Title Page
 Table of Contents
 List of Tables
 Historical background
 Electoral background
 Hierarchical organization
 Political recruitment and...
 Roles of hierarchical leaders
 Political communication and hierarchical...
 Hierarchical links with key individuals...
 Ideological orientation and motivation...
 Comparison and evaluation of the...
 Biographical sketch

Title: comparison of liberal and conservative party leadership in Cali, Colombia.
Full Citation
Permanent Link: http://ufdc.ufl.edu/UF00091566/00001
 Material Information
Title: comparison of liberal and conservative party leadership in Cali, Colombia.
Series Title: comparison of liberal and conservative party leadership in Cali, Colombia.
Physical Description: Book
Creator: Rozman, Stephen Lyle,
Publisher: University of Florida
 Record Information
Bibliographic ID: UF00091566
Volume ID: VID00001
Source Institution: University of Florida
Holding Location: University of Florida
Rights Management: All rights reserved by the source institution and holding location.
Resource Identifier: alephbibnum - 000125210
oclc - 01563511


This item has the following downloads:

Binder1 ( PDF )

Table of Contents
    Title Page
        Page i
        Page ii
    Table of Contents
        Page iii
    List of Tables
        Page iv
        Page v
        Page vi
        Page 1
        Page 2
        Page 3
        Page 4
        Page 5
        Page 6
        Page 7
        Page 8
        Page 9
        Page 10
        Page 11
        Page 12
        Page 13
        Page 14
    Historical background
        Page 15
        Page 16
        Page 17
        Page 18
        Page 19
        Page 20
        Page 21
        Page 22
        Page 23
        Page 24
        Page 25
    Electoral background
        Page 26
        Page 27
        Page 28
        Page 29
        Page 30
        Page 31
        Page 32
        Page 33
        Page 34
        Page 35
        Page 36
        Page 37
        Page 38
        Page 39
        Page 40
        Page 41
        Page 42
        Page 43
        Page 44
        Page 45
        Page 46
        Page 47
        Page 48
        Page 49
        Page 50
        Page 51
        Page 52
        Page 53
    Hierarchical organization
        Page 54
        Page 55
        Page 56
        Page 57
        Page 58
        Page 59
        Page 60
        Page 61
        Page 62
        Page 63
        Page 64
        Page 65
        Page 66
    Political recruitment and advancement
        Page 67
        Page 68
        Page 69
        Page 70
        Page 71
        Page 72
        Page 73
        Page 74
        Page 75
        Page 76
        Page 77
        Page 78
        Page 79
        Page 80
        Page 81
        Page 82
        Page 83
        Page 84
        Page 85
        Page 86
        Page 87
        Page 88
        Page 89
        Page 90
        Page 91
        Page 92
        Page 93
        Page 94
        Page 95
        Page 96
        Page 97
        Page 98
        Page 99
        Page 100
        Page 101
        Page 102
        Page 103
        Page 104
        Page 105
        Page 106
        Page 107
    Roles of hierarchical leaders
        Page 108
        Page 109
        Page 110
        Page 111
        Page 112
        Page 113
        Page 114
        Page 115
        Page 116
        Page 117
        Page 118
        Page 119
        Page 120
        Page 121
        Page 122
        Page 123
        Page 124
        Page 125
        Page 126
        Page 127
        Page 128
        Page 129
        Page 130
        Page 131
        Page 132
        Page 133
        Page 134
        Page 135
    Political communication and hierarchical relationship
        Page 136
        Page 137
        Page 138
        Page 139
        Page 140
        Page 141
        Page 142
        Page 143
        Page 144
        Page 145
        Page 146
        Page 147
        Page 148
        Page 149
        Page 150
        Page 151
        Page 152
        Page 153
        Page 154
        Page 155
        Page 156
        Page 157
        Page 158
        Page 159
        Page 160
        Page 161
        Page 162
        Page 163
        Page 164
        Page 165
        Page 166
        Page 167
        Page 168
        Page 169
        Page 170
        Page 171
        Page 172
        Page 173
        Page 174
        Page 175
        Page 176
        Page 177
        Page 178
        Page 179
        Page 180
        Page 181
        Page 182
        Page 183
    Hierarchical links with key individuals in Cali politics
        Page 184
        Page 185
        Page 186
        Page 187
        Page 188
        Page 189
        Page 190
        Page 191
        Page 192
        Page 193
        Page 194
        Page 195
        Page 196
        Page 197
        Page 198
    Ideological orientation and motivation of leaders
        Page 199
        Page 200
        Page 201
        Page 202
        Page 203
        Page 204
        Page 205
        Page 206
        Page 207
        Page 208
        Page 209
        Page 210
        Page 211
        Page 212
        Page 213
        Page 214
        Page 215
        Page 216
        Page 217
        Page 218
        Page 219
        Page 220
        Page 221
        Page 222
        Page 223
        Page 224
        Page 225
        Page 226
        Page 227
        Page 228
        Page 229
        Page 230
        Page 231
        Page 232
        Page 233
        Page 234
        Page 235
        Page 236
        Page 237
        Page 238
    Comparison and evaluation of the two overall parties
        Page 239
        Page 240
        Page 241
        Page 242
        Page 243
        Page 244
        Page 245
        Page 246
        Page 247
        Page 248
        Page 249
        Page 250
        Page 251
        Page 252
        Page 253
        Page 254
        Page 255
        Page 256
        Page 257
        Page 258
        Page 259
        Page 260
        Page 261
        Page 262
        Page 263
        Page 264
        Page 265
        Page 266
        Page 267
        Page 268
        Page 269
        Page 270
        Page 271
        Page 272
        Page 273
        Page 274
        Page 275
        Page 276
        Page 277
        Page 278
        Page 279
        Page 280
        Page 281
        Page 282
        Page 283
        Page 284
        Page 285
        Page 286
        Page 287
        Page 288
        Page 289
        Page 290
        Page 291
        Page 292
        Page 293
        Page 294
        Page 295
        Page 296
        Page 297
        Page 298
        Page 299
        Page 300
        Page 301
        Page 302
        Page 303
        Page 304
        Page 305
        Page 306
        Page 307
        Page 308
        Page 309
        Page 310
        Page 311
        Page 312
        Page 313
        Page 314
        Page 315
        Page 316
        Page 317
        Page 318
        Page 319
        Page 320
        Page 321
        Page 322
        Page 323
        Page 324
        Page 325
        Page 326
        Page 327
        Page 328
        Page 329
        Page 330
        Page 331
        Page 332
        Page 333
        Page 334
        Page 335
        Page 336
        Page 337
        Page 338
        Page 339
    Biographical sketch
        Page 340
        Page 341
Full Text






I would like to thank the members of my committee, Dr. Harry

Kantor, the chairman; Dr. Manning J. Dauer; Dr. Walter Rosenbaum;

Dr. John Spanier; and Dr. Alfred Hower. I would also like to note

my appreciation for the Rockefeller grant which financed my research

in Colombia.











TIONSHIP . . .. . . . . . ...

POLITICS . . . . . . . . .


OVERALL PARTY . . . . . . . . .

PARTIES . . . . . ... . . .

XII. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . .

APPENDIX . . . . . . . . . . . .

BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . .










136 -








. . . . . .

























IN VALLE . . . . . . . .. . . . 32















AGE . . . . . . . . . . . . 84

EDUCATION . . . . . . . . . . 87






Table Page









POLICY . . . . . . . . . . 149





POLITICS . . . . . . . . . 185


INDIVIDUALS . . . . . . . . 188




SHIP ; ; . . . . . . . . . 206


Table Pag

HAVE . . . . . . . .. . . . 20

HAVE . . . . . . . . . . 20.










LEADER'S OVERALL PARTY . . . . . . 240

PARTIES . . . . . . . . . 273



One of the much-neglected aspects in the study of political parties

has been the subject of party hierarchies, including their organization,

membership, recruitment patterns, and the relationships within a hierarchy

and between different hierarchical levels of a particular party. Some of

these themes have been considered by Samuel J. Eldersveld in his book

Political Parties: A Behavioral Analysis (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964),

and helped provide some orientation for the author of this paper. How-

ever, Eldersveld's study of Democratic and Republican hierarchical organ-

izations in Wayne County (Detroit, Michigan) dealt with hierarchical pat-

terns considerably different from those encountered in Cali, Colombia.

To start with, the number of hierarchical levels found in Cali and Colom-

bia is far smaller than that of Detroit and Michigan; and the objectives

of this author were only partially identical with those of the Wayne

County study.

Obviously, an initial problem was to determine the scope of the

politically relevant phenomena to be sought. Following an initial period

during which the author enhanced his knowledge of the Colombian political

system, it was decided that the folbwing factors would be most pertinent

to his objectives: (1) recruitment factors, also comprising political

socialization and promotion; (2) role factors, including the extent of

an individual leader's roles and the degree of boundary maintenance


between the roles of one leader and another within the same directorio

(directorate, hierarchical organization), and between the roles of the

Call municipal directorates and their corresponding departmental

directorates, utilizing somewhat of a structural-functional approach;

(3) political communication, including channels from the national to

the departmental to the municipal directorates; and (4)' non-mechanical,

attitudinal factors such as opinion concerning one's own directorate ano

the overall hierarchical relationship, and the ideological orientation

of the leaders.

Since the terms "role" and "ideology" may lend themselves to some

confusion, a definition of the author's use of these concepts is in order.

The authors of Explorations in Role Analysis examine three categories into

which definitions of the term role might be placed: (1) definitions of

role which either equate it with or define it to include normative culture

patterns; (2) the treating of a role as an individual's definition of his

situation with reference to his and others' social positions; (3) defini-

tions which deal with role as the behavior of actors occupying social

positions. With regard to this final category, the authors observe that

'A role defined in this way does not refer to normative patterns for what

actors should do, nor to an actor's orientation to his situation, but to

what actors actually jia-s--po.ition occupants."I The author uses the term

role in this latter sense.

With respect to ideology, Robert Dahl defines the term as "A set of

more or less persistent, integrated doctrines . .."2 The authors of

The American Voter comment that "An ideology may be.seen as a particularly

elaborate, close-woven, and far-ranging structure of attitudes . .. We

expect an ideology to encompass content outside the political order as

narrowly defined--social and economic relationships, and even matters

of religion, education, and the like." Finally, Eldersveld, whose

study served as an inspiration to the author's, seems to relate ideo-

logical differences between party leaders to differences in attitude

regarding "significant policy matters." Hence, "In determining ideo-

logical direction at all leadership levels, we used in our interviews

a series of questions touching on significant policy matters." The

author's use of the term ideology relates to all three of these defini-

tions. References to the traditional Liberal and Conservative mystique

illustrate Dahl's definition of the term. Many of the questions asked

in the survey dealt precisely with social, economic, religious, and

educational questions, to fit the definition of The American Voter. And

the Eldersveld "significant policy" orientation was also employed by the


Furthermore, the author was concerned, with degree of ideological

motivation; that is, how greatly was the leadership of each faction

motivated by the traditional ideology of their overall party as opposed

to more pragmatic considerations. Eldersveld distinguishes between the

direction of ideology as opposed to the saliency of ideology. Direction

is defined as "particular or patterned attitudes toward public policy

questions," whereas saliency concerns "the extent to which [party leaders]

think in terms of party ideology, and the importance they attach to at-

titude differences in political perception."5 The author operationalized

the concept of ideology to deal with both direction and saliency.

The instruments utilized to obtain tnis information were a 52-

question questionnaire and three of the Purdue Master Attitude Scales

(Remmers Scales) to measure attitudes toward vocation (of political

leader), defined groups, and proposed social actions, respectively.

Seven defined groups were studied. These included (1) large landowners,

(2) big businessmen,, (3) labor union leaders, (4) the upper-class in

general, (5) the middle-class in general, (6) the lower-class in general,

and (7) military leaders. Six social actions were selected for study.

These included (1) the expropriation without any compensation of agricultural

lands not utilized by their owners; (2) greater taxation of the wealthy to

allow for more state aid to the poor in order to redistribute the wealth;

(3) stronger action against Communists; (4) restriction of Protestant

missionary activity; (5) ending the teaching of religion in the public

schools; (6) changing the current unitary government to a federal govern-


Another initial problem was to determine the size of the sample.

Since the aim was to limit the study to the Call municipal directorates

and the Call members of the departmental (provincial) directorates, it was

roughly determined that a potential of slightly over 100 hierarchical

leaders existed if the interview schedule were confined to the active

members of each directorate. The fact that some of the inactive princi-

Pales (regular members) had had their duties taken over by suplentes

(substitutes) led the author to include several active suplentes in the

stu dy.


A random sample quickly proved unfeasible due to the limited

universe, including the fact that the active members of no municipal

or departmental hierarchical organization exceeded twenty. Communica-

tion with some members of these directorates appeared impossible and

others either directly refused to be interviewed or did so indirectly

by continually failing to agree on a time for the interview or neglect-

ing to arrive for a fixed.appointment. Over one-third of the leaders

finally interviewed had failed to keep their initial appointment. None- -

theless, the author succeeded in interviewing at least 50 per cent of the

active members of each directorate and close to 70 per cent of the potential
overall number; and he has found no reason to believe that a representa-

tive sample was not attained in all cases. The author estimated the total

universe of active members to be 103.

The universe encompassed the three factions of the Liberal party and

the three factions of the Conservative party. The three Liberal factions

included the Oficialistas, who represented the Liberal party in the Frente

Nacional (National Front) coalition government; the Movimiento de Renova-

ci6n y Revitalizaci6n Liberal, a breakaway movement from the Oficialistas,

occupying the role of a critical supporter of the Frente Nacional within

the boundaries of the coalition; and the Movimiento Revolucionario Liberal

(MRL), which had been shifting from the role of an opponent of the Frente

Nacional tothat of a very cautious supporter, but remaining outside the

coalition by choice.

The Liberal division was further complicated by a sub-factionalism

within the Oficialista faction between the forces of Francisco (Pacho)

Eladio Ramfrez (Pachoeladistas) and those of Gustavo Balcizar Monz6n

(Balcarcistas). This division is confined to the department of Valle del

Cauca (Cauca Valley), and thus is local in nature. The Movimiento de Re-

vitalizaci6n Liberal--the full title given above is normally shortened in

this manner--is likewise unique to the Valle department. On the other

hand, the MRL has presented the most complex example of Liberal sub-.

factionalism. The original movement and mainstream, the more moderate

Ifnea blanda (soft line), had been undermined by a somewhat more extreme

Ifnea dura (hard line), the much more extreme MRL del Pueblo (People's

MRL), and some ephemeral MRL independent currents.

By the beginning of 1967 the steady decline of MRL electoral fortunes

had reduced some of its complexity through the apparent organizational dis-

integration of all but the linea blanda and the more clandestine, Communist-

oriented MRL del Pueblo, whose leaders refused to grant interviews on the

grounds that they would be aiding the "imperialistic" designs of the U.S.

government by contributing to its knowledge of Colombian leftists.. (They

specifically referred to Project Simpatico, the U.S. Defense Department's

Colombian counterpart of its Project Camelot in Chile, as the factor

responsible for their uncooperative position.) Nonetheless, the MRL del

Pueblo was far less a bonafide Liberal faction than the Alianza Nacional

Popular (Anapo) was a bonafide Conservative faction so the author's re-

search goals suffered no setback.

The Conservative division was also split into three factions, but was

much less complicated in the sense that local factionalism patterned the

overall national division and that no organized sub-factionalism was ap-

parent. Conservative factions included the Unionistas, the Conservative part-

ner in the Frente Nacional, the Independientes (Lauro-Alzatistas), and Anapo.

Both latter factions were in opposition to the Frente Nacional. The

Unionista hierarchy did include a small number of followers of C4sar

Tulio Delgado (Cesartulistas), a group which had earlier broken away to

form a rival Unionista faction; but the lack of favorable electoral results

induced a reassimilation and the apparent demise of this sub-faction.

(Cesartulismo was a local phenomenon.) Likewise, the combination of fol-

lowers of the late Laureano G6mez and the late Gilberto Alzate Avendaio

in the Independiente faction has not been accompanied by a structural sub-

factionalism such as the Pachoeladista-Balcarcista division within Liberal

Oficialismo. In the latter case the provisions of parity and alternation

apply in the pattern of the Frente Nacional so that hierarchical positions

are equally distributed between the two groups, and the role of president

of the local municipal and departmental directorates is alternated between

Pachoeladistas and Balcarcistas.

Considering that the Colombian political system is characterized by

such a high degree of factionalism, specifically in the case of the Cauca

Valley, the author oriented his study toward three levels of comparison

of Liberal and Conservative party leadership in the departmental capital

of Cali. The first level was to analyze the responses found within a

single hierarchical directorate to determine the presence or absence of

similarity regarding the politically relevant phenomena encompassed by

this study. The second level was to study the responses found among the

factions of each of the two overall parties to determine the degree of

Conservative and Liberal uniformity. Finally, the third level was destined

to compare the overall Conservative and Liberal parties to ascertain their

similarities and contrasts.

While it is true that a two-party system has traditionally operated

in Colombia, its present form seems to be more complex, even though

factionalism is no stranger to Colombian politics. The Frente Nacional

seems to have produced two simultaneous two-party systems: the coalition

itself as opposed to the non-participants in the Frente Nacional govern-

ment, and the traditional Conservative-Liberal split. However, the

coalition's opponents lack any unity or common purpose beyond their op-

position to the government. \DAd the Conservative-Liberal division is found

more at the attitudinal ,level than at the practical level today] (Nonethe-

less, this does have implications for the future. Background information

preparatory to the field work indicated some negative attitude toward the

coalition on the part of some of the Liberal partners and, to'a lesser

extent, their Conservative counterparts. This, perhaps, is because the

Frente Nacional candidate for the next presidential term, in accordance

with the constitutional provision of alternation, is to be a Conservative,

plus the fact that the Conservatives-have been the minority party in recent

Colombian history.)

The reunification of the factions into single Liberal and Conservative

parties might cause the rapid dissolution of the Frente Nacional coalition.

Subsequent to the author's survey, Liberal party union was achieved and the

Unionistas and Independientes were discussing a settlement of their dif-

ferences. A lengthy continuation of the Frente Nacional might result in

the disappearance of the traditional two-party system.

Although apparently significant differences existed between the

Liberals and Conservatives in the past, these distinctions seem to have

declined in recent years to the point where the labels "Conservative" and

"Liberal" are less reliable indicators of an individual's ideological

position.) Whereas this trend seemed to ',be well developed prior to the

period of the violencia and the Frente Nacional established in its after-

math, the coalition of Conservatives and Liberals which resulted from the

1957 pact may have accentuated this inclination. In any event, a basic

aim of this study was to test a possible lack of essential differences

between the two parties when each is taken as a whole.

On the other hand, the creation of the Frente Nacional seems to

have greatly accentuated the traditional tendencies toward factionalism

found in the Liberal and Conservative parties. The coalition experiment,

by restricting all political offices to members of these two parties, has

probably impelled individuals and movements with political aspirations

into the ranks of the two traditional parties. Due in part to this pos-

sible phenomenon, but not neglecting the fact that, historically, some

factionalism has been due to ideological reasons, the author began with

the hypothesis that ideological homogeneity was not to be found within

either party and that certain factions within the ranks of each would ex-

libit a greater degree of ideological orientation than other factions.

The author also hypothesized that the most ideologically motivated

factions would be precisely those which were not in the mainstream of

either of the two overall parties and that where significant ideological

differences existed, they would be found in a comparison of the minority

factions of the Liberal party with those of the Conservative party. This

could be partially due to the apparent fact that the discouragement of

third party activity has impelled most politically motivated liberal or

radical ideologues, who might have rejected both traditional parties under

different circumstances, to join the ranks of the Liberals, whereas

conservative or reactionary ideologues have apparently been much more

inclined toward the Conservative side. Moreover, the very participation

of the Liberal Oficialistas and Conservative Unionistas in a coalition

suggests some ideological sacrifice on both sides, leading the author to

hypothesize that these ideologues would be more inclined toward other

factions within each party. (The categorizing of Anapo as a Conservative

party faction weakens this chain of hypotheses; but the growing disassocia-

tion of Anapo from its role as a faction and toward the position of a true

third party may obviate the appearance of a troublesome anomaly.)

The presence of two long-institutionalized parties in Colombia provided

a fertile field for the author's objectives and was a major reason for the

choice of that country. The interesting patterns of factionalism found in

Cali allowed for greater scope and depth of analysis of the two parties, thus

justifying the choice of that locality. Moreover, Cali is one of Colombia's

major cities--third in population behind Bogota and Medellfn--and is the

capital of the Cauca Valley, Colombia's foremost agricultural region and

rapidly becoming one of its principal industrial centers. The Cauca

Valley, which stretches from Popaygn to Cartago, is-Colombia's third

largest department behind Cundinamarca (Bogota) and Antioquia (Medellfn).

An additional factor which must be emphasized has been Cali's extremely

rapid population growth rate, which has only recently begun to decline after

reaching a height of 8.8 per cent per year.7 Cali was founded by Spaniards

.in 1536 and "remained a sleepy provincial town for almost 400 years." The

opening of the Panama Canal gave impulse to its first important spurt

of growth due to its proximity to the port of Buenaventura. Between 1912--

two years prior to the opening of the canal--and 1918, Call jumped in size

from 27,700 to 45,500.8 The 1938 census reported a population of 101,883;

the 1951 census total was 284,186; and that of 1964 had climbed to

637,929. The previously referred to 8.8 per cent annual increase included

a natural growth of 3.5 per cent and a migration of 5.3 per cent, the lat-

ter basically the result of the violencia in Valle and surrounding areas.

Since the 1964 census revealed Valle to have a population of 1,733,053,

Call's population equalled 36.81 per cent of the departmental total.II

Valle's increase since 1938, though impressive, was proportionately smaller

than that of its capital city, the departmental total changing from

613,230 in 1938 to 1,106,927 in 1951, to the present figure. The country

as a whole increased in population between 1938-1951-1964 from 8,701,816

to 11,548,172 to 17,482,420, a growth rate less than that of Valle depart-

ment. In comparison with Cali and Valle, Colombia's two largest cities

and their respective departments had the following population in 1964:

Bogota, 1,697,311, as opposed to Cundinamarca's overall total of 2,817,436;

and Medellfn, 772,887, as opposed to Antioquia's 2,477,299.12 In the last

half decade, Cali's rapid population increase appears to have slowed down

considerably as the apparent result of a great decline in the violencia.

Although it is by far the largest city in Valle, the department boasts a

number of other sizable municipios. These include Palmira, 140,889,

Buenaventura 96,708, Tulu6 80,394, Buga 75,898, and Cartago 65,403.13

In addition to the previously mentioned advantages in choosing

Call, it also boasted a benefit inherent to all departmental capitals:

the presence of both a municipal and departmental directorate. However,

a structural separation of the two directorates was not the case for all

the factions in Call. Both the Conservative Unionistas and Liberal

Oficialistas had separate municipal and departmental directorates with

distinct membership. The other four factions, on the other hand, either

had greatly overlapping membership between the municipal and departmental

levels, or presented cases where the directories municipales (which will

be referred to as DMs from now on), and the directories departamentales

(DDs from now on), were not both currently active. Consequently, this

further divisional breakdown between the DM and DD was undertaken only in

the cases of the Oficialistas and Unionistas. Nonetheless, some valuable

data were obtained from these two examples, providing a fourth level of

comparison of Liberal and Conservative party leadership. In all, a total

of seventy-one interviews was attained, broken down as follows: Unionis-

ta DM, twelve, DD, seven; Oficialista DM, six, DD, ten; Independientes,

nine; Anapo, nine; Movimiento de Revitalizaci6n Liberal, eleven; MRL, seven.

The author had devised a questionnaire prior to his September 1966

arrival in Call, but subsequently made some minor revisions as the result

of further background and discussions with fellow members of the academic

staff, both those from the United States and Colombians, at Call's Uni-

versidad del Valle. Some aid was also received in translating the two

instruments from the original English to Spanish. The author personally

administered each interview, a policy deemed necessary due to the presence

of a sizable number of open-end questions in the questionnaire. In ac-

cordance with a widely accepted procedure, the interviewer handed the

interviewee a copy of the questionnaire and asked him to follow each

question while the former read it aloud. All codifying was done by the

interviewer, who endeavored to avoid influencing answers by maintaining

a constant wording for each question and confining necessary explanation

to a simple clarification of the original wording. The average interview

required approximately one hour and twenty minutes, with extremes of forty

minutes and three hours. Only three interviews required a second visit

for completion. To minimize the possibility of collaboration, interviews

were given to one individual at a time, and, whenever possible, only the

interviewer and interviewee were present. Furthermore, the interviewee

was not permitted to retain his copy of the questionnaire as a measure to

prevent premature exposure and influencing of future interviewees.

In all, the author spent ten months in Call and wishes to acknowledge

his gratitude to the Rockefeller Foundation for the grant that made this

research possible.


Neal Gross, Ward S. Mason and Alexander W. McEachern, Explorations
in Role Analysis (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1965), p. 14.

2Robert A. Dahl, Modern Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice-Hall, 1965), p. 20.
3Angus Campbell et al., The American Voter (New York: John Wiley
and Sons, 1964), p. 111.
4Samuel J. Eldersveld, Political Parties: A Behavioral Analysis
(Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964), p. 184.

51bid., p. 196.

6Some of the active members were also members of the national congress
and were residing in Bogota. Although the author spent some time in Bogot6,
he was unable to arrange interviews with all of these leaders. Similarly,
some hierarchical leaders residing in Call could not, in a few cases, be
reached, or, more often, directly or indirectly refused to grant interviews.

7Pat M. Holt, Colombia Today--And Tomorrow (New York: Frederick A.
Praeger, 1964), p. 164.

9Call en Cifras (Bogota: Departamento Administrativo Nacional de
Estadfstica [DANEI, 1965), p. 3.
Holt, op. cit.

IXIll Censo Nacional de Poblaci6n (Bogota: Departamento Administra-
tivo Nacional de Estadfstica [DANE], 1965), p. 2.

121bid.; and Censo de Poblaci6n 1951 Departamento Valle del Cauca
(Bogota: Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadfstica [DANE],
1959), p. 8.
13XIllI Censo Nacional de Poblaci6n, p. 23.



Colombia, with the exception of Uruguay, is unique in Latin America

today in that it has a functioning two-party system--currently modified

and inspired by the Frente Nacional coalitbn--based on institutionalized

parties which are hangovers from the nineteenth century. Like Uruguay's

Blancos and Colorados, Colombia's Conservatives and Liberals grew out of

post-independence strife and division into two groups.

Ben G. Burnett observes that the decade of revolt against Spain

(1811-1821) was characterized by a situation where "poorly organized

political groups were primarily concerned with replacing Spanish colonial

institutions." Subsequently, this factionalism gave way as "doctrinal

differences began to divide men into two political camps" between 1821

and the 1840's. During this latter decade, the traditional two-party
system became established.

Concomitant with the struggle against Spain, an internal battle

occurred. Antonio NariTo, head of the government of Cundinamarca, organ-

ized the Partido Centralista and aimed to establish.the authority of

Cundinamarca over all the provinces in the campaign against the

Spaniards. In reaction to this, the Partido Federalista was formed, set-

ting as its .major goal the election of a congress to determine the future

political system of Colombia. It successfully backed Camilo Torres for

president in 1812, a result which Narino met with force, and civil war

ensued. The Centralistas appeared to be an incipient Conservative party

and the Federalistas a rudimentary Liberal counterpart. Nonetheless,

leaders of the former were encountered in the ranks of the Liberal party
and Federalista heads were later discovered among Conservative ranks.

Once Sim6n Bolfvar assumed the leadership of the struggle against

the motherland and the war grew more intense, the two fledgling parties

ceased to exist as both sides extended their support to Bolfvar. However,

the highly autocratic and militaristic nature of the resulting Bolfvar

government produced a reaction on the part of the followers of Francisco

de Paula Santander, who assumed the role that the Federalistas had played.

The Bolivarianos called for order, while the Santanderistas called for

individual liberty, and these positions became cornerstones for .the future

Conservative and Liberal parties. The precursors of the Conservative

party governed until 1831, beginning a rapid disintegration with the

death of Bolfvar in 1830. This period was followed by the presidency

of Santander from 1832 to 1837. From that point until 1861, control of

government shifted back and forth between parties which, by the 1840's

were known as Conservative and Liberal. In 1861 the Liberals emerged as

the dominant party, holding power until 1884, at which time the

Conservatives gained a control which was not relinquished until 1930.

Another shift put the Liberals in power until 1946, followed by a

reversal which brought forth Conservative government until 1953.

Ironically, the factionalism which has traditionally plagued both

parties was responsible for these shifts in power. In 1884 Liberal

President Rafael Nunez went to the extreme of abandoning his divided

party to assume the role of Conservative president. In 1930, a more

united Liberal party-emerged victorious as the result of Conservative

disunity. And in 1946 the minority Conservative party returned to power

on the basis of Mariano Ospina Perez's 565,939-vote plurality, while

Liberal voters wasted 800,000 votes, dividing them between Gabriel Turbay,

441,199 and Jorge Eliecer Gaitgn, 358,957.3 In 1953 the military staged

a rare coup d'.tat, ushering in a four-year period of likewise rare

dictatorship for Colombia, under the government of General Gustavo Rojas

Pinilla. In 1957 the armed forces repeated their earlier act, and the

stage was set for the Frente Nacional.

Behind this traditional two-party rivalry, one finds an ideological

basis of division at least as old as the parties themselves which, per-

haps, helps explain the longevity of the Liberal and Conservative parties

in Colombia. Hubert Herring refers to two major subjects of dispute in

the history of Colombia: centralism vs. federalism, and the status of the

Catholic Church. He observes that Colombia's difficult geography fostered

a regionalism which, in turn, helped spawn the centralism-federalism

dispute. "The nation's formidable geography created a land of city-states

not unlike the pattern of medieval Spain . .. Living for years in

pocketed isolation from one another,-each region developed its local

pride, way of life, and even its variation of the common tongue." The

result was civil wars. Herring notes that ten constitutions were

promulgated during the nineteenth century, six favoring strong centraliza-

tion, four, regional autonomy. Not until N&uez imposed his control over

the warring regions in the 1880's did national unity become somewhat of

a reality.

Herring adds the following interpretation:

The Conservatives, self-appointed custodians of order, have stood
for highly centralized government and the perpetuation of traditional
class and clerical privileges, and they have opposed extension of the
voting rights of the people. The Liberals have stressed states'
rights, universal suffrage, and complete separation of Church and
State. In no other Latin American republic except Mexico has the
Church-state imbroglio been more angry and obstinate.5

Referring to the fanaticism of Colombian Catholics, he remarks that they

are "perhaps spiritually more akin to their colleagues in Spain than

those in any other Latin American republic . .."

Ideological divisions notwithstanding the factionalism which has

impaired the structural unity of both parties has likewise undermined their

ideological homogeneity. One of Colombia's most progressive presidents,

Alfonso L6pez Pumarejo, was at the point of resigning his Liberal

presidency due to the opposition of more-conservative Liberals to his

programs to counter the Great Depression. One author compared L6pez's

land, tax, labor, and other reforms to the New Deal in the United States.7

L6pez's spiritual successor, Gaitan, similarly activated the opposition

of the traditionalist wing of the party, and the result was the self-

defeating dual candidacy, Gaitan vsTurbay, which brought victory to

the Conservatives in 1946. On the other hand, the Conservatives have

been divided for two decades between the more doctrinaire, authoritarian

followers of Laureano G6mez and those of Mariano Ospina P4rez.

In spite of both inter-party and intra-party rivalries, Colombia

has experienced prolonged periods of stability together with very in-

frequent military supplantment of the government in power, a departure

from the general Latin American rule. During this century, such

stability prevailed from the end of the Thousand Days' War in 1903 to the

tragic "Bogotazo" of 1948, when the assassination of Gaitan ushered in

a savage and lengthy wave of bloodletting. Burnett refers to those

forty-five years as a period when "Colombia enjoyed almost unparalleled

stability. Elections were usually free and devoid of coercion. Two

major changes of power were accomplished (in 1930 and 1946) with surprising
ease." However, there were instances when the opposition party, viewing

its chances pessimistically, refrained from participating in elections.

The Conservatives abstained from the congressional elections of 1935 and

1937 and the presidential elections of 1934 and 1938. And the Liberals,

in the aftermath of the "Bogotazo," boycotted the 1951 congressional

election and the 1950 presidential election. Voting rights were restricted

as illiterates were barred from the polls until the enactments of 1936

and 1945, and women were unable to vote until the 1957 plebiscite which

established the Frente Nacional.

One can infer from previous statements that the history of frequent

dictatorship common to most Latin American countries has likewise been

absent from the Colombian political system. Burnett observes that "Periods

of dictatorship are rare and brief in Colombian history. Indeed, once

Sim6n Bollvar left the political scene, Colombia experienced a total of

less than five years of clear dictatorship in the central government to

the end of the last century."9

This tradition suffered a rude blow with the assassination of Gaitan,

the hero of the Liberal masses. Although no proof of a conspiracy has

ever been established, the immediate Liberal reaction was to blame the

Conservatives for the deed, and the ensuing Liberal-Conservative struggle

assumed the character of a religious war. The violencia had begun, and

with it a corrosion of conditions propitious to a stable democracy. G6mez

won the presidency in 1950 by default, in the face of a Liberal boycott;

and the highly autocratic rule of this doctrinaire Conservative further

exacerbated the situation. As Guillermo Salamanca recalls, the Liberals

denied all legitimacy to G6mez, fighting him "tooth and nail" and welcom-

ing the military coup on June 13, 1953.10

To characterize this coup as a typical Latin American golpe de

estado would be erroneous. In the first place, it was out of tune with

Colombian tradition, and, secondly, it was not undertaken on behalf of

an opposition political group against the party in power. Furthermore,

the armed forces deposed their own representative, General Rojas Pinilla,

after he had deviated considerably from the democratic path and had

manifested the desire to continue in power in violation of the earlier-

announced caretaker role of his military junta and its promise of a quick

return to democratic institutions.

The Rojas Pinilla dictatorship, however, was in harmony with some

of the more brutal examples found in Latin American history. Herring

asserts that this four-year reign was "one of the most savage, venal,

and altogether incompetent administrations in the history of the nation,"

featuring rule by "decree and terror. Rojas was a sadist whose police

murdered and looted," while strong censorship was placed over the press.

In the manner of Per6n, Rojas decreed a law of desacato whereby anyone who

manifested disrespect for the president could be fined or jailed.

Nonetheless, Vernon Fluharty notes that Rojas' government was reform-

ist and socio-economically progressive, claiming that "Rojas has turned the

clock forward on social achievement."12 Indeed, the unusually high price

of coffee allowed for a fairly favorable economic situation during this

period. Fluharty portrays the increasingly united opposition of the

Liberals and Conservatives against Rojas as a union of "the oligarchs of both

parties against a popular-based movement," attributing to "El General"

the role of champion of the masses who came to power "as a result of the

inability of the traditional parties to cope with a long-smouldering

social revolution." Rojas has been endeavoring to further establish

this image today through his Anapo party.

Ironically, while military coups and dictatorial governments have

been somewhat anomalous in general Colombian history, the recent decade

of violencia was not out of place with Colombian traditions. Notably,

two other periods of bloody civil war preceded this latest example: that

of the 1870's, when an estimated 80,000 people lost their lives; and the

1899-1903 Thousand Days' War, which allegedly claimed 100,000 victims,

The newest violencia, however, overshadowed its predecessors in destructive-

ness, most estimates claiming at least 150,000 killed. Indeed, the

military intervention in 1953 and the final solution offered by the Frente

Nacional have been accredited with preventing an even higher death toll.

Bernardo Gaitan Mahecha observes two cycles in the last violencia.

The first began in 1948 and ended with the 1953 military coup. With the

installation of the military junta, "interest was lost in fighting in

the fields to be replaced by the political game in high places of power."

There was a public laying down of arms, and Rojas decreed a general

amnesty for political crimes. From that time on, those who continued

armed action became known as bandits. Gaitan Mahecha adds that, "If the

violencia of the first cycle represented opposition to the government or

support of it, that of the second cycle is confronting the whole

society . ..1

Robert Williamson claims that conflicting norms in Colombian society

produced anomic conditions which help explain the violencia. "Bogota and

other cities have encroached on what was once an untrampled landscape.

The campesino finds his values in confusion.". In effect, after the initial

upheaval in Bogota, order was soon restored in that capital and other

major cities; and the brunt of the violencia was felt in rural Colombia.

The involvement of traditional cultural factors in the strife was also

illustrated by Williamson:

It is significant that the Caribbean or coastal area with its more
varied ethnic background and more permissive sexual norms as well
as less rigid Catholicism was not especially affected by violence.
On the other hand, the more Hispanic central area was less adjusted
to changing needs.

He further notes that the regions near Ecuador were also spared much

violence, but for a different reason. There, a "stabilized culture pat-

tern" existed; even the few Liberals were pro-clerical.15 The Cauca

Valley, on the other hand, was one of the regions most affected by the

violencia, a factor which produced the huge wave of migration into Cali.

Whereas internecine civil war has not been alien to Colombian tradi-

tion, neither has the convivencia solution to assuage conflicts between

the two parties and to unite them in common action. In 1854, Conservatives

and Liberals joined hands to topple the dictatorial Melo government and

restore legality. In 1885, the NuMista Liberals and the Conservatives

united to end the federalist anarchy, enacting the 1886 constitution,

which continues in effect today. In 1910, the republican union was formed,

made up of Conservatives and Liberals; it overthrew the dictatorship of

General Rafael Reyes and restored a state of legality. During the consecu-

tive presidencies of Liberal Alberto Lleras Camargo and Conservative Ospina

P6rez just prior to the assassination of Gaitin, each executive decided that

his difficult relationship with congress could be countered only by

inviting leaders from both parties into his cabinet.

Thus, the united Liberal-Conservative effort against Rojas Pinilla

and their continued collaboration in forming the Frente Nacional had their

precedents, although nothing to the extreme of this coalition had pre-

viously been attempted. The Frente Nacional was the product of two ac-

cords reached by Liberal leader Lleras Camargo and Conservative leader

G6mez in Spain in 1956 and 1957. The first agreement, the Pact of Beni-

dorm, was a pledge of party cooperation against the Rojas Pinilla dictator-

ship and in favor of re-establishing freedom and constitutional guarantees.

The subsequent Declaration of Sitges laid down the principles of the

Frente Nacional, which was adopted in 1958. The two pillars of this

coalition were paridad and alternaci6n. Complete parity was to be estab-

lished between the two parties for all national, departmental, and muni-

cipal posts. Thus, both houses of congress would be composed of 50 per

cent Liberals and 50 per cent Conservatives, regardless of the popular

vote distribution and to the exclusion of all parties not calling them-

selves Conservative or Liberal. The net effect was to further stimulate

factionalism, a result that might well have been predicted.

Similarly, the presidency was to be alternated, with a Conservative

serving the first four-year term followed by a Liberal then another

Conservative, for a total of twelve years. However, the impasse result-

ing from G6mez's unwillingness to accept the candidacy of more moderate


Conservative Guillermo Le6n Valencia led to the candidacy of Liberal

Lleras Camargo. The duration of the Frente Nacional was later extended

to sixteen years to give equal time to both parties, the scheduled date

of termination being set for 1974. A plebiscite was held at the end

of 1957, and the Frente Nacional was ratified by an overwhelming vote.

Clearly, peace meant more to the people than the traditional two-party



Ben G. Burnett,'The Recent Colombia Party System: Its Organiza-
tion and Procedures," unpublished doctoral dissertation (University of
California at Los Angeles, 1955), p. 1.
2bid., pp. 2-3.

31bid., p. 121.

4Hubert Herring, A History of Latin America (New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1964), pp. 499-500.



7Cole Blasier, "Power and Social Change in Colombia: The Cauca
Valley," Journal of Inter-American Studies, VIII (July, 1966), 387.
Burnett, op. cit., p. 163.

10Guillermo Salamanca, Los Partidos en Colombia (Bogota, 1957).

"Herring, op. cit., pp. 519-520.
12Vernon Lee Fluharty, Dance of the Millions: Military Rule and
the Social Revolution in Colombia (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh
Press, 1957); p. 316.

131bid., p. 311.

14Bernardo Gaitan Mahecha, Misi6n Hist6rica del Frente Nacional
(Bogota:: Editorial Revista Colombiana, 1966), pp. 33-34.

15Robert C. Williamson, "Toward a Theory of Political Violence: The
Case of Rural Colombia," Western Political Quarterly, XVIII (March, 1965),



Colombia is a unitary state divided into departments and municipios.

The number of departments has recently risen above twenty--aided by the

division of existing departments--and, in addition, there are remote, but

vast, territories of rain forest and llanos (plains) categorized as

intendencias or comisarfas. These latter two administrative divisions

are directly responsible to the central government. The municipio, on

the other hand, consists of a city or town and its surrounding area.

Some municipios include sub-units known as corregimientos or veredas

(hamlets or villages).

The power of the central government is compounded by the fact that

the executive head of each department, the governor, serves as the agent

of the president. The latter appoints him to an indefinite term of of-

fice and can remove him at will. The only requirement is that the

gubernatorial posts be distributed equally among Conservatives and

Liberals in accordance with the parity provision of the Frente Nacional.

The principal role of the governor is to serve as a link between local

and central government and to coordinate to some degree the activities

of the municipios within his department. This control is exercised

through decrees, resolutions, and orders to municipio concelos (councils)

and mayors, as well as by approval of all municipio acts. The major

legislative body of the department, the assembly, has very limited authority.

In the first place, its legislation must be in harmony with that of the


national congress; and secondly, the governor enjoys the right of absolute


The executive power of the municipio, on the other hand, is vested

in the alcalde (mayor), who is appointed by the governor for a one-year

term, with probable reappointments. As noted by one source,,"He has a

dual role, to serve as chief of the municipal administration and as agent

of the central government. He is, in effect, the immediate agent of the

governor." Strict control over the municipios is exercised by the

central government in administrative, financial, and judicial areas.

The governor must approve all actions of the municipal council and mayor

and may revise those he regards as unconstitutional or illegal. Possessing

power similar to that of the president over the governor, the latter may

dismiss the mayor at any time. The mayor's power over the council, how-

ever, is quite formidable, since he can veto its resolution on the basis

of unconstitutionality or illegality. The council, for its part, has

(/competence over public works, such as construction and maintenance of

roads, water mains, aqueducts and public buildings other than schools,

public education matters, establishment of municipal courts and prisons,
and public welfare and health measures.

Thus, we see that the locus of power in the departments and muni-

cipios is mainly centered in the non-elective, appointive executive

branches, while the popularly elected assemblies and councils lack

significant strength. Relationship between the president and the national

congress, however,, is not so one-sided.

All four legislative bodies at the three administrative levels are

popularly elected. Senators serve a four-year term, while representatives,

deputies (in the assembly) and councilmen are elected for two years.

Representation in the senate, house, and assembly is based on a depart-

ment's population, while that of the municipal councils is based on the

population of the municipio. Members of the former three bodies are

elected at large in each department, and the same pattern prevails for

the election of conceiales (councilmen) within a municipio. Furthermore,

there is no requirement that a candidate for any of these offices be a

resident of the department or municipio where he seeks election, which

means that a party can run its lists in the departments where the best

chances of success are seemingly to be found. Hence, MRL leader Alfonso

L6pez Michelsen headed his party's senatorial list in Valle in 1962 and

gained election'to the senate.

Beyond this point, candidates for the senate or house could also

present their candidacy for the assembly, the council, or both, and

take office at all three levels if elected. Thus, L6pez Michelsen

headed MRL lists for the senate, assembly, and council in the same 1962

election. Furthermore, at the assembly and council levels, a candidate

may run for the same post, simultaneously, in different departments or

municipios as the case may be. Again using L6pez Michelsen as our

example, we observe that he was elected to nine departmental assemblies

in 1962 and to ten in the 1964 elections. The object of such tactics

was to use the name of the MRL leader to win seats for the faction in

districts where lists headed by lesser figures might have had less chance

to triumph. In each case, however, L6pez was paired with a different

suplente, and the. latter assumed the role of de facto principal if the

list won enough votes for at least the top man to win a seat.3

The list system in Colombia operates in the following manner. Once

the total vote is determined, a proportional representation formula is

applied in all races in which more than two seats are at stake. Then the

principle of parity comes into play as the total number of seats is divided

evenly between Liberals and Conservatives. Next, the electoral quotient

is determined, separately for each overall party, by dividing a party's

vote by the total number of seats to which it is entitled. Finally, each

faction receives a percentage of seats corresponding to its portion of the

vote. Should an extra seat remain, the faction with the largest number

of residual votes receives it. Members of a particular list receive seats

according to their position on the list. Hence, if a faction wins three

seats, the first three names on the list receive them. Each faction

provides its own ballots. Unlike the case for many other countries with

proportional representation, Colombia does not have a multi-party system.

However, such a development is presently impeded by the Frente Nacional

system. Furthermore, the high degree of factionalism partially offsets

the lack of a multi-party system.

The partisan composition of Colombia's legislative bodies thus

determined, the geographical distribution has been established in the

following manner. Each department has been entitled to one senator for

every 190,000 inhabitants and one for each fraction over 95,000. The

number of representatives has been based on one per 90,000 population

or fraction over 45,000. The size of an assembly, on the other hand,

has been determined by the ratio of one deputy per 40,000 population

or fraction over 20,000.4 However, the size of these legislative

bodies has been frozen to curtail unwieldiness, so these ratios no longer

prevail. Valle's quota has been ten senators, twenty representatives,

and twenty-eight deputies.

Municipal councils, on the other hand, vary from six to sixteen,

the first number corresponding to municipios with less than 5,000 in-

habitants, the second corresponding to those exceeding 50,000.5 Hence,

Call has-a council comprising sixteen members. (in order to maintain

the principle of parity between Conservatives and Liberals, the size of

each legislative body must be an even, rather than an odd, number.)

Principales at all legislative levels, of course, are matched by an equal

number of suplentes.

As to the basis of voting strength for the two overall parties, un-

fortunately, voting statistics do not enable us to detect partisan divi-

sions on the basis of socio-economic class. However, urban-rural dif-

ferences in the vote are very pronounced, with the Liberal strength in

the cities and the Conservative ,strength in the smaller towns. More

specifically, Robert Dix relates Liberal strength to the "more commer-

cialized, industrialized, and less traditional sections of the country,"

and Conservative strength to the "socially and economically traditional-

ist areas of the country." Using the March 1962 elections as his example,

Dix finds that the overall Liberal margin of 295,567 votes in the eleven

municipios where the vote total surpassed 25,000 votes more than accounts

for the nationwide Liberal majority of 281,239. In each of the eleven

municipios, the Liberals outpolled the Conservatives, by margins greater

than two to one in all but two of the municipios.6 We will soon see the

importance of large Li-beral majorities in Call in offsetting overall

Conservative strength (often majorities) in the remainder of Valle.

As to the regional basis of strength for the two overall parties,

the Conservatives traditionally have been strongest in Antioquia, while

the Liberals have enjoyed their greatest strength in Cundinamarca,

especially in Bogota. Burnett observes that the large majority of

Colombian departments historically have been overwhelmingly controlled

by one party or the other. However, six have been somewhat competitive

throughout the years, and Valle is included in this number. In effect,

Valle and the contiguous department of Cauca had manifested the greatest

degree of party competition prior to the Frente Nacional experiment.

Table 1 shows the voting percentages of the two parties in Valle in the

presidential elections between 1930 and the beginning of the Frente

National in which both parties participated, and the percentage in seven

municipio elections during this period.

While the presidential elections showed a fair amount of competi-

tiveness--even the 1930 and 1946 Liberal margins were small by Colombian

standards of overwhelming defeat--all seven municipio elections were

dominated by the Liberals. However, Burnett points out that even these

wide margins are deceptive when one compares Liberal-Conservative dif-

ferences in other departments with the Valle patterns. With the advent

of the Frente Nacional and its blunting of the Liberal-Conservative

rivalry, the voting gap between the two overall parties has diminished

considerably in several departments. Presently, the national strength

of the Liberals and Conservatives is quite even, with the Liberals hold-

ing a slight edge. However, the Oficialistas hold a tremendous edge

over the Unionistas. -The Liberals are strongest in the Caribbean coastal



Year Presidential Election Municipal Election

Liberals Conservatives Liberals Conservatives

1930 59.6 40.1

1935 65.7 34.2

1937 65.3 34.6

1939 67.7 32.2

1941 63.0 36.9

1942 49.6 50.4

1943 60.7 39.2

1945 61.7 38.2

1946 59.6 40.3

1947 62.3 37.6

regions and the cities, while the Conservatives have their main strength

in the rural regions. The urban and rural population of Colombia is

about evenly divided, but a considerably larger percentage of urban

citizens vote.

The first election connected with the present Frente Nacional system

was the 1957 plebiscite. Table 2 compares the voting results in Call with

those of Valle as a whole and the national total. The percentage voting

affirmative--this is, in favor of adopting the Frente Nacional--in Cali

was overwhelming (99 per cent .of the votes cast), greater than that of

Valle (98 per cent) and that of the nation as a whole (95 per cent). Only

in two departments, Santander and Boyac6,was there a sizable percentage

of negative votes, about 25 per cent in both cases. The figures in the table

suggest an overwhelming desire for peace above any purely partisan consider-

ation. Moreover, some 72 per cent of the potential voters in both Valle

and the nation voted in that election, a percentage which surpasses that

for any other election in recent Colombian history.

Subsequent elections, however, in addition to revealing less voter

interest, also manifest some interesting deviations in Call and Valle

from overall national patterns. But these deviations were slow to develop

as was the profound decline in voting totals. To illustrate these points,

the following tables compare the Cali, Valle, and national vote in

elections for president and representatives between 1958 and 1966.

Since elections for all legislative bodies take place at the same time,

the figures corresponding to any one are highly representative for all

others. Hence, the figures for senatorial elections, which take place

every four years rather than every two, and assembly elections have not



Affirmative Negative Blank Total

Cali 171,676 499 699 172,844

Valle 494,427 5,704 3,705 503,836

Nation 4,169,294 206,864 20,738 4,397,090

been included. The Cali municipal council results, however, are included

on account of some interesting sub-factionalism and their usefulness in

relation to our study of the party hierarchies in Call.

A comparison of the 1958 election results, the first under the

Frente Nacional system, is offered in Table 3. In accordance with the

terms of the coalition, the mainstreams of the Conservative party joined

the Liberals in supporting the presidential candidacy of Liberal Lleras

Camargo. However, an anti-Frente Nacional sector of the Conservatives,

led by Jorge Leyva, refused to support a Liberal and ran their own leader.

Call proved to be considerably more pro-Liberal than Valle and the nation

as a whole. Lleras Camargo received approximately 94 per cent of the

total presidential vote in Call as compared to 76 per cent in Valle and

80 per cent for the entire nation. A comparison of the voting for re-

presentatives at the three levels indicates that Call's deviation from

departmental and national norms in the presidential contest, which fol-

lowed the legislative elections by two months, was due much more to a

pro-Liberal sentiment than to support for the Frente Nacional. Had the

case been otherwise, the degree of deviation would have been less in

the legislative vote. However, the Liberals received 74 per cent of

the total vote in Cali for the house of representatives as opposed to

59 per cent in Valle and 58 per cent for the nation. Thus, at the time

of the 1958 elections, Valle leaned only slightly toward the Liberals,

barely more than the national average, while Call was strongly pro-Liberal.

A comparison of factional breakdowns shows further differences

between voting in Cali and in its overall department. Some 76 per cent

of the Conservative vote in Valle went to the rightist Laureanistas, as



Leyvistas Laureanistas Valencistas Alzatistas Total

Pres. 5,670 5,670
Repr. 16,156 11,654 1,043 28,853
Mun. 16,133 11,257 990 28,380

Pres. 79,380 79,380
Repr. 120,963 21,393 15,191 157,547

Prds. 614,861 614,861
Repr. 952,364 317,627 285,217 1,556,273

Oficialistas Dissidents Total Overall Total

Pres. 102,925 102,925 109,427*
Repr. 84,622 645 85,267 114,248
Mun. 66,974 19,109** 85,861 114,241

Valle '
Pres. 265,402 265,402 347,004
Repr. 230,467 658 231,125 389,029

Pres. 2,482,948 2,482,948 3,108,567
Repr. 2,102,001 28,078 2,132,741 3,693,939

This and other totals include some null, blank, and other votes.

** Another dissident list received 778 votes but represented no
important Liberal sector and was thus omitted.

opposed to the more moderate Valencistas (linked with the Ospinistas),

and mainly personalistic Alzatistas. In Call, on the other hand, the

Laureanista figure was limited to 56 per cent, fairly in line with the

national proportion of 61 per cent. This would seem to indicate that

even the Conservatives in Cali were moderate in comparison with those

in the surrounding department. The Alzatista vote in Cali was less than

4 per cent as opposed to 10 per cent for Valle and 18 per cent for the


On the Liberal side, factionalism in the races for representative

was negligible at all three levels as Liberals were strongly united behind

the Oficialista lists. However, in the Call municipio elections, a

significant split in voting did occur. Alfonso Barberena, who was to

head the MRL list in the 1960 municipio elections, leda dissident list

which captured 23 per cent of the combined Liberal vote. This was the

earliest indication of the fact that Cali Liberals were not solidly behind

the Frente Nacional. It will be noted that, otherwise, the municipio

voting followed the pattern for representatives very closely.9 Ap-

proximately 58 per cent of potential Colombian voters voted for president

in 1958 and 69 per cent voted for representatives, a decline from the 72

per cent who had voted in the plebiscite.10 (The presidential vote in

all three elections which have taken place since the beginning of the

Frente Nacional has been considerably below that for the legislative

contests, perhaps due to a combination of unwillingness to vote in a non-

competitive election and the reluctance of some Liberals and Conservatives

to vote for a man from the other party, coalition candidate or not.)

A change in the pattern of factionalism developed after the 1958

elections, including the formation of a front between Gilberto Alzate

Avendano and Ospina P4rez against G6mez, and the organization of the

MRL as a nationally operative Liberal faction. The effect of this new

factional pattern on the 1960 vote is illustrated in Table 4. The most

significant outcome of those elections was the defeat of the Laureanistas

at the hands of the Ospinista-Alzatista front. The latter then replaced

the former as the Conservative partner in the Frente Nacional. Notably

the Laureanistas, directly opposite from the 1958 elections, fared better

in Call than in Valle or the nation. In fact, they actually increased

their percentage of the Conservative vote from 56 per cent to 58 per cent,

while in Valle they fell from 76 per cent to 34 per cent, and nationally

from 61 per cent to 42 per cent.

Significantly, the vote total was down considerably from the 1958

figure. Over 28,000 Conservative votes were cast in Cali in 1958 as

opposed to slightly over 15,000 in 1960. Nor did the Liberals benefit

from this decline. Their total sank from 85,000 to 49,000. In fact,

the total number of votes cast for representative in 1960 was only 57

per cent of the 1958 figure, a more severe drop than those recorded in

Valle and the nation, where the respective figures were 71 per cent and

68 per cent. Moreover, only 58 per cent of potential voters voted in

this election, nationally. These figures suggest a growing disil-

lusionment with the Frente Nacional, especially in Call and Valle, where

Anapo and MRL strengthswere to become very pronounced in subsequent

elections. Indicative of this were the 34 per cent and 30 per cent totals





Ospinistas-Alzatistas Laureanistas Leyvistas Total

Repr. 6,075 8,834 417 15,326
Mun. 5,931 9,250** 378 15,559

Repr. 73,840 39,414 2,100 115,354

Repr. 560,000 445,000 50,000 1,059,370


Oficialistas MRL Total Overall Total

Repr. 32,909 16,711 49,620 64,946
Mun. 32,894 16,746 49,640 65,199

Repr. 112,355 48,054 160,409 276,318

Repr. 1,180,000 295,000 1,478,403 2,542,651

* The national figures for factional breakdown are rounded off.

**This figure includes two sub-factions of Laureanistas.

of the combined Liberal vote captured by the MRL in Call and Valle
respectively, as opposed to its 20 per cent national total.

A change in the factional pattern for both parties in the 1962

elections is- illustrated in Table 5. On the Conservative side, the

Ospinista-Alzatista front became known as the Unionistas, while the

more doctrinaire Laureanistas fittingly took on the name Doctrinarios.

Anapo became a new factional addition, and the rightist Leyva waged

another personal campaign against the Frente Nacional, gathering some

12 per cent of the total presidential vote. (Leyva had no independent

faction in the legislative contests.) On the Liberal side, a formal

factional split among the Oficialistas took place in Cali and Valle--a

purely local phenomenon--with the Pachoeladistas and Balcarcistas running

separate lists. Sub-factionalism also occurred in the ranks of the MRL,

a more radical "hard" line sector splitting off from the more "soft"

line main current. This development was national in scope, but official

national figures list only the total MRL vote without providing the


The 1962 presidential election manifested greater complexity than

its 1958 predecessor. In the 1958 campaign, the Liberals were solidly

behind Lleras Camargo, and the only Conservative opposition to this

Liberal candidate came from Leyva. In 1962, however, Guillermo Le6n

Valencia was unable to count on the solidarity of all fellow Conservatives

and was confronted with the candidacy of Leyva plus that of Rojas Pinilla.

In addition, a strong Liberal vote came out for L6pez Michelsen, a total

quite close to the Conservative vote .for Leyva in 1958. This suggests

that a sizable percentage of Liberals were no more willing to vote for








Pach. Balc.





Anapo Leyvistas




Blanda Dura








Total Overall Total

21,303 21,030 11,524
20,544 19,321 11,025

36,368 53,140 62,691

















a Conservative president than a similar number of Conservative counter-

parts were willing to vote for a Liberal chief executive. These votes,

however, amounted to nothing more than protest votes since the Frente

National provisions would not have allowed a Conservative to become president

in 1958 nor a Liberal in 1962 regardless of vote totals. In fact, the of-

ficial 1962 returns list only the totals for Valencia and Leyva, while

those for L6pez Michelsen and Rojas Pinilla are under the category of null

votes because the former was a Liberal and the latter lost his political

rights when he was overthrown in 1957. Nonetheless, the MRL leader received

29 per cent of the total vote in Cali, 34 per cent in Valle, and 24 per

cent in the nation. ,Rojas, however, received weak support.

The strong showing of the MRL and Anapo in Valle is better exempli-

fied by the returnsfor the house of representatives. The MRL received 34

per cent of the Liberal vote in Call and a considerably higher 48 per

cent in Valle, as opposed to the national percentage of 36 per cent.

Omitting the vote in Cali, the MRL actually received 57 per cent of the

total Liberal vote in the remainder of Valle. The relative weakness of

the MRL in Call as opposed to the rest of the department may find an

explanation by a comparison of overall Liberal strength in the two areas.

Liberals captured 70 per cent of the total vote in Call but only 51 per cent

of the vote in the outlying department. This Liberal domination of Calli

might suggest a more effective party organization and greater esprit de

corps which work against deviant Liberal voting than would be the case

for the rest of Valle, where Conservative strength was almost equal to

that of the Liberals. Due to its strength outside of Call, the MRL

received more votes in Valle than in any other department, thus establishing

this area as one of its principal strongholds. Of some interest is the

fact that the hard line MRL sub-faction nearly equalled the soft line in

voting strength in Cali, while it proved much weaker in the overall


On the.Conservative side, Anapo, competing in its first election,

drew relatively strong support in Cali and Valle, with 19 and 18 per cent

of the vote respectively. Anapo, like the MRL, was on its way to estab-

lishing some of its greatest strength in Valle. The faction now called

Unionista continued its advantage over the newly named Doctrinarios.

Indeed, Laureanista support fell from the 58 per cent of the 1960 elections

to 36 per cent in Cali, from 34 to 28 per cent in Valle, and from 42 to 35

per cent nationally. Significantly, this gap was filled mainly by Anapo

rather than the Unionistas, who amassed 45, 53, and 57 per cent of the

Conservative vote in Call, Valle, and the nation respectively.13

The total vote increased sharply from 1960, though failing to reach

the 1958 figure. This increase was due to a large growth in the number

of eligible voters, since the percentage of the potential electorate who
voted remained at 57 per cent, the figure for 1960. Thus, a fairly

high degree of abstention prevailed. Of perhaps greater importance was

the growing anti-Frente Nacional vote. In the races for representative,

the pro-Frente Nacional forces--the Oficialistas and Unionistas--won

only 58 per cent of the vote in Call, 52 per cent in Valle, and 61 per

cent in the nation. Excluding Call, the anti-Frente Nacional factions

received a majority in the remainder of Valle. These percentages were

almost identical with those for the presidential election, which is to

say that Valencia barely won a majority of the total Valle vote and owed

even this to his support in Call. The Cali municipio elections closely

patterned those for representative except for the fact that Conservatives

ran five different lists and Liberals ran eight. These additional lists

in all cases received very little support.

A probable further weakening of Frente Nacional strength in the

1964 congressional elections was avoided by the formation ofa front between

the Unionistas and Doctrinarios. Nonetheless, Anapo's gains were formidable

as Table 6 illustrates, and resulted in an increase from six to twenty-

eight seats in the house of representatives. In Call, Anapo drew almost

49 per cent of the Conservative vote, while it collected 45 per cent in

Valle as a whole. Its national total was only 27 per cent, but this still

represented a sharp upswing from the 8 per cent two years previously.

Anapo's 50,000 votes in Valle were second only to the 54,248 it received

in the much more highly populated Cundinamarca. Perhaps due to this large

Anapista vote, the Conservatives received more votes in Valle than the

Liberals for the first time since the beginning of the Frente Nacional.

However, the Liberals continued to hold a 58 per cent majority in Call,

nevertheless, a decline from the 70 per cent of 1962.

A,sharp drop in vote totals occurred, one far more detrimental to

Liberals than to Conservatives in Call and Valle alike. In the capital

city, the Conservative vote total was only some 5,000 below that of 1962,

while the Liberals lost 33,000 votes. In the overall department, the

Conservative decline was 25,000, while the Liberals lost 70,000 votes.

,This phenomenon might be attributable to far greater Liberal apathy or

to a sizable percentage of Liberals voting for Anapo, even though that

party ran only Conservative lists in Valle. (Anapo ran Liberal lists,



Frente Nacionalistas
Official Cesartulistas Anapo

8,903 2,983 11,235
9,007 2,807 10,569

51,908 7,551 50,186

794,000 293,183

ficialistas MRL .Total


24,787 3,341
24,519 3,957

59,711 33,717 1

738,437 284,952















Overall Total








along with its Conservative ones, in a few departments, collecting

16,495 votes with them as opposed to the 293,183 votes it amassed with

its Conservative lists.) Nationally, the same pattern occurred, although

the difference between Liberal and Conservative losses was less acute.

The Liberal vote total fell by 527,533, while that of the Conservatives

dropped 307,321. The Liberals continued to hold a majority in Colombia,

but it was reduced to a precarious 62,000 votes.

Another example c uniquely Valle sub-factionalism occurred in the

1964 elections. C4sar Tulio Delgado headed a list of his newly formed,

highly personalistic Movimiento de Restauraci6n Conservadora, a group

which continued to pledge its allegiance to the Frente Nacional. The

voting returns were not very favorable for the Cesartulistas. At the same

time, the Pachoeladistas and Balcarcistas formed a common directorate and

ran united lists, thus eliminating that structural sub-factionalism on the

Liberal side. However, two tiny splinter groups calling themselves Frente

Nacionalistas did run separate lists. Likewise, two equally weakly sup-

ported splinters from the MRL soft line ran separately from the recognized

soft line list. Even greater factionalism, as is traditionally the case,

occurred in the Call municipio elections. However, of the five Conser-

vative and six Liberal lists, only those which received a sizable vote

in the congressional elections attained one at the municipio level. The

municipio elections, by their very localized nature, seem to more easily

lend themselves to the intervention of ephemeral personalistic cliques which

in many cases do not even qualify as true sub-factions.

On the Liberal side, the MRL fell slightly from its 1962 total in

Valle of 48 per cent of the combined Liberal vote to 44 per cent, reflecting

its national decline from 36 to 33 per cent. However, in Call, it slid

from 34 to 24 per cent. Clearly, the MRL was never able to effectively

counter the strength of the Oficialista organization in Cali, and now it

was beginning to lose its hold in regions where it had made inroads.

Again, the hard line of the MRL showed better in Call vis-a-vis the soft

line than in Valle, actually attaining a larger vote. The Ifnea blanda

was far stronger than the Ifnea dura nationally.15 Similar to the case

for the Liberal party as a whole, it is difficult to ascertain whether

the MRL was falling victim to growing apathy or to a switch in factional

allegiance. Apathy was definitely on the increase in Colombia as only 36

per cent of eligible voters bothered to vote in 1964.

The 1966 elections, as Table 7 illustrates, produced another upswing

in the total number of votes cast, similar to that of 1962, the previous

presidential election year. However, this can in Iart be attributed to

an increase in eligiblevoters. Nonetheless, the fact that the Frente

National presidential candidacy now pertained to a Liberal impelled

considerably more Liberals to vote, as attested to by the Call election

figures, and the growing appeal of Anapo'probably converted a sizable

amount of apathy into anti-Frente Nacional voting. The Liberal vote in

Call more than doubled the 1964 total, while the local Conservative vote,

low to begin with, gained a considerably smaller 50 per cent. Nationally,

Liberal gains were not much greater than those of the Conservatives, the

former increasing by 32 per cent while the latter augmented 26 per cent.

Significantly, the vote in Valle with Cali omitted revealed an increase

of just 21 per cent for the Liberals and less than 2 per cent for the

Conservatives. In like manner, the overall vote total in Call increased



Official Cesartulistas






Official Revitalizaci6n






Blanda Dura .P












4,526 2,539
4,572 2,523




184,772 287,910

20,302 13,648 9,058





* A comparison of the senatorial

vote is used due to more complete national

**The presidential election figures are rounded off.

***Again, totals in this table and others include some null, blank, and
other votes.













83 per cent, in the nation, 29 per cent, and in outlying Valle, only 10

per cent. Due to the overwhelming Liberal vote in Call, the Liberals

once again gained the majority in Valle; but, significantly, the Conserva-

tives received slightly more votes than the Liberals in the rest of the


Furthermore, none of the Liberal gains were beneficial to the MRL,

which was now truly declining at all three levels. The MRL share of the

Liberal vote slid from 24 to 18 per cent in Call, 44 to 28 per cent in

Valle, and 33 to 24 per cent nationally. However, a new Liberal faction,

the Movimiento de Revitalizaci6n Liberal, arose in Valle, claiming that it

needed "renovation" and "revitalization." In their first participation

in an election, the Revitalizaci6n Liberals attained 22 per cent of the

Frente Nacional Liberal vote and 18 per cent of the total Liberal vote

in Call as opposed to respective figures of 23 per cent and 17 per cent

for Valle as a whole. While these figures qualify this new group as a

significant Liberal party faction, they do not seem highly impressive when

S11s that the faltering MRL showed much greater strength in its

electoral encounter. Meanwhile, sub-factionalism in the ranks of

.,iRL was continuing to grow, with the Communist-oriented MRL del Pueblo

eating into the strength of the soft and hard lines. Significantly, the

most radical of MRL tendencies again gained a plurality in Cali, indicating

that MRL voters in the capital city were more inclined toward extremism

than those in the overall department.

The Frente Nacional Conservatives in Call again manifested greater

electoral vulnerability than their Liberal counterparts. The short-lived

Ospinista-Laureanista front had split, the Laureanistas taking the Alzatistas

with them to form the Conservative Independientes. And the Cesartulistas

further weakened the Ospinistas by vying with them for what remained of the

Conservative Frente Nacional vote. As it was, the combined Ospinista-

Cesartulista vote equalled another 19 per cent of the Conservative total.

The Independientes accounted for another 19 per cent of the Conservative

output, while Anapo, which again ran only Conservative lists in Valle,

amassed 52 per cent of the Conservative vote. This pattern was closely

followed in the overall department, the Unionistas collecting 29 per cent

of the Conservative total as opposed to 22 per cent fr the Independientes

and 49 per cent for Anapo. Nationally, the anti-Frente Nacional feeling

was not as extensive, the Unionistas nearly equalling Anapo's vote total,

both with 34 per cent of the total Conservative vote. The Independientes

secured 25 per cent of this vote total. Anapo added slightly to its overall

total by running Liberal lists in seven departments, but their combined

value was only 13,791 votes.

Perhaps the most significant outcome of the 1966 elections was the

fact that the .proportion of the anti-Frente Nacional vote continued to

rise, in spite of the decline of the MRL. The breakaway of the Lauro-

Alzatistas ipso facto contributed to this, but the growing strength of

Anapo appears to have greater transcendental importance, both for the future

of the Frente Nacional and that of the Colombian political system. Anapo

now had accumulated 36 of the 190 seats in the house and 18 ofthe 109 in

the senate. This reduced the vote of the Frente Nacional coalition to 58

per cent i'n the house and 63 per cent in the senate, thus further removing

the coalition from the necessary two-thirds majority to pass major legisla-

tion. The resulting legislative stalemate had induced President Valencia

to declare a state of siege in 1965 whereby he could legislate by decree,

and President Lleras Restrepo has maintained the use of this instrument.

Of further significance is the fact that the anti-Frente Nacional

proportion decreased in Call and Valle at the same time it rose sharply

in the overall nation. In comparison with 1962, prior to the Ospinista-

Laureanista alliance, the share of the total vote for the. Frente Nacional

forces increased from 58 to 63 per cent in Call, from 52 to 53 per cent

in Valle, while it decreased from 61 to 55 per cent nationally. The

tremendous Liberal surge in Cali and the sharp downturn of the MRL in the

overall department account for these differences. The municipio elections

in Cali followed the same patterns already described except for the fact

that the Conservatives and Liberals each ran six lists, none of any

importance that was not included in the senatorial summary.

The May 1966 presidential election further attested to the Liberal

orientation of Cali. In the nation as a whole, there was a 12 per cent

higher turnout for the March congressional elections than the subsequent

presidential elections, and, in like manner, turnout was 6 per cent higher

in outlying Valle. Such a result hardly seems extraordinary since the

legislative elections were highly competitive whereas the presidential

balloting gave more the appearance of an act of ratification than a

competitive contest. Nonetheless, the vote in Cali was 16 per cent higher

for the presidential election than for the congressional elections,

clearly a sign of Liberal solidarity behind Lleras Restrepo. The 730,000

votes for Anapo presidential candidate Jos4 Jaramillo are difficult to

evaluate considering that he was the only opponent of Lleras. One cannot

ascertain what.the.figure might have been had Leyva once again presented

his candidacy.17

An evaluation of the elections which have occurred since the ini-

tiation of the Frente Nacional brings out several conclusions. Most

notable are the divergent voting patterns between Cali and Valle. The

former is.overwhelmingly Liberal; yet the Liberals are, apparently, more

easily given to apathy than the Conservatives unless they are particularly

inspired to vote. Furthermore, the official Liberal organization in Cali

seems highly invulnerable to threats from other Liberal factions. Valle,

on the other hand, exemplifies a far greater degree of both inter-

factional and inter-party competition, especially when one omits the

results of Call. The MRL made considerable, though temporary, inroads

into Oficialista strength, threatening to make the latter a minority

Liberal faction if the trend continued; and the Conservatives twice out-

polled the Liberals in outlying Valle, failing the other three times by

some 4,000, 11,000 and 17,000 votes respectively. With regard to the

elements of the Conservative party, the Cali and Valle patterns have been

fairly similar. In both cases, the two traditional factions have been

faltering in the face of serious and steady Anapo gains, this department

being a major stronghold of Anapo. A strong tendency toward sub-factionalism

is also a notable characteristic of the political party process in Call

and Valle. The competition between the Pachoeladistas and Balcarcistas,

the formation of the new Movimiento de Revitalizaci6n Liberal, and

Cesartulismo are indicative of such an inclination.


See Samuel Humes and Eileen M. Martin, "Colombia," in The Structure
of Lbcal Governments Throughout the World (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,
1961), pp. 351-355.

3See Organizaci6n y Estadfsticas Electorales Marzo y Mayo de 1962
(Bogota: Registradurfa Nacional del Estado Civil, 1962); and Organizaci6n
y EstadIsticas Electorales Marzo 15 de 1964 (Bogota: Registradurfa Nacional
del Estado Civil, 1965).

4See Constituci6nPolftica de la Republica de Colombia (Bogota:
Editorial Voluntad, 1966), pp. 108, 1945.

5See 3,000,000 de Colombianos Cedulados (Bogota: Registradurfa
Nacional del Estado Civil, 1958), p. 37.

6Robert H. Dix, Colombia: The Political Dimensions of Change
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), pp. 242-243.

7Ben G. Burnett,'The Recent Colombian Party System: Its Organ-
ization and Procedures" (Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University
of California at Los Angeles, 1955), pp. 103-111.

8See 3,000,000 de Colombianos, pp. 1-3; and Organizaci6n y
Estadfsticas Electorales, Marzo 15 de 1964, pp. 136-137.

9See ibid; and Records of the Registradurfa Municipal del Estado
Civil de Cali (all municipio electoral data are taken from these records).
See Organizaci6n v Estadfsticas Electorales, Marzo 15 de 1964,
pp. 136-137.

12See El Sufraqio y la Identificaci6n Ciudadana en Colombia 1959 a 1961,
II (Bogota: Registradurfa Nacional del Estado Civil, 1962), pp. 49, 82.

See Organizaci6n y Estadfsticas Electorales, Marzo y Mayo de 1962.

See Organizaci6n y Estadfsticas Electorales, Marzo 15 de 1964,
pp. 136-137.
151bid., book in general.

161bid., pp. 136-137.

17See Records of the Registradurfa Nacional del Estado Civil in Bo-
gota; and Records of the Registradurfa Nacional del Estado Civil de'Call.



The hierarchical organization of the Liberal and Conservative parties

traditionally has been quite similar and follows a pattern which dates back

to the nineteenth century. The national party organization occupies the

hierarchical apex with a national convention on top and a subordinate

national directorate. In practice, however, the unwieldiness of the

numerically large conventions has produced de facto control by the national

directorate. (Recent conventions have had as many as 1,000 delegates.)

The parties normally hold conventions every two years, chiefly for the

purpose of choosing the national directorates, handling matters dealing

with hierarchical relationships, adopting a party platform, nominating

the party's presidential candidate if it is to run one, and treating

budgetary affairs.

The recent Liberal convention exemplifies the wide range of delegates,

all with a vice and a vote: (a) Liberal ex-presidents; (b) current Liberal

senators and representatives; (c) members of the National Liberal Directorate;

(d) members of the party's central political committee; (e) the secretary

general of the party; (f) two men and two women delegates from each

departmental directorate, including the president of the directorate; (g)

the directors of Liberal newspapers; (h) Liberal ex-ministers; (1)

Liberal ex-governors; (j) Liberal ex-mayors of Bogota; (k) ten delegates

chosen by each department, plus an extra delegate for each 10,000 votes


above 100,000 attained by the Liberals in the department in the last

parliamentary election; (1) the current Liberal presidents or vice.pre-

sidents of the departmental assemblies; (m) a delegate from each depart-

mental federation of workers; (n) ten delegates from the Central de Tra-

bajadores Colombianos (CTC); (o) ten delegates from the Uni6n de Traba-

jadores Colombianos (UTC); (p) the Liberal presidents of the past depart-

mental comites bipartidistas (bipartisan committee to coordinate the

Liberal-Conservative Frente Nacional campaigns); (q) the national co-

ordinators of affiliated associations, electoral affairs, labor affairs,

youth groups, and women's groups; (r) the presidents of university profes-

sional and youth organizations; (s) the Liberal departmental coordinators;

(t) the presidents of affiliated associations; (u) the party treasurer;

(v) the party's electoral court witnesses; (w) the members of the Fondo

Liberal (which handles the funds of the party).1

The national directorates of the parties, which may vary in member-

ship from as few as one to as many as ten, are elected by the national

convention for a two-year term and are eligible for re-election. In-

variably, they are established party leaders with long records of service

in important positions. The national directorate has control over the

party headquarters, serves as coordinator and sometimes disciplinarian of

lower hierarchical levels, handles general propaganda and financing,

determines when national conventions are to be held, and often appoints

the members of the departmental directorates (DDs). However, some con-

ventions specifically require that DDs be chosen by departmental conven-

tions. Nonetheless, this function is normally performed by the DN, often

for reasons of expediency. The Conservatives differ from the Liberals

somewhat on this point in that the former have delegated to Valle, Antio-

quia, and Caldas the rank of federated department, which means that they

are autonomous from the DN to the point where their DDs are always elected

by departmental conventions.

The Conservative practice of decentralization in the form of federated

departments seems quite ironical since they have always been considered as

the strongly hierarchical party and would be much more expected to have a

stronger hierarchical, centralized control than the Liberals should any

differences exist in the organization of the two. Dix accents this

hierarchical orientation by observing that "Order and hierarchy are . .

key words in the lexicon of the Colombian Conservative. His emphasis is

on a strong central authority, a strong executive arm, and on firm measures

in dealing with popular disturbances or threats to the status quo. He is

also likely to stress the claims of discipline and hierarchy . .."2

Indeed, the Conservative hierarchical tradition did hold true within the

hierarchical organizations in Cali, based on statements by both Conser-

vative and Liberal leaders (see Chapter XI).

The degree of Conservative party decentralization in its overall

organization seems worthy of further comment since the pyramidal image

of a true hierarchy seems to be impaired in the case of the three

federated departments. One might wonder whether an upward deference

system between the three DDs involved and the DN is present in spite of

the departmental autonomy, or whether the theory of "stratarchy," often

applied to U.S. political party organizations, might not be somewhat ap-

plicable in this case. Eldersveld observes that stratarchy departs

from hierarchy in that it characterizes the "proliferation of the ruling

group and the diffusion of power prerogatives and power exercise." It

signifies a power pattern between the poles of "unity of command" and a

"general dilution of power throughout the structure." Thus, a "strata

command" would operate with a "varying, but considerable degree of,

independence.' Unfortunately, data on party financing and how dependent

the departmental strata are upon the national strata for their funds are

unavailable, so we cannot effectively introduce this factor to serve as

a point of analysis.

Below the national level in hierarchical rank stands the depart-

mental level, with its respective convention and directorate. Similar

to the DN at the national level, the DD has de facto predominance over

the convention since it decides whether or not to convoke one and since

the DD has an indirect control over the convention delegates due to the

fact that it appoints the members of the municipio directorates (DMs),'

and the latter often decide on the delegates to the convention. This

implicit chain of control would seemingly work to the advantage of the in-

cumbent DD members in cases where the departmental convention elected

the new DDs. Departmental conventions are normally convoked every two

years, and the term for DDs is likewise two years. Representation of

delegates at these conventions is by municipio, and size of delegation is

dependent on the number of votes the overall party received in the muni-

cipio in the last assembly elections (for example, one delegate for each

1,000 votes).

The functions of the departmental convention and directorate are

similar to those of their national counterparts for their jurisdiction.

The convention is responsible for the election of delegates to the na-

tional convention and, in some cases, the election of DD members. It also

draws up departmental platforms and chooses party candidates. The DD, on

the other hand, coordinates party election campaigns (propaganda and

financing), serves as a liaison between the DN and the DMs of its

department, and maintains vigilance over the DMs, including control over

their funds.

At the municipal level, the DM overshadows the municipal conven-

tions to an even greater degree than the analogous pattern at the depart-

mental and national levels. The DM dominates the municipal convention,

and the latter chooses the municipio's delegates to the departmental con-

vention. This is virtually the extent of the role of the municipal con-

vention. The DMs are appointed for two-year periods by the DDs, and

their roles within their jurisdiction somewhat parallel those of the

DDs.. They nominate candidates for the city councils and organize and carry

out activities related to national, departmental, and municipio electoral

campaigns within their municipio. The number of members of the DMs, like

that of the DDs and DNs, is not fixed and can vary greatly from one faction

to another and from one term to another. Below the level of DM, a more

informal sub-hierarchy exists, consisting of comites de barrio. These

are virtually confined to the barrios populares (lower-class districts)

of large municipios and are often led in caudillo style by a local leader

who has affiliated with a particular faction and is known as a capitan

de barrio. In some cases, a comit4 de barrio consists of little more

than the efforts of its capitan. At none of the hierarchical or sub-

hierarchical levels of any faction is financial remuneration offered.

Aside from these more or less general patterns, there are some

important differences in the hierarchical patterns of the various polit-

ical groups in Call. As one might expect, the Liberal Oficialistas and

Conservative Unionistas, as the largest groups, adhere most closely to

the organizational norms described above. The Oficialistas have three

well-defined hierarchical levels, the DN, DD, and DM, and an apparent

deference pattern from one level to its immediate superior. 'The DN

has been appointing the DDs, which, in turn, choose the DM members.

(However, a recent Liberal convention has stressed that the DDs should

henceforth be elected by departmental conventions.) Liberal conventions

are held with fair regularity, but gaps greater than two years do occur,

in which case the terms of current directorate members are simply extended

for another two-year period. The theoretical responsibility of the con-

ventions to elect the DD and DMs has been regularly eluded. The conven-

tion-, once in session, has simply conferred authority on the DN or DD,

as the case may be, to appoint the members of the immediately inferior

hierarchical level. For all three levels of organization, each principal

has a suplente to attend meetings when he is unable to do so. In practice,

however, the periodically scheduled reunions of the DD and DM in Cali

are poorly attended except during the few months prior to an election.

Unlike the case for some other factions, there is no overlap in DD and

DM membership in the departmental capital, the DD having fourteen members

and the DM ten in the beginning of 1967.

A unique feature of the Oficialista DD and DM in Call is their

coalition character. The Pachoeladistas and Balcarcistas, once divided

into separate directorios, were currently united and practicing a Frente

Nacional form of parity. The membership of the two directorates was

evenly divided between the two groups, and the officer positions (president,

vice president, secretary, and treasurer), were being alternated to give

equal weight to each side. However, no fixed terms were involved.

Changes normally depended on the attitude of the members of the two

groups toward the status quo.

Similarly, the Unionistas have three well-defined directorios.

However, they traditionally have one individual who;is member of both

the DD and DM to serve as a liaison between the two bodies. The DD

currently had some fourteen principles, while the DM number stood at

thirteen. The municipal hierarchy is chosen by the DD, but the latter,

due to the fact that Valle is one of the federated departments, is chosen

by the departmental convention rather than by the DN. Unionista

conventions, like those of the Oficialistas, are held with regularity.

Nothing akin to the Pacholadista-Balcarcista division is to be found

within the Unionis.ta hierarchy in Calli, but both the DM and DD currently

included followers of C4sar Tulio Delgado. However, they have had to

denounce any further divisionist tactics to retain their membership.

The Unionista DM differs from that of the Oficialistas in that the

entire mesa directive (officer group) comes up for renewal each two months,

and changes in the president, vice president, secretary, and treasurer can

occur with some frequency. The post of president actually follows a pat-

tern of rotation among the membership. The Unionistas are plagued with

the same problem as the Oficialistas in that attendance at weekly or bi-

weekly meetings is small; and the suplente who corresponds to each

principal often fails to be a reliable substitute. One significant

feature of the Conservatives is that the Unionistas and Independientes

share the same party treasury, having joint control over the Fondo Con-

servador,.both at the national and departmental levels. This is apparently

the only activity in which the two factions work together with some


The order found in the Oficialista and Unionista hierarchies in

Call was absent from the organizations of the other factions. On the

Liberal side, the Movimiento de Revitalizaci6n Liberal had such extensive

DD and DM overlap that for all practical purposes, the role of the latter

was obviated. All of the leading members in the Call DM also belonged

to the Valle DD, thus the DD total of twenty-one members and DM total of

fifteen were deceptive. Nonetheless, the two directorates had separate

meetings, the DM meeting once a week and the DD on the average of once

a month. The attendance at Revitalizaci6n hierarchical meetings appeared

to be much more regular than that for the Oficialistas and Unionistas,

perhaps because this faction had been in existence for only three years

and its apparent sense of mission was greater. The two directorates had

been renewed once since the founding of the faction--the changes in

membership were very slight--and further .renewals were scheduled at two-

year intervals.

The oficialismo of the .Revitalizaci6n movement extended to the

point of.giving strong support to the Frente Nacional, but not to the

point where the Liberal DN--the Valle-confined movement, of course, lacked

its own DN--had a voice in choosing the movement's hierarchy. Their own

departmental convention chose the DD, and the latter named the DM members.

However, the Revitalizaci6n faction was currently in a dilemma due to a

resolution passed at the February 1967 Liberal national convention which

required that all factions supporting the Frente Nacional in any given

department or municipio form a single Liberal directorate. The movement

was both fearful of losing its identity and of being declared outcasts by

the Liberal party. However, it was cautiously beginning to indicate a

willingness to comply with the convention requirement provided that it

could be guaranteed equal representation with the Pachoeladistas and

Balcarci stas.

The MRL was the weakest and most disunited of the Liberal factions

in Call. Subsequent to the 1966 election losses, only the original MRL

movement, the soft line, manifested any signs of continued organization,

and even this was barely functioning. Hierarchical meetings were ir-

regular, many members had already abandoned the faction, and there was no

MRL headquarters to be found in either Cali or Bogota. Moreover, the

dearth of active members was increasingly obliterating the boundaries

between the DD and local DM. A top MRL leader informed the author that

the seven MRL interviews he had obtained included all of the currently

active members of the Cali hierarchy, although half of the, theoretically,

twenty-seven DD members were Calenos and the local DM supposedly numbered

twelve. Terms for all three levels of the hierarchy were for two years,

with a national convention naming the DN, departmental conventions naming

the DDs, and the latter naming the DMs. To provide an example of the

extent of MRL decline, the major theme of the January 1967 MRL national'

convention was whether or not to dissolve the MRL.

On the Conservative side, the Independientes manifested much of the

disorganization found in the MRL, although their problems appeared to be

far less acute. Of their three hierarchical levels, only the DDs were

currently operative. Following their voting losses, principally to

Anapo, in the 1966 elections, the DN became dormant. In its place, the

party's junta interparlamentaria assumed de facto leadership. This body

included all Independiente members of the senate and house of representa-

tives, and its rule was destined to terminate once a national convention

was convened and a new DN elected. The Valle DMs, on the other hand,

were intentionally inactive as a protest to an allegedly unfavorable

relationship with the DD, which was said to be denying DMs any local

autonomy. In fact, only six of the twenty members of the Cali DM continued

to consider themselves as members of the hierarchy.

Even in the case of the DD, activity was at a low level, the Valle

delegation of the junta interparlamentaria having assumed many normally

DD functions. Approximately half of the fourteen member DD, some seven

of whom were from Cali, had disassociated themselves from the faction.

Independiente DD, since Valle is a federated department for the Conserva-

tives, are chosen by departmental conventions, and the DDs, in turn, elect

DM members, all of which is theoretically done at two-year intervals.

However, the faction was becoming less regular in holding conventions.

The combination of Laureanistas and Alzatistas is somewhat analogous to

the Oficialistas' Pachoeladista-Balcarcista union. However, the former

appear to have blended together to a greater extent and do not maintain

a rigid balance of forces.

Anapo, too, has suffered some of the problems of disunity within

its hierarchy and desertion of organizational leaders which have beset

the Independientes and the MRL. However, the apparent cause differs. Far

from suffering electoral defeats, Anapo's vote has moved steadily upward.

But the underlying ideological heterogeneity of the members of the

hierarchy, which remained below the surface as long as Anapo continued

to lack a defined ideology, was now threatening to split the movement

apart as the true Conservatives were beginning to realize that Anapo's

mass-oriented radicalism was not in harmony with the norms of the

Conservative party. Hence, the Conservative character of Anapo was

decreasing in two ways: a more pronounced non-Conservative ideology

was becoming more evident, and the proportion of true Conservatives in

Anapo ranks was dwindling.

Until recently, the Anapo hierarchy in Valle was, apparently,

highly organized behind the leadership of Hernando Olano Cruz. His death

in 1966, however, left a leadership struggle in its wake. The DD and DM

in Cali were virtually fused due to an extensive overlap in membership,

and meetings were irregular. A unique factor of Anapo has been its

lack of directorate presidents, as well as its leadership by comandos

eiecutivos. At the municipio level, the executive command consisted of

three members, while the DD command included all Valle members of the

national congress, and the DN command featured the troika pattern of

the DMs. Nonetheless, de facto leadership of Anapo appeared to be firmly

in the hands of Rojas Pinilla, currently not a member of the DN. The

DN is chosen by the national convention, the DD membership is chosen by

the DN, and the DMs are appointed by the DDs. The Valle DD currently

had some twenty members, while the Call DM totalled fifteen.

A further organization of hierarchical character is the Comit4

Bipartidista, which serves to coordinate the Liberal and Conservative

partners of the Frente Nacional into a common coalition policy. This

committee is active only during the time of election campaigns but has

a watchdog role during the interim. The Comitg Bipartidista Nacional.

normally has thirty members, while the Comit4 Bipartidista Departamental,

which has no municipal counterpart, also numbers around thirty. However,

most of this latter group, at least, were titular functionaries, with

only a minority engaged in active roles.



1El Tiempo, January 27, 1967, pp. 1, 27.

2Robert H. Dix, Colombia: The Political Dimensions of Change
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), p. 233.

3Samuel J. Eldersveld, Political Parties: A Behavioral Analysis
(Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964), p. 9.



The responses to the questionnaire revealed two principal factors

related to political recruitment: the strength of ideology as a component

in the political socialization process and an inducement to actual polit-

ical participation; and the self-initiative of the recruit in his own

recruitment. Table 8 is the first of a series of tables which illustrate

these points and various other factors related to the recruitment of

party faithful into the ranks of the hierarchical organizations.

For all eight hierarchical groups involved, ideological reasons

played a greater role than any of the other alternatives in interesting

the future political leader in politics. In fact, for the Oficialista

DM, Revitalizaci6n, the MRL, and Anapo, ideology was given a stronger

codification than all the other alternatives combined. This result sug-

gests that the initial political socialization prior to the actual recruit-

ment was principally linked to an ideological awareness. The results for

Liberals and Conservatives were very similar, with greater differences

between factions than between the two overall parties. Next to ideology,

example or influence of family was the second most important factor in

producing an interest in politics. The Oficialista DD and the ,ndepen-

diente samples gave greatest weight to this influence. Again, the two

overall parties were closer than some factions within each party. In

like manner, desire to oe a leader ranked third for both Liberals and



Example or influence of family

Example or influence of friends

Ideological reasons

Business reasons

Interest in social contacts

Desire to be a leader

Example or influence of family

Example or influence of friends

Ideological reasons

Business reasons

Interest in social contacts

Desire to be a leader

Liberal Party Leaders
Oficialistas** Revitalizaci6n MRL

5 34 15 12

0 17 0 0

35 43 63 40

0 4 0 0

10 0 16 5

10 4 20 0

Conservative Party Leader
Unionistas Indep. Anapo Total







* N = 103, n = 71 (N = total potential universe, n
cases in sample.)
**DM and DD are used as abbreviations for municipal
directorates in all tables.

= total number of

and departmental

***The figures are derived from a scoring system based on six points--
since there were six alternatives--for each alternative codified first in
priority by a leader, five for those codified second, and so on down to
one point for those codified sixth in cases where all six alternatives
were codified. The same system prevails for some future tables, as














Conservatives', although the latter gave it considerably more weight as

a factor. Interest in social contacts, example or influence of friends,

and business reasons followed in that order for the Liberals, while

example or influence of friends, interest in social contacts, and

business reasons was the order given by Conservatives.

These responses indicate a blending of factors serving the social-

ization process. Significantly, this process appears to begin fairly

early in life and to be somewhat narrowly channeled (through the family),

since the influence of friends was far less important than that of the

family. Furthermore, the attraction of material gains as an inducement

to initial interest in politics was negligible. Business reasons ranked

a distant last behind such non-material benefits as the desire to be a

leader and interest in social contacts.

This pattern continues to prevail when we move from the initial

socialization process to political recruitment itself (Table 9). Ideology

is again manifested as the primary motivator and the others relatively

secondary, the responses of Liberals again resembling those of Conserva-

tives. In like manner, the influence of the family carries over from the

socialization process to the recruitment process as the second most

important factor, although its relative strength declines somewhat due

to responses of leaders of Anapo, Revitalizaci6n, and MRL. The fact

that these three movements were only-recently founded explains the

decline because the importance of family influence actually gains slightly

for the other five groups.



Liberal Party Leaders

Oficialistas Revitalizaci6n MRL


Example or influence of family

Example or influence of friends

Ideological reasons

Business reasons

Interest in social contacts

Desire to be a leader

Example or influence of family

Example or influence of friends

Ideological reasons

Business reasons

Interest in social contacts

Desire to be a leader








21 23

10 6

65 38

5 0

32 5 5 52

10 0 0 10

46 63 42 187

4 0 0 4

10 21 10 46

0 21 6 36

Conservative Party Leaders

Indep. Anapo Total Overall







* N = 103, n = 71.

**The point system referred to in Table 8 is used.




Significantly, the desire for social contacts increases at this

stage, apparently because recruitment offers more channels for this than

the initial phase of socialization. Nonetheless, the importance of the

desire for a leadership role fails to grow in spite of the apparent fact

that actual recruitment would be the necessary stepping stone to such op-

portunities. Although caudillismo is by no means absent from the hierar-

chical organizations, the desire to play a dominant political role does

not seem to be highly prevalent. Also of some significance is the

declining role of the already weak influence of friends as a factor.

This strongly suggests a high degree of self-initiative, on the part of

the hierarchical leader in his own recruitment. Again, business reasons

were virtually no factor at all, making it evident that political

participation is not considered a road to financial gain. Conservatives

and Liberals once more manifested similar orientations, allowing little

basis for comparison.

Further evidence of self-initiative in recruitment is manifest in

Table 10. In the eight groups sampled, the number c leaders who took the

initiative to begin working for their party far outweighed those who were

invited to do so. Only eleven of the seventy-one leaders sampled had

actually been invited to undertake work on behalf of their party. This

self-recruitment appears to occur with great frequency at the university

level, when a student joins a partisan movement, exerts sufficient effort,

and reveals adequate ability to become a student leader. A high position

in the student hierarchy, the Comando de Juventudes, may gain the student

membership in the DMs or even the DDs of some of the factions, notably

the Unionistas. Likewise, in the case of the sub-hierarchical comitis



Invited Took Initiative

DM 0 6
DD 2 8

Revitalizaci6n 1 10

MRL 1 6

DM 3 9
DD 1 6

Independientes 2 7

Anapo 1 8

Overall 11 60

* N = 103, n = 71.

de barrio, recruitment seems to be principally through self-initiative,

with a local caudillo-type emerging, identifying himself with a determined

political group, and inter-acting with that group. However, such leaders

may emerge as the result of active campaigning in the barrios populares by

the political groups.

In spite of the very high degree of self-initiative, the molding

influences of the family should not be disregarded. Tables 11 and 12

reveal the apparent influence which the family example provides. A large

majority of each Liberal party sample had fathers who had been affiliated

with the Liberal party and, in like manner, every Conservative party

sample weighed heavily in favor of those with Conservative fathers. Of

the-seventy-one cases, only ten were deviant in that Liberals had Con-

servative fathers or Conservatives had Liberal fathers. Four of the five

deviant Liberal cases were from the two recently created factions, the

Revitalizaci6n movement (3) and the MRL (1), perhaps a significant fact.

A political leader whose father supported the other party might have

undergone a less effective socialization process than one who maintained

the allegiance of his father; and the result might be a greater in-

stability of allegiance to the point where a first generation Liberal,

for example, might show a greater readiness to join a minority Liberal

faction rather than the mainstream of the party. Moreover, an individual

willing to break with family tradition might be more attracted to radical

or reformist parties which are dissatisfied with the status quo, which

could explain the attraction of the non-Oficialista Liberals for renegade

Conservatives and that of Anapo for renegade Liberals. Indeed, three of

the five deviant Conservative cases were from Anapo. However, Anapo's



Conservative Liberal Deviant Cases

DM 0 6 0
DD 1 9 1

Revitalizaci6n 3 8 3

MRL 1 6 1

DM. 11 1 1
DD 7 0 0

.Independientes 8 1 1

Anapo 6 3 3

Overall 37 34 10

*N = 103, n = 71.













*N = 103, n = 71.



loose links with the overall Conservative party might make it less

anathema for a Liberal to join that movement than for a Conservative to

join any Liberal faction.

Of perhaps greater significance as a socialization and recruitment

factor is the percentage of the sample who had fathers who were active in

politics. Some 41 per cent of the Liberals, fourteen out of thirty-four,

and 43 per cent of the Conservatives, sixteen out of thirty-seven, had

fathers who had served in official partisan roles. In the two Oficialista

DM cases, the fathers had been councilmen in two fairly small towns; in

the four DD cases, two of the fathers had also served as small town coun-

cilmen, while one had been a deputy in a Valle assembly, and the other

had held posts in two different DMs; in the four Revitalizaci6n cases,

two of the fathers had been DD leaders (one in the Conservative party

hierarchy), three had been DM leaders, one had been a deputy, two had been

councilmen, one had served as a mayor, and one had been a Conservative

caudillo in the Thousand Days'War; in the four MRL cases, three of the

fathers had served in non-Call DMs, two had served as councilmen in towns

other than Cali, one had served as a deputy in a Valle town, and one had

held the post of chief of state in the Thousand Days'War, in addition to

having served on the Supreme Court of Justice.

On the Conservative side, four of the six politically active

fathers in the Oficialista DM had occupied official hierarchical posts,

including one in the DN, one in the DD, and two in DMs, two had been

senators, two had been representatives, one had served as a deputy, and

two had been councilmen; in the DD, three of the four politically active

fathers had been rural caudillos, one having served in the DM of a small

Valle municipio, and the fourth was currently a strong national figure of

the Unionistas, serving in the DN and having exercised the posts of senator,

representative, and mayor of Call; in the three Independiente cases, all

three fathers had served in DDs, one having been a DD president, two had

served in DMs, and one had been a city councilman; in the three Anapo

cases, one father had been a deputy and a councilman, another a DM leader

and a councilman, and the third a DM president.

The step from the initial socialization process to recruitment into

an official party hierarchy normally has not been immediate. In most cases,

as exemplified by Table 13, such advancement, apparently, has been the

result of active partisan effort and close identification with one's party.

Notably, nine of the twelve leaders who had not worked for their party prior

to joining a hierarchy belonged to the three recently created factions,

Anapo, Revitalizaci6n, and MRL, which were impelled to select some organ-

izational leaders simply to come into existence, thus ignoring the period

of service in lesser roles which the more mature, institutionalized factions

could afford to require.

Most pre-hierarchical roles, however, were highly general in nature

and involved the performing of whatever tasks were useful to the party,

particularly during the periods of electoral campaigns. The Oficialista

DM leaders mainly alluded to activity in aiding party leaders in whatever

needed to be done, basically propaganda distribution and agitation among

the masses. DD leaders gave similar responses, one specifically claiming

that he "did all work assigned me by the directorates." Stress was placed












*N = 103, n = 71.

on efforts in the barrios populares, including organization of the important

comites de barrio, mass meetings, conferences, ideological indoctrination,

and proselytism. Revitalizaci6n responses resembled those of the Oficia-

listas. However, two Revitalizaci6n leaders specifically referred to their

roles as heads.of comit4s de barrio--in fact, both were currently living

in lower-class barrios--and this, combined with the fact that one was cur-

rently holding a DD post while continuing to serve as a comity de barrio

leader, perhaps suggests a more extensive effort by the Movimiento to

strengthen its communications with the masses than was the case for the

Oficialistas. Another Revitalizaci6n leader had been a member of the co-

mando femenino of the Liberal party. MRL leaders, too, described general

activist roles as party militants spreading propaganda during campaigns.

One, however, referred to his activity as a'member of the Comando Juventud


The Conservative factions also stressed the generality, rather than

the specificity, of their pre-hierarchical party roles. Unionista DM

leaders placed some accent on their propaganda, organizational, and social

service work in Cali's working-class barrios. DD leaders likewise referred

to their duties as very general, doing whatever the party needed, especially

during campaigns. Independiente leaders similarly alluded to their pre-

hierarchical roles in general terms, describing themselves in such terms

as "militants," "propagandists," and proselytizerss." Anapista responses

were of the same order, but more stress was made concerning their relation-

ship with the lower-class masses, a position notably in harmony with Anapo's

orientation as the movement of the masses. In summary, regardless of the

highly general character and weak structure of pre-hierarchical roles,

the importance of rendering lower level activity as a stepping stone to

the official hierarchy cannot be gainsaid.

Nonetheless, once the party worker attains membership in the hier-

archy, he does not appear to hold this membership for a very prolonged

period. Only eight of the leaders, as Table 14 denotes, had been serving

in their directorates for more than ten years. (Length of tenure did not

closely relate to the top leadership positions within the hierarchies.)

The apparently high turnover in the directorates cannot be explained by

advancement to superior levels in the hierarchy because this was true

only in a minority of cases. Were this the case, tenure would probably

have been greater in the Oficialista and Unionista DDs than in the respec-

tive DM since advancement from the DM to the DD is easier than from the DD

to the DN, and thi-s was not so. Perhaps the self-declared ideological

zeal of the leader begins to wane in relation to the dissatisfactions

encountered in this role (an aspect which will be given further consider-

ation later), with the result that he refrains from seeking re-election

to the directorate or is rejected for re-election at the subsequent

convention for inadequate role performance.

Due to the recent creation of three of the factions, only the figures

for the Oficialistas, Unionistas, and Independientes allow for a meaningful

comparison, and the briefness of tenure is universally manifest. The

extreme is reached by the Unionista DM, where ten of the twelve leaders

had been serving less than five years and nobody had served more than ten.

Significantly, the Unionistas had the youngest directorates in terms of

average age, another topic which will be treated in greater depth. The



0-1 1-5 5-10 10-20 20-plus (years)

DM 0 2 1 2 1
DD 0 6 2 1 1

Revitalizaci6n 0 11 0 0 0

MRL 1 3 3 0 0

DM 4 6 2 0 0
DD 0 3 3 0 1

Independientes 0 4 3 1 1

Anapo 2 1 6 0 0

Overall 7 36 20 4 4

*N = 103, n = 71.

brevity of tenure notwithstanding, from the time a leader first joins

his directorate, he apparently renders continuous, uninterrupted service

until his tenure terminates. Only four of the leaders admitted to having

ceased working for their party at any time since they were first elected

to their directorates.

So far, the aspects regarding recruitment for all the factions of

both overall parties have been notably similar in terms of the leadership

response. The following section examines some personal characteristics of

the leaders sampled in this study, including such factors as length of

residence in Cali, age, education, occupation outside of politics, and

socio-economic class. Since Cali owes a great share of its growth to

migration, it perhaps should not appear unusual that only twenty-seven

of the leaders as shown in Table 15, were born in the capital of Valle.

However, an additional nineteen had lived at least twenty years in Cali,

and only eight had lived less than ten. This suggests that recruitment

to political party hierarchies in Call has not included many recent migrants

even though some of the city's heaviest migration occurred during the past

decade. Again, the responses were fairly uniform among the eight samples.

However, the Independientes exhibited a notably greater preponderance of

leaders born in Cali. Since this faction has often been considered as

the most representative of upper-class interests and the most inclined

toward the preservation of the status quo, perhaps it is significant that

an abnormally high percentage come from families which have been long

established in Cali.

The fairly young age of most of the hierarchical leaders seems to

be in harmony with the short tenure referred to earlier. As Table 16



Born in Cali 1-5 5-10 10-20 20-30 30-plus (years)

DM 1 0 0 1 3 1
DD 4 1 0 2 3 0

Revitalizaci6n 3 0 3 1 4 0

MRL 3 0 0 2 1 1

DM 5 0 1 2 2 2
DD 2 0 2 1 0 1

Independientes 7 0 0 2 0 0

Anapo 2 1 0 3 1 0

Overall 27 2 6 14 14 5

*Three members of the overall sample were currently living outside of

N = 103, n = 68.




20-30 30-40 40-50 50-60 60-plus (years)





7'n.ei Cli. ent es

illustrates, thirty-nine of the leaders had not yet reached their fortieth

birthday, and only thirteen were over fifty. The factional breakdown in

this case, .however, reveals some significant differences between different

samples. On the Liberal side, the Oficialista DM and DD samples revealed

very similar age patterns, but taken as a whole, only 19 per cent of the

Oficialistas were below forty years of age, considerably below the overall

percentage of 55 per cent. On the other hand, 55 per cent of the Revita-

lizaci6n sampleand 57 per cent of the MRL sample fell in this category.

Perhaps this difference is due to a greater idealism and radicalism on the

part of the latter.two groups since this would tend to attract younger

people in all probability, given equal opportunity for youth to enter all

factional hierarchies. More likely, however, this equality was non-

existent, the youthful Liberals attracted to Revitalizaci6n and MRL

encountering greater opportunity for hierarchical recruitment since the

recent creation of those factions had obviated the presence of a mono-

polizing "old guard" to serve as an obstacle.

However, this does not follow for the Conservatives. The faction

most likely to have had the lowest percentage of young people in its

hierarchy if degree of institutionalization is the key factor, the Unio-

nistas, had by far the highest percentage, 79 per cent, of any Liberal or

Conservative faction. Indeed, the Unionistas are looked upon by young

Liberals as a faction which places few obstacles in the paths of youth

toward recruitment and advancement up the hierarchy. -The other purely

Conservative faction, the Independientes, likewise manifested an open

recruitment in terms of age, with 67 per cent of their sample under forty

years of age. Anapo's percentage in this category was 55 per cent.

Again, there were notable differences among the factions with regard

to average educational level (Table 17). Overall, some 59 per cent of the

hierarchical leaders had college degrees, 76 per cent in law. All three

Oficialista DM leaders in this category had law degrees, as did five of

the six DD leaders, all five Revitalizaci6n leaders, three of the six

MRL leaders, four of the seven Unionista DM leaders, all five DD leaders,

five of the seven Independiente leaders, and two of the three Anapo

leaders. One Oficialista DD leader had received his degree in medicine;

three MRL leaders boasted degrees in civil engineering, architecture, and

art respectively; three Unionista DM leaders had graduated in civil

engineering (in two cases) and economics; two Independientes had completed

degrees in medicine; and one Anapista likewise had completed his studies

in medicine. Using the Oficialistasand Unionistas for comparison, one

notes that a slightly higher percentage of the DD samples had college

degrees than their DM counterparts. This, perhaps, indicates that

recruitment into the DDs is more selective, hence, less "open accordion,"

to use Eldersveld's term, than into the DMs.

A comparison of Liberals and Conservatives, however, reveals no

difference between the overall parties, 59 per cent on 6ach side having

obtained college degrees. The most pronounced differences are found in

a comparison of the factions within each party. For the Liberals, 86

per cent of the MRL sample were college graduates as opposed to 56 per

cent of the Oficialistas and only 45 per cent of the Revitalizaci6n move-

ment. However, due to the great disintegration of the MRL directorates,

this figure might not be representative of the hierarchy that was chosen




College Degree Non-College Degree

DM 3 3
DD 6 4

Revitalizaci6n 5 6

MRL 6 1

DM 7 5
DD 5 2

Independientes 7 2

Anapo 3 6

Overall 42 29

*N = 103, n ='71.

at the last convention where elections took place. Otherwise, one might

be led to believe that the MRL has been very selective in its recruitment

to the point where members of the lower class, who would very unlikely

have attained degrees in higher education, were largely excluded from

organizational leadership roles in spite of the fact that the faction

has continuously stressed its ties with the masses. The Revitalizaci6n

movement, which has also asserted its links with those at the bottom of

the socio-economic scale, appears to have oriented its recruitment to

harmonize with this orientation. Subsequent data will help substantiate

the hypothesis that the Revitalizaci6n's abnormally high percentage of

non-college graduates reflects an abnormally high percentage of lower-

or lower middle-class leaders. On the other hand, the percentage of non-

college graduates in the ranks of the Oficialistas seems to indicate that

the barriers to recruitment for young aspirants do not entail an overall

exclusiveness in the party's selection process.

Conservative factional figures have, perhaps, more significance

than those of the Liberals due to the great contrast between the Inde-

pendientes and Anapo. Some 78 per cent of the Independiente sample had col-

lege degrees as opposed to 33 per cent of the Anapistas. This, perhaps,

could be explained by different orientations in recruitment, the Anapo

hierarchy being considerably more open accordion. The two factions are

considered by many to be at opposite ends of the spectrum with regard

to the six factions in this study. Anapo is the most forceful, unceasing,

and demagogic in espousing its ties with the masses to the exclusion of

all oligarchicall" elements; and the Independientes are the most

identified with the status quo, due in part to their intimate and

unyielding association with the Catholic Church. Regardless of orienta-

tion, perhaps Anapo would find it easier to recruit .from the lower-class

than the Independientes. The Unionistas, with 63 per cent of their

leadership sample lacking college degrees, appeared to have a moderately

open accordion recruitment, a position in harmony with the opportunities

they had been giving to the younger activists of the faction.

All but four of the hierarchical leaders in this study, college

graduates and non-college graduates alike, currently worked in occupa-

tions apart from their political roles. (One Oficialista, one Unionista,

one Independiente and one Anapista claimed that they devoted full-time

to political work on behalf of their party.) This, of course, was to

have been expected considering that no remuneration was received for

their roles as organizational leaders. Thus, work in the directorates

was only part-time, even for the top officers of each DD and DM. The

Oficialista DM hierarchy included three practicing lawyers, a public ac-

countant, a landowner (retired businessman), and an employee of a working

class housing bureau. When they first became active in politics, two of

the lawyers had already begun practicing, one was still a student, and

the other three were involved in small business enterprises.

The DD included three practicing lawyers, a lawyer who had ceased

his practice to devote full-time to politics, a physician, an industrial

manager, three small businessmen, and a social worker. When they first

became active in politics, all were engaged in much the same jobs that

they were currently holding. None referred to any activity as a student,

which further accents an apparently greater opportunity for student

leaders to advance in the Conservative ranks than in the Liberal organization,

perhaps due to a better-developed student movement on the Conservative

side. For. the Revitalizaci6n movement, five leaders were currently

practicing lawyers, two were small businessmen, one a journalist, one

a caretaker of an office building, one a typist, and one a housewife.

At the time they first entered politics, three of the lawyers were still

students, one was a university rector, while the other had already begun

his practice. The position of the remaining six differed little from

their current situation. On the other hand, three MRL leaders were

practicing lawyers, one a civil engineer, one an architect, one a president

of a working-class housing bureau, and one an accountant. When they

initially became active in politics, all had already begun these careers

with the exceptionoF the architect, who was still a student, and the

housing bureau president, who was then a commercial artist.

For the Conservative factions, three leaders of the Unionista

DM were practicing lawyers, one managed a real estate and insurance firm,

two were civil engineers, one was an accountant, one an architect, one

an optometrist, one a social worker, and two were still students. When

they first became active in politics, six were students, two were lawyers,

one was an engineer, one was a businessman, and one-was a newly appointed

mayor. The DD included four practicing lawyers, a member of the cabinet

of the departmental government, a businessman, and a government employee.

When they were first recruited into political roles, three were still

students, one was a high school teacher, two were businessmen, and one

was a government employee. Again, the active political roles of the

Unionista hierarchy as students is in contrast with the, apparently,

much less active ones of the Oficialista hierarchy.


In the case of the Independientes, four were currently practicing

lawyers, one a lawyer who had forsaken active practice to devote full-

time to political activities, two were physicians, one a high school

teacher, and one a journalist. When they first became active in politics,

five were students, one a physician, one a lawyer, another a teacher,

and the other a businessman. Thus, the relatively high degree polit-

ical recruitment of students found in the ranks of the Unionistas has

been common to the two true factions of the Conservative party in general.

On the other hand, two Anapistas were currently practicing lawyers, one

a physician, two small businessmen, one an accountant, one a nurse, an-

other a housewife, and the other confined his labors to political activities.

When they initially became active in politics, two were still students,

two were lawyers, one a physician, one an accountant, one a nurse, one

a farmer, and one a dressmaker.

In summary, most of these occupations for the eight samples in

general seem to denote individuals with a middle-class, rather than ar

upper-class, background. Indeed, most the leaders who were involved

in business careers appeared to be small businessmen and not men of sizable

wealth. Additional queries concerning this point evoked responses to the

effect that the upper-class generally eschewed direct participation as

members of the party hierarchical organizations. Nonetheless, although

the upper-class might have been numerically small in representation, some

of the top leaders in Call pertained to that socio-economic level. The

newly chosen president of the Unionista DD, Rodrigo Lloreda, is a case

in point.

Because of the possible sensitivity involved, no direct approach

4as attempted to determine a leader's position on the socio-economic

scale. Rather, each was asked the district of Calli where he resided;

and since Cali is divided into more than fifty barrios, most considerably

homogeneous in a socio-economic sense, this approach apparently yielded

meaningful results. The author was immensely aided by a study which had

recently been carried out by Call's Oficina de Planeaci6n Municipal that

ranked the barrios in six categories, on the basis of their socio-economic

level. The lowest category, six, was classified as tugurio (slum);

category five was clase obrera (working-class); four was clase media

obrera (lower middle-class); three was clase media (middle-class); two

was clase media alta (upper middle-class); and one was clase alta (upper-

class).1 This provided the basis for Table 18.

An examination of the overall results reveals that 25 per cent of

the party leaders sampled resided in barrios classified as upper-class,

while another 40 per cent lived in barrios considered upper middle-class,

66 per cent living in these combined areas. These figures, of course,

give a somewhat different impression.of socio-economic level than the

occupation data. One possible explanation is that the sample was asked

only the types of non-political activity in which they were involved,

not their total sources of income. Subsequent to interviews, the author

discovered that one of the practicing lawyers and a practicing physician

owned sizable extensions of land which yielded handsome dividends,

information that the questionnaire was not equipped to obtain. None-

theless, the overall mean of 2.40 indicates that the average hierarchical

leader was middle- to upper-middle class; thus, the implication given



Barrio Category
1 2 3 4 5 6 Average

DM 2 1 2 0 1 0 2.50
DD 4 5 0 1 0 0 1.80

Revitalizaci6n 2 4 2 1 2 0 2.73

MRL 0 4 2 0 1 0 2.71

DM 3 4 1 2 2 0 2.67
DD 2 2 0 1 1 0 2.50**

-Independientes 4 5 0 0 0 0 1.55

Anapo 0 2 2 2 0 0 3.00**

Overall 17 . 27. .9 7 7 0 2.40.

*N = 103, n 67.

**One Unionista DD leader was currently living outside of Cali; two
Anapo leaders were living outside of Cali, and one listed a barrio
which could not be located in the Oficina de Planeaci6n study.

by occupation does not appear tobe highly incompatible with the area of

residence scale.

Again, there was no difference in the results for Liberals and

Conservatives. The average of 2.40 prevailed for both overall parties.

Factional contrasts, however, were once more of great significance. In

the case of both the Oficialistas and the Unionistas, the DD leaders

lived in wealthier barrios than their DM counterparts. This was especially

true for the Liberal's, which seems to indicate a greater selectivity in

recruitment the higher the hierarchical level. The contrast between the

two Unionista levels was too slight to warrant such an assumption.

However, the greater socio-economic level of the Oficialistas, in terms

of barrio, than the Unbnistas--the Oficialista DM average was equal to

that of the Unionista DD--seems to be another reflection of more

restricted recruitment on the part of the Oficialistas. All but one

of the Oficialista DD sample lived in barrios classified as upper- or

upper middle-class. In contrast, the Revitalizaci6n and MRL leader-

ships were relatively less upper-class in character, an organizational

makeup in harmony with their association with the masses.

On the Conservative side, the contrast between the Independientes

and Anapo represented the polarized extremes for all eight groups in the

study. Every Independiente in the sample lived in the two highest

categories of barrios, whereas Anapo's average was exactly middle-class.

These results are in accordance with the images that the author has

already begun to draw of these two political groups. One conclusion

emerges from these data on barrio of residence. All of the Liberal and

Conservative factions have been controlled, at least numerically, by

University of Florida Home Page
© 2004 - 2010 University of Florida George A. Smathers Libraries.
All rights reserved.

Acceptable Use, Copyright, and Disclaimer Statement
Last updated October 10, 2010 - - mvs