• TABLE OF CONTENTS
HIDE
 Front Cover
 Title Page
 Table of Contents
 List of Tables
 Foreword
 Acknowledgement
 Introduction
 The projects and their setting...
 Project strategies and perform...
 Lessons from the experience
 Appendix A. List of case studi...














Group Title: A.I.D. evaluation special study
Title: Development management in Africa
CITATION THUMBNAILS PAGE IMAGE ZOOMABLE
Full Citation
STANDARD VIEW MARC VIEW
Permanent Link: http://ufdc.ufl.edu/UF00087118/00001
 Material Information
Title: Development management in Africa context and strategy : a synthesis of lessons from six agricultural development projects
Series Title: A.I.D. evaluation special study
Physical Description: vi, 45 p. : ; 28 cm.
Language: English
Creator: Honadle, George
United States -- Agency for International Development
Publisher: U.S. Agency for International Development
Place of Publication: Washington D.C
Publication Date: 1986
 Subjects
Subject: Institution building -- Africa   ( lcsh )
Genre: federal government publication   ( marcgt )
bibliography   ( marcgt )
non-fiction   ( marcgt )
 Notes
Bibliography: Includes bibliographical references.
Statement of Responsibility: by George Honadle.
 Record Information
Bibliographic ID: UF00087118
Volume ID: VID00001
Source Institution: University of Florida
Holding Location: University of Florida
Rights Management: All rights reserved by the source institution and holding location.
Resource Identifier: oclc - 16938158

Table of Contents
    Front Cover
        Front Cover 1
        Front Cover 2
    Title Page
        Page i
        Page ii
    Table of Contents
        Page iii
    List of Tables
        Page iv
    Foreword
        Page v
    Acknowledgement
        Page vi
    Introduction
        Page 1
        Page 2
        Page 3
        Page 4
        Page 5
        Page 6
    The projects and their settings
        Page 7
        Page 8
        Page 9
        Page 10
        Page 11
        Page 12
        Page 13
        Page 14
    Project strategies and performance
        Page 15
        Page 16
        Page 17
        Page 18
        Page 19
        Page 20
        Page 21
        Page 22
        Page 23
        Page 24
        Page 25
        Page 26
        Page 27
        Page 28
    Lessons from the experience
        Page 29
        Page 30
        Page 31
        Page 32
        Page 33
        Page 34
        Page 35
        Page 36
        Page 37
        Page 38
        Page 39
        Page 40
        Page 41
        Page 42
        Page 43
        Page 44
        Page 45
        Page 46
    Appendix A. List of case studies
        Page 47
Full Text

UID Evaluation Special Study No. 43



Development Management in Africa:
Context and Strategy--A Synthesis
Af Six Agricultural Projects

















january 1986

Agency for International Development (AID)

Vashington, D.C. 20523
















)PMENT MANAGEMENT.
A SYNTHES:
AGRICULTURE


,ND STRATEGY


ES OF LESSONS FROM SIX
kL DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS




ION SPECIAL STUDY NO. 4


by


G(
Developmer


orge Honadle
t Alternatives, Inc












Page

List of Tables.............................................. iv

Foreword .................................................... v

Acknowledgments ............................................. vi

1. Introduction............................................ 1

1.1 Views of the Problem ............................... 2
1.2 Responding to the Need ............................. 5
1.3 Overcoming Perceptual Barriers ..................... 6

2. The Projects and Their Settings ......................... 7

2.1 Projects Reviewed................................... .7
2.2 A Contextual Map .................................... 9
2.3 Objectives and Stakeholders ........................ 10
2.4 Institutional and Other Constraints ................ 11

3. Project Strategies and Performance ...................... 15

3-1 Manaaement Strateaies------------------------------.. ..15


,,,,,,,,,,,





- { --


LIST OF TABLES


Page

1. Project Contextual Factors .............................. 12

2. Project Management Strategies ........................... 17

3. Project Management Enhancement Strategies ............... 21

4. Assessment of Project Performance ....................... 26

5. Considerations for Development Assistance in
Africa................................................ 46









M'UKRWUKU


Good program management is essential to successful and
sustained development programs in developing countries. Problems
of poor management are often cited as responsible for program
failure. The management factor in development programs is,
however, less well appreciated and understood as are the project
interventions that serve to strengthen management capabilities.
AID's Center for Development Information and Evaluation (CDIE) of
the Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination has undertaken a
series of studies to gain a better understanding of these manage-
ment problems and to assess the impact of some of the interven-
tions that have been tried.

The study began in September 1984 when CDIE organized a
workshop on development management in Africa. In attendance at
that workshop were senior AID personnel, contractors, and univer-
sity professors knowledgeable about Africa who have written on
development management issues. Many in this group at the
workshop participated in the field studies of six agricultural
development projects in Africa. The product of the workshop was
a report that isolated issues and approved a scope of work to
guide the field teams.

After returning to the United States, the six field teams
attended a wrap-up seminar in May 1985 to review their work and
to seek general findings and lessons. Several synthesis reports
were written incorporating the results of the field studies and
the deliberations of the wrap-up seminar. This present report is
one of the syntheses. Dr. Irving Rosenthal has been the CDIE
coordinator for this series.


Center for Development Information
and Evaluation
Agency for International Development
January 1986


V-









ACKNOWLEDGMENTS


Authorship of a paper, like management, is often ascribed to
an individual even though it reflects the contributions of many.
Among those whose comments, criticisms, and clarifications were
most instrumental in shaping this paper are Tony Barclay, Russell
Betts, Don Bowles, Gerald Britan, Coralie Bryant, James Cotter,
Chris Hermann, Michael Horowitz, Kenneth Kornher, David Leonard,
Laura McPherson, Norman Nicholson, Haven North, Craig Olson,
Dennis Rondinelli, Irving Rosenthal, Matt Seymour, Margaret Shaw,
Nena Vreeland, and Marion Warren. Editorial contributions by
Linda Robinson and word processing assistance by Carol Kulski and
Cereta Dudley are also appreciated.

This paper evolved through various iterations as it reflect-
ed the shifting emphasis on lessons learned. The original scope
of work for this entire effort was written by Irving Rosenthal,
the Sector Coordinator for Development Management in the Center
for Development Information and Evaluation of the Agency for
International Development (AID). "Promoting Performance in
Agricultural Projects" and "Olympians and Mortals in African
Development" were titles of earlier drafts of this present paper.
Comments on the first version by participants in the Workshop on
Development Management in Africa in April 1985 helped focus the
draft. Pat Fleuret and Merlyn Kettering contributed signifi-
cantlv at this staae. A review committee within ATD's Center for


Development I
and Policy Cc
as was inter


information
ordination,
al review a

I trip to I
efforts of


Evaluation c
s especially
developmentt A]


he Bureau for
pful at later


*ogram
I =TA c






Development managers are mere mortals in a world where
the Olympian decisions are made in the presidential
palaces and finance ministries and party
headquarters

Jerry Wolgin
Economist,
Africa Bureau,
U.S. Agency for
International
Development


The first thing which we must recognize is that effec-
tive management . is the most critical factor in
the development process of any country.2

Philip Ndegwa
Governor,
Central Bank of Kenya


1. INTRODUCTION


The Wolgin and Ndegwa citations above represent very dif-
ferent interpretations of the importance of management relative
to policy reform strategies for addressing Africa's economic
crisis. This paper, however, argues the following:

The policy/management apposition is overly simplistic.
Management practices can constrain or expand policy
opportunities and results just as policies can help or
inhibit management.

-- Project performance results from the interaction between
strategy and context.

The solution to the crisis lies less with the importa-
tion of cures (whether policy or management) than with
understanding the local context and building appropriate
responses to that context.





1Jerry Wolgin, "Development Management Amid Economic Crisis"
(Paper presented to the Workshop on Development Management in
Africa, Easton, Md., September 1984), p. 10.
2philip Ndegwa, Africa's Development Crisis (Nairobi: Heineman
Educational Books, 1985), pp. 127-128.




-2-


To support these arguments, however, three points must be
discussed. The first is the evolution of perspectives on the
relative importance of development policy and management. The
second is the place of this study in that evolution. The third
is the perceptual barriers that will have to be overcome for this
study to achieve operational results. Each point is addressed
below.


1.1 Views of the Problem


Since the publication of the World Bank's "Berg Report"3 in
1981, a predominant view of the source of Africa's crisis has
emphasized the impact of inappropriate economic policies. As
policy-oriented perspectives have gained currency in the develop-
ment community, the need for policy reform has grown from an
insight to a blanket prescription. Indeed, a mechanical view of
the benefits that will result from policies such as getting the
prices right or revaluing currency has obscured the reasons
behind these policies as well as the nature of the terrain the
reformers must cross.4 Structural adjustment programs often
specify the policy reforms to be accomplished without specifying
how to achieve them. That is, the management dimension of policy
reform is typically left out of structural adjustment programs.

The World Bank's 1984 follow-on to the Berg Report osten-
sibly stresses the need for management capacity and appropriate
technical assistance as the second of its four emphases.5
However, the authors of this report still view the management
problem largely in macro terms. The chapters on managing and
supporting policy reform view the issue as one of donor coor-
dination, macro management of the economy, and debt servicing.
Thus, even though the importance of management is acknowledged,
the prescribed way out of the crisis avoids direct confrontation
with management processes. To the authors of the report, con-
vincing the Olympians to adopt preferred economic policies
remains more important than supporting the management efforts of
lowly mortals.




3World Bank, Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An
Agenda for Action (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1981).

4Robert Bates, Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The Poli-
tical Basis of Agricultural Policies (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1981).

5World Bank, Toward Sustained Development in Sub-Saharan Africa:
A Joint Program of Action (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank,
1984).





-3-


Other writers, however, were concurrently recognizing that
the management of development efforts was an important element in
explaining successes as well as failures.6 Management was not
the only determinant of results, but its relative importance was
great enough for the World Bank's World Development Report, 1983
to dwell on the theme of management in development. Even so,
there was dissatisfaction with the report's treatment of manage-
ment.7 Until the dimensions of development management could be
more clearly articulated and refined, neither policy reform nor
management assistance was likely to be conducted more effective-
ly. Although this applies to all geographic regions, the inten-
sity of Africa's current crisis makes it most salient there.
However, the views on how to solve Africa's development manage-
ment problems differ.

Two opposing views define the historical grounds of this
debate. One view is that Western methods and theories, wherever
applied, will yield results similar to those obtained from their
application in industrial settings.8 The other view is that
each area of the world is permeated with unique historical and
cultural characteristics that inhibit the success of imported
theories or methods.9 Two recent studies have taken initial
steps toward resolving the impasse between these two positions.







6See, for example, Coralie Bryant and Louise White, Managing
Development in the Third World (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press,
1982); Merilee Grindle, ed., Politics and Policy Implementation
in the Third World (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1980); George Honadle and Rudi Klauss, eds., International Devel-
opment Administration: Implementation Analysis for Development
Projects (New York: Praeger, 1979); Jon R. Moris, Managing
Induced Rural Development (Bloomington, Ind.: Institute for
International Development, 1981); Elliott Morss and David Gow,
eds., Implementing Rural Development Projects (Boulder, Colo.:
Westview Press, 1985); Dennis A. Rondinelli, Development
Projects as Policy Experiments (New York: Methuen, 1983).

7D.J. Murray, "The World Bank's Perspective on -How To Improve
Administration," Public Administration and Development 3, 4
(1983):291-297.

8David K. Leonard, Reaching the Peasant Farmer: Organization
Theory and Practice in Kenya (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1977).

9See Moris, Managing Induced Rural Development.










organization and management in the developing world to determine
how many supported the first position and how many the second.
They also explored the reasons for the division of opinion.

The major finding of this study was that, when Western
theories and methods were determined to be appropriate, the focus
was on internal issues closely tied to the organization's produc-
tion technology. When Western theories and techniques were found
to be inappropriate, the emphasis was on processes that extended
into the project organization's environment.

The authors of this survey of academic literature concluded
that,

In general, each time the environment is involved, the
theory developed for Western settings does not apply,
because it assumes contingencies that may not be valid
for developing countries. In these situations, utili-
zation must be preceded by a situational analysis to
identify the relevant contingencies and their inter-
relationships.

A study of 24 rural development projects came to a similar
conclusion.ll This study argued that Western management
theories and methods were appropriate for building roads,
bridges, and clinics or delivering goods and services. But the
need to induce local responses to those services and the mandate
that development projects stimulate self-sustaining dynamics
created an intense interaction between project organizations and
local environments. As a result of these interactions, the
imported perspectives often lost their predictive power.

Using an analytic model based on project objectives and
linkage processes, the authors of this study concluded that

Orthodox management science does offer sound guidance
for delivering goods and services . . But generat-
ing local action and sustaining benefit flows are ob-
jectives that fall outside the domain of formalistic
Western management theory . .. Universalistic man-
agement science is a useful starting point for the




10Moses Kiggundu, Jan Jorgensen, and Taieb Hafsi, "Administrative
Theory and Practice in Developing Countries: A Synthesis,"
Administrative Science Quarterly 28 (1983): 6684.

11George Honadle and Jerry Van Sant, Implementation for Sustain-
ability: Lessons from Integrated Rural Development (West
Hartford, Conn.: Kumarian Press, 1985).










first linkage in the model, but the contextual mappers
may possess the key tools required to forge the second
and third linkages.

Both academic literature and field studies, then, support
the importance of context in development management. A clear
picture of development management requires an environment that is
lighted and focused, not one in which an imported theory casts
its own dark shadow and blurs the background of the subject.


1.2 Responding to the Need


Responding to the need for a sharpened understanding of how
to fit organization and management approaches to African circum-
stances, the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) in
1984 commissioned a series of case studies of the management
dimension of six agricultural projects in Africa. The studies
were jointly sponsored by AID's Center for Development Informa-
tion and Evaluation in the Bureau for Program and Policy Coordi-
nation, and the Bureau for Africa. The effort was under the
direction of Irving Rosenthal, Sector Coordinator for Development
Mnnnnamnt -


on, Maryland,
Id studies.
late March 1


designed to pr(
A=1 At7r rk TI i re1


1984 with a w


rkshop,
to under-
er 1984
Lesotho,
a work-
case


The s-


AXY n n 4 ~~n n Q +- Mk









Contextual factors related to management, including the
impact on the project of local physical, environmental,
political, and cultural factors, as well as worldwide
economic and political conditions

Management strategy, including organization, structure,
and institutional arrangements encompassing both for-
mally established and informally constituted working
relationships among affected organizations and people;
resource control encompassing financial, commodity, and
logistics management; and the approach to getting things
done in an effective and efficient manner

Management enhancement strategy, involving attempts to
change administrative processes, such as ways of carry-
ing out development programs in the local setting, and
efforts to increase consideration of human resources
management and behavioral factors, such as the skills,
performance, and management capacity of the people who
are part of, or who will benefit from, the project





-7-


4. The effect of management decisions and behavior often
seems fleeting and difficult to see, adding to the fuz-
ziness and keeping management out of the realm of expert
knowledge and in the realm of common sense.

The practical problem that arises from these perceptual
barriers is that good management is taken for granted. It is
assumed that what must be done is universally obvious and that if
problems occur they can be overcome by a change in personnel or
some training. But this simplistic approach seldom works.
Attempts to transfer experience from one setting to another with-
out adjusting for differences among the settings can lead to the
failure of the intuitively obvious because it is empirically
dubious.

To deal with this difficulty, this paper follows a progres-
sion from context to strategy to performance to lessons. This
progression is used to reveal and specify the complex, inconsis-
tent, or counterintuitive elements of successful development man-
agement. Moreover, it suggests a process for tailoring general
knowledge to fit specific circumstances.


2. THE PROJECTS AND THEIR SETTINGS


The projects reviewed here are distributed throughout Sub-
Saharan Africa. Three are in Anglophone countries, and three are
in Francophone countries. One is in East Africa, one is in
southern Africa, and four are in West Africa. A brief descrip-
tion of each project follows.


2.1 Projects Reviewed


The project descriptions that follow are intended to give
the reader a sense of the major activities undertaken and provide
a grounding for the later discussion. These descriptions are not
expected to replace or summarize the individual case studies.
This paper deals with crosscutting themes rather than project-
specific issues and recommendations. Readers wishing more
details should consult the cases studies, which. are listed in
Appendix A.

The Egerton College Expansion Project in Kenya (1980-1984)
aimed at upgrading a training institute for extension agents.
Faculty were sent to the United States to obtain advanced degrees









Lesotho aims at reversing severe soil erosion and range deterio-
ration while improving the economic opportunities available
through the productive use of livestock. The project uses a two
pronged approach to the problem. First, conservation and range
management training and staffing divisions within the Ministry o
Agriculture provide an organizational base for addressing the
problem at a national level. Second, a pilot area range manage-
ment association is used to test policy implementation and field
approaches for later replication throughout the country. The
project, which began in 1981 and will end in 1987, is one in a
series of three linked projects; the first began in 1976 and the
third is expected to begin implementation in 1986.

In Liberia, a sequence of two projects, the Agriculture
Sector Analysis and Planning Project and the Agriculture Devel-
opment Program, focus on upgrading the Ministry of Agriculture
capacity to conduct sector analyses and use the data for planning,
purposes. The project is placed within the Ministry of Agricul-
ture at the national level. Training and technical assistance
form the core of the Monrovia-based projects. The first project
began in 1980 and the second will be completed in 1986.

The Niamey Department Development Project in Niger uses
various line agencies, at the subnational level, to develop and
extend technical packages to increase food production. In addi-
tion to raising production, the project is expected to improve
existing Government technical service agencies and the linkages
among them. Project funding is used to augment ongoing efforts
of the line agencies. Implementation began in 1982 and will be
completed in 1987.

The Bakel Small Irrigated Perimeters Project in Senegal is
attempting to diversify agricultural production and reduce the
risk of drought in this Sahelian country. The project is imple-
mented through a subnational parastatal organization focusing on
riverine areas. Training of farmer groups plays a major role in
the effort, and a gradual transfer of parastatal responsibilities:
to a local-level organization is planned. The project began in
1981 and is expected to end in 1986.

The North Shaba Rural Development Project in Zaire is
located in the northern part of what was formerly Katanga
Province. This project aims at increasing maize production by
introducing new technologies, strengthening local organizations,
and improving the grain marketing system. The project was ini-
tially implemented through a semiautonomous project management
unit, but responsibility is now being transferred to private sec
tor and village organizations. The project began in 1977 and
will be completed in 1986.

Thus, the activities of the six projects cover a wide range
agricultural college upgrading, land conservation and range











iverse, using parastatals, subnational line agencies, a national
ine agency, a national line agency with a geographically iso-
ated field area, and a self-contained project management unit as
implementation mechanisms. This variety poses the question of
hat contextual factors promoted such a wide range of responses.


.2 A Contextual Map


A focus on context requires an organizing scheme that de-
imits the boundaries of significant surroundings. Unfortu-
ately, the state-of-the-art has not arrived at a commonly
accepted contextual map. Contingency theories of management
gree that appropriate practices depend on circumstances, but the
heories do not agree on what circumstances are important.14
moreover, many expositions classify environments so abstractly
hat, at first glance, the classifications are difficult to use
n developing country settings.15

A classic study16 suggests a key factor for defining a
elevant environmental dimension for management purposes--how
oals of an organization (project) relate to the goals of signi-
icant organizations and institutions in the same environment.
his perspective is compatible with the conclusions of the stu-
ies of project implementation and the analysis of journal
articles noted above. It is also consistent with other work exa-
ining the political context of leadership and management
ecision-making in both Western and non-Western settings.17



4See, for example, Don Hellriegel and John W. Slocum, Jr.,
management: A Contingency Approach (Reading: Addison-Wesley,
974); and Fremont Kast and James Rosenzweig, Contingency Views
f Organization and Management (Chicago: SRA, 1973).
5F.E. Emery and E.L. Trist, "The Causal Texture of Organizational
environments Human Relations 18 (1965): 21-32.

6Ibid.

7See, for example, F.G. Baily, Strategems and Spoils: A Social
anthropology of Politics (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1969); Norman
phoff and Warren Ilchman, The Political Economy of Change
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969); Marc Lindenberg
nd Benjamin Crosby, Managing Development: The Political Dimen-
ion (West Hartford, Conn.: Kumarian Press, 1981); and Richard
eaver, Bureaucratic Politics and Incentives for Rural Develop-
ent, World Bank Staff Working Paper No. 537 (Washington, D.C.:
world Bank, 1982).





two major classes of contextual factors that must be examined.
The first class relates project objectives to the organizations
and individuals that stand to gain or lose from the successful
achievement of project objectives: the project stakeholders.
The second class identifies institutional and other elements that
affect relationships between projects and their stakeholders.
Both sets of contextual factors are discussed below.


2.3 Objectives and Stakeholders


The impetus behind the project offers some insight into the
initial set of stakeholders, and a brief look at the projects
suggests very different purposes behind them. The project in
Senegal, for example, was requested by a sophisticated group of
villagers, whereas the project in Zaire was based largely on the
national Government's interest in the project area. In Lesotho,
national-level recognition of the severity of the soil erosion
and range degredation problem was complemented by the support of
an influential chief in the project area. The project in Liberia
was ostensibly more the idea of the donor than the Government.
Thus, examining the origins of the projects indicates the in-
volvement of one set of stakeholders--those who initially saw
that they would benefit if the objectives were achieved.

Thus, one way to view the contexts of the six projects is to
begin with project objectives and then to examine who stands to
gain or lose from project operations. The construction of Table
1 accommodates this approach. The six projects are listed on the
vertical axis of the chart. Along the horizontal axis, the first
two items are the objectives each project addresses and the
stakeholders who stand to gain or lose as a result of project
success or failure.

In some cases, such as in Kenya, the risk bearers are non-
existent or peripheral. In other cases, such as in Liberia, the
same people may benefit in some way and lose in other ways, and
they may also be central to project operations. Moreover, the
degree of risk appears to be higher in Lesotho, Liberia, Senegal,
and Zaire than in the other two projects.

The nature of the stakeholders and the risk level they en-
counter can affect policies in the project environment, while
policies and other factors can also determine the risk that these
stakeholders will take.






-11-


2.4 Institutional and Other Constraints


The horizontal axis of Table 1 also shows relevant aspects
of the social and policy settings and other factors that affect
project activities and thus influence the strategy for organizing
and managing each project. Different contexts will require dif-
ferent approaches.

In some cases, such as in Lesotho, policies are intention-
ally ambiguous because of the risks being borne by one group of
stakeholders. National policymakers feared a loss of local sup-
port if needed regulations were clearly stated and vigorously
enforced. In most cases, however, the interaction is mutually
reinforcing. In Zaire, for example, the different groups of
stakeholders are likely to see one group's gain as another's
loss, and thus the conflict level is apt to be high. In Kenya,
this is much less the case.

Five of the six field study teams were favorably impressed
by the quality of the local personnel. This, in combination with
other findings, has implications for appropriate training
approaches in Africa. These implications will be discussed
later (see Section 4.5).

Among other contextual factors are characteristics specific
to the project area or institution but not common to other set-
tings within that country. Four of the projects were able to
identify and build on favorable circumstances that, although they
might make replicability difficult, made the management task
easier than it would have been elsewhere in the country. When
administrative, ecological, and ethnic boundaries all coincide,
the management task is simplified. And when the chief who pre-
sides over the area supports the project, it is surely time to go
to work, just as the project in Lesotho did.

A major conclusion about the six contexts relates to the
centrality of project objectives to the social setting. Lesotho,
Liberia, Niger, Senegal, and Zaire all had projects aimed at
changing basic behavior. The projects focused on basic values,
such as in Liberia, or basic behavior patterns, with Zaire the
most extreme example of this emphasis. Kenya restricted its
emphasis to an expansion of existing patterns of behavior, with-
out attempting basic change. These factors are displayed in
Table 1, which can be used to begin an assessment of the dif-
ferent organization and management strategies used to help
achieve project objectives within the different contexts.








Table 1. Project Contextual Factors


Stakeholders


Country and Project Objectives Potential Beneficiaries Potential Risk Bearers Institutional Factors Other Factors


Kenya: Egerton Expand teaching Faculty and staff Students College has autonomous Ethnic rivalry
College Expansion capability parastatal status
Project Students Highest population growth
Construct buildings Graduates no longer rate of any country
Employers of graduates guaranteed government
jobs Devaluation of shilling
Local laborers
Expected upgrade to
university status

Strong leadership

High-quality staff


Lesotho: Land Contain soil erosion Villagers, livestock Chiefs who might lose Contradictory and un- Unique juncture of admin-
Conservation and owners power clear range regulations istrative and ecological
Range Development Manage livestock as zones in project area
Project a productive asset Ministry of Agriculture Livestock owners High-quality staff
and users Influence of South Africa
Establish land con- Ethnic harmony but
servation and range Politicians who would stratified family Weakness of the South
management program lose support if project system African rand
for replication displaced local leaders
and failed Lack of knowledge of
livestock use in area


Liberia: Agricul-
ture Sector Analysis
and Planning Project
and Agriculture De-
velopment Program


Develop statistical
data for agricul-
tural planning

Establish sector
planning capabil-
ity in Ministry of
Agriculture


Identify and meet
organization and
management needs
created by tech-
nology transfer


Rural populations

Professionals in Ministry
of Agricultural


Ministry of Agriculture
officials


Administrative culture
based on a strong
tradition of patronage

Irregular salary pay-
ments and lack of
performance incentives

Well-trained individuals


Political coup

Rapidly deteriorating
economy

High uncertainty among
domestic and interna-
tional investors









Table 1. Project Contextual Factors (cont.)


Stakeholders


Country and Project Objectives Potential Beneficiaries Potential Risk Bearers Institutional Factors Other Factors


Niger: Niamey Increase food Farmers Civil servants who Change in leadership State in fiscal crisis
Department Devel- production follow project priori-
opment Project Civil servants ties rather than line Project must compete Transition from policy
Strengthen local ministry priorities with technical agen- promoting large
organizations Local cooperatives cies for priority regional projects to
Peasants who go in debt of field managers and one promoting small-
Strengthen technical for technical schemes technicians scale interventions
services and link- and invest energy in
ages among them questionable activities Inheritance of central-
ized administration
Develop and extend
effective technical Inefficient distribution
agricultural pack- of agricultural inputs
ages by state agencies

Inconsistent staff qual-
ity


Senegal: Bakel
Small Irrigated
Perimeters
Project


Diversify agricul-
tural production

Reduce risk of
drought


Farmers with riverine
land

Parastatal would
strengthen mandate to
develop riverine areas

Ministry of Health


Villagers who could lose Change in style of
independence leadership


Those who might contract
bilharzia


High-quality staff

Patronage-based admin-
istrative culture

Highly sophisticated
villagers requested
help

Produce to be sold
to parastatal; changed
to allow competitive
buying


High remittances from
France to project area

Low prices foster parallel
market

Tradition of independence
in remote project area












btaKenolaers


try and Project Objectives Potential Beneficiaries Potential Risk Bearers Institutional F


,e: North Shaba Increase food produc- Villages, farmers, Merchants who do not Inefficient and (
i1 Development tion in project producers want to be displaced bureaucracy
ect zone
Grain merchants National Government, High-quality indi
Satisfy political which wants to show civil servants
desire for program Civil servants (project interest in area
in geographic area staff) Villagers not ac(
Donor who wants success- to cooperation i
Improve organization Nonproducer populations ful project themselves and
of grain production in project area cious of outside
and marketing Villagers who are fear-
ful of national pene- Ethnic rivalries
Reduce national food tration into their strong kinship i
imports and foreign lives
exchange drain









jrtxvumj .i~f O ftiLnL ciz.jLuL1L~I..E,


Given the diverse problems addressed by the projects and the
various contexts within which they were placed, two questions
arise:

1. What strategies were used to accommodate to these dif-
ferent situations?

2. How well did those strategies work?

Each question is addressed below.


3.1 Management Strategies


Before differences and similarities in project management
strategies can be identified, the components of a management
strategy must be identified. The case studies, the literature,
and the original scope of work support the use of four components
for this analysis:

1. Goals and benefits

2. Organization and process

3. Resource management

4. Time horizon

Goals and benefits refers to the choice of trying to mobil-
ize people around clear and simple goals versus multiple goals
and multiple benefits. The success of each approach depends on
the circumstances.

Organization and process relates to the host institution in
which the project is placed and the linkages to significant
actors or beneficiaries whose cooperation is necessary for the
project to succeed. More than one organization may be needed
simultaneously, or there may be a shift from one to another
during implementation.

Resource management refers to the approach to financial man-
agement, procurement, and logistics. Decisions about who does
what and how funds are controlled make up the major dimensions of
this component.

The time horizon component introduces the way in which sus-
tainability considerations are built into the strategy. Contra-
dictions may arise between the needs for short-term service deli-
nA 1 -- n n I -, 4 -1-'1 4 4









Table 2 compares these dimensions of the six project manage-
ment strategies. In some instances, management strategy compo-
nents are derived from specific contextual factors. For example,
five of the six projects adopted multiple or vague goals to
accommodate multiple stakeholders as part of the management stra-
tegy. Kenya was the outlier.

Organizationally, two projects used parastatals as their
base, one was housed in a subnational government body, one used
an autonomous management unit to bypass pre-existing structures,
one was based in a national office of a line ministry, and one
adopted a two-tiered approach using a ministry at the national
level and a semi-independent unit at the field level. Thus,
there was a wide range of responses to the different settings,
each reflecting an attempt to avoid or strengthen a stakeholder
group.

Although the organizational components varied considerably,
the approaches to resource control were similar. Procurement and
administration of dollar funds remained largely in the hands of
USAID Missions and contractors. The imposition of external
record systems on local organizations was largely avoided. (For
example, the principal at Egerton College could track funds, but
his system was not one that an American accountant could follow.)

Dealing with time horizons takes a variety of approaches.
In Liberia, the organizational implications of project success
and the provision of incentives to support the continuation of
project-introduced innovations are central, even though they were
not included in the original project design. The project in
Lesotho focused on the establishment of a beneficiary organiza-
tion to inherit project functions at the field level. The proj-
ect in Zaire emphasized the dissolution of the management unit
and the assumption of its functions by public and private enti-
ties. A similar approach was used in Senegal. The project in
Niger shifted its focus from production to institution building.

Although there were some commonalities, the strategies
attempted to accommodate each project to the particular circum-
stances of its environment, including stakeholder dynamics,
opportunities in the project areas, and the relationships between
pre-existing organizations and clientele groups. This last fac-
tor offers a partial explanation for the decisions to bypass a
ministry in Zaire and to use existing technical services in
Niger.

The combination of strategy components was different for
each project. In Kenya, simple goals, organizational autonomy,
divided resource control, and an immediate focus on training and
buildings characterized the approach. The Lesotho project stra-
tegy, however, was very different except for resource control; it
7Tac ,hl= ai -a+ hi mlv ii rI l 4 r% h T 7-F iM mi *I r- % ri = e V-rrrt=n i r7+4- 4 ^-nMi1


I f,













intry and Project Goals and Benefits Organization and Process Resource Management


lya: Egerton Simple and clear goals Project based in autonomous Local control of training
lege Expansion parastatal schedule and local resource
iject Benefits to those within
target institution and Managed by principal Procurement USAID responsi-
employers of graduates ability


sotho: Land Multiple--livestock qual- Integral to ministry at national Technical assistance control
iservation and ity, land conservation, level of dollar funds
ige Development program building
iject Informal policy link Gradual local assumption of
Immediate benefits include national range management
training, dip tanks, and Area-based and autonomous at field division costs
shearing sheds site but reporting to national
division Local control of local con-
tribution
Grazing association linked to pre-
existing structures--high partici-
pation strategy


ieria: Agricul- Introduce sector planning, Based in Ministry of Agriculture Reliance on ministry for
*e Sector Analysis broad goals headquarters logistical support
I Planning Project
I Agriculture De- Support benefits multiple Collaborative approach Close USAID monitoring
opment Program actors in Ministry of
Agriculture



ier: Niamey Multiple objectives repre- Attached to local government Close control of local funds
*artment Devel- sented by different com- by director
lent Project ponents as marginal Director from Ministry of Rural
additions to ongoing Development Close USAID monitoring
programs
Reliance on multiple technical
service agencies for implemen-
tation

Strategy emphasizes self-manage-
ment and participation by local
organizations














country and Project Goals and Benefits Organization and Process Resource Management


enegal: Bakel Multiple--crop diversifi- Based in decentralized, autonomous, Uses local organizations to
nall Irrigated cation, drought risk regional parastatal enforce credit repayment
erimeters Project reduction, health, labor-
saving devices, credit, Builds on village leadership Hands-off role for USAID
new land opened, food except for procurement
production increased Uses village groups as production
through collaboration unit Supplies agricultural inputs
between parastatals and
farmers, integrated tech- Initially top-down; became
nologies introduced interactive

Confrontational interaction with
farmer federation led to more par-
ticipatory approach



aire: North Shaba Multiple--maize produc- Autonomous management unit bypasses Donor control of dollar funds
ural Development tion, farmer organiza- ministry with few external linkages
project tion, assistance to Special logistics unit in
merchants, testing tech- Multiple subunits reflect multiple project
nical packages, political goals
integration Local accounting for local
Informal processes paramount resources

Co-leadership by government- Project independent from both
supplied staff and donor-funded donor and government for
contractor daily control

Participation stressed










L.UL Iy Cl1U a -oiuy--uLU awaCLi llea uL LtLjeu a uj.LL.Lt.ejei L LuLIj.jia ll.IUII
of strategy components. The Niger project offered still another
nix: multiple objectives, multiple implementing agencies, close
monitoring, and a long-run emphasis.

The Senegal project had multiple objectives, put implement-
ing authority in a subnational body while using village groups
for implementation, took a less active role in resource manage-
nent, and moved from an immediate to an extended time perspec-
tive. The Zaire strategy encompassed multiple objectives, an
organizational bypass, and a shift of time horizon. Thus, dif-
Eerent local contexts produced different mixes of management
strategy components in each project.

Attempts to fit the project into the local organizational
setting, either as an integral part of an ongoing operation or as
a separate entity with no appropriate host institution, derived
nainly from management concerns--the need to get things done.
But another set of concerns also had to be resolved within their
specific context--concerns about strengthening the capacity of
Local people to manage new initiatives after the end of project
funding. The Ndegwa citation at the beginning of this paper
focuses on this issue: the ability to manage people and resour-
ces must be indigenized if a project is to contribute to lasting
success.


3.2 Management Enhancement Strategies


For many people, management enhancement, or capacity build-
ing, is equated with training. But this linkage misses the
variety of management enhancement possibilities. Certainly,
training is an important element of management capacity building,
but there are other elements as well.

Another element is technical assistance. The substantive
emphasis of the technical assistance staff and their roles in the
project directly influence enhancement activity. If technical,
but not management, support is offered, the effects may be dif-
Eerent than if both are provided. Similarly, when technical
assistance staff do a job rather than helping someone else do it,
the outcome is not the same. Thus, the technical assistance com-
ponent of a management enhancement strategy must be considered.










who is guiding and participating in implementation and whose
capacity to carry on is being developed? This element is linked
to technical assistance and training, but it emphasizes the focus
of those efforts. If the leadership strategy is not clarified,
it is hard to know whether the training and technical assistance
elements are directed at the most appropriate positions and
people. Participatory approaches that incorporate multiple
decision-makers and actors will have different requirements than
directive approaches.

These three elements of management capacity building--
training, technical assistance, and leadership and participation
--have a human emphasis; that is, they focus directly on people.
But individuals alone do not define management. Management takes
place within organizational settings, and two aspects of those
settings greatly affect the ability of managers to manage.

The first aspect is policy. Policies make a difference and
thus cannot be ignored. Economic policies can affect the rewards
and risks attached to alternative actions; they can support,
inhibit, or be neutral to management efforts. Enhancing manage-
ment performance may require lightening or removing the burdens
imposed by inappropriate policies, or it may require establishing
new communication channels or operating processes to develop and
implement policies.

The second aspect is structure. Without discretion, control
of resources, communication links, and legitimacy, it is diffi-
cult for a manager to lead. The right skills imparted to a per-
son in the wrong position may have no effect on performance.
Moreover, participatory decision-making processes will require
structures that accommodate group interaction rather than foster
individual isolation.

Table 3 groups these five components of a management en-
hancement strategy under two major headings--human emphasis and
organizational emphasis--to compare the approaches implicit in
the six projects. This framework allows a more complete assess-
ment of complementarities, contradictions, and gaps than one that
focuses on training tactics as the totality of the management
enhancement approach.





18See David K. Leonard, "The Political Realities of African ManagE
ment," paper delivered to the Workshop on Development Management
in Africa, Easton, Md., September 1984; and Philip Boyle et al.,
"On the Analysis of Organizational Culture in Development Project
Planning," paper delivered to the Workshop on Development
Management in Africa, Easton, Md., September 1984.














Leadership and
Country and Project Training Technical Assistance Participation Poll


Kenya: Egerton Technical only Technical assistance Principal of the col- None
College Expansion staff substituted for lege directed the
Project For faculty only faculty being trained project
overseas

Understudy to procure-
ment officer

No attempt to build other
management capability


Lesotho: Land Mixed technical and Counterparts and mentor Chiefs and village Range regular
Conservation and management relationships at leaders integral to lated into
Range Development national level (sub- grazing association--
Project Government staff and stitutes also) participatory field Informal stu
local leaders structure and process
Scapegoat role at field Direct focus
Apprenticeship rela- site helps local organ- Training in management to identify
tion to technical ization in short run to build leadership policy
assistance skills

Technical assistance
provided leadership in
beginning at field
level

Local and technical
assistance staff
sharing at national
level


Liberia: Agricul- Technical only Technical skills pre- Shifted between mini- Objective wa
ture Sector Analysis dominant ster and technical improve poil
and Planning Project Ministry of Agri- assistance staff
and Agriculture De- culture staff Functioned as role
velopment Program models
Academic, then
on-the-job

Flexible plan












Human Emphasis

Leadership and
Country and Project Training Technical Assistance Participation Polii


Niger: Niamey Joint planning Computerization Focus often on indi- None
Department Devel- exercises viduals with marginal
Dpment Project Accounting, record authority
Accounting and record keeping, technical
keeping for local
organizations Local organizational
development
Technical
Input supply


Senegal: Bakel Multiple levels Confused roles; became Project-farmer contracts Changes in o
Small Irrigated performers and supervision at group policy and
Perimeters Classroom and applied level strived for par- cultural po
Project No management component ticipatory approach performance
No management com-
ponent except for Built on village leaders
zone chief
Used local project
Inventory control and director in parastatal
maintenance skills
in parastatal


Zaire: North Shaba Mixed technical and Varied roles, shifted Participation used to Change in ag
Rural Development management from mentor relation- develop local sense of pricing pol
Project ships to direct manage- ownership
Inadequate quantity ment roles Permanent go
in relation to need Heavy emphasis on tech- presence ch
Management and technical nical assistance leader- dissolution
Apprenticeship to advisers ship in beginning tion of pro
technical assistance
subunit head, on- Mixed quality of advisers On-the-job responsibility
the-job training for local staff received
strong emphasis
Secondary focus;
most local staff
previously trained









The six projects varied considerably in their approaches to
management enhancement. Some emphasized policy, whereas others
ignoredd it. Some gave only technical training, whereas others
iixed technical and managerial training. Some emphasized capa-
:ity building in government staff, some stressed capacity
building within beneficiary groups, and others did both. For
;ome, managerial experience and participation in decision-making
7ere the foundation of the strategy; for others, it was training
Llone. Zaire was the most experience-oriented example, Kenya the
lost training oriented. The other four projects were between
:hese two extremes.

The project in Kenya focused on the human dimension and
ignoredd the organizational one. The Liberia project initially
lid the same, but as the importance of the organizational factors
)ecame overwhelming, a change in emphasis occurred. Most of the
projectss included both dimensions, but the human dimension was
emphasized, as is apparent in the following summaries of manage-
ient enhancement strategies.

Kenya focused on the human dimension by giving individuals
technicall training and ignored institutional aspects. Lesotho
iixed technical and managerial training with a strong emphasis on
leadershipp and participation while directing efforts toward
)olicy and structure constraints. Liberia began with an emphasis
)n technical training but shifted the focus to organizational
structuree as the constraints on skill use became apparent.
liger's approach was more incremental and augmentative, like
,enya's, with an emphasis on the human dimension. Senegal, in
contrast joined policy, organization, leadership, participation,
ind training into an integrated set of components with only tech-
iical assistance becoming confused. In Zaire, the human dimen-
;ion was dominated by technical assistance, leadership, and par-
:icipation whereas the organizational dimension loomed larger as
implementationn progressed.

It is not yet possible to draw conclusions about the rela-
tive quality of any strategy. The test of a strategy is its per-
formance within the various contexts for which it was designed.
7his is true of both management and management enhancement strat-
egies.


3.3 Project Performance


In most of the projects, it is too early to assess the long-
:erm impact of the various management approaches, but it is
possible to identify certain short-term outcomes. This section
assesses the use of the different approaches in different set-
tings against five performance categories. Two of the categories
ire drawn from the original scope of the review, two are based on


1)13





-_Z-


JllllU.IIly II.LYII.L9yIIiLB U i1 LIIe Lij!u bLuaies, ana one is a carcnaii
category.

The first category is resource management, for which actual
performance is mixed. On the one hand, these projects did not
have major problems in the flow of funds or budget overruns. On
the other hand, one-half of them were severely criticized for
lack of bookkeeping and accounting procedures, and two were
scored average or mediocre. Only one project performed well in
this area, and even that had minor performance problems and was
characterized by an informal and secret record-keeping system for
local budget contributions.

The second category, training, played a large role in five
of the project strategies. Performance in this category was
outstanding. All of the projects met their targets, even though
the training given by one project was inadequate for its task.
Two projects exceeded their targets by using a combination of
tight supervision of the schedule and surplus funds generated by
the dollar's strength.

The third performance category is adaptation. This category
was added as a result of a consistent pattern noted in the case
studies. All identified some changes in use of resources, shifts
in emphasis, or evolving organizational linkages reflecting
important management decisions about the changes needed to
address new circumstances or discoveries affecting project suc-
cess or failure.
ml----r -j3_r -J__^ ^--~ r .C ^ ~- - 1-^- ^--^--i 2 _- -r -C s __- i- J- _-3





-25-


the policy link in Lesotho or the focus on organization in
Liberia. The project in Senegal was even faulted for an overad-
herence to some inappropriate objectives set at the design stage.
Three of the field studies concluded that flexibility to readjust
targets, organization, and procedures was necessary so that the
imperfect knowledge of designers and their inability to take
advantage of new circumstances would not handicap implementers.

Sustainability, the fourth category, refers to the prospects
for initiatives begun under the project that were to continue
after the end of donor funding. Sustainability refers not to the
perpetuation of an organization but to the continuation of ser-
vices, new behavior, and benefit flows.20 This category was
included because most case studies emphasized that, despite the
high success these projects showed in achieving short-run objec-
tives, their chances for long-run viability were uncertain.

The reason for this concern varied. In Kenya, the ability
to assume recurrent costs was the issue; in Lesotho, Senegal, and
Zaire, it was the capacity of local organizations to carry on; in
Niger, there was doubt about the validity of the project-promoted
technology; in Liberia, local commitment to the project mission
was questionable. Most of the field teams recognized the impor-
tance of these issues and analyzed them separately in their case
studies.

The final category, other targets and benefits, deals with
two types of outcomes that go beyond the previous categories:
(1) substantive problems addressed by the projects and (2)
unplanned effects.

Table 4 assesses the projects in relation to these five
aspects of performance.

Summarizing the performance of these projects leads to the
following four conclusions:

1. Intermediate targets such as training, construction, and
agricultural production were largely achieved.

2. Some form of adaptation occurred with all the projects,
and four of the six made major shifts in focus or opera-
tions. (The projects in Kenya and Senegal were the
exceptions.)





20See George Honadle, Fishing for Sustainability: The Role of
Capacity Building in Development Administration, IRD Working
Paper No. 8 (Washington, D.C.: Development Alternatives, Inc.,
1981).













Country and Project Resource Management Training Adaptation Sustainability Benefits and Other Targets


Kenya: Egerton Generally excellent Targets exceeded Extra funds resulting Recurrent cost burden Building targets exceeded
College Expansion from dollar apprecia- raised
Project Procurement of library Schedule met tion used to build
books only notable resource center Inattention to manage-
failing ment needs generated
Savings in training by expansion
budget used to train
more people


Lesotho: Land Satisfactory overall Targets exceeded Extra funds used for Questionable at field Range management changing
Conservation and training level
Range Development Local budget contri- Not enough attention Replicability questionable--
Project bution less than to needs of nongov- Informal policy link Chances good at project area uniquely con-
planned ernment personnel important national level trollable

Study of local prac- Participation high
tices introduced


Liberia: Agricul- No major problems Targets met (flexible) Focus on organization- Difficult to instill After initial strengthening
ture Sector Analysis al requirements dealt the values under- of capacity to generate basic
and Planning Project Lack of alternative On-the-job training and with critical factor lying the use of data, overall Ministry of
and Agriculture De- Government discre- in-country seminars well not in original the techniques-- Agriculture performance
velopment Program tionary funds received design no rewards at deteriorated as a result of
limited perfor- present factors outside project
mance control; capacity to conduct
In doubt annual surveys remains
Local contribution
less than planned


Niger: Niamey Poor record keeping and Farmer training (CPT) Shift from production Little strengthening Training center targets met
Department Devel- inventory control successful to institution of local organiza-
opment Project building tions or participa-
Decision blockades Inadequate followup to tion
result in delays cooperative training
Questionable techni-
Key position unfilled cal packages

Ownership has not
been transferred
to technical agen-
cies


-J---















negal: Bakel Poor management Positive impact but Tested unplanned Local organizati
all Irrigated accounting mostly at staff level technology strengthened
rimeters Project
Replacement of technical Use of informal system Participation
assistance staff stressed
erratic Adherence to inappro-
priate objectives National price p.
Increasing village changed
training

ire: North Shaba Financial management Inadequate in scope Shift from production Unknown
ral Development poor but did not and intensity, but to institutional focus
Dject impede output original targets met Now devolving soi
Use of informal system functions to pr
Excellent logistics On-the-job develop- village, and pul
operations ment of local staff Adapting components to organizations
capability contri- field realities con-
Local financial buted to success tribute to success Recognized belati
resources less than as management ii
planned may yield future
lessons

Participation hi'









3. Resource management had a mixed record, with three proj-
ects doing well and three managing resources poorly.


context and strategy. The Egerton College strategy of simple
city, autonomy, and a training focus worked in a setting in 9
there was little organized stakeholder risk or opposition. I
simple objectives and avoidance of the institutional dimensic
of management enhancement would most likely have led to a qui
collapse of the projects in Lesotho, Liberia, and Zaire, whei
nni-n ial1 nnnn.i inn minahi- rraoi1v hanv bhan mcnhili 7.d had nc


UYLAX CQLILL 0 L. k i1 L %_llG LA L.. % I- ilA t 4. Ll LA W L. lla.. L .LiA W JL WJ. .11 L
ential in determining the effectiveness of alternative management
enhancement strategies.

Thus, the link between context and strategy has influenced
the performance of these six agricultural projects. The task is
to derive some crosscutting lessons from these findings.
















LI II LLLUV J. UVI LL L I- UL LUL tL =CL Le-L). DUL Lj LI J LIII L
inherent in this exercise should be recognized. The
sis is based on examinations of just six agricultural pr
in six African countries. The fieldwork portion of each
was done in approximately 1 month. Thus, both the samp
and the time frame limit the general conclusions that ca
from the patterns emerging from the exercise.

Concentration on the management dimension provided both
stages and disadvantages. The narrow focus and the prior
ration helped field teams organize the effort and work
3h the peripheral aspects of the observations. However,
the exercise's limitations, it is still possible to dis
rns and relationships within this body of information th
B used as guidelines for further inquiry and experimen-
n.


Goals and Benefits


%^J W-LIV- ^i 2 A -%-. .72co %jL ul1%- /J.L %Jf j^ ^ %- %, 1 G iA L %.P^J J L 4
nation problems. But other field experience
t conclusions about the role of objectives


L L I le a-LJ-C wa~ Oc OUUUY aM.De=i. L-CU LiicLL. CL C
nentation "there is still no agreement on wl
was a maize or food production project or wl
"*^j^4^^^ *i i 1 f^' r.,rw 4-,,~,, ,,w^. A.^4 ^^^:n

;j L y. =CL.0 U. tIJ Lt = -
iether [the project]
,-+- I- 1" ;-* 4- -. en m~ii 4-i






-30-


project area and metropolitan centers, creating a positive
experience was bound to require cooperation among numerous public
and private and local and national actors. Each set of critical
actors needed to assess its interest in the project.

Different goals and purposes were interjected during the
life of the project. Although from an external perspective this
confused the process, the result allowed both local actors and
actors with very different agenda to continue to cooperate (or at
least not to refuse to cooperate) despite their differing
interpretations of project objectives and thus to maintain imple-
mentation momentum.

But it was not just acceptance of different interpretations
that kept people involved. They gained short-run advantages by
helping the project, even if these were not the initial project
objectives. The initial objectives included the following:

Bank credit to small grain merchants and cooperatives to
purchase trucks and spare parts as well as grain

Small farmer production credit

Business training for grain merchants

Assistance to the national cereals office to train
agents, license merchants, and purchase or rent equip-
ment

Although these objectives were not all achieved, the
exchanges between the project and stakeholders concerning fuel,
haulage, seed distribution, and other resources did serve to gain
support for the project from competing groups. Thus, cooperation
with the project gave a wide range of actors a stake in its
operations and success. Multiple goals generated multiple sup-
porters because the goals encompassed multiple benefits.

Two case studies, in Senegal and Zaire, introduced the con-
cept of "multiple benefits" when they mentioned that "success
breeds success." Three more, in Lesotho, Liberia, and Niger,
also considered the concept without using the term. That is,
some early benefit flows can create an aura of effectiveness that
generates support for future project-related efforts. When this
aura does not surround a project early in implementation, it may
be in danger of being labeled a failure, and the process of
securing support becomes more costly and difficult. Quick and
tangible results such as dip tanks, roads, clinics, fertilizer,
or transportation can win immediate friends and influence future
performance.

Although these benefits may be peripheral to the technical
objectives of the original project design, they are crucial for







-31-


its success. In some cases they may co-opt potentially strong
peripheral opposition to upcoming activities, whereas in other
cases they may elicit support from intended beneficiaries who
will later be asked to make behavioral changes or sacrifices.

An example of this occurred in the Land Conservation and
Range Management Project in Lesotho. A long-term objective was
to stop the severe erosion that is devastating the country. To
realize this goal, the way rangelands are used must change, and
this requires basic changes in how decisions are made about the
use of this resource. The primary beneficiaries of the project,
those who graze their cattle, goats, and sheep in the immediate
project area, will thus be asked to give up their autonomy in
deciding where and when they will use different ranges. Instead
of households deciding, a grazers association will do so.

Project management personnel realized that the transfer of
decision-making authority from households to the grazing asso-
ciation would take time and require education and capacity
building. To help buy this time, the project provided benefi-
ciaries with some immediately useful services. Dip tanks,
shearing sheds, and veterinary services are providing immediate
benefits and helping to diminish people's resistance to surren-
dering their autonomy. The educational process of the grazing
association is made easier by multiple benefits.

In such situations, early, visible benefits are important.
If credibility is not established quickly, the chances for long-
run success decline. During implementation, the formal technical
objectives in project documents are not the main objectives pro-
pelling many of the major actors. Thus, management process
involves balancing and mixing these other agenda to produce
actions that are not directly contrary to, although not always
totally supportive of, the technical objectives. Delaying the
implementation of particular components, pursuing peripheral
issues, and otherwise satisfying potential opponents may be
necessary. Bolstering the positions of actors whose agenda are
supportive may be the most important management activity, and
designing a project with multiple objectives may assist that
effort.

When project designers ignore or minimize the complexity of
a developing country's social and organizational settings, they
endanger the project. Development is a multilevel, multidimen-
sional process requiring involvement, acquiescence, support, or
active commitment from those in competition for limited resour-
ces. This competition often manifests itself in the implemen-
tation process; success often depends on sufficient project
flexibility to accommodate this competition.

Therefore, a central design issue is identification of the
role of objectives in management strategy. Do certain tech-










nologies and autonomous organizational settings support the use
of single objectives, or will the need for the involvement of
many different actors favor a design that provides them with
multiple benefits? Different projects and settings will require
different strategies. The key is the agreement between approach
and setting, including the array of stakeholders and the risks
they will incur.


4.2 Reducing Stakeholder Risk


Closely linked to the role of goals and benefits in imple-
mentation dynamics is the need to reduce the risks to key stake-
holders so that they cooperate. Five of the six projects
contained elements of this process. A separately identifiable
project unit or identity was sometimes used as a potential scape
goat in the event of poor performance. Highly visible technical
assistance teams, such as those in Zaire and Lesotho, also played
this role.

In Lesotho, local decision-makers were able to distance
themselves from politically unpopular, but technically necessary
decisions by attributing them to the project. The short-run
strategy was to use multiple benefits and a scapegoat to initiate
some fundamental changes in the use of local resources. Although
it was not without its difficulties, the approach was working.

Political reform entails risk. Some national political
leaders agreed with the need for change, but they also feared it
possible repercussions. They needed a success story to help
justify and support new policies. Thus, there was a double bind
--the project needed a new national policy to work but the poli-
ticians needed a successful working project before they could
safely promote new policy.

Three elements were used to deal with this delicate situa-
tion. The first was a mixed benefit package that co-opted some
of the potential opposition to the new policy and thus protected
the politicians. The second was the visibility and autonomy of
the project, which allowed it to become the scapegoat if things
did not work. The third was the use of informal mechanisms for
policy analysis and communication. This technique defused the
- - - 4.. -4 -1- 1 -- - - - 4- 4-1-- -- '1 _* -__ _^l r -1 - - -- _


policymaKers.





-33-


making processes, the long-term presence of a scapegoat com-
ponent, and a recognizable project identity. Just as the need
for multiple goals and mixed benefits encouraged nonlinear
thinking, so the disruptive nature of much policy reform and
institutional development requires a broad understanding of risk
reduction and management roles. This entails far more than
simply getting things done without regard to the process or the
cost to various participants or bystanders. Often, this percep-
tion involves assessing the tradeoffs between giving immediate
benefits to diminish the danger of future risk and asking for
current sacrifices with the potential for future gain. In either
case, time horizons that compete for management attention require
attention.


4.3 Time Horizon


Emphasizing the need for immediate benefits highlights one
difficulty inherent in development. What is needed for short-
term performance can stand in the way of long-run objectives.
Direct performance of project activities by project staff and
technical assistance teams can impede the efforts of local citi-
zens and civil servants to initiate the activities that the proj-
ect is trying to stimulate and to continue them after the project
is completed.

All six cases were high-performance projects. They were
judged to have achieved a high proportion of their objectives;
training, construction, and service delivery targets were met or
were exceeded. And yet all six case studies questioned the
sustainability and ultimate impact of the projects.

Delivering goods and services on time and as specified
requires a preoccupation with direct action by the project staff.
This situation often leads to concentration of authority in a
relatively autonomous body such as a parastatal or project man-
agement unit and to a management style that ignores requests to
support initiatives originating within beneficiary groups for
fear they will interfere with the prescribed service delivery
schedule.

The use of an autonomous unit in the project in Zaire, for
example, had helped bypass an ineffective Ministry of Agriculture
and complete construction. But as the project nears completion,
the issue of recurrent maintenance, staffing, and funding of
project-initiated activities becomes crucial. Short-run solu-
tions can impede the transition to sustained development.

A similar situation exists in Lesotho. Project and tech-
nical assistance staff in one project component have achieved
some immediate results in working with a grazers association by








taking a strong and open role in decision-making. This approach]
reduced the pressure on the local officers of the association ai
facilitated some controversial decisions regarding livestock
movements. However, this project crutch is limited to providing!
a financial subsidy for the association; long-run viability wil:
require a different approach. Training the association to run
its own affairs, make its own decisions, and cover its own costly
must replace the current technical assistance style of doing it
for them.

Although the six projects showed some evidence of early pe:
formance, all eventually encountered questions of postproject
viability, local capacity, and incentives for future action by
beneficiaries, counterparts, and bystanders. Without permanent
institutions equipped to carry on, future prospects look bleak.






-35-


bute widely believed necessary for performance. This suggests
that, within the contexts of these projects, local use of
imported techniques is far less important than previously
assumed.

However, one contextual factor may qualify this finding.
These projects began after the economic shocks emanating from the
fuel price increases of the early 1970s. Thus, the foreign
exchange components of the project budgets were planned in the
expectation of high inflation and costs. The recent strength of
the dollar, however, has served to generate excess foreign
exchange funds and lower the pressure on this aspect of manage-
ment activity.

At least three of the case studies found that loose, yet
seemingly effective, informal financial management practices
characterized local behavior. Not imposing outside procedures on
host country project managers appeared to be essential to suc-
cessful performance.

It is important to note that in five of the six projects,
procurement responsibility resided in the technical assistance
contractor or AID staff. In the sixth project, assignment of
responsibility was not clear, and poor procurement caused a minor
setback that marred the project record.

The acceptance of indigenous managerial styles and locally
approved procedures for using local funds was decisive. If
possible, resource management procedures should not hinder effec-
tive managerial leadership.


4.5 Managerial Leadership


Leadership is important for success. The experience of
these six projects suggests the following three key aspects of
managerial leadership:

1. A focus on interactions between a project and other
organizations

2. The use of informal communication and decision-making
processes

3. A sense of teamwork and compensation that shifts re-
sponsibilities among different actors

To nonmanagement specialists, a manager is often described
as a person who supervises others, gets them to work hard, and
makes sure that they comply with the organization's procedures.
But this internally focused orientation may not be the distin-





-36-


guishing characteristic of those who guide successful development
efforts.

In these projects, effective managers were those who
smoothed the interactions between the project and other organiza-
tions influencing the project's operational ability. If local
court support was needed to enforce range regulations, as in
Lesotho, building good relations with the judges could prove
decisive. Similarly, when the cooperation of another ministry
was critical, as in Zaire, management time was devoted to
obtaining that cooperation.

Policy directives, such as those dealing with crop prices or
range regulations, also can help or hinder implementation by
affecting participation by beneficiaries and action by staff. In
Lesotho, a link to policymakers and access to information about
policy were crucial for success. The original project design
called for an adviser to the minister to attend to this issue.
The ministry deleted this element from the project that was
finally approved and implemented. However, management recognized
the vital role of this position and continued to negotiate for
its reinstatement after implementation had begun. The result was
the inclusion of an adviser at a lower level in the ministry.
This adviser worked on human resources issues and informally
undertook policy-related studies, translations, and information
dissemination activities. Management initiative in pursuing this
issue led to improved project performance as a result of a key
link to the local setting.

When opportunities appear, they often must be seized quickly
or they are lost. In Senegal, leadership turnover combined with
simultaneous pressure from both donors and beneficiaries enabled
a manager to make some basic changes in project operations, which
would have been difficult without outside support. The manager
saw the opportunity and took it. The result was the regeneration
of a deteriorating project. Using and strengthening external
linkages formed a major part of implementation activity.

A second key aspect noted in all of the case studies is the
importance of informal processes for accomplishing tasks.
Communication channels, meeting places, financial decisions and
records, policy recommendations, and economic transactions out-
side prescribed organizational channels and hierarchies dominated
activity in all projects.

Both managers who accomplished tasks and observers who
understood events around them recognized and used informal
systems. Sometimes informal, bureaucratic practices mirrored
village ways of operating; at other times, they did not.

Experience with informal management included using parallel
markets to stretch project budgets, social gatherings and ethnic





-37-


alliances to reduce opposition to decisions, political bartering
with project resources to obtain support, and confidential stud-
ies of policies that hindered project objectives and processes to
determine what kind of action could be taken. However, to take
these approaches, managers had to be sensitive to the opportuni-
ties offered by informal dynamics.

Projects are temporary--artificial creations deposited into
environments marked by resource scarcity and preexisting rules
for moderating the battles for these new resources. These rules
often cannot be publicized without making them ineffective. In
Zaire, for example, trading project fuel in return for construc-
tion materials was an effective way of ensuring timely construc-
tion of the project, but publicizing the transaction would have
triggered a series of events that would embarrass cooperators and
bring activity to a stand-still. Good managers recognize this
characteristic of informal processes and keep them out of offi-
cial reports and processes.

Thus, identifying these rules and the key people within
informal networks becomes an important activity of managers.
What works is not always what is officially sanctioned.
Moreover, what worked before may not be appropriate in new cir-
cumstances or with new people. Strategy implementation is a
never-ending battle against the forces of decay. But those who
lead the charge can also shift its direction. In a team
situation, one player can pick up the banner at the point where
another has slipped. This introduces the third key aspect of
effective leadership--teamwork and compensation.

No single element mentioned above can guarantee success;
instead, it is the interplay and balance among them that lead to
the observed results. In the case study projects, good perfor-
mance often resulted from a number of elements working in con-
cert. In Senegal, staff turnover, pressure from farmers for more
participation, pressure from AID to deliver goods and services,
and the relative autonomy of the parastatal host institution com-
bined to present an opportunity to a newly arrived manager to
turn around a failing effort. Later, AID followed a hands-off
policy in Senegal, which was appropriate at that point. But if
the initiative had not been taken at the opportune time, the
result might have been poor performance.

This characterization of management as a balancing act goes
beyond the relationships among the actors in the process. It
also encompasses goals, procedures, and organization. The need
to deliver short-term benefits versus the need to build manage-
ment capacities to ensure long-term project sustainability pro-
vides one example of the balancing of goals. Similarly, a host
institution that is appropriate at the beginning of implemen-
tation may not be suitable toward the end. This was the case in
Zaire. However, appropriate solutions may not always be sequen-









tial. In the Lesotho project, two different kinds of host insti-
tutions existed concurrently; the project worked through the
ministry in one component and operated autonomously in another.

As individual staff members or leaders move from one posi-
tion to another, the value and nature of particular organiza-
tional relationships change. For example, with a weak manager as
director of the parastatal in Senegal, AID followed one approach
to project organization, but when an effective individual took
over the position, more autonomy was permitted the national orga-
nization.

No realistic review of management can ignore the pivotal
role played by key individuals. At the same time, building a
project strategy on the leadership of a single person is risky.
Moreover, long-run success requires the institutionalization of
new behavior patterns. This means moving beyond reliance on one
individual and interpreting options in terms of that person to
thinking and acting on the basis of the continuity of similar
actions by different people.

The problem here is similar to that faced in trying to
balance short- and long-run objectives. In the beginning, an
active leader may be critical to project performance. Eventu-
ally, however, dependence on this leadership may hinder the
assumption of project functions by regular staff members. A
change in approach must occur--active leadership by a charismatic
leader must yield to his support of the regular bureaucracy. Few
people, leaders, or staff are comfortable during this transition.


4.6 Training and Technical Assistance


Training is often considered to mean providing the counter-
parts of the technical assistance staff with the educational
qualifications and technical skills that will allow them to
I- __ --A 4- -1-- - -C -- &. U 4- - U 4 - 1 -4.. ".. L.r C~rr










boon. Recognizing the mobility of skilled personnel within an
organization is more realistic than assuming that project tech-
nical functions occupy the highest priority for either the indi-
viduals or the organizations that employ them.

The organizational dimension is key. Five of the case
studies judged favorably the quality of personnel in the projects
and the organizations supporting them. The problems were less
with the skills of the individuals than with the difficulty of
applying those skills within the organizational settings.
Management enhancement efforts that only recognize the need for
skills miss the target. These cases demonstrate that the policy
and structural aspects of the organizational dimension are impor-
tant.

Narrow views of who should be trained also lead to missed
opportunities. In Lesotho, much non-civil servant training was
needed to strengthen initial attempts at beneficiary partici-
pation. In Niger, multilevel training was needed in a benefi-
ciary organization, but only the officers were given training.

There is also political value in on-site, multiorganiza-
tional training. Interorganizational relations can be improved
through shared training experiences. When training is viewed as
a tool for strengthening organizations rather than a conduit for
imparting skills to individuals, it is more likely to improve
performance and results. Multilevel, work-group-oriented efforts
dealing with real problems can enhance local management
capacity.21

The views regarding training also are true of technical
assistance. Different styles at different organizational levels
or within different project components may be needed, as was the
case in Lesotho. Or the evolution of different approaches may
need to occur sequentially, as in Zaire and Liberia. Eventually
a transition from an active role to a support role will be
needed.22 The issue is not to bring expertise from the outside
to do something correctly (the "right" policy); rather, it is to
establish an ongoing local capacity to make and implement effec-






-40-



tive decisions. Successful development management leads to
institutional development: mentor relationships, shared respon-
sibility, scapegoat roles, and skills in mobilizing local resoul
ces characterized technical assistance styles that supported thE
enhancement of local capacities.

These six key elements--goals and benefits, stakeholder
risk, time horizon, resource control, leadership, and training
and technical assistance--and the lessons derived from them
represent the major management concerns emerging from the case
studies. The implications of these lessons are explored in the
concluding section.


5. CONCLUSIONS


The findings and lessons presented in this paper lead to tl
realization that development managers--those mere mortals--
influence the decisions made by the policymakers--those august
Olympians--and the impact that these decisions have. The
experience of six agricultural development projects in Africa
indicates that management is an important element in development
performance. The ways in which management affects project per-
formance are sometimes, but not always, straightforward and
obvious. At first glance, effective strategies are often coun-
terintuitive, and performance usually results from interactions
among multiple aspects of context and strategy--not from simple,
single factors.

Agricultural projects provided the empirical basis for theE
conclusions, but the insights that emerge transcend agricultural
projects. They are especially relevant to policy reform and
human resources development programs because they focus not on
the programs alone but on the interactions between the programs
and their contexts.


5.1 Context


Different contexts will require different management stratE
gies. It is particularly important to identify those who stand
to lose and those who stand to gain from project success or
failure and the risk level for each stakeholder.

Simple, clear-cut objectives are helpful to managers in
situations in which organizational autonomy and no key losers










Sociopolitical factors, interorganizational relationships,
ind policy settings are all important. General solutions to
Local problems may or may not be appropriate, but the implemen-
:ation of any solution must take local circumstances into account
Lf it is to succeed.23 This is intuitively obvious, but the
multiple objectives and complex projects that may be necessary to
contend with local circumstances successfully are not so obvious.
multiple objectives and project components may be particularly
necessary for projects involved in policy reform because of the
resistance that is raised to the management of such efforts.


5.2 Management Strategies


Successful management strategies can incorporate, under dif-
ferent circumstances, either clear, simple goals or multiple,
complexx goals. Effective strategies are those that are tailored
;o the project's objectives and the local setting, especially the
irray of stakeholders surrounding the project. The case studies
support this conclusion as a pattern explaining success.

Successful management also follows a second pattern: infor-
aal practices and communication channels are associated with most
examples of success. Informal dynamics are adaptation mecha-
iisms, and attempts at policy reform ignore this at their peril.
management practices can raise or lower the riskiness of reform
f forts.

Design flexibility also assists the management effort. A
project's original objectives, organization, or components often
.rove incapable of adapting to new knowledge or situations.
Adaptation, however, is characteristic of success. Olympians may
leed to be informed by, and learn from, the experience of mor-
:als.











23The argument here is not that the wheel must be reinvented for
every setting. This is certainly not the case--there are pat-
terns of relationships. Suburban commuting, grand prix racing,
and off-the-road driving all place different performance demands
on tires. Similarly, different Third World settings require dif-










The creation of new autonomous organizations to bypass
existing but inappropriate administrative machinery can help to
achieve short-run performance. But this approach often encoun-
ters difficulty in the attempt to achieve long-run sustainabil-
ity. Moreover, projects that are successful at meeting immediate
service-delivery targets are not necessarily self-sustaining.

This situation can introduce a dilemma: the need for quick
benefits to placate key stakeholders may require one approach,
whereas the need to build capabilities in local institutions may
require another. Different organizational approaches for dif-
ferent components or an evolving series of organizational changes
are both options that have been used with some success.

Rigorous local financial management practices are less
important for project performance than is commonly assumed. This
was particularly the case in projects for which dollar funding
was enhanced by the increasing strength of the dollar during
project implementation. Auditors and evaluators should be sen-
sitive to the situational nature of effective resource control
and should not equate the importation of sophisticated tracking
methods with development success. Enhancing local capacity is
more important than compliance with imposed procedures.


5.3 Management Enhancement Strategies


Management enhancement is often equated with training, but
training is only one component of management enhancement.
Technical assistance, beneficiary participation, and leadership
are also part of human enhancement strategies. In addition, two
elements of enhancement strategy focus on organizations rather
than individuals. They are policy and structural changes.

The six case studies indicate the importance of economic
policy and organizational structure. In fact, the case studies
found fewer problems with the human dimension than with the orga-
nizational one. The use of skills was constrained by the set-
tings in which they were to be applied. Liberia and Zaire were


i _









the most vivid examples of this situation, but it is common
throughout the case studies and the continent.24

Although African countries are commonly perceived to suffer
from deficiencies in skilled personnel, the six projects show a
different situation. Fifteen years ago, large-scale participant
training may have been the appropriate response. Today, however,
although training is still important, bad policies and poor orga-
nizational arrangements appear to be the key constraints. This
suggests the need for assigning a higher priority to organization
and management assistance, policy reform, and action-oriented
training applied in mutually supportive ways. From this perspec-
tive, policy reform and training become dimensions of a manage-
ment enhancement strategy, and policy change becomes one of the
multiple objectives to be obtained through a management process.


5.4 Implications


Some of the conclusions of this paper were intuitively
obvious before the case studies, but others were not. Whether
obvious or counterintuitive, few are easily accomplished. None
will occur simply as a result of new policy directions or by
assuming good management. Management is a constant battle, and
one actor must be ready to pick up the challenge as another
tires. In projects that foster a team spirit, the chances for
success improve. This conclusion is applicable to the process of
policy reform as much as to agricultural development efforts.

The ways context, management strategies, management en-
hancement strategies, and project performance interact have prac-
tical implications. Some are pertinent for action--project




24Among the many analyses of how organizational and institutional
factors inhibit skill use in Africa, the following offer argu-
ments particularly related to the conclusions of this paper:
Chikwendu C. Ukaegbu, "Are Nigerian Scientists and Engineers
Effectively Utilized? Issues on the Development of Scientific
and Technical Labor for National Development," World Development
13, 4 (1985):499-512; Goran Hyden, No Shortcuts to Progress:
African Development Management in Perspective (London: Heineman,
1983); Robert Price, Society and Bureaucracy in Contemporary
Ghana (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975); Steve
Wiggins, The Management of Rural Development Projects in Devel-
oping Countries (University of Reading, Department of Agricul-
tural Economics and Management, Development Study No. 27, 1985);
and David Gould, Bureaucratic Corruption and Underdevelopment in
the Third World: The Case of Zaire (New York: Pergamon, 1980).


m 6"









design, management, and evaluation. Others are pertinent for
future research.

Design implications include the following:

-- Social and administrative soundness analyses should
include stakeholder profiles to determine appropriate
management strategies for projects.

Management enhancement strategies should go beyond
training and remove constraints on effective perfor-
mance.

Consideration of the need for multiple objectives and
quick benefits should influence implementation planning
and sequencing.

Flexibility should be built into project design.

For management, key implications are as follows:

Reduction of stakeholder risk should be emphasized.

Informal communication and decision-making approaches
should be explored.

The balance between production and capacity building
should be weighed.

A potential need for project scapegoats should be anti-
cipated.

-- Promoting a team approach will improve chances for proj-
ect success.

Long-run and postproject sustainability should be over-
arching concerns.

For evaluation, the implications include the following:

Helping managers to articulate strategies, identify
shifting circumstances, and adopt new tactics should be
a major concern.

Identification and appreciation of informal processes
will be needed.

Overemphasis on resource control is to be avoided.

Implications for further research include the following:

-- The focus should be on the context-strategy fit rather
than on intervention attributes as independent









-- A refined typology of contexts is needed to advance the
state-of-the-art.

These points are summarized in the matrix presented in
'able 5.

The six case studies and this synthesis paper have attempted
.o identify important dimensions of the context of development
management in Africa and the ways that context and strategy
.nteract in a project, but much remains to be done. More refined
:ypologies of context and project fit are needed, and realistic
.ypologies will not spring full grown from the theories or
experiencess of any single discipline. Development management
foes beyond the simple delivery of goods and services to encom-
iass local capacity building and institutional development. To
ring the environment into focus, political, economic, and
Anthropological perspectives will be needed. Watching from Mt.
)lympus will not be enough.

The experience reported here does not dismiss the importance
if Olympian decisions or decision-makers, but it does provide
valuablee evidence of the importance of the mortal manager and the
development administration specialist. It further suggests that
management strategies are important and often contain counterin-
.uitive elements, that the strategies should be based on
knowledgee of local settings, and that complementary strategies
.re needed to enhance local management capabilities. When these
actors are not taken into account, unnecessary barriers are
laced in the path of development management in Africa.













Context/Strategy Design Management Evaluation


Context Stakeholder profile is useful. Shifts in emphasis are Evaluations should id
necessary to adjust to project responses to
Knowledge of constraints changing circumstances. changing circumstance
and incentives for performance
are needed. Informal mechanisms are Constraints on flexib
useful for juggling con- and adaptation should
Flexibility is needed to adapt tending perspectives identified.
to contextual change. among key actors.



Management Multiple stakeholders support Ability to reduce stake- Evaluations should he
Strategy use of multiple objectives, holder risk is key to managers articulate
benefits, and organizational performance. tial strategy and id
components. shifts and implicati
Multiple actors must be
Informal linkages can be more able to take up the Overemphasis on resou
effective than formal ones slack if anyone falters-- trol is to be avoided
in high-risk situations, division of responsibility
must not be rigid. Evaluators should be
An initial phase producing to the importance of
quick benefits may be Scapegoat role sometimes formal processes.
needed to gain support for useful for lowering risk.
long-run changes later.

Organizational choices should
be based partly on stake-
holder profiles.

Management Training for individuals is Mentor relationships, The balance between p
Enhancement seldom adequate; assistance management responsibility, and capacity building
Strategy in changing organizational and participation should be noted.
constraints is needed, become integral parts of
implementation. Constraints on skill
Multilevel training is often need to be identified
appropriate. At some point in the project
life, a shift from produc- Evaluations should he
Mixed technical and managerial tion to capacity building articulate the initi
training may be useful, is likely to be needed, and identify shifts,
tions, and contradic
Attention to policy constraints
may be key.

Leadership and participation
elements should be matched
to context.









APPENDIX A

LIST OF CASE STUDIES


1. Development Management in Africa: The Case of the Land
Conservation and Range Development Project in Lesotho. By
Marion Warren, George Honadle, Sam Montsi, and Bob Walter.
AID Evaluation Special Study No. 31. Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Agency for International Development, December 1985.

2. Development Management in Africa: The Case of the Bakel
Small Irrigated Perimeters Project in Senegal. By Matt
Seymour, Laura McPherson, and David Harmon. AID Evaluation
Special Study No. 34. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Agency for
International Development, December 1985.

3. Development Management in Africa: The Case of the Niamey
Department Development Project in Niger. By Thomas M.
Painter with Roger Poulin, David Harmon, and Douglas Barnett.
AID Evaluation Special Study No. 36. Washington, D.C: U.S.
Agency for International Development, December 1985.

4. Development Management in Africa: The Case of the North
Shaba Rural Development Project in Zaire. By Irving
Rosenthal, Leroy Jackson, Ruth Mara, and Laura McPherson.
AID Evaluation Special Study No. 32. Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Agency for International Development, December 1985.

5. Development Management in Africa: The Case of the Egerton
College Expansion Project in Kenya. By Norman K. Nicholson,
Donald Bowles, Ndungu Gathinji, and Elinor Ostrom. AID
Evaluation Special Study No. 35. Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Agency for International Development, December 1985.

6. Development Management in Africa: The Case of the Agricul-
ture Analysis and Planning Project in Liberia. By Chris
Hermann, Margaret Shaw, and John Hannah. AID Evaluation
Special Study No. 37. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Agency for
International Development, December 1985.




University of Florida Home Page
© 2004 - 2010 University of Florida George A. Smathers Libraries.
All rights reserved.

Acceptable Use, Copyright, and Disclaimer Statement
Last updated October 10, 2010 - - mvs