• TABLE OF CONTENTS
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 Front Cover
 Demographic concerns: Population...
 Manpower
 Policy
 Current issues
 Labor
 Foreign policy
 Citizenship
 Undocumented aliens
 Trends
 Footnotes
 Tables 1-7














Title: Overview of U.S. immigration trends and policy
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Table of Contents
    Front Cover
        Front Cover 1
        Front Cover 2
    Demographic concerns: Population growth
        Page 1
        Page 2
        Page 3
        Page 4
        Page 5
        Page 6
    Manpower
        Page 7
        Page 8
    Policy
        Page 9
        Page 10
    Current issues
        Page 11
    Labor
        Page 12
    Foreign policy
        Page 13
        Page 14
    Citizenship
        Page 15
    Undocumented aliens
        Page 16
        Page 17
        Page 18
    Trends
        Page 19
        Page 20
        Page 21
    Footnotes
        Page 22
    Tables 1-7
        Page 23
        Page 24
        Page 25
        Page 26
        Page 27
        Page 28
        Page 29
        Page 30
        Page 31
        Page 32
Full Text














Overview of U.S. Immigration Trends and Policy


Charles B. Keely
Center for Policy Studies
The Population Council
One Dag Hamnarskjold Plaza
New York, N.Y. 10017




Testimony presented to the
House Select Committee on Population
April 4, 1978







Charles B. Keely


Demographic Concerns: Population Growth

The effect of recent immigration on population growth has been noted

frequently ever since its role was pointed out by the Commission on Population

Growth and the American Future. The interim report of the Commission noted

that immigration is becoming an increasing part of population growth in the

United States(l). The Commission, however, also correctly pointed out that

the proportion of current population growth due to immigration and the increasing

role of immigration as of a portion of population growth in recent years is,

to a large extent, the result of decreases in fertility. The reason for

this is that the method of ascertaining the proportion of population growth

due to immigration is based on the following formula: Population growth =

(births deaths) + (immigration emigration). By this formula, one

subtracts all deaths from births and that equals natural increase; then

one subtracts all emigration from immigration, and that equals net migration.

These two components, natural increase and net migration, add up to population

growth. Obviously then it is a simple procedure to calculate the proportion

of the total growth due to each of the two components. The difficulty with

this simple formula and the statement of proportion of population growth due

to each of the two components is that, like all summary measures, it can

lead to concealing information as well as revealing it(2). Even if we

assume that each of the four components--births, deaths, immigration, and

emigration--are correctly counted or estimated, still the procedure for

combining births and deaths for the natural increase component, and immigration

and emigration for the net migration component, conceals some information.

For example, among those people who die each year are persons who are

previous immigrants to the country.









Perhaps to make clear why the use of this formula and the percentages

that it generates can be misleading is best revealed by pointing out that

if fertility declined rapidly, to the point where births equal deaths, then

even one immigrant would be responsible for 100% of population growth.

A more telling example is provided by the real experience in the U.S.

between 1960 and 1970. During the period between the 1960 and 1970 censuses,

the number of foreign born persons in the United States declined. Thus,

we are faced with the anomaly that during the 1960s, the proportion of

population growth due to immigration increased, but this increased importance

for population growth was accomplished by a decline in the foreign born

population. It is only by understanding the nature of these formulas

that it makes any sense at all to be able to say that a decline in the

number of foreign born people was responsible for an increasing proportion

of population growth.

But the importance of immigration in recent population growth is perhaps

not the most important concern about the role of immigration in population

dynamics. The use of the percentage of population growth due to immigration

was mainly to heighten sensitivity to the fact that immigration is not

merely a part of the past of the United States and that the restrictive

legislation of the 1920s did not mean an end to immigration. What is clearly

of concern is the role of future immigration in future population growth.

The most frequently referred to information on this topic are the various

population projections prepared by the Bureau of the Census and others. On

the basis of estimates of probable fertility and mortality during the coming

years as well as an estimate of net civilian immigration,projections are

made into the future. Demographers are quick to point out that population








projections are not predictions. Because so many assumptions are made,

the projection is only as good as the assumptions on which it is based.
Because of the nature of the assumptions involved, particularly concerning
fertility, most individuals and organizations produce a series of projections

based on different assumptions. This allows the user of projections to

see the range of possibilities and to also analyze the effect of varying

the assumptions within certain bounds on the future population growth.

The Census Bureau, for example, produces three sets of projections in their

projections series. In earlier testimony, Professor Dudley Posten of the

University of Texas used the Series III projections in his overview(3).

I would like to dwell in this presentation not on the probability of

the particular fertility or mortality schedules that are used by the various

analysts or organizations, but rather on the migration component in many

population projections. In order to do this I will speak on the Census

Bureau projection series, since their convention of estimating the net

immigration component as 400,000 is widely adopted.

The first thing to note is that the net civilian immigration component

used by the Census Bureau is not the same thing as net alien immigration.

Net civilian immigration includes net movement between the United States

and Puerto Rico, net movement of U.S. born persons abroad, either on govern-

ment or private sector assignments at overseas posts, the entry for the

first time into the United States by U.S. citizens born abroad who claim

citizenship on the basis of their parents' citizenship, alien immigration

Into the United States, including persons paroled into the United States under

authority granted to the Attorney General by Section 212(e)5 of the

Immigration and Nationality Act, and emigration from the United States by

native born and foreign born persons. It is clear form this long list that









the net civilian immigration component is an attempt to conceptualize

the net effect of the movement of all of those people who between any two

periods enter or leave the United States resident population. What is fre-

quently done, however, is to use net civilian immigration as a proxy for

net alien immigration. What is frequently done is to assume that the impact

of net civilian immigration is really equivalent to the impact of alien immi-

grants into the United States under the immigration and nationality laws.

The work done by Warren and Peck(4), as well as by Kraly and myself(5),

indicate a large difference between net civilian immigration and net

alien immigration and also indicate that many of the components used by

the Census Bureau are far from accurate. Net civilian immigration in the

early 1970s based on the work noted above, indicates that net civilian

immigration was in the neighborhood of 265,000 rather than 400,000. It

should be noted that net alien immigration as defined here includes the

movement of aliens to the United States under the Immigration and Nationality

Act as reported in the Annual Report of the Immigration and Naturalization

Service and the emigration from the United States of foreign born residents

(that is, the movement of native-born citizens out of the United States is

not included in the net alien immigration estimate). Therefore, if one

wishes to estimate the role of net alien immigration into the United States,

one should look at the lower figure and see its effect over time. I should

also like to point out that not only is the total number of persons

estimated as net alien immigrants important, but also the age and sex compo-

sition of that net migration are important in making projections. This is

true because a higher proportion of any number of net alien immigrants who

are young adult females obviously means that the impact on future population

growth due to the fertility of those aliens will be greater.








A good deal of work also needs to be done on all of the components of

the net civilian immigration estimates used by the Census Bureau. I am

currently undertaking a project to try to develop estimation techniques

for the various components so that we need not rely on such gross assumptions

as net civilian immigration being the equivalent of net alien immigration

as well as crudely estimating the other components of net civilian immigration.

Perhaps the immigrant group of most concern now in terms of population

growth is the number of undocumented aliens in the United States.

We have very little reliable data on the actual flow of permanent additions

to the stock of the United States population due to undocumented entry,

overstaying or violating the terms of visas. Illegal movement obviously

has been an item of great concern and attention, both in government

and in the media during the last five years. One of the causes for concern

is the assumption that the flow into the United States annually is rather

large and that from this flow a high proportion stay in the United States

to become part of the population. The estimates of the flows vary, but a

frequent convention, in lieu of a reliable estimate, is to assume that the
numbers of persons who enter the United States to stay is equivalent to

the number of persons reported by the Immigration and Naturalization Service

to be deportable persons apprehended. This number has fluctuated around

800,000 recently, and that figure is often encountered as an estimate

the annual addition to the population by undocumented movement. Note first

that we have no reliable data to indicate that the permanent additions

to the population by undocumented movement are anywhere near the 800,000

figure. Secondly, the effect of any undocumented movement on future population
growth is obviously not only a function of the number, but also the age

structure, the sex distribution, and the fertility of the persons involved.









As is to be expected, not only do we not have good information on the size,

we do not have any reliable information on the age, sex structure, and fertility

patterns. In order to illustrate the importance of the characteristics of

the stream, let me give an example which is obviously an extreme one, but

which illustrates the importance of knowing the characteristics in addition

to the total number. If all undocumented immigrants to the United States

were males, the effect of that movement on future population growth would

be only as long as that population continued to survive in the United

States (i.e., be a function of size and mortality). That is, as each gener-

ation died out, their impact on U.S. population would also end. If, on

the other hand, all undocumented were young adult women at prime childbearing

ages, and the birth rate of those women were very high, the impact of 800,000

additions to the population of such women would obviously have a much larger

impact on future population growth than 800,000 men. It should be clear

from these two extreme examples that the population impact of undocumented

immigration cannot be directly suggested from knowing only what the size of

the movement is. Even in that case, we have very little information

to go on.

Another concern about immigration and population growth is whether immi-

gration, both legal and undocumented, leads to the introduction of persons

with higher fertility than is true of the native born U.S. population.

The work by Kritz and Gurak on ethnic fertility indicate that in the aggre-

gate, fertility of ethnics is similar to the total population(6). To be

sure, some groups have higher fertility, but some groups also have lower

fertility. Also the fertility of the foreign born as recorded in the 1970

Census was below that of the native born. Such fertility behavior must

continue to be monitored because one obviously cannot assume that patterns








of the past will continue into the future. However, the picture in the

recent past has been that the fertility of foreign born persons apd the fer-

tility of ethnics has little impact on the fertility rates in the United

States.

Before leaving the topic of the demographic concerns surrounding immi-

gration policy, it would be well to point out that population only recently

has been included in the deliberations leading up to the development of

immigration policy. As has been true of many other policy areas in the

United States, the effect on population of immigration policy has not traditionally

been systematically considered and not an important factor in policy delib-

erations or decisions.

On the other hand, it should also be pointed out that the relatively

recent sensitivity to the importance of population and population dynamics

should not blind us to the fact that population concerns are neither the

only nor necessarily the most important concern in developing immigration

policy. That is, it is possible to conceive of a situation in which immigration

policy may lead to population effects which may not be desirable from some

points of view, but which are nevertheless still preferable for other reasons

despite the population impact. It is not difficult to think of various

economic, social or foreign policy considerations which may outweigh a

population concern. Obviously we are talking here about developing very

difficult priorities and decisions that would tax the wisdom of Solomon.


Manpower

The second major area of demographic concern is the effect of immigration

on the labor force. Recent concern has focused on the impacts of undocumented

aliens on the lower skilled sectors. I will take up the topic of undocumented

movement in more detail. However, the concern over undocumented movement








and by extension to legal movement needs to be seen in a dynamic context.

It is difficult for some to fathom that the 1980s and 1990s may bring labor

shortages to the U.S. We need to evaluate the role of immigration in

supplying manpower for current and future needs. However, we should not

assume that we have the data base or the administrative ability to use

immigration as a fine-tuning mechanism to meet short-term labor shortages.

Relegating immigration to the role of stopgap for failures in manpower

planning is probably not only bad immigration policy, it will not work.

Secondly, immigration also brings high-level manpower to the U.S.

The reliance on immigration for our manpower needs and the resentments

and hardships this causes sending countries (brain drain) ought to be re-

examined. The brain drain controversy has continued so long that going

over old ground may not advance policy analysis. However, looking at the

effects of U.S. dependence on immigration for high level manpower on oppor-

tunities for our own population may be instrictive. As a result of the

Health Professions Education Assistance Act of 1976, we can expect a reduction

in physicians admittances for permanent and temporary residence. We will

then be able to gauge the effect of this cut off of supply on the expansion

of medical training in the U.S., on opportunities for women and minorities

as physicians, on the improvement of medical care for all Americans, es-

espcially the poor of our large cities, and on the development of alterna-

tive medical delivery systems whereby the number of physicians per capital

can decline and paramedical services under the "supervision" of a physician

increase. I suggest that an analysis of the immigration sections of the

1976 Health Professions Education Act may shed light on whether cutting off

an alien labor supply opens up opportunities for U.S. citizens, while con-

tinuing the level and quality of U.S. services as well as upgrading

them in foreign countries sending highly trained manpower.









I might also add while on the subject of highly trained manpower,

that, in the absence of exit control in the U.S., we have data gaps concerning

trained/experienced U.S. manpower in the professions and business who leave

the U.S. fore overseas positions. Perhaps the continuous work history file

of the Social Security System can permit some analysis of the movements in

and out of the U.S., duration of stay and so on. To my knowledge, there

is no study of the size and scope of this movement and its broad implications.

Finally, before leaving the question of immigration and manpower, I

want to briefly discuss a suggestion frequently heard linking the two issues.

The suggestion is that immigration volume should be tied to U.S. unemploy-

ment rates. Aside from the mechanics of such adjustments, there is a basic

problem with the proposal. It assumes immigration causes more unemployment.

The logic is that if unemployment is at a certain rate, more immigrants will

only increase the unemployed either by displacing U.S. workers or being

unable to find jobs themselves. The assumption is untested. It is equally

possible that in times of unemployment, immigration should be increased

to stimulate demand. I raise the question to point out the level of

simplicity of our understanding of the determinants and consequences of

international migration and the consequent need of caution in examining

proposals which, at first blush, seem eminently reasonable.



Policy

The 1965 Amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act made major

changes in U.S. policy. The major change was the abolition of the national

origins quota system and Asia Pacific Triangle which restricted visa issuance

on the basis of race and national origin. The bill also introduced a new

preference system based primarily on family relationship and skill level for






- 10 -


issuing visas. It required labor clearances for non-relations seeking immigrant

status. Finally, the new law imposed a ceiling on Western Hemisphere immigration

for the first time.

The 1965 Act provided for a phasing out of the quota system. The full

implementation of the law began in July 1, 1968. During this transition a

Commission on Western Hemisphere Immigration provided for in the law reviewed

provisions and made recommendations which were not acted on by Congress.

The interaction of the various new provisions led to changes in the compo-

sition of the immigrant stream. Some were expected and some unanticipated.

The operation of visa issuance in the Western Hemisphere was a cause of great

concern. In 1976, a further bill was passed which brought the immigration sys-

tems for the Western Hemisphere and the rest of the world into conformity. Thus,

we have two parallel systems for distributing immigrant visas, with preference

systems, requirements for labor certification and so on exactly the same.

The ceilings for visa issuances for each hemisphere are 170,000 for non-Western

Hemisphere and 120,000 for Western Hemisphere. In addition, certain immediate

relatives of citizens are exempt from the ceilings on visa issuance.

Currently, there is widespread agreement in and out of government that

a major review of U.S. immigration policy is necessary. A few items which

need attention are: refuge policy; labor force, manpower development and immi-

gration; development policy and international manpower movement; brain drain;

foreign policy and immigration; evaluation of the 1976 amendments on Western

Hemisphere movement; trade and tax policy and its relation to the movement of

jobs and workers; undocumented immigration; and naturalization law. The list

does not include procedural or administrative matters such as border management,

interagency cooperation or intra-agency coordination for policy (e.g. Labor

Department on manpower policy and immigration or State Department on foreign





- 11 -


policy and immigration.

This listing alone indicates the immense job to be done.

attempts to consider immigration related matters are stalled.


In addition,

The hearings


on the President's porposals on undocumented aliens have been postponed by

the Senate; the hearings on the refugee bill by the House have been postponed

repeatedly at the administration's request. In fact, there is something of

a log jam on immigration matters despite the agreement on the need for changes

on numerous immigration issues. It seems to me that the National Commission

on Immigration proposed in HR 7175 sponsored by Representative Joshua Eilberg

who chairs the Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship and International Law

makes eminent sense. I respectfully suggest that this Select Committee sup-

port the concept of a Commission. I am sure the information on demographic

implications of immigration, needed data, and other issues developed by this

Select Committee would be welcomed by the Subcommittee and a National Commission

as it addresses the complexities of immigration policy, including the population

dimension.



Current Issues

In this section I will briefly review some of the current issues in the

immigration policy area. Each of them touches on population concerns to some

extent. I shall not spend much space trying to spell out those connections but

will merely outline the issue.

Before addressing each issue, I should first point out

policy has traditionally been dealt with as a domestic concern and as basically

isolated from other issues. Recently, however, the intertwining of immigration

with and the implications of immigration policy for other issues have been more

readily accepted as legitimate concerns. The interplay of the population and

immigration is a good example of this development. It is this development and the




- 12 -


realization of the complexities it introduces into policy analysis and develop-

ment in the area of immigration, in addition to the politically charged atmosphere

that usually surrounds discussions of immigration, that is a new development. As

we well know, immigration is an emotional issue touching deeply our images of our-

selves and this country, our interests and our values. Many seem to have deeply

held convictions and opinions about what should be. It is in this atmosphere

that the following issues are being discussed.


Labor

As mentioned, the role of immigration in supplying manpower is a central

concern today. This is most clear in discussions of undocumented movement, to

which I shall turn shortly. In the legal immigration area, however, there is

question as to whether we need or should have occupational preferences (3rd

and 6th preference), We need to examine the effect of value added tariff pro-

grams (like the Border Industrialization Program) on the loss of jobs, the

effect on wages and working conditions, particularly whether undocumented

aliens or other groups who are exploitable are needed to make U.S. based firms

competitive in labor intensive manufacturing (e.g. garments, assembly). Is

there room in our immigration policy to encourage investors to create jobs

in the U.S.?

We need to know, as referred to previously, the demand for workers of various

types in the coming years, the probable supply, the role of immigration cur-

rently in manpower in the U.S. I should point out that our data on occupation

of immigrants is extremely poor due to data collection mechanisms. (7; see

esp. chapter 5).

In short, we need to decide to what extent immigrants should and can be





- 13 -


integrated into manpower training and supply policy and then how to go about

it. Since it is only recently that agreement has been coalescing on the need

at least to be cognizant of the interplay of immigration and labor policy, if

not to integrate them, we are only in the beginning stages of systematic study

and understanding.


Foreign Policy

Immigration is not a substantive issue for U.S. foreign policy. Only

when a particular movement becomes critical (e.g. Mexican undocumented movement)

does it receive recognition. It is not clear why or how a movement comes to

be defined as "critical." Why is Mexican undocumented movement critical and

not undocumented movement from Caribbean basin countries?

The current foreign policy issue gaining current attention is refugee policy.

The major issue is the use of the parole authority of the Attorney General in

Sec.212 (e) (5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. The section, as noted

in legislative history, was neant for emergency entry of individuals or small

groups in case of emergency (e.g. an accident at sea calling for medical attention).

However, the section has been used with the urging and blessing of members of

Congress to admit large numbers of refugees from Hungary, Cuba and Indochina.

The issue revolves around whether such flexibility is desirable or whether

Congress should not delegate such broad authority to the Attorney General. Con-

gressman Eilberg introduced legislation limiting the numbers admissible under

the parole authority of the Attorney General. (The same bill contains the pro-

vision for the National Commission on Immigration referred to previously.)

Hearings have been postponed on the bill at request of the Administration appar-

antly due to disagreement between the Departments of Justice and State over an

Administration position on the issue of flexibility versus numerical limits




- 14 -


set in law and the role of the Attorney General.

Immigration and foreign policy interaction goes much further-than the pro-

cedural issue of Executive discretion in admission of refugees. The international

movement of manpower, like the movement of commodities and capital, is integral

to development policy. Again we are only in the first stages of looking at the

impact of development and trade policies on migration flows and vice versa. We

need to understand the effects on migration (internal and international) on the

institutional supports for high fertility as a rational response in rural and

urban sectors and the population displacement effects of economic development.

It is probably too simplisitc to conceptualize population growth leading to "ex-

cess population" putting pressure on resources leading to migration to release

ihe pressure. Such a model is non-contextual. That is, why does population grow

rapidly, under what circumstances does it become "excess" (i.e., more persons

than jobs in the economy), the role of economic structure (e.g. land use, pat-

terns of investment, development), the micro- and macro-level conditions making

migration an attractive alternative, if only in the short run. Understanding

of these processes may lead to designing development, trade and investment poli-

cies which more successfully address meeting basic needs of people and the needs

of economies and nations to guide and direct their futures with some autonomy.

Obviously, this is a tall order. It is only one more formulation of the problem

of North-South dialogue, restructuring the economic order, etc.

My aim here is to point out that international migration is not just a

safety valve for redistributing excess population from high fertility countries.

Migration may be the result of development "successes." People are only excess

population relative to a given economic structure, which is obviously not always

of their choosing or even of the choosing of the national leaders.





- 15 -


Citizenship

I must briefly discuss the topic of naturalization. Three reasons prompt

this. First, naturalization and citizenship law is contained in the Immigration

and Nationality Act. Two, citizenship (and therefore becoming naturalized)

grants benefits for future immigrants under U.S. law. Finally, we are of two

minds concerning citizenship.

Mr. Justice Black wrote: "the people are sovereign and the Government cannot

sever its relationship to the people by taking away their citizenship" (Afroyim

v. Rusk 387 US 253, 1967. p. 255). In this spirit, the Court has struck down

four of the provisions for revoking citizenship for acts committed after citi-

zenship is granted. The last, Afroyim v. Rusk, striking down revocation for

voting in a foreign election was a 5-4 decision. Thus, it is not clear that the

Court will move in the direction that citizenship is inviolate and once properly

granted by birth or naturalization cannot be involuntarily revoked by the govern-

ment for acts committed before or after citizenship was validily granted in con-

formity to the law. The point at issue here is not whether fraudulently obtained

citizenship is revocable. It is whether the government can pass laws to revoke

citizenship for acts committed after citizenship is granted or, for naturalized

citizens, for acts committed before citizenship was granted and which were not

a bar at the time of the grant.

Secondly, child citizens are not accorded the rights of adults. Certain

benefits, such as a visa preference, are limited to adult U.S. citizens. The

reason for this limitation seems to be to avoid the full implications of citi-

zenship being conferred by birth in the U.S. A U.S. born child of undocumented

alien parents is de facto deported if his parents are deported or leave under

voluntary departure. The interests of that minor U.S. citizen are not looked

after by U.S. sonsuls. In effect, the child may be deprived of citizenship






- 16 -


rights. On the other hand, the U.S. does not want people coming to the country

to have children and then filing immigration petitions on behalf-of the eligible

relatives of the child. Perhaps the answer is to require at least that one

parent be a citizen or even permanent resident alien before a person is granted

citizenship by birth. Thus, birth in the territory alone would not confer citi-

zenship but a consanguinal relationship would also be required.


Undocumented Aliens

The topic of undocumented aliens has received most public attention of all

immigration related issues in recent years. As we know, the issue received

wide attention due in part to claims about large numbers, impact of the labor

market, and use of social services. It has developed that, by the nature of

the case, we know very little about the dimensions of the situation. However,

the question arises about how much detail one must know and with how much cer-

tainty before action should be taken. In fact, discussion of policy proposals

centers on guesses about whether a program will work, or how well or what un-

desirable spin-off it will have.

We do not know how many undocumented aliens enter each year. We do not

know how many remain as more or less permanent additions to the population and

how many are seasonal workers. Even data on "apprehensions" are not all that

certain since those data include repeaters and include persons who were never

in custody. (INS apprehensions data area count of form 1-213, Record of a

Deportable Alien. There is a question whether these field-generated forms

are uniformly filled out in accordance with instructions. See reference 8.)

We do not know how many jobs they fill. We do not know to what extent they

displace workers or fill jobs U.S. workers are not available for. We have

two conflicting paradigms to explain the labor force impact one a supply-





- 17 -


demand approach and the other a dual labor market approach. We have little

data on the workers' desirability due to work habits and dependability, in

addition to their clear exploitability. We do have scattered and not random

data from small samples in various parts of the country of aliens in and not

in INS custody that points to low wages, in dead end jobs. These same samples

point to fairly high participation in tax withholding programs and even, sur-

prisingly, private hospital plans, but little use of income transfer programs.

Health and education program usage seems to be higher in the New York area

samples from the Caribbean (as opposed to the Southwest) since length of stay,

family in the U.S. and sex rations indicate a more mature migrant stream (with

all the links this brings with it). In fact, the consistent finding of low

social welfare usage led the Carter administration to prohibit access to

such benefits by the proposed temporary resident alien category in the Presi-

dent's proposals with the contention that since usage is so low that prohibition

would get rid of a red herring in debates over the temporary "amnesty" granted

the group.

In short, we have scattered data, whose representativeness is not known

since the sampling is not random. We have identified streams from many coun-

tries. In fact, undocumented aliens is such a broad concept with such hetero-

geneous groups included that many statements which attempt to be responsible

descriptions can be both true and false.

At present, the focus of the issue is changing to the future. Whatever

the numbers and current effects, will those permanent additions to the population

produce a second generation who will be Americanized on the one hand, not willing

to stay in low skill, low paying, dead end jobs, joining (even competing with)

minorities for expanded opportunities but on the other hand ill-equipped to com-

pete due to years of neglect and poor training? Must we not stop or curtail





- 18 -


the flow of permanent additions in order to avoid the civil rights problems

of the 1980s and 1990s? At the same time, will blocking access to schools or

other facilities for those already here, even though partially taken as a mea-

sure to discourage future flow, be counter-productive? If carried far enough,

will blocking access to medical facilities (e.g. Medicare supported services

as in Carter proposals) lead to public health problems (e.g. lack of vaccina-

tions lead to German measles exposures)?

Even as we attempt to make policy, how confident can we be that it is

enforcable and effective? A major criticism of employer sanctions proposals

is whether they are enforcable without a national identification card or without

discrimination against some minority group citizens. Even if voluntary compliance

and effective enforcement without discrimination is achieved, will that produce

jobs in significant numbers? Raising wages is not the only alternative in face

of a declining work force. Investment in non-union areas or overseas and going

out of business are alternatives. So is cutting back of minimum wage for younger

people and using them as a new source of low wage labor. My point is that even

if the reasoning behind employer sanctions is correct and such a policy is

successfully put in place, that is no guarantee that jobs will be increased in

the U.S. generally and certainly not regionally. Good ideas can have bad con-

sequences, just as bad ideas can sometimes lead to good results.

I will not go into further detail here. Other testimony will touch on

these matters. Much has already been written and said before Congressional

Committees and elsewhere. The study and debate will go on. There is no single

and final answer obviously. If nothing else, at least claims and suggestions

will be a bit more modestly made.





- 19 -


Trends

Before presenting data on the recent immigrant streams, I present tables

on the estimates of the recent net alien immigration and their affect on popu-

lation growth. In previous testimony (3) Prof. Posten presented

data using the 400,000 figure and the Series III assumptions of the Census

Bureau's projections of population growth.

The estimates by Kraly and me, built on the work of Warren and Peck referred

to, indicate that recent experience (first part of 1970s) was approximately

264,000 net alien immigrants annually rather than 400,000. (See attached Table 1.

Census age-sex distributions for their 1970 and 1975 projection publications are

included for comparative purposes. Tables 2 and 3 present the projection data.)

Prof. Ansley Coale(9)calculated the necessary decline in fertility of native

born women required to have 400,000 immigrants with the age-sex distribution

published in 1970 by the Census Bureau and with foreign born fertility at replace-

ment (i.e. 2.11). Coale calculated that rather than a total fertility rate (TFR)

of 2.11, a TFR of 1.97 would be needed to accommodate current immigration patterns

or a net reproduction rate (NRR) of .934 rather than 1.000 for replacement. Our

estimates, which include a lower level of net alien immigration but an age sex

distribution more conducive to births, would result in a TFR of 2.0 or a NRR of

.948 to accommodate current immigration and still maintain a stationary population.

The current total fertility rate (about 1.83) is below the levels indicated by

Coale and by our work.

Table 4 indicates immigrant admissions in the last 15 years for which

data are published. The data are divided into 5 years prior to the amendments

of the 1965 Act when the provisions of the McCarran-Walker Act were in force;

the three year transition period of 1966-68 (actually 31 months from December

1965 to June 1968); and the years since the full provisions. All data are for

fiscal years.





- 20 -


Recent averages are about 100,000 more than the pre-1965 Act. The

100,000admittances or so over the 290,000 hemispheric ceilings (170,000 Eastern
and 120,000 Western hemispheres) for visa issuance are due to exempt relatives.

(Although the ceilings refer to visa issuances, a rough but not exact equiva-

lance can be expected between visa issuance and admittances for a given year.)

Table 5 shows the age-sex distribtuion for the three periods, except
the final period includes 1969-73 only. The averages would not be greatly

changed by inclusion of the last two years of published data. Note the female

dominance. In recent years, about 88 males are admitted for each 100 females.

Table 6 summarizes labor force data as published by the Immigration

and Naturalization Service. As Tomasi and Keely ( 7 ) point out, these data

are only a rough approximation of labor force activity. Note first that a

slight decline from 46 to 41 percent has occurred in those who report an occu-

pation.

Of those who reported an occupation, there has been a notable increase

in professional workers and a decline in clerical and sales workers. These

changes have been the result of the interaction of the ending of the quota system,

the preference system and labor certification being easily available for high

level manpower but almost unavailable for many white collar jobs (e.g. secretary).

It should also be noted that many of the professional level persons are from

developing countries.

Let me end by urging a thorough review of data needs and practices in

regard to immigration. The review of practices is currently underway and some

preliminary results are available ( 10 ). Also review within INS is under-

way, as you will hear in testimony from representatives of that agency. However,

I doubt whether major resource allocation will be made to data collection in

INS, the de facto source of annual information on the flow and stock (through




- 21 -


the alien address report system) of immigrant and alien data. Unless Congress

identifies particular needs and interests, I doubt the poor data system will be

upgraded.

Finally, I will note for the record that data on the foreign stock

(2nd generation) is to be dropped from the 1980 Census. I have prepared a

memorandum for your staff outlining the problem with the self-identity question

currently planned. The net result is that we will know less about the foreign

stock and probably be treated to a decade of outcries of ethnic undercounts and

invalid comparisons of ethnic educational achievement, median income, occupational

distribution, fertility, etc. I would urge the Select Committee to support at

least replacement of the 2nd generation question (place of birth of respondent's

parents) before giving up that information on adjustment for an untested (in the

technical senses of validity and reliability) question.







Footnotes


1. Commission on Population Growth and the American Future. An interim Report
to the President and the Congress. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1971, 81.

2. Charles B. Keely. "The Estimation of the Immigration Component of Popula-
tion Growth," International Migration Review, 8:3 (Fall 1974), 431-35.

3. Dudley L. Posten, Jr. "Immigration to the United States: Issues, Trends
and Prospects," Testimony before the House Select Committee on Population,
February 8, 1978.

4. Robert Warren and Jennifer Peck. "Emigration from the United States: 1960
to 1970." Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Population Associa-
tion of America, Seattle, Washington, 1975.

5. Charles B. Keely and Ellen P. Kraly. "Recent Net Alien Immigration to the
U.S.: Its Impact on Population Growth and Native Fertility, Demography,
forthcoming.

6. Mary M. Kritz and Douglas T. Gurak. "Foreign Stock Minority and Native
White Fertility Differentials." Paper presented at the Annual Meeting
of the Population Association of America, Seattle, Washington, 1975.

7. S. M. Tomasi and Charles B. Keely. Whom Have We Welcomed? The Adequacy
and Quality of United States Immigration Data for Policy Analysis and
Evaluation. New York, Center for Migration Studies, 1975

8. Charles B. Keely. "Review of Immigration Policy." Paper presented at
Conference on In Defense of the Alien, A Legal Conference Representing
Aliens, Washington, D.C. March 1978.

9. Ansley J. Coale. "Alternative Paths to a Stationary Population" in Charles
F. Westoff and Rebert E. Parke, Jr., (eds.), U.S. Commission on Popula-
tion Growth and the American Future. Demographic and Social Aspects of
Population Growth, Volume 1 of the Commission Research Reports. Washing-
ton, D.C.: GPO., 1972. 591-603

10. Ellen P. Kraly. "U.S. Immigration Statistics: 1950-1975." Paper prepared
for the Roundtable on Immigration Statistics sponsored by the Population
Association of America, Committee on Population Statistics, Subcommittee
on Immigration Statistics, November 17, 1977.








Table 1. Selected Estimates of Recent Annual Net Immigration to
the United States, by Age and Sex.




Age and Sex U.S. Bureau of the Census Revised Estimates
1970 1975 1977


Total, all ages


0-4
5-9
10-14
15-19
20-24
25 -29
30-34
33-39
40-44
45-4 9
50-54
55-59
60-64
65-69
70-74
75+


400 000


33
40
3b
37
49
51
39
S29
23
16
12
10
8
5
3
2


Female, all ages


0-4
5-9
10-14
15-19
20-24
25-29
30-34
35-39
40-44
45-49
50-54
5,-59
60-64
65-69
70-74
75+


600
600
000
500
500
900
200
700
500
300
500
800
100
300
000
4u0


223 300


800
400
500
200
500
400
500
000
900
400
400
200
600
100
900
600


400 000


800
900
400
400
200
300
900
800
500
000
600
500
700
000
500
500


212 600


000
800
100
700
800
600
500
100
800
600
700
600
900
800
300
400


264 355


b22
609
542
160
901
263
551
163
300
785
648
495
839
282
173
632


134 733

14 626
15 964
10 915
16 185
28 494
23 512
10 952
6 664
5 383
4 001
2 670
1 954
741
571
-1 428
-6 471







Table 1


Age and Sex U.S. Bureau ot the Census Revised Estimates
1970 1975 1977


Male, all ages

0-4
5-9
10-14
l1-l1
20-24
&5-29
30-34
35-39
40-44
45-49
50-54
55-59
60-64
65-69
70-74
75+


176 700


16
20
17
17
17
22
17
12
9
6
5
4
3
2
1


187 400


900
200
400
400
000
600
800
100
600
900
100
600
500
200
100
900


00
100
300
700
400
700
400
700
700
400
900
900
800
200
200
100


129 622


996
645
627
97-
407
7,1
599
499
917
784
978
541
098
289
745
161


Source: (5)








Table 2: Projections of the U.S. Population Assuming Selected Estimates
of Annual Net Immigration, U.S. Bureau of the Census Series II
Mortality and Fertility Assumptions: 1975-2050.



Projections of the U.S. Population (in 1000s)
Year U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1975*+ Revised
Series II-X Series II Series IIA Estimates


1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

2005

2010

2015

2020

2025

2030

2035

2040

2045

2050


213

220

229

237

244

250

254

259

264

268

271

271

271

271

271

272


448

386

323

830

726

044

814

936

996

887

071

836

877

701

708

172


213

222

233

244

254

262

270

279

287

294

300

304

308

311

315

319


448

495

793

887

557

815

688

071

522

898

613

929

537

949

571

673


213

221

232

243

252

259

266

274

281

288

293

296

299

301

304

307


448

968

676

123

099

622

719

286

889

394

225

653

369

883

601

793


213

221

232

242

251

258

965

273

280

287

292

295

297

300

302

306


448

797

357

673

528

934

914

367

863

268

002

331

943

351

961

044


*The Series II Projections assume the "most realistic" trends in
fertility which are intermediate to other projected fertility trends.
Series II-X assumes zero net immigration; Series II assumes an annual
level of 400,000 net alien immigration and the age distribution by
sex shown in Table 3; Series IIA assumes the same age distribution
by sex, but the level of net alien immigration is scaled to 300,000.








Table 2: (continued)

+ These total population figures are those resulting from the
replication of U.S. Bureau of the Census projections. Percentage
differences between the displayed population figures and pub-
lished totals for each year are generally less than 0.5%.

Source: (5)






Table 3


Population Growth (millions) and Proportion Due to Immigration Assuming
Selected Estimates of Annual Net Alien Immigration, U.S. Bureau of the
Census Series II Mortality and Fertility Assumptions: 1980-2050.


Year U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1975 Revised
Series II-X Series II Series IIA Estimates
Na Na b Na b Na b


1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
2025
2030
2035
2040
2045
2050


6.9
15.9
24.4
31.3
36.6
41.4
46.5
51.5
55.4
57.6
58.4
58.4
58.3
58.3
58.7


9.0
20.3
31.4
41.1
49.4
57.2
65.6
74.1
81.5
87.2
91.5
95.1
98.5
102.1
106.2


23.3
21.7
22.3
23.8
25.9
27.6
29.1
30.5
32.0
33.9
36.2
38.6
40.8
42.9
44.7


8.5
19.2
29 .7
38.7
46.2
53.3
60.8
68.4
74.9
79.8
83.2
85.9
88.4
91.2
94.3


18.8
17.2
17.8
19.1
20.8
22.3
23.5
24.7
26.0
27.8
29.8
32.0
34.0
36.1
37.8


8.3
18.9
29.2
38.1
45.5
52.5
59.9
67.4
73.8
78.6
81.9
84.5
86.9
89.5
92.6


16.9
15.9
16.4
17.8
19.6
21.1
22.4
23.6
24.9
26.7
28.7
30.9
32.9
34.9
36.6


a Population growth between 1975 (N=213,448)

b Proportion of growth due to immigrants and
1985: 20.3 15.9 4 20.3 = 21.7 percent


and specified year.

their offspring, e.g., Series II for


Source: (5)








Table 4. Total Immigration, 1961-1975 and Selected Periods (000s)


N Average for Period

1961 271
1962 284
1963 306 -1961-65 = 290
1964 292
1965 297

1966 323
1967 362 1966-68 = 380
*1968 454

1969 359
1970 373
1971 370
1972 385 -1969-75 = 381
1973 400
1974 395
1975 386





*Without the peculiar circumstances of large adjustment of status
of Cuba refugees before the imposition of a hemispheric ceiling,
1968 = 355 (or -99 Cuban adjustees). The period average without
Cuban adjustees in 1968 = 347.

Source: U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.: GPO,
1968 and 1975. INS Annual Reports, Table 14.









Table 5: Age-Sex Distribution of Immigrants by Selected Regions for Selected Time Periods*


Total Immigration
1961-65 1966-63 169-73
M F M F M F
0-4 4.8 4.6 4.2 4.1 4.2 4.1

5-9 3.6 3.5 4.3 4.2 4.6 4.5

IC-19 7.0 9.2 8.0 9.3 8.7 9.3

2 2-29 .13.3 19.9 9.8 16.5 12.1 16.6

3:-39 3.2 8.7 8.2 9.2 9.0 8.7

40-49 4.0 4.4 4.4 5.5 4.3 4.6

50-59 2.2 3.0 2.8 3.3 2.2 2.3

5C-69 1.0 1.5 1.5 2.1 1.2 1.S

70-79 .3 .5 .5 .S .4 .6

30+ .1 .1 .1 .2 .1 .1

Total 44.5 55.5 43.8 56.2 46.8 53.3


Source: INS Annual Report, Table 9.






Table 6. Sex Ratios, 1961-75 and Selected Periods


Selected Period

1961-65 = 80


1966-68 = 78


1969-73 = 88


Source: Developed from data in INS Annual Report


1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975


I

+


I






Table 7.


Labor Force Participation and Occupational Distribution:
1961-65, 1966-68, 1969-73, 1974, 1975


Occupation Stated
No Occupation Stated


Distribution of Those with Occupation Stated


Professional
Farmer
Manager
Clerk
Sales
Craftsman
Operative
Household
Service, exc. hshold
Farm workers
Laborer, exc. farm


Source: Developed from data in INS Annual Report


1961-65


45.6
54.4


1966-68

43.0
57.0


1969-73

41.3
58.7


1974

38.3
61.7


1975

38.7
61.3


19.8
1.5
4.7
17.3
3.8
13.3
10.4
7.0
7.3
4.8
10.1


24.6
1.8
4.9
12.0
2.6
13.1
11.8
10.9
8.1
3.2
7.0


28.9
1.2
4.4
8.5
1.7
14.7
12.1
7.3
8.2
3.6
9.5


23.5
.2
6.1
8.7
2.0
13.2
11.9
5.8
12.0
4.6
12.1


25.7
.6
6.7
9.5
2.3
13.8
14.2
4.0
10.4
4.2
8.7




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