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Title: Caribbean Review
Physical Description: Serial
Language: English
Creator: Latin American and Caribbean Center, Florida International University
Publisher: Latin American and Caribbean Center, Florida International University
Place of Publication: Miami, FL
Publication Date: 1985
Copyright Date: 1980
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Table of Contents
    Front Cover
        Front Cover 1
        Front Cover 2
    Table of Contents
        Page 1
    Front Matter
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    Main
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    Back Matter
        Page 56
    Back Cover
        Back Cover 1
        Back Cover 2
Full Text









































































Elections Caribbean Style; Tobago's Quest for Autonomy; Barbadians and
the Panama Canal; Labor Organization in the Caribbean Basin; Export
Promotion in Costa Rica, Honduras and Puerto Rico; The CBI Faces
Adversity; Addressee Unknown, A Short Story


-o
--LIr
L~99L C





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TOLL FREE (800) 327-2600
in FL (800) 432-3364


I want to share the love affair. Tell me how.
NAME


ADDRESS
CITY/STATE/ZIP

















In this issue


3
Crossing Swords
Florida and the Caribbean
By Bob Graham

4
Politics Caribbean Style
Lessons from Grenada
By Anthony P Maingot

7
Tobago's Quest for
Autonomy
From Colony to Ward to...
By Selwyn Ryan

10
Go West Young Man
Black Barbadians and the
Panama Canal
By Bonham C. Richardson


14
Varieties of Labor
Organization
The Caribbean and Central America
Compared
By Steve Charnovitz

18
The CBI Faces Adversity
Lessons from the Asian Export
Strategy
By Bernardo Vega

20
The CBI Is Not Enough
The Case of Honduras
By Marta Ortiz-Buonafina

22
The Decision to Trade
Puerto Rico's Export Strategies
By Suphan Andic


Cover
Hacienda Venezolana by Cuban artist
Alberto Cruz (acrylic on canvas, 48 x 36
inches). The painting is on exhibit at the
De Armas Gallery in Miami, Florida.


27
The Costa Rican Solution
An Innovative Approach to Export
Promotion
By John C. Edmunds and
William Renforth


30
Addressee Unknown
A Short Story
Written and Translated by
James A. Able, Jr.


34
A Caribbean Lilliput
Scrutinizing the Grenada Skirmish
Reviewed by Kai Schoenhals


F 48
40 First


Impressions


52
Recent Books

















The New

Cuban Presence

in the

Caribbean

edited by Barry B. Levine

July 1983, 274 pages
$26.50 (cloth), $11.50 (paper)

"An extremely valuable and most welcome
addition to the literature on Cuba's Interna-
tional relations . The chapters are well
written, carefully documented and offer vital
Insights into the International rivalries which
have transformed the Caribbean Basin into
an arena of International conflict."
-Richard Millett,
The Air War College

"Indispensable for those wishing to gain in-
sight Into the basin's complex political
forces and dynamics." -Edward Gonzalez,
Caribbean Review

"A very thorough piece of work, highly Infor-
mative and analytical." -Frank Virden,
The Times of the Americas


Also of interest

Latin America, Its Problems and
Its Promise
A Multidisciplinary Introduction
edited by Jan Knippers Black
September 1984 ca. 450 pages
$30 (cloth) $14.50 (paper)

Revolution and Counterrevolution in
Central America and the Caribbean
edited by Donald E. Schulz and
Douglas H. Graham
July 1984 ca. 425 pages
$35 (cloth) $14.95 (paper)

For examination copies, write to M. Gilbert. Dept. CMG-5,
Westview Press, giving course title, enrollment, and present
text. Please Include $3.50 per book for processing and
postage.
Write for our complete catalog.

LkwWestview Press
5500 Central Avenue Boulder, Colorado 80301


JCA BBIEAN
H Kview


SPRING 1985
Editor
Barry B. Levine
Associate Editors
Anthony P Maingot
Mark B. Rosenberg
Managing Editor
June S. Belkin
Book Review Editor
Forrest D. Colburn
Bibliographer
Marian Goslinga
Cartographer
Linda M. Marston
Contributing Editors
Henry S. Gill
Eneid Routte G6mez
Aaron L. Segal
Andr6s Serbin
Olga J. Wagenheim


Vol. XIV, No. 2



Art Director
Danine L. Carey
Design Consultant
Juan C. Urquiola
Contributing Artists
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Velinka Patkovic
Circulation Manager
Maria J. Gonzalez
Distribution Manager
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Marketing Manager
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Project Director
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Project Manager
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Three Dollars



Board of Editors
Reinaldo Arenas
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Errol Barrow
German Carrera Damas
Yves Daudet
Edouard Glissant
Harmannus Hoetink
Gordon K. Lewis
Vaughan A. Lewis
Leslie Manigat
James A. Mau
Carmelo Mesa-Lago
Carlos Alberto Montaner
Daniel Oduber
Robert A. Pastor
Selwyn Ryan
Carl Stone
Edelberto Torres Rivas
Jose Villamil
Gregory B. Wolfe


Caribbean Review, a quarterly journal dedicated to the Caribbean, Latin America, and
their emigrant groups, is published by Caribbean Review, Inc., a corporation not for profit
organized under the laws of the State of Florida (Barry B. Levine, President; Andrew R.
Banks, Vice President; Kenneth M. Bloom, Secretary). Caribbean Review is published at
the Latin American and Caribbean Center of FIU (Mark B. Rosenberg, Director) and
receives supporting funds from the Office of Academic Affairs of Florida International
University (Steven Altman, Provost; Paul Gallagher, Associate Vice President for Aca-
demic Affairs) and the State of Florida. This public document was promulgated at a
quarterly cost of $8.537 or S 1.70 per copy to promote international education with a
primary emphasis on creating greater mutual understanding among the Americas, by
articulating the culture and ideals of the Caribbean and Latin America, and emigrating
groups originating therefrom.
Editorial policy: Caribbean Review does not accept responsibility for any of the views
expressed in its pages. Rather, we accept responsibility for giving such views the oppor-
tunity to be expressed herein. Our articles do not represent a consensus of opinion-
some articles are in open disagreement with others and no reader should be able to agree
with all of them.
Mailing address: Caribbean Review. Florida International University, Tamiami Trail, Miami,
Florida 33199. Telephone (305) 554-2246. Unsolicited manuscripts (articles, essays,
reprints, excerpts, translations, book reviews, poetry, etc.) are welcome, but should be
accompanied by a self-addressed stamped envelope.
Copyright: Contents Copyright @ 1984 by Caribbean Review, Inc. The reproduction of
any artwork, editorial or other material is expressly prohibited without written permission
from the publisher.
Photocopying: Permission to photocopy for internal or personal use or the internal or
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users registered with the Copyright Clearance Center (CCC), provided that the stated fee
of $1.00 per copy is paid directly to CCC, 21 Congress Street, Salem, MA 01970. Special
requests should be addressed to Caribbean Review, Inc.
Syndication: Caribbean Review articles have appeared in other media in English. Span-
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Index: Articles appearing in this journal are annotated and indexed in America: History
and Life; Current Contents of Periodicals on Latin America; Development and Welfare
"r ~j,: H;,, .,, 3,-.r;;..l, F ii,:;, j ili i.'j. H;:l ..;:3i ri,;i.j. i: lrlc .n il;-,jlB;bl:.. i.
Pr, :I : :k -A :, i .r,I ..u .l 1 B.,..:.,i a *.5..] ..i 3,.: 51 L -T..a .jr. I.-.I. r. .. ,51
Development Abstracts; International Serials Database (Bowker); New Periodicals Index;
Political Science Abstracts; PAIS BULLETIN; United States Political Science Documents;
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2; an index to volumes seven and eight, in Vol. IX, No. 2; to volumes nine and ten, in Vol.
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Number: 079.7295.


2/CAfIBBEAN PFVIEW










Crossing Swords


Florida and the Caribbean


By Bob Graham


When I visited St. Georges, Grenada, last
fall, I recalled a visit five years earlier-at a
time when the New Jewel Movement of
Maurice Bishop had just been installed, and
before the intentions of its most radical ad-
herents had fully surfaced. I remembered an
informal conversation with Angela Bishop,
the wife of the prime minister. In the days
following her husband's accession to
power, Mrs. Bishop told us, offers of aid
came from both the United States and from
Cuba.
An American diplomat brought forms to
fill out in triplicate for US AID projects, for
the Peace Corps, for other helpful pro-
grams. Then the diplomat flew away to the
Barbados embassy. A week later, a Cubana
airliner arrived. Out walked teachers, agri-
culturalists, nurses and construction work-
ers, offering to begin immediately teaching,
farming, innoculating and building.
In the years following, I often doubted that
Angela Bishop's story was totally accurate.
Captured documents since released by the
US departments of State and Defense es-
tablish beyond a reasonable doubt that the
Bishop regime was strongly leftist from the
beginning.
But that picture of an American bureau-
crat offering forms in triplicate, rather than
immediate help, has lived in my mind ever
since. When I returned to Grenada last Oc-
tober on a trade mission to the Eastern
Caribbean, the need for greater contact and
communication with our Caribbean basin
neighbors came home again.
All the nations of the Caribbean basin
share a mutual interest in our common fu-
ture. If we are to prevent the spread of com-
munism in our region, and ultimately
celebrate its elimination, we must make
stronger economic, cultural and educa-
tional ties a priority for the United States.
Those ties should be strongest with Flor-
ida-for Florida has truly become a Carib-
bean state.
Each Caribbean basin state strongly af-
fects the others. The same breezes blow
through all our skies. Our Florida ports are
Caribbean ports, by air and by sea, filled
with goods moving in both directions.
When the economies of the Caribbean
basin prosper, the Florida economy pros-


pers along with them. Florida supplies
more of the goods and services that come
from the United States to the Caribbean
region than any other state. Similarly, when
the economies of the Caribbean basin ex-
perience a decline, we feel a decline along
with them. Florida has seen that when
things go badly in the Caribbean, whether
in Grenada, Cuba, Haiti or Central America,
we get the backwash-refugees and eco-
nomic downturn.
The potential strengths of this region are
obvious. Last fall we toured an Intel Corpo-
ration plant where more than 1,000 Barba-
dians were making computer chips in an
air-conditioned "clean room" on the out-
skirts of Bridgetown. We visited Caribbean
Data Services, a subsidiary of American Air-
lines. This company processes 175,000
flight coupons a day, beaming the pro-
cessed data by satellite back to Tulsa,
Oklahoma, each night.
But this bright future of technology-
based employment is not universal. In Do-
minica, damage done by 1979's Hurricane
David still has not been repaired due to lack
of money and lack of skills. Not one archi-
tect-engineer lives on the island.
To help change that, the Florida Legisla-
ture has appropriated $150,000 for 10 four-
year scholarships, beginning in 1985, tar-
geting the nations of the Caribbean basin.
We awarded the first scholarship to Matthew
Carrette, 21, of the town of Plymouth, Do-
minica. He wanted to study architectural
engineering, and today he does. He was the
first of a group of ten students now in class
in Florida higher-education institutions
from the nations of Haiti, Costa Rica, Pan-
ama and Dominica. Their fields of study
were determined by their home govern-
ments-fields with a relevance for develop-
ing economies, such as agriculture,
engineering, computer science and solar
energy. And now the public and private sec-
tors are combining to expand scholarships
for the region through the new Florida
Inter-American Scholarship Fund, admin-
istered by the Florida Department of
Education.
This a beginning and an improvement.
Captured documents from the Bishop re-
gime show that hundreds of Grenadian stu-


dents were offered scholarships to Cuba,
the Soviet Union, Vietnam, Czechoslovakia,
Libya, East Germany and North Korea. This
situation is paralleled by what we found in
April 1984 on a visit to the Republic of Pan-
ama. We learned that among the hundreds
of Panamanians learning in East Bloc uni-
versities, 50 were on scholarship at Patrice
Lumumba University in Moscow to study
canal management-while only one Pan-
amanian student was on a United States
government scholarship. Obviously, what
we found is not an isolated example of phi-
lanthropy but a pervasive, comprehensive
and extensive program to capture the
minds of future leaders throughout the
Caribbean.
The United States, and particularly the
state of Florida, has an obligation to present
our ideas, our way of life, our freedoms to
the next generation of Caribbean leaders.
The National Bipartisan Commission on
Central America recommended 10,000
new scholarships to bring residents of the
Caribbean basin to US institutions of higher
learning. Unfortunately, Congress ad-
journed last year without taking action. Let
us hope for approval this year.
From a long-range perspective, we ought
to be doing this already. Florida and the
United States ought to be providing educa-
tional opportunities to our neighbors for
economic and humanitarian reasons. But
there's an even better reason: We ought to
be doing it because we can't afford to turn
over the intellect, the spirit and the youth of
our nearest neighbors to the communists.
To do so is to will our own future to them
as well.

Crossing Swords is
a regular feature of
Caribbean Review.
The views ex-
pressed herein are
the sole opinion of
the authors. Bob
Graham is governor
of the state of
Florida.


CAI?BBEAN FEVIEW/3




i-P"
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wa4 -


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itt


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N


Grenadian Prime Minister
Herbert A. Blaze


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BRi-










Politics Caribbean Style

Lessons from Grenada

By Anthony P. Maingot


t. David's was the parish to study for
the election. A traditional stronghold
for the Grenada United Labor Party
(GULP) of Eric Gairy, with a seat held by his
wife Cynthia, the area was also the birth-
place of the Joint Effort for Welfare, Educa-
tion and Liberation (JEWEL)-later to join
Maurice Bishop's Movement for the Assem-
blies of the People-to become the New
Jewel Movement. It is arguably the most
beautiful part of the island, with a series of
valleys rich in cocoa, coffee, bananas and
spice trees, the mainstays of Grenada's im-
portant small peasant farmer. With 5,341
registered voters, it is by far the largest
constituency.
My friend Tony Buxo, the island's only
optometrist as well as its only graduate from
Britain's Sandhurst Military Academy, was
legitimately worried about how his New Na-
tional Party (NNP) would do in St. David's. A
coalition of one old and two recently formed
parties, the NNP was hammered together
on Union Island under pressure from Prime
Ministers Tom Adams of Barbados, Eu-
genia Charles of Dominica, arid "son"
Mitchell of St. Vincent. The United States
was delighted with the outcome; they had
invested money and prestige in a bring-out-
the-vote campaign, and in making it clear
that the NNP's Herbert Blaize was their
choice.
But these were not the only outside influ-
ences. Eric Gairy was receiving strong sup-
port from Grenadians based in Trinidad,
and the Maurice Bishop Patriotic Movement
(MBPM) was receiving assistance from
friends in the US and, allegedly, Lybia. Gre-
nada, it appeared, had not stopped being an
object of international concern. And yet,
after the Eric Gairy revolution of the 1950s
and 60s which politicized the peasantry,
and the New Jewel Movement's four-and-
one-half years of revolution which pol-
iticized the urban youth and the middle
classes, no one in the know would predict
that outside forces would determine the
outcome of this first election since 1976.
Associate Editor Anthony P Maingot teaches
sociology and directs the Graduate Program
in International Studies at Florida International
University.


NNP symbol, "the house."


Election Fervor
Buxo, who had helped organize a telephone
campaign to force the NNP merger, was not
sitting still. On the eve of voting day he
wished to test the mood of St. David's for
the NNP and its candidate, Dan Williams. In
one of those strokes of theatrical genius
which makes West Indian carnivals such
spectacular affairs, Buxo appropriated his
daughter's dollhouse and strapped it to the
roof of his car. The house, you see, is the
new symbol of the NNP Eric Gairy's star
was quite well known, and the Maurice
Bishop Patriotic Movement's airplane was
an obvious allusion to the airport which the
murdered ex-prime minister had built.
These, then, were the competing symbols
of the new effort to get pluralist politics back
on track after a decade of Eric Gairy misrule
and nearly half a decade of Maurice
Bishop's "socialist" monologue.
After some hours of meandering through
the villages of the parish, Buxo decided that
most of the responses had been decidedly
in favor of "de house." While Buxo was tally-
ing reaction, I was attempting to gauge the
mood. Maybe the real challenger would be
neither Gairy's GULP nor the MBPM, but
rather disinterest reflected in a high voter
absentee rate. After all, every report since
the October 1983 invasion had highlighted


the fact that Grenadians wanted as little to
do with politics as possible. Our tour
through St. David's, however, showed that
the mood had changed dramatically. The
enthusiasm for the star, for the plane, but
especially for the house, was conveyed with
such energy that it soon became enveloping
and contagious. The people of St. David's
were showing as spontaneous a collective
joy as I had witnessed anywhere in the
Caribbean.
Buxo's polling ploy had been a smashing
success; it gave him something quantifiable
about the general mood, and it presented
me with the first lesson I would bring away
from Grenada: that the people's political in-
stincts and interest in free elections had
survived the multiple tragedies of their
young history. Previous elections in Domin-
ica, St. Kitts, St. Lucia, Tobago and the sub-
sequent one in Belize showed that Ca-
ribbean man, and especially woman, love
politics and the opportunity to vote peri-
odically for the party of their choice. Elec-
tions represent their basic conception of
what political rights-their citizenship-are
all about. In the recent elections in St. Vin-
cent, 89 percent of the electorate turned out
despite torrential rains and tropical squalls.
Grenada gave every evidence of coming
close to that performance. That Buxds poll-
ing gimmick seemed to be pointing in the
right direction, at least as far as St. David's
was concerned, was made forcefully evident
that same evening.
Expecting a motorcade of perhaps a
dozen or so vehicles, we had discussed
whether the two of us, both light-skinned
West Indians, should join in. Would this con-
tribute to the accusation by both the GULP
and the MBPM that the NNP was a "bour-
geois" party? We decided that the morn-
ing's experience with the dollhouse made
our presence not only possible, but indeed
desirable. And so I learned lesson number
two: West Indian racial (or better, color) ten-
sion, always latent, tends to recede dramat-
ically during periods which require collec-
tive, democratic participation. Elections,
like carnival, sporting events or religious
processions, seem to bring out that intrinsic
sense of humanity and fellowship which


CAI?BBEAN FEIEW/5









makes West Indian social relations unique.
But this lesson contains its antithesis: that
same fellowship can turn into raw hatred
and anger in the face of the people's collec-
tive sense of moral outrage or indignation.
Happily, the mood was one of camarade-
rie, so we drove towards the caravan. What a
sight! Snaking its way through St. David's
magnificent valleys was a line of vehicles of
every conceivable type, jammed with Gre-
nadians of every conceivable color, singing
to the beat of their specially composed ca-
lypso, "Dan is the Man in the Van." Beating
on bottles, pans, and on the sides of doors,
the caravan wound its way like a giant "jump
up" (the West Indian version of a conga line),
to screams of delight from clusters of hu-
manity in every village it passed. By the
time we reached the meeting place-a typi-
cal crossroads where traditionally Carib-
bean peasant meets urban man-a large
crowd of all ages had assembled and was
already "jamming" (a mutual, erotic rotat-
ing of the hips) to the tune of a popular
Trinidad Indian-imitating calypso, "Kuchi-
badbach," which the earthy Grenadians had
translated into sexual terms. And then, as if
by well-practiced synchronization, as a
voice called them to open the meeting with
the Lord's Prayer, the calypso went off the air
and the crowds settled down to pray in uni-
son. That religious note set the tone for the
rest of the meeting: no more hatred and
violence, no more jails, no more killings;
Grenadians were to behave as the big Chris-
tian family they had been before.
Lesson number three stared me starkly in
the face: Caribbean politics can be de-
scribed as a counterpoint between conser-
vatism and rebellion against virtually all
constraints; the interplay between deep-
rooted respect for religion and its corres-
ponding themes of family, the Christian
rearing of children and respect for one's
elders, and an explosive-even nihilistic-
"do-as-you-damn-well-please" syndrome
of attitudes. After all, weren't most of these
young people only yesterday raising
clenched fists and shouting "Power to the
People!"? Who, one might ask, are the "real"
Grenadians? No answer is possible because
the question is not quite relevant. Once you
take into account differences in style, in ex-
pression and presentation of self, all people
have the capacity and the tendency to shift
moods and loyalties. The difference is that
democracy, by defending the right to be
different, invariably seems more unruly or
chaotic than the disciplined order of institu-
tionalized "revolution."
It is precisely this flexibility-evident in
Jamaica yesterday, in China and Spain as in
Grenada today, and probably Cuba tomor-
row-which disproves absolutely the Marx-
ist theory of social change. Societies, i.e.
social classes, do not move inexorably for-
ward through an increasing social conflict,
nor is it a question of Lenin's "two steps


Party

NNP
GULP
MBPM


Popular Vote
Number Percent


23,984
14,677
2,022


Seats Won on
FPP System'

14
1
0


1984 Election Results


Seats Won on
PR System2

9
5 or 63
Oor 13


1. First-Past-the-Post: Seats assigned on basis of majority vote in each constituency.
2. Proportional Representation: Seats assigned in proportion to total votes cast for each party.
3. Depending on handling of residuals.


forward, one step back"; it can be forward or
backwards, sideways or stationary-all
movements quite unpredictable-unless,
of course, there is a straitjacket of the police
state. That, fortunately, was not Grenada in
1984.
And yet, throughout the political
speeches that Sunday evening, there were
direct and indirect allusions to the recent
past. That past still has to find its historian,
but, in a way, it was precisely this frenetic
and unpredictable swing between piety for
either Christian beliefs or "revolutionary"
and irascible independence which led the
more dogmatic Leninists within the Peo-
ple's Revolutionary Government (PRG) to
recommend putting the island's youth un-
der "heavy manners," i.e., severe discipline.
The clash over the advisability (not to say
feasibility) of censuring films, limiting free-
dom of movement, recruiting "armies of
production" as well as regular milita, etc.,
contributed as much as the deteriorating
economic situation to the division and then
self-destruction of the PRG. The Marxist-
Leninists failed miserably and tragically.
The question today is how the new regime
will fare.

A New Regime
The regime begins with some important
strengths. First, 84 percent of the electorate
voted despite a cumbersome registration
and enumeration system. Only in 1972 had
there been anywhere close to that kind of a
turnout (83.5 percent). In St. David's the
turnout was 87.7 percent; Dan Williams re-
ceived 60.5 percent, GULP 37 percent and
the MBPM 2.3 percent. That story was re-
peated in all but one of the 15 constituen-
cies. The victorious NNP won more than
two-thirds of the parliamentary seats
needed to change the constitution, some-
thing they promise to do. But the very size of
this victory presented lesson number four:
In the Westminster parliamentary system,
the electoral method (the so-called "first-
past-the-post") is basically undemocratic
and tends to distort the real weight of the
voting. The table shows how the NNP with
58.6 percent of the vote, secured 14 of the


15 seats. On a strict proportional basis, they
would have had 9 or 10 seats, depending on
the formula used to handle residuals. Since
the one GULP winner has stepped down, it
is conceivable that Grenada, like Jamaica
today and Trinidad during 1971-76, will be
governed without official opposition. This is
a bad situation in parliamentary systems
designed to accommodate opposing posi-
tions within the system itself.
Fortunately, there will be opposition.
Some of it will certainly come from Gre-
nada's important middle class, which has
come off the fence and taken sides. This is
no longer the "docile and confused bour-
geoisie" Maurice Bishop described in his
secret "Line of March" blueprint for a Marx-
ist-Leninist Grenada. Their new political
consciousness has contributed to a clarifi-
cation of political and ideological positions
and terminology on the island. "Right,"
"left" and "center" have now been defined;
terms such as the much-used "mixed econ-
omy" are being scrutinized. Does it mean a
partnership between government and the
private sector (as the NNP says), or is it a
mere "stage" on the route to the total social-
ization of production as the captured docu-
ments now show the PRG had intended?
Another form of opposition will probably
come from the younger, more left-leaning
members within the NNP Clearly the leader
of this group will be 42-year-old George
Brizan, who had brought his own National
Democratic Party into the NNP alliance.
Running in the city of St. Georges, with its
heavily young and restless population (it
had been an NJM bastion), Brizan took 71
percent of the 85 percent turnout, and he
was running against one of GULP's most
formidable campaigners, Albert Forsyth,
who received 24 percent of the vote.
It is a fascinating comment on the irony of
politics that it is precisely the four-and-one-
half years of New Jewel Movement rule
which generated this political awakening.
Virtually all the leaders on the present politi-
cal scene had been victimized by the "revo-
lution": Gairy and Winston Whyte on the
right; Blaize, Alexis and Brizan in the center,
Continued on page 36


6/CAI?BBEAN PKVIEW











Tobago's Quest for Autonomy

From Colony to Ward to...

By Selwyn Ryan


Tobago, part of the twin-island
state of Trinidad and Tobago, is
engaged in a feverish struggle
to redefine its relationship with Trin-
idad in the direction of greater auton-
omy, if not complete separation. It is a
struggle of long standing. During the
17th and 18th centuries, Tobago was
ruled at various times by the British,
the Dutch and the French. When the
island, which lies 18 miles to the
northeast of Trinidad, once more be-
came British in 1763 by the Treaty of
Paris, it was given the old system of
representative government which
characterized other West Indian colo-
nies-a system in which men of
property, or what was considered an
adequate stake in society, were the
only ones entitled to participate in the
political process. Under that system
Tobago had its own bicameral legis-
lature, and control of funds was in the
hands of an elected legislative as-
sembly which met for the first time in /'
1769.
For many years Tobago was one of Dr.
the most prosperous sugar-produc- 1962
ing islands in the Caribbean. Indeed,
in 1828 Tobago shared with St. Kitts first
place among all the colonies in the Carib-
bean in terms of prosperity, and it was con-
sidered a promotion for a governor of
Trinidad to be sent to Tobago. By the 1840s,
however, the period of prosperity had
passed.
In 1833, Tobago had been associated
with the Windward Islands (Barbados, St.
Vincent, Grenada and St. Lucia) for pur-
poses of administration. This federal ar-
rangement proved unsatisfactory for vari-
ous reasons, and in 1889 Tobago was
disassociated from the Windward Islands
and linked with Trinidad as a single colony
over the objections of the people of both

Selwyn Ryan is chairman of the Public Utilities
Commission of the Republic of Trinidad and
Tobago. Former head of the Department of
Government at the University of the West In-
dies, he is the author of Race and Nationalism
in Trinidad and Tobago.


Eric Williams, prime minister of Trinidad and Tobac
-1980.

islands. The Trinidadians, who hitherto had
little to do with Tobago, which was oriented
in trade and migratory patterns more to-
wards Barbados, were unwilling to share
their limited resources with Tobagonians.
The latter, fearing neglect, wanted to be
guaranteed the right to revert to its separate
existence, and they petitioned the Secretary
of State for the Colonies to that effect. The
British government flatly rejected the peti-
tion. It should be noted that Tobago had in
1877 ceased to have assembly govern-
ment, and like Trinidad was administered as
a crown colony.
It was hoped that the linkage with Trin-
idad would reduce the cost of administra-
tion and that capital would flow from
Trinidad to help restore the sugar and cocoa
estates to a measure of prosperity. This was
not to be, and in 1899 Tobago was reduced
to the humiliating status of a ward of Trin-
idad. It thereafter ceased to have a separate
treasury or statute book, and was governed


from Port of Spain in the same way as
was any other ward or county of Trin-
idad. As a result Tobagonians devel-
oped an acute inferiority complex
and a resentment of Trinidad and
Trinidadians, which soon found itself
channeled into political discourse
and action. That resentment became
stronger over the years as Trinida-
dians chose to dismiss, ignore or
ridicule it. Before long there was to
emerge a full-fledged national spirit,
which was limited only by Tobago's
concern that it did not have the eco-
nomic resources to stand fully on its
own feet.

Vastly Different Cultures
Unlike Trinidad, which in the 19th
century had a social structure that
Swas characterized by a fairly well-de-
fined class system with European
Whites at the top of the pyramid, fol-
Slowed by near whites and mulattoes
S of various hues at the middle levels,
I- and Africans and Indians in large
go, numbers at the bottom, Tobago soci-
ety was less stratified. True enough
there was a small planter class at the
top which owned substantial estates. Below
that group there was little social or ethnic
differentiation. Tobago was, and still is,
largely a folk society which is basically eth-
nically homogeneous. In the 19th and early
20th centuries, there were few Chinese,
Lebanese or Portuguese compared with
Trinidad.
The distribution is not dramatically differ-
ent today. Whereas the ethnic distribution of
the population of Trinidad and Tobago is
given in the 1980 census as Negro 40.8
percent, Indians 40.7 percent, mixed 16.3
percent, white 0.9 percent, Chinese 0.5 per-
cent and other 0.8 percent, in Tobago, it is
Negro 93.5 percent, mixed 3.6 percent, In-
dian 1.6 percent, white 0.4 percent, Chinese
0.8 percent, and Lebanese 0.5 percent.
The religious configuration of Tobago is
also significantly different from Trinidad, a
fact which derives from its colonial history.
Whereas Catholicism became and re-
mained dominant in Trinidad following the


CAI?BBEAN FIEIW/7









arrival of the French in the late 18th century,
Protestantism holds sway in Tobago, de-
spite the presence of the French on the is-
land for varying periods of time. The French
planters did very little by way of proselytiz-
ing among the slaves, a task which was left
to the Moravians, who first arrived on the
island in 1789, the Methodists, who estab-
lished a mission in 1818, and the Church of
England, which established a mission in
1801. These groups, which were ridden
with mutual jealousies, vied vigorously with
each other to Christianize and educate the
slaves as well as to eradicate the many Af-
rican rituals which were still prevalent
among the population.
The 1980 census shows Roman Cathol-
ics in Trinidad and Tobago to constitute
33.6 percent of the population, Hindus 25
percent, Anglicans 15 percent, Muslims 5.9
percent, Presbyterians 3.9 percent, Pen-
tecostals 2.5 percent, Baptists 2.4 percent,
Seventh Day Adventists, 1.5 percent, Meth-
odists 1.4 percent, Jehovah's Witnesses, 0.8
percent and others 8 percent. In Tobago the
distribution is radically different. Anglicans,
the largest denominational group, make up
a full 35 percent of the population, followed
by the Seventh Day Adventists 10.6 percent,
Methodists 10 percent, Roman Catholics
9.5 percent, Pentecostals 5.6 percent, Bap-
tists 2.4 percent, Jehovah's Witnesses 0.73
percent, Hindus 0.45 percent and Muslims
0.26 percent. Thus whereas Protestant
groups in Trinidad and Tobago as a whole
constitute some 35 percent of the popula-
tion, in Tobago they are the dominant ma-
jority, with some 90 percent of the
population adhering to one of the Protes-
tant communities.
The Methodists, Seventh Day Adventists
and Pentecostals, together with the Mora-
vian Baptists and the Jehovah's Witnesses,
are noted for the moral fervor of their re-
ligious worship, and together give religion in
Tobago a quality and style which is quite
different from that of Trinidad, which is a
more tolerant society in religion as well as in
other aspects of life. Tobagonians are very
serious, demonstrative and disciplined
about their religion, a quality which also
characterizes their approach to politics. The
Bible is a much quoted book on political
platforms in Tobago.
Family and kinship ties are also of para-
mount importance in Tobago, and one is
expected to respect one's elders and honor
and support one's family whatever the area
of concern or activity. There is a saying in
Tobago that politics is politics, but "blood is
blood." While there have been cases of de-
viance from the norm of family cohesive-
ness, the dominant pattern is for kin to
support each other, and sanctions are often
brought to bear on deviant individuals. This
of course is a fundamentally (though not
exclusively) African characteristic, and it
has frequently been remarked that African-


isms are far more persistent in Tobago than
in Trinidad, which has been effectively per-
meated by Western values.
With its essentially rural character, the
villages which developed along the coast
and in the interior of Tobago after eman-
cipation are of paramount significance.
Trinidad too has its villages, but the urban
life-style is pervasive. This is even so in the
more remote areas on Trinidad's North
Coast, where one finds large numbers of
Tobagonians. The metropolitanization phe-
nomenon is not as noticeable in Tobago,
where urban centers are insignificant, and
village loyalties and traditions therefore re-


The Bible is a much
quoted book on political
platforms in Tobago.


main strong. One knows (as does everyone
else) that one's family belongs to a particu-
lar village. Those who live in the village but
do not belong to it are regarded as "stranger
niggers," a term not often heard in Trinidad.
When estates declined due to the scarcity
of capital and market opportunities, a
sturdy peasantry developed, which had to
rely for survival on the cooperative tradi-
tions brought from Africa. Cooperation is
still a marked feature of village life in To-
bago. Tobagonians opposed to the ruling
party in Trinidad, the Peoples National
Movement (PNM), accuse it of instituting
policies which have helped to undermine
rather than develop that spirit.
Political aspirants and their supporters
must emphasize family links and village tra-
ditions and needs when campaigning on a
house-to-house basis. Political campaign-
ing must thus be particularistic rather than
generalized. It is important to win the sup-
port of older family heads who will then
function as political brokers. Elders expect
candidates to come to their homes and per-
sonally request their endorsement, sharing
a drink with them in the process. In one
recent campaign, the relationship of the
candidate to dead elders was also empha-
sized to firm up political support. Indeed,
considerations of family and the specific
need of the village frequently override is-
sues of class, religion and party platform in
determining political allegiance. And to be
successful in electoral politics in Tobago,
one would almost certainly have to be To-
bago born and a member of one of the
better known families, perhaps even a "fa-
vorite son" who has received some sort of
metropolitan credentials.
Many of Tobago's leading families gained
the prominence which they now enjoy
through their relationship with the Protes-
tant churches, which for long were the main


vehicles of social mobility in that island. Be-
coming a lay preacher was a mark of status
and distinction among the blacks. So too
was becoming a teacher or a school master
at a religious school, and it is to be noted
that many of the island's leading political
figures are the offspring of lay preachers
and school masters.
Given the ethnic homogeneity of Tobago,
race is of little if any significance in deter-
mining political allegiance, or for that mat-
ter any kind of allegiance. The reverse is true
in Trinidad, where it has been shown that
race is the most critical basis for political
cleavage, as it is for other types of social
affiliation. The same holds with respect to
religion, though to a lesser degree. While
religion affects the style and language of
politics, party cleavages do not coincide
with religion. An examination of voting pat-
terns in Tobago in the 1980 Assembly elec-
tions and the 1981 general elections reveal
that prominent Protestant families were to
be found supporting both the ruling PNM
and the Democratic Action Congress,
which by 1977 had emerged as the "party of
the soil" in Tobago.
The conclusion to be drawn is that politi-
cal style in Tobago differs radically from that
of Trinidad, which is more urban, cosmo-
politan and fractured by religious, racial and
class cleavages. Politics in Tobago is still
"parish pump" politics, and considerations
of family, kin and village override that of
party or nation except insofar as nation is
equated with Tobago rather than Trinidad
and Tobago. Whereas candidates can be
drawn from anywhere in Trinidad, in To-
bago, candidates must be rooted in the soil
and must be known by the notables
whether they be village elders or religious
heads. There is still a great deal of cohesive-
ness among Tobagonians, and even when
they support a non-Tobago political party,
they are expected to be loyal to Tobago and
to articulate its needs.

The Politics of Resentment
It is hardly surprising that political rhetoric
in Tobago has, for the most part, been dom-
inated by expressions of resentment against
Trinidad. Tobago nationalism has in fact
been largely forged in the struggle to obtain
a better deal from Trinidad. The dominant
and justified complaint of the Tobagonian
throughout the forties and fifties was that
Trinidadians looked down on them and
their island as being pariahs. Even though
they were part of the colony of Trinidad and
Tobago, they were ridiculed and regarded as
rustic small islanders with no "class." It was
also felt that whatever resources were avail-
able for development were expended in
Trinidad to the exclusion of Tobago. As
such, Tobagonians had to migrate if they
were to improve their intellectual and mate-
rial worth, and many did so.
The PNM had sought to put an end to this


8/CAI?BBEAN REVIEW









neglect when it appeared on the scene in
1955. Dr. Eric Williams, who became the
first prime minister in 1962, associated
himself with the complaints which Tobago-
nians had long made against the govern-
ment of Trinidad and Tobago. Still the PNM
lost Tobago in the 1956 general election by
245 votes. Despite the efforts which
Williams had made to put himself in the
vanguard of the Tobago protest movement,
many Tobagonians remained loyal to A.PT.
James, who had campaigned on their be-
half for many years. Tobagonians were also
less responsive to the urban-oriented cam-
paign of the PNM, with its emphasis on
morality in public affairs and the seculariza-
tion of the society and the educational sys-
tem. The anti-clerical tone of Williams' early
political speeches, as well as.some of the
circumstances of his marital life which were
exposed by the opposition, must also have
cost him support among some of the more
religiously fanatic elements in Tobago.
Nonetheless, the PNM government won the
election and sought to concretize its ex-
pressed concern for Tobago by earmarking
$13,600,000 for it-more money than had
been spent on the island for over 100 years.
A concern of long standing had been how
best to integrate Tobago with Trinidad ad-
ministratively. Tobagonians were dissatis-
fied with the situation that existed,
complaining that the administrative appa-
ratus in Tobago was incoherent. A Develop-
ment and Welfare Team constituted in 1957
shared that opinion and recommended the
appointment of an administrator to oversee
policy, particularly the implementation of
the development program, an administra-
tive officer who would deal with the routine
business of government, and a minister
with special responsibility to Tobago.
Williams admitted that Tobago was unique
and therefore could not be put on the same
foundation as other counties of Trinidad,
and he agreed that Tobago needed greater
autonomy.
Tobago responded to Williams' ex-
pression of concern by returning the PNM
candidate to the federal Parliament in 1958
and helping to elect two PNM candidates to
the national Parliament in the general elec-
tions of 1961, despite the efforts of the op-
position Democratic Labour Party to
pander to Tobago nationalism by suggest-
ing that Tobago should be made an inde-
pendent state and the capital of the
federation. The PNM won close to 70 per-
cent (68.87) of the popular vote in Tobago.
The way was now open for the PNM to inte-
grate the national movements of the two
islands and to correct the earlier neglect of
Tobago.
By 1970 many Tobagonians, particularly
the young, felt that the PNM had failed to
satisfy their expectations. Protest was vocal,
and a Tobago wing of the radical National
Joint Action Committee (NJAC) cam-


Copyright Linda Marston, 1985


paigned vigorously for a change of the so-
cial order in Tobago. Radical Tobagonians
complained about the fact that over 60 per-
cent of the land in Tobago is owned by
whites, that a lot of this land is tied up in a
golf course for tourists and that "Buccoo
Reef and Pigeon Point were seized by Gor-
don Grant and Co. for their kith and kin."
The NJAC also claimed that many young
blacks who confronted the capitalist system
in Tobago were brutally beaten by the
police.
In Tobago in the post-1970 period, as
well as in Trinidad, there was a great deal of
public reassessment of the economic, polit-
ical and social relationships and arrange-
ments which had been left over from the
colonial era or which had been put into
place in the period following the triumph of
the PNM in 1956. Not surprisingly, the con-
stitutional relationship between Trinidad
and Tobago was also thoroughly reex-
amined. Suggestions made with respect to
Tobago ranged all the way from full seces-
sion to a retention of the status quo with
minor modifications. A Constitution Re-


form Commission, established in 1971, rec-
ommended, among others, a) the replace-
ment of the permanent secretary in the
Ministry of Tobago Affairs by a commis-
sioner for Tobago, who would be vested with
wider powers; b) an improvement in sea
and air communications to Tobago; and c)
the establishment of a Tobago Regional
Council, consisting of elected and selected
members with partly executive and partly
advisory functions. The regional council
would carry out those duties and functions
performed by the Tobago County Council
and such other duties as may be prescribed
for county councils. The council would also
advise the minister charged with the re-
sponsibility for Tobago affairs on, and make
recommendations in connection with,
plans for implementation of programs in
Tobago. The commission further recom-
mended that provisions for the Tobago Re-
gional Council should be included in the
Constitution. The Commission saw no
need, however, for a law-making agency for
so small a community "where enactments
Continued on page 38


CAI BBEAN PIEW/9




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Go West Young Man

Black Barbadians and the Panama Canal

By Bonham C. Richardson


Before dawn on 18 January 1905,
hundreds of young black men
throughout the Caribbean sugar is-
land of Barbados already had left their tiny
wooden houses and were walking the gravel
highways toward Bridgetown. They wore
their Sunday best-suitcoats and straw
hats, some even with shoes-and all car-
ried canvas satchels or cardboard suitcases.
Their ranks swelled as they neared the
wharf-side area of the city. By daybreak a
crowd of well over 1,000 black Barbadians
had gathered at Bridgetown's inner harbor.
Friends and family had joined the men to
watch them depart.
As the day progressed, the men were
taken in small groups aboard lighters, car-
rying them past the moored sailing schoon-
ers and fishing sloops to the royal mail
steamer La Plata, lying offshore in Carlisle
Bay. As each group slipped away from the
crowded dock, wives and mothers sobbed
and waved good-byes. The transfer of all the
men to the La Plata's decks was finally
completed by late afternoon. Then the
steamship pulled anchor, gave a single blast
of its horn, and headed west. Those staying
behind watched the ship leave, maintaining
their vigil until it disappeared over the
horizon.
The men aboard the La Plata were the
first boatload of contract laborers sent from
Barbados for the United States' construc-
tion effort on the Panama Canal. Altogether
20,000 Barbadian men would travel to Pan-
ama as contract workers between 1905 and
the project's completion in 1914. The Isth-
mian Canal Commission (ICC), the US gov-
ernment agency with overall responsibility
for the Panama Canal, recruited an army of
45,000 contract workers during the dec-
ade-long project. They came from all over
the world, but two-thirds were black West
Indians, most from the British colonies. And
the overwhelming majority of British West
Indian contract workers were from Bar-

Bonham C. Richardson teaches geography at
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State Univer-
sity. He is the author of Panama Money and
Social Change in Barbados, 1900-1920 (Uni-
versity of Tennessee Press).


bados, by far the most important single
source for canal contract workers.
Those recruited formally by the ICC
(which took only male laborers) eventually
were outnumbered by those who arranged
their own sailboat and steamship passage
to earn their share of Panama money. An
estimated 70,000 Jamaicans traveled to
Panama during the American canal con-
struction decade. Altogether an estimated
45,000 Barbadians, including the 20,000
contract men, went to Panama. Lesser
numbers came from the other islands. Dif-
ferent from the exclusively male contract
workers, non-ICC migrants included
women and children.

Why Barbadians
American officials had hoped originally that
nearby populous Jamaica would provide
most of the canal workers, just as it had for
the failed French canal effort two decades
earlier. But late in 1904 Jamaica's governor
denied the ICC permission to establish a
labor-recruiting station in Kingston, claim-
ing that too many Jamaicans already had
died in the Isthmus while working for the
French. Surveying the remainder of the Ca-
ribbean region for labor in December 1904,
the Americans dismissed Haiti and the Do-
minican Republic as "Negro republics"
whose residents were disinclined toward
hard work. ICC officials considered the
smallest British islands too tightly con-
trolled by the British Colonial Office. And
the French eventually curtailed emigration
to the US Canal Zone from Guadeloupe and
Martinique. Among the remaining West In-
dian islands, Barbados-densely popu-
lated, English-speaking, controlled by a
semi-independent planter legislature
friendly to American overtures, and served
by reliable steamer lines-was the most
attractive.
The ICC representative to Barbados,
William Karner, arrived by steamship in
Bridgetown on 3 January 1905. Karner, an
engineer who already had supervised some
of the American construction work on the
Isthmus, would prove to be an ideal repre-
sentative to Barbados. Unlike other Ameri-
cans with whom Barbadian officials were


acquainted, Karner was tactful and patient;
but he also had the business-like drive that
they admired. Upon his arrival, Karner im-
mediately called on the governor, obtained
permission to recruit canal workers in Bar-
bados, and began publicizing free deck
passage to and from Panama for "500 day
workers" who, if willing to work hard, would
earn 10 cents per hour in Panama. Substan-
tial pay like this was bound to attract local
plantation laborers whose meager seasonal
wages had been lowered in recent years
because of the severe economic depression
affecting the entire British Caribbean.
Although Karner succeeded in rounding
up sufficient numbers to fill the decks of the
La Plata two weeks later, black Barbadians
were not as enthusiastic about Panama as
he had hoped. Quite the opposite, many
were wary of disease and political tyranny
awaiting migrants to Central America. Their
fears were based on what they had heard
from fellow Barbadians who had emigrated
recently to escape low wages and under-
employment, only to find conditions worse
elsewhere. In the latter decades of the 19th
century, many black Barbadians tradi-
tionally had traveled on sailing schooners
and as steamer deck passengers to the sis-
ter colonies of Trinidad and British Guiana
for seasonal cane harvests. But the effects
of depression had, by 1905, pushed hun-
dreds to seek rail construction work in Sur-
inam, Ecuador, Brazil, and even the Congo.
Many Barbadians, in extending their migra-
tory patterns beyond conventional limits
and well outside the British colonial sphere,
had been underpaid and mistreated
abroad. In one instance, Barbadians had
been tortured and perhaps murdered at the
notorious Putumayo rubber camps in the
Upper Amazon between Manaos and
Iquitos. This report was enthusiastically re-
ported in Barbadian newspapers along with
warnings by the local planters that such
atrocities were normal events in countries
ruled by typically cruel and capricious
"Latin" despots.
Within months after the departure of the
La Plata, however, black Barbadians were
no longer wary of traveling to the Canal
Zone. Hundreds of local laborers, some who


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had gone to Panama independently, now
were returning to Bridgetown and the rural
parishes of Barbados. The returnees told of
the Americans' high wages and tolerable
working conditions, and, most important,
their pockets were full of "Panama money."
A contagious migration enthusiasm soon
electrified the black Barbadian populace, a
cumulative and accelerating enthusiasm
gained more from one another than from
Karner's advertising efforts. Now, instead of
being indifferent, black Barbadians were ex-
uberant about the prospects of heading for
Panama where money was available "like
apples on a tree."
The subsequent rush to Panama affected
every black Barbadian family. And every
black Barbadian today, eight decades later,
has heard stories about a great-grandfather
or an old uncle who was one of the "Panama
men" who went to work on the canal. By the
end of 1905, crowds mobbed the ICC office
in Bridgetown on scheduled recruiting
days, and Karner had to engage special
police detachments to control the throngs
of applicants. Officially the Americans re-
cruited no one under the age of 20, but in
the absence of age verification teenagers
signed on by the hundreds. In the peak emi-
gration years of 1906 to 1909, fortnightly
steamers carried contract workers from
Bridgetown to Panama. Men who had failed
the required medical examinations often at-
tempted to sneak aboard the lighters trans-
porting workers from dockside to steamers.
Some potential stowaways approached the
waiting steamers on fishing sloops and
then tried to scale the sides of the Panama-
bound ships before they left. And the poi-
gnant scene of tearful mothers bidding
farewell to proud young men at the Bridge-
town wharf played itself out time and again
in the first years of the 20th century.

Demographic Upheaval
The average US citizen is ignorant of the
momentous demographic upheaval cre-
ated early in this century throughout the
Caribbean islands by the movement of tens
of thousands of West Indians to Panama for
canal construction. Most North Americans
entertain, at best, only a hazy picture of the
actual construction of the canal. We in the
United States view the Panama Canal first
and foremost, of course, as geopolitically
and economically significant. Our knowl-
edge of canal origins, however, usually is
confined to recalling the sentence in our
high school history book that explained our
treaty with Panama, a small Central Ameri-
can nation which we "stole fair and square"
from Colombia in 1903. This remark, at-
tributed to Senator Hayakawa during his
1976 senatorial campaign, was a humorous
antidote to the otherwise emotion-packed,
self-righteous, and often inaccurate politi-
cal rhetoric of the late 1970s associated
with the giving up of the canal that "we"


built. This notion that US sweat and toil were
expended in constructing the Panama Ca-
nal was not simply a case of national am-
nesia produced by the intervening decades.
The famous photograph at the time of The-
odore Roosevelt at the controls of a 95-ton
steamshovel in the Canal Zone reinforced
the idea that we Americans literally dug the
canal. And Canal Zone photographers in
general were much more interested in the
grandeur and sweep of the locks and water-
ways than they were in portraying members
of the indispensable West Indian labor force.
Black West Indians, by virtue of the sto-
ries they have heard from their parents and



In a broad sense, the
Barbadian exodus to
Panama was a creative
grass-roots catalyst of
social change.


grandparents, hold more realistic views
about the canal's construction. Older peo-
ple throughout the English-speaking is-
lands recall the returning veterans of the
canal construction and the impact of Pan-
ama money that migrating men and
women sent home from the Canal Zone
early in this century. Recollections of the
canal construction, moreover, are continu-
ously reinforced by contemporary family
visits between the black Panamanians de-
scended from canal workers and their rela-
tives who continue to reside in Barbados,
Jamaica, and the other West Indian islands.
The children of canal migrants, now in their
70s and 80s, remember much about the
period. A very few old Barbadians, now ap-
proaching or past 100, recall their travels,
work sojourns, and returns from the
Isthmus.
The estimated 45,000 black men and
women traveling from Barbados to Panama
between 1904 and 1914 represented
roughly one-fourth of Barbados's entire
population at the time. Only about one-third
returned to Barbados to stay. The migration
records maintained atthe time were sketchy
and incomplete, but extrapolations from
decennial census reports, annual birth and
death records, and officials' published com-
ments suggest strongly that the majority of
Panama emigrants never came back. This
conclusion was supported by recollections
of old Barbadians.
Many never returned because they died
in Panama. The ICC records enumerated
6,000 Barbadians who died in the Canal
Zone between 1906 and 1920 among the
total of 15,000 West Indians who died on the
Isthmus during that period. Probably most
died from a combination of exhaustion and


disease, the majority from malaria. Old-
timers remember stories of canal workers
sleeping outside in sodden work clothes,
unprotected from the "trillions" of Central
American mosquitoes. Explosions, land-
slides and machinery accidents killed many,
and West Indian newspapers at the time
routinely carried enumerations of those in-
jured, mutilated and maimed in Panama.
When Barbadian officials received lists of
local laborers killed in Panama, they dis-
patched members of a special police squad
to notify parents, wives or children. Many
old Barbadians recall the combination of
excitement and trepidation accompanying
the postman's arrival. Often he brought let-
ters and money from loved ones in Panama.
But occasionally he carried black-bordered
envelopes containing news that a husband
or son had died.
After the canal's completion, many Bar-
badians moved on to other work destina-
tions after returning home briefly. A few
drifted west to work in Honduran and Costa
Rican banana plantations. Many moved on
to the Dominican Republic or to Cuba and
the American-owned sugarcane estates
there. Others eventually emigrated to New
York. Hundreds of Jamaican and Barbadian
canal veterans enlisted in the British West
Indies Regiment in World War I and fought
the Turks in Palestine alongside Australians
and New Zealanders.

Migration Benefits
Typical of migrating West Indians before
and since, Barbadians who emigrated per-
manently to Panama and subsequent work
destinations in the first decades of the 20th
century were not abandoning those staying
behind. Rather, the emigrants sent home to
Barbados the equivalent of hundreds of
thousands of British pounds in postal
money orders and cash in envelopes, and
they probably brought even more than that
back during periodic visits home. Hun-
dreds of Barbadians, although residing per-
manently in Panama, continued to send
money regularly to their relatives back in
Barbados until they died.
The Panama money from emigrant Bar-
badians rescued friends and kinsmen from
the effects of the economic depression af-
flicting the entire Commonwealth Carib-
bean. At home, most black Barbadians
relied for their subsistence on tiny garden
plots rented from sugarcane plantations.
They needed cash to purchase supplemen-
tal imported foods. Those not receiving
Panama money often were reduced to seek-
ing poorhouse rations to avoid malnutri-
tion, disease and death.
Not all of the Panama moneywas devoted
to satisfying short-term needs. Thousands
of returnees, for example, purchased plots
of land on Barbados with their Panama sav-
ings. Small-scale land ownership through-
Continued on page 41


CArIBBEAN IPVlQW/13










Varieties of Labor Organization

The Caribbean and Central America Compared

By Steve Charnovitz


he Caribbean Basin Initiative encom-
passes two very different regions with
distinct language, cultural and gov-
ernmental traditions-Central America and
the Caribbean. The six Spanish-speaking
Central American countries have a collec-
tive population of about 25 million. They
have a history of dictatorship and oligarchic
rule (except in Costa Rica since 1948). In
contrast, the English-speaking Caribbean
islands plus Guyana and Belize have a pop-
ulation of about five million. Their tradition
is one of democracy and legal justice. The
two regions also differ in the composition of
their labor forces, resulting in disparate
courses of trade unionism.
The designers of the CBI were certainly
mindful of this economic, political and cul-
tural diversity. The US Department of Labor
(DOL) knew that the regions had dissimilar
problems, but it also knew that they shared
many of the same problems: high unem-
ployment, high underemployment and in-
adequate investment. Because of the
linkages of Caribbean basin economies to
the United States, the administration be-
lieved that opening our market to duty-free
imports would stimulate those economies.
The CBI has, in fact, generated some new
US and third-country investment in the re-
gion during its first year.
The development model underlying the
CBI implies outward-looking investment led
by the private sector. The CBI law lists 18
criteria that the president must consider be-
fore including a country in the program.
The purpose of these criteria is to assure
that the countries are amenable to private
investment and follow the principles of fair
commerce. For example, there are provi-
sions to exclude communist countries and
those that have expropriated American
property without compensation. Other cri-
teria relate to whether a country follows the
accepted rules of international trade,
whether it honors intellectual property
rights, and whether it permits free trade

Steve Charnovitz is an international relations
officer at the US Department of Labor. He is
currently on leave as a congressional fellow in
foreign affairs.


unions and collective bargaining, and has
"reasonable workplace conditions."
The criterion on labor has not always
been clearly understood. The administra-
tion's commitment to a free-enterprise sys-
tem refers not just to government restric-
tions on business but also to restrictions on
labor. The US sees free trade unions as
important vehicles for helping workers
achieve their economic goals and as signifi-
cant participatory institutions conducive to
more democratic political systems. The la-
bor criterion can be viewed as analogous to
the other criteria relating to fair trade (such
as following GATT rules and not subsidizing
exports). Just as the extension of duty-free
treatment can be withheld from a country
that uses unfair trade practices to gain a
disproportionate share of the American
market, CBI preferences can be withheld
from a country that gains its comparative
advantage from prohibiting free trade
unions or allowing child labor.
DOL's objective in implementing the la-
bor criterion was to press for improvements
in labor rights and working conditions. This
approach was dictated by the fact that the
criterion was discretionary and by the real-
ities of foreign government sensitivity to in-
terference in their internal affairs. As
expected, the labor issue was a contentious
one in many countries. The United States
was often told that the best way to help
workers was to grant them CBI benefits.
Even some of the trade union leaders in
countries where labor rights were not well
respected made the point that they would
be worse off if the labor criterion were used
to withhold the CBI from their countries.
The importance of free trade unions in
Central America was also noted by the Na-
tional Bipartisan Commission on Central
America, the so-called Kissinger Commis-
sion. It recommended thatthe United States
channel a portion of its economic as-
sistance through a Central American Devel-
opment Organization, which would include
representation from each country's labor
movement, business community and
government.
While the inclusion of worker rights in US
trade legislation is new, strengthening dem-


ocratic institutions such as free trade
unions has been a longtime goal of US de-
velopment policy. Since the early 1960s, the
American Institute for Free Labor Develop-
ment (AIFLD) has conducted a wide range
of union development and educational
programs throughout the Caribbean and
Latin America, financed primarily by
USAID funds.

Contrasting Styles
The trade unions of the Caribbean and Cen-
tral America are complex both ideologically
and institutionally. In this comparison of the
Caribbean with Central America, the Carib-
bean will include the English-speaking is-
lands plus Belize and Guyana, but not Haiti
or the Dominican Republic; Central Amer-
ica will include the Dominican Republic.
Labor laws differ markedly between Ca-
ribbean and Central American countries.
Caribbean law is based on British prece-
dents, which means that there is a minimal
reliance upon laws pertaining to labor-
management relationships. While the con-
stitutions of most Caribbean nations grant
trade unions the right to organize, the laws
are generally silent on questions such as
recognition of unions and unfair labor prac-
tices. Instead of extensive legal regulation,
labor relations are predicated upon
"custom and practice" or good will. Typ-
ically, the government's role is limited to
offering conciliation to parties in disputes
and conducting polls on questions of union
recognition.
By contrast, Central American countries
rely heavily upon law to regulate all aspects
of labor policy. Spanish or Latin law usually
covers matters such as union recognition,
registration with government, internal
union procedures, collective bargaining,
and health and safety. Rather than neu-
trality, the laws take a paternalistic attitude
toward unions by dictating working condi-
tions and protection for union organizers.
Within these generalizations, there is a
wide variation in the labor laws of particular
countries. Jamaica has a comprehensive la-
bor code. The labor code of Belize has noth-
ing on union recognition. Under a recent
law in Guyana, the government has frozen


14/CAIfBBEAN rEVIEW














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wages and invalidated past collective bar-
gaining agreements for public-sector em-
ployees. Among the Spanish countries, the
labor code in Panama favors workers, with
protection against dismissal and lowering
of wages. The Dominican Republic oper-
ates under a labor code written by Trujillo;
the law makes it easy for employers to dis-
miss workers and grants very little protec-
tion for agricultural employees.
Any analysis of labor laws, however, also
needs to discuss the effectiveness of the
laws' implementation. In general, the Carib-
bean governments adhere to their labor
laws. In Central America, on the other hand,
a government's interpretation and enforce-
ment of its labor laws often depends upon
the political outlook of the regime holding
power.
The trade unions of the Caribbean have
generally had a close relationship with the
area's governments. In fact, the unions pro-
vided the political leadership for many of
these countries as they approached and ob-
tained independence. For example, Alex-
ander Bustamante in Jamaica, Grantley
Adams in Barbados, Vere Bird in Antigua,
Eric Gairy in Grenada, Forbes Burnham in
Guyana and John Compton in St. Lucia
were all trade union leaders who became
prime ministers (or the equivalent execu-


tive) of their countries. The trade unions are
in most cases aligned with political parties
(often labor parties), although in some
cases the unions have actually been domi-
nated by political parties.
By contrast, trade union leaders in Cen-
tral America have not, by and large, been
part of those countries' power structures.
Some of them have been politically influen-
tial, but they are generally on the fringes of
real political power. The one conspicuous
exception is Luis Alberto Monge Alvarez,
the current president of Costa Rica, who was
a trade union leader and later general secre-
tary of the Inter-American Regional Organ-
ization of Workers (ORIT), the regional
organization of the Western Hemisphere of
the International Confederation of Free
Trade Unions. Some labor federations are
associated with political parties, but their
ties are far looser than occurs in many
South American countries.
The turbulent history of trade unions in
Central America has alternated between pe-
riods of tolerance and repression, but even
in the countries where unions have fared
relatively well (such as Honduras, Costa Rica
and Panama), the unions in most cases
have not been very powerful. The most ex-
treme cases of repression and control have
taken place in Cuba under Batista and Cas-


tro, the Dominican Republic under Trujillo,
and Haiti under Frangois Duvalier. The
worst situation in Central America today
may be in Nicaragua, where the govern-
ment controls five of the seven labor
federations.
Labor-management relations in the Ca-
ribbean are carried out in an atmosphere of
mutual respect. Management generally will
recognize and bargain with unions if the
majority of the work force want a union.
Unions generally show a cooperative atti-
tude toward management; this comity often
precludes long strikes. While strikes are
more frequent now than they were ten years
ago, they are not occasions for violence.
In Central America, on the other hand,
employers are generally more hostile to-
ward unions, which are regularly accused of
being communist even when they are dem-
ocratic. There is little sense of labor and
management being in the same economic
boat and having a mutual interest in coop-
eration. But there are some interesting vari-
ations. In Panama, the major labor
negotiations are carried out through a tri-
partite national commission. In Costa Rica,
there is a growing labor philosophy called
solidarismo, which is a church-oriented
movement stressing labor harmony and
opposing confrontation. The ORIT-affiliated


CAi?BBEAN pEVIeW/15


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labor leaders consider this a false union
movement.
Unions in the Caribbean generally follow
the British model and seek to cooperate
within a trade union congress (TUC). These
organizations, however, are far from unified,
as the unions may be aligned with different
political parties and are often factionalized.
In Central America there is a complex set of
umbrella organizations. The democratic
federations are fairly stable while the com-
munist federations change with new gov-
ernments and ideological winds. The
unions in Central America are more loosely
aligned with political parties than in the Ca-
ribbean (unions in Guatemala are prohib-
ited by law from having party affiliations)
and even more factionalized. It is also com-
mon for federations to try to steal union
affiliates from each other or to disaffiliate
from national centers.
In the Caribbean, trade unions tend to be
self-supporting from dues-checkoff ar-
rangements, and have knowledgeable lead-
ers working with a highly literate member-
ship. In Central America, the unions tend to
be financially weak and, while their leaders
are usually well educated, their members
are frequently not. Although neither area
has the industrial base to support strong
unions such as exist in some South Ameri-
can countries, there are large agricultural
and public-employee unions in Central
America, and large tourism and public-em-
ployee unions in the Caribbean.
Another difference between unions in the
two regions is that Caribbean unions usually
include a greater percentage of the labor
force than Central American unions do (see
table). The major exception to this is Nic-
aragua, where trade unions comprise about
39 percent of the work force. This figure has
gone up considerably (from about 8 per-
cent) since the Sandinista revolution and
includes workers in government-organized
trade unions. The trend in Nicaragua ap-
pears to be for all workers to become mem-
bers of trade unions because of FSLN
sponsorship.

Union Ideology
Despite the "class struggle" rhetoric that is
sometimes heard, there are very few com-
munist trade unionists in the Caribbean. By
contrast, there are relatively large commu-
nist unions in a few of the Spanish-speaking
countries. One reason the communist
unions do better in Central America may be
the long history of economic deprivation
and nondemocratic rule there. Another rea-
son may be that these countries are poor,
and the communist unions have external
funding sources that give them a stronger
base than unions which have to rely upon
dues from workers earning meagre wages.
(Noncommunist unions also receive exter-
nal funding, but do not depend on it as
much.)


Percent of Labor Force Organized ceive assistance from the West German
Friedrich Ebert Foundation (associated
Caribbean (English) with the Social Democratic Party) and from
some of the international trade secretariats,
Guyana 34 (e.g., the International Federation of Com-
Jamaica 33 mercial, Clerical and Technical Employees).
Barbados 32 The World Confederation of Labor (WCL)
Trinidad 30 changed its name in 1968 from the Interna-
Bahamas 25 tional Federation of Christian Trade Unions.
Dominica 25 Unions affiliated with the WCL, also called
St. Lucia 20 "Christian" unions, pursue a doctrine of a
Belize 8 "real socialist society" as an alternative to
Marxist socialism and capitalism. (The
Central America (Spanish) Christian unions have deemphasized the
Nicaragua "confessional" aspect of their ideology and
Honduras 28 are no longer religiously oriented.) These
Honduras unions are sometimes associated with
oamRia 12 Christian Democratic parties. In Latin
Costamican c 12 America they tend to be affiliated with the
Guateomica 12 Latin American Workers Central (CLAT),

El Salvador 8 the regional organization of the WCL, which
is headquartered in Caracas. Some of these
Other unions receive assistance from the West
German Konrad Adenauer Foundation, as-
Suriname 33 sociated with the Christian Democratic
Haiti less than 1 party.
In comparison with the ICFTU unions,
Source: US Dept. of Labor the WCL unions are more aggressive in
their criticism of multinational corpora-
Trade union ideology is a complex issue tions, and are strong advocates of social
because of its various permutations. The revolution and government ownership.
easiest way to understand ideological dif- They often make political attacks on the
ferences is to identify unions and federa- United States. Christian unions are anti-
tions by their international affiliations, communist, but in the past they have al-
Basically, there are three international labor legedly collaborated with communist
bodies. The International Confederation of unions.
Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) is composed of The largest Christian unions are in the
noncommunist or "democratic" national Dominican Republic, El Salvador and Hon-
unions or federations. The ICFTU accepts duras. Smaller ones exist in Guatemala, Nic-
as members bona fide labor organizations aragua, Panama and Suriname. There is no
which are independent of outside domina- significant Christian activity in the English-
tion, derive their authority from their mem- speaking Caribbean, although there ap-
bers, and have free elections. Latin pears to be some organizing in Aruba and
American labor organizations which are St. Lucia.
members of the ICFTU are typically affili- The third international labor body is the
ated with its Inter-American Regional communist-controlled World Federation of
Organization of Workers, headquartered in Trade Unions (WFTU). WFTU unions are
Mexico City, or with the Caribbean Con- always associated with communist or Marx-
gress of Labor, headquartered in Barbados. ist parties and pursue a revolutionary doc-
For Central America, there is a Confedera- trine of communism. In Latin America,
tion of Central American Workers, also with many of the communist unions are afffili-
headquarters in Mexico City. ated with the Permanent Congress of Trade
There is a broad band of ideology among Union Unity in Latin America (CPUSTAL),
ICFTU affiliates, ranging from democratic headquartered in Mexico City. Unlike the
socialism to capitalism. All of these unions other unions, the communist unions are not
are staunch defenders of democracy, how- run democratically. Because their goals are
ever, and firmly anti-communist. They fundamentally political rather than eco-
stress "bread-and-butter" issues in collec- nomic, these union leaders maintain tight
tive bargaining, but often pursue general control and discipline over their rank and
improvements for workers through relations file. Paradoxically, the communist unions
with political parties. There are democratic tend to have the best relationships with em-
unions in all of the Caribbean basin coun- players, often negotiating "sweetheart"
tries, with the exception of some of the very contracts.
small islands such as Turks and Caicos. The economic disparities in Central
Some of the labor organizations receive America have made it a fertile ground for
assistance (for erecting national union cen- communist unions. These tend to expand
ters, for example) from American trade when not repressed by government, and
unions and AIFLD. Union groups also re- thus are relatively stronger in the more re-


16/CAI?BBEAN r ViE










publican countries of Costa Rica and the
Dominican Republic. The communist
unions seem the most susceptible to ma-
nipulation by political leaders, as happened
under Trujillo, Duvalier (Papa Doc) and Cas-
tro. The strongest communist unions today,
of course, are in Nicaragua, but there are
also significant movements in Costa Rica,
where about half the organized workers are
communist (mostly banana workers) and
the Dominican Republic, with about 30 per-
cent. There is very little communist activity
in the English-speaking Caribbean.

Political Environment
Another way of explaining the dynamics of
Caribbean basin trade unionism is by the
political environment existing in the partic-
ular country. Although the union move-
ments differ in each country and are
constantly evolving, one can divide the
countries into four different groups for pur-
poses of rough illustration: (1) countries
with a tradition of free union activity, (2)
countries with an improving political cli-
mate for unions, (3) countries where trade
union rights are in transition, and (4) coun-
tries that seek to repress or dominate trade
unions.
All of the English-speaking Caribbean is-
lands fit into the first group. An example is
St. Lucia, where a general strike by five
unions in 1982 led to a downfall in the
government. The new prime minister, John
Compton, was aided by the strong support
he received from the seamen's and water-
front union. Another good example is Ja-
maica, where the two main unions are each
aligned with one of the two major political
parties.
An example of the second group is the
Dominican Republic, where there is an ac-
tive, but not strong, trade union movement
that did not exist 20 years ago. Although the
Trujillo labor code is still in effect, the labor
ministry has been known to interpret the
code loosely in order to aid trade unions.
When the CS government reviewed the Do-
minican Republic for CBI designation, the
Dominican administration agreed to ask
their congress to reform the labor code,
particularly with regard to protection for
union organizers. Another country with an
improving labor environment is El Sal-
vador, where the new constitution grants
legal recognition to campesino unions.
The third group, where unions are in tran-
sition, is best represented by Haiti. Before
the CBI, Haiti had nine unions and no labor
federation. After the United States dis-
cussed this problem with the Haitian gov-
ernment, it agreed to announce the right of
unions to form federations and affiliate with
international union organizations. In addi-
tion, the Haitian government sent a letter
announcing these policies to the AFL-CIO,
ORIT the ICFTU and the ILO. It also made
several amendments in its labor code to


remove restrictions on unions. Today there
may be the beginning of a real trade union
federation In Haiti, the first recognized by
that government in over 25 years. This
federation, called the Federation of Union
Workers, sent its president to the 1984 ILO
Conference to participate as the worker
delegate.
Another country with its trade union
movement in transition is Guyana, where
the TUC recently elected leadership from
outside of the government-affiliated unions
for the first time in decades. The non-
government-affiliated unions have been
challenged, however, by a new Guyanese



Unions want to be
recognized as part of
the private sector.


law that freezes wages and gives the TUC,
rather than each individual union, the right
to bargain with the government. At least 80
percent of the labor force is employed by the
government in this highly socialized
economy.
The fourth group, where governments
are repressing unions, is illustrated most
easily by Nicaragua, where the government
has created five communist federations and
attempts to restrict the activities of the two
democratic federations.
When companies consider new invest-
ments, they look for both a stable political
climate and a stable economic climate. Al-
though companies do not look for countries
with strong unions, it often turns out that
those with a political climate amenable to
unions also have the stable political climate
that prospective investors seek. Notwith-
standing the usual portrayal, unions can
foster a stable economic climate. Despite
some cases where trade union activism
could have impeded investment, demo-
cratic unions generally can reach an accom-
modation with employers so that both will
know what to expect of the other. Free trade
unions are also the strongest bulwark
against communist unions which, while
they may not be disruptive in the workplace,
will aggravate the political climate atthe first
opportunity. Thus, for both political and
economic reasons, foreign investors are
going to Trinidad and Barbados, but not to
Suriname and Guyana, despite the fact that
all four countries have strong union
movements.

Investment Constraints
About a year before the CBI went into effect,
the US Department of Labor conducted a
study of potential labor-related investment
constraints that could weaken the CBI. The
study had four main findings. First, con-


trary to the popular conception that many
CBI countries had inefficient labor laws
which impeded investment, the team found
that most of the labor laws were workable
and evenhanded. One exception was in
Panama, where the legal provision against
lowering wages makes it difficult to grant
one-time performance bonuses since these
bonuses are built into the base and cannot
be reduced.
A second finding was that the CBI coun-
tries had poorly trained work forces that
could constrict economic gains coming
from the CBI. The cause of this problem
invariably was the weakness of training
institutes, often government-run, which
use outmoded techniques and do not meet
the needs of employers. The "training gap'
was particularly apparent at the technical
supervisory level. The team recommended
that USAID improve vocational training as
part of its overall human resource develop-
ment programs, but so far little has
been done.
A third finding was that many of the coun-
tries had serious labor-management rela-
tions problems. The team concluded that
these problems did not usually arise from
untoward demands from labor or manage-
ment, but rather from the inability of both
sides to settle disputes and, more impor-
tantly, from the inability of the governments
to provide competent mediation assistance.
The team recommended that specialized
training in mediation techniques be given
to government officials.
The fourth finding was that the labor
ministries in these countries were very
weak. This means that important programs
such as manpower planning, statistics col-
lection and labor inspection are carried out
incompletely or not at all. For example, em-
ployment data are notoriously unreliable. A
company contemplating investment in a
country would have difficulty determining
whether skilled workers would be available
or what wage would have to be paid.
Although DOL had hoped to follow up
this study with technical cooperation pro-
grams in the Caribbean basin countries,
funding cuts from other US agencies elimi-
nated its ability to carry out labor visitor
exchanges and overseas assistance semi-
nars. DOL has proposed several manpower
training initiatives in conjunction with the
CBI, but has been unable to secure financ-
ing for them.

Union Attitudes
The democratic trade unions in the region
have generally been strongly supportive of
the CBI and in favor of the increased foreign
investment and jobs that it will bring. In fact
some Caribbean basin labor leaders lob-
bied for passage of the administration's CBI
bill, which the AFL-CIO opposed on the
ground that CBI imports would hurt Ameri-
Continued on page 42


CAIBBEAN VIEW/17











The CBI Faces Adversity

Lessons from the Asian Export Strategy

By Bernardo Vega


he basic economic objective of the
Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) is to
promote growth in the region
through export-led development stimulated
by access to the US market. The major ex-
port sectors would be assembly plants,
agro-industry and tourism.
Obtaining foreign financing for the es-
tablishment and operation of export-ori-
ented projects has normally been easier
than for projects based on import substitu-
tion and the internal market. The same ap-
plies to foreign equity participation. This is
primarily due to three factors: (1) Such
projects normally benefit from exchange
rate changes resulting from devaluations,
so that risk is not a deterring factor. (2) The
projects are relatively or totally free from
exchange controls so that loan repayments
or profit transfers are not hampered by in-
convertibility. Assembly plants operating in
industrial free trade zones are normally ex-
empt from exchange controls, except for
the surrender requirements covering local
costs. Tourism normally operates in a free
exchange rate situation due to the impos-
sibility of applying exchange controls to op-
erations in that sector. (3) Loan collection is
made easier through automatic deductions
from export proceeds made by US or Euro-
pean banks.
These considerations apply to capital re-
sources for the original investment as well
as to working capital. The latter is normally
covered by preexport financing, especially
for imported raw materials which are pro-
cessed locally and then reexported. They
also apply both to local and foreign-owned
businesses. Subsidized capital resources
are also relatively abundant for projects with
these characteristics and are even available
to foreign investors. Bilateral and multi-
lateral sources such as the Agency for Inter-
national Development, Inter-American De-
velopment Bank, and International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, provide
financing for the establishment of free trade
zone infrastructure and plants, export-ori-
ented agro-industries and hotels.

Bernardo Vega is an economist working in the
Dominican Republic.


Where then are the constraints linked to
the availability of capital resources? Al-
though these do not exist at the sectorial
level, they are tremendous at the national
level, and they negatively influence the in-
vestment climate including, of course, the
climate for investing in those export-ori-
ented sectors which the CBI wants to
stimulate.
Latin American economies in general,
and those of the Caribbean and Central
America in particular, are suffering from the
worst deterioration in their terms of trade in
45 years. The world recession, low export
prices, high interest rates and oil prices are
all responsible for this situation. Nowhere
else in the world has the oil shock been as
great as in the Caribbean and Central Amer-
ica. With the exception of Trinidad and To-
bago, all CBI countries depend greatly on
foreign oil for energy and transportation.
The debt problem also affects most CBI
countries. The Dominican Republic, Ja-
maica, Costa Rica and Honduras have al-
ready had to reschedule repayment; all but
Honduras have entered into extended credit
arrangements with the International Mone-
tary Fund. How does this affect their ability
to obtain foreign financing and foreign in-
vestment for those projects which the CBI is
supposed to stimulate?
First, foreign banks are reluctant to pro-
vide additional money to these economies,
even for specific export-oriented projects.
But it is the will of the entrepreneurs, both
foreign and local, that is mostly affected.
Local investors dedicate most of their time
to thinking about solutions to the problems
they already have in their businesses: lack of
foreign exchange with which to import raw
materials, foreign exchange losses, price
controls and lower sales, all combined with
the inflationary effects of devaluation. It is
difficult to convince these entrepreneurs to
spend new money or assume new risks to
take advantage of the CBI and access to the
US market. Foreign investors worry about
civil war in El Salvador, food riots in the
Dominican Republic, threat of civil unrest in
most of Central America, as well as in Ja-
maica and Haiti. New investment in Latin
America is not popular today in the board


rooms of American corporations, and that
part of Latin America covered by the CBI is
not exempted from this attitude. These po-
litical risk factors tend to offset the potential
benefits of access to the US market from a
geographically close low-cost area.
What the CBI countries are attempting to
do is to modify their economic model from
inward-looking industrialization to outward-
looking export-led growth under very ad-
verse economic conditions. The local pri-
vate sector, itself traumatized by the
adjustment process, is not enthusiastic
about venturing into new areas of growth.
To take advantage of the CBI, what is
needed is not just the classical short-term
balance-of-payments adjustment process,
but a medium-term structural adjustment
program. Meanwhile, high interest rates in
the US are promoting capital flows in the
wrong direction. The Third World expected
industrialized nations to transfer to them 1
percent of their GDP (gross domestic prod-
uct) per year as development aid, but in
reality the poor nations are transferring 3
percent of their GDP to the rich through
interest payments.
In short, the CBI would have had a much
better chance of rapid success ten years ago
than it has today. The question is not so
much access to the US capital market as it is
the political factors which deter capital
transfer to the region.

The Asian Contrast
Political factors were less critical in the Asia
of the sixties than in the Caribbean of the
eighties. Still the Asian example, and specif-
ically that of Taiwan, is useful in studying the
potential and restraints of the Caribbean
Basin Initiative. In Taiwan, as in the Carib-
bean region, import substitution preceded
the export-oriented model. However, agrar-
ian reform and self-sufficiency in food pro-
duction also preceded export growth in
Taiwan. Those who lost land were compen-
sated and encouraged to invest in industry.
Such is not the case in any CBI beneficiary
country. Another difference is the strength
of the internal market. In Taiwan in 1980,
only 33 percent of industrial production was
exported. Thus despite its reputation as an


18/CAP BBEAN REVIEW




















































export economy, Taiwan does not export
most of what it produces. Agricultural re-
search has produced increases in produc-
tivity which permit food prices to remain
stable; this has allowed for wage stability
which is basic for maintenance of the export
drive. Agricultural productivity has also re-
leased workers from farms for work in
industry.
In order for the CBI to have positive ef-
fects, the countries of the region must have
strong physical and social infrastructures,
that is to say not only good roads and ports,
but also a well-educated and healthy popu-
lation. Before it began its successful export
strategy, Taiwan received US foreign aid for
both types of infrastructure in huge
amounts, higher than those assigned to the
Caribbean region. The point is that capital is
not only required for the private sector to
help it set up its export industries, but also
for the government to improve the in-
frastructure. Public-sector investment in
Taiwan in the 1950s was 50 percent of total
investment. Government savings were big-
ger than private savings. This contrasts with
the role the private sector is supposed to
play under the CBI. In fact, foreign equity


investment has not been important in
Japan, Korea or Taiwan.
Taiwan wisely reduced exchange controls
and multiple exchange rates before starting
its export strategy. It also devalued and re-
duced effective protection for inward-look-
ing industries. The Caribbean region also
needs to do this in order to liberate the
forces which can take advantage of the CBI.
But since the Caribbean depends on im-
ported food and oil, a devaluation causes
such increases in living costs that salaries
have to be adjusted upwards, decreasing
export competitiveness.
Capital is just one of the movable factors
of production. Classical economic theory
reminds us that population is another. Mi-
gration to the United States, both legal and
illegal, is a generalized phenomenon in all
CBI countries today. In fact, its existence
may well have been one of the political rea-
sons for passing the CBI legislation. "Create
jobs in the Caribbean and Central America
by buying their goods, and they will stop
migrating" was the probable thought of
many in America. To the extent that capital
flows to the region and its terms of trade do
not improve, to the extent that a better way is


not found to renegotiate the foreign debt,
and as long as the investment climate does
not improve as a result of better general
economic conditions, people will migrate,
regardless of what laws say. The laws of
classic economics have universally been
proven to be more effective than political
legislation.
It is important to point out that the Asian
development strategy took place in a part of
the world where, due to sociocultural and
political factors, unions are very weak, there
are few strikes, and political dissent is not
common. This differs substantially from the
Caribbean where, in the English-speaking
area, the British Westminster political sys-
tem prevails, with separation of powers and
a parliament; in fact, the most important
political leaders reached prominence
through the labor movement. In some
Spanish-speaking countries of the area,
such as the Dominican Republic and Costa
Rica, there is also a very strong democratic
system, where the congress is independent
and individual freedoms flourish. On the
other hand, social unrest and even civil war
predominate in Central America, condi-
Continued on page 43


CAIBBEAN PEvIw//19


VIft











The CBI Is Not Enough

The Case of Honduras

By Marta Ortiz-Buonafina


Recent world trade patterns in man-
ufactured products have tended to
shift international division of labor to
the advantage of developing countries,
where the absolute and relative costs of pro-
duction are lower than in industrial ones.
The United States, along with other indus-
trial countries, has instituted incentives to
help developing nations diversify their
economies and accelerate development,
such as access to markets through the Gen-
eralized System of Preferences (GSP). More
recently, the US expanded this preference
system to the Caribbean basin and Central
American countries by providing a one-way
access to its markets for 12 years. This proj-
ect, the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI),
also provides incentives for promoting in-
vestments in the region to accelerate the
creation of jobs and expansion of produc-
tion capabilities.
Under these conditions, it is very impor-
tant for countries benefiting under the CBI
to develop the expertise to market their
products, especially to enter and tap new
markets for nontraditional products. Con-
sequently, one important question that
needs to be addressed is: Can access to
markets create the necessary conditions for
successful marketing and consumer accep-
tance, a prerequisite in the sophisticated
and affluent markets of industrial coun-
tries? Basically, the answer is no. Exporting
nontraditional products, which include
manufactured consumer goods, requires
techniques and skills which are influenced
by product and market characteristics.
Manufactured products are heterogeneous
and markets are highly segmented along
consumer preferences, income and life
styles. They require extensive marketing
efforts in a highly competitive environment
where domestic and other imported prod-
ucts are likely to have strong positions and
markets are saturated.

Honduras-An Example
Honduras is a case in point. Can its indus-
Marta Ortiz-Buonafina teaches international
and export marketing in the College of Busi-
ness Administration at Florida International
University


trial sector take advantage of the benefits of
the CBI, both in terms of product offerings
and investment potential? Honduran firms
with exportable supply have little expertise
in international marketing, making export-
ing a difficult venture for the average firm
wishing to tap foreign market opportunities
opened by the CBI.
Honduras has a weak economy and is
struggling with increasing political and
economic problems which can be traced to
events and forces both inside and outside
the country: rising costs of energy in the
1970s; the drop in world prices for coffee,
sugar, and bananas-products that are
Honduras' economic mainstay; recession in
industrial countries which greatly slowed
demand for commodities and raw mate-
rials; soaring interest rates which contrib-
uted to a decapitalization of the smaller, less
developed economies like Honduras; inter-
national political terrorism and ideologies
forming an allegiance with local discontent,
which aggravated political and economic
problems; rising claims by the Honduran
government on foreign exchange earnings
to service the external public debt, which
squeezed out the private sector and affected
the industrial sector's growth dynamics; do-
mestic economic policies of the sixties and
seventies which were divorced from eco-
nomic reality, namely balance-of-payments
effects or economic restrictions. All these
events have adversely affected the Hon-
duran economy, in which exports represent
37 percent of total output and the capital
base is very thin, at best.
The development model of import sub-
stitution industrialization was implemented
in Central America in the early 1960s as a
way to stimulate domestic capital formation
and human resource development. Indus-
trial development was seen as the catalyst
for economic growth and development. In a
general way, it can be said that import sub-
stitution industrialization as the cornerstone
of the economic integration process pro-
vided some benefits. During the sixties and
early seventies, the region experienced
steady growth in gross national product and
per capital income. However, other changes
laid the groundwork for some structural and


institutional problems which are of concern
today.
First, the structure of the external sector
changed. Demand for industrial inputs
began to grow, replacing demand for
previously imported consumer goods;
however, import demand for all goods con-
tinued to grow, soon outpacing the ability of
the export sector to provide the necessary
foreign exchange. As export earnings de-
clined, the industrial sector found itself fac-
ing shortages of foreign exchange needed
to purchase imported inputs, thus affecting
its growth and expansion.
Secondly, the structure of the industrial
sector remained the same; it was mainly a
producer of consumer goods dominated by
light industries. Moreover, the import sub-
stitution industrialization process in Hon-
duras, as was the case in the rest of Central
America, was characterized by the prolifera-
tion of assembly-type or conversion indus-
tries with a large imported input component
and few linkages with the domestic re-
source base. All five Central American
countries developed similar product offer-
ings which, within a short period of time,
saturated the domestic and regional
market.
Finally, the import substitution process
was made possible by providing generous
tax incentives for investment in manufactur-
ing activities. The new industrialist group
was formed by both foreign and domestic
investors. Multinational corporations set up
wholly-owned subsidiaries lured by gener-
ous tax incentives. For the most part, how-
ever, MNCs transferred limited technology
for assembly-type activities but generally
did not transfer their managerial and mar-
keting skills. Domestic investors came from
the ranks of the older, wealthier and landed
groups and wealthy importer/retailers.
These individuals had few industrial or mar-
keting skills but were attracted by protected
markets and tax incentives, as the import
substitution process introduced an almost
risk-free opportunity for those wealthy
enough to tap scarce financial resources.
Under the import substitution process,
scarce funds were made available for indus-
trial endeavors on a priority basis and were


20/CAIBBEAN EVIEEW
















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governed by local banking practices requir-
ing huge collateral. The result was the for-
mation of a wealthy indigenous industrial
class which can best be described as com-
mercial industrialists; they are more sales-
men than risk-takers, as compared to the
typical entrepreneurs characterizing more
affluent societies. Meanwhile, the MNCs fol-
lowed product and marketing policies
which involved few indigenous product de-
velopment activities-marketing of US or
home-based brands with the correspond-
ing commitment of resources to specific
brand advertising. Consumers, therefore,
may have paid higher prices for many prod-
ucts under import substitution than would
appear justified.
In addition, there are institutional prob-
lems which affect the efficiency of the Hon-
duran export sector. Although there is a
high degree of consultation between gov-
ernment and the private sector, government
gives highest priority to the foreign ex-
change market, squeezing the private sec-
tor and straining its resources. Export
development laws involving cumbersome
paperwork and taxes are disincentives in an
economy that sorely needs foreign ex-


change. Overprotection of domestic indus-
tries acts as a disincentive that adversely
affects efficiency, especially in markets
where most opportunities are available for
the efficient, marketing-oriented producer.
There is also a lack of private sector cooper-
ation. Although interindustry groups exist,
most are concerned with studying national
problems rather than creating effective
mechanisms to develop a viable export sec-
tor for manufacturers. Efforts are being
made in this direction but are still insuffi-
cient to generate a mechanism to serve the
manufactured export sector adequately.
The problems inherent in Honduras' in-
dustrial sector are related not only to current
economic problems but also to structural
and institutional deficiencies which must be
addressed if the export potential of the in-
dustrial sector is to be realized. The crux of
the matter is the need for the industrial sec-
tor to develop expertise in production, dis-
tribution and marketing of export products.
The challenge faced by the industrialist-ex-
porter is to develop an adequate product for
export markets as well as the managerial
skills to plan strategy and compete effec-
tively. The offer made by the United States to


provide access to its markets to stimulate
growth and development of the industrial
sector is likely to have little, if any, effect on
small and medium-sized domestic firms
with no marketing expertise and inade-
quate products for export markets. Interna-
tional trade of manufactured products is
significantly different from trade in raw ma-
terials and agricultural products. The latter
is a relatively simple exchange of goods,
buying and selling operations that require
little marketing effort. However, buying and
selling manufactured goods is a different
situation. Marketing expertise must be-
come a primary activity of the firm if it is to
sell products which serve a wide range of
consumer desires which are geographically
dispersed with varying levels of income,
taste and consumption patterns. This adap-
tation is essential if the Honduran exporter is
to develop an acceptable volume of man-
ufactured product exports.

Implications for the CBI
The aim of the CBI is to stimulate exports
with strong emphasis on manufactured
products. The countries included in the CBI
Continued on page 44


CAIBBEAN VIEW/21


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The Decision to Trade

Puerto Rico's Export Strategies

By Suphan Andic


Economic literature is replete with
quantitative and qualitative analyses
that try to establish the role of exports
in economic development. The general ver-
dict, but not a unanimous one, is that ex-
ports do promote economic development.
However, many economists have argued,
and some still do, that because of a certain
lopsidedness in the structure of some econ-
omies, which in the past has caused ex-
treme variations in foreign exchange
earnings, it is best to try to achieve eco-
nomic growth through an inward-oriented
strategy, which has meant the protection of
domestic industries against the vagaries of
the external world at all cost.
The argument is not new. It goes back
almost a century and a half, when the Ger-
man economist Friedrich List articulated
the infant-industry argument in justifying
the need for protective barriers for the es-
tablishment of the German industry, which
otherwise would not have been able to com-
pete with the powerful British one. In this
century too the argument has had a power-
ful influence. Raul Prebisch, with his theory
of the long-term decline in the terms of
trade, separated the world into the center
and the periphery and set his mark on the
direction of the Economic Council for Latin
America, which formulated the inward-ori-
ented import-substitution policies adopted
by all Latin American governments.
The criticism is commonly heard that for-
eign trade creates economic and cultural
dependence. Such criticism laments the
demonstration effects generated by open-
ness to the rest of the world-consumer-
ism, clash of cultures, the so-called loss of
identity-and ignores the powerful advan-
tages that flow from foreign trade, not only
in economic matters but for progress in
general.
There is nothing necessarily regrettable
about the so-called dependence on foreign
trade. Granted, in engaging in foreign trade
a country is influenced, willy-nilly, by exter-
nal events; this is a price any international or
interregional division of labor imposes. But

Suphan Andic is professor of economics (re-
tired), University of Puerto Rico.


a country that seeks development must
have an open mind and must invite influ-
ences from outside its geographical bound-
aries if it is to succeed in achieving its goals.
Trade produces innovation and transmits
its dynamic influences to the rest of the
economy, albeit in varying degrees.

Exports as Economic Stimuli
Exports contribute to economic develop-
ment in two ways. First, there is the increase
in output resulting from the primary in-
crease in export production. This then leads
to secondary changes elsewhere in the
economy, the extent of which depends upon
the linkages between the productive sec-
tors. The growth in some exports gives a
strong stimulus to expand the input-using
or input-supplying industries; others, how-
ever, provide little opportunity for the
emergence or growth of other sectors in the
economy.
From another point of view one can dis-
tinguish between the static and dynamic
effects of trade on economic development.
The static or direct effects refer to the gains
at any moment in the usual assumption of
given production capabilities. These are re-
ferred to in international trade theory as the
benefits derived from comparative cost.
The dynamic or indirect benefits are over
and above the static gains and are the result
of transformations in production
possibilities.
Foremost among dynamic gains is the
provision of capital goods, machinery, and
raw and semi-finished materials indispens-
able for economic development. Probably
even more important are the technical
know-how, skills, managerial talents and
entrepreneurship that accompany invest-
ments. Trade disseminates technological
knowledge, transmits ideas and skills, and
gives rise to a productive cross-fertilization
between countries and regions. We learn
from the experience. In the 19th century,
continental Europe as well as the United
States profited greatly from the technologi-
cal innovation and achievements of the in-
dustrial revolution. In the present century,
Japan proved to be a very adept learner;
were it not for the trade between Japan and


the United States, cross-fertilization could
not have taken place so fast. Furthermore,
trade fosters healthy competition and keeps
in check inefficient monopolies. The reason
the American economy is more competitive
and more efficient than most others should,
to a large extent, be attributed to its great
internal free trade area, of which Puerto
Rico is a part, rather than its anti-monopoly
policies.
The reason for the 1960s' economic
growth in the countries of the Central Amer-
ican Common Market was the liberalization
of trade among them. Unfortunately, the lib-
eralized trade concept was not extended to
the rest of the world. An import-substitution
policy aided by high effective tariff protec-
tion, exchange rate and import controls-
not to mention distortionary fiscal incen-
tives and inflationary monetary policies-
have helped erect an inefficient industrial
edifice with a bias against exports. This ex-
plains their present financial quandary, as
well as that of all Latin American countries
which have followed identical import-sub-
stitution policies in the name of growth and
progress. Bias against exports has distorted
the allocation of resources away from for-
eign exchange-earning activities into for-
eign exchange-using ones.
Exports can also affect the distribution of
income. When various industrial branches
use different factor combinations in their
production for export, the relative shares of
profits, wages, interest and rent will be af-
fected by the capital intensity of the export
sector and by the preponderance of the ex-
port sector in the total economy. The higher
the capital intensity, the more likely the shift
in factor remuneration towards profits, and
hence presumably towards a deterioration
in the distribution of income. But such a
statement by itself is insufficient, since in-
come distribution will be affected by numer-
ous factors, including the secondary effects
of the export activities themselves, es-
pecially on services. The final outcome may
very well be an improvement in the overall
distribution of income in the economy. In
fact, there is no concrete evidence from
Puerto Rico's experience for a worsening of
the income distribution, since the share of


CArIBBEAN rvIEW/23















































Computer quality control inspection.


employee compensation in personal in-
come, excluding transfers, increased from
65.1 percent in 1950 to 78.4 percent in
1980, while that of profits fell from 27.4
percent to 12.1 percent.
Thus we find that the stimuli from ex-
ports vary from country to country, depend-
ing upon the differential characteristics of
the economies and markets they face. In
general, however, we can expect stronger
stimuli when: the growth rate of the demand
for the export product is high; the direct
effect on employment in the export sector
itself is large; export expansion involves a
change in production functions; and the
export sector links with other sectors in
generating employment and investment.

Puerto Rico's Performance
It is well known that in Puerto Rico's regional
economy, trade plays an especially impor-
tant role; over the past 20 years, imports
have represented about 55 percent of out-
put and exports about 45 percent. While the
import coefficient has more or less re-
mained stable since 1960, the export coeffi-
cient has risen from 37 percent in 1960 to
54 percent in 1982.
What is more important is that Puerto
Rico has come a long way from the high


commodity concentration of its export
structure, and hence does not face the per-
ils of some countries, whose major export
product is subject to price fluctuations in
world markets. Two extreme cases are Ja-
maica, with its disastrous experience with
bauxite, and Trinidad & Tobago, which al-
most overnight became the country with
the highest per capital income in the Carib-
bean basin but today is bearing the negative
consequences of the tremendous ac-
cumulation of reserves, with implications
for money supply and inflation. Other ex-
amples are the Central American countries,
whose exports outside their region still con-
sist preponderantly of primary products
such as coffee, cotton and bananas. In
Puerto Rico, however, regardless of changes
in manufacturing and export structure, the
stabler relationship between exports and
output has existed in periods when the ex-
port value of sugar determined the total
value of exports, accounting for 60-70 per-
cent, and in periods when assorted man-
ufacturing replaced sugar.
The significant aspect of the relationship
between exports and output in the Puerto
Rican export structure is that because it has
moved away from the dominance of a sin-
gle product towards manufactured prod-


ucts, it has experienced rapid improve-
ments in technological know-how. It
therefore has grown while neighbors like
Jamaica have experienced deceleration re-
sulting from a decline in the export value of
their minerals and from the fact that their
manufacturing sector produced mainly for
import substitution rather than for export.
While Puerto Rico's Caribbean basin neigh-
bors have in principal maintained their
course of producing for the domestic mar-
ket, Puerto Rico has had a less fluctuating
and more sustained real per capital income
rise because of its export-based growth
strategy, the change in its export structure
towards manufactured products, and the
change in exported products in accordance
with dynamic comparative advantage mea-
sured at world prices.
Puerto Rico is not the only demonstration
case for the relationship between exports
and economic growth. Empirical estimates
referring to a sample of 41 developing
countries with different trade orientations
(such as vigorous export promotion in
South Korea and Taiwan, and import sub-
stitution in Chile, Brazil and Turkey) attest to
the higher rates of growth export-promot-
ing countries have achieved, and how much
slower their growth rates would have been


24/CA ?BBEAN REVIEW


Printer quality control inspection.














































Testing an anti-cancer agent.


had their exports grown at the average rate
of the sample as a whole. Several analytical
studies made by the National Bureau of
Economic Research show that Hong Kong,
Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan, re-
ferred to as the "gang of four," have
achieved annual growth rates of slightly
more than 7 percent in their per capital GNP
(measured in current dollars) in the period
from 1960 to 1981. The annual growth
rates in the value added in their manufactur-
ing sectors ranged from 9.3 percent in
Hong Kong to almost 15 percent in Taiwan,
and of their exports from 7.3 percent in
Singapore to 30.1 percent in South Korea.
Manufactured exports constituted 97 per-
cent of total exports in Hong Kong, 89 per-
cent in South Korea, 85 percent in Taiwan
and 46 percent in Singapore. Puerto Rico's
economy has fared as well as its Asian
counterparts. During the same period, its
per capital GNP (also in current dollars)
grew at an annual rate of 7.9 percent, the
value added in manufacturing by 13.5 per-
cent, and exports by 12.5 percent. Manufac-
tured exports make up at least 80 percent of
its total commodity exports.
No doubt the developmental advantages
to be derived from promoting exports de-
pend on the existence of a reasonably open


world trading system. The present system is
not sufficiently open to allow the completely
free flow of commodities among nations.
Restrictions exist in differing degrees across
borders, although efforts are constantly
being made in successive rounds of nego-
tiations to pull down the barriers to trade.
Therefore if countries like South Korea, Tai-
wan, Singapore and Hong Kong have suc-
ceeded impressively in their export-led
performance, it is because they were sup-
ported by the failures of those other coun-
tries which adhered strictly and overly long
to an import-substitution strategy and lag-
ged in exports. If increasing calls are being
made today for Japan to voluntarily restrict
its exports, it is because Japan's growth rate
and associated trade expansion are too
large for the sluggish rest of the world to
accommodate without serious disruptions
of sectoral markets.
Puerto Rico has had an accommodating
and open trading system from the begin-
ning-by design. The US market has been
available for its products not only since the
inception of Operation Bootstrap, but since
the beginning of the century. Puerto Rico's
leaders in the 1940s and 1950s had the
political, administrative and professional in-
telligence to seize the opportunity and use it


vigorously. No doubt the various incentives
have been very effective, and Fomento (the
Puerto Rican Development Corporation)
must be accorded generous recognition.
But no incentive can be as effective as the
duty-free quota-less access to a large world
market offered by the US economy. Puerto
Rico should be even more aware of this
advantage today, when the United States
has just reduced its list of duty-free imports
from developing countries like South Korea,
Taiwan and Hong Kong to the tune of $11.9
billion.
It is up to the new generation of leaders
and entrepreneurs to significantly extend
Puerto Rico's export market beyond the na-
tional boundaries of the continental United
States. This is a harder task, for markets in
Europe are characterized by imperfections
and greater tendency toward monopolies.
Those in the Caribbean, South America and
Central America shroud themselves in
highly protective import-substitution pol-
icies, closing their doors against any entry,
however small, of foreign products. Puerto
Rico must bring its lessons of development
to them and show them that relatively free
exchange is advantageous to all sides and
that ultimately all gain from exporting to,
and importing from, one another. [l


CAIBBEAN FPIEW/25


Making children's clothes.




















* 60 courses on Latin America and the Caribbean each academic year; language training in Spanish, Portuguese
and Haitian Creole; translation and interpretation program.
60 faculty specialists in the humanities, social sciences, natural sciences and professional schools.
Courses and faculty on two campuses: Tamiami in Southwest Dade and Bay Vista in North Miami.
One of the 12 National Resource Centers for Latin American Studies supported by the US Department of
Education.
Certificate in Latin American and Caribbean Studies; business and economics degree/certificate programs.
Master's degree programs in international studies, economics and international business.
Cooperative programs with Schools of Nursing, and Public Affairs and Services.
Lectures by distinguished visiting scholars; art exhibits, film series and other extracurricular activities.
Summer study in Latin America.
Latin American and Caribbean Students' Association.
Annual workshops for public school teachers and journalists.
Monthly discussion groups with members of business, banking and legal communities.
Central American Research Program.
Founding member, with Department of Economics, of IESCARIBE (Institute of Economic and Social Research of
the Caribbean Basin).
* Faculty exchanges with University of the West Indies Institute of International Relations.
* Conferences on foreign investment and economic growth in Latin America; Caribbean Basin economic conditions;
an international dialogue on Honduras; the social context of crisis in Central America; immigration and refugee
policy.

Library collection rich in area-related materials, particularly for the Caribbean and Central America. Latin American
and Caribbean Reading Room housing special collections, bibliographic and reference materials, newspapers,
government documents, and publications of international organizations.

Multidisciplinary research emphasizing the Caribbean Basin; ongoing faculty projects on migration, Cuban oral
history, Honduras, US foreign policy in the Caribbean, urban environment and health, social and occupational
stratification in Argentina and Costa Rica, the Amazon.
For further information contact:
Latin American and Caribbean Center
Florida International University
Miami, Florida 33199; (305) 554-2894

Latin American and Caribbean Studies Faculty


Irma Alonso, Economics; Carlos Alvarez, Education; Ewart
Archer, International Relations; Gabriel Aurioles, Technology;
Ken I. Boodhoo, International Relations; Jerry Brown,
Anthropology; Manuel Carvajal, Economics; Isabel
Castellanos, Modern Languages; Janet Chernela,
Anthropology; Forrest Colburn, Political Science; Roberto
Cruz, Economics; Leonel de la Cuesta, Translation and
Interpretation; Grenville Draper, Physical Sciences; Nancy
Erwin, International Relations; Luis Escovar, Psychology;
Robert Farrell, Education; Gordon Finley, Psychology;
Charles Frankenhoff, Health Services; Hugh Gladwin,
Sociology; Fernando Gonzalez-Reiqosa, Psychology; Marian
Goslinga, Library; Lowell Gudmundson, History; Jerry Haar,
International Business; John Jensen, Modern Languages;
Farrokh Jhabvala, International Relations; Antonio Jorge,
Economics; Charles Lacombe, (Adjunct) Anthropology; David
Lee, Biology; William Leffland, International Affairs Center;
Barry B. Levine, Sociology; Jocelyn T. Marie Levy, Modern


Languages; Jan Luytjes, International Business; Anthony P
Maingot, Sociology; Luis Martinez-Perez, Education; James
A. Mau, Sociology; Florentin Maurrasse, Physical Sciences;
Rambn Mendoza, Modern Languages; Raul Moncarz,
Economics; Olga Nazario, (Adjunct) International Relations;
Marta Ortiz, Marketing; Ricardo Pau-Llosa, (Adjunct) Visual
Arts; John Porges, International Banking; William Renforth,
International Business; Ana Roca, Modern Languages;
Leonardo Rodriguez, International Business; Mark B.
Rosenberg, Political Science; Luis P. Salas, Criminal Justice;
Jorge Salazar, Economics; Reinaldo Sdnchez, Modern
Lar l 'es: Philip Shepherd, International Business; Alex
S < Anlhropology. George Sutija, International Banking;
0. Szuchman, History; Anitra Thorhaug, Biology;
juel Torres, Visual Arts; William T. Vickers, Anthropology;
r s6 T. Villate, Technology; Maida Watson Espener, Modern
Languages; Mira Wilkins, Economics; Florence L. Yudin,
Modern Languages.


Latin American and Caribbean Center











The Costa Rican Solution

An Innovative Approach to Export Promotion

By John C. Edmunds and William Renforth


A after years of debate and
halfway measures, the
Costa Rican government
passed a law on 2 March 1984
which is a major departure from
its previous trade policy. This
law dramatically lowers the taxes
on companies engaged in ex-
porting, and includes a strong
fiscal incentive to launch export
ventures. Such a law may seem
commonplace, but given its
magnitude and the current busi-
ness environment in Costa Rica,
it may be the catalyst for a new
export-oriented economic pol-
icy. A major shift toward export
emphasis and open trade has
been in the air for some time,
and now it appears that the
country has taken a major step Presidenl
on a new path. Maurice
Many Caribbean countries
have tried to encourage export activity as
an engine of domestic economic growth,
with varying degrees of success. What
makes the Costa Rican case interesting is
that its leaders are as concerned with pre-
serving the distribution of income as they
are with reviving the economy. Costa Rica's
distribution of income is worth preserving;
it is notably egalitarian, an aberration in the
region. This fact deterred until now an ag-
gressive move toward export promotion be-
cause leaders worried that while producing
growth, export substitution would also po-
larize the income distribution. To their dis-
tress, this polarization was occurring
regardless of the country's export policy, in
a context of economic decline during
1980-83. It appears now that they have
adopted export promotion, knowing that it
may not arrest polarization, but needing to
revive the economy by whatever means
available.


John C. Edmunds teaches at the Instituto Cen-
troamericano de Administracidn de Empresas
(INCAE) in San Josd, Costa Rica. William Ren-
forth teaches in the College of Business Ad-
ministration at Florida International University.


t Luis Alberto Monge of Costa Rica (right) with Miar
Ferre, 1983.

Instability
From 1960 to 1979, the Costa Rican econ-
omy grew rapidly through a policy of import
substitution, implemented in conjunction
with its membership in the Central Ameri-
can Common Market (CACM). Rather
abruptly, this policy ceased working in
1980, as political and monetary instability
rocked the region. Costa Rican shipments
to CACM trading partners fell 55.7 percent
between 1980 and 1982, and evidence
from market participants shows a continua-
tion of this alarming downtrend. Worse still,
this decline in exports to the CACM came at
the same time as a severe downturn in tra-
ditional primary product export revenues.
In world markets, coffee, sugar, and beef
prices all performed poorly.
As this decline in export revenues was
going on, the country was reeling under a
foreign debt of $4,500 million, equivalent to
approximately six times its annual export
revenues or twice its GNP The country's
access to international credit was frozen
from mid-1980 onward, and government
negotiators have been busy since then try-
ing to achieve repayment terms consistent.
with the economy's debt capacity. There
has been some success in this endeavor,


but a return to the growth rates
previously achieved clearly will
require a recovery in export rev-
enues or long-term autono-
mous capital inflows.
At the end of 1980, facing a
balance-of-payments crisis, the
government floated the cur-
rency, hoping that the colon
would find a new equilibrium
after a devaluation on the order
of 30-50 percent. Floating or
outright devaluation is the
Orthodox neoclassical eco-
S nomic policy for a country with
balance-of-payments difficul-
Sties. When Costa Rica tried this
Policy, it backfired in spectacu-
Slar fashion. The exchange rate,
s steady at 8.52/$1 for the pre-
mi Mayor ceding 10 years, reached 65/$1
in 19 months. Several factors
contributed to this astonishing
escalation. Among them was fear that the
political turbulence in the region would spill
over into Costa Rica and lead to radical
change. Another was fear that the Costa
Rican government, in its efforts to promote
economic recovery, would resort to infla-
tionary policies. A third factor was that de-
valuation itself spurred inflation. The
import content of GNP was between 40 and
50 percent in the late seventies, so when
import prices rose, domestic prices fol-
lowed soon afterwards. This created an in-
flationary spiral, and fear gave the spiral
added impetus: when the currency floated,
people who earlier had been unable to buy
dollars decided to buy before the price of
dollars went any higher. And as the ex-
change rate got worse, domestic prices
started to rise sharply, confirming people's
fears that inflation would race out of control.
This incentive to convert assets into dollars
exerted further pressure on the exchange
rate.
The power of expectation was demon-
strated. Consumer prices increased 35 per-
cent in 1981, the first year after the float was
initiated, and then rose 85 percent in 1982.
During this time the number of colones
required to buy a dollar increased approx-


CAl?BBEAN FL1IEW/27








imately 600 percent. The effective devalua-
tion for exporters of manufactured goods
was on the order of 100 percent; that is, by
the beginning of 1982 exporters could
charge half as much in dollars and earn the
same profit margins in local currency as
they would have in 1980. This maxi-de-
valuation, which was expected to spur a
wave of nontraditional exports, in fact spur-
red very few. In 1981 there was a slight im-
provement in nontraditional exports to
markets outside Central America, but this
improvement evaporated in 1982, a year in
which exports in all categories continued to
fall.
No improvement in exports materialized
for several reasons. First, investors within
the country were more concerned with try-
ing to get their money out than with trying
to take advantage of the opportunities pre-
sented. Exporting a wide variety of prod-
ucts was profitable, according to studies
done by Arthur D. Little, Inc., but very few
people cared. Investors outside the country
were wary, and few put money into export
projects. They were in no hurry because
many observers both inside and outside the
country thought that things would keep get-
ting worse.

The Monge Policy
The sharply worsening trade performance


affected all economic sectors. GNP fell a
staggering 9.1 percent in real terms in
1982. What was worse, all economic strata
did not suffer equal income losses. The
middle class, and the lower middle class in
particular, lost most heavily. Costa Rica's
noted political stability and admirably
egalitarian income distribution were jeopar-
dized. Clearly something major and funda-
mental had to be done. The economic
model that had worked so well in the sixties
and seventies had run its course. The econ-
omy would have to be restructured, and a
new model would have to be put in place.
Surprisingly, although most Costa Rican
decisionmakers recognized what had to be
done, change proceeded very slowly. The
transition from one economic paradigm to
another is never smooth, but in Costa Rica's
case change was especially slow, and
fraught with agonizing but fruitless debate.
The Monge government, which took of-
fice in May 1982, immediately pursued a
policy of monetary restriction. The princi-
pal policy objective was to restore confi-
dence in the economy and to arrest the
currency's decline. Costa Rica in 1982 was a
warehouser's paradise: merchants could
buy goods on credit, paying 31 percent in-
terest, while the general price level was ris-
ing at an annual rate of 85 percent. This
chaotic set of conditions obviously could


not be allowed to persist; incentives were so
distorted that most productive activity was
unprofitable. A few merchants were doing
extraordinarily well, but most of the country
was in a profound slump.
To break the inflationary psychology and
the mania for buying dollars, the Monge
administration pursued a policy that had
worked once in the past to restore monetary
stability after the 1948 revolution. The gov-
ernment intentionally revalued the col6n.
The legally recognized parallel market ex-
change rate was 65/$1 in private mon-
eychangers' shops at the beginning of
August 1982. At the same time the inter-
bank exchange rate was 38/$1. For certain
transactions the central bank gave dollars at
the official rate 20/$1. This multiple ex-
change rate had been in effect since the
currency was floated, but under the terms of
an agreement with the IMF, the parallel and
interbank rates were to be unified.
The Monge regime's strategy for unifying
the two exchange rates was unexpected.
Most observers thought that the govern-
ment would supply dollars to the parallel
market to keep that rate steady, and then
gradually raise the interbank rate until the
two were equal. This would have led to a
single exchange rate in the vicinity of
65/$1, and with the rate at that level export-
ing would have been very profitable. With


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the currency once again pegged, and with
investment moving into export industries,
the country would perhaps have experi-
enced an export-led recovery.
The alternative of uniting the two ex-
change rates at the 65/$1 level, however,
had a number of drawbacks. First, it ignored
threats to political stability. Clearly it would
have further enriched the merchants who
gambled on hyperinflation and currency
decline. Also, it would have generated more
inflationary pressure because the weighted
average exchange rate would have con-
tinued its upward movement. Worse, it
would have produced further shifts in the
distribution of income among social strata.
The last point was an especially important
consideration for Monge's party, Libera-
ci6n, which represents middle-income
groups and organized labor. The party
viewed exchange rate policy first as a
means of altering or preserving the distribu-
tion of income. An export-led recovery was
an appealing prospect to the country's
commercial groups and creditors; but the
argument that exports would rise lacked
credibility. Exports had not risen in the first
year-and-a-half following the maxi-de-
valuation. It was hard to convince Monge's
advisers that intentionally undervaluing the
exchange rate for a few more months would
suddenly lead to an export boom. There
was skepticism that such a plan would work,
and at the same time they knew that its
initial impact would be to hurt their constit-
uency further.
Consequently the Monge regime unified
the two exchange rates by pushing the par-
allel rate down toward the interbank rate. To
accomplish this, the monetary authorities
first outlawed private money changing. To
gain more direct control over the parallel
rate, all parallel transactions had to be car-
ried out through commercial banks from
the second half of August 1982 on. The
Central Bank then began supplying dollars
to the parallel market. By October 1982 the
parallel rate was below 60/$1, and by the
end of 1982 it was below 50/ $ 1. By the third
quarter of 1983 the government had unified
the two exchange rates at 43/$1 and peg-
ged them both at that rate. This was a re-
markable accomplishment because many
observers felt in mid-1982 that the parallel
rate would reach 100/$1 by the end of the
year. Such a currency collapse would have
been consistent with what was happening
elsewhere, in Mexico for example.
Surprisingly Monge's policy worked, al-
though no economist with firmly-held neo-
classical convictions would have thought
so. The administration placed its bets well.
The middle class continued to suffer, but at
a less severe pace. Inflation slowed to an
annual rate of 22 percent. Exports stag-
nated, but they could hardly have been ex-
pected to rise in a year of worldwide
recession. Foreign bankers waited for better


times, the only thing they could do.

Weak Recovery
The Costa Rican economy continued to de-
cline in the first half of 1983, but not so
steeply as in 1982. Then in the second half
of 1983 it staged a modest rise, with GNP
increasing 0.8 percent in real terms. Con-
sumer prices rose at an annual rate of only
6.25 percent from July 1983 to March
1984. This is one of the most remarkable
inflation turnarounds in the region's history.
The economy has been in recovery dur-
ing 1984, with forecasts suggesting a 2 per-
cent growth in real GNP for the year. The
actual figure may be somewhat higher, be-
cause private capital is now flowing in.
Some investors have apparently come to
believe that the Monge administration's ex-
change policy is sustainable and so have
stopped hoping for further speculative
gains. In addition, high real rates of interest
can be earned on col6n deposits. Col6n-
denominated CDs are now paying 21 per-
cent, and with consumer prices rising only
6.25 percent, this gives a real interest rate
high enough to attract flight capital back to
the country.
For the future, the limiting factors are
foreign exchange and economic structure.
The country is now in the "easy" phase of its
recovery. Recovery can proceed for a time
without coming up against any capacity
constraints. Many activities can recover to
their 1979 levels. The problem is external
limitation. There is no prospect of having
enough foreign exchange to sustain eco-
nomic growth with the current economic
structure. The economy as it is currently
constituted consumes more foreign ex-
change than it generates. From 1960 to
1979 this fact did not restrict growth, be-
cause the country was able to attract foreign
investment or foreign loans sufficient to fi-
nance current account deficits. In the future,
however, Costa Rica will have to generate
more foreign exchange than it consumes.
The country will have to make some pay-
ments on its foreign debt regardless of how
successful it is in renegotiating and refi-
nancing it. This fact, which was obvious in
1980 if not earlier, is what makes a major
economic restructuring necessary.

Restructuring the Economy
Shortly after moving to restore confidence
in the currency, economic policymakers be-
gan to address the issue of structural
change. They knew that exports had to in-
crease, and they had already seen that
something more than devaluation would be
required to accomplish this. This first pre-
requisite, a worldwide economic recovery,
began with the strong US upturn com-
mencing in January 1983. This upturn,
however, had no impact on Costa Rica that
year. Exports were below the depressed
Continued on page 45


MARZO/ABRIL 1985


No 76


Director: Alberto Koschuetzke
Jefe de Redacc6n: Daniel Gonzalez V.

ANALYSIS DE COYUNTURA: Nueva
Voz: Guatemall: 4Volverdn los Milita-
res a sus Cuarteles?; D.F. Maza Zavala:
La Dificil Austeridad.
ENTREVISTA: Diilogo con Leopoldo
Zea. La Juventud Latinoamericana:
Crear lo que Nunca Han Tenido.
TEMA CENTRAL: JUVENTUD LATI-
NOAMERICANA: LUNAFICCIONJuan
Carlos Tedesco: 5.380.000 Preguntas al
Future. La Educaci6n Superior en Ame-
rica Latina; Felipe Carrera Damas: J6ve-
nes y Sexo; Mario Marcel: La Generaci6n
Pendiente; Miguel Bonasso: De los "De-
saparecidos" a los "Chicos de la Guerra";
Gloria Ardaya: Mujer Joven: Discrimina-
ci6n y Participaci6n; Edgar Montiel: Con-
formismo y Rebeldia; Ana Marfa Fox-
Iey: Marginados entire Marginados. Los
J6venes Artistas; Ricardo Solari: Entre la
nusi6n y la Desconflanza; Claudio Fer-
min: Lugares Comunes y Opticas Erra-
das. Political Estatales para la Juventud;
Friedrich Welsch Germain Campos: LJu-
ventud = Problema? Una Definici6n de
Juventud a Partir de Ella Misma; Mario
Toer: LEn Brisqueda de un Nuevo Perfil?
Los Movimientos Estudiantiles en el Co-
no Sur.
POSICIONES: Nuestra Conducta Parti-
daria y la Gesti6n del Gobierno de la
UDP. Una Evaluaci6n Critica y Auto-
critica del MIR Boliviano.
POLITICAL -ECONOMIA -CULTURA:
Andr6s Serbin: El Caribe Oriental: Las
Secuelas de Granada; Roberto Diaz Cas-
tillo: Rabinal Achi, Macho Rat6n, Mam-
bo. .. El Hecho Folkl6rico Danzario;
Alcides Hernindez: La Reaganomics pa-
ra Honduras: Roberto L6pez: Exporta-
ciones Tradicionales y Crisis Centroame-
ricana; Nils Castro Oyden Ortega: Nue-
vas Causas de Conflicto. El Canal de Pa-
nama a Cinco Afos del Tratado.
NOTICIAS INFORMES RECEN-
SIONES


SUSCRIPCIONES
(Incluido flete adreo)

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Resto del Mundo
Venezuela


ANNUAL BIENAL
(6 numa.) (12 n6na.)

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Ba. 150 Ba. 250


PAGOS: Cheque en d6lares a nombre de
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CAI?BBEAN PFVIEW/29


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Addressee Unknown

A Short Story

Written and Translated by James A. Able, Jr.


Tampa, Florida
23 May 1961

Dear Miguel,
I hope this reaches you. Iam sending it by
way of Juan Alvarez, a friend of a friend of
mine, in Mexico City. He has offered to for-
ward my letters to you and any reply from
you to me. If you can write, send the letter to
him at Apartado Postal 7717, Mexico City,
D. F., Mexico.
I suppose that you are surprised to hear
from me, since you probably did not know
whether or not I reached the United States
safely. I was very saddened at having to
leave Cuba after more than fifty years, but I
simply could not continue to live there un-
der the conditions and remain silent. I know
how you feel, and that you do not agree, so I
will not belabor the point.
I only wish that I could have brought Mar-
garita with me. However, she was away at
school at the time and, after learning the
police were on the way to arrest me, I only
had time to pack the most meager of be-
longings and make one hurried telephone
call to you. As it was, I barely avoided them
three times before I was able to get out of
the city.
I am anxious to know whether you have
found a buyer for the shop, or whether you
can raise the money to buy it yourself. Since
you were with me for so long, I would prefer
that you be the one. I know that I will get only
a small fraction of the money-to say noth-
ing of the many years of my life-I have
invested in it, but even that much would help
me to set myself up in a business here.
Earning a living has been most difficult; the
local people have helped as much as possi-
ble, but there are so many refugees and so
few jobs. I am working as a clerk in a grocery
store-not much for a man who owned his
own print shop-but, right now, I am thank-
ful to have even this. However, 1 would feel
better if 1 knew that Margarita was being
provided for, so please watch after her and

James A. Able, Jr., a former lawyer, is a writer
living in Tampa, Florida. He is the author of
VICTIMS: Story of a Teenage Hooker (1979
novel).


see that she has enough for her needs if you
can. I will reimburse you out of the sale
proceeds from the shop, of course.
I will close for now, but I shall eagerly await
your reply through Alvarez, if you can write.
Your friend,
Carlos Delgado



DELGADO PRINTING CO.
Calle San Carlos 401
Habana, Cuba
10 June 1961

Dear Carlos,
I was, indeed, surprised to hear from you
again. You left so suddenly-a hurried tele-
phone call in the middle of the night, then
nothing for more than three months. I tried
to warn you that your outspoken ways would
cause you trouble, but you would not listen
to me.
I fear for your daughter, Margarita. Since
you left, she has become very outspoken
and militant, even more than before, which
was considerable. And, for some reason,
she seems to blame me for what happened
to you. 1 have given her what little money I
could spare, which was not much.
However, I have some very bad news for
you: there is no business left to sell. When
you left as you did, your property was for-
feited and has been confiscated by the gov-
ernment. Since I had worked for you for so
long, and since I knew some influential peo-
ple in the government, I was allowed to con-
tinue as manager. However, the profits go to
the government, which is why I have not
been able to give more than I have to Mar-
garita and, of course, there is nothing left to
send to you.
I hope you will be all right in Tampa, al-
though I still believe you would have done
better to accept things as they are and done
business with them as I have done.
I will continue to help Margarita as much
as I can, but I do wish she would not be so
outspoken in public. Also, I wish she were
not so antagonistic toward Caridad and me.
After all, it is for her own good that we have
tried to steer her away from the course she is


following, one that can only get her in se-
rious trouble with the authorities. And, I
might say, we are doing this at great per-
sonal risk. It is not wise to be associated with
known critics of the government. I would
not do so at all if she were not your daughter,
whom I have known since she was a baby.
I will keep you advised of what is happen-
ing and, as 1 said, I will do what I can for
Margarita.
Your friend,
Miguel Flores


FLORES PRINTING CO.
Calle San Carlos 401
Habana, Cuba
4 April 1962


Dear Carlos,
I am sorry that 1 have not written in ten
months, but I have been extremely busy. I
am sure you have noted the new letterhead.
Because of my efficiency in running the
business-as well as knowing certain offi-
cials-1 have been able to operate the busi-
ness as my own. Of course, it still belongs to
the government, but it carries my name and
I receive a percentage of the profits, which is
quite a lot more than the salary I was receiv-
ing. I had to make certain "contributions"
and pay for some "licenses" and "fran-
chises"-1 am sure you understand what I
am trying to say-and had to borrow the
money from Caridad's uncle, but I will be
able to repay him out of the profits. 1 was
"fortunate" in obtaining a government
printing contract, too.
Of course, you realize that you no longer
have any interest in the business. However, I
feel that you gave me my start and indirectly
made it possible for me to, in a sense, own
my own business. So, if you ever decide to
make your peace with the authorities and
come back to Cuba, you may be assured
that you will have a job-which is better
than being a grocery clerk in a foreign land,
is it not?
But, before you could do this, something
would have to be done about Margarita. I
am sorry to have to tell you this but, in the


CAI?BBEAN PEVIEW/31












Forthcoming




May 29-June 1, 1985. Tenth Anniver-
sary Conference of the Carib-
bean Studies Association. San
Juan, Puerto Rico, Dupont Plaza
Hotel. Theme: Human Resources
and Human Values in the Carib-
bean. Contact. Angel Calderon-
Cruz, Program Chairman. Carib-
bean Studies Association, Center
for Energy and Environmental Re-
search, GPO Box 3682, San Juan.
Puerto Rico 00936.




June 16-19, 1985. Annual Meeting of
the US-Mexican Border Health
Association. San Antonio, Texas.
Contact: Dr. Herbert Ortega, Secly.
Dir., Pan American Health Organ-
ization, 6006 North Mesa, Suite
700, El Paso, TX 79912, (915)
581-6645.




June 19-23, 1985. 30th Seminar on
the Acquisition of Latin American
Library Materials (SALALM).
Princeton University Woodrow Wil-
son School and Forbes College.
Theme: Masses and Minorities:
Their Images and Realities. Con-
tacts: Dan C. Hazen, President
SALALM, 774 Euclid Avenue,
Berkeley, CA 94708 (program);
Peter T. Johnson, P.O. Box 190.
Princeton, N.J. 09544, (609)
452-3193 (local arrangements).




July 1-7, 1985. 45th Congreso Inter-
nacional de Americanistas.
Bogota, Colombia. Theme: Man in
the Americas. Contact: Nohra Rey
de Marulanda, Comite Ejecutivo,
45' Congreso Internacional de
Americanistas, Rectoria, Universi-
dad de los Andes, Apartado Aereo
No. 4976, BogolI, Colombia.


past ten months, she has become impossi-
ble! Since she dropped out of the university
because of finances (1 would have helped
her if I could, but I had just heavily obligated
myself for this business), she has become
even more open in her anti-government ac-
tivities in a movement of students and other
so-called "liberals" that is frowned on by the
authorities. It is even rumored that she is
connected with the publication of an under-
ground newspaper that is distributed here.
A police official questioned me about this.
Fortunately, I was able to convince him that
these rumors arise from her hotheadedness
and the fact that she is the daughter of an
expatriate.
I greatly fear for her safety if she does not
desist in her present activities. I wish that
you would write her, urging her to change
her ways before it is too late, and I will see
that it gets to her. I say, "gets to her," be-
cause she does not come to our home any-
more. She seems to resent the fact that we
have moved into a larger house in a nicer
neighborhood and that I am doing so well in
business-she especially disapproves of
my dealings with the government. The last
time she was here, there was quite a scene
in which she behaved rather badly, and she
left after saying some ugly things to us!
I do not mean this unkindly but, perhaps
it is better that she stay away. Her presence
could be most embarrassing to a person in
my position.
However, in spite of all she has done, if
she would change her attitude and sever her
ties with those "liberals," I would use my
influence-which is not inconsiderable-to
get her back into the university, and even let
her live with us. Dolores is attending on a
state scholarship, and we have an extra
room now that Diego is in the service.
Again, let me urge you to use your influ-
ence on her and, if you decide you want to
return to Cuba and resume your obligations
to your country, let me know.
Your friend,
Miguel



Habana, Cuba
15 August 1962

Dear Carlos,
It is with heavy heart that I write to inform
you that Margarita is in jail. A security agent
who had infiltrated the group of which she
was a member (and from which I tried to get
her to withdraw, remember?), linked her
with the underground newspaper I men-
tioned before, and her arrest was ordered.
She came to my house, just one step
ahead of the police, and asked me to hide
her. Carlos, you know I would have done so
if I could have, but I was sure the police
would trace her to my house and I would be
compromised. I wanted very much to help


your child, but I also have my wife and chil-
dren to think of, as well as my position and
my business. It hurt me deeply to have to
turn her away, but I know you will agree that
there was nothing else I could do! Even
then, she almost caused me serious trouble:
when she came to my door, I was entertain-
ing a very important party official but, for-
tunately, he did not see her. And she was
apprehended a considerable distance away
so, luckily, she was not connected with me.
I made some discreet inquiry to the po-
lice, hoping that I might do something,
through my political connections, to miti-
gate her punishment, but I learned that one
of the group had killed the police agent, so
the five who were apprehended (two were
killed resisting arrest) are charged with
murder as well as treason and are being
held incommunicado-so there was noth-
ing I could do for her.
Well, you can understand that I could not
afford to be connected even slightly with
such a heinous matter, and that even to
inquire further might cause serious reper-
cussions against me. However, if there is
any additional news, I will relay it to you.
Again, it grieves me deeply to have to tell
you this but, at least I did offer to help her
redeem herself before it was too late, which
offer she foolishly refused and you chose to
ignore.
Your friend,
Miguel


MIAMI (AP) Sep. 5-Word has reached local
Cuban refugee groups from underground
sources in Havana that five persons, including
a young woman, have been summarily ex-
ecuted for the murder of a police informer In-
quiry by newsmen in Havana produced
categorical denial.
An official of the Ministry of Justice said that
five CIA agents, being held for interrogation,
overpowered a guard and were killed while
attempting to escape. The spokesman admit-
ted that one of the dead was a young woman
but declared the Miami report to be "a clumsy
attempt by the CIA to cover up illegal US in-
volvement in the internal affairs of Cuba."
The names of the five dead were not given.


PAN-AMERICAN BROKERS, INC.
2647 Seventh Avenue
Tampa, Florida
10 October 1962

Mr. Miguel Flores
Flores Printing Co.
Calle San Carlos 401
Habana, Cuba

Dear Sir:
Confirming our agreement, we have dis-
tributed your catalog to our customers
throughout Central America, and orders will
be sent directly to you through our Mexico


32/CAl?BBEAN REVIEW









City agent on the customers' letterhead.
Shipment should be made directly to the
customer, and payment will be deposited in
your account in the National Bank of Mex-
ico-less our 20% commission-by our
agent.
As you directed, all communication will
be through the Mexico City agent in the
prearranged manner.
Yours very truly,
Carlos Delgado, President


Habana, Cuba
20 October 1962

Dear Carlos,
What is the meaning of the strange letter I
received from you today? You know that I do
not maintain a catalog stock but do only
contract printing, and that I have made no
such arrangements to sell in foreign coun-
tries. (All foreign trade-what little there is
of it, thanks to the imperialist US influ-
ence-is done by the government.) Also,
the last time I heard from you, you were
working for a grocer, and I have never heard
of the brokerage firm of which you are now
listed as president.
Please advise me, promptly.
Your friend,
Miguel


SAN JOSE SUPPLIERS, S.A.
Apartado Postal 1131
San Jose, Costa Rica
27 October 1962

Flores Printing Co.
c/o Juan Alvarez, Agent
Apartado Postal 7717
Mexico City, D.F, Mexico

Gentlemen:
Per your standing arrangement with Pan-
American Brokers, Inc., Tampa, Fla., USA,
please ship to us, to arrive on 6 Nov. 1962,
the following: 1,000 ea., No. 268G1997;
2,000 ea., No. 197R651; 100 ea., No.
007Z089.
Yours very truly,
G. G. Martinez


INTERNATIONAL IMPORTERS, S.A.
Apartado Postal 2213
Managua, Nicaragua
29 October 1962

Flores Printing Co.
c/o Juan Alvarez, Agent
Apartado Postal 7717
Mexico City, D.F., Mexico

Gentlemen:
Per your standing arrangement with Pan-


American Brokers, Inc., please ship to us,
to arrive on 8 Nov. 1962, the following:
3,000 ea., No. 110H6729; 5,000 ea., No.
734T8560; 2,500 ea., No. 619V3543.
Yours very truly,
H. A. Garcia

Habana, Cuba
9 November 1962

Carlos,
What are you doing? I have received,
through your friend in Mexico City, several
orders supposedly in accordance with your
10 October letter on the brokerage firm
letterhead, about which I wrote you and to
which you never replied. I do not have such
an arrangement, with you or anyone else. I
do not publish a catalog. I do not know what
they are talking about! PLEASE tell me
what is the meaning of all this?
Anxiously,
Miguel

ISTHMUS TRADING CO.
Apartado Postal 100
Panama City, Panama
14 November 1962

Flores Printing Co.
c/o Juan Alvarez, Agent
Apartado Postal 7717
Mexico City, D.F, Mexico

Gentlemen:
Please be advised that your order of 29
October cannot be shipped as you re-
quested. Please advise alternative shipping
method and route.
Yours very truly,
A. M. Valdez


Habana, Cuba
24 November 1962

Carlos,
What, in God's name, is going on? I am
still getting those strange letters from
strange Latin American companies about
which I have not the slightest knowledge.
Do you know what these can do to me?
You must know that our mail sometimes is
censored, and that such unexplained letters
can be very detrimental. Already my gov-
ernment contract is in danger of being can-
celed and, without it, I will lose this business
for which I have worked so hard.
I do not know why you are doing this.
Perhaps Margarita's unfortunate death has
affected your mind. Whatever it is, in the
name of our long friendship, please stop it!
Desperately,
Miguel
Continued on page 46


Forthcoming




July 2-4, 1985. Ninth Annual
Conference of the Society of
Caribbean Studies. High Leigh
Conference Centre, Hoddesdon,
Hertfordshire, England. Contact:
Tony Payne, The Polytechnic,
Queensgage, Huddersfield, HD1
3DH.





October 1985. IV Annual PROF-
MEX/ANUIES Conference. Santa
Fe, New Mexico. Theme: One
Border, Two Nations-Policy Im-
plications and Problem Resolution.
Contacts: Prof. Oscar Martinez, Di-
rector Inter-American & Border
Studies, University of Texas, El
Paso, TX 79968, (915) 747-5196;
Prof. Al Utton, School of Law, Uni-
versity of New Mexico, Albuquer-
que, NM 87131, (505) 277-4820
(local arrangements).





October 13-19, 1985. Energy for the
Americas International Confer-
ence. San Juan, Puerto Rico, Con-
vention Center. Contact: Dr. Juan A.
Bonnet, Jr., Director, Center for En-
ergy and Environmental Research,
University of Puerto Rico, GPO Box
3682, San Juan, Puerto Rico
00936.





October 17-20, 1985. Meeting of the
Pacific Coast Conference of Latin
American Studies (PCCLAS). Las
Vegas, Nevada, Flamingo Hilton.
Theme: Change and Continuity-
Cross Currents in Latin American
Development. Contact: Tom Wright,
College of Arts and Letters, Univer-
sity of Nevada, Las Vegas, NV
89154.


CAI?BBEAN FEVIEW/33











A Caribbean Lilliput

Scrutinizing the Grenada Skirmish

Reviewed by Kai Schoenhals


Documents Pertaining to Relations
Between Grenada, the USSR and
Cuba. 450 p. Series 1, 2, 3. United
States Information Agency,
Washington, D.C., 7 Novem-
ber 1983.
Grenada Documents: An Overview
and Selection, Michael Ledeen and
Herbert Romerstein, eds. 850 p. US
Department of Defense, Washing-
ton, D.C., September 1984.
The Grenada Papers, Paul Seabury
and Walter A. McDougall, eds. 344 p.
ICS Press, San Francisco, 1984.
Grenada: Revolution and Invasion,
Anthony Payne, Paul Sutton and
Tony Thorndike. 233 p. St. Martin's
Press, New York, 1984.

The capture of 25,000 pounds of
documents on Grenada (the biggest
haul of captured communist docu-
ments since the Germans seized the
Bolshevik Party records of Smolensk
in 1941) has produced a veritable
flood of books. In the forefront of this
outpouring stands the US govern-
ment itself which, until recently, had
exclusive access to these documents.
Only two weeks after the "rescue
mission" of 25 October 1983, the
United States Information Agency
published three volumes of hastily
mimeographed Grenadian docu-
ments which were sent to all US dip-
lomatic posts. These Documents
Pertaining to Relations between
Grenada, The USSR and Cuba were
elected to back up the government's cl
that Grenada was becoming a new cent(
Cuban and Soviet subversion in this he
sphere, and so one finds secret treaties
tween Grenada and the Soviet Union, Q
and North Korea which promised ton
military equipment for the People's Rev
tionary Army (PRA). Nowhere in these c


Kai Schoenhals, who teaches history at Ken-
yon College, resided in Grenada from August
1982 to June 1983. He is the author of Revolu-
tion and Intervention in Grenada: The New
Jewel Movement, the United States and the
Caribbean (Westview).


Post-intervention scene, Grenada, 1983.


uments, however, can be found the slightest
indication that Cuba and the Soviet Union
envisaged the new Point Salines Airport as a
future air force base.
Probably the most fascinating part of this
collection are the minutes of the New Jewel
Movement Central Committee's meetings
between June and October 1983. They
paint quite a different picture of the struggle
between Bishop and Coard than the one
portrayed by the world press, the Reagan
administration and Fidel Castro. These
minutes show that rather than having been
"a populist whose roots were in the Black
Power Movement of the 1960s" in contrast


to "the hard-line Marxist Bernard
Coard," Bishop was just as deter-
mined as Coard to transform Gre-
nada into a Marxist-Leninist state.
Both of them were intelligent enough
to realize that the power of religion, as
well as the lack of an industrial work-
ing class, made the introduction of
Marxism-Leninism on Grenada an
extremely difficult and slow task, but
there can be no doubt as to their ulti-
mate aims (Bishop's goals are clearly
spelled out in Maurice Bishop's "Line
of March" Speech, 13 September
1982, Grenada Occasional Papers
No. 1, US Department of State, Au-
gust 1984).

Documents and Then Some
In September 1984, one month be-
fore the first anniversary of the
collapse of the Grenadian revolution,
the US government came out with
another collection of captured Gre-
nadian documents, released jointly
by the departments of State and De-
fense. This volume of 850 pages,
which is entitled Grenada Docu-
ments: An Overview and Selection,
lacks the rush-job characteristic of
the previously published documents.
SThe reprinted documents are much
2 more legible and they are neatly di-
E vided into three sections: "Life under
1 the New Jewel Movement," "Interna-
tional Activities" and "Minutes of Po-
litical Bureau and Central
Committee."
In their foreword the editors, Michael Le-
deen and Herbert Romerstein, correctly
point out that there is no evidence that
either Cuba or the USSR were involved in
the power struggle between Bishop and
Coard. This should put to rest the much-
repeated but unfounded speculation
(most recently expressed again by Jiri and
Virginia Valenta in their article "Leninism in
Grenada" in Problems of Communism,
Washington, D.C., July-August 1984) that
the Soviet Union was apparently backing
Coard, while Cuba supported Bishop.
One of the most significant documents
is a long analysis of Grenadian-Soviet rela-


34/CAI?BBEAN P EieW


























tions written and typed personally by W.
Richard Jacobs, the former Grenadian Am-
bassador to the Soviet Union and the rest of
the East European communist states. The
analysis illustrates above all else that Gre-
nada was really of only marginal interest to
the USSR. Jacobs mentions Bishop's visit to
the Soviet Union during which Andropov
did not receive the Grenadian leader (in
contrast to his personal reception of the
Sandinista leadership). When the Soviet
government announced that it would send a
high-powered delegation to St. George's,
according to Jacobs, only a minor Soviet
official showed up who should not have
been received by the top NJM leadership.
Jacobs' frustration with the Soviet govern-
ment's condescending attitude towards the
Caribbean island states becomes even
more apparent when he relates how he tried
to explain the political situation on St. Vin-
cent to a Soviet official whose response to
Jacobs' elucidations was that they were all
very interesting "but St. Vincent is so far
away." The Soviet official could just as well
have been speaking of Grenada.
Editors Paul Seabury and Walter A.
McDougall are to be commended for mak-
ing Ambassador Jacobs' analysis of Grena-
dian-Soviet relations, as well as many of the
other captured documents, available to the
general public in the Institute for Contem-
porary Studies' publication, The Grenada
Papers. Yet this book is flawed by its failure
to set the revolution within the context of the
history of Grenada and the Caribbean area
in general. Instead the foreword, the intro-
duction, and the paragraphs preceding
each document portray the PRG's four-and-
a-half-year reign as part of a vast Soviet
conspiracy in which all communist coun-
tries (North Korea[!], Cuba, Grenada, etc.)
simply become "proxies" of the Soviet
Union's attempt to take over the world. As a
result, a number of distortions occur.
Sidney Hook, who wrote the foreword,
discovered a "four-star general" on Gre-
nada, an apparent reference to the former
Soviet Ambassador to Grenada, Genady
Sazhenev, who, in reality, was a fourth-rate
diplomat who spoke little English and was
unfamiliar with Grenada and the rest of the


Anglophone Caribbean. (1 sat next to this
gentleman at a celebration honoring T A.
Marryshow, a Grenadian national hero,
when Sazhenev turned to me and asked in
Spanish who on earth was "this Mar-
ryshow.") Maurice Bishop, who was re-
spected and admired even by his
opponents, is labeled "an incompetent ty-
rant" in the introduction; whereas in the
dramatic personae, the corrupt and repres-
sive Eric Gairy appears as a "colorful former
nightclub owner and spiritualist." A caption
under a photograph showing the assault of
three People's Revolutionary Army person-
nel carriers (manufactured in the Soviet
Union) upon Fort Rupert reads: "Russian
armored cars, following the orders of
Coard's faction, attack Fort Rupert minutes
before the killing of Maurice Bishop." Such
a description conveys the erroneous im-
pression that the Russians were involved in
the final attack upon Bishop and his
followers.
A number of outright errors occur on
page 323. Bernard Coard did not "become
prime minister of Grenada following
Bishop's detention," but, on the contrary,
resigned from his position as Minister of the
Economy. It was his replacement, Nazim
Burke, who devised the emergency eco-
nomic measures of the ephemeral Revolu-
tionary Military Council (RMC) which took
over after Bishop's murder. Nor is it accurate
to claim that Bishops seizure of Fort Rupert
was followed by the Coard government or-
dering the regular army to storm the fort.
What is true is that the anti-Bishop faction
dispatched two unarmed officers (Lester
Redhead and Chris Stroud) to attempt to
reach a compromise with the pro-Bishop
forces at Ft. Rupert, an attempt which was
rejected by Vincent Noel and Unison White-
man. It was only then that the armored cars
were dispatched, and we do not yet know by
whom. Most eyewitnesses (among them
the pro-Bishop officer Einstein Louison)
have reported that the armed crowd at the
fort first fired on the armored vehicles.
While it is true that Bishop feared that the
Coards were out to kill him (and the Coards
had reciprocal trepidations about Bishop's
intentions), there is no evidence whatsoever


that Bishop was suspicious "of Soviet in-
trigue on behalf of Coard." Finally, in the
book's glossary of abbreviations, Eugenia
Charles's Dominica Freedom Party (DFP) is
labeled incorrectly Dominica Federal Party.

Framework and Analysis
Perhaps the recording of recent Grenadian
history ought to be left to the English. At any
rate, three British authors (Anthony Payne,
Paul Sutton and Tony Thorndike) have writ-
ten what must be regarded as the most
objective and adequate account of the
PRG's reign so far. In Grenada-Revolution
and Invasion, the three authors do not fail to
critize the Bishop regime (increased isola-
tion from the populace, arrest of political
opponents, disorganization), but they also
do not fail to point out its genuine achieve-
ments (impressive educational reforms, the
considerable reduction in unemployment,
construction of an agro-industrial plant).
Rather than treating the Grenadian revolu-
tion as simply part of a Soviet master plan,
the authors put it in its proper perspective.
There are excellent analyses of the Gairy
years, US policy towards the Caribbean
basin, the relationship between the PRG, the
Commonwealth and CARICOM, and even
Grenada under Sir Paul Scoon and the in-
terim government. The most valuable sec-
tion of the book is Part II, "The Invasion and
Its Aftermath," which is based upon hun-
dreds of interviews which the authors con-
ducted with representatives of all sectors of
Grenada's society after the collapse of the
revolution.
It is to be hoped that future authors writ-
ing about the Grenadian revolution will take
this book as a model and set the short-lived
Bishop regime in its proper framework. If
that is done, the exaggerated distortions of
this event will recede, and the revolution will
be seen for what it really was: the popular
move of a small group of radicalized mid-
dle-class intellectuals to put an end to a
despised regime, and their less successful
attempt to construct a new society on their
island, an attempt which was doomed once
it was headed for the maelstrom of super-
power rivalry which tore Grenadian society
from its natural moorings. O


CAI?BBEAN FEVIEW/35









Politics
Continued from page 6



and even those stout Bishop loyalists, Radix
and George Louison, on the left. Grenada's
apparent commitment to parliamentary
pluralism, to freedom, is probably more au-
thentic than most, based as it is on bitter
experience and not just theory.

Potential Pitfalls
While there is never any guarantee in poli-
tics that experience will conquer hope, in
Grenada there is strong evidence that re-
cent experience will help keep hope within
the bounds of reality. This is to be desired,
for starting in 1985 the government will
have to face serious nonpolitical problems.
First and foremost is the economic one.
Along with the rest of the Caribbean, Gre-
nada is living in a period of economic tran-
sition; the traditional sources of wealth are
now outdated. Certainly there are available
stopgap measures to help them along: the
Soviets offered to buy tons of unsold Grena-
dian nutmeg for the same reason the Rea-
gan administration bought Jamaican
bauxite-to help a friend. But these acts of


charity only highlight the structural crisis in
the Caribbean. It is notjust the bananas and
spices of Grenada, or the sugar which Cuba
and the rest of the area have historically
depended on, it is also the oil refineries in
Curagao, Aruba and Trinidad, the bauxite
industries of Jamaica, Guyana and Sur-
iname, and even the manufacturing plants
so eagerly sought over the past three
decades.
In what will generally be a bad situa-
tion, the Eastern Caribbean will be facing
especially difficult circumstances. Even
though geography has given them an ad-
vantage over the Far East vis-a-vis the US


The corrupting and cor-
roding power of drug
money presents a
formidable challenge to
island leaders.


market, Haiti and Mexico are even closer,
and their wages and production costs in
general are much lower. It costs Barbados
US $6.00 more than Haiti to produce and


ship a dozen shirts to the United States. The
relative disadvantages do not end with geo-
graphy and wages. The fact that Barbados,
for instance, has a standard of social welfare
equal to that of Great Britain or Scandinavia
means that they can hardly make the same
tax concessions to new industries that Haiti,
for example, can. And the sad part is that a
person in Haiti with two years of schooling,
making 330 per hour, is as skilled an as-
sembler as one in Grenada with nine years
of schooling, making $1.10 per hour.
This crisis in the economy-individually
and collectively-explains the scramble for
capital, for investments and for service sec-
tor development that is evident every De-
cember during the Caribbean/Central
American Action Miami Conference on the
Caribbean. The Leninist notion of a capital-
ist world overflowing with excess capital
looking for opportunities abroad is believed
only by the ideologically committed. There
is a struggle going on, and Grenada is com-
peting not only with Haiti, but also with the
states of Florida and New Jersey. This new
reality has led to all types of innovations, not
all salutary. Already the Bahamas, Cayman
Islands, Panama and Curacao have a strong
offshore service sector (banking, real estate
and brokerages of all types). The successful
offshore medical school in Grenada shows


BIG REVOLUTION, SMALL COUNTRY:
THE RISE AND FALL OF THE GRENADA REVOLUTION
JAY R. MANDLE, TEMPLE UNIVERSITY
Did The New Jewel Movement, the political party which led Grenada through its ill-fated revolution, lack the
resources necessary to effectively implement the paternalistic socialism it sought to impose upon the tiny
Caribbean country? Dr. Mandle examines in detail the rise and fall of the People's Revolutionary Government and
the economic philosophies of Maurice Bishop and Bernard Coard in the context of the "non-capitalist path" the
PRG espoused. March 1985, 100 pp., $10.00


TIME FOR DECISION: THE UNITED STATES AND
PUERTO RICO. Edited by Jorge Heine, CISCLA, Inter-
American University of Puerto Rico. 1983, 303+ pp.,
$19.95. "... a collection of pieces by a talented array
of scholars ... offers the best concise assessment of
the achievements, failures, and changes wrought by
the Commonwealth experience." ROBERT PASTOR,
THE NEW REPUBLIC. "... rich collection of essays on
Puerto Rican political and economic problems...."
HAROLD LIDIN, SAN JUAN STAR. "... a major con -
tribution ... a stimulus for debate of the complex issues
involved...." DR. JAMES W. CARTY, JR., THE TIMES
OF THE AMERICAS.


PROBLEMS OF DEVELOPMENT IN BEAUTIFUL
COUNTRIES: PERSPECTIVES ON THE CARIBBEAN.
Ransford W. Palmer, Howard University. 1984, 91+
pp., $12.50. In eight essays, this book explores the
need for the Caribbean to develop an indigenous
engine of growth, the financial implications of past
industrialization strategies, the impact of large scale
emigration on the economic growth of the region, and
the potential impact of the Caribbean Basin Initiative.



Prepayment requested; prepaid orders shipped postpaid.


THE NORTH-SOUTH PUBLISHING CO.


P.O. Box 610, Lanham, Maryland 20706


36/CAI?BBEAN PFEIEW









that there is a ready market for these ser-
vices, and most are legitimate. But the risks
involved to small, fragile societies are also
evident.
The recent Commission of Inquiry into
corruption in the Bahamas points to one of
the most disquieting developments in the
area: the corrupting and corroding power of
drug money. With annual sales in the bil-
lions of dollars, with banks, trading houses,
lawyers and "investment experts" located
from Miami to the Bahamas to the Cayman
Islands all the way to Panama, the drug busi-
ness presents a formidable challenge to
men like Kennedy Simmonds of St. Kitts,
who alternates his practice of medicine with
lay preaching, or Grenada's Herbert Blaize,
who represents every trait of decency and
honesty.
Will Grenada's newly established democ-
racy be able to steer a steady course in such
rough waters? Will St. Kitts or Dominica or
St. Vincent? On the surface, the battle ap-
pears overwhelming. But in the Caribbean
the surface is only that; just below is that
great capacity for moral indignation which
gives encouragement that somehow, some-
time, wrongs will be redressed. One can
only hope that the costs will not be too
heavy. And this is where the United States
comes in.
The winds of change have been blowing
in the Caribbean since before World War II;
each island in turn has been in the spotlight.
1984 may well be recorded as the year in
which Grenada moved the United States to
center stage in a region previously domi-
nated by Britain. But the real test is yet to
come. Having plucked a drowning Grenada
from 30 feet of water, will the US have the
patience, the fortitude and the foresight to
carry it to shore, or will it drop the island in
15 feet?

Postscript
Since the elections, the new government of
Herbert Blaize has moved rapidly on the
constitutional-parliamentary front. It has
appointed a Constitutional Reform Com-
mission, chaired by Sir Fred Phillips of Bar-
bados, which is to present a new draft
constitution before the year is out. The fear
that the one opposition seat held by GULP's
Marcel Peters would not be occupied was
dispelled when Peters quit the GULP and
took his seat. He has since appointed three
senators, two who held portfolios under the
last Gairy government (1976-79), and the
other under the PRG. The new labor party,
the Grenadian Democratic Labour Party,
will participate in the debate on the new
constitution. While this move solves the vi-
tal issue of an official opposition in Parlia-
ment, it tells us nothing about the political
base of the actual opposition to the govern-
ment. In other words, the real consequences
of the basically distorting effects of the elec-
toral system have not been modified. 0


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Tobago

Continued from page 9






would in general be the same as for the
entire unitary state."

The Politics of Separation
The changing relationship between Dr. Eric
Williams and his former protege, A.N.R.
Robinson, is an integral part of contempo-
rary Tobago politics. Robinson, the most
articulate spokesman for Tobago, was
closely associated with Williams and rose to
become deputy political leader of the PNM.
Relationships between the tiwo men be-
came strained in the 1960s, particularly in
1966 when, as Minister of Finance, Robin-
son introduced a far-reaching bill which
sought to redefine Trinidad's relationship
with foreign capital. The bill was greeted
with widespread public criticism and
Williams withdrew it. The relationship be-
tween the two men worsened, but Robinson
remained in the Cabinet and did not resign
until April 1970 at the height of the black
power crisis.
Following his resignation, Robinson
formed the Action Committee of Dedicated
Citizens (ACDC), which was made up of a
substantial number of disgruntled mem-
bers of the PNM. The ACDC remained na-
tional in focus and even entered into an
electoral accommodation with the Hindu-
dominated Democratic Labour Party to
contest the 1971 general elections. Robin-
son, however, withdrew from that arrange-
ment and boycotted what he called the
"mock" election on the ground that elec-
toral and political reforms must precede
elections. Robinson's last-minute with-
drawal caused great confusion and made it
difficult for the DLP to regroup in time for
the election. The ACDC became the Demo-
cratic Action Congress (DAC), under which
label it contested the 1976 general election.
The party was badly beaten by the PNM, but
it won the two Tobago seats. The victory of
the DAC in Tobago imposed additional
strains on the normally problematic rela-
tionship between the two islands.
The crude way in which the PNM in gen-
eral, and the prime minister in particular,
responded to its defeat in Tobago helped to
fan the fires of Tobagonians' anger and
pride. The punitive decision on the part of
the government to close down the Ministry
of Tobago Affairs, throwing several tempo-
rary employees out of work and dislocating
the administrative services of the island,
also gave rise to frenzied outcries. Civil ser-
vants found it difficult to obtain their salaries
for weeks on end, and the public was gravely


inconvenienced. Tobagonians were also in-
censed by the fact that none of the 31 per-
sons appointed to the Senate were
Tobagonians living in Tobago. As Robinson
complained, "Tobago does not regard the
Senate as a Senate of Trinidad and Tobago,
but the Senate of Trinidad. The Senate in-
fringes the very basic principle of unity be-
tween the islands." This was a just criticism
which the PNM later accepted. The govern-
ment in fact promised to amend the Con-
stitution to ensure that in the future, one of
the independent senators would be a To-
bagonian normally residing in Tobago.
The prime minister's post-election



"Tobago does not regard
the Senate as a Senate of
Trinidad and Tobago, but
the Senate of Trinidad."



speech, in which he told Tobagonians to
secede if they wished and that the matter
was of no importance to him, also annoyed
Tobagonians immensely, as did his remark
that the real problem would come if Trinidad
decided to secede from Tobago. It appears
that the prime minister's first reaction was
to interpret the vote in Tobago as a vote for
secession.
The PNM did attempt over the years to
improve the administrative status of To-
bago. In the main, however, these efforts
generated dissatisfaction. Neither the estab-
lishment of a commissioner, a permanent
secretary with a nonresident minister re-
sponsible for Tobago affairs, nor the ap-
pointment of a resident minister fully
responsible for Tobago affairs appeased the
nationalists, since in both cases the officials
had no effective power. The Minister of To-
bago Affairs was responsible to all the other
functional ministries, but not to the people
of Tobago. His hands were tied by the con-
stant need to refer matters to his counter-
parts based in Trinidad. He had no local
power and no local responsibility. As a re-
sult, he was frustrated, and everyone who
dealt with him was equally frustrated. What
was particularly offensive was the fact that
the ministry idea seemed to depend on
whether Tobago returned a parliamentarian
from the governing party. In other words,
the structure depended on how Tobago
voted. This seemed to be the only way to
interpret the manner in which the prime
minister dealt with the ministry after the
1976 election.
Furthermore, according to Robinson, the
government had reverted to the colonial so-
lution of 1898. "You cannot just destroy the
Ministry for Tobago Affairs and leave a vac-
uum of government, with about 20 depart-


ments clashing around like the atoms in the
stratosphere. That spells confusion, it spells
inefficiency; it spells frustration. In 1898 it
was bad; in 1977 it is unforgiveable. In addi-
tion, there is no representation at executive
level, no representation in the so-called Sen-
ate. It is the most irresponsible attitude I
have seen a government adopt in a so-
called democratic society."
With respect to the economy, the PNM
rejected the claim that it had neglected To-
bago, arguing that vast amounts of money
had been spent there over the years. The
party gave Parliament figures comparing
Tobago with the rest of the Eastern Carib-
bean islands, arguing that they refuted the
claim that Tobago was the "Caribbean's
Third World."
In terms of employment, 34.9 percent of
the household heads in Tobago were re-
ported to be directly employed by the gov-
ernment, a figure which was 11 percent
higher than the national average. It was also
indicated that a great deal of money had
been spent to develop facilities along To-
bago's beaches and on the tourist industry
in general.
PNM spokesmen also averred that there
were a number of intangible benefits which
resulted from Tobago's association with
Trinidad which contributed to the relatively
high standard of living enjoyed by Tobago-
nians and residents of Tobago. It was ob-
served that as a result of freedom of
movement between the two islands (at
highly subsidized air and boat fares), To-
bagonians were able to travel to Trinidad in
search of opportunities not available in To-
bago. Tobago was also said to benefit from
the fact that Trinidadians filled professional
positions in Tobago which Tobagonians
were not capable of filling at the time. It was
argued too that Tobago had a level of in-
frastructural development which was com-
parable, if not superior, to that of Trinidad in
terms of population requirements. Tobago
was likewise said to be more fortunate in
terms of its welfare status than many other
parts of Trinidad.
Tobago's counter to these arguments was
that while money was indeed spent in To-
bago, disproportionately more was spent in
Trinidad. Robinson claimed that the in-
crease in capital expenditure in Tobago be-
tween 1970 and 1975 was under 50
percent. The price index however rose by
over 75 percent so that in real terms, expen-
diture on capital development in Tobago
was less in 1975 than it had been in 1970.
Moreover, national revenues had increased
by more than 400 percent. Robinson also
complained that the PNM was always com-
paring Tobago with less well-to-do areas of
the Caribbean and Trinidad. He went on to
argue that Tobago was a special case and
had to be treated differently.
Other spokesmen on behalf of Tobago's
position questioned the claim that welfare


38/CAI?BBEAN PiVIeW









standards in Tobago were higher than in
Trinidad. Reference was made to a survey
done in 1972 by Ralph Henry, of the Univer-
sity of the West Indies, which indicated that
the national average for households below
the poverty line was 35.2 percent, but 40.57
percent in Tobago. With respect to running
water in homes, the national average was
35.9 percent, while the figure in Tobago was
22.5 percent. Only 20 percent of the homes
in Tobago had water closets; 36.6 percent
were without electricity, compared to 29.5
percent for the country as a whole.
Migration rates from Tobago to Trinidad
were also high. Many of the migrants were
said to be craftsmen who had to leave to
seek work in factories in Trinidad which
were now producing goods competing with
those they once produced or repaired.
There were also complaints that whereas
Tobago once exported food and poultry, all
that it now exported were empty beer and
soft drink bottles. Most of Tobagos food,
including agricultural products, now had to
be imported at prices that were higher than
those prevailing in Trinidad.
It was likewise argued that Tobago had
not benefited, as had Trinidad, from devel-
opments which were taking place in the
larger economy in the years of the pe-
troleum boom. One spokesman noted that
there were only 28 businesses registered in


Tobago in 1973 including hotels and guest
houses, and that only one of them, a soft
drink factory, employed over 100 persons.
Most of the others were relatively small oper-
ations. In making any assessment of To-
bago, one had to take account of Tobago's
potential in fishing, agriculture, tourism
and food processing. Tobago was also said
to have chrome and nickel that could be
developed, as well as off-shore oil, a fact
which the PNM was accused of concealing.
Moreover, in terms of its marine economic
zone, if the 200-mile limit were taken into
account, the area available to Tobago for



All that Tobago now
exports are empty beer
and soft drink bottles.


exploitation would be twice as great as
Trinidad's.
Implications of a Twin Island Economy, a
document submitted for consideration to
the National Planning Commission in 1981,
made similar arguments with respect to the
asymetrical relationship between Trinidad
and Tobago in terms of development. It was
argued that being physically separated, To-


bago was isolated from traditional growth
centers, and as such was not as attractive to
prospective investors. Private sector invest-
ment was thus close to zero. What was
worse was that there was a leakage of the
limited public investment funds allocated to
Tobago since most purchases of material,
equipment and services took place in Trin-
idad. The paper thus called for an increase
in the development funds allocated to To-
bago in order to ensure the creation of ex-
panded infrastructure to support an
accelerated development program. The lat-
ter would create more real jobs and oppor-
tunities for career fulfillment, thus making
Tobago less dependent on politically dis-
pensed special works projects which de-
stroy agriculture and create a parasitic
citizenry.
Whereas PNM spokesmen regarded the
ability of Tobagonians to migrate freely to
Trinidad as a benefit and viewed the avail-
ability to Tobago of the professional skills
and capital of Trinidadians in like manner,
Tobagonians saw the matter as further evi-
dence of planned genocide and exploita-
tion. In their view, migration to Trinidad
skimmed off the skilled and the young, leav-
ing mainly older persons on the island. The
vacuum was then filled by persons who did
not always have Tobagos national interest at
heart. The feeling of xenophobia was ex-


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announces the publication of its

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SIONAL PAPER SERIES is to
provide a forum for discussion of
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various aspects of the interna-
tional relations of the Caribbean
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Occasional Paper 1: Financial
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Occasional Papers 2 & 3: The Car-
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Caribbean: an International Rela-
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(April 1983).

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PRICE: US $4.00 (including
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THE INSTITUTE OF
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Republic of Trinidad and Tobago.


tended to Indians, who were accused of
driving up the price of land and goods in
Tobago. It was also alleged that Indian firms
were given permission to engage in pro-
jects in downtown Scarborough which had
been refused Tobagonians.
In areas other than the economy, Tobago-
nians insist that they want to be in a position
to protect their land and marine environ-
ment from harmful exploitation, and to pro-
tect and preserve their rich archival history.
They also claim that there is need for a
resident judge on the island, as well as better
facilities for dealing with matters related to
law, such as rationalizing of land titles.

Attempts at Resolution
Tobago nationalists deeply resent what they
consider to be their powerlessness and hu-
miliation. To them, Trinidad is the imperial
power which succeeded the British in 1899.
Despite their valiant effort to respond to the
criticisms of the Tobago nationalists, the
PNM did concede that the complaints had
some validity even if they were exaggerated.
The PNM was also aware that support for
the DAC was growing in Tobago. They
feared that if the motion proposed by the
DAC that Parliament should take "all proper
and necessary steps to accord to the people
of Tobago internal self-government in
1977" were rejected outright, Tobagonians
might not only reject the PNM politically, but
that the embryonic secessionist movement
might also grow into a fully-blown demand
for independence. Thus, instead of flatly op-
posing the motion, the PNM proposed an
amendment which added the following
words: "In such measure as will not be con-
tradictory to the constitutional reality of the
independent unitary state of Trinidad and
Tobago, such proper and necessary steps to
take into account: the views of the majority
of the people of Tobago; the cultural, finan-
cial and economic realities, and potential of
Trinidad and of Tobago; and the impact of
any such change on other parts of Trinidad
and Tobago."
The DAC accepted the amendment on
the condition that the government would
regard the matter as urgent and important
and that it would be concluded before the
end of 1977. The motion was taken through
various stages between February 1977 and
September 1980, when the Tobago House
of Assembly was finally established by act of
Parliament. The powers given to the assem-
bly fell far short of what was envisaged when
the motion was tabled in 1977.
There has been continuous controversy
between the assembly and the central gov-
ernment concerning interpretation of vari-
ous provisions of the act. The DAC, which
won 8 of the 12 elective seats in the assem-
bly election of 1980, accuses the central
government of not giving the assembly
control over staff, accommodation or funds
which would enable it to function creatively


or to exercise initiative. Everything relating
to Tobago remains subjected to the control
of central government ministries, statutory
bodies and other agencies. For its part, the
central government accuses the DAC ma-
jority of seeking to arrogate more powers
for the assembly than is granted by the act.
Essentially the controversy revolves around
the question of whether the assembly is a
policy-formulating body in respect to spec-
ified matters relating to Tobago, or merely
the administrative agent of the central gov-
ernment. The High Court has sustained the
opinion of the central government that the
assembly is responsible to the Minister of
Tobago Affairs for specific matters identi-
fied in the act.
The frustrations of the DAC element in
the assembly reached such a level of inten-
sity in 1983 that a motion was introduced
and passed (by a majority of 10 to 4) which
once more raised the issue of secession.
An opinion survey carried out during the
November 1984 campaign for the Tobago
House of Assembly elections indicated that
secessionist sentiment had declined appre-
ciably. Only 7 percent of the sample was of
the view that Tobago should secede from
Trinidad. Thirty-three percent felt that the
existing constitutional arrangement should
be maintained; 45 percent wanted to see
the powers of the House of Assembly in-
creased; while a mere 6 percent opted for a
return to the old county council formula
which had existed prior to 1977. When the
responses were examined in terms of party
affiliation, they revealed that 11 percent of
those who supported the Democratic Ac-
tion Congress actively favored secession,
while 68 percent of them disagreed. DAC
supporters, however, wanted the powers of
the assembly increased. Fewer than 1 per-
cent of the active People's National Move-
ment supporters favored separation, while
62 percent wished to see the existing ar-
rangements maintained. Twenty-four per-
cent of National Joint Action's supporters
favored secession.
The PNM lost the November 1984 elec-
tions. The party retained only one of the four
seats which it held prior to the elections and
lost three to the DAC, which now controlled
11 of the 12 seats in the assembly. The PNM
was nevertheless able to retain the support
of 42 percent of the electorate. Much of this
came from older Tobagonians, especially
women.
As a result of the DAC victory in Tobago,
its leader is a strong favorite to emerge as
leader of the National Alliance for Recon-
struction, a coalition of all opposition par-
ties. Should this happen and the NAR were
to win the 1986 elections, the secession
issue would in all probability cease to be of
any political significance. If the PNM were to
win and failed to make concessions to To-
bago, secession might well be seen as the
only meaningful path for Tobago to take. O


40/CAiRBBEAN REVIEW










Barbadians

Continued from page 13





out the West Indies always has meant
rootedness and security, and land owner-
ship has provided a partial escape from
plantation oppression. Many of the small
plots were located in the Bridgetown sub-
urbs, contributing to the eventual urban
sprawl so noticeable throughout the entire
southwestern quadrant of the island. And
throughout Barbados today, old men and
women still point out houses, shops and
land that they say were originally bought
with money sent or brought home from
Panama.
The emigration to Panama also had other
far-reaching effects on Barbados. The loss
of many people and the gain of unprece-
dented amounts of cash by black workers
on Barbados set significant social and eco-
nomic forces in motion. The workers' ex-
odus undermined an antiquated sugarcane
industry and inspired modernization. Plan-
ter-worker relationships then changed. The
infusion of money dissolved traditional
food-sharing relationships among black
Barbadians. Mutual aid societies were
transformed. A decline in planter paternal-
ism was accompanied by heightened class
consciousness on the part of black Barba-
dians. In a broad sense, the Barbadian ex-
odus to Panama was a creative grass-roots
catalyst of social change, not simply a pa-
thetic drift of labor to capital.
It is not surprising that returnees from
work sojourns on the Isthmus were ac-
corded an unusually high degree of respect
and admiration from fellow blacks. Colonial
authorities often accused returned Panama
men of arson, robbery, loafing, and gener-
ally setting poor examples for others. Many
of the former migrants, however, became
acknowledged leaders of the local black
community, a pattern that has repeated it-
self elsewhere in the British Caribbean in
subsequent decades. When incipient black
political organizations emerged in Bar-
bados in the 1920s, Panama men often
were the organizations' spokesmen by vir-
tue of their experiences abroad, some of
which had involved labor union activity in
the Canal Zone.
In July 1937, the Bridgetown riots were
among a chain reaction of violent working-
class disturbances throughout the insular
British colonies of the Eastern Caribbean,
riots fueled by yet another economic de-
pression and an associated lack of migra-
tion outlets. The internal social and
economic changes leading to the 1937 Bar-
bados riots, however, really had begun dur-
ing the exodus to the Panama Canal, a point


emphasized by witnesses at the post-riot
hearings in Bridgetown. Barbadians one-
half century later generally consider the
1937 riots a historical watershed for their
island, marking the beginning of the end of
white planter control and the first real steps
toward black social and economic freedom.
Those events also indirectly led to the ex-
emplary political sophistication, superior
public services and relative prosperity en-
joyed by many Barbadians today.
It is entirely appropriate that the under-
pinnings of contemporary Barbadian social
and political institutions may be traced to
changes brought about by migration, be-
cause migration has been the overriding
demographic feature of Barbados in the
20th century. The Panama Canal was the
prominent destination for Barbadian blacks
only in the first decade. By 1916, only two
years after the canal's completion, Barba-
dian emigrants were sending more money
home from the United States itself than
from the Canal Zone. In June 1925, US
immigration restrictions redirected Barba-
dian migration trajectories toward Cuba
and the Dominican Republic. After the de-
pression and the Bridgetown riots, Barba-
dians emigrated in the 1940s, along with
thousands of other West Indians, to con-
struct the oil refineries on Aruba and Cura-
cao and to work on US armed forces bases
in Trinidad and British Guiana. An esti-
mated 30,000 Barbadians went to Britain
during the 1950s, but the United Kingdom
stiffened immigration restrictions in 1962.
Since 1965, after the relaxation of our na-
tional origins immigration policies, thou-
sands of Barbadians have rediscovered the
United States as a destination. In short, the
era of Panama money was but one epi-
sode-and by no means the first-in a
cumulative migration history that has
helped to sustain Barbados and the Barba-
dians for the one-and-one-half centuries
since British slave emancipation.

A Historical Process
Barbadians are well-known travelers, but no
less so than many of their West Indian
neighbors. The recent movements of Carib-
bean peoples to Miami, New York, Toronto,
London, Amsterdam and Paris have es-
caped the attention of very few. The "col-
oured question" in Britain and the massive
influx of black West Indians to the eastern
United States, for example, are the subjects
of academic seminars, television documen-
taries and political polemics in both coun-
tries into the late 20th century. Those left in
the home islands, on the other hand, con-
tinue to receive substantial sums of money
from those who have ventured abroad.
The immediacy of Caribbean migration
as a contemporary issue of international
significance carries with it a preoccupation
with the present that tends to disregard the
past, and therefore to obscure understand-


ing. A 30-second television spot on the
nightly news describing the tragedy of Hait-
ian malnutrition and poverty, juxtaposed
with Miami's bright lights, frames the issue
of Caribbean migration entirely in the pres-
ent and ignores the fact that Haitians, Bar-
badians and other Caribbean peoples have
been migrating and returning home for
many decades. The characterization of Ca-
ribbean migration as a "problem" also sug-
gests that such human movement is an
aberration or a departure from the norm-
the norm, of course, being the uniquely-
bounded, sedentary affluence of Western
society.
An ahistorical bias applied to migration
leads us away from its root causes. The
ancestors of contemporary Caribbean peo-
ples were imported to the region as slaves
and indentured laborers to serve as planta-
tion workers. The populations of the region
then, as now, bore little relationship to local
insular carrying capacities. Neither indi-
vidual freedom nor political independence
have altered the incongruity between West
Indians and the lands they occupy. These
incongruities have been compounded by
local hazardsdrought, hurricanes, earth-
quakes, social oppression and political tur-
moil-exacerbated by external inflation and
economic depression. So Barbadians and
other West Indians have for decades habitu-
ally moved away temporarily or perma-
nently to exploit job possibilities elsewhere.
Local Caribbean histories and ecologies
provide better insight into varying West In-
dian migration patterns than do "bright
lights" explanations. The 166 square miles
of Barbados, for example, are fertile and flat
when compared with the volcanic topogra-
phies of nearby islands. The mountainous
cores of the igneous Windwards, in con-
trast, historically have been subsistence ref-
uges for those islands' working people who
have gathered firewood and mangoes there
and have carved garden plots out of the
mountainous slopes to compensate for
meager and fluctuating plantation wages.
Barbados's fertile soils have been monopo-
lized by large-scale sugarcane planters
since the mid-17th century, and black la-
borers on the island, even after emancipa-
tion, have been hemmed in by cane fields
and forced to rent their drought-prone sub-
sistence plots from estate owners. Barba-
dian blacks therefore routinely emigrated to
nearby islands, even in the 19th century, to
compensate for local subsistence shortfalls
created and compounded by the hostile so-
cial environment. So when William Karner
came to Barbados early in 1905, he en-
countered a labor force suffering from local
social constraints on the one hand and
from externally-influenced economic de-
pression on the other. And because these
conditions had occurred before, black Bar-
badians were already conditioned to emi-
gration as a means of earning a living. O


CAIBBEAN FEVIEW/41









Labor
Continued from page 17




can workers. From my discussions with
these leaders over the past few years, several
points can be made. First, the unions want
to be recognized as part of the private sec-
tor. Too often, US government officials and
American businessmen mean "employers"
when they say private sector. The trade
unions feel they are the labor half (and the
important half) of the private sector and
should be allowed to participate in the plan-
ning of CBI investment by government and
industry. An example of this problem oc-
curred during the US CBI designation team
visit to Costa Rica, when a luncheon meet-
ing of several hundred business and gov-
ernment leaders turned away the half-dozen
invited labor leaders because the luncheon
was oversubscribed. The situation was de-
fused when a few members of the US team
held a separate luncheon with the labor
leaders, but the brush-off left ill will.
Another concern of labor leaders, partic-
ularly those in the Caribbean, is that new
foreign investors will attempt to undercut
labor standards. Union leaders are worried
that new investors will not follow the prac-


tice of recognizing unions with a majority of
the workers, will not pay prevailing wages or
meet prevailing working conditions, or will
agitate local employers to adopt a tougher
stance on unions. One Jamaican labor
leader argues that potential investors who
visit Caribbean islands but do not call on
labor leaders, may get a misleading picture
of labor standards, and may invest thinking
they can keep the union out. This leader
suggests that although he wants new invest-
ment to provide more jobs, he would rather
forego the investment and the jobs if the
new employer will try to disrupt labor
practices.
The democratic union leaders want to
cooperate with employers to make the CBI
work. It is the employers, especially in Cen-
tral America, who often prevent increased
labor-management cooperation by harass-
ing union organizers and accusing union
leaders of being communist. While there
are class differences that make labor-man-
agement cooperation difficult in Central
America, the absence of such cooperation
can only enhance the stature of the more
radical elements. One positive practice in
Honduras has been regular meetings be-
tween the government's economic cabinet
and the democratic confederation. The
unions in some of the other countries would
also be interested in such an arrangement.
Finally, the unions are concerned about


the growth of export processing zones, or
free trade zones, that are accused of
employing a docile population (usually
women) at less than prevailing standards.
The United States discussed this problem
with the various Caribbean basin govern-
ments in terms of the CBI labor criterion,
and obtained a statement from El Salvador,
Honduras, Panama and the Dominican Re-
public that their free trade zones did not
prohibit unions and did not exempt employ-
ers from meeting the labor laws applying to
the rest of the country. The local labor lead-
ers were asked to report any problems they
have in exercising their legal rights in these
zones.
The desire by trade unions for participa-
tion and consultation raises the question of
what trade unions can offer investors. Trade
unions provide management with a reg-
ularized procedure for the adjudication of
worker grievances and concerns. While
unions and management will always have
disagreements, management gains when
these problems can be handled without re-
course to wildcat strikes. Trade unions can
also assist in the training and education of
workers to make them more productive.
While this role for unions has not reached its
potential, the assistance by AIFLD in worker
education has been very useful. Further-
more, free trade unions are the best defense
against communism. E


42/CABBEAN PIIEW


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Adversity
Continued from page 19


tions which do not exist in those Asian
countries that have had successful export-
led growth.
Protectionist pressure from US pro-
ducers is another problem. While textiles
and leather goods were the heart of export-
led growth in Taiwan and other Asian coun-
tries, these two categories are specifically
excluded in the CBI legislation. In fact, it is a
matter of concern today that the higher
value of the US dollar, which makes imports
cheaper, will increase protectionist senti-
ment in the United States.
The Caribbean does have six specific ad-
vantages over Asia with respect to export
strategy: (1) The twin-plant concept is oper-
ational in the Caribbean because of its geo-
graphical proximity to the United States.
The experience with twin plants on the US-
Mexican border has been successful and it
can be copied in the Caribbean. That is not
the case in Asia because of huge geograph-
ical barriers. (2) The entrepreneurs who will
take greatest advantage of the CBI will not
be local or foreign investors, but Caribbean
migrants returning from the United States
and Canada to set up industries in their
country of origin. Their entrepreneurship is
motivated by the fact that they have been
migrants, and all migrant groups tend to
have great entrepreneurial skills. (3) The
fact that tourism is important in the Carib-
bean area is a definite advantage which
does not exist in Asia. It should be recog-
nized that corporate executives may prefer
locations for plant sites which are tourist
attractions, overriding technical considera-
tions. (4) The proximity of the Caribbean
region to the United States implies freight
and communication advantages. (5) It is a
known fact that businessmen from Hong
Kong and Taiwan are interested in investing
in the Caribbean area if that permits them to
obtain a second citizenship, as an insurance
policy in case they have to leave the country
in which they are now residing. (6) The Ca-
ribbean could become an area where in-
dustries move from Asia as labor costs
increase and to take advantage of free ac-
cess to the United States. In their industrial-
ization, Asian countries did not have this
tremendous advantage.
In eight years we will be commemorating
the 500th anniversary of the discovery of the
New World. The Caribbean islands were the
first reached by Columbus on that dan-
gerous journey to find a better and quicker
route to the Indies so that Europe could
obtain spices more easily. When he reached
the Dominican Republic, he thought he was
in "Cipango" the name by which Japan was


then known. On another island he thought
he was in Cathai. In time our islands came to
be known as the West Indies to differentiate
them from the original ones. It is thus ironic
that today people from Asia and the Carib-


JOURNAL OF


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AMERICAN


STUDIES
AND WORLD AFFAIRS


SPECIAL ISSUE:
The articles in the February 1985 issue of
the Journal oflnteramerican Studies
and World Affairs cover a broad range
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SPECIAL JOURNAL:
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gives greater editorial emphasis to articles
on foreign policy issues affecting
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bean are sitting together, trying to find out if
the development route of the old Indies is
applicable to the new Indies-whether the
Asian export strategy can add spice to our
Caribbean economies. [



Competition, Cooperation,
Eficiency and
Social Organization

Introduction to a Political
Economy
byAntonio Jorge

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The book deals with competition and
cooperation as antithetical approaches to
human interaction in the social field. Com-
petition and cooperation mix in an infinite
variety of combinations, giving rise to a wide
spectrum of different types of organizations.
They also reflect, particularly in the long run,
the nature of the motivational composite
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The essence of Jorge's message is that
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HACENDADOS, POLITICOS Y
PRECARISTAS: LA GANADERIA
Y EL LATINFUNDISMO
GUANACASTECO 1800-1950

by Lowell Gudmundson

The first work to deal extensively with the
history of cattle raising and Guanacaste
Province in Costa Rica. Four essays ana-
lyze the expropriation of cattle herds in the
late colonial period, the structure of
landed property and history of stockrais-
ing in the 1850-1950 period, peasants in
the 1910s and 1920s, and the history of the
mining district in the first third of the 20th
century.

EDITORIAL COSTA RICA
SAN JOSE/1983


CAiBBEAN lVIEW/43









Honduras
Continued from page 21



have some common denominators, which
can be summarized as follows: (a) small
domestic markets; (b) thin industrial sec-
tors, primarily composed of light assembly-
type industries; and (c) fragile economies
with a relatively high export dependence on
one, or a few, commodities. The problems
identified in the Honduran export sector il-
lustrate those confronted by developing
countries with similar structural and institu-
tional deficiencies. To take full advantage of
CBI opportunities, these countries must
initiate export development activities
to develop the needed managerial
infrastructure.
In the short term, an export development
strategy should include provisions for direct
resources to develop adequate manage-
ment and other human resources for export
development. This means extensive train-
ing and education with special emphasis on
the marketing aspects of exporting. It
should eliminate disincentives such as ex-
port and other taxes that affect cost and
efficiency in the export sector. Financial as-
sistance should be made available to


qualified exporters for market development
and working capital. Local governments
should initiate efforts to set more realistic
credit guidelines, reviewing exorbitant col-
lateral requirements and extending repay-
ment schedules. Similarly, they should
facilitate portfolio investment to promote
the formation of regional export develop-
ment banks to enlarge the supply of capital.
Credit should be targeted to provide work-
ing capital as a necessary prerequisite to
enlarge the export base.
The strategy should also promote the de-
velopment of a prototype export trading
company to perform procurement, assem-
bly, distribution and marketing functions
for the export sector in specialized product
areas and regions. The key provisions of this
prototype organization should be to pro-
vide needed expertise for specialization of
product/geographical area; displacement
of foreign-owned resources in export ac-
tivities; centralization of buying, selling, and
other marketing functions to escape con-
straints imposed by small and medium-
sized production capabilities; and central-
ization of financing functions to liberate in-
dustrial capital.
In the long run, especially for countries in
the Caribbean basin that are in the early
stages of import substitution, the export de-
velopment strategy should aim to promote


industries that provide domestic linkages
(for example, agri-business and labor-in-
tensive industries) with identified export
market potential. It should develop the ca-
pabilities of domestic resources, especially
managerial, to displace foreign-owned re-
sources in export industries and phase out
foreign ownership in qualified export enter-
prises and export trading companies. The
import substitution process should be re-
viewed so that protection is given only to
industries which develop linkages with do-
mestic resources, and protection of assem-
bly-type industries is gradually eliminated
to redirect resources to industrial activities
with exportable supply.
For the long term, the Caribbean basin
countries must look toward regional eco-
nomic cooperation in implementing export
development policies. The small size of
each country's market precludes significant
development in the nontraditional export
sector that can realistically provide foreign
exchange earnings in sufficient quantities
to contribute to the country's development
process. One country's isolated export pro-
motion program can have some positive
impact; however, a comprehensive regional
export development strategy that could
help channel resources and investment in a
balanced way could trigger a growing ex-
port sector with the managerial infrastruc-
ture needed to serve world markets. This
cooperative effort should be the ultimate
objective of any export strategy. Even if
some countries initially refuse to participate
in such an effort, it could still be promoted
among two or more until a comprehensive,
regional policy is developed. To achieve this
goal, one country must take a leadership
role, convincing government and private
sectors of the problem posed for the export
sector and the resource allocation efficiency
that could accrue to all participating
nations.
The export development strategy out-
lined above would require a definite com-
mitment by the private sector to assume
greater responsibility in the development
process. Unless some measures are intro-
duced to promote development of the nec-
essary expertise, new mechanisms for the
marketing of export products, and other
incentives to develop adequate resources
over the long run, it is highly unlikely that
countries like Honduras can benefit from
the CBI in a meaningful and profitable way.
The problems involved require changes in
the economic, political and social structure
and imply long-term solutions to short-
term necessities. Unless this perspective is
achieved, however, any effort to stimulate
exports without the adequate development
of resources may prove futile and short
lived, and will certainly not be of a magni-
tude that can effectively develop a dynamic
industrial sector that will contribute to self-
sustained growth and development. O


44/CArIBBEAN F VIW


CAIPBBGAN

rcvIEW AWARD

The Caribbean Review Award is given annually to honor an individual who has
contributed to the advancement of Caribbean intellectual life. The winner of the
sixth award is Arturo Morales Carri6n. He joins previous recipients Gordon K.
Lewis, Philip M. Sherlock, Aim6 C6saire, Sidney W. Mintz and C.L.R. James.
Arturo Morales Carri6n is a Puerto Rican historian, educator, writer and public
servant. Beyond that, however, he is a citizen of the Caribbean. During his
illustrious career he has served as president of the University of Puerto Rico,
special adviser to OAS secretary general Jos6 A. Mora, deputy assistant secre-
tary of state for inter-American affairs under John F Kennedy, and undersecre-
tary of state for the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico under Luis Mufoz Marin.
Morales Carri6n is currently executive director of the Puerto Rican Endow-
ment for the Humanities and chairman of the board of directors, Center for
Advanced Studies on Puerto Rico and the Caribbean. His notable book, Puerto
Rico and the Non-Hispanic Caribbean (2nd edition, 1971), deals with a theme
that continues to be important today. He is also the author of Puerto Rico: A
Political and Cultural History (1983) plus numerous other works on Puerto Rico,
the Caribbean, Latin America and US-Latin American relations.
The award committee consists of Lambros Comitas (chairman), Columbia
University; Fuat Andic, University of Puerto Rico; Locksley Edmonson, Cornell
University; Anthony P Maingot, Florida International University; and Andr6s
Serbin, Universidad Central de Venezuela.
The Caribbean Review Award recognizes individual effort irrespective of
field, ideology, national origin or place of residence. In addition to a plaque, the
recipient receives an honorarium of $250, donated by the International Affairs
Center of Florida International University.









Costa Rica
Continued from page 29


1982 level, and nontraditional exports con-
tinued to stagnate. Some improvement in
the foreign debt was achieved, but there was
little chance for a vigorous recovery.
The first indication that a new trade pol-
icy might be implemented came in Novem-
ber 1983, when the Legislative Assembly
repealed the 4.5 percent ad valorem tax on
nontraditional exports. This tax had clearly
reduced incentives to diversify exports, and
indeed offset the existing modest export tax
credits. Obtaining its removal was some-
thing of a triumph for commercial interests,
but most observers felt that the assembly
repealed the law only under extreme pres-
sure from the IMF It was still not clear that
the Costa Rican government had really
shifted to a more aggressive export policy.
January 1984 brought the Kissinger
Commission report, calling for trade con-
cessions and more aid for the region. The
Caribbean Basin Initiative had already
shown that the US was focusing on the
area's economic distress. The prospects for
trade were improving, and Costa Rica be-
gan composing a set of measures appropri-
ate to the new opportunities.
The assembly's response was the tax bill
passed 2 March 1984, which excluded from
taxation 100 percent of all income earned in
exporting by Costa Rican companies. More-
over, it allowed them to exempt up to 50
percent of their nonexport earnings if these
were reinvested in a company whose output
would be entirely exported. The first provi-
sion shifted the after-tax profitability of ex-
porting vis-a-vis selling to the domestic
market. The second provision made it prof-
itable for Costa Rican companies to invest in
export ventures even if these operated with
slight losses. The tax deduction would more
than cover the losses. The Costa Rican cor-
porate income tax rate is 65 percent, so in
effect it costs a corporate investor only 35
centavos to invest one col6n in an export
venture.
This tax change is by far the most signifi-
cant step that Costa Rica has taken to spur
exports, and its impact could be important.
The bill also signals an incentive: the as-
sembly passed it of its own volition with no
external pressure. Of course the bill may do
nothing more than reduce the tax burden on
Costa Rican companies that are already ex-
porting. But it may do much more because
prior to its passage, Costa Rica already had
a good investment climate, excellent com-
munications and infrastructure, raw mate-
rials, an educated labor force and low
wages.
The question which only time can answer
is how many light manufactured exports


can the world economy absorb? It would be
disappointing if this policy failed for lack of
access to markets. It has taken an impres-
sive act of national will for Costa Rica to take
this step, and indeed the assembly took it
against the judgment of many informed
people. Clearly there is still no consensus for
a really aggressive policy. Sufficient results
to compensate for lost tax revenue will have
to be produced if economic policy is to
move further in the direction of export pro-
motion. Several barriers may prevent this
policy from producing dramatic results in
the short run. Notably, Costa Rican manag-
ers have little experience in exporting
goods other than the traditional tropical
commodity exports. Also, export markets
are a competitive jungle. Other countries


provide incentives that make Costa Rica's
look meager in comparison. But before
writing off Costa Rica's chances, it is impor-
tant to keep in mind that the country has
products that not everyone can offer, and
has already exported these successfully.
They need only to increase the volume of
these exports and develop new ones. The
strong world economic recovery in prog-
ress will help. At any rate, the first steps
necessary to implement a policy of eco-
nomic development by export promotion
have now been taken. A supportive domes-
tic economic environment exists as a result
of the new phase in Costa Rican export pol-
icy. Attention can now be turned to exploit-
ing these opportunities for economic
growth through open markets and exports.
D


Las mejores decisions
...las toman quienes estan mejor informados.
RUMBO CENTROAMERICANO le ofrece informaci6n indispensable
para su actividad professional y empresarial.
Reportajes, entrevistas, analisis y comentarios de periodistas
profesionales, conocedores y estudiosos de la realidad ;:pclicia y
econ6mica del istmo, le ,:ernmitr,irn seguir paso a paso la evoluci6n
de Centroam6rica y Panama.

SUSCRIBASE A






RUMBO


CENTROAMERICANO

Apartado 10138 San Jos6, Costa Rica

Nombre
(Favor usar letra de molde)
Direcci6n


Suscribo por E 2 ahos $110 E un abo $60 El 6 meses$30
E Adjunto cheque O Letra E Money Order
Autorizo cargarlo a mi tarjeta de credit
E Visa Dl Master Card [E American Express
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Vence Firma


CAIBBEAN PfVIEW/45









Addressee

Unknown
Continued from page 33


HONDURAS EXPORTING CO.
Apartado Postal 6475
Tegucigalpa, Honduras
11 December 1962

Flores Printing Co.
c/o Juan Alvarez, Agent
Apartado Postal 7717
Mexico City, D.F., Mexico

Gentlemen:
Our expeditor, scheduled to arrive at des-
ignated location, will arrive 2230 hours, 15
December, instead of 16 December, same
time. Have someone meet him who is au-
thorized to make major policy changes and
implement new plans.
R. G. Rojas
Habana, Cuba
21 December 1962

Carlos, please stop! You are ruining me!
Your last letter about a secret meeting with
someones agent was intercepted, and I was
picked up and questioned by the police.
They act like they think I'm a CIA agent.


They released me, but I do not know for how
long. Dolores has lost her scholarship. Di-
ego has been relieved of duty and returned
to Havana. My government contract has
been canceled. My neighbors and employ-
ees have been questioned. My house and I
are under constant surveillance.
Carlos, what have I done that would make
you try to ruin me? If you don't care about
me, think of my children!
I beg you, STOP! PLEASE! PLEASE!
PLEASE!
Miguel


JUAN ALVAREZ
Attorney at Law
1267 National Bank of Mexico Building
Mexico City, D.F, Mexico
26 December 1962

Mr. Carlos Delgado
c/o Ybor City Printing Co.
2647 Seventh Avenue
Tampa, Florida, USA

Dear Mr. Delgado:
For the past year or more, I have been
transposting letters (through a post office
box rented at your request) between you
and a Miguel Flores in Havana, which you
said related to selling your business in
Havana and getting your daughter to the
Unites States.


Recently I received a strangely frantic-
sounding letter from Mr. Flores-ad-
dressed to me, personally, and marked
"Open-Do Not forward"-inquiring about
certain correspondence from Central
American firms supposedly forwarded to
him by me.
Since I have forwarded only the sealed
envelopes you sent me, I am at a loss to
answer his inquiry, so I shall appreciate your
clarification.
Yours very truly,
Juan Alvarez

PS.-Incidentally, I also will need a new ad-
dress for Mr. Flores. I am enclosing your last
letter forwarded to his business address. Al-
though it apparently has been opened and
then resealed, you will note that it is marked:
"ADDRESSEE UNKNOWN."

(Excerpt from El Liberador, Cuban refugee
newspaper, Miami, Fla, 30 December 1962.)
Funeral services were held Dec. 28 in Havana
for Miguel Flores, who died Christmas Day
when he stepped or fell in front of an auto in
front of the Havana police station.
Eyewitnesses said he seemed to be in the
custody of two police officers and apparently
was struck by the auto while attempting to
escape
However, local refugee leaders discount this
report since he was a known Castro supporter
and engaged in a considerable amount ofgov-
ernment business. O


46/CAFrBBEAN p1viE


MCAIBBEAN IVYEW

SFlorida International University
Tamiami Trail, Miami, Florida 33199



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Florida International University


Southeast Florida's Four-Year State University


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nation's fastest growing metropolitan areas and centers for
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Florida International University's faculty members are
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service from an international perspective. Individual and
group research projects run the gamut of possible topics and
geographic regions. Faculty exchanges take FIU researchers
abroad and bring leading international scholars to the campus.
15,000 students come from 74 nations and 41 states. They
may select from undergraduate and graduate studies in the
humanities, social sciences, mathematical and physical sci-
ences, and a wide range of professional programs, earning
degrees and/or certificates. Of special international interest
are the Graduate Program In International Studies, a multi-
disciplinary curriculum leading to the Master of Arts degree
[contact: Director, Graduate Program in International Studies,
(305) 554-2248] and a program in International Economic
Development, offered as part of the Master of Arts in
Economics [contact: Chairperson, Department of Economics,
(305) 554-2316]. A Master of International Business provides
basic management tools and familiarity with the international
environment [contact: Director, Master of International Busi-
ness, (305) 940-5870].
Several professional programs provide academic and ap-
plied courses in fields applicable to an international focus. The
School of Nursing's program leads to the Bachelor of Science
and prepares its graduates to practice professional nursing in
a multicultural and changing society [contact: School of
Nursing, (305) 940-5915]. The School of Public Affairs and
Services offers undergraduate and graduate degrees in Crimi-
nal Justice, Health Services Administration, Public
Administration and Social Work emphasizing needs, issues
and alternatives in rapidly changing urban societies [contact:
School of Public Affairs and Services, (305) 940-5840].
The Latin American and Caribbean Center, one of 12 US
Department of Education National Resource Centers, coordi-
nates teaching and research on the region, administers an
academic certificate program, supports research and sponsors
public activities on Latin America and the Caribbean [contact:
Director, Latin American and Caribbean Center, (305)
554-2894].
A certificate in International Bank Management provides
training in international banking policy, practice and tech-


niques [contact: Business Counseling Office, (305) 554-2781].
The International Banking Center cooperates with banks and
businesses in Miami to support research and sponsor seminars
on international banking topics [contact: International Banking
Center (305) 554-2771].
The International affairs Center promotes international
education, training, research and cooperative exchange by
encouraging a wide variety of faculty and student activities
and helping to develop the university's international programs
[contact: International Affairs Center, (305) 554-2846].
The English Language Institute conducts a writing labora-
tory for individualized instruction, provides diagnostic testing
of oral and written English language proficiency, and operates
the intensive English program, a four-month course of instruc-
tion in reading, conversation, grammar, composition, TOEFL
preparation and business English [contact: Director, English
Language Institute, (305) 554-2222].
The university is also the base for several international
organizations. The Inter-American University Council for
Economic and Social Development (CUIDES) is an indepen-
dent, nonprofit association of representatives from post-
secondary academic institutions. Its primary concern is assist-
ing nations of the Americas with economic and social
development. The Institute of Economic and Social Research
of the Caribbean Basin (IESCARIBE) is a group of Caribbean
basin economists and research institutes which develop
cooperative projects of mutual interest. The institute conducts
seminars and publishes resulting materials.
! ---- S^ T K------------------------------


Florida International University
Tamiami Campus
Miami, Florida 33199









First Impressions



Critics Look at the New Literature


Compiled by Forrest D. Colburn


Enterprising Enclaves
Getting Ahead Collectively: Grassroots
Experiences in Latin America, Albert O.
Hirschman. 101 p. Pergamon Press, New
York, 1984.

The archdeacon of development theory, Al-
bert Hirschman, has written a readable
study of local organizations in Latin Amer-
ica. In 1983, the author visited some 45
grassroots development ventures, all sup-
ported by the Inter-American Foundation,
in six Latin American countries (Dominican
Republic, Colombia, Peru, Chile, Argentina,
Uruguay). Hirschman offers a descriptive
account of what he saw, providing a "rea-
soned travelogue, rather than a scholarly
treatise."
The book begins, oddly enough, with a
quote from Adam Smith: "The desire of
bettering our condition comes with us from
the womb and never leaves us till we go into
the grave." Hirschman is interested in how
individuals collectively seek to better their
condition. The supposition is that pooling
resources enables poor people to under-
take otherwise unfeasible economic proj-
ects and to garner political strength they do
not have individually. Accounts of local
organizations are grouped around such is-
sues as the impetus for cooperative action,
the benefits and costs of cooperatives, and
the role of institutions in assisting organiza-
tions of the poor. Throughout the study
Hirschman attempts to draw generaliza-
tions. Perhaps his most suggestive proposi-
tion is that previous failed efforts at
collective action often spark new, albeit dif-
ferent, collective projects.
Hirschman's visits occasionally contra-
dicted some of his ingrained notions. For
example, in Santiago de los Caballeros, the
second largest city of the Dominican Re-
public, a free zone for industry was estab-
lished a few years ago and has had some
success in attracting foreign investors. At a
local university Hirschman castigated free
zones because, in his opinion, they are en-
claves that do not stimulate development.
Immediately after his lecture he visited vari-
ous cottage enterprises in the poorer neigh-
borhoods of the city. The first venture
belonged to a man who produced leather
belts in his home. Hirschman asked him
how he had hit on this particular idea and
product. The answer: Before going into

Forrest D. Colburn teaches political science at
Florida International University.


business for himself, the entrepreneur had
been working in a US-owned firm from
Miami that was producing belts for export in
Santiago's free zone!
FORREST D. COLBURN

Local Yokels
Local Organizations: Intermediaries in
Rural Development, Milton J. Esman and
Norman T Uphoff. 391 p. Cornell Uni-
versity Press, Ithaca, N.Y., 1984. $34.00.

How does one help the world's rural poor
escape famine and poverty? In opposition
to Marxists, who call for violent revolution,
technologists and their single-minded ad-
vocacy of technological change, and "liber-
ationists," who reject any state role in rural
development, the authors of this volume are
searching for "institutional and organiza-
tional changes that can cumulatively shift
the balance of socioeconomic and political
power" in the rural poor's favor. Supporting
a "structural-reformist" approach, they see
a wide variety of local organizations (LOs)-
development associations, cooperatives
and interest associations-based on peas-
ant participation, and some state and out-
side agency assistance, as the technique
most likely to improve rural living standards
and give peasants more control over their
lives. Building on a 1974 macrolevel study
of Asian LOs, this book combines over five
years of research by the Rural Development
Committee and the Rural Development Par-
ticipation Project at Cornell University to
study LOs from a microperspective.
The authors analyze 150 examples of
successful and unsuccessful LOs to explain
the conditions under which they are most
likely to succeed. The cases are drawn from
throughout the Third World, but many of the
most interesting are from Latin America
and the Caribbean. The first half of the book
relies on correlations (and in appendices,
more sophisticated stepwise regression) to
test various hypotheses concerning the ex-
tent to which natural, political, economic,
factional, organizational and other variables
affect the success of LOs. The second half of
the book employs a more qualitative ap-
proach to study the vulnerabilities of LOs,
how weaknesses can be overcome, and the
role of local leaders and outside as-
sistance-either national or international
agencies-in ensuring the success of LOs.
While the analysis in the first part seems
pithier, the authors' rich experiences in
working with LOs comes through more


clearly and in a more readable style in the
second, as they step back from the quan-
titative data and share their qualitative
experiences.
As intermediaries in development, LOs
are a critical topic for study. By mobilizing
and directing local energies, by serving as
conduits for channeling outside assistance
into local communities, and by acting as a
catchment for investments and local re-
sources, LOs can play a major role in local
development. But what are the important
conditions for maintaining successful LOs?
The basic picture emerging from this book
is that the environment is not a constraint
on establishing effective LOs; they can suc-
ceed in any environment. But so many vari-
ables affect their success or failure that
overall, the critical variable remains the role
of the individual, thereby leaving large
scope for the realm of human action in
building effective organizations.
This first-class study, which pulls to-
gether an enormous amount of data and
collective experience into a readable and
highly informative book on the role of LOs
in the developmental process, should be
particularly useful for government agen-
cies, semiprivate and private organizations
that fund rural development projects, prac-
titioners in the field who organize projects at
the grass roots, and social scientists inter-
ested in understanding the role of coopera-
tives and cooperative activities in alleviating
rural poverty.
DAVID ZWEIG
Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts

Guatemalan Wanderers
Los Ambulantes: The Itinerant
Photographers of Guatemala. Ann Parker.
149 pp. MIT Press, Cambridge, 1982.
$35.00.

Los Ambulantes is a coffee table photog-
raphy book which fits comfortably on the
reference shelf because of an involved essay
about the traveling photographers. It dem-
onstrates the plight of the diminishing
group of Guatemalan photographers. Utiliz-
ing large format view cameras, these pho-
tographers travel from one fair, festival or
market to another, satisfying the rural Indi-
ans' desire to have their image permanently
fixed. Their customers are placed in front of
an interestingly painted backdrop which
depicts an idolized landscape and/or icon-
ographic imagery. The pictures are uncer-


48/CAJBBEAN FeVIle







emonial, indecisive and uninspired, but full
of pathos. The itinerants' pictures function
as metaphor. They are somber and sug-
gestive accounts of the lives they attempt to
serve. This idea is not only conjured up by
the subjects and the backdrops, but by the
tired craftsmen.
Parker's photographs are superior tech-
nically and visually. Yet her over-the-shoul-
der approach lacks the potency of the
itinerants' images, which they nearly dupli-
cate. Artifice is her opponent; the pictures
lack spontaneity. Her finest photographs,
however, involve the subject in a more com-
plex scenario. Breaking away from the nar-
rative-oriented, tight vertical frame, and by
dealing with the less predictable pos-
sibilities of photographic description, the
pictures are more interesting, suggestive,
and incisive. These encourage relation-
ships and, therefore, new fresh images and
meanings.
The accomplishment of Los Ambulantes
is in the cumulative nature of the pho-
tographs and essay. The photographs
should have been more stringently edited.
Some may consider this book indulgent in
light of all of the social ills plaguing that
region today. It is, though, a refreshing
lesson in humanity and social poetry.
GARY MONROE
Miami, Florida

Little Backyards
Manufacturing in the Backyard: Case
Studies on Accumulation and
Employment in Small-Scale Brazilian
Industry. Hubert Schmitz. 232 pp. Frances
Pinter, London, 1982.

This is an interesting contribution to the
debate concerning the "potential" of small-
scale manufacturing enterprises in devel-
oping countries. The author reviews the
literature concerning the earning oppor-
tunities and growth constraints of small-
scale manufacturing; reviews Brazil's
growth and development in the 1960-70
period; and interprets findings in three case
studies.
The case studies are the book's strong
point. Each study examines a Brazilian tex-
tile-related sector in the context of its local
economy: the knitting and clothing indus-
try, Petr6polis, Rio de Janeiro; the ham-
mock industry, Fortaleza, Ceara; and the
weaving industry, Americana, Sao Paulo.
Each of the studies presents an excellent
"bird's-eye" view of the local industry's his-
tory, structure and problems.
Schmitz's conclusions can be summa-
rized in three propositions. First, individuals
who established the small-scale manufac-
turing enterprises were not people who
were unable to find jobs in large enterprises;
rather, they were people who voluntarily left
employment with the larger enterprises to
improve their economic and social posi-


tions. This finding directly contradicts the
majority opinion found in the literature.
Second, although Schmitz finds elements
of "exploitation" of the small-scale enter-
prises by the larger firms, he also finds a
greater degree of symbiosis than is the stan-
dard view. For example, it is found that tech-
nology and training transfers run both from
the small firms to the large firms, and in the
opposite direction. Third, the only internal
constraint which is found to limit the small-
scale producers is a lack of working capital;
however, there are external constraints
which pose potential problems, the most
important of which is access to raw mate-
rials. Technological discontinuities and
market access are found not to be severe
constraints in these sectors.
RICHARD P HARBER
Texas Tech University
Lubbock, Texas

Guyana Glimpses
Estudio Hist6rico de la Guayana
Britanica, Rita Giacalone de Romero.
Corpoandes, M6rida, Venezuela, 1982.
Guyana Hoy, Rita Giacalone de Romero,
ed. Corpoandes, Merida, Venezuela, 1982.
Nacionalismo, Etnicidad y Politica en la
Republica Cooperativa de Guyana, Andr6s
Serbin. Bruguera, Caracas, 1980.

Caribbean studies in Venezuela over the
years have tended to pay lip service to the
interests of Venezuela in the Caribbean
basin while concentrating their attention on
that Caribbean entity lying outside the
basin, namely Guyana. These three vol-
umes are good examples of the Spanish
literature on Guyana.
Produced at the Centro de Estudios Po-
liticos y Sociales de America Latina of the
Universidad de Los Andes in Merida, the
first two represent the research of Rita
Giacalone de Romero and her colleagues
and graduate students. Her own work, re-
viewing Guyana's history with special atten-
tion to labor relations, is a model of crisp
analysis drawing upon a wide array of
sources. Ending her account at 1949, she is
effective in letting us anticipate the troubles
to come: class-oriented politics would soon
be supplanted by ethnic ones.
The collection of readings leads off with a
fairly polemical effort to compare South Af-
rica and Guyana in terms of the so-
cioeconomic conditions that underly racist
ideology. Professor Giacalone de Romero
adds another chapter to her labor history
with an in-depth look at Guyana in the inter-
war period. Other essays deal with
Guyanese poet Martin Carter's political im-
agery, the image of Venezuela in the
Guyanese press, several studies of the Vene-
zuela-Guyana border dispute, and a critical
look at the realities behind Forbes Bur-
nham's "cooperative socialism." All in all,


these are solid products from an up-and-
coming center for Caribbean studies.
The study by Serbin, a social anthropolo-
gist at Universidad Sim6n Bolivar, is both
more adventurous and less successful. Ser-
bin sets out to apply a Gramscian frame-
work to the analysis of changing domina-
tion patterns under colonial and post-
colonial rule. Although Serbin manages to
recount Guyanese history in a useful man-
ner for the general reader, his methodology
falters in the contemporary period, leaving
the behavior of the Jagan government in
relative obscurity and that of the Burnham
government in only a pale light. The au-
thor's interest in ethnicity leads him into
interesting explorations of education and
other socialization mechanisms. But the
Gramscian model clearly entails a norma-
tive framework, and despite his dedication
of the book to the memory of Walter
Rodney, Serbin seems to shy away from
judgments and does little to arm us for
making them.
EDWARD DEW
Fairfield University
Fairfield, Connecticut

Dutch Details
Dutch Authors on West Indian History,
M.A.R Meilink Roelofsz, ed. 384 p. M.
Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands, 1982.

It seems to be an established custom of
editors in this type of anthology to include
themselves among the contributors. Meilink
Roelofsz is no exception, admitting in her
preface that "a well-rounded selection of
older Dutch studies on the historical rela-
tions between the Netherlands and the West
Indies for publication in English translation
is difficult."
The editor has an exceptionally well-
rounded background as archivist in the Al-
gemeen Rijksarchiefin The Hague and has
also been a member of the faculty at the
University of Leiden. Her easy access to so
many documents related to the East and
West Indies guarantees a valuable contribu-
tion. But her choice of collaborators in this
volume seems whimsical. Why, for in-
stance, include three essays by W. J. van
Hoboken in a total of thirteen articles?
On the other hand, most of the authors
are well qualified: B. de Gaay Fortman, J. G.
van Dillen, W. S. Unger, L. Knappert, and G.
J. van Grol-a fact which cannot help but
endow this publication with a certain pres-
tige. The fame ofJ. B. van Overeem rests-
as far as I know-on one article, albeit a
good one; while Kesler probably cannot be
considered in the same league as the oth-
ers. Other well-known and authoritative
West Indian historians such as J. Wolbers, P
M. Netscher and J.H.J. Hamelberg, al-
though mentioned in the preface, are not
represented. Neither is the prolific W. R.
Menkman. The editor would probably


CArBBEAN PVIEW/49









blame this exclusion on a lack of space;
however, to this reviewer the omission
seems inexcusable.
All in all, this work represents a valuable
contribution to the spreading of Dutch his-
torical writing on the West Indies in the En-
glish language. It is to be hoped that it may
soon be followed by others in order to fully
achieve that goal.
CORNELIS C. GOSLINGA
The Hague, Netherlands

Gospel
Financial Policies and the World Capital
Market: The Problem of Latin American
Countries, Pedro Aspe Armella, Rudiger
Dornbusch and Maurice Obstfeld. 293 p.
University of Chicago Press, 1983. $36.00.

The common objective of the essays in this
book is "to bring a unifying methodological
approach to the analysis of financial prob-
lems in developing open economies," par-
ticularly in Latin America. However, it is not
quite correct to call it a book in the tradi-
tional sense of the literary concept. It more
closely resembles the Gospel. Like the Gos-
pel, it is a collection of messages by different
people; it was voiced before it was put into
print; it attempts to tell the difference be-
tween good and bad. But unlike the Gospel,
it fails to assert what the reward and/or
punishment will be on the day that the final
results are put together.
The economic professions have not had
an easy task in the last decade. While they
were right in establishing an adequate diag-
nosis of the causes for the economic chaos
of international trade, they have been con-
tinuously blamed as incompetent in bring-
ing clear and practical remedies to cure the
problem, and in forecasting the changes in
the basic economic parameters, both for
the debtor nations and for the creditors.
This book attempts to moderate that feeling
by explaining the reasons for the debt prob-
lem as well as by developing some ap-
proaches to the policy for financial
integration in the world capital market.
The paper by Carlos F Diaz Alejandro
presents an interesting narration of the rela-
tively recent history of world financial inte-
gration, reminding the reader of the 1920s
and 1930s. Michael Mussa proposes that
policies should be established in different
regions that would avoid the creation of ar-
bitrary barriers to the normal market flow.
Stanley Fisher, and subsequently Guillermo
Ortiz, deal with the issue of acting, or not
acting on exchange rates to moderate/
cause capital flows.
Nissan Liviatan and Michael Bruno,
through a complex series of theoretical
analyses, conclude that full indexation is in
general not optimal in controlling an econ-
omy that is subject to frequent financial
shocks. Private parties, they conclude, will
choose incomplete indexation to achieve


maximum gain in variable labor and capital
markets. Cavallo and Petrei, and also Calvo,
analyze the struggle of Argentine private
firms at the time the various governments
instituted anti-inflationary policies. More
specifically, Calvo concentrates on the im-
pact of overevaluation.
Lizondo, Cumby, and also Obstfeld de-
scribe their studies analyzing the policies of
internal credits when governments deal
with efforts to stabilize the impact of dif-
ferences in exchange rates. Blanchard ex-
plains, in his rather controversial paper, that
current account adjustments should come
at the expense of consumption, not at the
expense of investment. He concludes in his
discussion of Brazil that there is not a debt
problem there!
The closing panel discussion by de Pablo,
Mancera and Simonsen opens more issues
than it resolves. But Juan Carlos de Pablo
voices his message as he describes the dev-
ilish effects of inflation. "And I know this
better than many of you," he concludes with
humility, "because I am an Argentine!"
On reading the book, one must always
keep in mind that the central theme is "the
debt." At the end the reader will certainly
agree with the remarks recently made else-
where by Professor Gunter Dufey, of the Uni-
versity of Michigan, that with this problem
the difference between solutions and non-
solutions is so thin that it is often difficult to
distinguish one from the other. There will be
debtors and bankers who fail and those who
survive, and the only effective medicine
known so far is for the debtor to pay and for
the collector to collect. This will not deny the
one truth admitted by all sides, that "the
debt" will not go away. This fact, one thinks,
is what Ronald Reagan, the leader of the
biggest debtor of all, means when he con-
vincingly states, "You ain't seen nothing
yet!"
JUAN A. YAFrES
Esso Caribbean and Central America
Coral Gables, Florida

The Garvey Papers
The Marcus Garvey and Universal Negro
Improvement Association Papers, Robert
A. Hill, ed. Vol. 1, 579 p.; Vol. 2, 710 p.
University of California Press, Berkeley,
1983.

The first two volumes of the projected ten-
volume series of the Marcus Garvey papers,
edited by Robert A. Hill, have now been
released. They are essential reading for ac-
tivists, scholars and students of the black
experience in the United States, Africa and
the Caribbean. Four characteristics of the
volumes seem especially important to me
as an activist in the black struggle.
First, the two volumes vividly illustrate
the iron will, vision and unquestioned com-
mitment to black liberation exhibited by
Marcus Garvey, the Jamaican-born black,


who more than any single figure that I know
stirred up black pride in this century. The
volumes cover the first two decades of the
20th century, a time when the black race
seemed especially degraded. Except for
Ethiopia and Liberia, all of Africa was under
colonial rule; and to many it seemedthatthe
African people would always remain
"hewers of wood and drawers of water" for
the British, French, Portuguese and Belgian
colonialists. This sentiment is well ex-
pressed in an editorial from the Daily Tele-
graph (London) of 4 August 1920, which
termed the demand by Marcus Garvey's
Universal Negro Improvement Association
(UNIA) that Africa be turned over to the
Africans to govern as a violation of the
"logic of history." In the United States with
its racism, and in the Caribbean with the
lack of majority rule, life was also very hard
for black people. In this atmosphere of leth-
argy and degredation, Marcus Garvey
raised the vision of a prosperous and proud
future.
Secondly, because of the excellent notes
and appendices contained therein, Hill's vol-
umes are not only a running commentary
on Garveyism but they also constitute a
literal history of black nationalism for the
time period. We read of black stalwarts and
pioneers like Casely Hayford (Gold Coast),
Chief Alfred Sam (Gold Coast), Frederick
Toote (Bahamas), Cyril Briggs (Nevis),
Robert Love (Bahamas), Arnold Ford (Bar-
bados), Lionel Francis (Trinidad), Elia Gar-
cia (Haiti), Duse Mohammed (Egypt), W. A.
Domingo (Jamaica), Hubert Harrison (St.
Croix), George McQuire (Antigua) and
many others. Black American heroes like
W.E.B. Dubois, A. Philip Randolph and
Chandler Owen are also discussed. In short,
if one is interested in studying and research-
ing black history in the first two decades of
this century, these volumes are an indis-
pensable source.
Thirdly, the Garvey volumes reveal that
many of the controversies that bedevil the
black movement today are problems of
long standing, that they also confronted
blacks in the first two decades of the cen-
tury. For example, should blacks attempt to
integrate into the societies in which they are
significant minorities, as they are in the
United States, or should they either go back
to Africa or build a separate nation on the
territory of their present national abode?
Should blacks use a capitalist or socialist
model to develop themselves? What should
be the relationship between the ex-colonial
powers and the independent black peo-
ples? Questions like these were raised at
numerous points in the Garvey papers, and
the almost contemporary nature of much of
the discussion will surprise readers.
Finally, the Garvey papers are fruitful
reading because they provide black people
in the United States, the West Indies and
Africa with a perspective by which they can
measure their achievements and failures in


50/CAI?BBEAN REVIEW









this century. For example, on the plus side,
most of the African and West Indian blacks
now live in independent nations, an
achievement that seemed utopian in the pe-
riod covered by these volumes. In the United
States, overt racial segregation has been
eradicated and blacks have made political,
economic and civic gains that I believe
Garvey would have considered nearly im-
possible. But a reading of the Garvey pa-
pers reveals that as preoccupied as he was
with symbols of black nationalism such as
political independence, he saw all of these
as mere instruments to lay the basis for
blacks to control their spiritual, cultural and
economic destinies.
JOHN MCCARTNEY
Nassau, Bahamas

Haitian Coffee
Le Commerce du Cafe en Haiti:
Habitants, Speculateurs et Exportateurs,
Christian A. Girault. 296 p. Editions du
Centre National de la Recherche
Scientifique, Paris, 1981.

Serious scientific research on contempo-
rary Haitian economics and politics is hard
to come by. Data is sparse and of dubious
quality. Anthropologists, who are ac-
customed to gathering their own data, are
virtually the only ones to have done sub-
stantial research in contemporary Haiti.
Girault's monograph on the coffee trade
is a significant exception. It is based on al-
most a year's fieldwork in Haiti and repre-
sents the first comprehensive investigation
of coffee marketing there. The argument is
guided primarily by dependency theory, al-
though a brand which has been adapted to
the local, peculiar conditions of Haiti. After
providing a theoretical background, the au-
thor discusses international coffee trade
and Haiti's historical insertion into that
trade. The primary conclusion is that such
trade is unequal and that small countries
like Haiti are unlikely to alter their less-than-
equal position.
The author then proceeds with the bulk of
his argument, the delineation of the un-
equal relationship between the multiple,
small-scale peasant producers and what he
calls the monopoly of coffee middlemen
and exporters, which might better be de-
scribed as a oligopsony. Girault details how
the peasants not only engage in unequal
exchange, but also support the burden of
high taxation and experience strong social
and political control.
Coffee has been Haiti's primary export,
contributing 20-35 percent to the gross na-
tional product. While the recent rise in as-
sembly plants has diminished its relative
importance, it is still critical to understand-
ing contemporary Haiti. Girault has written
an excellent book on an important topic.
ALEX STEPICK
Florida International University


Second-Hand Haiti
The Haitian Economy: Man, Land and
Markets, Mats Lundahl. 290 p. St. Martin's
Press, New York, 1983.

This book by Lundahl, a professor at the
University of Lund, combines a dozen arti-
cles published in different journals. The top-
ics dealt with concern the economy of Haiti,
as well as its history, demography, geogra-
phy and politics. In reality, however, for the
most part the book consists of information
from studies written during the past few
years. Thus we find an analysis of works by
G. Caprio, W. Donner, J. J. Honorat, B.
Joachim, D. Nicholls, G. Murray, my own
works on the coffee market, publications of
the Interamerican Institute of Cooperation
for Agriculture (IICA) and others.
We find again the thesis put forward in an
earlier book by the author on the Haitian
peasantry: the technological stagnation,
vicious circles caused by demography and
the need to migrate, the disinterest of the
leaders in social progress for the coun-
tryside. The contents does not sparkle with
originality. This is due, in my opinion, to
three major faults. First, the author provides
insufficient original data; thus the text often
becomes a mosaic of citations. In a short
text on Haitian migration to the Dominican
Republic, for example, there are no less than
157 notes.
The second fault is directly related to the
first, and is inherent in all second-hand
knowledge. This is the risk of "almost, but
not quite"-providing valuable analysis if
the work is taken as a whole, but lacking
precision in detail, in interpretation. Thus in
the case of commercialization of agri-
cultural products, the author navigates by
guesswork through the materials provided
by J. LaGra and the IICA. In the case of
coffee, Lundahl has to considerably revise
his position to take into account my contri-
butions on the question of oligopsonies.
The third fault originates from a lack of
depth on the part of the author. We repeat-
edly get the impression, which is frustrating
intellectually, that he stops with the first con-
sideration and doesn't pursue his inquiry
further. His thesis on the inefficiency of the
Haitian government is legitimate but all too
obvious. The class relations which hide be-
hind the vague notions of "state" or "elite"
would have deserved serious investigation.
In that sense, Lundahl's articles are superfi-
cial in the realm of description. Similarly I
criticize the absence of geographic depth
and the almost complete omission of inter-
national context. The author tries to con-
vince us that the causes of Haitian
underdevelopment are essentially internal,
but we can't ignore the fact that Haiti con-
ducts half of its foreign trade with only one
country-the United States. Dependence
on foreign trade, investment, economic or
military aid, regardless of the terms, has


precise meaning in the case of Haiti.
In short, readers interested in the Haitian
economy would do best to go directly to the
sources. If this is impossible, particularly for
those who don't read French, then reading
the Lundahl book can be an acceptable
substitute, as long as one is aware of its
limitations.
CHRISTIAN A. GIRAULT
National Center for Scientific Research
Bordeaux, France

If Crab Walk. ..
Ole Time Sayin's: Proverbs of the West
Indies, Lito Vails. St. John, US Virgin
Islands, 1983.

The last two decades or so have witnessed
among Caribbean peoples a determined
cultural search for various aspects of their
heritage, long submerged in the Euro-
centricism that has been the dominant fea-
ture of the region. It is a search for form and
purpose. At the heart of this buried culture
are hundreds of sayings and proverbs,
many of African origin, many more of West
Indian construction. Collectively, they con-
stitute a verbal art form and are a crucial
medium of everyday communication in
West Indian society.
Vito Valls's Ole Time Sayin's is a collec-
tion of 869 of these aphorisms. All are pre-
sented in Creole; most are given brief
standard English translations, with inter-
island variations noted. For example: 'If crab
don' walk 'e wont get fat; if crab walk he get
in de pot' (Damned if you do. Damned if you
don't). Or 'Ebry donkey bray in 'e own pas-
ture (Every man to his own taste); and
'Longer story run, de bigger 'e grow, de
worse 'e smell' (Gossip degenerates). Al-
together they make for fascinating reading.
As modest as this publication is, it is an
important contribution to Caribbean cul-
ture. These sayings have existed in Carib-
bean society for centuries, but mostly
unwritten. This publication will preserve
some of them for future generations. At the
same time it will likely stimulate the on-
going movement to celebrate indigenous
Caribbean cultural experience, including
folklore and linguistic autonomy. Regretta-
bly Vails provides the reader with no intro-
duction, no brief statement about what
these sayings really mean in Caribbean
daily life, why he considers them sufficiently
important to collect and publish, and how
they are to be interpreted and assessed by
the curious reader. But Vails has done
something useful, and I would recommend
this little book to anyone interested in learn-
ing more about Caribbean society and its
many fascinating sides. The glossary adds
to the book's usefulness.
G. LLEWELLYN WATSON
University of Prince Edward Island
Canada


CAI?BBEAN MNVIEW/51










Recent Books




On the Region and Its Peoples


Compiled by Marian Goslinga


Anthropology and Sociology

Anthropological Investigations in the
Caribbean: Selected Papers. Basil Calvin
Hedrick, et al. University of Northern Colorado,
1984. $4.00.

Bar6es e escravidao: trBs geracbes de
fazendeiros e a crise da estrutura escravista.
Eduardo Silva. Nova Fronteira (Rio de Janeiro,
Brazil), 1984. 274 p.

Christmas Sports: Our Neglected Cultural
Tradition. Frank L. Mills, S.B. Jones-
Hendrickson, Bertram Eugene. Eastern
Caribbean Institute (Frederiksted, VI.), 1984.
$6.00 [About St. Kitts and Nevis.]

La clase obrera como sujeto de studio en
Mexico, 1940-1980. Elena Azaola de
Hinojosa. Centro de Investigaciones y Estudios
Superiores en Antropologia Social, CIESAS
(Mexico), 1984. 111p.

Consommation alimentaire et etat nutritionnel
a la Martinique. Francois Delpelch, et al. Office
de la Recherche Scientifique et Technique
d'Outre-Mer, ORSTOM (Paris, France), 1984.
206 p.

Corrientes sociales del catolicismo argentino.
Nestor Tombs Auza. Claretiana (Buenos Aires,
Argentina), 1984. 398 p.

Crisis and Change: The Church in Latin
America Today. Edward L. Cleary. Orbis Books,
1985. 202 p.

Cristianismo y liberaci6n en America Latina.
Cayetano de Lalla, ed. Claves
Latinoamericanas (Mexico), 1984. 263 p.

Cultura y creaci6n intellectual en America
Latina. Pablo Gonzalez Casanova, ed. Siglo XXI
Editores (Mexico), 1984. 363 p.

Del paternalismo a la conciencia de cambio:
los congress panamericanos de servicio
social. Ezequiel Ander Egg, Herman C. Kruse.
Humanitas (Buenos Aires, Argentina), 1984.
125 p.

Educational Research: The English Speaking
Caribbean. Errol Miller. International
Development Research Centre (Ottawa,
Canada), 1984. 199 p.

Estudios sobre musica argentina. Roberto
Garcia Morillo. Ediciones Culturales Argentinas
(Buenos Aires), 1984. 400 p.

Marian Goslinga is the Latin American and
Caribbean Librarian at Florida International
University.


L'habitation i la Martinique. Centre Regional
de Recherche et de Documentation
Pedagogique. CRDP (Fort de France,
Martinique), 1984. 70 p. 45F.


Hispanics in the United States. Joan W.
Moore, Harry Pachon. Prentice-Hall, 1985.
208 p. $15.95

Individual and Society in Guiana: A
Comparative Study of Amerindian Social
Organization. Peter Riviere. Cambridge
University Press, 1984. 127 p.

Inmigraci6n ultramarina en Bahia Blanca,
1880-1914. Maria Jorgelina Caviglia de Villar.
Consejo Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales,
CLACSO (Buenos Aires, Argentina), 1984.
125 p.

A Just and Moral Society. Selwyn Reginald
Cudjoe. Calaloux Publications (Tacarigua,
Trinidad), 1984. 142 p.

La marginalidad: el comportamiento
adaptativo de las families marginadas en la
colonia Santa Anita, delegaci6n Iztacalco,
Mexico, D.E Dalmasio Hernandez Jimenez et
al. Universidad Nacional Aut6noma de Mexico,
1984. 140 p.

La mujer en Costa Rica y su participaci6n
politica-econ6mica en el desarrollo del pais.
Teresa Quiroz Martin et al. Facultad de Ciencias
Sociales, Universidad de Costa Rica, 1984.
128 p.

La mujer en Nicaragua. Luisa Amanda
Espinoza. Editorial Nueva Nicaragua, 1984.
84 p.

PetAn: la voz dominicana, su gente, sus cosas
y sus cuentos. Luis Eduardo Lora Medrano.
Editora Tele-3 (Santo Domingo), 1984. 305 p.

La poblaci6n del Peru en el afo 2050. Centro
Peruano de Investigaci6n Aplicada. C.PI.A.
(Lima, Peru), 1984. 168 p.


De Portugezen op Curacao. Tom Pijnenburg,
Cora de Wit. Stichting voor Culturele
Samenwerking, Sticusa (Amsterdam,
Netherlands), 1984.

Presencia del diablo en la tradici6n de
Hispano-America. Felix Coluccio, Marta Isabel
) Coluccio. Ediciones Culturales Argentinas
(Buenos Aires), 1984. 400 p.

Santo Domingo de ayer: vida, costumbres y
acontecimientos. Eduardo Matos Diaz. Editora
Taller (Santo Domingo), 1984. 190 p.

Solidarity with the People of Nicaragua. James
McGinnis. Orbis Books, 1985. 160 p.

Los viajeros de la gran Anaconda. Milagros
Palma. Editorial America Nuestra (Managua,
Nicaragua), 1984. 245 p. [Report on
Colombian Amazonia.]

We Drink from Our Own Wells: The Spiritual
Journey of a People. Gustavo Gutierrez;
Matthew J. O'Connell, trans. Orbis Books,
1984. 181 p. [Translation of Beber en su propio
pozo.]

Women and Change in Latin America: New
Directions in Sex and Class. June Nash et al.
Bergin & Garvey (South Hadley, Mass.), 1985.
384 p. $29.95; $14.95 paper.


Biography

AJS at 70: A Celebration on His 70th
Birthday of the Life, Work and Art of A.J.
Seymour. lan McDonald. McDonald
(Georgetown, Guyana), 1984. 122 p.
[Biography of the Guyanese poet.]

Carolina Muzilli. Jose Armagno Cosentino.
Centro Editor de America Latina (Buenos
Aires, Argentina), 1984. 110 p. [Biography of
an early 20th century Argentine feminist.]

Cartas do Pe. Jose de Anchieta, S.J.:
correspondencia ativa e passiva. Helio
Abranches Viotti, ed. Loyola (Sao Paulo, Brazil),
1984. 504 p.

Cisneros: Portrait of a New American. Kemper
Dieh, Jan Jarboe. Corona Publishing (San
Antonio, Tex.), 1985. $14.95; $5.95 paper.
[About Henry Cisneros, the Mexican-American
mayor of San Antonio, Texas.]

Daniel Cosio Villegas: el historiador liberal.
Enrique Krauze, ed. Fondo de Cultura
Econ6mica (M6xico), 1984. 430 p.

Guillermo Roux. Jean-Dominique Rey. Rizzoli,
1985. $45.00 [About the Argentinne painter.]


52/CABBEAN rEViEW









Imagen de Francisco i. Madero. Eliseo Rangel
Gaspar. Depto. del Distrito Federal (Mexico),
1984. 178 p.

Portraits of the Puerto Rican Experience. Adal
Alberto Maldonado. Institute of Puerto Rican
Urban Studies (New York, N.Y.), 1984. 210 p.
$300.00.

Queremos tanto a Julio. Hugo Niflo, ed.
Editorial Nueva Nicaragua (Managua,
Nicaragua), 1984. 161 p. [20 Latin American
writers pay tribute to the recently deceased
Cortazar.]

Trujillo: seguire a caballo. Jose Labourt.
Editora Taller (Santo Domingo), 1984. 229 p.

Urquiza y su tiempo: la vision de sus
contemporaneos. Beatriz Bosch, ed. Centro
Editor de America Latina (Buenos Aires,
Argentina), 1984. 87 p.


Description and Travel

Bermuda and the Bahamas, 1985. Rachel J.
Christmas, Walter Christmas. 2d ed. Morrow,
1985. 232 p. $7.95

Buenos Aires ayer: testimonies grhficos de
una ciudad, 1910-1930. Jose Maria Pefia, ed.
M. Zago Ediciones (Buenos Aires, Argentina),
1984. 190 p. [Spanish and English]

Diving and Snorkeling Guide to Bonaire and
Curagao: Including Information on Aruba.
George S. Lewbel et al., eds. Pisces books
(Locust Valley, N.Y.), 1984. 96 p. $8.95.

Hemingway en Cuba. Norberto Fuentes. Letras
Cubanas (La Habana, Cuba), 1984.
712 p.

Mexico: Places and Pleasures. Kate Simon. 3d
ed. Harper & Row, 1984. 416 p. $8.00.

The Other Puerto Rico. Kathryn Robinson.
Permanent Press (Santurce, PR.), 1984. 158 p.
$9.95.

O Rio antigo do fotografo Marc Ferrez:
paisagens e tipos humans do Rio de Janeiro,
1865-1918. Pedro Nava, ed. Exlibris (Sbo
Paulo, Brazil), 1984. 221 p.

Viajes a Buenos Aires, 1826 y 1831. Jean
Baptiste Douville; Carlota Podesta, trans.;
Bonifacio del Carril, ed. Emece (Buenos Aires,
Argentina), 1984. 156 p.

Viajes en M6xico: cr6nicas mexicanas. Xavier
Tavera Alfaro. Fondo de Cultura Econ6mica
(Mexico), 1984. 2 vols.


Economics

Agricultural Policy and Collective Self-
Reliance in the Caribbean. W Andrew Axline.
Westview Press, 1984. 130 p. $12.95

An Anatomy of the Distribution of Urban
Income: A Tale of Two Cities in Colombia.
Rakesh Mohan. World Bank, 1984. 133 p.
$8.00.


Aspecten van de ontwikkeling van de
Curagaose arbeidersklasse. Henk ten Napel.
Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land-, en
Volkenkunde (Leiden, Netherlands), 1984.
Nfl 18.50.

Belastingwetgeving in de Nederlandse
Antillen. F. Metry. Uitgeverij Drukkerij "De
Curagaosche Courant," 1984.

Bolivia: Agricultural Pricing and Investment
Policies. World Bank. The Bank, 1985. 130 p.
$8.00.

Brazil: The New Militancy. Jeroen Peijnenburg,
Andres Thompson, Martha McDevitt. Institute
for Policy Studies, 1984.


Capitalist Development and the Peasant
Economy in Peru. Adolfo Figueroa. Cambridge
University Press, 1984. 140 p. 19.50.

Estudio macroecon6mico de Argentina.
Osvaldo E. Baccino. Institute de Politica
Econ6mica y Social (Buenos Aires, Argentina),
1984. 107 p.

Focus on the Eastern Caribbean: Bananas,
Bucks and Boots. The Resource Center. The
Center (Albuquerque, New Mexico), 1984.

Guadeloupe, les quatre v&rites. Amedee
Adelaide, ed. Editions Caribeennes (Paris,
France), 1984. 96 p. 35F

Impactos regionales de las relaciones
econ6micas Mexico-Estados Unidos. Eliseo
Mendoza Berrueto, ed. El Colegio de M6xico,
1984. 507 p. [Spanish and English]

Income Transfers Within Extended Families to
Meet Basic Needs: The Evidence from El
Salvador. Daniel Kaufman, David L. Lindauer.
World Bank, 1984.

Land Reform in Mexico, 1910-1980. Susan R.
Walsh Sanderson. Academic Press, 1984.
186 p. $35.00.

Landwirtschaftliche Entwicklung und
Agrarreform in Nicaragua zwischen 1960 und
1982. Jirgen Glembotzki. Institute fir
Iberoamerika-kunde (Hamburg, Germany),
1984. 129 p.

Lateinamerika: Entwicklungsprozess am
Wendepunkt?: Perspektiven fiur die deutsch-
lateinamerikanischen Beziehungen. Klauss
Esser, Albrecht von Gleich, eds. Institute fir
Iberoamerika-kunde (Hamburg, Germany),
1984. 104 p.


Law and Agrarian Reform in Costa Rica.
James P Rowles. Westview Press, 1984. 229 p.
$22.00.

Legados del monetarismo: Argentina y Chile.
Rene Cortazar, Alejandro Foxley, Victor E.
Tokman. Ediciones Solar (Buenos Aires,
Argentina), 1984. 146 p.

Miners, Peasants and Entrepreneurs: Regional
Development in the Central Highlands of Peru.
Norman Long, Bryan Roberts. Cambridge
University Press, 1984. 288 p. $49.50.

No Free Lunch: Food and Revolution in Cuba
Today. Medea Benjamin, Joseph Collins,
Michael Scott. Food First/Institute for Food and
Development Policy (San Francisco, Calif.),
1985. 250 p. $7.95.

North-South Technology Transfer: A Case
Study of Petrochemicals in Latin America.
Mariluz Cortes, Peter Bocock. Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1984. 176 p. $25.00.

Oekonomie und Koloniales Erbe:
Moglichkelten und Perspektiven der
wirtschaftlichen und politischen Entwicklung
Mittelamerikas. Enrique Schmidt Guadra.
Edition Nahua (Wuppertal, Germany), 1984.
276 p.

Paraguay en la coyuntura econ6mica actual.
Agustin Oscar Flecha. Equipo T&cnico de
Investigaciones, E.T.I. (Asunci6n, Paraguay),
1984. 108 p.

Peasant Capitalist Industry: Piecework and
Enterprise in Southern Mexican Brickyards.
Scott Cook. University Press of America, 1985.
256 p. $24.75; $12.75 paper.

El Peru frente a las nuevas tendencies del
comercio international. Eduardo Ferrero
Costa, ed. Centro Peruano de Estudios
Internacionales, 1984. 328 p.

Plantations, Peasants and State: A Study of
the Mode of Sugar Production in Guyana.
Clive Y. Thomas. Center for Afro-American
Studies, University of California (Los Angeles),
1984. 214 p.

The Politics of Latin American Development.
Gary W. Wynia. 2d ed. Cambridge University
Press, 1984. 318 p. $39.50; $11.95 paper.

Sugar and Slavery in Puerto Rico: The
Plantation Economy of Ponce, 1800-1850.
Francisco Antonio Scarano. University of
Wisconsin Press, 1984. 242 p. $21.50.


History and Archaeology

America Latina: los desafios del tiempo
fecundo. Sergio Spoerer. Ornitorrinco
(Santiago, Chile), 1984. 163 p.

Atlas de historic de Chile. Osvaldo Silva
Galdames. Editorial Universitaria (Santiago,
Chile), 1984. 110 p.

Los brithnicos en el Paraguay, 1850-1870.
Josefina Ph. Arte Nuevo Editores (Asunci6n,
Paraguay), 1984. 316 p.


CATBBEAN PFVIEW/53









Cartografia mexicana: tesoros de la naci6n,
siglos XVI a XIX. Elias Trabulse, ed. Archivo
General de la Naci6n (Mexico), 1984. 192 p.

Economia e sociedade em areas colonials
perifericas: Guiana Francesa e Para,
1750-1817. Ciro Flamarion Santana Cardoso.
Edicao Graal (Rio de Janeiro, Brazil), 1984.
201 p.

Enfoques de la intervenci6n military
norteamericana a la Repiblica Dominicana,
1916-1924. Ram6n Alberto Ferreras. Editorial
Nordeste (Santo Domingo), 1984. 368 p.

El estado dominicano: origen, evoluci6n y su
forma actual, 1844-1982. Nelson Moreno
Ceballos. 3d ed. Editora Alfa y Omega (Santo
Domingo), 1984. 351 p.

Estudios de genealogia peruana. Josh de la
Riva Agiero. Institute Riva-Agiero (Lima,
Peru), 1984. 286 p.

L'Vtre patriote sous les tropiques: la
Guadaloupe, la colonisation et la revolution.
Anne Perruchin. Society d'Histoire de la
Guadaloupe, 1984. 3 vols.

Fortines paraguayos y bolivianos,
1905-1932. Ram6n Cesar Bejarano. Editorial
Toledo (Asunci6n, Paraguay), 1984. 118 p.

Haiti de 1804 a nos jours. Jacques Barros.
Editions I'Harmattan (Paris, France), 1984. 2
vols., 915 p. 320F.

Haiti in Caribbean Context. David Nicholls. St.
Martin's Press, 1985. 304 p. $27.50.

Nicaragua desde Nicaragua. Canuto Barreto.
Centro de Estudios Ecumenicos (Mexico),
1984. 122 p.

Nicaragua's Mosquito Shore: The Years of
British and American Presence. Craig L.
Dozier. University of Alabama Press, 1985.
276 p. $32.75.

El nfimero 13 en la vida de los aztecas. Angel
Raul L6pez. Costa-Amic Editores (Mexico),
1984. 286 p.

Les petites Antilles avant Christophe Colomb:
vie quotidienne des indiens de la Guadaloupe.
Christian Nontbrun, ed. Karthala (Paris,
France), 1984. 172 p. 74E

Las raices hist6ricas e ideol6gicas del
movimiento sandinista: antecedentes de la
revoluci6n national y popular nicaragiense,
1927-1979. Hugo Cancino Troncoso. Odense
University Press (Odense, Denmark), 1984.
Cr150.00.

To the Halls of the Montezumas: The Mexican
War in the American Imagination. Robert
Walter Johannsen. Oxford University Press,
1985. 368 p. $29.95.

Tributos y servicios personales de indios para
Hernan Cortes y su familiar: extractos de
documents del siglo XVI. Silvio Zavala.
Archivo General de la Naci6n (Mexico), 1984.
405 p.


El universe sagrado de la serpiente entire los
mayas. Mercedes de la Garza. Universidad
Nacional Aut6noma de Mexico, 1984.
462 p.

The Women of Mexico City, 1790-1857. Silvia
Marina Arrom. Stanford University Press, 1985.
288 p. $29.50.


Language and Literature

Black Fauns. Alfred Mendes. New Beacon
Press (London, Eng.), 1984. 328 p. [Novel
about life in Trinidad in the 1930s.]


Caribbean Poetry Now. Stewart Brown, ed.
Hodder & Stoughton (Sevenoaks, Eng.), 1984.
128 p. 2.95.

Cuando sali de La Habana, valgame Dios.
Roberto L6pez Moreno, ed. Claves Latino-
americanas (Mexico), 1984. 151 p.

Easy in the Islands: Stories. Bob Shacochis.
Crown Publishers, 1985. $13.95.

Espejo de escritores. Reina Joff6, ed.
Ediciones del Norte (Hanover, N.H.), 1984. 230
p. $10.00.

Estudios sobre teatro mexicano
contemporaneo: seminologia de la
competencia teatral. David William Foster. R
Lang (New York, N.Y.), 1984. 149 p. $14.75.

Form and Function in Chicano English. Jacob
Ornstein-Galicia, ed. Newbury House (Rowley,
Mass.), 1984. 247 p. $14.95.

History of the Voice: The Development of
National Language in Anglophone Caribbean
Poetry. Edward Kamau Brathwaite. New
Beacon Books (Port-of-Spain, Trinidad), 1984.
87 p.

The House of the Spirits. Isabel Allende;
Magda Bogin, trans. Knopf, 1985. 384 p.
$17.95. [Translation of La casa de los
espiritus, a novel by the niece of Chile's former
president.]

Images et mythes d'Haiti. Daniel Henri
Pageaux. Editions 1'Harmattan (Paris, France),
1984. 237 p.

La imaginaci6n insular: mitos, leyendas,
utopias y fantasmas en la narrative
dominicana. Bruno Rosario Candelier. Taller
(Santo Domingo), 1984. 190 p.


Koute pou tannl Akout pou tandel: anthologie
de la nouvelle po6sie creole: Caraibe Ocean
Indien. Lambert-Felix Prudent, ed. Editions
CaribBennes (Paris, France), 1984. 527 p.

Lecciones de guarani. Antonio Ortiz Mayans.
Comuneros (Asunci6n, Paraguay), 1984. 84 p.

A Nahuatl-English Dictionary and
Concordance to the Cantares Mexicanos: With
an Analytic Transcription and Grammatical
Notes. John Bierhorst. Stanford University
Press, 1985. 648 p. $65.00.

Ole Time Sayin's. Lito Vails. Vails (St. John,
VI.), 1984. $13.00.

Poesia feminist del mundo hispinico, desde
la edad media hasta la actualidad: antologia
critical. Angel Flores, Kate Flores. Siglo XXI
Editores (Mexico), 1984. 284 p.

La poesia mexicana del siglo XIX. Emmanuel
Carballo. Editorial Di6genes (Mexico), 1984.
93 p.

Tal Brasil, qual romance?: uma ideologia
est6tica e sua historic, o naturalismo. Flora
Sissekind. Achiame (Rio de Janeiro, Brazil),
1984. 203 p.

Tales of El Huitlacoche. Gary D. Keller.
Bilingual Press, 1985. 95 p. $6.00.

To Bury Our Fathers: A Novel of Nicaragua.
Sergio Ramirez; Nick Caistor, trans. Readers
International (N.Y), 1984. 253 p. $14.95.
[Translation of 4Te di6 miedo la sangre?]


Politics and Government

The American Connection: State Terror and
Popular Resistance in Guatemala. Michael
McClintock. Zed Press (London, Eng.), 1984.
272 p. $30.95; $12.25 paper.

American Intervention in Grenada: The
Implications of Project "Urgent Fury." Peter M.
Dunn, Bruce W Watson, eds. Westview Press,
1984. 140 p. $13.95.

De Besluitvorming over de decentralisatie van
landzaken op de Nederlandse Antillen. Helene
P van Peet. Caraibishe Afdeling, Koninklijk
Instituut voor Taal-, Land-en Volkenkunde
(Leiden, Netherlands), 1984.

Central America and United States Policies,
1820s-1980s: A Guide to Issues and
References. Thomas M. Leonard. Regina
Books (Claremont, Calif.), 1985. 150 p. $17.95;
$10.95 paper.

Cuba y Estados Unidos: un debate para la
convivencia. Juan Gabriel Tokatlian, ed. Grupo
Editor Latinoam rica (Buenos Aires,
Argentina), 1984. 247 p.

De Polonia a Nicaragua. Robert Czarkowski.
Lit. Trejos (San Jose, Costa Rica), 1984. 381 p.

The Dynamics of Foreign Policymaking: The
President, the Congress, and the Panama
Canal Treaties. William L. Furlong, Margaret E.
Scranton. Westview Press, 1984. 263 p. $19.00.


54/CAIBBEAN REVIEW









El Salvador: las fuerzas sociales en la present
coyuntura, enero 1980 a diciembre 1983.
Segundo Montes. Universidad Centromaericana
(San Salvador), 1984. 221 p.

El Salvador in Crisis. Philip L. Russell.
Colorado River Press, 1984. 168 p.

La elecci6n de un president: Costa Rica,
1982. Carlos E Denton, Olda M. Acufia B.
Impr. Nacional (San Jose, Costa Rica), 1984.
142 p.

Fascismo y antifascismo en America Latina y
Mexico. Brigida Von Mentz, Ricardo P&rez
Montfort, Verena Radkau. Centro de
Investigaciones y Estudios Superiores en
Antropologia Social, CIESAS (Mexico), 1984.

The Grenada Intervention: Analysis and
Documentation. William C. Gilmore. Facts on
File, 1984. 116 p.

Grenada: Intervention, Invasion, Rescue
Mission? Francois Dominique, ed. Dominique
(St. Croix, VI.), 1984. 110 p.

The Grenada Papers. Paul Seabury, Walter A.
McDougall, eds. Institute of Contemporary
Studies (San Francisco, Calif.), 1984. $16.95;
$8.95 paper.

Guatemala: A Nation in Turmoil. Peter Calvert.
Westview Press, 1985. 135 p. $28.00.

Honduras: ,un estado national? Juan
Arancibia C. Editorial Guay (Tegucigalpa,
Honduras), 1984. 132 p.

Leader and Party in Latin America. Ernest A.
Duff. Westview Press, 1984. 150 p. $15.95.

The Limits of Victory: The Ratification of the
Panama Canal Treaties. George D. Moffett.
Cornell University Press, 1985.

Mexican Democracy: A Critical View. Kenneth
F Johnson. 3d ed. Praeger, 1984. 304 p.
$32.95; $13.95 paper.

The Modern Mexican Military: A
Reassessment. David F. Ronfeldt, ed. Center
for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of
California (San Diego), 1984. 218 p.

Nederlandse Antillen en onafhankelijkheid:
overlevingskansen van zes eilandjes. Bas
Verschoor. Stichting IVIO (Lelystad,
Netherlands), 1984. NF2.50.

Nicaragua: un caso de agresi6n informative.
Marcelino Bisbal. Ediciones Centauro (Caracas,
Venezuela), 1984. 594 p.

The 1984 Presidential Elections in Panama.
Raul Arias de Para. Partido Democratico
Cristiano (Panama), 1984. 192 p. [Also
published in Spanish.]

The 1982 National Elections in the
Dominican Republic: A Sociological and
Historical Interpretation. Miriam Diaz Santana,
Martin F Murphy. Institute of Caribbean
Studies, University of Puerto Rico, 1983. 76 p.
$8.50.


La nueva izquierda argentina, 1960-1980:
political y violencia. Claudia Hilb, Daniel Lutzky.
Centro Editor de America Latina (Buenos
Aires, Argentina), 1984. 129 p.


On Trial: Reagan's War Against Nicaragua;
Testimony at the Permanent Peoples' Tribunal.
Marlene Dixon, ed. Synthesis Publications,
1985. 304 p. $23.95; $9.95 paper.


The Panama Canal and the Security of the
United States. Alfred Thayer Mahan. American
Classical College Press (Albuquerque, New
Mexico), 1985. 181 p. $97.85.


La political de Mexico hacia Centroamerica,
1979-1982. Rene Herrera, Mario Ojeda. El
Colegio de M6xico, 1984. 111 p.

Political y publicidad: como se hace un
president. Alberto Borrini. El Cronista
commercial (Buenos Aires, Argentina), 1984.
258 p.

Los politicos argentinos y el antisemitismo.
Alberto Kleiner, ed. Editorial del Poligono
(Buenos Aires, Argentina), 1984.
233 p. (3 vols.)

Le President Dartiguenave et les americains.
B. Danache. 2d ed. Fardin (Port-au-Prince,
Haiti), 1984. 165 p.

Race, Class and Political Symbols: Rastafari
and Reggae in Jamaican Politics. Anita M.
Waters. Transaction Books, 1984. 224 p.
$29.95.
Las razones y las obras: gobierno de Miguel
de la Madrid; cr6nicas del sexenio
1982-1988. Alejandra Lajous, ed. Presidencia
de la Republica (Mexico), 1984. 325 p.

La region Guyane, 1960-1983. Elie Castor,
Georges Othily. Editions l'Harmattan (Paris,
France), 1984. 388 p.

La seducci6n de la barbarie: analisis heretico
de un continent mestizo. Rodolfo Kusch. 2d
ed. Fundaci6n Ross (Buenos Aires, Argentina),
1984. 110 p.

La ultraderecha en Mexico. Manual Buendia;
Miguel Angel Sanchez de Armas, ed. Ediciones
Oceano (Mexico), 1984. 169 p.

La Uni6n Sovietica en America Latina: el caso
de la Unidad Popular Chilena, 1970-1973.
Isabel Turrent. El Colegio de Mexico, 1984.
270 p.


Venezuela: Politics in a Petroleum Republic.
David Eugene Blank. Praeger, 1984. 225 p.
$22.95.

Western Interests and U.S. Policy Options in
the Caribbean Basin: Report of the Atlantic
Council's Working Group on the Caribbean
Basin. James R. Greene, Brent Scowcroft, eds.
Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain (Boston, Mass.),
1984. 331 p. $27.50; $12.50 paper.


Reference

Bibliografia geol6gica de la Argentina,
1980-1981. Horacio H. Camacho et al.
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Cientificas
y Tecnicas (Buenos Aires, Argentina), 1984.
219 p.

Chicano Literature: A Reader's Encyclopedia.
Julio A. Martinez, Francisco A. Lomeli, eds.
Greenwood Press, 1985. 576 p. $49.95.

Chicano Organizations Directory. Cesar
Caballero. Neal-Schuman (New York, N.Y.),
1985. 200 p. $19.95.

Child Development in the Caribbean: An
Annotated Bibliography, 1962-1982. Leahcim
T Semaj, ed. Regional Pre-School Child
Development Centre (Kingston, Jamaica),
1984. 184 p.

Diccionario ejemplificado de chilenismos. Feliz
Morales Pettorino et al. Editorial Ciencias
Pedag6gicas (Santiago, Chile), 1984. 941 p.

Diccionario politico institutional de Chile.
German Urzia Valenzuela. Editorial Juridica
(Santiago, Chile), 1984.

Handbook of Latin American Art: A
Bibliographic Compilation. Joyce Waddell
Bailey. ABC-Clio Information Services, 1984.
1195 p. (2 vols.) $150.00.

Indice anotado de la colecci6n de tratados de
la Rephblica Dominicana. Rosa Campillo C.
Editorial CENAPEC (Santo Domingo), 1984.
188 p.

Jorge Luis Borges: An Annotated Primary and
Secondary Bibliography. David William Foster.
Garland Pub., 1984. 328 p. $32.50.

Manual bibliografico de trabajo social:
America Latina y Espafia. Norberto Alay6n.
Consejo Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales,
CLACSO (Buenos Aires, Argentina), 1984.
311 p.

Mexico. Naomi C. Robbins, Sheila R. Herstein,
eds. Clio Press, 1984. 165 p. $35.00.

Repertoire des projects de recherche en
matiere de developpement en Am&rique latine.
Centre de developpement de I'OCDE, Consejo
Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development, 1984. 831 p. 300F [French and
English]

Research Guide to Central America and the
Caribbean. Kenneth J. Grieb, ed. University of
Wisconsin Press, 1985. 464 p. $35.00.


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