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CAIBBEAN V IE AVol. XV, v Nol. Three Dollars Colombia Under Stress; Revolutionary Humor; Art and Politics in Panama. -i o 0i/ C * W IF I W We've got a love affair going with a fleet of Tall Ships, and we're looking for an intimate group of congenial guys and gals to share our decks. We're not the Love Boat, but we'll take on anybody when it comes to sailing and fun in the exotic Ca- ribbean. There's running' with the wind to great ports o' call for those with itchy feet and a love of adven- ture. Cruises to the loveliest places in paradise start from $625. We'd love to send you our brochure. WindjimmerO P.O. Box 120, Dept. 3427 Miami Beach, FL 33119-0120 TOLL FREE (800) 327-2600 in FL (800) 432-3364 r- I want to share the love affair. Tell me how. ) Windjammer PO. Box 120, Dept. 3427 Miami Beach, FL 33119-0120 TOLL FREE (800) 327-2600 . in FL (800) 432-3364 NAME ADDRESS CITY/STATE/ZIP Cover Seis de Mayo, 1984. No. 1., by Panamanian artist Rogelio Pretto (tempera, 13 x 23 inches). 3 Crossing Swords The Psychological Divide in the Caribbean Basin By Robert A. Pastor 5 Responses and Replies Does the New Man Exist? By Reinaldo Arenas 6 Colombia Under Stress A Presidency Lamed by Instability By Gary Hoskin 10 Betancur's Battles The Man of Peace Takes Up the Sword By Bernard Diederich 12 Colombia in the Eighties A Political Regime in Transition By Ricardo Santamarna Salamanca and Gabriel Silva Lujdn 15 Nature Strikes at Colombia By Bernard Diederich 16 Revolutionary Comics Political Humor from Nicaragua Cartoons by Roger Sdnchez Flores 18 Ritual, Paradox and Death in Managua Internacionalistas in Nicaragua By Alfred Padula 20 Political Systems as Export Commodities Democracy and the Role of the US in Central America By Ricardo Arias Calder6n 24 An Interview with Hugo Spadafora Four Months Before His Death By Beatriz Parga de Bay6n 26 What Graham Greene Didn't Tell Us Five Accounts of the Torrijos Legacy A Review Essay by Neale Pearson 28 Searching for Pretto Politics and Art in Panama By Sandra Serrano 33 An Exhibition for National Peace By Sandra Serrano 41 First Impressions 45 Recent Books In this issue In this issue a Lateinamerika Analysen Daten Dokumentation El Institute de Estudios Iberoamericanos public desde 1984 una revista sobre temas econ6micos, politicos y sociales de la actualidad latinoamericana. Cada numero contiene las siguientes secciones: Editorial Analisis (ensayos-en aleman) Datos: colecciones y datos procesados (cronologias, estadisticas etc.) Documentos (textos de leyes, programs, planes, declaraciones y actas fundamentals, entrevistas etc.-documentados en relaci6n con los andlisis y presentados en su version original) Bibliografia select de monografias y revistas latinoamericanas (200-300 referencias bibliograficas por numero) Resefas de publicaciones nuevas (o latinoamericanas o sobre temas latinoamericanos-en aleman) ResOmenes de los andlisis en espafiol y/o portugu6s. Nimeros publicados: 1: ))Oportunidades y limits de la democracia en Argentina)> (Mayo de 1984, 96 paginas) 2: n Chile: Oposici6n contra el modelo econ6mico y la dictadura> (Noviembre de 1984, 104 paginas) 3: ) La cuesti6n agraria de Brasil: Modernizaci6n y sus consecuencias)) (Abril de 1985, 110 paginas) 4: Crisis econ6mica y political de ajuste en Latinoam6rica)) (Julio de 1985, 142 pAginas) En Preparaci6n: 5: ,, Sindicatos y relaciones laborales dentro de la empresa en el sector industrial)) (Noviembre de 1985) LATEINAMERIKA. ANALYSEN-DATEN-DOKUMENT- ATION aparece tres veces al aho (primavera/verano/otofio); tamahfo octavo mayor. Favor dirigir pedidos al Instituto de Estudios Ibero- americanos, Alsterglacis 8, D-2000 Hamburgo 36 (R.F.A.) Suscripci6n annual (3 cuadernos): DM 40,-; precio por ejemplar DM 15-; mas los costs de franqueo y envio. Institute fir Iberoamerika.Kunde, Hamburg ISSN 0176-2818 SCAnBBEAN P VIEW WINTER 1986 Editor Barry B. Levine Associate Editors Richard A. Dwyer Anthony R Maingot Mark B. Rosenberg Managing Editor Elizabeth Lowe Assistant Editor Gilbert L. Socas Book Review Editor Forrest D. Colburn Bibliographer Marian Goslinga Cartographer Linda M. Marston Contributing Editors Henry S. Gill Eneid Routt& G6mez Aaron L. Segal Andr s Serbin Olga J. Wagenhelm Vol. XV, No. 1 Three Dollars Art Director Board of Editors Danine L. Carey Reinaldo Arenas Ricardo Arias Calder6n Design Consultant Errol Barrow Juan C. Urquiola Germhn Carrera Damas Contributing Artists Yves Daudet Terry Cwikia Edouard Glissant Velinka Patkovic Harmannus Hoetink Gordon K. Lewis Circulation Manager Vaughan A. Lewis Maria J. Gonzhlez Leslie Manigat James A. Mau Distribution Manager Carmelo Mesa-Lago Everardo A. Rodriguez Carlos Alberto Montaner Daniel Oduber Project Manager Robert A. Pastor David Kyle Selwyn Ryan Project Director Carl Stone Anna M. Alejo Edelberto Torres Rivas Jose Villamil Project Coordinator Gregory B. Wolfe Julia Hirst Caribbean Review, a quarterly journal dedicated to the Caribbean, Latin America, and their emigrant groups, is published by Caribbean Review, Inc., a corporation not for profit organized under the laws of the State of Florida (Barry B. Levine, President; Andrew R. Banks, Vice President; Kenneth M. Bloom, Secretary). Caribbean Review is published at the Latin American and Caribbean Center of FlU (Mark B. Rosenberg, Director) and receives supporting funds from the Office of Academic Affairs of Florida International University (Paul Gallagher, Acting Vice President for Academic Affairs) and the State of Florida. This public document was promulgated at a quarterly cost of $6,659 or $1.21 per copy to promote international education with a primary emphasis on creating greater mutual understanding among the Americas, by articulating the culture and ideals of the Caribbean and Latin America, and emigrating groups originating therefrom. Editorial policy: Caribbean Review does not accept responsibility for any of the views expressed in Its pages. Rather, we accept responsibility for giving such views the oppor- tunity to be expressed herein. Our articles do not represent a consensus of opinion- some articles are In open disagreement with others and no reader should be able to agree with all of them. Mailing address: Caribbean Review, Florida International University, Tbmiami Trail, Miami, Florida 33199. Telephone (305) 554-2246. Unsolicited manuscripts (articles, essays, reprints, excerpts, translations, book reviews, poetry, etc.) are welcome, but should be accompanied by a self-addressed stamped envelope. Copyright: Contents Copyright @ 1986 by Caribbean Review, Inc. The reproduction of any artwork, editorial or other material is expressly prohibited without written permission from the publisher. Photocopying: Permission to photocopy for internal or personal use or the internal or personal use of specific clients is granted by Caribbean Review, Inc. for libraries and other users registered with the Copyright Clearance Center (CCC), provided that the stated fee of $1.00 per copy is paid directly to CCC, 21 Congress Street, Salem, MA 01970. Special requests should be addressed to Caribbean Review, Inc. Syndication: Caribbean Review articles have appeared in other media in English, Span- ish, Portuguese and German. Editors, please write for details. Index: Articles appearing in this journal are annotated and indexed in America: History and Life; Current Contents of Periodicals on Latin America; Development and Welfare Index; Hispanic American Periodicals Index; Historical Abstracts; International Bibliogra- phy of Book Reviews; International Bibliography of Periodical Literature; International Development Abstracts; International Serials Database (Bowker); New Periodicals Index; Political Science Abstracts; PAIS BULLETIN; United States Political Science Documents; and Universal Reference System. An index to the first six volumes appeared in Vol. VII, No. 2; an index to volumes seven and eight, in Vol. IX, No. 2; to volumes nine and ten, in Vol. XI, No. 4. Subscription rates: See coupon in this issue for rates. Subscriptions to the Caribbean, Latin America, Canada, and other foreign destinations will automatically be shipped by AO-Air Mail. Invoicing Charge: $3.00. Subscription agencies, please take 15%. Back Issues: Back numbers still in print are purchasable at $5.00 each. A list of those still available appears elsewhere in this issue. Microfilm and microfiche copies of Caribbean Review are available from University Microfilms; A Xerox Company; 300 North Zeeb Road; Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106. Production: Typography by American Graphics Corporation, 959 NE 45th Street, Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33334. Printing by Swanson Printing Inc., 2134 NW Miami Court, Miami, Florida 33127. International Standard Serial Number ISSN 0008-6525; Library of Congress Classifica- tion Number: AP6, C27; Library of Congress Card Number: 71-16267; Dewey Decimal Number: 079.7295. 2/CAIBBEAN REVIEW Crossing Swords The Psychological Divide in the Caribbean Basin By Robert A. Pastor Mexico City. Below our feet, the earth seemed transformed, as if by Biblical com- mand, into the waves of an ocean, undulat- ing, rising, and falling. Our house rose, then gently descended as if it were a buoy in the ocean. The waves continued their advance north, lifting Mexico City, and for a moment, I thought that nature and geopoli- tics were conspiring to float Mexico into the proverbial Caribbean Basin. Just when man-made disasters seem so over-powering, nature has a habit of assert- ing its primacy. Problems like the suffocat- ing debt burden and the civil wars in Central America pale in comparison to the devasta- tion wrought in a few short minutes by the earthquake. While severe, the physical and financial effects of the earthquake actually seem less important than the psychological impact on the Mexican people. Polls confirm that Mexicans are not only losing confidence and faith in their government but also in their future. To be living in Mexico, particularly now, is to realize the importance of perceptions in assisting or impeding people and nations to cope with life's problems and opportunities. During the depression, Franklin D. Roose- velt was able to rekindle optimism in the future. But even if the Caribbean Basin had the leadership, its problems are too large, and the nations, especially in comparison to the US, are too small and vulnerable. Some form of regional cooperation and develop- ment is essential to cope with the pivotal development challenge-reducing vul- nerability-yet mutual suspicions and di- vergent perceptions frequently make the search difficult. The divergent perceptions between the US and the rest of the region are the product of asymmetry in power and wealth and dif- ferent interpretations of history. In no two friendly countries is the gap between per- ceptions wider than between the United States and Mexico. Most US Presidents would consider themselves fortunate to have one-quarter of the power over events in Mexico that Mexicans are certain they have. Mexicans fear US manipulation when the larger problem is US disinterest. The political-economic crisis in Mexico, exacer- bated by the earthquake, make it incum- bent for the US and Mexico to begin thinking about the contours of a long-term relationship. However, such an exercise is confounded by the intricate and convoluted psychological web that has grown up around the relationship, making communi- cation often so exasperating, and coopera- tion always tenuous. Throughout the Caribbean Basin, the power and the presence of the US has shaped values and perceptions. Some in the region admire the achievements of the US and look to it for answers; others see the US as the region's biggest problem and look to eliminate all its influence. Attitudes are strongest and most divergent on the causes and consequences of US intervention. US interventions generally have been viewed in the region as an unwanted projection of hegemony or imperialism, while the US has tended to view it as a necessary response to either an invitation or a provocation. The United States not only fails to re- ciprocate the region's strong feelings- both positive and negative-it has difficulty understanding the basis of those feelings, and attributes them to some character flaw or to the region's inability to deal with its own problems. Sir Eric Williams ends his epic history of the Caribbean with contradictory conclu- sions that reflect these two perceptions. "The whole history of the Caribbean so far can be viewed as a conspiracy to block the emergence of a Caribbean identity-in poli- tics, in institutions, in economics, in culture, and in values." And yet, Williams also con- cludes: "In the last analysis, dependence is a state of mind," suggesting that under- development is not just a function of foreign conspiracies but of internal inadequacies. Similarly, Jean-Paul Sartre wrote of the "split personality" of Third World people, who are born with "a nervous condition introduced and maintained by the settler among colonized people with their consent." With their consent ... isn't that the point? The clue to the psychological rela- tionship between the US and the Caribbean Basin lies in the intersection between the concepts of free will, so deeply ingrained in the United States, and dependency, so pop- ular in the Caribbean and the Third World. While the US tends to attribute to the Carib- bean Basin responsibility for their own in- stability and underdevelopment, many in the region tend to stress the structural obstacles and impediments placed in their way by US power. Both perceptions are valid. The region is vulnerable to outside forces in ways the US will never be, but it also has considerable room and choice to reduce its dependency. The path towards greater autonomy lies be- tween those who prefer to pay the price of defiance and those who would reap the re- wards of subservience. Perceptions matter; they can either facilitate or impede the jour- ney toward greater autonomy. One only has to contrast the Sandinistas' approach to the US with Torrijos' strategy to regain control over the Panama Canal. Both the US and the Caribbean need to understand each other's perspective better. The US needs to appreciate what it feels like to be on the receiving end of its policy or of a traumatic external shock over which a na- tion has no influence, let alone control. In turn, the region needs to accept that it has at least as much responsibility for its problems as the US. Because the US shares in the conse- quences of the region's instability and underdevelopment, it has a stake in assist- ing the region to become more developed and less vulnerable. The US should pro- mote regional unity even at the cost of lever- age over individual nations, and the region needs to look more to its neighbors to solve problems and less to the US. Perceptions need not be a barrier to communication; they could be a stimulus to overcome joint, common, or shared problems. O Robert A. Pastor is Professor of Political Science at Emory Uni- versity in Atlanta and Director of the Latin American and Carib- bean Program at the Carter Center. In 1985-86, he is on leave as a Fulbright Professor at El Colegio de Mexico. He is the editor of Migration and Development in the Caribbean: The Unexplored Connection (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985). CAIBBEAN KeIv-EW/3 THE HAITIAN JOURNAL OF PANAMA MONEY IN BARBADOS, LIEUTENANT HOWARD, 1900-1920 YORK HUSSARS, 1796-1798 BONHAM C. RICHARDSON EDITED, WITH AN INTRODUCTION, BY ROGER NORMAN BUCKLEY An essential primary source for the British invasion of and defeat in Saint Domingue as well as an adventure story filled with in- formation about the West Indies in the late eighteenth century. 248 pages. Illustrations. $22.50 CUBA, 1753-1815 Crown, Military, and Society ALLAN J. KUETHE In this account of the Cuban military forces following their humiliation by the British in 1762, Kuethe discusses the interac- tion among military priorities, the emerging colonial social struc- ture, and the broader reform program of the Bourbon monarchy. 232 pages. Illustrations. $23.95 CRIME IN TRINIDAD Conflict and Control in a Plantation Society, 1838-1900 DAVID VINCENT TROTMAN Trinidad's plantation system, Trotman argues, exerted a profound effect on the rate, pattern, and characteristics of criminal activi- ty. 320 pages. $27.50 FREE COLOREDS IN THE SLAVE SOCIETIES OF ST. KITTS AND GRENADA, 1763-1833 EDWARD L. Cox Focusing on the crucial seventy-year period that preceded eman- cipation, Cox shows that the frequency and ease with which slaves obtained freedom did not necessarily correlate with improved status for free coloreds or with improved race relations. 212 pages. Illustrations. $16.95 Using oral history and archival sources, the author analyzes the social and economic changes on Barbados caused by the migra- tion and return migration of the 40,000 black men and women who dug the Panama Canal. 308 pages. Illustrations $24.95 CARIBBEAN MIGRANTS Environment and Human Survival on St. Kitts and Nevis BONHAM C. RICHARDSON "[An] interesting and highly readable account of Carribbean emigration touches briefly on regional movements in the southeast islands, then focuses sharply on St. Kitts and Nevis in the former British Leewards."--Journal of Historical Geography. 224 pages. Illustrations. $19.95 cloth, $12.50 paper FOLKLORE FROM CONTEMPORARY JAMAICANS DARYL C. DANCE The first comprehensive anthology of the rich folklore of Jamaica offers a fascinating and informative introduction to contemporary Jamaican life and culture. Dance provides brief critical and analytical introductions to each chapter, a glossary, and maps of Jamaica and Kingston. 272 pages. 20 photographs, 11 original drawings, 2 maps. $23.95 TKnoxviversity of P4 Press Knoxville 37996-0325 4/CAIBBEAN REVIEW Responses and Replies Does the New Man Exist? Comments by Reinaldo Arenas Dear Colleagues: I have just read in Caribbean Review, Vol. XIV, No. 1, an impassioned literary review by Mr. Leonel de la Cuesta of the book Al norte del infierno, by the Cuban writer Miguel Correa. I was a member of the jury of the "Jesus Castellanos Prize" (along with writers Hilda Perera and Celedonio Gonzalez) which was awarded to this literary work, and I am intimately familiar with present Cuban real- ity, both that described in the novel and the even more pathetic one not described. I therefore feel it is my sacred duty to criticize such literary criticism. It is curious that Mr. de la Cuesta, coauthor of the well known Itinerario Ide- ol6gico de Lourdes Casals, and who rarely writes literary criticism, has chosen to do so with this novel, which has not been trans- lated to English. I respect the right to voice an opinion, just as I commend literary criti- cism as such. But I will refer here to parts of the review which fall outside the parameters of literary criticism without infringing on Mr. de la Cuesta's right to voice his opinion. I will limit myself to clarifying grave errors con- tained in Mr. de la Cuesta's review of Cor- rea's book, which color his analysis of the history of my country. Mr. de la Cuesta writes, "Correa is thus a product of the 1959 Cuban revolution, but he is far from being the hombre nuevo (reviewer's emphasis) dreamed of by Che Guevara." This is a misguided conceptual error. Does there or will there ever exist a New Man such as the one dreamed by Che Guevara? Can a new man be created who will not only condone but celebrate his own enslavement? Only a robot could approxi- mate that kind of creature, and if one were for sale, I'd be the first to go out and buy one. Push a button and the New Man will do headstands; push another and he will throw himself off a cliff. Such fun. This machine does not have the option to choose, to voice an opinion or to refuse. Is this the appliance dreamed by Che Guevara? Because the man of flesh and bones, the one with warts and dreams, will never tolerate such a des- tiny. I will take this even further: if that man did exist, he should be set free. If that dreamed-of man, that enslaved being, were possible, humanity would be bound for ex- tinction. A man that comes to understand persecution, militarized suffocation, con- centration camps and jail as a form of human expression would be a man of ques- tionable principles. It occurs to me as I sift through all the demagoguery that the only true and glorious New Man is the free man. Mr. de la Cuesta continues: "In fact, his vision of this revolution is negative." Could it be otherwise? Could one have a positive opinion toward a system that pretends to create a man in the style of a machine, without access to the most elementary human rights? Could the blacks of South Africa sing praises to the white minority that subjugates and kills them? Undoubtedly, only a technological invention, wired with cables, can have a positive attitude to a kick in the face. Only a General Electric product would see love in the chains of oppression. But a human being is different: he seeks freedom, he exists because of freedom and for it. And he will fight against any and all who try to tear it from him. Thus it has been through the centuries. Only the creature dreamed of by Guevara, the one not guided by the light of freedom, will wait in ware- houses for the deadly blade of the guillotine. The reviewer tells us: "Nothing created or done after 1959 seems to be positive for this 'prodigal son' of Castroism, not even the hospitals, schools or sports successes." My dear sir, nothing is positive about a com- pletely free hospital stay to heal prison wounds. A school to teach you where the wires of absolute submission are located is truly horrible. "Nothing after 1959" can be positive for Correa because he realized these things. But it is truly odd to mention the sports successes: this is the scenario of the as- sassin who allows his victim one last ciga- rette before strangling him. What a humanitarian assassin. Sir, would we justify Hitler because of the magnificent highways he built, the athletes he trained, the modern hospitals, the low level of unemployment that German society enjoyed under him? Nothing can justify Hitler or hide the corpses of millions of Jews slaughtered throughout Europe. In Cuba, how valuable could a free hospital be if the sons of the people are sent to fight to the most alien places? In Cuba, what hospital could heal us of desperation and the certainty of a most uncertain future? How do you heal the an- guish of slavery? But there is still more: the coauthor of Itinerario Ideol6gico de Lourdes Casals says other things. He establishes that "his (Correa's) strong dislike for the living condi- tions in Cuba appear to be the leitmotif of the novel." The critic's analysis is truly alarming this time. Living conditions in Cuba are not what inspired Correa's novel. Haiti could suffer from worse living condi- tions and so could the Hotentotes or the Navajo Indians, but Correa did not choose these people as his literary subjects. The author has given us, and in this resides the importance of the work, a novel that is a work of history, the history that transpires behind the closed doors of Cuban society under Castro. It is the novel of shattered teeth, frustration as a way of life, the absurd and of fear. It is the novel of Castroism. Living conditions in Cuba, bitter and hallu- cinatory as they are, are the work of an inept and predatory government. All this touches on the lives of Correa's characters but it does not constitute the leitmotif of the novel. The true leitmotif lies in the reasons that have made those conditions unbearable and that have victimized those people. De la Cuesta writes ". . a country per- ceived as the new El Dorado (the US) and later found to be only quantitatively better than the 'hell' located ninety miles to the south..." In the first place, I believe that Cor- rea's criticism of the United States does not indict the whole nation or imply that it may be quantitatively better than the hell left be- hind. His strong criticism is directed to those places where that intolerable "Cuban- ness" that we all know has entrenched itself. Correa attacks gossip, mediocrity, the bour- geois lifestyle, spite, the narrow and asphyx- iating morality that characterizes us. I do not believe that the freedom the author found in these shores is seen as detrimental. What the novel rejects is narrowness of vision and intolerance. Secondly, deleting the quota- tion marks from the word hell, I do believe that there is a hell left behind, and a new one here as Mr. de la Cuesta suggests. But the Northern hell is another one, it is the one that participates in the idle gossip and the intolerance; it seems we cannot live without a hell nearby. Finally, a literary comment: the reviewer writes about "his lack of interest in the search for objectivity. . Who told Mr. de la Cuesta that a novel need be objective? Who told him that this novel isn't? What con- stitutes objectivity in a work of fiction? I am afraid that our critic is referring to the tech- niques of socialist realism when he men- tions objectivity. Are socialist realist novels objective? A novel is a work of art. That is all. And, as an art form, the novel carries a different objective clarity to each different reader. O CAfrBBEAN KVIEW/5 :4 L ~ i ~ t 4 DiH- k. -bi' Rib T ip Colombia Under Stress A Presidency Lamed by Instability By Gary Hoskin olombia's democratic system is pres- ently under siege from every quarter. The legitimacy of the political system is being seriously questioned. A persistent source of conflict in the administration of President Belisario Betancur is guerrilla warfare and the unrest within the military and Congress related to the president's ini- tiatives to make peace with the dissident groups and bring them into the system. The additional inventory of problems besetting the nation is lengthy: labor and civic strikes have been frequent, government efforts to control the drug traffic have met with lim- ited success, there has been unhappiness with the electoral monopoly of the two tradi- tional parties, and relatively low rates of elec- toral participation. Congress has become increasingly marginalized from the policy process, policy makers have shown an in- ability or unwillingness to ameliorate severe socio-economic stress and the government has taken facile resort to a state of siege in an effort to secure stability. This discontent has been aggravated by the worst economic recession since the Great Depression. The political repercussions of the M-19 assault on the Palace of Justice in Bogota on 7 November 1985 and the long-term implications of the disaster resulting from the Nevado del Ruiz volcanic eruption on 12 November 1985 are not all that apparent at this juncture. The two tragedies are seem- ingly eliciting a heightened sense of na- tionalism and considerable support for Colombian institutions, at least among key groups. What is obvious at this point is that the way in which the government has con- fronted the two events has seriously under- mined President Betancur's credibility. Criticism of governmental performance has been vociferous and will certainly cur- tail the President's ability to govern effec- tively throughout the remainder of his term. Gary Hoskin, Associate Professor of Political Science at SUNY, Buffalo, was Visiting Pro- fessor at the University of the Andes in Bogota during several summers from 1973-1982. He is co-author with Francisco Leal and Harvey Kline of the two-volume Legislative Behavior in Colombia. No significant changes are likely to occur until after the 1986 elections; the more rele- vant tests of the resiliency of the political system will unfold then. Without minimizing the severity of the current legitimacy crisis, an historical per- spective necessarily reveals that Colombian political behavior has been reflective of and shaped by omnipresent crisis. But, as Fer- nando Cepeda has noted, the system "with all its defects, with its almost permanent violence, has survived the most difficult tests." How has the Colombian political sys- tem managed to sustain itself in light of persistent challenges to its legitimacy? To what extent will the present crisis lead to further destabilization? The Colombian Party System Although the roots of the Colombian party system run deep into the 19th century, not until the consolidation of the economy around the production and exportation of coffee did parties become a focal pivot of Colombian political life. At least since the institutionalization of the two-party system, the Liberal and Conservative parties had faithfully represented an extension of the oligarchical structure of power prevailing in the society. Challenges to the traditional power structure, which is sustained by a highly stratified social system, have been thwarted consistently throughout Colom- bian history. The dominant groups have demonstrated their capacity to mobilize their resources at crucial junctures in the country's development when serious threats appeared. The inability of challeng- ing elites to disrupt the predominant struc- tural features of the system has been predicated upon a policy of cooptation of dissident elites into the power structure and, with a few exceptions, by the political quiescence of the masses. In this respect, the National Front, formed in 1958 in the wake of the Rojas Pinilla dictatorship to unite the Liberal and Conser- vative parties in a contractual alternation of political power, is by no means a unique arrangement. Although unlike previous governing coalitions, the National Front was institutionalized through a constitutional plebiscite. As a consequence of the 1968 constitutional reforms, power sharing be- tween the two traditional parties was ex- tended beyond the 12-year termination period of the National Front. Both Presi- dents Turbay and Betancur have governed jointly with politicians from the major op- position party. One of the principal goals envisioned for the National Front was to curb inter-party competition by achieving parity in the dis- tribution of bureaucratic and legislative posts and in the alternation of the presi- dency. The National Front was quite suc- cessful, in part because of the conscious cultivation of a non-sectarian style by the principal actors involved. However, this non-sectarian style contributed to the weak- ening of party organizations and their ca- pacity to elicit partisan support from the masses. Consequently, the locus of political power shifted increasingly away from party organizations to the executive branch of government, further widening the breach between what Gaithn labeled el pais pol- itico and el pais national. The role of the state was fortified as a result of the develop- ment policies pursued under this program. Rather than relying upon traditional pat- terns of partisan politics, the expansive state increasingly turned to technocrats to manage the development process, a ten- dency that has been reinforced by mount- ing dependency of the state upon financial assistance from international agencies. In- terest groups assumed more significant roles in the policy process, often bypassing the political parties. Despite an expanding economy and a proclaimed commitment to socio-economic reform, scant progress was made during the National Front era in reducing the pronounced income in- equalities of Colombian society. All is not well with the party system in Colombia. This is reflected in the declining role of the parties in the policy process, electoral absention in urban areas, a pattern of declining partisan identification, and the growing inability of the parties successfully to represent various societal interests. About 74 percent of Colombia's population currently resides in urban areas. In 1982, CAIBBEAN rFEVEW/7 27.5 percent of the nation's electorate resi- ded in the four major metropolitan areas (Bogota, Medellin, Cali and Barranquilla). The traditional parties have not adapted well to these demographic changes in that they have not succeeded in mobilizing ur- ban voters. High urban abstention rates re- flect, in part, the attenuation of traditional party loyalties among the population. The increasing lack of accountability of the two major parties to their electorates as a consequence of the compartmentaliza- tion of the party and governmental arenas, coupled with the failure of the parties to penetrate the society very deeply in terms of the representational process, has produced a rather paradoxical situation in which the traditional parties continue their electoral domination, yet are unable to exercise effec- tive control over civil society. Fernando Cepeda's prophecy is becoming more and more accurate: "We are going to discover that societies do not live from votes alone, and there is no doubt that this discovery is going to be very painful." The pain is re- flected increasingly by the failure of politi- cians to control the society (el pals national), even with frequent resort to the state of siege, institutionalized by the Turbay administration as the Estatuto de Segu- ridad. The principal source of conflict in the Colombian political system has shifted from pronounced partisan struggle be- tween liberals and conservatives, so charac- teristic of the pre-National Front period, to a confrontation between supporters and op- ponents of the system. Initial expectations ran high with respect to President Betancur's ability to bridge the expanding gap between the political system and civil society, thereby reversing a trend of mounting civil disobedience and societal instability. Despite the prevailing Liberal Party majority, Betancur won the presi- dency in 1982 for a variety of reasons. First, the electoral calendar was revised for the 1978 elections, with legislative and presi- dential elections held separately, which en- hanced Betancur's candidacy because presidential elections produce a higher turnout that is based less upon clientelism than congressional elections. Second, feuds within the Liberal Party were so for- midable that two Liberal candidates even- tually went to the polls, thereby splitting the Liberal vote. In contrast, both major fac- tions of the Conservative party supported Betancur. Third, in order to forge a winning electoral coalition, Betancur conducted a campaign directed toward all Colombians, not primarily toward partisans. His cam- paign was exemplary-it was highly profes- sional, well-organized, amply financed, and very skillful in terms of campaign style and issue focus. Fourth, a rather pervasive an- tipathy toward the two previous Liberal gov- ernments prevailed among a sizeable segment of the electorate. The deepening economic recession, high inflation rates, Liberal tax reforms, government deficits, corruption, clientilism, and increasing civil disobedience contributed to this anti-gov- ernment sentiment. Fifth, Betancur mobi- lized a significant proportion of voters who generally abstain, largely on the basis of a successful populist campaign. This seg- ment of the potential electorate generally has been mobilized, if at all, by the Liberal Party, but neither L6pez Michelsen nor Luis Carlos Galan enjoyed much success with lower class barrio dwellers. Finally, the tra- ditional vote surplus of the Liberal Party from the Atlantic coast failed to materialize. No significant changes are likely to occur until after the 1986 elections. A Failed Program for Peace Despite the severe crisis confronting the government during the first half of his ad- ministration, President Betancur enjoyed a higher popularity rating at the beginning of 1984 than when he assumed office. This is somewhat paradoxical in light of the gov- ernment's limited success in producing tan- gible economic benefits for Colombians, particularly those at the bottom of the social structure. Betancur's popularity stemmed from his consummate political skills, which he utilized to convince Colombians that he was working tirelessly to improve condi- tions. Until the early part of 1984, Betancur fortified his populist image-based largely upon symbolic rather than concrete gov- ernmental benefits-through political ac- tivities such as: a personal identification with the pueblo, reminding Colombians of his own humble origins; reorientation of Colombian foreign policy along more na- tionalistic lines; a sincere effort to negotiate a political peace with guerrilla groups through an amnesty program and a "na- tional dialogue;" an attempt to perpetuate the non-sectarian stance associated with the National Movement; and a largely suc- cessful government effort to restore the badly shaken stability of the country's finan- cial institutions. However, the constraints of populism be- came increasingly apparent during the sec- ond half of 1984, and the bubble finally burst with the M-1 9 assault on the Palace of Justice. President Betancur's popularity nosedived from over 80 percent in late 1983 to just below 19 percent in mid-1985. The inability, or unwillingness, of Betancur to restructure the political party system through the consolidation of a populist- based National Movement during the initial half of his administration, coupled with the traditional lame-duck constraints operative during the second half, has not permitted him to overcome formidable opposition to his peace plan. Moreover, the dramatic re- versal of the initial drive toward a more au- tonomous role for Colombia in the inter- national arena, largely as a consequence of a sluggish domestic economy and the tight- ening of international credit, has under- mined Betancur's leadership. Because of the deep economic recession and Colombia's deteriorating international credit standing, President Betancur's gov- ernment has concentrated not upon social and economic change, but almost ex- clusively upon political reforms that were designed to open the system to groups that essentially had no political access. Peace agreements were signed with the largest guerrilla group, FARC (Fuerzas Revolu- cionarias Colombianas) in March 1984, along with the M-19 and ELP (Ejercito de Liberaci6n Fbpular) in August 1984. Minis- ter of Government Rodrigo Escobar Navia's proposed new institutional framework was packaged by the government and sent to Congress for its approval in the 1983 legis- lative session. Opposition to the reforms proved to be formidable and little progress was achieved during this session. Conse- quently, the new Minister of Government, Jaime Castro, presented a revised set of proposals to the 1984 Congress, involving two constitutional amendments and six leg- islative bills. Because of the slowness of congressional action, the President called a special session of Congress in 1985 to complete action on the proposals. In a recent overview of the status of the reform package before the Sociedad de Agricultores, the Minister of Government revealed that some of the minor bills have been approved, but that the constitu- tionality of the congressional reform mea- sure is in doubt and that the amendment pertaining to popular election of mayors still awaits a second approval in the Senate. Moreover, it is rumored that leaders of the two traditional parties have agreed to repeal the reform dealing with political parties. In summary, the legislative treatment of Presi- dent Betancur's proposals for a "Demo- cratic Opening" through institutional reform has demonstrated formidable op- position from the traditional parties, and, apparently, the failure of the project. This rather bold effort to restructure the Colom- bian political system encountered an igno- minious fate in Congress as a result of the refusal of either major political party to commit itself firmly to the proposals. The peace process thus is endangered not only because of congressional opposi- tion but also by the withdrawal of two guer- rilla groups from the "National Dialogue", and the decision to return to armed opposi- tion. On 21 May 1985, the M-19 announced that it would not participate in additional discussions with the Comisiones de Dii- 8/CAi?BBEAN reVIEW logo, proclaiming that in the future it would hold direct talks with the president. The ELP also broke the truce with the government when its leader was assassinated. The agreement with the FARC expired on 1 De- cember 1985, but it was extended for an- other year, awaiting the outcome of the 1986 elections in which its new political party the Uni6n Patri6tica will participate. Since the M- 19 returned to armed combat, political violence has once again become widespread. Economic Instability The peace process likewise has been un- dermined by unfavorable domestic and international economic conditions. Para- doxically, the foreign exchange bonanza of previous Liberal governments, based largely upon high coffee prices and the drug traffic, resulted in economic slowdown. The Turbay government sought to stimulate the economy by increasing public expendi- tures, reducing restrictions on imports, and removing governmental controls over for- eign indebtedness. Between 1980 and 1982, a trade surplus of $72 million dollars turned into a deficit of $2 billion dollars; huge government deficits were recorded that were financed largely through foreign loans; and economic growth slowed to .9 percent during 1981-1982. Declining cof- fee prices, the devaluation of the Venezuelan Bolivar, and the imposition of foreign ex- change controls by the Venezuelan govern- ment and the contraction of international credit sparked by the Mexican crisis of 1982, further contributed to Colombia's eco- nomic problems. By the fall of 1984, the Minister of Fi- nance began negotiations with interna- tional banks for loans to prop up the Colombian economy. The banks, however, refused to extend sizeable credits to Colom- bia without the approval of the International Monetary Fund. After prolonged negotia- tions, the Minister recommended that Co- lombia sign an IMF stabilization program, but Betancur refused the advice for political reasons. Instead, the government imple- mented its own austerity program which, ultimately, was deemed insufficient; in April 1985, Betancur agreed to "enhanced" IMF monitoring of the Colombian economy de- signed to placate the international bankers. Even the "enhanced" monitoring failed to satisfy critics, for on the eve of an IMF team visit to Colombia scheduled for late October an internal IMF document was leaked to the press. It called for a series of even harsher austerity measures, including a call for massive devaluation and wage restraint. The government's expectation of signing loan agreements in the vicinity of $1 billion failed to materialize because the bankers are waiting until "relations are clearer" be- tween the Colombian government and the IMF. Banking sources say that one demand L~ ~ - -- Ameo, Colombia, a he eupon ohe Nevado del Ruiz, November 1985 Armero, Colombia, after the eruption of the Nevado del Ruiz, November 1985. will be approval of foreign banks' plan to accept stock options in return for infusion of capital into local banks, effectively giving the former control of Colombia's financial institutions. Contrary to Andean Pact reg- ulations, Betancur had already allowed for the possibility of majority foreign control of local banks. Thus, despite his previous attempts to restructure his foreign policy in a more au- tonomous direction, President Betancur was compelled by the economic situation to seek United States support for debt re- negotiations. The United States responded favorably because of the government's im- plementation of austerity measures, Betan- cur's democratic trajectory, and the decision in 1984 to cooperate more closely with the United States in controlling drug traffic. Limping to the Elections Within this context of economic crisis and political instability, what are the political im- plications of the M-1 9 assault upon the Pal- ace of Justice and the catastrophe of the Nevado del Ruiz? The M-1 9 clearly miscal- culated the government's response to its attack upon the Palace of Justice, expecting to hold the hostages for a few hours while negotiating directly with President Betan- cur. Their expectation undoubtedly was to replicate the experience of the 1980 capture of the Dominican Embassy, which ended peacefully after sixty days of negotiations between the Turbay government and the M-1 9. However, the ambiente had changed considerably since 1980, with powerful elite groups and sectors of the middle class ex- pressing frustration with the failure of the peace initiative to stem guerrilla violence. Reaction to the congressional reform pro- posals had underscored the opposition of the industrial sector, the business commu- nity, and agricultural groups. But the princi- pal resistance to the peace proposals came from the military, which torpedoed Turbay's efforts to negotiate a peace with the guer- rillas and undermined Betancur's initiatives as well. Although the President accepted the re- sponsibility for the decisions associated with handling the attack upon the Justice Palace, the interpretation that seemingly prevails is that the military acted autono- mously, presenting Betancur with two alter- natives, supporting their action or resign- ing. President Betancur was receiving the credentials of foreign ambassadors in the Palacio de Narifio when the attack began, then he convoked a marathon cabinet ses- sion which all attended except the Minister of Defense, General Vega Uribe, who ap- Continued on page 34 CAIBBEAN PEVIEW/9 Betancur's Battles The Man of Peace Takes Up the Sword By Bernard Diederich It was during a light drizzle on Wednesday 7 November 1985, that an old tarp-cov- ered telephone company Ford crashed into the underground garage of the modern buff-colored marble Palace of Justice in Bogota, Colombia. Crammed into the back of the truck were more than two dozen guer- rillas of the April 19 Movement known as the M-19. The commandos opened fire with handguns and machine guns, killing two garage guards. From the basement parking area the guerrillas shot their way up the five- story building. On the fourth floor they took as hostage Chief Justice Alfonso Reyes Echandia, as well as other members of the 24-man Supreme Court and the 20-man Counsel of State. No courts were in session, preparations were underway for afternoon hearings and there was a wild rumor that the supreme court was going to review extradition cases of Colombian drug traffickers wanted by the United States. This rumor became so strong that the M-19 commando leader Luis Otero denied in a telephone interview from the palace that they were in league with narcotics traffickers, but had seized the palace to "denounce" the government for "betraying" the 1984 government-guerrilla truce. The M-19 misjudged the govern- ment's capacity to respond and what en- sued was called by leading newspaper El Tiempo the "most spectacular counter- guerrilla operation in contemporary times." For El Espectador it was a "bloody holocaust." The "Red Alarm" in the Justice Palace brought the Presidential Guard running from the Palacio de Narifio three blocks away, where President Belisario Betancur was in the act of receiving the credentials of the Algerian and Norwegian envoys. Sud- denly the brick-tiled Plaza Bolivar was alive with security forces and soldiers. The guer- rillas had managed to close the huge main door over which is engraved "Arms Gave You Independence, Laws Will Give You Free- dom," a statement made by Colombia's Bernard Diederich is Caribbean Bureau Chief for Time. founding father Francisco de Paula Santander. The army launched the retaking of the Palace without awaiting the Presidential seal of approval. The battle to retake the Palace of Justice began at 2 p.m. with police Swat teams landing by helicopter on the roof while three Brazilian made cascavels blasted the main door with their 90 mm cannon and then crashed through it into the lobby. Firing was intense. Some forty per- sons managed to escape. Smoke and cor- dite spread over the plaza. During the 27- hour battle hundreds more miraculously managed to flee the building. Bogota's feisty radio stations interviewed by phone guerrillas and hostages caught inside the palace. At 4 p.m. the voice of the Chief Justice Alfonso Reyes Echandia was heard emotionally pleading for a cease fire; "For God's sake, stop shooting or there'll be a holocaust." A guerrilla interrupted the Chief Justice's telephone plea to accuse President Betancur of "not even listening to Dr. Reyes Echandia." One guerrilla commander identified him- self as Luis Francisco Otero Cifuentes, who had planned and participated in the take- over of the Dominican Embassy in Bogota in 1980. Julio Cesar Turbay was then Presi- dent and because the M-19 held 16 foreign ambassadors, including US Ambassador Diego Ascencio, he made a deal. The guer- rillas got a reported million dollars in cash and safe conduct to Havana. This time, the man who says "I am the peace," chose to do battle. All through the night, Bogota echoed with the dull thuds of percussion explosions and shell fire. In the early evening the mili- tary detonated an explosive charge which turned the palace into a blazing inferno. President Betancur said his government, which had made peace with all but the ELN, smaller guerrilla group, "would not negoti- ate with the M-19." Later in a TV post-mor- ;em, the president said they had gone from being guerrillas to mere terrorists and upon falling into the trap of terrorism they had "progressively isolated themselves from the people, especially when seeking help from the narcotics traffickers." The shooting finally stopped shortly after 3 p.m. on 7 November, when combat troops made their final assault on the charred, gut- ted remains of what was one of Bogota's finest contemporary government buildings. Almost immediately, workmen began clear- ing away the blood and stains of Bogota's worst battle since the 1984 Bogotazo, which ignited the Violencia, the Colombian civil war that became one of the most dev- astating of Latin American history. Scaffold- ing went up around the battle-scarred palace the next day and the rebuilding and repairing was quickly underway as the na- tion tried to understand how its temple of justice had been turned into a bloody bat- tlefield that decapitated the high court. How did it happen? Thousands of Colombians crowded before the barriers that closed off the plaza and discussed the events in which 100 lives were lost, among them eleven su- preme court justices, Chief Justice Alfonso Reyes Echandia, 33 other judges, and all of the 40-odd guerrillas. One lawyer called the events of 6 and 7 November "Betancur's tragedy." The man who had campaigned with the slogan of peace, the innovating populist who sought to end 40 years of guerrilla warfare and open up Colombia's starchy old political system, had also shown he was a stubborn man of the sword when the authority of the state is challenged by an act of terrorism. The campaign banners and posters for next year's general elections that festooned the streets around Plaza Bolivar bore the slo- gans "Fbr la Paz Democratica" (For a Dem- ocratic Peace), featuring images of former guerrillas, such as Patriotic Union candidate Manuel Marulando, legendary guerrilla commander of the FARC, the Moscow-lean- ing Marxist Colombian Revolutionary Forces, who was also known as 7ro Fyo ("Sure Shot"). Sure Shot and his compan- ions not only signed the peace with the government of Belisario Betancur, but they have formed their own political movement and are campaigning for office in the March and May elections. Yet when the M-19 invaded the Palace of Justice on November 6, they demonstrated that they had completely misread Betancur. This miscalculation of the maverick non- 10/CAnBBeAN REVIEW Marxist group that looks down on other Co- lombian guerrillas such as the FARC, as Marxist country hicks who had none of their sophistication, nationalist feelings and intel- lectual capacity, has cost their 11-year old movement dearly. They were the urban yup- pies of Colombia's guerrilla groups, with lawyers, doctors, architects and other mid- dle and even upper class professionals in their ranks. They thought this would be an- other smooth and bloodless Dominican Embassy takeover. But Betancur had done enough listening. He had talked to the M-19 on a number of occasions, and when they returned to the armed struggle after charging that the Mili- tary were not only breaking the truce but planning to eliminate their leaders, Betan- cur admitted he couldn't understand them. He assumed full responsibility for his deci- sion. In fact, he acted the way he did pre- cisely to save his peace process. One Colombian university group declared him persona non grata. In a city 125 miles west of Bogota, Supe- rior Court judges filed an impeachment pe- tition against the President for his handling of the palace takeover. The judges said they were acting because of the "inhuman and vituperative decision to not order a ceasefire, taking into account the lives of the country's highest judges were more impor- tant than the capture of a few subversives." The Government declared three days of national mourning. On Saturday, grieving families of the eleven Supreme Court judges buried their dead in cities through- out Colombia. The surviving judges told Justice Minister Enrique Parejo Gonzalez that they did not want a single government official to attend the memorial services for their dead colleagues and that they would boycott the government services for the vic- tims as a sign of protest over the govern- ment's handling of the palace takeover. In the ancient cathedral on the corner of Plaza Bolivar across from the Justice Pal- ace, Betancur appeared pathetically iso- lated as he officiated at a ceremony for the victims on Sunday morning. He told the government officials and foreign diplomats who attended the service that he had no Colombian soldier leaves Palace of Justice clutching crucifix, Bogota, November 1985. Colombian soldier leaves Palace of Justice clutching crucifix, Bogotd, November 1985. alternative but to reject negotiations. "No more shouts of war ... Pray for peace," pleaded the president. Bogota's Archbishop Mario Rebollo said while mourning the loss of life, that the tragedy had "fortified the principle of legality" for all Colombians. After the ceremony, Justice Minister Enri- que Parejo Gonzales defended the govern- ment's action, saying it could not enter into negotiations, but had offered the guerrillas a "fair trial" if they surrendered. Ironically, the guerrillas had said they had wanted to put President Betancur on trial as well as the elected government of 27 million Colombians. Continued on page 35 CAI?BBEAN rEVIEw./11 Colombia in the Eighties A Political Regime in Transition By Ricardo Santamaria Salamanca and Gabriel Silva LujAn Translated by Gilbert L. Socas , ILn-i, ,i -fl ,Km '. .T , Contemporary Colombian history reached a watershed with the take- over of the Palace of Justice in Bogota on 6 and 7 November 1985 by the M-19 guerrillas. Never before had a guerrilla group attempted such a daring action and never before had the government and the army responded so radically. The ideologi- cal crisis within the Colombian political sys- tem became acutely evident; public opinion was drastically polarized within all sectors. The strategy of national pacification im- plemented by the government of President Belisario Betancur since 1982 was mortally wounded bythe Palace of Justice battle. The military acquired more autonomy in deal- ing with problems of internal public order, and the peace process, which sought to pursue political over military solutions, took Ricardo Santamaria Salamanca is Executive Secretary of the Center for Studies of Colom- bian Reality (CEREC), and professor of politi- cal science at the Central University in Bogota. He writes for El Tiempo and is co-author, with Gabriel Silva Lujin, of Proceso Politico en Co- lombia: del Frente Nacional a la Apertura DemocrAtica (1984) and Juventud y Politica en Colombia (1985). Gabriel Silva Lujdn is a researcher at the Cen- ter for Studies of Colombian Reality and as- sistant editor of the magazine Estrategia Econ6mica y Financiera. He is on the graduate faculty of political studies at the Pontificia Uni- versidad Javeriana in Bogota, and author of Politica Exterior: LContinuidad o Ruptura? Re- sefa de un Debate (1985). a 180 degree turn. But worse still, M-19 actions created the unfavorable conditions that today threaten the peace treaty enacted in March 1984 between the central govern- ment and the main Colombian rebel group, FARC, Fuerzas Revolucionarias de Colombia. The political history of Colombia, like that of many other Latin American nations, has been marked by violence. As Peter Wald- man points out, it is not the volume of politi- cal violence that distinguishes Latin America from other regions, but its promi- nence and continuity within the political arena. Nevertheless, Waldman and most other specialists agree that the Colombian situation issuigeneris. Despite the fact that there were 63 civil wars in Colombia during the nineteenth century alone, and that more than 300,000 people died during La Vio- lencia (1946-66), dictators have basically never been in control of central power. The reverse was true in Mexico, Brazil, Venezu- ela, Cuba and more recently in Argentina, Chile and Nicaragua. This is partly due to the capacity of Colombia's traditional par- ties to modernize and adapt to social change. Bruce M. Bagley characterizes the Colombian political regime since theFrente Nacional as one of "inclusive authoritaria- nism." The traditional parties have commit- ted themselves to coalitions and compro- mise in the competition for and exercise of political clout. In the last hundred years, Co- lombia has lived under sixty-six govern- ments formed by Liberal-Conservative coalitions, 64 percent of the time. The ability to adapt and modernize shown by the traditional parties and their ability to dominate the political scene through the coalition formula explains why, institutionally, Colombia has developed within a somewhat restrictive liberal demo- cratic framework that has allowed the im- plementation of reformist and modernizing policies. Political conflicts resulting from economic development and social diversifi- cation have been mediated by the parties. Historian Alvaro Tirado Mejia has docu- mented how every twenty-five years since 1886 (when a new constitution was en- acted), the Colombian political system has undergone significant reforms, permitting new groups and social interests to integrate into the general framework of the State. From Regeneration to the Frente Nacional Under the slogan "Regeneration or Catas- trophe," conservative President Rafael Nuihez undertook in 1886 radical constitu- tional reform. The most significant modifi- cations were in the political-administrative branch of the government. This movement toward regeneration soon turned sour, and, as Tirado Mejia explains, all channels of democratic expression were closed to the opposition. The Liberal Party was able to place only two representatives and no sena- tors in Congress from 1892 to 1904. Liberal Party leaders took up arms and transferred the political struggle from the voting booths to the battlefields. The War of the Thousand Days began in 1899 and ended 12/CAffBBEAN Ievlew with the implementation of President Rafael Reyes's integrational policy, the forerunner of the constitutional reform of 1910, a quar- ter century after the Nufiez constitution. At this time, parliamentary representation of the opposition was established and the Su- preme Court became the guardian of the constitution. During the next two decades, until the 1930s, the country changed radically. Growing coffee exports with a resulting cur- rency flow unknown until then, oil produc- tion and industrial growth in urban centers, produced radical social changes. The masses of peasants, now turned pro- letarian, demanded rights and services. In 1936, the state adapted again to meet these modern needs under the framework of the "Revolution in Progress" of the first term of President Alfonso L6pez Pumarejo. The state intervened in social and economic ac- tivities, the principle of the social function of property was adopted and trade unions were legitimized. Half a century after the reforms of 1910, the 1957 plebiscite produced new institu- tional formats grounded in the bipartisan coalition of the Frente Nacional, ending the bloody battle fought by Colombia under Liberal and Conservative banners. The Frente Nacional established the bipartisan ideal as a constitutional norm, and excluded other sectors from the electoral colleges and public administration, within the na- tional, departmental and municipal govern- ments. The parity of the two majority parties was established in parliament and in the government. The installation of a bipartisan coalition brought a series of important results in the process of pacification and political stabil- ization in Colombia. The most prominent outcome was the end of bipartisan political violence, the acceptance of negotiated po- litical confrontation and the creation of ap- propriate conditions for economic growth and social development. But it sowed the seeds of its own destruction by closing off access to political power to all those forces not aligned with the traditional bipartisan structure. The consequences of this severe curtail- ment of participation in the political system were traumatic, and are seen today in dwin- dling party membership, the erosion of ideological consensus, electoral apathy and, most significantly, the growth of non- constitutional forms of political action. Vio- lence was primarily partisan throughout the nineteenth century until 1957. Until then, guerrilla groups had stated political affilia- tions. This was the case with Liberal guer- rilla warfare that scourged the eastern plains and Andean mountains between 1948 and 1953. This was anti-government, not anti- system violence. The situation today is quite different. New guerrilla groups emerged during the Na- tional Front period: The FARC, (Colombian Revolutionary Forces) the ELN (National Liberation Army), and theEPL (Popular Lib- eration Army) were born in the 1960s; the M-19 and theADO (Workers' Self Defense) in the 70s, and finally theRicardo Franco, a dissident group of the FARC, and the Quintin Lame, in the 80s. All of these, whether Marxist-Leninist, Maoist, Cuban- leaning or nationalist, share a new charac- teristic: they not only seek power through violence but the total overthrow of the exist- ing political system. Colombia has gone from bureaucratic violence to ideological violence, from violence within the system to violence against the system. Can these subversive forces effectively take over the country? Waldman points out that despite the fact that guerrillas in some countries have considerable military and political clout, it is unlikely that a revolution such as Nicaragua's will be repeated. A care- ful analysis of the Nicaraguan and Cuban situation and the experience of guerrilla groups yet to attain power, prove that rebels can obtain victory only under special cir- cumstances: events must concern a small and underdeveloped country; a schism must exist in the middle class so that a reformist fraction from within its ranks sup- ports the rebels; not only must the regime in power lose prestige and legitimacy, but the rebels must make use of the situation and present their cause as the only viable alter- native. Clearly, this is not the case of Colom- bia. Even when, as in most Latin American countries, the Colombian government does not have a monopoly on weapons, the guer- rillas do not have sufficient military might or middle class support to overthrow the gov- ernment. Nor can the government annihi- late the guerrillas, or the guerrillas take power. The rebels remain an independent CAIRBBEAN FEVIeW/ 13 power that control certain small regions, maintain a militia and hold the fluctuating opinion of the public. A third alternative is the policy put in ef- fect by President Betancur in 1982: To reach an agreement by treaty whereby the guer- rillas lay down their weapons, cease hostili- ties and eventually dismantle their military apparatus as the government offers political and social guarantees to incorporate these sectors into the political system, while start- ing a process of reform. The hoped-for re- sult is national harmony and the creation of a peaceful and democratic climate within which antagonistic political forces can coexist. A Profile of Modernization Economic development in Colombia dur- ing the last 30 years has been swift and it has brought profound changes to both the economy and the society. A mainly agri- cultural society evolved into one of growing diversification, with new means of urban employment and the growth of modern la- bor-management relations. Public health has improved, illiteracy has fallen and en- rollment in institutions of higher learning has increased. As a consequence, unskilled labor rates went from 41 percent in the 50s to 21 percent in 1973 and to 9 percent by the end of the 70s. The economy of the country has been modernized and diversi- fied. Between 1950 and 1980, there was dynamic growth in industry, finance, gov- ernment, communications and public ser- vices. Colombia also saw significant diversification in the demand for imported goods and an increase of exportable goods. In the 70s alone, the economy grew by 75 percent. All these changes took place dur- ing the National Front period. But while the society and the economy were transformed at great speed, this change generated social destabilization and political unrest. Mean- while, political institutions remained un- changed and strongly attached to the decree of 1957. The tensions caused by accelerated change and a stagnated political structure have caused significant transformations in the Colombian's polity if not its political in- stitutions. The ranks of the politically un- affiliated have grown, reaching 50 percent in Bogota. A considerable block of voters question the legitimacy of the political sys- tem and are attempting to mobilize through illegal or marginal channels. The social sec- tors that did not accept the legitimacy of the bipartisan coalition found that the Liberal Revolutionary Movement (MRL) and others, including the administration of President Betancur, offered them a vehicle for opposi- tion and political expression within the tra- ditional structure. The MRL brought together different dissidents that considered the existing political system to be anti-dem- ocratic, contrary to the interests of liberal- ism and guilty of perpetuating the rule of the privileged. This group grew to a point that it represented 40 percent of the Liberal electorate, and then soon disappeared. This strengthened the ANAPO (National Al- liance for Opposition), thus ending the pos- sibility of channeling the participation of these new forces through traditional structures. These new forces channeled their efforts through the established political institutions but divorced themselves from bipartisa- nism. Led by General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, ANAPO became the principal manifesta- The strategy of national pacification of President Belisario Betancur was mortally wounded by the Palace of Justice battle. tion of this phenomenon, remaining out- side bipartisan parameters but gaining membership from the dissidents of the two traditional parties and the dissolved MRL. ANAPO's crisis came as a result of the 1970 elections and as a response to the attitudes and decisions of its rulers regarding the coalition, and finally, the death of its leader. The impossibility of participating in the po- litical process through electoral means radi- calized those sectors unhappy with the existing political and social structure lead- ing to the de-institutionalization of political participation and eventually, the birth of the M-19 and other illegal groups. A New View Leading the National Movement, a coalition that included the Conservative party, an in- significant group of Christian Democrats and a large segment of independent voters, Betancur became president of Colombia in 1982. He began his term with the promise of establishing a dialogue with rebel groups and of solving the demands for greater po- litical participation of the different regions of the country and the population at large through a vast process of political moderni- zation and democratic opening. During recent years, violence and politi- cal crime had increased in Colombia. Be- tween 1974 and 1984, officials estimate that more than 611 people were kidnapped and 3,000 Colombians killed or wounded for political motives. These numbers do not include guerrilla losses, which by now should be in the hundreds. The Betancur administration interpreted the phenomenon of violence as a protest against an inadequate political and so- cioeconomic system. During L6pez Michelsen's administration (1974-78), a di- alogue was attempted, but only Betancur's administration gave the effort real strength. Betancur pushed for a national policy of pacification encompassing three basic strategies: amnesty for rebel groups; the widening of channels so that non-tradi- tional groups can work through the estab- lished system, and a commitment to Third World causes and peace in Central America. The Betancur peace process is not yet concluded and it is therefore difficult to at- tempt a thorough analysis of the process. We can, however, venture some preliminary opinions. Throughout this time, the guns have continued to blast and violent encoun- ters have persisted. Even when the number of violent incidents decreased during 1983 and 1984, what has happened in 1985 sig- nals the new reality in Colombia. Since the unilateral breaking of the government-guer- rilla truce by the M-19 in mid-1985, the battles, assaults and terrorist acts in urban areas have returned. The failure of the Be- tancur administration's methodology has become evident. Since 1982, a total of 23 negotiating committees and sub-commit- tees have been formed. This strategy di- luted government responsibility and re- vealed weaknesses in its leadership. Moreover, the Armed Forces have acted in- dependently of the government. From the beginning, the Army expressed its discon- tent with the peace proceedings of Presi- dent Betancur, even if it publicly announced that it would abide by the president's author- ity. In 1983, Attorney General Carlos Jime- nez G6mez denounced the existence of paramilitary retaliation groups made up of active and retired army officials. A few hours before M- 19 leaders were to sign a ceasefire agreement with the president, army troops opened fire against a truck that carried members of the M-1 9 headed for the meet- ing in Corinto, nearly frustrating the signing of the pact. The peace process reached its dramatic climax with the taking of the Palace of Jus- tice by the M-19. Days before, an event had taken place that would put the peace initia- tive to the test- the Liberal Party, with a ma- jority in Congress, had declined to participate in the new Peace Commission, thus expressing its dissatisfaction with the policy of national pacification. Subse- quently, Senator Cesar Gaviria Trujillo would initiate a debate that questioned not only the peace policy of the president, but the way in which the Palace of Justice was retaken from the rebels. The main point of this discussion was that despite the fact that the M-19 broke the agreement and started a series of terrorist acts (the last of which was the attempted kidnapping and assassina- tion of the Commander General of the Armed Forces), the government should have taken retaliatory measures to salvage Continued on page 36 14/CAI?BBEAN rEvie Nature Strikes at Colombia It was desolate and silent. except for the occasional helicopter The sun glistened off the pools oat water that remained on the surface of the treacherous lake of mud The mire seemed to have sapped the %i- tality of all but a small team ot rescue %work- ers. Each survivor had his own description of the night of terror, .. hen. for the tirst time since 1945. the Arenas crater aot he majes- tic Nevado del Ruiz erupted on 12 Noem- ber 1985. causing one ot the worst natural disasters e'er suffered in Latin America. one that has been compared to the explo- sions of Mount Vesuvius in A D. 79, which destroyed Pompeii and Herculaneum. This natural disaster follo.Aed a fe\w days after political tragedy threatened the stability of the administration of President Belisarioc Betancur by the takeover of Bogotas Pal- ace ol Justice by AM-19 guerrillas on 6 November. Some likened it to a train and a roaring wild animal. A.ll the survivors interviewed agreed that the death toll was around 20.000. after a steaming. mile-wide ava- lanche of mud had cascaded down the high and narrow Lagunilla River canyon spread- ing a brown stain far out into the plain of rich green rice fields and burying much of the tow\n of Armero Before the eruption. Manizales. the ciry of open doors.' with the picture window view of the snow-capped mountain Ruiz, sought to attract tourists ,ith a promise of exotic excursions to the volcano, a site of incomparable natural beauty and endless vistas framed by rugged peaks Now the visitors in Manizales's lo.ely hilly streets are heavy booted scientists some of whom had predicted what happened. The volcano had begun to send up plumes of smoke more than a year ago. Authorities had issued warnings and emergency instructions to the population. Maps plotting the likely course ol the flow had been completed only a lew weeks previous to the eruption, but contingency plans were not implemented. When the time came. the people panicked and forgot all the safety instructions given to them. Some anger Aas expressed at the advice of an Armero parish priest, who had told people to stay in their homes and cover their faces with wet cloths. Destination Ruiz had become a popular passion with many of the ,world's leading volcanologists There are about 21 pres- ently in residence in Manizales, monitoring the crater. Alter the 12 November eruption, Ruiz became an unreachable destination Shrouded in clouds and in constant agita- tion. it appeared ashamed of shoving itself except for fleeting moments. One i. ho tried but failed to reach the crater after the erup- tion was the Jacques Cousteau of volcanos, Haroun Tazieff. France's Secretary of State for the Mitigation of Major Hazards, both natural and technological, but who ;s simply known as the Minister of Disaster." Tazieff is of the old school to volcanology and feels that irlhout real experience in eruptions. the scientists vith all their mod- ern detection aids cannot really predict '..hat is going to happen Practical experi- ence in volcanic eruptions is indispensable. he said while waiting for a break in the. weather for his fourth and last try to reach the crater. There are plenty of excellent sci- entists but most of them have no experience in diagnosing volcanic eruptions. A man %who talked fondly of past volcanic explo- sions and who was right in 1976 when he said Le Soutriere in Guadaloupe would t erupt. Tazieff sought to jump into the crater from a helicopter if necessary. or to climb up from below to observe and measure all that could be measured. By the end of the week after the eruption. Ruiz had become a scientific laboratory and with the aid of four US Black Hawk helicop- ters. the scientists were getting their sophis- Incated monitoring equipment in place Tazieff tried to reach the crater several times by helicopter and police hue.: when those efforts failed, he proposed to walk. Spot ;n- .estigations of the crater were ital. he said. and must be repeated as frequently as pos- sible For Tazieff the changes in the crater were the key. but even on his fourth try. he was unable to unlock the secrets of Ruiz Shooting photos with two cameras and furiously taking notes, he flew around the rim of the ice cap, peeping out from the cloud sitting under the crater -As the na- tional police huey bucked at 17.000 feet, he ordered the pilots to circle and finally traced the mudslide from the edge ol the ice cap down to Armero. where in the early morn- ;ng light only a black dog was visible hop- ping Irom the roof tops of the few remaining buildings standing near the cemetery on high ground. The French scientist pointed out the great gash near the ice cap where the water, mud and rocks had dropped into the high-walled Rio Azufrado. the Azufrado joined with the Ro Lagunilla a short distance from the mountainside and at this unction, from the scars left on the jagged banks of the river. must have been a furious fighting marriage of millions of gallons of raging muck Far below the crater, with its new white plume, lay the human tragedy which de- manded resources that were slow in arrnm- ing. despite the generous outpouring of sympathy and aid galvanizing not only in Colombia but in other countries as well. A\s one victim lay on an orange bedspread. with other survivors. two doctors put card- board splints on his broken left arm and leg. They used an army carton, according to the lettering. When the Colombian Army huey landed and the doctors requested the in- jured be moved to Manquita. the helicopter left empty on another mission. \\e are working against time. there are still a lot of people out there to be rescued and we are not getting to them." said PaLil Aiferez of the Red Cross Julian Ramirez. 32. a mechanical engineer from Armero. who lost his fie year old daughter, predicted that hundreds of survivors would die from lack of care. They give us yogurt and frena. .that good is that .' he wondered. Full sacks from the coffee harvest rode the crest of mud and for those seeking their living or dead families. the big burlap bags filled %ith beans became stepping stones The fertility ol this rich coffee growing re- gion was in fact, the result of the Nevado del Ruizs last eruption on Februar, 19. 1845, which deposited about 250 million tons of lime on the plains near Armero and formed a rich topsoil 25 feet thick A child's exercise book carried a teacher's note saving he had to write a hundred times. "I must keep silent in class." We met some of the living partially entombed in the mire. COmaira Sanchez. 1 3. was still alive after three days. up to her neck in water and mud. tangled together with her dead aunt. v. hose black hair bobbed next to her. Res- cue workers were trying to tug her aunt away, in a difficult struggle against rigor mortis. The girl was completely lucid and talked with reporters. Using a plastic bowl and a fuel container, wreckers tried to bail out the water, but it only seeped back. The small rescue brigade was short of every- thing imaginable: there were no pumps, no antibiotics, no anti-tetanus, no stretchers. Finally. after 60 hours. Omaira died of a heart attack. Tales of overwhelming loss, confusion and heroism born of despair multiplied. In Mariquita farmer Carlos Celes went to the Red Cross and gave blood An hour later he returned and tried to give blood again, but the nurse in charge wouldn't let him. Later the nurse discovered that Celes was the only member of a family of six to survive the tragedy. When a mud plaster of paris cast was removed from a little tot. she was found to be a girl wearing little golden earrings. Using a bottle of mineral water sparingly, a young Red Cross volunteer doctor removed the mud from her eyes and mouth. "Mami." she cried. The Armero tragedy is quickly becoming the source of folklore and myth. A worker relates how on the outskirts of the town, a young woman, completely naked, appeared walking through the tall grass. 'She was long-legged and statuesque. a Venus. She was clad in mud and didn't speak. I will never forget the sight." A Red Cross worker who heard the story of the naked girl said. 'Nothing is left in Armero but ghosts.' El -BERrAnFD DIEDERICH CAfBBEAN rfAtEW 15 Revolutionary Comics Political Humor from Nicaragua Cartoons by Roger Sanchez Flores One of the most gifted spokesmen of the Nicaraguan Revolution is a young cartoonist, Roger Sanchez Flores. All Nicaraguans-even those in opposition to the government-enjoy his cartoons in Barricada, the state newspaper. His cartoons have been reproduced in English, Russian, German, Swedish, and Italian. The Nicaraguan has won a number of international prizes, including a recent West German competition featuring the work of cartoonists from more than 30 countries. Roger, as he signs his work, never has had any formal training in art. His first note- worthy cartoon was a professor sketched on the back of an exam; he failed the exam. He began drawing cartoons for Nicaragua's fa- mous newspaper, La Prensa, but after the revolution of 1979 he joined the staff of Barricada. Roger is 25 years old. The cartoons mimic a pantheon of char- acters-speculators, the bourgeoisie, gov- ernment bureaucrats, the contra (Nic- araguan counter-revolutionaries), the CIA and the Reagan administration. Each of his caricatures has become familiar to Nic- araguans: speculators are portrayed as crocodiles, the bourgeoisie as middle-aged men in suits and top hats, the contra as Somoza's National Guard (GN), the CIA as spindly spooks in dark glasses and trench coats. Uncle Sam is Uncle Sam. -Forrest Colburn Some of Roger's recent work: Listen, it isn't necessary to go into details; I've already read about them in the newspapers. This little piggy went to Miami, this little piggy went to Honduras... 16/CAI?BBEAN REVIEW f2" ------------ o Here comes the American envoy. And remember, we are here to defend the national security of the United States. Being of sound mind, I will half of my factories to my wife and the other half to my son. I irrevoca- bly will my entire ideology to Juan my chauffeur. A military base? But of course, there's room for everyone here. CAiBBEAN PeVIEW/17 Ritual, Paradox and Death in Managua Internacionalistas in Nicaragua By Alfred Padula M anagua. June 28. The parking lot in front of the Sandinista newspaper Barricada is crowded with mili- cianos in dark green uniforms and black boots. Later this evening they will march from Managua to Masaya, twenty five miles to the south. They are re-enacting the Rep- liegue, a strategic retreat which led to the Sandinista victory of July 1979. Upwards of 30,000 milicianos are to participate. It is a moment of revolutionary ritual. Our ragged platoon of interna- cionalistas joins the march. White faces in a sea of mestizos. The milicianos seem very young. Few are over thirty. Many are apparently Sandinista bureaucrats. Many are women. Everyone is in good spirits. En march we are a sinuous green ana- conda weaving through the city, blocking the late afternoon traffic. I wonder what the drivers are thinking. A few days before a young official at the agrarian reform minis- try had said with a grin that the "class strug- gle" was intensifying. Do the drivers fear being swallowed? Will we wrench them from their individualist cocoons? The driv- ers smile and feign tolerance. No one honks. We coalesce with columns from other parts of the city at the parade ground be- hind the Mercado Roberto Huembes. The field is ringed with a cordon of Soviet made tanks and armored cars. The tank crews ask the gringos to take their pictures. A helicop- ter makes a low pass over the field, dropping leaflets. The wind carries them out of reach. Hard rock blares from a loudspeaker mounted on an amphibious jeep. We await now a benediction from the Sandinista directorate. All that week the city had been gripped by invasion fever. In Washington, Congress had spoken. Now in Managua headlines screamed: "Luz verde a la invasion." -"Green Light for invasion." Tanks were Alfred Padula is assistant professor of history at the University of Maine, Portland. He is working on a history of Cuban women under the revolution. Professor Padula visited Nic- aragua with a Latin American Studies Asso- ciation delegation in June, 1985. deployed in the fields around the city. Will we awaken to gunfire and a sky full of parachutes? The kleig lights snap on, the television cameras begin to whirr. President Daniel Ortega and the Sandinista directorate mount the stage. We sing the national an- them. Ortega begins to speak; a US inva- sion is his subject. His presentation is intense, delivered at a half shout and rife with images of death and martyrdom. Later, the American embassy will tell us that the Sandinista directorate is obsessed with North America. "They blame us for everything that has gone wrong here." The minutes pass. Half an hour. Or- tega's voice is increasingly hoarse, angry. How can the gringos do this to us? "The people are our atomic bomb" he says. "Their heroism, their force, their dignity." "No pasardn!" the milicianos reply, "the Yankees will die here." One scans the crowd to see if there are any convenient exits. There aren't. As if in response to our anxiety, Ortega assures the milicianos that the pueblo nor- teamericano is not responsible for the gen- ocidal policies of their government. Relieved, I notice that the attractive young miliciana next to me has taken off her black combat boots and is putting on a pair of lavender running shoes. An ice cream cart and a fritada wagon press their way through the crowd. Business is good. Ortega goes on. He is not a good speaker. He lacks charisma. There is no humor or irony. The milicianos grow restless. Some attempt to construct a human pyramid, climbing onto one another's shoulders. One expects a sharp rebuke from the presi- dent. Nothing happens. They fall, get up, and try again. This time, success. They reach three tiers. The television camera strays from Ortega to the gymnasts. An- other pyramid begins to form. A bottle of rum passes through the crowd. A pair of lovers stroll by, hand in hand. The formation which began as a great gridwork spread geometrically across the parade ground is gently disintegrating. As Ortega presses on, fully half of the mili- cianos have turned their backs to the podium and are talking to their friends. Not, one suspects, a gesture of disrespect. It's simply that they know the speech by heart. Finally he is finished. Acomandante sig- nals to the tankers. "Gentlemen, start your engines!" The march begins. Later a friend complains that he was almost asphyxiated by the diesel exhaust from the T-55 tanks at the head of the column. It would be rumored that the comandantes themselves did not march to Masaya, but were driven in air conditioned limousines. Gringos go to Mass One Sunday evening we went to Father Uriel Molina's chapel, Nuestra Sehiora de los Angeles, for the misa popular Father Molina is a leading spokesman of liberation theology. The chapel is quite modern. It is a small circular building with bright stained glass windows and a slanting roof supported by exposed steel trusses. The walls and ceiling are covered with dramatic murals reminis- cent of Mexico'ds Diego Rivera. The central mural which soars above the altar depicts a Sandinista soldier, his hands and feet rent by stigmata, ascending towards heaven where a large cross awaits him. Christ looks on benevolently from a side panel. A five piece band appears: three drum- mers and two guitarists. One of the musi- cians wears a black beret and thin mustache a la Che Guevara. Father Molina comes on stage and puts on his vestments. The musi- cians chat among themselves. With a great crashing of music, the mass begins. "Who will read from the bible?" A woman steps forward. Later Molina will speak, and his sermon will be an attack on Yanqui im- perialism and a celebration of Nicaragua's martyrdom. More women are called from the audience to burnish this theme. Of the hundred or so present perhaps a third are internacionalistas. Most seem to be West Germans or gringos. There is a Hare Krishna with shaved head, white robe, and rope bag. "Embrace your neighbor." The band crashes again. The communicants rise. One wonders: is this a mass, theater or agit- 18/CAI?BBEAN reVIEW prop? At the end a woman presents the internacionalistas with small wooden crosses engraved with the name of a Sand- inista martyr: "Ariel Hernandez, July 6, 1957--June 17,1979." Don't forget us, she pleads. Later we are told that this is the only radi- cal church in Managua, and that the hier- archy, which is quite conservative, does not like it. Another source tells us that as a sign of protest against the regime, Nicaragua's three hundred parish priests are refusing to give extreme unction to fallen Sandinista soldiers. The Blue Jeans Revolution Paradoxically, this death obsessed revolu- tion is also a revolution of youth, a generational revolution. A friend complains that some of the directors in the Ministry of Education are only 18 or 19. They don't know much, he says. The official Sandinista uniform seems as much blue jeans as olive drab. The intensity of the young Sandinista elite is impressive. The politician and sociologist Virgilio Godoy tells us that a good number of the Sandinista directorate were formerly his students. They are "going to nationalize all the means of production," he says. A univer- sity official tells us that sixty percent of the professors at Nicaraguan universities are under 28. As we visit the Sandinista minis- tries and research institutes it sometimes seems that this is a revolution of graduate students. Some of the principal Sandinista bureau- crats are graduates of US universities. The Vice Minister of Planning is an ABD from Yale. The head of the Human Rights Organ- ization has a Ph.D. from Kansas. A principal foreign relations advisor has a Ph.D. from Cornell. There are also many Americans working here. Some are graduate students. And there are so many visiting delegations of Americans who must be coddled and fussed over that at times one wonders how the revolution manages to accomplish any- thing at all. The Americans get together at 7 a.m. on Thursday mornings for the weekly protest demonstration in front of the US Daniel Ortega. embassy. As we dash about Managua in our brand new airconditioned bus, the stereo system playing "Nicaragua, Nicaragiita" at full throat, our delegation flashes victory signs to Managuans packed like sardines on an- cient buses. We chide the chicas plasticas of the defeated bourgeoisie while enjoying an exchange rate of 650 to one. This means that we can dine on beef or lobster at Los Ranchos, La Terraza, El Eskimo or any of the best restaurants in town for less than $1 US. Thus while most Nicaraguans are struggling to find sufficient beans and corn, visiting internacionalistas are enjoying the splendid smorgasbord at the Hotel Inter- Continental where Howard Hughes once hid out. Our love of a bargain outshines our revolutionary enthusiasm. The Hare Krishna with string bag and shaved head is at the next table. Bon apetit! The Passion According to Managua We are preparing to leave. Nicaraguans tell their departing American friends that they do not expect to see them again. They are sure that an invasion is coming. Dark rain clouds scud over Lake Nic- aragua, turning it almost black. An air of foreboding hangs over the city. Managua, not yet rebuilt from the earthquake of 1972, still bearing the scars of the rebellion of 1979, awaits its crucifixion. O CAl?BBEAN reviw//19 I) Political Systems as Export Commodities Democracy and the Role of the US in Central America By Ricardo Arias Calder6n The issue of democratization, con- ceived as the process of political de- velopment which establishes a system of representative democracy where it does not exist, has been the key political issue in Latin America and most dramat- ically in Central America, for the past dec- ade and will remain so for the foreseeable future. Since the days of Independence, democ- racy has come to represent historical legit- imacy. Dictatorship, however recurrent, remained an interruption, a regime of ex- ception. To overcome the conflict between the democratic legal norm, autocratic so- cial behavior, the ensuing cycle of unstable democratic governments and intolerable dictatorial interludes-some of them quite lengthy-became the paramount political challenge. As of 1960, Castro's regime introduced not just another dictatorship, but because of its Marxist-Leninist rationalization of total- itarianism, one claiming to supersede de- mocracy's historical legitimacy in Latin America. During the following decade and a half, even if no similar regimes managed to establish themselves, the weakening of democracy was quite evident. On the one hand, democratic forces themselves under- went a loss of conviction. Quite often they accepted uncritically the denunciation of so-called "formal liberties" of a political na- ture, as a pretended obstacle to the fulfill- ment of so-called "real liberties" of a social and economic nature. On the other hand, new military dictatorships went beyond their usual attempts to justify themselves as necessary interludes, with the argument that democracy had failed under excep- tional circumstances. In response to the claim of a new legitimacy on the part of Castro and his would-be emulators, these latter-day military dictatorships developed their own counter-claim. Operating behind an enveloping national security rhetoric, they established authoritarian regimes Ricardo Arias Calder6n is President of the Christian Democratic Party of Panama and was candidate for 2nd Vice President in the 1984 election in Panama. meant to be permanent, either with rightist tendencies as in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay, or with leftist tendencies as in Pan- ama and Peru. Since the mid-seventies, the movement toward democratization has swept across great parts of Latin America. It represents a new consciousness of the historical legit- imacy of democracy, as opposed to the illu- sions and failures of the two rival claims, the Marxist-Leninist and the national-security military claim. Few Latin Americans have expressed this new consciousness as lu- cidly and eloquently as the great Mexican poet and essayist Octavio Paz in his recent book Tiempo Nublado: "Latin American democracy arrived late and has been dis- figured and betrayed again and again. It has been weak, indecisive, turbulent, its own enemy, easy prey for the demagogue, cor- rupted by money, corroded by favoritism and nepotism. Nevertheless, almost all the good that has been accomplished in Latin America, for the past century and a half, has been accomplished under the regime of de- mocracy or, as in Mexico, for democracy. A great deal has yet to be accomplished. Our countries need changes and reforms that are radical yet consistent with the tradition and the genius of each people." The present crisis of violence in Central America nurtures controversy all over the western world. The factors at work within each country are evident: prolonged ac- cumulation of pressures generated by inhu- man levels of poverty; scandalous social injustices dividing the poor and the rich, and destroying the basic human solidarity necessary to build consensus and coopera- tion within a society; the frustration of those expectations created by increased educa- tional opportunities and the mass media, especially in the emerging middle classes; resentment of the overbearing role of the United States. Such factors emphasize the urgent need for social and economic change. But they would not by themselves have generated the present crisis, if they had not arisen in the context of closed political systems which imposed undemocratic practices, while proclaiming democratic norms. This hypocritical denial of democracy, made peaceful change almost impossible, fos- tered the recourse to violence and condi- tioned some to look towards an un- democratic model as an alternative. The denial of democracy resulted in vio- lence. Democratization offers the only road leading out of this violence. It is the condi- tion for peace and development on a sus- tained basis. And it is fundamentally in terms of democratization that judgement can be passed on each of the governments of Central America. While Costa Rica leads the way in the democratic process, followed at great distance by Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala, Panama's contribution has become quite negative and Nicaragua's is practically nil. Each time the peoples of the region are given the opportunity to opt for the demo- cratic way, they do so with conviction be- cause they recognize it as their only reasonable and humane hope. Each time the democratic way is obstructed through fraud or repression, the peoples of the re- gion express their discontent, and tensions rise to violence. The Region, the Superpowers and Contadora Historically, the countries of Central America have been vitally interconnected, so that most significant developments have had a regional scope. This interconnection has often taken the form of mutual involve- ment in each other's political affairs, even in the form of military action. A deep rooted sense of community has prevailed between the countries of Central America, to the point that they have constituted not so much an ensemble of different nations, as one nation fragmented into different states. Inevitably the present crisis acquired a re- gional significance and required a regional solution. Central America borders the Caribbean, and both superpowers are geographically present in the Caribbean basin: the United States and the Soviet Union through Cuba as its surrogate. Both superpowers were bound to play a role in the Central American crisis. The development of the crisis has CARIBBEAN rEVIEW/21 been conditioned by what an author close to the Sandinista point of view, Xavier Gorostiaga, admits to be the present "inex- istence of a dominating hegemonic pro- ject" on the part of the United States. As a result, competing regimes in Central Amer- ica are drawn indisputably into the super- power rivalry. The prospect of the peaceful coexistence, of opposing regimes, within Central Amer- ica, is an illusion. Democratization is a re- quirement of regional interaction, and a stable balance between the superpowers within the region. If Nicaragua were to thwart its own democratization and consoli- date itself as a Marxist-Leninist regime, the foreseeable results would be: the mainte- nance of high levels of militarization in the region, with the subsequent obstacle to de- mocratization everywhere; increased diffi- culty in obtaining adequate rates of private investment, both national and foreign, nec- essary to respond to the most urgent social and economic challenge of the region, un- employment; sustained reduction of the margin for national independence, as the regional relation between the powers would remain quite problematic. The possibilities of peace and development in the area would be very poor indeed. The integration of the Contadora Group in January of 1983 represents a recognition of the regional character of the crisis and of its eventual solution. It also represents an attempt to interpose a Latin American level of mediation, between the region and the superpowers, while avoiding recourse to the Organization of American States in the af- termath of its failure to maintain inter- american solidarity during the war over the Malvinas. What gave initial legitimacy to the Con- tadora Group was the fact that in its first major statement of purpose, the Document of Twenty-one Objectives of September 1983, it included both a call for democracy and national reconciliation and a call for security and peace. The Document, in fact, not only expressed a "commitment to create, promote and strengthen democratic systems in all the countries of the region" but also identified its fourth objective thus: "Adopt measures leading to the establish- ment and, if pertinent, the development of democratic, representative and pluralist systems which guarantee effective popular participation in decision-making and in- sure the free access of diverse currents of opinion to honest and periodic electoral processes, based on the full observance of civil rights". The draft treaty orActa of Con- tadora, in the version approved in Septem- ber 1984, which is still under discussion, incorporates these goals in the form of treaty commitments. Nevertheless, it is no secret that the Acta has focused on security and peace issues, rather than on democracy and reconcilia- tion issues, and that it provides for no sanc- tions in case of violations. As the Contadora diplomatic process unfolded, the Nic- araguan Government tied to sidestep the regional approach in favor of bilateral agreements, with the United States, in order to deal exclusively with security and peace issues. It has moved rapidly to organize and institutionalize a regime that bears no re- semblance to the "democratic, representa- tive, participatory and pluralist system" it would commit itself to "create, promote and strengthen." Finally, the four members of the Contadora Group, with the exception of Venezuela, have to date shown no forceful conviction with regards to the effectiveness of the commitments on democracy and reconciliation. Two of the four members, Mexico and especially Panama, are in open violation of democratic norms and in se- rious need of undergoing democratization themselves. Thus Contadora gives expression to the urgent need for democratization of all coun- tries of Central America, as an indispens- able condition for peace and development in the region. But it gives no assurance that it can lead the region in this direction. The Role of the United States In its political recommendations, the re- port on inter-American relations published in 1983 by the Wilson Center of Washington demanded direct international action in favor of human rights, arguing that multi- lateral action on the part of foreign govern- ments and other organizations does not constitute intervention, but compliance with an international obligation. At the same time, the report rejected such direct interna- tional action in favor of democratization. Its argument was that democratization con- stitutes a national process for which indi- viduals and institutions of each country are responsible, that democracy is not a com- modity subject to exportation and must be cultivated and developed within each na- tion. It concluded that it is doubtful whether any government can contribute much to the building of political institutions in other countries. The answer provided by the Linowitz- Galo Plaza Group to the question of whether or not the United States should promote democracy beyond its borders, is in my judgment quite false. Human rights, in so far as they involve a system of values and a set of institutional guarantees, are no less a national creation than democratic institu- tions. One can even argue that as values they are more deeply and vitally so. This means that they, too, cannot be subject to exportation. Nevertheless, they certainly can be and should be promoted by direct international action. One of the most signif- icant developments of our times has been the growing recognition that fundamental human solidarity demands such action. 22/CAiBBEAN rEVIEw The Helsinki agreements are only one of the latest of positive indications. The influence of the church has been quite beneficial, even if often one-sided. The same is true for democratization. The fact that it is not an export commodity, does not preclude its being promoted inter- nationally. And there are sufficient success- ful experiences both in Europe and in Latin America, to warrant hope in the outcome of such a course of action. Democracy is the one political system built on respect for human rights and which guarantees them as a matter of principle. Without democra- tization, the promotion of human rights turns into mere rhetoric or into a cover, a political tactic to undermine one repressive dictatorial regime in order to establish another. Political cooperation of the United States and Western Europe, with Latin America and Central America, must link the promo- tion of human rights with democratization. Not to do so, while the militaristic right and the Marxist-Leninist left support their own kind through direct international action, would be ethically and politically self-de- feating for democratic governments. Contadora is valuable as a means to con- tribute towards democratization, national reconciliation, and peace with security. But Contadora is a means, not an end in itself. It may be necessary to supplement its efforts with assistance from the Organization of American States or through other inter- american treaty mechanisms. We should remember that the Seven- teenth Meeting of Foreign Ministers held in 1979 under the auspices of the OAS, with- drew recognition from the Somoza regime and called for its replacement by a demo- cratic government. The meeting was never formally closed, as a sign of an ongoing commitment to its resolutions. Should Contadora be unable to achieve democra- tization and peace and should the OAS also fail to provide recourse to the countries of the hemisphere and other related inter- American treaty mechanisms the inevitable conclusion would be that the whole inter- American pattern of political interaction has reached its end. The United States' effort for democratiza- tion and peace is being thwarted just as much by economic and financial difficulties as by violence and warfare. The problem of servicing the foreign debt constitutes as radical a challenge to democratization and peace, as militaristic repression, guerrilla violence and prolonged civil strife. In July of 1983 the Jackson Bipartisan Commission on Central America, named by President Reagan and chaired by former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, estimated the net fi- nancial requirements of the Central Ameri- can countries at approximately $24 billion dollars in the seven years from 1984 to 1990, and considered at $10 to $12 billion dollars the sum that the United States might provide in some form or other. These esti- mates were based on the stated objective of permitting the Central American countries to regain by 1990 the level of income per capital which they had enjoyed in 1980 and have lost since then. Moreover, the esti- mates were based on several relatively up- beat assumptions which have not held true from 1983 to the present. Since the commission report, gross na- tional product per capital in Central America has continued to decrease. Servicing of the foreign debt has more than absorbed what- ever net earnings have resulted from ex- ports of goods and services, even in conditions of drastically diminished im- ports, so that a net outflow of capital from the region prevails. Unemployment has continued to rise, affecting in certain areas more than one third of the work force, and standards of living have worsened. To progress with democratization, under these circumstances, gives testimony to the irrepressible yearning for democracy of the Central American peoples. Leaders in the fight for democratization are men such as Jose Napole6n Duarte in El Salvador, Vin- icio Cerezo in Guatemala, and Adan Fletes in Nicaragua, to mention a few fellow Chris- tian Democratic leaders of exceptional vi- sion and courage. To give real support to democracy and peace in Central America, the United States must "put its money where its mouth is." Nothing would be more significant than a bold initiative to reschedule the foreign debt of the region over a long period, at reason- able rates of interest, with a significant num- ber of years of grace. At the same time, it would be indicated to act dramatically on the proposals of the Jackson Commission for economic assistance, taking into ac- count the deteriorated conditions and needs greater than previously estimated. There is no question in my mind that the United States' political cooperation for de- mocratization and peace must include a substantial security component. There are people in the region committed to obtain- ing totalitarian power and to keeping it through force, terrorism and warfare, under the guise of revolution. These people re- ceive training, support and guidance from likeminded regimes and organizations, un- der the guise of internationalism. This chal- lenge must be faced squarely by those who can do so legitimately. The United States must handle its rela- tionship to the military and police forces of the region in such a way to discourage il- legitimate predominance over civilians and arbitrary repression of basic human rights. The upgrading of the military in Honduras, for example, especially under the previous Honduran military leadership, has en- dangered that country's democratization. Continued on page 37 Forthcoming a J -24428, 1986. Third Ariftnu Meeting,-AssoclitiOb-hof -North- :American Colom- insist. SBogota, Pontificia -Universidad Jav--2 eriana. Contact: Jonathan Tittler- Department of -Romance Studies, - Cornell University, Ithaca, N-Y- 14853. - -. -" :- -. - June-July,1986. XV Gentral Ameri- can and Caribbean Games'D 0o minican Republic. Special events:- World Cockfighting Championship and Festival of Popular.-Theater;- Contact: Luis Midence -Sedretary_ -f -thie Organizing Cmmittee.X- Juegos Gentroarrr.ri anosiydc l SCaribe, Direcci6 deArte .--Gtula- Santo Bomingo, DR: - August 18-22,1986. Xlth-Worl -ond gress of Sociology, organizerey S-SA.- New Delhi, india. Theme ST- cial Change: Probiemr and-P ros' pects. Organize-r Professor William-i F. Straner, Population Researchd Laboratory, Department of Sociol-- ogy. Utah State University Logan, UT 84322. October 23-26, 1986. XIII Interna- tional Congress of the Latin. American Studies Association (LASA). Boston, Mass. Contact: Merilee S. Grindle, HIID, 1737 Cambridge Street,- Cambridge,- MA- 02138. _- - CARBBEAN "EVIEW/23 An Interview with Hugo Spadafora Four Months Before His Death By Beatriz Parga de Bay6n Translated by Gilbert L. Socas he life of Hugo Spadafora, the Pan- amanian political leader and medical doctor who exchanged a stetho- scope for a gun, is not easy to summarize. He considered himself to be a warrior for freedom. He claimed to fight for democracy and human rights. But often he seemed to ignore the political stance of his allies and he fought under very different banners. He fought as an ally of Cuba alongside Guinean nationalists in their fight to over- throw Portuguese rule. He fought as a Sand- inista to end the Somoza regime in Nicaragua. He returned to Nicaragua allied with the forces of Eden Pastora to fight against what he called "the dictatorship of the Nine." Subsequently, he left Pastora to side with the Misquito Indians under the command of Brooklyn Rivera. In 1978, Spadafora resigned his position with the government of Panama to organize the Brigada Internacionalista Victoriano Lorenzo, and under orders from the Sand- inista Army began armed struggle against the Somoza dictatorship in Nicaragua. Eight days after the Sandinista victory he returned to Panama, only to go back to Nicaragua three years later, in 1982, this time to fight on the side of Pastora against the ruling Junta. Two years hence Spadafora abandoned Pastora, openly ex- pressing his disagreement with the Nic- araguan leader's military strategy and indignant over Pastora's relationship with General Manuel Antonio Noriega, Panama's strongman. His last battlefield was the Atlantic region of Nicaragua, fighting alongside Indian leader Brooklyn Rivera. At nights, by can- dlelight, he wrote articles for the Costa Rican and Panamanian press, in which he unrelentlessly accused Noriega of admin- istrative corruption, drug trafficking and arms contraband. Ironically, he was killed in his own country, where his only combat was on the pages of the opposition newspapers. On 12 September 1985 he delivered his Journalist Beatriz Parga de Bay6n, a native of Colombia, lives and writes in Miami. In 1982, she was the recipient of the Givre Foundation journalism award. Hugo Spadafora. last article to Costa Rica's La Naci6n, an article in which he compared General Nor- iega with Machiavelli. Next day, he traveled to Panama. In Bugaba, a small border town, a man identified himself as an agent of the G-2, the Panamanian Intelligence Agency, and forced Spadafora off the bus in which he was traveling. On 14 September, his body was discovered under a bridge, be- headed and showing signs of torture, at El Robelito, on Costa Rican soil, 35 miles from Bugaba. Ardito Barletta, then president of Pan- ama, who at the time was in New York on an official mission at the United Nations, sent a personal messenger to Spadafora's family, promising to create an investigative com- mittee. When Ardito Barletta returned to Panama, he noticed on the door of his plane a new designation: "F-8," the same letters that were torn into the back of the assassi- nated leader. President Ardito Barletta was taken to Army headquarters, where he stayed for 14 hours. He was given three drafts of letters of resignation to choose to sign. Erik Arturo del Valle was designated by the military as the new president. From the beginning, the new appointee showed no interest in set- ting up an investigation into Spadafora's death, claiming that to do so would be "un- constitutional." The Panamanian Bar Asso- ciation and 120 experts in law signed a document dismissing that possibility. Pan- ama's Legislative Assembly created a com- mittee to aid the Public Ministry investigate Spadafora's murder, but those who made up the committee resigned, protesting the fact that they were not allowed access to government files. To date there is no official explanation of what happened. The following interview took place in Costa Rica, four months before the as- sassination of Hugo Spadafora. Beatriz Parga-You define yourself as an internationalist. What is the difference be- tween the internationalism that you pro- claim and that of the communist party? Hugo Spadafora-Latin American inter- nationalism, as the name indicates, has its roots in the ideas of our continent, in Bolivarian principles. A true internationalist must have a political background; other- wise, he becomes a mercenary. I consider myself an internationalist because I have an international vision of each country My ac- tions stem from a background that is in accord with the historical roots of Latin America. If I did not have that true convic- tion I would be an adventurer. On the other hand, the internationalism proclaimed by international communism is an hegemonic imperialistic international- ism, no different from other imperialistic doctrines. The word hegemonicc" says it all. It sees it as a worldwide movement that wants to make all countries revolve around a control center called communism. B.P.-If you are against communist inter- nationalism, what made you fight alongside Cuba in Guinea's rebel army? H.S.-Socialist democratic ideology compelled me in 1966 and 1967 to go to what was then Guinea and join the black African patriots fighting Portuguese impe- rialism. That same ideology made me struggle against the Torrijos military coup and subsequentlyto join that regime when it changed course. And that ideology took me to Nicaragua in 1978 and 1979, and it is the same one that spurred me to begin my struggle in 1982 against the nine total- itarians that so flagrantly betrayed the Nic- araguan revolution. B.P.-On whose side? H.S.-At the beginning, next to the natu- ral leader of that revolution, as I have often said in my writings, the democratic leader Eden Pastora. Pastora emerged as the 24/CArBBEAN IrEviEW leader of the revolution on two levels: civilian and military. On the civilian side, he is the leader of the Nicaraguan masses: the peas- ants, all social classes, the people in gen- eral. On the military, because he was the most prestigious leader of the Sandinista army. Fortunately, he is a man with demo- cratic ideals who seeks to return that revolu- tion to its democratic principles. I do not agree with Eden's military strategy; nev- ertheless, I personally applaud his demo- cratic efforts because I believe in his democratic vocation, but not in that of the Nine totalitarians whose lives contradict what they preach. B.P.-How do you assess the current po- litical situation in Nicaragua? H.S.-Internally, as a totalitarian and re- pressive policy imposed by the Nine, one that alienates the mass of the population. It is a process seen most clearly in the case of Poland. It is thus that this totalitarian and repressive government pummels the church, the economy, private initiative and the family through spying with its infamous neighborhood committees. We find the Nine facing a disastrous economy because their own ideological views make them think of private enterprise as an evil to be eliminated with time. B.P.-Will the Nicaraguan process be contained or could it possibly advance through Central America? H.S.-Historically, Central America has been a unit, as was readily recognized by William Walker, that pirate turned president of Nicaragua and who had on his banner the motto "Five or None." He knew clearly that either he had control of all of Central Amer- ica or he would fall. Nicaragua could not be a foreign body in the region, and surely enough, he was overthrown by Central America. The Nine have the weight of his- tory against them. That is why it is easier to fight against them than it was against Somoza. B.P.-Despite the Soviet tanks? H.S.-In spite of everything. The army of the Sandinista Front is no guarantee for the Nine. On the contrary, the Sandinista Front is the key in the triumph of Eden Pastora, because of what he represents. Besides, the Front is faithful to authentic Sandinismo, not the deformed one imposed by the Nine. B.P-How do you weigh Cuba's historical role in Nicaragua? H.S.-Cuba is consistent in its commu- nist policies, but inconsistent in the Bolivarian ideal of Latin American solidarity and independence from foreign powers. I believe that future developments will prove right those of us who view the Cuban situa- tion as an historical and political mistake. B.P.-Why do you think that while public opinion considers that there was a dictator- ship in Nicaragua, that there is now one in Chile, that one continues in Haiti, but that after 25 years no one mentions that there is a dictatorship in Cuba? H.S.-That is not really true anymore. There is an increasing belief that indeed there is a hard and repressive dictatorship in Cuba. What happens is that communism and Fidel in particular, attained power riding on a crest of nationalism, of anti-American imperialist sentiment, of hatred for Batista. It is an historical deed that cannot be ignored. The difference with all the dictators that you mentioned is that they have been home- grown dictators who have reached power allying themselves with the most reactionary forces of their respective countries. Fidel identified with the best historical and political ideals of Cuban society. That is why we can- not expect that suddenly everyone will ex- claim "Oh, Fidel is a dictator." That is why we see Felipe Gonzalez and Mitterrand and other politicians of world stature criticize communism in Poland, but be less harsh with Cuba. The reason is simple: in Poland, communism was imposed by Soviet tanks, but in Cuba it arrived allied to historic forces fighting against a dictatorship supported by one of the two imperialist powers. B.P.-You say that you are a Social Dem- ocrat, but at the same time you attack com- munism. How do you explain that social democracy in Latin America is invariably supported by the communists? H.S.-The communists support social democracy as a strategic measure. It is con- venient for them to support the precepts of social democracy, but when they attain power, they are not allied to anyone. They eliminate the forces that helped them rise to power. As a matter of fact, Europe is a good example of that. Everywhere you will find Social Democrats who have been hung or shot. Communists can work with the forces in power-they are doing it in Panama- with the forces that predominate. And I truly believe that communists have a right, just as the progressive capitalists, the Christian Democrats and others, to participate in a pluralist society, channeling their energies to help a democratically established pro- gram. But what I do not believe is that com- munists should take over any revolution. But beginning with this decade, we see communism in decadence. B.P.-But in Cuba communism did be- come established... H.S.-Yes, but in Cuba communism came in 1959, and Nicaragua happened in the 70s. But in the 80s, it will be shown that the true course of the Nicaraguan revolu- tion was not communism. That is the great mission ... B.P.-Why did the Cuban revolution end in communism and not in the democratic restructuring of the nation? H.S. -Because of the traditional near- sightedness of the ruling US political struc- ture. This nearsightedness is common, and is creating a second Bay of Pigs in Nic- aragua, around the border with Honduras. This way they help the Nine totalitarian commanders stir up the nationalist senti- ments of the people, through a propaganda campaign that presents the US threat as real and tied to a Somocismo, so hated by the people of Nicaragua. From a political stand- point, this helps the Nine. As for Cuba, I have always believed that Fidel was forced to take the course that he took. I remember a photograph of Fidel and his son, in which Fidelito was dressed as a Marine. I cannot forget that when I looked at the picture I thought, "The things that Fidel does to win over the Gringos." Nonetheless, in the US, Fidel was received as a pariah. He was at the time the great Latin American hero and yet President Eisenhower did not receive him. They treated him disrespectfully. Continued on page 38 CAtBBCAN KFEVIW/25 Panamb, Desastre ... o Democracia. Ricardo Arias Calderon. 2nd ed. Panama: Fundaci6n ECAM, 1985. 219 p. Red, White and Blue Paradise, The American Canal Zone in Pamana. Herbert and Mary Knapp. New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1984. 306 p. Panama Odyssey. William J. Jorden. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1984. 746 p. Getting to Know the General, The Story of an Involvement. Graham Greene. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984. 249 p. $14.95. The Limits of Victory, The Ratification of the Panama Canal Treaties. George D. Moffest ll. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1985. $39.95. Panamanian Army Commander General Manuel Antonio Noriega forced President Nicolas Ardito Barletta to resign 27 Sep- tember in an effort to end the growing scan- dal of the power struggle within Panama's National Guard. Noriega returned from a trip to Europe to squelch a palace coup led by Colonel Roberto Diaz Herrera, Chief of the General Staff, that was probably provoked by public demands for an investi- gation into the torture and decapitation of one of the Guard's leading critics, Dr. Hugo Spadafora. Barletta, originally selected by Noriega to be the governing coalition candidate in the May 1984 elections, had fallen from favor because he could not revive a debt-bur- dened economy. He had alienated nearly every sector of society with ineptly imple- mented policies including increased taxes, reduced protective tariffs for domestic in- dustry and reduced protection for domestic trade unions. The Spadafora murder was an unusually brutal act in a country that has escaped the El Conquistador. Lithograph by Edwin GonzAlez Miranda of Panama. Neale J. Pearson is professor of political sci- In the collection of Yuda Saydun. ence at Texas Tech University 26/CATfBBEAN IrVIJW What Graham Greene Didn't Tell Us Five Accounts of the Torrijos Legacy A Review Essay by Neale Pearson worst of Central American violence. Op- position leaders and Spadafora's family de- manded that an independent commission be appointed to investigate the killing. Spadafora had accused Noriega of govern- ment corruption and involvement in narcot- ics trafficking. According to a Costa Rican police report, Spadafora tried to slip across the border into Panama on 13 September. His decapitated body was found the next day just across the border inside Costa Rica, stuffed in an old US mailbag. The body had a tattoo cut into it that read "F-8." Only a few weeks earlier, Dr. Mauro Zhfliga, one of the leaders of COCINA, a group which devel- oped in opposition to Arditto Barletta's tax and spending proposals, had been kid- napped, beaten and dropped off alive with the same tattoo on his body near the border. The Guard's changing political involve- ment is one of several themes of the essays composing Panama, Desastre ... o De- mocracia. In an article titled "El Social Mili- tarismo" published inLa Prensa on 26 May 1981, Arias Calder6n notes that "social mili- tarism" is not a "reproduction of the caudillismo of the 19th century in which a caudillo, whatever his origins, is always a political chief who usurps military func- tions." Rather, the social military leader is a military chief who usurps political func- tions. The "militaristic chief" says his inter- vention in politics is a "transitory stage until conditions are produced for the return of a civilian regime, real or apparent." In an April 1981 article titled "Los Hijos de Penonome," Arias Calder6n discusses different contributions of two brothers of humble origins whose public life in the presidency "constitutes an enigma for Pan- amanian history." Harmodio Arias Madrid, built up the structure of the state through his reorganization of the Comptroller General's Office and the National Bank during the 1930 depression. His support for the Uni- versity of Panama created the basis for state responsibility for higher and professional education. His creation of a new daily news- paper was an important factor in the devel- opment of public opinion. In contrast, brother Arnulfo Arias Madrid, elected and deposed three times since 1940, subse- quently "increased state action on behalf of the marginal sectors of the community with family assistance, social security, voting for women and the recognition of legal rights for both legitimate and illegitimate chil- dren," issues with which the traditional sec- tors had not concerned themselves. In those pre-World War 11 days, actors in Panamanian political life were neither liber- als nor conservatives but two competing groups. These were the "populists," who identified themselves with Arnulfo Arias Madrid and the "developmentalists," busi- nessmen and professionals with roots in the Liberal Party and others linked to sectors of the National Guard led by Colonel Jose Re- m6n. Arnulfo Arias gained popular support not only for these issues, but also for a na- tionalistic program promoting hostility to foreigners in general and to Americans, West Indians and Chinese in particular. Dis- satisfaction with Arnulfo Arias Madrid's quasi-fascist constitution, his suppression of political opposition and support for the Axis powers, led to a civil-military coalition forcing him out of office. Arias Calder6n does not discuss these latter points in any of the articles in the book. Elsewhere he focuses on the role of Guard officers such as Rem6n, on Torrijos's move into government leadership and on Torrijos's bid to exercise "permanent leader- ship over the regime" after 1978. Rem6n, elected to president in 1952, represented a break in a traditional elite-dominated sys- tem. A heavily regressive tax base was mod- ified and collections enforced. Moves were taken against ethnic discrimination, allow- ing West Indians access to public schools. The 1903 Canal Treaty was revised to allow US and Panamanian citizens of every race access to US Civil Service Examinations. While class segregation of the West In- dian population is not mentioned by Arias Calder6n in this book, it is by Herbert and Mary Knapp, two Kansas teachers who served in the Canal Zone from 1963 to 1981. In the 1977-78 period of canal nego- tiations and treaty ratification, Zonians were considered "rednecks" opposing what many Liberals thought was a correct move in the signing of the Treaties. The Knapps, in a sympathetic portrait of life "on the zone," note that not only did white American workers marry dark Panamanians and work with the West Indians, but that the West In- dian Employees Association and Civic Councils invited the Canal Company to al- low West Indian employees to live in the segregated zone rather than force them to live in Panama, "where there was no public segregation." Zonians properly resented the sancti- monious remarks of Senator Frank Church of Idaho, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, that Panamanians were resentful of the Zonians and that there was "constant friction between Panama- nians and Zone police." Both the Knapps and Ambassador Jorden point out that there was considerable trust and camarade- rie between Zonians and Panamanians, who freely exchanged favors and services. The Knapps discussion of the manage- ment styles and personal philosophies of Zone leaders John Stevens, George Wash- ington Goethals and William Crawford Gorgas (the doctor who rid the Canal and Panama of yellow fever and other diseases) contributes to a view of "socialism with a human face." Goethals once chided one of his employees for saying the Zone was so- cialistic. The Zone, however, lived under a system of muted militaristic paternalism. In the Knapps's words, "the Zone Civic coun- cils paralleled the student councils of Amer- ican high schools with depressing accuracy." In 1968, the National Guard, led by Torri- jos, Majors Boris Martinez and Amado San- jur, ousted Arnulfo Arias. Martinez and Sanjur were sent into exile in 1969. William Jorden provides a colorful and intriguing account of this episode in Panamanian his- tory. Arias Calder6n observes that "a new era of Panamanian politics developed un- der which business associations, trade unions and other groups were considered as transmission belts for governmental de- cisions and not as a means of expression of different sectors of society." Torrijos tried to substitute the representa- tive democratic structures of the time with Continued on page 39 CAIBBEAN I"VIEW/27 'in 'I-. i. -O F Io , El Que Da Carino. 1983. Tempera, 9" x 11", by Rogelio Pretto. 28/CAl?BBEAN PEVieW 7s Searching for Pretto Politics and Art in Panama By Sandra Serrano Rogelio Pretto is one of Panama's most controversial contemporary painters. With an uncanny gift for prophecy, he has managed to predict recent Panamanian political history in his canvases. With technical skill and aesthetic sobriety, Pretto has avoided the iconoclasm of mili- tant art. Yet he has touched deep sen- sitivities in his compatriots, articulating a heretofore silent national conscience. Pretto's 1984 exhibit at Panama's Museum of Contemporary Art, titled National Peace: A Pictorial Essay, drew a public and media response un- paralleled in Panamanian history. Sandra Serrano first became interested in Pretto when she was a graduate stu- dent in fine arts in California. She spent five months in Panama in 1984 to do re- search and to interview Pretto. The follow- ing excerpt is from her book in progress on Pretto. Here, she narrates her journey to Pretto's retreat in the mountains of Pan- ama on the Costa Rican border where she hopes to find the artist for an interview. She reflects on hersearch for the artist and for the underlying relationships between politics, values and art. Hike into Paradise My stomach fidgeted with the queer mixture of fear and excitement, ap- prehension and fascination one gets when something intense is about to be experienced-much like what grips per- formers minutes before curtain on opening night. Despite cold and wind, I was perspir- ing; my pores were open wide, my senses keen to themselves. I had passed the gate with the lock and went over a drooping wooden bridge about 12 feet long that crossed the river, now nar- rowed down to a fraction of what it was even in Guadalupe. A short distance ahead 1 came to a cabin on the left. A large pond stood in front of it. Flowers were blooming everywhere around the house and down to the water line. A pair of swans glided smooth on the surface not far from a group of ducks and ducklings pecking the ground. On the far side, a small fall cascaded down several steps into the pool. The scene was a fairy tale illustration, live. It stood in such sharp contrast with what I had seen in Guadalupe, I was curious to know who the place be- longed to. Seeing chimney smoke I decided to move in closer to catch sight of someone inside, but was stood off by a dog that dashed from behind the house, hairs on end, barking down the stone steps leading from the house to the pond. He broke the charge at the bottom of the steps and stood yelping. I honored the distance he seemed to want to keep between us and opted to take a couple of pictures instead and went on. I hadn't the time for curious inquiries. From there on, the hike began to exact constant physical exertion. At every step, new strength was required because of the sharpening angle of climb. My leg muscles burned and gave initial signs of fatigue. The rough path obliged a lumbering pace and a stop every few minutes to catch my breath. Only five feet wide, parallel tracks on the path witnessed its occasional use as a rudi- mentary road filled in partially with stone sunk practically out of sight over time. Con- stant erosion and use had worn it down and had exposed big boulders, some jagged and threatening. Deep grooves had been carved by tires in a good number of places. Even a jeep would have a jolting ride trying to master them, and only jeep could. The road meandered through small patches of brush until it reached another bridge about 15 feet long. It was dan- gerously veneered with wet moss, and it leaned rather precariously to the left. A mass of boulders directly below in the mid- dle of the river warned of pain should I fall. The bridge had no railings. It was made of two large logs strewn parallel across and a few feet apart connecting each side. Two by twelves-nailed rather doubtfully to the logs, a few severely warped-served as the platform. The light rain made the wood shine menacingly. I took every step care- fully. A few boards felt loose. I was trembling and looking down at my feet. Occasionally 1 would stop to look up. My mind was trapped between the desire to glance at the beauty surrounding me and the thoughts of falling. I've dreaded falls and heights all my life. I was tempted to crawl across. Safe on the other side at last, I paused to observe the river and absorb the peace of the forest cradled around it. The boulders below were covered with moss; water sliding smoothly by them and turning bubbles as it fell and swirled. Through the different sounds the river murmured, I could hear the silence and listened. "I'm alone", I thought. I was breathing strong and even, my palms moist and blushed. My face must have been too; it tingled and felt warm. Heat flushed through my body ... like a rush of sexual excitement. It was a moment, exotic and magical. I don't remember how long I remained there, perhaps ten or fifteen minutes. The feeling of the sun burning my back bunted me out of the spell. It had stopped raining. According to my map I was a third of the way. I passed a wooden gate with a wire loop as a latch. Maria had emphasized to be sure to leave it shut. "There is a group of wild horses up there that shouldn't escape through the gate because they damage gar- dens and crop," she said. "Some neighbors have threatened to shoot them if the owner doesn't keep them from coming down." "Who's the owner?" "Sehior Paul. He used to live up there and had a farm, but he hardly comes anymore." "Where is he now?" "He lives in Panama City now." 1 crossed a meadow, half of which was occupied by a fenced yard and house. An Indian woman hung clothes for drying. "Hola," I said, "could you tell me if I'm head- ing in the right direction to the house of Mr. Pretto?" She looked at me in silence and nodded 'nd but I could tell it wasn't in re- sponse to my question. I was about to re- phrase it when a man, an Indian too, came out of the tiny wooden house. "Follow this road and cross the river," he said after a brief greeting. "The road will take you straight there." I thanked him and moved on. I was glad to see that, although far apart, at least people lived on the way. It relaxed some of my apprehensions of being alone. CAIBBEAN P VIeW/29 Flechista Nacionalista. 1983. Tempera, 13" x 18", by Rogelio Pretto. The river had no bridge. The path ran right into it and steeped up on the other side. A gate guarded the river on my side. It was even more primitively engineered than the one before. It was made of small thin tree stems joined by barbed wire nailed in three evenly spaced points, forming a few feet of fence. One end was fixed on one side and the other kept loose, pulled in place when closing. The loose end stem is slipped into wire loops fixed on the bottom and top of a supporting stalk on the other side. It took me a while to pry the gate open. The gate slipped from my grasp and snapped back across the path like a rubber band nearly slashing my face. It was just as trou- blesome to close. The mud made matters worse. The abundant precipitation of the region keeps the soil wet and soft. Horses and wheels had churned the path to a paste. I was getting stuck in it constantly, forcing me to step from rock to rock to keep atop ground. It required balancing expertise which I dread- fully lacked, so inevitably I would fall off into a gape of mush every two or three stones. Once I had to pry myself loose by pulling on a tree branch. My shoes and jeans were caked in mud up to my knee. I realized why rubber boots were so prevalent in the area. I washed off some of the mud in the river. It was the first time I had come in direct contact with it. It was fairly level at that spot. The water was cold and clear. I was tempted to drink, but I refrained for precaution. I had to walk through it to make the other side. It wasn't deep, but it was full of rocks of all sizes up to a foot and a half in diameter. Once across, the road got rougher and steeper... and narrower. Walking was diffi- cult, even more than before until the path levelled a bit into an open meadow studded with trees spaced randomly apart. It took me a while to cover the length of it. As the path veered into dense forest, it began to rain again, this time heavily enough to force me under a tree. I couldn't get over the splendor of the terrain around me. More and more it was taking on the true complexion of a rain for- est. To my back I could hear the river. On each side of it trees grouped close together overshadowed the water creating a cham- ber for the water's song trapped inside. Twisting white and green moss covered the tree trunks and limbs from which parasite plants dangled and bred orchids. Fog prowled mysteriously through the treetops. On the ground, fungus and moss feasted on the moist dead bark of fallen trees. Ferns were everywhere, growing in the same abundance of grass. I had the sense that time had slowed to a stop. I looked down on some dark red berries growing on a bush to my right. "The zarzamoras," I thought. They looked like raspberries all right, ma- roon, almost black. As I squatted to pick one, a flutter a few inches from my hand startled me. It was a bird feeding on the bottom of the bush. I must have frightened it when I reached for the berries. He sprung up about a foot and stood poised for flight on an outward branch, its neck twisted so his eye could keep me under observation. I froze, wanting not to frighten it, to savor the opportunity of watching it so close, but I betrayed my good intentions. I guess the fact that I ceased to move was taken precisely as a threat, like the freeze posture cats adopt when stalking their prey. So, it flew to a branch above me where its assessment of my intentions could be more safely determined. Seeing it gob- ble up a berry before, encouraged me to pick one for myself. I picked a deep colored one and nibbled cautiously, looking fre- quently for bugs or worms. When the rain let up, I was chilled by a breeze that swept across the path. I was soaked and I hadn't really noticed how 30/CAI?BBEAN rIvIEW ... ........ - 7- i ,_ "i 7,~ S '- 2- .. - IVA -. .- .. -- .-: EUt"dl018Tm r,"x"bR---et A;.. _ much. Renewing the hike was a dishearten- ing thought. I was feeling fatigued and hun- gry and cold. I had to stop more frequently to catch my breath. The altitude was affect- ing me. Without much food in my system, I felt faint and dizzy and decided to sit on a boulder to regain my balance. An over- whelming sense of fear crept over me. I began to think about where I was. The thought of being in the jungle alone made me shiver even more than I already was. I could see no one, hear no one. There wasn't a house in sight and the forest had become so dense around me that the rocky path was the only clearing. I had no idea what was ahead and my growing paranoia gave way to visions of wild animals lurking in the bushes. "My God, what are you doing here Sandra?" I questioned myself punishingly. I couldn't understand my sudden feelings of compunction. I was about to cry. I felt vul- nerable sitting there, feeling so insecure, so remorseful. I decided to shake myself from those feelings and got up to fight the nega- tive inertia that had set in on me. As I was getting up I heard a noise. I listened care- fully. They were thumps, even and forceful, like strong steps. Goose bumps sprung up all over my body. I could feel them crawl down my neck and shoulders. I was frozen, almost in panic. Suddenly a dog popped into view from out of the bend in the road. Apparently he too was alarmed, because he froze with a jolt when he saw me and began barking frantically, the bristles on his neck spiked straight up. Moments later, a man appeared clumping down the path wearing rubber boots. He was bearded and wore a thick corduroy jacket and a funny cone-shaped hat. His jeans were snuggled into the boots. He was white, tall, his appearance rugged, a machete in his hand. When he saw me half-terrified-to-death, he yelled at the dog and followed with a firm loud whistle-"Runcho! Fieuuu!" The dog immediately stopped barking and crouched submissively to the man's side, slurring his "grrrrr" as he kept his eyes on me. Runcho had blotches of black and white fur all the way down to his legs. A large patch of white on his chest. His look was timid behind his long snout and framed by ears half bent down. The man walked towards me smiling, his eyes fixed strong and firmly to mine. They were dark brown. His smile was pleasant and reassuring under the beard. I tried to appear calm as he approached me. "Good afternoon," he said. "Good afternoon," I replied. "What are you doing here alone and wet? Are there more coming behind?" "Uh, no. I'm alone. I was on my way to Mr. Prettds house. Am I on the right path?" "Yes, but Mr. Pretto isn't there now." "Oh. Uh. Do you, uh, know when he will be back. He is here, isn't he? I mean, he is here and not in Panama City or somewhere else, is he?" I held my breath. My God, I didn't want to hear that he was away. I couldn't bear the thought that I had gone through this whole ordeal to miss him. "No. He's here, but he's not in his house right now." He was smiling and not once took his eyes away from mine. I felt as if he were looking right through into my insides. I watched desperately for signs that every- thing was OK, that he wasn't outto harm me or anything. I had felt so afraid and misera- ble a few moments before. "Would you know when he will be back? Maybe I could wait for him in his house, if he won't be too long. Could you tell me how far is it from here? I need to see him very much." "Yes, I can tell you do. You're drenched. You look exhausted, afraid and you're alone. It must be important." He paused and then said, "Its only a few minutes further. I'll tell CAiBBEAN fKVIEW/31 Trapeador de Rojo Color. 1983. Tempera, 18" x 23", by Rogelio Pretto. you what. Come up with me to the house and dry up. I'll fix you something warm to drink. The climate here can be treacherous if you're not careful." He picked my bag and began walking, Runcho running ahead of him. In a second he had covered a few meters effortlessly. He knew how to handle the terrain. I scrambled to catch up. I had no idea who he was, but I figured he was famil- iar enough with Pretto since he knew where he had gone and had offered so readily to take me to his house, let alone use his kitchen. I tried to talk to him as I scuttled to keep up, the words barely making it out of my lips. I was panting, gulping for oxygen. "Ah, uh... Have you known him long?" I asked as I stumbled behind him. "Yes. All my life and all his life as a matter of fact," he said without turning his head. "That's interesting," I said sucking in air desperately. He could be a source of history and information about Pretto for me if he knew him so well, I told myself. I fumbled for more conversation. "Where uh, ummm ... ah ... where, uh did..." I gasped. He turned and approached me and said, "Look, let me give you some tips on how to walk over this ground." I surrendered to his suggestion willingly. I needed some help, any kind. I stopped and felt my eyes fogging. I was about to faint. He noticed and helped me sit down on one of the boulders on the side of the path. "Oh, God, yes, please do. Teach me how to do it. My heart's about to burst." I said abandon- ing myself to his arms. "Rest for a few minutes. You look very pale. Let your heart beat settle down again. Don't jerk your breaths, just take each one long and gently. Let it out quickly, but easy. Don't pant. That's it." He squatted, facing me. He looked at me intently now, watching over my breathing. He looked all around me, at all of me. Runcho moved closer, wag- ging his tail and smelling me. "You're ob- viously not from Panama, where are you from?" "Why? Does being grossly inept on this 32/CAfBBEAN PEVI6W mountain hike, give my alien origins away?" I asked him jokingly. He smiled. "No. Your accent and looks, obviously." He dug the machete into the ground and drew out a knife from a sheath on his belt. From his jacket pocket he pulled out a small brown lump of something wrapped in plas- tic. He carved a piece from it and gave it to me. "Here, eat this. It'll stabilize your ener- gies a bit. It'll give you some vigor for the rest of the way." "What is it?" I hesitated and did not reach for it. "Here. At least take it in your hands and look it over while I tell you what it is. It won't kill you for one thing." I gave him a reserved smile. He took a piece himself and put it in his mouth and chewed, crushing it with ease. "It'spanela It's made of raw sugar. It's the purest cane sugar there is second to chewing on the cane. Other than a few dead bugs you might find in it once in a while, it's safe and all natural. It's a great quick energy source." I nibbled at it as I had done with the berry. It was sweet, and, yes, its taste raw and strong, mildly sour. It was deep brown. I took a larger bite and held it on my tongue. It was delicious. As it melted I craved for more. "This is great!" I said. "I've had brown sugar before, but this is really rich and delicious. Thank you." I took another bite and this time crushed it and swallowed. "So, where are you from?" he asked. He put away his knife and flung a piece of pan- ela at Runcho. The dog snatched it in mid air. "San Francisco, California." I've lived there most of my life. "And what is a young woman from San Francisco like you doing here, looking for Rogelio Pretto?" "I'm working on a book and he's the sub- ject of it. I was hoping to meet and talk with him to see if he could help me with first- hand information about his work and him- self. Perhaps you can help me too, since you've known him for a long time." "Well, anything I would tell you he'd tell you the same, believe me." He leaned back against a tree stump and when he did his hat tipped accidentally down over his face. He pushed it back making a comical ges- ture that made me giggle. I wondered how old he was. His beard had strands of grey hair and had wrinkles around his eyes. He looked strong.- He picked some berries from a bush nearby offered me some. I declined. "Go ahead, eat a few, they'll mix well with the panel and keep you from getting dizzy." "Funny," I said. "Just before your dog ap- peared I got really dizzy after eating one." "Oh, that wasn't the berry," he said. "It's the altitude and the way you were walking. It had nothing to do with the berries. Go ahead, eat a few. It'll do you good." He Continued on page 40 An Exhibition for National Peace Earl in 1983. Rogelho Pretto became irate at the counterfeit promises oi national re- demptior and peace being trumpeted by the then military strongman ruling Panama. General Ruben Daric Paredes The general was making an early bid to the presidential elections to be held the following year For weeks. Pretto had focused his attention on the media. noting the frequency, with which the words 'National Peace were being ma- nipulated by the contestants He grew watchful ol the c rnical theatrics and the self- set\ ing campaign rhetoric Pretto observed ho`w the goernmert-co)ntrolled media e\- ploited speeches riddled .*,ith hype about social justice and peace Ne,.' quest icnabl - enacted electoral laws were promoted as the Insurance Policy lor Peace" b, officials who were publicly perceied as corrupt The artist produced a painting about his concerns titled "Custodians at 84.' a w.ort; courageously critical of the military -con- trolled government and the electoral pro- cess. That work was the beginning of what would become the most significant exhibi- tion in Panama's cultural history. Titled 'Na- tional Peace- A Pictorial Essay.' it would consist of 42 works in tempera dedicated toc Panama's national conscience and shown in the country, s Museum ot Contemporary Art Ne\er had a Panamanian artist dedi- cated such a large collec ton to the theme of his country's political morality The exhibits intellectual impact and the fact that it predicted grate political events were instrumental in altering the artist's im- age-he had been accused by the left ol being Gringo influenced' and b\ the right as inconsequential Not ornl did he min offi- c-al recognition but the exhibit increased the base of both his popular and intellectual support. The public flocked to the museum. in record numbers. praising the artist's commitment to the truth about the coun- try's political malaise. More importantly, the exhibit raised the issue of the need for Pan- amas artists to address social and political issues during troubled times. Art-lo ing Panamanians were finding their artists too commercial and indifferent to social con- cerns This show. finally responded to the need for a politically reactive art in Panama. Two weeks into the show. President Ricardo de la Espr-ella was ousted by the military. The vacanco was filled by, ice pres- ident Jorge Illueca. Pretto had used him as a subject in four of the six works dealing with the country's power hierarch,. Intriguingly. the deposed president was conspicuously absent from the entire 42-piece collection Even General Noriega, the country s mil,- tary strongman, had been portrayed in at least one of the paintings Events ahead would confirm the prophetic perception of the coincidence." The arrangement ot images and symbols in the paintings would prove a more precise prognosis ot things to come than the ab- sence of any figure in one work. the vicc president is depic ted in sunglasses sitting in ..hat is obviously the president's chair, his posture erect and pompous. A dote don- ning a military cap is perched on his right shoulder In an open book on the table in front of him an inscription refers to otticial deceit and corruption.' to the extreme left of the painting a tiny figure on the table points a videoo ne.s camera at him. Dollar bills pour from the tice president s pockets un- der the table In another picture, the same Since president is seen reading from a piece ot paper that is taken to be an inaugural speech Pretto had foretold the events that would place the vice president in the presi- dency. It was the most acknowledged "prophecy attributed to the collection. Others had been fulfilled months before. soon after he painted them. One in particu- lar was trenchantly exact in forecasting the tragic climax of a political drama expected to end different\ by most of the country fMter General Omar Tornjos's death in what ,eas reported as a plane crash in 1981 power was transferred to Ruben Paredes who soon after was promoted to general One of Jimmy Carter's fringe legacies of the Panama Canal treaty had been Torrijos's promise to return the country to democratic rule. v.ith the charismatic Torrjos dead. Paredes's chances in the running were good. and he played his ambitions to be- come president to the hilt by publicly guar- anteeing that elections would be held as promised in May 1984. Hi then considered his options by maneuvering and monopo- lizing control of the media. To insure com- plete coverage, he bullied stock holders of T1' and radio stations that were reluctant to support him into selling him a controlling interest or by threatening to cancel go'ern- ment advertising in the networks. Daily propaganda poured out about the virtues' ol Paredes through the servile stations and newspapers. Impressed by the intense hype. several political groups clustered to his camp and formed a potent coalition that appeared hard to beat. When Paredes's chances of success seemed most secure. Pretto produced a painting anticipating a different late tor the general. The artist showed him uniformed and wearing sunglasses. on the screen of a small. toyish, playfully colored T\ set sitting on a tabletop image of the Panamanian flag. Paredes's face is turned toward an empty chair that has Panama's coat of arms elabo- rately cared on its back. o\er which rests the presidential sash. Behind the table, a solitary gray haired cholo plais a Iiddle as he looks sadly down into the set. The knobs are labeled with %% writing that identify the op- pression co-sponsored by Paredes when he participated in the Torriuc.s coup years be- tore. 1968 replaces the TVs brand name and the dial is set on channel 11. October 11 1968 was the da, the coup brought do,,nr, constitutionally elected and three times deposed President Arnulto Arias. The words deceit and abuse" substitute brightness and "contrast" on other dials. On this T, set of Prettos. the power button means something entirely different Prettos insinuation wtas cleat. He was tell- ing Paredes that his efforts to become presi- dent were vacuous and he warned that success would be denied him by the illegiti- mate forces of Panamas corrupt domestic realities he himself .-as perpetuating That he better become resigned to them was symbolized b. the fiddle-playing mestizo paving his condolences to the time of col- lapsed, over-inflated dreams. Prettos forecast turned out to be fatally accurate. Paredes's ambitions v.ere felled. ironicall%, b', the principles of his own Ma- chiaellean contrivance The militar-, back- ing that guaranteed his only true SOurce of political power was stripped from him b\ his colleague. General Manuel Antonio Nor- iega. Immediatel, alter taking over as mili- tary chief after Paredes's resignation. INoriega forbade him access to military headquarters, the public coffers and go'.- ernment institutions that were the only sus- taining force of his campaign. %\ith his crucial leverage removed. Paredes's poten- tial for the high office was doomed. Soon after, the political factions that had pledged him their support withdrew it sealing his political fate Though he stubbornly cam- paigned on. he ended with paltry electoral pickings. beaten and forgotten The lesson- the traditional realities of Panama s less- than-loyal po.ver players are immutable. and Pretto had reminded his fellow na- tionals about that in a single but eloquent canvas a mere 10 by 13 inches. "Well. said a museum guard. "because he predicted things that actually happened later, a lot more people and even ones that had already seen the show came back to see it again, bringing friends and their chil- dren. Several teachers from elementary schools brought their whole class The show meant something. People are dissat- isfied with the situation in the government. They liked the show because Pretto re- flected what they felt. No painter had done that before.' IJ -SANDRA, SERR'Nh CAGBBEAN Fr-VIEW 33 Stress Continued from page 9 peared three or four hours late. Moreover, the early violent clashes between the mili- tary and the guerrillas suggested that the military might well have decided the appro- priate response itself. Although the government's action was unanticipated in light of President Betan- cur's deep involvement in the peace pro- cess, key politicians and interest groups offered their immediate support to the gov- ernment-former presidents, presidential candidates, the Conservative and Liberal Parties, the Colombian trade union (U1TC), and the Church. Despite these public dis- plays of support, considerable skepticism of the repressive response surfaced. The fall- out from the episode probably will result in a paralysis of presidential leadership through- out the remainder of Betancur's term. Does the military response to the M-19 attack imply that a "28 hour coup" occurred, as some have suggested? Probably not, but the event has strengthened the military's position in the power bloc, to the point where a return to the more activist military role in the suppression of civil violence characteristic of the Turbay administration appears likely. The military command seemingly respected the President's author- ity, even though this involved the resigna- tion of defense ministers who did not agree with the President (the M-19 maintains that the military consistently violated the cease fire agreement). While utilization of force to suppress guerrilla activity was curtailed during the Betancur administration, con- siderable role expansion for the military oc- curred during the period. The military command is in charge of the Plan de Mag- dalena Medio, a governmental effort to pacify and develop this violence plagued region. In addition, Congress has just ap- proved a Plan de Rehabilitaci6n Nacional, which the military will administer. Appar- ently, the civic-action model of civil-military relations of the 1960s is reemerging, spearheaded by a group of Antioqueio generals. The military now has the freedom to suppress those guerrilla groups not in the peace process, which undoubtedly it will do, but the crucial question that arises concerns the military's respect for the cease fire with the FARC, the major guerrilla group. Pros- pects for peace are remote if the FARC re- sumes its armed opposition; some have already returned to the hills because they are fearful of the Army. Considering the long tradition of civilian rule in Colombia, the resurgence of military power, and the declining legitimacy of the Betancur government, the probability of a military coup in the near future is not high, which means a period of muddling-through until after the 1986 elections. The presiden- tial campaign now is in full swing; the Con- servatives have nominated Alvaro G6mez Hurtado, the Liberal Party has selected Vir- gilio Barco and, barring a sizeable defeat in the congressional elections, Luis Carlos Ga- lan probably will enter the race for Nuevo Liberalismo. The Left, including the newly formed political party of the FARC, Uni6n Patri6tica, has yet to coalesce around a can- didate. Within the presentambiente of eco- nomic and political frustration, the Liberal Party seemingly has the advantage. Barco has the firm support of the Liberal Party establishment, perhaps even from ad- herents to Nuevo Liberalismo, including former President Lleras Restrepo. The Lib- erals surely will profit electorally from a comparison of governmental action in han- dling the Dominican Embassy crisis and the Palace of Justice attack during the Tur- bay and Betancur governments, not to mention the horrendous economic situa- tion which has been compounded by the volcanic eruption. Alvaro G6mez carries the heavy burden of his 1974 presidential de- feat, as well as his association with the Bet- ancur administration. In addition to showing a comfortable lead for Barco, pub- lic opinion polls reveal that the Left is gain- ing strength in urban areas, but not to the point of breaking the traditional party hegemony, at least without an attractive candidate capable of mobilizing the lower class vote. However, the extensive public manifesta- tions of support for Colombia's democratic institutions and the forthcoming electoral game will not be sufficient to restore the legitimacy of the political system much be- yond the first half of 1986. The military may well be capable of curtailing the guerrilla opposition in the short term, but not for very long if the FARC resumes its militant stance and economic conditions fail to improve. Ironically, the government's harsh austerity program, demanded by the IMF and the international banking community, may well create an economic environment that will solidify support for guerrilla movements. At some point, if it is to survive, the Colombian government must confront not only the pressures for political reform but also the agony stemming from pervasive socio- economic problems of the society. E 34/CAiBBEAN rtVIEW Recent Publications from the FIU/Tinker Foundation Central American Research Program Occasional Papers Series OPS 4 Villanueva, Benjamin. "Cambios en las relaciones entire el Estado y la economic en Centroamerica." April 1985. OPS 10 ** Crosby, Benjamin L. "Divided We Stand, Divided We Fall: Public-Private Sector Relations in Central America." May 1985. OPS 11 Trejos, Juan Diego. "Costa Rica: crisis economic y political estatal 1978-1984." May 1985. OPS 12 Delgado, Enrique. "El impact de la crisis economic en la region centroamericana y en Guatemala." May 1985. OPS 13 Orellana, Victor Antonio. "El Salvador: crisis y reform structurall" May 1985. OPS 14 Mayorga, Francisco J. "Nicaragua: trayectoria econ6mica 1980-1984" July 1985. * also available in English translation * also available in Spanish translation LACC Occasional Papers are available at $4.00 each; make checks payable to "Latin American and Caribbean Center." For further information contact: Latin American and Caribbean Center Florida Internonal University Miami, Florida 33199; (305) 554-2894 Battles Continued from page 11 The government appointed 30 judges to an official investigating commission while Colombia's Attorney General Carlos Jim&- nez said his office will conduct an indepen- dent investigation of the taking and retaking of the Palace of Justice. The country's judi- cial system was in complete disarray. The Judicial Employees Association paraded on 9 November and declared a strike. Some judges, survivors of the "holocaust," not in agreement with the strike, said that it penal- izes the nation's justice system, but they all demanded an explanation as to why Presi- dent Betancur and his government did not obey the authority of the Chief Justice, who ordered a cease fire and a dialogue. Why was his authority ignored? Emilio Urrea quit the President's Peace Commission asking rhetorically why had the president, who ne- gotiated with M-19 guerrillas in far-off Madrid, Spain and in Mexico City, suddenly had refused to talk to them or the hostage judges? As the country geared up for general elec- tions, the debate gathered steam in Con- gress, Betancur critics came out of the woodwork, sensing he was mortally wounded politically. The battle has become campaign fodder. All the presidential candi- dates have spoken out. Luis Carlos Galan of the New Liberalism Party said, "the decision of the government to defend its institutions has the nation's backing, but this does not mean that a humanitarian dialogue not be attempted to avoid such a total tragedy." Liberal Party official candidate Virgilio Barco was softer in his criticism, saying "We must correct the correctable." The candi- date from Betancur's conservative party, Al- varo G6mez Hurtado, former ambassador to Washington, limited his comments to the M- 19, saying "those who appeal to arms are weak because they don't have enough force or support to act within the law." Betancur is said to have received thou- sands of telegrams of support from indi- viduals and organizations in Colombia and abroad. One Government spokesman said the takeover was "more than just another terrorist act, it was the first act in civil war." The government argued that had the mili- tary operation been contained, it would have given the guerrillas greater pos- sibilities of success. El Tiempo expressed concern that the military might have been close to a takeover and stated "if the govern- ment had decided to negotiate, Colom- bians can be sure that today a government of legal origin would no longer exist in Co- lombia." El Tiempo columnist Enrique Santos Calder6n, who recently published La Guerra por la Paz (The War for Peace) observed "the triumphalistic infantilism of the M-19 doesn't allow them to understand that a president weakened to the maximum because of such terrorist action, doesn't have a real possibility to dialogue or negoti- ate in the context of this new, outrageous defiance. Otherwise we would be witness- ing the collapse of a civilian government." The M-19 leadership, meanwhile, has been decimated, but to prove they are not dead, had one of their commando units stage a raid, killing eleven soldiers, in the department of Cauca the Saturday follow- ing the Palace of Justice battle. The group that sprang to prominence on 17 January, 1974 by stealing Liberator Sim6n Bolivar's sword from the Bogota Museum, swearing they would not return it "until we realize our promise to bring democracy and freedom to our fatherland" suffered a mortal blow on the Plaza Sim6n Bolivar. The Military could be expected to respond to any future vio- lation of the truce and they are the ones who will decide if and when the truce is violated. The M-19 accuse the army of breaking the truce and leading them to the Palace of Justice. O . - - - ....-----.. ... ;-- ... ._ -- A-d d .- : _- -_ : .__- -_ __. -- - ----- ... _. indicated. - ---- -!-- .El My- check-fr--s is enclosed.--- l !e=---ewaieo. M _r'_to ibbean- Review-_-. ,. Intertryi -a iA -p -.- t. .. M Y- a- 2--e _ d -e -subclribers--inthe -U.- ., S.L --SLi $1200 . W-- .2. - au-o--- F t all .. ..bes hip edby AOAir a. - - ..... -on:- ': th C.. -_. ib_- fa-7 r .. e.. . Can..d. .. .. ......: ---g- t--:: .W ill-: :> - ---- -uc-- ---e-- h ...ed.y O-: M.il : u3---e -- ----- - ,.,- ,.-,- -" ~ ~ ~~-ci -= rft i]y si~ db -O N~~i ----... .........--- -o u "r s--'T -U -- - -- -- -- - : 7 --7 c"'- '= ---": '-- -- ----- --:: ':: CARIBBEAN FEVIEW/35 ___ :T -'.. _- Eighties Continued from page 14 its credibility as well as the treaty with the FARC. Even after the M-19 had announced its position of all-out war President Betancur insisted on negotiating with the group. The final blow to the peace commission would come after the event at the Palace of Justice, when the Attorney General and the new Liberal Party resigned from it. By late 1985, the peace strategy of President Be- tancur had reached a critical stage. Many fear a new wave of generalized violence. Every day, the FARC moves farther from its objective of incorporation into the main- stream. The gap has widened instead of closing. What rebel leader is going to cam- paign, knowing that he will be killed? The most dramatic consequence of the attack on the Palace is that it has polarized and radicalized all groups. Internal strife within the M-19 has be- come apparent: a new militarized leadership has taken over. The M-19 made two strate- gic mistakes with the attack. The first was that they took the Palace of Justice expect- ing that a few shots would be fired and then followed by negotiations. According to sources, they had provisions for ten days. The two who masterminded the attack, An- dres Almarales and Alfonso Jaquin, were negotiators and not military strategists. The Armed Forces launched its counterattack without any intentions of lowering their guard, even at the expense of the life of the hostages. They would not be humbled only meters away from the headquarters of the forces, the Presidential Guard Batallion. The M-19 did not know how to respond to the plight of a weak president cornered by the Armed Forces clamoring for strong action against the rebels. The second error was the very target of their operation. Few institutions have as good an image among Colombians as the Supreme Court and the State Council. To the general populace, it seemed irrational that the M-19 would vent its anger on one of the only true bastions of freedom and de- mocracy in the nation. What was the motivation of the M-19? Our hypothesis is that the group wanted to show its new style of open warfare. The government was to be cast as repressive with its counterattack and the movement hoped to gain the sympathy of the trade unions, academics, and journalists. After the attack, the Armed Forces changed their way of dealing with subver- sive elements. There are now questions about the pact with the FARC and the elec- tions of March and May 1986. Surely one of the objectives of the M- 19 was to compel the FARC to break their agreement with the government. And they are achieving this goal. As the right and center become radi- calized, the FARC loses possibilities of real integration within the system. As for the elections, this sad event gives more value to the vote of the Colombian people. Strong candidates will gain more strength and dissidents will lose support. When violence threatens democracy, there is a natural tendency to support those can- didates that seem stronger to preserve the survival of a civilian government. In practice, the political system in Colom- bia faces its own limitations. What really is at play is more than an attempt to make some reforms to appease rebel groups. The par- ties and the political system face the re- sponsibility of creating institutional means to integrate new social sectors within the political system. Ideological consensus must be restored by demonstrating that the political institutions of Colombia are suffi- ciently flexible and democratic to permit growth and modernization from within. In a way, it would be to return the hope of institu- tional change to the nation, just as L6pez Pumarejo did fifty years ago. O 36/CAI?BBEAN revIEW Commodities Continued from page 23 More vivid still is the case in my own country, Panama. For seventeen years, we have lived under an illegitimate and arbi- trary military regime. So blatant is this con- dition that in the past three years we have had five different presidents, imposed and later deposed by the National Guard, and also five different attorney generals, whose time in office has been marked by failures to investigate fully major scandals of crassest corruption and severe violations of human rights, including only last month the savage assassination of an opponent. Further- more, over the years this military regime has fostered or tolerated the traffic of arms and men to extremist guerrilla movements in the region, and also the transfer into Pan- ama of important operations in the growing narcotics business between Latin America and the United States. Because of purported security consid- erations and some undefined services ren- dered in the spirit of double dealing which often characterizes such regimes, the United States government and even US public opinion has generally avoided identi- fying the regime for what it is. In 1984, in the first presidential and legislative elections in sixteen years, fraud was unquestionably committed. Even the State Department, in its 1985 report to Congress on human rights, admitted that close to 10 percent of the votes cast had gone untallied. Neverthe- less the US Government kept up the pre- tense that Panama finally had its first elected civilian president in sixteen years and, for the first time in our history, granted Panama two gifts (not loans) of $20 million each to help balance the budget. Further- more, it saw fit to hold during two months the largest joint operations between the mil- itary of Panama and the United States, which included activities enhancing the im- age of the Panamanian military as the effec- tive problem-solvers of the country's ills. It was not till the fourth of five Panama- nian presidents was deposed, the day after addressing the United Nations and after being held for fourteen hours at military headquarters, on the wake of the assassina- tion by beheading of one of the leading adversaries of the military chief, that the US Government cautiously expressed its nega- tive reaction to the undemocratic situation prevailing in Panama. Central Americans share with their North American neighbors the "rights to life, lib- erty and the pursuit of happiness." What Central Americans hope is that the United States remain faithful to those key words of its Declaration of Independence, which we can translate into the political language of our times as "human rights, democracy and development." Democratic faith would then bloom into democratic solidarity, and democracy could no longer be treated as a mere export commodity. O ~@~ CUBAN FOREIGN POLICY Caribbean Tempest Pamela S. Falk, Hunter College and the Institute of Latin American and Iberian Studies at Columbia University The author discusses Cuba's foreign policy before the revolution in 1959 and assesses its modem policies. Dr. Falk explores the Cuban involvement in the Falkland/Malvinas Islands conflict and assistance to El Salvador and Nicaragua, and examines Cuba's contribution to Third World unrest. Using such primary sources as interviews with U.S. and Cuban government officials, foreign ministers from countries in the hemisphere, and Cuban exiles, the author offers a novel and timely assessment of the politics of an increasingly turbulent area. "Pamela Falk's able demonstration of the historical continuities of Cuban foreign policy reminds us that Fidel Castro is acting on national as much as on ideological motives a fact that all who think, write or make decisions about Cuban policy must take into account."'-Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. "Pamela Falk has written a smooth-reading and authoritative history of Cuban foreign policy. Hereafter, when people say they want 'to go to the source' on Cuban foreign policy, this will be the book they mean."-The Honorable Daniel P. Moynihan, United States Senate 352 pages ISBN 0-669-05127-6 $29.00 The Political Status of Puerto Rico Pamela S. Falk, editor Few people in this country are aware that an overwhelming majority of Puerto Rico's 3.5 million U.S. citizens favor changes in the island's association with the United States. Whether statehood, a modified form of commonwealth, or full independence would best meet Puerto Rico's needs remains a question of heated debate. This first-hand account of the history and positions of the various factions features articles by the governor of Puerto Rico, the mayor of San Juan, Puerto Rico's congressional representatives, and the head of the Puerto Rican Development Association. Additional sections analyze Puerto Rico's economy and the international implications of the status debate. An Americas Society Book. June ISBN 0-669-08279-1 $23.00 LEXINGTON BOOKS D.C. Heath 125 Spring St. Lexington, MA 02173 (617) 860-1204 or (800) 334-3284 ADOaheatCopa A Bayliean company CATBBEAN FKVIIW/37 CUBAN FOREIGN POLICY Caribbean Tempest , Spadafora Con-inued from page 25 At the time communism still had this aura of idealism, a mask that attracted the young, and we had still not seen the Sino- Soviet divisions, and the phenomenon of communist repression was not that well known. The Americans kicked him and the communists opened their arms with all their revolutionary jargon. That is why I say I un- derstand why Fidel embraced communism, although I do not share his enthusiasm. To- day he has become part of a great commu- nist bureaucratic machinery. B.P.-How do you explain the fact that Fidel came to power fighting for demo- cratic ideals against a dictatorship and now, 25 years later, he himself embodies a dictatorship? H.S.-That is due to communist ideol- ogy. There comes a time when they dog- matically convince themselves that they represent the interests of the people, of the masses. It is self-deception, another form of the corruption of power. It is not the blatant case of corruption through contracts, theft or fat bank accounts. In the case of Fidel, it is self-deception and in the process, he de- ceives everyone else. He might realize that he is a dictator, but he imagines that he is a dictator that represents the interests of the people. What worse corruption than self- deception? It is the worse form of intellec- tual corruption and it is the kind that Fidel suffers from. B.P.-Now let's talk about Hugo Spadafora, of Panama. Have you always gone to battle by your own free will? H.S.-I know why you say that. Before, when Torrijos was in power, it was thought that he commanded me. Now that Torrijos is dead and I criticize the military in power, I have shown that no one controls me. I do not identify with the policies of Noriega, the present military commander of Panama. With Noriega in power and me fighting in Nicaragua, it is clear that no one supports me, and yet I continue fighting for my dem- ocratic ideals as a matter of principle. Simply, I have been consistent with my- self. In 1978 and 1979, I enjoyed relative good health, youth and had the experience in Guinea. Why not go to Nicaragua then? As a Bolivarian, I did it. I have always resolved to go, but there will come a time when I will not go, when I will not be able to go. B.P.-What is your own political stand? H.S.-That of social democracy, under Bolivarian and Third World ideals. On one occasion, some Panamanian security agents detained me thinking perhaps that I was a communist. The inspector asked me what my political line was and I answered: "The only politics that I follow is that of my conscience." B.P.-lIf the Nine are overthrown in Nic- aragua, what will you do? H.S.-I will return to Panama, to devote all my energies to Panamanian politics with- out abandoning internationalist politics. And to be coherent with what I have said before, being an internationalist does not mean that one is always a guerrilla. I am not an adventurer. B.P.-But until now you have been a guerrilla ... H.S.-Ah! That the majority of those who do not know my ideas, my beliefs, see it thus, is something else. But it is not that way. Believe it or not, I plan to stay in Panama. After the liberation of Nicaragua, I will return to Panama. Panama faces ever-increasing problems. I will stay there without aban- doning the struggle, but I repeat that you do not have to be a guerrilla to be an internationalist. B.P.-Hugo Spadafora, combatant ... Hugo Spadafora, writer ... Which do you prefer, the gun or the pen? H.S.-1 have always said that action and thought cannot be separated. Action with- out thought is barbarian and thought with- out action is fainthearted passivity. I cannot separate one from the other; they are two sides of the same coin. B.P-Have you ever been wounded in battle? H.S.-No, I only suffered a broken bone while firing a mortar. When we retreated in Naranjo and the Somoza forces arrived, some bodies had to be left behind, and one had light eyes like mine. Since my docu- ments had also been left there, they thought I had died and Somoza announced my death. I found out through the radio. I have seen many deaths in battle, but until now I have been fortunate. B.P.-Have there been attempts against your life outside the battlefield? H.S.-I have heard that there are plans to that effect... B.P.-Do you go around with a bodyguard? H.S.-There were times when I was care- ful in Panama, but now I travel alone. B.P.-Do you aspire to the presidency of Panama? H.S.-Well, I do not think of those things, I do not think of positions because one of the subjects that truly fascinates me is the way power corrupts men. Not only when they exercise power, but the struggle to at- tain it, it changes them totally, it deforms them. So I go through a process of mental hygiene and avoid thinking about positions. That is why that phrase that "Power cor- rupts and absolute power corrupts abso- lutely" is so valid. However, that phrase is partially interpreted. Generally, it is thought that power corrupts only those that have it. That is true, but only partly true. For every man that arrives, there are hundreds who do not, but in their struggle to obtain power they have been deformed. I have seen it in Panama so often that I am not willing to be deformed like that seeking a position. As a matter of fact, I have promised myself that I will never solicit votes from anyone. No one will ever hear me ask for votes or hear me say that I am a good candidate. Never!! B.P.-Were you in favor of Torrijos? H.S.-Yes, I am a Torrijista because I be- lieve Torrijos was good for the history of Panama. B.P.-Why aren't you fighting in Panama? H.S.-Armed struggle is not now justi- fied in Panama and hopefully it never will be. I am the first one to wish the need never arises. Furthermore, I do not think that there is a political party that calls for it, not even the communist party of Panama. Many peo- ple have said, and with good reason, that if the situation in Panama is not handled deli- cately, it could become explosive and pro- duce a war. The ideal is to avoid an armed struggle, that this not be imposed on the people. It is preferable that there be an accelerated evo- lution that would include the just distribu- tion of wealth, that the worker receive the salary he deserves, the liberation of the masses through culture and that the people have access to health services and schools and that the ethnic traits of each minority be respected. In other words, that there be a balance between economic and social fac- tors. That is the ideal. But what happens in Latin America is that personal appetites and rivalries can become very powerful. They do so much harm! I hope that in the case of Panama the personalities of some military and civilian leaders will not hinder democracy. B.P.-According to your internationalist vision, what do you see as the future for Latin America? H.S.-I see the future of Latin America through my Bolivarian principles. In Europe and other countries, a powerful movement against the two superpowers is now rising, and I think that Nicaragua in Latin America will be a decisive point in the Americanist definition of our revolutions, of our solutions. Nicaragua overthrew a pro-US dictator- ship in 1979 and soon we will see the over- throw of a pro-Soviet dictatorship. Histor- ically, this circumstance will help our continent find our own path and to define our own destiny. Also, Cuba and Puerto Rico will cease being historical anomalies and join the Latin American block. I am convinced that once we, the Latin American revolutionaries, define the dividing line be- tween democratic socialism and commu- nism-which will be reaffirmed in the case of Nicaragua-then no country will be able to escape the influence of these ideals. E 38/CAI?BBCAN F ~EEW Greene Continued from page 27 "an ambiguous legitimacy that tried to shape social and economic life differently." In Arias Calder6n's words, it was a "leftist version of the ideology of National Security because there were no internal phenomena without an international dimension." In the 1968-78 period, Torrijos was Chief of the National Guard. He was called the "Max- imum Leader of the Panamanian Revolu- tion," and his rule was absolute. It was from 1976-1983 that Graham Greene made five visits to Panama. Despite the title, his book, Getting to Know the General, The Story of an Involvement, tells us more perhaps about Greene and his travelling companion and translator Pro- fessor Jose de Jesus Martinez, better known as Chuchu, than it does about Torrijos. Greene visited many Latin American and Caribbean countries as a journalist, novelist and unofficial courier for revolutionary causes. Getting to Know the General is based on articles published in The New York Review of Books from 1977-78. Greene introduces us to a large number of personalities involved in the politics of Central America and the Caribbean. How- ever we get only superficial glimpses at Fidel Castro, Salvador Cayetano (the Sal- vador guerrilla leader), Eden Pastora (Co- mandante Cero), Daniel Ortega and Father Ernesto Cardenal. We meet very few Pan- amanians in everyday settings because it appears that Greene spent most of his time in hotels or at events organized by Chuchu Martinez. We come to learn a lot about the amorous activities of Chuchu and Torrijos, but never meet Torrijos's wife or children. We never meet President Demetrio "Jimmy" Lakas, Ambassadors Aquilino Boyd and Gabriel Lewis, or Foreign Minister Juan Tack who played such an important role in the negotiations with the United States. Former Ambassador Jorden's book is much more informative in this respect, as is his assessment of Americans such as Ellsworth Bunker and Sol Linowitz, who were involved in the treaty negotiations. Greene's portrait of Torrijos, Panamanian politics and the negotiations between Pan- ama and the US is colored by his leftist politics and his anti-Americanism. He was denied a transit visa to Miami and was also deported from Puerto Rico in 1954 for po- litical reasons. William Jorden gives the best perspective on Torrijos of the five books reviewed here: "He was a complicated mix of good and bad, of openness and mystery, sophistication and nzilvete. But probably the most compelling attraction was power. Here was a man who had seized it by force, held it for years, used it with moderation, and by all appearances, retained the sup- port of his people throughout." In 1978, Torrijos informed Greene, "I'm going to give the politicians a big surprise. I'm designing a system, a political party (the PRD), to get out. They think I am designing a system to stay in. The politicians are aim- ing their guns in the wrong direction. They will waste their ammunition and then they will say 'But the son of a bitch is unpredict- able.' A party is necessary to me now be- cause I'm bored with politics." The balance sheet shows a populist who accomplished a lot in terms of putting money into rural education, health and other services as well as writing a banking law that laid the groundwork for Latin Amer- ica's biggest banking center. On the other hand, Torrijos's failure to attend to the de- tails of party organization, government ad- ministration and above all, failing to create an institutional framework within the Na- tional Guard so that it would perform only the functions of national security, were ma- jor weaknesses. The Canal treaties were an important ac- complishment for Torrijos. Jorden's discus- sion is more effective in terms of the analysis of parties and issues involved than Moffett's, which focuses principally on the seven months of effort by the Carter admin- istration to winning public and congres- sional approval for the treaties. Moffett, research director for a citizens' group sup- porting the Treaties and assistant to Hamil- ton Jordan, White House Chief of Staff, from 1978-81, notes the paradox of the "striking contrast between the administration's ad- vantageous political position at the start of the ratification debate and the enormous effort and cost that proved necessary to win a fragile 68-32 majority for approval in the Senate. Just as the administration sought to work out a new relationship with Third World countries based on equity and to end one of the last vestiges of American imperi- alism, more and more Americans came to feel a psychological hurt for the inability of the US to do what it wanted to do in the post-war period through the defeat in Viet- nam, the attainment of parity by the USSR and the challenge to energy security posed by the OPEC oil cartel. Thus the passions aroused by efforts to 'give away' the prized possession of the canal came at a time when Americans did not like what Kevin Phillips has called the 'forced retreat of US global power over the previous two dec- ades.'" Instead of gaining a quick legislative victory, the Canal issue provoked the "long- est foreign policy debate since the Versailles Treaty of 1919-20." Instead of knocking out the political right, the treaty debate regene- rated the right as a major force in American politics and gave Ronald Reagan an issue on which he could ride into the White House. O CAMtBBEAN rview is available in microform from University Microfilms International. 2 Please send information Name Company/Institution Address City State Zip Phone ) Call toll-free 800-521-3044. In Michigan. Alaska and Hawaii call collect 313-761 4700. Or mail inquiry to: University Microfilms International. 300 North Zeeb Road. Ann Arbor, MI 48106. / Learn Spanish On Your Own! Not just a phrasebook, but a real language S course! More than 29 hours of recorded material make this self-instructional cassette/book course a truly effective way to learn Spanish. The course consists of a series of cassettes recorded by native Latin-American Spanish speak- ers, and accompanying textbook. You'll learn to speak Spanish the way you learned English by listening and repeating. 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We offer courses in 42 languages: send for free catalog. OUDio-FORUM SRoom X 51, 96 Broad St.. Guilford. CT 06437 S- .-- m a CAI?BBEAN rEVIEw/39 Pretto Continued from page 32 leaned back on the log again, and this time seemed to be settling in for a long rap, as if he had forgotten that he was to escort me to Pretto's house to dry up. I wasn't feeling cold anymore, though. The discomfort had left me completely. A warming dash of sunlight was spotlighting us. In fact, I felt rather well. I decided to let him continue directing my energies as he obviously had been doing rather effectively already. "Why is he the purpose of your book?" he asked. "Oh, geez, that's such a long story." I wasn't about to go into detail about the book. At that moment it was the last thing I wanted to do. Besides, I had been riddled with doubt the night before, thinking that perhaps it hadn't been such a good idea after all to have taken this trip and made the expense. Although the adventure and chal- lenge was interesting to contemplate and all that, the complications the whole thing might involve were seriously discouraging my optimism and desire. "Be brief," he said. "Well, I'm an art major in a California university and wanted to write on Latin American political artists, or artists that do political themes in their work. I was bored with the whole thing, because I had been finding nothing really new or different to say about politics in art. Everything seemed to have been said about the subject already. I wanted to contribute something different, and didn't know how or what. One day I found out about a Panamanian artist that had become very controversial for doing political painting in a different, well, very serious way. It wasn't the usual radical pro- test, denouncing style of painting that is normally seen in political art. I did some minor research on him to see if he was interesting enough to include him among the Latin American artists I was going to cover and I liked what I found, so I did some more research on him. I discovered even more interesting qualities about him that seemed perfect for my paper. One day..." 1 stopped myself. I became self-conscious, because I felt I was revving into a long mo- nopolizing tale about myself. It was a habit I wanted to break as I could easily bore any- one to death that wasn't interested. I was sure this man was not banking on listening to a long story about my personal scholastic ordeals. He seemed intent enough, how- ever, leaning against the log, his head nestled back against his hands; but I felt I would soon bore him. "I'm sorry," I said. "I think I'm about to get carried away with the story, and I just real- Viaje a Fantasia. 1981 Tempera, 5" x 7", by Rogelio Pretto. ized I've told it many times before and each time is hard for me to stop blabbering about it." "Please, please go on. I'm interested, re- ally. Don't mind me. I'll stop you when I can't take anymore." "Oh... well. If you really want me to. Let's see, where was I... um ..." "Oh, yes! Well, one day it dawned on me that perhaps my best bet at broaching a whole new perspective would be not to focus on politics in art in general but rather to do the reverse. Why not investigate the nature of how political interests arise within an artist to the point where he feels com- pelled to express them pictorially by view- ing it through his personal viewpoint? But, I figured, to be able to do that, to be able to dig into those motivations, I should concen- trate on just one artist... If I could find an artist that exemplified the motivational qualities I wanted to investigate, that would be enough to concentrate on. It was better if the artist were unknown internationally be- cause the spectrum of his political con- cerns could be better studied within a more restricted range of social environment. Pretto fits the bill, perfectly." "Why did you choose him in particular?" "To tell you the truth I didn't have many artists to pick from. The information is sim- ply not available for me to know who they are. Learning about Mr. Pretto was like a prize find, and the more I found out about him the more interesting it became to use him. His approach to political commentary through his art was unique, and the things he had said about his beliefs and his ideas were perfect. He seemed clear and very so- ber about what he was doing. That could be a plus in analyzing his purposes and moti- vations, because he could do his own re- fleeting and explaining. I've read some articles and interviews that have been writ- ten on him and I would like to meet him and talk with him to see if he can grant me an interview. I decided to come to Panama and try to see him personally for an interview. Do you think he'll give me one?" I turned to him as if I hoping he would set up the oppor- tunity for me. "That could be arranged." He smiled again, somewhat mischievously, I felt. "Who told you he was here?" "I spoke with his wife. She encouraged me to come to see him here." "Obviously you don't know what he looks like," he said. "Well, I've seen some pictures of him in articles. Why?" "Why what?" "Why did you say I obviously didn't know what he looked like?" I couldn't tell what difference that made. "I'm afraid I've played with you a bit, Sandra. Please don't be offended with what I am about to say. Have you noticed that nei- ther of us have introduced ourselves for- mally to each other?" He was right. When meeting people for the first time, I automatically introduce my- self, but had completely overlooked the for- mality. The circumstances and the unusual place had something to do with it, I thought. I was anxious to hear him out. He knew something I didn't and he was about to let me know. "You are ... ?", he said coming towards me with arm extended for a handshake. His grip was firm but gentle; his hand was warm. Slightly perplexed, I looked into his eyes and said, "Sandra, Sandra Serrano." "I am very pleased to meet you Sandra. And I mean that. I'm Rogelio Pretto." 0 40/CAlBBEAN K1VIEW First Impressions Critics Look at the New Literature Compiled by Forrest D. Colburn Requiem for the Artist Heroes Are Grazing in My Garden (En mi jardin pastan los heroes) Heberto Padilla. Translated by Andrew Hurley. New York: Ferrar, Strauss & Giroux, 1984. $16.95 Heberto Padilla's HeroesAre Grazing inMy Garden is a slow-paced, fragmented novel about the process of psychological disin- tegration under conditions of intimidation and political repression. It is a novel about frustration and disappointment, about bu- reaucratic excess and the excess of political dogma, and about the contamination of family relationships by politics. It is also a novel which for observers of recent Cuban intellectual and political history will be diffi- cult to evaluate objectively: the international attention focused on the author's conflicts with the Cuban government in the 1970's (ending with his temporary imprisonment) and the "Afterword" in which Padilla links Heroes Are Grazing in My Garden with those personal conflicts (and their conse- quences for artistic and intellectual free- dom under a Communist regime) blur the customary distinction between autobiogra- phy and fiction. However, it is for these very non-literary or extra-literary considerations that the novel undoubtedly will receive a great deal of serious commentary. The title of Padilla's work is an ironically satiric evocation of Pablo Armando Fer- nandez' El libro de los heroes (1964). The latter gave "modern Cuban poetry a new beginning," in the words of J.M.Cohen, through a series of "laments for the heroes of the Revolution" whose spirits are trans- ported to the magical realm of Afro-Cuban (lucumi) mythology. The "laments" of Padilla's Heroes, however, are not only for the dead "of all sizes and ages-heroes sud- denly as puzzled as clumsy, frightened chil- dren ... heroes from remotest history and from today, moving like leeches but so downhearted and inept"-; the laments are also for the "heroes" who survived to experi- ence betrayal, disillusionment and escalat- ing fear. An oneiric quality permeates this highly self-conscious narrative. Dreams, visions and nightmares mingle and produce a dis- Forrest D. Colburn teaches politics at Prince- ton University. turbing atmosphere of claustrophobia and political surveillance. At times the charac- ters' actions assume an almost Gogolian pathos whereby the logic of dream dictates reality's perimeters. The principal character of the novel is Julio, a translator (like Padilla) and former supporter of the Revolution, whose hallucinations and paranoic visions of Fidel Castro now reflect his deep-seated fears of the Revolution's failure and the in- creasing danger to his individuality and mental stability. Julio's repeated criticisms of government policy have put him under suspicion of "counterrevolutionary opin- ions." Trapped by a social system he de- tests, a job he deplores, and a marriage he finds confining but which he cannot live without, Julio exists in virtual isolation. His encounters with others-male and female-serve only to confront him with his own frustration and alienation. This torment from both within and with- out gives the narrative a tone reminiscent of the Cuban existential novel of exorcism of an earlier decade. Indeed, there are ample allusions to existentialists from Dos- toyevsky to Sartre and Camus. Julio sees foreign tourists, for example, as either Ro- mantic automatons who view the Cuban revolution as a form of "exoticism" or as decadents whose attitude is a mixture of "fatuous ingenuousness with the most ab- ject nihilism, all under the rubric of 'under- standing'." In either case, Julids cynicism reveals complete frustration and a total abandonment of hope. Parallel to Julids incoherent existence is Gregorio's. A writer and struggling alco- holic, whose awareness of lost youth and approaching death is surpassed only by his fear of creative and sexual impotence, Gre- gorio (as his name suggests) is a Cuban variation of Kafka's dehumanized man. The new political dispensation, family difficul- ties (not unlike Gregor Samsa's in The Met- amorphosis), and the absence of meaning- ful relationships all have contributed to his transformation into something less than fully human. Padilla's narrative alternates between these two characters (who live in adjacent houses), consistently exploring the subtle ways in which each has been affected over the years by the Revolution, how each-as an intellectual-has reacted to the forces of history. And it is this unresolved conflict, finally, that Padilla's Heroes Are Grazing in My Garden is all about: whether a commu- nist state can ever allow intellectuals and artists freedom of creative expression which is not subordinated to the ideology of the political apparatus. The author's "Afterword" emphasizes that under such conditions writers in particular will be subjected always to a "ceremony of abasement" and that the fates of the charac- ters they produce, consequently, will be "in- conclusive, because everything written in a suffocating political atmosphere is in- conclusive and fragmentary." As observers from afar, we can only hope otherwise. ROLAND E. BUSH California State University Long Beach, California A Development Agency with a Difference Grassroots Development In Latin America And The Caribbean: Oral Histories Of Social Change, Robert Wasserstrom. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1985. 197 p. $11.95 Can peasant cooperatives and worker self- managed factories survive Latin America's economic crisis? Can development pro- grams initiated at the local level succeed? Yes, according to members of seven com- munity-based organizations interviewed by anthropologist Robert Wasserstrom. Rural and urban projects in six countries (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Jamaica, Mexico, and Paraguay) are represented, ranging from a consumer store to a women's theater. A key element in their success is support from the IAF (Inter-American Foundation), a devel- opment agency with a difference. Begun in 1969, the IAF responds to (rather than initiates-a crucial distinction) requests for assistance on projects chosen and organized by local people. The goal is "empowerment," or "helping poor people to create viable organizations of their own:" The author's method of reporting on these grassroots organizations, oral history, com- plements the IAF's "bottom-up" approach. Wasserstrom relies on first-hand narrative, which he skillfully selects and organizes with a minimum of intrusion-an introduc- tory chapter and background for each project. The result is an eloquent testimony in CAIBBEAN PEVIEW/41 which there are several recurring themes. First is the magnitude of the economic transformation of the last 30 years in Latin America and the Caribbean. Consequences include frequent migration by poor people and the vulnerability of male-female rela- tions. Far from being "marginal," poor peo- ple are impressive in their adaptability in economic activities and in their commit- ment to education for their children, in hopes of a better future. Self-actualization and participatory forms of organization are emphasized, as is the commitment to in- clude the very poor in projects. Wasserstrom concludes that IAF support reaches poorer people, helps them develop skills, use resources more effectively, and most important, make their own planning decisions. The result is personal growth in skills and attitudes, and social growth in group cooperation and solidarity. This book could be read in conjunction with Hirschman's (1984) and Esman and Uphoff's (1984) books on local organiza- tions, reviewed in this journal in Spring 1985. Taken together, the three books pro- vide an excellent, in-depth look at local-level development, as seen by social scientists and by participants. LINDA MILLER Center for Latin American Studies University of Florida, Gainesville Cultural Confusion A Review of Urban Life in Kingston, Jamaica. Diane J. Austin. New York: Gordon & Breach, 1984. 282 p. The third in a special Caribbean Studies series, Austin's book focuses on what she refers to as the "culture and class ideology" of two Kingston neighborhoods. At first glance the work might easily be dismissed as just one more addition to a long list of ethnographic studies on selected features of Jamaican society carried out by one more European outsider. The work, how- ever, presents an interesting departure from many of the earlier more or less "culture of poverty"-type studies of the Jamaican working class (e.g., the works of scholars such as Blake, Cohen, Hartley, Goode, and Henriques). In this work Austin makes a credible effort at grappling with the cultural confusions, complexities and contradic- tions prevalent in Jamaican society; in so doing she correctly places class rivalries and clashes in the cultural perspective of Jamaica's position as a neo-colonial, de- pendent-capitalist society. Building on, and at the same time modi- fying, theoretical formulations in both an- thropology and sociology, mainstream as well as Marxian, and drawing extensively from the empirical studies of "on the spot" experts like Stone, the author's central the- sis is that "culture is always an historical product subject to the changing needs and aspirations of men." For her, culture is nei- ther "grounded" nor totally reflective of some national, "collective will or conscious- ness" in the Durkheimian sense. Culture, she believes, is bound up with the specific dynamics associated with economic and social class. And in a highly class-divided society like Jamaica's, in which "there are immense conflicts of interest involved in fulfilling some needs rather than others," culture must be seen as "responding to dif- ferent needs in one and the same society." Relying on her own extensively collected ethnographic and survey data from two rel- atively distinct Kingston neighborhoods (one solidly inner-city and working class, the other near-suburban and marginally middle class), Austin argues the existence of two separate and diverse cultures (she avoids referring to them as "subcultures") in urban Jamaica; each responding in differ- ent ways to the reality of its own structurally imposed circumstance. For example, among other things the "class culture" of Kingston's working class exhibit a type of urban gemeinschaft (shown most clearly in patterns of mutual sharing and depen- dence that characterize the "yard life" of ten- ement housing), public airing of grievances (the institutionalized "fuss"), modes of dress which symbolize both resistance and disaffection (such as the "tam" often worn by Rastafarians), and distrust of the entire political apparatus politicsics, as reggae singer Peter Tosh likes to call it). On the other hand, the values of the mar- ginally middle class (referred to as the "aris- tocracy of the working class" by Lacey) typically emphasize privacy, diffuse social contacts, especially those that are politically useful, individual achievement, and a mea- sure of reasoned trust in the abilities of "qualified" (i.e., educated) leaders to "orga- nize the affairs of the nation." At the same time, however, she asserts that there is a powerful, inescapable degree of middle class hegemony over certain areas of the Jamaican sociocultural order. This middle class domination is reinforced and legiti- mated by a dominant "class ideology" that seeks, first and foremost, to subordinate and undermine the cultures) of the weak and dispossessed. The dominant middle class ideology, for example, underscores formal education as the essential qualifica- tion for placing individuals in socially useful or productive positions. It is an ideology to which even the poor and dispossessed sub- scribe; hence the "hegemony of middle class culture". The analysis of this important ideological component should make the work an im- portant contribution to building further un- derstanding of the peculiar social and economic position of Jamaica's native black petite bourgeoisie vis A vis the old wealthy, basically white expatriate, aristoc- racy and the newer merchant-owner class (e.g., the Chinese, Syrians and Lebanese) on the one hand, and the black proletar- ianized masses on the other. It is this class who in the absence of property has, by and large, become not only the professional elites, managerial and service workers, but also leaders of the political state. To have achieved this required a belief system-an ideology-that emphasized education and "qualification" over property, wealth and skin color. It has also meant, strangely enough, establishing a fair amount of social distance between themselves and the poor "uneducated" black masses, those with fun- damentalist religion, "irreversible socializa- tion", and an altogether dissolute culture. If one views ideology as the projection of specific beliefs that promote and protect specific class interests, as Austin obviously does, then the "ideology of education" has become, in the contemporary Jamaican setting, and perhaps in much of the En- glish-speaking Caribbean, an important middle class cultural weapon used against both the light-skinned propertied class and the black poor ("an educated person" should be treated with the utmost respect by all relevant parties). And in a society characterized by persistent shortage of so- cial and eocnomic goods, it is education which places individuals in important pat- ronage positions, notably in the political sphere where they can regulate and control the flow of scarce resources. BERNARD D. HEADLEY Northeastern Illinois University Chicago, Illinois Starting to Redistribute Scheming for the Poor: The Politics of Redistribution in Latin America. William Ascher. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984. 348 p. William Ascher is unabashedly "can do" in his approach to the political economy of redistribution in Latin America, and he comes close to assembling a cook book for political leaders who wish to promote re- distributive policies. Those who see the world in terms of structural blockages, fun- damental contradictions, and revolutionary break-throughs will not like this book. Ascher has little patience for what he labels deterministss;" "... this book," he asserts, "focuses on the policy-making process out of a conviction that it does (emphasis in the original) make a difference. This is not sim- ply a fond hope; both the questionable logic of the determinist arguments and a careful examination of the redistributive record re- veal that pessimism and fatalism are unjustified." What Ascher offers instead of, or at least 42/CAI?BBEAN REVIEW parallel to, determinist arguments are ele- ments of political style, policy packaging, timing, alliances, and dissimulation, that can be combined in ways that successfully bring about significant redistribution of wealth in Latin American societies in favor of the poor. To substantiate his assertions, Ascher uses case materials from Argentina, Chile and Peru. He analyses three periods and three styles of redistribution. In chrono- logical order they are "Authoritarian-popu- lism" represented by the regimes of Per6n, Odria and lbaflez; "Centrist reformism" championed by Frei, Belaunde, and Fron- dizi; and "Radicalism" practiced by Allende and Velasco (Argentina has no protagonist in the radical camp). All of these experi- ments were redistributive in intent, and each had to construct its own "pro-re- distributive alliance." There was a wide range of success and failure across these experiments, but what, in Ascher's view, best explains the variations is not the struc- ture of the economy and class interests, but rather more mundane factors of political agility. "The virtues of forthrightness, open- ness, ideological consistency and courage to face attack often turn out to be liabilities to successful redistribution. Progressive re- distribution may be more readily effected when regime leaders indulge in improvisa- tion, obfuscation, and even insincere threat- ening." It is impossible to trace out Ascher's argument in any detail, but the flavor of it is conveyed by his summary of the Peronist approach which he portrays as successful. "By manipulating wage levels through many separate, governmentally influenced collective bargaining agreements, rather than by legislating broad, industry-wide wage adjustments, Per6n's wage policy was differentiated. That is, different rules applied to different conditions and therefore to dif- ferent cases. Instead of having the same wage adjustment for all workers, imposed directly by the government, each bargain- ing outcome was unique. Therefore the full weight of the industrial owners could not be mobilized for or against a sweeping pack- age; nor was the government held responsi- ble for a blanket wage increase disappoint- ing to the workers. Equally important, industrialists in one subsector, or workers in another, could be favored or deprived with- out the necessity of treating all industrialists or all workers in like fashions. On most counts this is a useful and im- portant book. It is clearly written, and care- ful in its use of evidence. The author constantly draws lessons for leaders, often put in the form of mini-laws. ". . There is an asymmetry between redistributive and re- gressive policy attempts, in that the re- distributive efforts, if they go astray, are quickly abandoned; regressive attempts, if they do not produce more rapid growth, often result in conviction on the part of the leaders that the same measures have to be enforced with even greater vigor." Other les- sons that Ascher draws are that the benefici- aries of redistributive policies frequently force their benefactors to greater, and sometimes disastrous, efforts at redistribu- tion and fail to support their benefactors in times of crisis. Further, the redistributionist cannot afford to alienate, en bloc, the mid- dle classes. They must be lured or tricked into cooperation with the leadership above all to avoid "punitive disinvestment" and capital fight. Although he does not say so, it derives from Ascher's agrument that the programs of Allende and Velasco were both doomed to failure. The weaknesses of the book lie in three areas. The issue of macroeconomic struc- ture should be given greater due. Ascher's only concession to it is to note that success- ful redistribution in dual economies may affect only those within the modern, or what E.VK. Fitzgerald has called the corporate, sector. In that sense it is very hard to com- pare Frei to Belaunde or Allende to Velasco given the relative importance of dualism in the Peruvian and Chilean economies. Sec- ond, while international and multi-national actors are occasionally included in the anal- ysis, they are portrayed for the most part as ancillary to the success and failure of re- distributive efforts. This weighting goes too far in Ascher's attempt to challenge the 'de- terminists'. Finally, Ascher begs at least one major question: under what circumstances does the redistributive impulse emerge in the first place? Did its sponsors have a more determinist political economic understand- ing in mind than the author? This is a welcome book and should provoke considerable debate. Having shown how redistribution may start, Ascher might now tell us how it is to be sustained and consolidated. JOHN WATERBURY Princeton University Princeton, New Jersey Solid Survey Mexico: A History. Robert Ryal Miller. Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, 1985. 414 p., plates. Hardcover $19.95. In the perennial market for introductory texts to Mexican history, and as a service to that elusive "general reader," we have a new entry by Professor Miller and the University of Oklahoma Press. This finely manufac- tured, nicely illustrated, and reasonably priced synthesis may well find good fortune in even such a fickle marketplace as that described above. The work is intended as a summary of past and recent research on Mexican history for the beginning undergraduate student. It also offers an excellent topical bibliography of materials available in English, including various titles only published in 1984. It gives approximately equal space to the Pre-Co- lumbian and Colonial periods as to the Na- tional period, with relatively weak coverage of present day (post-1940) Mexico. Thus, the text will be ideally suited for those whose interests, or course syllabus, deal exten- sively with early Mexican history, but rather less so for those, such as this reviewer, whose course offerings concentrate on the Modern or National period. The guiding thread of the text is basically a traditional, political narrative, spiced with both primary documents and detailed de- scription of social, economic, and cultural aspects of Mexican development. Indeed, the author has done a masterful job of weav- ing a complex narrative around a basically traditional skeleton of politics and diplo- macy. This will no doubt endear him with the often unprepared and reluctant under- graduate readership, perhaps even relieving the instructor of the task of much of this narrative detail, but it does present some- thing of a problem as well. To the extent that the often insightful descriptions of social and economic structure or cultural life ap- pear to be digressions or add-ons to the political "story line," the student will have a very hard time evaluating any argument for structural or non-political causation. How- ever, this is remediable with additional read- ing, and the descriptions offered of social, economic, and cultural matters are quite good, reflective of the best and most recent scholarship in the field. As a basic text for a Mexican survey, this volume will find a significant readership, although the "general" reader will no doubt find that it neither fully explains "the myste- ries of the temples", nor those of contempo- rary Mexican society, and will continue to look elsewhere. Ultimately, the work's strong points are its synthesis of research on Colonial and Modern Mexico through the Revolution and its easily readable style, in themselves a strong recommendation for potential readers both in and out of academe. LOWELL GUDMUNDSON University of Oklahoma Norman, Oklahoma Insider's View Panama Odyssey.William J. Jorden. Austin: The University of Texas Press, 1984. 746 p. William J. Jorden, former United States am- bassador to Panama, has written a remarkably complete insider's view of the 1977-78 Panama Canal Treaty negotiations and ratification process. It is indispensable for any student of those events and makes CAPBBEAN P1VMEW/43 fascinating reading for anyone even re- motely interested in the subject. Panama Odyssey is an eyewitness ac- count of the events and people which were part of Jorden's life during that period. He was a central figure in most of the negotia- tions. Even where he was not, his account is comprehensive. He has painstakingly re- constructed the meetings, trips, negotia- tions and the conversations by means of extensive interviews with all of the actors in the process, all of whom he could legit- imately call his friends. In particular, it is remarkable to note how the Panamanians were willing to reveal to him their own strat- egy and tactics in negotiations as well as their own reactions to the negotiating posi- tions taken by the United States. Jorden himself had a remarkable career in government. Formerly a correspondent of the New York Times, he entered the Na- tional Security staff of President Johnson and then held non-career appointments un- der the Nixon, Ford and Carter administra- tions. He was appointed ambassador to Panama in 1974 and retired in 1978, spending most of the subsequent period working on this book, which is the most complete record published of that period. Representing the best in the journalistic tradition, Jorden researched carefully every relevant document he could find. Despite its breezy and sometimes novelesque style, the 746-page length of the book may give some readers more than they would want to know about the Panama Canal Treaties. In recognition of that fact, Jorden wanted to leave his full scholarship to posterity, and he deposited his entire collection of papers and documents used in his research at the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library at the Uni- versity of Texas at Austin. He also put there his penultimate draft, with extensive foot- notes, which ran to some 1600 pages. The stormy procedure of obtaining the advice and consent of the Senate for ratification of the Treaties is a colorful part of Jorden's book. He records in stark detail the most regrettable part of the Treaty process, the acceptance, by the Carter Administra- tion of the "DeConcini reservation" to the Neutrality Treaty, introduced by Senator Dennis DeConcini of Arizona. Jorden had warned Washington that the DeConcini lan- guage was "flatly unacceptable" to the Pan- amanians. Nevertheless, President Carter accepted it in a desperate move to round up the necessary votes. Reminiscent of the in- famous Platt Amendment, it interpreted the Treaty as permitting the United States, even beyond the year 2000, "... the use of mili- tary force in Panama, to reopen the Canal or restore the operations of the Canal, as the case may be." Panama's strongman Omar Torrijos nearly denounced the Treaties on account of this move, a fact which is not surprising even in retrospect. A recent book by Graham Greene, Get- ting to Know the General: The Story of an Involvement (New York: Simon and Schus- ter, 1984), is currently considered a "must" for Panama buffs. Nevertheless, the portrait of Torrijos which emerges from Jorden's pages is even more complete, if perhaps not as lyrical. Several books on the subject of the Pan- ama Canal Treaties have been written since their ratification, and there may be more in the future. Jorden's book, in my opinion, is now the definitive work and is likely to re- main so. AMBLER H. MOSS, JR. University of Miami, Miami, Florida Once Too Many Endless War How We Got Involved in Central America-and What Can Be Done About It. James Chace. New York: Vintage Books, 1984. 144 p. This opportunistic book was published as a "Vintage Original." Such a designation is doubly misleading: not only is there little original in the book's concept, style, or con- tent, but much of it had previously been published in The New York Review of Books. James Chace can do better; Solvency-The Price of Survival showed him to be a perceptive observer. But End- less War feels like the social science equiv- alent of those ghastly books that appeared immediately after the death of Elvis Presley or John Lennon-a cynical exploitation of someone else's bad luck. The book's first section reviews the con- nections between US and Central American history. The footnotes show how it was cob- bled together: a reference to a standard his- torical work, then a cluster of Ibid.'s, then repeat. The process resembles a profes- sional football team's march down the field. Chace's debt to Walter LeFeber's Inevitable Revolutions also shows up here, rather than in the acknowledgments: more than a third of the references are to that more use- ful work. Part Two describes the Reagan Admin- istration's responses to the Central Ameri- can crisis, including the work of the Kissinger Commission. It is primarily a re- telling of events based on articles from the New York Times. The last part of Endless War mentions Chace's 1983 trip to Central America, Cuba, and Mexico. He writes that he "spoke with high officials both in and out of govern- ment." Apparently, none of them told him anything unusual or different from what they had been telling everyone else. The Mexicans are worried about Nicaragua; they want peace on their southern border. The Cubans insist they have cut back military aid to Salvadoran rebels; they see power- sharing as a solution. Unfortunately, Chace's own suggested solutions, while ad- mirable, are no more original: demilitarize, warn the Russians not to take advantage by putting in nuclear weapons, solve the debt crisis by interest payment postponement and trade agreements, deal with the root causes of poverty and revolution. Most academics and journalists write pulled-together pieces like Endless War oc- casionally, usually under the pressure of time. Some writers, notably James Fallows and John McPhee, have even raised the pro- cess of soaking up a subject and sharing it to something like an art. But Endless War is not artful. All its seams and joints show. If James Chace had not been a cozy insider of the New York publishing establishment (for- mer managing editor of Foreign Affairs, an editor of The New York Times Book Re- view) he most certainly would not have been able to sell this material once, much less twice. ALEXANDER H. MCINTIRE, JR. University of Miami Miami, Florida Economic Erosion What Price Equity? A Macroeconomic Evaluation of Government Policies in Costa Rica. Fuat M. Andic. Caribbean Occasional Series No. 4. Institute of Caribbean Studies, Rio Piedras: University of Puerto Rico, 1983. 70 p. This book, which is a result of an AID mis- sion report, is divided into two parts: the first dealing with the development of the Costa Rican economy, and the second with a criti- cal evaluation of government development policies. The social and economic performance of Costa Rica is given for the last two decades. The achievements of this economy, in terms of growth, employment, productivity, sta- bility, and equity, in a democratic setting, were at first outstanding for a less devel- oped country. But now Costa Rica is in a state of economic crisis: the growth rate is negative, many sectors are sagging, and some signs of inefficiency are evident. Some of these negative trends are the result of cyclical fluctuations, but others, accord- ing to Andic, are precisely the result of pub- lic policies. After analyzing Costa Rican government development policies and in- stitutions, Andic reaches the conclusion that "the economy suffers from serious inef- ficiencies which are now beginning to hamper the development efforts and erod- ing equity." IRMA T DE ALONSO Florida International University Miami, Florida 44/CAPBBEAN FEV IEW Recent Books On the Region and Its Peoples Compiled by Marian Goslinga Anthropology and Sociology Animal Myths and Metaphors in South America. Gary Urton, ed. University of Utah Press, 1985. 288 p. $17.50. Art, Knowledge and Health: Development and Assessment of a Collaborative Auto-Financed Organization in Eastern Ecuador. Dorothea S. Whitten, Norman E. Whitten Jr., Cambridge, Mass.: Cultural Survival, 1985. 126 p. $25.00. Bondmen and Rebels: A Study of Master- Slave Relations in Antigua with Implications for Colonial British America. David B. Gaspar. Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985. 352 p. $35.00. Breaking Faith. Humberto Belli. Westchester, Ill.: Good News Publications, 1985. 176 p. $6.95. [About religion in Latin America] Caribbean Life in New York City: Sociocultural Dimensions. Constance R. Sutton, Elsa M. Chaney. Staten Island, N.Y: Center for Migration Studies, 1985. 250 p. $14.95; $12.95 paper. The Chicano Experience: An Alternative Perspective. Alfredo Mirande. University of Notre Dame Press, 1985. 272 p. $19.95. Les chichimeques: archeologie et etnohistoire des chasseurs-collecteurs du San Luis Potosi, Mexique. Francois Rodriguez Loubet. Mexico: Centre d'Etudes Mexicaines et Centrameri- caines, 1985. 239 p. Church and State in the Social Content of Latin America. Alberto Espada-Matta. Vantage Press, 1985. $7.50. Colonial Indian Education in the Andes: The Transplanting of a Culture. Robert D. Wood. Culver City, Calif.: Labyrinthos, 1985. 150 p. $15.00. Los comuneros: guerra social y lucha anti- colonial Mario Aguilera Pefia. Universidad Nacional de Colombia, 1985. 277 p. Cuba: Twenty-Five Years of Revolution, 1959-1984. Sandor Halebsky, John M. Kirk, eds. Praeger, 1985. 480 p. $16.95. Cultura brasileira e identidade national. Renato Ortiz. Sao Paulo: Brasiliense, 1985. 148 p. Cr10,500. Cultura urbana latinoamericana. Angel Rama, et al. Richard Morse, Jorge Enrique Hardoy, eds. Buenos Aires: Consejo Latinamericano de Cencias Sociales, CLACSO, 1985. 264 p. Marian Goslinga is the Latin American and Caribbean Librarian at Florida International University. The Disappeared and the Mothers of the Plaza: The Story of the 11,000 Argentinians Who Vanished. John Simpson, Jana Bennett. St. Martin's Press, 1985. 416 p. $17.95. La educaci6n superior de la mujer en Mexico, 1876-1940. Luz Elena Galvan de Terrazas. Mexico: Centro de Investigaciones y Estudios Superiores en Antropologia, CIESAS, 1985. 95 p. Folk Literature of the Chorote Indians. Johannes Wilbert, Karin Simoneau, eds. Los Angeles: Latin American Center, University of California, 1985. 288 p. $25.00. From Slavery to Vagrancy in Brazil: Crime and Social Control in the Third World. Martha Knisely Huggins. Rutgers University Press, 1985. 183 p. $25.00. Haiti. Ruth Simmons. American Association of Collegiate Registrars and Admission Officers, 1985. 108 p. Handbook of Latin American Popular Culture. Harold E. Hinds, Jr., Charles M. Tatum, eds. Greenwood Press, 1985. 320 p. $45.00. Hist6ria da music brasileira. Renato Almeida. Brooklyn: Revisionist Press, 1985. $79.50. [Reprint of the 1926 ed.] La inmigraci6n italiana en la Argentina. Fernando Devoto, Gianfausto Rosoli, eds. Buenos Aires: Editorial Biblos, 1985. 270 p. The Jade Steps: A Ritual Life of the Aztecs. Burr Cartwright Brundage. University of Utah Press, 1985. 256 p. $22.50. Latino Ethnic Consciousness: The Case of Mexican Americans and Puerto Ricans in Chicago. Felix M. Padilla. University of Notre Dame Press, 1985. 208 p. $22.95. La lucha por la salud en Cuba. Leopoldo Arbujo Bernal, Jose Llorens Figueroa, eds. Mexico: Siglo XXI Editores, 1985. 382 p. Mexican-Americans in Comparative Perspective. Walker Connor, ed. Washington D.C.: Urban Institute Press, 1985. 400 p. Musique aux Antilles. Maurice Jallier, Yollen Jossen. Paris: Editions Caribeennes, 1985. 170 p. 53E Los nifhos de la frontera: ;Lespejismos de una nueva generaci6n? Margarita Nolasco, Maria Luisa Acevedo. Mexico: Editorial Oceano, 1985. 183 p. [About the U.S.-Mexico border region] Outlaws in the Promised Land: Mexican Immigrant Workers and America's Future. James D. Cockcroft. Grove Press, 1985. 288 p. $27.50; $8.95 paper. Reflexiones sobre la crisis educativa panamefia. Virgilio Ara(z. Panama: Imp. Sigio XXI, 1985. 108 p. $11.00. Sanctuary: A Resource Guide for Understanding and Participating in the Central American Refugees' Struggle. Gary MacEoin, ed. Harper & Row, 1985. 224 p. $7.95 [Papers from the Inter-American Symposium on Sanctuary, held in Tucson, Ariz., Jan. 23-24, 1985] El sincretismo iberoamericano: un studio comparative sobre los quechuas (Cuzco), los mayas (Chiapas) y los africanos (Bahia). Manuel M. Marzal. Pontificia Universidad Cat6lica del Peru, 1985. 237 p. Les soeurs de solitude: la condition feminine dans I'esclavage aux Antilles du XVII e au XIXe siecle. Arlette Gautier. Paris: Editions Cari- beennes, 1985. 284 p. 128E Tsewa's Gift: Magic and Meaning in an Amazonian Society. Michael F. Brown. Smithsonian Institution Press, 1985. 192 p. $19.95. Umbanda: Religion and Politics in Urban Brazil. Diana D. Brown. Ann Arbor, Mich.: UMI Research Press, 1985. When Women Rebel: The Rise of Popular Feminism in Peru. Carol Andreas. Westport, Conn.: L. Hill, 1985. 320 p. $19.95; $12.95 paper. Women in Argentina. Marifran Carlson. Academy Chicago Publishers, 1985. $14.95; $6.95 paper. Biography Contra toda esperanza: un testimonio de la realidad de las carceles de Castro. Armando Valladares. Barcelona: Plaza & Janes, 1985. 447 p. Daniel Cosio Villegas: imprenta y vida p6blica. Gabriel Zaid, ed. Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Econ6mica, 1985. 181 p. Jesus Silva Herzog. Manuel Aguilera. Mexico: Terra Nova, 1985. 143 p. CA_?BBEAN F-VIEW/45 Joao Manuel de Lima e Silva: o general farroupiliha. Enrique 0. Wiederspahn. Porto Alegre, Brazil: Escola Superior de Teologia Sao Lourengo de Brindes, 1985. 142 p. Memorias de campahia. Francisco L. Urquizo. Mexico: Secretaria de Educaci6n Publica, 1985. [Autobiography with inside facts on the Mexican Revolution] Description and Travel El Salvador: Beauty among the Ashes. Faith Adams. Minneapolis: Dillon Press, 1985. 144 p. $10.95. Guide to Jamaica. Harry S. Pariser. Chico, Calif.: Moon Publications, 1985. 175 p. $6.95. Haiti. Hildebrand Staff. New York: Hippocrene Books, 1985. 160 p. $8.95. St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Bequia, Mustique, Canovan, Mayreau, Tobago Cays, Palm Union, PSV: A Plural Country. Jill Bobrow (author), Dana Jinkins (photographer). Stockbridge, Mass.: Concepts Pub., 1985. $25.00. So Far from God: A Journey to Central America. Patrick Marnham. Viking, 1985. 253 p. $17.95. Le volcanisme en Martinique: la montagne Pelee. Helene Pascaline, Jean Jacques Jeremie. Fort-de-France, Martinique: Universite Antilles- Guyane, 1985. 35F. The Voyage of the "Water-Witch": A Scientific Expedition to Paraguay and the La Plata Region, 1853-1856. Robert D. Wood. Culver City, Calif.: Labyrinthos, 1985. 114 p. $10.00. White River, Brown Water: A Record-Making Kayak Journey Down the Amazon. Alan Holman. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1985. 192 p. $10.95. Who is the River?: Getting Lost and Found in the Amazon and Other Places. Paul Zalis. Atheneum, 1985. 336 p. $15.95. Un yucateco en Cuba socialist: morrocotuda historic de un viaje. Alberto Cervera Espejo. Merida: Maldonado Ediciones, 1985. 82 p. Economics America Latina y el proteccionismo norteamericano. M. Rodriguez Mendoza, et al. Buenos Aires: Grupo Editor Latinoamericano, 1985. 87 p. Bourbons and Brandy: Imperial Reform in Eighteenth-Century Arequipa. Kendall W Brown. University of New Mexico Press, 1985. 320 p. $29.95. Brazil: Medium-Term Policy Analysis. Kenneth Meyers, F Desmond McCarthy. World Bank, 1985. 122 p. $5.00. Chile: Experiment in Democracy. Sergio Bitar. Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1985. 350 p. $33.00. Cuba: el movimiento obrero y su retorno socio-politico, 1865-1983. Rodolfo Riesgo. Miami, Fla.: Saeta Ediciones, 1985. 251 p. $15.00. Debt and Development in Latin America. Kwan S. Kim, David F Ruccio, eds. University of Notre Dame Press, 1985. 256 p. $24.95. Derecho laboral hondurefio: los sindicatos y la contrataci6n colectiva. Arnaldo Villanueva Chinchilla. Tegucigalpa: Editorial Baktun, 1985. Dominican Republic: Economic Prospects and Policies to Renew Growth. World Bank. The Bank, 1985. 174 p. $10.00. Economia e sociedade no Rio Grande do Sul, seculo XVIII. Corcino Medeiros dos Santos. Sao Paulo: Companhia EditSra Nacional, 1985. 216 p. Economic Policymaking in Mexico: Factors Underlying the 1982 Crisis. Robert E. Looney. Duke University Press, 1985. 309 p. $37.50. Energy Efficiency and Conservation in Mexico: Perspectives on Efficiency and Conservation Policies. Oscar Guzmhn, Antonio Yfilez- Naude, Miguel S. Wionczek, eds. Westview Press, 1985. 330 p. $28.00. External Debt and Development Strategy in Latin America. Antonio Jorge, Jorge Salazar- Carrillo, Frank Diaz-Pou. Pergamon Press, 1985. 268 p. $39.00. Factories and Food Stamps: The Puerto Rico Model of Development. Richard Weiskoff. Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985. 240 p. $25.00. Latin America: Capitalist and Socialist Perspectives of Development and Underdevelopment. Ronald H. Chilcote, Joel C. Edelstein. Westview Press, 1985. 250 p. $32.00; $13.95 paper. Latin America, Economic Imperialism and the State: The Political Economy of the External Connection from Independence to the Present. Christopher Abel, Colin M. Lewis, eds. London: Athlone Press, 1985. 540 p. $52.00. A New Earth: The Jamaican Sugar Workers' Cooperatives, 1975-1981. Monica Frolander- Ulf, Frank Lindenfeld. University Press of America, 1985. 240 p. $24.50; $12.50 paper. The 1982 Cuban Joint Venture Law: Context, Assessment, and Prospects. Jorge E. Perez- L6pez. Institute of International Studies, University of Miami, 1985. 93 p. $7.00. La organizaci6n cooperative en Costa Rica. Hernan Mora Corrales. San Jose, Costa Rica: Editorial Universidad Estatal a Distancia, 1985. 259 p. Origins of Church Wealth in Mexico: Ecclesiastical Revenues and Church Finances, 1523-1600. John Frederick Schwaller. University of New Mexico Press, 1985. 256 p. $22.50. Panama: Structural Change and Growth Prospects. World Bank. The Bank, 1985. 384 p. $20.00. The Peruvian Mining Industry: Growth, Stagnation, and Crisis. Elizabeth Dore. Westview Press, 1985. 195 p. $21.00. Plantation Agriculture and Social Control in Northern Peru, 1875-1933. Michael J. Gonzales. University of Texas Press, 1985. 251 p. $25.00. The Political Economy of Argentina, 1880-1946. Guido di Tella, D. C. M. Platt, eds. St. Martin's Press, 1985. 256 p. $30.00. Politics and Economics of External Debt Crisis: The Latin American Experience. Miguel S. Wionczek, Luciano Tomassini, eds. Westview Press, 1985. 482 p. $37.50. La productividad y el desarrollo industrial en Mexico. Enrique Hernandez Laos. Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Econ6mica, 1985. 448 p. Provincial Patriarchs: Land Tenure and the Economics of Power in Colonial Peru. Susan E. RamireL University of New Mexico Press, 1985. 512 p. $37.50. Rural Development in the Caribbean: Selected Essays. P 1. Gomes, ed. St. Martin's Press, 1985. 272 p. $32.50; $14.95 paper. The Search for Public Policy: Regional Politics and Government Finances in Ecuador, 1830-1940. Linda Alexander Rodriguez. University of California Press, 1985. 281 p. $32.50. Sobre la deuda externa impagable de America Latina: sus consecuencias imprevisibles y otros. Fidel Castro. Buenos Aires: Nueva Latinoamerica, 1985. 132 p. [Based on interview Feb. 13, 1985] Trade and Foreign Direct Investment in Data Services. Karl P Sauvant. Westview Press, 1985. 244 p. $23.50. A Tumpline Economy: Production and Distribution Systems in Sixteenth-Century Eastern Guatemala. Lawrence H. Feldman. Culver City, Calif.: Labyrinthos, 1985. 152 p. $20.00. Underdevelopment Is a State of Mind: The Latin American Case. Lawrence E. Harrison. University Press of America, 1985. 210 p. $17.95. History and Archaeology Ancient Mexico: An Overview. Jaime Litvak King. University of New Mexico Press, 1985. 128 p. $12.95; $6.95 paper. Apuntes de historic cultural del Paraguay. Efraim Cardozo. 2d ed. Asunci6n, Paraguay: Universidad Cat6olica, 1985. 377 p. The Assassination of Gaithn: Public Life and Urban Violence in Colombia. Herbert Braun. University of Wisconsin Press, 1985. $32.50. 46/CAnIBBEAN FEVi E Atlantic Empires of France and Spain: Louisbourg and Havana, 1700-1763. John Robert McNeill. University of North Carolina Press, 1985. $32.00. Chucherias de la historic de Yucatan. Juan Francisco Pe6n Ancona. Merida: Maldonado Editores, 1985. 134 p. Compendio de historic uruguaya, 1800-1985. Ricardo Rocha Imaz, Roberto Varesi, Dante Pizzirusso Lofiego. Montevideo: Ediciones Blancas, 1985. 92 p. Contribuci6n a la historic political de Colombia. Libardo Gonzlez. Bogota: Editorial La Carreta, 1985. 272 p. Las corrientes ideol6gicas en la historic argentina. Marcos Merchensky. Buenos Aires: Hachette, 1985. 323 p. Cuba: From Columbus To Castro. Jaime Suchlicki. 2d, rev., ed. Pergamon Press, 1985. 260 p. $19.95; $12.95 paper. Excavations at Tiahuanaco and Elsewhere in Bolivia. Wendell C. Bennett. Garland Pub. Co., 1985. 360 p. $62.00. [Reprint of the 1934 ed.] Haiti: Family Business. Rod Prince. London: Latin American Bureau, 1985. 96 p. E 3.50. Histoire de l'expedition des franCais a Saint Domingue. Antoine M. T Metral. Paris: Karthala, 1985. 348 p. 89F. [Reprint of the 1825 ed.] Historia del Paraguay: 6poca colonial. Luis G. Benitez. Asunci6n, Paraguay- Comuneros, 1985. 263 p. Hist6ria e historiografia: Brasil pbs-64. Jose Roberto do Amaral Lapa. Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1985. 119 p. History of the Conquest of Mexico. William H. Prescott. Abridged ed. University of Chicago Press, 1985. $18.00. Honduras: State For Sale. Richard Lapper. Monthly Review Press, 1985. 128 p. $8.00. Juan Manuel de Rosas y la historic del Rio de la Plata, 1815-1852. Gonzalo Aguirre Ramirez. Montevideo: Editorial de la Plaza, 1985. 365 p. Latin America in the Twentieth Century. John Griffiths. No. Pomfret, Vt.: David & Charles, 1985. 72 p. $14.95. Mural Painting in Ancient Peru. Duccio Bonavia; Patricia J. Lyon, trans. Indiana University Press, 1985. 208 p. $57.50. [Translation of Ricchata quellcanil The Murals of Bonampak. Mary Ellen Miller. Princeton University Press, 1985. 248 p. $67.50. The Nicaraguan Revolution: Ideas in Conflict. Gary E. McCuen, ed. Hudson, Wis.: G. E. McCuen Publications, 1985. 136 p. $10.95. Significado hist6rico del gobierno del Dr. Ram6n Villeda Morales. Stefania Natalini de Castro, Maria de los Angeles Mendoza Saborio, Joaquin Pagan Sol6rzano. Tegucigalpa: Editorial Universitaria, 1985. 220 p. [About Honduras] Language and Literature Antologia de la modern poesia venezolana. Otto d'Sola. Caracas: Monte Avila Editores, 1985. 2 vols. Bs.90.00. [Reprint of the 1940 ed.] Cantares mexicanos: Songs of the Aztecs. John Bierhorst, ed. and trans. Stanford University Press, 1985. $48.50. [Aztec and English] O carter social da ficcao no BrasiL Fabio Lucas. Sao Paulo: Editbra Atica, 1985. 80 p. Critical Analysis of Valle Inclan's 'Ruedo iberico'. Linda S. Glaze. Miami: Ediciones Universal, 1985. 206 p. $12.95. Critical Perspectives on Gabriel Garcia Marquez. Nora Vera, Bradley Shaw, eds. Society of Spanish and Spanish-American Studies, Dept. of Modern Languages, University of Nebraska-Lincoln, 1985. 220 p. $20.00. Cultural Policy in Cuba: Partial Proceedings from the Third Congress of the Union of Writers and Artists of Cuba. Armando H. Davalos, et al. Minneapolis: Shadow Press, 1985. 48 p. $2.50. Hispanic Feminist Poems from the Middle Ages to the Present Angel Flores, Kate Flores, eds. Feminist Press at the City University of New York, 1985. $24.95; $9.95 paper. Ideologia y ficcibn en la obra de Luis Spota. Sara Sefchovich. Mexico: Editorial Grijalbo, 1985. 308 p. Literature chicana: Creative and Critical Writings Through 1984. Roberto G. Trujillo, Andres Rodriguez. Oakland, Calif.: Floricanto Press, 1985. 95 p. $23.00. A Nation of Poets: Nicaraguan Poetry. Kent Johnson, trans. Los Angeles: West End Press, 1985. 160 p. $5.95. Once novelistas latinoamericanos. Manuel Antonio Arango L. Bogota: C. Valencia Editores, 1985. 180 p. Realismo mgico y concienc miticamitica en America Latina: textos y contextos. Graciela N. Ricci Della Grisa. Buenos Aires: Garcia Cambeiro, 1985. 219 p. Sociedad y tipos en las novelas de Ramon Meza y Suarez Inclan. Manuel A. Gonzalez Freixas. Miami: Ediciones Universal, 1985. 184 p. $12.95. La tematica narrative de Severo Sarduy. Jose Sanchez-Boudy. Miami: Ediciones Universal, 1985. 103 p. $10.00. Tempos da literature brasileira. Benjamin Abdala Junior, Samira Youssef Campedelli. Sao Paulo: Editora Atica, 1985. 304 p. Vocabulario congo: el banth que se habla en Cuba. Lydia Cabrera. Miami: Ediciones Universal, 1985. 164 p. $15.00. Woman as Myth and Metaphor in Latin American Literature. Carmelo Virgilio, Naomi E. Lindstrom. University of Missouri Press, 1985. 192 p. $20.00. Politics and Government La Argentina electoral Natalio R. Botana, Luis Gonzalez Esteves, et al. Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana, 1985. 160 p. Big Red Diary 1986: Nicaragua. Nicaraguan Solidarity Campaign, ed. Dover, N.H.: Longwood Publishing Group, 1985. 128 p. $5.95. Bitter Grounds: Roots of Revolt in El Salvador., Liisa North. Rev. ed. Westport, Conn.: L. Hill, 1985. $8.95. Central America and the Western Alliance. Joseph Cirincione, et al., eds. Holmes & Meier, 1985. 238 p. $26.50. Central America and United States Pqlicies, 1820s-1980s: A Guide to Issues and References. Thomas M. Leonard. Claremont, Calif.: Regina Books, 1985. 133 p. $17.95; $10.95 paper. Centroamerica: conflict y democracia. Jaime Darenblum, Eduardo Ulibarri. San Jose, Costa Rica: Libro Libre, 1985. 206 p. Crisis del bipartidismo y mitos del sistema en Colombia. Nodier Botero Jimenez. Bogota: Ediciones Lerner, 1985. 323 p. The Democratic Mask: The Consolidation of the Sandinista Revolution. Douglas W. Payne. New York. Freedom House, 1985. 100 p. Democratizacibn via reform: la expansion del sufragio en Chile. J. Samuel Valenzuela. Buenos Aires: Instituto de Desarrollo Econ6mico y Social, ILDES, 1985. 150 p. Diplomatic Claims: Latin American Historians View the United States. Warren Dean, ed. and trans. University Press of America, 1985. 330 p. $26.50; $14.50 paper. El studio de las relaciones internacionales en America Latina y el Caribe. Ruben M. Perina, ed. Buenos Aires: Grupo Editor Latinoamer- icano, 1985. 223 p. Guatemala: revoluci6n de octubre. Tomas Herrera Calix. San Jose, Costa Rica: Editorial Universitaria Centroamericana, EDUCA, 1985. 140 p. Guyana: Politics and Development in an Emergent Socialist State. Kempe Ronald Hope. Oakville, Canada: Mosaic Press, 1985. 180 p. $19.95; $12.95 paper. 0 Hacia d6nde va Costa Rica?: 56 preguntas y respuestas sobre la crisis. Miguel Gutierrez Saxe, et al. San Jose, Costa Rica: Editorial Porvenir, 1985. 158 p. CAI?BBEAN FEVIEW/47 Historia de los municipios de Cuba. Joaquin Freyre. Miami: Moderna Press, 1985. 638 p. $25.00. Historia del trotskismo argentino, 1929-1960. Osvaldo Coggiola. Buenos Aires: Centro Editor de America Latina, 1985. 159 p. Honduras: Portrait of a Captive Nation. Nancy Peckenham, Annie Street, eds. Praeger, 1985. 336 p. $36.95. La infiltraci6n comunista en los partidos politicos paraguayos. Leandro Prieto Yegros. Asunci6n, Paraguay. Cuadernos Republicanos, 1985. 521 p. Jamaica Under Manley: Dilemmas of Socialism and Democracy. Michael Kaufman. Westport, Conn.: L. Hill, 1985. $19.95; $9.95 paper. Latin American Democracies: Colombia, Costa Rica, Venezuela. John A. Peeler. University of North Carolina Press, 1985. 193 p. $24.00. Military Rule in Chile: Dictatorship and Oppositions. J. Samuel Valenzuela, Arturo Valenzuela. Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985. 352 p. $35.00. National Marxism in Latin America: Jose Carlos Mariategui's Thought and Politics. Harry E. Vanden. Boulder, Colo.: L. Rienner, 1985. 215 p. $20.00. Nicaragua: revolucibn y demografia. Jose Luis Coraggio. Mexico: Editorial Linea, 1985. 120 p. Nicaragua: The People Speak. Alvin Levie. South Hadley, Mass.: Bergin & Garvey, 1985. 224 p. $25.95; $10.95 paper. [Interviews] Opciones political peruanas 1985. Eugenio Chang-Rodriguez. Lima: Centro de Documen- taci6n Andina, 1985. 466 p. Political Power in Ecuador. Osvaldo Hurtado; Nick D. Mills Jr., trans. 2d ed. Westview Press, 1985. 432 p. $28.00. [Translation of El poder politico en el Ecuador] Politics in the Semi-Periphery: Early Parliamentarism and Late Industrialization in the Balkans and Latin America. Nicos P Mouzelis. St. Martin's Press, 1985. 320 p. $32.50. Problems of Succession in Cuba. Jaime Suchlicki, ed. Institute of International Studies: University of Miami: 1985. 105 p. $10.95. Rafael Nfilez and the Politics of Colombian Regionalism, 1863-1886. James W. Park. Louisiana State University Press, 1985. 336 p. $35.00. Realidade brasileira: visao humanizadora. Lauricio Neumann, Oswaldo Dalpiaz. Petr6polis, Brazil: Vozes, 1985. 156 p. The Rise and Fall of the Chilean Christian Democracy. Michael Fleet. Princeton University Press, 1985. 274 p. $35.00. The Sandino Affair. Neill Macaulay. Duke University Press, 1985. 320 p. $12.50. [Reprint of the 1967 ed.] State and Opposition in Military Brazil. Maria Helena Moreira Alves. University of Texas Press, 1985. 268 p. $22.50. Transicibn a la democracia en America Latina. Pilar Armanet, et al.; Francisco Orrego Vicuia, ed. Buenos Aires: Grupo Editor Latinoamer- icano, 1985. 240 p. The United States and Mexico. Josefina Z. Vizquez, Lorenzo Meyer. University of Chicago Press, 1985. 204 p. $29.00. U.S. Foreign Policy in the Caribbean, Cuba, and Central America. James N. Cortada, James W. Cortada. Praeger, 1985. 251 p. $35.95. Reference Bibliografia de la literature uruguaya. Thomas L. Welch, ed. General Secretariat, Organization of American States, 1985. 502 p. $35.00. Bibliografia del teatro hispanoamericano contemporaneo, 1900-1980. Fernando de Toro, Peter Roster. Frankfurt: K.D. Vervuert, 1985. 2 vols. 718 p. $48.00. Bibliografia sobre financiamiento y endeudamiento externo de los paises en desarrollo, con especial 6nfasis en America Latina. Asociaci6n Latinoamer- icana de Instituciones Financieras de Desarrollo. Lima: ALIDE, 1985. 107 p. Bibliography of Commissions of Enquiry and Other Government-Sponsored Reports on the Commonwealth Caribbean, 1900-1975. Audrey Joyce Roberts. Madison, Wis.: Seminar on the Acquisition of Latin American Library Materials, SALALM, 1985. 89 p. Brazil: A Handbook of Historical Statistics. Armin K. Ludwig. G. K. Hall, 1985. 430 p. $75.00. The Central American Fact Book. Tom Barry, Deb Preusch. Grove Press, 1985. 288 p. $27.50; $8.95 paper. Chicano Periodical Index: A Comprehensive Subject, Author, and Title Index for 1982-83. Chicano Periodical Indexing Project, et al., eds. Chicano Studies Library, University of California, 1985. 660 p. $75.00. Diccionario de antropologia meso-americana. Cesar Macazaga Ordofio. Mexico: Editorial Innovaci6n, 1985. 2 vols. 503 p. Index to Spanish American Collective Biography: The River Plate Countries. Sara de Mundo Lo. G. K. Hall, 1985. 400 p. $90.00. Latin American Music: An Annotated Bibliography of Reference Sources and Research Materials. Malena Kuss. Garland Pub. Co., 1985. 300 p. $40.00. Latin American Society and Legal Culture: A Bibliography. Frederick E. Snyder, ed. Greenwood Press, 1985. $37.50. Petroleum in Venezuela: A Bibliography. William M. Sullivan, Brian S. McBeth. G. K. Hall, 1985. 550 p. $75.00. Universities in the Caribbean Region: Struggles to Democratize: An Annotated Bibliography. Barbara Ashton Waggoner, George R. Waggoner. G. K. Hall, 1985. 450 p. $55.00. MAYO/JUNIO 1985 NO 77 Director: Alberto Koschuetzke Jefe de Redacci6n: Daniel Gonzdlez V. ANALYSIS DE COYUNTURA: Omar Luis Colmenares: CEE: Los Allados Proscritos; Andres Serbin: Cuba: Entre la Ideologia y el Pragmatismo; Juan Car- los Puig: Malvinas: Tres Anos Despues. TEMA CENTRAL: INSTITUCIONES PARA LA DEMOCRACIA: Alfredo Vsquez Carrizoa: Democracia Nominal y Democracia Real. El Problema de las Elbertades en America Latina; Luia Bus- tamante Belaunde: Explorando el Parla- mento en el Perul; Manuel Gaggero P6- rez: Continuidad y Ruptura. La Legall- dad Revolucionaria: Aristides Torres: Fe y Desencanto Democratico en Ve- nezuela; Fernando Cepeda Ulloa: Po- der Judicial y Estabilidad Democratica; Jorge Nufiez: Teoria y Practica de la Pugna de Poderes; Rafael de Is Cruz: Encuentros y Desencuentros con la De- mocracia. Los Nuevos Movimientos So- ciales: Humberto Nogueira Alcala: El Presidencialismo en la Practica Politica. "POSICIONES: Reorientar, Reconstruir, Renovar el Proyecto del MAS. POLITICAL ECONOMIA-CULTURA: Willy Brandt: Cooperacion en un Mundo de Tensions; Sergio Bitar: America La- tina-Europa: 4Conflicto o Colabora- cion?; Francisco Iturraspe: IManos a la Obra! Sindicatos Nacionales por Rama de Actividad; Carmen Rosa Balbi: 4Huel- ga o Participacion? Nuevas Formas de Lucha Sindical; Ernesto F. Villanueva: Peronismo: Entre sla Esperanza y sla Dis- gregacion; Carina Perelli Juan Rial: El Discrete Encanto de la Socialdemocra- cia. NOTICIAS INFORMES-RECENSIO- NES SUSCRIPCIONES ANNUAL BIENAL (Induido flf a*no) (8 nmus.) (12 ndm-.) America Latina US$ 20 US$ 35 Resto del Mundo US$ 30 US$ 50 Venezuela Ba. 150 Ba. 250 PAGOS: Cheque en dolares a nombre de NUEVA SOCIEDAD. Direcci6n: Apartado 61.712-Chacao, Ca- racas 1060-A. Venezuela. Rogamos no efectuar transferencias ban- carlas para cancelar suscralpciones. 48/CAIBBEAN PEVIEw _ __1 Florida International University Southeast Florida's Four-Year State University Florida International University (FIU)-located in one of the nation's fastest growing metropolitan areas and centers for international trade, finance and cultural exchange-empha- sizes broad interdisciplinary education for strengthening understanding of world issues and preparing students for membership in our modern interrelated world. It offers courses and programs at three locations: Tamiami Campus in Southwest Dade County, Bay Vista Campus in North Miami and the Broward Center, on the Central Campus of Broward Community College. Florida International University's faculty members are renowned for their commitment to teaching, research and service from an international perspective. Individual and group research projects run the gamut of possible topics and geographic regions. Faculty exchanges take FIU researchers abroad and bring leading international scholars to the campus. 15,000 students come from 74 nations and 41 states. They may select from undergraduate and graduate studies in the humanities, social sciences, mathematical and physical sci- ences, and a wide range of professional programs, earning degrees and/or certificates. Of special international interest are the Graduate Program In International Studies, a multi- disciplinary curriculum leading to the Master of Arts degree [contact: Director, Graduate Program in International Studies, (305) 554-2248] and a program in International Economic Development, offered as part of the Master of Arts in Economics [contact: Chairperson, Department of Economics, (305) 554-2316]. A Master of International Business provides basic management tools and familiarity with the international environment [contact: Director, Master of International Busi- ness, (305) 940-5870]. Several professional programs provide academic and ap- plied courses in fields applicable to an international focus. The School of Nursing's program leads to the Bachelor of Science and prepares its graduates to practice professional nursing in a multicultural and changing society [contact: School of Nursing, (305) 940-5915]. The School of Public Affairs and Services offers undergraduate and graduate degrees in Crimi- nal Justice, Health Services Administration, Public Administration and Social Work emphasizing needs, issues and alternatives in rapidly changing urban societies [contact: School of Public Affairs and Services, (305) 940-5840]. The Latin American and Caribbean Center, one of 12 US Department of Education National Resource Centers, coordi- nates teaching and research on the region, administers an academic certificate program, supports research and sponsors public activities on Latin America and the Caribbean [contact: Director, Latin American and Caribbean Center, (305) 554-2894]. A certificate in International Bank Management provides training in international banking policy, practice and tech- niques [contact: Business Counseling Office, (305) 554-2781]. The International Banking Center cooperates with banks and businesses in Miami to support research and sponsor seminars on international banking topics [contact: International Banking Center (305) 554-2771]. The International affairs Center promotes international education, training, research and cooperative exchange by encouraging a wide variety of faculty and student activities and helping to develop the university's international programs [contact: International Affairs Center, (305) 554-2846]. The English Language Institute conducts a writing labora- tory for individualized instruction, provides diagnostic testing of oral and written English language proficiency, and operates the intensive English program, a four-month course of instruc- tion in reading, conversation, grammar, composition, TOEFL preparation and business English [contact: Director, English Language Institute, (305) 554-2222]. The university is also the base for several international organizations. The Inter-American University Council for Economic and Social Development (CUIDES) is an indepen- dent, nonprofit association of representatives from post- secondary academic institutions. Its primary concern is assist- ing nations of the Americas with economic and social development. The Institute of Economic and Social Research of the Caribbean Basin (IESCARIBE) is a group of Caribbean basin economists and research institutes which develop cooperative projects of mutual interest. The institute conducts seminars and publishes resulting materials. Florida International University Bay Vista Campus North Miami, Florida 33181 Tamiami Campus Miami, Florida 33199 We're going to spoil you in the Caribbean. We'll spoil you on one of NCLs five Caribbean cruise ships to eleven tropical ports. Cruise across the Caribbean's crystal clear sea. So unspoiled. But you won't be. You'll be waited on. Be pampered. Bedazzled. See your travel agent for our full- color brochure, complete details and reservations. We're going to spoil your %15l 4000 |
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