• TABLE OF CONTENTS
HIDE
 Front Cover
 Center information
 Abstract
 Introduction
 Support mechanism for citrus
 Export refunds and other trade...
 Project withdrawls
 Intervention thresholds and direct...
 Support mechanisms for tomatoe...
 Export refunds and other trade...
 Product withdrawls compensatio...
 Intervention thresholds and direct...
 Support mechanisms for dairy
 Intervention and direct producer...
 Aid for private storage
 Disposal aid
 Export refunds
 Milk quota regime
 Agenda 2000
 Conclusion






Group Title: Policy Brief Series - International Agricultural Trade and Policy Center. University of Florida ; no. 03-1
Title: European Union farm policy for citrus, tomatoes, and dairy
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Permanent Link: http://ufdc.ufl.edu/UF00089758/00001
 Material Information
Title: European Union farm policy for citrus, tomatoes, and dairy
Series Title: Policy Brief Series - International Agricultural Trade and Policy Center. University of Florida ; no. 03-1
Physical Description: Book
Language: English
Creator: Adams, Damian C.
J. D.
Kilmer, Richard L.
Publisher: International Agricultural Trade and Policy Center, Institute of Food and Agricultural Sciences, University of Florida
Institute of Food and Agricultural Sciences, University of Florida
Place of Publication: Gainesville, Fla.
Publication Date: 2003
 Record Information
Bibliographic ID: UF00089758
Volume ID: VID00001
Source Institution: University of Florida
Holding Location: University of Florida
Rights Management: All rights reserved by the source institution and holding location.

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Table of Contents
    Front Cover
        Page 1
    Center information
        Page 2
    Abstract
        Page 3
    Introduction
        Page 4
        Page 5
        Page 6
        Page 7
    Support mechanism for citrus
        Page 8
    Export refunds and other trade policies
        Page 9
    Project withdrawls
        Page 9
        Page 10
    Intervention thresholds and direct producer aid
        Page 11
    Support mechanisms for tomatoes
        Page 12
        Page 13
    Export refunds and other trade policies
        Page 14
    Product withdrawls compensation
        Page 14
    Intervention thresholds and direct producer aid
        Page 15
        Page 16
        Page 17
    Support mechanisms for dairy
        Page 18
        Page 19
    Intervention and direct producer aid
        Page 20
    Aid for private storage
        Page 20
    Disposal aid
        Page 20
    Export refunds
        Page 21
    Milk quota regime
        Page 22
        Page 23
    Agenda 2000
        Page 24
        Page 25
    Conclusion
        Page 26
Full Text


PBTC 03-1


ional Agricultural Trade and Policy Center


POLICY BRIEF SERIES








\ "C






UNIVERSITY OF

.tFLORIDA

institute of Food and Agricultural Sciences


EUROPEAN UNION FARM POLICY FOR CITRUS, TOMATOES, AND
DAIRY

By
Damian C. Adams, J.D. and Richard L. Kilmer


PBTC 03-1 January 2003


I


''




II









INTERNATIONAL AGRICULTURAL TRADE
AND POLICY CENTER


MISSION AND SCOPE: The International Agricultural Trade and Policy Center
(IATPC) was established in 1990 in the Food and Resource Economics Department
(FRED) of the Institute of Food and Agricultural Sciences (IFAS) at the University of
Florida. Its mission is to provide information, education, and research directed to
immediate and long-term enhancement and sustainability of international trade and
natural resource use. Its scope includes not only trade and related policy issues, but also
agricultural, rural, resource, environmental, food, state, national and international
policies, regulations, and issues that influence trade and development.

OBJECTIVES:

The Center's objectives are to:

Serve as a university-wide focal point and resource base for research on
international agricultural trade and trade policy issues
Facilitate dissemination of agricultural trade related research results and
publications
Encourage interaction between researchers, business and industry groups,
state and federal agencies, and policymakers in the examination and
discussion of agricultural trade policy questions
Provide support to initiatives that enable a better understanding of trade and
policy issues that impact the competitiveness of Florida and southeastern
agriculture specialty crops and livestock in the U.S. and international markets










Abstract: European Union (EU) consumers pay almost twice the competitive world price
for many agricultural products. Agricultural subsidies accounted for almost half of the
EU's total budget (US$ 40 billion on agriculture in 2000) although agriculture
represented 1.7 percent of the EU's GDP and employs 4.3% of the EU's population.
Domestic policies for citrus and tomatoes include export refunds, product withdraws
from the market, intervention thresholds, and direct producer aid. Domestic policies for
dairy include export refunds, intervention thresholds, aid for private storage, disposal aid,
and milk quotas. The EU's intentions are to enhance agricultural competitiveness by
setting product intervention as "a real safety net measure, allowing EU producers to
respond to market signals while protecting them from extreme price fluctuations," and
promoting market oriented, sustainable agriculture by finishing the transition from
product support to producer support, by introducing a decoupledd system of payments per
farm" which are not connected to production. The EU wishes to allow flexibility in
production, but also guarantee income stability to producers. Within the last 10 years, the
EU has reduced price supports and increased direct payments to tomato, dairy, and citrus
farmers to compensate them for the reductions.











EUROPEAN UNION FARM POLICY FOR CITRUS, TOMATOES, AND DAIRY

Damian C. Adams, J.D. and Richard L. Kilmer1

Introduction

Since the advent of the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) in 1962 that helped

lay the foundation for the European Union2 (EU), Europe has taken a strong protectionist

stance with respect to its agricultural markets.3 This is especially true for European

products like dairy and fresh fruits and vegetables that are relatively vulnerable to foreign

competition due to domestic prices well above world price levels.

European consumers pay 45%4 more for food because of the EU's domestic farm

programs. EU farmers receive almost twice the world price5 for many agricultural

products. Fortunately, recent EU GATT and later WTO membership has successfully

forced changes to the CAP that result in less domestic support for European agricultural

markets. As a result, "Fortress Europe," as many American exporters call the EU, is

becoming more accessible to world agriculture producers, including Florida farmers. In

2001, the EU was a net exporter to the US with a Euro 2.63 billion surplus and the US


1 Adams, Damian C., J.D. and PhD student, Food and Resource Economics Department and Richard L.
Kilmer, Professor, Food and Resource Economics Department, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL and a
member of the International Agricultural Trade and Policy Center (IATPC) at the University of Florida.
2 There are fifteen full members of the EU: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great
Britain, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden. See
ihp \ \ %\ .encyclopedia.com/html/E/EuropnUln.asp
3 http://europa.eu.int/abc/historv/1962/1962 en.htm (Accessed October 17, 2002). Ironically, the GATT
negotiations would begin less than a year after the formation of the CAP. The CAP was primarily
concerned with reducing barriers to trade between European Economic EU (EEC and later EU) members
and ensuring a stable food supply. In 1965, when financing of the CAP was being negotiated by EEC
members, France, the largest agricultural producer in the EU, broke off negotiations, recalled its Permanent
Representative to the EEC, and refused to take part in official meetings relating to the EEC until its desires
concerning farm subsidies and external trade barriers were met. See generally
http://europa.eu.int/abc/history
4 Fuller, Thomas. "Berlin and Paris agree to cap EU farm spending." International Herald Tribune Online,
October 25, 2002. hup \\ \ \\ .iht.com/articles/74838.html(Accessed October 25, 2002).









was a net importer from the EU with a Euro 5.65 billion deficit. In 2000, the values are

2.63 billion and 5.51 billion, respectively.6 In 2000, Euro 1 = US 1.12.7

The level of EU support of agricultural markets is decreasing, but still relatively

high compared to the US (although this may have changed somewhat with the most

recent Farm Bill) and the rest of the world. The recent changes have signaled a trend

away from market-distorting actions and toward direct payments to producers.

Agricultural subsidies accounted for almost half of the EU's total budget (US$ 40 billion

on agriculture in 2000) although agriculture is a very small part of the European

economy. In 2000, agriculture represented 1.7 percent of the EU's GDP, and employed

4.3% of the European population.9 In 1999, the EU appropriated Euro 40,440 million for

agricultural support spending Table 1), of which Euro 10,301.4 million was spent on

market support and Euro 29,239.4 million was spent on direct aid to producers.10 Market

support includes export refunds (Euro 5,572.8 million in 1999), storage (Euro 1,568.3),

guidance premiums (Euro 154.3 million), processing and consumption aid (Euro 2,684.3

million), withdrawals (Euro 346.2 million) and miscellaneous (Euro 24.5 million).11

European support of agriculture is still very high compared to the US.12




5 Special Report no 6/2001 on milk quotas, Ottic ialJournal C 305, 30/10/2001 P. 0001 0034. The
"producer subsidy equivalent" for milk is 54% of the value of output compared to 44% for all agricultural
products.
6 Europe Trade statistics, http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/goods/agri/stats.htm
7 The Agricultural Situation in the European Union, 2000 Report, COM (2002) 67 final, Commission of the
European Communities at 132.
8 USDA-ERS briefing room, hup \ \\ \\ .ers.usda.gov/briefing/EuropeanUnion/basicinfo.htm
9 USDA-ERS briefing room, lhp \ \\ \\ .ers.usda.gov/briefing/EuropeanUnion/basicinfo.htm
10 The Agricultural Situation in the European Union, 2000 Report, COM (2002) 67 final, Commission of
the European Communities at 134.
1 The Agricultural Situation in the European Union, 2000 Report, COM (2002) 67 final, Commission of
the European Communities at 134.
12 "Comparison of Domestic Support: US-EU", http://www.fas.usda.gov/htp/tradepolicv/europe/ams98-
99.pdf For the 1998/99 marketing year, EU total Aggregate Measure of Support was 51,351 million
dollars, compared to 10,392 million dollars of support in the US.











Table 1. EU agricultural spending by commodity and economic type, 1990-
200013
Spending category 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 199914 20001
Millions Ecu, Euro
Dairy 4955.9 5636.6 4006.82 5211.3 4248.83 4013 3441.1 2984.9 2596.7 2581 2643
Export refunds 1930.8 2249 2056.15 2287.5 1926.75 2267 1605.2 NA 1426.7 1259 1417
Intervention 3025.1 3387.6 1950.66 2923.8 2322.08 1746 1835.9 NA 1170 1322 1226
Fruit and 1253 1106.5 1261.7 1663.9 1556.84 1557 1581.1 1555.3 1509.5 1661 1654
vegetables
Export refunds 80.6 94.8 116.72 187.4 216.67 239 98.4 NA 58.3 65 60
Intervention 1172.4 1011.7 1145.00 1476.5 1340.17 1317 1482.7 NA 1842 1596 1501.5
Total Market 24,850 30,334 30,128 33,223 29,947 30,956 37,790 37,838 36,729 37,165 35,720
Organization
Other Direct 1,604 1,450 1,241 2,128 1,105 424 1,318 2,585 2,019 3,275 4,806
Payments
Total Market 26,454 32,386 31,369 35,352 32,970 34,503 39,108 40,423 38,749 40,440 40,526
Support
Miscellaneous 1,974 2,306 2,983 3,336 3,335 3,609 4,044 4,399 4,525 5,691 2,668
Total agricultural 28,428 34,692 34,353 38,688 35,683 38,218 43,152 44,714 43,273 46,131 43,194
spending
Exchange rate 1.27 1.24 1.30 1.17 1.19 1.31 1.27 1.13 1.12 1.07 1.121
($/Ecu16)
Total agricultural 36,189 43,035 44,549 45,354 42,412 49,993 54,717 50,710 48,466 49,222 48,377
spending, US$


In general, the EU intends to enhance European agricultural competitiveness by

setting product intervention as "a real safety net measure, allowing EU producers to

respond to market signals while protecting them from extreme price fluctuations," and

promoting market oriented, sustainable agriculture by finishing the transition from

product support to producer support, by introducing a decoupledd system of payments per

farm" which are not connected to production" The EU wishes to allow flexibility in

production, but also guarantee income stability to producers. Within the last 10 years, the


13 USDA-ERS briefing room, http://www.ers.usda.gov/biefing/EuropeanUnion/PolicvCommon.htm. The
data from the US differs slightly from EU data due to rounding.
14 The data for 1999 and 2000 represent EU appropriations rather than actual spending.
15 The data for 1999 and 2000 represent EU appropriations rather than actual spending.
16 The ECU, or European Currency Unit, was the predecessor to the Euro.
17 Instead of the USDA-ERS projection, this is the actual exchange rate for the 2000 marketing year. See
The Agricultural Situation in the European Union, 2000 Report, COM (2002) 67 final, Commission of the
European Communities at 132.









EU has reduced price supports and increased direct payments to tomato, dairy, and citrus

farmers to compensate them for the reductions.

The EU has an arsenal of support mechanisms for domestic agriculture. This

paper inventories EU laws that provide the mechanisms for support of domestic

agriculture and discusses how they may affect Florida's dairy, tomato, and citrus

producers.

By WTO standards, "high" tariffs-17.3% on average-apply at the European

border but preferential trade agreements with tariff quotas allow some countries access to

the EU markets at reduced rates.19 These preferential agreements are consistent with

WTO regulations, and offer lower tariffs to former colonies, developing nations, and EU

neighbors. The US is not a party to any bilateral trade agreements with the EU that

reduce the tariff rate for agricultural (or any other) products below the Most Favored

Nation rate.

Following the successful negotiation of the 1993 Uruguay Round of GATT

(Uruguay), the EU has made attempts at liberalizing agricultural markets, including

citrus, tomatoes, and dairy, and moving from market distorting supports to less market

distorting regulation.20 This paper explains the domestic market support mechanisms for

citrus, tomatoes and dairy.







18 "Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: Mid-Term Review
of the Common Agricultural Policy", Com (2002) 394 final, Brussels, 10.7.2002 at 1.
19 "European Union: July 2000" WTO press release,
mlp \ \\ .wto.org/wto/english/tratop e/tpr e/tp137 e.htm
20 "The CAP: History and Attempts at Reform", Richard Howarth,
http://www.openrepublic.org/policvanalvses/Agriculture/IEA REFORMING THE CAP/200000601 CAP
HISTORY AND ATTMEPTS AT REFORM IEA.pdf, visited 10/17/02.










Support Mechanisms For Citrus

After Uruguay, the EU citrus market underwent some significant changes in 1996

with the reform of the common organization of the fruit and vegetable market.21

Common organization generally refers to the regulatory system of a particular

agricultural sector under the CAP. In addition to the 1996 reforms with respect to many

fresh fruits and vegetables-Regulation (EC) No 2200/96 on the common organization of

the market in fruit and vegetables and Regulation and (EC) No 2201/96 on the common

organization of the market in processed fruit and vegetables- the citrus market is also

subject to Regulation (EC) No 2202/96 introducing an aid scheme for producers of

certain citrus fruits that has since been duplicated in other markets, including the tomato

market. In particular, the scheme22 provides "compensatory aid" directly to Producer

Organizations (PO) delivering oranges and other citrus harvested in the EU for

processing in the EU under contracts with processors.23 PO's are very similar to U.S.

cooperatives.

The EU is a major exporter of citrus, exporting 16% of the world lemon

production and 12% of world orange production in 2000.24 The EU also produces

mandarins, clementines, and satsumas, but no trade information was available. In 1998,



21 Council Regulation (EC) No 2699/2000 amending Regulation (EC) No 2200/96 on the common
organization of the fruit and vegetables market, 2201/96 on the common organization of the processed fruit
and vegetables market, and 2202/96, which introduced an EU aid scheme for producers of certain citrus
fruits. Article (1) "EU aid scheme is hereby established for producer organizations which deliver for
processing certain citrus fruits harvested in the EU."
22 Council Regulation (EC) No 2202/96 of 28 October 1996 introducing a EU aid scheme for producers of
certain citrus fruits, OrQc ial Journal L 297, 21/11/1996 P. 0049 0052.
23 Council Regulation (EC) No 2202/96 of 28 October 1996 Article (2), "The scheme referred to in Article
1 shall be based on contracts between, on the one hand, producer organizations recognized or provisionally
admitted under Regulation (EC) No 2200/96 and, on the other, processors or legally constituted
associations or unions of processors."
24 The Agricultural Situation in the European Union, 2000 Report, COM (2002) 67 final, Commission of
the European Communities at 69.









EU citrus exports represented 67% of the import level.25 For the 1999/2000 marketing

year, EU citrus production totaled 10.2 million tons, which was up 18% from 1998/99

and roughly equivalent to 1997/8 levels. Spain is the EU's largest producer by far, with

56% of the total citrus production in 1999/2000. Orange production in 2000 was 5.8

million tons, which is a 22% increase over 1998/99.

Export Refunds and Other Trade Policies

Export refunds defray some of the difference between the internal European price

and the world market price of citrus to allow the European citrus producers to dispose of

excess citrus without affecting internal European prices.26 As of 1996, an additional duty

rate may be levied on certain products entering the EU when "conditions set out in

Article 5 of the Agreement on agriculture [article 16] concluded in the framework of the

Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations have been fulfilled."27

Product Withdrawals

In an effort to preserve high internal prices and to somewhat offset seasonal

production gluts, citrus producers may remove citrus from the market via POs. These

POs are a collection of producers that are organized and controlled much like

cooperatives in the United States, with legal means of exerting otherwise illegal market

influence. In 1999, 1008 POs, which represent 40% of the fruit and vegetable





25 The Agricultural Situation in the European Union, 2000 Report, COM (2002) 67 final, Commission of
the European Communities at 70.
26 Regulation (EC) No 2200/96 Article 35 (1) "To the extent necessary to enable economically significant
quantities of the products listed in Article 1 (2) to be exported on the basis of the prices of these products in
international trade but within the limits resulting from agreements concluded in accordance with Article
228 of the Treaty, the difference between those prices and prices in the EU may be covered by export
refunds."
27 Regulation (EC) No 2200/96 Article 33, 1. Certain import volumes or prices trigger these additional
duties. Article 34 also set out import quotas for certain products.









EU citrus exports represented 67% of the import level.25 For the 1999/2000 marketing

year, EU citrus production totaled 10.2 million tons, which was up 18% from 1998/99

and roughly equivalent to 1997/8 levels. Spain is the EU's largest producer by far, with

56% of the total citrus production in 1999/2000. Orange production in 2000 was 5.8

million tons, which is a 22% increase over 1998/99.

Export Refunds and Other Trade Policies

Export refunds defray some of the difference between the internal European price

and the world market price of citrus to allow the European citrus producers to dispose of

excess citrus without affecting internal European prices.26 As of 1996, an additional duty

rate may be levied on certain products entering the EU when "conditions set out in

Article 5 of the Agreement on agriculture [article 16] concluded in the framework of the

Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations have been fulfilled."27

Product Withdrawals

In an effort to preserve high internal prices and to somewhat offset seasonal

production gluts, citrus producers may remove citrus from the market via POs. These

POs are a collection of producers that are organized and controlled much like

cooperatives in the United States, with legal means of exerting otherwise illegal market

influence. In 1999, 1008 POs, which represent 40% of the fruit and vegetable





25 The Agricultural Situation in the European Union, 2000 Report, COM (2002) 67 final, Commission of
the European Communities at 70.
26 Regulation (EC) No 2200/96 Article 35 (1) "To the extent necessary to enable economically significant
quantities of the products listed in Article 1 (2) to be exported on the basis of the prices of these products in
international trade but within the limits resulting from agreements concluded in accordance with Article
228 of the Treaty, the difference between those prices and prices in the EU may be covered by export
refunds."
27 Regulation (EC) No 2200/96 Article 33, 1. Certain import volumes or prices trigger these additional
duties. Article 34 also set out import quotas for certain products.










production in the EU, "submitted operational programs" necessary for EU financing. In

2000, it was 1120.28

Market withdrawals are financed by Operational Funds29 of POs that, in turn, are

funded by levies on producers.3 POs can withdraw31 or "not put up for sale" any

products covered by the law in whatever quantity and for whatever period they want.32

This is the case for citrus, tomatoes and dairy. When withdrawals are made, POs must

pay their producer members the EU withdrawal compensation up to the ceiling set for the

quantity of product withdrawn from market.33 The POs provide withdrawal

compensation up to a EU ceiling set for each marketing year.34 The present ceilings35 on

withdrawals have been reduced to 10% of marketed product for the 2001/02 marketing

year and to 5% from the 2002/3 marketing year and beyond.36 The average amount of

withdrawal compensation for oranges in 2002 was Euro 14.00 per ton, 2000/01 was Euro

14.13 per ton, and 1997/8 was Eurol4.33 per ton.37 The unsold withdrawn products must

be disposed of in prescribed ways that do not affect the internal market price.38 EU


28 At 71.
29 Regulation (EC) No 2200/96, Article 15, 2. Operational funds as indicated in paragraph 1 shall be used
to: (a) finance both market withdrawals and processing of citrus fruit on the terms set out in paragraph 3;
30 Regulation (EC) No 2200/96, Article 15, 1. "EU financial assistance shall be granted on the terms set out
in this Article to producer organizations setting up an operational fund. This fund shall be maintained by
financial contributions levied on member producers on the basis of the quantities or value of fruit and
vegetables actually marketed and from the financial assistance..."
31 The quantities that may be withdrawn from the market are limited by Regulation (EC) No 2200/96
32 Regulation (EC) No 2200/96, Article 23, 1. "Producer organizations and their associations may choose
not to put up for sale products listed in Article 1 (2) contributed by their members, both in quantities and
for periods which they consider appropriate."
33 Regulation (EC) No 2200/96, Article 23, 3.
34 "Report From the Commission to the Council on the state of implementation of Regulation (EC) No
2200/96 on the common organization of the market in fruit and vegetables" COM (2001) 36 final at 21.
35 Set by articles 23 and 24 of Regulation (EC) No 2200/96 as a percentage of marketed quantity
36 Council Regulation (EC) No 2699/2000.
3 "Report From the Commission to the Council on the state of implementation of Regulation (EC) No
2200/96 on the common organization of the market in fruit and vegetables" COM (2001) 36 final at 23.
38 Regulation (EC) No 2200/96 Article 30, 1 (b) fruit: free distribution to school children, other than as part
of the meals served in school canteens, and to pupils in schools which do not have canteens providing
meals










withdrawal compensation limits39 were reduced to 5% for citrus and 10% for a list of

products that includes tomatoes for the 2002/3 marketing year.40

Intervention Thresholds and Direct Producer Aid

The 1996 reforms created processing thresholds41 that are referenced to determine

the level of direct aid to producers. A Member State exceeding the processing

threshold42 causes a proportional reduction43 in the current year's aid.44 Citrus thresholds

are set in terms of raw, not processed, products.

As of 2001, the direct aid45 amounts for citrus remain unchanged, but the

processing thresholds have increased.46 In the 2001/02 marketing year, processing

thresholds for oranges increased 26.2% over 2000/01 levels to 1,500,236 tons.47 For

lemons there was a 15% increase to 510,600 tons.48 The total aid remains largely

unchanged.49 Also, the ceiling for withdrawals50 from the market fell for 2001/2002 to

10% from 15% of the quantity marketed by producers and to 5% in 2002/2003. This

funding can be used to supplement EU withdrawal compensation.5



39 Set by Council Regulation (EC) 2200/96
40 Article 3 of Council Regulation (EC) No 2699/2000. For the 2001/3 marketing year, the ceilings were
10% for citrus and 20% for other products. Also, this article allowed growers who are not members of a
collective structure to benefit from Article 23 of 2200/96 aid, but EU withdrawal compensation must be
reduced by 10%.
41 Regulation (EC) No 2200/96, article 27.
42 Council Regulation (EC) No 2202/96 Article (5) 1. Processing thresholds shall be established, on the one
hand, for lemons, grapefruit and oranges separately, and, on the other hand, for mandarins, clementines and
satsumas taken together
43 Council Regulation (EC) No 858/1999 of 22 April 1999. Reductions in aid are directly proportional to
the threshold overrun.
44 See Generally Council Regulation (EC) No 2202/96 of 28 October 1996 introducing a EU aid scheme for
producers of certain citrus fruits, Official Journal L 297, 21/11/1996 P. 0049 0052
45 Council Regulation (EC) No 2202/96 introduces a new aid scheme for certain citrus fruits.
46 Council Regulation (EC) No 2699/2000.
47 http://europa.eu.int/comm/agriculture/markets/fruitveg/index en.htm
48 http://europa.eu.int/comm/agriculture/markets/fruitveg/index en.htm
49 http://europa.eu.int/comm/agriculture/markets/fruitveg/index en.htm
50 Regulation (EC) No 2200/96, article 23.
51 Both oranges and tomatoes may qualify for withdrawal compensation (See Annex II of the article).
Regulation (EC) No 2200/96, Article 15, 3 (b). This article also sets limits on the EU withdrawal










Recent increases in EU thresholds are accompanied by reductions in aid per ton52,

so that total expenditures of the EAGGF (European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee

Fund) are unchanged. Prior to 2000, limits in aid to POs was based on two limits, 4.5%

of the value of production marketed by each PO, and 2.5% of the total marketed of all

POs. Under the new system there is a single ceiling to apply to all POs, 3%. There was

an overrun during the 2000/01 marketing year in France and Spain, whose aid for

grapefruit and pomelos was reduced for the 2001/02 marketing year by 18.46% and

8.16%, respectively.53

Support Mechanisms for Tomatoes

Consistent with the market liberalization trend in Europe, in 2000 the EU made

major changes to the common market organization for tomatoes.54 These changes were

to be less market distorting because, while maintaining roughly the same level of aid to

European tomato producers, that aid is now somewhat decoupled from production

decisions. More market flexibility exists after the 2000 changes, less product can be

removed from the market, and supports for exports have declined.

Most importantly, the former quota system of 1996-2000, which was widely

suspected of introducing rigidity into the market, was replaced by a more flexible system



compensation: "The proportion of the operational fund which may be used to finance withdrawals may not
exceed 60 % in the first year, 55 % in the second, 50 % in the third, 45 % in the fourth, 40 % in the fifth
and 30 % from the sixth year onwards." No more than 50% of the EU support may be used for
withdrawals and citrus processing. 5(b): "financial assistance shall be capped at 4 % of the value of the
marketed production of each producer organization, provided that the total amount of financial assistance
represents less than 2 % of the total turnover of all producer organizations." Council Regulation (EC) No
2699/2000 removes the "total turnover of all producer organizations" limit on financial assistance and
increases the financial assistance allowed to each producer organization from 4% to 4.1%.
52 Reductions in aid are in proportion to the volume of overrun over the threshold set. Council Regulation
(EC) No 2699/2000 of 4 December 2000, L 311/14.
53 Commission Regulation (EC) No 1931/2001.
54 Council Regulation (EC) No 2200/96 is a major piece of legislation that reformed the common
organization of the fruit and vegetables market.










of processing thresholds55 and corresponding aid reductions.56 This is almost identical to

the citrus threshold system. The processed tomato quota system57 was based on

"compensatory aid" paid to the processor in return for the payment of a minimum floor

price to producers with aid fixed by unit weight of product processed.58

Except for 1997/8, this quota was consistently overrun from 1996 to 2000.59 The

threshold for 2001/02 is 8,251,455 tons, which is a 20.7% increase over the quota for

2000/01.60 As of 1998, the EU imports 4% of the world tomato production and exports

7% of the world tomato production.61 Additionally, very little of the world's fresh

tomato production is exported fresh. The leading producers of tomatoes for processing in

1999/2000 were the US (11.6 million tons, vs. 8.5 million in 1998/99), the EU (9.1

million tons vs. 8 million) and Turkey (1.8 vs. 1.7).62 EU aid was paid on 6.9 million

tons, which was the quota tonnage. Except for 1997/8, this quota has consistently been







55 Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on the "Proposal for a Council Regulation amending
Regulation (EC) No 2200/96 on the common organization of the market in fruit and vegetables, Regulation
(EC) No 2201/96 on the common organization of the market in processed fruit and vegetables and
Regulation (EC) No 2202/96 introducing a EU aid scheme for producers of certain citrus fruits"
Official Journal C 014, 16/01/2001 P. 0157 0165.
56 Council Regulation (EC) No 2699/2000 amending Regulation (EC) No 2200/96 on the common
organization of the fruit and vegetables market, 2201/96 on the common organization of the processed fruit
and vegetable market, and 2202/96, which introduced an EU aid scheme for producers of certain citrus
fruits.
57 Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/96 of 28 October 1996 on the common organization of the markets in
processed fruit and vegetable products, Official Journal L 297, 21/11/1996 P. 0029 0048 Article 6, 1. "A
quota system is hereby introduced for granting production aid for products processed from tomatoes. The
production aid shall be limited to a volume of processed products corresponding to a weight of 6 836 262
tonnes of fresh tomatoes."
58 See Council Regulation (EC) No 2699/2000 (6).
59 http://europa.eu.int/comm/agriculture/markets/fruitveg/index en.htm
60 http://europa.eu.int/comm/agriculture/markets/fruitveg/index en.htm
61 The Agricultural Situation in the European Union, 2000 Report, COM (2002) 67 final, Commission of
the European Communities at 69.
62 The Agricultural Situation in the European Union, 2000 Report, COM (2002) 67 final, Commission of
the European Communities at 132.









overrun thru 2000. The threshold for 2001/02 is 8,251,455 tons, which is a 20.7%

increase over the quota for 2000/01.63

Export Refunds64 and Other Trade Policies

Other trade policies include import quotas, tariffs65, and additional duties on

imports66. Imports into the EU above a certain level-501,111 tons from October 1 to

March 31, and 639,884 tons from April 1 to September 30-trigger additional import

duties on tomato products. Favorable bilateral trade agreements-allowed by the WTO

under GATT-with tomato producing countries like Turkey and Morocco all but

eliminate any potential tomato exports from the US to the EU. As a result of these

bilateral agreements, which are highly structured quota arrangements, all of the EU's

excess demand is satisfied without American tomatoes.

Product Withdrawals Compensation

This is the same system and set up as in the citrus market. The average amount of

withdrawal compensation for tomatoes in 2002 was Euro 4.83 per ton, for 2000/01 was

Euro 5.47 per ton, and for 1997/98 was Euro 6.44 per ton.67 In 2000, EU tomato

withdrawals represented 1.2% of EU production.68 EU withdrawal compensation

limits69, which indirectly limit the amount of product that may be withdrawn from the







63 http://europa.eu.int/comm/agriculture/markets/fruitveg/index en.htm
64 Council Regulation (EC) No 2200/96
65 Commission Regulation (EC) No 2201/96(15).
66 Commission Regulation (EC) No 1512/2000.
67 "Report From the Commission to the Council on the state of implementation of Regulation (EC) No
2200/96 on the common organization of the market in fruit and vegetables" COM (2001) 36 final at 23.
68 The Agricultural Situation in the European Union, 2000 Report, COM (2002) 67 final, Commission of
the European Communities at 71.
69 Set by Council Regulation (EC) 2200/96









overrun thru 2000. The threshold for 2001/02 is 8,251,455 tons, which is a 20.7%

increase over the quota for 2000/01.63

Export Refunds64 and Other Trade Policies

Other trade policies include import quotas, tariffs65, and additional duties on

imports66. Imports into the EU above a certain level-501,111 tons from October 1 to

March 31, and 639,884 tons from April 1 to September 30-trigger additional import

duties on tomato products. Favorable bilateral trade agreements-allowed by the WTO

under GATT-with tomato producing countries like Turkey and Morocco all but

eliminate any potential tomato exports from the US to the EU. As a result of these

bilateral agreements, which are highly structured quota arrangements, all of the EU's

excess demand is satisfied without American tomatoes.

Product Withdrawals Compensation

This is the same system and set up as in the citrus market. The average amount of

withdrawal compensation for tomatoes in 2002 was Euro 4.83 per ton, for 2000/01 was

Euro 5.47 per ton, and for 1997/98 was Euro 6.44 per ton.67 In 2000, EU tomato

withdrawals represented 1.2% of EU production.68 EU withdrawal compensation

limits69, which indirectly limit the amount of product that may be withdrawn from the







63 http://europa.eu.int/comm/agriculture/markets/fruitveg/index en.htm
64 Council Regulation (EC) No 2200/96
65 Commission Regulation (EC) No 2201/96(15).
66 Commission Regulation (EC) No 1512/2000.
67 "Report From the Commission to the Council on the state of implementation of Regulation (EC) No
2200/96 on the common organization of the market in fruit and vegetables" COM (2001) 36 final at 23.
68 The Agricultural Situation in the European Union, 2000 Report, COM (2002) 67 final, Commission of
the European Communities at 71.
69 Set by Council Regulation (EC) 2200/96









market, were reduced to 5% for citrus and 10% for a list of products that includes

tomatoes for the 2002/3 marketing year.70

Intervention Thresholds and Direct Producer Aid

In 2000, the quota system-- EU aid scheme for tomato processing governed by

Regulation (EC) No 2201/96(5)-- was replaced by a processing threshold system. The

threshold system is meant to be less market distorting than the quota system that made

the tomato market too rigid to allow the processors to adapt to market demand

fluctuations quickly enough.

The main differences between the old quota system and the new processing

threshold system are the minimum price and who actually receives the aid. Under the

quota system, aid was paid to the processors who paid at least the minimum floor price,

with aid reduced when the quota was exceeded.71 The threshold system provides aid

directly to the producer via POs, and the threshold system has no minimum price, just an

amount of aid based on quantity delivered for processing.72 These recent modifications

copied the citrus system, which already had direct payments to POs, in place of the old

tomato quota system of compensatory aid to processors who had to pay producers a

minimum price set each year by the European Commission, the EU's executive body.



70 Article 3 of Council Regulation (EC) No 2699/2000. For the 2001/3 marketing year, the ceilings were
10% for citrus and 20% for other products. Also, this article allowed growers who are not members of a
collective structure to benefit from Article 23 of 2200/96 aid, but EU withdrawal compensation must be
reduced by 10%.
1 Commission Regulation (EC) No 504/97 laying down detailed rules for the application of Council
Regulation (EC) No 2201/96 on production aid, Olik ial Journal L 078, 21r s 1997 P. 0014 0023
72 Commission Regulation (EC) No 449/2001 of 2 March 2001 laying down detailed rules for applying
Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/96 as regards the aid scheme for products processed from fruit and
vegetables, Olik ial Journal L 064, 06/03/2001 P. 0016 0029, Article 14, 1. Aid for tomatoes, peaches
and pears shall be paid by the competent body of the Member State in which the producer organization
signing the contract has its head office, as soon as that body has checked the aid application and established
that the products covered by that application have been delivered and accepted for processing, on the basis,
in particular, of the checks provided for in Article 18(1)(i).









Under the threshold system, a single EU threshold is fixed by tons of fresh

tomatoes intended for processing rather than by tons of processed73 tomatoes, with a level

above the marketing year 2000 quota to allow for expanding demand.74 When this

threshold is surpassed, the following year's aid is reduced to the Member State in

proportion to the overrun. In 2002, aid for producers in Member States not exceeding the

threshold is 34.50 Euro/ton of fresh tomatoes, regardless of the finished product

classification or existing market prices. For the 2000/2001 marketing year, the EU

threshold was 8,251,455 tons, which is 20.7% above the old EU quota for 2000/2001.

Aid for the 2000/01 marketing year for Member States that did not overrun the threshold

was Euro 31,36/ton.75 For marketing years 2002/3 and 2003/4, the aid is set at Euro

34.50/ton.76

In the 2001/02 marketing year, tomatoes were above threshold in some Member

States. In these States, the aid is reduced to Euro 31.36 per ton, with a supplement set by

the Commission to be paid after the marketing year to producers in Member States that

do not exceed the threshold by more than 10%.77 For the 2001/02 marketing year, the aid

supplement78 is Euro 3.14/ton in Greece, France and Portugal, EUR 2.70/ton in Italy,






3 Regulation (EC) No 2699/2000 (5). This regulation repeals a number of regulations that set up this
support mechanism: Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1709/84 on minimum prices payable to producers
and levels of production aid, last amended by Regulation (EC) No 1573/1999(13), Commission Regulation
(EEC) No 2022/92 on the rules for applying the minimum price paid to producers for certain tomatoes, and
Regulation (EC) No 2201/96 regarding the system of quotas for processed tomato products, as amended by
Commission Regulation (EC) No 2807/98(16).
74 Council Regulation (EC) No 2699/2000 (4)
75 Article 5(3)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 2201/96.
76 Article 5(3)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 2201/96.
7 Article 5(3)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 2201/96. Any 2002/03 marketing year overrun of the processing
threshold will by calculated based on the 2001/02 quantity supplied for processing.
8 Article 5(3)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 2201/96.









Euro 3.14/ton in Spain for tomatoes intended for processing into whole peeled tomatoes,

Euro 0.10/ton in Spain for tomatoes intended for processing into other tomato products.79

Direct aid to producers is reduced when thresholds are overrun.80 For 2001/2,

determination of whether the threshold is overrun is based on the quantity of tomatoes

processed during the year.81 For the 2002/3 year, this determination is based on the

previous year's quantity. For the 2003/4 year, threshold overrun is based on the average

quantity from the first and second years.82

After the 2000 reform, there is a new, higher ceiling on the amount of aid that is

granted to POs.83 This ceiling-- 4.1% production ceiling, which is a higher ceiling on

direct aid to producers from January 200184-- replaces two ceilings on aid to producers,

4.5% of the value of production and 2.5% of total turnover of all producers. The ceiling

is meant to place a limit on the amount of subsidies from the EU to the producers. Total

aid to POs may not exceed either of these ceilings. The support for the tomato processors

is expected to be at roughly the same level as 1999/2000. For the 2001/2 marketing year,

the direct aid to POs (and some individual producers satisfying the same requirements)

for tomatoes that go to processing was Euro 34.50/ton.85 For the 2001/2 marketing year,

individual producers were also eligible for this aid for a quantity not more than 25% of


79 Article 1 of Commission Regulation (EC) No 175/2002
80 See Commission Regulation (EC) No 1931/2001 reducing the amount of aid for grapefruit and pomelos
for the 2001/02 marketing year after the processing threshold for 2000/01 was exceeded.
81 Article 5 (3) of Council Regulation (EC) No 2699/2000.
82 Article 5 (4) of Council Regulation (EC) No 2699/2000.
83 Council Regulation (EC) No 2200/96. Commission Regulation (EC) No 1144/2001 fixes, for Regulation
(EC) No 411/97, a ceiling for EU aid granted to producer organizations that set up operational funds for
2000. Regulation (EC) No 411/97 was repealed in 2001 by Commission Regulation (EC) No 609/2001,
setting a new ceiling for aid and replacing the double ceiling with a single ceiling.
84 Amending Regulation (EC) No 2200/96 on the common organization of the market in fruit and
vegetables, Regulation (EC) No 2201/96 on the common organization of the market in processed fruit and
vegetables and Regulation (EC) No 2202/96 introducing a EU aid scheme for producers of certain citrus
fruits.
85 Council Regulation (EC) No 2699/2000 (4) (2).









the amount contracted for marketing.86 For the 2002/03 marketing year, the direct aid to

POs for processing87 is set at Euro 34.50/ton in Greece, France and Portugal, Euro

34.06/ton in Italy, Euro 34.50/ton in Spain for tomatoes intended for processing into

whole peeled tomatoes, and Euro 31.46/ton in Spain for tomatoes intended for processing

into other tomato products. The EU aid scheme for POs supplying tomatoes was set up

by Council Regulation (EC) No 2699/2000 (2).

Support Mechanisms for Dairy

In 2001, the EU was both the largest producer and the largest consumer of cow's

milk in the world, with 21.3% and 21% respectively, compared to the US' 13.1% and

12%.88 Only 6.9% of world milk production (40.8 million tons) was traded in 2001.89

Almost none of that is liquid milk. The bulk of trade is in the form of butter, cheese, and

powdered milk.90 About 2/3 of EU milk production is used for butter, cheese, or skim

milk.91 In 1997, farms with fewer than 50 cows accounted for 52% of all dairy cattle in

the EU, versus 68.5% in 1985.92 In 1995, the average number of dairy cows per farm

was only 23.93 Given this status, the broad and highly structured supports for the dairy

sector are not unexpected.

Support mechanisms affecting milk include public intervention, intervention

prices, private storage aid, domestic consumption aid (or disposal aid), milk quotas, and


86 Regulation (EC) No 2699/2000 (3)(1).
8 Article 2 of Regulation (EC) No 2201/96 provides for an aid scheme to assist producer organizations
delivering tomatoes, peaches and Williams and Rocha pears for processing
88 In tons of milk. Report on Milk Quotas, Commission of the European Communities, SEC (2002) 789
final, p. 5.
89 Report on Milk Quotas, Commission of the European Communities, SEC (2002) 789 final, p. 5.
90 Report on Milk Quotas, Commission of the European Communities, SEC (2002) 789 final, p. 5.
91 Special Report No 8/2000 on the EU measures for the disposal of butterfat accompanied by the
Commission's replies, Olic ial Journal C 132, 12/05/2000 P. 0001 0032
92 Special Report no 6/2001 on milk quotas, together with the Commission's replies, Otic ial Journal C 305,
30/10/2001 P. 0001 0034 (24).










export refunds.94 Of these, only disposal is a demand-side mechanism. These

mechanisms are used to achieve a target price for milk sold at the producer level. The

current target price for fluid milk is 309.8 Euro/ton at 3.7% fat.95 Maintaining the target

price is the principal objective of all of the dairy support mechanisms, including public

intervention and export refunds.

These support mechanisms are expensive to both consumers and taxpayers.

Maintaining the target price results in milk producers receiving 54 percent of their

revenue from the EU for an estimated cost of over 20 billion euro a year.96 In addition to

higher prices paid for the products, taxpayer's pay for these subsidies, with expenditures

on subsidies to the dairy market at Euro 2.5 billion per year as of 2000.97 Although still

high, support levels in total for dairy have fallen considerably since 1983, from 4285.3

million Euros in 1983 to 2601.3 million Euros in 1999.98 Since 1995, almost 28% of the

quantity of butter consumed in the EU has been granted EU aid99 representing about 30%

of market price, and skim milk powder aid (fixed at 35% of the market price) was paid on

more than half of the EU consumption level.100 In 2000, nearly 25 million tons of milk

equivalent was disposed of (i.e. demand-side aid) at a cost of 2601 million Euros.


93 "Agriculture, Environment, Rural Development Facts and Figures" 3/16/2001,
http://europa.eu.int/comm/agriculture/envir/report/en/live en/report.htm
94 Report on Milk Quotas, Commission of the European Communities, SEC (2002) 789 final, p. 6; See also
Regulation (EC) No 1255/ 1999, part of Agenda 2000; See also the milk quota regime Council Regulation
(EEC) No 856/84 and Council Regulation (EEC) No857/84, derogated by Regulation (EEC) No 3950/92,
and later amended by Regulation (EC) No 1256/1999 for Agenda 2000.
95 Report on Milk Quotas, Commission of the European Communities, SEC (2002) 789 final, p. 7.
96 Special Report no 6/2001 on milk quotas, Official Journal C 305, 30/10/2001 P. 0001 0034. The
"producer subsidy equivalent" for milk is 54% of the value of output compared to 44% for all agricultural
products.
97 Special Report no 6/2001 on milk quotas, Official Journal C 305, 30/10/2001 P. 0001 0034.
98 Special Report no 6/2001 on milk quotas, Official Journal C 305, 30/10/2001 P. 0001 0034
Milk and milk-products sector expenditures have decreased from 4285.3 million euros in 1983 to 2601,3
million euros in 1999.
99 Special Report No 8/2000 on the EU measures for the disposal of butterfat accompanied by the
Commission's replies, Onic ial Journal C 132, 12/05/2000 P. 0001 0032









Additional levy payments, or penalties on producers for exceeding the dairy quota,

recaptured 16% of these expenditures from producers.101

Intervention and Direct Producer Aid

Intervention mechanisms exist for butter and skim milk powder. Each Member

State's intervention agency must buy skim milk powder at the intervention price from

March 1 to August 31 each year, but the Commission may suspend the buying if

quantities exceed 109,000 tons. 102 The product purchased is state property held in

storage. When the price of butter in a Member State falls below 92% of the intervention

price during a certain period, the Member State must buy butter at a price set by the

Commission that may not be lower than 90% of the intervention price. 103 There is no

intervention quantity limit for butter.

Aid For Private Storage

Public stocks of skim milk powder and cheese may qualify for private storage aid

if a serious market imbalance exists that could be ameliorated by seasonal storage.104

The amount of aid is determined by actual storage costs. The Commission may require

that the Member State's intervention agency remarket some of the products if market

conditions so require.

Disposal Aid

This aid includes several measures used to stimulate dairy consumption, including

aid for use of skim milk and butterfat for animal feed, aid for supplying schools with


100 Special Report no 6/2001 on milk quotas, Ottic hi/Journal C 305, 30/10/2001 P. 0001 0034
101 Special Report no 6/2001 on milk quotas, Ottic i/ Journal C 305, 30/10/2001 P. 0001 0034
102 Report on Milk Quotas, Commission of the European Communities, SEC (2002) 789 final, p. 7.
103 Report on Milk Quotas, Commission of the European Communities, SEC (2002) 789 final, p. 7.
104 Council Regulation (EC) No 1255/1999 granting private storage aid for butter, cheese, and cream;
regarding intervention for butter and cream; regarding import arrangements for milk products and setting
tariff quotas.









Additional levy payments, or penalties on producers for exceeding the dairy quota,

recaptured 16% of these expenditures from producers.101

Intervention and Direct Producer Aid

Intervention mechanisms exist for butter and skim milk powder. Each Member

State's intervention agency must buy skim milk powder at the intervention price from

March 1 to August 31 each year, but the Commission may suspend the buying if

quantities exceed 109,000 tons. 102 The product purchased is state property held in

storage. When the price of butter in a Member State falls below 92% of the intervention

price during a certain period, the Member State must buy butter at a price set by the

Commission that may not be lower than 90% of the intervention price. 103 There is no

intervention quantity limit for butter.

Aid For Private Storage

Public stocks of skim milk powder and cheese may qualify for private storage aid

if a serious market imbalance exists that could be ameliorated by seasonal storage.104

The amount of aid is determined by actual storage costs. The Commission may require

that the Member State's intervention agency remarket some of the products if market

conditions so require.

Disposal Aid

This aid includes several measures used to stimulate dairy consumption, including

aid for use of skim milk and butterfat for animal feed, aid for supplying schools with


100 Special Report no 6/2001 on milk quotas, Ottic hi/Journal C 305, 30/10/2001 P. 0001 0034
101 Special Report no 6/2001 on milk quotas, Ottic i/ Journal C 305, 30/10/2001 P. 0001 0034
102 Report on Milk Quotas, Commission of the European Communities, SEC (2002) 789 final, p. 7.
103 Report on Milk Quotas, Commission of the European Communities, SEC (2002) 789 final, p. 7.
104 Council Regulation (EC) No 1255/1999 granting private storage aid for butter, cheese, and cream;
regarding intervention for butter and cream; regarding import arrangements for milk products and setting
tariff quotas.









Additional levy payments, or penalties on producers for exceeding the dairy quota,

recaptured 16% of these expenditures from producers.101

Intervention and Direct Producer Aid

Intervention mechanisms exist for butter and skim milk powder. Each Member

State's intervention agency must buy skim milk powder at the intervention price from

March 1 to August 31 each year, but the Commission may suspend the buying if

quantities exceed 109,000 tons. 102 The product purchased is state property held in

storage. When the price of butter in a Member State falls below 92% of the intervention

price during a certain period, the Member State must buy butter at a price set by the

Commission that may not be lower than 90% of the intervention price. 103 There is no

intervention quantity limit for butter.

Aid For Private Storage

Public stocks of skim milk powder and cheese may qualify for private storage aid

if a serious market imbalance exists that could be ameliorated by seasonal storage.104

The amount of aid is determined by actual storage costs. The Commission may require

that the Member State's intervention agency remarket some of the products if market

conditions so require.

Disposal Aid

This aid includes several measures used to stimulate dairy consumption, including

aid for use of skim milk and butterfat for animal feed, aid for supplying schools with


100 Special Report no 6/2001 on milk quotas, Ottic hi/Journal C 305, 30/10/2001 P. 0001 0034
101 Special Report no 6/2001 on milk quotas, Ottic i/ Journal C 305, 30/10/2001 P. 0001 0034
102 Report on Milk Quotas, Commission of the European Communities, SEC (2002) 789 final, p. 7.
103 Report on Milk Quotas, Commission of the European Communities, SEC (2002) 789 final, p. 7.
104 Council Regulation (EC) No 1255/1999 granting private storage aid for butter, cheese, and cream;
regarding intervention for butter and cream; regarding import arrangements for milk products and setting
tariff quotas.









milk, and, when public stocks build up, the Commission may grant aid to promote cream,

butter and concentrated butter purchases at reduced prices by certain groups.105 These

groups include non-profit groups, Member States' military, producer of pastries, ice

cream, and "other foodstuffs," and consumers of concentrated butter.106 In 2000, disposal

aid expenditure was Euro 449 million for butter and Euro 708 million for skim milk.107

The aid for milk to schoolchildren was 89 million Euros in 1999.108 In 1998, disposal aid

represented 20% of the total EU milk sector expenditures.109 These are the latest figures

available.

Export Refunds

To maintain internal dairy prices, export refunds are paid to help remove excess

supply. These are given to exporters to make up the difference between world market

prices and EU prices and they are the same rate for the entire EU.110 The refund rates and

quantities are set each year by the Commission according to market needs in order to

maintain the target price, and are ultimately controlled via a system of export licenses

issued each year.111 Together with internal consumption subsidies, export refunds cost

the EU budget 3 billion Euros per year in 2000 with almost 15 million tons of subsidized







105 Council Regulation (EC) No 1255/1999 of 17 May 1999 on the common organization of the market in
milk and milk products, Official Journal L 160, 26/06/1999 P. 0048 0072
106 Article 13 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1255/1999 of 17 May 1999 on the common organization of
the market in milk and milk products, Official Journal L 160, 26/06/1999 P. 0048 0072
107 Report on Milk Quotas, Commission of the European Communities, SEC (2002) 789 final, p. 7.
108 Special Report no 6/2001 on milk quotas, Otic iI/ Journal C 305, 30/10/2001 P. 0001 0034
109 Special Report No 8/2000 on the EU measures for the disposal of butterfat accompanied by the
Commission's replies, Onik ial Journal C 132, 12/05/2000 P. 0001 0032
110 See Commission Regulation (EC) No 174/1999 setting detailed rules for applying Council Regulation
(EEC) No 804/68 regarding export licenses and export refunds for milk products.
111 Commission Regulation (EC) 174/1999










export of dairy products.112 The resulting expenditure on export refunds (ECU 420

million in 1998) is also less than half of the maximum amount permitted. 113

Milk Quota Regime

Since 1984, quotas have been used to stabilize prices by constraining production

to keep it in line with projected consumption. Quotas were initially allocated to each

country and to each producer in 1984 based on historical production and new quotas

levels were negotiated for new EU members as they joined the EU.114

Quotas are set by volume and adjusted by milk fat content.115 Under the quota

system, an "additional levy", set at 115% of the target price of milk, is charged to the

producer for all volume above the quota set by the Council for each Member State for a

given year.116 Exceeding the reference milk fat level triggers an "additional levy" of

155% of the milk target price. 117 All producers who caused the oversupply by exceeding

their individual quotas are charged the levy.



Quota overruns at the producer or farm level can be offset by other individual

quota shortfalls or unused quotas in any manner decided by the Member State.118 The


112 Special Report no 6/2001 on milk quotas, Onik ial Journal C 305, 30/10/2001 P. 0001 0034
113 Special Report No 8/2000 on the EU measures for the disposal of butterfat accompanied by the
Commission's replies, Ol it il Journal C 132, 12/05/2000 P. 0001 0032
114 Special Report no 6/2001 on milk quotas, Ottic ia/Journal C 305, 30/10/2001 P. 0001 0034, p.11
115 Special Report no 6/2001 on milk quotas, together with the Commission's replies, Official Journal C
305, 30/10/2001 P. 0001 0034 (62-3).
116 Council Regulation (EEC) No 3950/92 establishing an additional levy on milk products.
117 Special Report no 6/2001 on milk quotas, together with the Commission's replies, Official Journal C
305, 30/10/2001 P. 0001 0034 (62-3).
118 Special Report no 6/2001 on milk quotas, together with the Commission's replies, Official Journal C
305, 30/10/2001 P. 0001 0034 (41-2). "In France, offsetting is kept to a minimum and even in years
where no national overrun occurs farmers who overproduce may have to pay a levy, the proceeds of which
go to national restructuring measures. In the United Kingdom, offsetting arrangements at both the national
and the purchaser levels allow farmers to trade their quota, fine-tuning their individual quota according to
the latest estimates of national overrun. At the extreme, cases were seen where farmers, believing that no
levy would be payable in a particular year, transferred out 100 % of their available quota (for financial









levy is charged to the individual dairy producers by milk purchasers, or to direct sellers of

the milk by the authorized national administration.119 If it were charged to the countries

rather than the producers, then it would effectively be a subsidy from the Member State

to the producers of that State, defeating the purpose of the quota. Today, quotas may

not be traded between countries, but can be transferred within each country according to

individual country regulations. In France, for example, the quotas are attached to the

land.120 Smaller farmers tend to receive reallocated quotas in the Member States.121

The original quota level was 103.7 million tons in 1984.122 In 1992, the total

quota was reduced by 10.5% for the 10 Member States, but increased by 13.8 million

tons to allow for Spain and Portugal joining the EU and to allow for German

reunification.123 For the 1992/3 marketing year, the total quota was 106.9 million tons.

Italy, Spain, and Greece negotiated a 1.6 million ton quota increase in 1993, and Austria,

Sweden, and Finland negotiated an 8.4 million ton quota increase when they became

Member States in 1995.124 Finally, Agenda 2000, explained below, will increase the

quota by 2.4% from a 1999/2000-reference year when it takes effect in 2005.125 Unless

changed, the milk quota system is set to expire in 2006.

Quotas and intervention prices have opposite effects. Quotas are a production

limiting mechanism that is meant to maintain high internal prices, but the relatively high

intervention price causes milk producers to produce up to the quota maximum even when


gain) only to find that they were liable to a levy on their entire production when in fact a national overrun
of quota did occur."
119 Special Report no 6/2001 on milk quotas Official Journal C 305, 30/10/2001 P. 0001 0034
120 Special Report no 6/2001 on milk quotas, Oric ial Journal C 305, 30/10/2001 P. 0001 0034, p.11
121 Special Report no 6/2001 on milk quotas, Orticil Journal C 305, 30/10/2001 P. 0001 0034
122 See Report on Milk Quotas, Commission of the European Communities, SEC (2002) 789 final, p. 8.
123 See Report on Milk Quotas, Commission of the European Communities, SEC (2002) 789 final, p. 9.
124 See Report on Milk Quotas, Commission of the European Communities, SEC (2002) 789 final, p. 9.









the quota would not be a limiting factor. This leads to accruals of public intervention

stocks. Export subsidies and import restrictions would aid the quotas in maintaining high

internal prices.126

Agenda 2000

In response to a Court of Auditors127 requirement for "a fundamental reform of

the dairy sector aiming at achieving equilibrium between overall milk production and

unsubsidized internal consumption plus potential unsubsidized exports while ensuring a

fair standard of living for dairy farmers and allowing the quota regime to expire," Agenda

2000, an extension of the 1992 reform for market policy, represents a significant step

towards CAP reform. Contained in the Agenda 2000 agreement were important changes

for the dairy market.

Under the original Agenda 2000 proposal, market prices would decline via a 15%

cut in intervention support prices in four steps from 2000 onward and a 2% increase in

quotas while compensation is paid to farmers. However, in March 1999 the European

Council delayed the main elements of this reform until the 2005/6 marketing year128, with

the reform phased-in over three years and the quota increased by 2.4% from a 1999/2000

reference year for some Member States and a flat-rate increase of 1.5% for the remaining

Member States in the 2005/6 2007/8 periods.129 These reforms are projected to

effectively improve market balance, cause intervention stocks to fluctuate at low levels,

reduce reliance on export refunds, and significantly lower internal consumption aids;


125 "Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: Mid-Term Review
of the Common Agricultural Policy", Com (2002) 394 final, Brussels, 10.7.2002 at 17.
126 Report on Milk Quotas, Commission of the European Communities, SEC (2002) 789 final, p. 11.
127 The Court of Auditors reviews European Union outlays and expenditures to ensure that they are lawful.
128 Council Regulation (EC) No 1256/1999 (3) amends Regulation (EEC) No 3950/92 establishing an
additional levy in the milk and milk products sector.









Direct payments to producers are expected to adequately compensate them for price

reductions.130 They would be introduced in three equal steps over three years from

2005/6 marketing year in the form of direct payments to producers called dairy premia

(5.75 Euros going to 17.24 Euros per ton of quota) and additional payments, including

"top-up" premia and regional payments.

The full effect of the Agenda 2000 reforms will not be felt until 2008 and the EU

is already considering four alternatives for 2008-2015. First, continuation of Agenda

2000 thru 2015. Second, Repeating the Agenda 2000 approach by further increasing

quotas (+3%) and reducing intervention prices (-15% butter and -5% skimmed milk

powder). Third, introducing a 2-tiered quota system under which EU quotas are reduced

by 5% to establish a domestic quota, while export quotas would be unlimited and export

refunds and disposal aids would be cancelled. Lastly, the final reform is the removal of

the Quota System altogether in 2008 and cutting intervention support by an additional

25%.

Significant reform of the milk sector along these lines is scheduled to begin in

2005.131 The present milk quota arrangements will run out after 2006.132 Recent dairy

CAP reform includes a quota increase and a 15% drop in intervention prices for butter

and skimmed milk powder.133




129 "Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: Mid-Term Review
of the Common Agricultural Policy", Com (2002) 394 final, Brussels, 10.7.2002 at 17.
130 "Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: Mid-Term Review
of the Common Agricultural Policy", Com (2002) 394 final, Brussels, 10.7.2002 at 17.
131" Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: Mid-Term Review
of the Common Agricultural Policy", Com (2002) 394 final, Brussels, 10.7.2002 at 6.
132 "Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: Mid-Term Review
of the Common Agricultural Policy", Com (2002) 394 final, Brussels, 10.7.2002 at 11.
133" Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: Mid-Term Review
of the Common Agricultural Policy", Com (2002) 394 final, Brussels, 10.7.2002 at 13.









Conclusion

European Union (EU) consumers pay almost twice the competitive world price

for many agricultural products. Agricultural subsidies accounted for almost half of the

EU's total budget (US$ 40 billion on agriculture in 2000) although agriculture

represented 1.7 percent of the EU's GDP and employs 4.3% of the EU's population.

Domestic policies for citrus and tomatoes include export refunds, product withdraws

from the market, intervention thresholds, and direct producer aid. Domestic policies for

dairy include export refunds, intervention thresholds, aid for private storage, disposal aid,

and milk quotas. The EU's intentions are to enhance agricultural competitiveness by

setting product intervention as "a real safety net measure, allowing EU producers to

respond to market signals while protecting them from extreme price fluctuations," and

promoting market oriented, sustainable agriculture by finishing the transition from

product support to producer support, by introducing a decoupledd system of payments per

farm" which are not connected to production. The EU wishes to allow flexibility in

production, but also guarantee income stability to producers. Within the last 10 years, the

EU has reduced price supports and increased direct payments to tomato, dairy, and citrus

farmers to compensate them for the reductions.




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