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    Back Matter
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LASA Forum


Latin American Studies Association


Vol. XIX, No. 4


Winter 1989


A Brazilian Approach to External
Debt Negotiation
by
Luiz Carlos Bresser Pereira*
Getulio Vargas Foundation
Sao Paulo, Brazil


The 1987 attempt to negotiate the Brazilian external debt,
which began with the moratorium on interest payments
announced at the beginning of the year, was guided by a
basic question: Is the full payment of interest compatible
with the national interest?
For the creditors, as well as for the nationals in
each debtor country who tend to identify their interests
with the creditors, this question was impertinent or menac-
ing. They therefore refused to seriously consider it, and
assumed that the debt could be paid if the debtor country
adopted an adequate combination of finance and adjust-
ment.
For the debtor, however, this question was crucial.
If the answer was negative-if the payment of interest and
the economic health of the country were not compatible-
the debtor had no alternative but to change its strategy.
Either the debtor obtained some kind of discount on its
debt, or it became the victim of economic stagnation, fur-
ther deteriorating its capacity to pay.
This paper discusses the question both theoretically
and empirically, examining the case of Brazil. The first
section describes in general terms the dominant strategy
for the debt problem-the finance and adjustment ap-
proach, more recently dubbed the muddling-through
approach-and evidence of its failure. The second section
summarizes the problem in Brazil up to the point at which
the country effectively lost its capacity to pay interest on
the debt and still remain economically viable. The third
section discusses the economics of the incompatibility
between reasonable growth and debt. Finally, the last
section briefly analyzes Brazilian strategy for the negotia-
tion of its debt in 1987, during the period from April 29
to December 20 when I was Finance Minister of Brazil.


*The author, Professor of Economics at the Foundation,
was Finance Minister of Brazil from April 29 to December
20, 1987. The following is an edited version of remarks
Mr. Bresser Pereira delivered in a special session on the
external debt of Third World countries, sponsored by the
LASA Executive Council, at the XIV International Con-
gress in New Orleans, March 18, 1988.


Report from the Program Committee
XV International Congress
San Juan, Puerto Rico
September 21-23, 1988


The Program Committee for the LASA XV International
Congress met November 11-13, 1988, at Florida Interna-
tional University (FIU). All members of the committee
were present: Joan Dassin, Gary Gereffi, Sergio Miceli,
Patricia Pessar, C6sar Rey HernAndez, Marcia Rivera,
Steve Stein, and Mark Rosenberg, chair. FIU's Maria
Baeza, Sandra Murado, and Douglas Kincaid also attended
in an ex-officio capacity.
The committee reviewed all panel, paper, and
session proposals that had been received by November 11.
Any proposals received on or after November 14 will be
acknowledged and kept on file, but there is little chance
that they can be included in the congress.
Of the 250 panel proposals, 222 were approved. Of
the 300 paper proposals, 269 were approved; from these,
48 new panels, involving about 195 papers, were created.
The committee decided that no roundtables will be
held. Rather, all informal sessions will be organized as
workshops, of which about 28 were approved (some panel
proposers will be asked to chair workshops rather than
panels).
Several topics were agreed upon for plenary sessions:
Puerto Rico; U.S.-Latin American Relations; Mass Edu-
cation in Latin America for the 1990s; Science and Tech-
nology in Latin America. The large number of panels
militated against having other special sessions or meetings
that would reduce the space available for panels.
The Program Committee reiterated its hope to
provide up to one airfare and some per diem to cover
housing expenses for one traveler from Latin America on
those panels proposing the inclusion of a participant from
the region. Since many of the panels requested more than
one participant from Latin America, some approved panels
are likely to be canceled. Steven Sanderson, chair of the
Congress Finance Committee, will review all international
travel requests.


SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT

This iu-eLiC tl r conin the ihc report of thL
LASA\ Internat:onal Commission to Obser\c the
Chilcjn Plehiscite.


(Continued on page 3)









CONTENTS


A Brazilian Approach to External
Debt Negotiation ...............
By Luiz Carlos Bresser Pereira

Report from the Program Committee
XV International Congress, San Juan

LASA Authors: Please Note .........


. . . . 1


8


LASA Media Award, 1989 .............


. . 11


Announcements ....................... 12

Forthcoming Conferences ................. 13


Employment Opportunities ............


.... 14


Research Seminar in Nicaragua, 1989 .......... 9


LASNET: Correction ..............


. . . . 9


Research & Study Opportunities ..........

Publications ........................


Contributors to LASA Endowment Fund .......

Prospective Task Force Members ...........

New Task Force Established ...............


10 The Chilean Plebiscite: A First Step
Toward Redemocratization ............
10 Report by the International Commission
of the Latin American Studies Association
11 to Observe the Chilean Plebiscite


LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES ASSOCIATION


President:
Vice President:
Past President:


Executive Council
(For term ending October 1989):



(For term ending April 1991):



(Ex officio):



Executive Director:
Assistant to the Executive Director:
Publications Director:

Forum Editorial Advisory Board:


Paul Drake (University of California, San Diego)
Jean Franco (Columbia University)
Cole Blasier (Library of Congress)


Lorenzo Meyer (Colegio de M6xico)
Richard Newfarmer (World Bank)
Marta Tienda (University of Chicago)
Peter Evans (University of New Mexico)
Adolfo Figueroa (Universidad Cat6lica del Per6)
Cynthia McClintock (George Washington University)
Richard Greenleaf (Tulane University)
Gilbert Merkx (University of New Mexico)
Reid Reading (University of Pittsburgh)

Reid Reading (University of Pittsburgh)
Lynn M. Young (University of Pittsburgh)
June S. Belkin (University of Pittsburgh)

Enrique Mayer (University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign)
Marta Morello Frosch (University of California, Santa Cruz)
Alexander W. Wilde (Washington Office on Latin America)


The LASA Forum is published in the winter, spring, summer and fall. Deadlines for receipt of copy are November 20,
February 20, May 20 and August 20 respectively. All contributions should be directed to Reid Reading, Editor, LASA
Forum, William Pitt Union-9th Floor, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA 15260. Opinions expressed herein are those
of individual authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Latin American Studies Association or its officers.
We welcome responses to any material published in the Forum.
ISSN 0890-7218


. 15








(Brazil, cont.) crisis-the creditor banks are today much stronger than in
The Finance and Adjustment Approach 1982-not only had it failed to solve the crisis in the debtor
countries, but was more damaging for the debtor countries
The finance and adjustment approach is the strategy than was thought initially, and that new ideas were neces-
adopted by the banks and governments of the creditor sary. The failure of the approach can be illustrated in sev-
countries. It claims that interest on the debt can be paid eral ways:
provided that there is "an adequate combination of adjust- 1. The per capital income of debtor countries had
ment with financing." Bank financing is naturally very not grown since 1980, when the debt problem really
limited. In principle it should never go above 50 percent of surfaced and banks began to demand adjustments. During
the interest due each year. The debtor must produce large the next four years, per capital income fell sharply as a
trade surpluses in order to pay the interest. This strategy consequence of the adjustment programs. Since 1984 some
earned the name "muddling-through approach" when it growth has indeed occurred due to good export perform-
became evident that finance and adjustment alone would ance on the part of creditor countries and the partial
not solve the debt problem; despite the evidence, however, abandoning of adjustment programs, but growth rates were
banks and governments did not change their approach. It clearly unsatisfactory. Stagnation and inflation have pre-
became clear that creditors were just postponing the so- vailed in all debtor countries since 1980, though to varying
lution to the problem, degrees. Latin American per capital income fell 7.6 percent
The partial financing of interest is basic in this between 1981 and 1986; Brazil's increased only 4 percent
strategy. Bankers call it "new money" (they are specialists (after artificial growth in 1985-86 the country returned to
in semantics), even though no real new money is involved, inflation and stagnation in 1987 and 1988).
The debtor country receives no new resources; there is no 2. The debtor countries' ability to pay did not
provision for new investment, just financing of no more improve; on the contrary, it deteriorated. The basic
than 50 percent of the interest, objective of adjustment programs was to increase ability
It is logical to limit the financing of interest to 50 to pay through increased exports and reduced imports.
percent. Since the real interest rate is roughly 50 percent Imports were reduced, but the reduction reflected declin-
of the nominal interest rate, the real total debt will remain ing investments as well as lower consumption; thus export
constant. On the other hand, bankers try to limit the fi- capacity did not improve.
nancing of interest. Given the discount in secondary 3. The deteriorating ability to pay became evident in
financial markets of about 50 percent, every time a new the debt ratios, particularly in the debt/export ratio. During
loan is made it immediately loses half of its real value. d the 1970s economists and bankers agreed that the debt/
1985, with evidence of stagnation and increased rates of in- export ratio should not exceed 2:1. In 1982 the ratio was
flation in debtor countries but no improvement in their 2.6:1 for the ten major debtors and in 1987, 3.8:1 (see
capacity to pay, U.S. Secretary of the Treasury James World Financial Markets, June/July 1987), a 46 percent
Baker presented the Baker Plan. This added the expression deterioration; for Brazil the ratio was 3.4:1 in 1982 and
"with growth" to the word "adjustment" and "with structural 4.7:1 in 1987, a 38 percent deterioration.
reforms" to "financing." Thus the formula read: "The 4. An increasing number of countries began resorting
interest on the debt can be paid provided there is an to total or partial moratoriums on interest payments; in
adequate combination of adjustment with growth and 1987 nine Latin American countries were among this
financing with structural reforms." This was the major group. No country took the second unilateral step of
creditor country's official recognition of the failure of the defining a discount and/or saying how it would pay
finance and adjustment approach. interest, but this was the probable next move.
The Baker Plan did not address the basic problem 5. In 1986 a discount appeared in international
of incompatibility between payment of the debt and growth financial markets; it increased during 1987, reaching an
and price stability. It just said that debtor countries need average of roughly 50 percent. It was stated correctly that
structural reforms in addition to austerity programs that this market was small, and incorrectly that it was not signi-
reduce the public deficit and make exchange rates realistic ficant.
(adjustment), and that the financing of interest should be 6. As Sachs and Huizinga (1987) demonstrated, the
large enough to guarantee growth. "Structural reforms" losses in value of stocks of creditor banks are closely
were understood as reforms limiting state intervention, related to their credits against debtor countries, and, as the
eliminating all kinds of subsidies and making the economy authors note, this is not a small market.
more competitive internationally. No suggestions were giv- 7. Following the move of Citibank, American and
en about how to convince banks to increase their supply of British banks began in 1987 to do what European banks
credit. had been doing since 1983: creating reserves against
During the annual IMF meeting in 1987, it became probable losses.
clear to everyone, including the U.S. authorities (see the While the discount in the secondary market and
speech of Mr. Baker and the communique of the Interim banks' stock losses were informal recognition that the
Committee), that while the finance and adjustment ap- finance and adjustment approach had failed and that the
proach had succeeded in avoiding an international banking debt could not be fully paid, the creation of reserves was









a formal acknowledgment. Thus it was clear in mid-1987
that new ideas and strategies were needed to cope with the
debt problem. Before examining some ideas and strategies
for doing so, however, let us look more closely at Brazil.

The Case of Brazil

In the beginning of the 1980s Brazil was considered one of
the wonders of the world. Growth had been very rapid
from the 1930s through the 1970s, and a solid industrial
base had been established. More than 50 percent of
Brazilian exports was industrial, demonstrating that sector's
technological development and ability to compete interna-
tionally. There was a large working class, a strong middle
or techno-bureaucratic class, and a competent entrepreneu-
rial class.
Growth during the 1970s, however, was artificial.
While the central countries engaged in an adjustment
process after the 1973 oil crisis, Brazil decided to complete
its process of import substitution. According to the Second
PND (Project for National Development), the state
responded for the basic industries (steel, oil, electric
power), the private sector for capital goods and for
cellulose production, and a combination of private and
public sectors for nonferrous metals and petrochemicals.
The cost of this strategy was clear: public deficit
through external indebtedness. The justification was
compelling: (a) the new liquidity of the international fi-
nancial market made it possible for commercial banks to
lend large sums of money to developing countries; (b) the
cost of these loans was low (real interest rates below 2
percent), and certainly considerably lower than the average
rate of return on investment in Brazil, which could be
particularly high given the high concentration of income;
(c) Brazil had a project of national development, the
Second PND, that legitimate if it did not urge large
investments; (d) Brazil's exports increased rapidly during
the 1970s, suggesting that the indebtedness and public
deficit strategy was correct-that the country would be able
to pay back its loans.
In 1979 the picture changed dramatically due to
three new factors that developed in the creditor countries,
particularly in the United States: (a) the second oil shock;
(b) a sharp increase in nominal and real interest rates; (c)
recession. The causes were, among others, the exhaustion
of the deficit-oriented Keynesian economic policy and the
adoption of monetary policies in accordance with the
conservative wave that took hold of the central countries.
At that point there was no other alternative for
Brazil but adjustment. The new finance minister, however,
decided to continue growth in an effort to repeat in 1979
the successful economic policy of 1968. This was a terrible
mistake. Economic conditions were entirely different from
1968. Brazil's growth rates in 1979 and 1980 were the
result of irresponsible indebtedness. Brazil started ad-
justment only at the end of 1980, when all indications were
that it was too late. Despite the strong adjustment in 1981
and 1983, and the stagnation of per capital income between


1981 and 1987, Brazil's ability to pay deteriorated, making
the country unable to pay its debt.
The reason is very simple. In the second half of
1980, the Brazilian external debt was already too high to
repay. Given an external debt of about $60 billion and
exports of $20 billion, the compatibility between payment
of interest on the debt and growth and price stability no
longer existed. The debt/export ratio was well above the
normally accepted ratio of 2:1.
This is the basic reason that creditors refused new
loans to Brazil in 1980. The continuous rise of the Brazil-
ian debt at a higher rate than the increase in exports made
new loans to Brazil too risky. At the end of 1980 the
Brazilian government changed its internal economic policy
and started an adjustment process, and until August 1982
creditors again made voluntary loans to Brazil, but only to
partially finance interest payments. Brazil has received no
real new money to finance new investments since 1979.
With Mexico's moratorium in 1982, voluntary lending to
Brazil ceased.
In spite of the suspension of voluntary lending to
Brazil, neither creditors nor the debtor acknowledged that
the debt was too high and that its interest could not be
paid. Creditors proposed, and Brazilian authorities ac-
cepted, the finance and adjustment approach, hoping to
reestablish the country's ability to pay. Actually they
mistook a structural disequilibrium for a conjunctural one.
They confused a stock problem (an external debt that was
too high) with a flow problem (a balance-of-payments
deficit). Consequently Brazil's ability to pay did not
improve; it deteriorated, while the debt/export ratio grew
above 4:1 and per capital income stagnated.

Reasons for Failure

I am suggesting that the finance and adjustment approach
failed in Brazil because the external debt was too high to
be repaid, that the sheer size of the debt made the
payment of interest inconsistent with growth. Experience is
demonstrating that this is true, but the proposition requires
further discussion. The simple affirmation that the debt/ex-
port ratio should not go above 2:1 is not sufficient. A
theoretical discussion of this problem requires some
assumptions. The success of the finance and adjustment
approach will be measured by the growth rate achieved by
the country after the adjustment process and by the
decrease of the debt/export ratio. Simplifying assumptions
are that: (1) international reserves will remain constant; (2)
the "investment balance" between direct investments and
net payment of profits and dividends will be negative; (3)
creditors, including multilateral agencies and official export
banks, will, on the average, limit financing to 50 percent of
the annual total interest owed by a country.
The direct consequences of these objectives and
assumptions are that the country will need a surplus in real
transactions (trade surplus minus real services) equal to 50
percent of the interest to be paid plus a negative invest-
ment balance, and that exports have to increase at a rate





Latin American Studies Association
William Pitt Union, 9th Floor
University of Pittsburgh
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15260
(412) 648-7929



NOTICE TO PAPER PRESENTERS
XV International Congress
San Juan, Puerto Rico



LASA is keenly interested in making sure that all participants who have been accepted
by the program committee as paper givers prepare written materials that are accessible
to congress attendees. To this end, the secretariat, in association with the San Juan
Local Arrangements Committee and local firms, and with the approval of the Program
Committee, has established the following rules and procedures:

1. Each paper giver will prepare a typewritten, single-spaced
manuscript with a 8-1/2 inch by 11 inch format (or as close to
these dimensions as possible, to allow for photocopying);

2. The length of the paper shall not exceed 30 pages, with a 10-
page minimum recommended (no minimum is required);

3. A reproducible copy of the paper will be sent to San Juan
(exact destination to be announced in future mailings), to
arrive there no later than September 1, 1989;

4. In the event that the copy does not arrive by the above date, the paper
giver will be expected to deliver 50 copies of the work to the designated
paper distribution area in the Caribe Hilton Hotel prior to the session in
which the paper is delivered.

5. The secretariat will distribute the papers to congress attendees at a
nominal cost as well as publicize the availability of the papers in
post-congress editions of the Forum and mail them at nominal cost to
members requesting them.

We would appreciate your compliance with these rules and procedures if you are
scheduled to present a paper at the San Juan congress. Please contact the secretariat
about any questions.








equal to 50 percent of the prevailing rate of interest
including spreads. For example, if the debt is 100, the rate
of interest 10 percent, and the negative capital balance 2,
the real transactions surplus must be 7 (or trade surplus
must be 10, given net real services of 3), in order to be
consistent with 50 percent financing of interest; exports
must increase at a rate of 5 percent so that the debt/ex-
port ratio remains constant.
If we relate these numbers to billions of dollars,
they correspond roughly to the Brazilian case. The ques-
tion, then, is first whether a trade surplus of $10 billion
can be obtained and maintained while the country con-
tinues to grow, and second whether exports and imports
can increase at a rate of 5 percent after the required trade
surplus is achieved.
Observe that the volume of trade surplus depends
crucially on the volume of the debt, while the required rate
of export increase is dependent on the rate of interest. If
the debt were a reasonable 50 instead of 100, and if the
interest rate were 5-that is, similar to historic interest
rates before 1979-instead of 10 percent, the required
trade surplus and the minimum rate of export growth
would be much smaller.
To answer the first question, we have to add
assumptions about the initial volume of exports and of
trade surplus. Continuing our simplification process, let us
assume for 1980 (since adjustment began in Brazil in 1981)
20 of exports and zero trade surplus. In that year the debt
was around 60, so the required trade surplus in 1981 was
2 billion smaller (3 to cover 50 percent of interest, 2 for
the negative direct investment balance, and 3 for real
services equal 8). Finally, let us assume that the adjustment
period would be three years, and that reduction of imports
above 2 would have to be made at the expense of invest-
ments, the 2 corresponding to a viable reduction of
consumption.
Given these assumptions, Brazil's exports would have
had to increase 30 percent (9 percent per year) and
imports decrease 10 percent during the three years of ad-
justment (1981-83) to achieve the required initial surplus of
6 billion. Such a reduction of imports was realistic, but not
the increase in exports. The only new factor that would
lead to a permanent increase in exports would be a real
devaluation of the national currency, and it is quite unlikely
that devaluation would lead to such a large increase in
exports. What actually happened in Brazil was a 9 percent
increase in exports between 1980 and 1983, while imports
decreased 33 percent.
The large reduction of imports, which is typical of
all adjustment processes monitored by the IMF and
creditor banks, was made not only at the expense of
consumption but also of investment, as can be seen by the
reduced rate of investment in the country, from 22.4
percent in 1980 to 16 percent in 1983-84. During the same
period, the transfer of real resources to creditors (identified
with the surplus of real transactions) increased from -2.5
percent in 1980 to +5.4 percent in 1984. In the most
recent years, this transfer averaged 3 percent of GDP.


If increased transfer of real resources results from
increased exports, investment is not harmed; but if it really
results from reduced imports, there is a direct correlation
between this transfer and reduced rate of investment. That
is what happened in Brazil and in Latin America generally.
In 1983 the targeted $8 billion of trade surplus was almost
achieved, but at the cost of reduced rates of growth and
investment. Since 1984 trade surpluses for Brazil have
averaged $11 billion, but it is quite clear that this has been
possible only with reduced growth rates for GDP and
investment.
The increase in exports can be explained by the real
devaluation of the cruzado and by the utilization of idle
capacity. Given the decreased rate of investment, however,
the rate of increase in total capacity declined. In addition,
given a modest but effective rate of increase in internal
demand, the country's export capacity also declined. In
1986, with a large increase in internal demand, idle
capacity was exhausted. This became very clear in 1987;
exports increased $4 billion, but only because of the
economy's deceleration.
When Castro and Sousa (1985) emphasized the
importance of the Second PND, they were correct; but
when they concluded that the investments of the 1970s had
produced a structural trade surplus that would allow Bra-
zil to repay its debt, they were clearly influenced by the
growth of exports in 1984 that had been made possible by
a particularly good year for the economies of the central
countries and by Brazil's use of idle capacity. And they
disregarded the reduction in savings and investments and
the increase in the fiscal deficit involved in the transfer of
real resources.
Currently, to pay the interest on its debt in accord-
ance with the finance and adjustment approach, and given
the fact that its trade surplus is around $11 billion (ap-
proximately consistent with the financing of 50 percent of
the interest), Brazil would need to increase its exports at
a rate of just 5 percent per year. This seems quite feasible.
Given the rate of inflation in U.S. dollars, the required
increase in exports would be around 2 percent. This
analysis, however, suggests that the $11 billion trade surplus
is incompatible with a 6 percent growth rate for the
Brazilian economy. The surplus was achieved not through
increased exports but through decreased imports and
reduction in the capacity to invest and export. The problem
is not the necessary rate of export growth, but rather the
present level of trade surplus, which is not consistent with
growth and price stability in Brazil.
Certainly a large increase in Brazilian exports would
solve this problem, but it is nonsense to hope that a
substantial increase in the rates of growth of the central
countries or a sharp decrease in the interest rate will lead
respectively to a large increase in exports and a reduction
of export requirements. Even the more optimistic analysts
of the world economy would not subscribe to such a
perspective for the next few years.
If the basic problem is reduced investment capacity
caused by decreased imports or by the transfer of real









resources to creditor countries, would a compensatory in-
crease in the country's internal saving capacity not be
possible? Theoretically it is possible, and was the strategy
proposed in the Macroeconomic Control Plan of July 1987.
But we should not mix political economy, our science, with
some kind of social engineering or mechanistic economics.
To compensate for excess transfers of real resources caused
by the excessive size of the debt, it would be necessary to
substantially reduce internal consumption, well below the
historic levels of the average Brazilian propensity to
consume. There is no doubt that a strong internal effort
must be made in this direction. The priority of the Macro-
economic Control Plan was the reduction of the public
deficit and thus recuperation of the public sector's saving
capacity; but the limitations of this strategy are quite
obvious. The public sector exhibits disequilibrium not only
in flow but also in stock.
The problem is not only the public deficit but also
the public debt, especially the external public debt. Total
public debt represents more than 50 percent of GDP, and
its respective interest costs 3.5 percent of GDP; the
external public debt alone represents more than 30 percent
of GDP, and its interest 2.3 percent of GDP. Thus there
is a structural or stock dimension of the public deficit that
can be solved only through a reduction of the public debt,
particularly the external public debt. To try to compensate
for insufficient internal savings through reduction of
internal consumption is not realistic.
On the other hand, it is convenient to remember
that a reduction in consumption, if not correctly managed,
may have perverse results. Instead of increasing savings
capacity, it may reduce it. If the reduction in consumption
is abrupt, as it was in 1983, the contraction of internal
demand will lead to a decline in investments and conse-
quently, in savings. To avoid such distortion, it would be
necessary to compensate for reduced internal consumption
with increased exports and export-oriented investment. But
such a change cannot be easily achieved.
In conclusion, the Brazilian external debt was
already too high at the end of 1980, when the finance and
adjustment approach was first implemented. In 1988 it is
still higher, while the country's export capacity has been
relatively reduced as the rate of transfer of real resources
to creditors has sharply increased and the rate of invest-
ment has decreased accordingly. If at the beginning of the
decade we already faced a basic incompatibility between
growth and payment of interest on the external debt, this
inconsistency is all the more evident at the present time.

Brazil's 1987 Strategy

I must admit that I was not completely aware of this
inconsistency when, as Finance Minister of Brazil, I
presented the Macroeconomic Control Plan. In May I
asked my staff to prepare a plan with two basic objectives:
a 6 percent growth of GDP after an adjustment process
during 1987, and a trade surplus consistent with a 50 per-
cent financing of interest by external creditors. My implicit


assumption was that these two objectives were consistent:
that it was possible for Brazil to grow at a rate of around
6 percent and negotiate its debt in conventional terms,
according to the finance and adjustment approach.
In July 1987, however, practically at the moment that
the plan was completed and published, I realized that it
was unrealistic. During the elaboration of the plan, two
things became clear: first, that 50 percent financing of
interest was insufficient and that we must change to 60
percent, consistent with trade surpluses in the following
years of a little more than $10 billion; second, and more
important, that a very great reduction of internal consump-
tion would be needed to increase the public sector's saving
capacity to 5 percent in four years, and that only a heroic
economic policy fully supported by society would achieve
such a result.
On the other hand I was learning a great deal more
about the debt problem, discussing it almost daily with
bankers, economists, and politicians. The discount in the
financial secondary markets was a clear indication that
bankers had also realized that the finance and adjustment
approach was unrealistic, that it was actually a mud-
dling-through approach, a strategy for the banks and for
economic authorities in the creditor countries to postpone
solving the problem. Its only positive effect was to give the
banks time to strengthen their financial positions, to im-
prove their capital ratios, and thus to minimize the negative
impact that sooner or later would occur when the partial
default of the debtor countries became a reality that must
be included in their profit-and-loss statements.
I also learned that there was another alternative for
the debtor countries besides the unilateral decision to
partially reduce the debt. Consideration was being given
to debt relief systems based on conversion of the debt to
discounted bonds with a guarantee by the creditor coun-
tries. There was some support in the United States for
debt relief along these lines, although this did not change
the generally conservative position of the U.S. government.
I further learned that after Citibank's decision to
create large reserves to cover defaults on its foreign loans,
American and English banks were finally following the
example of European banks and assuming a more realistic
approach to the debt problem. Both banks and debtor
countries began to realize that the threat of retaliation by
the banks would ultimately lose force. As a Japanese bank-
er told me in August 1987, five years after the 1982 crisis,
it was obvious that: (1) the finance and adjustment ap-
proach had failed; (2) a discount on the debt was unavoid-
able; (3) banks and taxpayers in the creditor countries
would have to share the burden of the discount; and (4)
the creditor countries, with the exception of the United
States government, were coming to a consensus on these
three points.
It then became clear to me that the moment had
come for Brazil to denounce the finance and adjustment
approach and to propose an alternative solution--ne in
which the burden would be shared by debtors and credi-
tors. In February Brazil -had declared a moratorium on








payment of interest due to commercial banks on long- and
medium-term loans. The best way to suspend the moratori-
um was to replace it with an innovative agreement with
creditors.
It was also clear to me that this agreement should
ultimately involve the creation of a debt authority con-
trolled by the IMF and World Bank that would buy the
credits extended by commercial banks to the highly
indebted countries at a discount, exchanging them for its
own bonds; this discount would then be transferred to the
debtor countries on a case-by-case basis. I made this
proposal in Wien, at the U.S. Congressional Summit: An
Agenda for the 90s (1987).
I could not wait then for the maturation of this
global solution that is now widely discussed in the creditor
countries; it was obvious, however, that Brazil needed to
take some initiative in that direction.
My first proposal to the banks then was a partial
and negotiated conversion of the present debt into new
bonds, either with the same face value but fixed rates of
interest below market rates, or with a discounted value and
interest at market rates. This conversion would have to be
partial because the new bonds would have to be secured;
the ideal situation would be for the governments of the
creditor countries to guarantee the new bonds, but they
were not ready to accept this alternative. The debt-bond
conversion would be negotiated in the sense that Brazil
would propose and discuss with its advisory committee
what portion of the debt-say 20 percent-would be
converted initially.
The reaction to this idea by the banks, and especial-
ly by the U.S. government, was very negative. This was the
first time that a finance minister of a debtor country had
spoken clearly about the need for a discount on the debt
and had offered an alternative to obtain this discount based
on the behavior of the market. The creditors felt threat-
ened, the American government challenged. Initiatives on
the debt problem had heretofore always been taken by the
creditors.
Since I was committed to seeking a negotiated
solution for the moratorium, I decided to change my
proposal, making the conversion completely voluntary. In
Brazil's formal proposal of September 25, 1987, however,
the conventional aspect, based on "new money" or the
finance and adjustment approach, was clearly distinguished
from the proposal for a long-term solution based on the
conversion approach, that is, on reduction of the debt.
Two mechanisms should be used to reduce the debt:
debt-equity conversion, much favored by the banks, and
debt-bond conversion. To count on debt-equity conversion
alone is unrealistic given the monetary limitations of this
mechanism.
In its formal proposal Brazil underlined the failure
of the finance and adjustment approach, and stated clearly
that the negotiation should be an improvement over the
former Mexican and Argentine model of negotiation, which
did not represent a solution to the debt problem. To
demonstrate its willingness to end the moratorium through


a process of negotiation, the Brazilian government yielded
to the U.S. government and signed an interim agreement
in November that extended negotiations until the end of
January.
Clearly the banks had little desire to negotiate an
agreement that even slightly contradicted the finance and
adjustment approach. Brazil, on the other hand, had dem-
onstrated its willingness to negotiate in good faith.
Therefore before leaving the Ministry of Finance in
December 1987, I had already decided with the President
of Brazil that if an agreement was not reached by 29
January 1988, Brazil would dismiss its advisory committee
and begin negotiations on the conversion approach with
each bank individually. In other words, Brazil would go a
step beyond the moratorium. The moratorium meant only
the suspension of interest payments; the next step would be
to say how much and in what manner Brazil would pay.
It was quite clear to me that this decision carried
risks. The creditors would say that Brazil was taking a
unilateral position and would eventually try to retaliate. I
was convinced, however, and I am still convinced, that this
is the only alternative that will make payment of the debt
compatible with growth. I was also convinced that to seek
a solution to the Brazilian economic crisis by demanding
sacrifices only on the part of creditors was neither reason-
able nor sufficient. One way to solve the structural disequi-
librium of the public sector is to obtain reduction of the
external debt, but another necessary way is to proceed with
the adjustment process, to seriously fight the public deficit
by demanding effective sacrifices from workers and from
business enterprises. When I realized conclusively that such
action was not possible in Brazil at this time, that the gov-
ernment was not ready to adopt this line of action, I
resigned. It would be meaningless to adopt strong measures
with respect to the external debt and do nothing, or very
little, with respect to internal problems.
Brazil will pay its debt, but according to what is
realistically possible. It will pay the debt, but with a
discount, since it is clear that paying interest on the Brazil-
ian debt in full is to condemn the country to its present
condition of stagnation and inflation.


References

Bresser Pereira, Luiz. 1987. "The Debt Problem:
Postpone It or Solve It?" Statement before the U.S. Con-
gressional Summit on the Economic Agenda for the 90s.
Wien, September 4. Published in Revista de Economia Po-
litica 8, no. 4 (October 1988).
Castro, Antonio Barros de and F.E. Pires de Souza.
1985. A Economia Brasileira em Marcha Forgada. Rio de
Janeiro: Paz e Terra.
Morgan Guaranty. 1987. "LDC Debt Realities."
World Financial Markets (June-July).
Sachs, Jeffrey and Harry Huizinga. 1987. "U.S.
Commercial Banks and the Developing Country Debt Cri-
sis." Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. No. 2.









LASA AUTHORS: PLEASE NOTE


Many LASA members have already notified Harve Horowitz, our advertising/exhibits representative, of their
latest publications for promotion at the XV International Congress in San Juan. If you have not, be sure to
do so. This is a valuable opportunity to bring titles of interest to the attention of your colleagues. Furthermore
your publishers can benefit from the marketing potential of congress exhibits and program advertising. Use
one of the forms below to alert your publisher to this opportunity or to notify our representative directly.



Dear Publisher:

Please contact Harve C. Horowitz, LASA Advertising/Exhibits Representative, 11620 Vixens Path,
Ellicott City, MD 21043 (301-997-0763) concerning promotion of my titles) listed below at the XV
International Congress of the Latin American Studies Association, September 21-23, 1989, Caribe Hilton, San
Juan, Puerto Rico.


Title Year

Title Year

Title Year

Author/LASA Member


TO: Exhibit Promotions Plus, Division of Horowitz and Associates
Attention: Harve C. Horowitz
11620 Vixens Path
Ellicott City, MD 21043
Telephone, 301-977-0763; Fax, 301-997-0764; in D.C. dial 596-3028.

FROM: Name

Address



Phone/Fax


Please contact the following publishers) concerning recent titles I have authored that would be of interest
to my colleagues and appropriate for display at the LASA XV International Congress in San Juan, Puerto
Rico, September 21-23, 1989:

Publisher

Title

Publisher

Title

Check here if interested in arranging own display if publisher declines participation.









RESEARCH SEMINAR IN NICARAGUA
June 18 July 1, 1989


Once again, the evaluations of last summer's Research
Seminar in Nicaragua, June 11-June 25, 1988, were filled
with praise for both the seminar and its organizers, Tom
Walker and Harvey Williams. The respondents called it
"excellent," well balanced as to program and speakers, "very
well organized," and made up of an excellent group of par-
ticipants. Walker and Williams were uniformly praised,
eliciting such comments as "very well informed," "accom-
modating" "good sense of humor." Note was made of their
"extreme patience" and willingness to deal with problems and
work with individual needs. Cooperation from CONAPRO
and TURNICA also received positive evaluation. All the
participants reported the seminar to have been very useful.

Based on such warm praise from the participants themselves,
the seminar was a resounding success. Tom Walker and
Harvey Williams are to be commended for their hard work,
excellent results, and their great service to the Task Force on
Nicaragua and Central America.
--John A. Booth, Chair



The LASA Task Force on Scholarly Relations with Nicara-
gua and Central America will conduct a fifth two-week
field seminar in Nicaragua for LASA members this
summer from June 18 through July 1, 1989.

As was the case with the previous four seminars, this one
is designed to introduce established Latinamericanists and
graduate students to some of the variety of institutions,
people, resources, protocols, and methods for studying
Nicaragua, teaching about the country, and doing research
there. A second objective of the seminar is to give LASA
scholars a close-up view of the multifaceted reality of
revolutionary Nicaragua.

Participants will be exposed to various social science "think
tanks," academic institutions, and research facilities. Latin
Americanists with a general interest in Nicaragua that is
not necessarily tied to specific research objectives are
welcome to participate. The group will have discussion and
interview sessions with important political and social actors
from across the political spectrum, including representatives
of the churches, mass media, business community, grass-
roots organizations, diplomatic community, the government,
military, etc.

Though much of the time will be spent in Managua, trips
outside of the city to a variety of rural communities are
also envisioned. The activities of the group as a whole will
be tailored to the major interests of the participants. In
addition, throughout the seminar an effort will be made
to accommodate individual interests through special


interviews, etc. To understand how this type of seminar
works in practice, prospective participants are advised to
read the reports on the last three seminars, published in
the Winter and Fall 1987 and Summer 1988 issues of the
LASA Forum.

Unless there are unforeseen price changes, the entire
seminar, including living expenses, in-country transportation,
and round-trip group airfare between Mexico City and
Managua, will cost around $1200 per person. (Bona fide
graduate students will receive a $200 discount.) The group
will be limited to 15-18 participants plus the co-coor-
dinators. Participants must be LASA members who speak
Spanish. All philosophical and political points of view are
welcomed.

Each applicant is requested to submit a current resume
and a 250-500 word letter of application explaining what
she or he expects to gain professionally from the seminar.
The participants will be selected primarily on the basis of
the potential relevance of the seminar to their professional
plans as outlined in the letter of application. An effort will
be made to balance the group in terms of gender, dis-
cipline, region of origin, etc. The deadline for the first
round of selection is May 1, 1989. Qualified later applicants
will be included if space permits.

For more information, write or call the seminar co-
coordinators:

Thomas W. Walker
Department of Political Science
Ohio University
Athens, OH 45701
614-593-4376 (or 4372)

Harvey Williams
Sociology Department
University of the Pacific
Stockton, CA 95211
209-946-2931


EXECUTIVE COUNCIL CHANGE

Because of schedule conflicts with upcoming
meetings of the LASA Executive Council, Peter
Bell has found it necessary to resign from the EC.
First alternate Richard Newfarmer, of the World
Bank, will fill the remainder of Bell's term, ending
October 1989.









CONTRIBUTORS TO LASA
ENDOWMENT FUND


We want to thank the following members who contributed
to the LASA Endowment Fund in 1988, since the publi-
cation of the previous list [Forum, Summer 1988]:


Diego Cardona
Thomas Cohen
Claudette Columbus Kemper
William Cooper
Theo R. Crevenna
Santiago Daydi-Tolson
Gwendolyn Diaz
Ana Maria Diaz-Stevens
Saul Diskin
David Felix
Leonor Figueroa
Marilena Franca
Barbara Freitag-Rouanet
Linda Fuller
Mary Gormly
Janet Groff Greever
Jimmy Harris
Kevin Healy
J. Noe Herrera
Edward Jamison
Thomas Kappner
Georgia Kilpatrick
Maria Dolores Luque


Francesca Miller
Shelley Miller
Frank Mora
Thomas Morin
Richard Norgaard
Arturo Ortiz
Nancy Patchett
Mary Louise Pratt
DA. Preston
Alvaro Ramos
Jorge Rovira-Mas
Bohdan Saciuk
Hector Samperio Guti6rrez
Rolando San Miguel Garza
Anthony Stevens-Arroyo
Silvio Torres-Saillant
Elena Urrutia
Rosemary Valle
Jeannette Varner
William Waters
Lawrence West
Ann Wightman


PROSPECTIVE TASK FORCE MEMBERS



LASA members who are interested in serving on a task
force from September 1989 until March 1991 should
contact president-elect Jean Franco, Department of
Spanish, Columbia University, New York, N.Y. 10027.
Current task forces are the following:

Task Force on Human Rights and Academic
Freedom

Task Force on Scholarly Relations with
Nicaragua/Central America

Task Force on Scholarly Relations with Cuba

Task Force on Scholarly Relations with the
Soviet Union

Task Force on Scholarly Relations with Spain

Task Force on Women in Latin American
Studies

Task Force on the Mass Media

Task Force on Natural Resources and the
Environment of Latin America


LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES ASSOCIATION
ENDOWMENT FUND



The LASA Endowment Fund was created with an initial grant from the Ford Foundation. Its purpose is to assure the financial
stability of the Latin American Studies Association. Earnings generated by this fund will be used to support travel by Latin
Americans to LASA International Congresses, to fund the activities of the LASA Task Forces, and to support LASA publica-
tions and other special projects that cannot be covered by regular income.

We invite you to join the generous members who have already contributed and to share in this important investment in the future
of Latin American studies. Please indicate below the amount you wish to contribute.

$25 $50 $75 $100 $150 $__ Other

Name
Address
City State Zip

Please send form, accompanied by check payable to Latin American Studies Association, to: LASA Secretariat, 9th Floor
William Pitt Union, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA 15260.









NEW TASK FORCE ESTABLISHED


LASA has approved a proposal initiated by Tulane Univer-
sity's Center for Latin American Studies to create a new
Task Force on Natural Resources and the Environment of
Latin America. The objectives of the new task force are to:

1. promote increased participation of the
natural science community in the activities of
LASA;
2. stimulate interest of the LASA membership
in current environmental issues in Latin
America;
3. advise the LASA Executive Council on
policy issues pertaining to environmental and
natural resource concerns.

It is anticipated that the task force would eventually serve
as an information clearinghouse for LASA members
seeking collaborative research partnerships with scientific
institutions and conservation organizations based in Latin
America. Initially the major function of the task force will
be self-definition: to clarify its potential role in LASA and
to outline future directions of activities. The task force
accordingly seeks broad input from LASA members inter-
ested in environmental and natural resource issues.

The Task Force on Natural Resources and the Environ-
ment of Latin America is comprised of the following
LASA members:

John O. Browder (chair), Virginia Polytechnic Insti-
tute and State University
Janis Alcorn, Agency for International Development
Gerardo Budowski, Universidad para la Paz,
Costa Rica
Robert Buschbacher, The Conservation Foundation
William Denevan, University of Wisconsin
Christine Padoch, New York Botanical Garden
Marianne Schmink, University of Florida

The new task force will schedule an open meeting at the
XV International Congress in San Juan for all LASA
members interested in participating in and planning future
task force activities.

Members who would like to serve on the task force for
the 1989-91 term, or who wish further information, are
invited to contact:

John O. Browder
Urban Affairs and Planning
Virginia Polytechnic Insti-
tute and State University
Blacksburg, VA 24061-0113


The Latin American Studies Association is pleased to
announce its competition for the 1989 LASA award for
outstanding media coverage of Latin America. This award
is made every eighteen months to recognize long-term
journalistic contributions to analysis and public debate
about Latin America in the United States, as well as for
breakthrough investigative journalism. Nominations are
invited from LASA members and from journalists. Jour-
nalists from both the print and electronic media are
eligible. To make a nomination, please send one copy of
the journalist's portfolio of recent relevant work, by July
14, 1989, to:

Richard A. Nuccio
Chair of the LASA Task Force on the Mass Media
Roosevelt Center for American Policy Studies
316 Pennsylvania Avenue, S.E., Suite 500
Washington, D.C. 20003
(202) 547-7227

If the work is in the electronic media and a copy is not
readily available, contact Dr. Nuccio to discuss further
procedures.

A three-member screening committee from the Task Force
on the Mass Media carefully reviews each nominee's work
and selects the top five candidates. The entire task force
then votes to determine the winner, who is honored at the
next LASA International Congress. LASA invites the
awardee to speak at a session and to submit materials for
possible publication in the Forum. The association also
assumes the costs of the awardee's travel to the meeting
site.

Recent recipients of the Mass Media award have included
Charles Krause of the McNeil-Lehrer Newshour and Bill
Buzenberg of National Public Radio.

LASA's forthcoming congress is in San Juan, Puerto Rico,
September 21-23, 1989. The next congress is scheduled for
Crystal City, Virginia, March 28-30, 1991. The deadline for
that competition will be comparable (mid-January 1991).


1989 DUES RENEWALS

Renewals for 1989 LASA membership are due as of
January 1. If you have not yet renewed, you can do
so using the enclosed form (marked "Second Notice").
If Nou have already renewed, please accept our thanks
and disregard the form.


LASA AIEDUA AWARD









ANNOUNCEMENTS


The Conference of Latin Americanist Geographers, which
will publish its sixth Yearbook in 1989, is calling for papers
for that volume. The Yearbook is a peer-reviewed publica-
tion that seeks to publish original manuscripts dealing with
Latin America and Latin Americans from the disciplines of
geography and related social and physical sciences. Con-
tributions from scholars in a broad range of disciplines are
encouraged. Manuscripts in English, Spanish, and Por-
tuguese are welcome. The deadline for submission of
manuscripts for the 1989 volume is 31 March 1989. For
further information on the preparation and submission of
manuscripts, please write to Robert B. Kent and Vern R.
Harnapp, Editors, CLAG Yearbook 1989, Department of
Geography, University of Akron, Akron, Ohio 44325-5005.

The Hispanic Division, Library of Congress, will request
from Congress funds to establish and operate a regional
office to acquire and process materials from Mexico, Cent-
ral America, and certain other countries in the Caribbean
basin. The office could purchase publications for university
and research libraries as well as for the Library of Con-
gress. Participating libraries would pay the purchase price
of the publications plus an administrative charge, perhaps
30 percent. Monographs and new serial titles would be
distributed with preliminary catalog cards. Members of the
scholarly community can help by writing to the Library of
Congress in support of this office and indicating whether
their institution would be interested in joining a cooperative
program as well as the nature of the latter's impact on
their area studies programs. Letters may be addressed to
Robert C. Sullivan, Director for Acquisitions and Overseas
Operations, or to Cole Blasier, Chief, Hispanic Division,
The Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. 20540.

Juscelino Kubitschek, a former president of Brazil, is the
subject of several current publications and dissertations.
Edward A. Redinger, a former secretary for English cor-
respondence to President Kubitschek (1972-1976), wants to
form a Kubitschek research group. The purpose is to
establish a communications network to inform Latin Ameri-
canists about research and resources and to be a forum for
presentation and discussion of research on the Kubitschek
period. Those interested in such a group should contact
Edward A. Redinger, The Berkeley City Club, 2315 Durant
Avenue, No. 408, Berkeley, CA 94704; (415) 549-3152 or
(415) 848-7800 (messages).

The Tinker Foundation has announced the recipients of its
visiting professorships at U.S. universities for 1988-1989.
Those interested in contacting the Tinker Professors should
write to them directly at the institution of their appoint-
ment.
Columbia University, Departments of Political Science
and History: Lorenzo Meyer Cosfo, Professor, Center of
International Studies, El Colegio de Mexico, fall 1988; De-


apartment of Political Science: Carlos Huneeus Madge,
Associate Professor, Institute of Political Science, Catholic
University of Chile, spring 1989.
Stanford University, Center for Latin American
Studies: Juan Martinez-Alier, Professor of Economics,
Autonomous University of Barcelona, winter and spring
1989; Department of Anthropology: Verena Stolcke,
Professor, Department of History of Precapitalist Societies
and Social Anthropology, Autonomous University of
Barcelona, winter and spring 1989; Department of Econom-
ics: Edmar L. Bacha, Professor of Economics, Catholic
University of Rio de Janeiro, spring 1989 (tentative).
University of Chicago, Department of History:
Gabriel Tortella, Professor of Economic History, Uni-
versidad de Alcala de Henares, Madrid, fall quarter 1988
and Enrique Tandeter, Professor of colonial American
History, Universidad de Buenos Aires, winter quarter 1989;
Department of Anthropology: Juan Ossio Acufia, Professor
of Anthropology, Pontificia Universidad Cat61ica del Perti,
winter quarter 1989 and Mario Rivera, Professor of
Anthropology, University of Tarapaca, Chile, winter and
spring quarters 1989; Department of Sociology: Salustiano
del Campo Urbano, Professor of Sociology, Universidad de
Madrid, spring quarter 1989 and Jos6 Luis Reyna, Director
of the Mexico office of Facultad Latinoamericano de Cien-
cias Sociales (FLACSO), spring quarter 1989.
University of Texas at Austin, Department of Sociol-
ogy and Institute of Latin American Studies: Fernando
Calder6n, Executive Secretary of the Latin American
Council of Social Sciences (CLACSO), Bolivia, spring 1989.
University of Wisconsin at Madison, Department of
Political Science: Eduardo Ferrero Costa, Professor in the
Law School and director of the master's program in
international economic law, Pontificia Universidad Cat61ica
del Peru, spring 1989; Department of Agronomy: Aino
VA. Jacques, Dean of the School of Agriculture, Univer-
sidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil, spring 1989;
Department of Spanish and Portuguese: TomAs Segovia,
Professor, Centro de Estudios Lingiifsticos y Literarios, El
Colegio de M6xico, spring 1989.



FOR YOUR INFORMATION

All purchasers of LASA mailing labels are sent the
following notice:

"The sale of LASA's mailing labels does not in any
way represent an endorsement by the Latin Ameri-
can Studies Association of the products, services or
political stands of the purchasers of the labels, nor
is the name of the Latin American Studies As-
sociation to be mentioned in conjunction with
mailings utilizing these labels."









FORTHCOMING CONFERENCES


The University of Florida Center for Latin American
Studies will hold its 38th Annual Conference on Alterna-
tive Development Strategies in the Caribbean on March 31,
1989. The conference is being cosponsored by PACCA
(Policy Alternatives for the Caribbean and Central Amer-
ica) as part of an ongoing project of its task force on the
Caribbean.
A core group consisting of task force chair Carmen
Diana Deere (University of Massachusetts) and members
Lynn Bolles (Bowdoin College), Peggy Antrobus (Women
and National Development, Barbados), Marcia Rivera
(Centro de Estudios de la Realidad Puertorriquefia), Edwin
Mel6ndez (MIT), Peter Phillips (University of the West
Indies), and Helen Safa (University of Florida) has re-
ceived funding from the MacArthur and Ford Foundations
to develop a document on alternative development strate-
gies for the Caribbean, the focus of the conference and the
basis for commentary by invited Caribbean and U.S.
scholars.
Commentators will include Patricia Anderson
(Institute for Social and Economic Research, University of
the West Indies), Richard Newfarmer (World Bank),
Compton Bourne (University of the West Indies), Robert
Pastor (Carter Center, Emory University), Sally Shelton
Colby (former ambassador to the Eastern Caribbean), Alex
Stepick (Florida International University), Bernardo Vega
(Dominican Republic), and Emilio Pantojas (University of
Illinois at Chicago). For further information contact Helen
Safa, 319 Grinter Hall, University of Florida, Gainesville,
FL 32611; (904) 392-0375.

NCCLA. The North Central Council of Latin Americanists
will hold its annual conference October 12-14, 1989, at the
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee. The theme will be
"Continuing Encounters: Latin America Since the Con-
quest." Papers are invited from any academic field; interdis-
ciplinary topics are encouraged. Proposals for complete
panels are especially welcome. Anyone interested in
presenting a paper should send an outline or abstract by
May 1, 1989 to the program chair. Completed papers
should be submitted by September 12, 1989 to David
Schodt, 1989 NCCLA Program Chair, Department of
Economics, St. Olaf College, Northfield, MN 55057; (507)
663-3156. For information on local arrangements contact
Julie Kline, Outreach Coordinator, Center for Latin
America, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, P.O. Box 413,
Milwaukee, WI 53201; (414) 229-5986.

The International Development Ethics Association (IDEA)
will hold its Second International Conference July 2-8 1989
at Universidad Aut6noma de Yucatan, M6rida. The con-
ference theme is "Economic Crisis, Ethics, and Devel-
opment Alternatives." IDEA is a cross-cultural group
composed of philosophers and development theorists, policy
makers, and practitioners who apply ethical reflection to


development goals and strategies, and to the relations be-
tween rich and poor countries.The deadlines for submission
of abstracts and papers are February 28 and April 30, 1989,
respectively. Inquiries, abstracts, and papers (three copies)
should be sent to David Crocker, IDEA, Department of
Philosophy, Colorado State University, Ft. Collins, CO
80523.

The Caribbean Studies Association will hold its 14th
annual conference May 23-26, 1989, at the Dover Conven-
tion Center, St. Lawrence, Barbados. The theme is "Carib-
bean Visions: A Tribute to Sir W. Arthur Lewis." For
further information contact Joycelin Massiah, Program
Chair, Institute for Social and Economic Research, Cave
Hill Campus, University of the West Indies, Barbados.

The Association of Caribbean Studies will hold its 11th
annual conference in San Jos6, Costa Rica, July 29-31,
1989. The theme is "New Affiliations: The Caribbean and
Latin America." Papers are solicited from both members
and nonmembers from all traditional areas of the humani-
ties and social sciences plus agriculture, business, com-
munications and mass media, science and technology,
theater, and tourism. Papers on interdisciplinary topics are
most welcome. Speaking time is limited to 15 minutes;
almost all papers are delivered in English. Abstracts of
200-300 words, double-spaced, must be submitted before
April 1, 1989. Notification of acceptance will be made by 31
May. As in past years, a booklet of abstracts will be
issued, and authors may submit full papers to be con-
sidered for publication in the association's Journal of
Caribbean Studies. Persons not offering papers are cordially
invited to attend as cultural events are included. For
additional information contact Yvonne Alleyne, Conference
Coordinator, Association of Caribbean Studies, P.O. Box
22202, Lexington, KY 40522-2202.

The 1989 Chaire Quetelet Seminar will be held in Louvain-
la-Neuve, Belgium, between 16 and 20 October 1989. It is
organized by the Institute of Demography, Catholic Univer-
sity of Louvain, in collaboration with the Soci6t6 de
D6mographie Historique. The topic is "Demographic As-
pects of Main Political Revolutions." The opening session
will be dedicated to the commemoration of the bicentennial
of the French Revolution. The working sessions will deal
with: direct demographic effects of revolutions; importance
and role of demographic factors in the making of revolu-
tions; demographic concerns in revolutionary (or coun-
terrevolutionary) ideologies. The organizers welcome papers
dealing with "the main political revolutions" that have
brought a radical change in the structures of societies and
in the way of life, as well as comparative studies. The lan-
guages of the seminar are French and English. For
information contact Chaire Quetelet 1989, Institut de
Demographie UCL, 1 Place Montesquieu, B-1348 Louvain-
la-Neuve, Belgium; Tel. 010-47.29.51 Telex 59037 UCLB;
Telefax 010-47.29.97.









Thirty Years of the Cuban Revolution. The Canadian
Association of Latin American and Caribbean Studies will
hold an international conference on "Thirty Years of the
Cuban Revolution: An Assessment" in Halifax, Nova Scotia,
October 25-28, 1989. Topics to be discussed will fall into
four groups of panels and workshops: social change
(women's issues, housing, education, health care, religion,
youth, culture), economic development (the process of
rectificaci6n, diversification, central planning, agricultural
strategy), political (democracy, human rights, institutionali-
zation, mass organizations, social classes, role of Fidel
Castro), and international relations (with the U.S., U.S.S.R.,
Latin America, developing world). For further information
contact: Cuba Conference Coordinator, International
Development Studies, St. Mary's University, Halifax, Nova
Scotia, Canada B3H 3C3. Papers, abstracts of proposed
papers, or other communications may be sent by mail,
phone (902-423-0376) or BITNET (OMALLEY@DALAC).

Translating Latin America. An interdisciplinary conference
on "Culture as Text..." is scheduled for April 19-21, 1990,
at the State University of New York at Binghamton,
Department of Comparative Literature, Latin American
and Caribbean Area Studies, Center for Research in
Translation. This conference on the interpretation of Latin
American culture will include not only the Hispanic U.S.
and Central and South America, but also the Anglophone,
Dutch, Francophone, and Portuguese cultures of the region.
Papers will be invited on such topics as gender, identity,
transculturaci6n, ethnicity, politics, and literary theory as
they are expressed in literature. Prospective participants are
invited to contact conference coordinators: William Luis,
LACAS; Julio Rodriguez-Luis, Comparative Literature;
Marilyn Gaddis Rose, Center for Research in Translation,
all at SUNY-Binghamton, Binghamton, N.Y. 13901.



FORUM ADVERTISING

The LASA Forum accepts a limited number of
display ads (camera-ready copy) for each issue.
Listed below are the rates for 1989:

Full page $225
Half page 125
Quarter page 75

The deadlines for receipt of copy are as follows:
Winter (late January), December 1; Spring (late
April), March 1; Summer (late July), June 1; Fall
(late October), September 1.

Call the LASA Secretariat (412-648-7909) for size
specifications and distribution dates.


EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES


University of Florida. The Department of Political Science
invites applications for a tenure-track position in compara-
tive politics with a Latin American area specialization.
Thematic and country interests are open. The appointment
will be made at the assistant professor level and includes
affiliate faculty status at the Center for Latin American
Studies, a national resource center with 110 affiliated
faculty members. Selected candidate will be expected to
teach in the undergraduate and graduate comparative
politics curriculum, supervise graduate students in political
science and Latin American studies, and pursue an active
research agenda. Competence in Portuguese and/or
Spanish is expected. Salary is competitive. The University
of Florida is an equal opportunity, affirmative action
employer; women and minority candidates are especially
encouraged to apply. Send letter of application with
curriculum vitae and three letters of reference to Steven
E.Sanderson, Chair, Latin American Politics Search
Committee, Department of Political Science, 3324 Tur-
lington Hall, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL 32611.
The deadline for receipt of applications is March 1, 1989.

Bard College. Applications are invited for a tenure-track
position at the assistant professor level in comparative
politics with a preferred specialization in Latin America.
Additional interest in either Africa or Western Europe is
desirable. Research interests might include, but are not
limited to, public policy-making under constraints of the
global political economy and state theory. Consideration
may be given to candidates with competence in any two of
the above geographical areas. Bard College is an affirma-
tive action/equal opportunity employer. Minority candidates
are strongly encouraged to apply. Send curriculum vitae
and letters of recommendation to Stuart Levine, Dean,
Bard College, Annandale on Hudson, N.Y. 12504. The
deadline for receipt of applications is March 1, 1989.

California State Polytechnic University, Pomona. The
Department of Social Sciences anticipates the availability of
a tenure-track position at the rank of assistant professor
(salary range $27,588-$34,740 per academic year). Selected
candidate will teach nine four-unit courses per year on a
quarter system. Areas of competence include physical
geography, image and map interpretation, cartography,
remote sensing, computer cartography, geographic informa-
tion systems using ARC-INFO, image processing, field
geography, and two or more of the following regional
specializations: Africa, Asia, California, Latin America, or
Soviet Union; areas of specialization should be applied
physical geography, cartography/remote sensing, geographic
information systems. The Ph.D. in Geography is required
by date of application. Candidates are expected to demon-
strate substantial preparation in teaching of all the areas of
competence and familiarity with computer geographics on
mainframe computers, minicomputers, microcomputers









and peripherals. Two or more years of full-time college
teaching is required. Request application form from Crane
S. Miller, Chair, Geography Search Committee, Social
Sciences Department, California State Polytechnic Univer-
sity, 3801 W. Temple Avenue, Pomona, CA 91768; phone
714-869-3569.
The Department of Social Sciences also has a tenure-
track opening for an Assistant Professor of Philosophy
(salary range $27,588-$30,252 per academic year).Success-
ful candidate will teach nine four-unit courses per year on
a quarter system. Areas of specialization are comparative
philosophical or religious traditions. Competence in one or
more the following areas is required: applied ethics,
philosophy of religion, modern religions, tribal religions,
religion and the arts (including literature), religion and the
social sciences, women and religion. The Ph.D. in Philoso-
phy or Religious Studies must be completed by June 30,
1989; ABD status is required by date of application. Prior
teaching experience at the college level is preferred.
Request application form from David G. Lord, Chair,
Social Sciences Department, California State Polytechnic
University, 3801 West Temple Avenue, Pomona, CA 91768;
714-869-3569.
Applicants for either position should submit a com-
pleted application form, curriculum vitae, official transcript
showing highest degree earned, and three recent letters of
reference postmarked no later than March 15, 1989.
California State Polytechnic University, Pomona, is an
affirmative action/equal opportunity employer and hires
only individuals lawfully authorized to work in the United
States.

The Library of Congress. The Office of the Chief, Hispanic
Division, is seeking a secretary/office manager to perform
wide variety of administrative duties. Applicants must have
two and one-half years of general experience (or a bache-
lor's degree) and one year of specialized experience, six
months of which must have been at the GS-6 level in the
Federal service or at a comparable level of difficulty. The
ability to read easily, converse fluently, and write well in
Spanish or Portuguese is required. Prospective applicants
should telephone (202) 707-5400 to verify that the position
is still open.


LASNET: CORRECTION

There was an omission in the LASNET Electronic
Addresses listed in the Fall 1988 LASA Forum
The correct addresses are:

INTERNET: ILASUlT@CEMX.CS.UTEXAS.EDU

BITNET: ILCJ775@aUTA3081

We apologize for any inconvenience.


RESEARCH & STUDY OPPORTUNITIES


Visiting Scholars Program. The University of Illinois/Uni-
versity of Chicago Joint Center for Latin American Studies
announces its annual Visiting Scholars Program for faculty
from U.S. colleges and universities without major research
facilities. The program enables visiting scholars to do
research and write on a Latin American topic for a month
during the summer at either Chicago or Urbana, or both.
Awards of up to $1,400 cover travel and basic living
expenses for the month of residence. Visiting scholars will
be associate faculty of the joint center and will enjoy full
access to libraries, faculty, and other resources at both
universities. Applicants should submit a letter of applica-
tion, curriculum vitae, a separate letter of reference, and
project proposal of no more than 500 words; the proposal
should include an indication of how a period of residence
at either or both institutions would relate to the project.
The deadline for receipt of applications for summer 1989
is March 15, 1989. Send applications and inquiries to: Vis-
iting Scholars Program, The Center for Latin American
Studies, University of Chicago, 5848 S. University Avenue,
Chicago, IL 60637; phone 312-702-8420.

Fellowship Programs in Grassroots Development. The
Inter-American Foundation offers fellowship programs
providing initial support for projects; counterpart funding -"
is required to complete field research or graduate studies.
The Master's Program awards 15 fellowships annually to
candidates in master's or equivalent level programs to I
support three to six months of field research in Latin
America and the Caribbean. Other eligible graduate 4:
students include, for example, those studying law or
medicine, as well as those conducting predissertation
doctoral field research. Applicants from Latin America, the
Caribbean or the United States must be enrolled in U.S.
universities, must write and speak the local language, and
must establish a formal affiliation with an appropriate local
institution. The application deadline is March 1, 1989.

NEH Summer Seminars. Six-to-eight-week seminars offered
by the National Endowment for the Humanities provide
college teachers and independent scholars with an oppor-
tunity for advanced study or research in their own fields
or in areas related to their interests. Each participant will
undertake an individual research project or a program of
intensive reading under the guidance of the director. A
tentative plan of research or study for the seminar is a
required part of the application. Stipends of $2,750 for six
weeks or $3,500 for eight weeks are intended to help cover
travel expenses to and from the seminar location, books
and other research expenses, and living expenses for the
period. The program serves those whose primary duties
involve teaching undergraduates as well as scholars with an
academic affiliation. Applications from members of Ph.D.-
granting departments are normally not accepted. Applicants
must have completed their professional training by March








1, 1989. Although an applicant need not have an advanced
degree in order to qualify, neither candidates for degrees
nor persons seeking support for work leading toward a
degree are eligible. An individual may apply to no more
than two seminars in any one year. College teachers who
participated in NEH Summer Seminars in 1987 or 1988 are
not eligible. Seminars that may interest LASA members
include: Critical Approaches to Twentieth-Century Spanish
Poetry, Andrew P. Debicki, University of Kansas, June 12-
July 21; The Oral Tradition in Literature, John Miles Foley,
University of Missouri, June 19-August 11; Humor in Cross-
Cultural Perspective, Stanley Brandes, University of Califor-
nia-Berkeley, June 26-August 4; AnthropologicalApproaches
to Law, Lawrence Rosen, Princeton University, June 12-
August 4; Jazz: A Comparative View, John F. Szwed, New
Haven, CT, June 12-July 21; Political Cultures, Aaron
Wildavsky, University of California-Berkeley, June 12-
August 4. The application deadline is March 1, 1989;
announcement of awards will take place on March 23,
1989. For further information write: NEH College Teachers
Seminars, Room 406, 1100 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.,
Washington, D.C. 20506.

Becas de Postgrado en Ciencias Sociales. La Fundaci6n
Ford anuncia un concurso de becas en apoyo de studios
de maestria y doctorado en las ciencias sociales para
ayudar en la formaci6n professional de postulantes que se
hayan distinguido en esas disciplines y que, terminados sus
programs en el exterior, deseen participar en tareas
vinculadas directamente al desarrollo de sus pauses de
origen. Los campos incluidos en el concurso son los de

economic y sociologia. Se darA tambi6n especial atenci6n
a solicitudes en temas pertinentes al program regional de
la Fundaci6n Ford: pobreza urbana y rural, derechos
humans, studios sobre la mujer y administraci6n piblica.
El financiamiento se extenderA para programs de alta
calidad acad6mica en Canada, Estados Unidos, Europa,
Jap6n y M6jico, y se dirige a ciudadanos que sean a la vez
residents de los paises de la regi6n andina y el cono sur.
Las becas cubriran un maximo de dos afios de estipendio
de sostenimiento. Las solicitudes serin aceptadas para
programs de postgrado que se inicien en 1989. Las
solicitudes completes deberAn Ilegar a la Fundaci6n Ford,
Lima, Peri, como iltimo plazo, el 15 de marzo de 1989.
La decision de selecci6n se anunciard aproximadamente el
15 de mayo de 1989. Requisitos para las solicitudes:
Curriculum vitae actualizado; descripci6n del curso de
studios que se propone, incluyendo grado a obtenerse;
descripci6n de sus planes profesionales despu6s de obtener
el grado propuesto; carta de una instituci6n national que
le asegure una posici6n al retorno del postulante a su pais,
y constituya, ademis, la nominaci6n institutional para
obtener la beca; tres cartas de evaluaci6n acad6mica y/o
professional; notas o calificaciones del mAs reciente progra-
ma de studios e informaci6n explicando el sistema de
calificaci6n utilizado; carta de aceptaci6n incondicional al
program de postgrado; constancia de ayuda econ6mica


complementaria para otros costs; presupuesto detallado,
sustentado por informaci6n sobre costs del program
proporcionada por la universidad respective; resultados del
examen TOEFL, si los studios fueran en ingl6s, o prueba
de nivel semejante si se tratara de otro idioma. Las
solicitudes e informaci6n deben enviarse a: Programa de
Becas, Fundaci6n Ford, Apartado 6025, Lima 100, Peri.

Center for the Study of Philanthropy. The center's Re-
search Awards Program fosters research into all aspects of
voluntary sector activities in Latin America, Europe, Asia,
Africa, and Australia. It awards grants of up to $1,500 to
scholars engaged in research on such issues as individual,
corporate and foundation giving, voluntarism, and social
reform by nongovernmental organizations outside the
United States. Dissertation-level graduate students and
postdoctoral scholars form any discipline are eligible. The
size of awards depends on the scope of the project and the
candidate's travel and research needs. Applicants should
submit a one-to-two page synopsis of their project, includ-
ing a description of the thesis, methodology, sources,
existing literature on the topic, the nature of the project
(book article, etc.), an itemized budget for which funds are
requested, and the anticipated completion date. If the work
is being done under contract to a publisher or as a
consultancy, this should also be noted. Include a one-page
CV highlighting relevant publications and work experience
and a cover sheet listing the candidate's name, address,
telephone number, and social security number. Two letters
of reference should be sent under separate cover. Proposals
must be postmarked no later than MarcL.3L,-989, and
should be sent to: Center for the Study of Philanthropy,
Graduate School and University Center, City University of
New York, 33 West 42nd Street, Room 1512, New York,
N.Y. 10036-8099.

The United States Institute of Peace. The institute invites
proposals in 1989 that use the case-study approach to
examine specific historical incidents of regional conflict
management and resolution in the developing world. The
institute is particularly interested in specific cases from
Latin America, as well as Africa, Asia and the Middle
East, that may provide insights for the constructive reduc-
tion and resolution of contemporary or future international
conflicts, as well as pitfalls to be avoided. Examples of
Latin American cases that might be examined are
Nicaragua, the Contadora Group, and the Arias Plan;
Argentina/Chile and the Beagle Channel Dispute; The
Falklands/Malvinas War; The "Soccer War" between Hon-
duras and El Salvador. The closing date for receipt of
solicited grant applications in the current review cycle is
April 1, 1989. Announcement of awards will be made on or
about September 1, 1989. For further information or
application material, write or call: Solicited Grant Projects,
United States Institute of Peace, 1550 M Street, N.W.,
Suite 700, Washington, D.C. 20005-1708; 202-457-1700; fax
number 202-429-6063.









Summer School in the Caribbean. Michigan State Univer-
sity has organized a Caribbean Summer Study Program to
be held July 10 August 9, 1989. It will be conducted at
three different centers in the Caribbean: the Cave Hill
Campus of the University of the West Indies in Barbados,
the St. Augustine campus of the University of the West
Indies in Trinidad and Tobago, and the University of
Guyana at Turkeyen, Georgetown. Students will visit and
observe the workings of governmental institutions and
major industrial plants, both foreign owned and local. They
will also meet political activists and some of the mar-
ginalized groups in the society. The program is designed
for general undergraduate students interested in sociology,
political science, and international relations. Students from
other universities are welcome to enroll through Michigan
State University's Office of Overseas Study for credit that
can be transferred to their own institutions. The approxi-
mate cost is $1,892 including tuition for seven credit hours
(out-of-state students pay $83 per credit), overseas ad-
ministrative fees, class activities fees for field trips, room
and two meals daily at the University of the West Indies;
it does not include round-trip transportation, independent
travel, or spending money. The enrollment deadline is April
21, 1989. A deposit of $75 is required. Acceptance will be
based on academic standing and approval of the MSU
program instructors. For additional information contact the
Office of Overseas Study, 108 International Center, Michi-
gan State University, East Lansing, MI 48824-1035, 517-
353-8920; or Ruthven N. Prime, James Madison College,
316 South Case Hall, Michigan State University, East
Lansing, MI 48824, 517-353-3538.

FLACSO anuncia cuatro programs docentes que se inician
en 1989 en la sede Ecuador: I. Maestria Internacional en
Economfa con Especializaci6n en Desarrollo y Politica
Econ6mica; II. Maestria Internacional en Ciencias Politicas
con Menci6n en Politicas Comparadas de los Paises
Andinos; III. Maestria Internacional en Historia Andina;
IV. Diploma Superior en Ciencias Sociales con Menci6n en
Estudios Amaz6nicos. Con excepci6n del iltimo, se trata
de convocatorias internacionales que considerarAn las
solicitudes de postulantes de todos los paises. La sede
recibirA solicitudes hasta el 28 de febrero de 1989. Los
interesados que requieran informaci6n adicional, o for-
mularios de solicitud, deberAn dirigirse a Carmen Gaybor,
Area de Coordinaci6n Docente, FLACSO, Avenida
Amazonas 1615, or Casilla 6362 CCI, Quito, Ecuador;
tel6fonos: 236-144, 520-653. Note: Given tight deadline,
contact LASA for applications if desired.


PUBLICATIONS


The National Coalition for Haitian Refugees is beginning
publication of a monthly bulletin called Haiti Insight. It will
cover human rights and current affairs in Haiti, and related
refugee and immigration concerns in the United States.
The bulletin will provide brief, authoritative reports of
important Haitian developments in such areas as the
government, the army, opposition activities, the economy,
relations with the Dominican Republic, and labor and
peasant organizations. Subscriptions are available free of
charge by writing to: National Coalition for Haitian
Refugees, 275 Seventh Avenue, 11th Floor, New York,
N.Y. 10001.


LASA PUBLICATIONS FOR SALE

Several LASA publications are available from the
secretarial:

Final Report of the LASA Commission on Com-
pliance with the Central America Peace Accords.
March 1988. 44p. $3.00.

Peace and Autonomy on the Atlantic Coast of
Nicaragua. Martin Diskin, Thomas Bossert,
Salom6n Nahmad S. and Stefano Varese. Report
of the LASA Task Force on Human Rights and
Academic Freedom. 1986. 36 p. $3.00.

Report of the LASA Delegation to Obsen'e the
Nicaraguan General Election of November 4, 1984.
36 p. $3.00

Available back issues of the LASA Fonmm may be
purchased for $5.00 each. All prices include third-
class domestic mailing and international surface
mail. Please add 50 cents for domestic first class
or $3.50 for airmail outside the United States.









THE CHILEAN PLEBISCITE: A FIRST STEP
TOWARD REDEMOCRATIZATION

Report by the


International Commission of the


Latin American
to Observe the


Commission Members*


Adolfo Aguilar Zinser (Carnegie Endowment, Wash., D.C.)
Alan Angell (Oxford University, England)
Marcelo Cavarozzi (CEDES, Argentina)
Paul Drake (University of California, USA), Co-chair
Federico Gil (University of North Carolina, USA)
Larissa Lomnitz (UNAM, Mexico)
Brian Loveman (San Diego State University, USA)
Amparo Men6ndez-Carri6n (FLACSO, Ecuador)
Frederick Nunn (Portland State University, USA)
Luis Pisara (CEDYS, Peru)
Paul Sigmund (Princeton University, USA)
Barbara Stallings (University of Wisconsin, USA)
Arturo Valenzuela (Georgetown University, USA), Co-chair
Peter Winn (Tufts University, USA)

The Commission was invited by the Asociaci6n Chilena de
Ciencia Politica. It received funding from the Ford Founda-
tion and acknowledges gratefully the support of Jeffrey
Puryear in the Lima office. The report was written by Paul
Drake and Arturo Valenzuela incorporating suggestions
from each of the commission members.
*******

The Chilean plebiscite of October 5, 1988, presented
analysts with three intriguing questions to answer: (1) Why
did a dictatorship hold an honest referendum? (2) How did
the opposition win a contest controlled by the government?
(3) Why did the regime and its supporters accept defeat?
The significance of that outcome for the current negotia-
tions over Chile's political future also requires extensive
analysis. This report will address these questions through
an examination of: the background and context of the
plebiscite; the key actors behind the "Yes" and the "No";
the campaigns; the vote itself; the subsequent interpreta-
tions, bargaining positions, and issues; and the implications
for transition to democracy.1

*Two other commission members, Liliana de Riz (CEDES,
Argentina) and Karen Remmer (University of New Mexico,
USA), had to withdraw for personal reasons. Although not
a formal member of the commission, Reid Reading, LASA
Executive Director, traveled to Chile and made valuable
contributions to the commission's work.


Studies Association
Chilean Plebiscite


Background to the Plebiscite


Military rule in Chile began on September 11, 1973, when
the Chilean armed forces overthrew the Popular Unity
(UP) government of socialist President Salvador Allende
Gossens. The military commanders vowed to stamp out
Marxism and depoliticize society. Thereafter, the military
junta gradually developed a model of prolonged and
personalized authoritarian rule, a free-market economy
emphasizing export promotion, and the privatization of
government social welfare programs. That system was
sustained through sharp repression during the 1973-77
period and through an economic boom fueled by financial
speculation in the second half of the 1970s.
In response to international criticisms of human rights
abuses, General Pinochet, who assumed the title of
President of the Republic in December 1974, held his first
plebiscite in 1978. It called for a "yes" or "no" vote on the
following proposition: "In the face of the international
aggression unleashed against the government of the
fatherland, I support President Pinochet in his defense of
the dignity of Chile, and I reaffirm the legitimate right of
the republic to conduct the process of institutionalization
in a manner befitting its sovereignty." The government
claimed a 75 per cent victory in that referendum, but it
was conducted with no guarantees of freedom, secrecy, or
fairness.
Thereafter, the regime sought to institutionalize its
transformation of Chile through an authoritarian constitu-
tion. It was ratified in a 1980 plebiscite held at the height
of the economic boom, again with no safeguards for
opposition participation or honest voting. According to the
government, 67 per cent of the voters approved the new
charter. Reliable reports indicate that President Pinochet
wanted an uninterrupted sixteen more years in office, but
he was convinced to include a provision for a plebiscite
midway through that period. Transitional articles in the
constitution gave President Pinochet sweeping powers for
eight years and established the Junta as a legislative body
until a congress was elected in 1990. Its permanent articles
created a "protected democracy" by providing for a tutelary
role for the armed forces through their control of a
national security council with the power to "admonish"
other organs of the state on national security grounds.2
In 1982 an international recession coupled with
domestic mismanagement ushered in the worst depression








in Chile since the Great Crash of 1929. In response,
Chilean labor leaders spearheaded an outpouring of
discontent which shook the regime and galvanized the
previously downtrodden and dispirited opposition party
leaders into action. Through much of 1983 and 1984
protests and strikes periodically paralyzed the country. By
1985, groups on the political right had joined the center-
left parties in signing a "National Accord," demanding
fundamental changes in the government's political itinerary
and the establishment of a fuller democracy than the one
envisioned in the 1980 charter. Soon thereafter, however,
the protests ran their course and the accord fell apart in
the face of government intransigence and serious disagree-
ments among the signatories. The government rebuffed
opposition demands for a more rapid redemocratization
timetable, insisting that its legitimacy and authority rested
on absolute adherence to the 1980 Constitution, which
provided for a phased and orderly transition. The military
leadership believed that its constitution, the exclusion of the
Marxists from political participation, and the free enterprise
economic system would be their fundamental legacy. By
1986, the economy was well into a recovery, retaining many
essential features of the market-driven "Chicago-Boys"
model. As opposition hopes faded that democracy might be
restored through social mobilization, the fragmented parties
began to focus on the promised plebiscite.
Many members of the opposition had been reluctant
to participate in the plebiscite because they feared that
doing so would legitimize the authoritarian regime-and
that they would probably lose in any case. They gradually
accepted participation in an inherently undemocratic and
unequal contest because no other viable alternative existed.
Neither social protests nor international pressure could
convince the regime to hold competitive elections or to
step down prior to the plebiscite. The insurrectionary path
endorsed by part of the Communist Party offered no hope
of victory, particularly after the failed assassination attempt
against Pinochet in September of 1986.
Moreover, the experience of other transitions had
shown that it was possible to use the government's own
rules to challenge a dictatorship. Democratic forces
elsewhere-Brazil, Uruguay, the Philippines-had taken
advantage of small institutional spaces to combat authori-
tarian regimes. The opposition believed that, although
dictators never call elections they expect to lose, they can
be defeated when their foes are united.
By 1988, the context had changed dramatically from
the 1980 referendum. Although the economy was doing
relatively well in both periods, its inequities had by now
been exposed. Whereas the social and political opposition
groups had been cowed and silenced in 1980, they were
now regrouped and assertive. Highly restricted liberalization
had given them some small openings to express their views,
for example through a number of radio stations and two
newspapers. Moreover, the international setting had been
totally transformed. Nearly all the other Latin American
dictatorships had been replaced by democracies, and the
United States had taken a stronger stand in favor of


democratization. Nevertheless, Pinochet still seemed
determined to perpetuate his rule, still controlled the major
means of coercion and communication, still presided over
prosperity, and still evoked support or fear from a large
segment of the population.

Preparing the Plebiscite

According to the constitution, the commanders-in-chief of
the army, navy, air force, and carabineros (national police)
had to name a date and a single candidate for the plebis-
cite prior to December 11, 1988. Within thirty to sixty days
of that announcement, a yes-or-no referendum would be
held on that nominee to serve as president for eight years
from March 11, 1989 to March 11, 1997. In the event of a
victory for the No, the current government would rule until
March 11, 1990. At that time, a president and two houses
of congress-to be chosen in competitive elections on
December 14, 1989-would take office. Despite reservations
on the part of the air force and carabinero commanders
and doubts among important leaders of the Right, Pinochet
was selected on August 30, 1988 to be the candidate in the
October 5 plebiscite.
Although rejecting the opposition's call for truly free
and competitive elections, the junta was committed to
assuring that the plebiscite would be seen as a valid
expression of public opinion. Throughout 1988, the junta
had insisted on allowing sufficient time for voter registra-
tion (there had been none in 1978 or 1980). When the
registries opened in February of 1988, the authorities
registered their partisans first, including members of the
armed forces. Both the government and the opposition felt
that a large registration would help their respective causes,
but the opposition feared that the cumbersome registration
process was designed to make it difficult for its supporters
to register in time. Also, the opposition was convinced that
most Chileans, particularly of the middle and working
classes, were tired of military rule and wanted a change.
The government, however, was convinced that the "silent
majority" wanted order and progress and would not follow
the politicians.
The junta further opened up the process the last thirty
days of the campaign by lifting the repressive state of
exception on August 24. It allowed virtually all exiles to
return home after September 1. For the first time in fif-
teen years, the opposition had fifteen minutes every day on
national television and with some restrictions was permitted
to hold public meetings and rallies. Although these
liberalizing measures did not eliminate the government's
huge advantages in the campaign, they did give the
opposition a fighting chance.
The most important safeguard was that the rules for
the voting itself were designed to insure fairness. The
regulations for the plebiscite grew out of an amalgam of
new laws decreed by the junta and previous electoral
practices in Chile. This blend produced a contradictory sys-
tem in which the process leading up to the plebiscite was
very authoritarian -with many restrictions on dissent and









opposition activity-but the procedures for voting, as the
report will detail further below, were very democratic, with
many protections against fraud.
Why did a regime long noted for its widespread
violations of human rights and democratic norms structure
a fair voting process? Several reasons stand out. First, the
regime wanted to use the voting to legitimize the system
established in the 1980 Constitution, regardless of the
outcome. They could scarcely argue for the legitimacy of
their constitution while violating it. Polls showed that the
overwhelming majority of citizens thought both sides should
recognize the honest results: 87 per cent if the Yes won
and 96 per cent if the No won. Chileans were aware of the
destabilizing impact of rigged elections under authoritarian
regimes in the Philippines and elsewhere.
Second, the armed forces felt honor-bound to abide
by its own constitution. Although its behavior since 1973
often appeared arbitrary to outsiders, the military always
saw itself as obeying strict rules and codes. In its own
subculture, it was just as legalistic as its civilian adversaries.
According to the constitution, "the armed forces and
carabineros, as armed bodies, are essentially obedient and
not deliberative." The military's own internal regulations-as
the opposition often reminded it-prohibited soldiers from
"participating in politics or in demonstrations or meetings
of this type."
Third, some minimal guarantees of fairness were
necessary to convince the No forces to participate. During
the year prior to the plebiscite, the junta met many
opposition demands for electoral safeguards, even though
there were never any formal face-to-face negotiations. For
example, the government made concessions by postponing
the date of the plebiscite to allow full registration, by
lifting the state of emergency, by allowing exiles to return,
and by granting access to television.
Fourth, the whole world was watching, as thousands
of foreign journalists and observers, including prominent
personalities such as Adolfo Suarez, Yves Montand and a
large delegation of legislators from numerous countries,
poured into Chile. The government and its partisans
generally viewed those observers as prejudiced and biased
against them and warned that they might get hurt.
Nevertheless, the regime was anxious to overcome Chile's
political and diplomatic isolation. Foreigners were allowed
to enter and observe freely. The international press, which
had often been shunned by government officials, was
welcomed by a press service eager to please. The
opposition for its part embraced the visitors as vital
guarantors that the plebiscite would be held fairly or
exposed as a charade.
Fifth, the Yes forces were sure of winning and did not
want any irregularities to tarnish their expected victory.
Why was the Pinochet camp so sure of victory? It
controlled the timing and rules; moreover, it believed that
it had won decisively previous plebiscites in 1978 and 1980.
The government counted on the opposition being divided,
fratricidal, and ineffectual. Polls indicated generally low
public esteem for opposition parties and politicians. Voting


"No" seemed like a leap into a void. By contrast, Pinochet
offered security and continuity. The Yes leaders relied on
fear of a return to the conflicts and crises of the Allende
years. They hoped that the homecoming of some of the
more militant leaders of the Popular Unity would arouse
traumatic memories. Indeed, the return of Communist
Volodia Teitelboim damaged the opposition when he called
for street demonstrations to protest a Yes victory or
immediate formation of a provisional government to
consummate a No victory. Although the long time Com-
munist leader soon disavowed his earlier statements, they
did cause considerable concern in opposition circles.
The pinochetistas could use the resources of the
government itself-such as public works-to bolster their
campaign. Both the armed forces and public employees
were pressured to register and vote "yes," as were poor
people dependent upon government subsidies. They also
possessed a mammoth financial and media advantage over
the opposition. The Yes campaign controlled most of the
newspapers and radio stations, as well as all the TV
channels except for the No's token fifteen minutes daily
during the last month before the plebiscite.
In addition the Yes enjoyed solid support from nearly
all the economic elites, who not only contributed to the
campaign but also urged their employees and workers to
vote correctly and in some cases threatened to fire them
if they did not. They were also confident that two other
traditionally conservative groups-women and country
dwellers-would provide the margin of victory.
Finally, the relatively buoyant macro-economic in-
dicators augured well for people voting their pocketbooks.
The country was in the third year of growth rates over 5
percent. Inflation was down to 12 percent, while invest-
ment, employment, and real wages were rising. Copper
prices were high, and total exports promised to exceed
those of Argentina in 1988. Chile enjoyed a trade surplus
and accolades from foreign bankers for its successful
servicing of the external debt. The government assumed
that the Yes would run particularly well in those provinces
that had experienced significant export development.
Above all, the overconfidence of the Yes reflected a
classic flaw in authoritarian regimes. The leader often gets
only part of the picture, as advisers and underlings tell him
only what he wants to hear. Pessimistic forecasts from even
pro-government pollsters were ignored or rejected by the
Pinochet camp. In the final analysis, that self-deception left
the regime surprisingly unprepared to counterattack the
predictable triumph of the No. And, while some govern-
ment supporters, particularly in the intelligence services,
may have realized that the No stood a good chance of
winning, by the time that realization set in it was too late
to reverse the process that had been put in place.

Key Actors
The Yes

The Yes campaign was dominated by Augusto Pino-
chet. Although some leaders of the armed forces (outside









the army) and the civilian Right preferred a younger,
non-military, less confrontational candidate, Pinochet
prevailed. Even polls that showed him doing poorly
indicated that he would be the regime's strongest nominee
in a two-way contest, because of name recognition if
nothing else. No other political figure in the country
enjoyed his level of support-even though that support
rarely went over 20 percent. Shrewder political engineers
might have opted for a more moderate Center-Right alli-
ance to effect a smooth transition isolating the Left. That
possibility was obviated by the ambitions of Pinochet, who
could not be denied so long as the army stood behind him.
The armed forces were not monolithic, but they
seemed united in their desire to avoid open rifts or feuds.
The opposition still lacked good access to or information
about thinking within the services. Most military leaders ap-
parently agreed on the need to hold an orderly and correct
plebiscite, to resist pressures from the United States, to
preserve their political and economic models, to proscribe
the Communists, and to rule out any discussion of human
rights violations. They also wanted to protect their profes-
sionalism and discipline from further politicization. Despi-
te fifteen years of adamant support for an ideological
government, the armed forces still saw themselves as
nondeliberating, apolitical soldiers. Available information
suggests that most army commanders strongly favored
Pinochet's election, partly because they had been appointed
by him. Some Chileans, however, conjectured that a few
officers may not have been totally dismayed to see their
longstanding commander-in-chief lose.
The other strongest pillar of support for Pinochet was
the property-owning class. Despite disagreement with some
of his economic policies, most entrepreneurs staunchly
backed the Yes, as evidenced by the statements and
activities of the Industrial Promotion Society (Sociedad de
Fomento Fabril-SOFOFA), the Confederation of Produc-
tion and Commerce (Confederaci6n de la Producci6n y del
Comercio), and the National Agricultural Society (Sociedad
Nacional de Agricultura-SNA.) Rural as well as urban
capitalists were committed to the Yes and pressured their
workers to vote accordingly. Unlike some other cases of
transitions toward democracy, the bourgeoisie did not
disengage from the authoritarian regime. They argued that
a firm hand at the helm was best to defend the economic
model, and they pointed with horror to the economic and
social crises in neighboring democracies. Moreover, they
did not trust the opposition, either the Christian Democrats
or the Marxists. As one leader of the Yes explained,
"Pinochet can learn democracy better than the opposition
can learn economics."
Although not openly active in the Yes campaign,
business groups issued dire warnings of the consequences
of a No victory. On the eve of the plebiscite, SOFOFA
projected falling rates of investment, growth, and employ-
ment in the event of an opposition triumph. Some entre-
preneurs' commitment to the free-enterprise model,
however, did not mean that they were absolutely dedicated
to Pinochet and military rule; a number of business execu-


tives realized that most members of the opposition were
not ready to risk embarking on a drastically different
economic course.
The rejuvenated rightist parties mainly backed Pino-
chet, although not without serious reservations. Many
endorsed a Yes for the system more than a Yes for
Pinochet personally. No formal alliance of parties for the
Yes emerged. The largest single organization was National
Renovation, led by Sergio Onofre Jarpa. It was composed
of independents and remnants of the old National Party.
Whereas National Renovation was dedicated principally to
the general conservative agenda of private enterprise and
anti-communism, National Advance, an ultra-right group,
was committed to Pinochet as a caudillo. Other factions of
the former National and Radical Parties also backed the
Yes, as did new entities such as the Independent Democra-
tic Union (UDI) of Jaime Guzmin, one of the authors of
the 1980 Constitution.

The No

In contrast to the Yes campaign, the No camp was
dominated by political parties. During 1986-87, they pressed
in vain for free, competitive elections. Previous unity efforts
including the Democratic Alliance, the National Accord
and the Assembly of Civilian Organizations had not been
successful in bringing about the downfall of the regime.
After a painstaking agreement in February of 1988, 16
parties finally came together to form the Command for the
No. They subsequently hammered out minimal understand-
ings on common social and economic policies (in May) and
on future democratic institutions (in August). As the largest
member party, the Christian Democrats (DC) became the
leaders of the coalition and their president Patricio Aylwin,
functioned as its spokesperson. The other key component
was the Ricardo Nufiez faction of the Socialist Party,
represented in the Command by Ricardo Lagos and the
Partido por la Democracia (PPD). Smaller progressive
parties such as the Social Democrats and Humanists joined
in. The No also included a few prominent former officials
of the regime, such as Pinochet's former ambassador to
the United States and former press secretary. A small
faction of the National Party, arguing that Chile's rightists
should return to a democratic tradition they were proud of,
also supported the No.
An important breakthrough occurred when the socialist
faction led by jailed Allende foreign minister Clodomiro
Almeyda decided to back the No and join the Command.
Breaking with the Communist party which had resisted
registration and considered participation in the plebiscite as
a ruse that would favor the regime, the Socialists gave the
No Command important backing from the Marxist left.
Other groups of the United Left (Izquierda Unida, IU)
that joined the No included the Christian Left, whose
leader Luis Maira played an important role in the leader-
ship of the opposition effort. One of the United Left's
slogans encapsulated its position: "Con Allende en la
Memoria, Con el No hasta la Victoria, Venceremos." In








other words, they retained a socialist project for the long
run, but they accepted the plebiscite as the highest priority
for the short run. Moreover, they stressed that their vision
of socialism did not denote a return to the UP program of
1973. While accepting the importance of simply voting No,
the parties identified with the IU still emphasized the need
for social mobilization to truly democratize the state, the
economy, and the society.
The most important No force outside the Command
was the Communist Party (PC). In 1980 it had reversed its
historically gradualist position by endorsing armed struggle
as one means to topple the dictatorship and set up, with
Cuban help, a military wing. By 1988 the PC was grappling
with an agonizing dilemma: it needed to maintain a radical
posture in order to mollify its more militant constituents,
but it needed to moderate in order to begin to reintegrate
itself into normal political life. Although severely divided
over tactics and strategies, its dominant leaders gradually
came to accept the need to follow the guidelines of the No
Command and the desirability of returning to its traditional
pro-electoral political line. After arguing for months for
abstention to delegitimize the plebiscite and for mass
mobilization to destabilize the regime, in June 1988 the PC
issued a declaration calling for a No vote, and most
Communists agreed to get out the vote and to refrain from
street disruptions.
Even farther removed from the No Command was the
small Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), which
also tendered its reluctant support. Most distanced was the
tiny, insurrectionary Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front, tied
to the Communist Party, which had tried to assassinate
Pinochet in 1986. By the time of the plebiscite, a portion
of the Front had broken away from PC control, but
nonetheless vowed restraint during the balloting.
As the plebiscite approached and the resuscitated
political parties took full command, the role of other
organizations faded. The most important of these for the
opposition had been labor unions. In the wake of severe
repression, restrictive labor legislation, and high unemploy-
ment, trade unions remained very weak, representing only
about 10 per cent of the workforce. They were also
divided. The largest confederation, the United Workers'
Central (Central Unitaria de Trabajadores-CUT), had only
been patched together in August 1988 and was scarcely
ready to mount a major effort. Moreover its top leader,
Manuel Bustos, had been sent into internal exile. The CUT
was dominated by the Socialists, Communists, and Christian
Democrats. More conservative, anti-communist DC unions
belonged to the Democratic Workers' Central (Central
DemocrAtica de Trabajadores-CDT). There were also a few
independent and even pro-government unions.
Although most unionists campaigned for the No, they
left the initiative to their parties. Some union activists
received death threats, and many workers felt pressure
from their employers to vote Yes; one boss even tried to
write a Yes commitment into a collective bargaining
agreement. At the plant level, the unions helped educate
workers on how to vote and convinced them that their


bosses would not know how they cast their ballots. In the
outlying provinces where parties were weaker, unions
provided crucial organizers for the No. At all levels, most
union leaders gave the No campaign high priority. They
believed that this step toward democracy was essential to
subsequent changes in the oppressive labor-industrial
relations laws and, eventually, their standard of living.
Other opposition nuclei among intellectuals, students,
human rights organizations, and pobladores also worked for
the No, but they played a secondary role to the political
parties. Like labor, these interest groups were not only
supporting the No but also focusing attention on their own
grievances. For example, the Grouping of Families of the
Detained and Disappeared (Agrupaci6n de Familiares de
Detenidos-Desaparecidos) kept alive the hope of justice
for past human rights violations.
The No expected to draw support primarily from men,
younger voters, voters in large cities, and better educated
voters. Polls showed that the No was receiving support
from both middle and low income voters, but the largest
percentage of support was coming from low income voters.
Pobladores proved to be a highly contested sector. The Yes
used its control of the municipalities to woo voters with
employment programs, housing improvements, and even
parties for children. The No enjoyed greater success with
its class-based appeals to the impoverished, but everyone
agreed that the Yes would have some success in the
poblaciones.
From 1973 to 1985 the Roman Catholic Church had
been essential to the survival and coherence of the opposi-
tion, but the clergy muted its participation as the show-
down approached. The Church did not align publicly with
either the No or the Yes, although the Episcopal Com-
mittee did call for a "consensus" candidate before Pino-
chet's nomination, indicating that it did not consider
Pinochet the most appropriate person to lead the nation
in the new term. The bishops still criticized the govern-
ment's economic model for lack of concern with the poor.
The Church also provided vital protection for the indepen-
dent think tanks of the opposition intellectuals, whose
polling guided the No campaign in the period leading up
to the contest. But the Church's most significant contribu-
tion was to press for conditions that would assure a
tolerably fair and representative plebiscite, once the govern-
ment rejected calls for competitive elections.
The Catholic Church spearheaded two national
registration drives in 1988. A small program called "Beth-
lehem" concentrated on civic education. A larger effort, the
Civic Crusade (Cruzada Civica) spread throughout the
entire country to convince people that as citizens they
should register and vote without fear. The Crusade received
funds from the United States and the Organization of
American States to help insure a free election. It con-
centrated heavily on young people who had never voted
before. One innovative technique was holding rock concerts
in small towns with the price of admission an electoral
registration card. Beyond adding voters to the rolls, the
Crusade raised consciousness about what it meant to









participate in a democracy. The work of voluntary groups
like the Cruzada contributed significantly to reinforcing the
opposition's campaign by providing people with basic
information and dispelling lingering fear.
The No forces themselves received international
support, though mainly in the form of solidarity rather than
finances. Indeed, monetary assistance from overseas fell
short of expectations. The most significant influx was
$410,000 from the U.S. National Endowment for Democ-
racy. Pro-government groups like the newspaper El Mer-
curio, which had received U.S. covert aid against Allende,
criticized this reliance on foreign funding. The No replied
that the government had far more resources than the
opposition and that accepting U.S. assistance was a lesser
evil than enthroning Pinochet for another eight years.
The U.S. embassy was particularly outspoken in its
support for democratization. Without taking sides, the U.S.
government stood by the December 17, 1987, statement of
the president and the secretary of state:

For the ideal of popular sovereignty to become
reality in Chile, the United States believes that
a climate of freedom and fair competition must
be established many months before the actual
balloting takes place. This atmosphere will be
marked by easy and equitable access to the mass
media, especially television, by unrestricted
discussion of political issues, broad freedom of
assembly, early announcement of the rules of any
electoral proceeding, facilitation of registration by
prospective voters, and freedom for citizens and
political groups to campaign peacefully in favor
of their ideas. States of exception which limit
freedom of assembly, association, and expression
are not compatible with a legitimate electoral
procedure.3

The Foreign Ministers of the European Economic Com-
munity and the presidents of Argentina, Colombia, Costa
Rica, Ecuador, Uruguay, and Venezuela issued similar calls
for procedural guarantees of free expression. The U.S.
embassy's explicit arguments for democratic freedoms and
its implicit sympathy for the No enraged the government
and heartened the opposition. Although the United States
applauded the regime's economic model, its relations with
the Chilean government had become quite poor.

The Campaign
The Yes

The government and the armed forces mainly ran the
Yes campaign. It began in earnest after the attempted
assassination of Pinochet in September 1986 with a massive
and unrelenting television campaign aimed at convincing
Chileans that those who stood with the government were
"millions." Public employees were mobilized and govern-
ment monies used to support the campaign, despite the
illegality of such practices. Indeed, the top campaign


manager was the Minister of the Interior, Sergio Fernan-
dez. The Yes people gave seasoned politicians from the
rightist parties a very small role, another indication of the
government's extreme confidence and the continued disdain
and distrust of the authorities for politicians of any stripe.
The Yes campaign stressed two major themes: order
and progress. Its dominant appeal was to fear of disorder,
of communism, and of chaos. Warning that the No sig-
nified a return to the Popular Unity period, Yes television
spots showed masked Miristas assaulting helpless
housewives out shopping. The Pinochet camp conveyed the
message that the No constituted a vote against social
stability and national security: "The life of Chile is at
stake." News items warned that radical leftists were
planning to disrupt the plebiscite. Such scare tactics may
have swayed some undecided voters in the closing days of
the campaign.
The second major Yes refrain was the triumph of the
economic model: "Chile: A Winning Country (Chile: un
pais ganador)." A sharp contrast was drawn between the
successes in Chile and the failures in neighboring democra-
cies. The regime stressed rising exports and falling un-
employment and inflation. Many Chileans obviously agreed
with this positive assessment of the economy, but many
others were concerned with the model's failure to improve
their own standard of living. Even some who hailed the
essential features of the free-market model were concerned
about their own income level and the social costs paid by
millions of Chileans. In a national television debate,
economist Alejandro Foxley hit a sore spot when he
charged that 5 million out of the 12 million Chileans lived
in extreme poverty. In any case, most Chileans realized
that the election was not exclusively about economics, even
though such issues were very important; the plebiscite was
also about politics: about dictatorship versus democracy.
Among lesser themes of the Yes campaign was the
appeal of Pinochet himself. Here the motif was a gentle,
paternalistic, grandfatherly figure in civilian garb, embracing
babies, old women, and the poor. Like the No campaign,
the Yes propaganda claimed that choosing its option was
a vote for democracy. There is some evidence that Pino-
chet's transformation from stern strongman to smiling
democrat was an image-making mistake. Although never
charismatic, Pinochet may have had more magnetism as an
iron-fisted, omnipotent, unyielding military commander. He
lost his aura of invincibility. Throughout 1987-88, non-
government polls had shown that most people planned to
vote No but nonetheless expected Pinochet to triumph; in
September, a majority still favored the No but now
believed that Pinochet could be defeated.
Pinochet's candidacy aroused passions on both sides.
One poll showed that the word Chileans most frequently
associated with him was "abuse." For many other Chileans,
he symbolized "security." Those who feared uncertainty
preferred "the devil they know." Meanwhile, his most
fervent partisans hailed Pinochet as the savior of the
fatherland.









Just as Pinochet's own constitution painted him into
a corner, so did his economic model. The very success of
the emphasis on the market instead of the state inhibited
his ability to use populist measures to win votes. The gove-
rnment made some efforts to improve its electoral position,
including a reduction in the value added tax, an expansion
of housing subsidies and construction, a special payment to
state workers, an increase in social services and public
works, and an amnesty for overdue water rates. However,
it did not undertake a massive campaign of public expendi-
tures to "buy" votes and refused to follow the advice of
some officials who wanted large-scale debt relief for
mortgage holders who had fallen behind in their payments.
The Yes campaign also made little use of rallies and
demonstrations. It became clear that the regime had
trouble competing with the opposition where the latter had
a comparative advantage: electoral politics rather than
military maneuvers. Pinochet was not given to many public
appearances or speeches in Santiago, although he was more
visible in other parts of the country where the government
thought its position was much stronger. Generally the Yes
marches paled beside the turnout for the No. The final
demonstration of support for the Yes was reduced to an
automobile cavalcade around Santiago. Although large and
noisy, that caravan looked weak compared to the final No
rally; it also conveyed an image of the upper class com-
position of the Yes camp.
Some Yes supporters counted on intimidation to win
for their side. Many municipal authorities worked for the
Yes and harassed No partisans, especially in rural areas.
Rallies for the No were sometimes shunted off to obscure
locations. Teachers and other public employees were
pressured to back the Yes. There were numerous instances
of arbitrary detentions of No campaigners and dismissals
from their jobs. Poorer Chileans who favored the No
feared loss of government subsidies for food, education,
and housing; the opposition advised them to "Say Yes,
Vote No." Numerous anti-government journalists continued
to be censored or arrested. In the first six months of 1988,
the Church's Vicariate of Solidarity tabulated 1,780 arrests
for political reasons. Several No leaders received kidnapping
or death threats from right-wing vigilante groups, such as
the Chilean Anticommunist Action (Acci6n Chilena
Anticomunista). With the lifting of the state of exception
the month before the plebiscite, however, more and more
Chileans felt safe opposing the government.

The No

In the face of the government's intrinsic advantages,
the key to the No's victory was overcoming three fears:
fear of Pinochet, fear of Unidad Popular, and fear of the
unknown. Giving the people courage and optimism was
crucial to begin recapturing a majority for the Center and
Left. The social protests beginning in 1983 had helped
reduce the level of fear. The No forces furthered that
effort with a door-to-door campaign to get their people
and some of their parties registered during 1987-88.


Women and campesinos were especially targeted for visits
in the final lap of the contest. The appearance of No
leaders on a few television forums-especially a dramatic
denunciation of Pinochet by Ricardo Lagos-also dispelled
fear. So did the No rallies, particularly the climactic
gathering of hundreds of thousands of supporters in
Santiago four days before the balloting. That rally cul-
minated the "March of Happiness," converging on the
capital from the northern and southern tips of the country.
The principal No effort that transformed the latent No
majority into reality, however, was the twenty-seven 15-min-
ute TV "spots." Although the authorities scheduled the
spots late at night in the expectation that few people would
watch them, polls showed that over 90 per cent of the
people saw them. Compared to the heavy-handed, violent
images conveyed by the Yes, the No adopted a rainbow as
its symbol of joyous pluralism. The commercials trans-
formed the negative word "no" into the embodiment of
"happiness." Their spokespersons appealed to national
pride in the democratic heritage. Whereas the Yes con-
centrated on the traumas-shortages, street clashes,
property seizures-of the UP period, the No focused on
the more recent horrors-murder, imprisonment, torture,
exile-of the Pinochet years. Above all, however, the No
emphasized the future instead of the past, a future of hope
and reconciliation. The TV campaign's technically superior
music and images aimed at a youthful audience.
Although the government still controlled television and
continued to purchase air time for a multiplicity of paid
advertisements, the No's brief interlude made a huge
impact after fifteen years of prohibition. The TV spots
proved particularly effective in the outlying areas, where
national leaders of the opposition seldom had been seen.
The No spots were thought superior by most Chileans,
especially young people: 59 percent of youths considered
them best, versus 16 percent who liked the Yes spots
better. The TV blitz convinced many wavering Chileans
that the No was legitimate and acceptable. It persuaded
many others that they should not fear retribution for voting
no, that they could mark "no" with impunity, as the ads
repeated "without hatred, without fear and without vio-
lence."
Another key to the opposition's success was its dis-
ciplined unity. Ironically, the plebiscite structure helped
cohere an incredibly diverse and fragile coalition around
the one thing on which they totally agreed: no to Pinochet
and his regime. There was very tight coordination on every
official speech, strategy, tactic, and contingency plan. Voters
were given instructions to cast their ballots early and then
go home, to avoid any provocations, and to await further
orders from the No Command.
The No also succeeded by striking a conciliatory tone.
They downplayed divisive issues, such as retribution for
human rights violations, class conflicts, and ideological
disputes. They stressed that the No was not a vote against
the armed forces or the economic model. Opposition
economists merely indicated a preference for a mixed econ-
omy with respect for private property and expanded








programs for the poor. In contrast with the government's
bellicose rhetoric, the No mainly portrayed the plebiscite as
a reencounter with Chile's former civic culture, as a way
for both Yes and No voters to solve disputes peacefully.
Some No and Yes party leaders even reached tacit agree-
ments to share information and recognize valid results on
election day.
Two days before the voting, all electioneering legally
stopped, except for a stray Yes banner or a No painted on
the back of a bus. Nevertheless, the government circum-
vented the media blackout by presenting propaganda as
news and by showing television "documentaries" on the
difficulties of the Allende years. An expectant quiet settled
over the nation, interrupted by car horns beeping out
slogans of the two campaigns. Mysterious blackouts
darkened the country the night before the voting. Beneath
the surface tranquility, fear and tension were palpable, as
the clock wound down to a historic faceoff. Although both
sides exuded confidence, the Yes worried that their victory
might trigger mass protests, especially from the Com-
munists. The No wondered whether Pinochet knew he was
about to be defeated, and what he might do about it.

Voting Procedures

When electoral registration closed the day Pinochet was
nominated as the official candidate, 7,435,913 Chileans
signed up to vote, a record 92.1 percent of the eligible
voters age eighteen or older. Registration was administered
by the government-appointed civilian National Electoral
Service (Servicio Electoral Nacional-SEN). Citizens could
either register near their places of residence or work. A
polling table (mesa) was constituted for each group of 350
citizens registered at a particular center. In the end 22,131
mesas were created. Following earlier Chilcan electoral
practice, men and women registered in separate mesas and
would vote in separate polling places.4
Opposition leaders repeatedly sought assurances that
the registration process would be carried out with openness
and fairness. In addition to being concerned that registra-
tion was expensive and cumbersome, and thus deliberately
designed to discriminate against poorer citizens, they also
feared that they would not be able to ascertain whether or
not the registration rolls were legitimate. Electoral officials
themselves were for the most part understanding and
accommodating, and showed willingness to meet not only
with opposition leaders but with a host of international
visitors coming to Chile to inspect the preparations for the
plebiscite.
After some hesitation government authorities agreed
to provide for a fee the registry lists by mesa. They
refused, however, to provide the opposition with a copy of
the computer tapes with the entire registry. Only with
access to the entire registry could technical experts ascer-
tain whether there was any double registration or whether
phantom voters had been added to the roles. In the end
the opposition was not able to carry out a fully systematic
analysis of the final registry because it became impossible


to create a parallel record. Nevertheless, campaign leaders
were able to check numerous mesas confirming that the
registries included actual voters and that there was no
systematic multiple registration which could have permitted
widespread multiple voting. There is fragmentary evidence
that some multiple voting took place in the 1980 plebiscite
when there was no registration system and voters cast
ballots with only their identification cards.
The voting mechanism conformed to traditional
Chilean electoral practices.5 Each mesa was administered
by five officials drawn by lot from a list of fifteen in-
dividuals registered in that mesa and proposed by the three
members of the regional electoral board (junta electoral).
Opposition leaders feared that because the seventy regional
boards were made up of officials named by the executive,
they would attempt to designate polling officials supportive
of the Yes option. This did not happen, however, since the
several thousand officials that each board had to nominate
were drawn more or less randomly from the lists of each
mesa. Thus, the opposition parties had ample representa-
tion among mesa officials.
On voting day, voters would show their identification
cards to mesa officials on approaching the voting booth.
The identification card, which contains both a picture and
the signature of the voter, would allow polling officials to
identify the voter and compare the person's name and
signature with the ones appearing on the master registry of
all 350 voters in that particular mesa. After signing next to
his or her name, the voter would leave the identification
card with the president of the mesa and obtain a ballot,
after the number on a small tab on the ballot had been
entered next to the voter's name. The voter would proceed
to a closed voting booth and indicate a preference by
marking a straight line through either the Yes or No
options. The ballot simply said:

Plebiscito Presidente de la Repfiblica
Augusto Pinochet Ugarte


Si


No


The voter would next fold the ballot, seal it with an
attached adhesive, and return the ballot to the mesa
president. The president would then tear off the tab and
instruct the voter to place the ballot in a box with an open
window on the front. Though some voters feared that the
tabs on the ballots could identify their vote, any identifica-
tion was impossible. Poll watchers for opposition parties
could observe every procedure and had a right to challenge
any that they deemed unacceptable.
The greatest challenge to the opposition in preparing
for the vote, once it became apparent that people were
registering in large numbers, was the selection and training
of poll watchers (apoderados). Only the parties which had
officially registered had a right to assign poll watchers to
every mesa. For the opposition these were the Christian
Democratic Party, the Humanist Party, and the Party for
Democracy. Although the validity of the Humanist Party's









registration application was questioned by the electoral
service shortly before the plebiscite, the Humanists were
nevertheless able to assign poll watchers because the
service's ruling was under appeal.
Together, the three opposition parties had to come up
with 120,000 volunteers who would serve as poll watchers
and back-ups for the thousands of mesas. The enormity of
this task can be appreciated by the fact that together the
three parties had not obtained that many signatures when
they registered as parties. Party leaders realized that
individuals willing to sign their name to a party registration
form might not be willing to take the much more public
role of acting as a poll watcher. In the month before the
nomination of Pinochet, opposition parties had lined up a
fairly large number of poll watchers in major cities.
However, they had done little work in the smaller towns
and rural areas and were having difficulty in obtaining
volunteers in the poorer suburbs of Santiago. Often
national leaders, who spent countless weekends going to
different neighborhoods to conduct poll-watcher training
courses, found that only a handful of those who had
promised to attend actually did so. It was only after the
beginning of the television campaign and the relaxation of
fear that the opposition was able to recruit enough poll
watchers. For the most part the opposition parties had
better coverage on election day than did the parties sup-
porting the Pinochet option. The Christian Democratic
Party and the Party for Democracy appointed the lion's
share of all poll watchers.
Among the parties favoring the Yes, National Renova-
tion and National Advance were entitled to assign poll
watchers. In addition, the candidate (Pinochet) had his own
poll watchers, many of whom were recruited from the
ranks of the UDI. Parties of the right also had difficulty
recruiting poll watchers and were much less organized than
the opposition parties. The authorities who ran the cam-
paign for Pinochet paid more attention to propaganda and
house-to-house campaigning than to organization for
election day.
For the opposition, poll watchers for each mesa were
crucial not only to monitor the fairness of the vote but also
to provide a final tally for the parallel count that opposi-
tion parties were setting up for election night. Drawing on
the experience of voting in other countries, notably the
Philippines, the Command for the No was convinced that
it could not hope to win the plebiscite unless it had its own
foolproof system for computing the votes. Help from
abroad and particularly from the National Democratic
Institute for International Affairs (NDI) of the National
Endowment for Democracy (NED) in the United States
played an important role in giving the opposition the
capacity to set up a parallel count. A computer system was
devised which would receive voting totals from all mesas
dispatched to Santiago via fax machines located around the
country. Support from other countries and foundations
contributed to the work of individual parties and party-
affiliated research and political action centers.


The opposition was able to set up three separate
mechanisms for monitoring the vote. In addition to the
Command for the No, the Christian Democratic party
created its own computer system with a similar format. At
the same time, the Committee for Free Elections (CEL),
also with help from the NDI, devised a vote count that
would tally a sample of communities. The goal was to give
the opposition the ability to monitor and project electoral
trends quickly. The sample consisted of 10 percent of all
mesas and was carefully selected to be representative of
the entire country.
The importance of the parallel count to the opposi-
tion was such that extraordinary measures were taken to
shield the computer system, particularly of the Committee
for Free Elections. Concern was heightened when a bomb
went off at the CEL headquarters in the days leading up
to the vote count. CEL hid its computer and used a
network of private homes and couriers who were not fully
aware of all of the contact points to protect its operation.
Both the No command and the CEL protected their power
supplies by setting up auxiliary generators.
A parallel count system was also set up by the "Inde-
pendents for the Yes" and was located at the Casa del Si
on Londres Street in Santiago. Because of their close
contacts with the government, however, the Yes count
planned to obtain their information directly from the
authorities and then enter it into their computer system. In
interviews with the LASA delegation, leaders and technical
personnel of the Yes campaign dismissed the CEL quick-
count effort by arguing that the sample of voting places
chosen was a biased one, deliberately designed to under-
represent the Yes vote by selecting polling places in areas
that favored the opposition. CEL officials vehemently
denied this, noting that they had taken the lead in ap-
proaching the Yes campaign technicians with a view to
exchanging information on election night and assuring each
other that the count was indeed fair. The Yes campaign,
closely tied to the authorities, refused to respond to those
overtures.
More receptive to conversations about sharing infor-
mation on election night were the leaders of National
Renovation, which did not have its own electoral count.
They did not agree, however, to the proposal of the
campaign for the No to select a sample of mesas based on
information from their own poll watchers to systematically
compare their information with that of the opposition. They
also planned to rely on the government authorities for
results, even though they had been critical of the govern-
ment's handling of the campaign and its undisguised
contempt for politicians of all stripes, including those who
supported the Pinochet option.

Political Climate Immediately Prior to the Plebiscite

Days before the plebiscite took place, opposition leaders
became alarmed by warnings that came directly from
sources in the carabineros. This information cautioned that
elements tied to the government security forces, indepen-









dent of the carabineros, had prepared contingency plans
aimed at provoking violent confrontations the night of the
plebiscite, confrontations which might then lead to the
interruption of voting and ballot counting and a suspension
of the plesbicite.7 In particular, carabinero officials were
concerned that several of their buses had been stolen over
the previous months. They feared that individuals dressed
as policemen might seek to heighten tension and deliber-
ately incite violence which might create a climate that
could force a cancellation of the plebiscite. It is noteworthy
that on the eve of the plebiscite the police issued a
statement saying that its personnel would act only in
uniform, leading to speculation that police officials feared
that elements of the secret police in civilian dress would try
to pass themselves off as policeman. The police went so far
as painting special symbols on their buses to distinguish
them from bogus vehicles.
Information coming from sources in the military, on
the other hand, warned of rumors that elements on the far
left were preparing to mount a violent campaign of protest
to condemn a "fraudulent" Yes vote on the night of the
plebiscite. Diplomats from the United States and other
embassies in Santiago took these reports seriously and
became worried that both the insurrectionary left and
elements in the security forces, in a perverse symbiotic
logic, might try to cause widespread incidents that would
provoke the imposition of a state of emergency with
unforeseen consequences. Adding to the pre-plebiscite
tension was the blackout of the entire capital city on
successive nights before the plebiscite, attributed by the
authorities to terrorist bombs blowing up electric towers,
but without the usual claims of responsibility by leftist
guerrilla groups.
Reflecting concerns about possible attempts to
provoke confrontation on the part of the government, the
United States took the unusual step of calling on the
Chilean ambassador in Washington to warn against any
attempt to create a climate that might lead to a suspension
of the plebiscite. This action was vehemently condemned by
the Chilean authorities and many of their civilian backers
as blatant interference in internal Chilean affairs. It was
applauded, however, by opposition leaders who regarded
the weight of international opinion as an important
guarantee of the fairness of the electoral process.
The U.S. action may have strengthened the hand of
moderate opposition leaders who urged the Communist
Party to refrain from calling on their people to go out on
the streets on election night in order to avoid playing into
the hands of government supporters who might want to
disrupt the peaceful outcome of the electoral process.
Fear of violent confrontation on election night is also the
reason why opposition leaders, in the closing spots of the
television campaign and on radio, called on all the sup-
porters of the No campaign to vote early and peacefully.
They urged their backers to stay home on election night
waiting for the electoral results to be provided by the No
campaign through its own radio station outlets as well as


instructions on how the victory celebration was to take
place. Yes leaders gave their partisans similar instructions.

October 5th: Day of the Plebiscite

October 5, 1988, the day of the plebiscite, was an extraor-
dinary event in the life of the Chilean nation. Ninety-seven
percent of the registered voters, or 90 percent of the
eligible population, turned out to vote, the highest per-
centage in the nation's history. Members of the LASA
delegation fanned out across Santiago; one member went
to the port city of Valparaiso, and two members went to
provincial capitals and rural towns to observe the vote.
From the Instituto Nacional, where Pinochet arrived to
vote at 11 o'clock, receiving a subdued reception by the
long lines of male voters awaiting their turn to vote, to the
working class neighborhood of San Miguel, to the shan-
tytowns of San Ram6n, thousands of Chileans queued up
peacefully to vote. Because most voters chose to arrive
early, lines were often long and many people stood for
three hours or more in the hot sun. Voters waited cheer-
fully without incident, occasionally debating in a good
humored way the political alternatives Chileans faced.
Among the many moving scenes was the arrival at polling
places of invalids and bed-ridden persons with the aid of
relatives or nurses and of senior citizens dressed in their
Sunday best.
By mid-afternoon, opposition leaders became con-
cerned that the voting was proceeding too slowly. They
feared that many voters would get tired and go home or
find that the voting place had closed by the time they
reached the front of the line. For the most part, the
slowness with which the mesas began operation and
undertook their work was due to the inexperience of many
of the polling officials after fifteen years without fair
elections and the complicated instructions they were sup-
posed to follow. Even so, Juan Ignacio Garcia, the head of
the electoral service, gave assurances to opposition leaders
that his office would see to it that the voting process was
speeded up.
There was no evidence, however, that the military
authorities were trying to slow down the voting process in
working class neighborhoods or otherwise hinder the voting
process. In fact military commanders from the different
services were very polite to the voters and were anxious to
ensure a fair and impartial procedure. At one voting place
in San Joaquin, for example, the young paratrooper in
charge had looked into every conceivable contingency, from
having ambulances stationed outside in case someone had
a heart attack to an elaborate evacuation plan in case of
an earthquake. Finally, both foreign and domestic observers
were allowed to watch the proceedings without hindrance.
Less accommodating than most of the military
authorities were some officials and private parties in
scattered rural areas. For example, some Yes partisans
hired all of the buses and denied transportation to people
from communities that were identified with the No. In a
few instances individuals were denied the right to vote









since their names had been removed from the electoral
registries because they were subject to prosecution for
political offenses against the state. In some localities
individuals who were openly supporting the No campaign
had had their identity cards requisitioned by the police,
making it impossible for them to vote. These incidents,
however, pale by comparison with the fact that the over-
whelming majority of Chileans voted without impediment.
The authorities were committed to a clean and fair
electoral process. In many polling places, voters embraced
soldiers and officers, thanking them for guaranteeing a
peaceful election.
As early as 5:00 p.m. some mesas closed and the vote
count began. Interested voters and observers alike were
allowed to watch the count. It took close to two hours at
each mesa, as polling officials counted all of the signatures,
ballot stubs and ballots to see that there was an equal
number of each. The president and secretary of each mesa
also signed each ballot before they were opened. The
results of the vote were read aloud by the president after
the secretary opened each ballot. The poll watchers for the
candidate and the opposition parties closely scrutinized
each vote. Sometimes the crowd around the mesa spoke up
to argue against questioning the validity of a vote, for
example in the case of a voter having marked an X over
his preference rather than a single vertical line.
Throughout the country, however, the counting went
on without serious incident, and citizens and officials alike
treated each other with respect and civility. When the
count was finished, the No, Yes, blank, and contested
ballots were placed in envelopes and sealed with lacquer,
as were the ballot stubs. Each poll watcher received an
official form signed by the president and secretary of the
mesa certifying the results. Opposition poll watchers quickly
sent their information to Santiago to be tabulated in the
computers of the Command for the No. Many Yes and No
partisans exuded civic pride in the peaceful electoral
process, concluding that "Chile was the winner." When the
LASA delegation asked a representative of the Yes how he
felt about losing his mesa to the No he replied, "I feel that
it is a great day for Chile." That shared sense of reclaiming
the country's democratic heritage helped hold the nation
together in the tense hours ahead.
Soon after the polls closed, it became apparent to
opposition leaders that the No was winning. The CEL,
concerned that false information not be broadcast, had
agreed that it would not give a preliminary count until it
had information for at least 600 mesas, and only after it
had informed the Yes campaign of its results. The No
campaign was equally concerned about not raising false
hopes so it agreed not to issue results until later in the
evening. Radio stations supporting both the government
and the opposition, however, began to broadcast partial
results from polling places across the country, underscoring
the fact that those tallies did not represent any particular
trend. Television, almost totally controlled by the authori-
ties, gave a decidedly different impression, conveying to
viewers the certainty of a victory for the Yes.


The opposition strategy-to wait until substantial
results had come in-was altered when the Undersecretary
of Interior, Alberto Cardemil, appeared at 7:30 p.m., an
hour and a half after he was supposed to give preliminary
returns. He reported the results of only 79 mesas or 0.36
percent of the total with a vote favorable to the Yes. By
that time the opposition already had counted over a half a
million votes which were showing a clear trend for the No.
Cardemil said he would have further results in an hour,
but an hour went by and he gave none. In view of the
refusal of the authorities to issue results, the opposition
decided to broadcast its own figures at 9:00 p.m. Sergio
Molina of the CEL also released his count with 735 mesas
tabulated, after unsuccessfully trying to reach the Yes
campaign on the telephone. That count favored the No
and, in restrospect, turned out to be surprisingly close to
the final tally. Television, however, refused to broadcast
opposition figures. In fact, Secretary General of the
Government Hernin Poblete later called the stations
warning them that to broadcast any opposition news would
have the "gravest" consequences.
When Cardemil appeared on television at 10:00 p.m.
to announce that with 677 mesas the Yes was still winning,
and national television began showing reruns of U.S.
sitcoms, the level of tension increased in opposition
headquarters. Leaders of the pro-Yes National Renovation
Party also became upset with what they perceived to be an
effort in governmental circles to provoke some kind of
incident. Some of them believed that the government had
been stunned by the results and was looking for some way
out, short of openly recognizing the No victory. Renovation
leaders contacted the Ministry of the Interior directly,
warning them not to do anything "stupid."
Some government officials, led by the Minister of the
Interior Sergio Fernandez, actually were considering a plan
to issue a statement around midnight declaring the Yes
was winning on the basis of more than a million votes
counted. Since they knew that the No was really ahead,
such a plan required the careful selection of actual polling
places to provide the desired totals-a very difficult task,
particularly since there was an overwhelming tendency in
favor of the No. The plan also envisioned calling on
partisans of the Yes to converge on the center of Santiago
to celebrate their "victory." What made such a scenario
especially sinister was that some government officials
simultaneously considered asking for the withdrawal of
police and troops which had cordoned off the center of
Santiago. Removal of the armed forces would not only
permit the Yes partisans to congregate downtown, but also
would heighten the risk of a dangerous clash between
partisans of both sides if No supporters rushed there to
protect their "victory." The authorities might then impose
a state of siege and put into place military contingency
plans to cope with disorder and violence. This could give
the Pinochet government the upper hand and an excuse to
blame elements of the opposition for provoking the
incidents and not recognizing the fairness of the count. It
also could permit a suspension of the vote count or, if the








unrest was widespread, a cancellation of the plebiscite. At
the very least, the policy of not reporting returns was only
adding to the tension in the country and the potential for
confrontation.8
Despite the bitterness of the election campaign,
political leaders of the Right and other junta members
were more willing to accept the count of the opposition
than the results given out by the government authorities
and showed their determination to guarantee a fair
electoral process. National Renovation maintained contact
with the opposition as well as with the government and had
access to the count from the Committee for Free Elections.
Data from opposition computers were also taken directly
to Generals Fernando Matthei, Commander-in-Chief of the
Air Force, and Rodolfo Stange, Director General of the
Police. Both junta members also obtained information from
their own institutions confirming opposition results. Sergio
Onofre Jarpa, the President of Renovation, went on
television at midnight with Patricio Aylwin, president of the
Christian Democratic party, to participate in a program
which had been scheduled much earlier. The leader of
Chile's right was prepared to accept the defeat of the Yes
and said that his impression was that there was a "majority
tendency in favor of the No." His statement had an
extraordinary impact. It immediately defused the tension in
the No headquarters and calmed listeners all over the
country who could not understand why opposition radio
stations were broadcasting figures continuously while the
authorities remained silent.
Even more important in providing reassurance to a
nervous nation was the declaration along the same lines by
General Matthei at 1:00 a.m. He was on the way to the
presidential palace to meet with General Pinochet and the
other junta members for a meeting which had been
scheduled originally at 9:30. Like some leaders of the
Right, Generals Matthei and Stange had not been able to
reach the Ministry of the Interior nor the Moneda palace
to find out what was going on. Their annoyance was clear
when they arrived at the palace, there to be greeted by an
enraged Pinochet; but they refused to sign a decree which
Interior Minister Fernandez had prepared, giving General
Pinochet broad emergency powers. According to some
accounts, they also had harsh words with the minister when
he tried to argue that the Yes had actually won because
Pinochet obtained an extraordinary vote for someone who
had been in office for fifteen years. In a testy exchange
with the minister and with Pinochet, all three junta
members (including Admiral Jos6 Toribio Merino) made
it very clear that there was no alternative but to recognize
the defeat and to adhere strictly to the constitution.
It was not only Renovation leaders and the other
junta members who helped defuse tension and dissuade
government officials from any desperate last minute
attempt to salvage a catastrophic loss. General Jorge
Zincke, commander of the Santiago garrison, had refused
to go along with the request that security forces be
removed from the center of Santiago. At two o'clock
Cardemil recognized that the No had won. Opposition


leaders in the crowded press room of the No campaign
openly embraced and wept before the cameras of the
world.
In the final analysis the most important reasons for
the absence of confrontations or incidents the night of the
plebiscite were the maturity and good sense of ordinary
citizens who followed the instructions of the No command
and stayed home. The Communist Party's willingness to
follow the directions of the Command for the No and to
forego celebrating victory was crucial. The vast majority of
Chileans waited patiently until the next day or until the
mass rally at the Parque O'Higgins on Friday October 7,
to celebrate what most had thought impossible only weeks
earlier-the defeat at his own game of the 72-year-old
dictator, who had prided himself on having won every
previous test.

Plebiscite Results

The results of the plebiscite were very positive for the
opposition. The No won 840,000 more votes than the Yes.
A total of 3,967,579 people voted No and 3,119,110 voted
Yes, giving the No 54.71 percent of the vote to 43.01
percent for the Yes. The No won in 10 of the 12 regions
of the country. The highest percentage for the No was
recorded in the second region of Antofagasta with 58.8
percent of the vote.
Generally speaking the Yes won in rural areas, but
not by as large a margin as most observers expected. It
also defeated the No in small towns, again by a very small
margin. In areas considered high on socioeconomic in-
dicators, the Yes came out ahead by 56 percent to 42
percent, whereas in low income areas the No won by 63
percent to 34 percent.9 Women, despite their history of
voting more conservatively than men, provided majority
support for the No: 51 percent of all females voting lent
their support to the opposition, with only 46 percent voting
Yes. More predictably, 58 percent of male voters cast
ballots for the No, with 40 percent voting to retain Pino-
chet. In big cities such as Santiago, Concepci6n and
Valparaiso, more women voted for the No than did men.
At this juncture, the best sources for remaining break-
downs of the vote are polls conducted shortly before the
plebiscite.10 They had indicated that the most likely Yes
voters would be people over 60 years old, those with low
levels of education, women dedicated to housework, rural
dwellers, higher income groups, and partisans of rightist
politics. The least likely Yes voters would be men, young
people, those with higher levels of education, the un-
employed and low income workers, students, and partisans
of centrist or leftist politics. Although close to one-third of
the voters for both sides considered themselves to be
independents, ideology appears to have been strongly
associated with voting choice. In one poll, 67 percent of
strong Yes voters (27% of the total) identified themselves
as either of the Right (52%) or Center (15%). By contrast,
65 percent of the strong No voters (45% of the total)
viewed themselves as Leftists (39%) or Centrists (26%). A









large 77 percent of the Yes voters "strongly" opposed, and
14 percent "somewhat" opposed a Marxist government.
Among No voters, on the other hand, only 29 percent
strongly opposed and 29 percent "somewhat" opposed a
Marxist government. It is striking that after fifteen years of
military dictatorship, Chile remains divided among its
proverbial "three thirds."
Along with ideology, evaluations of the state of the
economy and perceptions of personal economic well being
played key roles in voting decisions. A majority of voters
did not accept the government's incessant propaganda
campaign aimed at convincing them that Chile had left
underdeveloped Latin America behind. In September only
18 percent of the voters said that the economy was in good
shape, while 44 percent said that the economic picture was
only fair and 37 percent said it was poor. Only 45 percent
thought their own family income was sufficient to cover
necessities, while 55 percent thought it was inadequate.
Among the voters intending to vote No, 89 percent thought
the economic picture was either fair or poor. Even more
significant, twice as many respondents said that the
economy would be better under a No victory than under a
Yes victory.
Economic issues proved to be far more important to
voters than fear of the past, a theme exploited continuously
in the Yes spots. The drumbeat against the UP referred to
events occurring many years ago. Those memories were not
terribly gripping for the over 40 percent of voters who
were too young to have ever cast ballots. Polls showed that
only 7 percent of all Chileans surveyed expressed any great
fear of the consequences of a victory for the No, versus 11
percent fearful of a triumph by the Yes. Moreover, only 18
percent thought a victory for the No signified a return to
the UP, and only 24 percent thought a future government
of the opposition would be similar to the UP. Those
expectations were important because only 24 percent held
a positive image of the UP government, while 48 percent
had a negative impression and 23 percent were indifferent.
It is true that Yes voters were more concerned with issues
of law and order, including deliquency, terrorism and
strikes than with economic issues, but these factors were
not enough to generate sufficient support for Pinochet. And
although No voters identified economic issues as foremost
(44%), they also singled out human rights, freedom and
democracy (37%) as very salient concerns, outweighing the
preoccupation that some Yes voters had with law and
order.11
As noted above, the opposition spots on television
countered the negative images associated with the No and
the UP period. The reassuring ads helped to legitimize the
opposition, dispelling the view that the politicians could
not address the country's problems. The spots help to
account for the fact that between June and September the
slight majority for the Yes among women and politically
independent voters was transformed into a majority for the
No.
Immediately after the election, the business elites
accepted the results of the plebiscite. Manuel Felii,


president of the National Confederation of Production and
Commerce, declared that "democracy is the best system for
the development of free enterprise." Other entrepreneurs
praised the government's calm reaction, which they said
proved that "Pinochet is really a democrat." Although
disappointed, the property owners were not clinging to the
past but rather adjusting to the new political realities and
opening communication with the more moderate leaders of
the No. An indication of the favorable political climate in
the country was the fact that the stock market did not
crash nor did the black market rate for the dollar surge,
dire events which had been predicted only days before by
business elites if the No were to win.
The day after the plebiscite, Minister Fernandez
repeated the arguments he had presented unsuccessfully to
the Junta members the night before. In an address to the
nation he suggested that Pinochet, in a special sense, had
won. He claimed that it was extraordinary that after 15
years in power, a political leader would obtain 43% of the
vote, which exceeded any percentage obtained in recent
memory by the right on its own. While acknowledging that
the No had won, he minimized the victory by arguing that
the total had to be divided by 16, the number of parties in
the No command. Fernandez hinted that Pinochet would be
a good candidate for the competitive presidential election
scheduled for 1989.
It is doubtful whether the plebiscite can be read in
FernAndez' terms, though the vote for Pinochet was very
strong. The Yes campaign was waged with the power and
resources of the state on its side in a very uneven contest.
It is unlikely that the government could resort to such
blatant intervention when the issue becomes the choice of
one of several candidates. Furthermore, the polls showed
that in spite of the striking inroads of the No campaign, a
critical percentage of the vote for the Yes was motivated
by fear of a return to the unrest and violence associated
with the Popular Unity government, or fear of being
identified as an opposition supporter with its potential
consequences in terms of job security and even physical
safety. These factors would not be so dominant in an open
and competitive race between several candidates. Indeed,
a centrist candidate could conceivably attract a substantial
number of votes that went for the Yes, provided the op-
position were able to structure an electoral appeal with
the same themes of moderation that characterized its
campaign for the plebiscite. Earlier polls suggested that
the core support for Pinochet himself might not be more
than between 11 and 20 percent.
It is very unlikely that Pinochet will be able to satisfy
his most ardent supporters by standing for election next
year. UDI leader Jaime Guzman, one of the principal
architects of the constitution, noted that the document bars
Pinochet from seeking a second consecutive term. Even if
he resigned from office before the election, the intervening
months would still be considered part of his term. It is
very doubtful that the junta would agree to modify the
constitution to permit Pinochet to be a candidate. His
military colleagues agreed reluctantly to his candidacy for








the plebiscite, making it clear to the president that he
assumed the responsibility for either triumph or defeat.
Government supporters will have to look elsewhere in the
coming elections for a candidate to carry on the legacy of
the military regime.

Chilean Democracy: Prospects for the Future

According to the constitution, Pinochet will remain in office
until March 11, 1990, despite the fact that he lost the
plebiscite. The day after the election, Pinochet appeared
in full-dress uniform to deliver an angry, defiant concession
speech. That TV appearance signaled his determination to
stand firm on his most solid base, the army. He also made
it clear that he intends to fully implement his constitution.
He sees that blueprint, as do most of his military col-
leagues including the other commanders of the armed
forces, as the fundamental legacy of the military regime.
In the view of the government it is a constitution that will
permit the establishment of a modern and stable demo-
cratic regime, one that avoids the "vices" of the past. Key
provisions of the constitution include the prohibition of
"totalitarian parties" (Article VIII), the establishment of a
military-dominated national security council which gives the
military a broad tutelary role over other political in-
stitutions, the creation of a strong executive and a relatively
weak congress, and an extremely cumbersome amendment
process that would make difficult any profound change in
the document.
It is clear that the 1980 Constitution remains a fun-
damental obstacle for the opposition. It is not considered
legitimate by most opposition leaders, and a number of its
provisions are regarded as profoundly undemocratic. The
sixteen parties that supported the No campaign made it
clear before the plebiscite that they regarded a No vote as
a rejection not only of the candidacy of Pinochet, but also
of his regime. Therefore they have requested negotiations
that would lead to fundamental changes in the constitution
before the next presidential elections. Those reforms would
modify provisions that are viewed as critical by the military
and its closest supporters.
It seems doubtful that the opposition will obtain fun-
damental concessions from the Pinochet government. Many
military officers believe that the modifications asked for by
the opposition will only open the door once again to the
election of a leftist candidate to the presidency and a
destruction of Chilean institutions. There are also practical
considerations. The presidential elections have been
scheduled by law for December 14, 1989. Any modification
of the constitution would have to be agreed to by the junta
and submitted to a plebiscite for ratification before that
time. Opposition leaders may well realize that to press for
fundamental changes might distract from their objective of
preparing a campaign capable of winning the 1989 elec-
tions.
With the junta still in power, the opposition will be
negotiating from a position of weakness. Although the No
won the plebiscite, opposition leaders are stymied by the


weakness of their individual claims to representativeness
and legitimacy. In a narrow legal construction, the No only
signified a rejection of eight more years for Pinochet; it did
not provide a clear mandate for an alternative to the 1980
Constitution. In the absence of competitive democratic
elections, leaders with little popularity may claim as much
authority as leaders with larger followings. The government
has been skillful at incapacitating politicians. For every
demand from leaders of the multiparty opposition, the
government claims that its own spokespersons should have
as much say.
It is possible that the government will be willing to
negotiate some changes. The two most likely seem to be a
relaxation of the stringent rules for amending the con-
stitution and a modification of the provision that calls for
over one-fourth of the senate to be appointed, not elected.
These changes could be possible because parties of the
right might join the opposition in making a case for them.
Rightist politicians disapprove of a senate with a large
number of unelected senators, would prefer a stronger
legislature, and are worried about the tutelary role given in
the constitution to the military. In the future, other
constitutional requirements might be softened through
implementation or interpretation. For example, the role of
the national security council could be diluted by adding
civilian members and by defining narrowly the scope of
national security concerns. Even the highly restrictive
Article VIII, prohibiting Marxist participation, will depend
for its impact on how it is enforced.
The paramount question for both the Yes and the No
forces is whether they will be able to maintain their unity
for the coming elections. Because of its loss, the Right
seems to be more divided in the weeks after the plebiscite
than the opposition. Leaders have stumbled over one
another trying to attribute blame for the defeat of the Yes
option. Renovation has made it very clear that it intends to
distance itself from the government and not allow the
presidential palace to dictate the course of the campaign.
UDI and other rightist parties, that are much more linked
to the regime, are likely to seek partisan advantage by
remaining close to the authorities. While it is likely that
the Right will come up with a consensus candidate who
would be supported strongly by the government, the choice
may generate further conflicts and divisions and make it
difficult for the right to project a coherent strategy and
program.
Opposition leaders realized that to win in the plebis-
cite they had to put aside profound ideological, group, and
personality differences. They may be capable of retaining
that solidarity in order to achieve the political power
necessary to initiate more fundamental transformations in
the institutional order, but their task will not be an easy
one. The stakes are even higher now than before the
plebiscite. The challenge no longer is unifying to block the
reelection of an authoritarian leader, but uniting to shape
the future of the country. The sharp divisions in Chilean
politics, which brought democracy down in the early 1970s
and allowed Pinochet to remain in office for sixteen years,









constitute serious stumbling blocks. The formation of a
new left-wing coalition, the Broad Party of the Socialist
Left (Partido Amplio de la Izquierda Socialista-PAIS),
including socialists from the No campaign and the Com-
munist Party, clearly complicates the unity efforts by once
again pushing the Christian Democrats toward the right.
Although the opposition is likely to turn to the Christian
Democrats for a standard bearer, that choice has been
further complicated by serious intraparty divisions along
ideological, personal, and generational lines. Until the
Christian Democrats are able to come up with a candidate,
serious efforts at structuring a transitional program and
coalition for governabilityy" will have to wait.
In this picture the Communist Party faces difficult
choices. Party officials at first had refused to endorse voter
registration and later had refused to call for a No vote. In
both cases they relented when they saw that many of their
own supporters favored trying to defeat the regime under
its own rules. However, even though the Communists sup-
ported the No option at the last minute, they remained
convinced that the Yes would win, either through voting
fraud or some kind of internal coup. The fact that neither
took place reinforced the arguments of the democratic
opposition that the electoral route was the best way to seek
political change in Chile.
The Communists contributed to the No victory by
turning out voters and by agreeing to keep their own
partisans home on election night. After the plebiscite they
sought to recoup lost strength by helping to forge PAIS as
an answer to Ricardo Lagos and the PPD. Even in PAIS,
however, they will have to play a secondary role and wait
for free and open elections and a return to full democratic
practices to have an active say in politics. The military will
be very reluctant to change Article VIII of the constitution
nor will they permit Communist candidates. The Com-
munists want a deal with the other opposition groups to
obtain those changes after democratic politics have re-
turned. This position may be rejected by the left of the
party and by the armed Manuel Rodrfguez Patriotic Front.
Leftwing Communists fear that the moderate politicians will
only betray the people by agreeing to operate within the
framework of Pinochet's legality. Insurrectionary elements,
in some cases aided and abetted by government security
forces, may seek to provoke violence and to destabilize the
political process. However, it is likely that these positions
will receive much less support within the PC than they
have in the past. Chile is likely to move to elections and
to a democratic transition because most Chileans have
opted for that course.
For Pinochet the options are much less promising
than before the plebiscite. Pinochet is already feeling his
power slipping as the logic of "lame-duckness" sets in.
Within his own institution, the professionally oriented
members of the army may well seek to distance themselves
from their commander. Most likely, Pinochet will attempt
to retain his position as commander-in-chief of the army,
which he can do for another four to eight years. It is
possible, however, that he will feel pressure to step down


in favor of newer leadership unless he is prepared to retain
a largely ceremonial role.
For the armed forces, the transition process is compli-
cated. The regime has defined the transition in a constitu-
tional document they have sworn to uphold. Chile's armed
forces have evolved away from the tradition of military
leaders of the past, who viewed their role as clearly
subservient to civilian democratic authority. Many army
officers strongly believe that the military must maintain a
tutelary role over civilian leaders they regard with con-
tempt. Politicians will have to move cautiously in structur-
ing reforms and attempting to dialogue with the armed
forces in order to bridge the enormous chasm which exists
between the civilian and military worlds.
At the same time the opposition will have to tread
with caution in dealing with the issue of human rights.
Human rights seems destined to become an important item
on the agenda of a new civilian government. While elected
leaders may have to respond to the demand for justice,
they also will have to work out a policy aimed at reassur-
ing the armed forces that the institutions themselves are
not in jeopardy. A resolution of the civil-military rela-
tionship remains a vital element in the process of Chilean
redemocratization.
For the future of Chilean democracy, the plebiscite
represents only a first step, albeit a giant one. It leaves
open minimal as well as maximal scenarios. A minimalist
outcome resulting in "democradura"12 would preserve
virtually all the authoritarian features of the 1980 Constitu-
tion. The plebiscite would signify little more than a
termination of the presidency of Pinochet, who could retain
considerable behind-the-scenes power as army commander
and member of the national security council. The armed
forces commanders would maintain a veto power over the
policies and actions of constitutionally elected representa-
tives of the people in the legislature and presidency and
would invoke those powers when they felt "national
security" was threatened. Although a civilian president
would be elected in December 1989, with strong powers
vis-a-vis a very weak legislature, ultimate authority would
reside in a remarkably autonomous military institution. The
participation of opposition parties would legitimize the
system and the Marxist parties-representing at least 25
percent of the population-would remain banned from
political life. In this scenario, virtually no progress would
be achieved on questions of human rights and social
justice. Although the scope for democratic freedoms and
activities might widen over the years, further democratiza-
tion would remain gradual and tentative. A continual role
for the armed forces might risk open politicization of the
institution, a politicization which has not taken place under
military rule because of Pinochet's and the junta's insis-
tence on a clear separation between military and govern-
mental functions for armed forces personnel. A minimalist
outcome seems most likely if the parties represented in the
No command fail to unite in order to win the presidency
and a substantial majority of the Congress to be elected in
1989.








In a maximalist outcome, the plebiscite will have
generated momentum toward an untrammeled democracy.
Whether voting No or Yes, most Chileans expressed their
preference for settling their disputes through the peaceful
verdict of the ballot box. Despite fifteen years of harsh
authoritarian policies, they have retained their partisan
loyalties and democratic political culture. The logic of the
political marketplace should take hold, as national attention
turns to competitive elections for congress and the presi-
dency. If the parties represented in the No Command
succeed in structuring a joint transitional program led by
a common presidential candidate, they stand a good chance
of obtaining the mandate they need in order to bring about
the constitutional reforms required to return to genuine
democratic institutions. Only with substantial majority sup-
port will political leaders succeed in devising subordinate
roles for the armed forces and an exit for General Pino-
chet while taming the passions of extremists from the Left
and Right. Only with majority support will they be able to
address the grievances of the millions of Chileans who
expect that their vote for the No in the plebiscite will
alleviate their serious economic predicament. Even if they
win broad support for their policies, Chilean leaders will
have to move cautiously in responding to the country's
pent-up demands. The relatively favorable macro-economic
picture of Chile should make that task somewhat easier.
The defeat of Pinochet in Chile had a profound
impact on the fragile and struggling democratic forces in
the rest of the continent. The fact that the Chilean people
turned down a government which has received international
praise for its economic policies, suggests that even "eff-
icient" military regimes are incapable of addressing the
fundamental problems of a political community, and gives
pause to those who feel that authoritarian solutions are
more effective than democratic ones in addressing the
serious problems of the region. During the next few years,
the international community will continue to watch to see
whether Chile can translate the repudiation of dictatorship
into durable redemocratization.


APPENDIX

Formation and Operation of the Commission

The Executive Council of the Latin American Studies
Association authorized Paul Drake and Arturo Valenzuela
to appoint and co-chair an international commission to ob-
serve and report on the Chilean plebiscite. The Commis-
sion was formed in September 1988 and visited Chile
October 2-8, though some members stayed longer. All
members contributed to the writing of this report, though
Drake and Valenzuela took the primary responsibility. All
members of the Commission do not necessarily agree with
every statement in this report, but there was broad consen-
sus on most points. The report will be distributed in Latin
America and the United States.


Acknowledgements

The LASA Commission owes a debt to many Chileans who
gave freely of their time and assistance. Some of them are
listed below under interviews, but hundreds of others from
many walks of life will remain nameless. For the warm
hospitality shown by academic institutions during the
Commission's visit, thanks are due to Gustavo Lagos and
Boris Yopo and the Asociaci6n Chilena de Ciencia Politica,
to Oscar Godoy and the Instituto de Ciencia Politica of the
Universidad Cat6lica, to Norbert Lechner and the Facultad
Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO), and to
Alejandro Foxley and the Corporaci6n de Investigaciones
Econ6micas para Latinoam6rica (CIEPLAN). The
Commission also thanks Manuel Antonio Garret6n and
Carlos Huneeus for special presentations. The Commission
is grateful to the Ford Foundation for its funding.

Interviews with Public and Academic Figures

Jaime A16, Director of Research, Sociedad de Fomento
Fabril
Andr6s Allamand, Vice-President, Renovaci6n Nacional
Clodomiro Almeyda, Secretary General, Partido
Socialista/Almeyda
Genaro Arriagada, Secretary General, Comando por el No
Harry G. Barnes, U.S. Ambassador to Chile
Manuel Barrera, Centro de Estudios Sociales
Jos6 Miguel Barros, Comit6 Elecciones Libres
Carlos BascufiAn, Centro de Estudios de la
Realidad Contemporinea
Pablo Berwart, La Epoca
Andr6s Bianchi, CEPAL
John Biehl, CIEPLAN
Sergio Bitar, Comit6 Central, Partido por la Democracia
Alvaro Briones, Cauce
Jos6 Joaquin Brunner, FLACSO
Fernando Bustamante, FLACSO
Manuel Bustos, President, Central Unitaria de
Trabajadores
Carlos Cabello, President, Gran Frente Civico
Independientes por el Si
Guillermo Campero, Instituto Latinoamericano de Estudios
Transnacionales (ILET)
Carlos Catalan, FLACSO
Ascanio Cavallo, Editor La Epoca
German Correa, Comando por el No; Partido
Socialista/Almeyda
Gustavo Cuevas Farren, Consejo Econ6mico y Social,
Universidad de Chile
Enrique d'Etigny, Academia de Humanismo Cristiano
Jorge Errizuriz, Renovaci6n Nacional
Octavio Errizuriz, Ministry of Foreign Relations
Jaime Est6vez, President, Santiago District, PPD
Baldomero Estrada, Universidad Cat6lica, Valparaiso
,General Pedro Ewing Hodar (r.), Army; Ministry of
Foreign Relations
Joaqufn Fermandois, Universidad Cat6lica, Valparaiso









Angel Flisfisch, FLACSO; Comit6 T6cnico, Comando por
el No
Alejandro Foxley, CIEPLAN; Comit6 T6cnico, Comando
por el No
Ricardo French-Davis, CIEPLAN; Comit6 Econ6mico,
Comando por el No
Ricardo Garcia, Foreign Minister
Manuel Antonio Garret6n, FLACSO; Comit6 T6cnico,
Comando por el No
Oscar Godoy, Universidad Cat61ica; Vice-President, Comit6
Elecciones Libres
Gast6n Gonzalez, Direcci6n Comunicaciones, Cruzada
Civica
Jaime Guzman, President, Uni6n Democritica
Independiente
Josefina Guzman, Supervisora Nacional, Cruzada Civica
Patricio Hales, Partido Comunista de Chile
Tomas Hirsch, President, Partido Humanista
Carlos Huneeus, Centro de Estudios de la Realidad
Contemporanea; Comit6 T6cnico, Comando por el No
General Jaime Izarn6tegui, Army
M6nica Jim6nez, Cruzada Civica
George Jones, Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy in
Chile
Gustavo Lagos, President, Asociaci6n Chilena de Ciencia
Polftica
Ricardo Lagos, President, Partido por la Democracia
Norbert Lechner, Director, Facultad Latinoamericana de
Ciencias Sociales
Fernando Leniz, Businessman, Former Minister of
Economics
Marilyn McAfee, Public Information Office, U.S. Embassy
in Chile
Tomas MacHale, El Mercurio
Admiral Ronald McIntyre (r.), Navy
Luis Maira, President, Izquierda Cristiana
Luis Medina, Confederaci6n Unitaria Obrero-Campesina
Admiral Jos6 Toribio Merino Castro, Junta Member and
Commander-in-Chief of the Navy
Oscar Mertz, Director of Studies, Centro de Estudios
P6blicos; Adviser, Secretaria General de la Presidencia
Sergio Molina, President, Comit6 Elecciones Libres
Eduardo Morales, FLACSO
Tombs Moulian, FLACSO
Alfonso Mujica, Confederaci6n de Producci6n y Comercio
Heraldo Mufioz, Centro de Estudios de la Realidad
Contemporanea; Vice-President, Santiago Area, Partido
por la Democracia
General Jaime Nufiez Cabrera, Army; President, Academia
Nacional de Estudios Politicos y Estrat6gicos
Ricardo Nufiez, Secretary General, Partido Socialista/
Nufiez
Eduardo Ortiz, CEREN
Andr6s Palma, President, Izquierda Unida
Mario Papi, Social Democracia
Gianfranco Pasquino, Senator, Italy; International Observer
Bernardino Pifiera, Bishop of La Serena; Member, Comit6
Permanente del Episcopado Chileno


Jos6 Pifiera, Former Minister of Labor and Mines
Carlos Portales, FLACSO
Cristian Precht, General Vicar, Arzobispado de Santiago
Joseph Ramos, CEPAL
German Riesco, Partido Nacional
General C6sar Ruiz Danyau (r.), Air Force
Walter Sanchez, Universidad de Chile
Andr6s Sanfuentes, Partido Comunista de Chile
Lucia Santa Cruz, El Mercurio
Herman Schwember, PET
General Santiago Sinclair, Vice-Commander-in-Chief of the
Army
Sol Serrano, Centro de Estudios de la Realidad
Contemporanea
Ricardo Solari, Comit6 T6cnico, Comando por el No;
Partido Socialista/Almeyda
Juan Somavia, International Relations Committee,
Comando por el No
General Roberto Soto Mackenney, Army
Adolfo Suarez, Former President of the Government of
Spain; International Observer
Osvaldo Sunkel, CEPAL
Eugenio Tironi, SUR
Luciano Tomassini, RIAL
Juan Gabriel Vald6s, Instituto Latinoamericano de
Estudios Transnacionales
Maria Elena Valenzuela, Asociaci6n Chilena de
Investigaciones para la Paz
Augusto Varas, FLACSO
Gonzalo Vial, Historian
Ignacio Walker, CIEPLAN
Federico Willoughby, Former Presidential Aide
Boris Yopo, Asociaci6n Chilena de Ciencia Politica



NOTES

1. With the exception of the "background" section, most
of the material presented in this report comes from
detailed interviews and direct observations by commission
members. Most of the interviewees are listed in the
appendix to this report. Arturo Valenzuela and Peter Winn
spent most of August, and Alan Angell most of September
in Chile. Some of the material in the report reflects those
earlier research trips.
2. The word in the constitution is representar. Some
experts argue that this is only an advisory function. Others
have argued that such representation would constitute legal
justification for a coup should the authorities that are
admonished, including the congress and the president, not
heed the warnings of the national security council.
According to this view, it was the lack of such authority
that prevented the Chilean military from acting sooner in
deposing Allende. The legislative history of the constitution
is found in Sergio Carrasco Delgado, Ginesis y vigencia de
los textos constitucionales chilenos (Santiago: Editorial
Juridica de Chile, 1980). The most valuable source for the









Constitution of 1980 is Luz Bulnes Aldunate, Constituci6n
de la Rep(blica de Chile: concordancias, anotaciones y
fuentes (Santiago: Editorial Jurfdica de Chile, 1981). All
quotes are taken from this edition.
3. See United States Embassy, Santiago, Chile, Chile:
1988 Plebiscite-Resource Book, mimeo, 1988, pp. 69-70.
This publication, prepared for use by observer teams going
to Chile, provides valuable documents and information on
the plebiscite.
4. Registration data are taken from mimeographed
publications made available by the National Electoral
Service (Servicio Electoral Nacional). The service was
created by Law No. 18.556, Organic Constitutional Law on
the Electoral Registration System and the Electoral Service,
published October 1, 1986, in the Diario Oficial.
5. See Organic Constitutional Law No. 18.700 on
Popular Voting and Counting, published in the Diario
Official on May 6, 1988, modified by Law No. 18.733,
published on August 13, 1988.
6. Opposition parties had great difficulty agreeing to
register "in the legality of regime." The parties law required
each party to obtain large numbers of signatures and to
conform to a series of rules that were subject to
enforcement by the Electoral Service. For the Organic
Constitutional Law on Political Parties, see Law No. 18.603,
published in the Diario Oficial on March 23, 1987.
7. This section and the longer section below dealing
with the night of the plebiscite is based on conversations
by a Commission member with key sources in the
government, the opposition, and the diplomatic service. At
first the events described here were denied by government
supporters. Eventually, most of the events were confirmed
in subsequent published reports. The first published
revelations of the events of the night of October 5th
appeared in veiled form in Ascanio Cavallo's column, "La
hora de los audaces," La Epoca, October 9, 1988, p. 8, and
Pamela Constable, "Chile Factions United to Safeguard
Voting," The Boston Globe, October 13, 1988, p. 1. Because
of its close ties to the government, the most politically
significant account appeared in the rightist Que Pasa, No.
914 (November 13-19, 1988), "La noche mis larga...," pp.
6-7, under Patricia O'Shea's byline. Another good report,
which draws on the Qud Pasa account, is Nibaldo
Mosciatti's "La historic de un golpe frustrado," APSI (24-
30 October 1988), pp. 4-7. The most complete description
of what happened published to date is Ascanio Cavallo,
Manuel Salazar and Oscar Sepulveda, "La historic oculta
del regimen military: 5 de Octubre," Special Supplement 53
of La Epoca.
8. Renato Gazmuri, a leader of Renovaci6n Nacional,
caused a sensation when he agreed with these accounts and
noted in a public forum that "hot heads surrounding the
President" had tried to "provoke a grave confrontation that
would have resulted in military intervention...[and] maintain
the government beyond the results of the plebiscite." See
Las Ultimas Noticias, November 10, 1988, p. 7. See also La
Epoca, November 10, 1988, p. 10.


9. The totals are official results issued by the Electoral
Service. The regional and small town breakdowns were
obtained from the sample of polling places issued by the
Committee for Free Elections.
10. Several organizations and research institutions
conducted public opinion surveys in the months leading up
to the plebiscite. Those identified with the opposition
included FLACSO, CERC, ILET, and CIS. Those
identified with the regime included GALLOP, SKOPUS,
CEP, and the University of Chile. Generally speaking, the
pro-regime polls showed results favorable to the
government and the anti-regime polls showed results
favorable to the opposition. However, with the exception of
the CEP poll, the polls conducted by opposition research
organizations appeared much more reliable and serious.
FLACSO undertook the best polling up until April 1988.
Particularly valuable was a regional poll, Concepci6n 88:
Una Encuesta Regional, conducted by FLACSO in
cooperation with several other research centers. CERC
undertook some valuable national polls up until September,
although the CERC poll tended to underestimate the Yes
vote. The most valuable survey may well be the one
conducted by CEP towards the second half of September.
The data represented in this report draw on conclusions in
the CERC and CEP surveys, which appear to coincide. The
more detailed results are from the CEP poll. See CERC,
Informe Encuesta Nacional: Septiembre 1988 and the
English language summary of the CEP poll in Brockbank
and Associates, Inc., Estudio Nacional de Opini6n Piblica
de Chile, September 1988. It is instructive that the CEP
poll, which was available shortly before the plebiscite and
showed that the No would win, was suppressed by the CEP
board. Rather than reporting the results of that poll, of
which it had knowledge, El Mercurio, the pro-government
daily, reported instead the results of a SKOPUS poll that
showed the Yes winning by the same margin as that by
which the No actually won. See El Mercurio, October 5,
1988, p. 1.
11. The above information is taken from the CEP poll.
See Estudio Nacional.
12. As Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe Schmitter and
Laurence Whitehead have noted, transitions from
authoritarianism may stop short of unfettered democracy.
They identify four regime types: dictadura, or autocracy;
dictablanda, or liberalized autocracy; democradura, or
limited democracy; and democracia, or full democracy. The
plebiscite marks Chile's movement from the first to the
second type of regime, though some regression remains
possible. Assuming continued progress, the foreseeable
future could lead to types three or four, or a variant in
between. The O'Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead work is
found in Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, 4 vols.
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).









SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Arriagada, Genaro. El pensamiento politico de los militares.
Santiago, 1986.
Pinochet: The Politics of Power. Winchester, 1988.
Brockbank and Associates, Inc. Estudio national de opinion
piblica de Chile. September 1988.
Bulnes Aldunate, Luz. Constituci6n de la republica de Chile:
concordancias, anotaciones y fuentes. Santiago, 1981.
Campero, Guillermo. Entre la sobrevivencia y la acci6n
political. Santiago, 1987.
Los gremios empresariales en el period 1970-1983.
Santiago, 1984.
Campero, Guillermo and Jos6 A. Valenzuela. El
movimiento sindical en el regimen military chileno, 1973-
1981. Santiago, 1984.
Carrasco Delgado, Sergio. Genesis y vigencia de los textos
constitucionales chilenos. Santiago, 1980.
Cavallo, Ascanio. "La hora de los audaces," La Epoca,
October 9, 1988.
Cavallo, Ascanio, Manuel Salazar, and Oscar Sepilveda.
"La historic oculta del regimen military: 5 de Octubre,"
La Epoca, Special Supplement 53.
Chile. Constituci6n political de la republica de Chile.
Santiago, 1980.
Constable, Pamela. "Chile Factions United to Safeguard
Voting," The Boston Globe, October 13, 1988.
Domic K., Juraj. Political military del Partido Comunista de
Chile. Santiago, 1988.
Drake, Paul W. Socialismo y populismo en Chile, 1932-
1988. Santiago, 1989.
Edwards, Sebastian and Alejandra Cox Edwards.
Monetarism and Liberalization: The Chilean Experiment.
Cambridge, 1987.
El Mercurio, October 5, 1988.
Falcoff, Mark, Arturo Valenzuela, and Susan Kaufman
Purcell. Chile: Prospects for Democracy. New York, 1988.
Foxley, Alejandro. Chile y su future. Santiago, 1987.
Friihling, Hugo, Carlos Portales, and Augusto Varas.
Estado y fuerzas armadas. Santiago, 1982.
Garret6n, Manuel Antonio. Dictaduras y democratizaci6n.
Santiago, 1984.
Reconstruir la political. Santiago, 1987.
El plebiscite de 1988 y la transici6n a la democracia.
Santiago, 1988.
Hojman, David E. Chile After 1973. Liverpool, 1985.
Huneeus, Carlos. Los ChileAos y la political. Santiago, 1987.
"La democracia en Chile: un enfoque institutional."
Documento preparado para el seminario international
sobre Las Perspectivas de la Estabilidad Democrdtica en
los Paises Andinos dentro de un Marco Comparativo,
Villa de Leyva, Colombia, 9-11 de agosto, 1988.
La Epoca, November 10, 1988.
Las Ultimas Noticias, November 10, 1088.
Lavin, Joaquin. Chile: revoluci6n silenciosa. Santiago, 1987.
Loveman, Brian. Chile: The Legacy of Hispanic Capitalism,
2nd ed. New York, 1988.


Mosciatti, Nibaldo. "La historic de un golpe frustrado,"
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Munizaga, Giselle. El discurso pablico de Pinochet.
Santiago, 1988.
Mufioz, Heraldo. Las relaciones exteriores del gobiemo
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O'Brien, Phil and Jackie Roddick. Chile: The Pinochet
Decade. London, 1983.
O'Donnell, Guillermo, Philippe Schmitter, and Laurence
Whitehead. Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, 4 vols.
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Valenzuela, J. Samuel, and Arturo Valenzuela. Military
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Hemisphere


A MAGAZINE OF LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN AFFAIRS
Provoking debate on the region's problems, initiatives
and achievements...
Providing an intellectual bridge between the concerned publics of
North America, Latin America and the Caribbean.
Combining timeliness and depth, Hemisphere presents. ..


FEATURE ARTICLES
Frontline reports and essays
by opinionmakers from the
Americas and the world.
FAXFILE
Insider briefs on people and
institutions shaping Latin
American and Caribbean affairs.
EDITORIALS
Incisive commentary on
regional developments.
PUBLICATIONS UPDATE
A comprehensive guide to the
most recent books, periodicals
and documents on the region.


BOOK REVIEWS
Critiques of provocative new
books on Latin America and the
Caribbean, ranging from politics
and economics to literature and
cinema.


Published by the Latin American
and Caribbean Center
Florida International University,
Miami, Florida 33199
Subscribe now!
And get a year (3 issues) of Hemisphere.
US, PR, USVI, Canada $14 Elsewhere $22
Please make check or money order payable to:
Hemisphere
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SUMMER SOCIAL SCIENCE PROGRAM

June 5-July 28, 1989

Santiago, Chile


Objective: Introduce young social
scientists to outstanding Latin American
scholars and contemporary social science
issues.

Study Site: Santiago, Chile (pop. 4.6
million) is an exceptional place to study
social science issues. A wide array of public
and private research institutions are located in
Santiago, including the Economic Commis-
sion for Latin America (ECLA), the Latin
American Demographic Center (CELADE),
and the Latin American Center for Research
and Planning Studies (CIEPLAN).

Courses: 44:193 Latin America in the
International Political Economy, 3 s.h., will
analyze the structural conditions of regional
development. It will cover import-substitu-
tion, industrialization strategies, regional
integration schemes, the role of ECLA, debt
repayment, and other topics. Professors
Ffrench-Davis and Mufoz.


44:192 The State and Society in the Southern
Cone. 3 s.h., will deal with the determinants of
the rise of authoritarianism and the transition to
democracy in Brazil, Uruguay, and Argentina,
with special reference to Chile. Particular
attention will be paid to the relationship
between regimes and elements of civil society
such as political parties, the Church, and the
labor movement. Professor Garret6n.

44:194 Independent Study, arr. Students will
produce a paper based on library or field
research. Possible topics include social services
delivery systems, authoritarianism, regional
planning, urban studies, public health problems,
and related topics. Professor Scarpaci.

Sponsoring Institutions
* The University of Iowa
* Institute of International Studies,
University of Chile
* Latin American Faculty of the Social
Sciences (FLACSO)


Teaching Faculty
* Ricardo Ffrench-Davis (Ph.D. Chicago)
* Heraldo Muioz (Ph.D. Denver)
* Manuel Antonio Garret6n (Ph.D. Ecole des
Etudes des Science Sociales)
* Joseph L. Scarpaci (Ph.D. Florida)

Eligibility Requirements
* Proficiency in Spanish
* Graduate or advanced undergraduate

Application Deadline
March 15, 1989

For More Information, Contact
Joseph L. Scarpaci
Director, Latin American Studies Program
International Center
The University of Iowa
Iowa City, IA 52242
Telephone: (319) 335-0368/0164
BITNET: BLASCAPD@UIAMVS


THE ARGENTINE & IBERO-AMERICAN FOLK ART FOUNDATION, INC. (AIFA)
is a non-profit educational corporation whose purpose is the promotion of the Ibero-
American culture in educational and cultural institutions, in academia and among the
general public.
The programs created by AIFA are the ideal choice for Latin American Studies Program
Depts., Intl. Studies Depts., History Depts., Political and Social Science Depts.,
Anthropology Depts., as well as Music and Dance Depts. for curricular and extra
curricular activities.
Lectures, lecture-demonstrations, residencies, workshops, master classes, multi-media
presentations, choreographic commissions and exhibitions of artifacts are some of the
programs offered by AIFA.
Vocal and instrumental artists and groups
Solo dancers and dance groups
Visual artists
Cultural, research and fact-finding trips to Central and South America
(individuals and groups) via scheduled service of major airlines
at substantial savings.
For further information please call or write:
AIFA FOUNDATION, INC.
P.O. Box 624, FDR Station
New York, N.Y 10150-0624
Attn.: Alice Wichmann
FOUNDATION Phone: 718-784-7488


-





Institutional Form on Reverse Side


LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES ASSOCIATION
LASA Secretariat
William Pitt Union, 9th Floor
University of Pittsburgh
Pittsburgh, PA 15260
Individual Membership for Calendar Year 1989: Renewal; New Application
Please use this form to renew your membership or to become a LASA member. Dues are for the 1989 calendar year: January
1 December 31.
Membership Categories and Rates: 1989 Amount
Introductory (for new members only) O $22 $_
Regular:
Under $20,000 annual income D $29 $_
Between $20,000 and $29,999 annual income 1 $34 $_
Between $30,000 and $39,999 annual income ] $41 $
Over $40,000 annual income D $49 $_
Joint Membership (for second member at same mailing
address as first member; one copy of publications sent.
Add to rate (above) for highest income of the two, or to
categories below: 0 $14 $
Student Associate (five-year limit)
[Professor's signature certifying student status]:
$18 $
Latin Americanists permanently residing in
Latin American or the Caribbean (incl. Puerto Rico) o $18 $_
Emeritus Member (for retired members) o $18 $_


All members receive three issues of the Latin American Research Review and four issues of the LASA
Forum per year. If you wish to receive the Forum by air mail, please add the following amount
per year for postage: Canada and Mexico, $3; all other countries, $13. If you desire air mail
delivery of LARR, please contact the LARR office at the Latin American Institute, 801 Yale
NE, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, NM 87131. $
We encourage you to contribute to the LASA Endowment Fund. $
TOTAL PAYMENT ENCLOSED ........................................................ $_
Please make checks payable to the Latin American Studies Association and mail along with this page to: LASA Secretariat,
William Pitt Union, 9th Floor, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA 15260. Members residing outside the U.S. must send
either a money order, a check in U.S. dollars drawn on a U.S. bank, or a UNESCO coupon for the U.S. dollar amount pay-
able. There will be a $10 charge for all returned checks.



PERSONAL DATA

(If this is a new application for membership, please provide the information requested below; if a renewal, please fill in your
name, electronic mail address/FAX number, and any information that has changed since you last renewed.)

Name Discipline

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Business Telephone Home Telephone
Electronic Mail Address and/or FAX Number

Institutional Affiliation

Country Interest/Specialization








Individual Form on Reverse Side


LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES ASSOCIATION
LASA Secretariat
William Pitt Union, 9th Floor
University of Pittsburgh
Pittsburgh, PA 15260

Institutional Membership for Calendar Year 1989: Renewal; New Application
Please use this form to renew your membership or to become a LASA institutional member. Dues are for the 1989 calendar
year: January 1 December 31.
Membership Categories 1989 Dues
E Consortium of Latin American Studies Program (CLASP) $65

0 Institutional Sponsor, Nonprofit $65

l Institutional Sponsor, Profit $500

E If you wish to receive the LASA Forum by air mail,
please add the following amount for postage:
Canada and Mexico, $3; all other countries, $13. $

D We encourage you to contribute to the LASA Endowment Fund. $

TOTAL PAYMENT ENCLOSED ..................................................... $

Please make checks payable to the Latin American Studies Association and mail along with this page to: LASA Secretariat,
William Pitt Union, 9th Floor, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA 15260. Members residing outside the U.S. must send
either a money order, a check in U.S. dollars drawn on a U.S. bank, or a UNESCO coupon for the U.S. dollar amount pay-
able. There will be a $10 charge for all returned checks.





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