Title: Transcripts of interviews conducted by Gwendolen M. Carter, 1972-1985
ALL VOLUMES CITATION THUMBNAILS PAGE IMAGE ZOOMABLE
Full Citation
STANDARD VIEW MARC VIEW
Permanent Link: http://ufdc.ufl.edu/UF00095707/00021
 Material Information
Title: Transcripts of interviews conducted by Gwendolen M. Carter, 1972-1985
Physical Description: Archival
Language: English
Creator: Carter, Gwendolen M.
Copyright Date: 1982
 Record Information
Bibliographic ID: UF00095707
Volume ID: VID00021
Source Institution: University of Florida
Holding Location: University of Florida
Rights Management: All rights reserved by the source institution and holding location.

Full Text


Interview with Mr. David Anderson
Deputy Secretary and Director of the Commonwealth Fund
for'Techhical Assistance (OFTA)
Mar borough House
Pall Mall
London SW 1 Y 5 H X England
tel: 01-839-3411 cable: Oomsecgen London SW1
I : I'


SADCO --EARLY
There was a real reluctance on the part of both Malawi,uxx Swaziland,
and Lesotho to join with the other"nine"at Lusaka. This came to a head
when Julius Nyerere gave an off the cuff lambasting that these countries
should either join forces whole-heartedly or leave the meeting. This
settleA the issue for the time, but the prospects for active participation
Sby Lesotho and Malawi and to a lesser extent Swaziland, are slim in the
near term.i
By the time the Salisbury andBlantyre txeetings rolled around, however,
a sense ofi comradery had developed
--SUMMIT
The sense of commradery which began to develop after the Lusaka meeting
is essential if Sadcc is to survive. In the case of the East.African
(niommuvnit + ir Tr +io w he oheonn nf +.he iimmiT whi h kepat the organization


V 1'2I


B


from falling apart any earlier than it did, and it was the arrival of
Amin at the summit which cgjed the organization .to lose the cohesion
that it had been able to maintain. If Sadcc is to keep its momentum,
then this must also, and perhaps most importantly be maintained at the
level of the summit. Heads of State must continue to influence their ministers
that Sadcc is both important and worthwhile.

--AT TRACTI ONS
The notion of Sadcc i1,n the long run is very attrao, tive. Regional
manufacturing can be ?iilt upon a base of raw materials. The potential
for regional food processing is great as v! the potential for the development
of a regional mining machinery industry.
Sadco should also be attractive to the Western 'private sector. In the
coming years, the RSA will be increasingly unable to provide the West
with the raw materials that the West needs on a reliable basis. The:.,
instability of the South Afatican supply will stem from domestic labor
actions in gotth AfricA as well as from labor action in the West. IncreasingL
3 we can expect workers in the West to refuse to handle goods nm coming
from certain countries. The clearest preCddent was the refusal of the
longshoremen to handle goods destined to or coming from the USSR during
the past year and a haf.. We can expect this type of action to spread
to Sotth African qoods and disrupt the supply. Since the Sadcc countries
produce many of the same strategic materials that South AFrica does,
and since they will he not be su4ptable to these domestic and international
irregularities, the Sadcc region should Offer an attractive alterna'.-ve
to southh Africa.

MINISTERIAL MEETING IN BlANTYRE
The: Sadoc ministers met prior to the summit in Blantyre and issue
a statement concerning the recent destabilization of the entire region.
The statement was a simple factual account of their position vis a-vis
RSA actions in connection with attacks in Mozambique and Angols, .3e-the
bobbing of the bridge, the attack on Beira port, and the occupation of




Anderson p. 2


bombing of the bridge, the attack on Beira port, and the occupation of
Southern Angol .by the South African Defense force. The minist"1s
noted that although Sadoo was an economic organization with economic
goals, the context afxths within which these goals could be and would
be attained could not be ignored.
At the following conference, which included representatives from the
donor community as well.as the Malawi diplomatic cQ)orps-- and thus the
South African Ambassador-- the representative from the UK expressed
concern that Sadcc was branching into political areas and was running the
risk of alienating certdn international xxxraE.xBix bodies. The Chairman
of the conference then adjourned the conference temporarily and asked
the Btitish if they would like to publically go on record as having dis-
associated themselves with the ministerial statement about South Agican
activities. Sadcc stood ready to in6wdt such a disassociation in the
public minutes. The UK allowed as how it would not be prepared to make
such a move and the statement was agreed to without di ssention.

MRM
The Mrm has certain south A rican backing. The blowing up of the bouys
at the Beira port was very sophisticated and must have been the work of
the RSA, not the MRM. The attack on the road bridge in lete provence
was also the act of the MRM.

ON THE LIBERATION OF ESA
The focus of the front line states activity is currently on Namibia.
When that country is liberated, it will become a member of the FLS.
The question the FIS will then face is what to do about tmE RSA. This
country is x 'recognized as an independent sovereign state and not a
colony. Sovereign states are not liberated, but their forms of government
are changed. The process,however, is one which is inherently a domestic
one. The ANO will not get bases in the Front Line States from which
it will be able to fight a war.

On SWA
The DTA in SWA is a spent cause. The Whites who might once have
supported it will probably support the Nationalists and the Blacks will
undoubtedly support one of the internal parties, or more likely, SEAPO.
This fact might have been one of the causes behind the split by Peter
Kalangula (Kazangulay). It is not too far fetched to think that the
South Africans might have orchestrated, or at least given their approval
to the split in order to strenghhan the position of a non-SJy0O force
amongst the Ovamba. For all practicaV, purposes, the Southd Africans
have withdrawn their support frmm and have lost faith in the DTA.
The general feeling amongst the FLI is that too many concessions
in the negotiations with the contact group have been made by SWAPO
and too few by the RSA.

'.ON 72IMBABWEAN POLITICS
ZAINU is becoming a national party, not just a Shona party. Whites
and Ndebele will join in increasingi. numbers. white e MPs who have
broken from Smith would lose election if it would be held tomorrow.

Angola-- Southern Angola is virtually occupied by RSA, a fact that the
international press seem quite willing to ignore. In spite of, or perhaps
because of this occupation, Angola has shown a great amount Of flexibility.




' r *


. Tanzania
8 Nyerere is very Atil down
(I would be too if I were in his position)

Botswana
has a professional secretariat for SADOO. Would increase its role.

SADOC--Future i
the real results frbomSADO0 activities will not come for five years.
The initial stage !is to undertake feasibility st .dies, then to develop
,projects. At thi iipoint,! no SADOO project has been held up due to a lack
of funds. :

Angola--, i
The flex.,bility it has: shown recently is augmented by the fact that
it will probably; jin bo, the EEC and fler international organizations
soon, suc as thp IMF ad the IBREf.

i i i i
i ''' i I



,' i 1
SI I ' 1i



i i i i 1 ii '




i ,' I ,! i
1 i i ,.; I


Anderson p. 3




University of Florida Home Page
© 2004 - 2010 University of Florida George A. Smathers Libraries.
All rights reserved.

Acceptable Use, Copyright, and Disclaimer Statement
Last updated October 10, 2010 - - mvs