Extraordinary opportunities and...
 Back Matter

Title: LASA forum
Full Citation
Permanent Link: http://ufdc.ufl.edu/UF00091288/00009
 Material Information
Title: LASA forum
Alternate Title: Latin American Studies Association forum
Abbreviated Title: LASA forum
Physical Description: v. : ill. ; 28 cm.
Language: English
Creator: Latin American Studies Association
Donor: Helen Icken Safa ( endowment )
Publisher: Latin American Studies Association,
Latin American Studies Association
Place of Publication: Austin Tex
Publication Date: Spring 1988
Frequency: quarterly
Subject: Latin American Studies Association   ( gtt )
Study and teaching -- Periodicals -- Latin America -- United States   ( lcsh )
Politics and government -- Periodicals -- Latin America -- 1980-   ( lcsh )
Genre: periodical   ( marcgt )
Additional Physical Form: Also issued online.
Statement of Responsibility: Latin American Studies Association.
Dates or Sequential Designation: Vol. 14, no. 2 (summer 1983)-
General Note: Place of publication varies: Pittsburgh, PA, summer 1986-
General Note: Title from caption.
General Note: Latest issue consulted: Vol. 37, issue 1 (winter 2006).
 Record Information
Bibliographic ID: UF00091288
Volume ID: VID00009
Source Institution: University of Florida
Holding Location: University of Florida
Rights Management: All rights reserved by the source institution and holding location.
Resource Identifier: oclc - 10005251
lccn - 87643985
issn - 0890-7218
 Related Items
Preceded by: LASA newsletter

Table of Contents
        Page 1
        Page 2
        Page 3
        Page 4
        Page 5
        Page 6
        Page 7
        Page 8
        Page 9
        Page 10
        Page 11
        Page 12
        Page 13
        Page 14
        Page 15
        Page 16
        Page 17
        Page 18
        Pages 19-22
        Page 23
        Pages 24-26
        Page 27
        Page 28
        Page 29
        Page 30
        Page 31
        Page 32
        Page 33
        Page 34
    Extraordinary opportunities and new risks
        Appendix 1
        Appendix 2
        Appendix 3
        Appendix 4
        Appendix 5
        Appendix 6
        Appendix 7
        Appendix 8
        Appendix 9
        Appendix 10
        Appendix 11
        Appendix 12
        Appendix 13
        Appendix 14
        Appendix 15
        Appendix 16
        Appendix 17
        Appendix 18
        Appendix 19
        Appendix 20
        Appendix 21
        Appendix 22
        Appendix 23
        Appendix 24
        Appendix 25
        Appendix 26
        Appendix 27
        Appendix 28
        Appendix 29
        Appendix 30
        Appendix 31
        Appendix 32
        Appendix 33
        Appendix 34
        Appendix 35
        Appendix 36
        Appendix 37
        Appendix 38
        Appendix 39
        Appendix 40
        Appendix 41
        Appendix 42
        Appendix 43
        Appendix 44
    Back Matter
        Appendix 45
        Appendix 46
Full Text

gLASA Forum

Latin American Studies Association

Vol. XIX, No. 1

Spring 1988

President's Report
Paul W. Drake
University of California, San Diego

This overview updates the report of outgoing President
Cole Blasier published in the last issue of the LASA Forum.
Thankfully for us all, he managed both the Association and
the transfer of office with great efficiency and good cheer.
Both Cole and I have been committed to keeping LASA an
open, scholarly, participatory, vibrant organization.
Moreover, we shared four main objectives which will be car-
ried forward, in conjunction with the talented and dedicated
staff of the Secretariat: Reid Reading, Lynn Young, and June
First, LASA will continue to try to expand its member-
ship. We have reached nearly 2,500 members, approximately
1,300 of whom attended the meetings in New Orleans.
Second, the Association will further fortify its finances,
especially through augmentation of its endowment. Louis W.
Goodman (chair), Werner Baer, and Peter Cleaves have
agreed to form the LASA Endowment Funds Committee to
advise on the accumulation, management, and expenditure of
those small but growing funds; LASA members are urged to
contribute. Third, LASA has been undergoing a process of
institutionalization, evidenced by recent revisions to its con-
stitution and by-laws, terms for officers that better coordinate
with congresses, regularized financial rules, and established
procedures for congress programs. Fourth, we have sought to
increase participation by Latin Americans to reflect our inter-
national community of scholars. The expanding role of our
Latin American colleagues can be seen not only in terms of
congress participation but also in the membership of commit-
tees and task forces.

From all indications, the XIV International Congress in
New Orleans was a huge success. A special debt of gratitude
is owed to the Program Committee, chaired by Charles Berg-
quist, and the Local Arrangements Committee, led by Karen
Bracken and Richard E. Greenleaf. The Secretariat also
worked'extremely hard and effectively. Meetings were
enriched by an unusually large contingent of Latin
Americans, partly thanks to the fund-raising efforts of
Douglas Bennett. Those participants came from nearly every
country in the hemisphere, including-after several years of
frustrated efforts-Cuba.
Continued on page 3

XIV International Congress
Report of the Program Committee
Charles Bergquist
Duke University

LASA's XIV International Congress was held in New
Orleans, Louisiana, March 17-19, 1988. Some 1600 scholars
from approximately 25 different countries in North and South
America, Europe and Asia attended. The program featured
over 200 panels, workshops, roundtables, and special sessions
addressing topics as diverse as "Farmers and Bankers" and
"Art and Society in Puerto Rico," "Human Rights in Cuba"
and "Changing Perspectives on Colonial Spanish American
History and Literature."

Although it is difficult to gauge the overall quality and
organizational success of a meeting this large, the Program
Committee was heartened by what it saw and heard during the
congress. Participants seemed generally pleased with its diver-
sity, balance, professionalism and organization. A large part
of the credit for making the meeting function so smoothly
goes to the staff of the LASA Secretariat and to the Local
Arrangements Committee, especially the work of Richard
Greenleaf and Karen Bracken.

This year's congress featured twelve special sessions,
three or four of which competed during a reserved time slot
each afternoon. Organized by the Program Committee and
the LASA Executive Committee, these sessions emphasized
comparative themes or contemporary issues of great moment
in Latin America. An extraordinary session honored the
recipient of the Kalman Silvert Award, Charles Wagley.
Other sessions featured participants from Latin American
institutions outside the hemisphere: one included a represen-
tative from the Latin American Studies Association of Japan
and another, an associate of the Institute of Latin American
Studies of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.
Continued on page 5

Please note that the date for the XV International Congress
in San Juan, Puerto Rico, is September 21-23, 1989, not
September 28-30 as originally announced.


President's Report.............................. 1
By Paul W. Drake

XIV International Congress, New Orleans
Report of the Program Committee ................... 1
By Charles Bergquist

Research Visits to the USSR........................ 4

Call for Silvert Award Nominations .................. 4

LASA/88 Film Festival............................5

XIV Congress Papers Available ...................... 7

Nominations Invited for 1989 Slate ................. 10

Report of the LASA Business Meeting ............... 11

Committees and Task Forces ....................... 16

Blasier Accepts New Position ..................... 17

XV International Congress, San Juan:
Report from the Program Committee..............17
Policies and Guidelines for Session Organizers ...... 18
Proposal for Organized Session .................. 19
Proposal for Special Events & Meetings ............ 21
Proposal for Film Festival Submission ............. 23
Proposal for Paper Presentation ................. 25

Letters ......................................... 26

Announcements.............................. ..29

Forthcoming Conferences/Symposia ................ 29

Employment Opportunities ......................... 31

Research & Study Opportunities .................... 32

Publications ........... ...................... ... 33

Final Report of the LASA Commission
on Compliance with the Central
America Peace Accord .................. Appendix

Latin American Studies Association

Vice President:
Past President:

Executive Council:
(For term ending October 1989):

(For term ending April 1991):

Executive Director:
Assistant to the Executive Director:
Publications Director:

Forum Editorial
Advisory Board:

Paul Drake (University of California, San Diego)
Jean Franco (Columbia University)
Cole Blasier (University of Pittsburgh)

Peter Bell (Edna McConnell Clark Foundation), Lorenzo
Meyer (Colegio de Mexico), Marta Tienda (University of
Peter Evans (University of New Mexico), Adolfo Figueroa
(Universidad Cat6lica del Per6), Cynthia McClintock
(George Washington University).

Reid Reading (University of Pittsburgh)
Lynn M. Young (University of Pittsburgh)
June S. Belkin (University of Pittsburgh)

Marta Morello Frosch (University of California, Santa
Cruz), Enrique Meyer (University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign), Alexander W. Wilde (Washington Office
on Latin America).

The LASA Forum is published in the winter, spring, summer and fall. Deadlines for receipt of copy are November 20, February
20, May 20 and August 20 respectively. All contributions should be directed to Reid Reading, Editor, LASA Forum, William Pitt
Union, 9th Floor, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA 15260. Opinions expressed herein are those of individual authors and
do not necessarily reflect the views of the Latin American Studies Association or its officers. We welcome responses to any
material published in the Forum. ISSN 0890-7218


One of the few complaints that surfaced in New Orleans
concerned the cancellation of some of the special sessions,
such as the address of Peruvian President Aldn Garcia.
However well planned, such "big events" are always long
shots, which is why several are scheduled simultaneously.
Unless LASA wants to stop trying to arrange such extraor-
dinary opportunities, we will simply have to tolerate uncer-
tainties and disappointments.

Spearheaded by Chair Mark Rosenberg, preparations
are already well underway for the XV International Congress
in San Juan, Puerto Rico, September 21-23, 1989. [Note
revised date; earlier information gave date as Sept. 28-30.] His
Program Committee will be assisted by a separate Finance
Committee, led by Steven Sanderson, to raise funds for
foreign participants. Committees for the XVI International
Congress, which will convene in Washington, D.C., in the
spring of 1991, will soon be appointed. Various California
sites are under consideration for the fall of 1992.

During the meeting of the LASA Executive Council in
New Orleans, new member Peter Evans was elected
Treasurer, replacing Werner Baer. The Subcommittee on
Resolutions was chaired by Jean Franco and included Peter
Bell and Cynthia McClintock; their labors insured a smooth
discussion at the business meeting. After processing several
mundane matters, the Council considered plans for LASA
cooperation with CLACSO (Consejo Latinoamericano de
Ciencias Sociales) in discussions with its Executive Secretary,
Fernando Calder6n. At the instigation of former EC member
Susan Eckstein, the council also approved a LASA Book
Award, which will be described in detail in the next Forum; it
will be named after Bryce Wood, in recognition of his enor-
mous scholarly and administrative contributions to Latin
American studies.

The newly approved constitution and by-laws [which will
be published in the next issue of the Forum] were implemented
at the business meeting. Revisions included the quorum
requirement for all votes of 10 percent of those members
registered for the congress. Parliamentarian Arturo Valen-
zuela kept procedures on track. Following numerous commit-
tee reports and intensive recruitment in the hallways, the
assembly passed seven resolutions-on Haiti, Cuba, Central
America, Colombia, Paraguay, immigration, and debt-all
to be submitted to the full membership for a vote by mail
ballot. Motions were passed calling for a negotiated settle-
ment to the civil war in El Salvador, for the removal of U.S.
troops from Honduras, and for solidarity with Carmen
Gloria Quintana, a victim of repression in Chile. The high
point of the meeting was adjournment to the French Quarter.

All of the other LASA committees and task forces
remain very active, as previously reported by Cole Blasier.
Task forces function through communications with the chairs
and meetings at international congresses. Within their man-

dates and in consultation with officers, they respond to LASA
members and take their own initiatives. For example, they
recommend panels and events to the LASA Program Com-
mittee, proposals to the LASA Executive Council, and resolu-
tions or other actions to be taken at the business meeting.
Some task forces also launch projects outside of congresses
and seek extramural funding, since financial support from
LASA is normally not available. The Association is very
grateful to the outgoing chairs and members.

Taking over from their predecessors in New Orleans, the
newly appointed committee and task force members [listed
elsewhere in this issue of the Forum] will serve through the
congress in Puerto Rico. They welcome suggestions from
members. Any LASA member wishing to join a task force at
the next congress should contact Vice President Jean Franco
between now and January 1989. The Executive Council
received suggestions for new Task Forces on Natural
Resources and the Environment and on Scholarly Computing
and Electronic Communication. Although eager to be respon-
sive to initiatives from LASA members, the EC expressed
some concern about proliferating committees in an already
elaborate organization.

Before passing the reins of the Task Force on Scholarly
Relations with Cuba to Lars Schoultz, past cochairs Helen
Safa and Wayne Smith successfully oversaw a series of
seminars in Cuba and kept channels open for exchanges with
Cuba. On the eve of the New Orleans congress, they helped
turn back U.S. government plans to tighten restrictions on
scholarly travel to the island. For the future, the task force will
be organizing working groups on issues of mutual concern,
each cochaired by a specialist from the United States and
from Cuba.

At the request of several LASA members, the Task Force
on Scholarly Relations with Nicaragua has been broadened to
take into account acute problems throughout the Central
American region, while retaining emphasis on Nicaragua.
Outgoing cochairs Michael E. Conroy and Charles L. Stan-
sifer capped off their service by leading the LASA Commis-
sion on Compliance with the Central American Peace
Accord. Under new chair, John Booth, myriad activities will
continue, notably the summer research seminar in Nicaragua
organized by Thomas Walker and Harvey Williams.

Alejandro Portes has consented to once more chair the
Task Force on Scholarly Relations with the Soviet Union. He
will be continuing exchange programs and considering new
approaches in the context of the recent rapprochement
between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.

Federico Gil has also agreed to serve another term as
chair of the Task Force on Scholarly Relations with Spain. As
before, that group will try to expand the number of Spaniards
and panels related to Spain at international congresses. That

mission takes on growing importance as the quincentennial of
the Columbus voyage approaches. Earlier plans to hold a
LASA congress in Madrid had to be canceled.

Under the leadership of Martin Diskin, the Task Force
on Human Rights and Academic Freedom continued to
monitor a broad set of concerns. New chair Alexander Wilde
will be further emphasizing activities in Washington, D.C.

Chaired by Cynthia McClintock, the Task Force on the
Media awarded the LASA Prize for Outstanding Media
Coverage of Latin America to Charles Krause. Task force
members, particularly A. Douglas Kincaid, also arranged
special sessions in New Orleans involving journalists. These
endeavors will be carried forward by new chair Richard A.

The LASA Task Force on Women in Latin American
Studies, cochaired by Norma S. Chinchilla and Marysa
Navarro, also met in New Orleans. The group's new members
and activities are still under discussion.

The Nominations Committee, headed by James M.
Malloy, welcomes suggestions from LASA members for
nominations for Vice President and Executive Council. Can-
didates for the Kalman Silvert Award for lifetime contribu-
tions to Latin American Studies may also be recommended.
[See announcements elsewhere in this issue.]

Two entities affiliated with LASA also held meetings in
New Orleans and reported continued success. Under the
leadership of Richard E. Greenleaf, the Consortium of Latin
American Studies Programs (CLASP) carried on its dynamic
professional, research, outreach, and pedagogical programs.
Editor Gilbert W. Merkx reported on the financial and intel-
lectual good health of the Latin American Research Review.

On rare occasions, LASA sponsors investigative com-
missions to report on special events or issues that can be illum-
inated by its members' expertise. Such expeditions are largely
self-financed. A splended recent example was the LASA
Commission on Compliance with the Central American Peace
Accord, captained by Charles L. Stansifer and Michael E.
Conroy and funded by the Ford Foundation. With
remarkable celerity and thoroughness, those seventeen LASA
members presented their final report in New Orleans. The
Executive Council has authorized a similar, smaller
commission-cochaired by Paul Drake and Arturo
Valenzuela-to observe and report on the Chilean plebiscite.

If any LASA members have questions or comments
about the above matters, please contact me, the Executive
Council, or the Secretariat. On a personal note, let me say
what an honor and pleasure it is to serve such a thoughtful,
congenial, and spirited group of colleagues. See you in
Puerto Rico.


With the support of the International Research and
Exchanges Board, the LASA Task Force on Scholarly Rela-
tions with the Soviet Union will sponsor a small number of
research and consultation visits to the USSR in 1988 and 1989.
The awards cover round-trip air travel costs to Moscow and
a Soviet per diem allowance for the visit. The awards are coor-
dinated with the Institute of Latin America of the USSR
Academy of Sciences, which will sponsor recipients and
facilitate their research work, to the extent feasible. Visits
should be for about one month.

The task force will entertain requests from scholars with
a Ph.D. degree or equivalent, whose Latin America-related
projects will be furthered by a research visit to the USSR.
There is no formal application form. Requests should be in
the form of a letter, no longer than three typewritten pages,
explaining: (1) the goals and design of the project; (2) how
travel to the USSR will enhance it; (3) special qualifications
of the candidate, including past visits and knowledge of Rus-
sian, Spanish, or Portuguese.

A curriculum vitae should be appended to the letter. Send
requests to the US/USSR Task Force, LASA Secretariat, 9th
Floor William Pitt Union, University of Pittsburgh, Pitts-
burgh, PA 15260. Requests should be received prior to July
15, 1988, to be considered for the remainder of 1988 and
calendar year 1989. Decisions will be announced by
September 15, 1988.

- .. -- -- -- -- .. -0


The Kalman Silvert Award Committee invites LASA
members to nominate candidates for the 1989 award, to be
made at the XV International Congress in San Juan,
September 21-23, 1989. Nominations should be sent to the
LASA Secretariat, William Pitt Union, 9th Floor, University
of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA 15260, by September 15, 1988.
Proposers should include biographic information and a
rationale for each nominee.

The Silvert Award recognizes senior members of the pro-
fession who have made a distinguished lifetime contribution
to the study of Latin America. Four scholars have received the
award to date: John J. Johnson (1983), Federico Gil (1985),
Albert O. Hirschman (1986), and Charles Wagley (1988).

The selection committee consists of Cole Blasier (chair),
Past President; Wayne Cornelius and Helen Safa, imme-
diately preceding past presidents; and Gilbert Merkx, Editor
of the Latin American Research Review.

Program Committee

A mini-conference within the LASA congress on
"Fragile Lands of Latin America: The Search for Sustainable
Uses" was organized by John Browder of Tulane University.
It featured five sessions spread among the three days of the

As in the past, the book exhibit was organized by Harve
Horowitz. With 80 companies and organizations represented,
this was the largest and most diverse exhibit ever held in con-
junction with a LASA congress. The Film Festival, coor-
dinated by LaVonne Poteet, presented 26 films, of which
three were international premieres and eight U.S. premieres.
In addition, seven film directors attended, including Tizuka
Yamasaki of Brazil, LASA's distinguished guest director.

Although financial support for the travel of Latin
American participants fell short of the amount needed, many
scholars from Latin America were able to attend, thanks to
the support of a large number of institutions and foundations.
Financial support came from U.S. Centers for Latin
American Studies at Arizona State University, the University
of California at Berkeley, the University of California at San
Diego, University of Chicago, Cornell University, Dartmouth
College, Duke University, University of Florida, Florida
International University, University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill,
University of Pittsburgh, Princeton University, University of
Texas at Austin, and Tulane University. In addition, generous
bloc grants for participant travel were made by the Farm
Foundation, Ford Foundation, Howard Heinz Endowment,
Inter-American Foundation, Kellogg Institute, and the
Samuel H. Kress Foundation. The Association itself con-
tributed an additional amount for participant travel.

I want to thank all the members of the Program Commit-
tee for their contributions: Douglas Bennett, who deserves a
special thanks for handling the bulk of the committee's fund-
raising activities, Jan Flora, Regina Harrison, Nora Lustig
and Scott Whiteford.

Having experienced firsthand the magnitude of the
organizational task involved in putting together the program,
I am convinced that in the long run this function should be
assumed by the Secretariat. The process involves too much
work and too much learning to justify rotating from one insti-
tution to another the task of organizing successive programs.
The staff of Duke University's Council on Latin American
Studies and Center for International Studies put in hundreds
of hours digesting and coordinating thousands of pieces of
correspondence and information from hundreds of telephone
calls; they also mastered the details of scheduling, editing and
printing the program, of handling advertising copy and bulk

The workload assumed by the Program Committee for
the New Orleans congress placed heavy strains on all of us.

Now that LASA meetings have become huge undertakings, it
may be advisable after the San Juan congress to give serious
consideration to finding ways for the Program Committee to
confine itself exclusively to the task of promoting and selec-
ting panels, special sessions, workshops and roundtables. Our
experience suggests that ways to accomplish the remaining
program-related work should be found outside the program
committee itself.

I am presently in discussions with LASA President Paul
Drake, Executive Director Reid Reading, and the new pro-
gram chair, Mark Rosenberg, to find effective ways to
transfer some of this knowledge to the staff of the program
committee at Florida International University. It is clear to
me, however, that in spite of these efforts much learning will
be lost. Hence my suggestion that in the future the program
committee be charged with promoting and selecting panels,
special sessions, workshops and roundtables, and that the
mechanics of organizing the program be handled by a
permanent professional staff person at the Secretariat.

In the meantime, the task of organizing the next meeting
lies in the capable hands of Mark Rosenberg, his program
committee, and Mark's staff at Florida International Univer-
sity. My staff and I are in the process of transmitting what we
have learned to him. On behalf of the retiring committee, I
wish them good speed and good luck.


The films listed below, all recipients of the 1988 LASA
Award of Merit in Film, were screened during the XIV Inter-
national Congress in New Orleans.

Nicaragua: Development Under Fire. Nicaragua, 1986, 26'.
Director- Producers: Judy Jackson, Rosanna Horsley, Jackie
Reiter, Wolf Tirado. Distributor: First Run/Icarus.

Martin Chambi and the Heirs of the Incas. Peru, 1986, 50'.
Director- Producers: Paul Yule, Andy Harries. Distributor:
Cinema Guild.

Santa Marta-Duas Semanas no Morro. Brazil, 1987, 54'.
Director: Eduardo Coutinho. Producer: ISER. Distributor:

Seeing Windows. Honduras, 1987, 28'. Director-Producer:
Robbie Hart. Distributor: First Run/Icarus.

The Holy Father and the Glory. Chile, 1987, 42'. Director-
Producer: Estela Bravo. Distributor: Cinema Guild.

Children in Debt. South America, 1987, 29'. Directors: Estela
Bravo, Karen Ranucci, Monica Melamid, Ernesto Bravo,
Rafael Andreu, Roberto Chile. Distributor: Cinema Guild.

Popul Vuh: The Creation Myth of the Maya. Guatemala,
1987, 29'. Director-Producer-Animator: Patricia Amlin.
Distributor: Extension Media Center, University of Califor-
nia, Berkeley.

Tangos: The Exile of Gardel. Argentina, 1985, 125'. Director:
Fernando E. Solanas. Producers: Fernando E. Solanas,
Envar el-Kardi. Distributor: New Yorker.

Argentina, the Broken Silence. Argentina, 1986, 57'.
Director-Producer: Victor Fridman. Distributor: Victor Frid-
man Productions.

One Hundred Kids Waiting for a Train. Chile, 1988, 57'.
Director-Producer: Ignacio Aguero. Executive Producer:
Beatriz Gonzalez. Distributor: First Run/Icarus.

Under the Gun: Democracy in Guatemala. Guatemala, 1987,
40'. Director-Producers: Pat Doudvis, Robert Richter.
Distributor: First Run/Icarus.

Graffiti. Latin America, 1985, 28'. Director: Matthew
Patrick. Distributor: Cinema Guild.

Fire from the Mountain. Nicaragua, 1987, 58'. Director:
Deborah Shaffer. Producers: Adam Friedson, Deborah Shaf-
fer. Distributor: First Run/Icarus.

The Uncompromising Revolution: Fidel and Cuba at Middle
Age. Cuba, 1988, 100'. Director-Producer: Saul Landau.
Distributor: Institute for Policy Studies.

Minefield. Argentina/Uruguay/Chile, 1987, 90'. Director:
Fausto Canel. Produducers: Enrique Baloyra, Jaime
Suchlicki. Distributor: E & J Consultants.

We Aren't Asking for the Moon. Mexico, 1986, 58'. Director-
Producer: Mari Carmen de Lara. Distributor: First

Hechos Sobre Rieles: Una Historia de los Ferrocarrileros
Mexicanos. Mexico, 1987, 40'. Director-Producer: John
Mraz. Distributor: Universidad Aut6noma de Puebla.

Yo, T6, Ismaelina. Venezuela, 1980, 35'. Director-Producer:
Grupo Feminista Miercoles. Distributor: Grupo Feminista

Estigma. Peru, 1986, 13'. Director-Producer: Martha Luna.
Distributor: Luna Productions.

Patriamada. Brazil, 1985, 115'. Director: Tizuka Yamasaki.
Producer: Carlos Alberto Diniz. Distributor: Embrafilme.

El Diilogo: Una Conquista Popular. El Salvador, 1987, 26'.
Director- Producer: Sistema Radio Venceremos. Distributor:
El Salvador Media Project.

Todo el Amor. El Salvador, 1987, 26'. Director-Producer:
Unidad de Cine y Televisi6n de El Salvador. Distributor: El
Salvador Media Project.

Tiempo de Mujeres. Ecuador, 1987, 20'. Director-Producer
M6nica Vasquez. Distributor: Women Make Movies.

The Houses Are Full of Smoke. Central America, 1987, 180'.
Director- Producer: Allan Francovich. Distributor: Circle

Land for Rosie. Brazil, 1987, 85'. Director-Producer: Tete
Moraes. Distributor: Vemver Comunicacao.

Friday: Naturaleza Viva. Mexico, 1984, 108'. Director: Paul
Leduc. Producer: Manuel Barbachano Ponce. Distributor:
New Yorker.

Distributors of Festival Films:

Cinema Guild, 1697 Broadway, New York, N.Y. 10019;

Circle Releasing, 1101 23rd St., NW, Washington, D.C.
20037; (202)331- 3838.

El Salvador Media Project, 335 West 38th St., 5th Floor, New
York, N.Y. 10018; (212)714-9118.

E & J Consultants, Inc., 10342 SW 119th St., Miami, FL
33176; (305)284-4173.

Embrafilme, Rua Mayrinic Beiga, 28, Centro, Rio de Janeiro,

First Run/Icarus Films, 200 Park Avenue South, Suite 1319,
New York, N.Y. 10003; (212)674-3375.

Grupo Feminista Miercoles, Apartado 75312, Unicentro El
Marques, Caracas 1070, Venezuela; U.S.(517)353-0766.

Institute for Policy Studies, 1901 Q St., NW, Washington,
D.C. 20009; (202)234-9382.

ISER, Instituto de Estudos da Religiao, Rua Ipiranga, 107,
Laranjeias, 2231 Rio de Janeiro-RJ, Brazil 265-5635.

Luna Productions, Avenida Ricardo Palma -248, Dpto. 802,
Miraflores, Lima, Peru 451-842.

New Yorker Films, 16 West 61st St., New York, N.Y. 10023;

Universidad Aut6noma de Puebla, Centro de Informaci6n y
Documentaci6n dela Cultura Audio Visual, Puebla, Mexico;

University of California, Extension Media Center, 2176 Shat-
tuck Ave., Berkeley, CA 94704; (415)642-0460.

Vemver Comunicacao, Rua Joao Borges, 83, Gavea 22.451
RJ, Brazil 274- 4080.

Victor Fridman Productions, 104 Chester Ave., Fairfax, CA
94930; (415)454-8441.

Women Make Movies, 225 Lafayette St., #212, New York,
N.Y. 10012; (212)925-0606.


The following papers from the XIV International Con-
gress in New Orleans may be ordered from the Secretariat for
$3.00 each. LASA attempted to retain at least one copy of
every paper submitted. If your paper is not listed below,
please send a copy to the Secretariat, and we will include it in
future listings. A limited number of programs (xerox copies)
are also available for $4.50 each. Prices include postage.

Adams, Anna. Women's Tales of Torture
Agosin, Marjorie. La casa de los espiritus
Alvares, Sonia E. Women's Participation in the "People's
Alves, Maria Helena. Dilemmas of the Consolidation of
Democracy from the Top in Brazil
Angotti, Thomas. The Cuban Revolution: A New Turn
Arana, Mario. Deuda, estabilizaci6n y ajuste: La
transformaci6n en Nicaragua 1979-1986
Archila, Mauricio. La formaci6n de la clase obrera colom-
biana (1910-1945)
Auchter, Craig W. Democracy for Masters or Majorities? A
Comparative Analysis of Political Development in Cen-
tral America
Azuela, Alicia. Diego Rivera in the 1930s. Views from Both
Sides of the Border
Balin, Jorge. Profesi6n e identidad en una sociedad dividida:
La medicine y el origen del psicoandlisis en la Argentina
Barker, Wendy J. Banks, Industry and the State in Brazil
Barkin, David. Environmental Degradation and Productive
Transformation in Mexico: The Contradictions of
Crisis Management
Bartra, Eli. Notas sobre el arte popular y las mujeres
Baumann, Renato. Brazil-Argentina Economic Integration:
A Partial Approach
Baumeister, Eduardo. Agrarian Transformation and Revolu-
tion in Nicaragua
Bennett, Vivienne. How Popular Movements Shape the State:
Radical Oppositions in Juchitdn and Monterrey, Mex-
ico 1973-1987
Berryman, Phillip. Liberation Theology and the U.S.
Bishop's Letters on Nuclear Weapons and on the

Block, Miguel Angel Gonzalez. Decentralization of the
Health Sector in Mexico 1930-1987
Blondet, Cecilia. Pobladoras, Dirigentas y Ciudadanas: El
caso de las mujeres populares de Lima
Borja, Arturo T. Alternative Explanations of Regime
Breakdown. A Comparison of the Uruguayan and
Costa Rican Democracies
Brachet-Mirquez, Viviane. The Decentralization of Health
Services in Latin America
Braga, Carlos A.P. Monetary Reform and Trade in Brazil &
Brockett, Charles D. A Comparative Analysis of Peasant
Mobilization and Demobilization in Central America
Brown, Lyle C. Some Political Memoirs of Mexico Since 1910
Buchanan, Paul. Reflections of Institutionalizing Democratic
Class Compromise in the Southern Cone
Budowski, Gerardo. Developing the Choco Region of
Bustamante, Fernando. Los militares y la creaci6n de un
nuevo orden democritico en Perd y Ecuador
Cademartori, Jose. Chile: Aspectos econ6micos de la
Cardoso, Eliana A. Seigniorage and Repression: Monetary
Rhythms of Latin America
Carrillo, Teresa. Working Women and the "19th of
September" Mexican Garment Workers Union: The
Significance of Gender
Castrill6n-Hoyos, Dario. From Guti6rrez to Ratzinger and
Beyond: The Debate on Liberation Theology
Child, Jack. Antarctica: Arena for South American Coopera-
tion or Conflict
Chirifi, Alberto. Realidad 6tnica y realidad national
Ciria, Alberto. Democracy & Authoritarianism in Argentina:
Politics and Culture
Clements, Benedict J. Sectoral Performance, Income
Distribution, and Efficiency: The Case of Brazil
Coddou, Marcelo. La casa de los espiritus y la historic
Collings, Richard J. Debt, Dependence, and Default: Is Peru
the Wave of the Future
Cook, Maria Lorena. Organizing Dissent: The Politics of
Opposition in Mexican Unions
Dagnino, Renato. Arms Production and Technological
Spinoffs: The Brazilian Aeronautics Industry
Denevan, William M. The Nature of Fragile Lands in Latin
Dent, David W. North American vs. Latin American Subjects
of Investigation 1960-1985
Diniz, Eli. Post-1930 Industrial Elites
Dix, Robert H. Colombia: Social Change and Party System
Duany, Jorge. From the Periphery to the Semi-Periphery:
Caribbean Migration to Puerto Rico Since 1960
Durand, Francisco. Los empresarios y alianzas political: El
caso del Peri bajo Aldn Garcia
Evenson, Debra. Criminal Justice in Cuba: A Preliminary
Report of the National Lawyers Guild

Falc6n, Romana. La centralizaci6n political en el Porfiriato
alcances y limits en el caso de Coahuila
Foweraker, Joseph. Popular movements and the Transfor-
mation of the Mexican Political System
Frundt, Henry J. Esquipulas II y las posibilidades para una
reconciliaci6n national: Perspectivas guatemaltecas
Garner, William R. Chile: The Limits of Empirical Analysis
in a Milieu of Political Repression
Gereffi, Gary. Industrial Structure and Development
Strategies in Latin America and East Asia
Gerlero, Elena. Las artes mecanicas como via de redenci6n:
Fundamento teol6gico para la 6tica del trabajo pro-
movida por la orden franciscana en sus escuelas de artes
y oficios en La Nueva Espana en el siglo XVI
Giacalone, Rita de Romero. Major Trends and Changes in
Relations between Venezuela and the English-Speaking
Eastern Caribbean
Gill, Lesley. Senoras and Sirvientas: Women and Domestic
Services in La Paz, Bolivia
Gismondi, Michael. Conceptualizing Religion from Below:
An Approach to Popular Religious Values
Gordon, Sara. Guatemala y El Salvador: Dos regimenes de
Griesgraber, Joe Marie. Transitions Do not Lead Inevitably
Toward Democracy
Grindle, Merilee S. The Response to Austerity: Political &
Economic Strategies of Mexico's Rural Poor
Groth, Terrie R. Debating Latin American Democratization:
"A Theoretical Guide"
Hallin, Dan. Trends in Network Television Coverage of Cen-
tral America 1979-1988
Helwege, Ann. Latin American Agricultural Performance in
the Debt Crisis
Interamerican Research Center. Central American and Mex-
ican Public Opinion on U.S. Foreign Policy
Jim6nez, Michael F. "Travelling Far in Grandfather's Car."
The Life Cycle of Central Colombian Coffee Estates:
The Case of Vioti, Cundinamarca
Jiminez-Pelayo, Agueda. Problems de tierras de com-
unidades indigenas en el norte de la Nueva Galicia
Kirk, John M. The Church-State Rapprochement in Revolu-
tionary Cuba
Krause, Monika. Sex Education in Cuba
Lancaster, Roger N. The Church and Revolution in
Langton, Kenneth P. The Reform of Autocratic Social Insti-
tutions and the Transition to Political and Economic
Lehoucq, F. Edouard. Explaining the Origins of Democratic
Regimes: Costa Rica in Comparative Perspective
Le6n, Jorge. Composici6n social y escena political en el sin-
dicalismo ecuatoriano
Lesser, Jeff H. Refugees as Immigrants: The Case of
Brazilian Jewry
Lipsett, Sonya. Land and Water in Colonial Puebla
Lisi, Francisco L. Cultura popular, cultural de masas, cultural
de elite

Llambi, Luis. Emergence of Capitalized Family Farms in
Latin America
Lobel, Jules. The Meaning of Democracy
Londero, Elio. Sources of Revealed Comparative Advantage
in Manufacturing Exports: A Preliminary Report on
L6pez, Jose Roberto. La deuda externa en Centroamerica:
Lecciones de la teoria y practice de su administration
Luciak, Ilja A. Grassroots Movements in Nicaragua: A Com-
parative Analysis of the Rural Workers (ATC) and
Small Farmers (UNAG) Associations
Lugo, Elisa Vargas. Primeros historiadores del arte colonial
Lutz, Christopher H. Core and Periphery in Colonial
Maingot, Anthony P. Problems of a Transition to Democracy
in Haiti
Malloy, James M. Statecraft, Social Policy and Regime Tran-
sition in Brazil
Mars, Perry. Left Wing Politics and Caribbean Democracy
Martin, Cheryl. Gender and Socio-Political Order in Latin
Mauch, James E. Analysis of Research and Lecturing Pro-
posals That Meet Fulbright Quality Standards
Maybury-Lewis, Biorn. The Debate over Agrarian Reform in
McClintock, Cynthia. The Trajectory of Values Toward
Enterprise and Electoral Democracy Among the Peru-
vian Peasantry 1968-1988
McCoy, Jennifer. Democratic Class Compromise, Concerta-
tion and the Social Pact in Venezuela
McCreery, David. State Power, Indigenous Communities,
and Land in Nineteenth-Century Guatemala
McIntyre, Kellen Kee. The Martinez Hacienda, Taos, New
Mexico: Development of an Architectural Form and Its
Historical Relevance
Meyer, Mary K. Double Discourse: Reagan, Contadora, and
the Paradigms of Inter-American Relations
Mitchell, Christopher. U.S. Foreign Policy and Dominican
Migration to the U.S.
Montgomery, Tommie Sue. Pacts and Politics in El Salvador
Mraz, John. Videotaping the History of the Latin American
Working Class
Nagy, Silvia M. El process de transformaci6n de la cultural
indigena durante la Colonia y la Repiblica
Nichols, John Spicer. U.S. Government Funding of La Pren-
sa: Uses and Abuses of the Nicaraguan Opposition
Ogliastri, Enrique. Clases sociales y desarrollo empresarial en
Santander: Apuntes sobre la economic political de
Bucaramanga en el Siglo XIX
Ortiz, Edgar. Crisis econ6mica y papel estrat6gico de la
empresa pfiblica mexicana
Oviedo, Josd. Estructuraci6n political y partido dnico en la
Repiblica Dominicana

Oxhorn, Phillip. Bringing the Base Back in. The Resurrection
of Civil Society Under an Authoritarian Regime and
Chilean Shanty Town Organizations
Pardo, Teresa. La dinimica sociocultural y las perspectives
de las comunidades indigenas: El caso de la sierra,
Juarez de Oaxaca
Pastor, Manuel. Capital Flight and the Latin American Debt
Paul, Benjamin. Entrepreneurs and Economic Inequality in
San Pedro de Laguna, Guatemala: A Hundred Years of
Payne, Leigh A. The Brazilian Labor Movement and the New
Penalosa, Fernando. Incipient Trilingualism Among Mayans
in Los Angeles
Perez Escamilla Costas, Juan Ricardo. The Mexican State
and Business: Recent Revolution and Perspectives of
Financial Policy
Peritore, N. Patrick. Brazilian Attitudes Toward Agrarian
Reform: A Q-Methodology Opinion Study of a Con-
flictual Issue
Pittman, Howard T. Southern Cone Antarctic Claims, Ter-
ritories and the Ibero-American Club vs. the Common
Heritage of Mankind Theory
Plank, David N. Issues in Brazilian School Finances
Poitras, Guy. The Reagan Doctrine and Latin America: A
Premature Post-Mortem
Polakoff, Erica G. Opening Urban Frontiers: Squatter Set-
tlements in Managua
Polanco, Jorge Diaz. Tres actors politicos en el process de
salud en Venezuela
Prevost, Gary F. The Development of the Political
Philosophy of the FSLN: From Sandino to State Power
Priego, Rosalba P6rez. Los carActeres femeninos en la
literature del Porfiriato
Ranis, Peter. Argentine Workers: Rethinking Class
Reiche, Carlos E. Centro Agron6mico Tropical de
Investigaci6n y Ensenanza, Catie Turrialba, Costa Rica
Reinhardt, Nola. Economic Development and Rural Fertil-
ity in Theory and Practice: Evidence of Change from
Rural Colombia
Robbins, James. Ideas of Change in Cuban Popular Music
Rodriguez, Adrian. La deuda pdblica eterna de Costa Rica:
Crecimiento, moratoria y renegociaci6n
Roldan, Mary. Guerrillas, Contrachusma, and Caudillos:
Local Challenges to Elite Control During La Violencia
in Antioquia, Colombia, 1949-1953
Rus, Diane. Changing Economic Roles of Indigenous
Women in the Chiapas Highlands
Rus, Jan. The Revolution and Its Aftermath in Four Tzotzil
Communities of Highland Chiapas, Mexico
Ryan, Jeffrey J. The Effects of External Support on Latin
American Insurgencies
Safa, Helen I. Gender and Social Science Concepts in Latin

Sanborn, Cynthia.; Elfuturo diferente? The Legacy of the
1970s for Peruvian Populism in the '80s
Sanderson, Steven E. Economy of Political Violence in the
New Republic of Brazil
Schmidt, Gregory D. Regime Type, Political Alliances, and
Bureaucratization: Explaining Variations in Regional
Development Organizations and Decentralized Public
Investment in Peru, 1944-1988
Schwartzman, Simon. Brazil: Opportunity and Crisis in
Higher Education
Scurrah, Martin J. Civil Institutions and Democratic Par-
ticipation in Peru
Selser, Gregorio. La Internacional Socialista: Contradic-
ciones e incoherencias de su presencia en Am6rica
Latina y el Caribe
Nicaragua: El presunto incumplimiento del gobierno de
la revoluci6n sandinista, de sus compromises asumidos
en visperas del triunfo sobre Somoza
Paraguay: En elecciones de carnaval, Alfredo
Stroessner se hace president por octava vez
Serra, Luis. Peasant Stores: A Democratic and Feasible
Model for the Feeding of the Rural Sector in Nicaragua
Sigmund, Paul E. The Catholic Church and Social Change in
Latin America
Sikkink, Kathryn. The "New Institutionalism" and
Economic Policy Making in Latin America: State
Autonomy and Developmentalist Policy Making in
Argentina and Brazil
Smith, William C. Heterodox Shocks and the Political
Economy of Democratic Transition in Argentina and
Soifer, Ricardo J. Advanced Technologies in Latin America
Spalding, Rose J. The Agricultural Bourgeoisie and the
Nicaraguan Revolution
Spoor, Max. Agricultural Price Policy in Transition: The
Case of Nicaragua 1979-1988
Stahler-Sholk, Richard. Stabilization, Destabilization and the
Popular Sector in Nicaragua, 1979-87
Staples, Anne. El estado y la iglesia en la repdblica restaurada
Steele, Cynthia. Gender and Class in Women's Testimonio
Stephen, Lynn. Culture as a Resource: Four Cases of Self-
Managed Indigenous Craft Production
Stephens, Evelyne Huber. Economic Development, Social
Change, and Political Contestation and Inclusion in
South America
Stewart-Gambino, Hannah W. The Catholic Church and
Redemocratization in Chile
Stokes, Susan C. Peru's Urban Popular Sectors in the 1980s:
Autonomy or a New Multi-Classism?
Suzigan, Wilson. Consolidating Industrialization: Market
Creation in Post-1964 Brazil
Tarris Barraza, Luisa. Los campos de acci6n de la mujeres:
Una alternative para el anAlisis de su participaci6n
social y political
Taylor, Michelle M. Presidential Initiatives Toward Latin
America: Do They Receive Funding and Where Does
the Money Go?

Taylor, Patrick. Religion, Social Science, and Liberation: An
Afro-Caribbean Perspective
Thompson, Carol B. Economic Coordination Under Crisis
Conditions: Lessons from Southern Africa
Thoumi, Francisco E. Long-Term Industrialization Trends in
Two Small Caribbean Countries: The Cases of the
Dominican Republic and Trinidad and Tobago
Twomey, Michael J. The Debt Crisis and Latin American
Urrutia, Eugenio Rivera. La dindmica inflacionaria y las
political de estabilizaci6n en Centroam6rica y Panama
en la d6cada de los 80
Valenzuela, Maria Elena. Del sufragismo al feminismo: La
morilizaci6n de la mujer y su cuestionamiento del orden
patriarcal en Chile
Van Bodegraven, Donna. La geometria en el studio nar-
rativo de La casa de los espiritus
Vera Luna, Eduardo. Interest Groups and Popular
Democracy: Dilemmas of the Nicaraguan Transition
Verhine, Robert E. Formal, Nonformal, and Informal
Education and Occupational Opportunity: Research
Outcomes from Northeast Brazil
von Mettenheim, Kurt. Social Policy and the Brazilian Voter
in the Transition to Democracy
Welch, John. The Possibilities of Financial Integration
Between Brazil and Argentina: Preliminary Remarks
West, Terry. Souvenirs: The Role of Tourist Handicraft
Markets in Regional Development in Cusco, Peru
Williams, Harvey. War and Austerity: The Impact on Social
Williams, John H. Social Issues in Post-Stroessner Paraguay
Willis, Eliza. Investing in the Poor: State Autonomy and
Social Distribution in Brazil
Wise, Carol. Peru's Political Economy 1980-1987: Responses
to the Debt Crisis from Neoliberalism to the New
Wolf, Daniel H. Falling off the Bandwagon: Speculations of
Electoral Politics and the Scope Available to Loyal
Oppositions in Nicaragua
Woodward, Ralph L. The State and the Indian in Conser-
vative Guatemala 1839-1865
Xianglin, Mao. Some Tentative Views on the Contemporary
Caribbean Socialist Movement
Yiinez-Naude, Antonio. Agricultural Development and
Terms of Trade: The Case of Mexico
Zabin, Carol. Cultural Promotion and Economic and
Political Development: A Case Study in the Sierra
Juarez, Oaxaca, Mexico
Zapata, Roger A. La Nueva Cr6nica: Ambigiiedad y
contradicci6n en el discurso colonial
Zimbalist, Andrew. The Cuban Economy Toward the Fourth
Decade: A Critical Review
Zirker, Daniel. Contemporary Brazilian Foreign Policy:
Transcending a Sub-Imperialist Role?


LASA members are invited to suggest potential
nominees for Vice President and three members of the Exec-
utive Council, for terms beginning November 1, 1989.

Criteria for nomination include professional credentials,
character, and credible previous service to LASA. Candidates
must have been a member of the Association in good standing
for at least one year prior to nomination. Biographic data and
the rationale for nomination must accompany suggested
names and be sent by November 15, 1988, to: James M.
Malloy, Chair, LASA Nominations Committee, Department
of Political Science, 4L27 Forbes Quadrangle, University of
Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA 15260.

The winning candidate for Vice President will serve in
that capacity until April 30, 1991, as President from May 1,
1991, until October 31, 1992, and as Past President for an
additional eighteen months. The winning candidates for
members of the Executive Council will serve a three-year term
from November 1, 1989, until October 31, 1992.

The members of the Nominations Committee are James
M. Malloy, chair; Maria Patricia Fernandez-Kelly, Johns
Hopkins University; Elizabeth Garrels, Massachusetts Insti-
tute of Technology; Peter Knight, Washington, D.C.; Steve
Stern, University of Wisconsin; Marta Tienda, University
of Chicago; and Julio Samuel Valenzuela, University of
Notre Dame.


President Paul Drake began the meeting by introducing
LASA officers Cole Blasier, Past President; Jean Franco,
Vice President; Reid Reading, Executive Director; and Arturo
Valenzuela, Parliamentarian. Special thanks were extended
to Richard Greenleaf and Karen Bracken, Tulane University,
for the splendid job they and their local arrangements com-
mittee and staff did in preparing for the congress.

Drake acknowledged the recent report of Cole Blasier
and the good condition in which he handed over the presi-
dency. Drake noted that he and Blasier shared four main
objectives that would be carried over, noting progress on each
front: (1) expand the membership, (2) solidify the financial
base of the organization, (3) institutionalize procedures and
financial operations, and (4) further internationalize LASA.
Drake noted that he would publish a more comprehensive
report in the Forum [see President's Report in this issue].


Cole Blasier formally announced that Charles A. Wagley
was the 1988-89 recipient of the Kalman H. Silvert award for
a distinguished lifetime contribution to the study of Latin
America and to the advancement of the profession. Terry
McCoy accepted the award for Professor Wagley, who could
not attend because of illness.


Cynthia McClintock, chair of the LASA Task Force on
the Mass Media, announced that the award for outstanding
media coverage of Latin America over the last 18 months was
presented the day before to Charles A. Krause of the
McNeil/Leher News Hour. Professor McClintock noted that
competition for this award had been particularly strong.


Reid Reading reported continuing strong support from
the University of Pittsburgh for LASA and its operations.

Travel funds for congress participants from Latin
America came from many sources, including Latin American
centers and programs, foundations, and LASA itself. Even
though no formal U.S. government support was forthcom-
ing, the estimated amount of travel-related funds from all
sources was nearly $90,000.

LASA continues to operate in the black. A financial
review prepared by its accountant for the fiscal year ending

September 30, 1987, showed a surplus of over $53,000 in all
LASA funds. An inhouse, cash accounting summary showed
a surplus for funds administered by the Secretariat of $19,600.

Election results were published in a recent issue of the
Forum and were mentioned in the meeting, as was the exten-
sion of the terms for officers who assumed their positions on
January 1 of this year. The revised constitution and by-laws
were overwhelmingly approved by the membership by a vote
of 609 for and 29 against.


Charles Bergquist, program committee chair, gave a
brief report in which he acknowledged the hard work of his
committee and their indispensable contributions to the success
of the congress. He noted that a final report would appear in
the next issue of the Forum.


Richard Greenleaf, Chair of the Consortium of Latin
American Studies Programs, referred to his report in the last
issue of the Forum and noted the New Orleans panels con-
ducted under the auspices of CLASP. He also called attention
to the newsletter Informe.


Paul Drake mentioned his invitation to task force chairs
to report at the meeting. None of them chose to do so, but
their activities are discussed in both the outgoing and incom-
ing president's reports published in the Forum. Drake
reported on the long-standing LASA goal of maintaining
freedom of scholarly exchange with Cuba and the successful
efforts of the Task Force on Scholarly Relations with Cuba,
under the auspices of Helen Safa and Wayne Smith; attempts
by the Department of the Treasury to restrict U.S. scholarly
travel to Cuba have been successfully countered. Drake also
expressed his personal pleasure by the presence of scholars
from Cuba for the first time in five years.

[A list of task force and committee members and chairs
for 1988 appears in this issue of the Forum.]


President Drake acknowledged the efforts of the LASA
Commission on Compliance with the Central America Peace

Accord and noted the availability of its final report. The
Executive Council has approved the formation of a small
team to observe the voting in the expected Chilean plebiscite.


Drake introduced Mark Rosenberg, program committee
chair for San Juan. Rosenberg noted that the deadline for
receipt of proposals is September 15, 1988. He presented the
names of the members of the program committee [see list
elsewhere in this issue of the Forum]. Among the basic objec-
tives of the San Juan committee are to have the largest ever
representation of scholars from Latin America and the Carib-
bean, diverse scholarly activity, and to raise funds to assure
these goals. The program committee has created a separate
congress finance committee, chaired by Steve Sanderson, to
raise funds for San Juan.

In response to a question about insuring participation of
scholars from around the world, Professor Rosenberg
stressed that panel organizers have the major responsibility
for insuring that participation.

Be it resolved that the Latin American Studies Associa-
tion call on the U.S. government to withhold all aid to the
Haitian military or security forces and to send all
humanitarian aid exclusively through international
humanitarian organizations.

Affirmative: 113

Negative: 1 Abstain: 2


Be it resolved that the Latin American Studies

1) Call on the Immigration and Naturalization Service
to extend the amnesty application deadline beyond May
1988; and

2) Apply amnesty to the rest of the immediate family of
the member who has received amnesty.

Affirmative: 111

Negative: 4 Abstain: 5



Seven proposed resolutions were submitted to the LASA
Secretariat and sent to the resolutions subcommittee for con-
sideration. The subcommittee subsequently reported to the
Executive Council on March 16, 1988. The EC referred all
resolutions, with slight modifications, to the business meeting
on March 18, 1988. Paul Drake determined that a quorum
was present before votes were taken. Please note that resolu-
tions six and seven are the recommendations of Policy Alter-
natives for the Caribbean and Central America (PACCA).

All resolutions will take effect upon ratification by mail
ballot of the LASA membership. A majority vote is required.


Whereas U.S. aid and support to the Haitian military has
contributed to continued thwarting of the democratic aspira-
tions of the Haitian people by the military and

Whereas the Haitian military has been implicated in the
killing of numerous Haitians during the election campaign
and was specifically involved in the brutal attacks which led
to the cancellation of the November 1987 elections and

Whereas the subsequent January elections held by the
new military-appointed electoral commission were
characterized by widespread fraud and the refusal of the four
leading candidates to participate,

Whereas gross human rights violations in Colombia have
reached staggering levels, claiming the lives of over 4,000 Col-
ombians in the last five years and

Whereas the victims of assassinations, attempted
assassinations and death threats include academics among
them eight professors and eight university students killed by
unidentified assassins in the city of Medellin in the latter half
of 1987 as well as human rights monitors, journalists,
leaders and office holders of legal political parties, priests,
doctors, members of indigenous groups, community and
labor leaders, and government officials and

Whereas the perpetrators of this violence include
civilians, members of the armed forces and police, guerrillas,
and drug traffickers and

Whereas the violence seems intended to weaken Colom-
bia's democratic institutions, to prevent the peaceful par-
ticipation of new groups in Colombian politics, to legitimize
militarist solutions to political conflicts, and to terrorize and
silence those who oppose human rights violations and

Whereas few of those responsible for gross violations of
human rights in Colombia have been identified and brought
to justice,

Be it resolved that the Latin American Studies

1) Deplores the violence in Colombia;

2) Expresses its deep regret over the deaths of Colom-
bian professors and students at the hands of assassins;

3) Affirms its support and solidarity with academic col-
leagues in Colombia whose lives have been threat-
ened; and
4) Urges the Colombian government to make every
effort to investigate and prosecute all those respon-
sible for gross violations of human rights.

Affirmative: 121

Negative: 4 Abstain: 2


Whereas the international debt of the nations of Latin
America has reached a level at which it cannot be repaid on the
terms at which it was lent, or financed through traditional
rollover procedures and

Whereas the current debt situation has a negative effect
upon the economies of the lending nations as well as the
economies of Latin American nations and

Whereas the burdens of the current adjustment policies
have fallen disproportionately upon the poor and working
populations and

Whereas, increasingly, unilateral actions such as a year
of nonpayment by Brazil have been undertaken and

Whereas the presidents of Colombia, Mexico, Panama,
Venezuela, Argentina, Brazil, Peru and Uruguay, meeting in
Acapulco in November 1987, in their final statement called
for the foreign debt to be "adjusted to the capacity of each
country to pay" and for a "turnabout in the massive
transference of financial resources abroad" and expressed
support for "countries obliged to take unilateral measures to
limit debt service,"

Be it resolved that LASA calls upon the United States
government to take the initiative in a process whereby the
United States, multilateral lending agencies, and private inter-
national banks enter into debt renegotiations with the region
as a whole rather than individual countries with the goal of
substantially reducing or eliminating the debt; and these
negotiations be conducted in good faith to reach terms upon
which world economic growth can be reactivated and Latin
American nations can establish their own development
policies without predetermined conditions which constrain
their economic sovereignty.

Affirmative: 131

Negative: 3 Abstain: 5


The Latin American Studies Association deplores and
condemns the abuse of power, manipulation of the electoral
process, and violation of basic political and human rights
perpetrated by the government of General Alfredo Stroessner
to ensure his reelection on 14 February 1988 for an eighth con-
secutive term.

Those elections, in which the democratic political opposi-
tion was denied basic guarantees to participate, were
denounced as fraudulent and meaningless by the majority of
the electorate and so stated in documents issued by
Paraguay's Conference of Roman Catholic Bishops and the
National Committee for Free Elections, made up of all
democratic parties and social forces including a large segment
of the official Colorado Party.

LASA likewise deplores that ABC Color, the major inde-
pendent newspaper in Paraguay, remains closed since 22
March 1984 by arbitrary government decision, and that Radio
Nanduti, the most popular radio station, and the opposition
weekly El Pueblo are also interdicted, in flagrant violation of
the freedom of the press guaranteed by the Paraguayan

LASA thus calls for

1) Free elections, in which all democratic parties and
social forces participate, and

2) The institution of press and media freedom.

(Passed by unanimous voice vote on decision of the chair.)


Policy Alternatives for the Caribbean and Central
America (PACCA) is an association of scholars and
policymakers. Through research, analysis, policy recommen-
dations, and collaboration of analysts in North America,
CentralAmerica, and the Caribbean, PACCA works to pro-
mote humane and democratic U.S. policies toward the region.

I. End the regional war.

1. Stop all military, economic and political efforts to
destabilize or overthrow the Nicaraguan government; begin
by cutting off all assistance to contra forces and abiding by
international law.

2. Halt maneuvers in Honduras, cease the drive to
militarize Costa Rica, and assist both governments to disarm
contra forces within their territories.

3. Cut off all aid for waging war in El Salvador and
Guatemala and support negotiated national solutions to the
conflicts in those countries.

exchanges, "sister city" arrangements, and similar programs
designed to promote understanding and exchange skills and

II. Forge a durable peace.

Affirmative: 120

Negative: 4 Abstain: 5

4. Reopen bilateral talks between the United States and
Nicaragua and sign a new friendship treaty committing both
countries to a mutual nonaggression pact and normalization
of relations.

5. Support, and sign a protocol to, a treaty and nonag-
gression pact among all countries of the region-a treaty that
bans foreign bases and military personnel, halts arms imports
and arms smuggling, and provides for reciprocal reductions
in military forces.

6. Support efforts for democracy in the region, includ-
ing free elections with guarantees of safety for all participants.
Support other forms of popular participation in community,
labor and religious organizations.

III. Help rebuild Central America.

7. Take the lead in assembling an international program
of assistance to rebuild postwar Central America and provide
the basis for renewed, equitable, and environmentally-sound

8. Target development assistance to programs that
increase the participation of the poor in the region's
economies. Support genuine land reform, including credits
and technical assistance for peasant cooperatives.

9. Condition U.S. aid on compliance with internation-
ally recognized standards of human, political, and labor
rights, as well as respect for indigenous people's culture and
tradition. Direct humanitarian assistance to programs run by
reputable international or domestic nongovernment organiza-
tions, avoiding military-dominated state agencies and pro-
grams tied to counterinsurgency activities.

10. Support a rejuvenated Central American Common
Market committed to the satisfaction of basic needs and
balanced regional development, while building more
equitable trade and financial relations between Central
America and the United States.

IV. Work for international reconciliation.

11. Grant Extended Voluntary Departure status to Cen-
tral American refugees in the United States instead of detain-
ing and forcibly repatriating them.

12. Foster citizen-to-citizen contact between the United
States and Central America through cultural and educational


I. Restore relations and negotiate bilateral issues.

1. Reestablish full diplomatic relations.

2. Begin negotiations to settle U.S. claims for compen-
sation for expropriated property and Cuban claims for
damage as a result of U.S. actions.

3. Resume trade and economic relations between the two

4. Negotiate bilateral issues, including radio interference
problems, medium-wave broadcasts from one country to the
other, maritime border disputes, violations of air space,
handling of acts of sabotage and hijacking, and security and
sovereignty concerns related to the U.S. Gauntdnamo Bay
Naval Base in Cuba.

II. Work to resolve regional and global security issues.

5. Open discussions on mutual security concerns, such
as the Soviet presence in Cuba and U.S. military exercises in
the Caribbean, with the aim of signing a document commit-
ting all parties to strengthen international peace and security
as established in the U.N. Charter and other international

6. Open exploratory discussions with Cuba on mutual
commitment to, and compliance with, the provisions of the
Central American peace agreement forbidding foreign aid to
irregular forces and the use of one Central American nation
as a base for waging war on another. Discuss the prospects for
a security accord among the Central American nations leading
to the withdrawal of all foreign military personnel, an end to
military maneuvers, the freezing of arms acquisitions, and
mutual reductions in military forces.

7. Halt aid to UNITA in accordance with U.N. Resolu-
tion 435, which calls for the independence of Namibia and an
end to attacks on Angola. Open exploratory discussions with
Cuba and Angola on the implementation of U.N. Resolution
435 and the eventual withdrawal of Cuban forces from

8. Open discussions with Cuba with the aim of
reintegrating it into Inter-American forums such as the

Organization of American States; seek Cuba's inclusion in
regional development efforts for the Caribbean; and include
Cuba in hemispheric efforts to seek joint solutions to the debt
and other economic and social development problems.

III. Work for reconciliation between the United States and

9. Lift economic sanctions against Cuba that have the
effect of denying U.S. citizens the right to free trade in ideas,
including restrictions on travel and the free flow of

10. Permanently halt the use of the McCarran-Walter
act to deny visas to Cuban citizens who wish to participate in
educational and cultural exchanges in the United States.

11. Foster educational, cultural and tourist exchange
programs between the United States and Cuba to share skills
and promote understanding between the two countries.

12. Initiate discussions with Cuba on the rights of com-
munication and travel for Cuban-Americans and Cubans
wishing to visit their relatives for family and humanitarian
reasons. Work to improve telephone services and establish
direct mail service.

1) to guarantee the safety of members and leaders of the
Democratic Revolutionary Front and other organiza-
tions that, in order to exercise their rights and carry
out political activities, are in, or are planning to return
permanently to El Salvador;

2) to fulfill the agreement between the FMLN and the
government, signed in January 1987, witnessed by
Archbishop Arturo Rivera y Damas, which allowed
the evacuation of the wounded from war zones;

3) comply with all the agreements of Esquipulas II,
including the negotiations with the FMLN/FDR to
achieve a Salvadoran resolution of the conflict.

The motion passed by unanimous voice vote.

The following was read to be voted on as a "sense-of-the-
meeting" motion, to be presented to the staff of Tulane
University Hospital:

LASA expresses its concern for the wellbeing of Carmen
Gloria Quintana [burned over 65% of her body for her
political activities in Chile] who was a panelist at the XIV
international congress, and expresses its appreciation to
Tulane University Hospital for its care for her.

Affirmative: 114

Negative: 3 Abstain: 3

The motion passed by unanimous voice vote.


Tommie Sue Montgomery requested that the following
be read and voted on as a "sense of the meeting":

The members of the Latin American Studies Association
gathered at the business meeting of the XIV international con-
gress in New Orleans, March 18, 1988,


1) that it is necessary to search for an end to the
Salvadoran civil war, which is worsening due to impo-
sition of the counterinsurgency project imposed from

2) that it is necessary to find a political means to
humanize the conflict and pursue democracy, peace,
and national development in El Salvador;

3) that the Esquipulas II international verification com-
mission found little progress toward compliance with
the Esquipulas II agreements by the government of El

We therefore call on the government of El Salvador:

A petition, bearing the signatures of over 1400 people
attending the congress was read, to be voted on as a "sense-
of-the-meeting" motion:

We, the undersigned members of the Latin American
Studies Association, believe that President Reagan's recent
dispatch of 3200 U.S. troops to Honduras is dangerous and
destructive, and represents a surreptitious attempt to continue
military aid to the contras. We call for the immediate
withdrawal of the newly deployed troops, an end to military
aid to the contras and for the U.S. to cooperate with the spirit
and letter of the Central America peace accords.

The motion passed by unanimous voice vote.

Some of our colleagues may be unaware of the
advantages of LASA affiliation: LARR, the Forum,
reduced congress registration fees, scholarly networks
and more. Why not invite them to join? The association
needs them, and you may be doing them a big favor.
Just send the secretariat names and addresses of poten-
tial members, and we will send membership


Recently appointed members of committees and task
forces, to serve through October 1989, are listed below.

Nominations Committee:
James M. Malloy, Chair (Department of Political Science,
University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA 15260)
Maria Patricia Fernandez-Kelly (Johns Hopkins University)
Elizabeth Garrels (MIT)
Peter Knight (Washington, D.C.)
Steve Stern (University of Wisconsin)
Marta Tienda (University of Chicago)
Julio Samuel Valenzuela (University of Notre Dame)

Congress Program Committee, LASA/89:
Mark B. Rosenberg, Chair (Latin American and Caribbean
Center, Florida International University, University
Park, Miami, FL 33199)
Joan Dassin (Ford Foundation, Brazil)
Gary Gereffi (Duke University)
Sergio Miceli (ANPOCS, Sao Paulo)
Patricia Pessar (Georgetown University)
C6sar A. Rey Hernandez (University of the Sacred Heart,
Puerto Rico)
Marcia Rivera (Centro de Estudios de la Realidad
Puertorriquena, San Juan)
Steve Stein (University of Miami)

Congress Finance Committee, LASA/89:
Steven Sanderson, Chair (Center for Latin American Studies,
Grinter Hall, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL
Rosemarijn Hofte (University of Florida)
Terry McCoy (University of Florida)
Mitchell Seligson (University of Pittsburgh)

Kalman Silvert Memorial Prize Committee:
Cole Blasier, Chair (Hispanic Division, Library of Congress,
Washington, D.C. 20540)
Wayne Cornelius (University of California, San Diego)
Gilbert Merkx (University of New Mexico)
Helen Safa (University of Florida)

LASA Endowment Funds Committee:
Louis W. Goodman, Chair (School of International Service,
American University, 4400 Massachusetts Ave., NW,
Washington, D.C. 20016)
Werner Baer (University of Illinois)
Peter Cleaves (Chicago, Illinois)

Task Force on Human Rights and Academic Freedom:
Alexander Wilde, Chair (Washington Office on Latin
America, 110 Maryland Avenue, NE, Washington,
D.C. 20002)
Adolfo Aguilar Zinzer (Carnegie Endowment)
William Bollinger (Interamerican Research Center)
Holly Burkhalter (Americas Watch)
Christina Cerna (Inter-American Human Rights
Richard Claude (Bethesda, MD)
Ralph Della Cava (New York, NY)
Robert Goldman (American University)
Margaret Keck (Yale University)
Beatriz Manz (Wellesley College)
Kenneth Sharpe (Swarthmore College)
J. Samuel Valenzuela (University of Notre Dame)

Task Force on the Mass Media:
Richard A. Nuccio, Chair (Roosevelt Center for American
Policy Studies, 316 Pennsylvania Avenue SE, Suite 500,
Washington, D.C. 20003)
Marvin Alisky (Arizona State University)
Robin K. Anderson (Fordham University
Pamela Constable (The Boston Globe)
Peter Hakim (Inter American Dialogue)
A. Douglas Kincaid (Florida International University)
Jack Spence (University of Massachusetts)
Peter Winn (Tufts University)

Task Force on Nicaragua/Central America:
John Booth, Chair (Department of Political Science, Box
5338, North Texas State University, Denton, TX
Margaret Crahan (Occidental College)
Michael Dodson (Calvin College)
Christina Eguizibal (CSUCA, Costa Rica)
Laura Enriquez (Playa del Rey, CA)
Laura O'Shaughnessy (St. Lawrence University)
Nola Reinhardt (Smith College)
Rose Spalding (DePaul University)
Edelberto Torres-Rivas (University of Texas)
Carlos Vilas (CIDCA, Nicaragua)
Thomas Walker (Ohio University)
Harvey Williams (University of the Pacific)

Task Force on Scholarly Relations with Cuba:
Lars Schoultz, Chair (Institute of Latin American Studies,
University of North Carolina, Hamilton Hall 070A,
Chapel Hill, NC 27514)

Rafael Hernandez (Centro de Estudios Sobre Am6rica)
Carmelo Mesa-Lago (University of Pittsburgh)
Marifeli Perez-Stable (SUNY, College of Old Westbury)
Helen Safa (University of Florida)
Rebecca Scott (University of Michigan)
Wayne Smith (Johns Hopkins University)
Alex Stepick (Florida International University)
K. Lynn Stoner (Arizona State University)

Task Force on Scholarly Relations with the Soviet Union:
Alejandro Portes, Chair (Department of Sociology, Johns
Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD 21218)
Michael Meyer (University of Arizona)
Richard Newfarmer (World Bank)
Ivan A. Schulman (University of Illinois)

Task Force on Scholarly Relations with Spain:
Federico Gil, Chair (314 Hamilton, 070A, University of
North Carolina, Chapel Hill, NC 27514)
Ram6n Bela (Instituto de Cooperaci6n Iberoamericana,
Judith-Maria Buechler (Hobart and William Smith College)
James L. Buschman (Alma College)
Charles J. Fleener (St. Louis University)
Ram6n Guti6rrez (University of California, San Diego)
D. Rafael L6pez-Pintor (Madrid, Spain)
Joaquin Roy (University of Miami)
Pilar Saro (Instituto de Cooperaci6n Iberoamericana,
Joseph S. Tulchin (University of North Carolina)
Diana Velez (Tinker Foundation)


Past President Cole Blasier, one of LASA's founding
members, has been named Chief of the Hispanic Division,
U.S. Library of Congress. He will assume his new duties in
Washington this summer. We extend our very best wishes to
Cole and Martha as they embark on this new adventure.

Professor Blasier, who is retiring from the University of
Pittsburgh after 24 years of service, founded Pitt's Center for
Latin American Studies in 1964 and served as its director until
1974. Since then he has held the title of Professor of Political
Science and Research Professor of Latin American Studies.
He has also served as general editor of the University of Pitts-
burgh Press's Pitt Latin American Series.

Pitt's Political Science Department expects to open a
national search to replace Professor Blasier in the near future.

SEPTEMBER 21-23, 1989

The XV International Congress of the Latin American
Studies Association (LASA) will be held in San Juan, Puerto
Rico, September 21-23, 1989.

In addition to the usual topics that are discussed and
debated at LASA congresses, the 1989 meeting presents us
with an opportunity to focus comparatively on issues of par-
ticular significance to Puerto Rico and the Caribbean. This
would include topics such as race and ethnicity, cultural
minorities and the national question, international migration,
and critical public policy issues.

The Program Committee anticipates that this congress
will have the largest registration and the greatest diversity of
scholarly activities in LASA's history. The committee will
work to ensure the highest attendance ever by scholars from
Latin America and the Caribbean and encourages the LASA
membership to propose innovative activities that enhance
multidisciplinary perspectives on the region.

Four types of sessions will constitute the major part of
the program:

1. PANELS: consisting of presentations of formal
papers prepared especially for the occasion, and
related discussion of them.

2. WORKSHOPS: consisting of several participants
who exchange ideas about common research prob-
lems, techniques and perspectives, or teaching inter-
ests in new fields of study.

3. ROUNDTABLES: sessions consisting of no more
than ten persons who wish to discuss a topic of com-
mon interest. Participants and organizers must sign
up in advance for roundtables; session organizers
serve as discussion leaders.


In addition, the program will include film showings,
public forums, receptions, and other special activities.

If you wish to organize a session for the San Juan
meeting, please send us the information requested on the
forms that follow. We deeply appreciate your interest in con-
tributing to the next LASA congress.


All those who have roles at the 1989 LASA congress
should be current members of the Latin American Studies
Association. Participants in the San Juan meetings will be
limited to one role on the program so as to broaden oppor-
tunities for all applicants. The exceptions to this are panel
organizers, who may also present a paper on their own panel,
and those who are attending from outside the continental
United States and Puerto Rico.

Panels, workshops, and roundtables will be limited in
size to assure orderly and full discussions. An "ideal" panel
would consist of three paper presenters who summarize their
work and two discussants. Ample time must be allowed for
questions and discussion. An "ideal" workshop would con-
sist of six persons, while an "ideal" roundtable would consist

Members of the 1989 Program Committee:

Mark B. Rosenberg, Chair
Latin American and
Caribbean Center
Florida International
University Park PC 237
Miami, Florida 33199

Gary Gereffi
Department of Sociology
Duke University
Durham, N.C. 27706

Patricia Pessar
Center for Immigration
Policy and Refugee
Georgetown University
Washington, D.C. 20057

Steve Stein
Department of History
University of Miami
Coral Gables, Florida 33124

Joan Dassin
The Ford Foundation
Praia de Flamengo 100
Rio de Janeiro, RJ, Brasil

Responsibilities of Session Organizers

Session organizers are asked to:

(1) submit 7 copies of their proposal form to the Pro-
gram Committee by September 15, 1988;

(2) ensure that all participants in their sessions are paid-
up members of LASA;

(3) provide complete, accurate and up-to-date informa-
tion for each participant; i.e., current address and
telephone number, and for participants who will or
may be coming from abroad, the status of their
need/request for a travel grant (It is imperative that
we know where and how to reach participants for
whom funding is requested.);

(4) inform participants of requirements and respon-
sibilities for the session, including submission of
papers in advance;

(5) notify the Program Committee of any audiovisual
needs for their session by August 18, 1989.

The Program Committee will communicate directly with
session organizers and will provide them with infor-
mation and assistance on a timely basis.

Sergio Miceli
Avenida Dr. Arnaldo 1973
Sumare 01-255
Sao Paulo, SP, Brasil

Marcia Rivera
Centro de Estudios de la
Realidad Puertorriquena
Tanca 150PH
Viejo San Juan, Puerto
Rico 00901

C6sar A. Rey Hernandez
University of the Sacred
P.O. Box 12383,
Loiza Station
Santurce, Puerto Rico 00914


SEPTEMBER 21-23, 1989

Mail 4 copies to: Film Council:
LaVonne C. Poteet, Coordinator LaVonne C. Poteet
1989 LASA Film Festival Julianne Burton
Bucknell University Dennis West
Lewisburg, PA 17837 Randal Johnson


Film and video materials not integrated into a panel, workshop, roundtable, or meeting may be presented in
one of two ways: (1) as selections in a LATIN AMERICAN FILM FESTIVAL; or (2) as part of a noncompeti-
tive FILM EXHIBIT of visual and informational materials. Those not selected for the festival may be presented
at the exhibit for a fee. Please use a separate form for each film/video proposed. PROPOSALS MUST BE
RECEIVED BY JUNE 1, 1989. Please type or print clearly.

Films and videos chosen for the FESTIVAL are designated as recipients of the 1989 LASA Award of Merit in
Film for "excellence in the visual presentation of educational and artistic materials on Latin America." Ap-
proximately 15 such awards will be made. Selection criteria are: artistic, technical and cinematographic excel-
lence; uniqueness of contribution to the visual presentation of materials on Latin America; and relevance to
disciplinary, geographic and thematic interests of LASA members, as evidenced by topics proposed for panels,
workshops and roundtables at recent congresses. Films and videos released after January 1989 and those that
will premiere at the congress will be given special consideration if they also meet the above criteria.

The noncompetitive FILM EXHIBIT of Latin American films, videos and descriptive materials (brochures,
catalogues, etc.) is organized in conjunction with the book exhibit. For information on the film exhibit, contact
Harve C. Horowitz & Associates, LASA Film Exhibit, 10369 Currycomb Court, Columbia, MD 21044; phone

Title of work:

Format: [ ] Film (16 mm [ ]; 35 mm [ ])
[ ] Video (available formats:

Distributor (name and address):

Director: Producer:

Year of release: Screening time: Language:

Brief description (25-50 words) of subject, including country or area treated:

Your name: Affiliation:

Phone: (office) (residence)

If you have questions, call LaVonne C. Poteet at (717)524-1286.


however, the intent and substance of my letter and, I believe,
Reid Reading's analysis.

My letter then-and now-addresses the responsibilities
of a citizen to his or her own government. I consider it my first
obligation to see that my government, for which I am partly
responsible, behaves in a manner I believe to be appropriate.
That government acts on my behalf; what it does is in my
name. At the same time I am concerned about the policies of
other governments, and try as best I can to influence the
course of events in a way that increases individual freedom
and a more equitable access to world resources. I will not be
distracted, however, as Gustafson and Waggaman would
seemingly have me be, from my first task, which is to rectify
what I view as the serious errors of my own government.

I consider much of the foreign policy of the Reagan
administration in Latin America to be wrong. In particular,
I am opposed to United States actions in Nicaragua because
I believe they violate Nicaraguan sovereignty and interna-
tional law, not to mention standards of decency and freedom.
My opposition to these policies does not blind me to concern
about certain restrictions on freedom in Nicaragua, but I
nonetheless believe that Nicaragua is far better off today than
it was under Somoza. It is also a better place than many of the
nations the United States actively supports. At the same time,
I consider United States support for the Contras an abomina-
tion, an ill-disguised attempt to impose the will of particular
government functionaries on a neighbor country, using
murder, deceit, and possibly drug-running to do so, while
speaking of establishing freedom and democracy. In this
Orwellian world "freedom" means anticommunism, which
is itself a code word to mobilize support against regimes which
attempt to be independent of United States suzerainty.

I am further concerned because this undeclared war by
proxy (and similar actions elsewhere) has a negative impact
not only on Nicaragua but also on United States institutions.
"Anticommunism" not only provides the rationale for
foreign adventures, but it has subverted constitutional limits
on government power within the United States. The problems
scholars have had with the U.S. Customs Service, which have
been well reported in the LASA Forum, are only one such
example of this abuse. The secret group running the war in
Nicaragua (and other actions) from the White House base-
ment, a shadow government unaccountable to the electorate,
and the use of the FBI to monitor domestic dissent have
ominous implications for the vitality of United States
freedoms. Such abuses require the proverbial "eternal

I wish to change the policies of my government, using the
constitutional means available to me to do so. There are
important issues concerning the use of LASA and other pro-
fessional organizations to voice such concerns, but I believe
such use is appropriate, as we have a responsibility to the peo-
ple with whom we work and study.

Finally, I wish to register a strong objection to Gustafson
and Waggaman's letter. Under the guise of being even-
handed, they have written a highly politicized letter, in which
their high-minded call to fairness is used to forward policy
goals rather than clarify the issues, and in which they employ
scraps of negative information about regimes they do not like
to justify Reagan administration foreign policy. They have
every right to make their political argument, but I object to the
hidden manner in which they have done so, the self-righteous
tone of the letter, and their attempt to stifle those who disagree
with them.

William P. Mitchell
Freed Professor in the Social
Sciences, Monmouth College,
and Profesor Visitante, Univer-
sidad Cat6lica, Lima, Peri
January 29, 1988

It was precisely my point that an individual who opposes
the policy orientation of the Reagan administration should
avoid the temptation to overlook the sins of those who are
belligerent to it solely for that reason. "The enemy of my
enemy is my friend" obeys natural human tendencies, but
must be struggled against. On this we agree.

That Cuba, and more especially Nicaragua, already are
under extreme duress, obviating the need for additional
pressure, is a separate, more controversial point. How one
lines up on this issue depends on one's view about the extent
to which these countries constitute a national security threat
to the United States. It appears that Gustafson and Wag-
gaman would not agree with my views, nor, interestingly, with
those of President Arias of Costa Rica, when it comes to
Nicaragua. Of all those who might have reason to be nervous
about what is happening in Nicaragua, it logically should be
the president of Costa Rica. Yet when asked in a recent inter-
view whether he feels threatened by the Sandinistas, Arias
replied flatly "No."*

In the final paragraphs of my piece, I simply offered
some personal explanations about why one might not be
"totally upset" about what is happening in places like Cuba.
Although these have struck a note with some, I would not
expect everyone to feel a sense of kinship with them.

As for remaining nonrhetorical points in the authors' let-
ter that invite a response-I personally am delighted with
whatever the United States is doing to encourage democracy
in Chile and Paraguay. Whether one interprets the
Nicaraguan military buildup as defensive or offensive in
nature is dependent on the conceptions one brings to the
analysis of this problem rather than on an exacting empirical
analysis of the available facts. Finally, in every society,
including that of the Soviet Union, there are values that
*Penthouse, U.S.Vol.19, No.9, May 1988, p.76.

scholars can embrace, and people who can teach us about
themselves and about ourselves as well. LASA performs a
valuable service to the cause of intellectual freedom by
attempting to keep open lines of scholarly communication
that might otherwise be closed.

Reid Reading
Executive Director, LASA
April 18, 1988

To the Editor:

As a frequent critic of recent LASA efforts to inject itself
into political controversies, I'm required by simple fairness to
give credit where credit is due. The Preliminary Report of the
LASA Commission on Compliance with the Central America
Peace Accords, which arrived in today's mail, is for me a sterl-
ing example of how a scholarly association like ours can
usefully contribute its expertise to the resolution of pressing
public issues. The report is balanced, well documented, and
well reasoned. The Commission is to be congratulated for
applying its expertise fairly and honestly to a situation that
must have been, in many respects, exceedingly difficult to

LASA, too, deserves congratulations for having under-
taken this task. Unlike the case of the commission that
observed the Nicaraguan elections of 1984, the current effort
did not duplicate the efforts of other, more expert bodies or
individuals. Nor did the effort entail, either by its nature or by
its approach to the problem, accepting the terms of the debate
laid down by the administration.

I remain convinced that in order to be effective in the
public arena, LASA must become far more modest and
measured in the number and wording of resolutions it adopts
and in the other public-issue-oriented activities it undertakes.
A system in which hastily scribbled resolutions are presented
to a business meeting attended by a tiny, unrepresentative
sample of the membership is not conducive to effectiveness in
the world of public affairs; nor are resolutions whose wording
responds more to the passions and ideologies of the member-
ship, no matter how valid they may be, than to careful con-
sideration of how such documents are likely to be received by
policymakers and the general public.

Such a cautious approach, in which considerations of effec-
tiveness take precedence over emotional satisfaction, in no
sense equates to political passivity. Much to the contrary, it
implies doing more good where good can actually be done.
(One area in which the Association always should stand ready
to speak out, in my view, is that of freedom of opinion and
political association; the recently revealed outrageous conduct

of the FBI in regard to CISPES and other groups active in the
Central America controversy is an example.) Let's hope that
the work of the Commission on Compliance with the Central
America Peace Accords becomes one of the standards by
which LASA's future public-affairs activities will be

David G. Becker
Dartmouth College
February 1, 1988

Drake and Reading Reply

We are delighted that Professor Becker is pleased with
the work of the LASA Commission on Compliance with the
Central America Peace Accords. Fortunately, his positive
reaction reflects that of most LASA members we know who
have followed this activity.

His negative reaction to the LASA Delegation to Observe
the Nicaraguan General Election of November 4, 1964 is not
typical, however. Wayne Cornelius had reported previously
on the enthusiasm with which the report was received (see Vol.
XVI No. 4, page 26), and the Secretariat continues to fill
orders for the second printing of the Nicaragua election
report. Several professors have assigned the report for their

As for his comments about resolutions and business
meetings, they are not based on accurate observations.
Nothing hastily scribbled can become a resolution. The by-
laws of the Association require that "resolutions for con-
sideration at the international congress must be signed by at
least five LASA members and received by the LASA
Secretariat at least thirty days prior to the beginning of each
congress." The proposed resolutions are reviewed by a resolu-
tions subcommittee and ultimately the Executive Council
decides whether to refer a proposed resolution to the business
meeting. If approved there, the resolution is then submitted
to the full membership for a vote by secret mail ballot. Given
the overwhelming approval of the membership for the resolu-
tions approved in the business meetings (see past issues of the
Forum), they cannot be considered the sentiments of a "tiny,
unrepresentative sample of the membership."

The vitality of LASA depends on the expression of
diverse views, and we commend Professor Becker for speak-
ing out. Other LASA members should feel free to use the
Forum for this purpose.

Paul Drake
President, LASA
Reid Reading
Executive Director
April 21, 1988


Hoover Institution Prize for Best Article. The Hoover
Institution announces its annual prize for the best article on
Latin American political affairs published in a scholarly jour-
nal. The first prize is $1000 and the second prize $500. Articles
must have appeared in print during 1988. They may treat
domestic or foreign affairs and may be in English, Spanish,
Portuguese or French. The Caribbean Basin is regarded as
Latin America for this purpose. Weight will be given to
originality, quality of scholarship, and relevance for public
policy. Entries in quadruplicate must be received by January
20, 1989. Send to William Ratliff, Senior Research Fellow,
Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford,
CA 94305-6010.

Hubert B. Herring Memorial Awards. Nominations and
submissions are sought for the Hubert B. Herring Awards
presented by the Pacific Coast Council on Latin American
Studies (PCCLAS). The award categories are best article or
article-length manuscript; best book or book-length
manuscript; best masters or senior thesis; best Ph.D. disser-
tation; and best film, videotape or nonprint media. Can-
didates need not be members of PCCLAS if the project was
carried out while the author was affiliated with an institution
within the PCCLAS geographic region, which is defined as
follows: the states of Washington, Oregon, California,
Arizona, Nevada, Idaho, Hawaii and Alaska; British Colum-
bia and Alberta, Canada; Baja California and Sonora, Mex-
ico. Deadline for submissions is July 1, 1988. For details, con-
tact Harry Polkinhorn, Chair, 1988 Hubert Herring Awards
Committee, English Department, San Diego State University-
Imperial Valley, 720 Heber Avenue, Calexico, CA 92231;

Conservation Needs in Guatemala. Organizations such
as Centro de Estudios Conservacionistas (CECON), Instituto
Guatemalteco de Turismo (INGUAT) and El Museo de
Historia Natural have projects involving environmental
education programs, natural area status surveys, and natural
resource investigations. Eight Peace Corps volunteers work-
ing in Guatemala in the Wildlife/Parks Program are trying to
help these organizations by acting as field extension agents,
but the funds and personnel allocated for conservation work
by the Guatemalan government is seriously lacking. Mean-
while the country contains a wealth of natural areas and
resources that are not being adequately surveyed or protected.
The Peace Corps volunteers are therefore seeking masters and
doctoral students from the United States who could perform
natural resource investigations in Guatemala; they would gain
valuable experience and would be helping Guatemala's rap-
idly growing conservation movement. Contact: Michelle H.
Brown #144, Cuerpo de Paz, 6a Avenida, 1-46, Zona 2,
Ciudad de Guatemala, Guatemala, Centro Am6rica.

Americas '92 is a five-year program for strengthening
knowledge and understanding of Latin America in the United
States. Organized by the University of Florida's Center for
Latin American Studies, the program proposes a partnership
among the U.S. Department of Education-funded Centers of
Latin American Studies working with the public schools to
develop and incorporate Latin American materials into the
kindergarten through grade 12 curriculum. This project in
inter-American understanding is set in the context of the 1992
Columbus Quincentennial, the increasingly complex nature
of interdependence in the Western Hemisphere, and the grow-
ing Hispanic presence in the United States.

The first step in developing the program was a planning
conference held in M6rida, Mexico, October 11-14, 1987, with
support from American Express. The five conference themes,
developed in working sessions, were: State of the Art (the cur-
rent state of U.S. cross-cultural education about Latin
America); Content (what needs to be taught about Latin
America between now and 1992); Motivation (how to
stimulate teachers to teach and students to learn about Latin
America); Networking (how to build a national partnership
of Latin American centers and public schools); Resources
(how to mobilize and allocate the support needed for
Americas '92).


PCCLAS Annual Meeting. The Pacific Coast Council
on Latin American Studies will hold its 34th annual meeting
in Mexicali, Baja California, October 20-23, 1988. A special
feature will be field trips to maquiladoras and ejidos. The
theme is "1888-1988 Visions of Art and Politics in Latin
America: Perspectives on Democracy and Modernization
Through the XXI Century." Proposals for papers, panels,
and roundtable topics are invited on this theme or any related
Latin American topic. Submit proposed title with a one-page
abstract by June 1, 1988, to Reynaldo Ayala, President
PCCLAS, Institute for Border Studies, San Diego State
University, Imperial Valley Campus, 720 Heber Avenue,
Calexico, CA 92231; (619)357-3193.

NCCLA Annual Meeting. The North Central Council of
Latin Americanists is soliciting papers for its annual meeting
October 13- 15, 1988, at the University of Wisconsin-Stevens
Point. Papers are invited from any academic field; inter-
disciplinary topics are encouraged. Proposals for complete
panels are especially welcome. Send outline or abstract by
June 30, 1988, to the Program Chair, Martin Farrell, Depart-
ment of Politics & Government, Ripon College, Ripon, WI
54971; (414)748-8197. For information on local arrange-
ments, contact Robert J. Knowlton, Department of History,

or M. Roberto Assardo, Department of Foreign Languages,
both at the University of Wisconsin-Stevens Point, Stevens
Point, WI 54481.

MALAS Annual Conference. The Midwest Association
for Latin American Studies will hold its annual conference at
Indiana University, Bloomington, October 20-22, 1988. The
theme is "North vs. South: Coexistence in Fact and Fiction."
The conference will focus on how Latin America and the
United States have dealt with unequal coexistence in the
Western Hemisphere, as revealed in politics, economics,
history, and literature. The participation of scholars from a
broad range of disciplines is encouraged. Send proposals for
papers, complete panels, workshops, or roundtables to Jack
W. Hopkins, School of Public and Environmental Affairs,
Indiana University, Bloomington, IN 47405; (812)335-0732.

LAILA/ALILA Symposium. The Latin American
Indian Literature Association will hold its international sym-
posium in Guatemala City June 13-17, 1988. For informa-
tion, contact Richard Luxton, P.O. Box 163553, Sacramento,
CA 95816.

Latin American Narcotics Trade. The Center for Inter-
national Security and Strategic Studies of Mississippi State
University will host an international research conference on
"The Latin American Narcotics Trade and United States
Security" June 16-17, 1988. Scholars interested in attending
should contact Donald J. Mabry, Conference Organizer,
CISS, Drawer Y, Mississippi State, MS 39762.

The International Institute of Iberoamerican Literature
will hold its congress in Mexico City July 24-31, 1988. For
information, contact Alfredo A. Roggiano, Hispanic
Languages and Literatures, University of Pittsburgh, Pitts-
burgh, PA 15260.

The Latin American Jewish Studies Association will hold
its Fifth Research Conference on the Jewish Experience in
Latin America in Buenos Aires, Argentina, August 15-19,
1988. Original papers, not previously published, dealing with
Jews in Latin America (in English, Spanish, Portuguese or
Hebrew) are invited from researchers, academics, communal
workers, and students living in any country; maximum length
is 30 double-spaced, 8-1/2 x 11" pages. Send three-to-four-
page paper proposals, along with relevant data on the author,
before June 30, 1988, to Centro de Documentaci6n e
Informaci6n sobre Judaismo Argentino "Marc Turkow,"
Ayacucho 632, 3 piso, Buenos Aires, Argentina (tel.
49-0518/2609); or to Judith Laikin Elkin, President, Latin
American Jewish Studies Association, 2104 Georgetown
Blvd., Ann Arbor, MI 48105.

The Inter-American Indian Institute is planning "First
Encounter of Caribbean Amerindians," to be held in Santo
Domingo, Dominican Republic, in August 1988. Interested

scholars should contact Alejandro Camino, Head, Research
Dept., Instituto Insurgentes Sur, 1690 Col. Florida, 01030
Mexico, D.F.

The American Association of Teachers of Spanish and
Portuguese will meet in Denver August 19-23, 1988. For
information, contact AATSP, P.O. Box 6349, Mississippi
State, MS 39762-6349; (601)325-2041.

The Meaning of Freedom. The University of Pittsburgh
and the Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological
Research are sponsoring a conference on "The Meaning of
Freedom: Post-Abolition Social Order in the New World"
August 24-27, 1988. The first two days will consist of
workshops, to be held at the University of Pittsburgh's
Greensburg campus. A plenary session will be held on Satur-
day, August 27, at the University's main campus. For infor-
mation, contact Frank McGlynn, Department of Anthro-
pology, University of Pittsburgh at Greensburg, Greensburg,
PA 15601.

The International Comparative Literature Association
will meet in Munich August 22-27, 1988. The theme is "Space
and Boundaries." For information, contact Roger Bauer,
Abt. fur Deutsche Philologie, Schellingstrasse 3, D-8000
Munchen 40, Federal Republic of Germany.

The Northeast Regional Meeting of the American
Association of Teachers of Spanish and Portuguese will be
held in New York City September 23-24, 1988. For informa-
tion, contact Margaret Fernandez, Manhasset Jr.-Sr. High
School, Memorial PI., Manhasset, NY 10030.

Teaching of Foreign Languages and Literatures. The
12th annual conference will be held at Youngstown State
University October 21-22, 1988. For information, contact
Foreign Language Conference, Department of Foreign
Languages, Youngstown State University, Youngstown, OH

Latin American Popular Culture will hold its annual
meeting at Michigan State University, East Lansing,
Michigan, April 13-15, 1989. A 200-word paper abstract may
be sent by October 1, 1988, to Joseph Straubhaar, Latin
American Studies Center, Michigan State University, East
Lansing, MI 48823.

The Center for Great Plains Studies, University of
Nebraska- Lincoln, will hold a conference on "From Spanish
Explorers to Plains Settlers: The Hispanic Presence on the
Great Plains" March 15-17, 1989. Interested scholars should
submit proposals f 150-200 words by July 1, 1988, along with
a brief resume, to Miguel Carranza, Center for Great Plains
Studies, 1213 Oldfather Hall, University of Nebraska, Lin-
coln, NE 68588-0314.

The Southern Historical Association is soliciting indi-
vidual papers and complete panels, in any field of Latin
American historical studies, for its 1989 meeting in Lexington,
Kentucky, November 8-11, 1989. Deadline for submission is
September 16, 1989. Contact Tom Leonard, Department of
History, University of North Florida, Jacksonville, FL 32216;

The Business Association of Latin American Studies will
hold a conference in Boca Raton, Florida, February 15-18,
1989. Discussion will focus on issues and research that affect
the economies and business environment of Latin America
and the Caribbean today and in the near future. High quality
papers, panel proposals, and abstracts, submitted in quad-
ruplicate and subject to blind review, are being accepted until
October 8, 1988. Camera-ready final versions of papers must
be received by January 6, 1989, for inclusion in the Pro-
ceedings and to compete for outstanding paper awards. To
receive more information and be placed on the conference
mailing list, write to the 1989 Conference Director, Robert P.
Vichas, Florida Atlantic University, P.O. Drawer 7638, Fort
Lauderdale, FL 33338.


Academic Training Specialist. The Institute of Interna-
tional Education seeks a part-time Academic Training
Specialist to join the project team for the Andean Peace
Scholarship Project. Responsibilities include the placement
of project participants from Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and
Bolivia in appropriate U.S. academic programs and working
with academic institutions, national and community
organizations to design experiences for participants in U.S.
society, culture, government and commerce. Candidates
should have experience in the placement, orientation, and
monitoring of foreign nationals in U.S. academic programs,
knowledge of the social and economic background of less
privileged Latin American populations, and functional
Spanish language ability. The position allows flexible work-
ing hours, 20 hours per week, at the Arlington, Virginia, proj-
ect office. Salary is $15,000 with full benefits. The position is
available immediately. Send a letter of application and resume
to Elizabeth Daniel, Andean Peace Scholarship Project, c/o
Development Associates, 2924 Columbia Pike, Arlington,
VA 22204-4399. The Institute of International Education is
an equal opportunity employer.

The Office of International Affairs is responsible for supervising and actively participating
in the development of international academic and service activities at the University of
Connecticut. These activities include: consulting with academic departments on recruit-
ment and retention of international and area studies faculty; identifying and assessing
external funding opportunities; assisting international program constituencies in the design
of new projects; and maintaining and expanding contacts at all levels.
The successful candidate must show evidence of ability to administer and evaluate
international programs and activities, and successful experience in working with foreign
universities and organizations with research proposals and the procurement of external
funds. A doctorate is preferred with faculty and/or broad foundation experience in inter-
national affairs. The salary will be commensurate with training and experience. The position
is available immediately.
Interested candidates should submit a letter of application along with a curriculum vitae
and three letters of recommendation to: Ms. JoAnn Basley, The University of Connecti-
cut, Office of the Vice President for Academic Affairs, Gulley Hall, U-86, Storrs, CT 06268.
(Search #8A243)
The University of Connecticut is an Affirmative Action/Equal Opportunity Employer. We
urge all interested candidates meeting the above qualifications to apply.



Fulbright Scholar Awards. The Council for Interna-
tional Exchange of Scholars is accepting applications for
1989-90 Fulbright grants in research and university lecturing
abroad. The basic eligibility requirements for a Fulbright
Award are U.S. citizenship, Ph.D. or comparable profes-
sional qualifications, university or college teaching experience
and, for some assignments, proficiency in a foreign language.
Awards are granted in virtually all disciplines, and applica-
tions are encouraged from retired faculty and independent
scholars. Application deadlines are June 15, 1988, for Latin
America except for lecturing awards to Mexico, Venezuela
and the Caribbean, for which the deadline is September 15,
1988. Application information is available from the Council
for International Exchange of Scholars, Eleven Dupont Circle
N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036-1257; telephone

Latin American Archeology. The University of Pitts-
burgh Department of Anthropology announces a new pro-
gram of graduate fellowships in the archeology of Latin
America for distinguished predoctoral students from Latin
America, effective September 1988. Supported by the
Howard Heinz Endowment of Pittsburgh, the fellowships
provide a stipend to cover full tuition in the Faculty of Arts
and Sciences and living expenses in Pittsburgh. Citizens of all
Latin American nations are eligible. Successful candidates
will be required to enroll in a full-time program of study
leading to the Ph.D. in anthropology, with specialization in
Latin American archeology. Fellowship recipients will also be
required to take active part in ongoing archeological research
projects; such participation is a central part of the depart-
ment's doctoral program. Fellowships are awarded for a
tenure of one year, with renewal of support dependent on
academic performance. For further information and applica-
tion materials, write to Nancy Stugan, Department of
Anthropology, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA
15260, USA; telephone (412)648-7500.

Historical Studies. The Institute for Advanced Study:
School of Historical Studies announces fellowships for
research in the history, thought and culture of the western
world. The Ph.D. (or equivalent) and substantial publications
are required. Qualified candidates of any nationality may
apply for one or two terms. (For U.S. nationals, NEH
fellowships, with some travel funds, are available.) Applica-
tions for 1989-90 are due before October 15, 1988. For further
details, write to the Administrative Officer, School of
Historical Studies, Institute for Advanced Study, Olden
Lane, Princeton, N.J. 08540.

U.S.-Mexican Studies Fellowships. The Center for U.S.-
Mexican Studies at the University of California, San Diego,
announces its tenth annual competition for visiting research
fellowships for the year beginning July 1, 1989. Application

packets and additional information are available from
Graciela Platero, Fellowship Coordinator, Center for U.S.
Mexican Studies D-010, University of California, San Diego,
La Jolla, CA 92093. The program is supported by grants from
the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur and the Ford

Nineteen fellowships were awarded for 1988-89 by a
selection committee consisting of 21 leading Mexican and
U.S. scholars representing the disciplines of anthropology,
economics, history, sociology and political science: Arturo
Borja (political science, Duke University), "Development of
the Computer Industry in Newly Industrialized Countries:
The Case of Mexico"; Maria Lorena Cook (political science,
U.C. Berkeley), "Organizing Dissent: The Politics of Opposi-
tion in Mexican Unions"; Consuelo Diaz Amador (social
anthropology, El Colegio de Jalisco and El Colegio de
M6xico), "International Migration from the Los Altos de
Jalisco Region"; Luis Javier Garrido (political science,
Universidad Nacional Aut6noma de M6xico), "The PRI's
Democratic Current, 1986-1988"; Neil Harvey (political
science, University of Essex, England), "Corporatist
Strategies and Popular Responses in Rural Mexico: State and
Unions in Chiapas since 1970"; Maria Teresa Koreck (anthro-
pology, University of Chicago), "The State Against Society:
The Mexican Revolutionary State and the Implementation of
the Agrarian Reform"; Wilson Peres Ninez (political science,
Centro de Investigaci6n y Docencia Econ6micas), "Ten Years
of Industrial Planning in Mexico: An Evaluation"; Keith Pez-
zoli (urban planning, UCLA), "The Politics of Land Alloca-
tion in Mexico City: The Case of Ajusco"; Keith Rosenblum
(journalist, Arizona Daily Star), "The Anatomy of Mexico's
Regional Newspapers"; Luz Consuelo Saldana Pico
(economics, El Colegio de M6xico), "Mexican Exports and
U.S. Transnational Companies: Industrial Restructuring,
Intrafirm Transactions, and Dynamic Comparative Advan-
tages;" Arturo Sanchez Guti6rrez (political science, Univer-
sidad Aut6noma Mexicana-Azapotzalco), "Development of
the Mexican Political System during the 1950s"; Frans
Schryer (social anthropology, University of Guelph,
Ontario), "Language, Education and Ethnicity in Huasteca
Nahuatl Communities (Hidalgo)"; Enrique Semo (political
science, Universidad Nacional Aut6noma de Mexico), "Mex-
ico: Roots of Authoritarianism and Democracy, 1810-1928";
Ilan Semo (political science, Universidad Nacional Aut6noma
de M6xico), "Crisis in the Caribbean and U.S. Policy toward
Mexico"; Lynn Stephen (anthropology, Northeastern
University), "Weaving Changes: Zapotec Women and Com-
munity Development"; Celia Toro (political science, Stan-
ford University and El Colegio de M6xico), "United States-
Mexican Diplomacy: The Drug Traffic"; Kurt Unger Rubin
(economics, El Colegio de Mexico), "Mexican Exports and
U.S. Transnational Companies: Industrial Restructuring,
Intrafirm Transactions, and Dynamic Comparative Advan-
tages"; Peter Ward (urban geography, University of Cam-
bridge), "The Recent Development of the Mexico City

Metropolitan Area and Its Insertion into the World
Economy"; Sergio Zermeno (sociology, Universidad
Nacional Aut6noma de M6xico), "Student Conflicts and the
Future of the Mexican University."

-------------. .. .. ------ ..


After Latin American Studies: A Guide to Employment
for Latin Americanists by Shirley A. Kregar, Linda Pavela
Gentile and Alan Adelman. Latin American Monograph &
Document Series #10, 1987, $4.00. Includes sections on:
Graduate Study, Research and Internships for Graduate and
Undergraduate Students; Opportunities in the Private Sector;
Career Opportunities in the U.S. Government; International
Organizations; Sources and Resources. Make checks payable
to University of Pittsburgh and send to Shirley A. Kregar,
Latin American Studies, 4E04 Forbes Quadrangle, University
of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA 15260.

Funding for Research, Study and Travel: Latin America
and the Caribbean edited by Karen Cantrell and Denise

Wallen. Oryx Press, 1987, 320 p., $27.50 (North America),
$33.00 (elsewhere). Provides funding information for educa-
tion, science, business and the arts. Includes program profiles,
subject and sponsor-type indexes, list of sponsoring organiza-
tions, and a bibliography. Order toll-free, 1-800- 457-ORYX,
or write: Oryx Press, 2214 North Central at Encanto,
Phoenix, AZ 85004-1483.

Monograph Series in Latin American Archeology. The
Department of Anthropology, University of Pittsburgh,
announces a new, fully bilingual (English-Spanish) publica-
tion series in Latin American archeology. The series is made
possible by a grant from the Howard Heinz Endowment of
Pittsburgh. Two types of writings will be published:
preliminary reports (about 25-100 pages) and memoirs (about
250 pages). Manuscripts will be accepted in either Spanish or
English, and submissions are encouraged from anywhere in
the world. Manuscripts will be reviewed by the series editors:
Robert D. Drennan, James B. Richardson, III and Jeremy A.
Sabloff. For further information, write or call Drs. Drennan,
Richardson or Sabloff, Department of Anthropology,
University of Pittsburgh, 3H01 Forbes Quadrangle, Pitts-
burgh, PA 15260, USA; (412)648-7500.


We are pleased to announce the availability of the 1986-87 LASA Membership Directory, which can be purchased from
the Secretariat for $2.50 per copy. Inexpensively produced in 8-1/2 x 11 format, it contains an alphabetical list of members
with their mailing addresses and a list by discipline, which includes office telephone numbers when provided by members.
Please use the form below to request copies; be sure to include your check, payable in U.S. dollars to the Latin American
Studies Association, for $2.50 per copy ordered.


Please send me copy/copies of the 1986-87 LASA Membership Directory. My check for $ is enclosed.



The LASA Commission on Compliance with the Central America Peace Accord *

Co-chairmen of the Commission:

Charles L. Stansifer
Professor of History, and
Director, Center of
Latin American Studies
The University of Kansas

Michael E. Conroy
Associate Professor of Economics, and
Associate Director,
Institute of Latin American Studies
The University of Texas at Austin

Other members, in alphabetical order:

Richard N. Adams
Rapoport Centennial Professor of
Liberal Arts, and Director,
Institute of Latin American Studies
The University of Texas at Austin

John Booth
Professor of Political Science, and
Chairman, Department of
Political Science
North Texas State University

Margaret Crahan
Luce Professor of Religion, Power,
and Political Process
Occidental College, and
Member, Board of Directors, Inter-
American Institute on Human Rights

Thomas J. Farer
Visiting Professor of Law, 1988,
School of International Service,
American University;
Former president, University of New
Mexico, and former member, Inter-

Jan L. Flora
Professor of Sociology
Kansas State University

Darfo Moreno
Assistant Professor
of Political Science
Florida International University

Ambassador Ambler Moss
Dean, Graduate School
of International Studies
The University of Miami, and
Former ambassador to Panama

Marysa Navarro
Professor of History, and
Associate Dean for Social Sciences
Dartmouth College, and
Chair, LASA Task Force on Women

Laura Nuzzi O'Shaughnessy
Associate Professor of Government, and
Associate Dean,
St. Lawrence University

D. Scott Palmer
Chair, Latin American Studies
Foreign Service Institute

Manuel Pastor, Jr.
Assistant Professor of Economics
Occidental College

Reid Reading
Executive Director,
Latin American Studies Association,
and Adjunct Professor of
Political Science
University of Pittsburgh

Mark Rosenberg
Professor of Political Science, and
Director, Latin American
and Caribbean Center
Florida International University

Mitchell Seligson
Professor of Political Science, and
Director, Center for
Latin American Studies
University of Pittsburgh

K. Lynn Stoner
Assistant Professor of History
Arizona State University

* Institutional affiliations listed for
identification purposes only.




Final Report of the LASA Commission on
Compliance with the Central America Peace Accord

"President Arias has done something here that is extraordinary; he has changed
the situation from one of stalemate to one of new opportunities and new risks."

Deane Hinton, U.S. Ambassador to Costa Rica, and
former U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador
San Jos6, January 15, 1988

March 15, 1988



I. INTRODUCTION. ...........



Costa Rica ...........

El Salvador .. ..........

Guatemala ...........

Honduras. ...........

Nicaragua ...........


V. CONTADORA [ET AL.] .......

VI. CONCLUSIONS ...........


REFERENCES. ..... ........

1 Central America, an area of great diversity,
has witnessed growing social conflict over the
4 past 40 years. In the southeast, Costa Rica has
enjoyed many decades of democracy and general
7 development, coupled with peaceful growth. To
the north, first in Guatemala, then in El Salvador
7 and Nicaragua, especially after 1978, bloody
conflict has increasingly dominated the local
9 scene. All international efforts to alleviate the
conflict failed until August 7, 1987, when the
15 elected presidents of the five principal Central
American countries (Guatemala, El Salvador,
20 Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica) seized the
initiative and signed an unprecedented set of
26 agreements, known collectively as the Guatemala
Accord, the Central American Peace Accord, or
31 Esquipulas II.1 First proposed by President
Oscar Arias of Costa Rica, they were designed to
34 end the conflict and lay the basis for the
progressive democratization of the region.
Agreement among Central American nations
38 on such important issues as acceptance of
politically undesirable neighbors and nonuse of
41 their territory for rebel activity is not unprece-
dented.2 Such agreements have much to do with

Final Report of the LASA Commission on the Central America Peace Accord

political survival in a set of nations with intimate
historical ties and whose citizens frequently cross
international borders for political purposes.
Those unfamiliar with the region can perhaps be
excused for not knowing that Central America
once formed a single nation (1821-1838) and for
not taking seriously the many unsuccessful efforts
to re-create that union. But to grasp the sig-
nificance of the conflict of the last decade and
the current heroic effort by the Central American
presidents to resolve it, one should be aware of
the long memories of a unified Central America.
These memories create a special international
affinity, which in turn creates special problems.
Exile invasions are an example. For Nicaraguans
to wish to influence events in El Salvador (and
vice versa), and for Nicaraguan exiles to organize
in Honduras to change the government in
Nicaragua (and vice versa) are not new pheno-
mena. For better or for worse, such difficulties
have been largely resolved in the past by Central
Americans themselves.

The difference in today's conflict is the
lengthy shadow of the United States and the
Soviet Union, whose worldwide rivalry is being
played out in Central America, exaggerating
existing differences among Central American
nations. Attempts by the Latin American nations
known as the Contadora group--Panama, Colombia,
Venezuela, and Mexico--to resolve the isthmian
conflict faltered for a multiplicity of reasons.
Support of Contadora's efforts by the Support
Group (Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Peru) was
no more successful. Weak gestures of support for
a peaceful solution by the United Nations and the
Organization of American States were greeted in
Central America and elsewhere with distrust.
Insistence by the United States government on a
military solution to the conflict in Nicaragua
appears to be the principal reason for the failure
of these diplomatic efforts.

Sensing that the conflict on the Isthmus
was stagnating with continuing loss of life and
economic opportunities and recognizing that
peacemaking efforts had failed, Central American
leaders, headed by President Arias, attempted to
regain control over their own destiny. With great
courage, especially in their challenge to the
United States, the hegemonic power in Central
America, the five Central American presidents

signed the Guatemala Accord. In effect, they
drew upon the logical, historically proven last
resort of agreeing to accept each other, despite
sharp political differences. The essence of the
Guatemala Accord is acceptance of the legitimacy
of each of the existing governments.

Some of the commitments, assumed by the
signers, such as the establishment of a national
dialogue, were well within the capacity of the
governments in power to fulfill. Full implemen-
tation, however, was not possible. Good-faith
steps, particularly with regard to democracy and
election, could have been taken, but it was not
anticipated that constitutions would be changed
or that elections would be held within the time
frame established by the Accord.

On January 15-16, 1988, the five presidents
met in San Jos6, Costa Rica, to review progress
under the original agreement, to receive and
review the official report from the International
Commission on Verification and Follow-up
(Comisi6n Internacional de Verificaci6n y Segui-
miento, CIVS), and to determine the future of
this peace process. They signed a new document
committing themselves to a continuation of the
process and calling for immediate fulfillment of
those points with which the participating nations
had not fully complied by that date.

The Guatemala Accord represents a dramatic
regionwide effort to reinforce internal processes
and to eliminate external support for irregular
and insurrectionary forces in the region. Because
the United States has supported the contra forces
in Nicaragua since 1981, the Accord, reaffirmed in
San Jos6 on January 16, 1988, places the Central
American nations squarely in opposition to the
United States.

Heightening the drama of this confrontation,
President Jos6 Napole6n Duarte of El Salvador
proclaimed that the San Jos6 document was a
second Central American declaration of indepen-
dence. That such a statement could be made by
President Duarte, who is not known for his
independence of the United States, indicates the
significance of the actions taken by Central
America in the last few months. In one sense, as
Ambassador Hinton said, it is an opportunity
seized. But at the same time, challenging the

Page 2

Final Report of the LASA Commission on the Central America Peace Accord

United States, the strongest external influence in
the region in this century, holds grave domestic
and international perils for Central America. For
the moment, the Central American presidents have
taken the initiative. Will they be able to achieve
a lasting peace?

That question is of considerable concern to
the Latin American Studies Association (LASA).
As the largest professional association of Latin
American specialists in the world, LASA has a
responsibility to attempt to clarify the issue for
its twenty-four hundred members, who include a
large proportion of the college and university
scholars in the United States who study and teach
about Latin America. LASA wished to contribute
to public understanding and discourse about the
Central American peace process and to assist its
members in interpreting the rapidly unfolding
events. Recognizing the difficulty of measuring
compliance with the many-sided Guatemala
Accord, LASA commissioned seventeen scholars
to apply their collective years of experience in
Latin America to the problem and charged them
with assessing compliance with the Accord.

The seventeen members of the commission
include twelve academic investigators with
extensive prior research and study experience in
Central America and many prior publications on
Central America. Their areas of specialization
include history, political science, economics,
anthropology, and international law. The
commission includes, as well, the directors of
four of the major Latin American studies centers
in the United States. [The full list of the
members of the commission and their affiliations
is provided on the inside cover of the report.]

Fourteen of the members of the commission
traveled to Central America in mid-January, 1988,
and were present in San Jos6, Costa Rica, when
the five Central American presidents reaffirmed
their commitments to the August 7 Accord. They
met with Central American academic colleagues in
San Jos6 and laid out a work plan. They then
traveled in smaller groups to interview represen-
tatives of all of the major participants in the
peace process throughout the region. Although
each country team was operating under the same
instructions, circumstances determined different
interviews, approaches, and topics in each

country. More than 150 interviews were con-
ducted between January 15 and January 21,
across all five of the participating countries, as
well as in Panama and Mexico. The three
remaining members joined the delegation in Miami
at the Latin American and Caribbean Center of
Florida International University to evaluate the
results of the fieldwork and to assist in the
drafting of this report.

In response to the continuous and urgent
requests for information on Central America that
LASA members receive from citizens' groups, the
press, and congressional representatives, among
others, a preliminary report was prepared to
communicate the commission's principal con-
clusions. It was completed within one week of
the return of the commission to the United
States and distributed to LASA members, to the
media, and, through the courtesy of Congressman
Jim Slattery of Kansas, to all United States
senators and representatives. In the meantime,
commission members drafted expanded and fully
documented versions of their individual country
reports for final editing during February.3 This
report, edited by Charles L. Stansifer and Michael
E. Conroy, is the result.

Acknowledgments. The seventeen members
of the commission wish to express their thanks to
Professors Martin Diskin of the Massachussetts
Institute of Technology and Thomas W. Walker of
Ohio University, who originated the idea of the
LASA commission, and their gratitude to LASA
and to the Ford Foundation for financial assis-
tance, without which the project would not have
been possible. Not the least of the contributors
to the success of the project were the univer-
sities that, with little advance notice, recognized
the importance of the commission and gave
financial assistance and leave to the members.
The commission is also grateful to all the Central
Americans who set aside time at a crucial period
in their region's history to explain their views to
one more set of North American scholars whose
time was short and whose need to know, we
thought, was urgent.

The Central America Resource Center, in
Austin, Texas, compiled an exhaustive compendium
of documents and newspaper clippings on the
peace process in each Central American country.

Page 3

Final Report of the LASA Commission on the Central America Peace Accord

Copies were provided to every member of the
commission. Documents were also provided by
the Washington Office on Latin America, the
Center for International Policy, and the Central
American Peace and Democracy Watch, all in
Washington, D.C.

Finally, we wish to acknowledge with
gratitude the hospitality of institutions in Central
America that welcomed the opportunity to
collaborate with us. While it would be impossible
to list all of them, we would be remiss if we
failed to mention the cooperation of the personnel
of FLACSO (Facultad Latinoamericana de
Ciencias Sociales), and CSUCA (Confederaci6n
Universitaria Centroamericana) both of San Jos6,
and ASIES (Asociaci6n de Investigaci6n y
Estudios Sociales) in Guatemala. Administrators,
researchers, and staff of these institutions had
short notice of the our arrival and they went out
of their way to facilitate our work. The oppor-
tunity to work alongside our Central American
academic colleagues was one of the most satisfy-
ing aspects of the commission's work in the

For assistance in putting together the
preliminary and final reports, the editors are
also grateful to the staffs of the Latin American
and Caribbean Center of Florida International
University, the Institute of Latin American
Studies at the University of Texas, and the
Center of Latin American Studies at the Univer-
sity of Kansas.


The members of the commission found it
impossible to appreciate the quality of compliance
without taking the distinctive historical ex-
perience of each Central American nation into
account. The major part of the report, therefore,
consists of country-by-country assessments of the
process of compliance in each. It was thought,
however, that a broader picture would also be
useful, and the group therefore prepared the
following general findings about the process as a
whole. They are presented here, point by point,
as they relate to the specific terms of the Accord
signed in Guatemala City on August 7, 1987. The
sequence below provides translations of the

essential clauses of each point agreed to in the
accords, and they are presented in the same order
as they appear in the signed document.

Point 1-a of the Accord: On national
reconciliation and dialogue. The five
presidents committed themselves "to
carry out urgently .. actions toward
national reconciliation that would allow
popular participation with full guaran-
tees in political processes of a demo-
cratic nature, based upon justice,
freedom and democracy, and to create,
for these purposes, the mechanisms that
according to law, would allow dialogue
with opposition groups." To accomplish
this purpose, the five governments
promised to "initiate dialogue with all
nonarmed groups of internal opposition
and with those that have accepted

Commission finding on Point 1-a: Guatemala, El
Salvador, and Nicaragua are deeply divided
societies. Their governments have taken the
formal steps envisioned by the agreements to
varying degrees -- appointing national commis-
sions of reconciliation and dialoguing with
internal opposition groups. None of the three,
however, have yet evidenced a willingness to
discuss the sort of constitutional and structural
change that the armed opposition groups have
identified as essential for achieving national

Point 1-b of the Agreement: On
amnesty. The five presidents agreed
that "in each Central American country,
except those where the International
Commission on Verification andFollow-
up has determined that it is unneces-
sary, decrees of amnesty will be issued
establishing all conditions needed to
guarantee the safeguarding of life,
freedom in all its forms, material
possessions, and the security of persons
to whom these decrees apply."

Commission finding on Point 1-b: Formal
amnesty has been declared in Guatemala, El
Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua; Costa Rica

Page 4

Final Report of the LASA Commission on the Central America Peace Accord

was exempted from this obligation by the
International Commission on Verification and
Follow-up. In Guatemala, El Salvador, and
Nicaragua, these measures have not contributed
substantially to national reconciliation. The good
faith of the declarations is subject to sharp
debate within Central America, and it is difficult
at this point to resolve the conflicting claims. In
Guatemala and El Salvador the amnesty also
applies to those guilty of military abuses; the
ability and the willingness of the governments of
those two countries to guarantee the security of
persons accepting amnesty is subject to legitimate

Point 2 of the Accord: Calls for
cease-fire. "The governments vehe-
mently exhort that a cessation of hos-
tilities be agreed in the states of the
region that currently suffer from the
actions of irregular troops or insur-
gents. The governments of said states
promise to take all the actions neces-
sary to achieve an effective cease-fire
within the constitutional framework."

Commission finding on Point 2: The call to
pursue negotiations for a cease-fire has led to
irregular but continuing discussions in the case of
Nicaragua. Talks were initiated but have been
discontinued in Guatemala and El Salvador. In
none of the three cases have lasting cease-fires
been achieved.

Point 3 of the Accord: Steps toward
democratization. The five presidents
agreed to "promote an authentic,
pluralist and democratic process of
participation that would imply the
promotion of social justice, the respect
for human rights, sovereignty, ter-
ritorial integrity of the states, and the
right of all nations to determine, freely
and without foreign intervention of any
kind, their own economic, political and
social model." They committed
themselves to carrying out, in verifiable
manner, the creation of "complete
freedom for television, radio and the
press [including] the freedom for all

ideological groups to open and to
sustain media operations without
submitting to prior censorship,. . full
political party pluralism" and, "for
those governments with states of
emergency or martial law in force," the
revocation of such laws and the return
of the full force of constitutional

Commission finding on Point 3: The Accord calls
upon the governments to strengthen democratic
institutions and specifies three areas for measur-
ing compliance.

(1) The first concerns freedom of information.
Since the signing of the Accord, the most
significant changes have been the reopening
of Radio Cat6lica and La Prensa and the
elimination of prior censorship in Nicaragua.

(2) The second calls for political party pluralism.
the only events that possibly signal some
change have been the ability of exiled
opposition leaders to return to El Salvador
for limited periods of time, the re-registra-
tion of the MNR party in El Salvador, and
the registration of one new political party
in Nicaragua.

(3) The third addresses the restoration of
constitutional guarantees. The only change in
this area is the lifting of the state of
emergency in Nicaragua on January 18, 1988,
including the abolition of the Popular
Anti-Somocista Tribunals. El Salvador's
state of siege lapsed in January of 1987, and
had not been reinstated at the time of this

Point 4 of the Accord: Free elections.
The Central American presidents have
called for free, pluralist, and honest
elections throughout the region, once
the preconditions for democratic
government have been established. In
particular, they have called for
elections for the creation of a Central
American Parliament, first proposed in
the declaration of the five presidents
on May 25, 1986, "Esquipulas I."

Page 5

Final Report of the LASA Commission on the Central America Peace Accord

Commission finding on Point 4: The Accord
called for carrying out free elections at a time
established separately by each country. There
has been no occasion for compliance since the
signing of the Accord. The proposed treaty for
establishing a Central American Parliament has
thus far been ratified only by Guatemala and

Point 5 of the Accord: Cessation of
assistance to irregular forces and to
insurrection movements. "The govern-
ments of the five Central American
states will urge the governments of the
region and the extraregional govern-
ments that openly or secretly provide
military, logistical,financial,promotion-
al, human resources, armaments,
ammunition, and equipment aid to the
irregular forces or to the rebels, to
cease such aid, as an indispensable
element to procure permanent and
lasting peace in the region."

Commission finding on Point 5: Since the signing
of the Accord, there has been little consistent
evidence of substantial material aid being provided
by any Central American country to armed
opposition groups operating in neighboring
countries, although Honduras has served as a
major channel for U.S. aid to the Nicaraguan
Resistance forces.

The major failure of the Guatemala Accord
has been the continuation of material aid by the
United States to the armed Nicaraguan opposition,
despite the request agreed upon in the Accord
that extraregional powers terminate all aid to
insurgent and other irregular forces.

Point 6 of the Accord: Nonuse of
territory for aggression against other
countries. "The five countries that
sign this document reemphasize their
commitment to impede the use of their
own territory and to neither lend nor
permit logistical military assistance to

persons, organizations, or groups that
attempt to destabilize the governments
of the nations of Central America."

Commission finding on Point 6: There has been a
substantial decrease in the number of such troops
operating from Honduras, but the use of its
territory by the armed Nicaraguan opposition,
contrary to this Accord, continues. There
remain claims that Guatemala, El Salvador, and
Nicaragua have allowed some use of their
territory for support of armed opposition forces,
but there is no documented level of use in those
countries comparable to that encountered in
Honduras. The Costa Rican government has
complied to the extent it has been able, including
a ban in January, 1988 on nonmilitary, political
activity by representatives of the Nicaraguan

Point 7 of the Accord: "The govern-
ments of the five Central American
nations, with the participation of the
Contadora Group exercising its media-
tion function, will continue negotiations
on the still-pending points of agree-
ments with respect to security matters,
verification, and control under the
terms of the Contadora Agreement for
Peace and Cooperation in Central

Commission finding on Point 7: The Contadora
governments continue to be willing to supervise
and mediate talks on the security issues that have
not been covered by the Guatemala Accord.
There is some doubt, however, whether the
Central American governments continue to be
interested in external verification.

Point 8 of the Accord: On refugees
and displaced persons. "The Central
American governments commit themsel-
ves to tend with a sense of urgency to
the flows of refugees and displaced
persons that the regional crisis has
provoked, by means of granting
protection and assistance . .as well
as repatriation, resettlement, and
relocation so long as it is voluntary

Page 6

Final Report of the LASA Commission on the Central America Peace Accord

and individual."

Commission finding on Point 8: Some steps have
been taken by Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras,
and Nicaragua to facilitate the return of refugees.
In Guatemala and El Salvador, however, these
steps have not provided sufficient security,
freedom of action, or economic support to
encourage a significant movement of returning

Point 9 of the Accord: On coopera-
tion for peace and development. Under
this point the five presidents agreed to
adopt further measures to accelerate
development efforts; in particular, they
agreed to seek joint programs of
assistance from the international

Commission finding on Point 9: To meet the call
to consider development in its entirety as an
intrinsic component of the achievement of peace
requires considerably more time and vastly more
resources from both within and outside the region
than have been forthcoming.

Point 10 of the Accord: On interna-
tional verification. This point calls for
the creation of an international
verification commission composed of
the foreign ministers of the five
Central American states, representatives
of the four Contadora Group nations
(Mexico, Panama, Colombia, and
Venezuela), the four Contadora Support
Group nations (Peru, Brazil, Argentina,
and Uruguay), and the secretaries
general of the United Nations and the
Organization of American States. It
conveys to this group the responsibility
for determining compliance with the
agreements and for reporting to the
presidents of the five Central American
nations within 150 days of the original

Commission finding on Point 10: TheInternation-
al Commission on Verification and Follow-up
(CIVS) has carried out its task under the

provisions of the Accord. It has found that there
were substantial steps toward fulfillment by all
parties and that there were additional steps
needed by all countries to be in full compliance.
The Executive Commission of the Guatemala
Accord, consisting of the Central American
foreign ministers, must now determine mechanisms
for further verification. Whether extraregional
verification will be sought in the future is
unclear; diplomatic sources indicated that Hon-
duras and El Salvador appeared particularly
hostile to verification by parties from outside the

Point 11 of the Accord: On the
calendar for fulfillment of the Accord.
This final point establishes a timetable
for fulfillment and for verification.

Commission finding on Point 11: The five
countries have not met fully the ambitious
timetable set by the Accord; but on January 15,
1988, the five Central American presidents
declared their continuing commitment to the
Accord and declared that compliance with the
remaining points would be immediate.


Costa Rica

The Guatemala Accord was not designed to
solve internal political problems in Costa Rica,
nor was it expected to have any impact on that
country's political process. Costa Rica's solid
reputation as the most democratic country in
Latin America, with an excellent record of respect
for human rights and freedom of expression,
assured it little attention by the Esquipulas II
reporting mechanisms. Nevertheless, a sense of
equity with the other Central American countries
and recognition that Costa Rica's democratic
system could be improved led President Oscar
Arias to cooperate with the international commit-
tees set up by the Guatemala Accord to monitor
progress toward peace and democracy. To have
done otherwise would have risked Arias' peace-
making role.

Page 7

Final Report of the LASA Commission on the Central Ameia Peace Accord

National Reconciliation Commission. Like
the other Central American countries, Costa Rica
named a National Reconciliation Commission
(CNR). The commission's members were an-
nounced on October 21, 1987. Joaquin Vargas
Gen6, a lawyer and editor of La Repiblica from
1977 until December 31, 1987, was elected
president. Other members of the commission were
Archbishop Ram6n Arrieta, Juan Jos6 Trejos of
the Partido Unidad Social Cristiana, and Minister
of Justice Luis Paulino Mora. The commission
immediately invited political parties, labor unions,
and other associations to send it complaints and
grievances. Although lacking permanent offices
and a budget, it was able to function by borrow-
ing space, office furniture, and supplies from
government agencies. According to Vargas, the
commission, including the four alternates, met
every Monday and Tuesday and on other occasions
when necessary.

As required by the Guatemala Accord, the
Costa Rican commission duly filed its report with
the CIVS on December 21, 1987. Reasoning that
other agencies such as the Red Cross and the
United Nations Refugee Program were already
dealing with the important issues of refugees and
displaced persons in Costa Rica, and judging that
issues of workers' rights were beyond its purview,
the commission concentrated on violations of
individual rights and democratic reform. In a few
weeks it became clear that no one in Costa Rica
claimed that there were systematic violations of
human rights or denial of freedom of expression
in the country. However, the commission received
a much greater indication of unease than anyone
familiar with Costa Rica's democratic system
might have expected. It therefore chose not to
look into larger issues of social justice and
economic grievances, to the disappointment of
some groups, but chose instead to act as Costa
Rica's ombudsman.

The commission looked into several cases of
arbitrary arrest and lengthy detentions without
trial. It uncovered the fact that large numbers
of persons with criminal records or judged
suspicious by the police were placed under
"preventive arrest" to avoid expected trouble.4
The commission found that the Immigration

Departmentsometimes detained unwanted foreig-
ners for lengthy periods and that Costa Ricans
and others were often detained or harassed by
customs officers for bringing in "subversive"
literature even though no laws had been violated.

As is well known, many members of the
armed Nicaraguan opposition used encampments
on Costa Rican soil before and after forays into
Nicaragua. Many used Costa Rica as a haven to
recover from wounds. Problems of individual
rights arose from these circumstances. Some
twenty soldiers of the armed Nicaraguan opposi-
tion, many of them wounded and hospitalized in
Costa Rica, had been arrested for violation of
Costa Rica's neutrality legislation and sentenced
to five years in prison. The National Reconcilia-
tion Commission found it ironic that, while other
guerrilla fighters in Central America were granted
freedom by the amnesty laws required by the
Guatemala Accord, these men, who had not taken
up arms against Costa Rica, continued to languish
in Costa Rican jails.

According to CNR President Vargas, the
commission also explored ways of perfecting Costa
Rica's electoral system and widening freedom of
expression. The CNR reported on the legal
requirement that journalists must belong to the
Journalists' Association (Colegio de Periodistas)
before being allowed to practice their profession
and on certain restraints on printed expression of
opinion during electoral campaigns. No specific
suggestions for reform had been put forward by
the commission at the time of the LASA delega-
tion's visit to Costa Rica.

The National Reconciliation Commission
deliberately avoided airing its investigations in
the Costa Rican media. It justified its low-
profile approach on three grounds: (1) the
problems uncovered were small, (2) the govern-
ment of Costa Rica would be more likely to
cooperate in eliminating abuses if the commission
worked in a quiet manner with the agencies
involved, rather than if it took a confrontational
attitude, and (3) undue publicity about Costa
Rica's imperfections would give ammunition to
leftist opponents intent on destroying the political
system. The commission, in short, took a serious
but conservative approach to its responsibilities.

Page 8

Final Report of the LASA Commission on the Central America Peace Accord

On the issue of use of territory for guerrilla
forces, Costa Rica claimed that it had done all
that possibly could have been done to remove
such forces. Although it was common knowledge
before the Arias presidency that armed opponents
of the Nicaraguan government were operating with
impunity from Costa Rican soil during 1986 and
1987, Costa Rica made efforts to remove all armed
Nicaraguan opposition camps. A northern Costa
Rican airfield that had been used in the supply of
the armed Nicaraguan opposition was closed by
the Costa Rican government in 1986. On January
13, 1988, just two days before the San Jos6
summit meeting, President Arias wrote Nicaraguan
opposition leaders Alfonso Robelo, Alfredo CMsar,
and Pedro Joaquin Chamorro asking them to leave
the country or cease their support of the armed
Nicaraguan opposition.5 The CIVS report of
January 14, 1988, accepted Costa Rica's view that
it was in compliance with this requirement of the
Esquipulas Agreement.6

Other Issues. Costa Rica, arguing that its
National Assembly provided a forum for national
dialogue, took no steps to comply with the
section on national dialogue in the Guatemala
Accord. The government of Costa Rica also
maintained that since there were no political
prisoners in Costa Rica no amnesty was necessary.
The CIVS agreed with Costa Rica on the former,
but not on the latter. The NRC recommended
pardon for three prisoners convicted of homicide
on the grounds that their crimes had a political
character.7 The CIVS made no formal recommen-
dation on the matter but informal reports in San
Jos6 indicated CIVS support for pardons. With
respect to a cease-fire, derogation of a state of
emergency, and democratization, the CIVS agreed
that Costa Rica did not need to take action.8

El Salvador

El Salvador is a country beset with intense
and unrelenting population and economic pres-
sures. Already the region's most densely in-
habited country, its population will double to
about $10 million in the next twenty years. Since
1979, almost 60,000 people have lost their lives,
and damage to the Salvadoran economy amounts
to about $1.5 billion. Almost one million people
have been displaced by the war. The economy is

heavily dependent on United States assistance,
totaling nearly $3.5 billion in the last nine years;
the 1987 aid package of nearly $750 million put El
Salvador behind only Israel and Egypt in terms of
the amount of aid received from the United
States.9 A devastating earthquake in 1986 and a
debilitating drought are only the latest calamities
to wreak havoc on the economy. Peace is a
necessary condition to promote the country's
well-being, but even with peace, El Salvador will
still face enormous economic and social problems.

Esquipulas II gave El Salvador's president,
Jos6 Napole6n Duarte, an important opportunity to
deliver on a 1985 election promise of peace. The
limited results obtained partially through his
efforts illustrate the real constraints on bringing
about peace in El Salvador and, more broadly, in
Central America. These constraints are largely
internal conditions having little to do with the
currently more publicized conflict between
Nicaragua and the United States.

While Duarte and his party hold formal
power, the real power in El Salvador lies else-
where. Three critical actors dominate the
Salvadoran political stage: the army, the United
States Embassy, and the insurgent Farabundo
Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN).

The Salvadoran armed forces have dominated
politics since the 1930s. Resolutely anti-Com-
munist, the military has been locked in a vicious
struggle against the FMLN insurgents since the
late 1970s. Even though there is now nominal
democratic rule in the country, it is the military
that controls movement throughout the country-
side, particularly in contested zones. Duarte and
his Christian Democratic party are at best
tolerated. The military's objection to the party is
both ideological and practical. The army now
represents its own institutional interests, which
often coincide with those of the diminished
oligarchy. But it has been disappointed with
Duarte's indecisiveness regarding the prosecution
of the guerrilla war. Economic mismanagement and
corruption have been a source of friction as well.
Duarte's international prestige counteracts his
administrative inefficiency and has been an
important element facilitating the economic
assistance underwriting the military's recent

Page 9

Final Report of the LASA Commission on the Central America Peace Accord

The United States Embassy has been
Duarte's critical interlocutor with the military.
Indeed, United States aid has been vital for
Duarte's survival. The embassy's ability to
impose the Christian Democratic leader on the
military is a function of a current policy predi-
lection for the legitimacy brought by elections
and other democratic processes. But the embas-
sy's power also derives from its tremendous
economic clout. Direct economic assistance has
ballooned from $10 million in 1979 to $502 million
in 1987. Security assistance, which grew from
about $25 million in 1982 to about $111 million in
1987, has been a vital element in the military's
ability to sustain its anti-insurgency efforts and
its ultimate dominance of the civilian govern-
ment.10 Inevitably, the United States ambassador
functions, in the eyes of many, as a proconsul.

The massive United States influence seems
to generate concern and frustration on the part
of leaders in the popular sectors as well as in
more conservative groups. While the Left is
resentful of the country's lack of sovereignty, the
political and business elite is increasingly
concerned about the impact of a possible United
States abandonment of the country.

FMLN efforts in El Salvador have been
significant since the latter part of the 1970s.
While a major insurrectionary effort in late 1980
failed, the insurgent forces have gradually
enhanced their military capability and organiza-
tional sophistication. They have supported the
development of several allied civilian organiza-
tions, the most prominent of which is the
Democratic Revolutionary Front (FDR); and they
have aggressively pursued a strategy of prolonged
popular war. The United States Embassy claims
that the FMLN has received consistent material
and logistical support from Cuba and Nicaragua,
but there has been little hard evidence presented,
and El Salvador has not appealed to the World
Court for redress. While most analysts suggest
that some external aid to the guerrillas is likely,
most also agree that the FMLN has the internal
organizational coherence and determination to
continue as an effective fighting force even if
all material and logistical support from neighbor-
ing countries were cut off.11 Even though FMLN
spokespersons have shown renewed interest in

peace talks, they want to negotiate their role in
a reformed government, a position unacceptable to
the military and Duarte.12

Two questions are central to an assessment
of the feasibility of Esquipulas II as it relates to
El Salvador. Is the Accord appropriate to El
Salvador's circumstances? Has the country
complied with key provisions of the agreement
since it was signed in August, 1987?

El Salvador and Esquipulas II. Esquipulas II
is an eminently political document because the
forum for discussion is at the highest level of
formal political discourse. However, effective
political power in most of Central America is in
the hands of military officers. Thus, no decision
regarding the peace process is final until it is
mediated and negotiated through each country's
military institution.

In El Salvador, President Duarte found
himself in the midst of his two main brokers, the
United States and his own military, both of which
were antagonistic to the implications of Esquipu-
las II. On the whole, he managed to negotiate
well through that difficult terrain, at least in
terms of obtaining their tolerance of his peace

Esquipulas II assumes a minimal environment
of trust among opposing groups within the society
as a means for promoting reconciliation. In El
Salvador there is no political trust, only political
will. As one experienced political observer
remarked, "This society is so divided that I don't
know where it comes together."13 Since political
power is in the hands of militants, nonarmed will
has definite limits. Duarte's personalization of
the Esquipulas II peace efforts is one manifesta-
tion of this reality. This lack of trust in each
other and in Duarte ultimately resulted in the
unwillingness of both Left and Right to cooperate
with the government's reconciliation efforts.

Esquipulas II explicitly rejects external
intervention as a means by which to promote
reconciliation. Nonetheless, in El Salvador there
is a strong feeling that the only means to effect
peace is through external pressure on key internal
actors in order to secure the compromises
necessary for peace.14

Page 10

Final Report of the LASA Commission on the Central America Peace Accord

National Dialogue. The national dialogue
envisioned in the Guatemala Accord had two
aspects: (1) a dialogue with the "internal"
opposition that would be concerned with political
issues and would be conducted under the auspices
of a National Reconciliation Commission, and (2) a
dialogue with the armed opposition regarding a
cessation of hostilities.

With regard to internal opposition, the
Salvadoran government formed a National Recon-
Alvaro Magafia. Because Magafia was chief
executive during a period of intense activity by
death squads, his credibility was questioned by
the Left and by human rights groups. In
addition, the commission has only one left-of-
center member, social democrat Mario Reni
Roldin, who was named only as an alternate. He
resigned from his position in protest over the
October 26 assassination of human rights leader
Herbert Ernesto Anaya. The representative of the
major rightist party, ARENA, subsequently
resigned as well, arguing that President Duarte
was manipulating the peace process and "acting in
a partisan way" that lacked "seriousness and
depth."15 This left the commission without
members representing the opposition parties of
the Left or the Right. The possibilities for
reconciliation with such a commission seem

Dialogue with the Salvadoran armed opposi-
tion has a history that precedes the Esquipulas II
Accord. The armed opposition and the govern-
ment have met on several occasions, starting with
a 1984 meeting in Las Palmas. The FMLN has
generally demanded power sharing in the govern-
ment, restructuring of the military, withdrawal of
United States assistance, new elections, and the
ceding of territory to their forces as terms for
laying down their arms. The government and, in
particular, the military have found those terms
unacceptable. They have instead proposed the
surrender of the opposition army and an amnesty
for those troops without arms, suggesting that
ex-guerrillas could then participate peacefully in
ongoing electoral processes. The armed opposition
has refused these terms, arguing that the pattern
of assassinations and disappearances in El

Salvador makes it unlikely that their physical
security in an electoral process could be guaran-

In 1985 the FDR-FMLN attempted to follow
the Las Palmas meetings with new negotiations,
but had no success in convincing President Duarte
to participate. In 1986, Duarte agreed to meet
with the rebels, but the insurgent leaders refused
to appear when they realized that the town where
the meeting was to take place was surrounded by
the military. In May 1987, the FDR-FMLN sought
to renew talks by limiting its demands to
"humanizing" the conflict by stopping aerial
bombardments by the military, the use of land
mines by both sides, economic sabotage, and the
capture of civilians in zones of conflict. This
initiative was rejected by the Duarte government.

Under the Guatemala Accord, dialogue with
the armed opposition was required. Talks between
the FDR-FMLN and President Duarte occurred on
October 4 and 5, 1987, at the office of the Papal
Nuncio in San Salvador. The meeting produced no
cease-fire, and the armed opposition withdrew
from the talks following the assassination of one
of the nation's most prominent human rights
activists, Herbert Anaya, in late October. No
further meetings have been held, and a negotiated
cease-fire does not appear likely.

Both the FDR-FMLN and independent
observers have suggested that the terms of
Esquipulas II that limit talks with the armed
opposition to the subject of cease-fire may be a
step backward for El Salvador. Earlier meetings
had included a broader agenda. For now, the
government insists that such talks should only
concern a cease-fire that would allow the
opposition to lay down its arms and participate
peacefully in ongoing political processes. A
unilateral fifteen-day cease-fire declared by the
government on November 5, 1987, had little
impact. The FMLN called its own nine-day cease-
fire for San Salvador on November 21. Both were
largely staged for the benefit of the respective
forces' international image.16

The likelihood of ending the war through the
dialogue envisioned in Esquipulas seems small.
The armed opposition insists that the government
must agree both to share power with the FMLN

Page 11

Final Report of the LASA Commission on the Central America Peace Accord

and to allow it to retain control of the areas in
which they now form a "dual" government. The
military is unwilling to agree to such a solution.
According to one Western official, the civilian
government does not exercise sufficient authority
over the military to mandate such a solution
without provoking a coup.

The intransigence of both the military and
the armed opposition is fed by other factors as
well. First, a long history of bloodshed has led
to almost irreparable hostility. Second, each side
seems to be convinced of the possibility of
military victory. The FMLN, for example,
believes in the inevitability of its victory and is
encouraged by the development of leftist or-
ganizations within the country that support the
broad aims of its political program. Meanwhile,
the military's conviction that it can win is
supported by the United States embassy, although
both the United States and the Salvadoran
military point to the need for a political and
economic component to the counterinsurgency

Focus on the political and economic com-
ponent of counterinsurgency has caused strains
between the military and the Christian Democratic
government. President Duarte, for example, has
launched unpopular economic policies, including a
"war tax" that was eventually ruled unconstitu-
tional. On the political side, he has seemed
somewhat weak, battered in part by internecine
conflicts within his own party. Military officials
were said to be especially upset over the fact
that the FDR-FMLN was able to orchestrate
massive demonstrations near the offices of the
Papal Nuncio while the Christian Democratic
forces were outnumbered and cowed. The military
apparently believes that it is delivering on its end
of the counterinsurgency program but that the
civilian government is not; in the military view,
the government is mismanaging both the economic
and political sides of the domestic policy equa-

A final reason to expect continuing conflict
has to do with the relative self-sufficiency of the
armed opposition. While the United States
embassy and the Salvadoran military publicly
contend that there is a high degree of Nicaraguan
aid to the FMLN, experienced and well-placed

political observers in El Salvador suggested to
members of the LASA Commission that a complete
curtailment of whatever Nicaraguan aid exists
would at best slow but not significantly weaken
the opposition's military efforts. Thus, even if
Nicaragua were to comply thoroughly with the
portions of Esquipulas requiring nonsupport of
insurgent forces, the Salvadoran war would

Democratization. Esquipulas II mandates a
democratization process involving such measures
as freedom of the press, freedom to form political
parties, and the lifting of any state of emergen-
cy. In arguing that it has complied with these
aspects of Esquipulas II, the Salvadoran govern-
ment has pointed to actions both before and after
the signing on August 7. Without a doubt, there
is more political space than existed several years
ago. The last two years have seen the formation
of new popular organizations, including the
National Union of Salvadoran Workers (Unidad
Nacional de Trabajadores Salvadorefios, UNTS),
and an increase in demonstrations in the streets
of San Salvador. Press freedom has grown: one
daily is vitriolically opposed to the Duarte
government, and another daily has published paid
advertisements from the FDR-FMLN. Television
reports have carried interviews with Guillermo
Ungo and Rub6n Zamora, president and vice-
president, respectively, of the FDR. Finally, the
state of emergency was lifted by the government
in January, 1987; this restoration of constitution-
al rights was, however, not due to a conscious
governmental decision; rather, it occurred
inadvertently when a legislative boycott by
rightists prevented the Legislative Assembly from
renewing the law.

Since the signing of the Guatemala Accord,
the expansion of political space for leftist-
oriented parties has accelerated. Key FDR
leaders have returned to the country. In
November, 1987, the FDR's Ungo and Zamora
returned to El Salvador and openly engaged in
political activities. Ungo re-registered his party
(the Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario -- MNR)
with the electoral council, and a new civilian
leftist political coalition, the Democratic Conver-
gence, was established under the leadership of
Mario Reni Roldin. During their short visit in
the country, Ungo and Zamora also met with the

Page 12

Final Report of the LASA Commission on the Central America Peace Accord

United States ambassador under the auspices of
Spain's ambassador in San Salvador.

Despite these appearances, many believe that
the democratic opening is artificial and a
mechanism for exposing opponents of the military
and the government. Guillermo Ungo and Ruben
Zamora do not live in the country, and another
leading democratic leftist politician went into
hiding for several months as the result of
threats from death squads. The fear of repres-
sion and reprisals for political activity remains.
Even a senior Christian Democrat in the govern-
ment has conceded that "to get involved in
political life is a risk.""17 Human rights groups
report that since the signing of Esquipulas II,
death squad activity and government repression
seem to have increased.18

Four key points can be made about this fear
of political violence and its effects on democrati-
zation. First, given the fresh memories of
widespread death squad activity in the 1981-83
period, little progress toward democratization can
take place as long as any political assassinations

Second, while the extent of military and
government control over the death squads has
been extensively debated, none of the alternative
explanations augur well for those from the
democratic and moderate Left who would like to
re-enter the political forum. Either the armed
forces have control and the government is
unwilling to prosecute them, the armed forces
have control and the government is unable to
exercise authority, or the armed forces have no
control and so cannot provide public security.

Third, independent observers suggest that
both death squads and the military are now more
sophisticated in identifying their alleged FMLN
targets; in the words of one observer, "they no
longer need to kill thirty innocent bystanders to
get one sympathizer."1 Whether this reflects
better intelligence or a shift in death squad
tactics is not clear.

Finally, one central issue in the debate over
democratization -- in El Salvador and elsewhere
in the region -- is whether individuals have the
right to sympathize with the political goals or

methods of the armed opposition, provided that
they offer no direct support to actual armed
actions. The army, for example, has resisted
refugee repopulation except for designated areas;
the refugees have claimed that they have a right
to return to their home territories as well as to
sympathize with whichever side they wish, as long
as they do not themselves participate in the
armed opposition. While Esquipulas II would not
seem to limit political freedom to those unsym-
pathetic to opposition movements, the actual
practice of allowing such sympathies is not viewed
kindly by either the civilian government or the
armed forces.

Amnesty. In keeping with the general
requirements of Esquipulas II, President Duarte
proposed and implemented a broad amnesty
measure. Under its terms, 427 prisoners accused
of political crimes were released. Military
personnel accused of attacks against citizens,
fewer than 20, were also released. The govern-
ment also declared that no military personnel
could be indicted for crimes against civilians
committed prior to October 22, 1987.

These amnesty measures satisfied neither the
Left nor the Right.20 Both the Left and human
rights groups argue that citizens accused of
crimes against the state had good chances for
acquittal under constitutional law because their
crimes tended to be ones of possessing knowledge
about the armed opposition and not criminal acts.
The military defendants, they argued, should
have been prosecuted because they were being
tried for assassinations, which were punishable
crimes. Thus, one knowledgeable human rights
observer concluded that the "trade-offs" en-
gineered by Duarte in the amnesty were "piti-

The military was equally unhappy about the
amnesty. In the past, the courts rarely prosecu-
ted military defendants, and the military believed
that the civilian prisoners set free would join
the guerrilla forces. This would in turn demoral-
ize field commanders who were trying to prose-
cute the war. Each side believed that the other
had the advantage under the terms of the

President Duarte pointed to the amnesty as

Page 13

Final Report of the LASA Commission on the Central America Peace Accord

further evidence of El Salvador's compliance with
the peace Accord, in contrast to the Sandinistas'
noncompliance. He skillfully prevailed over
military opposition to the amnesty provisions of
Esquipulas II by giving amnesty the broadest
possible definition. In the process, however, he
managed to displease just about everyone,
including the United States.23 Moreover, by
granting amnesty to the Salvadoran military, the
Duarte government actually violated the peace
agreement. Amnesty was intended for irregular
forces, not government military and police units.
In the process, a de facto amnesty for death
squads was made into a de jure reality.24

Human Rights. President Duarte's govern-
ment has showcased human rights issues in order
to demonstrate El Salvador's superior compliance
with, and Nicaragua's neglect of, the requirements
of Esquipulas II. The case most cited by the
government as an example of its respect for
human rights is the return of 4,300 refugees who
fled El Salvador to Honduras to escape the civil
war. (Estimates are that 1,000,000 Salvadorans
live outside their country, more than 60,000 have
died, and 500,000 are displaced internally due to
the war.)

Eleven thousand refugees have been living in
camps in Mesa Grande, Honduras, where they have
been dependent upon the United Nations High
Commission for Refugees and the Honduran
government for subsistence. They have been
threatened by the Honduran military.

From early 1985 to March, 1987, an es-
timated twenty-five hundred refugees who found
conditions in Honduras intolerable began returning
in small groups to El Salvador. Twenty-six of
them were tortured and incarcerated and others
were captured, detained, interrogated, and
subsequently released.25

When Esquipulas II was signed on August 7,
1987, some forty-three hundred refugees decided
to test the implementation of the Accord by
crossing into El Salvador en masse, surprising
the military and reducing its ability to intimidate
individual refugees. There are now five repopu-
lated communities in northern El Salvador, part
of the conflict zone. In all cases, the army has
surrounded the communities, maintaining a

permanent military roadblock and routinely
restricting the passage of food and other humani-
tarian assistance. Despite government pledges to
provide immediate documentation, more than five
months after the repatriation, fewer than ten
percent of the returnees have received official
documentation. The military bombards the
communities with mortars and arbitrarily fires
into the villages. Violations of human rights
continue. On February 18, 1988, for example, six
repatriates were captured, along with two North
American volunteers.26 Ironically, President
Duarte points to this spontaneous, grass-roots
repopulation action as evidence of the govern-
ment's peaceful repatriation of refugees and
observation of human rights conventions.

Reports confirm that repression, which had
become more selective and less frequent than the
mass slaying before 1983, is again on the rise.
The murder, on October 26, 1987, of Herbert
Ernesto Anaya, the head of the nongovernmental
Human Rights Commission, was first attributed to
Alberto Miranda, a student. But he has subse-
quently retracted his confession, saying that he
was drugged and forced to sign it. Miranda is
an admitted sympathizer of the armed opposition,
and his initial confession was apparently designed
to throw guilt upon the left. At present, he is
still in jail awaiting trail for the murder of

On November 8, 1987, two bodies were found
on a roadside with the letters "FDR" written on
their chests in red ink, an apparent warning to
members of the Democratic Revolutionary Front
who planned to return to El Salvador. Tutela
Legal, the Catholic human rights organization,
attributed the murders to the army.

America's Watch documented 45 death-squad
killings, 78 targeted killings of civilians by
military and civil defense forces, and 39 disap-
pearances in 1986.28 According to Tutela
Legal, civilian deaths caused by governmental
forces totaled 381 for 1987, while deaths caused
by the armed opposition equalled 31. During
1987, thirty-nine deaths occurred when victims
stepped on mines or were in the way of bom-
bardments of strategic locations. Thus, human
rights violations were significantly greater in 1987
than in 1986, and most of the abuses occurred

Page 14

Final Report of the LASA Commission on the Central America Peace Accord

after the signing of Esquipulas II.

Additionally, acts of harassment are better
concealed by the military than they were previ-
ously. Since official reports of disappearances or
arrests cannot be made for seventy-two hours
after a person has been missing, military and
police forces, according to government critics,
detain people for less than seventy-two hours, or
falsify dates of arrest so that the period of
sequestration never appears in police records.

Continual and increasing human rights
violations on the part of governmental forces call
into question the United States position that
President Duarte controls the military and seeks a
negotiated peace and democratic opening. The
fact is that repression has been and continues to
be a legitimate means of political control in the
eyes of some military leaders and right-wing

Significance for El Salvador. While El
Salvador has complied with various portions of
the Esquipulas agreement, compliance has not
been complete. As a recent Salvadoran study of
the peace process in El Salvador concludes: "the
government complied formally and superficially
with all the Esquipulas accords, but it did not
comply with the intent and spirit; and, above all,
compliance was not effective."29 Peace does not
seem more likely than it did prior to August.
Both the military stalemate between the FMLN
and the military and the continuing polarization
and intransigence evidenced by both groups are
symptomatic of the society as a whole.

There are growing tensions between the
military and the government as the Christian
Democratic party has proven unable to deliver on
the economic growth and political mobilization
that the military sees as a necessary component
of a complete counterinsurgency strategy. This
does not bode well for peace and democracy in El

As a result of these twin processes of
polarization and fragmentation, many sectors of
Salvadoran society look outside the country for
both the source of the problems and the means to
effect peace.30 The military, Christian Demo-
crats, businesspeople, and the Far Right blame

Nicaragua for the "subversion," and some suggest
(in private conversations) that peaceful coexis-
tence with the current government of Nicaragua
is impossible. Some of the Left sees the United
States as the source of almost all of the coun-
try's problems and generally argues for a sharp
reduction in United States influence. Other
observers argue that the United States should use
its influence to restrain the military and at the
same time they argue that Cuba, Nicaragua, and
other "friends" of the FMLN should pressure the
FMLN to make compromises leading to peace.

The difficulty with all of these views is that
no matter how constrained El Salvador may be by
international factors and foreign influence, the
conflict is indigenous and deeply rooted; "looking
outside" is indicative of both the desperate mood
of the country and the deep desire for an end to
the conflict.

There remains general agreement in Sal-
vadoran society that Esquipulas II has been
important in at least shifting the political
discourse toward the promise of peace. While
Esquipulas may be written in what one high
government official described as the "language of
the angels," such a shift in the terms of the
debate is welcomed by a populace exhausted from
years of war, death squads, and economic


Guatemala is a profoundly divided nation.
Half the population consists of Spanish-speaking
Ladinos who have traditionally dominated the
Indian portions of society, often by violent means.
The Indian half of the population is itself divided
among more than twenty distinct indigenous
groups. Since the 1960s, military-dominated
regimes have repressed political opponents with a
savagery rarely seen. In the last decade, the
frustrations of the indigenous population gene-
rated support for the armed insurgency that began
in the 1960s.

Guatemala today faces two daunting tasks.
The first is to curtail the immediate violence of
war and human rights violations. The second is to
address several centuries of accumulated political-

Page 15

Final Report of the LASA Commission on the Central America Peace Accord

economic structural traits that have created the
staggering inequities in living conditions, health,
and literacy so evident across class, ethnic, and
regional lines. During its stay in Guatemala, the
delegation was struck by the degree to which
increasingly pressing social and economic concerns
predominated in the media and in the minds of
the public over matters related to the Central
America Peace Plan.31

During the three decades after 1954, and
especially after 1966, tens of thousands of
Guatemalans were murdered by elements connected
to state security forces and right-wing paramili-
tary groups, ostensibly for participation in
partisan politics and for activity in labor, student,
peasant, and professional organizations. With the
1985 election, Guatemala began what President
Vinicio Cerezo calls a "transition to democracy," a
process of building institutions and processes of
political participation within a traditional liberal,
representative constitutional framework.

National Reconciliation. There was wide-
spread agreement in Guatemala that there is at
present more political space than in the recent
past, enabling groups that work within the system
to make themselves heard and to establish bases
of popular support. Political party and labor
union spokespersons, for example, reported
operating fairly openly.32 Problems remain,
however. Independent unionists criticized the
government for bureaucratic interference with
organizing efforts as well as restrictions upon
freedom of movement in the countryside by local
military authorities.33 Several political killings
and crimes were reported in late 1987.34 Indeed,
repression of unions is still evident; while our
delegation was in Guatemala, a market-stall guild
leader was kidnapped, beaten, and warned not to
participate in a demonstration planned for
January 18, 1988.35

The Guatemalan government met once in
Madrid with representatives of the Guatemalan
armed opposition, the Guatemalan National
Revolutionary Union (Unidad Revolucionaria
Nacional Guatemalteca -- URNG) but announced
that it would not continue the dialogue until the
URNG disarmed. (The Accord is not clear as to
whether any government is obliged to conduct
talks with groups that do not lay down their arms

permanently.) Opinion differs in Guatemala about
the extent to which the refusal of the govern-
ment to pursue further dialogue is attributable
either to a military veto or to a lack of political
will by the regime.36 One expert observer em-
phasized that "the axis of the structure of
[national political] power is in the army," an
argument with which almost no one in Guatemala
would disagree. Many believe that the military's
immense power greatly limits what the civilian
government may do in many areas. Another
respondent stated flatly that "the stability of the
government depends on the army." He stated
that any suggestion of concessions to the URNG
via cease-fire talks was unacceptable to the
Guatemalan armed forces, who in his view were
committed to a military victory.

One Guatemalan observer, a high-ranking
party official, argued that President Cerezo had
won the support of only part of the armed forces.
This respondent described the present army high
command as supportive of civilian rule, but he
believed that not all junior officers could be
counted on for similar support. Also indicative of
this perception, Colonel Francisco Luis Gordillo, a
retired army officer who was one of the leaders
of the 1982 coup that toppled General Lucas
Garcia from the presidency and himself a
member of Guatemala's National Reconciliation
Commission (CNR), told the LASA delegation, "I
believe that an army should not rule; unfor-
tunately if the civilians don't have the norms and
values to rule well, sometimes the army has to do
it. I am not justifying [military rule]," he
continued, "but sometimes it's the lesser evil."

Amnesty. Amnesty is a particularly thorny
issue for Guatemala. It was striking that respon-
dents representing a wide range of ideological
differences admitted that, given the present
political context and the lack of guarantees and
safeguards, it was not realistic to expect in-
dividuals who have engaged in armed political
conflict to give themselves over to the authori-
ties. Another common observation was that
earlier amnesty decrees were more sound than the
one generated under the Esquipulas Accord. We
found no evidence that more than a handful of
individuals had availed themselves of the most
recent decree.

Page 16

Final Report of the LASA Commission on the Central America Peace Accord

National Reconciliation Commission. As in
each of the other Central American republics,
Guatemala formed a National Reconciliation
Commission. One of its major functions was to
"verify the effectiveness of the reconciliation
process," but we could not establish that this
function had been carried out effectively. The
CNR was hampered by a serious lack of resources
and governmental support. It had no offices,
staff, or equipment and usually met in the home
of one of its members. Much of its work
appeared ceremonial, such as meeting with visiting
foreign delegations. Moreover, labor leaders and
representatives of the popular classes with whom
we spoke were critical of the makeup of the CNR,
considering that its composition was centered too
much in the upper classes. Also, the fact that
the political party representatives came from
Center-Right and rightist parties left a substantial
range of political views unrepresented on the
commission. Guatemala's CNR never produced a
written report. Its members did not know what
the foreign minister reported on their behalf to
the International Commission on Verification and
Follow-up (CIVS), and one complained that as of
mid-January 1988, CNR members had never even
received a copy of the CIVS report.37 One party
official, when asked what Guatemala's CNR had
done to promote national reconciliation, flatly
stated: "Nothing."38 While it may be tempting
for Guatemala's critics to attribute this outcome
to a lack of political will on the part of the
government, the fact remains that verifying the
effectiveness of the amnesty, the reality of a
cease-fire, and the extent of democratization in
Guatemala do constitute tasks of such gargantuan
proportions that it perhaps is understandable why
they were never seriously undertaken.

Cease-fire. The position of the Guatemalan
government and its supporters is that declaring a
cease-fire is not relevant in the Guatemalan case
because the war is undeclared and largely involves
hit-and-run tactics by insurgents and counterac-
tions by government forces. One official, who
was a member of the Guatemalan negotiating team
in San Jos6, argued that "Guatemala is not in a
state of belligerence like El Salvador and
Nicaragua." Colonel Gordillo gave the delegation
some insight into the military's reluctance to
accept a cease-fire. He argued that a "cease-fire
is very difficult in an irregular war. One cannot

define clear zones [of control]. The guerrillas
are very mobile. A truce or cease-fire gives
them the advantage."

The armed opposition, as seen from within
Guatemala, was reluctant to participate in a
process that would involve verification of a
cease-fire by elements it did not trust. More-
over, for its part, the URNG appeared unwilling
to consider seriously a cessation of hostilities on
any terms that might be acceptable to the
Guatemalan army. The insurgents demands -- that
they not surrender any weapons, that demilita-
rized areas between zones of conflict be es-
tablished, and that controlled territories be
recognized -- led the military to break off talks:
"Army spokesmen," according to Guatemalan
media, "hurried to say that they did not accept
the proposal and that the talks were suspended.
President Cerezo subsequently said the same
thing."39 URNG spokespersons later affirmed in
a communique that "there will be no cease-fire
because the causes of the war remain; they are
present daily in the political, economic, and social
life of the country."40 The armed opposition also
appeared to several Guatemalan observers to be
internally divided over the strategy to follow
regarding the government under the Esquipulas
Accords. (See Section IV below for the perspec-
tive provided directly by the Guatemalan armed
After the suspension of talks, Defense
Minister H6ctor Gramajo promised to continue the
war "until the enemy is wiped out."41 As General
Gramajo's declaration so graphically illustrates,
despite formal compliance with the Accord, that
is, the holding of talks aimed at arranging a
ceasefire, the Accord brought no progress toward
a real suspension of hostilities. One Central
American study of Esquipulas II has concluded
that the impact of the Accord on the war itself
in Guatemala was, as also in El Salvador and
Nicaragua, "directly contrary to the letter and
spirit of Esquipulas II."42 Indeed, most obser-
vers agreed that rather than moving toward a
cease-fire or even a lessening of conflict, both
the army and the insurgents have intensified their
efforts in order to show that they have not lost
ground and that they must be taken into full
account in all future negotiations.

Despite army affirmations that the armed

Page 17

Final Report of the LASA Commission on the Central America Peace Accord

opposition was being defeated militarily, several
observers with good military contacts assured the
delegation, off the record, that the armed forces
privately admit and other evidence sustains that
the URNG is experiencing a substantial increase
in numerical strength, in logistical capacity, in
the number of areas in which it is active, and in
the level of combat activity. These affirmations
appeared substantiated by press accounts of
increased combat and the development of a major
army offensive throughout the August-January
period of the Esquipulas Accord.43

Cessation of Aid to Irregular Forces and
Nonuse of Territory. These aspects of the
agreement did not loom large for Guatemala. The
government has been criticized for allowing the
Nicaraguan contras to meet with support groups
on Guatemalan territory and to operate an
ideological training program at a private Guatema-
lan university.44 The official response to this
allegation is that Guatemala does not deny entry
to groups and individuals who abide by the law
while in the country and that even though contra
leaders did meet in Guatemala, Guatemalan
territory was not used as a platform for military
aggression against Nicaragua.

Refugees and Displaced Persons. Guate-
mala's war and political repression have generated
tens and perhaps hundreds of thousands of
refugees and internally displaced persons. There
are an estimated 40,000 refugees in camps in
southern Mexico and perhaps 150,000 Guatemalan
refugees overall in Mexico.45 The CNR was
unable even to estimate the overall numbers. A
committee representing political exiles returned to
Guatemala to discuss their status, but was
frustrated by government denunciations that it
represented the insurgents. In the end the
committee's members had to leave the country
hurriedly without meeting with President Cerezo.
The CNR attempted but was unable to visit
refugee camps in southern Mexico. Overall, the
problems of refugees and displaced persons remain
largely unaddressed by the Guatemalan government
under the aegis of Esquipulas.46

Democratization. The level of democratiza-
tion in Guatemala today may only be evaluated
against the background of the decades of military
rule and state terror that preceded the military's

relinquishing control of the executive branch to
Christian Democratic president Vinicio Cerezo in
January, 1986. Against that background, freedom
of the press in Guatemala is relatively broad but
not complete. The government does not censor
the mass media, but access to the print and
broadcast media is somewhat restricted by the
generally conservative posture of the major
media. Leftist groups, including the URNG, have
recently been able to purchase newspaper space to
publish their opinions. As far as the delegation
could determine, no journalist had been killed in
Guatemala since the torture/murder of a radio
station reporter in the Department of Alta
Verapaz in December 1986. Because dozens of
Guatemalan journalists were murdered in the 1970s
and early 1980s, newspapers and television outlets
practice self-censorship by exercising extreme
caution in what they investigate and report in
order to avoid offending the sensibilities of
certain interests, especially the armed forces.

Similarly, there are few formal limitations
upon the participation of political parties in
Guatemala today. However, parties of the Left
and Far Left suffered so much repression under
the military regimes of recent decades that many
leftists went into exile or underground. Since
1985, the only leftist party to return to the legal,
overt political arena has been the Partido
Democritico Socialista (PSD), which took part in
the 1985 national election. Most of the parties
actively participating now in the legal political
arena appear generally free to organize and seek
the support of potential voters.47

State of Emergency and Human Rights.

Guatemala did not have a general state of
emergency or state of siege in effect at the time
of the Accord, and it therefore easily complied
with that formal provision. However, freedom of
movement and association in the countryside and
outside the major cities -- especially in zones in
which there has been armed conflict in recent
years -- is often quite restricted in practice by
the armed forces and by civil patrols (local
militias in which participation is not always
voluntary). Recourse to the courts for redress of
such effective limitations of individual rights has
been highly restricted by violent repression, fear
of such repression, the courts' institutional
weakness and the executive branch's lack of

Page 18

Final Report of the LASA Commission on the Central America Peace Accord

cooperation with the courts. Some progress has
been made in all these areas recently, but full
exercise of constitutionally protected civil
liberties still eludes large numbers of Guate-
malans.48 Moreover, many opposition parties and
labor organizations, and even the new human
rights prosecutor, complain that the present
government frequently acts in an unconstitutional
manner, ignoring judicial orders to comply with
the constitution of 1985 and setting a poor
example for other political actors.49

Guatemala's human rights performance before
and after the Accord remains deeply flawed.50
Several observers concurred that a major restric-
tion imposed upon the civilian government by the
armed forces as a condition for the transfer of
power in 1986 (a condition ratified by two
amnesty decrees) is that there should be no
investigation or prosecution of the security forces
for past human rights abuses.51 In practical
terms, there appear to remain very powerful
barriers to the civilian regime's pursuit of human
rights improvements. The Guatemalan government
established the office of human rights prosecutor
only late in 1987, two years after coming to
power. As of January 1988 the prosecutor's
office had yet to receive an operating budget
sufficient to purchase furniture, computers, and
vehicles, and to hire staff. The prosecutor
manifested frustration at his inability to function
and had mainly taken only symbolic actions in
defense of human rights (such as ordering a
rollback of sharply increased electrical rates),
because it was impossible for his agency actually
to investigate rights violations. Other develop-
ments also reveal how tenuous is state support
for the protection of human rights in Guatemala
under the Peace Plan. As of early 1988 and after
two years of continuous pressure on the civilian
government, the regime still refuses permission to
the International Red Cross to open an office in
Guatemala. Moreover, the Catholic Church
continues to delay the opening of a legal aid
office that it has been planning for at least two

Against this backdrop of frail institutional
support for human rights, most observers agreed
that the overall number of politically motivated
killings and abductions of Guatemalans in 1985
and 1986 remained well below levels observed

from 1979 through 1984.52 The 1985-1986 decline
in the level of state-sponsored political violence
was due in part, according to one observer, to
the chilling fact that after years of terrorism
against political parties, student groups, and labor
unions, "there are just not as many people left to
kill now."

Nevertheless, there was a marked increase in
political violence in 1987. Credible observers who
felt the need to remain anonymous noted that
during 1987 "there was a total of 1,021 cases of
political violence, of which 550 were murders and
150 kidnapping. The total register of [political]
crimes rose 57 percent above 1986 levels and the
number of kidnapping increased 10 percent....
Levels of political murders are even higher than
in 1985, when the total number of murders was
448."53 The number of political murders surged
sharply in December, 1987.54 Expert observers
also affirmed to the delegation that no meaningful
alteration has occurred in the infrastructure of
state terror and insurgent terror. Thus the
official security forces and paramilitary organiza-
tions responsible for most such state-sponsored
terror persist, as do leftist armed groups. Both
sides continue to abduct, murder, and torture
perceived political opponents at varying rates
from month to month.

As regards the promotion of social justice,
all observers concurred that no progress of any
sort toward redressing Guatemala's severe and
persistent inequities was made under Esquipulas II.
Guatemala's greatest difficulty in the area of
social justice -- the grave inequalities and disad-
vantages suffered by the large indigenous
population -- remain unchanged by the Accord
and by the current process of transition to
civilian rule.

Free Elections. Guatemala's 1985 national
election was judged by observers to have been
procedurally honest and correctly counted.55 The
electoral laws and mechanisms for the conduct
and counting of the vote appeared quite satisfac-
tory. The military regime made no major effort
to sway the outcome in favor of any particular
party. The 1985 electoral campaign, however, was
marred for most of its duration by the climate of
fear that had pervaded Guatemalan life for two
decades and by military rule itself, both of which

Page 19

Final Report of the LASA Commission on the Central America Peace Accord

led the participating parties severely to restrain
themselves as to the issues they discussed.
Moreover, parties to the left of the PSD were
unwilling to participate in the climate of general-
ized state and paramilitary violence that had
severely decimated their ranks and leadership in
the previous two decades.

Given the limitations of the amnesty law
enacted under the Guatemala Accord, few members
of those parties of the Left still operating from
exile and underground appear likely to return to
Guatemala to contest possible forthcoming Central
American Parliament elections. No parties to the
left of the PSD have surfaced and entered the
electoral arena to participate in the upcoming
April, 1988 municipal elections.56

Significance of the Esquipulas Accord for
Guatemala. Many Guatemalans believe that the
Esquipulas Accord has had very little impact on
domestic politics and that such impact as has
occurred has not been in the areas formally
contemplated by the agreements. CNR member
and opposition party leader Jorge Serrano Elfas,
for example, described himself as "very cynical
about the CNR" and stated that he refrained from
resigning from the commission in protest over its
impotence only to prevent the government from
taking political advantage of such a gesture.
Another CNR member, Colonel Gordillo, suggested
in a thinly veiled reference to President Cerezo,
that one reason for Guatemala's participation in
the Peace Plan was that "everybody wants to win
a Nobel Peace Prize."

The Accord did not promote much dialogue
among political actors, nor has it altered the
performance of the government in the areas of
human rights, race relations, or social justice.
The Accord has definitely not contributed to an
end to the insurgency or counterinsurgency
warfare by the armed forces; indeed, the war has
heated up substantially since August, 1987. Most
observers, however, believe that the participation
of the Christian Democratic government and
President Vinicio Cerezo in the peace process has
served them well, since attention has been
deflected from the daunting array of social,
political, economic, and policy problems that beset
the country.

Guatemala's foreign policy of pursuing a
regional peace accord, mediating between Nicara-
gua and the Sandinista regime's critics, and
seeking to reduce tensions in the isthmus have
improved Guatemala's formerly abysmal image in
the international community. The resulting
improvement of Guatemala's relations with the
United States and with European and Latin
American nations has facilitated and will probably
continue to facilitate Guatemala's reorganization
of its foreign debt, acquisition of international
credit, recuperation of its decimated tourism
industry, and cooperation with industrial nations.


Prior to the devastating armed conflicts of
the 1980s in El Salvador and Nicaragua, Honduras
was clearly the poorest country in Central
America. By some measures it still is. However,
it does not have the same degree of inequalities
in income distribution nor the tradition of
political violence of several of its neighbors. In
the post-World War II period, there has been
considerable political uncertainty and instability,
along with a number of limited reform efforts
under both civilian and military regimes. In the
early 1970s, the country experienced a reformist
military regime, followed by two caretaker
military governments. Now, halfway through its
second consecutive elected government, the
political system shows signs of growing institu-
tional democratization.

Even though the two traditional parties,
Liberal and Nationalist, garnered 94 percent of
the popular vote in the 1985 elections, the
continuing challenge for the system is the
political incorporation of the popular sectors,
particularly peasant groups. Even though the
military is an increasingly powerful force, which
looms as a potential threat to democratization,
systematic human rights violations have not
typically been a mechanism of political control.
In comparison with Guatemala, El Salvador, and
Nicaragua, Honduras' politics have been reasonably
consensual and familial.

Honduras borders on all three Central
American nations experiencing major internal
violence. This geographic centrality has made the

Page 20

Final Report of the LASA Commission on the Central America Peace Accord

country the object of considerable attention from
bordering nations and, after 1980, from the
United States. The attention has provided
Honduras with new opportunities and new
challenges. Economic and military assistance to
the country increased from $55 million in 1980
($51 million economic and $4 million military) to
$255 million in 1987 ($195 million economic, of
which $89 million is balance-of-payments assis-
tance, and $60 million in direct military aid). In
addition, since 1981, the United States has
supported the armed Nicaraguan opposition on
bases in Honduras: total formal assistance to the
opposition comes to about $237 million. While
these infusions have had a major impact on the
country's economic growth rates, the costs have
been considerable. Besides economic distortions
and difficulties in absorbing such large sums, the
presence in Honduras of the armed Nicaraguan
opposition has created new threats to the
tentative democratic process. Honduras began the
decade at the margin of the Central American
conflict; today it finds itself at the center.

When the five Central American presidents
signed the Guatemala Accord on August 7,
Honduras had fewer internal challenges than did
its neighbors. Since there was no armed opposi-
tion against the Honduras government, no cease-
fire was necessary. The elements of democratiza-
tion, defined under Esquipulas II as media and
political party freedom and lifting of emergency
rule, were not controversial issues in Honduras.

Nonuse of Territory for Aggression Against
Other Countries. The key issue for Honduras to
be in compliance with the Guatemala Accord is
the nonuse of its territory by the armed Nicara-
guan opposition, the contras. Overall estimates of
the size of the Nicaraguan rebel force range from
8,000 to 16,000. Both government and opposition
sources agree that most of these armed persons
are now inside Nicaragua. Estimates of the
number still inside Honduras range between
fifteen-hundred and 3,000. While there is
agreement on the fact of sharply reduced
presence in Honduras since the signing of
Esquipulas II, explanations for the reductions
differ. One view is that the sharply increased
United States support beginning in June, 1987
enabled troops to move into Nicaragua. Honduran
officials assert that steps they took to comply

with Esquipulas II, including conversations with
leaders of the contras resulted in the virtual
elimination of irregular forces from Honduras.
Both President Jos6 Azcona and Vice-President
Alfredo Fortin, the government's representative
on the National Reconciliation Commission, claim
that the only contras remaining inside Honduras
with the knowledge of the Honduran government
are those receiving medical treatment at the
Aguacate military base.

However, Honduran opposition sources and
other observers dispute this claim. For example,
El Tiempo, a frequent critic of government policy
(although owned by another of the three vice-
presidents of the country), published pictures of
contra troops on a Honduran base in early
January 1988. The National Federation of
Farmworkers (Confederaci6n Nacional de Traba-
jadores del Campo--CNTC) asserts that the armed
Nicaraguan opposition retains control of over 500
square kilometers near Capire in the Las Vegas
salient, from which 3,000 Honduran peasant
families have been displaced. Although they agree
that the military presence has been sharply
reduced, CNTC spokespersons say it is still not
possible for the peasant families to reclaim their

The Honduran government did pressure the
armed Nicaraguan opposition into closing its major
base camp in the Las Vegas salient. However, a
diplomatic source in Honduras noted that the
Nicaraguan opposition maintains a secondary
headquarters inside Honduras. Colonel Enrique
Bermddez, the military commander of the Nicara-
guan Democratic Force (Fuerza Democritica
Nicaragiense, FDN), the largest rebel force, was
interviewed in Tegucigalpa following the negative
United States congressional vote on aid to the
armed Nicaraguan opposition in February, 1988.
His presence in Honduras would in itself appear
to be a violation of the Guatemala Accord.

High government officials assert that
international verification under the Guatemala
Accord may take place in any part of the national
territory without prior notification. Honduran
authorities agreed to such verification early in
January 1988, when the CIVS visited the country.
The offer is now moot, since the presidents, in
their declaration of January 16, dismissed the

Page 21

Final Report of the LASA Commission on the Central America Peace Accord

CIVS and have not yet agreed on an alternative
mechanism of verification. Vice-President Fortin
indicated concern that implementation of para-
graph 31 of the CIVS' conclusions would be a
violation of the sovereignty of the Central
American nations. Paragraph 31 requests that the
Central American presidents ask the secretaries
general of the OAS and the UN to send a
technical mission to the region to finalize plans
for mobile inspection teams to operate in each of
the five countries.57

There was general agreement among Hon-
durans of all political persuasions that the cutoff
of United States aid to the armed Nicaraguan
opposition could have serious repercussions in
Honduras. Military officials anticipated that the
end of United States aid would result in a sharp
increase in Nicaraguan refugees in Honduras.
President Azcona noted that Honduras would
have to give at least temporary refuge to former
contra soldiers. He observed that the Honduran
military would disarm them and that the Honduran
government would provide them with humanitarian
assistance, at least for a short period.

A representative of the business community
in Honduras expressed great concern for the
short-term and long-term implications for the
country of a complete cutoff of aid to the armed
Nicaraguan opposition. He stated that the
business community would see the cutoff as a sign
that the United States would no longer protect
Honduras, which would contribute to economic
instability and would undermine business con-
fidence in the country. He also expressed his
fear that the elimination of the pressure of the
armed opposition on Nicaragua would result in
new covert Sandinista initiatives inside Honduras
to polarize the political situation. He stated that
Honduras was "ripe for subversion" and that
Nicaragua would certainly provide the catalyst for
violent revolution inside the country if the United
States presence was sharply reduced and assis-
tance to the armed Nicaraguan opposition

An alternative view, expressed by a leading
Honduran banker, was that a cutoff of United
States aid would not be detrimental to Honduras
because it would permit the reinvigoration of
economic relations with its Central American

neighbors, particularly Nicaragua. However, for
this to happen, he made it very clear that it
would first be necessary to remove the armed
opposition from the scene: "We cannot permit a
force like the contras to remain in Honduras.
They are veterans, they have arms, and they can
cause problems."

Democratization. Honduras has had two
successive presidential elections in which the
results were respected by all parties. There are
no formal restrictions on press freedom and no
state of exception restricting constitutional
liberties. Political parties are free to organize,
except that class-based parties or those accepting
international economic assistance are not per-
mitted. In practice, these limitations have been
applied to Communist and Social Democratic
parties. In the 1985 elections, the two traditional
parties, the Liberals and the Nationalists, received
94 percent of the vote. The remainder was
divided between the reformist Christian Demo-
cratic and the National Innovation and Unity
(Partido de Inovaci6n Nacional y Unidad, PINU)
Parties. In part, both traditional parties have
maintained their electoral strength by permitting
ideological diversity within the party structure.
Hence there is more intraparty diversity than
between the dominant factions of the two parties.
This has contributed to the traditional weakness
of the Left in Honduran politics.

Many critics claim that the most difficult
obstacle that Honduras faces on its road to full
democracy is reducing the role of the military in
civil affairs. The power of the armed forces is
illustrated by the fact that the Chief of the
Armed Forces (jefe del estado mayor) is not
appointed by the president and can only be
removed by a two-thirds vote of Congress in
combination with a presidential decree. There
was agreement in all nongovernmental sectors of
Honduran society that abuses of authority by
some military personnel remain a problem for the
political system. Dealing with such problems is
complicated by the fact that the police force is
directly under military command. Thus, civilian
authorities are prevented from investigating
possible police abuses. The attorney general,
while admitting that police and military abuse
remain a problem, especially in rural areas,
indicated that the government is prosecuting 150

Page 22

Final Report of the LASA Commission on the Central America Peace Accord

officials and enlisted men accused of such
offenses. Three of the 150 cases are related to
human rights abuses.

Honduran military leaders acknowledge that
abuses of authority remain a problem, but they
argue that as the training and education level of
the officer corps improves, these abuses will
gradually disappear. One of the consequences of
increased United States military assistance is the
Honduran military's institutional enhancement,
contributing to its growing political capacity vis-
g-vis civil organizations. While this may lead to a
lower level of abuses, it also puts the military in
a stronger position regarding future intervention
in the political process. Episodes of military
professionalization elsewhere have been followed
by military intervention in the political process.

National Reconciliation and Dialogue.
Honduras was the last country to establish a
National Reconciliation Commission, beating the
November 7 deadline by only three days. After
the signing of the Guatemala Accord, President
Azcona stated, "From the peace agreement it can
be seen that the commission is for those coun-
tries that have an armed conflict . ., for it
would be absolutely inconceivable to introduce a
commission of reconciliation where there is
nothing to reconcile."58 Pressure from internal
opposition groups, the Episcopal Conference of
Honduran Bishops (in a pastoral letter of August
27, 1987), and other Central American countries
apparently persuaded Honduras to comply,
ultimately, with the national reconciliation
requirement of the Guatemala Accord.

The CNR was made up of representatives of
the established party system (a Liberal, a
Nationalist, and a Christian Democrat, as principal
representatives); and the ailing archbishop of
Tegucigalpa served as chairman. The commission,
according to the report it released, carried out
three activities: it prepared the amnesty decree
(see below), it talked with a wide variety of
Honduran groups, and it transmitted the accusa-
tions of those groups to the proper authorities.
Labor, peasant, student, human rights, and
university groups, as well as political party
representatives, appeared before the commission.
The commission mentions in its report that the
following complaints were brought to it: (1)

complaints from the Christian Democrat and the
National Innovation and Unity parties, as well as
a faction of the Nationalist party, regarding the
postponing of municipal elections that were to
have been held in November, 1987 (as of mid-
January, 1988, no date had been set); and (2)
testimony regarding abuse of power by military
personnel and certain politicians carried out
against civilians. The commission noted that such
abuses occurred principally in rural areas, and
that there were accusations of disappearances,
persecution of Catholic lay leaders (celebradores
de la palabra), and of forced removal from
occupied land of peasants involved in agrarian
conflicts. The commission requested a meeting
with General Humberto Regalado Hernandez and
presented these complaints against the armed
forces to him. The results of the meeting are
specified in the commission's report:

The military authorities demonstrated
an attitude of full cooperation and a
willingness to investigate the in-
dividuals involved. A channel was
opened in order to maintain constant
communication with members of the
commission so that problems presented
could be solved jointly. The commis-
sion testifies to the full cooperation
lent by the armed forces and its desire
to clarify any accusation which might
soil the prestige of the [military]

As of mid-January, 1988, the commission had
received no response from the military on any of
the specific cases presented to General Regalado.

While the National Reconciliation Commis-
sion served as a funnel for collecting important
concerns and accusations from many sectors of
the society, it lacked a mechanism -- except in
the case of amnesty -- to convert these concerns
into constructive responses. This shortcoming is
highlighted by recent notable cases of political

The level of political violence in Honduras
has traditionally been low among political elites.
This fact increases the significance of the deaths
of a human rights activist and his companion in
San Pedro Sula on January 14, 1988, the eve of

Page 23

Final Report of the LASA Commission on the Central America Peace Accord

the meeting in San Jos6 of the five Central
American presidents. One of the victims, Miguel
Angel Pav6n, was vice-president of the Honduran
Commission for Human Rights (Comisi6n Hon-
durefia de Derechos Humanos, CODEH). A few
months earlier Pav6n had testified before the
Interamerican Court on Human Rights in San Jos6
in a case brought against Honduras regarding
alleged human rights abuses by the military in
1981 and 1982. The chilling effect of this murder
could have negative consequences for open
political participation in Honduran society. This
situation has been exacerbated by the alleged
failure of the police to investigate the case
adequately. Ram6n Custodio, president of CODEH,
claimed that although the police arrived ten
minutes after the shooting, there was no official
autopsy, no ballistics tests, nor the lifting of
fingerprints, footprints, or tire prints. Four days
later, top military officials indicated they had no
leads in the case.

Ten days before the murder of Pav6n, an
aide in the intelligence branch of the Honduran
police, Isafas Vilorio, was machine-gunned to
death prior to his scheduled testimony before the
court in the same case. Vilorio was reportedly
killed by a lone assassin the morning after the
Honduran attorney general announced that Vilorio
would testify before the court. According to one
account, the assassin draped the flag of the
minuscule "Cinchonero" leftist guerrilla movement
over the body. Florencio Caballero, a defector
from the interrogation unit called Battalion 316,
has alleged that in the early 1980s Vilorio was in
charge of the archives and of internal security
for that unit. Battalion 316 was directly respon-
sible to the chief of intelligence of the Honduran
Armed Forces, and, according to Caballero, acted
as a death squad during the period that General
Gustavo Alvarez was chief of the armed forces
(1981-1984).60 A few days prior to Vilorio's
death, Joselito Aguilera C6rdoba, a military
defector who had given secret testimony to
CODEH, was also killed.

While many government opponents view these
deaths as marking the possible resurrection of
officially sanctioned right-wing violence in the
country, both the United States Embassy and the
Honduran military adhere to the view that these
assassinations are the work of leftist revolution-

aries or the Sandinistas, designed to embarass
the Honduran government.

Another impediment to the evolution of
democracy in Honduras is the difficulty people in
the lower social strata, particularly peasants,
experience in gaining political and economic
access. A specific problem, which has led to
increased violence in the countryside, is the
unwillingness of the government to enforce the
agrarian reform law that has been on the books
since the early 1970s. Aside from a titling
project for peasants on government land, which is
supported by USAID, petitions for access to
underutilized private property are rarely acted
upon. Peasants' efforts to take matters into their
own hands have met with arrest and apparently
even torture.

The continuing violence in the countryside is
a matter of considerable concern in this fragile
democracy. In October, 1987, fifteen members of
the CNTC were arrested, apparently in connection
with a land invasion. An America's Watch report

Several reported being brutally tor-
tured, a charge the government has
denied. One of the peasant activists,
Margarita Murillo, reported being
repeatedly raped, beaten, hung by the
arms and legs and tortured with
electric shocks all over her body while
in the custody of the National Depart-
ment of Investigation (Direcci6n
Nacional de Investigaciones, DNI).
Murillo had to be hospitalized after her

Amnesty. The Honduran government's
amnesty decree, which became law on December
11, 1987, was written to comply with the Guate-
mala Accord. Among its provisions is a pardon
for peasants who participated in the land
invasions of 1987. The government notes that
this was done because there were no others who
could be classified as political prisoners. The
Assembly added to the draft amnesty proposal
developed by the National Reconciliation Commis-
sion a provision that also allows for amnesty for
individuals guilty of crimes committed under the

Page 24

Final Report of the LASA Commission on the Central America Peace Accord

code of military justice.62

According to the report of the International
Commission on Verification and Follow-up, some
29 persons were released under the amnesty.
Fifteen were peasants belonging to the National
Confederation of Field Workers (CNTC) and th
remainder were members of various other unions.
Leaders of the CNTC indicated that there are
hundreds of peasants--176 belonging to their own
organization--who have been jailed or who are
accused of political crimes who should have been
granted amnesty. Manuel Acosta Bonilla, head of
the Human Rights Committee of the Honduran Bar
Association (Colegio de Abogados), and other
critics of the government claim that the amnesty
decree was quite narrowly drawn.

Refugees. Official figures from the United
Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR)
for December, 1987, show 11,758 non-Indian
refugees in three UNHCR camps in Honduras.
There were also about 13,115 Nicaraguan Indian
refugees under UNHCR protection in Honduras in
January, 1988. In addition, there are between
75,000 (United States Embassy estimate) and
135,000 (Honduras refugee officer's figures)
unregistered Nicaraguans currently living in
Honduras. There were over 3,200 more refugees
in the three non-Indian camps at the end of 1987
than at the beginning. They are believed to be
Nicaraguans previously in Honduras who moved
into the UNHCR camps after the closing of the
armed Nicaraguan opposition's primary base camp
close to the Nicaraguan border. There are also
around 16,500 Salvadoran refugees living in three
camps near the Salvadoran border. Some repatri-
ation has occurred over the past year under
UNHCR auspices, including approximately 4,300
Salvadorans since October. Reportedly, some 400
Miskitu Indians return to Nicaragua each month.

In the UNHCR refugee camp of Teupasenti in
mid-January, 1988, there were an estimated 3,600
to 3,800 non-Indian refugees, residing in about
200 wooden ten-square-foot houses and some 50
large field tents. Food was distributed at a
spartan but calorically adequate standard, and the
water source was the adjacent river. Resident
coordinators were responsible for ensuring that
able bodied persons work regular hours in camp
carpentry, tinware, and sewing workshops, wood

gathering and splitting, and coffee harvesting
outside the camp. They also had responsibility
for proper food distribution and for enforcing
order. Catholic and Protestant churches operate
inside the camp. An eight-room school for the
refugee children operated through the fifth grade.
Adult classes were also offered. Most refugees
interviewed were from the Honduran-Nicaraguan
border area where the war is most pervasive. All
indicated their desire to return as soon as
conditions permitted.

Conclusions. Since August, 1987, Honduras
has implemented a limited amnesty and initiated a
national dialogue through the creation and
operation of aNational Reconciliation Commission.
As of the Central American presidents' meeting in
January, 1988, none of the complaints presented
to the commission had been satisfactorily

Freedom of the press, political pluralism, and
the absence of a state of emergency characterized
Honduras even before the signing of the Guate-
mala Accord. While in the 1980s Honduras has
moved to set up institutions of a free society, the
military retains a key role in the national
political decision-making process. Increased
military assistance has expanded its capacity,
which makes it stronger than its civilian counter-

Another problem limiting full democratization
is increased political violence. While violence in
Honduras is minor in comparison with its neigh-
bors, several incidents since August, 1987, have
given many Hondurans cause for deep concern.
The Guatemala Accord has had little favorable
impact on the human rights situation in Honduras,
although the limited amnesty has been a plus.

The knottiest problem for overall implemen-
tation of the Guatemala Accord in Honduras is
the continued presence of the armed Nicaraguan
opposition on Honduran soil. So long as the
Honduran government perceives that United States
aid might be lost were Honduras seriously to seek
to expel the armed Nicaraguan opposition, the
Honduran government can be expected not to take
such action. In addition, there is great concern
in all sectors of Honduras regarding the country's
ability to cope with members of the Nicaraguan

Page 25

Final Report of the LASA Commission on the Central America Peace Accord

opposition who would likely stream back across
the Nicaraguan border, should United States
assistance cease.


After the signing of the Guatemala Accord,
Nicaragua took early and decisive steps to
comply. Four days after he returned to Nicara-
gua in August, 1987, President Daniel Ortega
established the National Reconciliation Commis-
sion, and on August 25, he announced its
composition. He also announced at that time
that three noted priests, all previously banned
from returning to Nicaragua because of their
alleged support for Nicaragua's armed opposition,
would be allowed to re-enter the country. Two
of the priests, Bismarck Carballo and Benito
Pitito, returned to Nicaragua in September, 1987.

On September 13, President Ortega issued a
pardon for sixteen Central American nationals
convicted of participating in counterrevolutionary
activities. Approved by the National Assembly,
the pardon went into effect on September 23.
Shortly afterward he announced the derogation of
a decree known as the Absentee Law, which had
been enacted on July 19, 1981, and about which
opponents of the Sandinistas had bitterly com-
plained. This law established courts of exception
under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Agricul-
ture and allowed for the confiscation of proper-
ties of absentee owners. The president also
called for a national dialogue with opposition
parties and scheduled the talks for October 5.
On September 19, the Nicaraguan government
authorized the reopening of the opposition
newspaper La Prensa, "with no further restrictions
than those imposed by responsible journalism."
Three days later, prior censorship of the media
was lifted and the archdiocesan radio station,
Radio Cat6lica, was allowed to begin broadcasting
again. La Prensa resumed publication on October
1, and Radio Cat6lica returned to the air soon

During October, the main government
activity relating to the Guatemala Accord was
centered on the process called "National Dia-
logue," which progressed at a slow pace before
collapsing over the issue of the constitutional

reforms demanded by the opposition. The
government also designated three unilateral cease-
fire zones on October 7, but as these had not
been negotiated, as required by the Guatemala
Accord, they had little effect.

On November 6 President Ortega proposed to
Archbishop Miguel Cardinal Obando y Bravo that
he serve as mediator in cease-fire negotiations
between the government and the armed opposition.
The parties met twice in the Dominican Republic
during December, but the talks were not
successful. President Ortega's response to the
amnesty requirement of the Guatemala Accord was
to propose an amnesty law, which was approved
by the National Assembly on November 18.
However, since the law's implementation was
conditioned on other nations' compliance with
other provisions of the Guatemala Accord, it was
not fully implemented. On November 22, a total
of 985 prisoners, including 188 former members of
the Somoza National Guard, were officially
pardoned and released.63

After the January 15, 1988 meeting of
Central American presidents held in San Jose,
Costa Rica, the Nicaraguan government joined the
other Central American nations in a public
pledge to fulfill the remaining Esquipulas II
commitments "immediately, totally, and uncondi-
tionally." Nicaragua then lifted the state of
emergency, suspended the functioning of the
exceptional courts related to public security,
announced its willingness to enter into direct
talks with the armed opposition, and offered to
release all of the remaining prisoners accused or
convicted of political crimes, once a cease-fire
was agreed upon. Nicaragua also offered to
permit the prisoners to emigrate if any country
would take them and reaffirmed its commitment to
holding municipal elections and elections for the
Central American Parliament.64

The NationalR reconciliation Commission. The
National Reconciliation Commission assumed high
visibility in Nicaragua. The government ap-
pointed Dr. Gustavo Paraj6n (a physician and
Baptist minister), Archbishop Obando y Bravo,
Mauricio Dfaz (an opposition political leader from
the Popular Social Christian party, Partido
Popular Socialista Cristiano -- PPSC), and Sergio
Ramirez Mercado (Nicaragua's vice-president).

Page 26

Final Report of the LASA Commission on the Central America Peace Accord

Despite the Sandinistas previous verbal abuse of
the archbishop, the Nicaraguan government
selected him over two other church nominees and
encouraged the group to elect him president.
Nicaragua's religious and political institutions
achieved a measure of their own reconciliation
with the naming and acceptance of the archbishop
as president of the commission.

By November 26, 1987, the commission had
met eight times and had filed written reports, as
required by the Guatemala Accord, to the
International Commission on Verification and
Follow-up (CIVS). The full reports were printed
in the Nicaraguan newspapers. They dealt with
the specific measures taken by the government to
comply with the Guatemala Accord, included
listings of specific charges of human rights
violations, and reflected an unusual convergence
of the views of government and opposition.

In general, Nicaragua was successful in
utilizing the National Reconciliation Commission
as an instrument for lessening political tension.
Nevertheless, criticism arose concerning lack of
full compliance with the Guatemala Accord, even
within the commission itself. For example, in his
testimony before the CIVS on December 31,
Cardinal Obando, after reaffirming his support
for what Nicaragua had accomplished, pointed to
six areas where government action was needed:
(1) the continuing state of emergency, (2) the
government's failure to declare total amnesty, as
the Catholic Church had requested, (3) the lack
of complete freedom of speech, (4) the continu-
ing abuse of human rights, (5) the failure to
achieve a cease-fire, and (6) the collapse of the
National Dialogue.

Nicaragua took an additional step not
required by the Guatemala Accord. On September
24, at the suggestion of the National Reconcilia-
tion Commission, the government formalized the
grass-roots peace organizations that had emerged
in Nicaragua in support of the Esquipulas Accord
by authorizing the creation of local reconciliation
commissions. These commissions replicate the
structure of the national commission, with
representatives of the government, the church,
the opposition, and prominent citizens. Their
purpose is to promote and support cease-fire
arrangements, encourage acceptance of the

amnesty law, and assist in the return of displaced
persons. As in the case of the national commis-
sion, the local commissions verify measures taken
by the government on behalf of amnesty and
cease-fire agreements and receive documentation
concerning alleged violations of human rights. By
October 7, 1987, approximately 250 local recon-
ciliation commissions were in operation throughout
the country.

National Dialogue. On September 13, 1987,
the Nicaraguan government invited all legally
recognized opposition parties to participate in a
National Dialogue. Each party was asked to
designate a representative and an alternate and to
prepare an agenda for the talks. Eleven parties,
as well as the Democratic Coalition (Coordinadora
Democritica, an unregistered opposition coalition
group), responded to the government's call.
Commander Carlos NMfiez, president of the
National Assembly, served as President Ortega's
personal representative. The National Dialogue
met for the first time on October 5.

Problems arose from the start. The Demo-
cratic Coalition walked out of the talks because it
was awarded only four seats. Nevertheless, one
of the four coalition representatives continued to
attend, and on November 4, four Democratic
Coalition representatives were once again in
attendance. Agreement on procedures also proved
difficult. The opposition parties insisted on the
need to reach decisions by majority vote, and the
government argued in favor of consensus rule.
Furthermore, the four Democratic Coalition
members requested revision of the bylaws because
they had been agreed upon prior to their incor-
poration in the dialogue.

The final agenda included the following
topics: constitutional reforms, the municipalities
law, the electoral law, the political parties law,
and the promulgation of laws to implement the
Constitution. The first item brought the dialogue
to a standstill. Among the constitutional reforms
the opposition wished to discuss were the
following: limitation of presidential powers;
abolition of presidential re-election; denial of the
right to vote to persons serving in the armed
forces; redefinition of the armed forces;
recognition of conscientious objection to military
service; creation of a special prosecutor for

Page 27

Final Report of the LASA Commission on the Central America Peace Accord

human rights; elimination of the preamble to the
Constitution; establishment of municipal auto-
nomy; and separation of the state, the armed
forces, and political parties. While the govern-
ment was willing to consider the discussion of
bills that might be sent to the National Assembly,
it refused to consider constitutional reforms as a
part of the National Dialogue. Nfiiez pointed out
that constitutional reforms, according to the
Constitution, must originate in the National
Assembly. He also pointed out that the Guate-
mala Accord did not call for constitutional
reforms. The dialogue collapsed.

In an interview published in Barricada on
January 19, 1988, President Ortega reaffirmed the
position taken by Nifiiez but indicated his
willingness to renew the dialogue. "We are ready
to continue the dialogue;" he noted, "we did not
break it; the opposition groups walked out with
the clear intention of strengthening the political
aggression against our people, but we are ready
to begin again at any moment."

Amnesty. Nicaragua's response to the
Guatemala Accord in regard to amnesty has been
conditional. Although 985 political prisoners have
been pardoned and released, more than three
times that number are still imprisoned. President
Ortega's recommendation of an amnesty bill on
November 19 was a positive step, but the
resulting law permitted the release only of
prisoners convicted of violating the public
security laws if the following conditions were
met: (1) all of the Central American governments
must prevent the use of their territory by groups
that seek to destabilize the Nicaraguan govern-
ment; (2) the other Central American govern-
ments must stop all support of the armed anti-
Sandinista forces, and (3) all extraregional support
to the armed resistance organizations must end.
Since these conditions have not been met the
prisoners remain in jail. The offer made by
President Ortega on January 16, 1988, to release
all prisoners convicted of political crimes, so long
as a third country would receive them, has not
been taken up. Opponents of the Sandinistas see
the offer as simply trading imprisonment for
exile and not a true amnesty offer.

It should be added that the Nicaraguan
government has been offering amnesty to armed

resistance forces since December, 1983. Rebel
soldiers who are willing to lay down their arms
and return to live in Nicaragua were received
before and have been received since Esquipulas II.
After the signing of the Guatemala Accord,
offices were opened in areas affected by armed
resistance to accommodate anyone wanting to take
advantage of amnesty. Local reconciliation
commissions were to facilitate the government's
amnesty measures. According to the government,
1,969 individuals formerly of the armed opposition
laid down their arms and returned to Nicaragua
between August 5 and November 5, 1987.65

Atlantic Coast. Although technically the
Guatemala Accord does not deal with the special
problems of the indigenous population in Central
America, the situation of Nicaragua's Atlantic
Coast merits a comment. Miskito Indians and
other Indian groups on the Atlantic Coast and
along the Nicaraguan-Honduran border have been
caught up in the war to overthrow the Sandinis-
tas from the beginning. Various Indian organiza-
tions have fought alongside the Sandinistas and
others have fought against them, with resulting
loss of life and destruction of villages. After
realizing their failure to take into account
separate ethnic interests and needs, the Nicara-
guan government has attempted to solve the
problem by granting special privileges to armed
Indian rebels and by granting autonomy to the
Atlantic Coast.

Indian leaders who have taken up arms
against the Sandinistas are not required to seek
amnesty, as are other insurrectionary forces. The
Indians were permitted to retain their arms after
promising that they would not use them against
the government. One Indian field commander,
Uriel Vanegas, and 400 men accepted these terms
on October 3, 1987. According to the agreement
with the Nicaraguan government, a third of
Vanegas' forces will be sent to study in various
national and foreign study centers, a third will
join the Sandinista army, and the remaining third
will return to their communities.66 Brooklyn
Rivera, head of the indigenous contra organization
YATAMA, has also accepted amnesty. He visited
President Ortega in San Jos6 during the summit
conference and in the following week appeared
in Managua to negotiate terms with the govern-

Page 28

Final Report of the LASA Commission on the Central America Peace Accord

Human Rights. The human rights situation
in Nicaragua has been the subject of numerous
and conflicting reports. Over the course of the
last seven years, the quality and implicit credi-
bility of these reports have varied greatly. The
LASA commission consulted prior reports and,
while in Central America, spoke with representa-
tives of several of the Nicaraguan and interna-
tional human rights organizations that report on
Nicaragua.68 There is agreement on four
important points. First, they strongly criticize
the state of emergency, for it allowed detention
of persons without due process of law. Some
individuals have been held for months without
being informed of the charges against them. But
there is a consensus that in Nicaragua there are
very few claims that people "disappear" or are
murdered by the state, security forces, or death
squads, as is repeatedly and extensively claimed
about other Central American countries.9 Human
rights organizations also vigorously objected to
the "Popular Anti-Somocista Tribunals," special
courts for persons accused of crimes under laws
similar to the sedition laws in force in the United
States during wartime.70 Even some Nicaraguan
government spokespersons criticized these
tribunals, which were abolished by presidential
decree on January 19, 1988, as being improper in
times of war as in times of peace. The final
point of concurrence among human rights
observers is that most of the abuses attributed to
the government occur in the war zones. It
should be added that several international
organizations also document the continuing abuses
of the armed Nicaraguan opposition inside and
outside the war zone.

There is a predictable discrepancy among
human rights groups concerning the total number
and type of prisoners in Nicaragua. The most
commonly cited figure is seven thousand, of which
fifteen-hundred to two thousand are believed to
be former national guardsmen convicted after the
overthrow of Somoza. Many others are believed
to be common criminals who would not necessarily
be affected by the Esquipulas amnesty when fully
implemented. Some groups maintain that another
one thousand persons are held in a "shadow
system" of detention centers to which national
and international organizations are denied access.

The derogation of the state of emergency in
January, 1988, the abolition of the Popular Anti-
Somocista Tribunals, and the government' promise
to release the remaining political prisoners when
a cease-fire is achieved with the armed opposition
are encouraging steps that are certain to be
supported by the international human rights
community. An end to the war, it is clear, would
also lead to direct improvements in the human
rights situation.

Democracy and Elections. The issue of
democracy is of course at the heart of the
Esquipulas Accord. President Arias has often
stated his conviction that there can be no peace
in Central America without democracy, and on the
eve of the summit conference he reiterated the
linkage in an open letter to President Ortega.71
The other Central American presidents, by
signing the Guatemala Accord, had already firmly
linked democracy with peace. The essence of the
problem of democracy, for Nicaragua, is whether
the government represents the will of the people.
In the openly contested elections of November,
1984, the Sandinista Front (Frente Sandinista de
Liberaci6n Nacional -- FSLN) won the presidency
and a majority of the seats in the National
Assembly by drawing approximately 67 percent of
the votes cast. Some political groups, such as
the Democratic Coalition, refrained from par-
ticipating in those elections; some claimed that
they could not participate effectively. But a
consensus of the international observers was that
the election accurately measured Nicaraguan
public opinion at that time.72

Since the 1984 election the National
Assembly has drafted a Constitution, in a manner

similar in some ways to the recent writing of new
constitutions in Guatemala and El Salvador. The
Constitution was promulgated in January, 1987,
and it calls for new presidential elections prior to
January, 1991. No specific date is set, but the
president of the Nicaraguan equivalent to a
national election commission, the Supreme
Electoral Council (Consejo Supremo Electoral),
indicated to members of the LASA Commission
that he expects elections to be held in November,
1990. Municipal and regional elections are also
prescribed in the Constitution, but no date is set
for them. Nicaraguan sources in the National
Assembly suggest that the timing of the elections

Page 29

Final Report of the LASA Commission on the Central America Peace Accord

depends on the outcome of the cease-fire
negotiations and the passage of enabling legisla-

The war, the negotiations for a cease-fire,
and the discussions with internal opposition
parties create a climate of uncertainty; but
supporters of the government assert that the
constitutional commitment of Nicaragua to
democratic electoral procedures is firm and the
machinery is in place to carry them out. Despite
the Marxist orientation of the nine comandantes
of the FSLN, these procedures have been devel-
oped in a National Assembly with significant
opposition voices and are clearly in the Western
European tradition.

The Opposition's Views. While some
opposition political leaders object to characteriza-
tions of Nicaragua as a democracy, there is in
fact a level of public anti-administration political
activity in Nicaragua that has grown steadily
during the implementation of the Guatemala
Accord. Large demonstrations have been held by
opposition political parties, labor organizations,
and business groups without government interven-
tion or opposition. Within three days of the
lifting of the state of emergency on January 18,
1988, several opposition parties communicated
their intention to hold outdoor rallies.73 They
have proceeded without major interference.

Some members of the opposition have
responded favorably to these measures, but others
doubt the government's sincerity. The interna-
tionally respected critic of the Nicaraguan
government, Violeta de Chamorro, is unimpressed
with Nicaragua's turn toward liberalization. In
her testimony before the CIVS, Chamorro
described La Prensa (and, by extension, Nicara-
gua), as "living under a precarious liberty, which
the Sandinistas see themselves obliged to extend
from time to time and which they can terminate
at any moment."

Two days after the lifting of the state of
emergency, the LASA delegation asked Chamorro
about the position she had taken before the CIVS.
In her view nothing had changed because "four
days ago people were taken to jail." She referred
to the Nicaraguan government's detention of
internal opposition leaders Julio Baltodano, vice-

president of the Democratic Coalition, Mario
Rappaccioli, president of the Nicaraguan Bar
Association and of the Nicaraguan Conservative
party, and others who had just returned to
Nicaragua after attending a meeting in Guate-
mala.7 Representatives of the armed Nicaraguan
opposition and two unidentified North Americans
attended the meeting. The government explained
that the individuals were detained under suspicion
of conspiring with the contras. Although these
persons were released after forty-eight hours,
Chamorro's point about the dangers of political
opposition in Nicaragua remained.

Conclusion. On balance, Nicaraguan
compliance with the Guatemala Accord has been
swift and substantive. Decisive steps have been
taken toward democratization in the areas of
freedom of information and the restoration of
constitutional guarantees. In accordance with
point 3 of the Guatemala Accord, Radio Cat6lica
and La Prensa, both symbols of the opposition,
have been reopened. On January 18, the state of
emergency, which had been in effect since March,
1982, was lifted.

Unlike in Honduras, the Nicaraguan National
Reconciliation Commission was formed four days
after the signing of the accord and its perfor-
mance went beyond the level of formalistic
compliance. Despite the demands of Cardinal
Obando's schedule, the commission met regularly
with its original and alternate delegates in
attendance. It was a forum for healthy discus-

At the close of its deliberations, the
commission issued a statement of nine objectives
to which Barricada devoted a prominent full-page
display. Unlike in Guatemala, whose CNR never
saw the CIVS report on Guatemala, the Nicara-
guan CNR testified before the CIVS. Moreover,
in its attempt to formalize a National Dialogue
with opposition political parties, including the
Democratic Coalition, which chose not to register,
the government went beyond the povisions of the
accord as established in point 1A.

Finally, with regard to point 2 of the
accord, which calls for a cease-fire, Nicaragua
made significant concessions to stop the war on
its borders. From its initial declaration of a

Page 30

Final Report of the LASA Commission on the Central America Peace Accord

unilateral cease-fire in three zones of the nation
(which was not accepted by the contra leaders) to
its appointment of Archbishop Obando as media-
tor, the government has pursued different
strategies to achieve a workable cease-fire.
Despite the lack of success of the cease-fire
talks, as of this date, they are still under way in
Nicaragua, although they have been discontinued
in El Salvador and Guatemala.

We have argued that Nicaraguan compliance
has been substantive but that Nicaragua has not
complied completely with all the provisions of the
Accord. The critical factor in this regard is that
Nicaraguan compliance is deemed to be contingent
upon the compliance of other Central American
and regional actors. For example, in accord with
the amnesty provisions, (point 1B of the Accord)
President Ortega released 985 political prisoners;
thus, to some extent, Nicaragua complied with
this provision. But the declaration of a full
amnesty, which would in effect release former
Somoza guardsmen upon Nicaraguan soil, is
contingent upon United States compliance with
point 5 of the agreement and Honduran com-
pliance with point 6.77 Nicaraguan compliance
was greater on internal provisions of the Accord:
on external provisions a stalemate ensued.

Yet in pervasive ways internal compliance
was also deeply influenced by external factors.
For example, point 3 of the Accord called for the
promotion of "an authentic, pluralist and demo-
cratic process of participation." Yet while the
LASA delegation was in Nicaragua, several
members of the internal Nicaraguan political
opposition, the Democratic Coalition, traveled to
Guatemala to meet with members of the Nicara-
guan armed resistance and were detained upon
their return to Nicaragua. This highlights the
difficulty of achieving full democratization in
times of war.

Undoubtedly, there are varying degrees of
commitment to democracy within the government
and within the opposition. But commitments
cannot be strengthened when the internal
opposition continues to be courted and financed
by the United States, as it has been since 1980.
The consensus and the shared values upon which
democracy rests must be worked out by internal
political actors. As Vice-President Sergio

Ramirez said to the LASA delegation in discussing
Nicaragua's compliance with the Accord: "We
have taken important steps, but there are risks
for us and costs. There are also limits beyond
which we will not go."

It is clear that the long and continuing war
obscures the distinction between the loyal and
disloyal opposition and impedes the development
of democracy. It is difficult to imagine Nicaragua
totally honoring its commitment to pluralism and
reforming its system toward democracy while the
war continues. On the positive side, the new
Central American spirit of Esquipulas and the
conciliatory measures recently taken by the
Nicaraguan government offer the immediate
possibility of decreasing the bitterness of the
Nicaraguan political scene.


The armed opposition groups in El Salvador
(FMLN), Guatemala (URNG), and Nicaragua (RN)
have, to date, focused principally on those
provisions of the Guatemala Accord that call for
cease-fire talks, amnesty, and democratization.78
While the FMLN, URNG, and RN have all
demonstrated willingness to participate in the
peace process, their evaluations of the progress
achieved since the August 7, 1987 meeting are
somewhat pessimistic. This judgment is based on
their belief that the Guatemala Accord is too
limited in its mandate and that the governments
involved are not fully committed to a negotiated
settlement. The armed opposition in each
country has argued that the agreement should
have directed that cease-fire talks include
discussion of constitutional and structural
changes. None of the governments was willing
prior to the January 15-16, 1988, San Jos6
meeting to incorporate such issues. At present,
only Nicaragua continues to engage in cease-fire
talks and has recently indicated some flexibility
concerning the agenda.

While amnesty has been declared in El
Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua, the armed
opposition has generally manifested considerable
skepticism concerning the commitment of the

Page 31

Final Report of the LASA Commission on the Central America Peace Accord

governments to safeguarding those individuals
availing themselves of amnesty. Armed opposition
groups have also expressed considerable doubt
concerning the possibility of substantial progress
toward democratization in El Salvador, Guatemala,
and Nicaragua. While admitting that there is
greater political space in each of these countries,
the armed opposition groups regard the advances
as limited. As a consequence, the FMLN, URNG,
and RN have been unwilling thus far to abandon
armed struggle. They are, however, disposed to
continue their participation in the peace process,
in part because of the increased political space
within their countries and in the region as a
whole. In addition, such participation has in one
sense helped legitimize the armed opposition
groups nationally and internationally and allowed
for broader dissemination of their views.
Esquipulas II has also brought pressure to bear on
the FMLN, URNG, and RN to display good faith
by participating in the peace process, although
they are not optimistic about its outcome. The
specific reasons for their reservations are detailed
in the following examination of their positions on
cease-fire talks, amnesty, and democratization.

The FMLN of El Salvador. The October 3-4,
1987, cease-fire talks between the FMLN, its
political allies, the Democratic Revolutionary
Front (FDR), and the government of El Salvador
were regarded by the FMLN/FDR as having been
a step backward, because the agenda was limited
to discussion of a cease-fire. Meetings in
1984 had somewhat broader agendas, raising the
possibility that such talks might eventually lead
to negotiations. Since the Esquipulas II document
limited the agenda to a means of achieving a
cease-fire within the existing constitutional
framework of El Salvador, spokespersons for the
FMLN/FDR regarded the talks as fruitless.
Furthermore, they alleged that the government
representatives were not authorized to make any
specific commitments. Subsequently, in December,
1987, the government decreed a unilateral cease-
fire that lasted approximately three days.

The armed opposition also felt that the
insistence of the Salvadoran government that the
FMLN lay down its arms and accept amnesty prior
to substantive talks was essentially a tactic to
force them to disarm. Refusal to do so is,
according to the FMLN, not intransigence, but a

necessary means to guarantee survival. In
support of their position, it cites the August 31,
1987, call of such diverse political parties as the
right-wing ARENA, the more centrist PSD (Social
Democratic Party), and PAISA (the Authentic In-
stitutional Party of El Salvador) for a national
dialogue without preconditions that would include
the armed opposition.80 This position, the FMLN
argues, is also supported by some military
officers, particularly those in the lower ranks,
who bear the brunt of field casualties.

Without substantive talks dealing with
possible constitutional and structural changes
within El Salvador, the armed opposition does not
foresee much progress toward democratization.
According to the FMLN, progress would require
the reestablishment of the sovereignty of the
country in the face of United States inroads.
Partial democratization could be achieved, the
FMLN argues, if Salvadorans had the freedom to
change their political and economic structures.
This would require a broadening of the political
spectrum by allowing greater participation by
political parties and other groups on the Left.
Some limited progress has been made, according
to the FMLN, as a result of the return to El
Salvador of some of the leadership of the FDR.
There are reasonable fears, however, that these
individuals may be assassinated by the Right.
Under present conditions, the FMLN sees virtually
no possibility of its participating openly in
established political processes.

Other impediments to democratization,
according to the FMLN, are continued human
rights violations -- particularly assassinations,
disappearances, and torture attributed to the
military, police, and paramilitary groups. The
FMLN argues, as have the Catholic Church and a
number of human rights organizations, that such
violations have increased since August 7, 1987.
Nevertheless, the FMLN believes that there is
more political mobilization within El Salvador
today than prior to the initiation of Esquipulas II
and that pressure on the government to talk with
the armed opposition has increased. Hence, the
FMLN regards the peace process as having had
some positive, albeit limited, benefits. Its current
position is, therefore, to continue to participate
in the peace process.

Page 32

Final Report of the LASA Commission on the Central America Peace Accord

The URNG of Guatemala. The URNG shares
the FMLN's doubts that Esquipulas II will result
in a negotiated peace settlement. The URNG did
not believe that its October 7-9, 1987, meeting in
Madrid represented a serious commitment on the
part of the government to peace talks. In
support of this interpretation, URNG spokesper-
sons cite the failure of the Guatemalan army to
respect the cease-fire declared by the government
and the URNG on October 2, 1987. In addition,
they believe that the government representatives
sent to Madrid were not of a sufficiently high
level to have the authority necessary for serious
negotiations. They also cite the fact that on
October 28, 1987 General H6ctor Gramajo,
minister of defense, announced a new offensive
intended to annihilate the armed opposition,
thereby eliminating any need for cease-fire or
other talks. Gramajo and other military officials
reportedly reiterated on a number of occasions
that the experiment with dialogue was over.81
This demonstrates, the URNG argues, that
President Vinicio Cerezo is commander-in-chief of
the armed forces in name only and does not
have the capacity to engage in serious negotia-
tions with the armed opposition in the face of
army recalcitrance. Given this situation, the
government's request at the Madrid meeting that
the URNG lay down its arms and accept amnesty
prior to any further talks was not seriously
considered by the armed opposition. For its part,
the URNG proposed at the Madrid meeting a
cease-fire plan, the creation of demilitarized
zones, and a national dialogue with all political
sectors to achieve peace and democratization. At
a press conference at the end of the Madrid
meeting, the government delegation indicated that
the URNG proposals would be studied and the
possibility of a second meeting considered.8 To
date no progress has been reported, although
mechanisms for the government and the URNG to
communicate were agreed upon at the Madrid

The URNG position with respect to the
amnesty passed by the Guatemalan legislature in
1987 (Decreto 71-87) is that it has more relevance
for the military, police, penal authorities, and
paramilitary groups guilty of human violations
than for the armed opposition, for most captured
insurgents were killed rather than imprisoned.
Few trust the government's capacity to guarantee

their safety.

With respect to democratization, the URNG
holds that little progress will be made so long as
the armed forces rather than the civilian presi-
dent hold the real power. Such progress would
require major changes in the Guatemalan political
system. The URNG has noted, nevertheless, an
increase in political activity within the popular
sector, particularly in rural areas and among
labor groups. The creation of the United Labor
Board (Coordinador Sindical Unido, COSU), was
regarded as a positive sign, as was the revitaliza-
tion of some student and teachers' groups in
Quezaltenango. On the negative side, the URNG
cited, as have international human rights groups,
an upsurge in disappearances and assassinations by
paramilitary groups. The armed opposition
responded to such developments and to the
intensification of army operations by increasing
URNG activities particularly in Quich6 and El
Pet6n. The current position of the URNG with
respect to Esquipulas II is that, since it has
resulted in official recognition of the URNG as a
valid interlocutor, it will continue to participate
in the peace process, although it will not abandon
armed struggle.

The RN ofNicaragua. Spokespersons for the
Nicaraguan Resistance have expressed strong
reservations concerning the peace process. They
feel that neither Contadora nor Esquipulas II took
sufficiently into account the internal conditions in
Nicaragua. They argue that the Sandinista Front
is an occupation force, rather than a legitimate
political party in power. Nevertheless, the RN
has participated in cease-fire talks with the
government since December, 1987. These talks
have served not only to provide them with some
legitimacy, but also to modify the RN stance that
the Sandinista government is not legitimate.

Like the FMLN and URNG, the Nicaraguan
Resistance holds that the cease-fire talks should
include discussions of constitutional and structural
changes it believes necessary for reincorporation
into the Nicaraguan body politic. The December,
1987, cease-fire talks were not regarded by the
RN as particularly useful. It was also critical of
the fact that the government delegation did not
include any high-level officials. In contrast, the
meetings that have occurred since the January 15-

Page 33

Final Report of the LASA Commission on the Central America Peace Accord

16, 1988, San Jos6 meeting have incorporated
senior Nicaraguan Foreign Ministry and military
officials. Reports concerning the January and
February, 1988, talks reveal ongoing dissatisfac-
tion on the part of the RN over the scope of the

The RN's position on the amnesty offered by
the Nicaraguan government is that it does not
provide enough safeguards to convince the armed
opposition to lay down its arms. While some
soldiers, particularly those from the Atlantic
Coast, have availed themselves of amnesty, the
majority have not.

With respect to democratization, the RN's
position is that the government's actions in
compliance with Esquipulas II have not been
sufficient to guarantee democracy. The RN's
response to the steps announced by President
Daniel Ortega at the San Jos6 meeting was that
you cannot have democracy by decree, but only
by changing the existing constitution and political
system. As models it suggests the political forms
in existence in the other Central American
countries. It insists that the war will continue
until there is a separation between the FSLN and
the government.

The RN admits that there is greater political
space in Nicaragua, which it attributes not to the
peace process, but to military pressure on the
Sandinistas. Hence, the armed opposition does
not see a cease-fire or the end of United States
military aid as contributing to democratization.
Nevertheless, it continues to participate in the
peace process because of the uncertainty of
future aid and because of regional and other

Conclusion. While participation in the peace
process by the FMLN, URNG and RN and the by
governments of El Salvador, Guatemala, and
Nicaragua has not resulted in the abandonment of
military means as the prime mechanism of conflict
resolution, it has introduced the possibility of
nonmilitary alternatives. In addition, all parties
agree that there has been an increase in political
space in each country. There is a belief that as
long as the peace process continues there remains
the possibility of more political gains being made.
Esquipulas II has also resulted in some dialogue

among the contending forces, which has helped to
legitimize the armed opposition. As one Con-
tadora representative commented, just the act of
sitting down at the same table results in a
greater balance of power between the antagonists.
Over the long term, this could result in a greater
disposition to negotiate. It could also reduce the
level of warfare, with obvious benefits for the
civilian population, which would then have more
possibilities for political expression and participa-
tion. This could stimulate democratization.
Achieving democratization requires the continua-
tion of the peace process and an ongoing
commitment to participation in it by the armed
opposition and the governments.


The "Contadora Group" consists of Mexico,
Panama, Venezuela, and Colombia, the four
countries that met in January, 1983, to initiate a
process of international consultation to promote a
negotiated peace in the region. They have been
assisted, since 1986, by four other countries,
Brazil, Peru, Argentina, and Uruguay, which are
identified as the "Contadora Support Group."
These eight countries contain more than 80
percent of Latin America's population and have
repeatedly hosted meetings at the foreign
minister level for all five Central American
countries to seek a negotiated solution. They
mediated negotiations on August 3rd and 4th,
1987, in Tegucigalpa that provided the minimum
bases for the meeting of the presidents in
Guatemala City two days later. They accepted
responsibility for continuing discussions among the
five Central American countries on issues of
security, military force levels, and foreign military
assistance; these issues were then specifically
excluded from Esquipulas II. They, together with
the sectretaries general of the United Nations and
the Organization of American States, became the
core group of the International Commission on
Verification and Follow-up. The presidents of the
eight Contadora and Support Group nations (now
the Group of Eight) met in Acapulco in November,
1987, and reaffirmed their support for the Central
American peace process and the Esquipulas

Page 34

Final Report of the LASA Commission on the Central America Peace Accord


The report of the CIVS was the initial basis
for the San Jos6 meeting on January 15, 1988.
The five Central American presidents gathered to
discuss compliance with Esquipulas II based on
the evaluation provided by the CIVS. The
participation of the Central American foreign
ministers in the verification process itself was
seen by some of the other members of the CIVS
as unprecedented; for, as one participant in the
commission's deliberations indicated to us, "the
Central American foreign ministers were able, in
many cases, to dictate key paragraphs of the
verification document." This led, he suggested, to
a modification of the conclusions of the group of
ten, to reduction in the criticism of Guatemala, El
Salvador, and even Costa Rica, and to an
increase in the criticism of Nicaragua. Neverthe-
less, all fifteen members of the CIVS accepted
and signed the final document on January 13,

The agreement then signed by the Central
American presidents in San Jos6 on January 15,
1988, eliminated the CIVS and turned verification
tasks over to an Executive Committee composed
of the five foreign ministers. It left no specific
role for the Contadora countries, the Support
Group, or the secretaries general of the United
Nations and the OAS. This decision was seen by
representatives of the Contadora countries as a
weakening of international participation in the
peace process.

We questioned many of our principal sources
on the significance of the elimination of the
CIVS, and we traveled to Mexico and Panama to
discuss the significance of the change with
representatives of the foreign ministries of those
two countries. Their positions can be summarized
as follows:

a) The Contadora Group and the Contadora
Support Group remain committed to pursuing
a Latin American solution to conflict within
Central America.

b) Discussions of international security issues in
Central America are scheduled to continue
under Contadora auspices.

c) The next meeting of the Group of Eight is
likely to review the Central American peace
process at that time and the possibilities for
new initiatives to bring about a negotiated
peace to the region.

d) To demonstrate its interest in the continued
participation of these countries in the
verification process, Nicaragua requested
formally, on January 20, that the Group of
Eight, plus the secretaries general, create a
special verification team to re-evaluate
Nicaragua's compliance with the Esquipulas
Accord, especially in light of the additional
measures taken by Nicaragua after negotia-
tions in San Jos6 on January 15.

e) The Contadora countries feel that they have
a right to comment on international issues
that affect the Central American region
since these issues affect the stability of the
Western Hemisphere as a whole. And it is
their position that additional assistance
from the United States to the armed
Nicaraguan opposition would contribute to
the collapse of the whole structure of the
peace processes in the region.


The peace process set in motion by the
agreements signed in August 1987 has generated
significant change in Central America. And, while
they represent a dramatic shift in the conflicts
wracking the Central American region, the
optimism and hope they have engendered is best
tempered by a sense of the region's history and
by recognition of current constraints. Interna-
tionally, for example, the Reagan administration
has had little interest in the peace plan. The
president's coolness makes the plan eminently
more difficult to effect, particularly given his
unswerving support for an alternative project for
the region: the use of the supposed eventual
military prowess of the contra as the principal
means to guarantee United States security

Within the region, the Esquipulas Accord has
not reduced or eliminated the most fundamental

Page 35

Final Report of the LASA Commission on the Central America Peace Accord

economic problems of the region, nor could it
have been reasonably expected to. Democracy in
the region remains nascent and incomplete.
Intransigent national militaries and intransigent
guerrilla groups, weak executive branches of
government, shifting coalitions, and vested
interests linked to the war-economy offer little
opening for negotiating the central issues of war
and peace.

Compliance has been uneven and incomplete.
The details provided in the preceding pages lead
to straightforward assessments about each country
that reflect both their actions and the differing
conditions in each:

* Less was required of Costa Rica than of any
other country that signed the Accord. Costa
Rica's National Reconciliation Commission
was formed, met, and dealt with a few minor
matters. Costa Rica was exempted by the
CIVS from the need for formal dialogue with
opposition forces; but it was noted by the
CIVS that Costa Rica had not declared an
amnesty for political prisoners. Costa Rica
appears to have done all that could be
expected to deny use of its territory to
armed opposition forces, even to the extent
of banning residence in the country for
members of the Nicaraguan contras who
refuse to renounce their armed cause.

In El Salvador the peace process must be
seen in the context of the three-way
struggle between the military-dominated
government of President Duarte, the United
States Embassy, and the armed opposition led
by the FMLN. Neither the embassy nor the
military have made compliance easier for
President Duarte, yet some progress was
made. There has been some fragile opening
of political space for the temporary return
of some exiled opposition political figures.
Press freedom has increased and opposition
demonstrations are more common.

New dialogue with the armed opposition fell
short of discussions that had been held in
1984. The National Reconciliation Commis-
sion was hobbled by unbalanced representa-
tion, then crippled by resignations. Refugee
repatriation and resettlement has been

undermined by military actions and by the
continuation of a climate of violent attacks
upon political opponents of the regime.

Human rights violations continue at reported
levels exceeding those of any other Central
American nation, unaffected by the peace
Accord. And the level of direct violence
associated with the ongoing civil war
actually increased during the months after
the signing of the Accord, demonstrating
continued expectations of victory by both
the military and the armed opposition.

* In Guatemala there may have been less
movement toward needed compliance than in
any other country in the region. The
National Reconciliation Commission was
virtually non-functional, filed no report, and
played little role other than a ceremonial
one. The declared amnesty affected, under
prevailing conditions, no more than a
handful of persons. As in El Salvador, the
military is seen by most observers as a
major constraint on fuller compliance.

Attempts to further the repatriation of
refugees from Mexico under the Accord were
thwarted by threats and accusations against
the delegation sent to negotiate with the
government. The human rights situation
deteriorated in Guatemala throughout 1987
despite the Accord. There has been,
however, some opening of political space for
opposition groups, some demonstrated
increases in media freedom, and some
strengthening of the civilian government of
President Vinicio Cerezo attributable to the
peace process.

* There was less expected of Honduras under
the Accord than of any country other than
Costa Rica; but the one crucial condition
that Honduras needed to meet -- the
expulsion of Nicaraguan contra armed
opposition forces from its territory -- con-
stitutes one of the most serious failures of
compliance in the whole region. This
failure, however, cannot be separated from
the nearly abject dependence of the present
Honduran government upon continued
economic and military assistance of the

Page 36

Final Report of the LASA Commission on the Central America Peace Accord

United States nor from the forceful presence
of the United States in Honduran national

Honduras made only a token effort to create
a National Reconciliation Commission, and its
principal contribution was the preparation of
a limited amnesty law that set free a small
number of persons jailed largely in agrarian
conflicts. Political violence has increased in
disturbing fashion in the months since the
signing of the Accord, especially in terms of
the murders of witnesses summoned by the
Interamerican Human Rights Court for
testimony related to activities of the
Honduran military in 1981 and 1982.

* Nicaragua has been for some the principal
focus of the Guatemala Accord and for
others its principal beneficiary. Nicaragua
has also been the country in which the
greatest change has occurred under the
terms and timetable of the Accord. The
National Reconciliation Commission in
Nicaragua was the most prominent, most
public, and, by most criteria, the most
successful in the region. By appointing its
most respected critic, Archbishop Obando y
Bravo, to the commission and by urging that
he be elected its president, as he was, the
Nicaraguan government took the considerable
risk of placing itself under intolerable
pressure for compliance with the Accord.

There have been dramatic increases in the
levels of opposition party political activity,
re-opening of opposition media, suspension
of censorship, and a largescale, but partial,
amnesty for political prisoners, all under-
taken under conditions of ongoing counter-
revolutionary war, openly organized and
assisted by the Undited States and supported
by the use of Honduran territory. The
derogation of the state of emergency and
the resultant restoration of constitutional
protections on basic rights, suspended at the
outset of the contra war, represent other
major elements of compliance by Nicaragua.
By the date of this writing, Nicaragua has
also had more contacts with its armed
opposition since the signing of the Accord,
in pursuit of a cease-fire, than either El

Salvador or Guatemala.

Large numbers of Indians from the Atlantic
Coast of Nicaragua, formerly part of the
armed opposition, have returned, accepted
amnesty, and begun the process of reintegra-
tion into Nicaraguan society.

Nicaragua is the only country in the region
confronting an armed opposition where the
steps taken by the government appear to be
creating real prospects for cease-fire,
amnesty, return, and re-integration of
significant numbers of former refugees and
armed opponents of the government.

Overall results. The Accord has, in general,
strengthened the prospects for democracy, civilian
governments, and negotiations among the Central
American governments as principal vehicles for
social, political, and economic change in the
future. And it has reaffirmed Central America's
desire to take charge of its own destiny.

The agreement signed by the five Central
American presidents has opened opportunities,
limited though they still may be, that would have
been inconceivable in Central America just one
year ago. It has strengthened the hand of
elected civilian presidents in all those countries
with histories of strong military influence over
national politics. It has strengthened the
opportunities for a free press throughout the
region, even when that freedom remains incom-
plete in several of them. It has provided an
opportunity for the five presidents to take a
stand, publicly and formally, on the presence and
role of armed opposition forces; all five oppose
all support for such forces and the use of any
territory in the region for supporting them. It is
clear that each of the five presidents has
benefited politically from the regional commit-
ments in the Accord and the subsequent declara-
tion of re-commitment in San Jos6. They have
been able to take steps toward more democratic
processes, toward dialogue, toward amnesty, and
ultimately toward national reconciliation -- small
steps, to be sure -- that they would not have
been able to take without the Guatemala Accord
and that they will not be able to sustain if the
peace process breaks down.

Page 37

Final Report of the LASA Commission on the Central America Peace Accord

The commitments have carried risks. They
have exposed all of the presidents to greater
political pressures as the democratic processes
have become more open, even where that opening
remains limited. They have led to the release of
common criminals, convicted violators of human
rights, and others whose return to civil life
causes great concern, all released under amnesties
designed for political prisoners. They have led to
increases, perhaps only temporary, in the levels of
violence. For all of the more extreme contenders
for political attention and political power have
increased their activity, apparently to thwart the
legitimization of more democratic, institutionalized
figures, parties, and processes.

But there are virtually no voices in the
region calling for an end to the process. Even
the representatives of the principal armed
opposition groups, both Left and Right, call for
complete compliance with the Accord by all
governments in the region.

The principal and most visible failure of the
Accord has been the failure of governments
outside the region, most notably the United
States, to abide by the expressed wishes of the
Central American governments to cease its
assistance to the armed forces of opposition.
There is no interpretation of the Guatemala
Accord of August 7, 1987, and no interpretation
of the reaffirmation of January 15, 1988, that
would permit or encourage any further assis-
tance, "openly or covertly . in terms of
military, financial, logistical, or propaganda
assistance, armaments, munitions, or equipment" to
any irregular forces in the region.


On Costa Rica

Mario Carvajal, leader of the National Liberation
Party (PLN), National Assembly.
Patrick Duddy, Cultural Affairs Officer,
United States Embassy.
Guido Fernindez, Costa Rican ambassador to the
United States.
Enrique Gomariz, research associate, FLACSO.
Deane Hinton, United States ambassador
to Costa Rica.
Rodolfo M6ndez Mata, leader of PUSC,
National Assembly.
Rafael Menjivar, research associate, FLACSO.
Francisco Rojas, research associate, FLACSO.
Luis Guillermo Solis, chief of cabinet,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Joaquin Vargas Gene, Editor of La Reptblica;
president, National Reconciliation

On El Salvador

Rodolfo Blanco, Human Rights Commission of
El Salvador -- CDHES.
Edwin Corr, United States ambassador
to El Salvador.
Roberto Cufllar, Interamerican Institute of
Human Rights (San Jos6).
Ignacio Ellacuria, rector, Universidad
Centroamericana Jos6 Sime6n Cafias.
Jake Gillespie, public affairs officer,
United States Embassy.
Benjamin Gonzalez Cotto, Foreign Ministry.
Labor leaders associated with the National
Union of Salvadoran Workers (UNTS).
Leaders of the Salvadoran Sociology Association.
Reinaldo L6pez Nuila, colonel, Ministry of
the Presidency.
Eduardo Ntiiez, executive secretary,
Salvadoran Development Foundation.
Officials of the Oficina de Tutela Legal,
Archbishopric of San Salvador.
Barbro Owen, Political Officer,
United States embassy.
Abraham Rodriguez, primer designado
a la presidencia.
Mario Reni Roldan, PSD and Convergencia

Page 38

Final Report of the LASA Commission on the Central America Peace Accord

Mario Samayoa, Superior Elections Council.
Greta Siebentritt, Central American
Refugee Center.
Eugenio Vides Casanova, general,
Minister of Defense.

On Guatemala

Juan Francisco Alfaro Mijangos, president,
United Labor Federation (CUSG).
Edgar Alvarado Pinetta, executive director,
National Farmers Union (UNAGRO).
Miguel Angel Balcarcel, research associate,
Economic and Social Research Association
Jorge Luis Borrayo, professor, University of
San Carlos; attorney; consultant to ASIES.
Julio Celso de Le6n, president of the General
Workers Federation of Guatemala (CGT).
Jos6 Luis Cruz Salazar, director, ASIES.
Angel Alfredo Figueroa, adjunct prosecutor,
Government human rights agency.
Mons. Juan Gerardi, Auxiliary Archbishop of
Guatemala, alternate member of the
National Reconciliation Commission.
Francisco Luis Gordillo Martinez, retired army
colonel, president of the Movimiento
Emergente de Concordia (MEC), and member,
National Reconciliation Commission.
Fernando Hurtado Prem, attorney, training
director and member of the national board,
Union de Centro Nacional (UCN) party.
Arnoldo Kuestermann, board member, ASIES.
Gonzalo Men6ndez de la Riva, prosecuting
attorney, government human rights office.
Nineth Montenegro de Garcia, president,
Grupo de Apoyo Mutuo (GAM).
Edmond Mulet, vice-president, foreign relations
committee of the Guatemalan congress,
member of the UCN party.
Ariel Rivera Trias, Director of the National
Institute of Public Administration, former
second vice-minister of foreign relations.
Rodolfo E. Robles S., executive secretary,
International Food and Kindred Workers
Union (UITA).
Hector Rosada Granados, professor, University of
San Carlos, and researcher at ASIES.
Robert W. Rosenhouse, Editor, This Week:
Central America and Panama.
Marco Antonio Sinchez, colonel, director,
Institute de Prevision Militar.

Jorge Serrano Elfas, president, Solidarity Action
Movement (MAS); 1985 presidential can-
didate, former member of Council of State;
Jean Marie Simon, journalist and author, Guate-
malan representative of Americas Watch.
Mario Solorzano Martinez, president, Partido
Socialista Democratico (PSD).
Ricardo Wilson-Grau, president, Inforpress
Centroamericano; publisher of newsmagazine
Central America Report.

On Honduras

Manuel Acosta Bonilla, director of the legal
affairs committee, Honduran Bar Association.
David Adams, journalist, BBC correspondent.
Rafael Alegria M., projects secretary, National
Farmworker Association (CNTC).
Alejandro Aria Gonzalez, first secretary,
Embassy of Spain.
Jos6 Azcona Hoyo, president of Honduras.
C6sar Batres, member, National Reconciliation
Commission (Nationalist Party).
Mario Enrique Boquin Hernandez, general,
advisor to the Honduran army.
Everett Briggs, United States ambassador to
Guillermo Bueso, president, Banco Atlantida.
Rob Collier, journalist, UPI correspondent.
Hector Corrales Padilla, member, National
Reconciliation Commission (Christian
Democratic Party).
Oscar Ren6 Cuevas, advisor, ministry of
government and justice.
Ram6n Custodio, president, Honduran Committee
for the Defense of Human Rights (CODEH).
Efrain Diaz Arrivillaga, representative, Honduran
congress (Christian Democratic Party).
Joseph Eldridge, CODE.
Alfredo Fortin Inestrosa, vice-president of
Honduras; member, National Reconciliation
Ren6 Fonseca, colonel, First Artillery Batallion,
Honduran army.
Manuel Gamero, director, El Tiempo.
Juan Arnaldo Hernmndez Espinosa, attorney.
Ian Hughes, first secretary, British Embassy.
Donald Johnson, chief, political section,
United States Embassy.

Page 39

Final Report of the LASA Commission on the Central America Peace Accord

Manuel Martinez Avila, chief of staff,
Honduran army.
Ramon R. Mejia M., representative, Honduran
congress (Nationalist Party).
Victor Meza, director, Honduran Research Center
Angel Augusto Morales, advisor, Honduran army.
Juan Hiehorster, general manager, Curagao stores.
John Pendfold, DCM, United States Embassy.
Ruben Zepeda, solicitor general of Honduras;
director, governmental human rights group.

On Nicaragua

Alvaro Arguello, vice-rector, University of
Central America (UCA).
Julio Arevalo, director, North American section,
ministry of foreign relations.
Violeta Birrios de Chamorro, director, La Prensa.
Alfredo C6sar, member of the directorate;
Nicaraguan Resistance organization.
John Cramer, human rights officer,
United States embassy.
Roberto Cuellar, staff member, Interamerican
Commission on Human Rights.
Louis Falino, deputy public affairs officer,
United States embassy.
Mariano Fiallos, president, Supreme Electoral
Xabier Gorostiaga, director, CRIES.
Carlos Hurtado, Counsellor, NicaraguanResistance.
Delvin Junker, second secretary,
United States Embassy, Managua.
Peter Marchetti, vice-rector, UCA.
Gustavo Paraj6n, director, Evangelical Committee
for Assistance and Development (CEPAD);
Eric Ramfrez, Social Democratic Party (PSD);
(alternate member, National Reconciliation
Sergio Ramirez, vice-president of Nicaragua;
Alberto Sab6rio, president of the Nicaraguan
lawyers association.
Richard Stahler-Sholk, research associate, CRIES.
William Vigil, Northamerican section;
ministry of foreign relations.

On the Armed Opposition

Iliana Alamilla, Centro Exterior de Reportes |
Informativos sobre Guatemala (CERIGIjA).
Manuel del Castillo, Ci6ncia y Tecnologia pata
Guatemala (CITGUA), Mexico.
Roberto Cuellar, Interamerican Institute of
Human Rights, San Jos6, Costa Rica.
Ram6n Custodio, president, CODEH, Honduras.
Jos6 Miguel Insulza, CIDE, Mexico.
Bosco Matamoros, press secretary, Nicaraguan
Resistance, United States.
Roberto Montafi6z, Adviser, ministry of
foreign relations, Panama.
Hector Oqueli, FDR, Mexico.
Oscar P6rez, Center for Research and Social
Action (CEASPA), Panama.
Pedro Ramirez, Agencia de Noticias de
Guatemala, Mexico.
Miguel Saenz, member, political and diplomatic
commission, FDR-FMLN, Mexico.
Miguel Sandoval, member, political and diplomatic
commission, URNG.
Robert Stark, PACCA, United States.
Guillermo Ungo, president, Democratic
Revolutionary Front (FDR), Panama.
Ricardo Valero, undersecretary for international
cooperation, ministry of foreign relations,
Jos6MiguelVivanco, InteramericanCommissionon
Human Rights, United States.
Jos6 Luis Yunes Celis, advisor, international
cooperation secretariate, foreign ministry, Mexico.

Page 40

Final Report of the LASA Commission on the Central America Peace Accord


1. The document signed by the Central American presidents has been given many names. In this report
it is generally referred to as the Guatemala Accord. Because talks resulting in the agreement were
initiated at the shrine of Esquipulas in Guatemala, it is often referred to as the Esquipulas Agree-
ment. Since the signing occurred at the second meeting of the five presidents in Guatemala, the
document is often distinguished from the results of the first meeting (in May, 1986) by calling it
Esquipulas II. It is also called the Arias Plan after Costa Rica's President, Oscar Arias, who is the
Accord's principal author.
2. Members of the LASA Commission are well aware of differing connotations of words such as "rebel,"
"guerrilla," "insurgent," and "contra." In this report we have chosen to use the relatively neutral
term "armed opposition" in most instances, to refer to groups attempting to replace existing
governments. Nevertheless, for variety and specificity and when the context provides a degree of
neutrality, we do not shy away from these commonly used but, to some, value-laden terms.
3. Following are the country teams: Costa Rica -- Charles L.Stansifer; El Salvador -- Manuel Pastor,
Jr., Mark Rosenberg, K. Lynn Stoner; Guatemala -- John Booth, Ambler Moss, Reid Reading; Hon-
duras -- Jan L. Flora, Darfo Moreno, F. Scott Palmer; Nicaragua -- Marysa Navarro, Laura Nuzzi
O'Shaughnessy, Charles L. Stansifer; Armed opposition and Contadora -- Michael E. Conroy, Margaret
4. Comisi6n Internacional de Verificaci6n y Seguimiento (CIVS), "Informe sobre los progress en el
cumplimiento de los acuerdos del procedimiento para alcanzar la paz fire y duradera en Centro
America," mimeo, January 14, 1988, p. 49.
5. Copy in LASA Commission's possession. Also published in Barricada (Managua), January 13, 1988.
6. CIVS, "Informe," pp. 82-83.
7. Ibid., pp. 27-28.
8. Ibid., pp. 35-36, 42, 47-48, 63, 65-67.
9. The figures here include economic credits and guarantees and were provided by the United States
Embassy. Without credits and guarantees, the figures are around $3 billion for the nine-year period
and over $600 million for 1987.
10. Statistics provided by the United States embassy, January, 1988.
11. Interviews on January 18, 19, 20 in San Salvador.
12. Chris Norton, "Central American Peace Plan Could Stall onSalvador," Christian Science Monitor,
August 19, 1987; see also Tomis P. Campos, "Las primeras vicisitudes del didlogo entire el gobierno y
el FMLN-FDR," ECA, 39, no. 434 (December, 1984): 885-903.
13. This view was expressed by an experienced Western observer during interviews in San Salvador,
January 18-20, 1988.
14. Interviews and public opinion polls published in El Salvador support these findings.
15. Quotations from ARENA leader Alfredo Cristiani, as reported in FBI Daily Report: Latin America,
November 16, 1987, p. 9.
16. Background interview in San Salvador, January 18-20, 1988.
17. Interview with senior official of the Superior Electoral Council, January 19, 1988.
18. Interviews with human rights officials in Costa Rica and El Salvador.
19. The interviewee in San Salvador requested anonymity.
20. "La ley de amnistia y la reconciliaci6n national," ECA, 42, no. 468 (October 1987): 711-712.
21. Interview in San Salvador, January 18, 1988.
22. Lindsey Gruson, "Amnesty Law Is Passed in Salvadoran Violence," New York Times, October 29, 1987.
23. A number of controversial cases have provoked special concern about Duarte's amnesty efforts.
Those cases include the Zona Rosa killings of June 1985 (three persons accused of the crime were set
free); the Sheraton Hotel assassinations of January 1981 (two ex-members of the National Guard
were released from prison in December under the terms of the amnesty); the "Las Hojas Massacre,"

Page 41

Final Report of the LASA Commission on the Central America Peace Accord

of February 1983 (two army officers accused of ordering the massacre of at least seventy-four
peasants were freed in November 1987); and the killing of four United States religious workers in
December 1980 (five ex-National Guardsmen were excluded from the amnesty and remain in prison).
See "El Salvador: Amnesty Law Criticized," Central America Report, 15, no. 3 (January 22, 1988).
24. See El Salvador Proceso, 8, no. 318 (January 6, 1988): 4.
25. Central American Refugee Center, Human Rights Violations Relating to the Displaced. December 1987-
January, 1988 (January 1988), p. 16.
26. Douglas Farah, "Rebels Step Up Attacks, Protest Salvadoran Vote," Washington Post, February 19, 1988.
27. Douglas Farah, "Salvadoran Retracts Rights Case Confession: Prisoner Held in Killing Claims Coer-
cion," Washington Post, February 18, 1988.
28. Americas Watch, The Civilian Toll, 1986-1987: Ninth Supplement to the Report on Human Rights in El
Salvador (New York, August, 1987), pp. 2, 7, 11, 17.
29. See El Salvador Proceso, 8, no. 318 (January 6, 1988): 13.
30. See Salvadoran public opinion polls published in Ignacio Martin-Baro, Asi piensan los salvadorefios
urbanos (1986-1987) (San Salvador: UCA Editores, 1987).
31. Note that Richard N. Adams was in the field in Guatemala working on a research project during the
time when the LASA delegation visited Guatemala. Adams did not participate in the interviews cited.
32. Interviews with Colonel Francisco Luis Gordillo Martinez, of the Emerging Concord Movement
(Movimiento Emergente de Concordia -- MEC) and member of the National Reconciliation Commission
(CNR), January 18, 1988; Juan Francisco Alfaro Mijangos, president of the United Labor Federation
(Confederaci6n de Unided Sindical de Guatemala -- CUSG), and Adriin Ramirez, CUSG officer,
January 18, 1988; Julio Celso de Le6n, president of the General Workers Federation (Confederaci6n
General de Trabajadores de Guatemala -- CGTG), January 18, 1988; Rodolfo E. Robles S., executive
secretary, International Union of Food and Kindred Workers (Uni6n Internacional de Trabajadores de
Alimentaci6n y Afines, January 20, 1988; Jorge Serrano Elias, president, Solidarity Action Movement
(Movimiento de Acci6n Solidaria -- MAS) and member of the CNR, January 20, 1988; Fernando
Hurtado Prem and Monsefior Juan Gerardi, auxiliary archbiship of Guatemala and alternate member of
the CNR, January 18, 1988.
33. Interviews with Alfaro and Ramirez of the CUSG and Robles of UITA, and with Celso de Leon of
the Christian Democratic union confederation, CGTG.
34. Inforpress Centroamericano, January 21, 1988, pp. 11-13.
35. The victim was Julio Alberto L6pez of the association of small businessmen of La Placita market in
Guatemala City. He was kidnapped and held for several hours on January 17, 1988, by unknown
gunmen (Prensa Libre [Guatemala], January 18, 1988, p.9).
36. Interviews with Gordillo, Gerardi, and Edmond Mulet, Vice President of the Foreign Relations
Commission of the Guatemalan Congress and member of the UCN party, January 18, 1988.
37. Interviews with Gordillo, Serrano Elias, Hurtado Prem, and Robles S.
38. Interview with Hurtado Prem of the UCN.
39. Prensa Libre, November 25, 1987, p. 29, reported in FBIS-LAT-87-231, December 2, 1987, p. 23
(translation by FBIS); see also Compendio: Proceso de paz en Centroam6rica, Guatemala: Inforpress
Centroamericano, January 5, 1988, pp. 61-63.
40. Quoted in Excelsior, November 4, 1987, p. 2A.
41. In Spanish, "hasta acabar con el enemigo." Quoted in Exc6lsior (Mexico), November 4, 1987, p. 2A.
42. Informe blanco sobre los avances logrados en el process de cumplimiento del acuerdo de paz para
Centroamerica: Esquipulas II, (En su segundo plazo, del 5/11/87 al 15/1/87, DRAFT), San Jos6, Costa
Rica: Facultad Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO), Consejo Superior Universitario
Centroamericano (CSUCA), y Universidad para la Paz (UPAZ), p. xv. This was confirmed several
times in briefings by Central American scholars such as Francisco Rojas Aravena of FLACSO in San
Jos6, January 15, 1987; Jorge Luis Borrayo, Universidad de San Carlos and Asociaci6n para la Inves-
tigaci6n Econ6mica y Social (ASIES), Guatemala, in San Jos6, January 15, 1988; and at an ASIES
briefing in Guatemala, January 18, 1988, with Borrayo, Cruz Salazar, Rosada Granados, Balcarcel, and

Page 42

Final Report of the LASA Commission on the Central America Peace Accord

43. FLACSO-CSUCA-UPAZ Informe Blanco II, pp. 90-93; El Grifico (Guatemala City), January 19, 1988,
p. 11; Guatemalan television news programs, January 17-20, 1988.
44. Interviews with Mulet; Rivera Frias; Hurtado Prem; Informe CIVS, p. 95.
45. See Christian Science Monitor, September 4, 1987, p.14.
46. Interviews with Serrano Elias; Rivera Frfas; Hurtado Prem; and Nineth Montenegro de Garcia, head of
the Grupo de Apoyo Mutuo (GAM), a human rights group, Guatemala, January 18, 1988; see also
Mesoam6rica, December 1987, p.102.
47. Interviews with Mario Sol6rzano, president, Partido Socialista Democrdtico (PSD), Guatemala, January
18, 1988; and with Hurtado Prem; Serrano Elias; Cruz Salazar; and Hector Rosada Granados. See also
David Carliner et al., Political Transition and the Rule of Law in Guatemala: Report of the Follow-up
Delegation of the International Human Rights Law Group and the Washington Office on Latin
America, Washington, D.C.: International Human Rights Law Group and Washington Office on Latin
America, January, 1988, pp. 2-10.
48. See Carliner et al., passim; interviews with Jean Marie Simon, a journalist, Guatemala, January 20,
1988; Robert W. Rosenhouse, editor, This Week: Central America and Panama, Guatemala, January 20,
1988; and Ricardo Wilson-Grau, president, Inforpress Centroamericano, Guatemala, January 20, 1988.
49. Carliner, et al., passim; and interviews with Gonzalo Men6ndez de la Riva, head prosecutor of human
rights violations in the government's human rights office, and with Angel Alfredo Figueroa, adjunct
prosecutor in the government's human rights office; Guatemala, January 19, 1988; with Montenegro de
Garcia, Robles S., and Alfaro Mijangos.
50. See Carliner, et al., pp. 2-26; Human Rights in Guatemala, New York: Americas Watch and British
Parliamentary Human Rights Group, February, 1987; Civil Patrols in Guatemala, New York: Americas
Watch, August, 1986.
51. Interviews with Rosada Granados, Cruz Salazar, Gerardi, Mulet; see also Carliner, et al.
52. For reasons of their personal security, several well informed observers of the human rights situation
interviewed by the delegation will not be named in this report.
53. Inforpress Centroamericano, January 21, 1988, p. 12-13.
54. Statistical data from ibid., p. 12, were confirmed impressionistically by several persons interviewed by
the delegation, including Montenegro de Garcia de GAM, Mons. Gerardi for the record, and by
several others who must remain anonymous.
55. John A. Booth, et al., The 1985 Guatemalan Elections: Will the Military Relinquish Power? Washing-
ton, D.C.: International Human Rights Law Group and Washington Office on Latin America, December
56. Interviews with Cruz Salazar, Rosada Granados, Gerardi, Mulet, Montenegro de Garcia, Alfaro Mijan-
gos, Robles S., and Hurtado Prem.
57. CIVS, "Informe," p.114.
58. Quoted from Inforpress Centroamericana, no. 756, September 17, 1987, in Central America Bulletin,
November, 1987, p.405.
59. Honduras, Comisi6n Nacional de Reconciliaci6n, "Informe de las actividades realizadas por la Comisi6n
Nacional de Reconciliaci6n (hasta el 21 de diciembre de 1987)," mimeo, p.8.
60. Human Rights in Honduras: Central America's "Sideshow." An Americas Watch Report, May, 1987, pp.
61. "Compliance with the Human Rights Provisions of the Central American Peace Plan," An Americas
Watch Report, mimeo, January, 1988, p. 28.
62. Honduras, Comisi6n Nacional de Reconciliaci6n, "Informe de la Comisi6n Nacional de Reconciliaci6n,"
mimeo, January, 1988, p.3.
63. Information about Nicaragua's response to Esquipulas II comes primarily from the CIVS "Informe,"
64. La Naci6n (San Jos6), January 17, 1988; Barricada (Managua) January 17, 1988; La Prensa (Managua),
January 18, 1988.

Page 43

Final Report of the LASA Commission on the Central America PedCe Accord

65. Nicaraguan Embassy in the United States, "Update of Nicaragua's Report on Compliance with Esquipu-
las II sent to the CIVS November 20, 1987," mimeo.
66. Nicaraguan Embassy in the United States, "Chronology of Actions, Second Report," p. 1.
67. Barricada (Managua), January 17, 1988. YATAMA was organized in September, 1987 by Rivera for the
purpose of negotiating with the Nicaraguan government. Washington Office on Latin America
(WOLA), Peace Plan Monitor, no. 2 (October 5, 1987), p. 4.
68. Americas Watch, Amnesty International, Pax Christi, the Puebla Institute, WOLA, the Human Rights
Office of the Department of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, two permanent
commissions for human rights within Nicaragua, as well as the Ecumenical Commission for Develop-
ment (Comit6 Evang6lico para Asistencia y Desarrollo, CEPAD), the Atlantic Coast Ethnic Minority
Legal Aid (Bufete Popular de Minoria Etnica en la Costa Atlintica) and the Jesuit Legal Aid Project
(Bufete Jurfdico Jesufta) have all reported on the status of human rights in Nicaragua.
69. For example, Americas Watch noted that "taking into account all of the civilian noncombatant deaths
attributable to government forces in the more than seven years since the Sandinistas consolidated
power, it is difficult to count a total of more than 300." (The Reagan Administration's Record on
Human Rights in 1986, The Watch Committees, February 1987.) In contrast, a joint State Department
and Defense Department document claimed that "in the American continent, there is no regime more
barbaric and bloody, no regime that violates human rights in a manner more constant and permanent,
than the Sandinista regime." (The Challenge to Democracy in Central America, December 1986).
70. La Prensa (Managua), January 18, 1988.
71. La Prensa (Managua), January 14, 1988.
72. For the full story of the 1984 elections, consult the study by the Latin American Studies Association,
The Electoral Process in Nicaragua: Domestic and International Influences (Austin: LASA, 1984).
Other international teams that observed the election concurred with the conclusion of the LASA
report that the election was openly contested and accurately reflected Nicaraguan public opinion.
73. Interview with Erick Ramfrez of the Social Christian Party (PSC).
74. La Prensa (Managua), January 16, 1988; Barricada (Managua), January 14, 1988.
75. LASA delegation interviews with Gustavo Paraj6n, Sergio Ramirez, and Erick Ramirez (alternate
delegate). All confirmed this assessment.
76. The five presidents committed themselves to "create the mechanisms that according to law, would
allow dialogue with opposition groups."
77. Respectively, point 5 of the Accord calls for "the cessation of assistance to irregular forces and to
insurrection movements"; point 6 calls for the nonusee of territory for aggression against other countries."
78. For the sake of readability, the full names are moved to this note. The FMLN is the Farabundo
Martf National Liberation Front (Frente Farabundo Marti de Liberaci6n Nacional); the URNG is the
Guatemalan National Revolutionary Union (Uni6n Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca); and the RN is
the Nicaraguan National Resistance Movement (Resistencia Nacional).
79. "Carta abierta a los presidents de Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras y Nicaragua, del FDR-FMLN,"
July 31, 1987, El Salvador.
80. "Carta de los partidos politicos al Presidente Jos6 Napole6n Duarte," August 31, 1987, San Salvador.
81. "Ej6rcito de Guatemala, entire la falta de credibilidad y la guerra," CERIGUA, no. 21 (November,
1987), p.10.
82. "Madrid, Espafia-Declaran delegados del gobierno guatemalteco," CERIGUA, no. 21 (November, 1987),

Page 44

LASA Secretariat
William Pitt Union, 9th Floor
University of Pittsburgh
Pittsburgh, PA 15260
1988 Membership Renewal or Application

Please use this form to renew your membership or to become a LASA member. Dues are for one calendar year: January 1
December 31, 1988.
Membership Categories and Rates: 1988 only Amount
Introductory (for new members only) o $21 $
Under $20,000 annual income E $28 $_
Between $20,000 and $29,999 annual income D $32 $_
Between $30,000 and $39,999 annual income E $38 $_
Over $40,000 annual income D $44 $_
Joint Membership (for second member at same mailing
address as first member; one copy of publications sent.
Add to rate (above) for highest income of the two, or to
categories below: D $13 $
Student Associate (five-year limit)
[Professor's signature certifying student status]:
__ $18 $_
Latin Americanists permanently residing in
Latin America or the Caribbean (incl. Puerto Rico) o $18 $_
Emeritus Member (for retired members) o $18 $__

All members receive three issues of the Latin American Research Review and four issues of the LASA
Forum per year. If you wish to receive the Forum by air mail, please add the following amount per
year for postage: Canada and Mexico, $3; all other countries, $13. If you desire air mail delivery of
LARR, please contact the LARR office at the latin American Institute, 801 Yale NE, University of
New Mexico, Albuquerque, NM 87131.
We encourage you to make a contribution to the LASA Endowment Fund. $
TOTAL PAYMENT ENCLOSED ....................................................... $__
Please make checks payable to the Latin American Studies Association and mail along with this page to: LASA Secretariat, William
Pitt Union, 9th Floor, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA 15260. Members residing outside the U.S. must send either a money
order, a check in U.S. dollars drawn on a U.S. bank, or a UNESCO coupon for the U.S. dollar amount payable. There will be a
$10 charge for all returned checks.

(If this is a new application for membership, please provide the information requested below; if a renewal, please fill in your name
and any information that has changed since you last renewed.)

Name Discipline

Mailing Address

City, State, Zip, Country
Business Telephone Home Telephone

Institutional Affiliation

Country Interest/Specialization

University of Florida Home Page
© 2004 - 2010 University of Florida George A. Smathers Libraries.
All rights reserved.

Acceptable Use, Copyright, and Disclaimer Statement
Last updated October 10, 2010 - - mvs