U.S. ISSN 0084-0793
LTC No. 93
THE LAND TENURE CENTER
310 King Hall
University of Wisconsin
Madison, Wisconsin 53706
GREEN REVOLUTION TECHNOLOGY AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT
THE LIMITS OF ACTION PROGRAMS"
A. Eugene Havens and William Flinn"
This study was supported by grants to the University of Wisconsin
from the Ford Foundation, Rural Modernization in Latin America Con-
tract, and U.S. Aid Grand cds. 2823. This paper has been submitted
for journal publication.
_'"Associate Professors of Rural Sociology and the Land Tenure
Center, University of Wisconsin-Madison.
All views, interpretations, recommendations, and conclusions
expressed in this paper are those of the authors and not necessarily
those of the supporting or cooperating agencies.
a.- II- s
GREEN REVOLUTION TECHNOLOGY AND COMMUNITY-DEVmL T
THE LIMITS OF ACTION PROGRAMS"
A, Eugene Havens and William Flinn
University of i scons n-Mad i son
Development, as the term will be used in this article, involves
three interrelated societal activities: (I\ the establishment of in-
creased wealth and income as a perceived, attainable goal for the broad
masses of the society; (2) the creation and/or selection of adequate
means to attain this goal; and (31 the restructuring of society so that
there is persistent economic growth.
Societies have frequently selected programs of community develop-
pent (or community action' as a means to increase levels that affect in-
come on a broad range. This is because the community is viewed as a
"service center" where the major economic institutions of society have
agencies. Those who hold to this view frequently assume that all mem-
bers of a community have relatively equal access to and influence over
these institutions. 1/
In fact, a major feature of many economic systems is the concentra-
tion of control of the major economic institutions -- and the consequent
differential access to these institutions -- depending on one's relation-
ship to those who control these agencies. If the dominant class is
small and powerful, it is likely to have great control over the major
economic institutions. If control is concentrated it is likely that
this elite will have little concern for public welfare issues. Commun-
ity development programs operating In this milieu will probably be unable
to increase the levels of income for the broad masses. 2/
The major purpose of the present study is to demonstrate empiri-
cally that when community action fails to take extant institutional
arrangements into account, who has the will and the ability to intro-
duce new techniques determines who will increase his income. Who has
access to these institutions may result in a further concentration of
control over productive resources.
THE SITUATION STUDIED
The community to be analyzed here is located in the coffee produc-
ing region of Colombia in Antioquia. This state (department).regularly
produces about 20 percent of Colombia's coffee each year. In 1963, there
were 1,575 rural families in the area studied of which 1,008 lived in
the coffee producing area. The remaining families resided in altitudes
either too high or low for coffee. Of these 1,008 families, )l00 were
.interviewed in 1963. A complete description of the area Is presented
in Havens. 3/ All indications are that the area is typical of coffee
producing areas in Antioquia, 4/
In 1963, a random sample of rural families was selected by first
dividing the community into twenty areas and selecting 10 areas randomly.
Next, ten family units within each area were picked, thus yielding an N
of 100. Such a procedure was necessary because a sampling frame of all
rural families was not available,. n 1970, these families were located
and reinterviewed. Not all 100 families were farm owners-or renters;
some were day laborers or sharecroppers. Others did not produce coffee.
Only those who were owners or renters of farms producing coffee during
the 8-year period are included in this analysis.
In 1963, 64 families had control over land, either as renters and/
or owners. During the study period, 4 day laborers in our sample be-
came owners either through inheritance or purchase of small plots. In
1971, 56 of these 68 were either owners or tenants. We omitted from our
analysis threewho owned over 200 acres of coffee land because we were
mainly interested in the small farm coffee producers. Thus, our 1971
analysis will concern 65 families. Of these 65 families, 53 still had
control over land in 1971 and the three day laborers who lost land.but
remained in the community. Of the 9 who were no longer owners or rent-
ers in the community, eight migrated from the community and one died.
Thus, the major part of the analysis to follow will deal with 56 fami-
lies who were in the 1963 sample and remained 'in the community and were
interviewed in 1971.
The major technological changes during the past seven years were
that two new coffee varieties (Caturra and Borbon) and large applications
of fertilizers and weed killers had become available. Public investments
during the seven-year period remained relatively constant in the real
Of the 56 coffee producers used in the analysis, 17 had adopted the
new coffee varieties (they had planted the new strains and these varieties
are now in production) and used commercial fertilizer and weed killer.
The remaining 39 had not adopted Caturra and Borbon.
SIt was 1965 when the National Federation of Coffee Growers intro-
duced the new, high-yielding coffee varieties in the community. The
Federation is an action ageicy within the community which provides tech-
nical assistance, credit and marketing facilities. It also regulates
the internal price of coffee which is largely dependent on internation-
al coffee agreements. Its avowed pruoose is to increase the levels of
living of small coffee producers.
Consequences of Green Revolution Technology
"Green Revolution technology" refers to new seed and fertilizer Inw
puts that are highly divisible and, thus, available to the..small farmer,
Major emphasis on Green Revolution inputs developed In the late 1960's.
It wasn't until the "First Decade of Development" ended that analysis
indicated that the Green Revolution may actually have a counterproduc-
tive aspect. 6/
Some analysts feel that the positive contributions of the Green
Revolution were diminished because of accompanying problems of: 1)
erosion; 2) the costs of the adoption package (improved seed varieties.
often demand irrigation and intensive application of fertilizers and
pesticides); 3) storage, distribution, and marketing costs were In-
creased, and 4) the lack of awareness of their existence by lower-
income farmers. In a phrase, the Green Revolution technology was of-
ten available only to the large land owner -- the man of means -- and
this could lead to further concentration of agricultural, incomes. 7/
This says nothing about its possible adverse effects on employment, 8/
For a detailed analysis of these problems see Shulka 9/ and Schulter. 10/
In our opinion these studies clearly demonstrate the tendency for Green
Revolution inouts to concentrate resources. Others also have argued that
not only might the Green Revolution have these effects, it also result-
ed in expulsion of some microplot owners from their land. I / Indeed,
a structural change in agriculture which doesn't permit sufficient em-
ployment and hastens farm-to-city migration is an important cause of
the urban problem. 12/
Those who may not benefit fully from the fruits of the Green Revo-
lution may be small farms, sharecroppers, renters, shop keepers~ arti-
sans, agricultural laborers and industrial workers. 13/ As one x~am-
pie, Lele and Mellor note, "As compared to the smaller cultivators,
the larger farmers can better afford the risks of innovation-and they
wield more political power over the developm: -.nl agencies which pro-
vide access to credit and crucial supplies such os fertilizers, seed
and pesticides." J1/
in other words, the introduction of new technology, seems general
ly to fall under the predominant control of those who own most of the
land and capital. Consequently, while new technology may increase pro-
duction, and thus, incomes, these benefits may not automatically trickle
down to the majority of those employed in agriculture. I5/
How did the program to introduce Green Revolution inputs into the
community of Tamesis, Antioquia, work out in fact when the distribution
of income and land are considered? To what extent were institutional
arrangements affected by the program and limited non-adopter access to
credit necessary for changing over to the new varieties?
The National Federation of Coffee Growers made available new coffee
varieties and fertilizers but credit to enable the small producer to
stand the cost of changing to the new varieties was not provided, Ur-
like improved corn or rice which are frequently presented as the exemplars
of the Green Revolution, when coffee trees are planted land to grow them
must be taken out of production for three years while the trees come into
Institutional arrangements usually provide that credit is not pro-
vided if the loan exceeds the mortgage value of property owned. Because
the small producer must take so much land out of production that would
ordinarily support subsistence crops, he does not receive enough credit
to sustain him for the length of the change-over period. Moreover, the
new varieties don't produce well until relatively large amounts of fer-
tilizer are applied. Small producers cannot initially afford this cost
either, if the producers who want to plant newt varieties could be pro-
vided with support during the changeover period, rcrgrdless of sine, all
landowners could benefit from new varieties.
Unfortunately this is not the case, the aoners of smaller plots
are restricted in their ability to adopt. Farmers with l.r-er acreages
are regarded as good credit risks and prime candidates for loans. Thie-
senhusen suggest other reasons for this bias in that...
the cost of servicing a loan to a small farmer may be as great
as that to a large one. The red tape and delay may also deter
the small farmer from borrowing. Even assuming zero credit
availability to everyone, large-scale farmers would be able
to finance a certain level of inputs from their cwn savings
while small holders usually find this impossible. And even
if small farmers who are prevented from receiving public cre-
dit are able to borrow from private credit market, they will
probably have to pay usurious rates which may well cancel out
profit. Worse yet, the peasant pay be so encumbered with past
due accounts that he is not able to avail hirself of any credit --
private or public. 16/
Griffin 17/ rugy.--t- that green revolution tcc1i'. lo'i is biased
against the small producer unless landIonershlp Is equally distributed
in small parcels and that all peasants have approximately equal access
to fertilizer, water, technical knowledge, and.credit.
This certainly is not the case in Tamesls, In 1963, sixty percent
of the producers owned less than five scres of land. Thus It would seem
reasonable to hypothesize that these producers would be at least partial-
ly blocked from adopting unless institutional arrangements affecting
credit availability were changed, The case was that those who began
with higher incomes and owned more land could better withstand short-
run loss of production during change-over and were eligible for higher
credit levels. With this situation, the consequences of introducing new
techniques without changing institutional arrri-.ments is to further
concentrate control over income and land, we predict.
The Find nqs
Of the 65 families who were in the 1963 sample, 17 adopted and 48
did not. Of the 48, thirty-six still were farm operators, eight migrated
to other areas, three became day laborers and one died. Twenty three
percent of the non-adopters (11 out of 48) who were either owners or
renters in 1963 had become rural or urban day laborers by 1971. Of the
eight migrants more than half of the families migrated to Medelifn or
Bogota. All 17 of those who adopted the new technology during the
study period kept control of their land (see Table 1).
All subsequent analysis will only treat the rf families who remain-
ed in the community in 197i (53 as owners and/or renters and 3 as day Ia-
borers). Table 2 presents data on annual net income per.family unit In
1963 and 1970 for adopters and nc---r.copt!-sw for the 56 ftamiles. Look-
ing at the total number of families and the distribution of incoe in
1963 and 1970, we find that the Gini Coefficient for concentration in
1963 was .275 and In 1970 was .443 showing that Income distribution
has become more concentrated during the eight year period. We can Infer
from Table 2 that a relatively small group Increased their control over
the income in the connmunity from 1963 to 1971. The adopters' Income
increased from an average of 6,731 peso pssper year to 21,443 while the
non-adopters Increased from 4,509 pesos to 12,063 pesos. The increase
In income for both adopters an no-edopers was statistically signf.i-
cant, but the difference in the amount of increase between adopters and
non-adopters .8/ was also significantly different' in other words,
more of the increase in income flowed to the adopters than to the non-
adopters. It Is also worth underlining the fact that adopters started
at a higher income level in 19G3 than did no--.- fpters,
Table 3 presents the same data but 1971 currency is converted to
1963 pesos. The same differences are observed for adopters but the
increase for non-adopters rose from 4,509 to 6,274 which is not statis-
tically significant. When income is converted to real terms, therefore,
adopters have increased their income significantly but non-adopters have
not. Subsequent calculations are all expressed In real terms.
What is the source of this new income? Perhaps it is accounted for
by more family members coming of working age and contributing to total
family income. The average number of family members that'were employed
by families adopting the new inputs was 2.1 In 1963 and 2.9 In 1971; for
non-adopters the average was 2.2 and 3.1 In 1971, These averages are not
statistically different so we can reject the notion that more total family
members working accounted for the increase in income.
Perhaps the best explanation for the increase in Income Is in suc-
cessful adaptation of new varieties of coffee. It was thought that mone-
tary return for each acre of coffee in production would give a good mea-
sure of "successful adoption." Table 4 presents these findings. Adop-
ters and non-adopters both began at about the same level of net Income
per acre in 1963 (290 pesos for adopters versus 222 for non-adopters).
But by 1971 the adopters increased net Income per acre to 1,642 pesos.
Net return per acre for non-adopters increased.to only 632 pesos 49/
and the difference in theamount of increase between adopters and non-
adopters was highly statistically significant. Thus, there appears to
be very little doubt that the change in income levels is largely accounted
for by the adoption of the new inputs.
If adopters have increased their income levels, how have they in-
vested their greater surplus? Clearly, part of It has been Invested In
the change-over to new varieties. But Table 5 leads us to believe that
some new land was bought by adopters as well; land has become concentra-
ted in fewer hands. The GIni Coefficient of concentration was .706 for.
1963 and .859 for 1971. it is also clear that it Is the adopters and
not the non-adopters who acquire land. The adopters increased their
farm size from an average of 18.86 to 33.13 acres while the holdings of
the non-adopters decreased from an average of 7.97 to 6.42 acres. It
is worth underlining that even in 1963 those who subsequently adopted
the technology controlled more acreage. The average farm size was 18,86
acres for adopters and 7.97 acres for ric.'--adop::'--.
InS i uticna.! t.rrna nn .:, :.mit'r.c :;.jtcr
It has been demonstrated that the distribution of Income and land
has become more concentrated in the carnnunity under study and that the
adopters of the new coffee varieties we*in with the more resources and
have enjoyed the bulk of these gains in income and land from 1963 to 1971.
Because they have more land to use as collateral, it is quite probable
that adopters have had greater access to credit than non-adopters on the
During this ten-year period adopters received an average of 1,040
pesos of credit per acre each year while non-adopters received an average
of 436 pesos per acre annually. Moreover, a significantly greater number
of adopters than non-adopters used credit (79 percent of the adopters and
47 percent of the non-adopters),
Based on this preliminary evidence, we constructed three measures
of institutional constraints that may be blocking receipt of the nvw
technology to non-adopters. There is little doubt that adopters achieve
the goals of the action programs, they significantly Increased their In-
come levels. The .problem is with the ,70% of the sample farms that did
not adopt the new varieties, it is our contention that this lack of
adoption is partially due to perceived or real institutional blocks to
Three measures were constructed to reflect the real or perceived
blocks to credit: 1) total credit received frcm 1962 to 1971 for the
total sample; 2) the percent of credit asked for and received during
the same time period; and 3) the respondents perception of credit avail-
ability from the institutionalized credit sources, 20/ Table 6 presents
the intercorrelation metrix between these variables and the adoption of
Caturra. As can be seen, the total amount of credit used per acre is ,
related significantly to the adoption of Caturra as is the percent of
credit asked for and received. Respondents' perception of the ease of
receiving credit is highly related to adoption and to the percent of
credit asked for and received.
It seems that small scale farmers have "learned" over a long period
of time that credit can only be used for those with greater levels of in-
come and rgeo-r acreages. indeed, the small acreage farmers may not even
ask for credit. As one small farm owner (4 acres) said, "I don't have
any land or money resources. If I did, I would use Caturra but it Is
only for those who have lots of land." Another (.4 acreas said, "I would
like to use Caturra but up to noA I have not been able to find the means
to do so." A non-adopter with 1.5 acres explained the situation thus,
"I haven't cultivated it because it is very costly due to the requirement
of chemical fertilizers, insecticides. and fungicides.. How can a poor
person afford that when he qan't get credit"? Another coffee producer
also indicated they didn't adopt it due to lack of money and credit.
Thus, there appears to be a definite structural limiting factor affect-
Ing the action program. Lack of credit seems to block more than half
of the farm owners from participation in the pro-r,': .
Rural communities in developing countries are not autonomous units.
Economic institutions are largely controlled directly or Influenced by
decisions taken in the major economic centers of the country where there
may be little knowledge of or concern for the needs of local.people. ,In
this study, the major sources of public credit in the community were banks
which have their main office in the :'pttal city. whether or not there
is a conscious effort of the city policy-maker to withhold resources from
small farmers is not at issue here. The fact is that credit was not
included as part of the green revolution package to many small farmers.
An argument can be made that these farms are too small to operate
efficiently and that their loss may be a better allocation of resources.
Six of the eight,migrants, however, became part of the migration streams
to large cities, such as Bogota and Medellrn. 21/ The question is whether
the migrants are economically more productive to the Colombian economy in
the urban sector than they were in the agricultural sector. Preliminary
analysis of the mi-p'-nt data indicate that this may not be the situation.
All six rural-to-urban migrant household heads moved to Medelifn and
cent respectively in 1967. 22/ Upon arrival in the city, over one-
half of the migrants were unemployed for a period of one month or longer.
Thus, many may be trading under .employment in the agricultural sector
for unemployment in the urban sector. These "''orcn.'i migrants (non-
adopters who could not compete with the adopters) seem to be less pre-
pared for urban life than those "pulled" by the city. 23/ For example,
they possess lower levels of e'du-cation and skills.
The creation of lobs for this group is the most costly and difficult.
For example, Jpes 24/ indicates that t cost $O1,000 of new capital
to provide one urban ob in Mexico in the ".., 's. To.construct e manu-
facturing plant which can compete on international market, however,
requires a capital outlay of approximately 1"'.3.; per job. Thus, policy
determination is not an easy task. The answer lies somewhere between
"keeping them down on the farm" --status quo-- and induced migrartion --
If cc immunrty action program, which introduces ti ':::. revolution tech-
nology, is to raise the socioeconcmic levels of the majority of the people,
it must provide for more equal access and control of institutional re-
sources. In Colombia, several action : -'9 'gre are currently directing
energies to this issue. '': problem is that the number of small farmers
Is l-rge and the available resources may not be sufficient for She task.
If broad access to productive resources is not feasible, planners
nust be cognizant that induced changes may have negative consequences
for certain segments of the population who are structurally blocked
front institutional resources. Thus green revolution technology may be
exacerbating what is already a bad situation-- Increase rural-to-urban
nigrat on, increase incomee gap between the r'ch and poor, and trade under-
employfrnt for unemployment.
For the seventeen adopters of the new coffee variety, the new tech-
nology greatly increased income per acre. On the other hadd, fourteen
of the 48 non-adopters lost control of their land and are employed as
wage laborers (see Table 1). Sixty percent of these mi'rced to urban
centers of more than 10,0000 inhabitants ,
Focusing on the small farmer who remained behind, there seems to
be a clear tendency for land and capitol resources to become more con-
centrated in few hands. Most of this concentration occurred -on'g those
who were able to make use of an adequate package of new varieties and a
heavier rate of fertilization. Those who used the new inputs had greater
access to institutionalized credit resources. Similar tendencies have
been noted in other regions of Colombia, 25/ so, the present study ap-
pears to be part of a :-2r.:sl pattern in the coffee growing area of Colom-
bia and not an exception. Thus, the type of land tenure system and
the delivery of credit--sociai structural variables-- seem to be crucial
Determining how technology is shared and, hence, how and to whom
;reams are directed. Given a more egalitarian arrangement, however,
ie results m!oht be quite different. 26/
This study was supported by grants to the University of Wisconsin
from the Ford Foundation, Rural Modernization in Latin AmTrica
Contract and U.S. AID Grant cds. 2823.
1/ Todd Gitlin, "Local Pluralism as Theory and ideology," in Recent
S Socioloa ed. Hans Peter Dreltzel (London: MacMillan Company,
T19Tb, pp. 62-87.
2/ Manning Hash, "'Soe Social and Cultural Aspects of Economic Develop-
ment," Economic Development and Cultural Chnqge 7 (October 1961):
3/ A. Eugene Havens, T'mesrs: Estructura Y Cam (Bogota: Tercer
4/ Hernando Ochoa, Co%.rt v ismo Combbo Estructural en Timesis
(Geneva: United Nations Research institute for Social Development,
5/ A. Eugene Havens, Incom EeE a nt and Occpational Structure In
Small Farm Sector of Colo ,blea Bogota: Universi faibe Wisconsin
Serie Investigatlva, 1971 .
6/ Clifford R. Wharton, Jr., "The Green Revolution: Cbrnucopal or
Pandora's Box?" Foreign Affairs 47 (April 1969): 464-476; Samir
Amin, "Los Lrmites de la Revoluclon Verde,"' Ceres 3 (January 1970):
49-52; Lester R. Brown, Seeds of Chaqg_: The g-reen Revolution in
the 1970s (New York: "-.:7.. Ti7 ; S.L. .,r.-. i...: Goo is
Economic Betterment?" Ceres 3 (January 1970): 21-25; Lesl l Nulty,
The rreen Revolution in WIest Pakisten (New York: Prr.'-.r, 1972);
and James M. B.lume, War on. Huner 7 (April 1973): 22.
7/ Luis Ramior Beltran, 1 0 .....'.ij E -.1 .
ricano (Bogota: Cent'. te .--n n:. o ':r ar o c- ?ur l F, P.fortra
8/ The adoption of r:'e. revolution technology is often accompanied
by the importation of labor-saving machinery which often means
fewer jobs. Some tyoes of green revolution technology may have
the same total demand for labor but .'-ang: the structure of employ-
ment. See Randolph Barker, Wilia .H. Meyers, Cristina Crisostomo,
and Bart Duff, international Labour Review 106, nos. 2-3 (August -
September 1972): 111-139. Other green revolution inputs may in-
crease the demand for labor. See Refuglo Rochin, "Dwarf Wheat
Adoption by Barani Smallholders of Hazara Ostrict: Techonologi-
cal Change in Action." Mimeo (!slemabad: Ford Foundation, May 1971)
9/ V. P. Shuika, An Econc ic Analystis of Resource Use In Farming,
Jabuipur District, Mada Pradesh inadi (ithaca: Cornne.- Un ver-
sity Occasional Paper 26, 19&9),
10/ Michael Schluter, i_ fferential Rates of Adoption of New Seed Varle-
ties in India (Ithaca: Cornell University Occascioal Paper 7, 1971
11/ Rodolofo S;. -.'-r_+-*. "Seven Fallacies about Latin America" in Latin
.-'-mri-i:: lFe'- r- or ':.) 'Cij iC; eds. James Petras and Maurice Zeitlt
(Greenwich: Fawcett Press, 1968).
12/ William C. ThIesenhusen, "Letin America's Employment Problem,"
Science 171 (March 5, 1971): 3:0-74.
13/ Das indicates that assisting the neglected group resulting from
green revolution is not an easy task and Indeed varies from
situation to situation. See Amritananda Das, "Understanding the
:;-,rn Revolution," Econoic and Political Weekly (November 18, 1972)
14/ Uma J. Lele and John W. Melovw, "Jobs, Poverty and the 'Green Revo-
lution'," International Affairs 48 (January i?'. : 20-32.
15/ Kieth Griffin, "The Green :.A,.olutlon: An :con-s.c Analysis," Re-
port No. 72-76 (United Nations Research institute for Social Deve-
lopnent, 1972): .48.
16/ William C. Thiesenhusen, 'What i--;nging Technology implies for Agra-
rlan Reform," Mimeo. Paper prepared for the international Bank
for Reconstruction and Development (Land Tenure Center, University
of Wisconsin, Madison, April 20, 1973): 24.
17/ Griffin, "The Gre:r, Revolution: An Economic Analysis": 47.
18/ For the test of difference between means for dependent samples over
time see Wilfred Dixon and Frank Massey, Introduction to Statistice
Analysis (New York: McGraw-Hi 1, 1969).
9/ These averages are very close to national statistics, in 1963, the
average return per acre was 263 pesos while in 1971 the return for
non-improved varieties was about 650 pesos and for improved varle-
ties about 1,600 pesos. See Arist6bulo Hozman Cruz, "EL Credito
Agrfcola y la Asistencia Tecnica como Factores de Produccoin,"
Revista Cafeter de Colombia 20 (January 1971): 18-23; and Fedecaf"
"Los Ingresos de los Cafeteros," Econwla Cafetera 2 (March 1972):
20/ Perception of credit availability is a critical aspect of the pre-
sent analysis. If an individual has experienced a history of re-
jection of his request for credit, he rather quickly defines the
situation so as to preclude future credit seeking from institution-
alized sources. Such a perception may be categorized by others as
"objectively wrong" but the behavior of the individual will remain
21/ The six migrants referred to are household heads. The total num-
ber of family members affected by migration was 52 people or 7,8
per cent of the 1963 sample.
22/ International Labour Office, Towards FullL Em~,~E nt (Geneva:. Inter-
national Labour Office, 1970): 30
23/ The migrants did not sell out to take advantage of higher land
prices, but to pay off debts.
24/ Preston E. James, "Uneven rPte.'i. of Change in Latin America."
Paper presented at the conference of Latin Americanist Geogr"-
phers, University of Calgary, Calgary, Cauada, June 28-30, 1973:
25/ A, Eugene Havens, inccnea, Em1oyrment and OcuMtLonal Structure In
the Sma l Farm Sector of Colombla; and Orlando Fals Borda, Hebre
yTierJra en yaca (Bogota: Punta de Lanza, 1973),
26/ For a thorough discussion, see William C, Thiesenhusen, '"hat
Changing Technology implies for Agrarian E.,form ": 11-27.
TABLE 1. Change in Land Tenure Patterns of Adopters and Non-Adopters of New Coffee Varieties,
Tamesis, Colombia, 1963-1971
STATU.r S IN 1971 ---
Status In 1963 Owner or Renters Day Sold -rrp :..y Household Total
owner/renter Only Laborers and migrated Head Died
1. Adopters 14 0 0 14
Renters only 2(a) 1 0 3
Day laborer only 0 0 0 0
Sub-Total 16 1 0 17
owner/renter 28 3 3 8(b) 1 43
Renters only I 0 0 1
Day laborer 3(c) 4 0
Sub-Total 32 4 3 8 48
GRAND TOTAL 48 5 3 8 1 65
(a)In 1971 one individual secured
still rents land.
property through inheritance, oc.e purchased land and one
(b)The average amount of land in coffee for migrants in.1963 was 4.29 acres. The range was
1.58 to 7.90 acres.
The average amount of coffee land bought or inherited by these individuals in 1971 was
.93 acres. The range was .39 to 1.58 acres.
TABLE 2. Changes in Actual Net Family Income for Adopters and
Non-Adopters of New Coffee Varieties, Tames;s, Colombia,
Adopters Non-Ado ters Total
Income in Pesos 1903 1970 19631 1970 1963 1970
(N=_7) (N-39) (1=17) (N39) (17) (N=39) (M7I) =39)
0 to 2,500 5.9 0.0 23.1 5.1 17.9 3.6
2,501 to 5,000 23.5 0.0 41.0 12.8 35.6 8.9
5,001 to 7,500 41.2 11.8 25.6 20.5 30.4 17.8
7,501 to 10,000 17,6 5.9 10.3 17.9 12.5 14.3
10,001 to 12,500 5.9 11.8 0.0 12.8 1.8 12,5
12,501 to 15,000 0.0 17.6 0,0 5.1 0.0 8.9
15,501 to 17,500 5.0 0.0 0.0 5.1 1.8 3.6
17,501 to 20,000 0.0 23.5 0.0 2.7 0.0 8.9
,20,001 to 22,500 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.7 0.0 .1,8
22,501 to 25,000 0.0 5.9 0.0 5.1 0.0 5.4
25,501 to 27,500 0.0. 0 ,0 0.0 5.1 0.0 3.6
27,501 to 30,000 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
30,001 plus 0.0 -23.5 0.0 _k.1 0.0 10.7
Total 100.0% M 00.0% 100. 0% 100.0% 100.0% 100. 0%
Average Income $6,731 $21,443 $4,509 $12,063 $5,183 $14,910
Difference in fotal family income between adopters and non-adopters in
t = 2,336, D.F. 54 > .01
Difference in actual total family income between adopters and non-
adopters in 1971.
t = 2.336, d.f. 54, 7 .01
Changes in actual family income between 1963-1?," for non-adopters.
t = 3.607, d.f. 39, 7 .01
Changes in actual total family incane between 1963-1970 for adopters.
t = 3.893, d.f. 17, > .01
Changes in the amount of increase or decrease in actual total family
income between adopters and non-adopters during period 1963-1970.
t = 4.278, d.f. 54, 7 .01
The Gini Coefficient for income concentration in 1963 is: .275
TI- n!rt rnF_ Ff fia C__ -- -----.e-_ -1 t_ 1-n '. f 1. ID
TABLE 3. Changes in Real Total Family Income for Adopters and
Non-adopters in New Coffee Varieties, Tamesis, Colombla,
0 to 2,500
2,501 to 5,000
5,001 to 7,500
7,501 to 10,000
10,001 to 12,500
12,501 to 15,000
15,001 to 17,500
17,501 to 20,000
20,001 to 22,500
22,501 to 25,000
.0.0 \ 0.0
Difference in real family
Difference In real family
income between adopters and non-adopters in p963.
t- 2.335, d.f. 54, > .01
income between adopters and non-adopters in 1971.
t 2.479, d.f, 54, > .01
Changes in real family income between 1963-1970 for non-adopters.
t = 1.996, d.f. 39 n.s.
Changes in real family income between 1963-1970 for adopters,
t = 2.284, d.f. 17, > .01
Changes In the amount of increase or decrease In real family income between
adopters and non-adopters during 1963-1970.
t 3.884, d.f. 54, > .01
- --------- -- -- -----------)-~~~~"I"~I~
TABLE 4. Changes in Actual Net income for Coffee per Acre of
Coffee Production for Adopters and Non-Adopters of
New Coffee Varieties, Tamesls, Colombia, 1963-1971
Income per Acre _196-----___ 1971
from Coffee Non- Ron-
SProduction Adopters Adopters Total Adopters Adopters Total
(N=17) 'N 39) (N=56) (1N.7) (N=39) (N=56)
0 to 250 35.3% 41.0% 39.3% 0.0% 15.4% 10.7%
251 to 500 52.9 53.9 53.6 5.9 15.4 12.5
501 to 1,000 11.8 5.1 7.1 17.6 53.9 42,8
1,001 to 1,500 0.0 0.0 0.0 23.5 12.8 16.1
1,501 to 2,000 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.9 2.5 3.6
2,001 to 2,500 0.0 0.0 0.0 35.3 0,0 10.7
2,501 pius 0.0 0.0 0.0. 1118 0.0 6
Total 100.0% 0 100,0% 100.0% 0 100.0% 100.% 100.0%
per Acre of Coffee
Production $290 $222 $242 $1,642 $632 $938
in net income per acre between adopters and
t = S.421, d.f. 54 n.s,
In net Income per acre between adopters and
t = 7.777, d.f. 54, > .001
non-adopters In 1963.
non-adopters In 1971.
Changes in net Income per acre between 1963-1970 for
t.- 4.709, d.f, 39, 7 .01
Changes in net income per acre between 1963-1970 for
t = 6,437, df. 17, .001
Changes in the amount of increase or decrease In net
between adopters and non-adopters during 1963-1970.
t 9.185, d.f. 54, > .001
Income per acre
TABLE 5. Changes in Farm Acreage for Adopters and Non-Adopters of
New Coffee Varieties, Tamesis, Colombia, 1963-1970
Acres in Farm
0 to 5
5.1 to 10
10.1 to 15
15.1 to 20
20.1 to 25
- -~--I----~~~`--~~--~~~--~ --~ ~~
of Acres 18.86. 33.13(' 7.97 6.42%0) 11.28 14.42
(a)Three farmers accounted for most of this Increase. On the other hand
Five farmers who owned and rented land stopped renting and more In-
tensively farm their own land.
(b)Thls mean is computed on the basis of 38 farmers.. One landless
farmer inherited 79 acres and was dropped from the analysis. With
this Individual Included the average farm size for non-adopters in
1971 was 8.28 acres,
Difference In amount of land between adopters and non-adopters In 1963.
t = 3.503, d.f. 54, > .001
Difference in amount of land between adopters and non-adopters in 1971.
t = 4.021, d.f. 54, -7 .001
Changes In amount of land between 1963-1970 for non-adopters.
t = .601, d.f. 32, n.s.
Changes In amount of land between 1963-1970 for adopters,
t = 1.969, d.f. 17, 7 .05
Changes In the amount of increase or decrease In land between adopters
and non-adopters during the period 1963-1970.
t 2.019, d.f. 54, 1 .05
The Gini Coefficient for land concentration in 1963 Is ,706.
The Gini Coefficient for land concentration in 1970 is .859.
/ _\ A.I I
TABLE 6. Interrelationship of Total Credit Used of Credit Asked
for and Received, Perception of Credit Availability end
Adoption of New Coffee Varieties,
Variables V a r i a b e s
1. Total Credit Used 1.000 .459*, .333** .413**
2. Percent of Credit Asked
for and Received 1.000 ,437*-'f .339**
3. Perception of Credit
Ava Iabili ty 1.000 .607**
. Adoption 1, 000
::~- Significant at .05 percent level.