WORLD EMPLOYMENT PROGRAMME RESEARCH
International Labour Office, Geneva
WEP 2-26/wp 47
WORLD EMPLOYMENT PROGRAMME RESEARCH
MIGRATION FOR EMPLOYMENT PROJECT
GUEST WORKER EMPLOYMENT, WITH SPECIAL
REFERENCE TO THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF
GERMANY, FRANCE AND SWITZERLAND -
LESSONS FOR THE UNITED STATES?
Note: WEP Working Papers are preliminary documents, circulated
informally in a limited number of copies solely to
stimulate discussion and critical comment. They are
restricted and should not be cited without permission.
International Labour Organisation 1980
The designations of countries employed, which are in
conformity with United Nations practice, and the presentation
of the material in this paper do not imply the expression
of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the International
Labour Office concerning the legal status of any country or
territory or of its authorities, or concerning the de-
limitations of its frontiers.
The responsibility for opinions expressed in WEP Research
Working Papers rests solely with their authors, and their
circulation does not in any way constitute an endorsement
by the International Labour Office of the opinions expressed
TABLE OF CONTENTS
A. PREFACE, by W.R. B'hning ............................. iv
B. GUEST WORKER EMPLOYMENT, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, FRANCE AND SWITZERLAND -
LESSONS FOR THE UNITED STATES? by W.R. B'6hning ....... V
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY ........................... 1
I. SELECTED ASPECTS OF GUEST WORKER POLICIES IN WESTERN
EUROPE ............................................. 3
(a) Federal Republic of Germany .................... 4
(b) France ....................................... 6
(c) Switzerland .................................... 7
II. DETERMINANTS OF CONTEMPORARY LABOR MIGRATION ...... 11
(a) Different schools of thought ................... 12
(b) Demand determination revisited ................. 19
(c) US Demand or supply? Necessary vs. sufficient
factors! ...................................... 21
III. MEASUREMENT AND EXPLANATION OF TEMPORARINESS ....... 22
(a) The extent of temporariness .................... 22
(b) Migrants' intentions ........................... 27
(c) Family migration or reunification .............. 34
(d) Other explanations? ............................ 40
IV. IN LIEU OF CONCLUSIONS ............................. 45
NOTES ................................................ 47
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1: Annual average number of foreign workers
admitted to seasonal employment in France,
1955-78 ................................... 7
Table 2: Stock of foreigners in Switzerland by cate-
gory during selected years ................. 9
Table 3: Number of seasonal work permit holders given
annual permits, 1968-1978 ........1....... 10
Table 4: Proportion of employed foreign workers by
size of firm in different sectors of the
economy of the Federal Republic of Germany,
autumn 1968 ................................ 15
Share of foreign workers in total employment
by size of firm in different sectors of the
economy of France, October 1976 ..............
Coefficients of determination of least square
regressions relating flows and stocks of eco-
nomically active foreigners to demand vari-
ables in the Federal Republic of Germany,
Number of economically active foreigners
admitted to employment in the Federal Republic
of Germany, and percentage leaving the country,
by selected nationalities, 1961-1976 .........
Table 8: Number of economically active foreigners
admitted to employment in Switzerland, and
percentage leaving the country, 1949-1978 ....
Table 9: Originally intended, actual duration and
envisaged future duration of stay of economi-
cally active foreigners of selected nationali-
ties in the Federal Republic of Germany ......
Envisaged future duration of stay of Italians
in Switzerland, by category ..................
Predicting the propensity to return with
migrants' intentions, Federal Republic of
Number of foreigners in the Federal Republic
of Germany and percentage of inactive, by
selected nationalities, 1961-1976 ...........
Number of resident foreigners in France and
percentage of inactive, by selected nationali-
ties, 1962-1976 .................. ..........
Number of resident foreigners in Switzerland
and percentage of inactive, by selected
nationalities, 1968-1978 ...................
Indicators of family migration and reunifi-
cation in the Federal Republic of Germany, by
selected nationalities in 1976 ...............
Predicting the propensity to return by degree
of completed family reunification, Federal
Republic of Germany ..........................
Table 17: Predicting the propensity to return by
personal or socio-economic factors,
Federal Republic of Germany ................. 41
Table 18: Predicting the propensity to return by
economic factors, Federal Republic of Germany 42
Table 19: Predicting the propensity to return with dif-
ferent behavioral assumptions relating to
earnings/income factors, Federal Republic of
Germany ............................EPA...... 43
C. MIGRATION FOR EMPLOYMENT PROJECT: WORKING PAPERS ...... 57
This is the forty-seventh paper appearing in the World Employment
Programme working paper series of the research project on Migration for
Employment. The aim of the project is to investigate the implications
of international migration movements from low-income to high-income
countries for economic and social policy making.
This paper assembles thoughts on the causes and temporariness of
guest worker employment in Western Europe. It was written at the
behest of the University of Maryland, Center for Philosophy and Public
Policy, which formed a working group on "Mexican Migrants and U.S.
Responsibility". I should like to thank the many people too many to
enumerate here who find their research results or discussions reflected
in the pages that follow. The responsibility for the views expressed
rests, of course, entirely with me.
3. GUEST WORKER EMPLOYMENT, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE
TO THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, FRANCE AND
SWITZERLAND LESSONS FOR THE UNITED STATES?
(International Labour Office)
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
The search for elements of a US immigration reform has led
several observers to look to Western European countries as a source
of experience with foreign or migrant workers, commonly referred to
as "guest workers". When the subject is the illegal influx of
Mexicans, the eyes often enviously wander to Western Europe where the
countries apparently control well what has to date proved to be an
uncontrollable phenomenon in the US. Not all observers grasp fully
or correctly the law and practice prevailing in Europe today, partly
because newspapers have highlighted certain extreme features and partly
because the discussion in the US wrongly equates temporary worker
with guest worker policies. Therefore, I shall straight away explain
the difference and elaborate in section I the relevant characteristics
of post-war policies in Western Europe.
If temporary means what it says, i.e. only for a time, the
temporary admission of foreigners stands for limited-time programs
and implies voluntary exit after a time or enforced departure when
the time is up. H-2s in the US or seasonal workers in France and
Switzerland are of this type, although moves to a more permanent
status have been allowed on both sides of the Atlantic. Guests are,
as a rule, invited to stay as long as they wish; they are generally
expected to leave eventually; but, barring misconduct, they are not
forced out. Guest worker employment rather than temporary worker
programs is the hallmark of Western Europe. Although the term is
not official foreign employees or migrant workers are most frequently
used it is very popular, and I will stick to it here in the senee
in which it should be used. A third distinction concerns the practice
of admitting aliens subject to restrictions regarding, for instance,
duration of stay or access to jobs. This, too, is different from
temporary worker programs because restricted admission does not entail
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forced exit. Restrictions are, unfortunately, ubiquitous in the
case of both temporary and guest workers. Most restrictions, fortu-
nately, come to an end sometime. One central but frequently unacknow-
ledged element of the Western European make-up has been what one
might call a progressive adjustment system where restrictions in
matters of economic and social rights are gradually lifted.
Western European policy makers have been plagued by the question
how permanent the influx of foreigners is or how temporary it could
be made to be. This is also the key issue in the current US debate,
especially as regards Mexicans. The main aim of this paper, therefore,
is to examine what happened in Western Europe, and why, with a view
to assessing whether future labor inflows into the US could be managed
so as to fulfil expectations of temporariness should the country opt
for a guest worker policy.1
Such an exercise in prediction can only be valid if the deter-
mining factors are identical or at least similar. I assume one can
credit the non-communist countries North of the Alps and the US with
sufficient similarities as regards their forms of government and
economies. But is one concerned with the same migration phenomenon?
Does one not compare apples with organges if, as has been said, Western
Europe's migration movements are determined by the demand for labor
in the country of employment2 while the US movements are determined
by the supply of labor in the country of origin?3 Section II attempts
to shed some light on this question analytically and by way of simple
regressions. It proceeds to make the all-important distinction between
necessary and sufficient factors; supply pressure falls in the former
category and labor demand in the latter; both factors are operative
on both sides of the Atlantic; our exercise in cross-national policy
learning is therefore valid.
Section III begins by measuring how many of the guest workers
admitted during the prime migration periods have stayed or returned.
In the Federal Republic of Germany the rate of return is about two-
thirds and in Switzerland it is more than four-fifths. There are
intriguing differences among the major nationalities. In Germany,
about 9 out of 10 Italian, 8 out of 10 Spanish, 7 out of 10 Greek,
5 out of 10 Yugoslav and 3 out of 10 Turkish workers returned.
These differences call for an explanation. First, migrants'
intentions are reviewed. In Western Europe, fewer workers were either
short-term return-oriented or target workers and more were either
permanent emigrants or undecided than was generally believed. Many
changed their mind. Intentions, which in any case require sophisticated
methods to typify, do not predict reliably whether a nationality
tends to return. The second predictor examined, family migration and
family reunification, does not turn out to be very helpful either.
Nor do a host of personal, social, economic and behavioral determi-
nants that are analysed through ranked data. None of the factors at
which policies might aim, such as skills or rural origin, fulfil the
expectations that have generally been placed in them. The level of
GNP per capital is perhaps an exception; it corresponds to the nationality
differentials; it is plausible in that low incomes re-attract less
than high incomes; but this finding has limited utility for policy
making when there is not much choice about whose migrants to admit.
However, the analysis clearly reveals that certain nationalities have
a high, others have a low propensity to return. Irrespective of which
group the Mexicans fall into, the theoretically conceivable manipu-
lation of intentions, family reunification or selection criteria would
probably change the secular tendency very little and is unlikely to
be worth the political and administrative effort.
In the concluding section I briefly touch upon the question
whether the US should institute a proper temporary worker program or
whether it should restrict the rights of workers admitted for the
purpose of non-temporary work.
I. SELECTED ASPECTS OF GUEST WORKER POLICIES IN WESTERN EUROPE
A short paper obviously cannot go intq the details of the social,
economic, political and other dimensions of guest worker policies.
Only characteristics that have a bearing on the question of temporari-
ness will be dealt with.
A selection of countries will have to be made.4 Some are too
small (Liechtenstein, Luxembourg) or too little documented (Austria,
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Denmark, Norway), others are too heterogenous (the Netherlands,
the UK) or have too short and checkered a history of labor immigration
(Belgium, Sweden and, once more, the UK) to be suited to the analysis
aimed at here. This leaves the Federal Republic of Germany, France
and Switzerland, the three countries which have regularly absorbed
the great majority of foreign workers in Western Europe. Sometimes
contrasted, they are in effect fairly similar in their orientation
towards migrants and are as nearly representative of Western Europe's
experience in this field as a selection of countries can be. For
example, the progressive adjustment system mentioned earlier that
enables in some cases even entitles guest workers to enjoy
unrestricted economic rights and/or permanent resident alien status,
fixes the qualifying periods for free choice of employment at 5-10
years in Switzerland (depending on nationality), 5 years in Germany
and 4 in France. This compares with, e.g., 8 years in Austria, 4 in
the UK, 3 in Belgium and the Netherlands, and 1 year in Sweden.
It should also be mentioned that the bulk of the Western European
population is authorized to move and work freely in Member States of
the European Economic Community (EEC)5 and the Common Nordic Labour
When I now come to analyse the three countries selected, it would
be rather tedious to examine each aspect for each country. I will,
instead, exemplify salient points for the country best suited.
(a) Federal Republic of Germany
Successive Federal Governments have only themselves to blame
for the reputation they have earned for the treatment of Gastarbeiter.
Although they never officially implemented a temporary or rotation
policy vis-2a-vis the major migrant-sending countries, they received
the people who were actively recruited by proclaiming publicly, stri-
dently and repeatedly DeutscBlaad ist kein Einwanderungsland (Germany
is not a country of immigration); and they tolerated, even fostered,
a climate of legal and material insecurity that has made many a guest
feel most unwelcome. One or two L*Ander Government flew "trial balloons"
in the early seventies but the Federal Government did not accept admini-
stratively enforced departure or even financial inducement to return.
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It proclaimed in one of its basic policy statements, "The limitation
of the duration of stay of foreign employees will not be effected
through (police) measures under the law relating to foreigners."9
One telling statistic may elucidate realities. During the high
unemployment years, 1974-78, foreign workers submitted 6,370,000
requests for issue of a new or renewal of a given work permit (exclu-
ding EEC citizens). 152,000 or 2.4 per cent were refused.10 A one-
time refusal, of course, did not preclude a later successful request.
Many will have signed on to the unemployment register. Others who
felt discouraged may have left for home or for a third country. At
any rate, being without gainful employment did not force departure.
On the other hand, the proclamation of a public policy does not
ipso facto mean that every subaltern official in the country dutifully
implements it without regard to personal prejudices or preferences
(which can cut either way: in favour of or against an individual
foreigner). Besides anecdotal evidence there are several court
cases which revealed that a few lower labor exchange officials or
sections of the police were more than keen to expedite the return of
foreigners. Illegal entrants were in any case usually deported when
caught; and foreigners considered a threat to the political order were
also given short shrift.
Policy makers assumed that the volume of guest worker employment
could be regulated by the interplay of market forces and the migrants'
short-run return orientation. Operatively, this policy was given
effect through strict control of entry of non-EEC citizens, i.e. the
market forces were brought to bear upon the numbers entering (with
active recruitment being discontinued since November 1973). The
market forces were expected to act indirectly upon the number of
foreign workers present through the intention of temporary expatriation
attributed to the migrants. It was taken for granted that rationally
calculating workers would decide to go home when the economy ran out
Official attitude can thus be summed up as follows. "Given past
experience, the Federal Government continues to proceed from the assump-
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tion that the overwhelming number of foreign employees will not stay
permanently in the Federal Republic."11 Politicians and officials
have always refused to be drawn to state with any precision what rate
of settlement they expected in the 1950s or early sixties, when the
large-scale recruitment of foreigners began, or what rate they might
find comfortable today. I have reason to believe that in the begin-
ning it was no more than 10 per cent of the numbers admitted to employ-
ment. At any rate, to state a definite rate or number potentially
entails repatriating the excess and would therefore be extremely unwise
politically if prior public declarations rule out the forced exit of
France has been able to project a welcoming and non-restrictive
image of her migrant worker situation so as to differentiate it from
her neighbours to the East. Yet, beneath the thin veneer of a population-
orientated policy that throughout the post-war period was always some-
thing of a myth, there was the harsh reality of work and residence
permits, police checks, strikes, and some very ugly racial confrontations
(the latter did not occur in France's Eastern neighbours!). Entry
control has been tightened in stages since 1968; previously the majority
of the people receiving annual permits had entered as illegals (techni-
cally speaking, in that they circumvented the cumbersome official re-
cruitment machinery) and were subsequently regularized. The share of
regularizations in total admission dropped to 39 per cent in 1971 and
27 per cent in 1972, while 11 per cent and 23 per cent, respectively,
of the requests for regularization were denied.12 Large-scale
recruitment was discontinued in summer 1974 and admissions are now
down to exceptional cases, dependents who have joined breadwinners or
who have grown up in France, EEC citizens, as well as seasonal workers.
The inflow of seasonals has, in fact, remained fairly stable during
the last twenty years (see Table 1). With very few exceptions, France's
seasonal migrants work in agriculture.
If one disregards seasonals, it would be true to say that France
pursued a guest worker policy as opposed to either a temporary worker
program or a traditional immigration policy. In the face of growing
unemployment, the French Government recently attempted to change
- 7 -
Table 1: Annual average number of foreign workers admitted to
seasonal employment in France, 1955-78 (in thousands)
1955-59 1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79
No. 53.8 104.8 124.6 138.0 120.0
Source: Revue des Affaires Sociales, Vol. 32 (April-June 1978);
Ministbre-du Travaily 'Elements statistiques sur 1' immigration
en France.en-l979 7(ards: mai 1980)1v ,
policies. In mid-1979 it proposed that work and residence permits be
withdrawn from foreigners who were unemployed for more than six months;
that the period required to qualify as permanent resident alien be
raised to twenty years; and that the number of foreigners in the coun-
try be reduced by 200,000 each year.13 There was an immediate outcry
in national and international fora, and it appears as though the Govern-
ment plans have quietly been shelved.
The circumvention of the official recruitment procedures by the
employers' direct hiring of entrants and their later regularization
has been a peculiar feature of France's post-war history. Leading
politicians have not been adverse to rationalizing it. As M. Jeanneney,
the Minister of Labor, said: "L'immigration clandestine n'est pas
inutile car si 1'on s'en tenait h application strict des rbglements
et accords internationaux, nous manquerions peut-@tre de main-d'oeuvre."14
Illegal immigration in the full sense of the word happens in
Western Europe, too. Outside the UK (where numbers are probably very
small but public opinion jumps on each individual case as though it
were the tip of an iceberg), the most widely accepted figure puts
illegals at one-tenth of all foreigners legally present in Western
Europe. The public is not exercised by the scale of the problem.
Civil penalties for employers of illegals are now much harsher than
they used to be and imprisonment is included in the range of sanctions.15
Amnesties in Belgium, the Netherlands and the UK have drawn fewer
illegals out of hiding than commonly expected.16
To be given leave to enter Switzerland as a worker presupposes,
as elsewhere, that nationals are not available to fill the vacancies.
- 8 -
This has not been difficult to demonstrate given the virtual absence
even of frictional unemployment.17 In the early fifties the economic
boom was viewed as a passing phenomenon soon to be followed by a de-
pression on the lines of the inter-war period. Foreigners were, there-
fore, not encouraged to settle. When boom followed boom with but the
slightest interruption, popular misgivings emerged about the burgeoning
foreign population along with economic fears about dependence on foreign
workers and the labor intensity that appeared to be associated with
them. Beginning in 1963 the Federal Council decreed limits on the
numbers of both workers and dependents. Successive policies tried
rather unsuccessfully to set ceilings on the number of foreigners in
enterprises or sectors. Reduction was the order of the day during the
early seventies when several referenda were pending. (They were eventu-
ally defeated with the support of Government, employers' and'workers'
organizations). Today, stabilization of the reduced numbers is the
leitmotif (along with assimilation of long-term stayets). It is achieved
-in the main by fixing quotas for the inflow of annual permit-holders.- In
other words, the stock (the numbers present) is held constant by manipu-
lation of the inflow (the numbers admitted from abroad).
The post-war period witnessed a gradual easing of the restrictions
placed upon new entrants; this process was general throughout Western
Europe. Switzerland's restrictions were perhaps more draconian than other
countries'. For instance, the Italians who represented some 90 per cent
of the new entrants in the early fifties and still comprise 50 per cent
of today's stock were restricted to one canton and bound to an
employer or an occupation or both for at least five years. They
required ten years of continuous employment to qualify as resident
foreigners to be on a par with Swiss nationals in matters of economic
and social rights. Family migration was not foreseen. Annual permit
holders could apply for family reunification only after ten years'
residence. Seasonal permit holders had no such rights. Today, annual
permit holders can change cantons, employers and occupation after one
year's employment and family reunification is possible after one year,
too. Adjustment to resident alien status still presupposes ten years
(five in the case of Austrians, French and Germans), and naturalization
twelve years. Seasonal workers who have accumulated thirty-six months
of employment during four consecutive seasons can have their status
changed to that of an annual permit without restrictions regarding
choice of canton, employer or occupation; and they can now also
request family reunification when they obtain an annual work permit.
There are five basic categories of foreigners in Switzerland
(see Table 2). Annual permit holders are a dying breed as more and
more of them are entitled to the status of residents while fewer and
Table 2: Stock of foreigners in Switzerland by category during
selected years (numbers in thousands)
Residence Annual Seasonal Frontier Inter- Sum
permit 1 permit 1 work workers2 national
holders holders permit 2 officials
holders and depen-
total act. total act. act. act. total act. total act.
1950 159.0 83.0 126.04 92.04 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 285.0 175.0
1960 137.6 71.0 358.1 266.0 139.5 34.9 10.0 3.3 680.1 514.7
1970 365.8 182.9 617.1 410.3 154.7 74.1 20.0 6.6 1,231.7 828.6
1979 672.9 361.6 211.0 129.1 96.2 91.9 30.0e 10.0 1,102.0 688.8
n.a. = not available e = estimate
End of year figures.
End of August figures.
One-third of the group of international officials and their
dependents is assumed to be economically active.
Including international officials and their dependents.
Sources: Bericht des Bundesrates an die Bundesversammlung 'ber das
Volksbegehren gegen die lberfremdung, Drucksache No. 9715
vom 29 Juni 1967 (Bern); SOPEMI, Rapport annual de la Suisse
1977 (Bern: mimeographed, June 1978); and La Vie Economique,
Vol. 53, No. 3 (mars 1980).
fewer are admitted. For instance, the numbers in this category amounted
to 137,700 in 1960, 70,400 in 1970 and 26,800 in 1979. The inflow properly
speaking was 9 per cent smaller in 1970 and 14 per cent in 1979, because
the over-all figures include the seasonal permit holders whose status
has been adjusted to that of an annual permit holder (see also Table 3
- 10 -
Seasonal workers have been a bone of contention, especially
between Swiss and Italian authorities and particularly because it
was known that a number of employers had foreigners registered as
seasonals when in fact they were engaged in permanent positions but
were sent home once a year for an extended holiday (faux saisonniers),
a practice now clamped down upon by the Swiss Government. Seasonal
workers are employed chiefly in construction or hotel and catering. They
have long been allowed to adjust their status to annual permit holders,
even before the recent legislation eased the conditions of change-over
(see Table 3). The statistics gain added weight when it is realized
Table 3: Number of seasonal work permit holders given annual
permits, 1968-1978 (in thousands)
1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
3.5 7.7 6.0 8.3 11.9 11.6 9.6 7.9 9.2 5.8 4.1 3.7
Source: Letter of Eidgen'6ssische Konsultativkommission fUr das
Ausl'nderproblem dated 20 November 1979; and La Vie Economique,
Vol. 53, No. 3 (mars 1980).
that the average annual proportion of seasonals who has never before
worked in Switzerland amounts to about one-third.18 Some make the
journey only once, others come back each year and still others see
their seasonal permit as a springboard to better employment in the host
country. In France it has not actually been possible de jure to change
from seasonal to a better status but exceptions were made de facto.
(The Federal Republic of Germany and other Western European countries
do not grant seasonal permits.)
Seasonal employment is by definition of limited duration. Seasonal
workers seem to have accepted their unenviable lot. Similarly, annual
work permit holders who found themselves without a job and a permit to
stay also returned home quite regularly and apparently quite naturally,
unless they decided to claim local unemployment benefits which, in
Switzerland, was rarely the case. It was not much trouble for, say,
an Italian whose home country was within a short driving distance to pack
up his belongings and wait for next year's beckoning call from the employer.
- 11 -
To most people living in the triangle bounded by the Scandinavian
countries in the North, Portugal in the Southwest and Greece in the
Southeast, the expiration of one's permit signifies that one should go
home of one's own volition. To challenge government authority in the
form of a foreign bureaucracy, let alone a policy apparatus, hardly
comes naturally to inhabitants of this triangle. But habits are
changing. Besides, it requires information, communication, financial
and human resources all matters which are now more amply available than
formerly. I mention this because, contrary to the innuendos or inferences
in many publications, the considerable return flow of Mediterranean
workers from countries North of the Alps is seldom the result of
administrative enforcement in the true sense of the word.19 To shore
up this contention from the other side, as it were, one can point to
Swiss statistics which show that residence permit holders, i.e. foreigners
whose exit cannot be forced, form an important part of the return flow.
During the six years 1974-79 there were 189,500 (including 95,100 active)
cases of return_ anlthbawd?
from among the annual permit holders.
Western European countries may not deserve much praise in immigration
matters but they are certainly not the black sheep they are often made
out to be.
II. DETERMINANTS OF CONTEMPORARY LABOR MIGRATION
The degree of settlement that might be associated with a future
US guest-worker-type policy can in principle be predicted on the basis
of Western Europe's experience provided, firstly, there are sufficient
structural similarities between the polities and economies on both sides
of the Atlantic and, secondly, their labor inflows are determined by
the same factors. The first assumption is generally accepted with
reference to democratic, pluralistic forms of government and high-income
market economies butressed by advanced technology, a broadly based
industry and a wide network of trade relations. The second assumption
is contentious. I maintain that the politically sanctioned demand for
labor: in the immigration countries is the key to explaining contemporary
international migration movements; prominent American authors have
said that it is the supply of labor- in the emigration countries.22
- 12 -
This controversy cannot be resolved in the course of a short
paper. One can merely explore the ground to see whether there is a
reasonably firm basis for cross-national policy learning. To start
with, different schools of thought are critically reviewed. There-
after, I will briefly present my own views and exemplify them empirically.
I will mostly have to rely on data from the Federal Republic of Germany
because other statistics are either plainly unavailable or insufficiently
valid to underpin the analysis. Finally, I will examine comparable
research undertaken in the US.
(a) Different schools of thought
Marxist authors23 have deterministically attributed a peculiar
hunger for "cheap" foreign labour to "early" as well as "late" capitalism.
Although Marxists have been diligent unravellers of the intricacies
of employers' attempts to keep down labor costs as well as being in
the forefront of migrant workers' struggles for equality of opportunity
and treatment their causal explanations are unconvincing for several
First, they cannot explain the characteristic differences between
countries (say, between Canada, France and Japan).
Second, they cannot explain the differences within countries as
regards (a) differential recourse to migrants by different types of
employers or industries, (b) different statuses for one nationality in
the same country of employment, or (c) different treatment of various
Third, they cannot explain a host of other kinds of international
labor movements, such as those between South American countries or the
movements between the socialist countries of Eastern Europe or the truly
temporary migration system instituted between a developing North African
country, Algeria, and the technologically advanced German Democratic
Regardless of the political merits of the Marxist analyses, their
broad causal interpretations lack validity.
Two sectoral explanations have been offered. Lutz's influential
model25 sees selective opening of the borders as a way of postponing wage
- 13 -
adjustments in an inflation-prone environment. Sector I contains
industries with high productivity growth and wages, sector II low
productivity and wages. Today's labor force, being increasingly
educated, aspires to sector I jobs. Scarcities occur in sector II
which, in Lutz's view, are
"ultimately a wage (or price) question. The scarcity
implies one or both of two things. Either the general
wage level is lower than the country can afford while
providing full employment for its domestic labour force.
Or the structure of relative wage rates as between dif-
ferent industries and occupations is 'wrong'. I shall
argue that the primary reason for the recent large-scale
importation of foreign labour by the European countries
concerned is that relative wages have been out of line
with conditions on the supply side of the domestic labour
Valid and invalid points are mixed in Lutz's two-sector model.
Among the invalid ones I would mention: First, the supply-determined
engagement of nationals in sector I as though it was not the general
demand for labor that enabled them to find jobs there.
Second, the fact that wage differentials within each sector
(industry or occupation) tend to be larger than between them as
though intrasectoral differentials would not have the effects
ascribed to intersectoral differentials.
Third, the mechanical view of "just" or "wrong" wage levels -
as though the real world corresponded to the atomizing, homogenizing
and conflict-free world of neoclassical assumptions where rational
economic man disregards all but pecuniary rewards or accepts
disutilities after a suitable top up of his pay.
Fourth, the related supposition that national labor was not really
numerically short but merely failed to come forward as though people
have an obligation to work and, given a little incentive, should work
whether they want to or need to or not.
Portes has offered a somewhat different two-sector model. His
key line of reasoning is also worth reporting at length because it
contains a number of basic and valid observations:
"Other things being equal, the rate of return to capital
is inversely related to the costs of labor ... Advanced
capitalist societies tend to be characterized by scarcity of
- 14 -
labor either in the absolute sense of exhaustion of the
domestic labor supply or in the relative one of exhaustion of
labor willing to work for low wages ... Smaller industrial
and service firms cannot readily pass on their labor costs. In
addition, many continue to be labor intensive since there is no
available technology to increase labor productivity or it is
beyond their means. In this situation, the only available
alternative is to seek a reduction of the share of the product
going to labor as wages. The search for new sources of low-cost
labor takes two major forms: 1) exporting the production process
to where such labor sources are found; and 2) importing low-cost
labor to replace or supplement the domestic work force ... There
are a number of firms which, by their very nature, cannot easily
export themselves abroad. Agricultural enterprises are the most
obvious and best publicised examples, although certainly not the
only ones. A wide variety of urban services cannot be 'produced'
except in place and, hence, require a readily available supply
of low-cost labour."29
Portes's explanation has two basic shortcomings:
First, in relation to the United States, where illegals seem to
cluster in the secondary labor market among small-scale employers,30
it is clear that only a relatively small portion of the said employers
actually hires illegals.
Second, in relation to Western Europe, foreign workers are more
often than not employed by the larger firms (see Tables 4 and 5).
Portes's reasoning might appear to stand up to verification in the
agricultural sector. However, the nature of family enterprises pre-
determines average firm size. And agriculture is with the exception
of France and Switzerland the least important employer of foreigners.
For instance, in the Federal Republic of Germany it accounts for merely
1 per cent of all guest workers. As regards the commercial and private
service sector, Portes's contentions would be supported by the German
but not by the French data. At any rate, in the Federal Republic it
is manufacturing which employs most foreigners (61 per cent in 1968 and
59 per cent according to the most recent data of June 1979). In the
case of France it is manufacturing and construction (47 per cent and
33 per cent, respectively, in 1976). On balance, therefore, Portes's
arguments fail the empirical test.
Two macro-sociological attempts to explain contemporary inter-
national migration may be noted in passing. Richmond and Verba have
- 15 -
Table 4: Proportion of employed foreign workers by size of firm in
different sectors of the economy of the Federal Republic
of Germany, autumn 1968
Size of firm (= total no. of employees)
500 and over
Mines and 1
men women men women men women men
= Magnitude not zero but sample survey results too small to yield
Including energy sector.
Sources: Bundesanstalt fUr Arbeit, Ausl'ndische Arbeitnehmer: Besch'Afti-
gung. Anwerbung. Vermittlung Erfahrungsbericht 1969, Beilage
zu Nr. 8 der Amtlichen Nachrichten vom 28 August 1970, p. 79.
constructed a global systems model where economic determinants are
combined with political and administrative controls. Migration is one
of the ways in which people and societies adapt to changing condiditions,
among them the continuing high requirement of geographic and labor
mobility in industrial and post-industrial societies. In essence,
migration is supply determined. The model is seductive but, at least
in its present form, unverifiable on account of its generality and
Hoffmann-Nowotny's theory of structural and anomic "tensions"32
can only be labelled as such but would take a paper of its own to summarize.
The specification of the factors that give rise to international labor
- 16 -
Table 5: Share of foreign workers in total employment by size of
firm in different sectors of the economy of France, October 1976
Size of firm (= total no. of employees)
10-49 50-199 200-499 500 and Average
Mines and quarries 12 11 7 7 9
Manufacturing 9 10 9 12 10
Construction 19 27 33 41 27
Commerce 5 6 5 7 6
Transport 4 6 10 5 5
Private services 4 )8 7 4 5
Grand total 8 11 11 12 11
1 Excluding firms with less than 10 employees, agriculture, public
administration, public services and domestic services.
Source: Ministere du Travail et de la Participation, Resultats de
1'enqutte sur la main-d'oeuvre 6trangere effectuee en Octobre
1976 (Paris: juillet 1979), Table 2.
movements is, in my view, forced and arbitrary. One must acknowledge,
nevertheless, the explanatory power of the Unterschichtung concept
(sub-class formation) which forms an important element of Hoffmann-
Nowotny's thinking and which he has tested in Switzerland.
The latest line of advance is associated with the secondary labor
market model and Piore's name. I shall follow through Piore's re-
jection of other schools of thought before coming to his own secondary
labor market concept. I have tested some of his contentions with
ordinary least square regressions using absolute numbers of foreign
workers, vacancies, unemployed, etc., from the Federal Republic of
Germany over the period 1961-76. Logarithmic transformations have not
been performed so as not to complicate unnecessarily the basically
straightforward lines of reasoning. Relevant coefficients of determi-
nation have been assembled in Table 6. When tests are subsequently
designated as "correct" or "incorrect" it means that the regression
results shown in Table 6 support or contradict his arguments.
Piore starts by saying that migration cannot be explained as a
response to general labor shortages that eventually feed through to
Table 6: Coefficients of determination of least square regressions
relating flows and stocks of economically active foreigners
to demand variables in the Federal Republic of Germany,
Vacancies Unemployed Workseekers
Stock4 Change Regi- Stock4 Change Regi- Stock4 Regi-
Active in stra-3 in 5 stra- stra-3
foreigners stock tions stock tions tions
Inflow2 0.96* n.a. 0.44* 0.66* n.a. 0.90* 0.64* 0.65*
inflow5 (0.11) 0.96* 0.09 (0.04) 0.52* (0.06) (0.02) (0.00)
Stock6 (0.02) n.a. (0.47)* (0.14) n.a. (0.03) (0.18) (0.32)**
stock5 0.16 0.52* 0.49* 0.12 0.65* 0.18 0.15 0.35**
Outflow7 (0.10) n.a. (0.01) (0.29)** n.a. (0.20) (0.29)** (0.07)
n.a. = not available or analytically spurious link.
= coefficient of determination significant at 1 per cent level.
** = coefficient of determination significant at 5 per cent level.
Bracketed figures indicate that the regression coefficient has the
Including frontier workers.
Annual sum of foreigners granted leave to enter for the purpose of
employment (16 observations).
Annual sum of vacancies, etc., notified to labor exchanges (16
Annual average of monthly data (16 observations). Stock in the
case of vacancies means vacancies remaining unfilled at end of month. In
the case of unemployed and workseekers they similarly represent those
"remaining on the books". Unregistered unemployed etc. are disregarded.
5 Year to year changes (15 observations which include a half-year
lag where related to stock data).
End of year data, including unemployed since 1969.
Adjusted for deaths, naturalizations and unregistered unemployed.
For method of calculation see Table 7 below (where frontier workers are
Workseekers comprise registered unemployed plus employed wage and
salary earners who register to seek new jobs.
Sources: Amtliche Nachrichten der Bundesanstalt fur Arbeit (various); own
- 18 -
bottom rung jobs, because a contrario the labor demand model (i)
cannot explain why there are X rather than Y numbers of foreign workers,
and (ii) it cannot explain why market or administrative forces do not
achieve a lasting reduction in foreign worker employment. As the determi-
nation of the inflow is not specified in Piore's demand concept, one can
only test his a contrario arguments relating to stocks and return. On
the first of these, the coefficients of determination prove Piore correct
(see row relating to "stock" in Table 6). On the second, the results
are a little mixed but Piore is by and large correct (rows relating to
"change in stock" and "outflow"). Demand variables predict badly or
not at all the size of the foreign workforce, changes in it or return
Next Piore elucidates the bottom-rung or dead-end jobs concept.
Verification of this model runs the risk of becoming circular: because
certain jobs are bottom-rung/dead-end, it is migrants who are employed
in them, therefore they are bottom-rung/dead-end jobs ... Regressions
do not help here. It is obvious visually and verifyable statistically
that foreign workers in Western Europe are over-represented in unskilled
1-w.!Ftatus jobs with lousy working conditions.
Finally, in his dual labor market hypothesis Piore posits the
uncertainty and variability of demand for labor as the "underlying
explanation of the adverse job characteristics"38 and job security
arrangements for nationals, especially skilled workers, as the impetus
of the employers' search for foreigners to satisfy additional, variable
demand for labor. Although Piore's reasoning is full of stimulating
insights, I am certain that few, let alone many or most, labor markets in
Western Europe can be characterized in this way. Inherent in Piore's
theory is a bimodal distribution of jobs which one has great difficulty
in discovering in reality. One reason is that, where industry-wide rather
than craftsman-type trade unions are prevalent (as in many parts of Europe),
job security is an industrial rather than a hierarchical matter in col-
lective bargaining. Moreover, beginning in the late sixties and gathering
momentum in the seventies, there were moves on the side of workers'
organizations to assure disproportionate gains in wages and working con-
ditions for low-skilled workers. In other words, the wage and salary
earners at the bottom were deliberately favoured by Piore's primary
labor force! Furthermore, Western Europe's foreign workers have become
- 19 -
passive as well as active members of trade unions in large numbers.40
The fact that they nevertheless suffer disproportionately from
unemployment is due primarily to the differential incidence of lay-
offs by sector, marital status, age or seniority, and lack of knowledge
of the local language.. Skill differentials also play a role, but this
does not, as such, signify the existence of secondary labor markets.
(b) Demand determination revisited
International labor migration is determined, in my view,41 as
follows. In a world of nation states there are borders over which non-
belongers may not step without explicit or tacit consent. Whether or not,
and if so by how much, the borders open to economically active foreigners
depends on how the nation's influential members and groups seek to satisfy
the wants and promote the welfare of nationals and, in doing so, command
non-utilized or under-utilized capital. If such capital articulates a
demand for labor that cannot be satisfied sufficiently quickly (because
there is a physical shortage of nationals in the sense that there are
not enough people or a relative shortage in the sense that not enough
unemployed or inactive can be attracted to the jobs), and if the political
power structure sanctions it, borders will be opened to foreigners fit to
work. Otherwise, labor will not be admitted for the purpose of employment.
Demand, then, is caused economically, screened politically and given
effect to administratively. Of course, it is necessary that there be
candidates for migration. As a rule, their supply is infinitely elastic
whereas demand is limited. The relative attractions of the area in which
the demand arises and the area in which the supply originates are condi-
tioning factors but not the cause of labor movements.
One way of clarifying the arguments is to compare refugees with
economic migrants. Refugees are persons who leave their country for
another because of a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of
race, religion, nationality, political association or social grouping.
Their flows are supply determined. No country in this world articulates
a demand for refugees, although many accept them. In contrast, a range
of countries wish to admit certain categories or numbers of active
foreigners, both of which can be highly variable; in others, politics
and administration produce illegals. Recruitment, border or residence
control matches candidates with aims. The volume and socio-economic
- 20 -
characteristics of the resulting migration are demand determined in the
sense outlined here. The nationality composition may well be influenced
by the interplay of distance (cost) and differential "push" factors (of
an economic or political kind), or by the comparative attractions
of home and immigration country; but that is another question.
The presence or absence of economic demand can be checked with the
help of the regressions already presented in Table 6 (above p. 17).
Given a guest-worker-type policy, i.e. a policy that operates on the inflow
rather than the stock of migrant workers, one must hypothesize that the
demand for labor determines (i) the numbers admitted during any period
and (ii) the change in numbers admitted between periods. Both contentions
are proved correct, at least when demand is expressed in the form of
vacancies.42 Ninety-six out of 100 annual admissions in the Federal Republic
of Germany were due to variations in unfilled vacancies; and 96 ner cent
of the differences in numbers admitted from one year to another were
accounted for by the changes in the annual number of unfilled vacancies.
This leaves no room for supply factors!43
The lack of specification of the political framework in Piore's
work is responsible for his mis-specification of the demand model.
If policies link demand for labor with numbers coming in rather than with
numbers present or numbers returning, one should not in the first instance
expect any correlation between the stock or outflow of foreign workers
on the one side and demand variables on the other. Properly specified,
demand determination relates to the inflow, which it explains satisfactorily
both analytically and empirically.44
When the inflow of foreign labor is demand determined, resources
that were waiting to be used will be brought into productive use and
value added will be created, internal and external demand will be generated
and the whole will turn into a self-feeding process where a portion of
the additional labor will come to form an increment to the national
labor force with structural rather than conjunctural characteristics.
Recessions will not necessarily cut down jobs in the same numbers or
sectors or occupations as were previously offered to foreigners; and
voluntary return movements in excess of needs will call for new immigration.
The flaw in the Western European guest worker concept was the apparent
belief that a migrant worker comes, performs a job, and goods or services
- 21 -
are supplied as though this were a discrete and finite event at the end
of which the guest would have worked himself out of a job. It is small
wonder, therefore, that the stock and outflow figures correlate badly
with the ups and downs of demand for labor.
(c) US Demand or supply? Necessary vs. sufficient factors!
In theory, the US should fit the framework I have developed
about demand determination, irrespective of whether one is concerned with
illegal or other labor inflows. Two pieces of comparable empirical re-
search appear to suggest otherwise.
Frisbie48 and Jenkins ran a variety of regressions chiefly on the
basis of INS apprehension data as a proxy for inflows. Frisbie con-
cluded that Mexican supply factors have greater explanatory power than US
demand factors. Jenkins's regression coefficients relating to US employ-
ment and unemployment had, inter alia, the "wrong" sign, which he took as
a refutation of the demand model.
In actual fact, INS apprehension figures are not by any means a
true approximation of the labor inflow, not even of the Mexican inflow.
It is widely accepted that enforcement efforts are inversely related to
the state of the labor market or that INS officers turn a blind eye to
certain situations of illegal employment. INS Commissioner Castillo
confirmed officially, as it were that his staff responds even to the
sectoral or regional incidence of unemployment. Generally speaking,
in good times when US employment goes up, INS apprehensions take on a
routine or lenient character; in bad times when unemployment goes up,
apprehension efforts are intensified and the numbers caught go up, too.
The "wrong" signs of Jenkins's coefficients confirm this reasoning!
The size of his coefficients indicate that the good times/bad times
relationship is weak, which is not surprising because apprehension efforts
are undertaken all the time.
Both Frisbie and Jenkins failed to make an essential conceptual
distinction. They should have distinguished between necessary and
sufficient determinants of international migration. Of course, it is
necessary that there are Mexican candidates for migration. It is,
indeed, highly plausible that "push" factors influence their number and
composition. If this determinant of international moves were inoperative
- 22 -
in the case of Mexico, the INS would apprehend only a random number
of Mexicans. But the Mexicans found in the US are not there because of
"push" factors in their village or country. There are other Mexicans
and, more importantly, many other nationalities who are "pushed" a great
deal more nnd yet they never come near to the US. The Mexicans who are
caught by the INS, as well as those who slip through, are there in essence
because US employers keep on hiring them, often seeking them out, and
because the-employers are exempted by law (section 274[a] of the 1952
Immigration and Nationality Act, the so-called Texas proviso) from
penalties for doing so. It is through this hole in the law that US
demand takes effect; and it is this demand factor which is the sufficient
condition for the illegal inflow of Mexicans and others. If US employers
stopped hiring them voluntarily or in the face of dissuasive penalties,
there might still be numerous surreptitious movements across the
border, as well as visa abusers, but this would not entail significant
employment in the US.
In view of these observations I think one can accept as a working
assumption that the structural features of the migration are sufficiently
similar to permit policy learning across the Atlantic.
III. MEASUREMENT AND EXPLANATION OF TEMPORARINESS
What happened in Western Europe? How many economically active
migrants who were once admitted later on returned home? What are the
determinants of temporariness? Are there policy-relevant factors
that can be singled out and, in future, applied so as to modify the extent
of spontaneous settlement? These are the questions to be investigated
in this section. Fortunately, the data base is a little broader than it
was for the preceding section. The statistics used have been made comparable
to the greatest extent possible. Seasonal workers have been eliminated
in the measurement of temporariness because they are limited-time rather
than guest workers.
(a) The extent of temporariness
Figures on several nationalities are presented in Table 7 for the
Federal Republic of Germany and over-all rates in Table 8 for Switzerland.
Two measures are developed: firstly "withdrawal" and secondly "outflow".
"Withdrawal" is a rough estimate of the number of foreigners that have
dropped out of the labor market of the country of employment. "Outflow"
- 23 -
Table 7: Number of economically.active foreigners admitted to employment
in the Federal Republic of Germany, and percentage leaving the
country, by selected nationalities, 1961-1976 (numbers in thousands)
1961-76 1961-68 1969-76 1969-75 1974-76
stock at begin.
stock at end
stock at begin.
stock at end
(See next page for footnote and sources.)
- 24 -
1 Economically active (excluding frontier workers) = employed +
Calculation of "withdrawal" from German labor market = stock of
active at beginning of period + inflow during period stock of active
at end of period. Result as percentage of inflow.
Calculation of "outflow" (approximates return of active foreigners)
from German labor market = stock at beginning + inflow naturalizations -
deaths unregistered unemployed (change from active to inactive status)
- stock at end. Result as percentage of inflow. The presumably negligible
number of retirements taking place in Germany is disregarded because of
lack of hard data. The very small number of changes to self-employed
status is also disregarded, firstly because it is not known, and secondly
because the table is conceived in terms of economically active status
even though all raw data actually relate to wage and salary earners.
Estimation of naturalizations and deaths of active foreigners =
rising share of over-all number of naturalizations and deaths published by
Statistisches Bundesamt; a few data gaps were closed by interpolation
and extrapolation. The share was assumed to be 10 per cent in year 1961
and increased by 5 per cent each year, thus rising to 85 per cent in
year 1976. The naturalizations and deaths for each nationality were
estimated as follows: the proportion of each nationality in each year's
average number of employed foreigners was obtained and this proportion
was applied to the previously calculated total number of active foreigners
who had been naturalized or who had died during that year.
Unregistered unemployed foreigners = nil throughout 1961-1973,
36,000 in 1974, 156,000 in 1975 and 181,000 in 1976. Source: Mitteilungen
aus der Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung, Vol. 12, No. 1 (1979), p. 28.
These semi-official figures, which at heart reflect the ups and downs of
the economy, appear to include many of the teenagers and young adolescents
who had joined their parents in Germany but were prohibited from taking
up employment. Not forming part of the inflow (or work permit) statistics
used here, and therefore not representing persons who changed from active
to inactive status, this group had to be taken out of the calculation of
outflows of people admitted for the purpose of employment. It was assumed
that this group amounted to 50 per cent of the over-all number of un-
registered unemployed foreigners. Each nationality's share was then
estimated as corresponding to its proportion in the average number of
employed foreigners during each year, i.e. on the same lines as natura-
lizations and deaths.
Sources: Published and unpublished information of the Bundesanstalt flr
Arbeit; Statistisches Bundesamt, Wirtschaft und Statistik
(varioius-own estimates. -
- 25 -
is a refined estimate that takes account of the foreigners who died,
were naturalized or pulled out without appearing in the unemployment
statistics. "Outflow" equals return from the point of view of the coun-
try of employment; but since a portion of the migrants involved tends to
move to a third country rather than to the country of origin, "outflow"
does not necessarily mean return from the point of view of the country
whose nationality the migrants bear. The economic status and nationali-
ties of foreign deaths and naturalizations in the Federal Republic and
Switzerland are not known in sufficient detail for most of the years
under consideration. Therefore, a plausible and logical estimation pro-
cedure was used that affects all nationalities and the total figures in
the same way. The discrepancies with reality52 probably make themselves
felt only after the decimal point and can for all practical purposes be
neglected. Migration streams gain in maturity in the course of time,
i.e. they change their characteristics, especially with regard to the
question "Stay or return?" Therefore, several periods have been dis-
tinguished to permit comparisons between the countries over the same
periods or during different periods within both Germany and Switzerland.
Since the Federal Republic clamped down on the inflow of foreign workers
at the end.of 1973,and Switzerland effectively since 1970, the last
columns in Table 7 and 8 showing percentage figures above 100 under
"withdrawal" and "outflow", indicate that more people withdrew or
returned than were admitted to employment. As the statistics and the
calculations derive from administrative acts, an individual migrant may
turn up in them several times; this fact does not affect the basic
question or the interpretation of the empirical results.
The highlights from the Tables may be summarized as follows.
More than two-thirds of the foreign workers admitted to the Federal
Republic, and more than four-fifths in the case of Switzerland, have
returned. The future will probably witness a continuing small
trickle of return migrants still figuring in the 1976 or 1978 stock data,
thus tending to raise the proportion of temporariness. Whether or not
this corresponds to the assumption of German policy makers quoted above
(pp. 5-6) that the "overwhelming number of foreign employees will not
stay permanently in the Federal Republic", it is not really possible
to say. However, it would be defensible to say that neither German nor
- 26 -
Table 8: Number of economically active foreigners admitted to employment in
Switzerland, and percentage leaving the country 1949-1978 (numbers
1949-78 1949-60 1961-76 1961-68 1969-76
stock at begin.
stock at end
Excluding seasonal workers, frontier workers and international officials.
Withdrawal and outflow are calculated as in Table .7.
percentage of inflow.
Estimation of naturalizations and deaths of active foreigners = rising
share of overo-all number of "naturalisations ordinaires" and deaths published
by the Office F4deral de la Statistique. The share was assumed to be 2.5 per
cent in year 1949 and increased by 2.5 per cent per year, thus rising to
75 per cent in year 1978. However, naturalizations prior to 1954 were not
taken into account.
As there are no hard data on unregistered unemployed foreigners and
because their numbers are generally held to be very low, the calculation of
the outflow from Switzerland disregards this group.
Source: Annuaire statistique de la Suisse (various); ownmcalculations.
- 27 -
Swiss policy makers, among others, expected to admit so many foreign
workers over such a long period of time. Therefore, one would not go
far wrong in concluding that 20 or 30 years ago none of the Western
European countries opting for a guest worker policy foresaw as many for-
eign workers on its soil as there are today. I believe Western European
policy makers had expectations that proved wrong as regards the volume
of guest worker employment rather than its temporariness.
Table 7 reveals impressive differences between nationalities, for
example Italians (9 in 10 of-wh6m remrue& r6paved with Turks (only 3
in 10 of whom returned). If one applies the results of the calculations
for (a) Italians, (b) Spaniards and (c) others to the Swiss data, i.e.
if one weights the German rates of return by the proportion of Italian,
Spanish and other nationalities in Switzerland's foreign workforce for
the period 1961-76, one obtains fairly exactly the over-all Swiss rates
shown in Table 8. This would seem to suggest two lessons. First, a
nationality's propensity to stay or return is not greatly influenced by
where it is employed abroad or by the degree of welcome/hostility
emanating from the country of employment. Second, one has to choose
one's nationality carefully if one wants it either to settle or to return.
In the case of return one then faces the further task of efficiently
handling the recruitment, selection, admission, etc., of what would
undoubtedly involve large numbers of people.
(b) Migrants' intentions
Given the key role assigned to them by Western European policy makers,
motivations and intentions can be presumed to predict whether an indi-
vidual or a distinct group or a nationality stays or returns. The
authorities actually based their views on assumptions; they did not
commission enquiries until well after the movements had settled into a
pattern. Had they done so earlier they would probably have been surprised
by the gap between their assumptions and reality or by the lack of
certainty on the part of the migrants.
One can distinguish, simplifyingly, five categories. First, the
seasonals who have their time horizon fixed by the legislation of the
country of employment. Second, the emigrants who intend to stay abroad
for good. Third, the target workers whose expatriation is linked to the
- 28 -
accumulation of a certain sum of money for the purpose of attaining one
or several objectives back home. Fourth, the non-seasonals who have a
clearly limited expatriation of X numbers of years in mind. And fifth,
all others who do not have a well defined time horizon.
Several intimate observers of the Western European migration scene
have pointed to the huge proportion of people who did not have a
clear idea as to the duration of migration. For example, a quarter of
the Greeks interviewed in 1960/62 in Belgium, France and Germany were
undecided at the moment of emigration;54 and nearly half of those to whom
a questionnaire was administered during a journey home over Christmas
1964 planned to stay abroad for an indefinite period.55 Half the
Italians surveyed by Braun in 1964 in German-speaking Switzerland had
no idea at the moment they left home how long they would want to stay
in Switzerland; after many years of expatriation, more than a quarter
still fell into this category. As regards Yugoslavs, it was esti-
mated that 55 per cent of the Yugoslavs left without a concrete idea
regarding the length of out-migration, although it was believed that
most people in this category hoped to return one day when their
country's development offered attractive wage-earning opportunities.'
Such a high proportion of waverers seems remarkable for the one migrant-
sending country in the Western European-Mediterranean context which has
conceived all external labor movements as temporary employment abroad.58
Table 9 documents a range of intentions, changes therein, and actual
length of stay.59 It speaks for itself. The notion popularly bandied
about in the 1950s and 1960s that migrants from Mediterranean countries
cross the Alps in order to work for one or two or at most three years
and then return is visibly a myth, or an ideology. The German figures
in Table 9 can be corroborated by a few survey data from Switzerland.
Braun found that 29 per cent had originally intended to stay up to five
years, 7 per cent longer or permanently, and 11 per cent had materially
determined targets; at theitime of his 1964 interviews, 58 per cent
had been resident for up to five years and 17 per cent for ten years or
more; 20 per cent envisaged a further five years in Switzerland and 27 per
cent each intended to stay longer/permanently or to fulfil their material
ambitions before returning. Hoffmann-Nowotny interviewed economically
active male Italians in 1969, 44 per cent of whom had been resident for
Originally intended, actual duration and envisaged future duration of stay of economically
active foreigners of selected nationalities in the Federal Republic of Germany (percenta-
ges recorded in surveys held between 1968 and 1976).
Original intentions Actual duration
D.K. up to 5 years 10 years up to 5 years 8-10 years and over
or no and
men men men men men women men men women
1968 1968 1976 1968 1968 1971 1971 1976 1968 1971 1971 1976
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)1 (10)2 (11)2 (12)3
6 62 62 24
19 67 78
5 79 74
54 43 65 23
45 37 41 28
45 42 54
66 n.a. n.a. 82
Turks 7 83 69
11 20 7 47
6 16 10 42
6 14 5 57
n.a. 4 2 20
1 3 0 27
4 84 69 85 51
Table 9 (continued)
Envisaged future length of stay
short medium long no idea shorter than as long as longer than no idea
or no originally originally originally
response foreseen foreseen foreseen
men men men men women men women men women men Women
1968 1976 1976 1968 1976 1968 1971 1971 1971 1971 1971 1971 1971 1971
(13)4 (14)5 (15)6 (16)7 (17)8 (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26)
45 52 25
70 62 29
77 44 36
38 13 14
7 9 41 30 39 47
13 19 62 54
12 11 38 37
6 7 25 31
26 28 32 30 36 42
n.a.= not available
1 = 8 years and over
4 = up to 5 years
7 = 5 years and over or permanently
2 = 10 years and over
5 = up to 4 years
8 = 17 years and over
3 = 9 years and over
6 = 5-16 years
(1), (2), (4), (5), (9), (13), (16) and (18) see R. Hentschel et al., Die Integration der
ausl'ndischen Arbeitnehmer in K'61n Tabellenband (Cologne: mimeographed, 1968), Tables 1,
7a and 52. (3), (8), (12), (14), (15) and (17) see Forschungsverbund Integrierter
Endbericht, op. cit., pp. 231 ff. (6), ( 7), (10), (11) and (19)-(26) see U. MehrlAnder,
Soziale Aspekte der AuslAnderbesch'aftigung (Bonn-Bad Godesberg: Neue Gesellschaft, 1974),
pp. 24f and 122.
- 31 -
up to five years and 15 per cent for over eleven years; half tended to-
wards leaving Switzerland, 41 per cent towards staying and about 10 per
cent were undecided.61
The target workers form the most intriguing but least understood
group. There is no doubt that some migrants have specific and
limited material or monetary goals. (Occupational or educational objec-
tives or the evasion of national service obligations, among others,
may be neglected here in order not to complicate the picture unneces-
sarily.) However, I do not believe that they have played an important
role in Western Europe. Target workers are certainly a minority. What
is more, target workers are not easily identifiable. As Braun's 1964
data show (see T"able 10), their personal, social and economic characteris-
tics do not differ greatly from those of other migrants. One may suspect
that target workers are over-represented among married men, possibly
older ones, and perhaps among migrants from rural areas with an above
average education. In the Federal Republic a 1976 survey distinguished
a group that was economically highly motivated and paid little attention
to improvements regarding quality of life in Germany. This definition
comes close to the notion of target workers and the group was, indeed,
characterized by intentions of comparatively short future duration of stay.
Thirty-six per cent of the Yugoslavs, 34 per cent of the Turks, 24 per
cent of the Greeks, 21 per cent of the Italians and 17 per cent of the
Spaniards formed part of it. Still, neither the notion nor the quanti-
ty would seem to justify the policy assumptions which have been placed
Ranking data visually can tell us whether the nationalities' pro-
pensity to return recorded in Table 7 accords with the intentions reported
by survey researchers. Table 11 contains the ranked data. Even when
allowance is made for the fact that the 1976 predictors measure the
intentions and proportions of those who have stayed rather than those who
returned, there is no semblance of close correlation between intentions
and realities. I believe that the intentions of migrants were both more
complex and more fickle than policy makers allowed for. On top of this
comes the notorious difficulty of finding out what exactly people's in-
tentions are. To build one's policy on revealed or unrevealed -
intentions of migrants is to build a house on sand. It is much
Envisaged future duration of stay of Italians in Switzerland, by category
(percentage recorded in 1964 survey)
stay 5 years
Sex Age Marital
men women under 26 over single married
25 -35 35
9 6 12 6 6 9
18 20 5 20 51 18
54 19 29 24 32 25
below average above
Table 10 (continued)
Intentions Reason for emigrating Occupational status Years of residence in
poverty and higher reunifica- other un- skilled foreman less 2 4 6 10
need earn- tion skilled than -4 -6 -10 and
ings 2 over
stay 5 years
or longer 6 9 7 10 8 7 0 19 5 8 7 6
nently 20 21 18 15 15 51 27 9 10 10 30 42 I
worker 25 50 21 33 27 29 27 26 25 42 24 26
1 = Proxy. Source records geographical origin southern Italy.
2 = Proxy. Source records geographical origin northern Italy.
Source: Braun, SozialkpIltAielle Probleme ..., op. cit., p. 489.
- 34 -
easier simply to rely on how intentions crystallize into secular
patterns of behaviour.
Table 11: Predicting
the propensity to return with migrants'
, Federal Republic of Germany (ranked data)
Proportionwtith Proportions with
originally short- future intentions
term intentions short long
1976 1976 1976
1=hi hest l=highest3 slowestt
5 3 5
1 2 4
2 1 1
4 4 3
3 5 2
Sources: (1) see Table 7.
2) see Table 9, column 3.
3) see Table 9, column 14.
4) see Table 9, column 17.
5) see text; Forschungsverbund, Integrierter Endbericht,
op. cit., pp. 237-8.
(c) Family migration or reunification
If breadwinners bring along their dependents or if the dependents
join them later, one might be forgiven for thinking that such events
herald immigration or settlement in the traditional sense of the word.
Family migration or reunification was viewed in the 1950s and 1960s with
equanimity in France but with considerable unease in the Federal
Republic of Germany and Switzerland. Demographic, economic, social
and ethnic reasons played a role, sometimes reinforcing one another in
one country at one point of time and sometimes contradicting each other.
Today, Western Europe's non-seasonal guest workers who have a job and
accommodation can, as a rule, count on having members of the nuclear
(as opposed to extended) family join them once they have worked for
12 months in the country of employment, provided their dependents are
free of certain diseases constituting a danger to public health. Austria,
- 35 -
Belgium, Sweden and the UK are more liberal, they do not subject
family members to any period of qualification. France introduced a one-
year waiting period in 1976; but Greeks, Spaniards and Portuguese in non-
seasonal employment are still treated more leniently in accordance with
the provisions of earlier bilateral agreements.
Popular beliefs notwithstanding, the proportions of inactive in the
migrant population tend to be similar in the Federal Republic (see Table
12), France (see Table 13) and Switzerland (see Table 14); and the same
holds true for particular migrant nationalities in each of the three
countries. Marked differences disappear in the course of time. Remai-
ning differences can be explained by the relative lack of fresh labor
immigration in France and the greater maturity of some migration streams,
i.e. the longer periods of family reunification. For instance, the
Yugoslavs in Switzerland are newcomers compared with the Italians in
that country or compared with the Yugoslavs in France. People's ideas
about family members accompanying or joining them may be influenced by
the perceived degree of public or private hostility towards them, but
this influence bends rather than breaks human bonds.
A different set of data underlines the historical evolution.
Shortly after the immigration had gathered momentum in the Federal
Republic of Germany, Hollenberg estimated that 7 1/2 9 per cent of
the foreign workers resided with their families there. Twelve
or thirteen years later the situation had changed dramatically, as
Table 15 demonstrates. Of the married migrants, about three-quarters
of the nuclear families were united in the case of Italians and Greeks,
about seven-tenths in the case of Spaniards, and just under half in the
case of Yugoslavs and Turks.
Rank orders should indicate whether different degrees of completed
family reunification predict a nationality's tendency to stay. The ans-
wer is clearly no (see Table 6), and the explanation for it must be
sought largely in the complex web of economic, social and human factors
that make people move. It is quite possible, for example, that a target
worker may ask his spouse to join him for the purpose of gaining more
rapidly the desired nest egg, rather than for settlement abroad. If a
group has a strong attachment to family life, hostile attitudes and
policies on the part of the country of employment will only delay rather
than stop family reunification short of an inhuman policy totally pro-
hibiting that families can come together.
- 36 -
TablP 12 : Number of foreigners in the Federal Republic of Germany and
percentage of inactive,by selected nationalities, 1961-1976
(numbers in thousands)
6 June 1961
30 Sept 1968 30 Sept 1975 30 Sept 1976
1961 = Census. Other "total" figures from Statistisches Bundesamt
qp. cit. Figures of economically active (not represented here) from
Bundesanstalt fur Arbeit op. -cit. The statistics of active published
by the Statistisches Bundesamt, based on residence permits, and those
of the Bundesanstalt fGr Arbeit, based on work permits, often differ
slightly; but this impediment to strict comparability does not affect
the order of magnitude.
- 37 -
Table 13:Number of resident foreigners in France and percentage of inactive, by
selected nationalities, 1962-1976 (numbers in thousands)
n.a. = not available.
Source: 1962, 1968 and 1975 = Census (the 1962 Census counted all Algerians,
including members of the French army). 1976 = Groupe de travail
interminist4riel sur lee statistiques de population 6trangbre,
Mesure de la Dprsence etrangure en France (n.p.[Paris]: May 1979).
- 38 -
Table 14: Number of resident foreigners in Switzerland
and percentage of inactive, by selected
nationalities, 1968-1978 (numbers in thousands)1
1968 1973 1978
7o n. a.
no. 933.1 1,052.5 898.1
n.a. = not available.
Excluding seasonal workers, frontier workers as
well as international officials and their families.
The figures of the total population and all grand
total figures relate to the end of 1968, 1973 and 1978.
The figures for inactive Italians, Spaniards and Yugoslavs
were approximated by deducting the stock of active in
April 1979 from the end-of-1978 population figures
(statistics by nationality are not published for earlier
Source: Annuaire statistique de la Suisse (various); La
Vie Economique, Vol. 52, No. 6 (juin 1979).
- 39 -
Table 15: Indicators of family migration and reunification in the
Federal Republic of Germany, by selected nationalities
in 1976 (percentages)
Single Married Families in Germany with Families that
divorced have children:
and wi- without with no chil- one or three or proportion
dowed spouse spouse dren two more with one or
in in children children all children
Germany Germany in home coun-
25 6 69 12 37 18 25
n.a. = not available.
Source: Forschungsverbund, Integrierter Endbericht, op. cit., pp. 56 ff.
Table 16: Predicting the propensity to return by degree of completed
family reunification, Federal Republic of Germany (ranked data)
among among all
Sources: (1) see Table 7.
S2) and (3) see Table 12.
4) and (5) see Forschungsverbund, Integrierter Endbericht,
op. cit. pp. 56 ff.
- 40 -
(d) Other explanations?
Can one identify other factors that would help to explain why a
nationality returns? Continuing with visual rank correlations Table
17 examines personal and socio-economic determinants; Table 18 screens
economic determinants relating to the countries of origin; and Table
19 takes earnings or incomes obtained in the country of employment
and refracts them under different behavioral assumptions, i.e. it
assumes first that all migrants behave as people are ordinarily
said to behave, and it then assumes that all migrants behave as though
they were target workers.
Excepting the recent level of GNP per capital (Table 18, column
), no single variable predicts the various nationalities' differential
propensity to return. Moreover, what one determinant indicates at one
point of time, or for one sex, may be quite different from what it
indicates at another time, or for the other sex. Furthermore, there
is not as much coherence between factors as is assumed when one of
them is taken as a proxy for another. For instance, youthfulness and
proportions of single, etc., do not go well together; proportions of
rural origin do not predict skill levels either before departure from
home or at the place of work abroad; per capital income levels do not
correlate with either the growth rates of income or the growth rates
of employment, nor do the growth rates of income and employment cor-
relate among themselves.65 The policy variables that are generally
mentioned in this context, namely marital status, rural origin or
skills, perform too unsatisfactorily to inspire confidence as criteria
to maximize the numbers returning.
GNP per capital at recent levels appears to explain the various
nationalities' rate of return. It is, indeed, plausible that the
lower income of, say, Turkey should be less attractive than the higher
income of Italy. However, I have certain misgivings about the explana-
tory power of this factor, quite apart from the fact that, in the case
of the US, it does not really represent a policy variable as the candi-
dates for migration come in the main from middle-income Mexico rather
than from low-income Malawi or India or other countries. The GNP
explanation could well be spurious. Firstly, the income concept under-
Table 17: Predicting the propensity to return by personal or socio-economic factors,
Federal Republic of Germany ranked data)'
ness = per
4 2 1
2 3 2
5 4 4
3 1 3
1 5 5
Determinants relate to economically active persons.
1968 survey data refer to the autumn of that year, in the case of 1971 and 1976 to the summer.
1968 = proportion in excess of 4 years of stay. 1976 = proportion in excess of 5 years stay.
Sources: (1) see Table 7.
(2), (4) and (10) see Bundesanstalt fur Arbeit, Ausl'ndische Arbeitnehmer ..., op. cit.,
pp. 45, 49, 53-4, 86,and own computations.
3), (5), (11) and (13) see Forschungsverbund, Integrierter Endbericht, op. cit., pp. 56-8,
94, 117 and 231.
(6), (7) and (8) see Mehrl'Ander, Soziale Aspekte ..., op. cit., pp. 24, 28 and 36.
Table 18: Predicting the propensity to return by economic factors. Federal Republic of Germany
growth of per
capital income in
growth of the
labour force in
Sources: (l see Table 7.
(3 -(6) see World Bank Atlas (various).
(7)-(8) see World Bank, World Development Report,
1979 (Washington: August 1979), Table 19.
Table 19: Predicting the propensity to return with different behavioral assumptions 1
relating to earnings/income factors. Federal Republic of Germany (ranked data)
ordinarily: high earnings =
target workers: high earnings =
men women men women
4 (4) 3 (3)
5 (5) 5 5
3 3 4 1
1 2 1 (4)
2 1 2 2
3 3 2 5
5 4 5 (2)
4 5 4 4
Determinants relate to economically active persons.
The bracketed ranks in columns (3), (5), (8) and (10) are identical scores that have
been arranged so as to make the ranks of men and women as equal as possible.
Sources: 1) see Table 7.
2)-(5) and (7)-(10) see Mehrlander, Soziale Aspekte ..., op. cit., pp. 113-4.
6) and (11) see Forschungsverbund, Integrierter Endbericht, op. cit., p. 130.
- 44 -
lying it should in principle also show up well but does not in
its other forms, such as the socio-economic variables that are at
least in some way associated with incomes (rural origin, skills prior
to migration, skilled employment abroad = Table 17, columns -[ll])
or the income differentials in the country of employment (Table 19).
Secondly, the influence of income should be confirmed but is not -
in the correlations with the rates of growth of income in the countries
of origin (Table 18, columns  and ); for one must expect any
single nationality to be decisively influenced by the progress achieved
in its own country rather than by a learned comparison of different
countries' wellbeing. Why should almost every Italian return to his
home country's stagnating economy whereas Turks show a remarkable
tendency not to go back to a relatively flourishing economy? The
level of GNP per capital may be one facet of the explanation but there
must be other factors at work.
Single ranks do not, of course, capture composite factors that
might explain return. For instance, young unskilled target workers
of rural origin may be expected to exhibit a lower propensity to
settle than older skilled ordinary workers of urban origin. However,
this brings us back to the realm of speculation that ruled Western
Europe for many years. And the policy relevance of cumulative vari-
ables is limited because multiple selection criteria are difficult to
administer. As far as the crucial target worker dimension is concerned,
it is probably impossible to have bureaucrats or even sociologists
or economists determine reliably who is or is not a target worker.
In any case, target workers can change their mind and often do.
I have the firm impression that nationality, as such, tells one
better than any other factor whether people migrant workers -
tend to stay or return.67 This finding tallies with other attempts
to explain migrants' behaviour. Large-scale survey research in the
Federal Republic of Germany came to the following conclusion.
"It is almost completely immaterial to the future duration of
stay envisaged by foreign workers whether their occupational
status is high (skilled worker and above) or low (unskilled
worker), whether the conditions at the place of work are good
or bad, whether the general social climate at the place of work
is perceived as positive or negative, whether social mobility
is desired or not, or whether the people concerned have resided
in the Federal Republic for a short or long while. Even if all
- 45 -
these factors are jointly accounted for, they explain barely
6 per cent of the variation in the planned duration of stay.
Moreover, the larger part of this marginal power of explanation
derives from the more subjective valuation and judgement of the
social climate at the place of work and the desire to climb up
the social ladder, rather than the objective factors such as
occupational status or work-place conditions."6
It is clear that some nationalities have on average a low, others
have a high propensity to return. A historical pattern or secular
tendency has evolved. Neither incentives nor constraints seem to be
able to influence it markedly. Raw political force might, but Western
democracies are neither domestically nor internationally free to pro-
ceed with brute force.
If guest workers' propensity to return voluntarily cannot be
predicted with accuracy on the basis of selection criteria other than
nationality, what lessons does this hold for the US? The key lesson
is that one should accept high or low temporariness rather than try
to manipulate it. A further lesson is that one should not create
expectations regarding the return of guests that are not substantiated
by hard facts. If one were to tell public opinion that Mexicans, for
instance, tend to return rather than to stay, one should be sure about
the facts first and in my view the facts are highly debatable in
the case of Mexicans. If expectations turn out to have been unrealis-
tice, the policy will be in ruins.
IV. IN LIEU OF CONCLUSIONS
Should the US institute a massive temporary worker program instead
of a guest worker or an enlarged traditional immigration program? I
believe that temporary worker programs for non-temporary jobs are
incompatible with the fundamental tenets of Western democracy, the
charter of the UN, the constitution of the ILO and, most of all,
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.69 It is perfectly legitimate
to argue that foreigners do not have a right to enter a country.
However, those who are voluntarily admitted excepting perhaps
foreigners destined to work in truly temporary activities should
be entitled to what the Universal Declaration of Human Rights calls
free choice of employment (article 23 [l]) and to security in the
event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or
- 46 -
other lack of livelihood (article 25 [11) as well as to the protection
of their family (article 16 ). Western Europe's guest worker
policies, by and large, respect the social rights of article 25 (1)
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; they freely admit and
thereby protect families in some albeit not yet all cases; but they
still subject the free choice of employment to a qualifying period
(outside the EEC and the Common Nordic Labour Market). The trend of
policies has been towards closer conformity with the principles of
Western democracy, and the recent French attempt to reverse it has
met with powerful domestic and international resistance.
This reinforces the lesson drawn earlier. Temporary worker
programs and restrictions are not only morally offensive but politically
less and less tenable in Western plural societies. One can save oneself
a great deal of domestic political and administrative commotion and
loss of international political capital by adopting from the start a
position that is in conformity with the democratic values to which one
claims allegiance rather than to have to yield in inauspicious
circumstances to domestic and international pressures.
- 47 -
1. As opposed to an expanded H-2 program on the lines proposed by
E.P. Reubens, Temporary admission of foreign workers: Dimenaions
and policies, National Commission for Manpower Policy, Special Report
No. 34 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, March 1979).
2. W.R. Bldhning, "The differential strength of demand and wage factors in
intra-European labour mobility: With special reference to West Germany,
1957-1968", International Migration, Vol. VIII, No. 4 (1970), pp. 193-202.
3. So R. Marshall, "Employment implications of the international migration
of workers", in National Council on Employment Policy, ed., Illegal aliens:
An assessment of the issues (Washington: October 1976), pp. 23 and 63;
and P.L. Martin, Guestworker programs: Lessons from Europe, prepared for
the Joint Economic Committee, U.S. Congress (Washington: The Brookings
Institution, June 1979), p. 61ff.
4. The law and practice of immigrationn in the world at large has recently
been documented in ILO, Migrant workers: Summary of reports on
Conventions nos, 97 and 1453 and Recommendations nos. 86 and 151, Interna-
tional Labour Conference, 66th Session, Report III (Part 2) (Geneva: 1980);
and ILO, Migrant workers: General survey by the committee of experts on
the application of Conventions and Recommendatione, International Labour
Conference 66th Session (Geneva: 1980).
5. Whose original six members were Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany,
France, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. Denmark, Ireland and the
U K joined in the early 1970s. Greece will enter in January 1981.
Spain and Portugal hope to do so before the mid-1980s and Turkey occasionally
presses hard for membership. See also W.R. B'dhning, The migration of
workers in the United Kingdom and the European Community (London: Oxford
University Press, 1972).
6. Established 1954 by agreement between Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden.
See also J. Lbnnroth, "The Common Nordic Labour Market: Background and
developments", in Demographic Society of Finland, ed., Finnish contribu-
tions to the IUSSP conference on Economic and Demographic Change: Issues
for the 1980s (Helsinki: 1978), pp. 63-77.
- 48 -
7. One exception for minor migrant-sending countries was the 1970 agreement
concerning the admission of miners from the Republic of Korea for
temporary employment in colleries. At present, it involves some 600
One historical oddity is also worth mentioning. The original
recruitment agreement with Turkey of October 1961 had features of a
temporary worker program. Initial work permits could be extended but
the text stated categorically that "the residence permit will not be
extended beyond a total duration of validity of two years." (Amtliche
Nachrichten der Bundesanstalt fur Arbeit, Vol. 9, No. 12 [December 1961],
p. 589.) However, an exchange of notes in 1964 deleted this clause.
(Text ibid., Vol. 13, No. 1 [January 1965], pp. 1-2.) Germany's only
major limited-time program was therefore abandoned before it had really
8. Cf. R.C. Rist, Guestworkers in Germany: The prospects for pluralism
(New York: Praeger, 1978).
9. Bundesminister fUr Arbeit und Sozialordnung, Politik der Bundesregierung
gegenUber den auslAndischen Arbeitnehmern in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland,
Deutscher Bundestag, 6. Wahlperiode, Drucksache VI/3085, 31. January 1972
(Bonn), p. 4.
10. Bundesminister fUr Arbeit und Sozialordnung, "Bundesregierung beschliesst
Integrationsprogramm fur junge Auslander", Sozialpolitische Informationen,
Vol. 16, No. 6 (March 1980).
11. Same as fn. 9.
12. G. Tapinos, L'immigration 6trangbre en France 1946-1973 (Presses
Universitaires de France, 1975).
13. See Le Monde, 15 juin 1979.
14. Les Echos, 29 mars 1966, which roughly translates as: "Clandestine
immigration itself is not without its uses, because if we were to insist
on the strict application of international regulations and agreements
we might perhaps be short of labour."
15. D.S. North, "Foreign workers: Unwanted guests?" Transatlantic Perspectives,
No. 1 (June 1979), pp. 19-23.
- 49 -
16. D.S. North, The Canadian experience with amnesty for aliens: What the
United States can learn (Geneva: ILO, October 1979 ; mimeographed World
Employment Programme research working paper; restricted).
17. The Swiss rate of registered unemployment briefly touched the 1 per cent
level during the depth of the mid-seventies' recession. It had fallen
back to 0.5 per cent by the end of the decade.
18. A similarly high rate is found among frontier workers.
19. Only Austria has clear legal reserve powers to enforce departure on
economic grounds. Residence permits may not be renewed or cancelled
when a foreigner is not engaged in regular employment or is not entitled
to unemployment insurance benefits and where he consequently appears to
be without means of support. If in this event the foreigner does not
leave Austria voluntarily, or does not comply with an order for his
departure, he may be forbidden to stay in the country and be expelled
to his country of origin.
In Switzerland, the 1931 Federal Act respecting the residence and
settlement of aliens provides that an alien may be deported if he or a
person for whose maintenance he is liable becomes permanently and to a
substantial degree dependent on public relief. The Act makes deporta-
tion subject to the condition that the return of the alien to his
country of origin is practicable and may reasonably be demanded of him.
The Aliens Bill now before Parliament further limits the scope for
The Swiss Government has tried on three occasions to rid the country
of whole groups of foreign workers who did not possess the status of
residents. In 1952 work permits were revoked in the textile industry,
in 1958 in the watch-making industry, and in 1975 firms were instructed
not to make redundant nationals or resident foreigners as long as they
employed foreign annual permit holders in comparable jobs. No follow-up
research has come to my knowledge.
20. La Vie Economique, Vol. 53, No. 3 (mars 1980), Table 3.
21. W.R. Bbhning, Regularising indocumentados (Geneva: ILO, April 1979;
mimeographed World Employment Programme research working paper; restricted);
and "Elements of a theory of international migration to industrial nation
states", in M.M. Kritz, C.B. Keely and S. Tomasi, eds., Global trends in
migration: Theory and research on international population movements
(New York: Center for Migration Studies, 1980), pp. ; also "The
differential strength of demand and wage factors ...," op.cit.
- 50 -
22. See fn. 3.
23. See, for instance, S. Castles and G. Kosack, Immigrant workers and class
structure in Western Europe (London: Oxford University Press, 1973);
C. Mercier, Les d4racinis du capital: Immigration et accumulation
(Presses Universitaires de Lyon: n.d. ); and M. Nikolinakos,
Politische Okonomie der Gastarbeiterfrage (Reinbeck: Rowohlt, 1973).
24. See S. Adler, "Co-operation or coercion? Algerian migrant workers in
the German Democratic Republic", Studi Emigrazione/Etudes Migrations,
Vol. XV, No. 50 (1978), pp. 246-261.
25. V. Lutz, "Foreign workers and domestic wage levels: With an illustration
from the Swiss case", Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review,
Vol. 16, No. 4 (March 1963), pp. 3-68.
26. Ibid., p. 7.
27. My own view of the origin and development of wage differentials (W.R.
BBhning, "Determinants of labour immigration in industrialized countries
of Western Europe," in Basic Aspects of immigration and return migration
in Western Europe [Geneva: ILO, July 1975; mimeographed World
Employment Programme research working paper; restricted], pp. 5-23)
resembles Piore's (M.J. Piore, Birds of passage: Migrant labour in
industrial society [Cambridge University Press, 1979]) in that it places
emphasis on the social determination, function and perception of income
differences. There is much casual evidence that e.g. Frenchmen or
Germans who are not marginal labour market participants are little
influenced by attempts to make low status jobs more attractive in terms
of pay and/or working conditions. If a town cannot get, say, local
garbage collectors, it is not usually on account of low pay. Evidence
on the failure of the ambitious French policy of giving manual workers
a better image and pay is beginning to appear; see Y. Moulier, "Le
secteur de 1'industrie automobile", in G. Tapinos et al., eds.,
Possibilities de transfer d'emploi vers les pays d'6migration en tant
qu'alternative aux migrations internationales des travailleurs: Le cas
franQais, II: Etudes Sectorielles (Geneva: ILO, April 1978; mimeo-
graphed World Employment Programme research working paper, restricted);
and R.E. Verhaeren, Revalorisation du travail manuel dans le B.T.P. et
la substitution immigr4s-nationaux (Grenoble: Universit4 II, Institut
de Recherche Economique et de Planification, 1978).
- 51 -
28. A. Portes, "Towards a structural analysis of illegal (undocumented)
migration", International Migration Review, Vol. XII, No. 4 (Winter
1978), pp. 469-484.
29. Ibid., pp. 472-3.
30. D.S. North and M.F. Houstoun, The characteristics and role of illegal
aliens in the U.S. labor market: An exploratory study (Washington:
Linton and Co. Inc., March 1976); and M.J. Piore, The role of immigration
in industrial growth: A case study of the origins and character of
Puerto Rican migration to Boston (Cambridge, Mass.: May 1973; mimeographed
MIT department of economics working paper).
31. A.H. Richmond and R.P. Verma,"The economic adaptation of immigrants: A
new theoretical perspective", International Migration Review, Vol. XII,
No. 1 (Spring 1978), pp. 3-38.
32. H.-J. Hoffnann-Nowotny, Migration: Ein Beitrag zu einer soziologischen
Erkllrung (Stuttgart: Enke, 1970).
33. Idem, Soziologie des Fremdarbeitersystems: Eine theoretische und
empirische Analyse am Beispiel der Schweiz (Stuttgart: Enke, 1973).
34. Piore, Birds of passage ..., op.cit.; also The role of immigration ...,
35. As far as return migration is concerned, the lack of correlation with
economic factors points, a contrario, to the importance of personal and
family factors which has been revealed time and again by survey research.
36. Whereby he attributes to me a supposed key characteristic of jobs, namely
the personalised as opposed to institutionalized relationship between
supervisor and migrant subordinates (Piore, Birds of passage ..., opcit.,
p. 17, fn. 6) by referring to a publication (Bbhning, "Determinants of
labour immigration ...," op.cit.) which makes no mention of it and
apparently without knowing that I have explicitly rejected this feature
for Western Europe on analytical and empirical grounds. (W.R. Bbhning,
Elements of a theory of international migration and compensation [Geneva:
ILO, November 1978; mimeographed World Employment Programme research
working paper; restricted], p. 7, fn. 1).
37. See, for instance, W.R. Bb'hning, "Migration from developing to high-income
countries", in ILO, Tripartite World Conference on Employment, Income
Distribution and Social Progress and the International Division of
Labour. Background Papers, Vol. II: International Strategies for
- 52 -
Employment (Geneva: 1976), Table 3; and Forschungeverbund "Probleme
der AuslLnderbeachiftigung", Integrierter Endbericht (n.p. [Bonn],
Bundesminister fUr Forschung und Technologie, July 1979).
38. Piore, Birds of passage ..., op.cit., p. 45.
39. Ibid., pp. 35-43.
40. G. Minet, "Spectators of participants? Immigrants and industrial relations
in Western Europe", International Labour Review, Vol. 117, No. 1
(January-February 1978), pp. 21-3$.
41. See Bbhning, "Elements of a theory of international migration to
industrial nation states," op.cit.
42. The stock of vacancies remaining on the books and the change therein
(columns 1 and 2 of Table 6) are, for Germany, the most appropriate
indicators. They reflect better than the flow nature of registrations
(column 3) the labor market test required by law, i.e. the search for
national workers before foreigners are admitted. The lower power of
explanation of the unemployment/work-seeker variables is probably due to
non-registration of women, youngsters, etc. Tests indicated a steady
(inverse) relationship between vacancies and unemployment in the course
of the period 1961-76.
43. It is interesting to note that the coefficients of determination for
1961-76 are practically identical with the ones I had earlier calculated
for 1957-68 with minutely different data and after double log transforma-
tion; see B'dhning, "The differential strength...", op.cit.
44. Unfortunately, the statistics of demand for labour cannot be decomposed
to investigate which proportion of the over-all demand is due to physical
as opposed to relative shortages of nationals. The given regressions
cannot, therefore, tell us anything about the origin of the demand for
foreign labor. Nor is my analytical framework designed to do that.
In the real world, one must expect physical and relative shortages to
45. Wage differentials, which do influence movements between developed coun-
tries, are totally eclipsed by the demand factos in migration from
developing to developed countries; see Bohning, "The differential
strength of demand and wage factors ...," op.cit. H.-M. Geck, Die
griechische Arbeitsmigration: Eine Analyse ihrer Ursachen und Wirkungen
- 53 -
(Kbnigstein/Ts.: Hanstein, 1979), regressed the importance of Greek
wages and employment as "push" factors compared with German wages and
employment as "pull" factors. He was forced to the conclusion that,
whereas wage differentials may have been a necessary condition,
Germany's demand for labor was the sole determinant of Greek movements
to the Federal Republic. W. KUnne, Die Aussenwanderung jugoslawischer
Arbeitskrl.fte: Ein Beitrag zur Analyse internationaler ArbeitskrAftewan-
derungen (Kbnigstein/Ts.: Hanstein, 1979) undertook a comparable analysis
for Yugoslav migration to Germany and came to similar results.
F. Butschek, "Die Verwendung formalisierter Modelle in der Dsterreichiashen
Arbeitsmarktforachung," in F. Butschek, ed., Die Bkonomischen Aspekte der
Arbeitsaarktpolitik (Vienna: Bohrmann, 1975), demoniliated that demand
was crucial in the Austrian context.
46. For details of the economic and social aspects of the self-feeding process
see W.R. BBhning, "The economic effects of the employment of foreign
workers: With special reference to the labour markets of Western Europe's
post-industrial countries", in OECD, ed., The effects of the employment of
foreign workers (Paris: 1974), pp. 43-123.
47. As happened, for example, in the Federal Republic of Germany both in the
1967 recession and after the 1973 rise in oil prices. U S employers
voiced demands for Mexican labour even during the Great Depreassion; see
G.C. Kiser and M.W. Kiser, Mexican workers in the United States:
Historical and political perspectives (Albuquerque: University of
Mexico Press, 1979), pp. 50,1.
48. P. Frisbie, "Illegal migration from Mexico to the United States: A
longitudinal analysis", International Migration Review, Vol. IX, No. 1
(Spring 1975), pp. 3-13.
49. J.C. Jenkins, "Push/pull in recent Mexican migration to the U S ",
International Migration Review, Vol. II, No. 2 (Summer 1977), pp. 178-189;
idem, "The demand for immigran.workers: Labor scarcity or social
control?", International Migration Review, Vol. XII, No. 4 (Winter ,1978),
50. See e.g. Kiser and Kiser, Mexican workers ..., op.cit.; and E.R. Stoddard,
"A conceptual analysis of the 'alien invasion': Institutional support of
illegal MexlAan aliens in the U.S.," International Migration Review,
Vol. XII, No. 4 (Winter 1978), pp. 469-484.
- 54 -
51. Television interview conducted by W.F. Buckley, Jr.; script in
Population and Development Review, Vol. 5, No. 2 (June 1979), pp. 358-371.
52. It appears, for instance, that more Italians but fewer Turks are
naturalized in Germany than estimated by the procedure used in Table 7.
53. Assuming the Federal Republic had opted for Italians only, and given the
90 per cent rate of return indicated by Table 7, Germany would have had
to admit 19 million Italian workers, ceteris paribus, in order to reach
a 1976 stock of 1.9 million.
54. E. Dimitras, Enaqutes sociologiques sur les migrants grecs: Deuxibme
enqubte lors du sajour en Europe occidentale (Athhnes: Centre Nationale
de Recherche Sociales, 1971), p. 28.
55. E. Dimitras and E. Vlachos, Sociological surveys on Greek emigrants:
Third survey upon the return to Greece (Athens: National of Social
Research, 1971), p. 53.
56. R. Braun, Sozio-kulturelle Probleme der Eingliederung italienitcher
Arbeitskrafte in der Schweiz (Erlenbach-Zurich: Rentsch, 1970), pp. 473
57. I. Bauti6, "Migration temporaire ou definitive: le dilemme des migrants
et les politiques de migration", Studi Emigrazione, Vol. XI, No. 33
(March 1974), p. 126.
58. This to the extent that Yugoslav trade unionists told their counterparts
in the Federal Republic that they wouldlook with disfavour on German
moves to give municipal voting rights to Yugoslav migrants or to ease
naturalization requirements for the second generation; see O.N. Haberl,
Die Abwanderung von Arbeitskraften aus Jugoslawien (Munich: Oldenbourg,
1978), pp. 120 and 128.
59. Many of the interview schedules used in surveys appear to press migrant
responses into predefined categories or to repress the "don't know/no
response" category for fear of showing untidy results. Migrants can be
assumed to bias their answers to the short-term end of the range so their
attitudes and behaviour can be seen to correspond to what is expected of
60. Braun, Sozio-kulturelle Probleme ..., op.cit., pp. 60, 80 and 473. By
comparison, the Greeks interviewed by Dimitras, Enquttes sociologiques ...,
op.cit., pp. 28-9, comprised 34 per cent who initially intended to stay
up to five years, 20 per cent longer or permanently, and 11-18 per cent
had materially determined targets.
61. Hoffmann-Nowotny, Soziologie des Freudarbeitersystems ..., op.cit.,
pp. 184 and 256.
62. Forschungaverbund, Integrierter Endbericht, op.cit., pp. 237-8.
63. Citizens of the EEC and the Nordic countries are in any case entitled to
have their families move within the two groups of countries.
64. W.A. Hollenberg, "Der Familienwohnungsbedarf auslindischer Arbeitnehmer"
Bundesarbeitsblatt, Vol. 14, No. 5 (May 1965), p. 222.
65. Unemployment rates could not be standardized sufficiently to order the data
by ranks. It appears as though they would not correlate well with the
propensity to return.
66. Compare particularly the 1969-76 rates of return in Table 7 with the
1970-76 rates of growth and employment in Table 18, columns (5) (8).
There are indications that Italians (as well as Spaniards and Greeks) are
repeat migrants to a greater extent.than Turks, i.e. they return home and
after one or several years they leave again to work abroad; see W.R.
Blohning, "The social and occupational apprenticeship of Mediterranean
migrant workers in West Germany", in M. Livi Bacci, ed., The demographic and
social pattern of emigration from the southern European countries (Firenze:
1972), Table 32. However, this differential does not by any means explain
why Italians return at a much higher rate than Turks.
67. It could be argued that the full implementation of the EEC's free movement
provisions since 1968 is responsible for the high rate of return among
Italians in the Federal Republic of Germany. I think it has been an
enabling or contributing factor but not the cause. How else is one to
explain the apparently identical return rate of non-seasonal Italians
from Germany and Switzerland (see p. 27 above) when the latter country
does not form part of the EEC? Distance may be assumed to be the
enabling or contributing factor which takes the place of the institutional
factor in the case of Swtizerland. But the distance does not really
favour Switzerland all that much; and Table 18 (column 2) does not
actually lend much credence to the predictive power of the distance or
68. Forachungaverbund, Integrierter Endbericht, op.cit., p. 235.
- 56 -
69. See also W.R. BBhning, Regularising indocumentados, op.cit.; and
"International migration in Western Europe: Reflections on the past
five years", International Labour Review, Vol. 118, No. 4 (July-August
1979), pp. 401,414.
70. Such as (a) artists and members of the liberal rofessions entering on a
short-term basis; (b) persons coming specifically for purposes of
training or education; and (c) employees of organizations or under-
takings operating within the territory of a country who have been admitted
temporarily to that country at the request of their employer to undertake
specific duties or assignments, for a limited and defined period of time,
and who are required to leave that country on the completion of their
duties or assignments.
In these cases one is likely to find positive discrimination to
compensate the migrants for the geographical displacement and temporary
nature of the job.
- 57 -
C. MIGRATION FOR EMPLOYMENT PROJECT
WEP ResEarch Working Papers are preliminary documents circulated informally
in a limited number of copies solely to stimulate discussion and critical comment.
They are restricted and Ehould not be cited without permission. A set of selected
WEP Research Working Papers, completed by annual supplements, is available in
microfiche form for sale to the public; orders should be sent to ILO Publications,
International Labour Office, CH 1211 Geneva 22, Switzerland.
In the following list the papers from this project of the WEP which are
already available in microfiche form are identified by the letter "M" following the
by W.R. Bdhning, July 1965 (out of print)
"Determinants of labour immigration in industrialized countries of
Western Europe", pp. 5-23;
"Return migrants' contribution to the development process The issues
involved", pp. 24-38.
HP 2 MedirEanEan_wo2rkers_i_ WesternEr.E j: __Effects__ n home cou.naries anRd
coun tries _of e mlolyent -
by W.R. Bdhning, September 1975 (out of print)
= published in German: "Arbeitnehmer aus Mittelmeerlandern in
Westeuropa: Wirkungen auf Heimat- und Empfangslander", in R. Regul
(ed.): Die EuropAischen Gemeinschaftqen_ und die Mittelmeerlander
(Baden-Baden, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1977), pp. 195-223.
= also available in Serbo-Croat, in "Inostrana Iskustva i Prevodi",
Binten, Vol. 19, No. 44, 1976, pp. 25-71.
WP 3 A11121
by Francis Wilson, November 1975 (out of print)
= published in ;Ilt E&&nti igration view, Vol. X, No. 4, Winter
1976, pp. 451-488;
= also available as SALDRU Working Paper No. 1 (Cape Town, Southern
Africa Labour and Development Research Unit, May 1976).
WP 4 M Future demand for mig.r.ant_workers in Western EuroEe
by W.R. BShning, January 1976 (out of print)
= also available in Serbo-Croat, in "Inostrana Iskustva i Prevodi",
Bilten, Vol. 19, No. 44, 1976, pp. 1-24.
WP 5 M TransferL dlt a1qis vtKales_ E ans___a __di_ _t-' ua--sur E s is _ai-
par D. Maillat, C. Jeanrenaud et J.-Ph. Wider, mai 1976 (out of print)
shortened version published in t __mRAREA1ig2e/ uds_.iAEAAions,
Vol. XV, No. 51, September 1978, pp. 361-381.
wP 6 Basigc_aspects qf migration _from poor to rich__ countries: Facts, proble,s
by W.R. B6hning, July 1976 (out of print)
"Determinants of labour immigration in industrialized countries of
Western Europe", pp. 5-23 (reprint of WP 1);
"Return migrants' contribution to the development process The issues
*Much of this Working Paper has been worked into W.R. Bohning. "Migration
from Developing to High-Income Countries", in ILO: TriE.arLtte.__ Rld__Cogferenceon2
Employment,. Income Distribution and Social Progress andthe_Interational Division
of Labour, background papers. Vol, II _Internatioal__siatafgie.Is__R2-slTIaa
- 58 -
involved", pp. 23-38 (reprint of WP 1);
S "Migration and policy: A rejoinder to Keith Griffin", pp. 39-50;
S "The Migration of workers from poor to rich countries: Facts, problems,
policies", pp. 51-70.
The latter paper has been published in IUSSP (ed.): International
Po2u1ajti.o_Cog er.LjnceA.Xli2_S12Z2, Vol. 2 (Liege, 1977), pp. 307-318.
WP 7 Trans-a E of efjploYet opprtanitie.qas._Ua alternative to the international
on ke TheFedera blicof Germany (Il**
by U. Hiemenz and K.-W. Schatz, August 1976
parts published in German: "Internationale Arbeitsteilung als
Alternative zur Auslanderbeschaftigung Der Fall der Bundesrepublik
Deutschland", Die Weltvirtachaft, No. 1, 1977, pp. 35-58.
wP 8 m Tranaid'eplois _vers_ les Days _qui dispose ~jen a surplus de main-
d2oevre pomme ._altenaUyei aux iqratips international: Le cas de la
par D. Maillat, C. Jeanrenaud, J.-Ph. Widmer, January 1977 (out of print)
= shortened version published under the title: "Transfert d'emplois et
d6s6quilibr6s r6gionaux", in P. Caroni, B. Dafflon and G. Enderle
(eds.): Nur Oekonomie ist keine 0~jkonaie (Bern, Haupt, 1978), pp.
WP 9 T.a.asfe.r.of__ep!loyImeBtpoEtuniiesasnitt.rnative to the international
aaqtaio-n o-2w-orkers LThe_9_seoS2i.._naL- nd _Tuarkey vis-A-vis the Federal
by U. Hiemenz and K.-W. Schatz, April 1977.
NP 10 laaikratioie__.aSouth Africa What are the issues?
by W.R. Bahning, June 1977 (out of print).
WP 11 Labouc or t__n Southejn _A ca Soeeare aLd policy implications
bilh_ sa toLiin taka li Xaon- ui sc, ftapnfees
by Charles W. Stahl, July 1977.
UP 12 Siaz land_ 1laaiara tin _-__Sme__ia n o s_ or___ation al development
by M.H. Doran, August 1977 (out of print).
WP 13 iaionaaQnd__agaricltusal__dveloEBei_ __Sasiadj A micro-econoaic
by A.R.C. Low, August 1977 (out of print).
WP 14 M Transfert d'emplois vers les pays_ qui disposent d'un surplus de main-
d'oeuvre co mme alternative jjx migrtons r ationales: Le cas de la
Suisse__III_ Lecompotement de 1'entrepreneur face A la p6nurie de -aie-
d 'oeuvre: Ersultats d'une enqurte Parg!uestion air *
par C. Jeanrenaud, E. Maillat et J.-Ph. Wider, September 1977 (out of
= shortened version published under the title: "Reactions of Swiss
employers to the immigration freeze", in International Labour Review,
Vol. 117, No. 6, November-December 1978, pp. 733-745;
= version abreg6e publiee sous le titre: "Les entrepreneurs suisses face
A l'arret de l'immigration", Revue_intea tionale du Travail, Vol. 117,
No. 6, novembre-decembre 1978, pp. 791-804 (reprinted in Hoames et
!rations__D._ocuments, No. 972, 15 juin 1979, pp. 9-22).
**The two Working Papers Nos. 7 and 9 have been published in shortened form
as an ILO book. U. Hiemenz ard K.W.. Schatz: Trade in_place of amiration (Geneva,
1979); also in Spanish: Intercambio en_yez dg_~miqraci6 (Ginebra, 1979).
- 59 -
WP 15 M A Eeiiinaar__aasessat_ ofl__laboEavement n__the __Aab ___eaii
by J.S. Birks and C.A. Sinclair, October 1977 (out of print).
WP 16 M loneigamigrana_1abour iE Sauthen_AfLri_ _StieSaaGcaalation in_ ha
by D.G. Clarke, November 1977 (out of print)
"Accumulation and migrant labour supply in the labour reserve economies
of Southern Africa", pp. 1-40;
"Some determinants of demand for foreign African labour in South
Africa", pp. 41-78;
"Foreign African labour and the internalisation of labour reserves in
South Africa, 1970-77", pp. 79-130.
WP 17 Brea i _a.n o raE a..ht-Sih.se
by Malcolm Vallis, November 1977.
WP 18E ompensating countries of origin for the out-migration of theirp.E21le
by W.R. Bohning, December 1977 (out of print)
= also available in Serbo-Croat, in Centar Za Intrazivanje Migracia,
Zagreb (ed.): Rasprave o Niqraciiama, Svezak 48 (Zagreb, 1978), pp. 7-
WP 18F M Comment d6dommager _es pays d'origine des migrants?
par W.R. Bahning, dec6mbre 1977.
WP 19 The_State and labour_ migrationin the South African political economY, with
particular respect to 2q2jAliniS
by John Bardill, Roger Southall and Charles Perrings, December 1977.
WP 20 M International labour supply trends and economic _tEucture__in__SouheEn_
Rhodesia/Zimbabe in the 1970s
by D.G. Clarke, January 1978 (out of print).
WP 21 M Requjlating international miar %tion in the interest of the developing
countries, with a rticular reference to Mediterranean countries
by Klaus H. Hapfner and Maria Huber, February 1978 (out of print).
WP 22 N irant _louL__iL _Swaziland: Characteristics. attitudes and PoiLI
by Fion de Vletter, February 1978 (out of print).
WP 23 M Return _min aiolfEamWesagan_ .tiediterra--nc--uni-E
by Han Entzinger, March 1978 (out of print).
WP 24 M PosseinitsdetAfEtdl iseE Easd arAi tJA
aaaltenaie__aa__aat sinternati~al~esdes trarilles: Le cjs
_fanas__L .: Elments in__ odutifs)
par G. Tapinos, et al., mars 1978 (out of print).
VP 25 M Possibilit6s_ det_ransfert._d'aelois_ves los__ __s d'6miqration en tant
lle.ernativegu miat-ions- inaternationales des travailleurs; Le cjs
frEansAisJI: Etudes sectoiellesgl
par G. Tapinos, et al., avril 1978.
WP 26 M Possibilit6s de transfer d'emplois vers_les a_s d'mairation en ___a
aualatLerativ e _aux miratiaos__iternati2onales_ des travaillefurs Le_cgags
franrais _III:L__es Pays dead1art et synthse)
par G. Tapinos, et al., mai 1978.
- 60 -
WP 27 M Human capital on the Nile: Development and emigration in the Arab Republic
of Egypt and the Democratic Republic of the Sudan*es*
by J.S. Birks and C.A. Sinclair, May 1978.
WP 28 M TgSfutlnate of_ Oman:.__gqAonic_developmnt. the domestic labour market
by J.S. Birks and C.A. Sinclair, June 1978.
WP 29 M MjLrqtio aAnd reintegrat ion Transferability of the Turkish aodel of
r.eIutn ig.aratoanjd self-help organizations to other Mediterranean labour-
by M. Werth and N. Yalcintas, June 1978 (out of print).
WP 30 M atare adroceqsflaboi po ia; heAaalf States of Kuwait,
by J.S. Birks and C.A. Sinclair, August 1978.
WP 31 Mtqrant labour and .rural hoesteads; An investigation into the
sociological dimensions of the migrant labour system in Swaziland
by Beth D. Rosen-Prinz and Frederick A. Prinz, September 1978.
WP 32 LR-12: ___pKrelima& y siulation model of the effects of declining
migration to South Africa op households i, Botswana
by William M. Woods, September 1978.
WP 33G Bfrun ugosa wisher Haushlte in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland
by C. Bock and F. Tiedt, September 1978 (out of print).
BP 33E SuaytrvecY guaos]_jv households in the Feder 1.Republic of Germany
by C. Bock and F. Tiedt, June 1979.
UP 34 FLme Ontq f _a,_theory o___inte nati;2onajl j gratJon and cqopensati2o
by W.R. Bohning, November 1978.
WP 35 The women left behind: A study of the wives of the migrant workers of
by Elizabeth Gordon, December 1978.
WP 36 Pe._qulaPtj qiaijiouita!12&
by W.R. B6hning, April 1979.
WP 37 Reducing__migation deRndenq in Southern Africa
by C.W. Stahl and W.R. Bahning, April 1979.
WP 38 iping _employmeat in Saath-Afgca, 1946-2000
by N. Bromberger, May 1979.
= also available as SALDRU Working Paper No. 15 (Cape Town, Southern
Africa Labour and Development Research Unit).
WP 39 The Kinjdo f Sadi Aria nd the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya; The key
countries of emaPlyBenIt***
by J.S. Birks and C.A. Sinclair, May 1979.
*** The data collected and analysed in Working Papers Nos. 27, 28, 30 and
39, has partly been reproduced in, and forms the basis of analysis of, the ILO book
by J.S. Birks and C.A. Sinclair: International!migration and development in the
ALabreiq (Geneva, 1980).
- 61 -
WP 40 Le~gal asectSflabaou aai2nfoiLesothto. t 2ith rican i
by Sam Rugege, July 1979.
UP 41 Southern African migrant labour supplies in the past the resent and he
future, with special reference to the cold-ainina industry
by C.W. Stahl, August 1979.
UP 42 An empirical study of the attitudes and perceptions of amirant workers:
by E. Holapi Sebatane, September 1979.
HP 43 TheM._a ath.aaxrinc._wi._AfnestY for aliens: at the UnitedStaes ca
by David S. North, October 1979.
UP 44 A massive _temporary worker programme for the U.,.- iution or airage?
by Mark Miller and David J. Yeres, November 1979.
BP 45 aigration&_tAhiLaoa f c9aeaBPtFig a-nd the in-ernational economic order
by W.R. BShning, December 1979.
"Some facts and figures on international economic migration", pp. 1-10;
"The idea of compensation in international migration,.pp. 11-28;
"International migration and the international economic order", pp. 29-
= The first contribution has been published in French, "Faits et chiffres
sur les migrations internationales", in Population, Vol. 34, No. 6
(novembre-deceabre 1979), pp. 1130-1137.
= The last contribution has been published in Journal of International
AIgfil.s (spring 1980).
WP 46 Swallows'lchildrea~_-_emigration and development in AlgqRia
by Stephen Adler, May 1980.
WP 47 Gue.t_worker_alo.aant, with_aPqcjll_reference to the Federal Republic of
Germanv. France and Switzerland -_ Lessons for the United States?
by W.R. BShning, June 1980.