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 Material Information
Title: Caribbean Review
Physical Description: Serial
Language: English
Creator: Latin American and Caribbean Center, Florida International University
Publisher: Latin American and Caribbean Center, Florida International University
Place of Publication: Miami, FL
Publication Date: 1982
Copyright Date: 1980
 Subjects
Genre: serial   ( sobekcm )
 Record Information
Source Institution: FIU: Special Collections
Holding Location: FIU: Special Collections
Rights Management: All rights reserved by the source institution and holding location.
Resource Identifier: oclc - 1553369
System ID: UF00095576:00039

Table of Contents
    Front Cover
        Front Cover 1
        Front Cover 2
    Table of Contents
        Page 1
    Front Matter
        Page 2
        Page 3
    Main
        Page 4
        Page 5
        Page 6
        Page 7
        Page 8
        Page 9
        Page 10
        Page 11
        Page 12
        Page 13
        Page 14
        Page 15
        Page 16
        Page 17
        Page 18
        Page 19
        Page 20
        Page 21
        Page 22
        Page 23
        Page 24
        Page 25
        Page 26
        Page 27
        Page 28
        Page 29
        Page 30
        Page 31
        Page 32
        Page 33
        Page 34
        Page 35
        Page 36
        Page 37
        Page 38
        Page 39
        Page 40
        Page 41
        Page 42
        Page 43
        Page 44
        Page 45
        Page 46
        Page 47
        Page 48
        Page 49
        Page 50
        Page 51
        Page 52
        Page 53
        Page 54
        Page 55
        Page 56
        Page 57
        Page 58
        Page 59
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        Page 61
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        Page 64
    Back Cover
        Back Cover 1
        Back Cover 2
Full Text





CABBAN






"-w
C VIEW Vol. XI, No. 2
Three Dollars































Caribbean Strategies, Critiques of Left & Right, Christian & Social Democrats
V- ..- ,-










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Certificate

In Latin

American-

Caribbean

Studies


* Over 55 Latin American and
Caribbean related courses in
the University.
* Certificate requirements include:
successful completion of five Latin
American and/or Caribbean
related courses and one
independent study/research
project, from at least three
departments; demonstration of
related language proficiency in
Spanish, Portuguese, or French.
* Certificate program is open to
both degree and non-degree
seeking students.
* Expanded University support as a
Title VI Undergraduate Language
and Area Center.
* Expanded Library holdings in
Latin American-Caribbean
materials.
* Special seminar series offered by
distinguished visiting scholars in
Latin American and Caribbean
Studies.



For further information contact:
Latin American-Caribbean Center
Florida International University
Iamiami Trail
Miami, Florida 33199


Latin American-Caribbean
Studies Faculty
Irma Alonso, Economics
Ewart Archer, International
Relations
Ken I. Boodhoo, International
Relations
Manuel Carvajal, Economics
John Corbett, Public Administration
Grenville Draper, Physical Sciences
Luis Escovar, Psychology
Robert Farrell, Education
Gordon Finley, Psychology
John Jensen, Modem Languages
David Jeuda, Modern Languages
Charles Lacombe, Anthropology
Barry B. Levine, Sociology
Anthony P Maingot, Sociology
James A. Mau, Sociology
Floretin Maurrasse, Physical
Sciences
Ramon Mendoza, Modem
Languages
Raul Moncarz, Economics
Marta Ortiz, Marketing
Mark B. Rosenberg, Political
Science
Reinaldo Sanchez, Modern
Languages
Luis P Salas, Criminal Justice
Jorge Salazar, Economics
Alex Stepick, Anthropology
Mark D. Szuchman, History
William T. Vickers, Anthropology
Maida Watson Breslin, Modem
Languages


Miami Speaker's
Bureau
On Latin America
and the Caribbean
The Latin American and Caribbean
Center of Florida International
University hosts a Speaker's Bureau
for scholars traveling through
Miami. The Bureau serves as a
means for area specialists to share
their experiences and research
during colloquia. A modest
honorarium and per diem expenses
will be provided. Scholars
anticipating travel through Miami
and interested in participating in
the colloquia should contact
Mark B. Rosenberg, Director, Latin
American and Caribbean Center,
FIU, Miami, FL 33199 at least
30 days prior to the anticipated
departure from their home cities.

Occasional Papers

The Center also publishes both an
Occasional Papers Series as well as
a series of Dialogues given by guest
speakers on the campus of FIU.
Please write for details.













CA lBBEANr||




SPRING 1982 Vol. XI, No. 2 Three Dollars
Editor
Barry B. Levine


Associate Editors
Anthony R Maingot
William T Osborne
Mark R. Rosenberg
Contributing Editors
Carlos M. Alvarez
Ricardo Arias
Ken L Boodhoo
Jerry Brown
Herbert L Hiller
Antonio Jorge
Gordon K. Lewis
James A. Mau
Raul Moncarz
Luis R Salas
Mark D. Szuchman
William T. Vickers
Gregory B. Wolfe
Assistant Editor
Brenda Hart


Art Director
Danine Carey
Design Consultant
Juan C. Urquiola
Contributing Artist
Eleanor Bonner
Bibliographer
Marian Goslinga
Cartographer
Linda M. Marston
Circulation Manager
James E Droste
Marketing and Sales Manager
Robert A. Geary
Production Assistant
Stephanie Schneiderman
Editorial Managers
Christina Bruce
Beatriz Parga de Bay6n


Caribbean Review, a quarterlyjoumal dedicated to the Caribbean,
Latin America, and their emigrant groups, is published by Carib-
bean Review, Inc., a corporation not for profit organized under the
laws of the State of Florida (Barry B. Levine, President; Andrew R.
Banks, Vice President; Kenneth M. Bloom, Secretary). Caribbean
Review receives supporting funds from the Office of Academic
Affairs of Florida Intemational University (Steven Altman, Vice
President for Academic Affairs) and the State of Florida and
cooperates with the Latin America and Caribbean Center of FI
(Mark B. Rosenberg, Director). This public document was prom-
ulgated at a quarterly cost of $6,659 or $1.21 per copyto promote
international education with a primary emphasis on creating
greater mutual understanding among the Americas, by articulat-
ing the culture and ideals of the Caribbean and Latin America,
and emigrating groups originating therefrom.
Editorial policy: Caribbean Review does not accept responsibility
for any of the views expressed in its pages. Rather, we accept
responsibility for giving such views the opportunity to be ex-
pressed herein. Our articles do not represent a consensus of
opinion-some articles are in open disagreement with others
and no reader should be able to agree with all of them.
Mailing address: Caribbean Review, Florida International Univer-
sity. Tamiami Itail, Miami, Florida 33199. Telephone (305)
554-2246. Unsolicited manuscripts (articles, essays, reprints,
excerpts, translations, book reviews, poetry, etc.) are welcome,
but should be accompanied by a self-addressed stamped
envelope.
Copyright: Contents Copyright 1982 by Caribbean Review, Inc.
The reproduction of any artwork editorial or other material is
expressly prohibited without written permission from the
publisher.
Photocopying: Permission to photocopy for internal or personal
use or the internal or personal use of specific clients is granted by
Caribbean Review, Inc. for libraries and other users registered
with the Copyright Clearance Center (CCC), provided that the
stated fee of 1.00 per copy is paid directly to CCC, 21 Congress
Street, Salem, MA 01970. Special requests should be addressed
to Caribbean Review, Inc.
Syndication: Caribbean Review articles have appeared in other
media in English, Spanish, Portuguese and German. Editors,
please write for details.
Index: Articles appearing in this journal are annotated and in-
dexed in Development and Welfare Index; Hispanic American
Periodicals Index; Historical Abstracts; America: History and Life;
United States Political Science Documents; and Universal Refer-
ence System. An indextothe first six volumes appeared in Vol. VII,
No. 2 of CR; an indexto volumes seven and eight, in Vol IX No. 2.
Subscription rates: See coupon in this issue for rates. Subscrip-
tions to the Caribbean, Latin America, Canada, and other foreign
destinations will automatically be shipped by AO-Air Mall. In-
voicing Charge: $3.00. Subscription agencies, please take 15%.
Back Issues: Back numbers still in print are purchasable at $5.00
each. A list of those still available appears elsewhere in this issue.
Microfilm and microfiche copies of Caribbean Review are avail-
able from University Microfilms. A Xerox Company, 300 North
Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106.
Intemational Standard Serial Number: ISSN 0008-6525; Library
of Congress Classification Number AP6, C27; Library of Con-
gress Card Number: 71-16267; Dewey Decimal Number:
079.7295.


In this issue


page 14


page 25


page 46


On the cover:
Detail from "Retazos del
Mapamundi de un
Hombre Universal," a
portrait of R6mulo
Betancourt, by Puerto
Rican artist Francisco
Rod6n. The original oil
(2.40 m. x 1.84 m.),
finished in 1979, hangs in
Pacairigua, the Betancourt
family residence in
Venezuela.


Thoughts On A Democratic Consortium
The World Is Small to Stay
By Gregory B. Wolfe
The US and the Caribbean
Issues of Economics and Security
By Vaughan A. Lewis
A Comprehensive Strategy for
the Caribbean Basin
The US and her Neighbors
By Ambassador Thomas O. Enders

The Reagan Administration
and Latin America
An Uneasy Beginning
By William D. Rogers and Jeffrey A. Meyers

The Real Clear and Present Danger
A Critique From the Left
By Richard R. Fagen

Reagan Policy: Global Chess
or Local Crap Shooting
A Critique From the Right
By L. Francis Bouchey

The End of the Good Neighbor Policy
Changing Patterns of US Influence
By Bryce Wood

The Tradition of Democracy
in the Caribbean
Betancourt, Figueres, Mufioz and
the Democratic Left
By Charles D. Ameringer
Hegemonic Tolerance
International Competition in the Area
By Martin C. Needler
The Christian Democrats in
Latin America
The Fight for Democracy
By Ricardo Arias Calder6n
The Socialist International and
Latin America
Progress and Problems
By Karl-Ludolf Hibener

The Mediation of the Socialist
International
Inconsistency, Prejudice and Ignorance
By Carlos Alberto Montaner
The French Connection
Two Views of Their Latin American Policy
Interviews by Barry B. Levine
Recent Books
An Informative Listing on the Caribbean, Latin
America and Their Emigrant Groups
By Marian Goslinga





































REDIG IN CAIBAN HISOR AN ECNMIS
AnItoL3 01 oth elo
A S S


Caribbean Studies, Volume 1

Edited by
Roberta Marx Delson
Rutgers University, New Jersey, U.S.A.

This study examines contemporary political and social
movements in the Caribbean Islands. These modern day
developments are put into the perspective of Caribbean
history from the time of the Spanish conquest in the 16th
century, to the first awakenings of nationalism leading to
independent status. The focus is on the entire Caribbean
and covers a wide spectrum of topics making it the first
such comprehensive study of this area.
CONTENTS IN BRIEF: The Caribbean Under Spanish
Control: 16th Century Patterns; The Magnetism of the
Caribbean: The Arrival of Competitive European Powers;
Slavery and Plantation Systems: Theory and Reality; Slave
Emancipation and Changing Economic Patterns of the


British West Indies: The Emergence of the Peasantry;
Political and Economic Upheavels of the Non-British Carib-
bean: Restructuring the Economy; Caribbean Reactions:
The Awakening of Consciousness and the Beginning of
Nationalism; New Solutions to Old Problems: The Caribbean
Since 1945; The Caribbean Future: Hope and Dour Ap-
praisals; Epilogue.
Publication Date: 1981 Price: $59.50
ISBN: 0 677 05280 4 366 pp.
ISSN: 0275-5793
SOON TO BE PUBLISHED:
Volume 2 of Caribbean Studies:
PATTERNS IN CARIBBEAN DEVELOPMENT
ISBN: 0 677 0600 9
by Jay R. Mandle
Temple University, Pennsylvania, U.S.A.
Books in this series can be.ordered on a continuation order
basis; please contact publisher for details.
Text editions available in North America only. Please
contact publisher for details.


ONE PARK AVENUE, NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10016


Gordon and Breach

2/CAI?BBEAN reVIew


Avances en

psicologia

contemporanea

Gordon E. Finley
Gerardo Marin
Las mas significativas y recientes
aportaciones al pensamiento psicol6gico
del continent americano, expuestas por
sus propios autores, se han logrado
conjuntar en este valioso texto que
permitira tanto a profesionales como a
estudiantes de psicologia actualizar
sus conocimientos.
B.F. Skinner, Edwin I. Megargee, Rogelio
Diaz-Guerrero, Ruben Ardila y otros
reconocidos psicologos desarrollan en esta
obra diversos temas cuyo studio result
imprescindible, por igual, para aquellos
que se desemperian en el ambito de la
ciencia de la conduct, y para quienes se
aprestan a hacerlo.
Editorial Trillas, S.A.
Av. 5 de Mayo 43-105, Mexico 1, D.E
1979


moneda y banca en
america central
Raul Moncarz
El libro esta escrito en un lenguaje claro y
comprensible teniendo en consideracion que el
mercado potential para el cual esta proyectado
esta representado por una amplia variedad de
posibles lectores.
El material esta dividido en tres areas. La
primera explore concepts basicos del dinero y
la banca, tales como el lugar del dinero en la
economic, la importancia de la banca y otros
intermediaries financiers.
La segunda parte hace un analysis detallado de
la banca en Centroamerica, la expansion y
contracci6n monetaria y los aspects
economicos del sistema bancario
centroamericano en los ultimos cinco aflos, y
finalmente, se estudia con detalle la banca
central en Centroamerica y sus principles
funciones.
La tercera parte trata en una forma general y
especifica la teoria y la political monetaria
incluyendo aspects internacionales del dinero
y la banca de Centroamerica.
Escuela Bancaria Superior
Centroamericana
Tegucigalpa, D.C., Honduras, C.A.
1978









Mobility

and Integration

in Urban Argentina

CORDOBA IN THE LIBERAL ERA


By Mark D. Szuchman

Between the 1870s, when the great influx
of European immigrants began, and the
start of World War I, Argentina underwent a
radical alteration of its social composition
and patterns of economic productivity.
Mark Szuchman, in this groundbreaking
study, examines the occupational, resi-
dential, educational, and economic patterns
of mobility of some four thousand men,
women, and children who resided in
Cordoba, Argentina's most important
interior city, during this changeful era.
The use of record linkage as the essential
research method makes this work the first
book on Argentina to follow this very
successful research methodology employed
by modern historians.

290 pages, $19.95






University of Texas Press 083
POST OFFICE BOX 7819 AUSTIN, TEXAS 78712
Please send copies of Mobility and Integration in
Urban Argentina at $19.95 ea. Texas residents add 5% sales
tax.
[ Check Enclosed E VISA E MasterCharge
Credit card no. Exp. date
Signature
Name (print)
Address
City/State Zip code


Barry B. Levine shatters
the myth of the victimized
immigrant.



BENJY


LOPEZ

A Picaresque Tale
of Emigration and Return

Using the first-person technique pioneered by
Oscar Lewis, noted sociologist Barry B.
Levine records and analyzes the life story of a
Puerto Rican emigrant, "one of the most col-
orful characters to make an appearance in
sociological literature:..Barry Levine has that
increasingly rare gift, the sociological ear. In
this book, we have the result of his listening."-
Peter Berger "A labor of love for Puerto Rico
and its plight, and a fine piece of scholarship."
Ed Vega, Nuestro "Levine has rescued
Third World man from indignity...I believe that
few works will better demonstrate the circum-
stances of the Puerto Rican in New York than
this one." Miguel Barnet, Caribbean Re-
view "Highly recommended" Joanna
Walsh, Library Journal "Excellent..." -Frank
Fernandez, Revista Interamericana "Valu-
able research, excellent writing" Raymond
E. Crist, Latin America in Books "Estu-
pendo..." Carlos Alberto Montaner, Span-
ish International Network "A rare work about
the Puerto Rican diaspora..."- Gerald Guin-
ness, Americas "Interesting and refresh-
ing..." -Aaron Segal, Times of the Americas
"Opens the readers eyes to the problems and
challenges, the pain and frustration of life as a
Puerto Rican in the big metropolis." -Joseph
P Fitzpatrick, S.J., Contemporary Sociology
"A good read...but above and beyond its liter-
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conceived, thoroughly researched, and solid
study....A significant contribution to the scien-
tific analysis of the causes and consequences
of Puerto Rican emigration and return." -An-
gel Calderon Cruz, Caribbean Studies "A
stupendous book that only a sociologist/
anthropologist willing and unafraid to let a little
humanism and common sense creep into his
study could write. A very human document
about a very human being." Gary Brana-
Shute, The New West Indies Guide.
$12.95 at bookstores, or direct from the publisher

BASIC BOOKS, INC
10 East 53rd Street, New York 10022

CAIRBBEAN PVIEW/3






























atin American affairs have historically
been assigned low priority by the
United States. In general, US attention
focuses on Europe, the Middle East, and on
those countries that border the Soviet
Union. It is only when there is a crisis or a
natural disaster that Latin American issues
do receive a high priority from Washington.
While there have beert no earthquakes or
floods since the Reagan administration has
come to office, there has been a tidal wave
of Latin American and Caribbean crises
which have occasioned an unusual amount
of policy work in the State Department and
the White House. This edition of Caribbean
Review on the new geopolitics contrasts
various perspectives about a number of
these crises.
For the most part, US response to Latin
American events is reactive rather than pro-
active. High level North American efforts to
find solutions to the problems of the hemi-
sphere, even to long-standing problems
like poverty and development, are custom-
arily the result of improvisation, often hastily
organized, rather than of deliberate study
and preparation. Large policies that encom-
pass long-term commitments to strategies
and programs have been rare. In the last 50
years, only the Alliance for Progress and the
Good Neighbor Policy have been such
examples.
Latin American governments, generally,
have acquiesced in the low priority status
assigned them in Washington. While some
have done so without much complaint,
some even with relief, others worry that US
policy bureaus have not adequately under-
stood the changes that are occurring in
their republics. Washington persists in ask-
ing old questions, traditional and unrelated
to new realities: How safe are the investment
and political climates of Latin American
countries for North Americans? How re-
strictive are the policies respecting raw ma-
terials access and export? What are the

Gregory B. Wolfe, president of Florida Interna-
tional University, has occupied US govern-
ment posts in the White House and the
Department of State.
4/CAI?BBEAN Jv IEw


market conditions for US exports? Are tar-
iffs too high? What is the situation regarding
local manufacture and assembly
operations?
To Latin Americans these North Ameri-
can queries appear to ignore or obscure the
political and social changes that have been
developing over the past 25 years in Latin
America and the Caribbean. To take just one
political matter, it is not clear that US policy
makers are adequately aware of the new
relations that have developed between Latin
America and France, West Germany, and
Japan. Or to take a social matter, it is not
clear that US policy makers have come to
terms with the fact that Latin America has a
larger and denser urban coastal frontier
than does the United States. (Between now
and the year 2000, the population of Latin
America will increase from over 350 million
to over 600 million persons!)

Paying the Bills
The overriding preoccupation of Latin
American leaders today, whether eating,
sleeping or working, has to be with how to
pay the bills. A companion to that preoc-
cupation is, of course, how to find the
money necessary to run urban economies
and render those services necessary to
keep the lid on a boiling social pot. Inter-
nally, the supply side shows no likelihood
whatsoever of being able to equal the de-
mand side. And if the demand side is not
supported, demand will erupt into an un-
conditional demand that could destroy
what fragile social fabric still exists. World
prices for needed import goods are at all-
time highs. Energy costs alone have deci-
mated currency reserves. Inflation has


blunted efforts to plan, much less carry out,
major expenditures. US Agency for Interna-
tional Development grants necessarily have
been modified to accommodate new US
domestic priorities. The US explains these
cut-backs as necessary to reduce the ex-
cess of former US administrations.
Blanketing the whole economic and po-
litical landscape is the rising level of Latin
America's external debt. Overall, it is esti-
mated to be $230 billion. A large part of any
working day for government leaders in
Latin America has to be spent considering
how to reschedule debts that cannot be
paid and how to negotiate yet additional
loans for current needs. The pressures of
over-extension that result from over-bor-
rowing are staggering the capacities of
most of the public managers. Increasingly,
these pressures also test the patience and
forbearance of the leaders. Meanwhile, the
game goes on, modified in pace by the
efforts of the International Monetary Fund
to impose rigid economic regimens
intended to reduce spending and tighten
credit. Attempts to conform to these terms
only tighten the economic Catch-22.
All this is hard on the psyches of the de-
veloping world. And yet, the whole eco-
nomic climate of the world seems to be
driving the developing countries, the
smaller ones especially, into the old mold of
having to rely on selling raw materials and
agriproducts at low market prices while try-
ing to get hold of traditional necessities, as
well as of newly-perceived ones, on terms
that are more burdensome than ever.
Against this background, some US policy
makers have been attempting to develop
responses to calls for help, particularly in





























the Caribbean and Central American re-
gion. To date, the principal experiment, yet
to be tested in action, is President Ronald
Reagan's Caribbean Basin Initiative. Its au-
thor hails the Initiative as a free enterprise
panacea for dealing with underdevelop-
ment. It stresses a heightened role for pri-
vate investment as the spur to restore
confidence in flattened, flagging economic
systems, and to create jobs in places that
are radically overpopulated and critically
underemployed. The Initiative calls for the
establishment of a common market be-
tween the United States and participating
countries, for one-way free trade and an
array of tax breaks for investors willing to
join the crusade to make capitalism work in
the troubled region.
Some critical questions must be an-
swered before we can know whether or not,
and if so, how, this new Initiative will work?
Will the US Congress buy it? The answer to
this question will be determined largely on
domestic rather than on foreign policy con-
siderations. Will the private investment
community rise to the incentive claimed for
the Initiative? Or will it react to the oft-re-
peated position of the White House and the
State Department that communism is be-
hind most, if not all, of the insurgent move-
ments in the area and therefore withhold its
participation? As long as the instability in-
dices require costly gifts of hardware and
resident US military advisors to keep the
peace of the area, why should US business
not act on clear competitive advantage and
go elsewhere? For many investors and in-
vesting corporations, that would seem still
to mean Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, Sri
Lanka, and even the People's Republic of


China.
Washington sources say that the plan-
ners of the Caribbean Basin Initiative held
discussions with representatives of Mexico
and Venezuela. However, there is no clear
indication that the program will have a mul-
tilateral and multinational character. If the
experience of international business and in-
temational organization of the past 30 years
has had any instructive product, it is that we
now know that development speeds up and
profits rise significantly when capital and
knowhow are combined in ways that cross
frontiers and narrowly-conceived old-fash-
ioned corporate structures. If then the real-
ities of international interdependence are
genuine, and if the monetary crisis is truly
global, and the future of the democratic
world is somehow linked to economic and
political pluralism, the time may be upon us
to recognize that the world is small to stay.
This would allow us to make bold with the
Caribbean Initiative. It might become the
key to that New International Economic
Order which has been eluding its advocates
and confounding its critics.

A Democratic Consortium
With Germany, Japan, France, and Great
Britain included, the Initiative could pool
resources of nations in which economic
systems which are mixed but free are com-
bined with political systems essentially
committed to democratic forms. The first
basic commitment of such a consortium
would be to solving the problems of under-
development: pitifully inadequate health
care, inadequate clean water supplies, the
need to develop transportation and energy
sources, etc. But in such a team effort, con-


sideration could now be given to demil-
itarizing the whole Caribbean and Central
American region. Pledges of investment by
the richer nations could be exchanged for
pledges of gradual elimination of costly mil-
itary establishments from the poorer ones.
Such an exchange would be based in devel-
oping a continuing commitment to civilian
control from the concerned democratic
governments. The alternative to such a
consortium is merely to accept the ineffec-
tive process of country by country "coup-
crisis" management efforts by the United
States. Such efforts are by their very nature
self-limited by the domestic economic pol-
icies now advocated by the Reagan admin-
istration, as well as by the clear rejection of
unilateral US influence by many Latin
American political leaders on the right and
left.
Thus the first step toward a new policy for
US-Latin American relations may be to
transcend them by establishing a consor-
tium of democratic powers. The purpose of
the consortium would be to internationalize
the process of effecting political change
and economic development simul-
taneously. It would thereby become the
means to avoid the costly repetition of be-
ginnings that are made and then lost
among givers and receivers of political ad-
vice and material goods. Countries which
claim a democratic tradition and pledge its
progressive refinement should welcome an
opportunity to accelerate the rate of their
development on all fronts. The consortium
could lay down conditions for substantial
aid availability to recipient Latin American
countries: among them a commitment to
observe elections, to respect human rights,
to limit or eliminate military expenditures to
practice parliamentary politics.
Only a broadly-based multinationally-or-
ganized set of political and economic re-
sources will help us deliver a more secure
future for the peoples of Latin America as
well as meet the priorities of the United
States. This then would make any initiative
not only a series of bilateral economic rela-
tionships but multinational political ones as
well. E
CAI?BBEAN PEVIEW/5













The US and the



Caribbean


Issues of Economics and Security
By Vaughan A. Lewis


The independence of the larger British
Caribbean states Trinidad and Tobago
and Jamaica, took place at a time
(August 1962) of intense American con-
cern and activity in the Caribbean, domi-
nated by the United States' difficulties with
the new revolutionary regime of Cuba. The
government of the United States sought to
isolate Cuba from the other countries of
Latin America and the Caribbean; and to
ensure that those states would not be af-
fected by any spread of communism and
Soviet influence. This was the rationale for
the American intervention in the Domin-
ican Republic in 1965.
The United States expected, and her ex-
pectation was largely met, that the new Car-
ibbean states that achieved full sovereignty
during this period, would follow the guide-
lines about inhibition of communist influ-
ence laid down by herself in and for the
Inter-American system. And from the point
of view of these Caribbean states, the active
demonstration of this requirement was the
determined exercise of American influence
in the resolution of the racial/political dis-
pute in Guyana (then British Guiana) during
the first half of the 1960s. The United States
government was at that time concerned to
ensure that any regime taking the country
into independence would give allegiance to
the US Inter-American system position.
The eventual mode of resolution of the
Guyana issue, indicates an important fact of
Caribbean domestic politics: the element of
voluntary cooperation and subordination in
relations with the United States, bome in
part of the socialization of most of the politi-
cal elite of the period into pre- and post-war
ideologies of anti-communism and anti-
Stalinism. But it indicated also, at the level
of the external relations the changing nature
of hegemonic relationships in the Carib-
bean: the de facto cession by the British, of
responsibility for the maintenance of order
and regional security for what had been up
to then their segment of the Western Hemi-
Vaughan A. Lewis is Director General of the
Organization of Eastern Caribbean States.
This article is based on his presidential ad-
dress before the Sixth Annual Conference of
the Caribbean Studies Association, St.
Thomas, USVI.
6/CAlrBBCAN PCVIEW


sphere. This cession to the United States
paralleled the British decision to reorganize
the international economic relationships
(and by implication political relationships)
of the United Kingdom, through her ap-
plication for entry into the European Eco-
nomic Community (EEC). This decision
was in turn perceived by the new Caribbean
states as having the potential for threaten-
ing their own economic viability; for it would
in effect remove the economic underpin-
ning of the old imperial hegemonicc)
relationship.
For the Caribbean, these processes in
fact reflected the gradual domination by
North America of the Caribbean economic
staples (export commodities producing for-
eign exchange)-bauxite, tourism. (We
might note too, the American purchase of
the small British petroleum facilities in Trin-
idad.) The expansion of tourism particularly
in Jamaica, was itself partly a consequence
of the United States' difficulties with Cuba
and the virtual ending of the US-Cuba trade
and communication. We might note also
that the United States opposed the initial
United Kingdom/EEC proposals for a set
of reciprocal relationships in trade and in-
vestment--the so-called reverse prefer-
ences-between the Caribbean and the
Community. But this was done not so much
with the possible volumes of Caribbean
trade and investment in mind, but with the
view that it would set a negative example for
global trading arrangements; the United
States being concerned to ensure that there
was no increase in trade discrimination
against herself. This is, however, an early
example of the American tendency to safe-
guard her Caribbean and Latin American
interests, and to treat them as exemplary in
the context of the patterns of global ar-
rangements which she wished to see exist.
Nonetheless, into the first half of the
1970s, a general stabilization of these new
Caribbean states' relationships appeared to
have been arrived at, satisfactory to all. The
states (with the exception of Guyana for
special reasons) joined and accepted the
obligations of the Inter-American system-
the OAS; their traditional international eco-
nomic relationships were regularized in the
Lome Convention within which were in-


cluded new arrangements for economic
and technical aid. And within the sub-region
itself, some stability was apparently given to
country-to-country relations, and to the
possible trends in their foreign policies,
through the attempt to institutionalize the
harmonization of foreign policy decision-
making within the Caribbean Community
(CARICOM).
In general, the Caribbean countries, and
in particular Jamaica and Guyana were
deemed to have benefitted from the isola-
tion of Cuba. North American investment in
tourism and bauxite in Jamaica secured
continuously high rates of economic
growth. Jamaica in turn had accepted all
the American institutional terms for foreign
investment: the Hickenlooper amendment,
Overseas Private Investment Corporation
(OPIC) and International Centre for Settle-
ment of Investment Disputes (ICSID)
(within the World Bank system). The new
regime in Guyana under Forbes Burnham
set out to reap the financial rewards of fealty
to the United States hemispheric line after
its independence, and quickly dismantled
previous economic arrangements with
Cuba established by the government of
Cheddi Jagan. Many of these independent
Caribbean states now came to be consid-
ered "middle income countries" with re-
spect to the international aid institutions;
thereby disqualifying themselves from re-
ceipt of "soft" loans.
In this overall appearance of stabilization
in the late 1960s and early 1970s, there
were one or two dark clouds-intimations
of the potential for disorder. Domestic eco-
nomic difficulties after 1965 culminated in
a youth-cum-military rebellion in Trinidad
in 1970. Trinidad's oil production had en-
tered a period of persistent decline, the gov-
ernment had begun to experience foreign
exchange difficulties, and difficulties in rais-
ing loans on extemal markets on reason-
able conditions; the government was
increasingly incapable of satisfying the de-
mands for employment of a youth popula-
tion which had been the recipient of a
substantially expanded educational pro-
gram; and in the face of all this the govem-
ment's own sense of self-confidence began
to decline. In Jamaica too, the pace of eco-

























JAMAICAI


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CARIBBEAN BASIN INDEPENDENT
GOVERNMENT ORIGINS

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Copyright Linda M. Marston 1982.


nomic growth, however impressive, was not
capable of satisfying the requirements of
those placing themselves on the job mar-
ket. Increasing social discontent found ex-
pression in the brief spell of rioting in 1968
(the Rodney riots). This the government
was able to subdue, but it thenceforth in-
creasingly displayed a degree of nervous-
ness towards its own population.
The quick muting of these uprisings in
the two leading countries of the sub-region,
was accompanied by a tendency on the part
of the governments to increase their em-
phasis and dependence on instruments of
security. The political directorate was in-
clined to attribute the disturbances not to
the development of broad social discontent
in their communities, but to small fringes of
the intelligentsia and others attracted to
Marxism and other radical ideologies. Con-
spiratorial explanations were evident in, for
example, the Report of the commission of
inquiry established in Trinidad during the
1960s; and in the speeches and activities of
members of the Jamaican government.
American diplomacy also, was not un-
affected, as is evident from the report pre-
pared by Ambassador Milton Barrall for the
United States Department In general, how-
ever, the governments felt themselves capa-
ble of maintaining local stability.
Finally, as far as the rest of the colonial
Caribbean was conceded, the dominant


American problem of securing proper ar-
rangements for regional order and security
was ensured by linking the territories in
these areas (defense and foreign relations)
to the metropolitan centers. For the territo-
ries in the British Caribbean the institution
of Associated Statehood was devised. Such
arrangements allowed for swift intervention
in the event of local disorder.
This appearance of general stability
seems dramatically changed today. In the
American view, a major crisis appears to
exist in the archipelago Caribbean (the West
Indies). There is a perception of Cuban "ex-
pansionism," and the making of diplomatic
"gains" bythat country in boththe large and
the small states. There is a perception of
danger implicit in the development of com-
munication and relationships between the
hitherto institutionally separated sub-re-
gions of the West Indies and Central Amer-
ica, suggested in relationships between
Grenada, Cuba, Jamaica (before the recent
general election) and Nicaragua. The re-
cent election in Jamaica has been inter-
preted as a victory against "Marxism" and
"radicalism." For America policy-makers
and corporate interests, the central concern
has been the effect of the assumed radical-
ization of Caribbean internal and external
policy on American interests, in which are
included American security interests, in the
area.


United States Interests:
A Summary
The United States considers the area in
general as an important security zone,
along with Central America; and considers
instability there as threatening to her own
security, where such instability is likely to
serve as a magnet for non-hemispheric
(that is, Communist) intervention or inter-
ference. While it is the case that other areas
of the globe are perhaps given a greater
day-to-day significance in strategic terms,
this zone represents the fundamental un-
derpinning, as part of the geographically
proximate hemisphere, of the American
system of security arrangements. Hence
the term "America's backyard," frequently is
used to describe it. Since the revolutionary
regime of Cuba is seen as a local proxy for
the global socialist system, a Cuban pres-
ence in any country is now automatically
perceived as "outside intervention." In
American perceptions, some administra-
tions and congressional leaders distinguish
between a Cuban military presence (as did
Kissinger in 1976) which is considered un-
acceptable, and a Cuban technical as-
sistance and diplomatic presence. Others
however hold that there is no a prior dif-
ference between the two kinds of pres-
ences, and that the security implications of
each need to be examined on a case by
CARIBBEAN EVIEW/7


ELIZE


I I









case basis.
The Caribbean Sea, linking the West In-
dies and Central America is seen as the
American Mediterranean whose security
constitutes a part of the general area of
American hemisperic security. The Carib-
bean Sea remains an important transit
route for trade to and from the United
States, petroleum, for example, being an
especially important economic and strate-
gic commodity transported therein. The
Caribbean thus becomes linked with the
Panama Canal which still retains important
economic and strategic interest for the
United States and her allies. For an impor-
tant American hemispheric economic and
security partner, Venezuela, the passages
through the Caribbean islands constitute
her gateway to the North Atlantic.
The United States is conceded in this
era, to ensure the uninterrupted continua-
tion of trade in Caribbean mineral re-
sources, in particular bauxite. This require-
ment becomes linked to the questions of
local policy on the terms of foreign invest-
ment, and policy relating to the diversifica-
tion of Caribbean mineral exports. It is today
increasingly concerned with the effects
within the US itself, of the movement-both
legal and illegal-of Caribbean peoples to
America as well as with the illegal move-
ment of drugs from and through the Carib-
bean states. These last two areas of interest
induce in turn a concern with the economic
and institutional weaknesses in the struc-
ture of Caribbean political and social
systems.
The American interests in these varieties
of areas give rise, given the over-riding US
concem with security, to what appears to be
an American perception of a general inca-
pacity on the part of the regimes of the
islands, either because of smallness and/or
weakness, to hold autonomous positions in
relationships deemed actually or potentially
hostile to the United States. In that context,
the American response is to react negatively
and preemptively-to act "in anticipation"
so to speak, of the development of any such
relationships. Her perception of the recent
experience of Jamaica (seen as nearly hav-
ing slipped away into the communist
camp) reinforces this orientation. In the
Caribbean the United States perceives,
then, a potential vacuum, in the traditional
international relations sense.
But what the United States policy makers
suddenly see as a crisis of regional se-
curity-specifically of Cuban communist
expansion into a weak area-in the short
time perspective of American decision-
making, can more usefully be seen (and
many in the Caribbean prefer to see) as a
slowly developing crisis of economic and
social (dis)organization implicit in the eco-
nomic and social development strategies of
the 1960s, and maturing at the present
time; a crisis not susceptible to mili-
8/CAIBBEAN P VIEW


tary/security solutions, or solutions de-
signed essentially to inhibit the normaliza-
tion of relations between the Caribbean
states and Cuba.
Of course, the mere fact that the United
States arrives at the situation of defining a
period as one of crisis in security terms, or a
geographical area as a crisis zone, be-
comes, or ought to become a factor and an
input in the structure of Caribbean deci-
sion-making. It was perhaps one of the er-
rors of the Manley administration in
Jamaica that it failed to assess in time, and
to attribute sufficient significance to, the
American definition of its policy as having


Democratic socialism was
given a programmatic
content, asserted as the
alternative solution for the
country's socio-economic
problems.


the potential of creating a security crisis for
the United States, however invalid such a
definition might have been.

Social Crisis and
Political Orientation
Jamaica experienced fairly rapid economic
growth in the 1960s, fuelled by substantial
foreign investment in the bauxite and tour-
ism industries, and by investment in man-
ufacturing partly for the country's domestic
market, on the basis of incentives to both
local and foreign investors, provided by the
government. As a result, there was also an
expansion of the commercial and services
sectors, and an expansion of the range of
indigenous skills appropriate to the degree
of economic expansion. On the other hand,
during the period, the country's range of
agricultural exports, relatively diversified
(bananas, sugar, citrus, tobacco, coffee) be-
gan to experience for the most part, fairly
persistent declines. In spite of the existence
of strong trade unions, wages in the agri-
cultural sector lagged (as is not uncom-
mon) behind those in the new industrial
and service sectors.
Fairly rapid population growth, com-
bined with improvements in health and wel-
fare, when added to these phenomena,
resulted in a situation of large resources of
labor which the industrial sector was inca-
pable of absorbing, in spite of the rapid
rates of growth. Large pockets of unem-
ployed, in particular unemployed youth, be-
came visible; a visibility exacerbated by the
fact of substantial shifts of population from
rural areas to the urban centers experienc-
ing economic growth. Toward the end of the
1960s the political elites were becoming


uncomfortably aware that these large
pockets of unemployed, many functionally
illiterate, and perhaps unemployable indi-
viduals, could provide dangerous political
fodder.
The Caribbean political elite is particu-
larly sensitive to the question of large scale
unemployment and its possible political ef-
fects, since for the most part that elite de-
rives from the trade union movementwhich
entered political office when the British con-
ceded universal adult suffrage. This political
elite gained office on the specific promise to
the working class that they could and would
provide this class with the economic inheri-
tance from which it had previously been
deprived by colonialism and the local
landed oligarchy which dominated the eco-
nomic systems of the Caribbean territories.
With the maturing of the investment prQ-
cess in bauxite and tourism in Jamaica by
the beginning of the 1970s, the political
directorate of that country now had to seek
other, or additional, means for coping with
the surge in unemployment, to meet the
expectations of the working class.
The relatively minor riots in Jamaica in
1968 (the Rodney riots), induced the gov-
ernment to increase its emphasis on se-
curity measures, as it sought to maintain
the degree of social and political stability
deemed necessary for the attraction of new
foreign investment But this had the domes-
tic consequence of an increasing sense of
social crisis for which new solutions had to
be sought This was the context of the entry
into office of the People's National Party
government of Michael Manley in 1972, the
party having run its campaign in the two-
party competitive system of Jamaica, on
the basis of a promise of modernization of
the economic system in such a manner as
to maintain economic growth while ensur-
ing the unemployed masses their legiti-
mate economic and social rights.
The rhetoric of the party and the new
government suggested a platform of popu-
lism, not uncommon in systems of this kind
when they have reached social crisis. But
populism does not constitute a program or
policy, and this the new government even-
tually found by taking recourse to its historic
doctrine, recently however muted, of social-
ism. Democratic socialism was now given a
programmatic content, and asserted as the
alternative solution for the country's socio-
economic problems. This populist re-
sponse (though not the specific content of
socialism) was not unlike the political re-
sponse of the government of Trinidad and
Tobago after the uprising in that country of
1970. This complement of populism and
socialism took the form of acceptance of
the policy of non-alignment as the central
feature of the government's political foreign
policy, and along with that, acceptance of
the thesis of national liberation. This thesis
suggested that Caribbean regimes them-










selves should define the parameters of their
external relations activities; that the Ameri-
can hemispheric security system and its
assumptions should not necessarily take
precedence as the determining framework
of their international relations. Later the di-
versification of their external relations with
countries to which the United States was
not necessarily sympathetic was to be legiti-
mated by the doctrine of "ideological plu-
ralism," originally formulated by Venezuela.
This then, was the kind of domestic so-
cio-political context in which some of the
Caribbean regimes undertook the regional
normalization of relations with Cuba, and
began to explore the possibilities of rela-
tions with the socialist bloc-perhaps the
most extreme of these explorations being
the Guyana application for membership in
the Council for Mutual Economic As-
sistance (COMECON). Those countries, for
example Guyana but to some extent Ja-
maica, which sought particularly close rela-
tions with the communist bloc, while
pursuing alternative domestic solutions,
now sought also to restructure their domes-
tic economic and political institutions in
ways mae appropriate to the effective con-
duct of tetions with the socialist countries.
This was in part, the rationale for the deci-
sions to move somewhat away from the
orthodox Westminster institutional system
which they had inherited from the British.
But these various innovations in internal
and external policy began to disturb Ameri-
can perceptions of the Caribbean countries'
acceptance of the rules relating to hemi-
spheric security; and even more impor-
tantly, of the rules relating to foreign
investment and the political attitudes and
forms that should accompany those rules.
The Jamaican refusal of international ar-
bitration after its implementation of its
bauxite levy, provided a particularly impor-
tant instance of the developing American
sense of unease. It should be said also that
these various innovations began to disturb
the local dominant socio-economic sec-
tors, a factor which marked the beginning
of a certain coincidence of interest between
these local sectors and segments of the
American economic and political systems.
In Jamaica, by 1975, this unease indicated
the end.of the government's attempt to con-
duct policy on the basis of broad national
("all-class") unity. (In Guyana this was al-
ready the case much earlier on.)
Thus by the end of the Nixon-Kissinger-
Ford regimes, the relationships between
some of these countries (Jamaica, Guyana)
and the American government and com-
panies had become strained. This strain
was characterized by a slowing down of
economic assistance, of investment, and by
Caribbean claims and American denials of
"destabilization." In effect, the national liber-
ation orientation was beginning to come up
against the known facts of the small, depen-


dent, character of Caribbean economies,
and their vulnerability to external politi-
cal/economic pressure. The decline of the
Jamaican and Guyanese economies by
1976 indicated the problem. The pressures
which were now initiated against these gov-
emments were intended to reverse the na-
tional liberation orientation. (We are not, of
course, here saying that external pressures
were solely responsible for the decline of
the economies.)
The Nixon-Kissinger-Ford approach of
subtle, persistent, more often than not cov-
ert, pressure, was one response to the
changes in Caribbean foreign policy. It was


These various innovations
in internal and external
policy began to disturb
American perceptions of
the Caribbean countries'
acceptance of the rules
relating to hemispheric
security.


being undertaken at a time when American
policy was in general being subordinated to
the internal and external effects of Water-
gate and the failure of the Vietnam adven-
ture; and when, also, the national liberation
orientation appeared to have, still, local Car-
ibbean support and popularity. The political
crisis concerning the ethics of intervention
by the United States was at its height
(1975-76). One need only compare the de-
bates in the American congress then (which
resulted in the Clark Amendment), with the
sense of confidence and legitimacy with
which Arthur Schlesinger writes inA Thou-
sand Days of the American determination
of the nature of the Guyanese regime in
1964, to get a sense of the difference in
political climates.
The new Carter administration (Carter-
Young-Vance we might say), sought at first
to accept the apparent constraints on
American international policy, the relatively
greater presence in global relations of the
Soviet Union, and that country's assertion
of the necessity to continue detente and
'normalization' of international relations. In
the Caribbean, it appeared to accept the
view of the necessity for reorganization of
domestic structures and domestic eco-
nomic policies, so as to make the regimes
more capable of coping with socio-eco-
nomic crises. The administration accepted
the view also (already partially accepted by
Kissinger), that a normalization of relations
should take place regionally in the Carib-
bean and Central America, by beginning
the process of resolution of Cuban-United


States problems, and concluding resolu-
tion of the Panama Canal issue.

Two Views of Cuba's
Relationship
Two differing views about approaches to
Cuba, characterized American and Latin
American attitudes towards that country:
The first was the view indicating the neces-
sity for isolation of Cuba, either (a) to cause
maximum domestic difficulties for, and
therefore dissatisfaction with, the regime at
home; or (b) on a medical analogy of Cuba
as a virus, to inhibit the infection of other
regional countries. The second view, which
began to gain adherents in the late 1960s,
was that the first approach had definitively.
failed, and that the best approach was to
attempt to draw Cuba into a network of
economic and other arrangements in the
region/hemisphere that would induce on
her part continuing cooperation with vari-
ous important countries; and at worst, entail
recognizable sanctions for initiating disor-
der. This process of "opening" to Cuba can
be seen in the shift by Argentina in the early
1970s to extensive trade and financial credit
relations with her; and in discussions about
the possibilities for a triangular Venezuela-
Cuba-USSR arrangement on petroleum
supplies for Cuba.
It is generally accepted that the Cuban
military assistance to the Popular Move-
ment for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) in
Angola, and then to the revolutionary re-
gime in Ethiopia, were the occasion for a
new disintegration of the gradually develop-
ing bipartisan approach to Cuba in the
United States. We should, on the other
hand, note that Cuba's assistance to Angola
was supported by two Caribbean govem-
ments, and tacitly assisted by a third. But
these Cuban activities also mark a break in
the developing process of harmonizing of
approaches to Cuba among Anglophone
Caribbean governments; Trinidad taking
the view that for small countries, non-inter-
vention on such issues is the appropriate
diplomatic approach. A certain diplomatic
cohesion within CARICOM as an institution
also began to loosen, leading the Trinidad
Prime Minister to question in 1979 whether
there might any longer be a basis for coordi-
nated diplomacy within the grouping.
The Prime Minister of Trinidad, in making
these observations, alluded also to the fact
that domestic economic difficulties in major
Caribbean states were contributing to the
distortion of the attempt to undertake coor-
dinated external activities. This developing
diversity of external relations, especially as it
related to the world socialist bloc and to the
more radical section of the non-aligned
movement, began to take on, for the Carter
administration also, the aura of hostility to
the United States. The administration's re-
sponse was, in brief, to begin a process of
Continued on page 50
CAr?BBEAN PFVIeW/9












A Comprehensive



Strategy for



the Caribbean Basin


The US and her Neighbors

By Ambassador Thomas O. Enders, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs


The countries of the Caribbean Basin
are in trouble. To help them overcome
their troubles, President Reagan on
March 17 submitted to the Congress an
urgent request that it approve a precedent-
breaking US contribution to a cooperative
undertaking with Canada, Colombia, Mex-
ico and Venezuela. The centerpiece of the
president's program is free trade for all Car-
ibbean exports to the United States except
textiles for 12 years. Tax incentives and
emergency economic assistance are also
key elements of this package, which is de-
signed to strike at the root causes of the
human misery that underlies many of the
region's problems, from migration to vul-
nerability to Cuba.
Why, some have asked, mustwe increase
aid to the Caribbean Basin now, at a mo-
ment when our own economy is in reces-
sion and we are asking our own people to
tighten their belts? The president's answer
to this question was direct. "Make no mis-
take," he said on February 24, "the well-
being and security of our neighbors in this
region are in our own vital interest" Be-
cause the peoples of the Caribbean Basin
are our neighbors, we can not turn our back
on their plight Their troubles are inevitably
our troubles.
Our history as neighbors goes back a
long way-to Indian cultures even before
the Spanish began their Empire in the New
World from a Caribbean center. Later, Haiti
and Louisiana were French, and the West
Indies were British like the 13 American
colonies. George Washington had business
interests in Barbados. Alexander Hamilton
grew to manhood and learned his financial
acumen in Nevis. Caribbean leaders like
Marcus Garvey and Napoleon Duarte have
since returned the compliment, working or
studying in the United States.
In short, the Caribbean is to us what the
Mediterranean is to Europe. Its islands
swing south from Florida to Barbados in an
arc with Puerto Rico and the US Virgin Is-
10/CAIMBBEAN NrviEW


lands. Its waters reach two thousand miles
from the Eastern Caribbean to the Central
American isthmus. There are 23 countries
in the Caribbean and Central America.
Each is unique, but even the most distant is
closer to Washington, D.C. than is San
Francisco. Together they have been called
our "third border."

Their Crisis is Ours
At the moment, the countries of the Carib-
bean Basin are experiencing an economic
crisis so pervasive and so overwhelming
that it is shaking even the most established
democracies, consuming their money, re-
sources and credit, forcing thousands to
seek escape from their misery by emigrat-
ing to the United States and other countries,
and providing fresh openings to the en-
emies of freedom, national independence
and peaceful development.
When times are hard for us, they are usu-
ally even harder for our smaller and poorer
Caribbean neighbors. When economic
conditions are bad-and they are bad
now-thousands of people migrate from
the Caribbean to the United States. We
know the human tragedy of refugee move-
ments. A few months ago, some migrants
lost their lives trying to reach Florida. Two
years ago more than 120,000 Cubans
risked their lives to come to the United
States. We also know the enormous social
and economic burdens these waves of refu-
gees bring to the communities which re-
ceive them.
The Caribbean is vital to our security. In
the great debate over the Panama Canal a
few years ago, the one question on which
there was universal agreement was that the
Canal had to be kept open. Yet the Canal
itself is but one short fifty-mile span in thou-
sands of miles of Caribbean sea lanes.
Nearly half of our crude oil imports-in fact,
nearly half of all our exports and imports
pass through these Caribbean sea lanes.
Forty years ago in February 1942, one U-


boat torpedoed two ships in Port-of-Spain
harbor, Trinidad, then two more, including a
Canadian passenger vessel, in Castries har-
bor, St. Lucia. That May, a Mexican tanker-
running full lights as was the custom for
neutrals-was sunk off Miami. In June, a
single submarine (U-159) sank eight ships
in four days, two of them just off the en-
trance to the Panama Canal. All told, hun-
dreds of ships were sunk in Caribbean and
Gulf waters by a handful of enemy subs.
Today the peace and security of the Car-
ibbean Basin are deeply threatened not by
Nazi U boats but by a web of political vio-
lence, economic collapse and Cuban sup-
port for subversion. In the Caribbean, the
smallest islands are as exposed politically
as they have long been to the sudden vio-
lence of tropical storms. Three years ago a
small group of armed men took over the
nation of Grenada; they tumed out to be
Marxists, but they could have been of many
political stripes or even gangsters. In Cen-
tral America, acute economic troubles are
unsettling rigid social compacts formed
generations ago in Guatemala, widening
distrust in El Salvador, and bringing Costa
Ricans to worry about the sturdy demo-
cratic compact that has served them well
for more than 30 years.
Timing the move to exploit these vul-
nerabilities, Cuba has mounted a campaign
to establish Marxist-Leninist dictatorships
in both Central America and the Caribbean.
Beginning in 1978, Fidel Castro redoubled
his efforts to discredit Basin governments,
ridicule democracy and glorify armed vio-
lence. The Cuban government has covertly
trained, supplied and directed extremists
engaged in guerrilla warfare and economic
sabotage. Arms delivered through Nic-
aragua to guerrillas in El Salvador with
Cuban and Soviet bloc help have come
from as far away as Vietnam. Cuba's Air
Force now has 200 or more Soviet-sup-
plied MiG fighter-bombers. Should Cuba's
Soviet MiG's be able to utilize airports now













=~~--~=N


under construction in Grenada and Nic-
aragua, their range would be greatly
extended.
The Soviet Union knows the cost of hav-
ing hundreds of thousands of its soldiers
manning hostile borders. We do not. But if
Soviet MiG's or submarines were to be
based in the Caribbean area, we would be
forced to divert American defensive
strength from Europe and Asia to develop a
costly military shield where today we have
none.
US security and humanitarian interests in
the Caribbean Basin are supplemented by
our economic relations. In 1981, the United
States exported $6.8 billion in products to
the Caribbean Basin. In almost every one of
these countries we have at least 25% of their
import market. As they develop and their
demand grows, US business will expand its
sales in this market. Our total imports from
the region in 1981 were $9.9 billion and
total direct US investmentwas $22.5 billion.
Expenditures by US tourists in 1980 was
$1.1 billion. In fact, it is partly the magic of
the marketplace that we believe can help
countries to revive their hopes for a better
economic future, achieve the development
on which their very independence depends,
and eventually to eam their own way.

US Objectives and Policies
We seek a region at peace with itself, free
from outside threats, able'to devote its en-
ergy and attention to economic progress
and the development of democratic politi-
cal institutions. Security, democracy, and
economic development are clearly linked.
Progress toward democracy is best
achieved when a country's economy is de-
veloping well and when a nation does not
have to divert precious resources to defend
itself against a threat to its security. And a
country is most secure when it can promise
its people freedom and economic well-
being. Our policy must address all of these


Ambassador Thomas O. Enders. Illustration by Terry Cwikla.
dimensions: political, security, and 23 states in the Caribbean Basin have dem-
economic. ocratically elected governments. With the
elections in Colombia on March 14, seven
Support for Democracy open and honest, competitive elections
First, the political dimension. Democratic have been held and honored in the last two
institutions provide the best framework for years. Many of these countries found their
stable economic and social development way to democracy or have reinforced their
They provide channels for redress of griev- democratic traditions in circumstances of
ances, the flexibility to resolve differences great stress. Jamaica in 1980 held elections
through compromise before dangerous amidst embryonic civil conflict. Costa Rica
pressures build up and violence results. If returned to democracy out of a civil war in
governments are to be responsive to the 1948. Venezuela managed the transitibri to
needs of their peoples, they must permit democracy from more than six decades of
their citizens to express their will in honest, the most brutal and corrupt military dic-
competitive elections. Some suggest that tatorship in the hemisphere. In 1963, in cir-
elections of this kind cannot work in devel- cumstances very much like those now in El
hoping countries. Meaningful elections, they Salvador, Venezuelans went to the polls and
argue cannot be held in a bitterly divided ushered in twenty years of democratic pro-
country or in one with no democratic tradi- gress. Similarly, the Dominican Republic
tions. And elected governments, one hears, began its transition to democracy with elec-
are too weak to take the drastic measures tions in 1962 after thirty years under Tru-
necessary to reform unjust social orders. In jillo's repression. Just this January, Hon-
short, freedom may have to be sacrificed to duras inaugurated a democratically elected
some greater good, such as economic pro- president after more than a decade of mili-
gress and the formation of a national iden- tary rule.
tity. Their view is that democracy may work Here in the United States, we held elec-
for North America, but it won't work in Cen- tions during a terrible civil war despite the
tral America or the Caribbean. warnings of those who said it couldn't be
I don't accept this. Nor do President Rea- done. Afterwards, Lincoln had this to say: "If
gan, Secretary Haig or other American lead- the rebellion could force us to forego or
ers. Nor do most Caribbean Basin nations, postpone a national election, it might fairly
We believe democracy is as appropriate claim to have already conquered or ruined
for the Caribbean and for Central America us. But along with its incidental and unde-
as it is for the United States. In fact, 16 of the sirable strife it has done good too. It has
CAXBBEAN VE -"1/11











demonstrated that a people's government
can sustain a national election in the midst
of a great civil war. Until now, it has not been
known to the world that this was a
possibility."
Readers of the Caribbean Review,
which devoted its March 1981 edition to the
status of democracy in the Caribbean, will
understand that "the Caribbean today is by
and large governed by democracy-respect-
ing, pragmatic regimes." This fact should
not be overlooked by those who question
the viability of democracy in small, under-
developed countries.
The test as I write is in El Salvador. We
have supported the March 28 Constituent
Assembly elections there as the first.step in
a process to replace killing and the rule of
force with politics and the rule of law. The
test is difficult but neither new nor impossi-
ble. There will be setbacks, and success is
not assured. But we are not alone. The OAS
General Assembly voted 22-3 last Decem-
ber to support elections in El Salvador; the
OAS Permanent Council voted 19-0 in Feb-
ruary to send observers to the March elec-
tions. The reasons boil down to this: the
alternatives are dictatorships either of the
left or of the right, equally abhorrent, equally
incompetent, equally unresponsive to the
needs of their peoples.
We must place our support squarely be-
hind those in the region who share our val-
ues and principles. The evolution of
democratic institutions and just relation-
ships between governments and the gov-
erned are central to our own traditions and
vital to the future of the Inter-American
Community.

Enhancement of Security
We intend to keep our Rio Treaty commit-
ments and help our neighbors defend
themselves. We are prepared to give as-
sistance to countries in the region now
coming under increasing threat from Cuba
and Nicaragua. We have already increased
our security assistance-in equipment and
training--to El Salvador. This does not
mean sending American fighting men to
Central America. Though our assistance is
vital, the countries can defend themselves
without American troops.
The warm support at the OAS meeting in
St Lucia, for the principles of non-interven-
tion and collective security in the Inter-
American System should give comfort to
the small and defenseless that they need
not feel abandoned. The independence of
sovereign nations can best be protected by
reinforcing the hemispheric commitment
to non-intervention. This commitment
reached its full expression in the Pan Ameri-
can Conference in 1936, but the pledge
itself is not enough. We must all face up to
the fact that it is being violated systemat-
ically by Cuba with the support of the Soviet
Union. By militarizing their nation and sup-
12/CArBBEAN rIvIE


porting insurrection in El Salvador, Nic-
aragua's sandinistas have allowed them-
selves to become accomplices. Even Costa
Rica feels threatened. No country in the
Caribbean Basin can today feel secure from
this threat.
Our message to Cuba is clear. We will not
accept, we do not believe the countries of
the region will accept that the future of the
Caribbean Basin be manipulated from
Havana. It must be determined bythe coun-
tries themselves.
Our security assistance to the countries
of the Caribbean and Central America is



Because the peoples of the
Caribbean Basin are our
neighbors, we can not turn
our back on their plight.
Their troubles are inevitably
our troubles.



thus not an end in itself, but a means to an
end. In combination with our own eco-
nomic assistance and political support, our
security assistance will support national
efforts at building representative and re-
sponsive institutions, toward strengthening
pluralism and free institutions, toward nur-
turing basic human freedoms. Yet as the
Table makes clear, security assistance is but
a fraction of the total assistance we will be
providing to the Caribbean Basin.

Economic Development
The countries of the Caribbean Basin face
very major economic difficulties and need
the support of the international community.
After years of growth, a financial crisis of
immense proportions has enveloped the
Caribbean and Central American countries.
The prices of their commodity exports, like
coffee, sugar and bauxite, plunged, while
the costs of oil imports and foreign capital
kept going up. The world recession pinches
their economies hard. The results have
been disastrous. Costa Rica's GDP de-
clined 5% in 1981. Inflation rose to 60%.
Foreign exchange reserves-in a country
of two million-became negative by $400
million. The Dominican Republic, after a
decade of strong growth, expects no better
than zero growth this year: earnings from
sugar sales, its main export, could decline
40% in 1982, a drop of $230 million, and
current account deficit could approach $1
billion. In El Salvador, terrorism and eco-
nomic sabotage have brought the econ-
omy to the point of collapse. Output will fall
another 10% this year to a total decline of
more than 20% in three years.


A Collective Response
During the past year we have consulted
closely with Mexico, Canada and Venezu-
ela-all of whom already have substantial
and innovative programs of their own--to
encourage stronger international efforts
and to coordinate our own response to the
needs of the region with theirs. At a meeting
in New York in mid-March, Colombia joined
this core donor group.
Each donor country is making a very
significant contribution to the economic
development of the Caribbean Basin. Our
collective effort is very impressive, particu-
larly since three of the donor countries are
themselves still considered developing na-
tions. Canada has embarked on a five-year
expanded program for Central America as
well as the Caribbean. Canadian assistance
will reach more than one-half billion dollars.
Canadian tariff treatment currently provides
duty-free or preferential access for some
98% of all Caribbean Basin exports. Mexico
and Venezuela are providing, among other
things, an assured supply of oil and long-
term concessional credits valued at over
$700 million per year. And Colombia is ini-
tiating a special technical assistance fund of
up to $50 million, new credit lines up to $10
million a country, additional financing for
balance of payments deficits and other
measures to support economic develop-
ment in the Basin. While Trinidad and To-
bago is not a member of the core group, it
has established its own oil facility which is
helping its neighbors in the Caribbean re-
duce the impact of high oil prices on their
economies.
Our contribution to this coordinated in-
ternational effort was announced on Febru-
ary 24 in a special message by President
Reagan to the American people. Speaking
to the OAS Permanent Council and an in-
temational television audience, the presi-
dent outlined a major and unique program
designed to promote economic progress,
thereby enhancing peaceful democratic
evolution and the security of the region. The
president's program consists of mutually
reinforcing measures in the fields of trade,
investment and financial assistance, in a
comprehensive strategy to promote eco-
nomic development
The president will request from Congress
authority to eliminate duties on all imports
from the Basin except textiles and apparel.
Sugar imports will receive duty free treat-
ment but only up to certain historic limits in
order to protect the US domestic sugar
price support program mandated by Con-
gress. A safeguard mechanism will be avail-
able to any US industry seriously injured by
increased Basin imports. To encourage in-
vestment, rules of origin on imports to the
US from Basin countries will be liberal but
will require a minimum amount of local
content (25%). The president will have dis-
cretion to designate beneficiaries of these











measures, and one important considera-
tion will be a country's own efforts to carry
out necessary internal economic reforms.
To give countries time to take advantage
of the opportunities in these proposals, the
president has also asked Congress for an
additional assistance appropriation this fis-
cal year of $350 million to provide emer-
gency assistance for several key countries
whose situation is particularly critical. That
will bring proposed FY 1982 economic as-
sitance to $823.9 million or $403 million
above FY 1981. In FY 1983, the administra-
tion's request is for $664.4 million in eco-
nomic assistance. This assistance, as the
president said in his February address, is
necessary to put Basin countries in a "start-
ing position" from which they can begin to
eam their own way.
The centerpiece of the US program to
encourage development through self-sus-
taining growth is the offer of a one-way free
trade arrangement. Products from Basin
countries are already afforded liberal entry
into the United States under the Gener-
alized System of Preferences (GSP). In
1980, for example, $6.4 billion of the $10.4
billion in exports to the United States en-
tered duty free. Nevertheless, some of the
duties which remain in place are on prod-
ucts of special interest in the Caribbean
Basin. The one way free trade arrangement
will allow these countries to expand into
many products which they have not been
able to produce for export previously. Fur-
thermore, the complex structure of the GSP
has proved difficult for inexperienced
traders from the small Caribbean countries
to master. And many of their more promis-
ing opportunities have been excluded from
GSP for reasons of trade relationships else-
where in the world which have nothing to do
with the Caribbean Basin. By extending
duty free treatment for 12 years, the presi-
dent is giving investors a firm long term
basis for planning not present under GSP
In addition to these measures which re-
quire approval by both houses of Congress,
President Reagan plans to take others as
well. The US wil extend more favorable
treatment to Caribbean Basin textile and
apparel exports under bilateral and multi-
lateral agreements while continuing our
overall policy of seeking tighter limits on
import growth from our major suppliers.
The US will seek to negotiate double taxa-
tion and bilateral investment treaties with
interested countries. The US will work with
multilateral development banks and the pri-
vate sector to develop insurance facilities to
supplement the Overseas Private Invest-
ment Corporation's non-commercial in-
vestment risk operation. Finally, the US will
work with each country to develop strat-
egies to coordinate and focus development
efforts of local business, US firms, and pri-
vate voluntary organizations. The strategies
will seek to remove impediments to growth


US ASSISTANCE TO THE CARIBBEAN BASIN. BY FISCAL YEAR


1981
(Actual)
419.6
167.4

143.4


Economic
Development (DA)

Economic Support (ESF)

Food Aid (PL 480)


Military


Training (IMET)

Sales Credits (FMS)

Grants (MAP & 506)

TOTAL ASSISTANCE

Percent Economic

Percent Military


including lack of marketing skills, short-
ages of trained manpower, poor regional
transport, and inadequate infrastructure.
A series of measures will support the
efforts of Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands
to play a dynamic role in the Caribbean
region. Their involvement will be critical to
the success of private sector development
strategies. The US government has con-
sulted closely with Puerto Rico and the Vir-
gin Islands about the Caribbean Basin
Initiative. Legislation under the Initiative
takes into account Puerto Rican and Virgin
Island interests in many important ways.
Excise taxes on all imported rum, for exam-
ple, will be rebated to Puerto Rico and the
Virgin Islands. Their inputs into Caribbean
Basin production will be considered do-
mestic inputs under the rules of origin to
encourage use of products from Puerto
Rico and the Virgin Islands. Their industries
will have access to the same safeguard
provisions as mainland industries.
This unique combination of trade, aid
and investment initiatives addresses funda-
mental economic problems. The measures
are based on the assumption that eco-
nomic progress helps enhance the security
of a nation and promote peaceful demo-
cratic development. As President Reagan
noted last October at the Cancin Summit
in Mexico, they are also based on the realiza-
tion that nearly all of the countries that have
succeeded in their development over the
last thirtyyears have done so on the basis of
market oriented policies and vigorous par-
ticipation in the international economy. To
promote progress over the long term, aid
must be complemented by trade and
investment.


($ Millions)

1982
(Budget) (
474.6
211.3

140.0


1982
Supplemental)
350


350


3.24


1983
(Proposed)
664.4
217.6

326.0

120.9


106.23


4.93


471.11 586.74 410


89.3

10.7


101.3


770.73

86.2

13.8


How, specifically do they serve US inter-
ests in the area? They advance our national
interests in the Caribbean Basin in several
ways: (1) by alleviating the root causes of
human miserywhich have stimulated a ma-
jor and sustained flow of people from the
Caribbean Basin into the United States; (2)
by promoting long-term self-sustaining
growth, thus reducing the need for future
assistance from the United States and ex-
panding markets for our goods; (3) by
strengthening regional cooperation and the
principle of burden sharing, coordinating
our contribution with those of Mexico, Can-
ada, Venezuela, Colombia and with self help
measures by recipient nations; (4) by en-
hancing the security of and prospects for
democratic political evolution in the area,
thus offering a credible alternative to those
who claim that economic progress can be
achieved only through violent change and
the impositions of Marxist governments;
and (5) by protecting our strategic and eco-
nomic interests by promoting stable neigh-
bors friendly to the United States.
Recently the Washington Post ended a
long story about the Caribbean Basin by
reporting that many in the United States-
policy makers, Congress and even journal-
ists-have onlythe barest knowledge of this
area so close at hand. It remains to be seen,
the paper reported, whether the United
States can remain constructively engaged
in this region over a long period of time.
These, in fact, are the central questions
which the president is addressing: Can we
understand the needs of our closest neigh-
bors? Can we then sustain the long-term
commitment needed to support our vital
interests and theirs? [
CAI?BBEAN FeVIEW/13


108.8 123.2


50.51 112.14


23.29 41.4


25.0













The Reagan



Administration and Latin



America


An Uneasy Beginning

By William D. Rogers
and
Jeffrey A. Meyers


R onald Reagan began his mid Febru-
ary news conference ready to discuss
ow his administration would regain
control over the economy. But reporters
wanted the president to address a far differ-
ent subject. Nine times the president was
asked to explain how the United States
intended to respond to the growing tur-
bulence in the region, and nine times the
president answered with studied ambigu-
ity. Only if and when rebel guerrillas from
El Salvador dropped a bomb on the White
House was the president sure of his re-
sponse. He said "he might get mad."
Ronald Reagan appeared frustrated that
day. He seemed generally irked that after a
little more than one year in office, the atten-
tions of his administration's foreign pol-
icy-and those of the media-were
focused much as they had been at the be-
ginning of his term. They were focused on
Central America.
The president's unwillingness to disclose
his plans for the region was also interpreted
by some as a reaction to the growing con-
cern of the American public and many in
the Congress over the administration's in-
ability to articulate a policy short of saying
that there were "no plans to send American
combat troops into action any place in the
world." Although the president wanted to
convince his audience that he would not be
reckless with American lives, his inability to

William D. Rogers, former Assistant Secretary
of State for Latin American Affairs and Un-
dersecretary of State for Economic Affairs
in the Ford administration, is a senior
partner at Arnold & Porter in Wash-
ington. Jeffrey A. Meyers, a candi-
date for a MA degree at the Johns
Hopkins University School of
Advanced International Stud-
ies, serves as Law Assistant /L
for International Affairs at o
Arnold and Porter.
14/CAI?BBEAN rIvIeW


state his mind in public confirmed the belief
that his administration was running out of
answers to the crisis in Central America.
The new administration did not plan to
exert its early energies on Central America.
The president assumed office determined
to tackle the vexing economic problems of
inflation, high interest rates and unemploy-
ment which some of his senior advisors
warned at the outset threatened to engulf
our nation in an "economic Dunkirk." Is-
sues of foreign policy were to receive only
episodic attention. Arms control, relations
with Europe and even the intractable and
threatening conflicts in the Middle East
were pushed to one side. (Indeed, the only
item that bore on how the United States
would proceed to relate to the rest of the
world that was designated for immediate
action was the revitalization of our military
power.) As far as our own hemisphere was
concerned the administration appeared in-
terested in doing little in its first few months
other than providing small amounts of aid
and some kind words in an attempt to snug-
gle closer to the regimes scorned by the
previous administration because of their
human rights records.
But events were not kind to the Reagan
administration. For at the very moment it
took office, it stumbled over some left-wing
guerrillas, radical murder squads and in-
dications of Cuban and Soviet involve-
ment in a bloody micro-war in El
Salvador. The January 1981 procla-
mation by the left of a final of-
fensive caught the new administra-
tion at a bad time. Secretary of State-
designate Haig had no experience in hemi-
sphere affairs. But he was eager to assert his
prerogative over the policy-making process
and determined to demonstrate his anti-
communist credentials to the Republican
right wing. The leading figure of that right
Illustration by Jorge Baiales. wing, Senator Jesse Helms, Republican



































from North Carolina, was to be Chairman of
the Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee dealing with Latin
America, and had given notice from the
very outset that he intended to assert an
influence on United States policy in the
hemisphere greater than that of any senator
in recent memory.
The new administration compounded
the difficulties of Executive Branch inex-
perience and congressional aggressive-
ness. It fired the chief of the State
Department's Latin American Bureau
within moments of Reagan's inauguration
on January 20th. For two months thereaf-
ter, through a critical early phase of the Sal-
vador crisis, Haig and the White House were
unable to decide even who to nominate to
that key position. This left a gaping hole in
the policymaking machinery. Even after
Ambassador Thomas O. Enders was con-
firmed in June, the difficulties continued, as
the entire crew of deputy assistant secre-
taries was shifted, and a host of new faces
brought in.

A Strong Posture
At the very moment when the new admin-
istration discovered the El Salvador crisis,
Soviet armies were poised to attack Poland.
Concern about Warsaw translated into an
additional reason for a strong posture. Cen-
tral America was seen as possibly important
in itself, certainly as a place from which to
send a signal to Moscow about American
intentions in Eastern Europe.
Perhaps then, it is not so surprising that
the Reagan administration should have re-
acted as it did. El Salvador became the one
place where the new group, eager to articu-
late a distinctive view of United States for-
eign policy interests, could demonstrate its
resolve, a battlefield in the superpower con-
frontation-and in the process an early and
important indication of the premises which


might inform the Reagan response to other
world problems as well. The difficulty was
not so much what the new administration
did in Salvador, but rather what it said. To
some, it sounded like simple-minded anti-
Sovietism.
Yet, what Reagan did was very little more
than the Carter administration had done,
and what would have very likely been the
choice of any American government in the
same circumstances. Carter had resumed
economic assistance to the Duarte regime
in December, following a short suspension
because of the murder of the four American
churchwomen. Additional, yet modest,
amounts of military aid began again in Jan-
uary, before Reagan was swore in.
The Reagan team did not announce any
new initiative. They continued to support
Duarte in El Salvador. The decision to do
so, ironically enough, was probably forced
on them by the blunder of the extreme
right-wing Salvadoran Colonel D'Aubuis-
son, who emerged briefly from under-
ground in February to tell the world press
that the Reagan administration was sym-
pathetic to the far right; the White House
had no alternative but to disassociate itself
with him and in the process confirm its
commitment to the Duarte government
Carter's program of military support was
maintained with the addition of a few more
advisers and some helicopters and other
equipment And Reagan went ahead with
an expanded effort of economic aid, though
ironically the program was shoring up the
very agricultural and financial reforms
which the old Salvadoran right was attack-
ing so viciously. The new administration, in
short, found itself supporting the same cen-
trist government, the same land reformers
and the same civilian-military combination
as Carter.
But the new Reagan team radically al-
tered the rhetorical justification for the pol-


icy. Reagan had said to The Wall Street
Journal during the campaign that, "The
Soviet Union underlies all the unrest that is
going on. If they weren't engaged in this
game of dominoes, there wouldn't be any
hot spots in the world." In the administra-
tion's early days, Secretary Haig and the
new team at the White House gave every
evidence that they believed this arrant
nonsense.
Armed with documents captured from
guerrilla headquarters in the December
fighting-documents that later proved less
clear and convincing than the administra-
tion had first claimed-the president and
Secretary Haig announced that the conflict
in El Salvador was in fact a test of wills
between the United States and the Soviet
Union. Reagan representatives-Assistant
Secretary of State-designate Lawrence Ea-
gleburger, and former CIA Deputy Vernon
Walters-were quickly dispatched to meet
with European and Latin American leaders
to explain the administration's commit-
ment to drawing the line in Central America
against the further spread of communism.
The complexities of the conflict between
the various local factions in El Salvador, the
long, singular history of El Salvador's politi-
cal turmoil severely intensified by the land
reform program in 1979, the pathological
killing, and the total breakdown of law and
order-all of these were obscured in Wash-
ington in the first half of 1980 bythe admin-
istration's concern for the rather modest
flow of arms that the left was receiving from
sources outside El Salvador.
By emphasizing so stridently the infusion
of arms to the insurgents, the administra-
tion gave the impression that it believed a
counterflow of US military assistance to the
government could-and would-solve the
problem. It thus lost the chance to demon-
strate an early concern for the nonmilitary
dimension of the conflict, as well as the
CAIBBEAN rEVIEW/15











essentially centrist character of the Duarte
regime it was trying to save. The new ad-
ministration thus sacrificed domestic politi-
cal support that it might have counted on
had it articulated a subtler view. The result
was a hardening in American public opin-
ion against any further expansion of the US
commitment, a growing opposition in
Catholic circles against military aid of any
kind, and the eventual passage by the new
Republican Senate of legislation condition-
ing further assistance to the Salvadoran
government

Strategic Implications
More importantly, though, the administra-
tion made three rhetorical points which had
strategic implications considerably broader
than El Salvador:
Both Secretary Haig and the president
declared that El Salvador would not be an-
other Vietnam; in this case, they explained,
the United States intended to not only sup-
port its allies on the battlefield but to meet
the problem of foreign arms "at its source."
This sounded ominous. If their statements
were meant to attract the attention of the
Cubans and the Soviets, they did so. There
were reports that Cuban forces were placed
on alert, fearing an actual American inva-
sion, and there is continuing high-level ap-
prehension in Havana over what Wash-
ington really intends. Moreover, the threat to
go to "the source" injected a kind of manic
quality into US policymaking. That state-
ment could be taken as a warning to
Moscow not to count on US rationality for
the next four years. In a sense, it recalled
Nixon in his less astute moments, who
claimed that unpredictability should be an
element in US policy toward the Soviet
Union--that it is, in other words, desirable
that the Soviets believe that the United
States might on occasion react emotionally.
In the long run, however, irrationality and
policy are fundamentally antithetical. A rep-
utation for unpredictability scarcely contrib-
utes to the confidence of foreign
policymakers in US foreign policy inten-
tions, which is so essential particularly to
Atlantic relations. The administration's ini-
tial reaction to El Salvador raised doubts,
dramatically in Europe, about its steadiness
in other, future crises.
Beyond this, the promise to resolve the
problem "at its source" risked becoming an
empty threat In the first instance, assuming
that the warming was aimed at Havana, there
is really not much that the United States can
do, short of invasion or blockade, .which
would, be a significant sanction against
Cuba. Washington has maintained a trade
embargo against the island for twentyyears.
It could be tightened at the margin, but not
in a way to hurt Cuba. The other Latins and
Europe are not likely to join any new eco-
nomic quarantine. The few cooperative
ventures between Cuba and the United-


States, such as the anti-hijacking treaty and
weather information sharing, are not impor-
tant to the Cubans but are in our interests.
There is not much to be gained by de-
nouncing them. New organs of propa-
ganda may add something, though not a
great deal, to what the VOA has been doing.
It is inconceivable that the United States
would revert to another clandestine effort
against Cuba. And an outright military
effort-blockade or an invasion-would
deal a grave blow to US relations with Eu-
rope andthe other maritime nations around
the world, to say nothing of the fact that
both measures would violate international
law.


The difficulty was not so
much what the new
administration did in El
Salvador, but rather what
it said.


The administration's own evidence dem-
onstrated that Cuba and Nicaragua were
not the only "source" for the guerrillas'
arms. The documents on which the admin-
istration's case of foreign intervention
rested did not establish the precise prove-
nance of all the weapons, to say nothing of
the routes by which they had found their
way into El Salvador. What was clear is that
they had come from a wide variety of.
sources. In fact, the captured papers
showed that even if Moscow and Havana
terminated all arms shipments the guer-
rillas would not be without resources. Even
if the administration's policy of drying up
direct shipments of communist arms from
Cuba and elsewhere succeeded, the arse-
nals of the leftist insurgents would not be
completely diminished. The international
weapons markets are too various.
But the threat to go "to the source" was
not the only rhetorical excess of the admin-
istration. Even more important from the
standpoint of global politics were the refer-
ences by the president and Secretary Haig
to El Salvador as being in the "front yard" of
the United States. They probably meant to
imply that a superpower has special rights
in its immediate neighborhood-and by
the same token that this special interest
preempts the opposing superpower from
acting there as he may elsewhere in the
world. If so, the concept is important, and a
dangerous contribution to contemporary
foreign policy theory to boot.
Many in the United States took the "front-
yard" metaphor as a throwback to ancient
notions of spheres of influence. Some sug-
gested that the administration's formula-
tion was not very far from the Brezhnev


doctrine. In an awkward-and uninten-
tional-way, the administration might have
been interpreted as suggesting to the Sovi-
ets that if the conflict in Salvador could be
resolved satisfactorily the administration
would recognize special Soviet interests in
Afghanistan and Poland. Whatever the real
intent, the "frontyard" view was clearly not
the product of very careful analysis.
Furthermore, the metaphor suggests pri-
orities. Does El Salvador deserve a very
high ranking in US foreign affairs con-
cems? The answer is a ringing no. What
happens there will not have much conse-
quence elsewhere-nothing like, for exam-
ple, the effect of the martial law crackdown
in Poland or of the Iraq-Iran war. El Salvador
has no raw materials; there is no significant
American investment there; it occupies no
strategic geography. Its weightiest claim to
world attention is as a proving ground of
Washington's foreign policy wisdom.
The third overstatement was Secretary
Haig's explanation to the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee that what was hap-
pening in Salvador reflected a communist
"fit list"-a master plan to capture Nic-
aragua first, then Salvador, then Honduras
and finally Guatemala. And, the secretary
added, that objective had already been
achieved in the first country.
When the administration moved shortly
thereafter to cut off the remaining as-
sistance provided by the United States un-
der the $75 million loan program for
Nicaragua, and dispatched Ambassador-
at-large Vemon Walters, as a special emis-
sary to Guatemala to assure the Lucas
regime, as Walters put it, that the US knew
"who its friends were," it appeared to give
life to its worst fears. Not only did the termi-
nation of aid to Nicaragua have a discon-
certing effect on those non-Marxists who
are still fighting for a pluralist resolution
there; more importantly, it suggested that
the United States had itself given up the
struggle for democracy in that country.
The bolstering of the Lucas regime in
Guatemala, by verbal assurances of sup-
port, as well as by the provision of military
spare parts, was also seen in Central Amer-
ica, at least, as symbolic of a new attitude.


El Salvador
As far as El Salvador itself was concerned,
the administration's early efforts not only
betrayed a flawed analysis. They obscured
the complex realities of the conflict. Most
importantly, the remedies prescribed were
inappropriate to the disease. What seemed
to have escaped the administration's early
calculations was that the Duarte govern-
ment's success or failure would depend not
merely on its military muscle. To survive,
that regime would first have to persuade the
people of El Salvador that it could slow
down the killing-probably now higher per


16/CAI?BBEAN KvIEW










capital than anywhere else in the world, with
the possible exception of Cambodia-and
to begin to move the country towards a
regime of law and order. To that end, Duarte
would have to bring the right-wing terrorists
under control.
As the year ended and 1982 began, how-
ever, there was little evidence that Duarte's
efforts were meeting with much success.
Violence by the leftist guerrillas, by the right,
and by government security forces re-
mained at extraordinary levels. Sabotage by
the insurgents of the country's economic
infrastructure, the deterioration in the mor-
ale of the Salvadoran Army, and a stepping
up of the gruesome acts of the security
forces and terror squads, raised doubts
whether a peaceful political resolution was
possible.
Last January, Secretary Haig told the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee what
was already apparent that the civil war in El
Salvador was at a "stalemate." The search
for a political way out of the violence
seemed stuck. The government and some
elements of the opposition said they were
ready to begin a dialogue. But Duarte, evi-
dently under pressure from his military part-
ners, refused to meet with any groups which
did not lay down their weapons and sur-
render the vight to armed insurgency. The
opposition could not bring itself to consider
anything more definitive than a cease-fire
as the framework for talks. The United
States was not readyto breakthe logjam, for
fear of introducing new tensions into the
already fragile Christian Democratic-mili-
tary coalition. And France and Mexico, by
publicly urging that the opposition be rec-
ognized as a "representative political force,"
reflected both their interests in the Central
American conflict and the deep division of
opinion within the Atlantic Alliance and the
Inter-American community on the issue.
Some of the rhetorical excesses of the
early days-nominating Central America
as a region of supreme importance to US-
Soviet and US-European relations-re-
ceded when, in July, Assistant Secretary
Thomas O. Enders, brought back from
Brussels by Secretary Haig, declared in his
first major statement on the issue that, "just
as the conflict was Salvadoran in its origins,
so its ultimate resolution must be Sal-
vadoran." This adjustment in rhetorical em-
phasis, however, was not long-lived. By the
administration's first anniversary in office,
official pronouncements struck a note
more bellicose and as desperate as the
crisis had grown. The guerrillas-their mili-
tary and political strength shored-up-evi-
denced greater success. They now gave
every appearance of a formidable military
force.
Along with the steady and growing op-
position to US involvement bythe Congress
and the American public, the guerrillas' new
successes over the past two months ulti-


mately impressed the administration that its
hand was slipping in El Salvador. The ad-
ministration reacted quickly. Just days after
our ambassador in San Salvador, Deane
Hinton, publicly declared that the prospects
for a non-military solution to the crisis
looked bleak, Secretary Enders went before
the Congress to seek $55 million more in
military aid. A fortnight later, the president
took the rostrum at the hall of the Organiza-
tion of American States to announce what
he labeled an "unprecedented" initiative of
trade, aid and investment incentives that he
believed would help create a "secure future"
for the region.



The roots of instability in El
Salvador are to be found in
many locations and not
only in the cauldrons of
Cuban and Soviet
mischief.




The president's Caribbean Basin Initiative
does signal a positive departure from Wash-
ington's traditional approach to the region.
It holds out the promise of enhancing the
long-term economic prospects for El Sal-
vador and the region. But it is not sufficient
to resolve the war that is raging today and
now. Military aid applied in even lavish
amounts will not convince the insurgents to
cede their struggle.
The president was right when he sug-
gested in his OAS address that political sta-
bility is linked in many ways to economic
prosperity. But the calculus of the present
crisis in El Salvador is more complex than
that It is tied to centuries of discrimination
and injustice by greedy oligarchs, a pas-
sionate disrespect of civil and political rights
of its citizens by the Army and a rigid bu-
reaucratic system that was not capable of
gradual change. In short, the roots of in-
stability in El Salvador are to be found in
many locations, and not, as the president
and his secretary of state have implied, only
in the cauldrons of Cuban and Soviet
mischief.
The themes of the administration's state-
ments on El Salvador were once only nega-
tive and unilateral-the United States, the
administration argued, needed to stop ex-
ternal arms shipments and defeat Central
American insurgents in military combat.
Today, there is more attention on the affir-
mative and the regional: how to design a
comprehensive development program for
the Caribbean and Central American re-
gion, drawing on the overlapping, though


not entirely identical, interests and activities
of the United States, Canada, Mexico and
Venezuela.
But though the emphasis has shifted
from war to include economic growth, from
threats and imprecations to positive talk
about poverty and private investment, it is
still plain that Central America and the Car-
ibbean will continue to enjoy a high place
on the worry list of the administration. The
president conceded as much when he de-
clared to the OAS that the Caribbean region
"is a vital strategic and commercial artery
for the United States." The reason for that
priority is the continued conviction of the
administration that what happens in Nic-
aragua and Guatemala, as well as Jamaica,
Grenada and Barbados, means something
on the global balance scale.
There are, of course, serious differences
in the perceptions of the various policy-
makers currently at post in Washington
about the nature of the Soviet threat, and
about ultimate Sovief intentions. But it is
worthy of generalization that this admin-
istration has so far tended to superimpose
on the conflicts and difficulties of Central
America and the Caribbean its own anx-
ieties over the superpower balance. Though
it is prepared to address the issue with de-
velopmental as well as military instruments,
it continues to see the region as a proving
ground for a test of will with Moscow and
Havana.
Important questions emerge from this
way of looking at Central America and the
Caribbean as elements in the calculus of
superpower politics. What if the Soviet
Union agrees that Central America and the
Caribbean indeed are our front yard? What
if it withdraws from the competition there?
(Indeed, there are those who suggest that it
already has, in Central America, and that in
fact there never was a real contest between
the Soviet Union as such and the US; they
add that this is the very reason why the
administration selected the region in the
first instance to demonstrate its metal.)
Does that suggest that, in silent exchange,
the United States might acquiesce in a simi-
lar assertion of primacy by the Soviet Union
in those areas which rim its national terri-
tory? What if the administration declares its
policy successful, the battle in the region
over, and the United States victorious? Does
that lead to withdrawal, a decline in concern
and a diminution even of the positive devel-
opment programs so nobly inaugurated?
It is perhaps ironic-and it is certainly
sad-that we are very unlikely to have the
answers to these questions in the near fu-
ture. The conflicts in Central America are
too intransigent, too caught up in hate and
violence. But the administration's course in
the region, and its incapacity to articulate
much by way of policy for the remainder of
the hemisphere, make them no less
weighty and legitimate. O
CAIBBEAN 1eVIEW/17













The Real Clear and



Present Danger


A Critique from the Left

By Richard R. Fagen


Six weeks after Ronald Reagan was in-
augurated as President of the United
States, the Subcommittee on Inter-
American Affairs of the House of Represen-
tatives held hearings on El Salvador. One of
the witnesses called was Col. Samuel T
Dickens, a "Consultant for the National Se-
curity and Foreign Relations Division of the
American Legion." Among the opening
paragraphs of Col. Dickens's prepared
statement were the following: "The United
States cannot afford to wear blinders, ignor-
ing Cuban and Soviet efforts in the region.
Ultimately our lack of courage destablizes
our weaker friends and allies as they adjust
their foreign policies. We must consider the
serious consequences of any perception of
weakness in an area acknowledged to be
basic to United States security and how our
European allies in NATO might question
our resolve in Europe if we appear indif-
ferent to the spread of communism in our
own back yard.
"During the past few years we have toler-
ated Cuban activities in the hemisphere as
though Fidel Castro were some sort of Latin
American 'niio mimado,' or spoiled brat,
whose efforts to spread communism could
be tolerated with mild amusement and con-
descension. Fidel Castro's call for an al-
liance between Marxists and Christians is
truly a call for an "unholy" alliance among
atheists and Christians. Many deeply re-
ligious followers have fallen into the trap of
supporting communist guerrillas because
of their mistaken belief that the lot of the
poor would be improved. And so in the
United States we have been readyto believe
all sorts of lies about the state of El Sal-
vador's economy and the rule of the so-
called'fourteen families.' We were unable to
differentiate between authoritarian and dic-
tatorial leaders and fell prey to the commu-
nist's call for a new 'wave of the future.' The
'wave of the future' turns out to be nothing
but dictatorial control under communist
Richard R. Fagan is Gildred Professor of Latin
American Studies at Stanford University.
Among his works are: Capitalism and the
State in US-Latin America Relations, Latin
America and the US, Politics & Privilege in
a Mexican City, The Transformation of Po-
litical Culture in Cubaand Cubans in Exile.
18/CAIfBBEAN IPEVEW


sponsorship and leadership.
"In the United States we end up having to
deal with governments in our own hemi-
sphere we are unable to influence, who are
receiving political guidance and indoctrina-
tion from Cuba and the Soviet Union, while
forcing out authoritarian governments over
which we had some semblance of influ-
ence. What we haven't realized was that
these changes, which we have helped bring
about, have created reverberations
throughout the hemisphere with shock
waves being felt by our allies throughout the
world. What we haven't been able to per-
ceive is that our own security has come into
jeopardy."
At about the same time, tens of thou-
sands of Americans received a direct mail
appeal on Congressional letterhead over
the signature of Representative Daniel B.
Crane, a Republican from Illinois. The four
page letter began as follows: "My dear
friend...Ronald Reagan needs your support
now more than ever. He needs your help in
closing America's 'open door' to bomb-
throwers, spies and revolutionaries. Castro
sent his trained Communist revolutionaries
into our country. They were hidden ariong
the thousands of Cubans escaping Castro's
bloody regime. Castro's agents have al-
ready stirred up riots in relocation centers.
Burning buildings. Destroying American
property. Now here's what really scares me.
President Reagan has no way of telling how
many terrorists Castro sent. For that matter,
there's no telling how many terrorists from
Iran and other unfriendly countries slip
through America's open door. The liberals
have ripped apart our internal security sys-
tems and created this 'open door policy'
Liberals abolished the House Internal Se-
curity Committee. And they're fighting off
attempts to re-establish internal security.
Now we're wide open for hate-America rev-
olutionaries. That's why I'll be co-sponsor-
ing the Anti-Terrorism Bill in this new
session of Congress. Without it, Ronald
Reagan is left virtually powerless to close
the open door to terrorists. We have an obli-
gation to help him. Don't you agree?"
Bad grammar and substantive errors
aside, what are the main ideas expressed in
these two statements? They can be briefly


summarized as follows: (1) Cuba (acting for
the Soviet Union) is the primary cause of
unrest in the region. As a first corollary,
Cuba is the local staging area for "intera-
tional terrorism." (2) The United States has
been soft on Cuba, with grave conse-
quences for US credibility and stability at
home and abroad. (3) "Liberals" are re-
sponsible for that softness, damaging not
only US relations with friendly authoritaria-
nisms, but the political process within the
United States as well (capacity for self-de-
fense). (4) This situation has reached the
point where basic US security is en-
dangered. (5) Therefore, emergency mea-
sures are called for in both domestic and
foreign policy.
There are two additional aspects of this
point-of-view worth noting: First, it is a ven-
erable Cold War argument, dating at least
from the early 1960s in what might be
called its "Cuba-centric" form. Second, in
bold outline it is identical with the basic
formulations of the Reagan administration
as articulated by the president, his secretary
of state, and others. Jeanne Kirkpatrick may
be more literate than Col. Dickens, but her
widely circulated articles in Commentary
differ from the American Legion analysis
only in the sense that a sophisticated
French pornographic movie is not a Times
Square skin flick.
What is also notable however-at least to
date-is the failure of the Reagan admin-
istration to act vigorously and coherently in
ways consistent with this highly inflamma-
tory and deeply ideological view of the
hemisphere. Put somewhat differently, if US
security is really endangered by Cuban ac-
tions and revolutionary upheaval in Central
America, why isn't the United States gov-
ernment doing more about it?
It would be comforting to believe, as
many commentators and opposition politi-
cians have speculated, that "the administra-
tion is finally waking up" to the realities of
the area, realizing for example that unrest in
El Salvador is basically fed by local condi-
tions and a long history of oppression
rather than by Cuban and Nicaraguan
agents and guns. Certainly saner voices at
lower levels of the bureaucracy have been
arguing this point of view for months. But to














































Jeane Kirkpatrick, US Ambassador to the UN. Wide World Photos.


date there is no evidence that this perspec-
tive has triumphed at the higher reaches of
government To the contrary, it took only a
few months for the administration to once
again begin speaking about "going to the
source" and "Cuban and Nicaraguan re-
sponsibilities" after being forced into tem-
porary quiescence in the face of the
unanticipated barrage of international and
domestic criticism, counter-evidence, and
ridicule that greeted the El Salvador White
Paper.
Thus, the cyclical nature of the bellicose
outbursts does not reflect a changing of
beliefs, but rather a basic dilemma. The
administration has not ceased thinking like
Col. Dickens and Congressman Crane, but
on the other hand it cannot find. ways to
overcome the maze of obstacles that im-
pedes acting on those beliefs. The periodic
outbursts and threats thus carry multiple
messages: At one level they mean just what
they say. They are a reaffirmation of the
administration's world view and a warming
that consequential actions are being con-
sidered. At another level they are cries of
frustration, the ventings of an angry giant
who can only throw words and an occa-
sional adviser at the pigmies when what he
really wants to do is unleash the
thunderbolt.
Finally, and most seriously, each new cy-


cle ratchets up the stakes, making the
threats seem more hollow and the need to
act more acute. "In the Caribbean," as
friend of the administration William Safire
has written, "we have been foolishly whip-
ping out our gun and putting it back in the
holster." The critical question is thus under
what circumstances is the gun likely to be
fired instead of reholstered, and who is most
likely to be the victim? The search for an-
swers must begin with a closer look at the
geography of frustration.

The Geography of Frustration
In what follows we deal almost exclusively
with the geography of frustration as it de-
rives from Caribbean and Central American
realities. A more detailed analysis would, of
course, have to examine additional domes-
tic and international constraints on admin-
istration policy. In particular, what is not now
clear (and by its very nature can never be
entirely clear before-the-fact) is the extent
and depth of anti-interventionist opinion in
the United States. What did become clear
very early in the Reagan presidency, how-
ever, was the fact that important sectors of
Congress, the media, and religious and
civic groups in the United States were not
buying the administration line on the re-
gion. Similar skepticism has also charac-
terized most European allies as well as


many important sectors of opinion in Latin
America. Despite these constraints, the ad-
ministration nevertheless continues to work
vigorously to militarize US policy in the
region.
In political as well as cartographic terms
the geography radiates out from Cuba. It
makes sense, therefore, to begin with the
alleged "source." The key tactical question
given the belief system of the administra-
tion is, "how vulnerable is Cuba?" The an-
swer is, "not very." Even the most optimistic
of Castro's Washington enemies by now
must have abandoned the fantasy that the
revolutionary government is about to crum-
ble, that there is some diplomatic or eco-
nomic straw that will break Fidel's back
Despite invasion, subversion, exodus, isola-
tion, mismanagement, adventurism, and a
catalogue of other misfortunes (some ex-
ternal, some self-inflicted) of Jobian pro-
portions, the Cuban Revolution continues.
Additional threats from the imperialist
north, as US policy makers should have
learned years ago, only strengthen Cuban
resolve, only rally support for the
government
Nor is direct military action against Cuba
particularly promising. Short of a massive
commitment of US naval, land, and air
forces, the island is impregnable. Addi-
Continued on page 52

CAPBBEAN IPEevEW/19


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ique From .t

By L. Francis Bouche


As thoughtful observers have realized
for over a decade, Latin America and
the entire Southern Hemisphere are
on a global chessboard, and the United
States can no longer pursue its long-stand-
ing crap shooter's approach to its neigh-
bors in this hemisphere. Unfortunately,
there is still an overabundance of crap
shooters working the Latin American scene
and a severe shortage of geo-political chess
players. The problems facing US Latin
America policy makers and the problems
which some find with new policy directions
must be considered from first a compre-
hensive geo-political and then from a more
specialized regional perspective.
The conflict in El Salvador is regional in
nature but global in implication and may
very well extend soon into the territorial
United States. That reality can be more fully
appreciated by reflecting briefly upon the
geo-political contest in which the Soviet
Union and the United States are engaged
for control of the sources and supply routes
of strategic resources, namely, petroleum
and minerals. That petroleum and those
minerals come from, or are transited
through, our southern flank. They originate
in the Middle East's Persian Gulf, in the case
of petroleum, or from the South African
mineral basket. The country is more than
90% dependent on foreign chrome, cobalt,
manganese, and the platinum-group met-
als and more than 50% dependent on an-
other 13 foreign non-fuel minerals.
Without secure access to these essential
imported minerals, United States' industry
would be unable to manufacture many
electrical components, many chemical
compounds, some types of glass, and
some dental products. The automotive and
L. Francis Bouchey is Executive Vice Presi-
dent of the Council for Inter-American Security
in Washington, D.C., and co-author of
Guatemala: A Promise in Peril and of A
New Inter-American Policy for the
Eighties.
20/CAIBBEAN I IEW


fuel-cell industries, stainless-steel produc-
tion, aircraft, jet engine, missile and space
industries would be gravely affected by er-
ratic delivery of imported minerals. US
technological pre-eminence could be dev-
astated by interrupted mineral supply. The
likelihood of shipping interdiction has in-
creased markedly with the rapid destabiliza-
tion of Central America. Soviet naval bases
are naturals for Nicaragua and as revolu-
tionary ferment spreads, Soviet naval in-
stallations would be easy exchanges for
economically bereft countries in the region.
These vital materials on which free world
industrial and military production and oper-
ation depend are transported via an oceanic
supply line that extends through the Persian
Gulf, the Indian Ocean, and South Atlantic
routes to Western Europe and to the United
States. For the United States, the Caribbean
and the Gulf of Mexico is the funnel or
nozzle through which 70% of imported US
petroleum products and 50% of US trade
flows.
The Caribbean region is not our back-
yard, it is literally our front door. Throughout
our history, the Caribbean has been recog-
nized as an area of strategic importance for
the United States. Thus as Ambassador
Jeane Kirkpatrick has observed, for the
United States there is no place in the world
more important today than Central Amer-
ica. While it is argued that the United States
is becoming caught up in a Central Ameri-
can quagmire which will prevent it from
being able to respond to more threatening
prospective developments in Western Eu-
rope, or elsewhere, it has to be pointed out
that US power projection has always rested
upon a cooperative Caribbean and a sup-
portive-or truly neutral-South America.
That is true whether the United States is
actually or potentially engaged in conflict
requiring the commitment of substantial
military resources. The exclusion of Old
World maritime powers from Cuba, the Car-
ibbean and Latin America has helped the


United States generate sufficient surplus
power for balancing activities on European,
Asian and African continents.
Latin America, like Western Europe and
Japan, is part of America's power base. Any
United States power base, be it in Latin
America, Western Europe or the Western
Pacific, cannot be allowed to crumble if the
United States is to retain adequate extra
energy to be able to play a balancing role
elsewhere in the world. For a balancing
state like the United States, there is no pos-
sibility of flexible global action if its power is
immobilized or checked in any one area.
Indeed, in areas vital to any nation's power
potential, preservation of the status quo is
not enough. If there is a loss of will with
respect to the importance of improving a
nation's relative power position, it will be
only a matter of time until the inactive state
is replaced by a competitor.
The United States is being shoved aside
in the Caribbean and Central America by a
sophisticated, but brutal extracontinental
super power manipulating client states. So-
viet influence has expanded mightily since
1959. The Soviet Union is now ensconced
in force in the Western Hemisphere. More-
over, for the first time in well over a century,
American troops may be called upon to
defend its very borders and the territorial
integrity of the continental United States.

On the US Border
An America pinned down on its Mexican
border and caught up in an internal police
action against terrorism would have little or
no surplus power to project for the defense
of overseas interests or allies. Thus, it is
clearly in the interest of the Kremlin's geo-
strategic chess players to exacerbate poten-
tially destabilizing tensions and social con-
flict that holds the promise of pinning down
US forces in the Western Hemisphere or
complicating their movement to other
areas of the globe.
A year ago a Salvadoran guerrilla com-


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mander called Neto told a foreign reporter.
'This is not just a Salvadoran resolution. \'e
have to help all the oppressed and exploited
people of Latin America. After we triumph
here, we will go to Guatemala and offer our
proletarian brothers the benefit of our expe-
rience. Eventually we will fight in Mexico."
Such expressions of intent forces attention
to the less than reassuring reality of Mexico.
Mexico is neither democratic nor progres-
sive, and its political system is a brittle, one-
party dictatorship based on institutional
demagoguery.
Pressure clouds of urbanization, balloon-
ing population, foreign debt and in-
creasingly pervasive corruption have been
perceived on Mexico's horizon for at least
five years, but few spoke or wrote about
them because to raise the issue of the threat
a destabilized Mexico would pose to the
United States seemed imprudent, and likely
to antagonize Mexican sensibilities. The
better course seemed rather to accentuate
the positive, seeking closer collaboration
with official Mexico, aimed at ameliorating
those pressures. The Carter administra-
tion's ineptitude wasted the opportunity for
this approach, one which held real promise
in the early phase of the L6pez Portillo presi-
dency. Now, well-to-do Mexicans are mov-
ing their money, and in some cases
themselves, to the United States. These
people sense an explosion coming, es-
pecially if Guatemala falls to Marnst-Leni-
nist guerrillas. Mexico could become a new
Lebanon. Upheaval in Central America is
already destabilizing Mexico. There are re-
ports of heightening disagreement between
Mexican military officials responsible for
safeguarding the oil fields and politicians
who support revolutionaries.
Ability to deny Mexican oil to current ma-
jor importers such as Brazil and Japan, or to
Europe in the event of a cut-off of Middle
East suppliers, would enhance the correla-
tion of forces aligned against the West
globally. Even more ominous is the pros-


Illustration by Danine L. Carey.


pect of rampant terrorism and political po-
larization as waves of desperate people,
seeded with agents provocateur, fled
north. A brief glimpse of what US society
would have to grapple with was offered by
the Mariel exodus of Cubans in 1980. Like-
wise, the opposition surfacing among US
Chicano spokesmen to a proposed pro-
gram for national worker ID cards, aimed at
discovering illegal immigrants from south
of the Rio Grande, is but a hint of how
readily American Chicanos might be alien-
ated and polarized by efforts to police their
ethnic brethren.

New Policy Predicates
President Reagan personally, the Re-
publican platform officially, and Reagan-
Bush advisors overwhelmingly recognized
the necessity of establishing new policy
predicates in this hemisphere. The failed
Carter administration was viewed as having
undermined alliances and destabilized al-
lies on the altar of human rights, overlook-
ing the ideological pedigree of those with
whom it league in the cause of liberation
and progress, and ignoring geo-political re-
alities in pursuit of what its new-leftish ana-
lysts called ideological pluralism.
As the Committee of Santa Fe put it in A
New Inter-American Policy for the
Eighties (Council for Inter-American Se-
curity, 1980), "The roots of the present se-
curity dilemma of the United States are in
the early 1960s-the Bay of Pigs fiasco in
1961, followed by the Kennedy-Krushchev
Agreement ending the Cuban missile crisis
of 1962, where the escalation of a threat


beyond what had been previously consid-
ered tolerable brought acceptance of what
had been previously unacceptable. The ap-
parent adoption in Washington of the posi-
tion during the Vietnam War that Latin
America was not strategically, politically,
economically nor ideologically important
further eroded the US position. And the
post-Vietnam detente premises of Presi-
dents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford (that
even an intransigent and disruptive Soviet
Union lacked the capacity to disrupt an in-
temational system now more plural in its
power distribution as it involves China as a
de facto US ally in the containment of the
Soviet Union) became the basis for US
policy.
"President Jimmy Carter's Ibero-Ameri-
can policies, undergirded intellectually by
the reports of the Commission of United
States-Latin American Relations and the In-
stitute for Policy Studies (IPS), are the
culmination of this accommodation pro-
cess whereby Latin America is excluded
from US strategic concems and indepen-
dent Latin American regimes are aban-
doned to extracontinental attacks by the
international Communist movement.
"Latin American governments were well
aware that the Carter administration, upon
taking office, sought to normalize relations
with Cuba. The Commission and IPS re-
ports called for basic changes in the US
approach to Latin America in general and
the Caribbean in particular. Arguing that
military security need not be the overriding
goal and ordering principle for US policy in
Latin America; thatthe United States should
CAIBBEAN IJVIeW/21


S










































Fidel Castro in Havana, 1961. Wide World Photos.


not continue the policy of the isolation of
Cuba; that 'Cuba's material support of sub-
versive movements in other Latin American
countries has diminished in recent years';
that the United States should end the
Cuban trade embargo; and that 'an equita-
ble new agreement with Panama regarding
the Canal would serve US interests not only
in Panama but throughout Latip America,'
the Commission and IPS engineered the
end of the American presence in the Carib-
bean. The Institute for Policy Studies report
was optimistic regarding the socialist gov-
ernments of Jamaica and Guyana and used
the phrase 'ideological pluralism' to en-
courage a receptive US attitude toward pro-
Soviet socialist models of political and eco-
nomic development.
"President Carter had reflected this atti-
tude at his Notre Dame speech in 1977
when he declared thatthe United States had
overcome an 'inordinate fear of commu-
nism.' The pardon of convicted Puerto
Rican terrorists, the casual attitude toward
Fidel Castro's efforts to push the non-
aligned movement substantially closer to
the Soviet world view, and the cordial recep-
tion at the White House in 1979 of three
sandinista members of the Nicaraguan
revolutionaryjunta, which included a mem-
ber trained in Cuba, became characteristic
of US-Latin American policy."
The new Reagan policy was supposed to
be based on a comprehensive ethical real-
ism that would take into account the ele-
ments of social, political and economic
22/CAIBBEAN REVIEW


underdevelopment, which the totalitarian
left exploits, and to apply free market mech-
anisms to their alleviation. Anticipating the
recently announced Caribbean Basin Initia-
tive, the Committee of Santa Fe counseled
that: "The United States must launch a new
positive policy for the greater Caribbean,
including Central America. That policy will
provide multi-faceted aid for all friendly
countries under attack by armed minorities
receiving assistance from hostile outside
forces. The program will wed the most suc-
cessful elements of the Truman Doctrine
and the Alliance for Progress.
"Concurrently, the United States will re-
affirm the core principle of the Monroe Doc-
trine: namely, no hostile foreign power will
be allowed bases or military and political
allies in the region. A revitalized Monroe
Doctrine will be made multilateral-a view
long held by key Latin American republics.
"The United States can no longer accept
the status of Cuba as a Soviet vassal state.
Cuban subversion must be clearly labeled
as such and resisted. The price Havana
must pay for such activities cannot be a
small one. The United States can only re-
store its credibility by taking immediate ac-
tion. The first steps must be frankly punitive.
Cuban diplomats must leave Washington.
Aerial reconnaissance must be resumed.
American tourist dollars must be shut off.
The 1977 fishing agreement, highly advan-
tageous to the Cuban fishing fleet, must be
reassessed.
"The United States must offer the


Cubans clear alternatives. First, it must be
made absolutely clear to the Cuban govern-
ment that if they continue as they have,
other appropriate steps will be taken. Cuba
has been a problem for American policy-
makers for more than two decades. The
problem is no nearer solution today than it
was in 1960-indeed, the problem has
grown to truly dangerous proportions.
Cuba is not only an effective weapon for the
Soviet Union in Africa and the Middle East,
it is also increasingly effective as a force for
subversion of our southem flank-the Car-
ibbean and Central America.
"The Reagan administration must under-
stand that Havana does not want normal
relations except on its terms-terms which
are inimical to the most basic security inter-
ests of the United States and our friends in
the Western Hemisphere. Cuba will not ac-
cept any modus vivendi with this country
that compromises its relationship with the
Soviet Union.
"For more than a decade, Havana's sub-
ordination to Moscow's foreign policy goals
has lifted both Communist powers to new
heights of influence around the world. In
Africa and the Middle East, the Cubans have
supplied the raw military force that keeps
Marxist regimes in power in Angola, Ethi-
opia and South Yemen. These countries in
turn supply Moscow and Havana still further
opportunities in mineral rich south and
central Africa and the oil rich Persian Gulf.
"Meanwhile, Cuban aid to leftwing move-
ments in Nicaragua, El Salvador and
Guatemala have in the last two years turned
Central America into an area of great in-
stability. That in turn presents great oppor-
tunities for both Cuba and the Soviet Union
in Mexico with its oil and Panama with its
canal.
"Finally there remains the glaring prob-
lem of the Soviet Union's growing military
and intelligence presence in Cuba itself.
The Carter administration did nothing
about Soviet pilots flying air defense mis-
sions for Cuba. It did nothing about super-
sonic attack aircraft (MiG 23s) and
submarines being transferred to the Cuban
military. It did nothing about military base
improvements in Cienfuegos and San An-
tonio de los Bafios. It did nothing about
Soviet intelligence facilities near Havana.
"Cuba at some point must be held liable
for working with the Soviets on a successful
policy of subversion and destabilization in
this hemisphere. At the same time, we must
shore up our remaining friends in the area
and carry out, for once, some preventive
measures. Havana must be held to account
for its policies of aggression against its sis-
ter states in the Americas. Among those
steps will be the establishment of a Radio
Free Cuba, under open US government
sponsorship, which will beam objective in-
formation to the Cuban people that, among
other things, details the cost of Havana's


'I










unholy alliance with Moscow. If propaganda
fails, a war of national liberation against
Castro must be launched.
"The second alternative would be to en-
courage the Cubans to make a radical shift
in their foreign policy. Although it is unlikely
that the United States can win the Cubans
away from the Soviet Union, we should
make it clear that if the Cuban-Soviet al-
liance is ended, the United States would be
generous. The Cuban economy is in
ruins-demolished by twenty years of mis-
management and Soviet modeling. US as-
sistance should go well beyond what even
the Castro regime is demanding as an
American step toward normalization of rela-
tions. Thus Havana must be presented with
two clear options. It is free to choose either,
but the United States must carry out the
threat or the promise with equal vigor."

Following Through
The policy parameters on the horizon when
Ronald Reagan assumed office would ap-
pear to be in place, at least rhetorically. The
Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) embodies
rather fully the trade and aid notions con-
tained in A New Inter-American Policy
for the Eighties. To that package has been
added strong support for the initiation of
democratic processes. A policy embellish-
ment that in the wake of recent successfully
conducted elections in Honduras and El
Salvador deserves high praise. On the other
hand, critics from diverse ideological per-
spectives fault the administration for exces-
sively bellicose public rhetoric amid
minimal evidence of actually positioning
the country to follow through. An inter-
agency task force for high-level coordina-
tion of all aspects of the crisis in the Carib-
bean Basin, political, military, and diplo-
matic is still lacking, and as this is written,
Congressmen report that the White House
is applying little muscle on behalf of their
proposed Radio Marti, that would tell
Cubans the truth about Cuba and the world.
More distressing has been the admin-
istration's poorly presented case concern-
ing the nature and extent of Nicaragua's
and Cuba's connection to violence in El
Salvador and elsewhere. Politically, the mo-
mentum passed to opponents of US in-
volvement against the revolutionaries by
the fall of 1981--exactlywhat mid-level offi-
cials wamed would happen months before
unless the administration presented its case
cogently and forcefully. With the White
House's attention obsessively focused on
the battle of the budget, Latin America was
once again relegated to second level offi-
cials, at least some of whom one knows, or
suspects, were more comfortable with Car-
ter than with Reagan policy. The failure lies
in not moving swiftly and effectively from
the conceptualization of policy to its execu-
tion. That lag could very conceivably
achieve exactly the reverse of what was


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NAME INSTITUTION
ADDRESS


intended with the United States ending up
as the guarantor of a communist regime in
Nicaragua after a throw of the negotiating
dice that looks for a politically cheap fix. The
dramatically high tumout of voters in El
Salvador may buy the administration a bit
more time, but a settlement with Nicaragua
about anything other than when they will
live up to their promises of pluralism and
elections will be a setback of major propor-
tions. Washington would, per the Mexican
accommodationist scenario, agree to


squelch anti-sandinista liberation efforts
in exchange for a sandinista promise to
halt the flow of arms, etc., to El Salvador.
Threats and enticements must be judi-
ciously blended and promises be meted out
or else the line Reagan drew in the sand last
year will be blown away like Jimmy Carter's
quickie crisis over the Soviet brigade in
Cuba. In that event the United States could
confront another failed presidency and the
prospects of restoration of US world leader-
ship diminished. LI
CAI BBEAN IVIEW/23























. .4 ..



49 / s s












IL.: -,












The End of the Good



Neighbor Policy


Changing Patterns of US Influence

By Bryce Wood


he history of efforts by the United
States to implant democratic govern-
mental systems in the Caribbean area
is largely one of failure. The early interven-
tions around the turn of the century, were
aimed primarily at the reassertion of the
Monroe Doctrine following the defeat of
Spain. In order to prevent European gov-
ernments from intervening to force the re-
payment of debts, the United States
asserted that it had the right to intervene in
the Dominican Republic for example, to set
up a customs receivership that gradually
-repaid investors. Marines were sent into
Haiti and into Nicaragua to maintain order,
since foreign investments did not thrive in
situations where unrest was chronic.
The principal case where the United
States made an all out attempt to induct a
state into the democratic fold was that of
Nicaragua at the end of the 1920s. The
United States Marines were landed in Nic-
aragua following the outbreak of civil war in
1926. Secretary of State Henry L Stimson
arranged a truce, and proposed that the
Marines would police the country; that elec-
tions be held; and that a non-political force,
the National Guard, be trained to keep the
peace in the future.
The Marines, however, were unable en-
tirely to keep the peace, for a group led by
Augusto Sandino, formed a guerrilla de-
tachment that was able with help from Hon-
duran,sources, to carry out raids and kill a
number of North Americans as well as Nic-
araguans. However, two fair elections were
supervised bythe Marines, and the National
Guard was trained and armed. The Marines
were withdrawn shortly before the inaugu-
ration of Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1933, and
Stimson stated that Nicaragua was well on
its way to becoming a democratic country.
However, Anastasio Somoza, the officer ap-
pointed by the United States to head the
National Guard, used his well-trained
troops to overthrow the elected govern-
ment, and, after arranging for the as-
sassination of Sandino, Somoza estab-
Political scientist Bryce Wood is the author of
Peaceful Change and the Colonial Prob-
lem and The Making of the Good Neighbor
Policy (Columbia University Press), among
other works.


lished himself with such authority that he
and his family ran Nicaragua as though it
were their estate from 1935 to 1979, when a
revolution overturned the system.
This failure to instill even the rudiments of
a democratic regime was preceded by the
announcement of the Good Neighbor pol-
icy in Roosevelt's inaugural address, and
the beginnings of a policy of noninterven-
tion on the part of the United States. The
policy was first established by Roosevelt
and Secretary of State Cordell Hull, when
they refused to send troops to Cuba at the
request of Ambassador Sumner Welles.
Their decision in this case set the precedent
for non-intervention that was not broken
until the CIA-sponsored invasion of
Guatemala in 1954. Not only did the United
States refuse to intervene with troops, but
Secretary Hull announced in 1935 that the
United States would also refrain from inter-
fering in the domestic political affairs of any
Latin American state, on the ground that
such action had been found to result in
intervention. The distinction here was that
intervention meant the landing of troops, or
provision of military assistance to one side
in a civil war; while interference referred to a
whole group of activities ranging from offer-
ing advice, to economic sanctions. Non-
interference was vividly expressed by
Willard L Beaulac, Assistant Chief, Division
of Latin American Affairs, who said in 1936
to a visiting Nicaraguan politician who re-
gretted that he (Beaulac) hesitated to give
any advice on the situation in Nicaragua: "I
said that there was no hesitation at all on my
part; that I was determined not to give him
advice." Thus the United States did nothing
when Somoza's National Guard took over
the government, nor did it do anything to
prevent Rafael Leonidas Trujillo Molina or
Francois Duvalier from consolidating their
dictatorial controls over the Dominican Re-
public and Haiti.
The Good Neighbor policy was never
intended to establish democratic political
institutions in Latin American countries.
The failure of Stimson's policy in Nicaragua
was well recognized, and many are the
statements in diplomatic memoirs and
correspondence that assert that democracy
cannot be 'imposed' upon one country by


another. The Good Neighbor was, first of all,
a negative policy of restraint, imposed upon
itself by the great power, the United States. It
was a basic first step that, to the Latin Amer-
icans, meant that they could look forward to
negotiation, compromise and arrange-
ments, rather than to the blunt use of force
against them by the single great power in
the hemisphere. This meant, on their part,
restraint also, in that they would not ask too
much of the United States in their mutual
dealings. The view was often expressed by
United States diplomats, that the Good
Neighbor policy was not a "one-way street"
but that they expected to be met half-way or
part-way along the street, when interests
clashed. The United States' attitude was
one that anticipated reciprocity, in return for
pledges on its part not to intervene.

Two Cases
The classic case demonstrating these prin-
ciples was offered in March 1938 when
President Lazaro Cardenas of Mexico expro-
priated American and British oil com-
panies. Would the United States use force to
help the companies regain their positions?
It would not, although the argument was
long and hot. The United States at first sent
a note to Mexico through Ambassadot
Josephus Daniels, demanding prompt and
adequate compensation for the expropri-
ated lands. Daniels, fearing the effects of the
note, gave it to the foreign minister, but told
him that he could regard it as not having
been delivered. This meant, in effect, to
Hull's annoyance, that the note was with-
drawn. The Department of State then pro-
posed arbitration of the dispute, a
suggestion that Mexico refused, saying that
its experience with arbitration in compara-
ble cases indicated the expropriator always
lost its case. Hull and Welles finally realized
that the only way in which to secure a settle-
ment was by political negotiation rather
than through juridical procedures. A solu-
tion of this type was facilitated by the desire
of the United States to use Mexican airports
for refueling of planes going to the Panama
Canal. Thus it was, only ten days before
Pearl Harbor, that a settlement was reached
that left the troublesome matter of compen-
sation for the oil companies to a two-man
CAI?BBEAN PlVIE/25










panel-one Mexican and one North Ameri-
can--to determine the issue. Their decision
gave the companies about $23,000,000,
less than a tenth of the $250,000,000
claimed.
This settlement laid the basis for a revi-
sion with the aid of the Department of State,
of Venezuela's share of oil revenues from
that country's production. It was also in this
case that Welles made his famous remark
that the companies must not be permitted,
as had occurred in the Mexican case "to
jeopardize our entire Good Neighbor policy
through obstinacy and short-sightedness.
Our national interests as a whole far out-
weigh those of the petroleum companies."
The latter were thus brought to agree to
increasing Venezuela's share of the income
from oil operations.
By obtaining high marks in Latin Amer-
ica from these two cases, and by its policy of
military and financial assistance to Latin
American governments, the United States
secured the cooperation of all but Argentina
in the war effort. Even in Argentina, which
did not break diplomatic relations with the
Axis until January 1944, and did not declare
war against it until March 1945-un-
becomingly late-its ranchers continued to
ship their precious beef, grains, leather and
other products to United Nations countries
throughout the war.
It is this record of gaining collaboration
from Latin America during World War II that
is commonly cited as indicating that the
Good Neighbor policy was a successful
one. Acceptance of the leadership of the
United States in resisting Japan and Ger-
many was the primary test of inter-Ameri-
can solidarity. Such acceptance was to be
expected from dictators such as Somoza,
Trujillo, Duvalier and Jorge Ubico in
Guatemala. They were aware of the over-
whelming might of the United States, and
rightly managed their foreign and domestic
policies to accord with Washington's. Per-
haps the critical case among dictatorial re-
gimes was that of Getulio Vargas in Brazil,
who had shown signs of cooperating
closely with Germany in trade relations in
the pre-World War II years. However, at the
Rio de Janeiro Conference in January
1942, Vargas decided to join with the sup-
porters of the United States. He broke rela-
tions with the Axis and later declared war;
gave the United States aircraft landing
rights at Natal in Brazil's "bulge"; placed
Brazil's navy under the command of a
United States officer, Admiral Jonas In-
gram; and sent a Brazilian division to fight in
Italy. The United States was certainly not
going to raise issues about human rights or
political freedom with these governments
that were cooperating so closely in the
struggle for survival against the Axis.
When the war had ended, however, new
problems arose in Latin America and the
Caribbean area in particular, along with a
26/CA ?BBEAN vPIEW


new threat-that of the Soviet Union, usu-
ally described as "international commu-
nism." Argentina, which had been admitted
into the United Nations through Herculean
efforts by Secretary of State Edward Stet-
tinius and Assistant Secretary Nelson
Rockefeller, was not fully accepted into the
family of American states until she had
taken action against German individuals re-
garded by Assistant Secretary Spruille
Braden as sources of possible danger to
Argentina and her neighbors. Only then
was it possible to arrange for negotiation of
the Rio Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance in
the autumn of 1947, and for the institu-


The Good Neighbor policy
was never intended to
establish democratic
political institutions in
Latin American countries.



tionalization of the Organization of Ameri-
can States (OAS) through the establish-
ment of the Charter of Bogota in the spring
of 1948.
In the Caribbean, new forces were at
work. Somoza attempted to bring down
Jos6 Figueres who had come to power in
Costa Rica; and the Caribbean Legion aided
by a new liberal regime in Guatemala under
President Juan Jose Ar6valo, tried to orga-
nize raids against Trujillo. These, and other
actions were countered by the OAS, just
beginning to work out its arrangements for
peace-keeping, with the aid of the Inter-
American Peace Committee (IAPC). The
IAPC was capable rapidly of sending some
of its members to the scenes of hostilities to
see what was going on, and to threaten
violators of the non-intervention articles of
the Bogota Charter with joint counter-
action.
The United States strongly supported the
IAPC in these efforts, since the Department
of State considered the use of force as an
element of instability in the Caribbean, and
therefore undesirable. Despite protests that
it was doing nothing to foster democracy in
Nicaragua or the Dominican Republic, the
Department unilaterally maintained a pol-
icy of non-intervention in the Caribbean
countries. In the fall of 1945, Ambassador
Adolf A. Berle had made a speech in Brazil
urging that Vargas hold elections as prom-
ised, which meant the end of Vargas' term in
the presidency. This was regarded in Brazil
as "intervention" in domestic affairs, but it
seemed to have little effect on Vargas, who
was ousted by an army coup on his ap-
pointment of his brother, Benjamin as chief
of police in Rio de Janeiro. The army appar-
ently feared that its officers would be ar-


rested if the appointment went through.
In the Caribbean, however, the non-inter-
vention policy of the Truman administration
was just as "pure" as that which flourished
under President Roosevelt. In 1946 and
1947, Somoza arranged an elaborate cha-
rade in which his successor as president
turned out to be less malleable than
Somoza desired. Somoza thereupon
turned him out with the aid of the National
Guard, and made his uncle Victor Manuel
Roman, president As reported from Man-
agua, Roman was "an amicable, none too
active old gentleman whose best days are
past and whose greatest virtue in the eyes of
General Somoza is his subservience to the
latter." Roman was not recognized by the
United States, and the Department said that
Guillermo Sevilla Sacasa, the Nicaraguan
ambassador in Washington, should know
"that we had absolutely no intention of pick-
ing the next president of Nicaragua." This
policy of non-intervention and non-inter-
ference was accepted as part of the Good
Neighbor policy, and was maintained with
absolute correctness toward Latin America
by the Truman administration until it
handed over the presidency to Dwight D.
Eisenhower in January 1953.

The Policy of Containment
The Caribbean, however, could not be sep-
arated from world developments, the chief
of which was the expansionist effort of the
Soviet Union in the troubled years following
the end of World War II. When in the spring
of 1947, the British government informed
Washington that it could no longer support
the government of Greece in its fight
against Communist irregulars, the Truman
administration consulted with Congress
and the American people, and legislation
was passed that approved massive aid to
Greece and Turkey that resulted in the de-
feat of the Communist forces, and pre-
vented the Soviet Union from gaining
control of the eastern Mediterranean, and
perhaps also of Iran and its oil. This was the
occasion of the application of the Truman
Doctrine and the policy of containment.
The enemy was visible, and the measures to
be taken were obvious, and successful. The
Truman Doctrine was closely followed by
the Marshall Plan, offering the opportunity
to Europe to provide jobs and hope to its
peoples.
In the Americas, communism advanced
in different fashion. In Guatemala, a revolu-
tion in 1944 forced Ubico to flee, and
Ar6valo, the new president, entered upon a
series of intemal reforms of a liberal charac-
ter. He and his successor Jacobo Arbenz,
who carried the reforms further, and expro-
priated lands owned by the United Fruit
Company, found it useful to cooperate with
local Communists, who provided manage-
rial skills in various fields of labor, agricul-
ture and health services. There were no










Communists in Arbenz' cabinet, and only
four in the congress, and it is estimated that
there were fewer than 4000 in the country
as a whole. Nevertheless, the Communists
were able to turn Guatemala's foreign policy
from one that followed the lead of the
United States, to one that followed the lead
of the Soviet Union, notably in the United
Nations. The United States government
protested the United Fruit Company expro-
priations, but this was an issue that probably
could have been solved in much the same
manner as had been found possible for the
Mexican oil dispute. In the circumstances of
the Cold War, it is understandable that a
state of mind expressed by the executive
secretary of the National Security Council,
James S. Lay, Jr., became dominant in
Washington in the 1950s: "It is quite clear
from Soviet theory and practice that the
Kremlin seeks to bring the free world under
its dominion by the methods of the cold
war. The preferred technique is to subvert
by infiltration and intimidation."
Applying this view to the situation in
Guatemala, the Eisenhower administration
determined on a policy of ousting the Ar-
benz government, which appeared to be
cooperating with Communists. In so doing
it made use of a new organization in the
United States, the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA). The CIA had proposed that it
act against Arbenz during the Truman ad-
ministration, but Truman and Secretary of
State Dean Acheson had refused it such
authority. In the Eisenhower administration,
however, with John Foster Dulles as Secre-
tary of State and his younger brother, Allen
Welsh Dulles as Director of the CIA at a
critical period in the Cold War, the president
gave the CIA a go-ahead signal in the late
summer of 1953. The CIA selected Col.


Carlos Castillo Armas, a Guatemalan exile,
to head a group of Guatemalans and others
that would invade Guatemala from Hon-
duras. The -invaders, who would be sup-
ported by aircraft manned by pilots who
were citizens of the United States, and by an
elaborate radio campaign run by a North
American, aimed at the ousting of Arbenz
and his replacement by Castillo Armas.
Secretary Dulles, at a meeting of American
foreign ministers at Caracas in March 1954,
succeeded in getting a resolution passed
condemning the activities of international
communism in the Americas, and calling
for a meeting of foreign ministers to consult


Democracy cannot be
'imposed' upon one
country by another.



on appropriate action in the light of existing
treaties. The vote was 18 to 1 (Guatemala)
with Argentina and Mexico abstaining.
On May 18, a Swedish ship, the Alfhem
unloaded some 2000 tons of arms and mu-
nitions in Puerto Barrios; the arms came
from the Skoda works in Czechoslovakia
and were loaded at Stettin, in Poland. The
Department viewed this development as
one of "gravity," but the Department took
no steps to arrange for a meeting of foreign
ministers, nor did any other American
republic.
On June 17, Castillo Armas and his force
of some 500 men invaded Guatemala. The
Guatemalan army put up only a token re-
sistance. United States planes-P-47s-
dropped some small bombs on Guatemala


City, and the United States radio station in
Honduras exaggerated the strength of the
invaders. Arbenz, on leading that his army
would not fight, and not trusting his air force
whose chief had recently become an exile,
resigned on June 27, giving power to an
army junta, and took asylum in a Latin
American embassy along with some 400 of
his followers. The arms shipment from the
Alfhem had been sequestered by the army,
so there was no armed body of civilians to
support the regime. The Communists did
not organize a guerrilla force, so that there
was practically no fighting after Arbenz' re-
linquishment of power.
Putting Castillo Armas into the presi-
dency required some alert maneuvering by
AmbassadorJohn E. Peurifoy that included
the provision of diplomatic posts in the
United States for two members of a five-
man junta. Arrangements were completed,
however, and Castillo Armas was elected
provisional president on July 7, and the
United States and other governments rec-
ognized his regime on July 13.
The role of the CIA in financing the inva-
sion was a secret, even to senior officers in
the Department of State until April 1954,
and the press carried no indication of the
CIA's activities at the time or for several
years thereafter. While expressing satisfac-
tion over the success of Castillo Armas, it
was the position of Eisenhower, John Fos-
ter Dulles, Peurifoy and Vice President Rich-
ard M. Nixon that "the Guatemalan people
themselves" had risen up against Arbenz. It
was not until the early 1960s that the par-
ticipation of the CIA in the affair was recog-
nized, and not until the late 1970s that
several books were published admitting the
CIA's activities, such as that of David Atlee
Continued on page 54


CABBEAN IJVIEW/27











The Tradition of



Democracy in the



Caribbean

Betancourt, Figueres, Muiioz and the Democratic Left

By Charles D. Ameringer


Democracy in the Caribbean? It is not
a strange concept: for almost thirty
years after the Second World War a
remarkable trio of Caribbean leaders de-
fended and promoted the democratic ideal
with greater consistency than most leaders
outside the region. R6mulo Betancourt of
Venezuela, Jose "Don Pepe" Figueres of
Costa Rica, and Luis Mufioz Marin of Puerto
Rico struggled to establish representative
democracy in their respective homelands
and to aid in its triumph in neighboring
countries as well. They endured the disap-
pointments of the years following World
War II, when the United States switched its
concern from fighting fascism to combat-
ting communism. They persevered during
the dark days of the fifties, when military
dictatorships dominated the region and
threatened to snuff out the democratic
flame completely. They suffered the cruel
twist of fate of the sixties, when the Cuban
Revolution seized the initiative and tried to
cast them in the role of reactionaries and US
lackeys. By the seventies, they had suc-
ceeded through surviving and what they
had accomplished, as fragile as it might be,
provided a hope for the eighties.
A significant factor which contributed to
the success of Betancourt, Figueres, and
Mufioz was the degree to which they shared
a similar notion of democracy. Each main-
tained that the true test of democracy was
its ability to resolve basic economic and
social problems. In this, they acknowledged
an indebtedness to the political philosophy
of the Peruvian leader,Victor Ra6l Haya de la
Torre, the founder of the American Popular
Revolutionary Alliance (APRA). Each

Charles D. Ameringer teaches Latin American
history at the Pennsylvania State University.
He is the author of The Democratic Left in
Exile: The Antidictatorial Struggle in the
Caribbean, 1945-1959 published by The Uni-
versity of Miami Press and Don Pepe: A Polit-
ical Biography of Jose Figueres of Costa
Ricapublished by The University of New Mex-
ico Press.
28/CAIBBcAN PEVIEw


adopted in some form Haya's belief that
representative democracy was the most ef-
fective vehicle for the attainment of equal
economic opportunity and social justice.
They were attracted especially to Haya's
multiclass concept which abhorred the
class struggle and sought instead class har-
mony, working to overcome poverty and
inequality within a democratic order. They
embraced his idea of the responsibility of
the state for social well-being and eco-
nomic development through institu-
tionalized reform and government plan-
ning. They, as he, recognized the right of
private property, but asserted the principle
of government intervention in the econ-
omy, particularly in order to defend basic
economic activity and natural resources
and to assure an equitable distribution of
the fruits of production. They agreed with
Haya that democracy functioned best in a
just society which provided adequate edu-
cation, housing, and health care. Because
they recognized Haya as their intellectual
precursor, they were frequently labelled
"Apristas," but Betancourt argued that,
while their movements had a kinship, they
also had their idiosyncrasies. He preferred
'the term democratic revolutionary, whereas
Figures referred to himself as a social
democrat, and Mufoz adopted the name
popular democrat. They were, in essence,
leaders of the democratic left, a more ap-
propriate term because of its general nature
and the distinct experiences which shaped
the three leaders. However, they all
confessed to being admirers of the US
New Deal.
The three men developed many of their
political ideas during the thirties when the
United States was coping with economic
hard times without sacrificing its demo-
cratic traditions. In referring to the New
Deal, Figueres declared, "If we had been
there, we would have been New Dealers."
Although their admiration for the New Deal
frequently caused them to be criticized as
pro-US, the attitude of the three was more a


recognition of North American liberalism
and the pluralism of the US political system
than an uncritical view of US policies and
actions. Each formed very close relation-
ships with leaders of the US Democratic
party, particularly New Dealers. For Muiioz,
the relationship was the most natural. He
rose to political prominence in Puerto Rico
during the most vigorous period of the New
Deal, and the Popular Democratic party,
which he founded in 1938, was modeled
after that of the Democratic party of Frank-
lin Roosevelt. He learned much about the
art of democratic politics through his asso-
ciation with New Deal administrators Er-
nest Gruening and Rexford Guy Tugwell. In
the case of Figueres, although the circum-
stances were different, he enjoyed an inti-
mate friendship with Adolf Berle, another
New Deal brain truster. This friendship was
transformed into close US-Costa Rican ties
during the administration of John F Ken-
nedy, when Berle served as an adviser for
Latin American affairs. Betancourt's list of
North American confidants was long, but
he was also an avid reader and his own
writings reflected the influence of those of
Robert Sherwood and Harry Hopkins,
among others. He is probably best-known
for his friendship with President Kennedy,
but preceding it, during his exile in the
fifties, he had collaborated with social dem-
ocrat and professor Robert Alexander,
Serafino Romualdi of the American Federa-
tion of Labor, and historian Arthur
Schlesinger, Jr., then prominent in the
Americans for Democratic Action. It is clear
that the three Caribbean leaders were influ-
enced by the main currents of US demo-
cratic thought of the thirties and forties,
including the democratic idealism of World
War II, and they converted it into political
action during the next three decades.

Political Parties
Each of the leaders founded a political
party, which eventually ranked among the
strongest in the Caribbean and gave sub-









































Figures, Mufioz, and Betancourt, 1965. Courtesy Venezuelan Embassy.


stance and permanence to his action.
Mufioz founded the Popular Democratic
party (PPD) in 1938. Although Puerto
Rico's peculiar situation as a US territory at
the time provided most democratic guaran-
tees with reference to civil liberties and
human rights, the matters of self-govem-
ance and representation remained unset-
tled. Originally in favor of independence,
Mufioz came to believe that Puerto Rico's
link with the United States gave it an eco-
nomic advantage, which might be used to
overcome the poverty of the island and fa-
cilitate its development However, his con-
cern for economic development was
matched by his efforts to give Puerto Ricans
greater control over their affairs by electing
their own government and establishing rep-
resentation in the US Congress. In 1948,
Mufioz became the first elected govemor of
Puerto Rico, a post which he held until
1964, and, by means of a compact with the
Truman administration, he was instrumen-
tal in the drafting of the Constitution of
1952. The Constitution of 1952, modeled
after that of the United States, made Puerto
Rico a self-governing democracy and, as
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, re-
solved the status question for the time-
being. Muiioz achieved the commonwealth
status at the polls, giving the proponents of
statehood or independence an equal op-
portunity to express their views. Only when
the Nationalists resorted to violence, did he
draw the line and take stiff measures. Dur-
ing the fifties, when most lands of the Carib-


bean experienced dictatorial rule, Mufioz's
Puerto Rico was one of the few democ-
racies and it provided hope and a haven for
refugees from tyranny. Mufiozs democratic
rule undertook Operation Bootstrap, an
economic development program which in-
cluded agrarian reform and industrializa-
tion and impressive advances in education
and health facilities. Mufioz achieved an
"economic miracle," and friends like
Figures noted that the democratic process
never suffered.
Figures' situation in Costa Rica was
similar to that of Mufioz in that he was able
to build upon a democratic tradition. Costa
Rica had a reputation as a model democ-
racy in Latin America, although growing
economic problems raised the spectre of
dictatorship even in that country during the
1940s. Don Pepe Figueres restored de-
mocracy to Costa Rica in the Civil War of
1948 and, as head of the Founding Junta of
the Second Republic, he enabled Costa
Ricans to write the Constitution of 1949.
The new constitution provided the founda-
tion for one of the most democratic coun-
tries in the world. It severely limited the
powers of the presidency (initially, a presi-
dent could not succeed himself in office
until after eight years had elapsed; later, as
amended, a president could serve only one
four-year term in a life-time). The constitu-
tion enlarged the powers of the legislative
branch and the Supreme Court and created
a "fourth branch," the Supreme Electoral
Tribunal, to monitor the electoral process


independently. It extended the suffrage to
women and to all citizens over eighteen
years of age. The constitution created the
autonomous institutions to regulate and, in
many cases, to perform economic activities
and provide social services, including one
of the most honored educational systems
and one of the most extensive social se-
curity programs anywhere. In 1951,
Figueres,founded the National Liberation
party (PLN), which became Costa Rica's
principal political party. Don Pepe served
two presidencies, in 1953-1958 and
1970-1974, during which he respected the
democratic process, while endeavoring to
improve the well-being of all Costa Ricans,
to the extent of creating a welfare state.
Figures' career has been the most con-
troversial of the three leaders, but there was
never any doubt that he was the archfoe of
the dictators of the Caribbean.
Betancourt's task was the most difficult,
because before his time Venezuela lacked a
democratic experience; but it was also the
most promising, because Venezuela pos-
sessed great natural wealth. Whereas
Puerto Rico and Costa Rica were poor and
provided a weak base for the economic and
social programs of Mufioz and Don Pepe,
Venezuela's oil resources could support
even ambitious projects. Betancourt recog-
nized this early on and made the control of
Venezuela's petroleum reserves the center-
piece of his political action. Betancourt
founded the Democratic Action (AD) party
in 1941 and helped to shape it into one of
CAIBBEAN IeVIEW/29









Latin America's premier parties. Betancourt
became provisional president of Venezuela
in 1945 following the overthrow of General
Isaias Medina Angarita by a group of junior
army officers. Betancourt was apologetic
that he first came to power by force of arms.
During this presidency, Betancourt oversaw
the drafting of the Constitution of 1947,
which provided for Venezuela's first demo-
cratic government through individual guar-
antees, universal suffrage, and the direct
election of the president. Betancourt's ad-
ministration and the constitution encoun-
tered difficulties, however, because of the
commitment to economic and social re-
form, including efforts to improve the status
of labor and measures to govern the exploi-
tation of sub-surface wealth. Betancourt's
most famous action was the 50-50 split of
the oil profits between the government and
the private oil companies (mostly foreign-
owned) to enable the state to develop the
rest of the economy and provide social ser-
vices. Betancourt called it, "sowing the oil."
Despite the fact that R6mulo Gallegos,
AD's candidate for president in the 1947
elections, won Venzuela's first democratic
election, democracy was too weak, particu-
larly for all the changes taking place, and
the military seized power again within a
year.
Betancourt and AD spent almost a dec-
ade in exile, but they kept the democratic
spirit alive through a resistance that was
non-violent and heroic. A small AD under-
ground within Venezuela engaged in propa-
ganda and exposed the dictatorship's
repression. In exile, Betancourt marshalled
international public opinion against the dic-
tator Marcos Perez Jimenez through collab-
oration with organizations concerned with
human rights, labor, and the press. When
the dictatorship fell in January 1958, Betan-
court returned to Venezuela and won the
presidential election in December of the
same year. Betancourt and AD were be-
deviled by both the right and the left (Fidel
Castro had come to power in Cuba at vir-
tually the same time), but Betancourt per-
severed and served out his full term, the first
democratically-elected president to do so in
the history of Venezuela. That achievement
alone was enough to give democracy the
momentum for the next two decades in
Venezuela. The achievements of Betan-
court, Figueres, and Mufoz for democracy
in each of their states were important in
themselves, but acting as a team they were
a powerful combination.

Mutual Support
In fact, the success of these three leaders
may well have rested upon the support they
gave each other. Not only did they believe
that democracy had to overcome eco-
nomic and social injustice to be effective,
but that it had to eliminate dictatorship.from
the Caribbean to be secure. The three men
30/CAI?BBeAN I"VIE7


met for the first time in Havana in 1951,
along with other democratic leaders of
Latin America and the United States, where
they founded the Inter-American Associa-
tion for Democracy and Freedom (IADF)
dedicated to the defense of democracy and
a militant antidictatorial position. Figures
had come to power in Costa Rica with the
aid of Dominican, Nicaraguan, and Hon-
duran exiles and had pledged in return to
help them liberate their homelands from
such tyrants as Anastasio Somoza and
Rafael Trujillo. The filibustering activities of
the so-called Caribbean Legion proved
futile, but in 1952, when Fulgencio Batista


They all confessed to
being admirers of the US
New Deal.



seized power in Cuba, and Betancourt left
his exile there and fled to Costa Rica, Betan-
court and Figueres began a close
collaboration.
Don Pepe gave Betancourt and otherAD
exiles his full support. He permitted Betan-
court to set up a clandestine radio transmit-
ter for communication with the AD
underground in Venezuela. Recognizing the
difficulty of military action against the
powerful dictators, Somoza, Batista, Trujillo,
and Perez Jim6nez, Figueres and Betan-
court endeavored to keep alive the hope for
democracy and to alleviate the hardship of
the captive peoples by enlisting the support
of the IADF in the area of human rights; the
Inter-American Regional Organization of
Labor (ORIT), with its AFL-CIO affiliates, in
the field of free labor development; and the
Inter-American Press Association (IAPA) in
the matter of press freedoms. They hoped
also that these organizations might influ-
ence the policy of the United States. Betan-
court and Figueres criticized US Secretary
of State John Foster Dulles as being overly
concerned about communism in the Carib-
bean and, hence, placing a premium upon
stability, which, in effect, favored the dicta-
tors. They described this policy as sterile,
arguing that the most effective means of
opposing communism was through erad-
ication of the poverty and injustice upon
which it could breed. Don Pepe incurred the
wrath of Dulles when he boycotted the
Tenth Inter-American Conference in Car-
acas in 1954. Dulles wanted to make the
conference a platform for condemning the
pro-Communist regime of Jacobo Arbenz
in Guatemala, but Betancourthad been agi-
tating for a boycott of the meeting in the
hope of securing the release of political
prisoners in Venezuela. Although the demo-
cratic leaders of the Caribbean assiduously
avoided contacts with Arbenz's Guatemala,


Figures felt it was essential for someone to
bear a democratic witness, and Costa Rica
refused to attend.
The fifties were a dangerous time for
such gestures, because the dictators domi-
nated the decade, and Somoza, Trujillo, and
Perez Jim6nez plotted Don Pepe's over-
throw. In January 1955, they sponsored an
exile invasion by his enemies from Nic-
aragua, but, although Costa Rica had no
army, Figueres had friends in the United
States. Despite the fact that the US State
Department looked upon him as a "trouble-
maker," Don Pepe's reputation as a demo-
crat rallied such North American liberals as
Berle and Senator Paul Douglas of Illinois to
his side. The United States, acting through
the Organization of American States, res-
cued Costa Rica in this instance, but
demanded that Betancourt leave Costa
Rica as a condition, in order to "reduce
tensions."
Betancourt established his new exile in
Puerto Rico, where perhaps the State De-
partment believed itcould watch him better,
but Mufioz was in no mood to restrict his
friend. Out of respect for Mufioz's position,
Betancourt was more discreet. Nonethe-
less, he wrote a book, traveled frequently to
Mexico City and New York to lecture and
consult with sympathetic political leaders
and other exiles, and established himself as
the democratic conscience of the Carib-
bean. Mufioz protected him from would-be
assassins sent by Trujillo and P6rezJim6nez
and permitted him to travel freely and re-
ceive friends. The times were less conspir-
atorial, but Betancourt was ready to pick up
where he had left off when P6rez Jim6nez
was overthrown in January 1958.
The end of the fifties brought a new phase
in the collaboration of the democratic tri-
umvirate. The dictators were in their so-
called twilight, for which Betancourt,
Figures, and Mufioz could take much
credit, but a new challenger from the left,
Fidel Castro, threatened to be the principal
beneficiary. During the difficult times of the
fifties, the three friends noted that both the
dictators and the Communists were orga-
nized internationally, butthat the democrats
lacked any such network. They undertook
to remedy this situation through the estab-
lishment of the Inter-American Institute of
Political Education in 1959 in Costa Rica
following a meeting of the leaders of the
three parties (AD, PLN and PPD), along
with those of other parties of the democratic
left of Cuba, the Dominican Republic,
Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama,
and Peru, plus representatives of Norman
Thomas's Institute of International Labor
Research (IILR) of New York. The Institute in
Costa Rica was a leadership training school
for youthful members of the participating
political parties, offering courses in political
organization, mobilization, and tactics, plus
a point of contact for the parties to analyze









together the problems of Latin America and
plan strategies for their solution. The In-
stitute also published a bi-monthly joumal,
Combate, for the exchange of views and
the dissemination of the ideas of the demo-
cratic left. In this endeavor the Caribbean
democrats were finally joined by the United
States.
Even before Castro's coming to power in
Cuba, the Eisenhower administration had
begun to reevaluate its policy in the Carib-
bean. The attack upon Vice President Rich-
ard Nixon in Caracas in May 1958, in which
a crowd stoned and spat upon his motor-
cade, awakened many North Americans.
Don Pepe himself explained the meaning of
the episode to a committee of the House of
Representatives. You cannot spit on a for-
eign policy, he said, which is what the crowd
in Caracas meant to do. From this point on,
the Eisenhower administration began to
disassociate itself from the Caribbean's au-
thoritarian leaders and to lend support to
the democratic camp. The only trouble was
that, except for vague generalities, it con-
cealed this change of attitude and aided the
democrats covertly. It used the Central Intel-
ligence Agency to channel funds to the In-
stitute in Costa Rica, employing the Kaplan
Fund (a private foundation) and Thomas's
IILR as conduits for the covert funding.
When this activity was subsequently ex-
posed, it brought some discredit upon the
Institute and its founders, but this so-called
"triple-pass" of funds concealed the source
even from the recipients. Figures, who
knew about the origin of the funds, made
no excuses; he pointed out that the demo-
cratic leaders had tried for years to influ-
ence North American policy in their favor
and that if the United States, for reasons of
its own, wished to conceal its role, that was
its choice, as long as there were no strings
attached. Figures told Betancourt that no
leader of the democratic left would ever be a
Castillo Armas (Colonel Carlos Castillo
Armas led the CIA-sponsored invasion of
Guatemala in 1954).
When the CIA's activity became more
militantly anti-Castro, culminating in the
Bay of Pigs, the democratic leaders of the
Caribbean had no part in it Although Be-
tancourt, Figueres, and Mufioz had close
ties with leaders of the Cuban Autentico
party, such as Carlos Prio Socarras and Au-
reliano Sanchez Arango, they did not con-
spire in the overthrow of Castro, but rather
competed with him for the liberation of the
other countries of the Caribbean. In this
way, the Institute was not a tool of the CIA for
getting rid of Castro, but a base of support
for Pedro Joaquin Chamorro of Nicaragua,
Ram6n Villeda Morales of Honduras, and
Juan Bosch and Angel Miolan of the Do-
minican Republic. This reality became
more apparent during the presidency of
John F Kennedy, who adopted a more open
and statesman-like policy.


In many respects, Kennedy's Alliance for
Progress was a vindication of the struggle of
the democratic left. It recognized that the
most effective means of promoting democ-
racy was through significant change in eco-
nomic and social conditions. When
President Kennedy announced the Al-
lanza, he made direct reference to the lead-
ership of Betancourt, Figueres, and Mufioz.
He made Venezuela a "showcase" for dem-
ocratic reform, where Betancourt survived
an assassination plot by Trujillo and leftist
terrorism sponsored by Castro. In the OAS,
the United States condemned equally the
interventionism of Trujillo and Castro. De-


Betancourt and AD spent
almost a decade in exile,
but they kept the
democratic spirit alive
through a resistance that
was non-violent and heroic.



mocracy made strides, with the election of
Villeda Morales in Honduras and Juan
Bosch in the Dominican Republic. Al-
though Bosch proved a disappointment as
a leader, his party, the Dominican Revolu-
tionary party (PRD), sustained for years in
exile by the Caribbean three, eventually es-
tablished democracy in the post-Trujillo era.
Villeda's Liberal party after his death trod an
equally winding path, but has remained via-
ble in Honduras's uncertain political order.
The murder of President Kennedy dealt a
severe blow to the Caribbean's democratic
left, because none of his successors pos-
sessed that quality which earned for Ken-
nedy the label, simpatico. Kennedy's death
tended to mark the decline in the influence
of the Caribbean's three democratic states-
men, although they were already sensing
that it was time for them to go.

Honoring the Process
One of the most important contributions
That Betancourt, Figueres, and Muiioz
made to democracy was the manner in
which they honored its process. They set an
example of how democracy was supposed
to work. They were deeply committed to
programs of economic and social change,
but they never permitted that commitment
to take precedence over the decisions of the
ballot box. Betancourt was the first demo-
cratically-elected president of Venezuela to
serve his full term and to pass his office
along to an elected successor. Although
that successor was Rauil Leoni, the candi-
date of the AD party, five years later Leoni
delivered his office to the new president,
Rafael Caldera, who represented the op-


position Christian Democratic (COPEI)
party. Following that milestone, COPEI and
AD have alternated in power. The situation
has been similar in Costa Rica. Ever since
its founding in 1951, on only one occasion
(in 1974) has the PLN succeeded itself in
the presidency. During the last thirty years,
the PLN has been out of the presidential
office almost as much as it has occupied it,
although it has been more consistent in
controlling the legislative branch. When the
PLN suffered its first setback in the presi-
dential election of 1958, Don Pepe ac-
cepted it gracefully, affirming, "he who does
not know how to lose, ought not take part in
a democratic contest." At the same time,
Mufioz consoled Figueres, noting that the
defeat could be "a blessing in disguise." He
remarked that his own party had never lost
an election and suggested that it might
have been better for it to have suffered a
defeat early in its development, observing
that defeat forces a party to rethink its ideas
and helps to overcome complacency.
Mufioz did not foresee that his party's suc-
cesses would, in fact, diminish, because the
PPD has only won the governorship twice
since 1964, when Muiioz stepped down,
refusing to run for a fifth term. In the same
way that each of these leaders respected the
democratic process, each recognized the
importance for the future of democracy to
know when to step aside.
Betancourt, Figueres, and Mufioz were
the founders and charismatic figures of
their respective parties, but they were aware
of the dangers of personalism in Caribbean
politics. In 1964, when Betancourt trans-
mitted the presidency to Leoni, he left Vene-
zuela and undertook a self-imposed exile in
Italy and Switzerland, in order not to cast his
giant shadow upon his successor. At that
time, he wrote to Figueres: "We have
finished the work of governing; now our
responsibility and what we have to do is put
our message in writing." Betancourt did
write extensively and, although he even-
tually returned to Venezuela, it was in the
role of elder statesman and Senator-for-life
(an office which the Venezuelan constitution
bestowed upon ex-presidents), never again
as a candidate or maximum leader of AD.
Mufioz also retired from electoral politics in
1964 after sixteen years as Governor. It
would be naive to say that he did not remain
influential politically, but it was not as a per-
sonalist leader--his most active role was in
support of continuing Puerto Rico's com-
monwealth status in a referendum in 1967
against the advocates of statehood or inde-
pendence. Following the decision to retain
the commonwealth status, Muiioz visited
Betancourt in Switzerland. Figures joined
them and quipped that the Caribbean "had
not exploded," even though all of them were
absent.
History may judge that Figueres was the
Continued on page 55
CA1?BBEAN "IlE1W/31













Hegemonic Tolerance


International Competition in the Caribbean and

Latin America

By Martin C. Needler


he United States is the dominant
power in the Caribbean, but US power
is not absolute. Other governments,
and non-government actors of other na-
tionalities, have always been important
there, although the character of their pres-
ence has changed and is changing. The
precise character of the US role as well as
the way in which the US dominance makes
itself effective, needs specifying.
The traditional limits to the range of US
hegemony in the Caribbean, in the form of
the dominance of European colonial gov-
ernments or the autonomy of local oligar-
chies, have been in rapid decline. Yet at the
same time new challenges to hegemony
are developing more appropriate to an era
characterized on the one hand by popular
mobilization and participation, and on the
other by the development of poles of eco-
nomic growth outside the United States.
These challenges consist of 1) the greater
autonomy in national policies made possi-
ble for two medium-size powers of the re-
gion, Mexico and Venezuela, by their
possession of vast supplies of oil "Oil
acts as Mexico's guarantee," as Jose L6pez
Portillo has put it; 2) the greater responsive-
ness to their own populations on the part of
national governments, growing out of
heightened popular mobilization; 3) the
greater influence of European powers other
than Britain as Continental economies be-
come stronger. Of course the greatest chal-
lenge to US hegemony in the region has
been Cuba's manipulation of superpower
rivalry to place a Soviet shield over her se-
cession from the sphere of US influence.
But that seems a unique event, whose suc-
cess has made the US doubly unwilling to
tolerate movement in the same direction by
another country, and therefore likely to re-
sort to the most extreme measures to pre-
vent its happening.

Martin C. Needler teaches political science at
the University of New Mexico. Among his
works are Political Development in Latin
America: Instability, Violence and Evolu-
tionary Change (Random House, 1968), Pol-
itics and Society in Mexico (University of
New Mexico Press, 1971).
32/CAIBBEAN PrVIEW


European Influence

Leading among the European influences
newly making themselves felt in Latin
America is that of Germany, whose 20th
century rise to world superpower status was
only interrupted, not ended, by defeat in two
wars, and has been moderated only slightly
by postwar division. One of the more im-
pressive processes of peaceful democra-
tization, the liberalization of Brazil's military-
dominated political system over the last 10
years, has been partly motivated by the
need to obtain constitutional respectability
in order to qualify for West German aid for
the country's nuclear-development
program.
The principal German influence in the
region, however, is not government to gov-
ernment, but party to party. Strikingly, just as
political parties in Latin America called
themselves Conservative or Liberal in the
era of British predominance, today the
area's parties increasingly define them-
selves as Social Democratic or Christian
Democratic, like the two principal parties in
West Germany. The region's airports wit-
ness a procession of the leading lights of
'the Socialist International Mario Soares,
Bruno Kreisky, Felipe Gonzalez, Olof Palme,
and especially Willy Brandt. Parties that in
the Kennedy era identified themselves with
the "democratic left" have now redefined
themselves as Social Democratic and
joined the International: Acci6n Demo-
cratica in Venezuela, the Partido Revolu-
cionario Dominicano in the Dominican
Republic, and Liberaci6n Nacional in
Costa Rica.
Fewer parties are being bom again as
Christian Democratic today because par-
ties with that label had largely already been
franchised in the 1940s and '50s, under
French, and sometimes Spanish or Italian,
influence. The Christian Democrats already
held power in the 1960s in Chile and Vene-
zuela. But something of the same effect is
occurring with Christian Democrats as with
Social Democrats, with Joaquin Balaguer
in the Dominican Republic, for example,
deciding that his Partido Reformista
Would be reorganized as a Christian Demo-
cratic party, much to the disgust of the small


Partido Revolucionario Social Cris-
tiano, who consider themselves the legiti-
mate representatives of Christian democ-
racy in that country.
The main factor in parties' identifying
themselves with one or the other banner is
surely ideological stylishness. But grubbier
motives should not be overlooked. The
German political parties are generous in
financing co-religionaries abroad, usually
through their respective foundations, the
Socialist Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung and
the Christian Democratic Konrad-Ade-
nauer-Stiftung. (The Liberal Free Demo-
crats have the Friedrich-Naumann-
Stiftung, likewise named after a party pa-
tron saint, but have fewer resources and
fewer clients.) The development of these
party internationals provides international
support for democratic forces in Latin
America independent of the United States
and may play a constructive role. If a solu-
tion short of genocide by stages is ever
reached for El Salvador, for example, it may
well be through the mediation of foreign
Socialists and Christian Democrats, who
have traveled frequently to the region to try
to arrange a peaceful outcome to the coun-
try's slow-motion civil war.


Popular Participation
The great demographic and psychological
changes of the twentieth century have
made it more difficult to operate regimes of
pure exploitation. Mass mobilization and
heightened political consciousness have
made the lower classes increasingly assert-
ive and begun to give relevance to the
promises made in the constitutions written
during the independence years and rewrit-
ten countless times since then, of equality,
liberty, and democracy. An important factor
in the attitudinal changes that have taken
place, particularly among peasants and ag-
ricultural laborers, has been the progressive
movement within the Roman Catholic
Church, a movement of consciousness-
raising and grass roots mobilization which
has recovered some of the original mean-
ings of Christianity, instead of regarding
conformity to the requirements of ritual as
the total obligation of the believer. Hard-line




























































1981, The Miami Herald. Reprinted by permission.


last-ditch defenders of the status quo un-
derstand this change in the Church. It is not
for nothing that the paramilitary forces and
hit squads of the Salvadoran Right have
killed Jesuits, American nuns, and even the
archbishop.
In many countries of the region, rising


mass demands have passed the point
where they can be met, or even palliated,
out of any increases in national income that
have been occurring. Increasingly, there-
fore, the possibility is raised of policies that
will redistribute income and wealth, pol-
icies, that is, which threaten the economic


well-being of upper status groups. Es-
pecially in Central America, governments
are therefore called into being with the man-
date of repressing mass participation and
demands and of crushing labor organiza-
tion and peasant mobilization. The United
Continued on page 56
CAI?BBEAN FEVI6W/33


EM... MAKEW
1 TEC-RIB"EAN

L------













The Christian Democrats



in Latin America

The Fight for Democracy

By Ricardo Arias Calderbn


/ he number one problem in Latin
America is called 'dictatorship'
and its solution 'democracy,'"
states the Manifesto of Christian Democ-
racy to the Peoples of Latin America,
approved at the Xth Congress of the Chris-
tian Democratic Organization of America
(ODCA), held in Caracas in December of
last year. To understand the perspective
within which the statement was made, it is
necessary to consider the development of
Christian Democracy as a political force in
Latin America and to analyze its ideological
outlook as it faces the decade of the '80s.
At present, 19 parties or political move-
ments are full members of the Christian
Democratic Organization of America. Full
members are the Christian Democratic par-
ties or movements of: Argentina, Bolivia,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Curacao,
Chile, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nic-
aragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Sur-
iname, Uruguay and Venezuela. Several
others have taken part in its activities. The
early development of Christian Democracy,
as a Latin American political force, took
place in the late '40s and mid-'50s, particu-
larly in South America. In the late '50s and
early '60s, it extended both to the Central
American Isthmus and to the Spanish-
speaking Caribbean. Presently, there are in-
dications that parties from the English-
speaking Caribbean might establish ties
with ODCA At the Xth Congress, 18 full
members sent delegations, and the list of
special guests included representatives of
approximately 16 other Latin American par-
ties which, while not necessarily social-
Christian in their explicit outlook, neverthe-
less maintain some degree of convergence
with Christian Democratic parties.
This development of Christian Democ-

Ricardo Arias Calderdn is president of the
Christian Democratic Party of Panama, and
president of the Christian Democratic Organi-
zation of America (ODCA). He holds a docto-
rate in philosophy from the Universitd de Paris
and has taught at universities in Panama,
Chile, Venezuela, and the United States. He
was academic vice president at Florida Inter-
national University, while obliged for political
reasons to work outside his own country.
34/CAIBBEAN KIVIW


racy in Latin America has involved respon-
sibility for the executive branch of
government in several countries. This oc-
curred in Chile under President Eduardo
Frei (1964-1970) and in Venezuela under
President Rafael Caldera (1968-1973). It is
happening again in Venezuela under Presi-
dent Luis Herrera (1978-1983), in El Sal-
vador under president of the Revolutionary
Junta Jose Napole6n Duarte (since 1980),
and in Ecuador where Vice President Os-
valdo Hurtado became president
(1981-1985) after the accidental death of
President Jaime Rold6s.
Participation of Christian Democrats in
the legislative branch of government has
also been quite significant. Suffice it to
mention in this respect that in Argentina,
Jose Antonio Allende was president of the
Senate; in Suriname, Emile Wijntuin was
president of Parliament; and in Costa Rica,
Rafael Grillo was president of the Chamber
of Deputies.
An overview of political life in Latin Amer-
ica today reveals, moreover, several coun-
tries in which Christian Democrats play an
important and even decisive role in opposi-
tion. In Guatemala, the Christian Demo-
cratic Party was the largest member of the
Opposition Union, which supported Ale-
jandro Maldonado Aguirre as the presiden-
tial candidate of the democratic center in
the recent elections and obtained the votes
of nearly a third of the electorate. In Pan-
ama, the Christian Democratic Party ob-
tained 21% of the vote in the last partial
legislative elections held in 1980. In Colom-
bia, the Christian Democratic Party and
Asamblea Nacional de Oposicidn Popu-
lar have given their support to Belisario
Betancur, the Conservative Party's candi-
date for president. In Brazil, the Christian
Democratic leader Andre Franco Montoro,
who is a prominent member of the opposi-
tion Brazilian Democratic Movement be-
came senator from Sao Paulo with over five
million votes, the largest number obtained
by any legislator in the history of that coun-
try, and is a very strong candidate for the
governorship of his state. In Argentina, the
Christian Democratic Party, once again uni-
fied, has joined the Justicialista Party, the
Radical Party and two other parties in the


Multiparty Organization, to foster a civilian
alternative to the military. In Chile, the im-
portance of the Christian Democrats in the
resurgence of the labor movement and the
crowds which gathered for the funeral of ex-
President Frei, last January, reveal the con-
tinued role of that party as the principal
force of the democratic opposition.
Throughout Latin America, Christian
Democrats have given witness to their per-
sistent fight for democracy in the face of
totalitarian, dictatorial or authoritarian re-
gimes: often persecuted, as in Bolivia, Nic-
aragua, Panama, Suriname and Uruguay;
many times imprisoned, as in Cuba, Haiti
and Paraguay; exiled, as in Brazil and Chile,
and even killed, as in El Salvador and
Guatemala. The development of Christian
Democracy as a political force has required
the sacrifice of the security, the freedom, the
right to homeland and even the life of party
members and leaders. Seldom has this fact
even been recorded, much less recognized.

An Instrument for Cooperation
ODCA is the instrument for cooperation
between full member parties and between
them and other friendly parties. It was born
out of a meeting held in 1947, in Mon-
tevideo, between Dardo Regules of Uru-
guay, Eduardo Frei of Chile, Manuel V.
Ordofiez of Argentina and Alceu Amoroso
Lima of Brazil. Since then, it has held ten
congresses.
The organization represents a commu-
nity of partieswhich share a unified ideolog-
ical outlook, drawn from social-Christian
thought, and which cooperate with each
other while maintaining their indepen-
dence in analyzing their respective realities
and in making their respective decisions. As
it has become better structured and much
more active in recent years, in response to
the demands of member parties and to the
growing political interdependence of Latin
America, ODCA furthers cooperation in
many different areas: (1) In the area of the
elaboration and development of the shared
ideological vision; (2) In the area of the for-
mulation and promotion of strategic ten-
dencies respectful of the variety of
situations; (3) In the area of the preparation
and implementation of events of continued





































Aristides Calvini, Secretary General of ODCA.

political education, of general and spe-
cialized scope, for top-level and mid-level
leaders; (4) In the area of technical advice in
organization, education, public opinion and
electoral planning; (5) In the area of the
exchange and discussion of information
and experiences; (6) In the area of interper-
sonal relations and of solidarity in cases of
persecution, imprisonment, exile and vio-
lent death.
The Executive Committee of the Organi-
zation, elected at the Xth Congress, in-
cludes the following: President: Ricardo
Arias Calder6n, from Panama; Vice Presi-
dents: Francisco Cerro, from Argentina;
Rafael Grillo, from Costa Rica; Juan Pablo
Moncagata, from Ecuador; Jesuis Permuy,
from Cuba. Member: Juan Resck, from Par-
aguay. Secretary General: Aristides Calvani,
from Venezuela. Also included, on an ad-
visory basis, are two representatives from
each of three complementary organiza-
tions: the Christian Democratic Labor Front
(FETRALDC), the Christian Democratic
Youth (JUDCA) and the Christian Demo-
cratic Women (MUDCA). The offices of
ODCA are presently in Caracas.
ODCA is one of the two regional organi-
zations of the World Christian Democratic
Union (UMDC), the other being the Euro-
pean Christian Democratic Union (UEDC),
which has 14 member parties or political
movements. Full members are the Chris-
tian Democratic parties or movements of:
Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, France, Ger-
many, Holland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg,
Norway, Portugal, San Marino, Spain and
Switzerland. Several parties from Asia and
Africa have developed direct ties with the
World Christian Democratic Union.


Eduardo Frei Montalva, former president of Chile.
In summary, Christian Democracy repre-
sents in Latin America a strong political
force, present throughout nearly all of the
continent and vigorous in its development,
which has included both major govern-
ment responsibilities and very significant
roles in opposition. It is increasingly well
organized, within a unified ideological out-
look, for cooperation between member par-
ties and with other friendly parties of the
region. In a more indirect manner, it is re-
lated to similar parties of Europe and, to a
lesser extent, of other continents.

A Humanist Manifesto
The Manifesto of Christian Democracy
to the Peoples of Latin America, ap-
proved at the Xth Congress, begins at the
level of theoretical discussion with a reaffir-
mation of humanism: "As Christian Demo-
crats we believe that the essential
theoretical problem of our times is knowing
how to define oneself between humanism
and antihumanism. Those who represent
contemporary bourgeois classes say that
we are utopian; those who call themselves
the spokesmen of the proletarian classes
accuse us of proposing an abstract ideal.
Both sides take positions within the limits of
a narrow class conception. They insist on
saying that history advances only on the
impulse of force under the conditions of
previous force. For this reason, the former
have recourse to the economically powerful
classes which retain power; the latter use
violence to overturn (existing power) and to
maintain, thereafter, a totalitarian state. Yet
these developments are accompanied by
the general crises of the contemporary ex-
periences of capitalism and socialism....
"Such consequences stimulate a re-
surgence of humanism. Wherever there is
oppression or inequality, the objectives of
the oppressed human being relate them-
selves to humanist ideas.
"The aspiration of the oppressed tends to
find liberties, autonomies, rights, forms of
community life, sentiments of solidarity and
of pluralist recognition, attitudes of collab-
oration, unity of the peoples in favor of inter-
nal and external peace. Society comes to be


regarded as the union of all men" (art. 2).
The resurgence of humanism, as a re-
sponse to a general crisis, leads to two basic
commitments. The first is the commitment
to respect human rights, when in power,
and to fight for them, when in opposition.
This respect is rooted in the "philosophy of
person" which Christian Democracy pro-
fesses, in the perspective of Jacques Mari-
tain's "integral humanism" with its Judeo-
Christian inspiration. This respect is to be at
the foundation of all programs of reform,
and democracy itself is to be conceived as
the progressive realization of these rights at
the political, cultural and economic levels.
Moreover, the respect for human rights
must serve to define political friends and
adversaries.
Humanism leads, furthermore, to an-
other commitment: the choice in favor of
the poor, for poverty cannot be accepted
when it is the result of neglect or of injustice.
"There must never be a concession in this
field, nor in the defense of human rights, for
both are indissolubly joined" (art. 4).
Humanism, thus conceived, motivates a
rejection of terrorist violence. The theory of
rebellion against a tyrant and the juridical
concepts of the state of need and of legiti-
mate defense remain valid. But violence in
the contemporary world has become
something else, namely terrorist violence:
the terrorism of the state or that against the
state, which "not only use dehumanized vi-
olence, but moreover seek as their objective
to maintain a state of things founded on it"
(art. 5).
To create conditions of solidarity in order
for society to understand justice and free-
dom, is an alternative to dehumanized vio-
lence, and when rebellion might be justified,
a condition for it to be an advance towards
democratic community. For this reason,
Christian Democrats reject armed groups
on the left and the right which believe in the
permanence of violence and generate dic-
tatorships of one sort or the other.
From the point of view of humanism, the
Manifesto addresses two reproaches to tra-
ditional socialism. On the theoretical level,
socialism, unlike Christian humanism, has
CAl?BBEAN I IEW/35










failed to consider adequately the human
person and, consequently, human rights. It
does not explain "how society has priority
over the individual and how, inversely, cer-
tain aspects of the latter must be respected
by society in order to be truly human" (art.
7). Socialist theory presents itself as hu-
manist, but has not reflected on man as
person. On the political level, socialism
moves unconsciously from the position of
anarchist individualism to that of totalitaria-
nism. It really has no theory of democracy,
and jumps, therefore, from denying it as
something merely formal or relative, to
turning it into an absolute identical with a
self-defined Socialist regime.
To the extent that socialism liberates itself
from totalitarianism and deepens its notion
of the rights of the individual vis-a-vis the
state, and vice versa, Christian Democrats
will not find it difficult to collaborate with
socialists. But it should be clear that "the
inhumanism of today will not be supplanted
by another form of inhumanism with the
support of Christian Democrats" (art. 7).
There is no necessary incompatibility be-
tween theologies of liberation or of revolu-
tion and Christian Democratic views. But
some of these theologies actually assume
classical socialism as its basic idea. This
leads them to an acceptance of historical
materialism and to an identification with
governments, such as that of Cuba, for ex-
ample, or with armed movements or with
whatever events the left happens to support
at a given moment. Their mistake lies in the
loss of the concept of democracy and of
human rights as universal values.

The Fight for Democracy
At the level of political discussion, the Man-
ifesto concentrates all its attention on the
fight for democracy. The content of democ-
racy is identified in terms of three principles:
the respect for human rights; the affirma-
tion that free, regular elections, while not the
"whole" of democratic participation, are
fundamental to it; and the public character
of all governmental activity, as well as the
responsibility of all governmentalagents. It
is also identified with the validity of certain
institutions and organizations: the revalua-
tion of parties as organs of political media-
tion; the independence of the legislative and
the judiciary; freedom of the media, as well
as free access to them by representative
sectors of the community; and freedom of
labor unions and of other intermediary as-
sociations and groups.
Fighting for democracy encompasses
different situations. It includes the fight to
maintain democracy where it exists, some-
thing which requires distinguishing political
liberties from traditional vices, and estab-
lishing with clarity the limit between liberty
and anti-democratic subversion and vio-
lence. The very notion of human rights in-
volves the recognition of society's or the
36/CAfIBBEAN PEVIEW


state's needs for defense against the crime
of subversion, for only in a society orga-
nized with legitimate authorities and
through a system of law enforced by the
state can the human rights of all citizens be
guaranteed.
The fight for democracy is all the more
dramatic when its aim is to establish de-
mocracy where it does not exist. In such
cases, it is important to realize that democ-
ratization is a process, not a simple act.
Support should be given, therefore, to steps
in this direction, even under dictatorships,
when these steps really represent the initial
takeoff of such a process. Christian Demo-


"The number one problem
in Latin America is called
'dictatorship' and its
solution 'democracy.'"


crats consider it "a grave error against de-
mocracy, for political parties to refuse to
give their support to an important change
simply because it does not lead immedi-
ately to the whole of their program" (art. 14).
Likewise, to maintain armed groups, when
the dictatorship is in a situation where it
must yield to the pressure of popular con-
sensus, is another error against history.
Democratization requires an incessant
effort to build democratic consensus. This
covers a wide variety of possibilities: from
setting up the means to further understand-
ing, negotiations and agreements on a na-
tional basis, to developing relations with
like-minded governments to promote inter-
national initiatives in favor of democratiza-
tion. Two major strategies should be kept in
mind: first, "the strategy of convergence at
the base, at the root of the concrete prob-
lems of the population, in order to form a
social front leading the people to oppose
the dictatorship" (art. 14); second, where
possible, the formal constitution of a "dem-
ocratic political front," without commitment
to positions which are contrary to democ-
racy or which advocate the use of terrorism.
The insistence on building democratic
consensus, while not new for Christian
Democrats in theoretical terms, has ac-
quired a new practical urgency in the con-
text of the fight for democracy. In its
concluding section, while discussing tacti-
cal matters, the Manifesto underlines the
need to consider building consensus, in all
different forms, as a service to the people,
requiring unitary work which goes to the
heart of the people's problems, however dif-
ficult the given circumstances. At the same
time, this effort cannot be devoid of demo-
cratic realism, according to certain rules of
political affinity. Consensus can go further,
for Christian humanists, with other democ-


ractic currents characterized by a strong so-
cial concern, which reach neither to the
extreme of individualism nor to that of col-
lectivism. In other cases, consensus is lim-
ited to coincidences on immediate political
events, because the final perspectives, the
methods or the external ties of the political
currents involved make agreements and,
even more, alliances very difficult. True plu-
ralism "avoids apparent unions, which are
vitiated or lacking in sincerity, while it as-
sures the pursuit of the same objectives
through convergent channels" (art. 31).
Consensus must root itself in popular par-
ticipation through community groups, in-
stitutionalized or not, for it is from them that
democracy is generated anew.

Social Participation and Eco-
nomic Pluralism
The fight for democracy cannot be limited
to its political dimension, for the general
crisis to which it responds is not simply a
crisis of regime, but also one of society and
even of civilization.
In facing this crisis, Christian Democrats
propose the ideal of "a community of free
men," viewing society as a whole as an as-
sociation of communities and the state as
the culmination of the process of solidarity
by which communities grow and integrate
into a society. Humanism is not indi-
vidualistic, for it underlines the fundamental
role of community life, but neither is it total-
itarian, for it recognizes that communities
are formed by free men.
In this light, both the collectivist eco-
nomic model, tied to the totalitarian state,
and the liberal capitalist model, often sup-
porting itself on militaristic states, fail to pro-
vide an alternative to the principle of
participation, on which human community
is to be grounded. "For Christian Demo-
crats the basic concept which must serve as
point of departure is that of participation"
(art. 19). Representative democracy, as a
political regime, must perfect itself through
social and economic participation, to be-
come participatory democracy, if it is to re-
spond to the general crisis of our times.
A community-oriented economic sys-
tem, the so-called "communitarian econ-
omy," is nothing more and nothing less
than the effort to conceive an economic
model which accomplishes its production
and distribution tasks effectively while fos-
tering participation, rather than restricting it,
as collectivism and capitalism do in their
quite different ways. This model does not
consist of ready-made formulas, be it the
formula of state control of the means of
production or the formula of private enter-
prise. It consists of two fundamental guide-
lines, the implementation of which is
susceptible of a wide variety of concrete and
progressive realizations.
The first guideline is that of the primary
value of labor. Since labor is the common,










shared activity of all men, an economic sys-
tem that does not recognize its primary
value cannot fully recognize the participa-
tion of the common man in the benefits and
responsibilities of society. For this reason,
"the communitarian economy stimulates
and supports all forms of property which
adapt themselves to the pattern of revaluat-
ing labor" (art. 19).
Moreover, in order to further participa-
tion, economic pluralism is required, lead-
ing gradually towards a complex system
which encompasses personal property, pri-
vate enterprise, cooperatives, co-manage-
ment and self-management enterprises
and, for reasons of national interest, state
enterprises. This economic pluralism is jus-
tifiable in terms of favoring participation by
creating a system of varied and counterveil-
ing powers within the economy. But it is
also justifiable as a way to assure the con-
crete possibilities of ideological pluralism,
as it expresses itself politically and culturally,
and of social pluralism, as it expresses itself
in the vitality and significance of basic com-
munities and intermediary organizations.
Mutually supportive of each other, these
forms of pluralism create the environment
of free participation, wherein representative
democracy can perfect itself and become
participatory democracy.
This economic model, from a functional
point of view, remains a market economy,
but it calls for the elaboration of a national
plan for development, through a process of
negotiation and free democratic discus-
sion. Such a plan, by the dynamics of the
market, whenever possible, and by au-
thoritative decisions, whenever indispens-
able, should seek to assure human rights by
aiming at the satisfaction of basic needs, for
human rights "are to begin with those
which touch on the conditions for life,
health, education, employment, housing,
security and participation" (art. 21).

Frei and Caldera
As Latin America moves into the '80s and
prepares for the turn of the century, Chris-
tian Democracy constitutes one of its major
political forces and one committed to fight
for democracy in its fullest sense. It is not
surprising, therefore, that the two foremost
leaders of Christian Democracy in Latin
America should have become two of the
most outstanding spokesmen of demo-
cratic Latin America.
In 1933, at the very start of their public
lives, Eduardo Frei and Rafael Caldera met
in Rome at the Ibero American Congress of
Catholic University Youth. In the nearly fifty
years since then, they organized two of the
largest and most enduring Latin American
democratic parties, with broad popular sup-
port, and became the first Christian Demo-
cratic presidents of the continent. With
many other men of their generation and of
succeeding generations, they were able to


make Christian Democracy into an authen-
tic expression of some of the deepest traits
of Latin America's personality.
To this extent they came to inspire, on the
basis of their ideological principles, some of
the most significant contributions to the in-
ternational life of Latin America. Barely 60
days after becoming president, Eduardo
Frei wrote a letter to four distinguished Latin
American economists, Raul Prebisch, Jose
Antonio Mayobre, Felipe Herrera and Car-
los Sanz de Santa Maria, asking them to
elaborate a project to establish the "institu-
tions capable of giving impulse to the crea-
tion of a Latin American Common Market."


The development of
Christian Democracy as a
political force has required
the sacrifice of the
security, the freedom, the
right to homeland and
even the life of party
members and leaders.



He thus gave an initial thrust, in our times, to
the process of Latin American integration,
which according to the Manifesto, in its
discussion of international affairs, has be-
come "a capital thesis of our parties and-
must be incorporated into their govern-
mental programs" (art. 28).
This contribution of Frei, like all the de-
velopments of Christian Democracy, was
sustained by an ethical inspiration which
Frei himself underscored in a book written
in 1973, A New World, when referring to
the task of integration: "It is not a task for an
elite. It is a task for peoples animated by a
new moral sense; with a spirit of solidarity;
with faith in liberty; with an inflexible will for
justice; convinced that it is necessary to
surpass hate; but at the same time to have
the courage of breaking the ties of a world in
which there is no longer place for small
groups organized to defend selfish
interests."
Even before becoming president and all
during his administration, Rafael Caldera,
for his part, argued that just as the notion of
national community gives rise to the con-
cept of social justice, to which a country's
development must respond, so does the
notion of the larger human community give
rise to the concept of international social
justice, to which must respond the relation-
ships between developed and developing
countries. He was thus able to give ex-
pression to Latin America's role in world
affairs. He did so in Christian Democratic
terms, which, as the Manifesto makes


clear, rejects the thesis of wars of liberation,
but seeks to gain, through the various orga-
nizations of developing countries, such as
the Group of 77 and OPEC, for example,
and through negotiations with developed
countries, "the acquisition of power for the
poor countries" (art. 28).
This contribution of Caldera, as ex-
plained in 1964 in his book Christian De-
mocracy and Development, maintains
and prolongs the underlying Christian
Democratic conviction regarding the rela-
tionship between politics and economics:
"To reach development requires a conjunc-
tion of numerous factors, unified by clear
ideas and by a firm will. Our generation
must face it through a profound change in
structures. The political structures of formal
democracy will bear the impact; yetwe can-
not reach it through tyranny, which in any
form and in any time degrades the sub-
stance of man, but rather through liberty.
We must demonstrate the viability of a sin-
cere, robust and strong liberty, to open the
way more clearly towards social justice and
towards the redemption of peoples."
Such then is the reality, as a political force,
and the vision, as an ideological current, of
Christian Democracy in Latin America.
From this reality and with this vision, it deliv-
ers a message, at the same time simple and
forceful, which is its own program for ac-
tion: "The number one problem in Latin
America is called 'dictatorship' and its solu-
tion 'democracy.'" E


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CAl?BBEAN PEVIEW/37












The Socialist



International and Latin



America

Problems and Possibilities

By Karl-Ludolf Hubener


amaica's Michael Manley called it "ser-
vile" accusing the US of pressuring
Venezuela's Accidn Democratica
into requesting that Willy Brandt postpone
the Leader's Conference of the Socialist In-
ternational which was scheduled to be held
in Caracas at the end of February. Acci6n
Democratica, the major opposition party
in Venezuela, had balked at inviting the
sandinistas to attend as observers-even
though they often had attended meetings of
the Socialist International in the past. Wash-
ington must regard Manley's indignant out-
cry as a barometer of its success in trying to
drive a wedge through the seemingly
closed ranks of the Organization.
The Socialist International (SI) has
aroused the suspicion of US foreign policy
makers as it has taken a more progressive
attitude toward liberation movements in the
Third World. Constantine Menges, CIA chief
for Latin America, bluntly listed the Socialist
International under its president, the Nobel
Peace Prize Laureate Willy Brandt, among
the four major threats to the stability of the
region. The other three were Cuba, the PLO
and "certain other Arab nations," and Mex-
ico. Menges does not even believe that the
leaders of the SI are being used as, to use an
expression of Lenin's, "useful idiots" by in-
ternational communism. He is convinced
that they are rather dangerous in their own
right.
This view is also shared byAcci6n Dem-
ocratica. The party had only reluctantly
added its signature to the many progressive
resolutions and statements put out by the
International. The strong conservative right-
wing of the party is convinced that what it
regards as its social democratic platform
has little in common with what they suspect

Karl-Ludolf HObener is editor of the journal
Nueva Sociedad. Nueva Sociedad is pub-
lished in Costa Rica with the support of the
German Social Democrat Friedrich Ebert
Foundation.
38/CAIBBEAN NVIEW


to be the Marxist-Leninist ideals of the
sandinistas and other such opposition
movements in Central America. The in-
fighting among its ranks has suddenly cata-
pulted the SI (which includes socialist, so-
cial democratic and labor parties) into the
headlines of the Latin American press.
However the mixture of fact and fiction in
the reports, only serves to show how little is
really known about the history and objec-
tives of this organization. The SI has existed
in different forms since 1864, when it was
founded in London by Karl Marx. The First
International did not last very long and was
dissolved in 1876. The Second Interna-
tional was started in Paris in 1889. Diver-
gent points of view with regard to the First
World War, as well as the sharp ideological
differences between reform, revisionist and
revolutionary platforms led to divisions
within the workers movement. In 1919
Lenin founded the Third International
called the Komintern, while the members
of the Second International reorganized
themselves in 1923 as the "Labour and So-
cialist International." However, the Second
International was dissolved during the Sec-
ond World War in 1940, and in 1943 so was
the Komintem. In 1951 the Second Inter-
national was started up once again and a
new epoch began in the history of the
movement.
The new International could not help but
be influenced by the cold war. The Pream-
ble to the 1951 Frankfurt Declaration
states: "International communism is the in-
strument for a new imperialism. Wherever it
has achieved power it has destroyed free-
dom or the chance of gaining freedom. It is
based on a militarist bureaucracy and a ter-
rorist police." This is not a rejection of
"Marxism." It is a rejection of "communism"
because communism is "incompatible with
the critical spirit of Marxism...whether So-
cialists build their faith on Marxist or other
methods of analyzing society, whether they
are inspired by religious or humanitarian


principles, they all strive for the same
goal-a system of social justice, better liv-
ing, freedom and world peace."
Until 1976, the Third World was not very
important in the SI. The image thatthe Inter-
national reflected in the developing coun-
tries was not exactly progressive. Salvador
Allende called the organization the ex-
tended arm of US imperialism. Moreover
hardly anyone paid any serious attention to
its conferences, resolutions or declarations.
To most people, at that time, the SI was a
sort of club for retired politicians-a sin-
ecure for services rendered. The situation
changed completely, when in 1976, in Gen-
eva, Willy Brandt was elected president. He
widened the scope of the International to
include the countries of the Third World.
Even before Willy Brandt, Olof Palme, for-
mer Prime Minister of Sweden and Austrian
Chancellor Bruno Kreisky had criticized the
Eurocentrist orientation of the movement.
In conversations with Palme and Kreisky,
the former German Chancellor argued that
the principles of the International made it
difficult for them to have contacts with polit-
ical parties in countries such as those in
Africa, because the principles did not per-
mit the inclusion of monolithic parties.
Brandt argued, however, that these mono-
lithic parties often contained different politi-
cal streams which in another system would
have formed themselves into different polit-
ical parties. He questioned, "Why should
friendly powers, who define themselves as
socialists, socialist parties or socialist-orien-
tated groups within a party not meet singly
or in groups with the socialist and social
democratic parties of Europe, not only ad
hoc, but to work with us on a more or less
regular basis?"
Despite this positive attitude Brandt's ob-
jectives were only partially realized. Africa
did not become the central field of action,
even though the SI consolidated its con-
tacts with the front-states and liberation
movements of Southern Africa. Yet despite









































Frangois Mitterrand, Willy Brandt, Felipe GonzAlez, and Joop den Uyl at a SI conference in Paris,
1981. Wide World Photos.


these contacts Africa and Asia are very
poorly represented in the SI. The organiza-
tion has had more success in Latin Amer-
ica, though the relationship is today under
stress and the outcome uncertain. Even be-
fore 1976, 27 political leaders from Latin
America and Europe met to demonstrate
their solidarity. The spectrum of the attend-
ing parties extended from socialist and pop-
ulist to liberal parties. These leaders
reached a consensus on many points, al-
though it must be noted that it is easy to
pass resolutions, but extremely difficult to
put them into practice. Willy Brandt
stressed the fact in Geneva that the SI never
was, and never would be, an international
"Command Center." It would never dictate
an ideological direction to the member par-
ties. As Brandt said, the SI is "an association
of sovereign and independent parties,
based on certain common basic ideals."
With reference to the new objectives of the
SI, he added: "let us remember our anti-
imperialist tradition... In 1900 at the Paris
Congress, the Second International con-
demned colonial policies. In 1907, when in
Stuttgart, the 7th Congress demanded that
the mineral resources of the earth be put at
service of all mankind." This idealistic reso-
lution, however, Brandt remarked a little
later, did not prevent the Western industrial
nations from getting together with the fi-
nancial elite to serve their own short-term
economic interests: "Those who for hun-
dreds of years supported and collaborated
with feudal systems and corrupt family


clans are also responsible for spreading dis-
tress and misery and should not be sur-
prised when the rebellious masses in the
Third World today look elsewhere for their
models."
The member parties who met in Geneva
passed a Latin America resolution. The res-
olution dealt primarily with the dictatorships
established in the "southern cone" and
called for democracy and respect for
human rights. The declaration went so far
as to mention eventual sanctions against
these regimes and the US was severely criti-
cized: "The United States will play a decisive
role in determining the future of Latin
America. The member parties of the Social-
ist Intemational should therefore use their
influence to persuade the [Carter] admin-
istration to undertake a fundamental review
of their policies towards military dictator-
ships in Latin America and the activities of
multinational companies." The language
was restrained and it seems that the resolu-
tion had a modest effect on the early Carter
administration's stress on the principles of
human rights. It was still possible in 1978
for the SIto persuade the Carter administra-
tion to check the evidently dishonest post-
election maneuvers in the Dominican Re-
public, with the result that the SI member
party, the Partido Revolucionario Domin-
icano, won a just victory and forced the
resignation of Balaguer.

The Latin American Committee
The first conference of the Latin American


Committee of the Socialist International
was held in Santo Domingo in 1980. The
General Secretary of the PRD, Francisco
Pefia G6mez, was elected as head of the
Committee which included Jamaica's for-
mer Prime Minister Michael Manley and
Carlos Andres P&rez, former President of
Venezuela. The committee was influential in
winning support for the Sandinista Libera-
tion Front (FSLN) of Nicaragua.
The rebellion against Somoza in
Nicaragua also marks the shifting of inter-
est within the SI from the "southern cone" of
Latin America to rebellious Central Amer-
ica. Nicaragua was later to become the test
for the unity of the International. At first, the
triumph of the revolutionaries in Managua
was loudly acclaimed by all member par-
ties. Nicaragua became a symbol for op-
pressed people all over the world, and many
began to believe that "the revolution" could
not be stopped. In the general enthusiasm it
was easy to forget-or not want to remem-
ber-the ominous factor of the US. El Sal-
vador provided the sobering reality and it
became clear that in this hemisphere libera-
tion from economic and political oppres-
sion could not easily be attained.
However at the first regional conference
in Santo Domingo, spirits were still high.
The members passed a strong and optimis-
tic resolution: "The Regional Conference
marks the beginning of an era of unity
among anti-imperialist and socialist forces
in Latin America, Europe, Africa and Asia ...
In this conference the Latin Americans have
CAI?BBEAN IEV1-W/39










made the commitment to offer their sup-
port to the liberation struggle of the ex-
ploited peoples of Africa and Asia." Except
for the standing ovation given to the repre-
sentatives of some African liberation orga-
nizations, only empty words remained. For
the Latin American members of the Interna-
tional already had enough trouble showing
their solidarity with liberation movements in
their own region.
In Santo Domingo, the US was chal-
lenged: "Imperialist activities have left indel-
ible marks upon the area. The vestiges of
this policy can still be seen today, as ex-
emplified by the colonial status of Puerto
Rico and other territories under the control
of European powers, as well as the exis-
tence of foreign military bases in the re-
gion." The US was anything but pleased
with the reference to Puerto Rico, and for
the first time the State Department officially
voiced its displeasure at this "interference"
to some of the major member parties. The
involvement of the SI in the revolutionary
turmoil taking place in Central America rad-
ically changed the attitude of the organiza-
tion towards armed struggle in the Third
World. Whereas most European political
leaders concentrate on peaceful solutions
to all problems, the SI admits that in Latin
America other forms of confrontation, in-
cluding armed struggle, are often neces-
sary and legitimate.
The International does however make a
clear distinction between revolution and ter-
rorism in Western capitalist states. The
mass armed liberation movements in the
Third World, as against terrorist activities,
have to struggle against brutal dictatorships
where there is no vote and no other way to
change oppressive regimes except to bring
them down by force. The government of
Ronald Reagan however does not sub-
scribe to this distinction between terrorism
and revolutionary struggle. On the contrary,
revolutionary guerrillas are labeled "terror-
ists." The Reagan administration sim-
plistically blames everything on the
subversive activity of either the Soviet Union
or Cuba. For the US, East-West conflict is
the measure of all things. That social misery
and oppression are the reasons for revolu-
tion has little relevance according to the US
analysis. In this way the policies of the West
in this region are reduced to simple-minded
anti-communism. This fear of communism
goes so far that even liberal US presidents
have prevented not only "left wing" but also
moderate "right of center" parties from
holding power and bringing about reforms.
An ideal witness is Robert White, former
US ambassador to El Salvador. White has
pointed out how US propaganda fogs the
real issues, dismissing the claim of Haig
and company that the source of all trouble
in El Salvador is Cuban and Soviet subver-
sion. He has stated categorically that the
reasons for the present turmoil are to be
40/CAI?BBEAN REVIEW


found in the social and economic condi-
tions within the country itself; unemploy-
ment, hunger and social injustice. That
White himself-or more correctly, his boss
at the time, Jimmy Carter-also has to
shoulder a large portion of the blame for the
present situation is another matter.
Statistics give some indication of the
poverty and exploitation suffered by the five
million people of El Salvador: 0.4% of the
population own 38% of the arable land;
91.4% are crowded together trying to eke
out a meager living on 22% of the cultivable
land; 60% of the rural and 40% of the urban
population are illiterate; only 16% of the la-


The CIA chief for Latin
America bluntly listed the
Socialist International
among the four major
threats to the stability of
the region.



bor force is employed the whole year round;
there are only three doctors for every
10,000 inhabitants and the majority of the
doctors practice in the cities; only 39% of
the population has access to electricity.
In 1979 hope began to fade in El Sal-
vador. The firstjunta was not serious about
social change. The much touted reforms
turned out to be mainly propaganda while
the "death squads" continued liquidating
all opponents. Bitterly disappointed with the
turn of events, Manuel Guillermo Ungo,
leader of the National Revolutionary Move-
ment and a member of the Socialist Inter-
national, left the junta. After this, the SI
began to support the opposition in El Sal-
vador. This caused the first rifts in the move-
ment. The leaders of the National
Liberation Party of Costa Rica, Daniel Odu-
ber, a vice-president of the International,
and Luis Alberto Monge, the newly elected
president of Costa Rica, objected to a press
release of the International in 1981, which
they interpreted as exclusive support for the
armed struggle. In huge full-page news-
paper advertisements across the continent,
the Costa Ricans disassociated themselves
from the SI policy of complete support for
the Democratic Revolutionary Front (FDR)
led by Ungo and the Farabundo Marti
Liberaci6n Nacional (FMLN). These ad-
vertisements attracted a lot of critical and
adverse attention, and demonstrated visu-
ally and dramatically the slippery path of
Latin American politics that the once purely
European-orientated International had
taken.
At the Madrid Bureau Meeting in 1980,
the situation seemed to be different. The


Latin American wing was strengthened with
new members so that there were 14 Latin
American parties among the 49 full mem-
bers and 15 consultative parties that made
up the Intemational. The largest of all the
Latin American member parties is the
Democratic Action Party of Venezuela,
which claims to have more than a million
members. Another Venezuelan party, the
Peoples Electoral Movement (MEP), is also
a member. This small party split fromAD in
1967 and moved to the left, defining itself as
socialist. Other Latin American parties in-
clude the Democratic Left Party (Izquierda
DemocrAtica) of Ecuador and (which
plays a relevant role in the political life of the
country) and the Popular Socialist Party of
Argentina (which can at best be described
as a mini-party and whose membership is
expected to be suspended at the next Con-
gress because of collaboration with the mil-
itary regime).
The Radical Party of Chile was part of
Salvador Allende's Unidad Popular and is
today in exile. Its leader Anselmo Sule is one
of the four Latin American vice-presidents
of the International. Other members of the
presidium from Latin America and the Car-
ibbean are Gonzalo Barrios (AD/Venezu-
ela), Daniel Oduber (PLN/Costa Rica)
and Michael Manley (PNP/Jamaica). In
Central America the Democratic Socialist
Party of Guatemala, the National Revolu-
tionary Movement of El Salvador and the
winner of the February elections in Costa
Rica, the National Liberation Party, are all
members. In the Caribbean the member-
ship includes the Dominican Revolutionary
Party (with Antonio Guzman, the governing
party today), the Peoples National Party of
Jamaica, the Barbados Labour Party
headed by Prime Minister Tom Adams and
the New Jewel Movement of Grenada lead
by Prime Minister Maurice Bishop. In
Madrid two new members from the Nether-
lands Antilles were admitted: The Peoples
Electoral Movement (Movimiento Elec-
toral di Pueblo) of Aruba, which under its
leader Betico Croes is seeking Aruban inde-
pendence and the New Antilles Movement
(Movementu Antiyas Nobo) of Curacao,
until recently the governing party of the is-
land under its leader Don Martina.
The Mexican governing party, the Party of
the Institutionalized Revolution (PRI) is,
contrary to many false assumptions, not a
member of the SI. The Mexicans have
founded their own organization to supple-
ment their foreign policy-the COPPPAL.
Latin American parties from the center to
the left are represented in this organization.
Some SI parties are also members of COP-
PPAL. Until now the COPPPAL has played
a very positive role, especially in Central
America, but it is difficult to foresee its fu-
ture, as it is very dependent on the person-
ality of each Mexican president and his
foreign policy.











Ideological Disagreements
At a glance, the list of regional member
parties seems imposing enough. Except-
ing the southern part of the hemisphere, the
SI is extremely well represented in Central
America and the Caribbean Basin. How-
ever, it would be misleading to interpret
these various parties as representing an
ideological front. On the contrary, the mem-
ber parties in this region are almost as di-
verse as those represented in the UN. They
range from Manuel Pefialver (AD/Venezu-
ela) who is a hard-line anti-communist on
the right to socialist Maurice Bishop who
represents the extreme left wing of the polit-
ical spectrum. Between the two extremes,
there is little ideological agreement and
often even a disguised animosity between
members.
While the ODCA, the regional union of
Christian Democratic parties closely allied
to US policies in the area, can present a
common ideological platform based on a
minimum political consensus, it is almost
impossible to find a common basis for the
Latin American parties in the SI. As the
Frankfurt Declaration can hardly be relevant
to this region, it is left to each party to more
or less define for itself, what it understands
by "socialism" or "social democracy." This
has led a man such as L6pez Michelsen
from the Liberal Party of Colombia to try to
improve his image by seeking admission to
the SI. L6pez Michelsen has understood
only too well that certain liberal ideas can be
represented, and are represented by, certain
parties who vaguely define themselves as
"social democratic." However it should not
be forgotten -that under President Turbay
Ayala, who also comes from the Liberal
Party of Colombia, torture and the denial of
basic democratic rights have not been un-
usual. Even Admiral Massera, who was an
infamous member of the first Argentine
junta after the downfall of Isabel Per6n has
tried to pass himself off as a social demo-
crat to make himself more palatable at
home and abroad.
The danger that the term "social democ-
racy" could begin to mean all things to all
men has begun to worry some of the mem-
bers of the SI and it has become an acute
necessity to define a common ideological
position. However an attempt in this direc-
tion at the second meeting of the commit-
tee in the fall of 1980 in Caracas failed
miserably. A proposition to base the defini-
tion on the one worked out by the PNP of
Jamaica landed in the wastepaper basket.
The PNP defined democratic socialism as:
"a political and economic theory under
which the means of production, distribution
and exchange are owned and/or controlled
by the people. It is a system in which politi-
cal power is used to ensure that exploitation
is abolished, that the opportunities of soci-
ety are equally available to all and that the
wealth of the community is fairly dis-


tribute. A process rather than a rigid
dogma, its application must depend on the
particular conditions which obtain from
time to time in each country. It emphasizes
co-operation rather than competition, and
service rather than self-interest, as the basic
motive forces for personal group and com-
munal action. Its ultimate objective is the
building of a classless society by removing
the element of entrenched economic priv-
ilege which is the basis of class divisions. As
distinct from scientific socialism, its
method is based on the alliance of classes
around clear objectives." The committee


Salvador Allende called the
organization the extended
arm of US imperialism.


instead decided to retain such pompous
and vague terms as "freedom," "solidarity"
and "justice." Words that each member can
conveniently interpret to suit his own ends
and that are even frequently used by dicta-
tors on ceremonial occasions.
The Sl's commitment to the Third World
is controversial. US sociologist James Pe-
tras, for example, has pointed an accusing
finger at the SI and especially at the Social
Democratic Party of Germany. He has
claimed that German social democracy is
an attempt to find a political basis for Ger-
man capital, an attempt to present a more
or less social form of capitalism. On the
other hand, Carl Gershman, a representa-
tive of the Social Democrat Party of the US
and a member of the SI, has claimed that
the SI has formed an alliance with the "anti-
Western revolutionary movements in the
Third World.... Beyond muddled and radi-
cal ideology, beyond the fashionable and
condescending view that democracy can-
not be expected in the Third World is the
deep anxiety of many European leaders
about their countries dependence on raw
materials from the Third World." These re-
flections and analyses do contain some
seeds of truth, but they do not reflect the
whole complex picture of contradictions
and the reality within the SI. Not even the
Committee for the Defense of the Revolu-
tion in Nicaragua, which has such famous
names as Willy Brandt, Carlos Andr6s P&rez,
Olof Palme, Frangois Mitterrand, Michael
Manley and Bruno Kreisky, among its
members is undisputed-as the events in
Caracas recently demonstrated.
At a time when solidarity is more neces-
sary than ever, some of the parties in the SI
seem to be having their difficulties. The
heavy propaganda barrage constantly
being fired from the US against the san-
dinistas in Nicaragua has borne fruit.
Some of the more conservative parties


within the SI, the AD/Venezuela and the
PLN/Costa Rica, have begun to express
their doubts about the revolution in Nic-
aragua. TheAD in particular insists that the
sandinistas comply with the principles of
political pluralism, a mixed economy and
follow a policy of strict non-alliance in inter-
national relations. It is interesting to note
that these conditions were never mentioned
in Madrid.
The call for political pluralism may be
acceptable to a point, but the demand that
thesandinistas develop a mixed economy
can be regarded as pure interventionist poli-
tics. More so since the founding Frankfurt
principles do not prescribe any particular
form of economy. In Nicaragua over 70% of
business and industry is still in private
hands and one cannot help asking if the
persistent calls for a mixed economy from
certain political quarters are not really
meant to obstruct necessary and urgent
changes in the economy.
A careful observer could not have failed
to notice signals of a rift within the ranks of
the Latin American member parties some
time ago. At the Oslo Bureau Meeting in
1980, Oduber and Mario Soares of Portugal
tried to canvas members to accept the can-
didature of Nicaraguan Alfonso Robelo,
whose party opposes the sandinistas. The
public disagreement of the PLN/Costa
Rica over El Salvador has already been
mentioned, while the meeting of the Latin
America Committee in Grenada last August
was poorly attended. The more conserva-
tive wing: Accidn DemocrAtica, PLN and
PRD with its general secretary Pefia Gomez,
who is at the same time the president of the
Committee, were conspicuous by their ab-
sence. In December last year the executive
committee oftheAD/Venezuela adopted a
deliberate collision course with the official
SI policy, when Manuel Pefialver invited the
Social Democratic Party of Nicaragua for a
visit. Pefialver stated thatAD because of the
"increasing totalitarian tendencies in Nic-
aragua," would now support the Social
Democrats. Only a year ago the SI had re-
futed the advances of Nicaragua's so-called
"Social Democrats" and presented its opin-
ion of the party in a press release: "The
misnamed Social Democratic Party of Nic-
aragua acts on behalf of obscure foreign
and domestic reactionary interests the pur-
pose of which is to discredit the honest
intentions of the FSLY."
In Latin America the SI has arrived at the
crossroads. The question is: will the SI place
its confidence in groups and parties which
often have contradictory ideas and are
small today but are prepared to create the
kind of society that will offer the people of
Latin America a better life tomorrow? Or,
will the SI only throw in its lot with the large
populist and liberal parties of the continent
and follow them from one compromise to
another? o

CAIBBEAN EVeI 6/41


























P~ ~ .u:. :
c -YrurY~j 9
Z
~L~.L"-L;::


42/CAI?BBEAN P VIEW


he Socialist International (SI) has ac-
quired increasing importance in Latin
American affairs, appearing as a pres-
sure group legitimizing certain political
opinions, condemning specific govern-
ments, and counteracting the influence of
the United States. All this has been made
possible by the gradual loss of authority of
the United States within the international
political arena, and by the simultaneous ac-
quisition of economic power and political
prestige of countries like Germany, France,
and Sweden.
The death of Franco in 1975 brought
about the resurrection of the Spanish So-
cialist Worker Party (Partido Socialista
Obrero Espatiol) and thrust onto the inter-
national arena the charismatic Felipe
Gonzalez. Gonzalez is connected not only
institutionally to the Socialist International,
but also personally, through ties of mutual
affection with Willy Brandt (president of the
SI and architect of its projected influence
abroad) and with the Swede, Olof Palme.
With Gonzalez and the Spanish Socialist
Worker Party, the Socialist International de-
veloped the proper drive belt to exert its
influence in distant Latin America. Spain
would be the bridge, and the Spaniards the
most appropriate spokesmen. On the other
side of the Atlantic favorable circumstances
were also taking place. Echeverria ruled in
Mexico, Torrijos in Panama, and Carlos An-
dr6s P6rez in Venezuela. These leaders dis-
played Third World behavior, independence
from the authority of Washington, and that
obscure state populism called "socialist" or
"revolutionary" by Latin Americans. The
presence of the Socialist International
gathered strength from 1975 on, until now
when it has become particularlywell-known
during the current Central American and

Carlos Alberto Montaner is an author, colum-
nist and playwright who lives in Madrid.
Among his works are: Perromundo (novel),
Perro de Alambre (moviescript), Witch's
Poker Game (short stories), Instantaneas al
Borde del Abismo (short stories), 200 Afos
de Gringos (essays), El Ojo del Cicl6n
(essays), Secret Report on the Cuban
Revolution (political ethnography). Nestor
Dominguez, a professional translator, is with
the University of Miami.













The Mediation of the



Socialist International

Inconsistency, Prejudice and Ignorance
By Carlos Alberto Montaner
Translated by Nestor Dominquez


Caribbean crises. Contributing to their
presence is the victory in France of a social-
ist government with R6gis Debray a political
advisor to the French president, and
Danielle Mitterrand, the president's wife, as
chairwoman of the Committee of Solidarity
with El Salvador and Latin America. With-
out a doubt, the most immediate conse-
quence of this coincidence is the
unexpected meddling of France in matters
that are completely alien to the diplomatic
tradition of the Quai d'Orsay.

Lack of Qualifications
These new factors raise many doubts. For
many centuries, international influence was
exerted by nations whose State Depart-
ments were capable of defining their own
interests and of outlining strategic guide-
lines that could be of use to them. But if it is
obvious that the power elites of only some
very few nations do indeed possess that fine
sense for international relations (with the
ability to carefully determine and defend
their own interests), it is doubtful that the
task can be rationally carried out by interna-
tional federations of political parties who
may agree on some ideological points, but
whose interests may also be in opposition.
So, the first observation that can be made
regarding the mediation of the Socialist In-
ternational in Latin American affairs is that
perhaps it will prove to be counterproduc-
tive for the cohesion of the organization
itself. A second observation may be less
practical, but it is equally important: the
aims pursued by the Socialist International
are not clear. Is it trying to promofe in Latin
America a model of democratic govern-
ment conceived as the very image of the
ones in Western Europe? If that is the case,
how is it possible that the Socialist Interna-
tional lends itself to include on its political
clientele list governments such as the one
in Managua, avowedly Marxist-Leninist, or
Mr. Bishop's mini-dictatorship in Grenada?
What is the sense of condemning the old
Marxist-Leninist regimes in Europe, and
supporting them in Latin America during
their period of consolidation? Why does Mr.
Gonzalez, Vice-President of the SI for Latin
America, chair an International Committee
for the Defense of the Nicaraguan Revolut-


tion? Why do the constant accusations
against the increasing dictatorial abuses of
sandinismo, made by the Social Demo-
crats of the Nicaraguan, Robelo, fall on deaf
ears? Why is a Panamanian "strongman"
acceptable, but not his equivalent in other
nations of the area? Why, if it is the case of
an essentially ethical mission, is Mr.
Gonzalez capable of maintaining excellent
relations with the Cuban dictatorship?
From these contradictions it must be
concluded that what determines the con-
demnation or support of the Socialist Inter-
national in Latin America, is not the moral
texture or the real behavior of the Central
American or Caribbean governments, but
the kind of image they project. In the case of
a group like the sandinista commanders,
who still benefit from a good international
image, the Socialist International has no ob-
jections in tuning over all the organization's
weight in their benefit. If the dictator hap-
pens to be a photogenic politician, neither
Felipe Gonzalez nor the Socialist Interna-
tional show the slightest prejudice in coor-
dinating with him the political projects of
the zone.
Ethical reasons must also be eliminated
as motivations of the Socialist International.
Those reasons, if they exist, are too heavily
tinted with opportunism to be taken in con-
sideration. As long as Castro, Bishop, or
Daniel Ortega is accepted, it does not seem
coherent to repudiate the Polish dictator-
ship in the name of human rights and dem-
ocratic principles...unless, that is, if one
endorses a value scale so flexible that the
same facts are assessed in different ways,
depending on whether they take place in
white developed Europe, or in poor cross-
bred Latin America.

The Hidden Reserves
What induces having discarded human-
itarian principles this desire by the SI to
assume a leading role in Latin America? It
seems to me that it is simply a rebellious act
against the hegemony of the United States;
a rebellious act in line with the increasing
disagreements arising in Europe over the
way to confront the Soviet Union, the kind of
atomic weapons prescribed by the Ameri-
cans, or the US interest rates which weaken


European currencies. Europe constantly
sends forth signals about its desire not to
conform to its role as subordinate to the
American superpower. However, the cer-
tainty that it cannot escape such subordina-
tion in the Old Continent without running
the risk of being subdued by the Soviets
forces this expression to be limited to politi-
cal and diplomatic actions executed in the
Third World. Specifically, this independence
is claimed vis-a-vis Latin America and Af-
rica, underscoring a sovereignty that reality
prevents from expression in Europe but that
finds outlets in other less compromising
corners of the planet.
The ones who first realized this paradox
were the clever strategists in Havana. From
the moment of Reagan's victory, Cuba de-
cided to thoroughly use the weight of the
European socialists for the benefit of its
own political interests (especially as a
blocking mechanism against the reprisals
proposed by Reagan's advisors in the Santa
Fe document, a position paper considered
alarming in Havana). Strictly speaking, the
Cuban project was not illogical and had, in
its favor, an unusual precedent a year be-
fore, when the final offensive against
Somoza was coordinated in Havana, it was
able to verify, not without a bit of ironic
surprise, that it was perfectly possible to
recruit on the same side! people like
Carlos Andr6s Perez, Rodrigo Carazo, Jos6
Figures, Felipe Gonzalez, Omar Torrijos,
the Palestine Liberation Organization, the
Socialist International, and even the wearied
William Bowdler, Under-Secretary of State
in the Carter administration (who was ready
at the last hour to believe any promise pro-
vided that the serious Nicaraguan crisis
would come to a "solution" even if the "so-
lution" entailed the beginning of another
even more serious, dangerous and distress-
ing crisis).
After Reagan's victory, Cuba made haste
to expedite the meddling of the Socialist
International in Latin American affairs.
Then in December 1981 Felipe Gonzblez
was invited to establish and direct the Com-
mittee for the Defense of the Nicaraguan
Revolution and was asked to hurriedly for-
mulate statements against a supposed mili-
tary attack Havana was expecting from
CAITBBEAN IEVIEW/43










Washington. Objectively, for the Castro gov-
ernment, Felipe GonzBlez and the Socialist
International were instruments of the anti-
yankee policy, assigned to block Wash-
ington's actions in Central America and the
Caribbean.
Yet this role as Washington's adversary in
Latin America, even given the imperial nos-
talgia of the Europeans, is not compatible
with the socialist parties in Europe. It is to-
tally inconsistent to live in Europe under a
military doctrine designed by the Pentagon
and US Department of State to serve as a
containment strategy and, simultaneously,
to move 7000 kilometers to the West to
oppose the very same Pentagon and the
very same State Department on the south-
ern border of the same United States -
fighting in Central America for something
no less than the same weltanschauung
proposed by Washington in Europe.
There is no doubt that the Socialist Inter-
national has acted in Latin America without
serious analysis, without weighing the con-
sequence of its actions. The parties who are
members of the Socialist International lack
the minimal information and political and
military intelligence structures capable of
detecting the intentions and the activities of
Havana and Moscow in Latin America. Nor
do they have at their disposal qualified aca-
demics to contribute serious thought about
Latin America's problems. All of this makes
the mediation of the SI an act unworthy of
responsible groups with decades of political
experience. Consider, for example, that in
distinction to the happy "amateurism" of
the Socialist International, the Cuban Cen-
tral Intelligence Office has a staff of 150
specialists, under the expert leadership of
General Pifieiro, dedicated exclusively to at-


training the objectives intended for Latin
America by Moscow and Havana.

Prejudices of the SI
The inevitable question, then, comes to
mind: How has the Socialist International
been able to participate in the political arena
without first defining its objectives, without
later on gathering elements of information,
and without the aid of qualified academics?
The answer is obvious: Because the results
of that action are not vital for European
interests. In the long run, it is the case, once
again, of events taking place in banana re-
publics and carried out by those dark and

Spain would be the bridge
and the Spaniards the
most appropriate
spokesmen.



explosive little men appearing in the novels
of Garcia Mbrquez and Alejo Carpentier. It is
possible that the same European socialist
who considers the colonels of the Greek
junta repulsive, may find the commanders
of the Nicaraguanjunta to be charming.
For sure, the repudiation that a man like
Jaruzelski gets from the Socialist Interna-
tional is not in contradiction with the esteem
that a photogenic dictator like Fidel Castro
provokes. How? Because for the Socialist
International, as for a good part of the Euro-
pean world, the Latin American bug an-
swers to the noble-savage-turned-into-the-
noble-revolutionary stereotype, brilliantly


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44/CAIBBEAN REVIEW


portrayed by the Venezuelan Carlos Rangel
in his famous book
Roughly, the European socialist parties
have endorsed the superficial scheme de-
scribing the Latin American societies as the
captives of despotic oligarchies, nourished
by the United States, against which the ex-
ploited population rebels. The guerrilla
fight, then, is not the product of a political
and ideological confrontation, just the sim-
ple battle of the oppressed against the op-
pressors, of the tyrannized poor against the
rich, served by their armies.
An analysis of the political events of Cen-
tral America and the Caribbean that is so
weak, can only be explained by the almost
complete ignorance of European political
leaders about the social and economic real-
ity of Latin America. It is difficult to believe
that a French, Swedish or Spanish socialist
leader might know the rate of development
of the Salvadoran economy prior to the civil
war, its rate of consumption of electricity,
cement, newsprint or any of the other indi-
cators of relative levels of development, the
degree of industrialization within the fright-
ening Central American context, the degree
of agricultural yield, or the percentage of
salary increases within the last decades. All
that basic information is replaced by the
repetitious story indeed false of the
"fourteen families" -and bythe unyielding
stubbornness of considering as a social
revolution what is, essentially, a rebellion of
a political nature.
This does not mean that El Salvador was
a prosperous country without serious in-
justices, only that the analysis of the eco-
nomic and social reality of El Salvador that
the Socialist International does is not se-
rious, but the result of an emotional sim-
plification. For example, the Socialist
International ignores that in the twentyyears
since the triumph of the Cuban Revolution
and the beginning of the Salvadoran civil
war in 1979, El Salvador was three times
more prosperous than revolutionary Cuba.
This puts the SI in a difficult position. The
Sl's assumption that the Salvadoran revolu-
tion is carried out to seek more efficient
methods of generating wealth and more
reasonable forms of distributing it leads
them to back the armed struggle. By the
same token should not the SI also support
the fight against the Cuban dictatorship,
and be ready as well to do the same against
the sandinista dictatorship when it be-
comes evident that the Managua govern-
ment is leading its people towards even
greater shares of misery than did the pre-
vious tyrannical regimen, and towards the
imposition of a costly nomenklature
which has already replaced the old
oligarchy in exercising and reaping the ben-
efits of economic privilege. Among the de-
plorable contradictions made by the
Socialist International, is one of keeping a
most prudent silence in the presence of the









neglectful inefficiency of the left, while justi-
fying the armed rebellion against the ne-
glectful inefficiency of the right. Neither
Gonzalez, nor Brandt, nor Palme, have ever
declared that the Torrijos' government had
a disastrous effect on the Panamanian
economy, stagnating its economic devel-
opment, jeopardizing its future with one of
the highest per capital foreign debts in the
world. Once more this demonstrated that
when a country's misery can be attributed
to the clumsy management of a rightist
economic oligarchy, it deserves the censure
of the Socialist International. But when that
indigence is compounded as in Cuba,
Panama, Peru or Nicaragua by the irre-
sponsible actions of the leftist political
oligarchies, this fact simply does not
provoke the rejection of European
socialists.

Washington and the SI
Actually, there is nothing clear, or coherent,
regarding the presence in Central America
and the Caribbean of the Socialist Interna-
tional. The only thing that is clear is that the
Socialist International wants to "balance"
the influence of the United States in the
region without having to outline its
intended goals or the theoretical base sup-
porting those goals. The American attitude
may be debatable and even hardly gener-
ous, as it is not based on humanitarian con-
siderations. But at least it is clear and based
on a series of well articulated reasons
intended to protect its interests: first, in the
long run the United States cannot survive as
a free, democratic and prosperous society if
its territory is surrounded by nations linked
to a hostile superpower; second, 70% of the
oil imported by the United States passes
through the zone in dispute, also the loca-
tion of the Panama Canal, the shortest route
between the Atlantic and Pacific Coasts.of
the nation; third, since the triumph of the
Cuban Revolution there has been the Soviet
intention to exert influence in and maintain
a military presence within the zone chal-
lenging the power of the United States and
moving the never forgotten "cold war" to
the American sphere of influence; fourth,
from all of the above it can be concluded
that the most reasonable American objec-
tive is to avoid the installation of Marxist
groups in government centers that are so
close by.
This does not necessarily mean that in
exchange for its anti-communism, the US
will enthusiastically support the repulsive
right-wing dictatorships that may exist in
the Isthmus. Rather, it means thatthe US will
not make exceptional efforts to dislodge
them from power, among other things, be-
cause they do not damage their vital inter-
ests. The US will be forced to support them
only if the alternative proposed by the guer-
rillas is a dictatorship guided from Moscow
jeopardizing the security of the United


States. Logically, Washington feels a greater
affinity towards Venezuelan or Costa Rican
democracies than towards Guatemalan
dictatorship, but is not always in the hands
of Washington to prevent the Latin Ameri-
can military from obstructing the demo-
cratic game and propitiating the commu-
nist insurrections. At times, Washington
succeeds, as was the case in the Dominican
Republic after the defeat of Dr. Balaguer, or
in Honduras, during the recent liberal vic-
tory elections that were respected due to
real American pressure on behalf of two
parties, connected, bythe way, to the Social-
ist International. At other times, the irre-

The most immediate
consequence of this
coincidence is the
unexpected meddling of
France in matters that are
completely alien to the
diplomatic tradition of the
Quai d'Orsay.



presible obstinacy of the military closes all
doors to the democratic political process.
This is the analysis proposed by the
Americans. But in some way, it is also valid
for all the democratic nations in the area. It
is similarly not convenient for Venezuela, or
for Mexico (whose oil fields are within the
"combat zone") that the Caribbean and
Central America turn into an explosive trou-
ble spot in which Marxist radical move-
ments proliferate. The Colombian case,
and the Cuban-Soviet complicity with the
M19 guerrillas, should provide a good les-
son for the Caracas and Mexico City gov-
ernments. The fact that there is a
democracy, elections and formal liberties in
Colombia, has not prevented the Cuban
government from training guerrillas and
having them infiltrate Colombia via Pan-
ama. Cuba and Moscow are now fighting to
put an end to military dictatorships, but to
install regimes sympathetic or accessory to
the communism canonized by the Soviet
Union, not caring in the least about the
political nature of their allies or adversaries.
In another continent in the eastern
part of Africa -with a strong dose of oppor-
tunism, in the course of a few weeks,
Havana changed its political and military
commitments and passed from ally to en-
emy of Somalia and Eritrea. That kind of
behavior is the same that the Mexicans or
the Venezuelans can expect from Cuba as
soon as the propitious circumstances arise
in those countries for a Marxist insurrection.
Continued on page 57


The Latin American and Caribbean
Center has recently published the
second study in its Occasional Papers
Series: "Vernacular Culture in
Uruguayan Art: An Analysis of the
Documentary Function of the Works of
Figari, Gonzalez, and Solari" by
Alicia Haber.
Manuscripts are solicited for blind
evaluation for the Occasional Papers
Series. Research that addresses
individual countries or the whole of
Latin America and/or the Caribbean
from the perspectives of the
humanities and social sciences is
welcome.
Manuscripts should be no longer
than 45 typewritten pages in length
and should be sent in duplicate to:

The Editor, Occasional
Papers Series
Latin American and
Caribbean Center
Florida International
University
Miami, FL 33199







Florida International University now
offers a Master of Arts program in
Economics with an emphasis in
International economic develop-
ment. The program, consisting of 30
semester hours with the option of a
thesis or a research paper, is
designed to be completed in one
year. For information please contact:
Dr. Jorge Salazar
Department of Economics
Florida International University
Miami, Florida 33199
(305) 554-2316

CAffBBEAN EVIW/45


Occasional Papers Series
Latin American
and
Caribbean Center














The French Connection


Two Views of Their Latin American Policy



Interviews by Barry B. Levine


rance's attitude toward the left, both in
terms of internal and international
policy, changed drastically when
Francois Mitterrand took over the presi-
dency from Valery Giscard d'Estaing.
Giscard d'Estaing was an anti-communist
vis-a-vis France's internal politics but was
"soft" on the Soviet Union. Mitterrand, how-
ever, has developed a "hard" line toward the
Soviet Union while incorporating Commu-
nists into his government. A consequence
of Mitterrand's political geography is the
new French policy toward Latin America.
French policy today operates on the basis
of a similar belief that one can distinguish
between leftist movements attempting to
bring about internal changes in society and
the geo-political relationships of that soci-
ety. This has generated an untold amount of
consternation in the United States.
The following two interviews are pre-
sented to bring out the critical issues that
the new French policy creates. Both inter-
viewees are academics who have, or have
had, some advisory capacity with the
French governments. Given the court eti-
quette of such relationships they speak here
as private individuals and not as govern-
ment spokesmen.
Alain Rouquie is a researcher with the
Centre d'etudes et de recherches inter-
national (CERI) de la Fondation na-
tionale de sciences politiques (FNSP).
Among his works are Pouvoir militaire et
socidtd politique en Republique argen-
tine (Presses de la Fondation national des
sciences politiques, 1978; Spanish edition,
Emece, 1981) and Le Mouvement Fron-
dizi et le radicalisme argentin (Fondation
national des sciences politiques, 1967).
His interview, conducted in Spanish, was
translated by Lourdes A. Chediak, formerly
of the Caribbean Review staff. His analysis
presents the positive aspects of the new
French policy toward Latin America.
Offering a critical analysis of this policy is
Francois Bourricaud. M. Bourricaud is pro-
fessor of sociology at the Universit6 de Paris
(IV). Among his works are Esquisse d'une
theorie de l'autoritd (Plon, 1961);
Changements a Puno: etude de so-
ciologie andine (Institut des hautes etudes
de l'Amerique latine, 1962; Spanish edition,
46/CAlBBEAN "VIEW


French President Fran;ois Mitterrand, 1981
Wide World Photos.


R6gis Debray, today a counselor to the
French president on Latin America, in 1974.
Wide World Photos.


Institute Indigenista Interamericano, 1967);
Pouvoir et socidte dans le Perou con-
temporain (Cahiers de la Fondation na-
tionale des sciences politiques, 1967;
Spanish edition, Sur, 1967; English editions,
Farber and Farber, 1970, Praeger, 1977);
Universities la derive (Stock, 1971);L'in-
dividualism institutionnel: essai sur la
sociologie de Talcott Parsons (Presses
universitaires de France, 1977; English edi-
tion, University of Chicago Press, 1981); Le
bricolage iddologique: essays sur les in-
tellectuels et les passions ddmocrati-
ques (Presses universitaires, 1980).
The interviews took place in Paris in early
January 1982, shortly before the French
government announced it was to sell arms
to the sandinista government of Nic-
aragua and amidst the very vocal French
condemnation of events in Poland. But by
that time swords had been crossed with the
US over policy for Latin America: M. Regis
Debray, a former companion of Ch6
Guevara, had been appointed as a personal
advisor to the French president for Extemal
Affairs; Mitterrand made his famous pre-
Cancun speech in Mexico before the Monu-
ment to the Revolution committing France
to support leftist liberation movements, of-
fering "a message of hope to all the comba-
tants for freedom"; and France joined
Mexico in recognizing the rebels in El Sal-
vador as a "legitimate political force." The
interview with M. Rouquie is presented first,
and then M. Bourricaud follows.

Alain Rouquie:
Reducing the Logic of
Power Blocs*
Barry B. Levine: What is the philosophy
behind France's international relations with
Latin America and the Caribbean?
Alain Rouquie: France's foreign policy
under the present government follows two
important principles. On the one hand there
is the defense of human rights and of the
freedom of self-determination; that is to say,
the right to individual and national dignity,
the possibility of independent choice on the
road to development with the freedom to
elect one's system of government and gov-
*Translated by Lourdes A. Chediak


























ernment officials.
On the other hand, French policy ac-
knowledges the need to reorganize world
commerce and world exchange and com-
munication with the nations of the Third
World in a more just and equitable manner.
The French government believes that to
strengthen world peace the Third World
must be taken out of the East-West conflict
so that they be given a chance to develop
rather than remaining pawns in the great
power conflict. We need to create a new
economic order at the international level to
reduce what the Socialist program refers to
as "the logic of power blocs." We need to
give more weight to the opinions of those
people that have a more independentwill so
as to strengthen world peace.
How can these objectives, these princi-
ples, be applied to Latin America? There is
on the one hand, an absolute decision
made by France to have a policy of pres-
ence in all parts of the world; that is, to
consider no spaces sacred, no zones taboo
where we cannot pronounce political judg-
ments. On the other hand, there is the pres-
ent situation in Central America. In this
case, it was the North American administra-
tion itself that presented the Central Ameri-
can issue to its European allies, requesting
that we accept Washington's interpretation
of the facts: that the entire crisis was di-
rected from the outside, that it was the man-
ifestation of a foreign aggressor-of Soviet
expansion in the free world. It was the
United States that required the European
nations to take a stance concerning the
Central American situation and oblige
those governments to make their own anal-
ysis of the situation to check and see if it
coincided with that of the Reagan
administration.
The previous French government, under
the presidency of ValIry Giscard d'Estaing,
accepted the American interpretation of the
facts. The French foreign minister went to
Washington and came to the conclusion
that the facts, as set down in the US "White
Paper" coincided with the actual facts and
thus the policies that were being planned
toward Central America. The analysis of the
new Socialist administration was different.
Since the time of Latin American inde-


Alain Rouqui6.


pendence, France has had an important
influence in both the cultural and intellec-
tual aspects of these countries. But for vari-
ous and diverse reasons, France never took
advantage of this. France's interests had,
historically, tended to lie mostly in Asia and
Africa. France had a colonial empire and
the process of decolonization was long and
hard until the end of the Fourth Republic.
There was, in addition, the existing notion
that Latin America was the reserved ground
of North America. It was a continent that
held no interest for France and France
therefore did not feel it should be present
there.
Things began to change by 1964 with the
famous trip of General de Gaulle. This trip
was a great political gesture and was natu-
rally one of great discovery for France,
which was at that time emerging from its
last colonial war. But this trip was not fol-
lowed by a policy of economic presence nor
by any of the moves that might have been
expected by the visited countries. It was a
grand gesture that symbolized France's
newbom interests toward the Latin Ameri-
can continent and de Gaulle's new policies
towards Third World nations, but it was not
solidified, it was not implemented.
The successive presidencies of Pom-
pidou and Giscard d'Estaing saw a re-
awakening of interest in Latin America, but
the political aspect was not emphasized. If
there was an effort in negotiations it was
towards formation of an economic pres-
ence, which was at that time still very weak.
The political aspect was totally secondary.
Today, under the Francois Mitterrand gov-
emment, there is the will to have a political
presence in Latin America that is not simply
symbolic. Under Mitterrand, we will achieve
the synthesis of these two orientations, of
these two needs, within the selfsame princi-
ples of our government and within its own
global concerns.
BBL: Then it is not a question of definite
interests but of a general interest in North-
South relations?
AR: There are concrete and very definite
interests. It is true that France is more de-
pendent on other countries for its raw mate-
rials than many other industrial nations, but
it is also true that Latin America consists of
CAIBBEAN PEVIEW/47


Francois Bourricaud.









many countries with unique characteristics
that serve to unite them with France. It is
entirely natural that such policies of new
relations with the Third World should be
applied above all to Latin America, to those
nations that have cultural affinities with us.
Both the economic and the cultural aspects
converge to explain this new interest and
the foundation of these new relations with
Latin America. There is also this fact to con-
sider-that Latin America is a group of na-
tions, not all, that can be called the middle
class of the Third World, the most devel-
oped areas of the Third World. Then, in so
far as France needs to find new ties of coop-
eration with Third World countries on an
equal basis including, for example, co-de-
velopment and co-planning agreements,
then the Latin American countries, more
developed and with economies compli-
mentary to our own-and I do not speak
solely of Mexico's oil-take first priority.
BBL: Mitterrand's socialism is not pro-
Soviet communism. Is the same strategy
that put him in power in France-squeez-
ing between the left and the right-the basis
for his policies towards Latin America?
AR: Of course, it cannot be considered
that French aid to Latin American liberation
movements and support of Nicaragua's
sandinista regime means approval of pro-
Soviet communism. On the contrary, these
involvements mean that when there is a
government that attempts to follow an inde-
pendent line bywaging its own revolution in


the form of a liberation movement, it be-
comes imperative for the nations of the
Westem world to help it avoid the choice
between abandoning the road to social
change or becoming allies of Moscow. So, it
is precisely in the sense of reducing com-
munist expansion in the Third World and
not, as some critics would have it, of lending
support to a communist regime that we
have done what we have. In that sense, also,
it is false to say that Nicaragua has ever
been, to date, a communist government.
Nor is it true that the guerrilla movement-
as complex and as varied as is the armed
opposition in El Salvador-represents only


Latin America can be
called the middle class of
the Third World.



an international communist movement.
That means that our policies towards
Latin America are not different from or con-
tradictory to our policies towards the Soviet
Union, or Poland, or the United States. In the
same way as the French government took a
stand, quite firm, in the situation in Poland,
in that way it takes an appropriate attitude
towards Central America. In both cases
there is a question of the defense of human
rights and in both cases there is the will of a


people who seek to withdraw from a
hegemony, to defend a possibility of na-
tional freedom. There is never, in any way,
the desire to support the international com-
munist movement or to the designs of the
Soviet Union.
BBL: In La Condition Humaine by An-
dre Malraux one of the characters talking
about tactics in the Chinese uprising says
"extend the revolution, and afterwards
deepen it." The American government
seems to be saying that where you see a
many sided armed opposition in El Sal-
vador they see a tactical diversity for an
ultimate communist take over.
AR: We have to avoid pushing a nation
into communism. We have to stop assum-
ing that a nation is already lost to those
values that we stand for by assuming it has
become communist. To prejudge and to
label a country as being communist is to
push it. Then the communist element will
say to the people that the US government is
supporting the oppressor whom they are
trying to overcome, and the people will have
no other choice than to look to the Soviet
Union and the East for help. That is the way
of the world, it is what you call a "self-fulfill-
ing prophesy." I believe that some of these
past experiences could be used to avoid the
same errors in the future, and to proceed
instead, with neither expectations nor naive
innocence, to do everything in our power
so that those who share our values, those
who have the least interest in an alliance
with Moscow, can take the initiative and di-
rect these revolutions. To predict that a revo-
lution will end on the side of communism is
to not take an appropriate and competitive
stand. It is, on the contrary, to take a passive
attitude, an attitude of defeat
BBL: The US government has appar-
ently adopted the distinction reintroduced
by US Ambassador to the UN, Jeane
Kirkpatrick, between totalitarian and au-
thoritarian regimes (in her articles in Com-
mentary) as the basis for political
responses. As someone who understands
the French perspective, what value does
that distinction have?
AR: This distinction, that arose during
the cold war of the 1950s, is a polemical
distinction. In Regis Debray's recent book,
Critique de la raison politique (Gal-
limard, 1981), there is an interesting section
on this concept of totalitarianism, calling it a
concept that covers over an emptiness,
covers over a vacuum of conceptualization,
designating only absolute evil. Now, 1 am
not going to get into these distinctions to
decide whether Somoza was a moderate
autocrat or a bloody dictator. It is worthless
to follow through with these distinctions
which, applied to human rights, are nothing
but a definition of polemical and not scien-
tific facts.
BBL: M. Debray makes a distinction be-
tween guerrillas in Europe and those in


48/CAI?BBEAN rEviEW


Volume 10
January & July 1980 1 A



r, STUDIES






SPECIAL VOLUME

1eAu IN AFRICA
Cuban-Soviet Relations and
Cuban Policy in Africa
Cuba's Involvement in the
Horn of Africa
Limitations and Consequences
of Cuban Policies in
Africa
Economic Aspects of
Cuban Involvement in
Africa

Published by the Center for Latin American Studies. University Center for
International Studies, University of Pittsburgh. Annual subscription rates are $8 for
individuals and $16 for institutions. Address inquiries to: Center for Latin American
Studies, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15260, USA.










Latin America. He has indicated that he
sees no positive attitudes in the European
guerrillas, but that in certain cases he would
accept those of the Latin American move-
ments. How are they different?
AR: You can't judge those who rebel
against dictatorship and institutional op-
pression by the same standards as you
would adventurers and mercenary Euro-
pean terrorists. We cannot be more
"guevarista" than Guevara when he wrote,
in his Guerra de guerrillas that as long as
there existed the possibility of a democratic
government, while there is the hope of free-
dom of expression and of free participation
in political life, there is no need to appeal to
armed revolution. The right to insurrection
against an oppressive or illegitimate gov-
ernment is inscribed in the charter of the
United Nations. When there are many types
of oppression, when all the political chan-
nels are closed, as in Guatemala, for exam-
ple, where all the possibilities of free
democratic expression in the defense of lib-
erty were liquidated, where the moderate
opposition was killed, then what solution
remains? This has not been the case in
Western Europe. The situations are entirely
different. Certain Latin American uprisings
have been cases of popular and national
rallying. Not so in Europe, or in other Latin
American instances, where guerrilla warfare
goes on in spite of democratic possibilities.
BBL: What was the purpose of the
Franco-Mexican recognition of the guer-
rillas of El Salvador?
AR: The Franco-Mexican resolution of
August 28,1981, was a response to both a
humanitarian and a political concem. The
humanitarian issue is to attempt to take the
initiative and institute measures that will
stop the killing and the daily misery of the


people of these countries. Any measure that
might bring us closer to world peace seems
just to the government of France. In his
speech in Mexico President Mitterrand
spoke of the international projection of
French law which obligates one to aid peo-
ple in danger of death. For the French gov-
ernment, that is an international concern,
when a nation is in danger of death we must
take immediate measures-and this is not
intervention. All governments have the right
to express what they think before situations
of dramatic crisis; moreso, when an ally
such as the US expressly requests it More-
over, we feel that the rights of the people are


It becomes imperative for
the nations of the Western
world to help Latin
America avoid the choice
between abandoning the
road to social change or
becoming allies of
Moscow.



above the rights of the state.
That is our first concern. Our second
concern is political and pertains to both the
US and the sides in conflict The Franco-
Mexican declaration, well understood,
means that North America's greatest allies
cannot follow it in its methods to contain
communism. We have the same objectives
but we do not conceive all things in terms of
a confrontation between East and West We


cannot follow US policies of supporting a
junta government the priorities of which we
know cannot achieve peace. The establish-
ment of peace requires the acknowledge-
ment of all the actors involved by global
negotiations.
I do not know if the declaration had that
specific objective, but it had those conse-
quences. I believe that in spite of criticism,
the more democratic, moderate and nego-
tiation-oriented sectors have been strength-
ened-as against those who want or
support a military solution either for the
opposition or the junta. Outside of those
who considered that the only possibility was
one of reciprocal military liquidation, there
were countries with authority, nations
whose opinions carry some weight in the
world, that agreed it was better to get to the
negotiation table to end the misery of the
people of El Salvador. It is in that direction
that the French declaration is intended to
point
There was much hypocrisy on the part of
many Latin American nations. They
claimed that the resolution by Mexico and
France was intervention. That was not inter-
vention. It is no more intervention than to
speak your mind about a crisis of that mag-
nitude. Non-intervention is neither indif-
ference to nor blind isolation from the rights
of the people.
BBL: But the resolution startled certain
countries such as Colombia, which as you
know has the M-19 rebels in its mountains.
AR: In spite of Colombia's security mea-
sures and the growing concerns over its
evolution, it is a democratic country. They
have elections, political parties, freedom of
expression. Colombia is a country that has
endured endemic guerrilla warfare for 30
Continued on page 58


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US & the

Caribbean
Continued from page 9

ceasing its policy of differentiation between
states on the basis of the efforts that they
might be making to reorganize domestic
economic structures and policies (for ex-
ample its support for Jamaica in its rela-
tions with the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) while not being necessarily sym-
pathetic to the government's foreign pol-
icies). Instead the administration now
began to place emphasis in its relations with
the states, on their attitudes to security and
external relations questions.
In practice, this meant not overt acts of
hostility to countries like Jamaica and
Guyana: not so much acts of commission,
as acts of omission. That is, no assistance-
private or public-would be given where the
US had not been previously obligated to do
so, where such assistance might have been
useful in allowing the government greater
domestic flexibility. Assistance would be
given to the governments, or to sectors
within the societies, where this coincided
with the American national interest. Given
the known vulnerability of these countries,
deriving from location and economic de-
pendency, such pressures could have mul-
tiple effects on the local economies and
socio-economic systems. This policy of
"hands off" took place-in both Jamaica
and Guyana-in the context of their re-
course (dejure or de facto) to IMF stabil-
ization agreements that led inevitably, to
major social difficulties, placing govern-
ments on the defensive at home, at the
same time as their external contexts were
becoming increasingly rigid and restrictive.
This conjuncture of internal and external
difficulties had one of two effects: either
radicalization of external policies to counter
or alleviate domestic political (and party)
pressures, this radicalization itself then in-
ducing further hostility from the United
States; or an increase in internal domestic
control and repression, in order to effect the
stabilization policies, a recoil from radical
external policies deemed hostile to the US,
and a certain acceptance of American se-
curity definitions.
In this atmosphere, the revolution in Gre-
nada, led by the New Jewel Movement, with
its partiality to Cuba, was enough to rein-
force and maximize the American concern
with security. Economic aid, now more than
ever, became the handmaiden of security
stabilization; an orientation reinforced by
electoral/political changes in St. Lucia and
Dominica, simple-mindedly read, in the cli-
mate, as instances of radical change. Then,
in the context of the dispute over American
policy in respect of Nicaragua in a develop-
50/CAI?BBEAN PREVIEW


ing electoral season in the United States
itself, came the spectre of the development
of tight diplomatic relations between radical
governments in a manner not hitherto in
existence, across the whole breadth of the
"American Mediterranean": Nicaragua-
Cuba-Jamaica-Grenada-Guyana. It is an
open question whether, for American diplo-
macy, the development of coherent Carib-
bean-Central American relations or al-
liances, unmediated by American interest
and power, is acceptable. What, neverthe-
less, is noticeable is an American orienta-
tion towards differentiation of policies



Economic aid, now more
than ever, became the
handmaiden of security
stabilization.


towards the areas deemed possibly hos-
tile-Jamaica, Guyana, the Lesser Devel-
oped Countries, within the broad context of
security stabilization diplomacy.

The Reagan Diplomacy
It is, in fact, a short step from this general
line of the Carter administration (in which
the Young-Vance influence had given way to
that of Brzezinski) to the Reagan admin-
istration policies-harking back to an ear-
lier period and approach, of concentration
on security in the region, differentiating be-
tween firm allies and others, and isolation of
Cuba. In a sense, the groundwork for the
reinforced security oriented policies of the
new administration, had been prepared in
the last phase of the Carter regime.
This is welcome, it should be said, to
some governments in the region, operating
with an awareness of weakness and depen-
dence exacerbated by the continuous pe-
troleum price explosion and minimum
regional cohesiveness. In such an environ-
ment, there have tended to develop policies
of seeking to derive resources on the basis
of proven allegiance to the dominant power.
We can perceive three cross-currents, or
potential countervailing forces, to this at-
tempt at reassertion of American domi-
nance. First, there has been a certain re-
invigoration of interest on the part of Eu-
rope, with its doctrines of social and Chris-
tian democracy. This re-invigoration de-
rives not simply from ethical considera-
tions about the legitimacy of social change
and resistance to dictatorship in Latin
America. It derives, also, from as the case of
European-Middle Eastern relations dem-
onstrate, a perception of self-interest in an
international economic climate of increas-
ing "struggle for the world product" in
Helmut Schmidt's phrase. It leads to a con-


cem on the part of European countries, that
active, unilateral interventionism propelled
by domestic forces and interest groups in
the United States, may lead to an American
distortion of the general socio-economic
environment, and hinder their (the Euro-
peans') attempts to construct an environ-
ment in which there is a continuity of access
to crucial commodity requirements, and
availability of markets. Such a concern
leads, from time to time, to divergences of
interests and policies in the Third World,
between Europe and the United States. This
is the relevant interpretative framework of
the spread of European social/Christian
democratic trends, and of the competition
within Latin America between them. Atten-
tion to the Caribbean represents in part a
spill-off from this.
A second countervailing current is the
rise of the so-called middle powers in Latin
America, and particularly in the Caribbean-
Central America area: Venezuela and Mex-
ico. Such countries, as is well perceived by
now, have the potential for playing either
"proxy" roles, or limited but important
"buffer" roles, vis-a-vis American policy. We
might simply note here what we can call
recent Venezuelan "assertive interven-
tionism," and Mexican "protective diplo-
macy" in contemporary Caribbean-Central
American regional relations. Of course,
these countries' still asymmetric relation-
ships with the United States constitute im-
portant parameters in the regional role-
playing which they can undertake. So too
does the fact of structural incoherences in
their domestic economic and social sys-
tems. But clearly Mexico, for example, now
perceives that certain forms of American
interventionism in the region not only in-
crease diplomatic instability in the area, but
can give rise to internal pressures on her
own government-whether from local fac-
tions hostile to such interventionism, or
from growing numbers of migrant exiles
from other countries. Her own domestic po-
litical relations could therefore, as a result,
become complicated.
Third, there is the perception that there
are still not in existence, new and viable
economic strategies capable of dealing
with the problems that gave rise to the crises
in Caribbean states in the first place, even
after the boom years of the 1960s. Certain
questions arise here. Is more massive capi-
tal-intensive investment in the short term
likely to make any major impact on the
unemployment problem in Jamaica, even if
the optimal local climate is provided? Are
foreign investors interested in labor-inten-
sive agro-industrial enterprises with longer
lead times for recovery of investments than
the mineral industries? Is the functioning of
the Guyanese economy, in the medium
term, dependent perhaps not so much on
foreign investment in bauxite or massive
hydro-electricity schemes, but rather on the










rationalization of local racial-political rela-
tions that will allow incentives to those in-
volved in the major agricultural sectors
there-a problem not susceptible to exter-
nal solution? Can regional planning take
place in the Eastern Caribbean without ma-
jor innovation in the local political institu-
tions, so as to permit predictability in the
functioning of regional and supra-national
institutions? Is the functioning of such co-
operation institutions compatible with an
emphasis on bilateralism in economic aid
between the United States and the Carib-
bean countries, which while providing polit-
ical leverage and visibility for the donor,
reinforces the tendency to competition be-
tween the Caribbean countries themselves?
It is ironic that the current protagonists in
the Caribbean, in the private economic and
in the political sectors, of the American free
enterprise way, do not recognize the histor-
ical fact of the major effort at innovation in
political institution-making among the sep-
arate states in the United States that set the
trend at the end of the 18th century for a
slow but continuous continental harmo-
nization and centralization of decision-mak-
ing structures (private and public) there.
Nonetheless, there is now a dawning real-
ization in the Caribbean at least, that the
problems of the social systems of say, Ja-
maica and Dominica, have little to do with
the presence or absence of Cubans in those
territories.
Still, however, the view appears to be
prevalent, and emphasized by American
emissaries, that it is necessary to reinforce
the security systems of these countries, as a
prerequisite to their economic develop-
ment This harks back, of course, to the
philosophy applied in Southeast Asia in the
1960s, and popularized by then Secretary
of State Robert McNamara, emphasizing
what was taken to be the key linkage be-
tween national security and economic de-
velopment. In Latin America, this took the
form of the close relationship between the
Alliance for Progress economic programs,
and programs of counter-insurgency; the
alleged economic successes of the
post-1964 Brazilian regime were seen as
justifying this approach.
The fact of the matter is, however, that in
small countries, the reinforcement of the
local security systems leads to an upsetting
of the balance between the various socio-
political sectors in the countries, giving the
military, or national security sector, a deci-
sive weight and a tendency to eventual pre-
eminence in the political systems. This is,
and is likely to be the case for two reasons
additional to their mere technological dom-
inance. First, with few exceptions, the politi-
cal party systems, as conciliating and
legitimating structures or mechanisms in
the Caribbean countries are still weak.
Within the context of their lack of capacity
for solving mass economic problems, their


'moral' strength weakens, and becomes in-
capable of counter-balancing the apparent
strength of the modernized security forces.
Second, the process of modernization of
the security forces has a strong ideological
content, in addition to its technological
content. Already, in the Western tradition,
set apart from society, the modernization
process suggests to the military a sense of
their particular status as the only virtuous
sector-as the guardians of the system.
Since in small countries the unnatural in-
stitutional segregation of the military can-
not supersede the traditional social reality of
kinship and other such networks, their as-


The emphasis on security
is destructive of the
society. It ultimately de-
legitimizes the local
government and political
elite itself.



sumption of political power is likely to be
soon tainted by the divisions and social
competitiveness of the society. This sets the
basis for the coup and counter-coup
syndrome.
Thus the emphasis on security is ulti-
mately destructive of the society. It further
draws the United States into the local politi-
cal system, establishing the country and its
representatives as the ultimate mediators of
the local political system. Such influence
can of course even be seen as benign, as in
the case of the assurance of the election of
Guzman in the Dominican Republic. But it
ultimately de-legitimizes the local govern-
ment and political elite itself. If then, this
model is applied to the newly independent
Caribbean, the results can only be similar to
those characterizing the older Caribbean,
and most of Central America. It is therefore
importantthat the Caribbean leadership, to-
day frequently crippled by the local eco-
nomic disorder and social pressure, not
succumb to this model.
There is no substitute for the endeavour,
however faulty and faulting, or regional co-
operation and integration of these relatively
small national systems, supported by sub-
stantial technical and economic assistance
by the major metropoles. And though the
point is still not accepted by many of the
region's academics and political intel-
ligentsia, there is the possibility that the
strengthening of the regional system can
have an important, though not determin-
ing, influence on national social integration.
Here again, the geographically peripheral
countries, Mexico and Venezuela, will play a
role in the determination of the mode of


cooperation that can develop; as also in the
resolution of the question of whether re-
gional cohesion in the West Indies and Cen-
tral America will develop within parameters
that give primacy to unilaterally adduced
US notions of hemispheric interests; or
whether, at a minimum, the concerns of
national liberation and Third World country
economic and political alignments will
qualify the influence of those parameters.


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The Real Danger
Continued from page 19




tionally, an overt military move by the
United States against Cuban territory is an
act of war, with potentially very grave conse-
quences because of the security relation-
ship between the Soviet Union and Cuba. A
full naval blockade-a move which is occa-
sionally threatened by Washington-is also
tantamountto an actof war; certainly such a
maneuver is neither politically or militarily
as viable as itwas 20 years ago at the time of
the missile crisis. A punitive strike against
Cuban forces in Africa or elsewhere may
seem tempting, but it too would be ex-
tremely risky. Given the highly dispersed
deployment of Cubans overseas, massive,
multiple attacks would be necessary if real
damage were to be done to the Cuban
armed forces. A large number of non-mili-
tary and non-Cuban casualties would surely
result. The diplomatic and other costs of
that kind of aggression are incalculable.
Thus, the basic inaction of the admin-
istration toward Cuba is understandable.
No really damaging, low cost punishment
can be found for Cuba-the-culprit And if
actions are to be tailored specifically to the
alleged crimes, instead of simply assaulting
the Cuban Revolution en masse for puni-
tive purposes, viable policies are no easier
to find. Stop Cuban training of insurgents?
(By bombing training camps?) Stop Cuban
support for arms shipments to guerrilla
groups? (By seizing Cuban bank assets in
third countries? By shooting down any
Cuban airplane headed for Central Amer-
ica?) Stop Cuban attempts to forge unity
among diverse insurgent groups? (By for-
bidding Cuban officials to talk?) Faced with
these realities, the Reagan administration
has had no answers other than threat, blus-
ter, semi-documented allegations, and oc-
casional stupidities like intercepting Cuban
periodicals destined for the United States,
refusing to grant visas to Cuban visitors,
and spending millions of dollars on a new
radio transmitter that will broadcast much
the same material (without the advertise-
ments) that any Cuban can now hear by
tuning into commercial broadcasts from
Miami.

El Salvador and Guatemala
If "going to the source" in any serious way is
difficult and possibly prohibitively costly,
what about "going to the targets?" A partial
answer to the question is found in the Rea-
gan administration's actions to date in El
Salvador. Despite an avalanche of rhetoric,
the administration has done little more than
remove the policy inconsistencies (and the
ambassador) inherited from the closing
52/CAI?BBEAN REVIEW


days of the Carter presidency. To ex-Ambas-
sador Robert White's credit he did attempt
to combine concern for human rights with
support for the Duarte government But the
task was more than Herculean, it was im-
possible. Hercules, at least, was cleaning
out a gigantic stable from which the ani-
mals had been removed. Ambassador
White was trying to get a stable cleaned out
while the animals were still living there-
and being given handouts by the United
States government. (Hercules was given
only one day in which to clean up centuries'
worth of accumulated manure. He accom-
plished the job by diverting the cleansing


It is a venerable Cold War
argument, dating at least
from the early 1960s in
what might be called its
"Cuba-centric" form.



Alpheus and Peneus rivers through the
Augean stables.) The Reagan administra-
tion, on the other hand, simply ignores the
condition of the stable, concentrating in-
stead on helping the stablemen survive po-
litically and economically.
Survival is one thing, however, and de-
stroying the enemy is quite another. Win-
ning the guerrilla war is proving to be a
seemingly impossible task for the Sal-
vadoran military, at least with the levels of
American instructors and equipment given
to date. In fact, there is evidence that at the
end of 1981 the guerrillas were stronger
vis-a-vis the government forces in El Sal-
vador than they were a year earlier when US
counter-insurgency aid began in earnest. To
add to the frustration, it is proving difficult
both domestically and internationally for
the Reagan administration to place either
men or material in El Salvador in sufficient
quantity to tip the balance. Certainly no
quick military victory for either side is now
in sight. Few observers believe that the
March 1982, elections will heal the basic
social and political schisms in the country.
In short, a "solution" of the sort that the
Reagan administration would like to see in
El Salvador is proving very difficult to
achieve.
Guatemala is a somewhat different case,
but hardly one to give solace to hardliners in
the long run. At first glance the situation
looks more promising. The Guatemalan
military is stronger, better equipped and
trained, and more directly under the control
of the president than in El Salvador. The
insurgent forces are still more scattered and
less unified. Mexico is much less likely to be
supportive of a guerrilla movement on its
immediate border than it has been of the


Democratic Revolutionary Front much far-
ther to the south in El Salvador. And cer-
tainly the Guatemalan government has
shown no inhibiting sensitivity to human
rights pressures-nor is there any indica-
tion that they are receiving serious pres-
sures of that sort from Washington.
In general, then, Guatemala looks like the
ideal situation in which to prove that a revo-
lutionary movement can be defeated if only
the local military and its friends and sup-
porters both inside and outside the country
are left free to fight with all the weapons
necessary. But the news from the highlands
cannot be entirely comforting forthose who
hold such views. There are multiple indica-
tions that more and more previously iso-
lated and "apolitical" Indians are joining the
guerrillas. There is increasing evidence that
the government's policy of massive and un-
differentiated repression is not working as a
deterrent
Thus, the potential, if not yet the actual
nightmare for those who support the status
quo is that even under such favorable con-
ditions the powers-that-be may not be able
to contain an explosion of revolutionary
change. If Alexander Haig and his friends in
Washington are not presently concerned
about that possibility, it is only because they
have not been well briefed on Guatemalan
realities. And if and when Guatemala does
move to the center of attention, many of the
same constraints to policy as now operate
with El Salvador will become evident: It will
not prove easy to make the commitment of
men and material necessary to "make a
difference" if the tide begins to turn in favor
of the insurgents. No "democrat" like Jos6
Napoleon Duarte is likely to be in the saddle
to legitimate US aid when the critical mo-
ment arrives. The introduction of proxy
troops from outside the region-since
closer to home no supporters of the
Guatemalan regime can spare the man-
power-will not turn out to be as attractive
in practice as it might seem in theory. Ar-
gentine boys killing Indians and in turn
dying in support of Guatemalan land-
owners and generals is not a scenario likely
to make hemispheric relations run more
smoothly. As many Americans discovered
more than a decade ago with Vietnam, even
the otherwise arrogant Argentine military
might eventually learn that foreign adven-
tures in the service of corrupt and repres-
sive regimes almost inevitably result in the
war being brought back home.

Nicaragua
If Cuba is a tough nut to crack, and if victo-
ries over the insurgents in El Salvador and
Guatemala do not seem imminent, where
in Central America and the Caribbean can
the Reagan administration hope to demon-
strate that its muscles are as big as its
mouth? The answer is obvious: Nicaragua.
From the point of view of those who want










to stoke the fires of the cold war in the
Caribbean basin, the Nicaraguan Revolu-
tion is, in fact, a godsend: The sandinista
triumph can be blamed on the "liberals" in
the previous administration; Cuban support
for the Nicaraguans "proves" that the san-
dinistas are the proximate supplier of
weapons to Central American insurgents;
the crackdown on certain opposition lead-
ers and voices demonstrates according to
Secretary Haig that "the hours are growing
rather short to prevent Nicaragua under the
leftist sandinista government from be-
coming a totalitarian state like Cuba";
and-best of all according to Haig-the
growth of the Nicaraguan armed forces
suggests that "the militarization of Nic-
aragua is but a prelude to a widening war on
Central America (emphasis added)." Thus,
the sandinista government is portrayed as
quasi-totalitarian, a primary supporter of lo-
cal insurgencies, and the new military
power threatening the security of its neigh-
bors. It is worth emphasizing that except for
the growth of the armed forces-in itself a
very rational response to the current level of
external threat-there is no substantial evi-
dence to support this portrayal of the Nic-
araguan Revolution.
The list of charges is, of course, not dis-
similar from the list drawn up against Cuba.
There is one critical difference between the
two cases, however. Whereas geography
and its economic and security relations
make the Cuban Revolution very difficult to
attack effectively, the Nicaraguan Revolu-
tion seems extremely vulnerable to imperi-
alist actions. With an economy still
dominated by the private sector, serious
balance of payments and production prob-
lems, thousands of ex-National Guardsmen
just across the border in Honduras, ethnic
and regional stresses-particularly on the
Atlantic Coast, and very significant opposi-
tion groups operating domestically, Nic-
aragua appears to be a destabilizer's dream.
However, a second look at the Nic-
araguan situation suggests that there are
also impediments-and thus potentially
deep frustrations-for those who would de-
stroy the sandinista Revolution. On the
one hand, Nicaragua's alleged domestic
sins cannot be used to legitimate an armed
intervention. Bad management, arresting a
few opposition leaders, and temporarily
closing a newspaper are not sufficient
cause to justify landing troops; if such were
the case, the US would have occupied every
square inch of Guatemala years ago. Addi-
tionally-although this is not necessarily
understood by the Reagan administra-
tion-US hostility probably strengthens the
power of the sandinistas, leading at the
same time to a less pluralistic political sys-
tem and a stronger defense posture. Also,
international support for the sandinistas,
spearheaded by the Mexican government
and European Social Democrats, provides


a diplomatic and economic if not a military
shield against aggression. Finally-and
quite unlike the anti-Allende campaign in
Chile-enemies of the sandinistas cannot
count on the Nicaraguan armed forces to
lead a counter-revolutionary movement
from within. Outside intervention, some-
how dressed up to cover its nakedness, will
be needed.
What the Reagan administration now
seems to be doing is cutting and tailoring
the rags with which that nakedness can be
clothed. By casting Nicaragua as Haig has
as a potential "platform of terror and war in



There are multiple
indications that more and
more previously isolated
and "apolitical" Indians are
joining the guerrillas.



the region," the administration is seeking
nothing less than a rationale for future mili-
tary action. If Nicaragua can be made to
seem the actual or potential aggressor in
the region, a new range of options, from
blockade to joint military actions by other
Central American nations and "allies" from
the Southern Cone, can be placed on the
agenda.
Placing these options on the agenda is
one thing, however, and actually executing
them successfully is quite another. With
every week that passes-as the Reagan ad-
ministration well knows--the Nicaraguan
Revolution becomes militarily stronger. Al-
though Nicaragua can be badly hurt by
some combination of overt and covert
armed actions, it is doubtful that the san-
dinistas can be overthrown by anything
short of a full-scale invasion by US troops.
And that, as the Pentagon has been at-
tempting to tell the White House and the
State Department, would not only weaken
the United States in other, more critical
areas like the Middle East, but would be a
sure guarantee that 99% of the Nicaraguan
people would unite behind their govern-
ment to do battle against the Yankees.
The promulgation of a perspective in
which Nicaragua appears as a platform of
terror and war in the region thus carries a
double message: On the one hand it too
both reflects and embodies the geography
of frustration mentioned earlier. If the United
States cannot "get" Cuba, and if easy victo-
ries in El Salvador and Guatemala are not in
reach, then by elimination Nicaragua looms
large as the one country in which the impe-
rial power can hope to demonstrate its re-
solve. The only revolution-in-power in
Central America becomes the surrogate for


other revolutionary movements which cur-
rently are either too well defended or too
elusive for the United States to hunt down
and destroy.
But there is a second message, really a
subtext, that is even more ominous. An ad-
ministration that believes that revolutionary
unrest can be contained if only Nicaragua
and/or Cuba can be "made to behave" is
dangerously out of touch with reality. In
classic fashion, the Reagan administration
early in 1981 helped to ensure that it would
remain out of touch with reality by firing or
forcing out many of the top State Depart-
ment career officers with extensive experi-
ence in Central America and the Caribbean.
This being the case, frustration can only
mount, either because Cubans and Nic-
araguans refuse to "behave," or because no
matter what they do, little else improves in
other parts of Central America. At some
point--and the anti-Nicaraguan rhetoric
suggests that such a point is not too dis-
tant-there is a real possibility that the frus-
trations will breakthrough the constraints of
more normal policy calculations and cost-
benefit analysis. At that moment, it no
longer will make any difference what Mex-
icans or other Latin Americans think, what
advantages will accrue to the Soviet Union if
the United States has its own Afghanistan,
what the fine print in the War Powers Act
says, or how the liberals at home or abroad
will react. It will have become, in one of
Washington's favorite metaphors, a differ-
ent ball game.
If this seems too harsh ajudgement of an
administration that to date has done little in
the region except bluster and threaten, it is
useful to remember that it took the Carter
White House many months and much soul-
searching before finally launching the luna-
tic expedition to rescue the hostages. It is
also sobering to recall how surprised most
Americans were to learn that the seemingly
dovish Carter administration had actually
used force in an attempt to regain the initia-
tive in its quarrel with Iran, even though the
use of force meant putting the lives of the
hostages (and of other Americans in Iran) in
jeopardy. History suggests that policies of
aggression and military adventurism are
often born out of just such combinations of
spiraling frustration and misperceptions of
reality.
This, then, is the real "clear and present
danger" in Central America and the Carib-
bean. An administration incapable of for-
mulating an alternative view of the region is
inevitably trapped between its analysis of
the problem and its seeming inability to act
with the decisiveness that its analysis sug-
gests is essential. Caught in a snare of its
own making, increasingly frustrated, not
wanting to appear a paper tiger, military
action-no matter what the conse-
quences-looms as more and more "ra-
tional" to the empire's high command. []
CAl?BBEAN IPEVIW/53











Good Neighbor
Continued from page 27



Phillips (1977), who characterized it as
"brazen intervention."
Washington recognized the need for giv-
ing Castillo Armas financial support, and it
did so in handsome fashion. He maintained
some of the reforms of his immediate pred-
ecessors, but he also retumed to the United
Fruit Company its expropriated acreage,
declared the Communist Party illegal, and
restricted the vote to citizens who could
read and write. He returned Guatemala
largely to its old ways under Ubico, and the
liberalizing efforts of Ar6valo and Arbenz
were largely halted. Today, the Guatemalan
regime is essentially a military dictatorship.

The Limits to US Influence
This experience exemplifies the difficulty of
the part the United States can play in the
Caribbean and elsewhere in Latin America,
with respect to affecting the types of gov-
ernments that its neighbors may adopt, or
have inflicted upon them. During World War
II, the United States endeavored by non-
recognition, freezing of assets, control of
exports, and influence over elections, to
cause Argentina to change its policies to-
ward the Axis, and even to force the Argen-
tina military to give way to a civilian
government. The failure of Hull and Braden
in these efforts was total, and the failure is
remembered in the Department of State. In
the earlier case of Nicaragua, even the use
of the Marines was ineffectual in changing
the political mores of the people. In
Guatemala, the success of the CIA was a
limited one. The case demonstrated that
the use of force by the United States could
in certain cases be effective in denying the
presidency to an individual and his associ-
ates. However, such use of force did not


instill a love of liberty, electoral honesty, and
a concern for human rights that accom-
pany a democratic regime as known in the
United States and, for example, in Costa
Rica.
Encouraged by its success in
Guatemala, and learning little from it, the
CIA obtained authority from Eisenhower
and then from President John F Kennedy,
to mount the expedition at the Bay of Pigs
that was to destroy the Castro regime in
Cuba, in 1961. There are many causes for
the failure, including Kennedy's unwilling-
ness to order a larger air strike, but one


The United States was
certainly not going to raise
issues about human rights
or political freedom with
these governments that
werg cooperating so
closely in the struggle for
survival against the Axis.



reason was that in Cuba, as distinct from
Guatemala, there was no old-time army that
could be counted on as an ally of the CIA.
Ernesto Guevara was in Guatemala City at
the time of the invasion in 1954, and he
counselled Castro that it would be neces-
sary, in consolidating his power, to elimi-
nate the military establishment, and this
was done.
The missile crisis of 1962, with its direct
threat to the security of the United States is,
of course, the reason why the United States
is still concerned about the Communist re-
gime in Cuba, and about the nature of the
government in Nicaragua following the
deposition of the younger Somoza in 1979.


Similarly, the Department of State is con-
cemed about the unresolved struggle in El
Salvador, where the Duarte junta is assailed
by "leftist" guerrillas. As John Moors Cabot,
former Assistant Secretary of State for Latin
American Affairs, put it: "Guatemala was on
a course which would have made it-as
Cuba later became-a menace to our na-
tional security."
Had the United States made a serious
effort to convene a meeting of foreign min-
isters in late May 1954 at the time of the
Guatemalan crisis, ways might have been
found for aiming collective action of the
American states in such a way as to satisfy
both the concern of the other American
republics to avoid intervention by the United
States, and the desire of the United States to
restrain the influence of local communists
and of international communism in
Guatemala. That opportunity was, however,
lost, for no such meeting was held, al-
though one was scheduled on June 28, for
July 7, but was later cancelled in view of
Arbenz' resignation on June 27. At the pre-
sent time, collective action by the OAS
seems impossible to arrange, given the ad-
verse vote in the OAS in 1979 on the pro-
posal for joint action, sponsored by the
United States, in connection with the Nic-
araguan situation. The United States, there-
fore, without prospects for multilateral OAS
action, is left to deal with individual coun-
tries in seeking to bolster its own security.
In the Dominican Republic affair in 1965,
the Johnson administration took no
chances with the CIA, but sent in some
30,000 troops to keep the peace and ar-
range for elections. The OAS entered the
situation after Brazil, Nicaragua and a few
other countries had supplied military
forces, but its action was primarily a face-
saving device. The essence of this massive
operation was that it demonstrated that the
United States would not allow another Cuba
in the hemisphere, especially in the Carib-
bean. The end of the affair was much later
celebrated by Zbigniew Brzezinski, Presi-
dent Jimmy Carter's National Security Ad-
viser, in stating: "To me the central problem
is that because we and the Latin Americans
have a divergent view of our common past
we may confront the risk of divergent fu-
tures. Americans tend to be very proud of
the Monroe Doctrine. To most Latin Ameri-
cans it is a document expressing American
domination.... We have deliberately chosen
not to label our policy toward Latin America
and instead to pursue a policy of treating
Latin American countries as mature part-
ners on a bilateral basis in most cases, as we
do with Europe and Asia; on a regional
basis when needed (and we have made real
strides in developing Caribbean coopera-
tion); and on a global basis in regard to
those problems which Latin America
shares with other developing countries"
(The HNew York Times, Jan. 4,1979). [E


54/CAI?BBEAN REVIEW


N W i N ot@a from FIU's International Affairs Center
Florida International University is the University's Summer Program in
the present locus of a new Cambridge.
international organization, the Professor Jorge Salazar
Interamerican University Council for convened a recent meeting to
Economic and Social Development. discuss final plans for the May 1982
The Council was established in meeting of the Brazilian Economic
March 1982 at an Assembly in Seminar.
Washington, D.C. The Secretariat Under cosponsorship with the
may be addressed in care of Victoria and Albert Gildred
Gregory B. Wolfe. President. Florida Foundation for Health and
International University who is Education in Latin America, the
serving as the first Board Chairman. International Affairs Center and the
Professors Mary Volcansek and School of Education conducted a
Jan Tucker hosted a reception for five-day higher education seminar
the visiting delegation from the at the University for administrators
Division of Extramural Studies of from the Universidad Pedagogica
Cambridge University in advance of Nacional in Bogota, Colombia.
International Affairs Center Florida International University
Tamiami Trail, Miami, Florida 33199, Ph: (305) 554-2846











Tradition of

Democracy
Continued from page 31

least disposed to leave the limelight He was
elected president of Costa Rica again in
1970 at the age of 63. This last presidency
turned out badly for him, principally be-
cause of his involvement with the "fugitive
financier" Robert Vesco, but other than his
personal problems he was a democratic
president. However, Don Pepe had earlier, in
1966, declined to run for the presidency,
when he might have, declaring, "I want time
for scholarly pursuits. I want the young men
to move along as they develop. [Daniel]
Oduber is qualified, and I support him."
What changed his mind in 1970 was Odu-
ber's defeat in the 1966 election and the
conviction that he was needed to restore the
PLY's fortunes.
Of course, these leaders continued to be
influential, as already noted in the case of
Mufioz. They were politicians and, although
they were not perfect, they were men of
deep conviction. In 1967, Betancourt con-
fided to Figueres: "I am uneasy about the
situation in Venezuela. The conflicts among
the candidates within the AD could even-
tually lead to disaster." Still, he stayed away
and did not take part in the 1968 election,
which AD lost It may be noted, too, that
none of the three got along well with his
successor, but none behaved un-
democratically. Betancourt's relations with
Leoni were strained and he was barely on
speaking terms with AD's Carlos Andres
Perez during the latter's presidency,
1974-1979. When Oduber finally became
president of Costa Rica, 1974-1978, he and
Figures had a complete falling-out Mufioz
had the same experience with his protege
and successor Roberto Sanchez Vilella,
which accounted for the victory of Luis A.
Ferr6, the statehood candidate, in 1968.
Overall, the three leaders set a democratic
example, permitting the political process
and nature to follow their course.
The democratic example which the three
leaders set was enhanced by a healthy prag-
matism and a warm sense of humor. Ac-
companying a willingness to subordinate
personal ambition to institutional growth
was an awareness of the need to avoid ex-
tremes. Betancourt for years opposed the
nationalization of Venezuela's petroleum in-
dustry on the grounds that it was better to
compromise with the oil companies and
keep the revenues coming for economic
development and social programs, while
the Venezuelans prepared themselves for
ownership, rather than to take the popular
step of seizing the oil fields prematurely,
with a consequent lengthy period of sacri-
fice and disruption. Mufioz's common-


wealth idea was a classic compromise
solution. In all matters, Muiioz was well-
known for. his comment, "If it works, use it"
Don Pepe consistently argued that class
harmony was essential for full production,
generally striving to combine the best fea-
tures of capitalism and socialism and to
discard the worst. The pragmatic approach
of the three made them targets of both the
left and the right, but Figueres was philo-
sophical, telling Betancourt, "I ought to
have the hide of a rhinocerous." Clearly, the
strength of their leadership was sustained
by the friendship they shared for one an-
other and the good humor they displayed
among themselves.
In 1960, when Figueres supported a tour
of Latin America by Adlai Stevenson, he
urged Betancourt to arrange a demonstra-
tion in behalf of Stevenson in Caracas, but
cautioned his friend to do it discreetly. "We
have to act like gentlemen," he wrote, "and
not like what we are, like Cantinflas." While
president, Betancourt told Figueres that his
presidency was like a marriage, "in that the
first year is the most difficult, and the others
are worse." In 1965, when the three leaders
were called upon by President Lyndon
Johnson to try to mediate the Dominican
crisis, after Johnson had already inter-
vened, Mufioz was not deceived, calling
their action, "operacidn sacar la pata"
(operation removing the foot from the
mouth). It should be noted also that they
were honest men. Except for Figueres's
problems with Vesco, which was more a
matter of badjudgment than personal gain,
no hint of scandal or corruption touched
their administrations. None of them was a
wealthy man or abused his political position
for personal enrichment.

A Tradition of Democracy
The unique leadership of Betancourt,
Figures, and Mufioz has established a tra-
dition of democracy in the Caribbean. They
created working democracies in Venezuela,
Costa Rica, and Puerto Rico and contrib-
uted to democratic progress in the Domin-
ican Republic and Honduras. Their
achievement provides hope for the future
and a nexus for the formulation of US pol-
icy. If the three men seemed more compati-
ble with certain leaders of the US
Democratic party, it was because they per-
ceived North American liberals as more
sympathetic toward the idea that democ-
racy could not survive in the Caribbean
without promoting social and economic
change. Figures frequently lamented that
his presidencies coincided with Re-
publicans in the White House. The three
leaders criticized Republican administra-
tions for failing to appreciate that the Carib-
bean oligarchy was not merely conservative
but was reactionary and was prepared to
use repression to maintain its privilege and
wealth. In the view of the oligarchy, democ-


arcy itself was subversive. The Caribbean's
democratic leaders also expressed concern
thatthe anti-communism of the Republican
party was too narrowly conceived and that
Republican leaders appeared to distrust
change as either communist-inspired or as
providing the opportunity for communist
infiltration.
The fate of democracy in the Caribbean,
however, was not necessarily linked to US
partisan politics. Betancourt, Figueres, and
Mufioz admired such Republicans as
Clifford Case, Douglas Dillon, Jacob Javits,
and Nelson Rockefeller. Figures summed
up the attitude in a letter to Arthur
Schlesinger, Jr., in February 1960, follow-
ing a visit to San Jose by McGeorge Bundy
(then dean of the faculty at Harvard Univer-
sity). "He [Bundy] is a very bright fellow, in
spite of his being a Republican," Don Pepe
wrote. "It is too bad that you fellows, Yankee
scholars, are not better known in the non-
English-speaking parts of the world. We get
enough of coca colas and Mr. Dulles
instead."
It is too early to tell about Ronald Reagan,
because the signals are mixed. The talk of
the distinction between authoritarian and
totalitarian regimes is reminiscent of the
double standard of John Foster Dulles with



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CARfBBEAN eVI1W/55










reference to right-wing and left-wing dicta-
tors, but the Reagan administration has an-
nounced plans for a program of develop-
ment in the Caribbean basin, showing an
awareness of the economic and social
causes of unrest. Secretary of State Alex-
ander Haig has called for the creation of an
institute for the study of democracy in the
Americas, under the auspices of the OAS,
proposing to name it in honor of R6mulo
Betancourt. The latter action may indicate
an important change in attitude. The Rea-
gan program apparently places emphasis
upon private investment and self-help, and
the Caribbean's democratic left may be re-
ceptive to a shift in strategies, given current
economic conditions, but the approach
ought not to be doctrinaire and needs to


Hegemony
Continued from page 33






States is enlisted as supporter of such gov-
ernments on the premise that the threats
not simply of a more just distribution of
wealth and income, but of "communism,"
and thus of an extension of Russian power.
The military regimes placed in power
may, like the demons summoned by the
sorcerer, not always obey him, and military
governments may prove to have their own
way of ruling not necessarily to the liking of
the propertied classes that had solicited
military intervention against movements of
popular power; they may have nationalist
and socialist ideas of their own, or they may
themselves assume permanent rulership in
their own personal and institutional interest,
dealing directly with the United States and
diminishing the role of the old oligarchy.
As repression is heightened, however, the
possibility emerges of the steady alienation
of the middle class from the regime, the
intensification of the hostility of the lower
classes, and finally the development of an
insurgency or civil war which the regime
may well lose, as in Nicaragua. Given the
self-identification of the United States with
the regime, which represented "anti-com-
munism" and law and order, the emergence
under these circumstances of a revolution-
ary government has been regarded by US
administrations as a "defeat" (although
there is no reason why it could not have
equally well been interpreted as a triumph
for American democratic principles and an
analog to the American Revolution, if the
US government had not made a point of
wearing its anti-communist hat). The atti-
tude of the Roosevelt administration to the
government of Lazaro Cardenas is apposite
56/CAI?BBEAN PIEWvi


recognize that there are grave economic
and social problems which may not attract
private capital. As someone has already ob-
served, it is awfully difficult to pull yourself
up by your bootstraps if you don't have any
boots.
The plan must accept the democratic
pluralism of the Caribbean and the na-
tionalistic sensitivities and locally-devised
programs for the solution of local prob-
lems. It does not advance the cause of
Costa Rican democracy, for example, to
charge that the welfare state is spending
more than it earns. Reform may be neces-
sary in Costa Rica, but its problems cannot
be blamed solely upon its social democratic
course. In 1954, George Humphrey,
Eisenhower's Secretary of the Treasury,


here, or the difference between the attitude
of the Kennedy administration to the origi-
nal election of Juan Bosch in 1961, and the
attitude of the Johnson administration to
the prospect of Bosch's return to power in
1965.

Escaping Hegemony
Assuming that a more enlightened US gov-
ernment is not now in prospect, and absent
an economic miracle (e.g. oil strikes of Mex-
ican or Venezuelan proportions) that would
make it possible for economies to gratify
popular aspirations without touching the
present distribution of wealth, then a gov-
ernment in the Caribbean today has prima
facie the choice of playing the game by the
rules laid down by the United States and the
international financial institutions, which
means shelving prospects for serious eco-
nomic redistribution, and therefore resort-
ing -increasingly to repressive techniques;
or mobilizing and arming the population to
deter incursions from mercenaries, armies
of neighboring countries, and others
prompted bythe CIA, etc., and to indicate to
the United States that outright military ac-
tion would bring no easy victories but would
instead raise prospects of an endless Viet-
nam-type engagement.
Another course may however be possi-
ble, given the present correlation of forces
in the region. Fidel Castro believed that his
only option, if he wanted his country to be
truly independent of the United States, was
to sign up with the Soviet Union. Today it
may be possible to put together a protective
and supportive international network with-
out a speech proclaiming oneself a Marxist-
Leninist, with the very mixed blessings that
that brings in its train. Perhaps sympathy
from Mitterrand's France and even Helmut
Schmidt's Germany, a little solidarity from
the Socialist International, some Christian
Democratic gestures from Venezuela arid
revolutionary nostalgia from Mexico, can be
translated into enough economic and dip-
lomatic support to ride out the waves of self-


took a similar negative view toward as-
sistance to state-owned enterprises, under-
mining the solutions of the democratic left
and indirectly providing the opportunity for
those of Fidel Castro. The leaders of Costa
Rica and Venezuela aided in the overthrow
of Somoza, but they were not pro-san-
dinista. They were not afraid to oppose a
tyrant because of the possibility that the
Marxists might triumph and they continue
to aid the Nicaraguan revolution in order to
enable the democratic forces to prevent
that from happening. Betancourt, Figueres,
and Mufioz could be tough against those
who violated the democratic process, but
they always gave democracy a chance,
even if they did not like the results. That is
their legacy. E


righteous outrage in Washington and New
York.
If one may allow a little play to the imag-
ination here, there may be possibilities that
sandinista Nicaragua, for example, has
overlooked. How much wind would it take
out of the sails and the speeches of Alex-
ander Haig, and how much menace out of
the covert instructions being given by his
colleagues, for example, if Tomas Borge or
Humberto Ortega were to announce that
after due consideration of Cuba and other
revolutionary forerunners sandinista Nic-
aragua had decided to adopt the Mexican
model? General Sandino was himself of
course inspired by the Mexican Revolution
during the period he lived and worked in
Mexico, so this would be no more than a
return to first principles.
The Mexican model signifies a leading
role (and an indefinite stay in power) for the
revolutionary party other parties are
legal, they compete, they are even encour-
aged and subsidized by government; they
are just never popular enough to win. Mex-
ican land reform legislation could be
adopted in toto, along with Mexican rules
governing private and foreign business and
assigning a substantial role to the public
sector. The principles of Mexican foreign
policy-non-intervention, juridical equality
of states, etc. are all perfectly appropriate.
Mexican technical assistance missions
could be brought in. Surely the flattered
Mexicans would exert themselves to pro-
vide economic assistance. The cold war-
riors in Washington would have a harder
time peddling the formula that a revolution-
ary government necessarily means a gov-
emment in the Cuban or Russian mode.
The United States' need for Mexican oil
would inhibit attacks on a state identified so
closely with Mexico.
Perhaps this vision is too rosy; perhaps it
carries the point too far. In today's Carib-
bean, however, there may be enough play in
the situation to suggest that hegemony
need not be absolute. M










Mediation
Continued from page 45




Let no one think that in Central America
Cuba is defending freedom and human
rights, for they will then have to explain why
Cuban troops are supporting the Ethiopian
government, a government responsible for
a horrifying genocide in its devastated Af-
rican comer.
It is in that sense that strategy instituted
by Washington for the defense of its inter-
ests, can also be useful to protect the inter-
ests of Latin American democratic nations.
This is not always understood in Latin
America. Too frequently Social Democratic
leaders conspire against their own political
and ideological objectives in exchange for
the circumstantial applause of the more
able Marxist groups, and for the mysterious
prestige that the abused word "revolution-
ary" still carries in the primitive Latin Ameri-
can political milieu.
Finally, what is the alternative the Social-
ist International proposes to substitute for
the American action? Given the perform-
ance models in Nicaragua and El Salvador,
it appears that the most agreeable formula
to the SI consists of not opposing the insur-
rectionary movements encouraged by
Cuba/Moscow, while trying to control these
movements by the inclusion of democrats
within the rebel cadres. This is the story of
Alfonso Robelo and Violeta Chamorro in
thejunta that set up Somoza's downfall,
and this is the story of Ungo and Zamora in
the Front that lies in wait for power in El
Salvador. Experience has shown that this
strategy is childishly naive as the military
apparatus of the Guerrillas remains con-
trolled by Marxist-Leninist groups. It is sad
that the Socialist International has not
learned the Cuban or Nicaraguan lesson,
but it is even sadder that their very own
European lesson at the end of the Second
World War is not even remembered. Then,
Marxist-Leninist parties, with the backing of
the military apparatus, seized power in half
of Europe, paying no attention to the pro-
tests of the naive social democrats, who had
believed the communist promise of politi-
cal fair play. As Mao used to say, in convul-
sive societies, power comes from the
muzzle of a gun.

The Breakdown of the SI in
Latin America
The Socialist International has so many
contradictions, and the damage its unex-
pected actions can cause to the political
destiny of Latin America (and to its own
relations with the United States) is so great,


that it would not be surprising to see the
future breakdown of the social democratic
movement in the region. One segment, the
Romulista faction ofAcci6n DemocrAtica
seems to be ready to repudiate the irrespon-
sible conduct of the SI. It is possible that the
apristas of Andres Townsend, the full
membership of the Liberaci6n Party in
Costa Rica, and the guzmanista sector of
the Partido Revolucionario Dominicano,
may follow the same line. Some voices, as
in the case of the Chilean Alberto Baeza
Flores, historian of Latin American social
democracy, are already calling for the resur-
rection of the Democratic Left, and the re-
pudiation of an International that serves the
democratic interests in Europe and the to-
talitarian ones in Latin America. It would not
be surprising if this separation takes place
during the coming years and, basically, it
will come as a result of the absurd behavior
of the socialist parties of a Europe not re-
signed to the marginal role the bipolarity of
the planet condemns it to. It has acted with
the greatest irresponsibility in an area of the


world where the consequences of these ac-
tions will be always considered alien, some-
thing like a distant flare-up splendor, on the
other side of the Atlantic.
Of course, none of this means that the
democratic forces of the West should re-
main impassive in the face of the horren-
dous Central American carnage, but it is
indispensable that the actions undertaken
be carefully pondered over, even if it is only
for the compassionate reason of not creat-
ing greater harm for those unfortunate pop-
ulations. Cubans discovered that it was
possible to surpass the horrors of the
Batista era, and the Nicaraguans are about
to repeat the same frightful discovery in
regards to Somoza. It is necessary to oust
from power the military dictatorships andto
establish instead democratic governments
that will promote social justice. But this can
never be achieved by backing Castro-So-
viet obedient armed groups even when re-
spect for the democratic game is
demanded of them for they will never keep
their promise. [
CARBBEAN NW'VW/57


THE


REVIEW AWARD
The Caribbean Review Award is an annual award to honor an individual
who has contributed to the advancement of Caribbean intellectual life. The
recipient of the Third Annual Award is Aime C6saire.
Aim6 C6saire was born in Basse-Pointe, Martinique in 1913. He is with
Leopold Senghor and Leon Damas, the father of n6gritude, also today's
foremost black dramatist in the French language, an internationally
recognized poet, historian, political activist and combatant for black and
human dignity. As Andr6 Breton said:
Aime C6saire est un Noir
qui est non seulement un Noir
mais tout I'homme
et qui s'imposera de plus en plus A moi
comme le prototype de la dignity
His greatest political treatise, Discours sur le colonialisme (1950), his
most read poem, Cahier d'un retour au pays natal (1939), his greatest
play, La Tragddie du rol Christophe (1963), are cultural and intellectual
dimensions paralleled by his political service: maire of Fort-de-France and
d6put6 in the Assemblee Nationale for 35 years. His contribution to
Martinique, to the Caribbean, to Africa, to France and to mankind make him
a model for our generation and many to come.
The award committee consisted of Lambros Comitas (Chairman),
Columbia University, New York; Fuat Andic, Universidad de Puerto Rico,
San Juan, Puerto Rico; Wendell Bell, Yale University, New Haven,
Connecticut; Locksley Edmondson, University of the West Indies, Mona,
Jamaica; Anthony P. Maingot, Florida International University, Miami,
Florida.
Nominations for the fourth annual Caribbean Review Award-to be
presented at the Eighth Annual Meeting of the Caribbean Studies
Association in Spring 1983-should be sent to The Editor, Caribbean
Review, Florida International University, Miami, Florida 33199.
The award recognizes individual effort irrespective of field, ideology,
national origin, or place of residence. In addition to a plaque the recipient
receives an honorarium of $250, donated by the International Affairs Center
of Florida International University.










French

Connection
Continued from page 49

years (going back to its period of "violen-
cia"); it is not a dictatorship nor a military
regime. It has other problems, as un-
satisfactory as they may seem.
BBL: What is the relationship between
France and Nicaragua?
AR: Given their economic difficulties-
40 years of dictatorship, three years of
war-and the strategic difficulties that rid-
dle a country in crisis and the difficulties
met in reconstruction, I don't think it proper
to take a hard stand, to cut their credit, to
press and threaten them with military inter-
vention. On the contrary, we have to help
them. We have to support them in all thatwe
recognize as constructive and productive.
We have to give them all we can. Not only
financial aid but aid of any other kind that
might comfort the people and strengthen
their national independence. To label it a
totalitarian state, a satellite of the Soviet
Union, is totally negative and
counterproductive.
BBL: What is France's attitude toward the
US proposed mini-Marshall plan for the
Caribbean?
AR: As far as the mini-Marshall plan is
concerned, no one has invited us to partici-
pate-but we believe that international aid
is a necessity for the development of those
counties with the poorest economies. We
are planning to double the amount of
France's public aid, but aid is not enough.
Aid has to come together with a reorganiza-
tion of international relations. And with the


establishment of prices for raw materials
that will allow economic solvency so that
the resources of these countries in develop-
ment will not be subjected to international
market laws that prevent a fair income and
frustrate steady development. With that,
and with the withdrawal of these countries
from the middle of the East-West conflict-
these are the two conditions necessary to
allow these countries to climb out of under-
development They need peace. And peace
is to be had only through the end of conflict;
through an alliance of all developed
nations
So we must not isolate the issue of for-

Non-intervention is
neither indifference to nor
blind isolation from the
rights of the people.


eign aid. We must not deviate from the
more general framework of North-South re-
lations and I would say that the problem of
world economic order is fundamental, be-
cause if we do not better relations between
the North and South we will create currents
unfavorable to the establishment of peace.
Such a result can only serve to reinforce
negative forces against the values of de-
mocracy and freedom, forces represented
by the alliance against the North of the East
and the South. All the policies of the present
French government attempt to thwart that
unhappy force, that alliance or domination
of the East and the South, against those of
the West. This realization is vital to the un-
derstanding that there is no antagonism


between President Mitterrand's policies and
the long-term interests of the US. Instead,
there are differences of behavior, there are
modalities. But they are based on common
values.

Francois Bourricaud:
French Latin American Policy
Is Not Too Serious
Barry B. Levine: How would you charac-
terize French policy toward Latin America
under the Mitterrand government?
Francols Bourricaud: The nuances
and shades of Latin American Policy have
been blurred in recent years. Those who are
in the government now, except forthe presi-
dent, are people who get their most basic
inspiration from '68. These people look at
the problems of Latin America from special
glasses. They were deeply moved by what
happened in French student politics in May
1968. This was the time of the Vietnam War,
the time of Ch6 Guevara and his followers,
who were the cultural heroes of the Euro-
pean intelligentsia. They had this special
admiration for the man who went to the
mountain and was able to defy the gigantic
American imperialism, set up the first so-
cialist state in Latin America. Remember
the incredible paper that Jean Paul Sartre
wrote defending Castro. It was one of the
saddest things he wrote, written after a visit
of just ten days. It was an example of what
has been called "the classic irresponsibility
of the French intellectual."
True, the fantastic enthusiasm for Ch6
Guevara, Fidel Castro and all their crew is
probably fading now. Lastyearwhenwe had
this terrible exodus of boat people leaving
Cuba-it was very hard for these people to
defend Fidel and the Cuban regime. That


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was too much-not even Le Nouvel Ob-
servateur could! The flame for Cuba is
vanishing. Fidel is no longer a shining
young man. It's difficult to look at that sad
cigar smoking boss as a hero coming down
from the sierra. They started realizing that
they were cheated, deceived; and if they
have been fooled it is because they are
fools. All of that has started to fade but at the
first possible opportunity it could start up
again and for the benefit of another hero of
the same variety. Please excuse my funda-
mental pessimism.
The French policy is not very systematic,
it's more of a mood, an undertone, an atti-
tude. The people around M. Mitterrand, who
inspired him when he delivered his speech
in Mexico, are of the intellectual fiber that
I've tried to describe in my book, Le bri-
colage ideologique: essais sur les intel-
lectuels et les passions democratiques.
"Bricolage" is a concept I took from
Claude Levi-Strauss' La pensee sausage
(Plon, 1962). He uses the concept to dis-
tinguish the intellectual products of the sav-
age mind in relation to modem thought.
"Bricolage" is the way savages deal with
problems which are infinitely beyond the
scope of their intellectual mastery. Political
ideologies in our cultures raise problems of
the same type. These ideologies grow, re-
main, and then decay. It's something like
the difference in Pareto's thought between
logical and non-logical actions.
But you also have another line of
thought, more technical, which comes
from the technocrats, specialists, diplo-
mats, etc. These people look at Latin Amer-
ica in terms of problems between the North
and the South. M. Cheysson, the foreign
minister, is such a person.
They all take much too global a view of
Latin America, they see it as homogeneous,
unified. They still live on the catastrophic as-
sumption that the Third World has been a
disaster, that there are no possible solutions
for that part of the world. They have taken all
that literature from the '50s and '60s about
center and periphery, dependency theory
and the lot, much too seriously. Depen-
dency theory is an interesting ideology but
its explanatory powers are extremely lim-
ited. It starts from the fact that people in
some areas of the world are very rich and
more powerful than others in other parts of
the world. That is obvious..But as a theory it
is too global, and it ignores the internal con-
ditions of the countries of the areas that it is
supposed to describe. Everything that hap-
pens in the periphery'is explained in terms
of the domination by the center.
When I wrote my book on Peru, I very
carefully took the opposite perspective and
tried to explain what was happening in Peru
mainly by the integral structure of that soci-
ety. That isn't all, of course; Peru doesn't
exist for itself and by itself. It has some rela-
tion to the outside world, but the method,


the procedure that I used was to start with
proven facts about what was happening in
Lima, and not what was happening in New
York or New Orleans.
The consequences of dependency the-
ory for policy are twofold. On the one hand,
you have a rhetorical consequence which
pays off extremely well, especially with the
kind of government we have now, because
it builds you into a defender of the op-
pressed people, of the pariahs of the world.
That was the Mitterrand position of last Oc-
tober in Mexico. On the other hand, there is
a diplomatic consequence. It's a kind of
trick or strategy that leaves you free to


France wants to be a
good friend of American
policy in Europe without
at the same time
appearing to be a follower
of American diplomacy.



choose between certain alternatives. It al-
lows you to take the position that you are
neither in opposition to, nor in support of,
American policy while you can still say that
the Americans are responsible for the ex-
ploitation of these underprivileged coun-
tries. That's what makes it so useful a policy
for M. Mitterrand. He wants to be a good
friend of American policy in Europe without
at the same time appearing to be a follower
of American diplomacy. So this theory gives
you the appearance of a transcendental
neutrality, or transcendental activism if you
prefer, but though they claim to be strongly
committed my suspicion is that it's sheer
rhetoric and of not the slightest possible
consequence.
BBL: The political strategy of the French
Socialist Party was to fit between the Com-
munist Party and the rest of the country,
controlling the communists and dis-identi-
fying with the right Isn't their policy in Latin
America a projection of this strategy?
FB: Yes, except that the situation in Latin
America is very different, it's even easier to
play the middle position overseas. In
France, the position of the so-called conser-
vative forces is in many respects something
that you have to deal with when you are in
government After all, you may agree that
capitalists are bad people, that conserva-
tives are stupid, etc., etc., but in terms of
elections they represent a vast part of the
population, in terms of the economics of
the country they represent something you
have to deal with. But when it comes to
saying the same thing in Latin America it is
an entirely different question. You have no
restrictions and limitations on the accusa-


tions you make about their governments.
What is the danger of saying that the El
Salvador regime is corrupt and that the Sal-
vadoran government has to be changed?
You and I totally agree about that, so it's
totally inconsequential.
The pronouncements of the French gov-
ernment in international affairs are margi-
nal, they don't carry much importance. It's
still debatable if France is a world power,
and if it is a world power it is a second rate
world power at that. But the very nature of
the role of the presidency in France is such
that the president is always looking for addi-
tional resources. Thus, to show that he is
important in world affairs, to show that what
he says has some importance in the deci-
sions of the so-called super powers is sud-
denly extremely rewarding for him. This is
especially so because for at least ten years
now foreign policy has been uncontrover-
sial in French politics; once we got out of
NATO itwas assumed that we were between
the two world powers and a sort of consen-
sus developed. The reactivating of the con-
sensus has been very useful for the
president and the power incumbents. The
speech of M. Mitterrand in Mexico is a sort of
replica of General de Gaulle's speech in
Phnom Penh in 1966.
BBL: You obviously don't approve of the
French and Mexican recognition of the
armed opposition in El Salvador.
FB: I don't see the point; frankly I think its
a faux-pas. It has no consequences be-
cause, as I've said before, our importance in
that area is limited. The statement is unbe-
lievable. It is without provable effectiveness
except maybe only to tease the Americans.
It is not too bright for a government to pro-
ject a feeling that its decisions are
inconsequential.
BBL: Then French Latin American policy
is without consequence?
FB: The only consequences in Latin
America that I can see would be in terms of
the integral situation of the Caribbean de-
partments of France. I would be surprised,
for example, if there were no connection
between Cuba and those who are favoring
the independence of Martinique and
Guadeloupe from France. Cuba says they
have nothing to do with such persons but I
wouldn't take such a statement at face
value. As soon as a violent movement starts
in one of these two departments, and as
soon as some leaders emerge with a very
explicit call for independence, for instance,
that would put M. Mitterrand and his gov-
ernment into a rather unpleasant situation.
The way out would be to say, "Well, we'll go
to elections." But is it possible for that kind
of radical element to accept the dictum or
verdict of the polls. Thatwould be unlikelyto
happen.
You have that situation, without of course
the presence of Cuba, in what is now going
on in New Caledonia. There you have a
CARBBEAN PEv 1W/59













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rather explosive situation. You have a native
population which has been colonized and
ruled by the French under a classical colo-
nial system. The local Socialists of New Cal-
edonia have insisted that some sort of self-
government, home rule, etc., be given to the
territory. It was one of the promises in our
national presidential and legislative elec-
tions and now these people are asking for
the fulfillment of the promises. The Socialist
government is now embarrassed. There are
large industrial interests in New Caledonia
where you have nickel And it's always un-
pleasant for a government, whatever the
government, to have to grant indepen-
dence to a new territory.
Suppose now that something of the kind
happened in Guadeloupe or Marti-
nique...with Fidel Castro behind it! It would
be rather an embarrassing situation. And it
could likely happen because expectations
such as these once aroused would not be
satisfied with only a little more public
spending from the French treasury.
BBL: Could French policy toward Latin
America, in the context of a Socialist gov-
emment, be any different?
FB: It could be a little more realistic, a
little less rhetorical. You could send M. De-
bray to study. You could pay more attention
to what your diplomatic attaches write. You
don't try to invent grand policy for the mass
media. I think it could be easily rearranged
without turmoil, even within the Socialist
Party itself. They are quite capable of con-
trolling the situation, avoiding any claim
from rank and file that some basic tenet of
the doctrine has been betrayed.
What they have now is gratuitous, it's
done for their own pleasure, a sort of autistic
and narcissistic behavior. French Latin
American policy is not too serious and
never has been by the way.
Latin America as a whole doesn't exist
any longer. Several of the countries have
much better possibilities than do others,
Brazil, Mexico, etc. It doesn't do any good to
work with the broad sweeping generaliza-
tions that they do. The first condition for a
realistic policy about Latin America would
be to dump stupid aggregates like "Latin
America." It is not the case that all of Latin
America suffers the same problems or has
the same possibilities.
BBL: What then is the importance of M.
Mitterrand's speech in Mexico?
FB: Just before the meeting in Cancin,
the president went to Mexico City to meet
with Mexican president Jos6 L6pez Portillo.
During that show he delivered a speech to
the "descamisados," the poor people of
Latin America. He had to deliver it at the
Plaza de las tres cultures. He was follow-
ing the model of General de Gaulle who
delivered a speech from the balcony of the
Mexican Presidential Palace. Mitterrand, of
course, couldn't do less, but they couldn't
let him speak from the balcony. The priv-


ilege of speaking from the balcony is re-
stricted to very few people and the French
quota had been dried up for the next 50
years after de Gaulle! So I am told that it
took subtle maneuvers by the diplomatic
services of both countries to arrange for the
speech in the plaza. From pictures one
gathers that it was a second or third order
rally-it was not the Queen of England or
Princess Diana after all!
But the important point is the relationship
between such symbolic gestures in and for
Latin America and more instrumental pol-
icy concerning the North-South problems.
That is something that is taken seriously by
the French diplomatic service, and by the
technocrats and the bankers. The president
ofSociete Generale, an important French
bank, has written a book and an endless
amount of reports trying to show that the
international monetary system is about to
break down because of the insolvency of
the countries of the Third World. The only
way to save it would be to engineer a new
variety of massive Marshall Plan.
But they are mistaken to treat the Third
World as one unit. The problems of Brazil,
Mexico, Colombia and Venezuela are totally
different from the problems of Senegal,
Zimbabwe and Madagascar. You see what
they are doing is in order to give some
minimum credibility to the vagaries of Latin
Americathey are covering it with the facade
of the North-South business.
If you truly want to have an effective
North-South policy, especially given French
resources-alone we couldn't muster all
that much to loan to the South-we would
have to have some kind of agreement,
some kind of common views, some kind of
common policy with the US, Japan and
Germany. But then suddenly that would be
so much less rewarding than to deliver a
speech at the Plaza de las tres cultures.
It's not even an ideology, it's a glamorous
imitation...no, simply it's electoral
convenience.
BBL: Given your previous statements
that French Latin American policy could
change, do you think it might?
FB: Could be. First, they could get bored
and finally realize that it doesn't work. Sec-
ond, they could need more and more help
and support from their allies in order to
finance their own internal needs. The
French economic situation two years from
now, perhaps less, might make the Socialist
government a little more receptive to what
comes from the international community. It
is easier for the French government to stick
to its macho attitude in Latin America and
other sensitive spots if it has nothing to ask
from the American bankers or from the in-
temational monetary institutions. Finances
and deficits might compel the government
to be more modest. Then they would clearly
talk more North-South and less Fidel
Castro. E


60/CAffBBEAN El IEW
















Recent Books

An informative listing of books about the Caribbean,
Latin America, and their emigrant groups



By Marian Goslinga


Anthropology and Sociology

BOLIVIA THE EVOLUTION OF A MULTI-
ETHNIC SOCIETY Herbert S. Klein. Oxford
University Press, 1982. 320 p. $19.95;
$6.95 paper.

BRAZILIAN WORLD. Robert Hayes. Forum
Press (St Louis, Mo.), 1982. $5.75.

THE CHURCH IN BRAZIL: THE POLITICS OF
RELIGION. Thomas C. Bruneau. University
of Texas Press, 1982. 270 p. $27.00.

CIVILISES ET ENERGUMENES: DE
LENSEIGNEMENT AUX ANTILLES. Andr6
Lucrece. Editions Caribeennes (Paris,
France), 1981. 70.00E

THE COSTA RICANS. Richard Biesanz, et al.
Prentice-Hall, 1982. 304 p. $14.95.

CULTURAL Y SOCIEDAD EN AMERICA LATINA
Y EL CARIBE. United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization.
Unesco, 1981. 183 p. Papers presented at a
conference held in 1978 in Bogota,
'Colombia.
CULTURE ET POLITIQUE EN GUADALOUPE
ET MARTINIQUE. J. Blaise, et al. Editions
Karthala (Paris, France), 1981. 36.00E

DEMOGRAPHIC COLLAPSE: INDIAN PERU,
1520-1620. N. David Cook. Cambridge
University Press, 1982. 320 p.

LE DISCOURS ANTILLAIS. Edouard Glissant.
Editions du Sueil (Paris, France), 1981.
504 p. With emphasis on Martinique.

ENSAYOS SOBRE LA CULTURAL
DOMINICANA. Bemardo Vega, et al. Museo
del Hombre Domincano (Santo Domingo),
1981. 247 p. $8.50.

LESCLAVE AUX ANTILLES FRANCHISES,
XVII-XIX SIECLE: CONTRIBUTION AU
PROBLEM DE LESCLAVAGE. Antoine
Gisler. Rev. ed. Editions Kathala (Paris,
France), 1981. 68.00F
THE EYE OF A FLAME. Victor D'V C'Ng.
Vantage Press, 1982. $6.95. Social
conditions in Venezuela.

FOLK CULTURE OF THE SLAVES IN
JAMAICA. Edward K. Braithwaite. Rev. ed.
Caribbean Booksellers (Parkersburg, Iowa),
1981. $2.25.


THE HISPANIC AMERICANS. Milton Meltzer.
Harper & Row, 1982. 160 p.

HISTORIC DE LA ANTROPOLOGIA
INDIGENISTA: MEXICO Y PERU. Manuel
Marzal M. Pontificia Universidad Cat6lica del
Peri, 1981. 572 p. $23.00.

INMIGRACION Y CLASSES SOCIALES EN EL
PUERTO RICO DEL SIGLO XIX. Francisco
A. Scarano, ed. Ediciones Huracan (Rio
Piedras, Puerto Rico), 1981. 208 p. $5.95.

THE LAST LORDS OF PALENQUE: THE
LACANDON MAYAS OF THE MEXICAN
RAIN FOREST Victor Perera, Robert D.
Bruce. Little, Brown & Co., 1982. $17.95.

A LEGACY OF PROMISES: AGRICULTURE,
POLITICS AND RITUAL IN THE MORELOS
HIGHLANDS OF MEXICO. Guillermo de la
Pena. University of Texas Press, 1982.
262 p. $25.00.

EL NEGRO EN COSTA RICA. Carlos Melendez.
Editorial Costa Rica (San Jose), 1981.
258 p. $7.50.

LOS NEGROS CARIBES DE HONDURAS. Ruy
Galvao de Andrade Coelho. Editorial
Guaymuras (Tegucigalpa, Honduras), 1981.
208 p.

THE NEW AMERICANS: CUBAN BOAT
PEOPLE. James Haskins. Enslow
Publications, 1982. 64 p. $7.95.


ORDER WITHOUT GOVERNMENT THE
SOCIETY OF PEMON INDIANS OF
VENEZUELA David J. Thomas. University
of Illinois Press, 1982. 328 p.

THE POTTERY OF ACATLAN: A CHANGING
MEXICAN TRADITION. Louana M. Lackey.
University of Oklahoma Press, 1982. 164 p.
$19.95.

SAN JOSE DE GRACIA: MEXICAN VILLAGE
IN TRANSITION. Luis Gonzalez. John
Upton, tr. University of Texas Press, 1982.
400 p. $8.95. A reprint

SAN PEDRO, COLOMBIA: SMALL TOWN IN A
DEVELOPING SOCIETY Miles Richardson.
Irvington Publications, 1982. 104 p. $6.95.

SOBRE LOS INDIOS DE GUATEMALA. Pedro
Carrasco. Seminario de Integraci6n Social
(Guatemala), 1981.

THE TEJANO COMMUNITY 1836-1900.
Amoldo De Leon. University of New Mexico
Press, 1982. 288 p. $19.95.

TOLTECAYOTL- ASPECTS DE LA CULTURAL
NAHUATL Miguel Le6n-Portilla. Fondo de
Cultura Econ6mica (Mexico), 1981.

WOMEN OF CUBA. Inger Holt-Seeland.
Elizabeth Lacoste, tr. Lawrence Hill
(Westport, Conn.), 1982. 144 p. $14.95;
$7.95 paper.

Biography
BIOGRAFIA DE COSTA RICA. Eugenio
Rodriguez Vega. Editorial Costa Rica (San
Jose), 1981. 190 p. $7.50.

COLUMBUS: HIS ENTERPRISE. Hans Koning.
Monthly Review Press, 1982. 128 p. $6.50.

JOSE GABRIEL TUPAC AMARU ANTES DE
SU REBELION. Jos6 Antonio del Busto
Duthurburu. Pontificia Universidad Cat6lica
del Perd, 1981. 134 p.

JOSE GIL DE CASTRO: VIDA Y OBRA DEL
GRAN PINTOR PERUANO DE LOS
LIBERTADORES. Ricardo Mariategui Oliva.
Empresa Editorial La Confianza (Lima,
Peru), 1981. 282 p.

JOSE MARTI, GUIA Y COMPANERO. Carlos
Rafael Rodriguez. Editorial Nuestro Tiempo
(Mexico), 1981. 118 p. $4.55.
CAIfBBEAN VIE1W/61











A MATTER OF FEAR: PORTRAIT OF AN
ARGENTINIAN EXILE. Andrew Graham-
Yooll. Lawrence Hill (Westport, Conn.),
1982. 136 p. $12.95; $7.95 paper.
Biography of Jacobo Timmerman.

MEMORIES SOBRE LA VIDA DEL
LIBERTADOR. TomAs Cipriano de
M6squera. TomAs Cipriano M6squra Wallis,
ed. Ediciones Banco del Estado (Bogota,
Colombia), 1981. 2 vols. $120.00.

MONSENOR ROMERO. Arnoldo R. Mora.
Editorial Universitaria Centroamericana
(San Jos6, Costa Rica), 1981. 374 p.
$10.00.

NUESTROS GOBERNANTES, 1821-1981.
Francis Polosifontes. Editorial Jos6 Pineda
Ibarra (Guatemala), 1981. 215 p. $8.00.

SIMON BOLIVAR: SU VIDA, SU OBRA, SU
MENSAJE. Max G6mez Vergara.
Universidad Pedag6gica y Tecnol6gica de
Colombia (Tunja), 1981. 200 p. $20.00.

LA VIDA GLORIOSA Y TRISTE DE JUAN
PABLO DUARTE. Rafael Est6nger. Editora
Universidad Nacional (Santo Domingo),
1981. 203 p.

Description and Travel
CARIBBEAN HIDEAWAYS. Ian Keown. Rev. ed.
Crown, 1982. $7.95.

MEDELLIN: SU ORIGEN, PROGRESS Y
DESARROLLO. Jorge Restrepo Uribe, Luz
Posada de Greiff. Servigraficas (Medellin,
Colombia), 1981. 658 p. $100.00.

NINETEENTH-CENTURY SOUTH AMERICA
IN PHOTOGRAPHS. H. L. Hoffenberg.
Dover, 1982. 160 p.

RIOS, PLAYAS Y MONTANAS DE COSTA RICA.
Miguel Salguero. Editorial Costa Rica (San
Jos6), 1981. 172 p. $15.00.

SOUTH AMERICA OVERLAND. lan Finlay,
Trish Sheppard. Hippocrene Books, 1982.
$22.00.


Economics

ACUMULACION ORIGINARIA Y DESARROLLO
DEL CAPTIALISMO EN EL SALVADOR.
Rafael Menjivar. Editorial Universitaria
Centroamericana (San Jos,. Costa Rica),
1981. 169 p. $7.50.

THE AGRARIAN QUESTION AND
REFORMISM IN LATIN AMERICA. Alain de
Janvry. Johns Hopkins University Press,
1982. 352 p. $27.50; $8.95 paper.

AL NORTE DEL RIO BRAVO: PASADO
INMEDIATO, 1930-1981. David Maciel.
Siglo Veintiuno (Mexico), 1981. 234 p.
$8.75. A survey of Chicano labor history..

CHILE: AN OUTLINE OF ITS GEOGRAPHY
ECONOMICS AND POLITICS. Gilbert J.
Butland. Greenwood Press, 1982. 128 p.
$19.75. Reprint of the 1956 ed.
62/CAI?BBEAN MEIEW


CRISIS ECONOMIC EN COSTA RICA. Helio
Fallas. Editorial Nueva Decada (San Jose,
Costa Rica), 1981. 120 p. $7.50.

CRISIS Y POLITICAL AGRARIA EN EL PERU:
PROBLEMA Y SOLUTION. Jos6 A.
Portugal Vizcarra. Consultoria de Proyectos
Agro-Industriales (Lima, Peru), 1981. 165 p.

DESARROLLO DEL CAPITALISM EN COSTA
RICA. Reinaldo Carcanholo. Editorial
Universitaria Centroamericana (San Jos6,
Costa Rica), 1981. 388 p. $12.50.

ECOLOGIA Y SUBDESARROLLO EN
AMERICA LATINA. Santiago R. Olivier. Siglo
Veintiuno (Mexico), 1981. 225 p.


ECONOMIC SUBTERRANEA O EL IMPERIO
DEL CONTRA-DERECHO EN COLOMBIA.
Benjamin Losada Posada T. Praga
(Bogota, Colombia), 1981. 212 p. $10.00.

LOS EMPRESARIOS Y EL ESTADO. Carlos
Arriola. Fondo de Cultura Econ6mica
(Mexico), 1981. 213 p. $5.25. About the
influence of big business on Mexican
government.

ESTILOS DE DESARROLLO Y MEDIO
AMBIENTE EN LA AMERICA LATINA O.
Sunkel, N. Gligo, eds. Fondo de Cultura
Econ6mica (Mexico), 1981. 2 v.

LA HACIENDA COSTENA EN EL PERU:
MALA-CANETE, 1532-1968. Eduardo
Arroyo. Centro de Proyecci6n Cristiana
(Lima, Peru), 1981. 202 p.

THE IMPACT OF IMPORT SUBSTITUTION
POLICIES ON MARKETING ACTIVITIES: A
CASE STUDY OF THE GUATEMALAN
COMMERCIAL SECTOR. Marta Ortiz-
Buonafina. University Press of America,
1982. 158 p. $19.50; $9.50 paper.

LANDOWNERS AND REFORM IN CHILE:
THE SOCIEDAD NATIONAL DE
AGRICULTURA, 1919-1940. Thomas C.
Wright University of Illinois Press, 1982.
443 p. $21.00.

LE MAL-DEVELOPPEMENT EN AMERIQUE
LATINE: MEXIQUE, COLOMBIE, BRESIL
Ren6 Dumont, Marie-France Mottin.
Editions du Sueil (Paris, France), 1981.
55.00E


MEXICO'S POLITICAL ECONOMY:
CHALLENGES AT HOME AND ABROAD.
Jorge 1. Dominguez, ed. Sage, 1982.288 p.
$20.00; $9.95 paper.

NUEVA FASE DEL CAPITAL FINANCIERO:
ELEMENTS TEORICOS Y
EXPERIENCIAS EN AMERICA LATINA.
Jaime Estevez, ed. Editorial Nueva Imagen
(Mexico), 1981. 391 p. $20.75.

PEMEX MUERE. Rail Prieto. Editorial Posada
(Mexico), 1981. 264 p. $10.10.

RELACIONES LABORALES EN LAS
EMPRESAS ESTATALES DE AMERICA
LATINA. A. S. Bronstein. International Labor
Organisation (Geneva, Switzerland), 1981.
193 p. $14.25.

LOS SINDICATOS Y LA POLTICA EN
MEXICO: LA C.R.O.M., 1918-1928. Rocio
Guadarrama. Ediciones Era (Mexico),
1981. 239 p. $11.25.

SUCRE AMER: ESCLAVES AUJOURD'HUI
DANS LES CARAIBES. Maurice Lemoine.
Nouvelle Soci6t6 des Editions Encre (Paris,
France), 1981. 293 p.


History and Archaeology

ACERCA DE LA HISTORIC Y EL UNIVERSE
AYMARA. D. Llanque, et al. Centro de
Informaci6n, Estudios y Documentaci6n,
CIED (Lima, Peru), 1981. 149 p.

THE ANCIENT FUTURE OF THE ITZA: THE
BOOK OF CHILAM BALAM OF TIZIMIN.
Munro S. Edmonson, ed. University of
Texas Press, 1982. 240 p. $37.50.

ANCIENT MAYA CILIZATION. Norman
Hammond. Rutgers University Press, 1982.
352 p. $12.95.

ARQUEOLOGIA DE LA AMERICA ANDINA.
Luis Guillermo Lumbreras. El Virrey (Lima,
Peru), 1981. 300 p. $18.00.

THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN COLONIAL
HAITI, 1704-1773: SELECTED LETTERS,
MEMOIRES, AND DOCUMENTS. George
Breathett. Documentary Publications, 1982.

A CENTURY OF CHANGE IN GUATEMALAN
TEXTILES. Ann P Rowe. University of
Washington Press, 1982. 152 p. $18.95.

COMPENDIO DE LA HISTORIC DEL REINO
DE GUATEMALA, 1500-1800. Domingo
Juarros. Piedra Santa (Guatemala), 1981.
407 p. $15.00.

THE COSTA RICANS. Richard Biesanz, et al.
Prentice-Hall, 1982. 304 p. $14.95.

ESCLAVOS REBELDES: CONSPIRACIONES Y
SUBLEVACIONES DE ESCLAVOS EN
PUERTO RICO, 1795-1873. Guillermo
Baralt Ediciones Huracin (Rio Piedras,
Puerto Rico), 1982. 184 p. $4.95.












STUDIO DE CUATRO NUEVOS SITIOS
PALEO-ARCAICOS EN LA ISLA DE
SANTO DOMINGO. Elpido Ortega, Jose
Guerrero. Museo del Hombre Domincano
(Santo Domingo), 1981. 226 p. $6.00.

STUDIOS SOBRE LA CONQUISTA DE
AMERICA. Nestor Meza. Editorial
Universitaria (Santiago, Chile), 1981. 184 p.
$4.90.

GOVERNMENT AND SOCIETY IN CENTRAL
AMERICA, 1680-1840. Miles L Wortman.
Columbia University Press, 1982.464 p.
$27.50.

EL GRITO DE INDEPENDENCIA: HISTORIC
DE UNA PASSION NATIONAL. Femando
Serrano Migallon. Porr6a (Mexico), 1981.
236 p. $15.00.

GUERRILLA INDIGENA EN LA GUERRA CON
CHILE. Nelson Manrique. El Virrey (Lima,
Peru), 1981. 430 p. $17.00.

EL IMPERIO DE LOS CUATRO SUYOS:
BREVE EXPOSICION POLITICA-SOCIAL
DEL INCARIO. Luis Femando Guachalla.
Biblioteca Popular Boliviana de 'Ultima
Hora' (La Paz, Bolivia), 1981. 189 p. $4.95.

LA INDEPENDENCIA Y LA MAFIA CRIOLLA
David Emesto Pefias Galindo. Ediciones
Tercer Mundo (Bogota, Colombia), 1981.
92 p. $5.00. About Colombia.

LA LEGISLATION ECLESIASTICA EN EL
VIRREYNATO DEL PERU DURANTE EL
SIGLO XVII. Valentin Trujillo Mena. Editorial
Lumen (Lima, Peru), 1981. 362 p.

LIMA: EL VALLE DE DIOS QUE HABLABA.
Alfonsina Barrionuevo. El Virrey (Lima,
Peru), 1981. 166 p. $6.00.

LAS MALVINAS EN LA EPOCA HISPANA,
1600-1811. Laurio H. Destefani. Corregidor
(Buenos Aires, Argentina), 1981. 424 p.
$17.90.

MATERIALS PARA LA HISTORIC DE SANTA
MARTA. Arturo E. Bermidez Bermidez.
Banco Central Hipotecario (Bogota,
Colombia), 1981. 339 p. $30.00.

MAYA SUBSISTENCE. Kent Flannery, ed.
Academic Press, 1982. $34.50.

LOS MAYAS Y LAS INCOGNITAS DEL
IMPERIO ANTIGUO. Jorge Santos G.
Paraninfo (Madrid, Spain), 1981. 264 p.

MEXICO: FROM INDEPENDENCE TO
REVOLUTION, 1810-1910. W Dirk Raat,
ed. University of Nebraska Press, 1982.
379 p.

MODERN MEXICO. James Cockroft. Monthly
Review Press, 1982. $17.50.

ON THE PERIPHERY OF NINETEENTH
CENTURY MEXICO: SONORA AND
SINALOA, 1810-1877. Stuart Voss.
University of Arizona Press, 1982.


ORIGINS OF PRE-COLUMBIAN ART. Terence
Grieder. University of Texas Press, 1982.
192 p. $20.00.

ORIGINS OF THE MEXICAN WAR: A
DOCUMENTARY SOURCE BOOK. Ward
McAfee, J. Cordell Robinson. Documentary
Publications, 1981-82.2 v. $40.00.

PRE-COLUMBIAN ART HISTORY. Alana Cordy-
Collins. Peek Publications (Mountain View,
Calif.), 1982.400 p. $16.95; $11.95 paper.

PREHISTORIC SETTLEMENT PATTERNS IN
THE NEW WORLD. Gordon R. Wiley.
Greenwood Press, 1982. 202 p. $27.50.
Reprint of the 1956 ed.


REBELLION DE SAN GERMAN, 1701-1712.
Francisco Uuch Mora. Isla (Mayaguez,
Puerto Rico), 1981. 75 p. $4.50. About
Puerto Rico.

THE SACK OF PANAMA. Peter Earle. Viking
Press, 1982. 320 p. $16.95.

EL SALVADOR: BACKGROUND TO THE
CRISIS. Central American Information
Office. CAMINO (Cambridge, Mass.), 1982.
148 p. $5.00.

THE STATE, EDUCATION, AND SOCIAL
CLASS IN MEXICO, 1880-1928. Mary K.
Vaughan. Northern Illinois University Press,
1982. 380 p. $22.50.

VENEZUELA: THE SEARCH FOR ORDER,
THE DREAM OF PROGRESS. John V
Lombardi. Oxford University Press, 1982.
368 p. $19.95; $6.95 paper.


Language and Literature

ANTI-YANKEE FEELINGS IN LATIN AMERICA:
AN ANTHOLOGY OF LATIN AMERICAN
WRITINGS FROM COLONIAL TO
MODERN TIMES IN THEIR HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE. F Toscano, James Hiester.
University Press of America, 1982. 314 p.
$22.50; $12.25 paper.

ANTOLOGIA DE LA POESIA SURREALISTA
LATINOAMERICANA. Stefan Baciu.
Editorial Universitaria de Valparaiso (Chile),
1981. 288 p. $38.00.


CINCO POETAS HONDURENOS. Heman
Antonio Bermidez. Editorial Guaymuras
(Tegucigalpa, Honduras), 1981. 102 p.

ENRIQUE A. LAGUERRE. Estelle Irizarry.
Twayne, 1982. $15.95.

EL ENSAYO HISPANOAMERICANO DEL
SIGLO XX. John Skirius, ed. Fondo de
Cultura Econ6mica (Mexico), 1981. 407 p.
$14.05.

FOLK LITERATURE OF THE MATACO
INDIANS. Johannes Wilbert, Karin
Simoneau, eds. Latin American Center,
University of California (Los Angeles), 1982.

LITERATURE Y SOCIEDAD EN AMERICA
LATINA. Valentin Tasc6n, Fernando Soria,
eds. San Esteban (Salamanca, Spain),
1981. 250 p.

LITERATURE AND IDEOLOGY IN HAITI,
1915-1961. J. Michael Dash. Bames &
Noble, 1982. $26.50.

LA ISLA DE ROBINSON. Arturo Uslar Pietri.
Seix Barral (Madrid, Spain), 1981. 357 p. A
novel about Sim6n Rodriguez, Bolivar's
mentor.

LA NOVELA SOBRE LA VIOLENCIA EN
COLOMBIA. Luis Ivan Bedoya, Augusto
Escobar. Ediciones Hombre Nuevo
(Medellin, Colombia), 1981. 179 p. $6.00.

PLANTADO. Hilda Perera. Editorial Planeta
(Madrid, Spain), 1981. A novel about
Cuba's political prisoners.

THE PORTRAYAL OF IMMIGRATION IN
NINETEENTH CENTURY ARGENTINE
FICTION, 1845-1902. Evelyn Fishburn.
Ibero-Amerikanisches Institut (Berlin,
Germany), 1981.

EL TEATRO BARROCO
HISPANOAMERICANO. Carlos Miguel
Suarez Radillo. Porr6a Turanzas (Madrid,
Spain), 1981. 3 v. (698 p.)

TEXTOS EROTICOS DEL RIO DE LA PLATA.
Robert Lehmann-Nitsche (Victor Borde).
Libreria ClAsica S.R.L (Buenos Aires,
Argentina), 1981. 375 p. $97.00. Reprint of
the 1923 ed.


Politics and Government

APUNTES SOBRE NICARAGUA. Gregorio
Selser. Editorial Nueva Imagen (Mexico),
1981. 319 p. $11.00. Newspaper articles.

LA ASAMBLEA LEGISLATIVE EN COSTA
RICA. Hugo Alfonso Mufioz. Editorial Costa
Rica (San Jose), 1981. 305 p. $12.50.

EL AUTONOMISMO PUERTORRIQUENO: SU
TRANSFORMATION IDEOLOGICAL,
1895-1914. Mariano Negr6n Portillo.
Ediciones Huracan (Rio Piedras, Puerto
Rico), 1982. 96 p. $4.50.

CAfiBBEAN P IE1W/63











BITTER FRUIT: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE
AMERICAN COUP IN GUATEMALA
Stephen Schlesinger, Stephen Kinzer.
Doubleday, 1982. 336 p. $16.95.

EL CARIBE A LA HORA DE CUBA: STUDIO
SOCIO-POUTICO, 1929-1979, DEL
CARIBE. Gerard Pierre-Charles. Casa de las
Americas (Havana, Cuba), 1981. 534 p.

THE CIA IN GUATEMALA: THE FOREIGN
POLICY OF INTERVENTION. Richard H.
Immerman. University of Texas Press, 1982.
296 p. $24.50.

COMMUNISM IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND
THE CARIBBEAN. Robert Wesson, ed.
Hoover Institution Press, 1982. 200 p.
$10.95.

EL CONFUCTO HONDURAS-EL
SALVADOR, 1969. James Rowles. Editorial
Universitaria Centroamericana, EDUCA
(San Jose, Costa Rica), 1981. 303 p. $7.50.

LA CONSTRUCTION DEL SECTOR PUBLIC
Y DEL ESTADO NATIONAL DE
HONDURAS, 1876-1979. Maria Posas.
Editorial Universitaria Centroamericana,
EDUCA (San Jose, Costa Rica), 1981.
254 p. $12.50.

CRISIS DEL PODER EN CENTROAMERICA.
Edelberto Torres Rivas. Editorial
Universitaria Centroamericana, EDUCA
(San Jose, Costa Rica), 1981. 251 p.
$10.00.

DEMOCRACIA Y PARTIDOS POLITICOS EN
COSTA RICA Oscar Aguilar Bulgarelli.
Editorial Universidad Estatal a Distancia
(San Jose, Costa Rica), 1981. 175 p. $7.50.

DIALECTICA DEL TERROR EN GUATEMALA
Gabriel Aguilera Peralta. Editorial
Universitaria Centroamericana, EDUCA
(San Jose, Costa Rica), 1981. 281 p.
$10.00.

LA FASE OCULTA DE LA GUERRA CIVIL DE
COSTA RICA Jacobo Schifter. Editorial
Universitaria Centroamericana, EDUCA
(San Jose, Costa Rica), 1981. 156 p. $7.50.

GOVERNMENT AND SOCIETY IN CENTRAL
AMERICA, 1680-1840. Miles L Wortman.
Columbia University Press, 1982. 464 p.
$27.50.

GUATEMALA: PLAN PILOTO PARA EL
CONTINENT. Susanne Jonas
Bodenheimer. Editorial Universitaria
Centroamericana, EDUCA (San Jose, Costa
Rica), 1981. 430 p. $10.00.

GUERRA Y POLITICAL EN EL SALVADOR.
Adolfo Gilly. Editorial Nueva Imagen
(Mexico), 1981. 196 p. $8.50.

LAS IDEAS POLITICAL EN COSTA RICA. Luis
Barahona Jim6nez. Ministerio de
Educaci6n (San Jose, Costa Rica), 1981.
433 p. $12.50.

64/CAifBBEAN lev~W


INSURRECCION EN NICARAGUA. LA
HISTORIC NO CONTADA Julio Sunol.
Editorial Costa Rica (San Jose), 1981.
237 p. $12.50.

EL JUEGO DE LOS REFORMISMOS FRENTE
A LA REVOLUTION EN
CENTROAMERICA. Hugo Assmann, ed.
Departamento Ecumenico de
Investigaciones (San Jose, Costa Rica),
1981. 181 p. $7.50.

MEXICO TODAY. Tommie Sue Montgorery,
ed. Institute for the Study of Human Issues,
1982. 140 p. $12.95.


THE MURDER OF MADERO AND THE ROLE
PLAYED BY U.S. AMBASSADOR HENRY
LANE WILSON. Gene Z. Hanrahan, ed.
Documentary Publications, 1981. 175 p.
$27.95.

OIL AND POLITICS IN LATIN AMERICA.
NATIONALIST MOVEMENTS AND STATE
COMPANIES. George Philip. Cambridge
University Press, 1982. 608 p.

PARTIDOS POLITICOS Y ELECCIONES EN
HONDURAS, 1980. Arturo Femandez.
Editorial Guaymuras (Tegucigalpa,
Honduras), 1981. 106 p.

POLITICAL Y SOCIEDAD EN HONDURAS.
Victor Meza. Editorial Guaymuras
(Tegucigalpa, Honduras), 1981. 397 p.

POLITICS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN LATIN
AMERICA. THE DISTINCT TRADITION.
Howard J. Wiarda, ed. Rev. ed. University of
Massachusetts Press, 1982, 368 p. $9.95.

REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN EL
SALVADOR. American Civil Liberties Union.
ACLU, 1982. $6.00.

RESENA DE LA SITUATION GENERAL DE
GUATEMALA, 1863. Pio Casal. Serviprensa
(Guatemala), 1981. 102 p. $8.00.

RETRATO DE FAMILIAR CON FIDEL. Carlos
Franqui. Editorial Seix Barral (Barcelona,
Spain), 1981. 549 p. 23.95R. About Cuba.

REVOLUTION FROM WITHOUT: YUCATAN,
MEXICO'AND THE UNITED STATES,
1880-1924. Gilbert M. Joseph. Cambridge
University Press, 1982. 416 p.

THE ROAD TO OPEC: UNITED STATES
RELATIONS WITH VENEZUELA,
1919-1976. Stephen G. Rabe. University of
Texas Press, 1982. 256 p. $25.00.


EL SALVADOR: REVOLUTION Y MUERTE.
Le6n Ovidio Medina, ed. Ediciones Hombre
Nuevo (Medellin, Colombia), 1981. 415 p.

UN SIGLO DE POLITICAL COSTARRICENSE.
Eduardo Oconitrello. Editorial universidad
Estatal a Distancia (San Jose, Costa Rica),
1981. 274 p. $10.00.

SITUACIONES E IDEOLOGIAS EN
LATINOAMERICA. Jos6 Luis Romero.
Universidad Nacional Aut6noma de M6xico,
1981. 244 p. $7.35.

TORRIJOS: COLONIA AMERICANA, NO!
R6mulo Escobar Betancourt Carlos
Valencia Editores (Bogota, Colombia),
1981. 315 p. $26.00.

LAS TRIBULACIONES DE JONAS. Edgardo
Rodriguez Julia. Ediciones Huracan (Rio
Piedras, Puerto Rico), 1981. 106 p. $9.95.
About Mufioz Marin and Puerto Rican
politics.

VENEZUELA'S TUTELARY PLURALISM. Luis
Oropeza. Center for International Affairs,
Harvard University, 1982. 130 p. $17.95;
$6.95 paper.

VOTER PARTICIPATION IN CENTRAL
AMERICA, 1954-1981: AN EXPLORATION.
Patrick Cotter, George A. Bowdler. University
Press of America, 1982. 276 p. $21.75;
$11.00 paper.

WHAT DIFFERENCE COULD A REVOLUTION
MAKE? FARMING AND FOOD IN THE
NEW NICARAGUA. Joseph Collins. Institute
for Food and Development Policy (San
Francisco, Calif.), 1982. 160 p. $4.95.


Reference

BIBLIOGRAFIA MEXICANA DEL SIGLO XVI.
Joaquin Garcia Icazbalceta. Agustin Millares
Carlo, ed. Fondo de Cultura Econ6mica
(Mexico), 1981.

CUBA. A HANDBOOK OF HISTORICAL
STATISTICS. Susan Schroeder. G. K. Hall,
1982. $85.00.

ENCYCLOPAEDIE VAN NEDERLANDSCH
WEST-INDIE. H. D. Benjamins, J. E
Snelleman. S. Emmering (Amsterdam,
Netherlands), 1981. 782 p. Nfl.65.00.
Reprint of the 1914-1917 ed.

ENSAYO DE UNA BIBLIOGRAFIA
BIOGRAFICA BOLIVIANA. Jos6 Roberto
Arze. Editorial Los Amigos del Libro (La
Paz, Bolivia), 1981. 71 p. $3.00.

RESEARCH GUIDE TO ANDEAN HISTORY:
BOLIVIA, CHILE, ECUADOR, AND PERU.
Judith R. Bakewell, John H. TePaske, eds.,
et al. Duke University Press, 1981. 346 p.


Marian Goslinga is the Latin American and
Caribbean Librarian at Florida International
University






Ships' Registry: Norway


"We had a great time.he S/S Norway

is a beautiful ship. And the entertainment

is byfar the best. MrMrs.John Noterman, Sarasota,FL.


"This was our first cruise and I thought it was
really great.
"To start with, aboard the S/S Norway you don't
have to worry about reservations anywhere. For the
price of your room, you have your meals and practi-
cally everything else included.
"The entertainment aboard the ship during the
whole cruise was excellent. We had a really profes-
sional performance of the Broadway show 'Hello
Dolly.' One night Al Martino, the famous singer, gave
us all a great show. And it's really hard to believe
but even the television shows on the TV set in our
stateroom were good.
"A lot of times we had food that I didn't think
they were able to serve aboard a ship. One night we
had prime rib and another night it was a delicious
roast duck. It was really very, very good.
"All the different sports you were able to play
aboard the S/S Norway were really surprising. I
mean we were actually able to play volleyball and
basketball. Imagine volleyball and basketball aboard
a ship. I was really impressed!"


For more information about one-week cruises
departing from Miami aboard the magnificent
S/S Norway- our $100 million resort-and her visits
to St. Thomas and the unforgettable beach party
you can enjoy on NCL's private Out Island, see your
travel agent or use the attached coupon.
We'll be glad to send you a free booklet about
the S/S Norway that's full of hints and tips on how to
get the most out of your cruise vacation.
ll----- ------------------
I Norwegian Caribbean Lines'
I First Fleet of the Caribbean
Norwegian Caribbean Lines
P.O. Box 1111
Addison, Illinois 60101
Please send me your FREE S/S Norway cruising
I booklet (#102).
NAME
ADDRESS
I CITY/STATE/ZIP


-@a .I





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