rapid rates of mobilization.





41


continued modernization is very high. If the pressure for greater

education does not result in higher educational attainment, then the

probability of continued modernization is almost non-existent.

The basic elements for an explanation of increasing political

development have new been outlined. Modernization is an interaction

between increasing wealth and increasing social mobilization; each

factor is dependent on the other and neither can long continue without

the other. Yet, the aspirations raised by social mobilization can only

be satisfied, through time, by increased individual capability arising

from increased educational opportunity. If the Insatiable Personality

is not to experience system de-stabilizing frustration which will

ultimately end the process of modernization, widespread education must

become normal. Since the state is the only agency which can supply

educational opportunities on a mass basis, extreme permeance growth

begins. The state thus becomes intimately involved in the redistribution

of life chances for the society, and by being involved, becomes an

integral part of the process of'modernization.

Political development is one possible result of modernization if

the rates of change allow balanced growth. Imbalances in economic

growth or social mobilization can result in hybrid forms of political

organization which may or may not become developed in time. Our concern

in the following pages will be to present a specific model of the

ideal-typical form of development.

To this point, our theoretical concern has centered upon the

general case of transition from peasant to industrial society. Peasant





42


societies were used as the base line to insure applicability to many

societies. In the specific case of the United States, we are examining

the transition from a society based upon agrarian enterprise to one

based on industrial production. Prior to the onslaught of massive

industrialization, the process of frontier expansion, indeed the very

process of colonization, had increased the range of life chances avail-

able to the average individual. American society was already experiencing

the process of social development resulting from increased wealth produc-

tion. The American was a farmer, not a peasant.

Although increased life chances were available to the average

American as a result of the abundance and quality of available land,

as in a peasant society, the means of wealth production were still

based on agriculture. Despite the increased availability of wealth,

the average American was still faced with a restricted set of altern-

ative life styles. So long as the society was based on agricultural

production, it was limited in its potential for social, and hence politi-

cal, development. Since political and social development are processes,

not events, there is no compelling reason to begin at the beginning

in order to conduct valid tests of models of these processes.

Accepting the preliminary changes in the social structure which

established America as a free agrarian, rather than peasant society, it

is still expected that the transition from a rural-agrarian to an

urban-industrial social order would be deeply traumatic. Although the

theoretical argument for the experiences which result in the Insatiable

Personality remain the same, it must be acknowledged that the average










American's situation in 1870 was not as restricted as the situation of

the average peasant.

To cover as long a time period as possible, it would be best to

commence the research at as early a date as possible. At the same time,

extension of the time period should not result in any loss of quality

in the variables used, nor too severe a loss in the number of available

data points. The specific time period of 1870 to 1960, was chosen for

the research as a result of several considerations.

Prior to 1850, data on newspaper consumption and literacy are not

available on a state by state basis. Therefore, two of the major variables

are unavailable prior to 1850. Comunencing the research with 1850

would have included the disturbing effects of the Civil War. Further,

since many of the states were not, in fact, states during the period

of secession, the political participation index would be truncated.

Consequently, it was decided that the earliest practical year to

include in the research was 1870.

Figure 1 presents the gross total pig-iron shipments in the United

States between 1820 and 1960, by census years. Pig-iron is used as

an index of basic industrial capacity since it provides the raw

material for all advanced industrial processing of steel and steel

related products. In addition, the basic metal used in the advancement

of the rail network in the United States was forged iron. From Figure 1

it can be seen that through 1870, little change had occurred in the level

of industrial activity. By beginning with 1870, we will be examining the

process of transition from .agrarian to industrial society from its

earliest stages.

















Legend for Figure 1



Production noted in thousands of short tons.

Raw data from the United States Bureau of the
Census, Historical Statistics of the United States,
Colonial Times to 1857 (Washington, D.C.: United
States Government Printing Office, 1960), and
Historical Statistics of the United States,
Continuation to 1962 and Revisions (thashington,
D.C.: United States Government Printing Office,
1965).










73,500


70,000


66,500


63,000


59 500



56,000


52 500


49,000


45 500


42,000


38,500


35,000


31, 50 0


28,000


24, 500


21, 50 0


17, 500


14, 000


1 C 0 5 0 0


7, 0 0


3, 50 0


1820 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 1900 10 20 30 40 50


Figure 1


Total Pig Iron Shipments in the United States: 1820 1960





46


Our previous discussion suggests the following linkage for the

theoretical elements: increasing wealth leads to increasing social

mobilization, which in turn aids in increasing wealth. If increasing

social mobilization leads to increased individual adaptability, then

social mobilization and wealth will likely continue increasing.22

Diagrammatically, we may represent the simultaneous occurrence of these

relationships by interconnected circularities.


Wealth -> Social ---- General
Production Mobilization Adaptability

Figure 2

Causal Model of Three Concepts with Simultaneous Interactions


Considering the above within the framework of passing time

makes the entire system clearer. For any single period, T, the

linkages are shown in Figure 3.


IWealth __-> Social _General
Production Mobilization Adaptability

Figure 3

Causal Model of Three Concepts with One-Way Causation



22 - -
For a similar, but confusing model, see Norman H. Nie, G. Bingham
Poweil, Jr., and Kenneth Prewitt, "Social Structure and Political
Participation: Developmental Relationships, I F, II," American
Political Science Review (June and September, 1969), 361-378 and 808-
318.




47


If we consider these same relationships for a period, T to T+1, we

would have the linkages shown in Figure 4.

Wealth Social General
Production Mobilization Adaptability
P T T

Wealth Social General
ProductionT+1 obilizationT+1 AdaptabilityT+1


Figure 4

Causal Model of Three Concepts with Inter-Temporal Effects



Through time, each variable's continued growth becomes a necessary

precondition for the continued growth of the other variables in the system.

This argument assumes that in past periods of rapid social change, the

process was interrupted by the inelasticity of available wealth. The

ensuing re-institutionalization of the norm structure of perceived

limited good led to the demise of further social mobilization and the

reassertion of the traditional agrarian social order.23 In considering

current modernization, wealth increases have become the result of in-

dustrialization, and therefore have been relatively continuous. In

current modernization, all the variables in the system have become

more closely interdependent since wealth production is now a highly com-

plex social process. The social organization of industrial society require

widespread social mobilization in order to continue increased industry.


23
Lenski, op. cit., 275.











Social mobilization can be broken down into two major, inter-

related processes, urbanization and mass communication, each more

specific and more easily operationalized. In the following

discussion, urbanization will be considered only in terms of intense

demographic concentration.24 Industrialization as it occurred under

past levels of technology required extreme demographic concentrations.

Large scale industrial production requires masses of workers concen-

trated in close proximity to the place of work. Throughout the history

of industrialism, the growth of cities has been the primary result of

stripping the hinterland of agrarian population. Urbanization did not

result merely from natural population increase in pre-existing cities.

Indeed, as Deutsch25 has noted, in all industrializing societies, new

cities sprang up as new industries were formed.26 Again, there is a

cycle; industrialization makes large scale urban populations possible,

and increasing urban populations are necessary for further industrial



24
Rather than treat urbanization as a syndrome, it was considered
wiser to examine the most basic characteristic of urban life and
then test for associated relationships.
25
Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication. An Inquiry
into the Foundations of Nationality (New York: Wiley, 1953).
26
One must, of course, also consider the effect of urbanization on
peasants who are intermittently exposed to city life. The extraordi-
nary urban slum sprawl of many cities of the third world is an apparent
reflection of the effect of urban opulence on the unprepared rural
population. S-3 also, Philip M. Hauser, "The Social, Economic and
Technological Problems of Rapid Urbanization," in B.F. Hoselitz and
I.E. Moore (eds), Industrialization and Society (UNESCO: Houton,
1i963), 199-217.




49


expansion. The by-product of this process is an ever increasing

quantity of Insatiable Personalities who, by their activities,

will tend to reinforce both industrialization and urbanization.

Urbanization necessitates the second process of social mobiliza-

tion, mass communication. Mass communication is essentially the process

of large scale community integration. If cities were merely organized

in small enclaves, industry by industry, then integration would be less

important. However, even in a relatively small city, the extreme

complexity of the logistical system makes widespread communication

necessary. To create an urban society, mass communication is an absolute

essential. In earlier epochs, communication required literacy since

the media were print. This has led some theorists to presume that

literacy is necessary for mass communication. There is, in reality,

no reason for mass literacy to precede mass communication. Prior to

the development of electronic media, as long as the nodal personality

in a sociometric network was literate, the other persons in the net

could effectively be considered-part of the mass communications system.

A society cannot support urbanization without the community

integration carried on by the processes of mass communication.

Demographic concentration can continue for some time, but the process

of modernization will break down under the pressure and confusion of a

non-integrated environment.

A cycle is again apparent. Industrialization leads to urbanization

which in turn is necessary for further industrialization, Yet, continued

urbanization is not possible without the integrating functions of mass

communication. Diagramatically, in terms of two time periods, the relation





50


are shown in Figure 5.


Industrialization --- Urbanization ------ Commnunication
T T T

Industrialization ------- Urbanization ------ Communication
T+l T+1 T+o

Figure 5

Inter-Temporal Effects of Three Operational Indicators



Mass communication has a significant impact on the development

of the Insatiable Personality. Where urbanization acts as the first

stage of social mobilization, mass communication acts as the second

stage by increasing the individual's aspirations, making him aware of

currently available alternative life styles. At this juncture, social

stress becomes reflected in the political sphere. Aspirant individuals

are faced with the unpleasant realization that their abilities are

not commensurate with their aspirations.

It has been argued that social mobilization destroys the

individual's links with his previous social position and identity. In

order to exist in his new situation, the individual must find some

new form of identity in which to secure himself. He must, in short,

take on new roles. Yet, his ability to fill new roles is contingent

upon his level of general adaptability. Education may be learning through

experience, or formal classroom schooling. If the individual is educa-

ted through experience, it will be a process of trial and error.










Repeated exposure to modern life styles may simply inure the individ-

ual to the harassments of modernity. If the rate of mobilization is

slow, then learning from experience will be sufficient to perpetuate

modernization for a time. The more rapid the original rate of mobil-

ization, the more necessary an efficient form of education will be.

Insecurity and maladjustment are common products of repeated failures

to cope in the face of an incomprehensible social order. As the

number of maladjusted individuals increases, the ability of the remain-

ing mobilized individuals to sustain the process of modernization

decreases. Hence, the process of social mobilization creates a situation

in which education becomes increasingly necessary. In terms of an

entire society, mass formal schooling becomes necessary if the process

of modernization is to continue. Diagrammatically, the relations

explicated so far are shown in Figure 6, first for one time period, T,

and then for a time span, T to T+l.


For Time T

Industrialization--- Urbani nation --s Communication -. Education

For Time T+l

Industrialization--> Urbanization--> Communication--> Education
T T T T


Industrialization ---> Urbani zation--- Communi cation-- Education
T+1 T+1 Ttl T+1

Figure 6

Inter-Temporal Effects of Four Socio-Economic Indicators





52


While increasing communication produces the need for increased

education at a given time, T, continued increase in the level

of communication at time, T+1, is contingent upon prior increases in

education

Formal schooling provides the only method of increasing individ-

ual adaptability in the mass of the mobilized populace. The necessity

for increasing the level of individual adaptability generates the first

extreme permeance growth of the state. Government activity is obviously

necessary to the process of social modernization, yet it is not

a necessary link in the chain of causality. Mass education is a social

service which has no immediate return. Government activity is thus a

necessary intervening variable between the pressures resulting from

mass mobilization and the increased need for education. If it were

possible to increase the level of mass education without government

intervention, then the process of modernization would continue without

the state. It is precisely the process of modernization which renders

non-political solutions to the problem impossible. As the rate of

social change increases, political activity becomes more and more

necessary. These relations can be diagrammatically represented by

Figure 7, for any time, T.


Industrialization Media Consumption

___- Education
Urbanization Government Activity

Figure 7

Causal Relations of Four Variables and Gcvernment Activity




53


It is possible to extrapolate this argument one step further.

Having acquired some measure of education, the average individual will

be more willing to engage in political activity.27 In a rapidly

changing society many issues will have become politicized. The

average individual's interest in political activity will vary with the

number of issues which he perceives as affecting him. Previous expo-

sure to the activities of mass media and government will arouse his

awareness of the importance of political participation. In general,

however, the tendency will be against attempting to participate until

a certain measure of self-confidence is attained. For the average

citizen, that self-confidence will be the result of the process of

education. A generalized disposition toward attempting to affect

one's fate will be the result of education. The actual opportunity for

participation will be determined by the rate of social change which the

extant political institutions can accommodate. Presumably, if the

current political institutions have been able to provide a satisfactory

level of education, then the probability is high that they will be

able to accommodate mass political participation. In other words,

it is expected that if the developmental process continues through the

level of creating widespread education, then increased political

participation will follow as a matter of course. The expected final

model will follow the path indicated in Figure 8.



27
For the general evidence already relating education to participation
see, Lcster IV. Milbrath, -Political Participat.on. IIow and lWhy Do
People Get Involved in Politics? (Chicago: Rand, McNally and Company,
1965), 48-89.




54




Industrialization Media Caiisumption Education



Urbanization Governii;'nt Activity Political Participation

Figure 8

Final Representation of a Six-Variable I!odel
of Political Development


The ensuing discussion will describe the methodology and

operational indicators used to examine the adequacy of the above model.












CHAPTER III

INDICES AND METHODOLOGY



In the preceding chapters, some objections were raised to

the methods used to test models of development. One of those objec-

tions referred to the cross-sectional nature of the tests. Develop-

ment is a dynamic process, and it cannot be tested by an examination

confined to one point in time. In fact, it is all too easy to come to

false conclusions about a concept simply from examining its behavior at

only one point in time. As an example, let us examine the relationship

between the concept of inter-party competition and education. Inter-

party competition is used as an example because it was not included

in the model of development. Table I presents a list of correlations

between an indicator of inter-party competition and the level of

education in the United States, by state, from 1870 to 1960.

Table I

Decennial Correlations of Inter-Party Competition and Educationa,b


Year 1870 1880 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960

IPC
with -.20 .32 .33 .44 .76 .06 .64 .71 .25 -.05
education

The indicator of inter-party competition used was the losing
party's percentage of the winning party's vote.
Raw data from Sven Petersen, A Statistical History of the
American Presidenti.al Elections (New York: Ungar Publishers,
1963), ard U.S. Bureau of the Census, U.S. Census of Population
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1872, 1883,
1895, 1901, 1913, 1922, 1933, 1943, 1952, 1962).





56


It is obvious that observing this correlation at only one point in

time could lead to erroneous conclusions. Observing the relation in

only 1940 would lead us to conclude that a very high relationship

exists between education and inter-party competition. If, however, we

confined our observation to 1920, we would conclude the exact opposite.

In order for a generalization to be valid, it must hold for more than

one point in time.

To avoid falling prey to this same criticism, the current

research uses data drawn from a period from 1870 to 1960. Observations

were made at ten year intervals beginning in 1870. The ten year

interval was used primarily for the sake of convenience. Data for the

socio-demographic variables were readily available at the ten year

intervals of the census. It would have been possible to generate

the necessary data for shorter intervals by interpolation. However,

since interpolated data would have been based on the decennial census

figures, it was felt that little would be gained by increasing the

number of observation points.

A second objection raised against previous work was the use

of cross-societal samples as a data base for creating intra-societal

generalizations. This research used the United States, by state, as a

data base. Table II presents the number of data points used for each




United States Bureau of the Census, U.S. Census of Population
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972, 1883, 1895,
1901, 1913, 1922, 1933, 1943, 1952, 1962).





57


census period.


Table II

Number of Observations for Each Decennial Census Period


Year 1870 1880 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960


N 37 38 44 45 48 48 48 48 48 48



A state became a data point if, at the time of the census, it was

legally a state. During the 1870's, several of the southern states

had still not been readmitted to the Union. Although the socio-

demographic data were available for these states, no election figures

were available, and,therefore, the last stages of the model could

not be tested. The same situation prevailed in regard to the various

territories which had not yet been admitted to the Union.



Data Sources



All socio--demographic data used in this analysis were taken

froma official government publications. The primary sources of infor-

mation were the various volumes of the Census of the United States.2

At times, certain series of statistics were more readily available in


2
Ibid.





58


the United States Statistical Abstract.3 While the figures in. the

abstract are generally based on the data reported in the Census, the

abstract figures are often presented in a more usable form, especially

in regard to state summary totals. In certain cases, notably early

school attendance figures, it was necessary to use special reports.

Data on school attendance were retrieved from the Report of the United

States Commissioner of Education.4 Figures for postal receipts, by

state, were obtained from the Report of the Postmaster General.5

Beginning in 1850, the Bureau of the Census was directed to collect

figures on social statistics, and there are data on literacy, news-

paper circulation, church attendance, etc. starting with 1850.

Oddly enough, the figures on Presidential and Congressional

elections were not available on a state by state basis from official

publications before 1920. Data for the Presidential elections were

drawn from Petersen, A Statistical History of the American Presidential

Elections, and were checked against the figures presented by W.D.



3
U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1883, 1893. 1903,
1913, 1923, 1933, 1943, 1953, 1963).
4
U.S. Commissioner of Education, Annual Report of the Commissioner of
Education (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1871,
1881).
5
U.S. Postmaster General, Annual Report of the Postmaster General
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1871, 1881).
6
Sven Petersen, A Statistical History of the American Presidential
Elections (New York: Ungar Publishers, 1963).











Burnham, Presidential Ballots: 1836-1892.7 Both authors were forced to

rely on newspaper accounts of the various elections in those states

where no special totals were kept by a state agency. Data for the

Congressional elections were taken from an archival record supplied by

the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research.8 The tape

presented only congressional district totals, but for the purposes

of this research the district totals were aggregated to the state level.



Variables



A series of fourteen socio-demographic variables was collected

for the entire period. This series included data on government

employment and government expenditutes which were available from census

reports. Table III presents a list of the variables originally

selected for examination as possible operational indicators of the six

major variables: industrialization, urbanization, education, media

consumption, government activity and political participation. First

it was necessary to select a series of variables, appropriate as

indicators, both in terms of variable behavior through time, and in

terns of the relationships among the several variables. Second, it was



7
Walter D. Burnham, Presidential Ballots: 1836-1892 (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1955).
8
Inter-University Consortium for Political Research. Historical
Data Archives, Statistics of the American Congressional Elections,
1324-1968 (Computer tape).





60


necessary to choose either a single operational indicator for each

concept, or to create an index of the concept.


Table III

Original Variables Selected as Possible Indicators



1. Per capital value added from manufacturing

2. Percent of the total population resident in cities greater
than 2,500

3. Percent of the total population resident in cities greater
than 25,000

4. Average daily newspaper circulation per 1,000 population

5. Telephones per 1,000 population

6. Radios per 1,000 population

7. Postal receipts per capital

8. Total horsepower in use in manufacturing per capital

9. Percent of the working age population in manufacturing

10. Percent of the population who are literate

11. Percent of the school age population in elementary school

12. Percent of the school age population in high school

13. Percent of the age group 19-24 enrolled in college

14. Total state and local government expenditures per capital

15. State and local government employees as a percent of working
age population

16. Turnout in Presidential elections as a percent of population

17. Turnout in Congressional (off-year) elections as a percent
of population

aAvailable from. 1880 on
b
Available from 1930 on
CAvailable from 1910 on





61


Of the seventeen variables presented in Table III, four were

found unsatisfactory and were not included in the analysis. Two

variables, government employees and elementary school attendance, were

discarded due to the extremely erratic nature of their mean values

through time. Both of these variables were anticipated to demonstrate

a relatively consistent growth pattern through time. However, this

was not the case. The difficulty probably lies in the sources of the

statistics. The elementary school attendance figures were often

incomplete during the early period covered in the research. The em-

ployment figures were probably correct, but erratic due to constantly

shifting definitions of the census category during the early period.

Perhaps reflecting the stable nature of American industrialism,

or more probably an artifact of the census categories, the

percent of working age population in manufacturing has remained remark-

ably steady over the past hundred years. If a variable does not change,

it cannot be examined. Since the mean value of this variable remained

steady at around twelve percent'of the working age population, it could

contribute no additional information to the analysis. The fourth

variable, horsepower in use in manufacturing, presented a different

problem, also related to its variance. There was no effective means

of combining this variable with the other usable indicator of indus-

trialization, value added per capital. If the total horsepower were

measured against a per capital base, then the value added variable, being

measured in dollars, would dominate the index. If horsepower ;'ere

measured against some other base, then it would most probably dominate









9
the index. Since these two variables were highly correlated (0.85),

it was decided to use just one and not try to combine them. Since the

primary theoretical concern is with industrialization as a source of

wealth production, it was decided to use value added per capital as the

major indicator of industrialization. Figure 9 presents the mean

values of the index of industrialization from 1870 to 1960.

In this research, urbanization is viewed simply as a measure of

demographic concentration, and does not represent any complex of

expected associated traits. Two indicators, percent of population in

cities over 2,500 and percent of population in cities over 25,000

were combined into an additive index of urbanization. Figure 10

presents the mean values for the two indicators from 1870 to 1960.

It is necessary to refer to the concept of increasing scale to

explain the manner in which several of the indices, including

urbanization,were constructed. At any one time, T, a variable will

have some variance, S. Through time, the value of S may alter. While

we refer to the same conceptual,variable at many times, T, T+1,...T+N,

the variance of that variable at different times may be different. If

the variance of the variable changes in a steady and predictable manner,

due to increasing scale, it may be necessary to build into the index

a means of compensating for the alteration in the variance of one of the

sub-indicators. Specifically, if the component variables of the index

have a naturally occurring saturation point, then it will be necessary



9
For my objections to the use of standard scoring techniques of index
construction, see the. Appendix.

















Legend for Figure 9



Units of measure in dollars

Raw data from the U.S. Bureau of the Census,
U.S. Census of Population (Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1872, 1883,
1895, 1901, 1913, 1922, 1933, 1943, 1952, and
1962), and the U.S. Bureau of the Census, Sta-
tistical Abstract of the United States (Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1883, 1893,
1903, 1913, 1923, 1933, 1943, 1953, and 1963).

Means computed using Norman H. Nie et al., Statis-
tical Package for the Social- Sciences (New York:
McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1970).





















































































1870 80 90 1900 10 20 30 40 50 60


Figure 9


Mean Per Capita Productivity from Manufacturing


5 5 0


so ol



450'



4 0 0



350



30 0



250

















Legend for Figure 10



Percent of population in places over 2,500
population, 1870-1960.

Percent of population in places over 25,000
population, 1870-1960.

Raw data from the U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical
Abstract of the United States, 1883, 1893, 1903, 1913,
1923, 1933, 1943, 1953, 1963; and U.S. Bureau of the
Census, U.S. Census of Population, 1872, 1883, 1895, 1901,
1913, 1922, 1933, 1943, 1952, 1962.

Means computed using the Statistical Package for the Social
Sciences.





66


Figure 10

Mean Percent of Population in Cities over 2,500
and over 25,000 by Census Years


100





67


to continue adding co.locnent variables to maintain the variance of the

index. For example, during the early phases of urbanization in a so-

ciety, residence in a place of more than 2,500 people may be an adequate

index of urbanization. However, as the percentage of the population

resident in places of more than 2,500 approaches 100, then the index

is no longer an adequate basis for differentiating what is urban. In

short, the variable, through time, will cease to vary. Examine the

data presented in Table IV, presenting the means and standard deviations

of the two component variables of the index of urbanization.


Table IV
Means and Standard Deviations of Indicators of
Urbanization by Census Yearsa,b


Cities over 2,500
Mean Standard Deviation


21.4

24.3

32.2

33.8

37.9

42.2

46.0

47.3

55.6

61.9


16.8

19.0

22.2

21.7

21.4

21.4

19.9

18.3

16.0

14.8


Cities over 25,000
Mean Standard Deviation


10.2

13.0

15.9

18.4

21.9

25.4

28.7

29.2

31.3

35.5


12.6

13.6

15.8

17.7

19.6

20.8

20.3

19.4

15.5

14.7


aPaw data from the Bureau of the Census, U.S. Census of
Population, 1872, 1883, 1895, 1901, 1913, 1933, 1943,
1952, and 1962.
bComputations performed using the Statistical Package for the
Social Sciences.


1870

1880

1890

1900

1910

1920

1930

1940

1950

1960


I





68


Had we depended on the single variable, percent in cities over 2,500,

as an index of urbanization, our index would have begun to saturate.

We would have been led to infer that the importance of the conceptual

variable, urbanization, was decreasing, when in fact what was occurring

was the saturation of a society where approximately the same proportion

of the populace was resident in places over 2,500. In short, inter-

temporal research requires that operational indicators take account both

of increasing scale and, thus, decreasing variance in component variables.

The index of urbanization was created by summing the percent of

the population resident in cities greater than 2,500 and the percent of

the population in cities greater than 25,000. The majority of the

variance of this index from 1870 to 1930 'was contributed by the percent

in cities greater than 2,500. Since 1930, the percent in cities greater

than 25,000 has contributed the greater portion of the variance. It

should be clear that to continue the research for a time period beyond

1960, a further variable would have to be added to the index. Figure 11

presents the mean values of the index of urbanization from 1870 to 1960.

An index of media constumption was created following the same

procedure as used for urbanization. For 1870, the index of media

consumption was created by summing the per capital postal receiptsl0 and



10
Postal receipts per capital were used as an index of media consumption
following the argument that postal correspondence is a measure of
the level of community integration. Since our primary concern was
with media consumption as a means of community integration as well as
a means of modern behavior pattern transmission, the level of
postal activity was included.

















Legend for Figure 11



Raw data from the U.S. Bureau of the Census,
U.S. Census of Population, 1872, 1883, 1895,
1901, 1913, 1922, 1933, 1943, 1952, 1962; and
Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of
the United States, 1883, 1893, 1903, 1913, 1923,
1933, 1943, 1953, 1963.

Computations performed using the Statistical
Package for the Social Sciences.













100


95


90'


85


80


75


70



G 5'


60


55


50





4 0


35


30'


25


20


15


10


1870 80 90 1900 10 20 30 40 50 60

Figure 11


Mean Values of the Index of Urbanization by
Census Years










the average daily newspaper circulation per 1,000 population. Figures

12 and 13 present the mean values of the newspaper and postal receipts

for 1870 to 1960.

In 1880, the number of telephones per 1,000 population were

added to the newspaper and postal receipts to create the index. This

same configuration was used for 1890, 1910 and 1920. Figure 14

presents the mean values of the telephone variable from 1880 to 1960.

Beginning in 1930, the number of radios per 1,000 population

was added to the index of media consumption. The composition of the

index from 1930 to 1960 was the sum of the newspaper, postal receipt,

telephone and radio variables. Figure 15 presents the mean values

for the total index of media consumption from 1870 to 1960.

Government activity was indexed by per capital state and local

government expenditures. It was unnecessary to use more than one

variable for this index since it had no saturation point during the

period under study. Table V presents the means and standard deviations

of the index of government activity for 1870 to 1960. Figure 16

presents the mean values of the index for the same period.


Table V
Means and Standard Deviations (S.D.) of the Index of Government Activity
by Census Years


Year 1870 1880 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960

:.ean 6.5 5.9 9.1 14.5 15.8 33.9 74.0 92.9 69.4 330.7

S.D. 3.6 3.5 5.2 7.5 11.4 13.5 25.8 29.7 19.3 70.2
















Legend for Figure 12



Quantities in real numbers.

Raw data from the U.S. Bureau of the Census,
U.S. Census of Population, 1872, 1883, 1895,
1901, 1913, 1922, 1933, 1943, 1952, 1962; and
Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of
the United States, 1883, 1893, 1903, 1913, 1923.
1933, 1943, 1953, 1963.

Computations performed using the Statistical
Package for the Social Sciences.
























400-











300'











200











10 0-


0870 ~ 90 1900 0 0 'o

Figure 12

M an Daily Newspaper Circulation per 1,000
Population by Census Years

















Legend for Figure 13



Quantities in dollars.

Raw data from the U.S. Bureau of the Census,
Statistical Abstract of the United States,
1883, 1893, 1903, 1913, 1923, 1933, 1943, 1953,
1963; and U.S. Postmaster General, Annual Report
of the Postmaster General (Washington: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1871, 1881).

Computations performed using the Statistical
Package for the Social Sciences.





75

















8




71




6





















2









----i --p---j----T------- -1-oTo---T----------T--'-----'----| 6%
1870 80 90 1900 10 20 30 40 50 60

Figure 13

Mean Per Capita Postal Receipts by Census Years

















Legend for Figure 14



Quantities in real numbers.

Raw data from the U.S. Bureau of the Census,
U.S. Census of Population, 1872, 1883, 1895,
1901, 1913, 1922, 1933, 1943, 1952, 1962; and
Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of
the United States, 1883, 1893, 1903, 1913, 1923,
1933, 1913, 1953, 1963.

Computations performed using the Statistical
Package for the Social Sciences.






77






500











40





35











250





200





150





1 00




50






1870 30 90 1900 10 20 30 40 50 60


Figure 14

Mean Number of Telephones per 1,000 Population
by Census Years
















Legend for Figure 15



Quantities in index numbers.

Raw data from the U.S. Bureau of the Census,
U.S. Census of Population, 1872, 1883, 1895,
1901, 1913, 1922, 1933, 1943, 1952, 1962; and
Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of
the United States, 1883, 1893, 1903, 1913, 1923,
1933, 1943, 1953, 1963.

Computations performed using the Statistical
Package for the Social Sciences.












1,500


1 ,000


95o


900


850


800


75 0


700


650-



600


550-


500'

450-






350


300


250-


200'


150'


100o


1970 80 90 1900 10 20 30 40 50 60


Figure 15


Mean Values of the Index of Media Consumption by Census Years

















Legend for Figure 16



Quantities in dollars.

Raw data from the U.S. Bureau of the Census,
U.S. Census of Population, 1872, 1883, 1895,
1901, 1913, 1922, 1933, 1943, 1952, 1962; and
Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the
United States, 1883, 1893, 1903, 1913, 1923, 1933,
1943, 1953, 1963.

Computations performed using the Statistical
Package for the Social Sciences.






81


325



300



275



250



225



200



175



150



125



100



75



50



25 -




1870 80 90 1900 10 20 30 4 0 5 0 6 0


Figure 16


Mean Per Capita Government Expenditures
by Census Years










For the years 1870 to 1910, the index of education was

created by summing the percent of the population who were literate

and the percent of the school age population attending high school.

Beginning in 1910, the percent of persons, age 19 to 24, attending

college was added to the index. Figure 17 presents the mean values

for the entire index of education for the years 1870 to 1960. Figure

18 presents the mean values for the index for the same period of time.

Electoral participation is the final conceptual variable in

the model. It was indexed by two different series of electoral

statistics. The first series was turnout in Presidential elections

as a percent of the total populace. Turnout in Presidential elections

is an obvious measure of participation; however, the base used to

compute a percentage turnout may occasion some comment. The decision

to ignore the obvious differences in electoral laws regulating the

suffrage was deliberately made. The most compelling argument for using

the total population, rather than the legally eligible electorate, as

a data base lies in the definition of political development on which

this work is based. Political participation is understood as one

element in the process of development. Participation is seen as a

political response to a change in the social environment. It is,

of course, possible to disenfranchise certain groups in the society.

The basis for disenfranchiscment may be color, language, religion or

sex, but, whatever the reason, exclusion of a social group from political

participation does not exclude them from the society. There are

reasonable bases for exclusion, such as age or mental incapacity, but
















Legend for Figure 17



Percent literate.

Percent attending High School.

Definition of literacy changed in 1950, to
functional literacy.

Raw data from the U.S. Bureau of the Census,
U.S. Census of Population, 1872, 1883, 1895,
1901, 1913, 1922, 1933, 1943, 1952, 1962; and
Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of
the United States, 1883, 1893, 1903, 1913, 1923,
1933, 1943, 1953, 1963; and U.S. Commissioner
of Education, Annual Report of the Commissioner
of Education (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1871, 1881).

Computations performed using the Statistical
Package for the Social Sciences.





84


,- .-..--


.
J


/
... ~ ,-- .--.


1870 80 90 1900 10 20 30 40 50 60

Figure 17

Mean Percent of Population Who Are Literate and
Mean Percent of Population Attending High School
bv Census Years


100





10




80





70





60





50




40


30





20"





10

















Legend for Figure 18



Quantities in index numbers.

Raw data from the U.S. Bureau of the Census,
U.S. Census of Population, 1872, 1883, 1895,
1901, 1913, 1922, 1933, 1943, 1952, 1962; and
Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of
the United States, 1883, 1893, 1903, 1913, 1923,
1933, 1943, 1953, 1963; and the Report of the
Commissioner of Education, 1871, 1881.

Computations performed using the Statistical
Package for the Social Sciences.





















1,300



1,200



1,100-



1, 0 0 0-



90 0



800




700



600



500



400



300-



200



100


1870 80 90 1900 10 20 30 40 50 60

Figure 18


Mean Values of the Index of Edu.cation
by Census Years





87


even here, the criteria may yield to a changing social milieu.

We may be forced to argue that the eighteen-year-old vote is more

developed than the twenty-one-year criterion. If it becomes clear

that the desire for participation of the eighteen-year-old population

is high, then their exclusion from political decision making indicates

a lack of development. The argument can be raised that in a caste

system, it is possible for one caste to advance while a lesser caste

remains backward -- perhaps. But basically, such an argument seems

to claim that the upper caste constitutes the society. For this

argument to be valid, we must be willing to equate political non-

existence with social non-existence.

It is precisely the increasing self-awareness of social existence

upon which we have predicated our argument of increasing pressure

for political growth on both the permeance and participation dimensions.

Hence it was deemed permissible to use the total population as a data

base. This base was also thought most reliable, since an enumeration

of the population would tend to.be more valid than an estimate of the

eligible electorate.11



11
Walter Burnham argues (Walter D. Burnham, "The Changing Shape of the
American Political Universe," American Political Science Review
(March, 1965), 7-28) that the American political universe altered
from a predominantly high participatory state to a less participatory
state around the turn of the century. This change can partly be
attributed to a decline in participation rates by eligible white
males.





88


Operating on the assumption that alternative electoral arenas

might reflect different developmental patterns, it was deemed

advisable to check the model by using another series of electoral

statistics. The second series used was turnout in off year Congression-

al elections. Congressional elections were chosen since the constituency

represented is at the sub-state level and the pressures in this type

of election would seem to be the most unlike the Presidential race.

Yet, the office is significant enough to merit general attention. Off

year elections were used to minimize the pulling effect that a

Presidential contest is believed to exercise on the electorate. Thus,

the pressures to participate were not expected to come from the effects

of a possibly exciting Presidential contest.

To further minimize the deviations inherent in single election

results, the electoral data were aggregated around the appropriate

decennial census periods. For example, the elections for the Presidency

for 1888 and 1892 were averaged to give one figure per state, per

decade. In this way, minor variations in turnout were smoothed over,

and the effects of particular campaigns on the level of participation

were partially controlled. Figures 19 and 20 give the mean values

of the participation indices for the period 1870 to 1960.

Before discussing the methodology used, a summary statement of

the variables and their operational indicators, as used in the

research, is presented in Table VI.

















Legend for Figure 19



Raw data from Sven Petersen, A Statistical
History of the American Presidential Elections
(New York: Ungar Publishers, 1963).

Computations performed using the Statistical
Package for the Social Sciences.





90


35




30 "










20




15

















1870 80 90 1900 10 20 30 40 5i G0

Figure 19

Mean Values of Turnout in Presidential
Elections by Census Years




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