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Women's Roles & Gender
Differences In Development
Prepared Under the Auspices of The Population Council
Copyright 1985 Kumarian Press 29 Bishop Road, West Hartford, Connecticut 06119
All rights reserved uAder International and Pan-American Copyright
Conventions. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording or any information storage and retrieval system, without prior written permission of the publishers.
Printed in the United States of America
Cover design by
Timothy J. Gothers
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
The impact of agrarian reform on women.
(Women's holes and gender differences in development ; 6)
1. Women in agriculture-Developing countries.
2. Land reformn-Developing countries. 3. Rural womenDeveloping countries. I. Title. II. Series: Women's
roles and gen der differences in development, cases for
HD6073.A292D447 1985 331.4'83'091724 85-5250 ISBN: 0-931816-21-1
Preface ...................................................................... vii
SUM M ARY ........................................................ ix
BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY ............................................... 1
Objectives and Different Types of Agrarian Reform ...................... 1
Issues Concerning Women ............................................. 4
Women's Rights in Land ........................................... 4
Efficiency of Allocation of Women's Resources in Noncorporate
Household Economies ......................................... 5
Women's Net Economic Gains and Household Maintenance .......... 6
Women's Membership, Employment, and Remuneration in
Collectives and Producer Cooperatives .......................... 7
Women's Unremunerated Work in Household-associated Tasks and
the Provision of a Social Wage .................................. 7
The Role of Women's Organizations in Agrarian Reform ............. 8
The Authority of Government in the Locality ....................... 9
Agrarian Reform and Demographic Change ......................... 9
CASE STUDIES OF AGRARIAN REFORM .................................... 11
Problems of the Available Literature and Approach to the Analysis ...... 11
Land Redistribution Between Households ............................... 12
Iran .............................................................. 12
Land Adjudication ..................................................... 13
K enya ............................................................. 14
The Impact on Different Lineage Systems ........................... 15
Settlem ent Schem es ................................................... 16
Pilot Resettlement Schemes of the Volta Valley Authority
in Burkina Faso ............................................... 16
The Mwea Irrigated Rice Settlement Scheme in Kenya .............. 18
The flora Farm Settlement in Western Nigeria ...................... 18
The Mahaweli Irrigation Settlement Scheme in Sri Lanka ........... 20
Tanzanian UJamaa Villages ........................................ 22
Producer Cooperatives and Collectives .................................. 24
Chile .............................................................. 24
Peru .............................................................. 25
Cuba .............................................................. 27
Nicaragua ......................................................... 29
Ethiopia ........................................................... 32
China: A Case of Transition From Collectivization to
Private Incentives ................................................. 33
Stages of the Agrarian Keform ..................................... 33
Work-point Valuation ................... ........................ 35
Personal Remuneration .................... 35
Household Plots ......... .............................. 36
The New Responsibility Systems and Domestic Sidelines ............ 36
Implications of the Responsibility Systems and Domestic Sidelines
for Demographic Change and Women's Status ................... 37
The Issues Reexamined ....................... ........................ 39
The Importance of Women's Separate Rights in Land .............. 39
The Efficiency of Household Labor and land Use
After land Redistribution and in Settlements ................... 40
Determinants of Advantages and Disadvantages for Women of
Collectives and Producer Cooperatives .......................... 41
The Value of Women's Organizations in Agrarian Reform ........... 42
Social Wage Formation ............................................ 44
Agrarian Reform and Demographic Change ........................44
Alternative Designs of Agrarian Reform ...........................45
Small-scale Family Farms .......................................... 45
Agricultural Services ........................................... 47
Producer Cooperatives and Collectivized Farms ..................... 47
Mobilization and Participation of Women ........................... 50
BIBLIOGRAPHY .............. ..................... ......................... 52
Why should development planners and scholars of development be concerned about women's roles and gender differences?
No project that expresses its goals in terms of production gains or increased benefits can afford to ignore the economic potential and needs of one-half of the population. Guidelines for the design and evaluation of development projects sensitive to women's roles have often been applied only to a narrow range of "women's projects." Our view at the Population Council is that all development efforts could be improved if the differential impact on both class and gender groupings were considered.
The series of case studies on Women's Roles and Gender Differences in Development was developed to demonstrate that such analyses are not only essential, but also feasible within existing structures.
These case studies make clear how inattention to womenis roles and gender differences is played out as projects are implemented. Excluding gender as a variable, or limiting women's roles to the welfare sector, results in unintended effects, sometimes positive, but more frequently negative. Many of the stated objectives of the development schemes under study were not attained because project designs were predicated on an incomplete picture of the society to be served and drawn into participation.
The case studies draw largely from material that existed originally in other forms (such as exceptional Ph.D dissertations). From these materials has been extracted the 11case:11 (1) salient aspects of the culture and society in which the development project was placed, (2) the project dynamics themselves, and finally, (3) an assessment of gains and losses in different goal areas. To complement
individual case studies, this series for planners includes monographs on broader development phenomena whose effects are seen outside the confines of specific development schemes. As of this writing, the series includes two monographs, one dealing with the effects of male outmigration on rural women's roles and a second on the impact of different styles of agrarian reform on women's roles and productivity.
These materials are intended to be used by students of development and professionals in the field, including those at the highest planning levels. By providing examples of how individual development schemes have operated vis-a-vis gender, we hope they stimulate in the reader an interest in exploring what these effects might be in development projects being designed, implemented, or evaluated. For
some time now, an understanding of class dynamics has been
seen as essential in designing projects for successful outcomes. We have the same conviction regarding the importance of understanding gender differentials. We hope that this study series positively advances that notion and provides its readers with new skills and insights by raising questions and suggesting alternatives.
We wish to thank each of our individual authors for the exhaustive work they have put into forming their material into case studies. We commend Marilyn Kohn for her fine editorial work in finalizing the material. Finally, we acknowledge with appreciation the role of the Ford Foundation in providinl support for developing three of the five cases and both monographs in this series.
The Population Council
Editor of the Series
BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY
The objectives of agrarian reform variously include promoting equity, creating employment, raising productivity, and increasing incomes of the poor. It is assumed in this study that these objectives ought to apply to women as well as men.
The study includes cases of (T) land redistribution between households, (2) adjudication of traditional land systems, (3) settlement schemes, (4) collectives and producer cooperatives, and (5) women's own cooperative farms. Agrarian reform in China is examined as a special case which illustrates successive stages.
Issues Concerning Women
Women's Rights in Land
If women are to enjoy equity with men in life-long access to land regardless of their marital status, their land rights must be secure. Land rights also affect their decision-making authority in the family and their access to enabling services to raise productivity of any own-account farming.
Efficiency of Allocation of Women's Resources in Noncorporate Household Economies
Any sexual division of labor and resource management means that the household is not a corporate unit of production. If land rights are vested only in heads of households the objective of the more efficient distribution of women's resources may not be realized. Income maximizing positions may result from improvements on only part of the household's land.
Women's Net Economic Gains and Household Maintenance
The sexual division of the appropriation of produce and income, as well as of economic obligations to family maintenance, raises the issue of women's gains, relative to mengs, from reform. What sources of personal income do women have after reform? Are men's and women's respective responsibilities to family maintenance altered?
Women's Membership, Employment, and Remuneration in Collectives and Producer Cooperatives
A labor collective may recruit members on an individual or household basis. In the latter case, on what terms do wives join or obtain employment? If only heads of household are the directibeneficiaries of land reform how do other household members obtain membership and employment in producer cooperatives? Do the sexual division of labor and cultural attitudes to the value of women's work still have an influence when the production unit is larger than the household? If wives are denied membership how can they affect future economic activities of the unit?
Women's Unremunerated Work in Househoid-associated Tasks and the Provision of a Social Wage
If the more efficient use of family labor leads to the more intensive use of female labor, there may be a trade-off between greater economic production and standards of family welfare. Concurrent investment in easier water and firewood collection, creches, and medical facilities can moderate the trade-off. 1 Which Agrarian reforms allow for this investment? At what s age of the reform is this social wage formation started, and who decides on priority elements?
The Role of Women's Organizations in Agrarian Reform
The different types of agrarian reforms hold different implications for women distinct from those for men. Are
women mobilizedlto th' same extent as men in the planning and implementation stages whether or not they are direct beneficiaries? If not,1 how can they be mobilized?
The Authority of Government in the Locality
The willingness o governments to take action on behalf of women's concerns may not be effective at the local level because of male opposition or because of governments' desire to give autonomy to local reform units. What measures can be taken to correct a local situation?
Agrarian Reform and Demographic Change
The implications of agrarian reform for fertility include consequent changes in demand for children's labor assistance, Jin !ability to hire labor or invest in laborsaving equipment, injincome available for higher standards of living, and in apprehension about old age. To the extent that the cost and utility of children, represented by these factors, is different for women and men, the personal gains
of women from agrarian reform are relevant to fertility change.
FINDINGS OF THE CASE STUDIES
Land Redistribution Between Households
Land reform in Iran resulted in improved cultivation practices. Small farms used labor more intensively and enjoyed higher yields. Tractors reduced men's work in plowing, and threshing machines reduced the work of some women. But the inflexible sexual divisions of labor meant that female family labor was intensified with better farming practices. There is no evidence that the utility of children was less than before the reform.
In Kenya very few women had land registered in their names. Adjudication officers stated that this accorded with the custom that women do not own land. only all-male groups were involved in implementing this reform which left the position of widows ill-defined. The new right of men to sell or rent land has caused some complaints from women. In other respects adjudication may strengthen past trends in enhancing men's powers to allocate household land and use their wives' labor on their own cash crops.
These schemes have common characteristics: the selection of young nuclear families, vesting land rights in male heads of households, the clear demarcation of land between men's cash crops and a small plot for women's household-provisioning food agriculture, and some social sector investment. The position of widows is precarious, and divorced women appear to have no rights to remain. The promotion of improved farming practices (on cash crops) imposes a much heavier work burden on women, sometimes causing them to neglect the food plot in the early years. Women lose sources of personal income. Removal from
traditional support networks comes at the most difficult time in their life cycle. A sense of isolation is acutely felt by many. There are no institutional channels through which women can voice their complaints. Social sector investment is sometimes delayed or not fully implemented.
Communal cash cropping in settlements may be no better for women. In Tanzania's ujamaa villages women had stronger motives than men for rejecting it because of all their other work and their major responsibility in finding the family's
food. Village institutions might have provided the means for women to negotiate a better deal had women's public assertiveness been more socially acceptable.
There is no information on the impact of settlements on fertility, but the consequences of settlements for women would suggest that they incorporate a strong pronatal factor.
Producer Cooperatives and CoIlectives
When producer cooperatives are formed by land reform beneficiaries pooling: land, wives are not automatically granted membership. The importance: of membership lies in pay discrimination against nonmembers and in the right to claim cooperative resources for new ventures. The active support of ia women's organization in mobilizing women's labor contribution and obtaining equal conditions of work (plus creches) "was seen to pay off in the Cuban case in terms of women's enthusiastic support when the government later moved to formlproducer cooperatives from (men's) benefits from an earlier land reform,. In Nicaragua women who benefited under }the land reform saw advantages of overcoming the problems of a small family labor force and of obtaining farmer services through membership of a producer cooperative.i But in both collectives and producer cooperativesi in this country women still face wage discrimination which is correlated with the degree of sexual division of labor. I
Women 'cooperative members in all countries faced obstacles of shyness, Imale hostility, and time taken up by domestic work which limit their effective participation in meetings. This inevitably affects the composition of the social wage formed fro surpluses.
There is noireason to believe that collectivization of production in itself changes fertility decisions. However, where women have obtained regular gainful employment and enjoyed benefits from social sector investment, conditions ought to be auspicious for a decline in fertility.
Women's. collectiyized usufructuary land rights in Ethiopia developed alongside men's producer cooperatives. In other cases land may be obtained from village heads or rented. The sexual division of labor appears to be easily solved by exchange labor (with men's cooperatives in Ethiopia) or by hiringilabor.
CHINA: A CASE OF TRANSITION FROM COLLECTIVIZATION
TO PRIVATE INCENTIVES
Nominal individual benefits for women from the 1969
land reform were not turned into full effective rights
because the household was the unit of accounting in reform
implementation and in work-point remuneration in the later
work teams and cooperatives. Although women's contribution
to agriculture increased steadily, it was only at the
commune stage, started in 1958, that wage differentials
between men and women were substantially moderated and women
began to receive personal work-point remuneration. This
stage saw the massive entry of women into agriculture partly
due to men moving into industry. The commune stage also
saw an acceleration of social wage formation.
The large-scale collectivization of the means of
agricultural production and opportunities for women to
obtain regular personal gainful work ought to have favored
incentives to restrict fertility. But the recently
introduced Responsibility Systems return production to a
household basis for which a large family labor force is an
advantage. Private production and profits also pose a
threat to parts of the social wage.
CONCLUSIONS: ALTERNATIVE DESIGNS OF AGRARIAN REFORM
Small Family Farms
Joint husband-wife rights in land is one means of
promoting equity and efficiency. But it has problems.
Another means is awarding women reserve powers; to prevent
the sale or renting of land, and retaining control of part
of the holding upon divorce.
Women need equal access to cooperative and extension
services if distortions in household resource allocation are
to be avoided. Credit for improving women's own-account
farming could be on the basis of credit-worthiness rather
than land collateral. Women should be encouraged to grow
crops that are most profitable to them, leaving them free to
decide which foods are to be grown and which purchased.
Producer Cooperatives and Collectives
Since these vary according to agro-economic conditions
there are many organizational options. With the potential
of diversification they can also evolve through successive
stages. Membership needs to be separated from land reform
rights so that all adult members of the land reform
beneficiaries' household enjoy membership of the cooperative, whether or not employment is available for them.
There are also options for incorporating women's separate cooperative enterprises. They may be called
cooperative farms (Ethiopia) or horticultural sidelines (Peru and Nicaragua)! These, together with women's cooperative farms established quite apart from a larger
agrarian reform, have proved so successful in terms of production, higher incomes, and skill acquisition that they merit much more attention than they have received.
Mobilization And Participation Of Women
A women's caucus in all kinds of farmers' associations, in addition, to women s general membership, would help to overcome -the problems lof shyness in speaking up and men's hostility. Such a caucus can distill discussion on women's concerns and present arguments to planning committees before presentation to the wider membership.
National women's federations should be brought into planning agrarian reforms at the earliest stage. Their vertical links down t6 the locality constitute an important resource for mobilizing women to contribute to the success of an agrarian reform And for securing benefits for women.
EMKGROUND TO THE STUDY
Increasing rural poverty and migration to the cities have focused a great deal of attention on agrarian reform. But all too often the details of agrarian reform plans omit gender considerations in the farming community. This study examines the effects on women of a selection of different types of agrarian reform. It seeks to extrude the main
issues concerning women, and to offer suggestions for alternative designs that would enhance womenis participation, contribution, and benefits.
OBJECTIVES AND DIFFERENT TMS OF AGRARIAN REFORM
The goals of agrarian reform are variously purported to be promoting economic and social equity, increasing incomes and living standards of the poor, creating rural employment, and raising the productivity of land.
Wherever land redistribution to smaller farming units has been the favored type of agrarian reform, several arguments can be made in support of these objectives. First, awarding land titles or lifelong tenancies to landless laborers and tenants provides a redistribution of the means of production in favor of the poor. Second, a large body of evidence points to small farmers being more efficient than large farmers in raising the productivity of land (a scarce resource) through their more intensive application of labor (a relatively abundant resource). Third, small family farms apply family labor instead of capital-absorbing mechanization wherever this is technically feasible, thereby saving on capital (another scarce resource). Where small farms have been noted to be less productive than large farms in terms of output per unit of land, it has been argued that this has been due to large-scale farmers enjoying privileged access to extension services and subsidized credit and fertilizers. Were more equitable distribution of land to be promoted, the argument continues, more equitable access to these inputs would follow by weakening the privileged access of more powerful farmers.
Collectivization of land and other resources over a .number of farming households has been seen as an alternative agrarian reform that can advance the objectives of equity and the rational use of resources. It has the additional advantage of leading to economies of scale in land and labor use, and in the acquisition of other inputs and farm-support services. Moreover, the aggregation of surpluses over a larger unit allows for the creation of a social fund for investment in amenities.
The structure of an agrarian society is determined
primarily by access tolthe means of production. It could be argued that the introduction of farmers' cooperatives that regulate the supply and price of all means of production other than land and labor is an agrarian reform. This study considers only! those agrarian reforms which alter individuals' access to land, regardless of what else does or does not accompany the reform. The types of agrarian reform can be broadly definedias: (1) land redistribution between households or individuals; (2) adjudication of traditional land systems; (3) settlement schemes; and (4) collectives and producer cooperatives.
Land redistribution between households or individuals
This type of agrarian reform redistributes land on larger farms (sometimes in excess of a certain amount) to former tenants or landless people. Tenants are usually given preference over the landless. Typically implemented in areas of much landlessness nd high population density, its main intentions are the promotion of equity and greater efficiency in resource allocation expected from small farms.
The objectives of redistribution do not include reaping economies of scale in production to provide a surplus for investment in economic diversification or in the social sectors of health, education, safe water, etc. Nor do they include state provision of social-sector amenities. Profit is to be accumulated privately by the household, and welfare gains will accrue from private preferences in expenditure.
Adjudication of traditional land systems
This kind of reform applies where land is held in common by lineage groups or under the jurisdiction of chiefs. The purpose is to confirm in modern law ownership of land by individuals to whom credit and other agricultural services might be directed. Such a transformation from traditional group pra tices of land descent and allocation to privatizing is widely held by planners to be an important precondition for the modernization of agriculture because it strengthens private profit incentives and facilitates the use of credit on the basis of land collateral. If kinship obligations are weakened as a result then "leakages" of income to kin support should decline and returns to agricultural entrepreneurship accrue more to beneficiaries. Proponents argue that these factors should lead to greater production efficiency and therefore to greater increases in household income.
In this case, too, economies of scale and social-sector investment are not expected to follow.
These are undertaken primarily as a means of delivering agricultural services and social-sector components in a more cost-effective way by concentrating farm households and organizing their support systems. Most of the larger schemes are on newly irrigated land where the greater urgency to achieve a high net economic rate of return to recover the very high costs frequently leads to detailed directions on land use, choice of crops, and acceptance of credit and production inputs in order to obtain as large a surplus of market-oriented production as possible.
Settlements include a land-reform component inasmuch as formerly landless or very poor farmers are included. In some cases, particularly in Africa, the size of the new holdings significantly exceeds the average holding size in the surrounding area. The frequent provision of a household food plot can be interpreted as some recognition of women's traditional sphere of agricultural management, although in African settlement schemes this bears little resemblance to womenis customary food fields, which are normally large enough to provide a surplus for sale with proceeds at the disposal of women. An often-stated purpose of the household food plot is to provision the household as much as possible, thereby increasing net gains from the marketed crops. Settlement schemes are also characterized by the selection of young, nuclear families as participants.
Collectives and producer cooperatives
The literature frequently leaves these two terms illdefined. Sometimes producer cooperatives are formed by farmers with title to specific pieces of land joining together to cultivate their holdings communally while retaining the right to withdraw their land. An example is the early work teams in China. At other times the term is used to denote former tenants or landless people who became beneficiaries of land reform without receiving title to a piece of land but who farm communally as automatic members of a cooperative. The Chilean and Peruvian cooperatives are examples. The later cooperatives and communes in China would fall under this category as well, although exactly when land reform beneficiaries effectively lost individual title to land is unclear.
Collectives, on the other hand, appear to describe a group of landless people who are never specifically
designated as land-reform beneficiaries but who collectively acquire usufructuary rights to a piece of land. Examples include the use of some land by landless groups in Nicaragua or land acquired in the Ethiopian case.
The distinction is not helped by the loose use in the
literature of phrases such as "the collectivization of land," which can be applied to collectives and producer cooperatives. But here both terms are retained for two reasons. First, thel literature uses the term "producer cooperatives" when what is being described are de facto collectives of the members who were at the outset designated land-reform beneficiaries. To avoid confusion the nomenclature is retained. Second, women have been nominally (and effectively) discriminated against in most cases when it came to membership 6f producer cooperatives because they failed to meet the criteria to become land-reform beneficiaries, whereas collectives usually acquired members on an individual basis with some effective discrimination against women arising from the burden of the double day, women's reticence, resistance by men, etc.
Both types of pooling land and labor present opportunities for surplus accumulation from economies of scale and specialization in the use of land and labor. When surpluses are formed from the gains of many households or individuals a social fund for investment in amenities becomes possible. In most cases collectives and producer cooperatives are expected to finance at least some socialsector amenities.
ISSUES CONCERNING WOMEN
SThis study takes as axiomatic that the objectives of agrarian reform should -apply to women as well as__ men. Therefore, improved access to the means of production, social equity, benefits from the more efficient use of land, labor, and other inputs, and gains in income are viewed as intended fowomen -as much as for men. However, the most cursory introduction tO the subject leads to the realization that the extent to which women share in the attainment of these objectives is a Matter of debate.
Womezi's Rights in Land
If the objective of social and economic equity in agrarian reform is to be achieved, women need to acquire the same rights as men to become beneficiaries. If reforms do not follow this practice, three problems arise.
First, since land title or lifelong tenancy bestows on the recipient access to a livelihood through holding land, the position of women in the event of marital separation, divorce, or widowhood can be threatened. In the case of separation or divorce the woman is usually obliged to leave and find other means of supporting herself (and often her children). The posit ion of widows may be left ill-defined and depend on the age of children or traditional practices of attaching widows to other households. The agrarian reform
itself may weaken traditional protective practices.
Second, land title or lifelong tenancy rights are normally regarded as collateral for credit. Where women are left to manage a separate piece of land belonging to their menfolk they cannot, as a right, raise credit to improve the efficiency of that land, no matter what technological opportunities exist for doing so. This must affect the objective of the efficient use of both land and statesubsidized inputs.
Third, if producer cooperatives are formed from the land of beneficiaries, it is unclear what rights of membership, if any, wives of beneficiaries will enjoy.
Efficiency of Allocation of Womens Resources in Noncorporate Household Economies
The promotion of small-scale farms through agrarian reform carries the implicit assumption that the household is the primary unit of production, management, and earnings. This unit is analogous to the concept of the individual in microeconomics. Translated into farming microeconomics the unit means that "the farmer" distributes his land under one or more crops, and applies capital, credit, and fertilizer, as well as his labor, to maximize net overall returns. He also directly receives the produce or cash income resulting from his labor. His farm economy is therefore corporate. But in fact the farming household is not a primary economic unit in this strict sense. There is always a sexual division of labor, and often a sexual division of management of certain crops and plots as well as of rights of appropriation over produce. Spouses may exchange labor or remunerate each other in cash or kind. Credit may even pass between them.
Inasmuch as the reform encourages the beneficiaries to invest in more intensive agriculture, it will almost certainly affect the sexual division of labor. Small farm units use free family labor as much as possible. Any investment in mechanization normally affects the tasks of land preparation and transporting the crop. Other tasks may require more effort, particularly if mechanized land preparation allows for double cropping. This has implications for the efficient use of household labor.
if land redistribution is limited to heads of households, then these individuals acquire privileged access to subsidized farm inputs and extension services. The intended more competitive or efficient distribution of resources will reach into the farm household economy. if men have greater access to the means of higher productivity, there could be an impact on the terms of economic exchange between men and women. Women may be encouraged or obliged
to plant and weed their husbands' crops more carefully even if this entails a mea ure of neglect of their own separate crops. This must ha e an effect on the efficient use of women's fields and labor. It is difficult to see how marginal net returns ver different crops and plots of land will be equated, 6r the overall household position
maximized. If technological possibilities are delivered only to male beneficiaries of the agrarian reform, final household-level production must represent an arbitrary maximizing" position.
Women's Net Economic Gains andHousehold Maintenance
The issue of efficiency of resource allocation cannot be settled without reference to rights of appropriating the returns to labor. To the individual, one allocation of labor is more efficient than another if it leads to a greater personal return with which to meet expected obligations. Beneficiary households should enjoy greater total income. How much women gain from this depends on their powers of decision making and appropriation of produce and cash income.
If men are the direct beneficiaries of an agrarian reform, women are placed in a nominal position of subordination to their husbands, who are now confirmed as the custodians of household resources. How effective this subordination is will depend on a number of factors. Where a frameworklof agricultural institutions supports the land reform, husbands' powers of decision making must de jure exceed those of their wives. De facto this may depend on whether wives are totally committed to familial labor or have other employment that provides personal sources of income. Two studies indicate that women whose labor is most committed to familial production, and who have little or no income sources of their own, have least authority in decision making and coAtrol over income (Sajogyo 1980: v-26, 27, 57-60; Acharya and Bennett 1981: 256-71, 278-82). These women were from a middle socioeconomic category that resembles the just-viable small farms promoted by land redistribution.
Settlement schemes expect a major effort on marketed crops to be made by household labor. If land is made available for women's food farming, women will presumably enjoy powers of appropriation of this produce; but land
allocated for this may be less than women previously enjoyed.
All these types of agrarian reform can lead to a shift of women's labor from sources of personal income to unpaid family labor on men's crops. The net gains to women from greater production and income from the entire household holding then become qu stionable. What sources of personal
cash income do they have after the reform? Are men's and women's respective responsibilities for family maintenance altered?
WOMen!s Membership, Employment, and Remuneration in Collectives and Producer Cooperatives
Membership rights in collectives and cooperatives vary by country. A labor collective may recruit on an individual or household basis, although the former appears much more common. But the sexual division of the demand for labor can affect membership selection. Beneficiaries of land reform are automatically members of producer cooperatives. Spouses and other household members may or may not have some associate form of membership. The criteria of associate membership can also differ. If wives cannot meet the criteria, their voices will not be heard in the planning of the cooperative or collective or in its future economic activities and use of surpluses. These issues have implications for equity between men and women in agrarian reform.
The structure of production, plans to diversify agriculture, and the sexual division of labor may be the important determinants of women's employment opportunities. The sexual division of labor, and cultural attitudes to the value of women's work, can influence women's remuneration relative to men's in these newly formed collectives and cooperatives. On the other hand, pay discrimination may disappear when households take the radical step of pooling resources and working together. Men and women may be remunerated as individuals, or the remuneration of all household members may be passed to its head. For all these reasons the equity ideology of collectivized agriculture need not always result in equitable treatment of women.
Women!s Unremunerated Work in Household-associated Tasks and the Provision of a Social Wage
The efficiency of household labor allocation is affected in another way. Much labor is spent in the reproduction and maintenance of the family beyond work in the fields. Water and firewood is collected, food crops are processed, sick members are nursed, and of course cooking and washing has to be done. The cost of all this is borne almost entirely by women, often with the assistance of children. Because these goods and services are outside market exchange, the work involved cannot lead to net returns that could be invested in higher labor productivity.
if agrarian reform leads to the more intensive application of labor per unit of land, there is likely to be greater competition for women's labor between agriculture
and this nonmarketed sector. Will there be a trade-off between economic gains and welfare standards? It cannot be assumed that increases in agricultural cash income will be used to purchase compensatory services and goods if the new income is under the management of men'. Moreover, marketed services of water andfirewood collection, child care and nursing, and food-crap processing or housework are simply not available.
The distinction between private wage and social wage is well known. The social wage provides goods and services, such as health and education, that cannot be adequately supplied by! the individual or household. If equitable benefits are to be obtained by men and women, and if agrarian reform is to1lead to the technically appropriate application of labor in agriculture, :the concept of socialwage formation can usefully be extended to include more accessible water and firewood supplies, collectivized childcare facilities, and the subsidization of the introduction of appropriate technology for women's nonmarketed labor. Gains from this social-wage formation fall
disproportionately to Women, but ultimately affect men and children.
Certain items oP this social wage have been on the agenda of some agrarian reforms. Settlements include the goal of delivering health, education, and safe water in a more cost-effective way by the concentration of population. There is a general debate as to which social-wage items should be financed from surpluses of collectives and
producer cooperatives, and which from government resources.
But two main i3sues remain. First, the stage of agrarian reform at whi h social-wage formation is initiated has a bearing on women's ability to participate effectively in new work arrangements and gain in welfare terms. Is it initiated after economic production is established and is fully functioning, orl simultaneously? Second, which items of a social wage are to be included and which are to receive priority attention determines the value of the social wage for women. iSince women are so directly affected, will they participate in this decision making? How might women be mobilized to do so?,
The Role of Women's Organh aio in Agrarian Reform
It is worth bearing in mind that reform beneficiaries are mobilized in a variety of ways:! through farm service cooperatives:, adjudication groups, settlement tenants' associations, labor uhions, producer cooperatives, and even land-reform committees. It cannot be assumed that spouses also participate in [hese groupings. The importance of mobilizing women in organizations for arguing the case for social-wage formation! and its composition is obvious. But
women s organizations can also play an important role in the design and implementation of agrarian reforms to ensure the feasibility of women's expected economic contribution and their benefits.
The problem remains of finding a basis for mobilizing women. What women's organizations have been used in agrarian reform? Are existing women's organizations appropriate for woments concerns in agrarian reform? Can a woments organization at the national level substitute if there are no local ones?
The Authority of Government in the Ima1ity
Governments are increasingly concerned about the impact of development on women. Settlement schemes have long included social-sector amenities. In the latest agrarian reforms in Cuba and Nicaragua, and as far back as 1950 in China, there have been affirmative declarations and measures taken at the national level to advance women's effective economic contributions and benefits.
But the willingness of governments to take action has to be translated into effective action at the local level, and it is at this level that male opposition can be strongest. How far does the writ of central government effectively reach? What measures can government take to monitor and correct a local situation?
There is another problem. Some governments incline toward giving more autonomy or freedom of arrangements to groups of farmers.. But the reality is that local autonomy and organization means more decision-making powers for local men who may not be as apprised of women's concerns as some officials at the national level. There is therefore a potential trade-off between decentralization of decision making and affirmative action on women's concerns.
Agrarian Reform and Demographic Change
One of the purposes of all agrarian reforms is to raise the income and living standards of the rural poor. A widely held assumption of demographers is that when per-capita income reaches a certain level, fertility will decline. But the inherent premise is based on the belief that utilities and costs of children are the same for fathers and mothers. It ignores such factors as the sexual division of labor and need of children's assistance, differences between men and women in fears of old age insecurity, divorce, and widowhood, and different powers of men and women in appropriating any surplus income and deciding on its reinvestment use. Since women's decision to control fertility is more important, the impact of agrarian reform
on their utility and cost of having children needs to be assessed separately. If agrarian reforms lead to the intensification of wpmen's work, continued or increased
fears of women about their future security, or diminished powers of appropriation of produce or cash income, what is the effect on fertility rates of any increase in per-capita household income?
The next sectiono describes cases of agrarian reform according to the five 'categories outlined above, looking at China separately. It examines the implications for women's effective contributions and benefits, highlighting the aforementioned issues !as far as the information allows. The closing section !examines the significance of the issues and the causes of problems concerning women, and concludes with alternative designs foY agrarian reform.
CASME STUDIES OF AGAINREFORM
Because of the numerous contextual variations of agrarian reform, examples offer, as far as the available literature makes possible, portraits representing the range of reforms outlined in the previous section. To have included a large number of cases would have carried the danger of summarization and drawing conclusions with little reference to the background and other important aspects of each case.
PROBLEMS OF THE AVAILABLE LITERATURE AND APPROACH TO THE ANALYSIS
The literature on the impact of agrarian reform is extremely uneven, written for different purposes and from different disciplinary standpoints. Moreover, except in the case of China, only in the last decade or so has the literature included any significant mention of women's concerns. Because the historical pattern is such that most of the straightforward land redistributions occurred between the 1920s and the 1960s, while settlements, collectives, and producer cooperatives mostly occurred since then, much more is known about these later reforms' impact on women.
There are other reasons for noncomprehensiveness in the available literature. First, even those studies most concerned with the impact on women include different combinations of the issues mentioned above, and the majority do not cover many of the issues. Second, the negative conclusions on the impact on women drawn by most of the studies are based on what happens directly to women. Derived benefits through economic gains for men or any improvement in household income receive little attention. Therefore, something less than a holistic background is given.
It is more appropriate to examine issues in their context than to take each issue separately and glean the literature, because they arise with varying importance and for different reasons by agroeconomic conditions and by type of reform. Resolutions to problems need also to be related to limitations imposed by the structure of the reform.
There were problems in categorizing some reforms. For example, the Tanzanian ujamaa villages are settlements in that they added many households to an original settlement or even formed new villages. But they are also examples of collectivized agriculture as they include what was called communal farming, which fits the definition of collectivized farming used here. Because they include a substantial
private (household) sector, are characterized by women's precarious access to land in many settlements, and reveal a rapidly weakening collectivized sector, they are discussed
In the case of China, agrarian reforms not only evolved from land redistribution to producer cooperatives to collectives, but were later succeeded by policies returning incentives to households and individuals. Since the study of China tells a story of the evolution of agrarian reform that has lessons in itself, it is treated as a special case.
LAND REDISTRIBUTION BETWEEN HOUSEHOLDS
Where agrarian r form stops at redistribution of land, former tenants are usually given preference over the landless, and male h ads of households are invariably the direct beneficiaries. The new farming units join the ranks of small scale farming households. The example of Iran captures well the impact on women of land reform and higher yields.
The primary purpose of the land reform, which began in 1962, was to distribute landlords' estates to their male tenants in order to accelerate productivity improvements and agricultural modernization. New cultivation practices and mechanization were expected to follow from small-farmer investment incentives.
Gilan Province specializes in rice production. Eightytwo percent of acreage under staple crops is put to rice, and rice assumes greater importance as farm size declines. In the village of Janakbar the direct effects of the land reform on production included better cultivation practices and greater use of fertilizer (Suzuki 1981: 45, 46). Rice had been exclusively grown on irrigated land, and there was no change in basic 'echniques of production other than these two factors, which required more labor. Therefore the yield increases werg largely due to the more intensive application' of labor on small farms. The study provided ample evidence to show that yield was inversely related to farm size.
Different varieties of rice allow for some staggering of the harvesting on separate fields. Households with small labor forces often also stagger sowing and transplanting (Suzuki 1981: 192, 195-96). This can be seen as a reflection of limited available household labor. In Janakbar village the weeding is done twice, and during the first weeding the seedlings are thinned out. The first drying after harvesting is accompanied by threshing. Then a second drying is done, sometimes in local factories along with threshing. But the traditional time-consuming method
of "cooking" is used by many households for the second drying.
Women are exclusively responsible for preparation of nursery beds, sowing, transplanting, weeding, and sun
drying. They also share with men the work of seed germination and harvesting. Threshing and winnowing used to be done by women only, but now where threshing machines are used men and women share this work. Men do the plowing and constant maintenance work on village and farm-level irrigation structures.
Plowing is now done by power tillers, which have displaced draft animals and hired male labor. But except for threshing, all of women's exclusive tasks are still done using traditional methods. We can see that the intensification of rice farming has meant the intensification of female household labor. The sexual division of labor remains inflexible. Suzuki cites the examples of transplanting and weeding, which are intensive and laborious and must be well timed if yields are to be maximized. No man does these tasks. If necessary "the household employs extra women while men idle in the tea shops or wander and chatter in the market" (266). There is no evidence to suggest that there is less dependence on children's labor than before the land reform. In a
discussion on the family life cycle and consumer-worker ratios, Suzuki considers a child of six to fourteen years as the equivalent of 0.25 of an adult worker, and of fifteen to nineteen years as 0.35 of an adult worker (297), while admitting this is quite arbitrary. No mention of the sexual division of children's productive labor or of their assistance in household-associated tasks is made.
While the intensification of female labor was due in part to better cultivation practices and more use of fertilizer (which raised yields before as well as after the land reform), the fact that yields are inversely related to farm size is evidence of the interaction of more careful cultivation and land reform. This study made no mention of womenis control over returns to production, but Suzuki
comments that proportional to their role in rice farming, womenis position in the family "becomes higher" (he does not explain what this means).
In Africa, where land has customarily been held by a lineage group, privatizing through land adjudication could present something of a watershed for women's de facto control over resources and income. In patrilineal areas women acquired access to land upon marriage from their husbands' lineage on the understanding that this land would be cultivated to supply their families with food. The
nature of this land a location gave rise in many instances to separate women's fields, men's fields, and even household fields. Proponents of this system point out that with
market exchange a woman's rights of disposal over the
produce of her fields! extended to any cash income obtained from the sale of surpluses. With these rights went managerial functions in terms of choice of crops and response to market incentives. Therefore in the practice of lineage land allocat on in its pure form, it is more meaningful to talk of sufruct rights than male ownership of land and produce.
Before attributing changes in the position of women solely to land adjudication, it is worth noting that in practice the situation has not always been as favorable to women as this suggests. How much land, and of what quality, was allocated to women can depend more on their husbands' separate incentives than to tradition or lineage approval.
Women have been described as having "secondary rights" to land under lineage practice (Bukh 1980: 19). With husbands assuming greater allocative powers, de facto privatizing by the male heads of households has been phased in. Does land adjudication do no more than legitimize de facto privatizing by the male head?
The most detaile study of land adjudication comes from western Kenya (Okeyo 1980: 39). Of a sample of 135 women, there were 8 cases of the land being registered in the woman's name only, 8 in their own and sons' names, 34 in their sons' name only, and more than 50 percent in their husbands' name only. The remainder were joint registrations between husbands and sons. The category that is noticeably missing is joint husband-wife registration. That women should be registered at all is due to recognition that they are guardians of their sons' land.
This distribution of land titles accords with the idea that all household members are dependents on the male head. It does not assume that members are not significantly engaged in farming. For instance, Okeyo reports that when she asked land-adjudication officers why more women were not registered owners, he answer was always, "Because it is customary: men own ,land and women do not own land." Moreover, the all-mal6 local groups involved in implementing the Kenya adjudication argued that by custom women did not take part in land disputes, and therefore it was reasonable that they should not take part now. At the same time landadjudication officers often defined widows or women who had only daughters as persons not in need of much land. But this ideological framework is partial in its application of traditional laws; te new ideology chose to reject the option of confirming usufruct rights of other household
members. It also ignored the fact that by custom widows continued to farm their fields and remained guardians of the land for their sons. It is seen that in the passage from traditional to modern laws, aspects of traditional laws negative to women were retained while aspects that safeguarded their rights were jettisoned. This could have
resulted only from the powerful combination of planners' model-building and the local mobilization of only men in the groups organized to assist in the implementation. There does not appear to have been any mobilization of women on the issue of usufruct rights.
With the confirmation of men's privatized rights to land, past trends of men's increasing allocation of land to
cash crops and the squeeze on women's food land are likely to continue, especially if incentives to do so accompany the adjudication. Nevertheless, Okeyo believes that women in western Kenya will continue to enjoy cultivation rights. One factor supporting this is the evidence that women are still principally responsible for supplying food to the household as well as some other items of day-to-day maintenance.
Another concern is men's new right to sell or rent out land. Okeyo's study indicated that more than 60 percent of women respondents said their husbands were exclusively responsible for the disposal of land in these ways. Already there have been complaints from women that land has been sold by husbands without wives' consent. Also, in the future sons may be more inclined to sell land given the known impact of education and the attraction of the cities to youth. The status of widows is therefore one of the most problematical outcomes of land adjudication.
Predicting the long-term effects on women's standing in farm management decision making is difficult. In most areas agriculture has already moved from traditional crop patterns to a crop mix influenced by the market and government farm services, directed to male heads of households. But there may be further shifts now that individual land collateral is established. Much depends on future agricultural policies and government intentions to use land collateral and confirmed privatized farming to further them.
The Impact on Different lineae Systemis
The study in western Kenya was in an area of former vertical patrilineal land inheritance (from father to son). If land adjudication is to be taken up extensively over Africa, can we expect to see different impacts of change according to whether vertical patrilineality, lateral patrilineality, (father to father's brothers first), or matrilineality formerly prevailed?
Goody and Buckley (1973: 108-18) claim that there is an association between the extent of women's role in African agriculture and land inheritance practice. Female predominance in agriculture is much more marked in matrilineal than patrillineal systems, and least in systems of bilateral inheritance. But between the two patrilineal systems women's relative labor contribution is greater with vertical than lateral inheritance.
Land adjudication leading to male title holders could have the most serious' consequences for women in the case of matrilineal systems. Women's traditional dependence on the goodwill of their brothers (usually indifferently exercised) would change to dependence on the goodwill of their husbands. i But in the process returns to women's agricultural work, formerly under women's control, could come under the control of their husbands, especially if cash crops were involved. On the face of it, this might merely resemble a new patrilineal situation, albeit with loss of women's authority. But women from matrilineal systems would begin the postadjudication period with a greater labor commitment to agricul mure, so that more of their labor time would be vulnerable tolmen's control.
Adjudication of lateral patrilineal inheritance systems offers women one advantage: in the future inheritance would be vertical. With sons rather than brothers-in-law inheriting, widows could come to be seen as guardians of their sons' land, and therefore retain a degree of independence over their livelihood.
These five studies were selected on the basis of the quality of information allowing analysis of the effects on women, and because together they cover a wide range of economic and social issues.
Pilot Resettlement Schemes of e Volta Valley Authority in Burklna Faso
The land of the Volta Valley Authority is owned by the state. Fields are !allocated to the heads of nuclear (sometimes very young) households for use as long as credit repayments are maintained. Acceptance of credit is compulsory from the second year of settlement. Each household is directed to cultivate fields allocated to it within larger tracts of land designated for specified cash crops. Cotton is com ulsory, but grains may also be added.
Ostensibly two fields are to be cleared manually and cultivated in the first year with another field added in each of the subsequent four years. In addition each
household is allocated a one-hectare plot for selfprovisioning food cultivation. In practice acreage for cash crops is allocated on the basis of estimates of family labor available to the head of household. All males between fifteen and fifty-five years are considered as one labor unit, and females 0.75 units (Conti: 1979). The basis for these calculations is unexplained, but the smaller figure for women presumably allows for all domestic work plus food cultivation on the household plot, which is wholly or mostly
worked by women using traditional techniques.
In the settlers' former situation women had the personal use of a field over which they also had complete control in terms of produce disposal. Surpluses could be sold. While women also worked on common household fields, this arrangement still allowed time for processing and selling foods, maintaining small livestock and selling the produce, and spinning cotton.
On the Volta Valley Authority scheme women have a greater workload than formerly. They are heavily committed to their husbands' cash crops because the profitability of these crops determines the future of the family on the settlement. Food cultivation on the household plot is expenditure-displacing work, and therefore determines the ability of husbands to repay credit. The women have no time for own-account activities, and some women claimed that even if their husbands were prepared to allocate a plot for women's own cash crops from within their allocations, they would refuse it because they have no time to cultivate it. The first years of settlement in particular were found to be very difficult, and many settlers were obliged to take wage employment off the scheme in the off-season in order to purchase food. As young nuclear households were selected for settlement, high consumer-worker ratios were accompanied by a small household labor force.
Women on the scheme appear to have no sources of separate income. Because women have no money of their own, men now take the grain to the mills to be processed. Thus the men have direct control over the disposal of surplus grains. The array of agricultural institutions has lifted heads of households to a new position of authority over family labor resources, and has created a new set of relations of production and distribution within the household.
On the social side, the effects of this new set of economic relations can be seen in women being unable to afford visits to their extended families, or gift exchanges, which are a form of social insurance in the event of divorce or family crisis.
The Mwea Irrigated Rice Settlement Scheme in Kenya
In the Mwea settlement, as in the Volta Valley Authority, young, nuclear (but sometimes polygamous) families were selected. Again, use of land for a specified cash crop was decreed.1 Rice fields were leased for life to male tenants, while small plots for self-provisioning foods were lent to the household. The latter effectively meant that food plots wer! allocated to wives as long as they stayed with their husbands. In polygamous households each
wife had use of such a plot.
The food plots were too small for family food selfsufficiency. The planners had known this, but had assumed that part of the rice crop would go to family maintenance. Yet women in this area were by tradition responsible for finding the family's food, and were able to do so with small surpluses for sale f om their food fields. Although male tenants had little td do on the rice crop between planting and harvesting, and often absented themselves for several months, women shared in all rice-cultivation tasks and did all the weeding. In addition they worked their food plots relying only on their own labor. They expressed resentment over their extra workload because they had no direct control over most of the retu s (Hanger and Moris: 1973). They did receive some remunera ion from their husbands in the form of paddy, but this did not satisfy them and many refused to weed properly. What they received went directly to family food requirements or v)as sold in order to purchase preferred foods. This left them with inadequate cash income to purchase firewood, which was necessary since there were no nearby forests. A woman was considered fortunate if her husband bought six mo ths' supply of firewood.
Community issues were discussed in tenants' associations preside over by leading farmers who were appointed by projeIt management. This new village
patriarchy was not an appropriate forum for women to voice their complaints. It was only when the management became alarmed at the unexpectedly low rice yields, and when some women took their complaints directly to the management, that action was taken. This action came in the form of better milk and firewood sup lies, which merely ameliorated women's cash problems; it did not touch on the new and unfavorable set of intrahousehold exchange relations created by the scheme.
The lora Farm Settlement in Western Nigeria
This settlement was started in 1959. The objectives were to raise the productivity of food agriculture in the region, and to stem the migration of male and female school graduates to the towns'. Therefore, the settlement was to demonstrate a new far Iming system and village community that
offered the educated young an income, and working and living conditions comparable to what they might find in urban areas. Initially only young, single males were considered suitable applicants; girls and young women were not considered as settlers in their own right. By 1963, when it became apparent that the selection criteria did not result in enough applicants, older married men were also included.
The maximum yearly working capacity of the settler and his family was estimated at 235 days. A settler's wife was considered as half the labor unit of the settler, thus contributing 78 days a year.
The settlement was to include a school, a health and community center, market stalls, a shop, a post office, and piped water. The last was of particular relevance to the expansion of poultry raising which was the responsibility of women. Settlers were allotted fifty acres each, half of which would be under arable crops at any one time. This was about double the size of the larger farms in the surrounding area.
Traditionally in this area young women trade and older women move to own-account farming, using land allocated to them by their husbands. This was not taken into account by the settlement planners who failed to establish the customary periodic market (to be held every few days) to which wholesalers would come for the agricultural surplus. All women contributed labor to their husbands' farms and undertook crop processing.
A survey in 1976-77 showed that women worked an average of 192 days and men 264 days a year in farming (Spiro: 1985). Both figures are much higher than the planners' estimates. However, women at Ilora spent twenty-four fewer days in farming than women in the traditional village used in the study. They also averaged only 3 hours a day against an average of 5.5 hours for the women in the other village. But Ilora women had to spend almost twice as much time procuring water. The differences in time spent on farming have to be viewed against the fact that Ilora has a very high proportion of young women with child-care responsibilities. In accordance with traditional customs they would not yet have embarked on own-account farming in addition to helping their husbands.
Those women who did farm on their own enjoyed the benefit of tractors for plowing and transporting the crop. They also used fertilizers, and were able to hire a great deal of labor. It was found that they made more (own) farm management decisions than was traditional.
The women made gains in another respect. In this area husbands provide the family's staple-food requirements as much as possible. The greater output and cash income from
men's farms meant that men were able to provide (from own farm or purchases) a significantly higher proportion of family food require ents than men in the traditional village. This left women own-account farmers with larger surpluses for sale, and it is clear that these women enjoyed economic gain However, the young age profile of settlement women mean that only a few women farmed on their own.
The real gains for women should have come from trading in the surplus from the larger farm output of the community. But the absence of a periodic market, and the men's practice of selling their staple surpluses direct to town merchants, precluded this.
But the failure to fulfill the agenda for social wage formation, combined with the sense of isolation the young women felt' because of the absence of relatives and the distances between houses were as significant in women's eyes as any economic gain. Of the planned facilities only the school had been provided by 1977. The piped-water structures were larg ly completed by 1967, but in 1977 the system had still not 1een connected to a water supply. Women continued to spend on hour a day in the wet season and two hours in the dry season collecting water.
Uncertainty about lifelong security and access to land on the settlement must also have been a factor. Women were not settlers in theii own right. If their husbands died they had to find a male kin to take his place, or leave the settlement. The problems of living on the settlements were reflected in the igh rate of settler turnover and desertion. Between 1960 and 1965 this amounted to 47 percent of the original settlers. Between 1976 and 1977 alone the number of settlers declined from 84 to 75, the latter number including 23 households in which wives chose to live elsewhere
The Mahaweli Irrigation Sttlement Scheme in Sri Lanka
This settlement scheme is long established, but has been recently exten ed to accommodate new settlers. It therefore provides so e comparative information on the early and later impacts n women. Once again young nuclear families were selected for settlement. The economic objectives of the sch me were to promote higher-productivity methods of rice culti nation and double-cropping, as well as to raise incomes. Homestead plots of 0.5 acres were provided for the pro uction of self-provisioning secondary foods to be undertake by women.
The cultivatio timetable of double-cropped rice increases the year-round agricultural work of settler men and women. For women the two sets of seasonal peak demand
for their labor have to be set against their domestic and homestead plot work. Because of the shortage of labor they share in all traditional male tasks except threshing (Postel and Schrijvers 1980: 113). The conflict between
agricultural work and child care is most acute for young, recently settled mothers because they are the only adult women in the household, and settlement has meant the loss of women's traditional support networks. The stress of conflicting roles sometimes results in women leaving the homestead plots uncultivated during the first years.
Second-generation women settlers, on the other hand, have the advantage of larger families with a mixed age profile, and new informal women's networks. They are better informed of wage-employment opportunities on other farms, and generally have greater standing (in terms of decision making) in the household (Lund 1978: 49-52). Those women who acquired a personal income appeared to have a greater say in economic affairs of the household. A much higher
proportion of long-settled than recently settled women are able to exercise the decision to process other farmers' paddy rather than their husbands'. This gives them a personal cash income. They are further able to maximize personal returns on their labor by limiting the time they spend on their husbands' rice fields, and spending more time on homestead plots, which they use not only for selfprovisioning but for raising cash crops, such as sesame (Postel and Schrijvers 116). The fact that after the passage of time women choose to use *homestead plots for raising cash crops suggests that these crops have a higher return than the imputed value of the foregone self-provisioning foods. But agricultural extension services do not cover homestead plot crops, and yields remain low.
New settler women are more confined to the orbit of their own households and more dependent on their husbands for economic and social information. Lund emphasizes these women's expressed feelings of isolation and loneliness. All this comes at the most difficult stage in a woman's life cycle, when she is at the peak of her reproductive cycle, has small children but no older children to act as infant minders, and is expected to contribute heavily to the success of rice production. With little hope of a personal income in the early years her authority in the household is weaker than that of longer-settled women.
Fortunately the supply of firewood in the new-settler areas of Mahaweli studied by Lund is close to the homesteads. Were it not so, firewood collection could be a serious constraint on the time available for all other activities. In the more densely populated, longer-settled, and deforested parts of the scheme, women organize teams for firewood collection, which can take two whole mornings a week. But this solution depends on developed social networks. Water for domestic use is a seasonal problem at
Mahaweli, particularl when the reduced or halted flow of irrigation water coincides with the dry season. One solution practiced is for women and children to return to their relatives in other areas for up to six weeks a year.
Tanzanian tIjama Villages
In 1967 the ujama'a concept of villages was introduced to promote nucleated village settlements and collectivized agriculture. New settlers (expected to be accompanied by a wife) joined already established residents. These villages usually comprised between 250 and 600 families, but some held far fewer. Land disposition could be any combination of preexisting smal family holdings, family holdings distributed from vill ge-based blocks to new settlers, and communal farms (which are believed to amount now to no more than 8 percent of the country's cultivated land).
Where village land was allocated to settler households, all rights were ves ed in men. Women retained any land
rights they had in their previous homesteads, but cultivating that land was rarely practicable because of distance. When new villagers came from matrilineal areas no regard was paid to women's land rights. This meant a sharp shift to patrilineal ty (Brain 1976: 44-55). Under the villagization legisl dtion a male settler has to nominate an heir, assumed to be a son or sons. Should the heir not wish to stay and cultivate the land, the family loses it. Traditionally in patrilineal areas a new widow could choose between marrying her late husband's brother (and therefore continue to enjoy access to the land allocated to her on her first marriage) and returning to her natal village. Matrilineal widows had no problems, of course. While there is no legislative provision for widows in the ujamaa villages, in practice they appear to be able to remain. But divorced or separated women appear to have neither de jure nor de facto rights.
There is an elected village administrative structure that includes five committees covering economic and social matters. But because village projects tend to originate at district or higher levels, with no consultation with villagers, the very l w participation and committee membership of women (see FoItmann 1980: 64; Madsen 1981: 39-57) may not be of much consequence. However, the reasons given for women's low participation in village meetings are of interest. They include exhaustion from a working day of about ten hours, and the feeling that a "woman who asserts herself in public is ikely to be sanctioned not only by men but by other women as well" (Fortmann 1980: 63). In fact, women found it more effective to voice their concerns directly to district fficials.
The outcome of the lack of villagers' autonomy in
decision making is that they have to devise strategies to effectively regain it. These strategies affect, in particular, communal farming and delivery of produce to state bodies.
The decline of communal farming and the avoidance of production directives have occurred for good reasons. most communally grown crops and some household cash crops can be sold only at low fixed prices and only to state bodies. Shifting to crops whose prices are not controlled or that can be consumed by the household is an obvious solution. Brain (1976: 48) reports that in most villages he studied the intention that all work be done communally had to give way to dividing up the communal land among the households. In one village a compromise was attempted by forming work teams of five people (or "ten including wives") in the hope that this would encourage them to work an eight-hour day on communal land. But this ignored women's other work commitments.
What is clear from the literature is that women led the way back to household production. Labor on communal land was especially unpopular with them both because they had enough to do on household plots and around the house and because of differences in work-point valuation due to the sexual division of labor. But women went farther to improve what they saw as the efficiency of their own labor allocation. They were expected to work on both food and cash crops on the household plots. Madsen (1981: 59) mentions that they preferred to cultivate their own individual plots. This presumably refers to land set aside for household provisioning foods for which women would be responsible by tradition. Brain (1976: 50) also explains this preference by contrasting the traditional law that the proceeds of any crop grown by both men and women should be divided between them with today's uncertain practices. He quotes instances of women refusing to work on household cash crops.
The impact of inflation and low procurement prices on communal farming can only partly explain women's rejection of collective work. The planned tiers of their agricultural contribution did not reflect their perceived efficient allocation of their own labor in relation to their powers of appropriation and their economic obligations to family maintenance.
PODUCER COOPERATIVE AND COLLECTIVES
The difference between producer cooperatives and collectives was explained in the introductory section. The Chilean and Peruvian case studies below describe clearly the failure of producer c operatives to incorporate women. Cuba offers an example 4f how the mobilization of women to augment labor supply on the state farms, and consideration of women's work con itions and of social wage formation,
encouraged women to play an important role in the later producer cooperative Nicaragua illustrates effective limitations to wom n's full incorporation in producer cooperatives when there is less nominal discrimination against them. Peru and Nicaragua also give examples of women's separate farming as collectives within producer cooperatives. A further, extended illustration of this comes from Ethiopia.
The Chilean agrarian reform during the period 1965 to 1973 focused on appropriating and redistributing large farms and estates. This transitional stage was followed by the formation of producer cooperatives in which most of the land would continue to b pooled in order to prevent a fall in output through disruption of production methods. Originally these large private farm units included a tenant sector. Since the 1930s commercialization and modernization of agriculture have led to tenanted land being absorbed into landlord's own farming, and a transformation of the active labor force to an fever-decreasing number of permanent resident employees plus some casual workers. Women lost
permanent employee s atus faster than men in proportion to their original numbes. In 1935 women already constituted less than 20 percent If the permanent resident work force on landlord's farms. B~t at the start of the agrarian reform in 1965, the permanent resident labor force on these farms, which by then amounted to only about 12 percent of the total agricultural labor force, was almost wholly male (Garrett 1978: 124-26).
Eligibility to b-come a beneficiary of the land reform was based on a poi t system that included the necessary qualifications of having been a member of the permanent work force and being a hea of household (Deere 1984). Wives of beneficiaries had n entitlement to membership of the producer cooperatives!.
The criteria e fectively excluded almost all women. The proportion of omen cooperative members is given indirectly by an examination of women's participation in cooperative meetings. Garrett found in her study of cooperatives in the Central Valley that only 12 percent of a
sample of 236 women residents on cooperatives reported that they were allowed to participate in meetings (1978: 231-36). She concludes that women were excluded from this area of participation because they were not engaged in central production; their participation therefore have been inappropriate. She also describes how rural women's
organizations partitioned them into nonconflict social activities (1978 :194-201 ). While men were organized according to their economic roles, women were channeled *into the separate Centros de Madres with a community-oriented, homemaking, and personal focus. Joining the Centros might have been a valuable first step since it allowed women to come together to discuss their problems (and many joined the Centros over the objections of their husbands), but the thrust of Garrett's argument is that it led nowhere.
The later Allende administration decreed that everyone over eighteen years, even temporary workers could become a member of the cooperative. With that the formal basis of discrimination against women ended. At the same time women's incorporation appeared to be viewed only in terms of more efficient management of the family's income and greater participation in subsistence production. With a shortage of agricultural jobs even for men, there was no urgency in releasing women from domestic work. With women still not effectively incorporated, confusion over their participation continued. An illustration of this is given by Garrett (cited in Deere 1984: 66). The new government encouraged income-generating projects. In one case women started a rabbit-raising venture using imported animal feed. When in
1973 feedstuff became scarce the women asked the cooperative for land on which to grow alfalfa for the rabbits. This request was rejected on the grounds that as wives of members they had no right to utilize the cooperative's resources.
What is clear from the Chilean case is that the combination of past trends excluding women from mainstream agriculture, the pronounced division of labor, and the weak social and political visibility of rural women worked against their participating as full members of the producer cooperatives. Garrett makes much of the scarcity of human resources available to organize women in what she called 'community development,'' which largely corresponds to social wage formation. But even had the women been exercised in these skills, without the ability to command some of the resources of the cooperatives they would not have been able to do much about advancing the social wage.
The Peruvian land reform from 1968 to 1978 had similar purposes and constraints and followed much the same strategy as the Chilean one. The general outcome was that heads of households (with dependents) who had been former
sharecroppers or re t-paying tenants, or who had worked exclusively in perm anent or regular wage employment in agriculture, were thd beneficiaries, but without receiving title to specific pi eces of land. As beneficiaries they joined producer coope atives on the pooled land.
The exclusion of almost all women from cooperative membership constitutes a denial of women's past land
ownership in Peru. Deere (1984: 64) pointed out that in the 1950s and 1960s when landlords in Cajamarca Province sold parts of their estates to peasants, 40 percent of these sales were registered in the name of both husband and wife, and there were almost as many in women's names as in men's. The agrarian reform by awarding titles to heads of households, represented a setback for women.
In fifteen dairy cooperatives in Cajamarca Province, although between 30 and 50 percent of the permanent workers were women (because of their past prominence in livestock care), women constituted only 2 percent of the membership because of the additional criterion that they had to be heads of household. In the cotton-producing cooperatives in northern Peru, where women accounted for 40 percent of the temporary labor force but few had permanent jobs, again women represented only 2 percent of the membership.
The consequences of not having membership status are clear. First, wive had no right to regular employment. Because the activities of the former large farms continued, women could be offer d only the temporary or seasonal work they had performed previously. Second, nonmembers were discriminated against in terms of pay. Temporary workers (including men) were remunerated on a piece-rate basis whereas permanent workers were paid a daily wage (Fernandez 1981: 20). Over the reform period women's wage rates declined relative to [the wage rates of both temporary male workers and cooperative members. "The condition of women was thus exacerbated by the reform process" (Deere 1984: 63). Temporary wor ers received no social benefits. The great majority of woman who made an economic contribution to the cooperatives did so as proletarians selling their labor to a collective male membership.
Finally, nonmembers were unable to safeguard their working conditions. In one dairy cooperative the administration decided that cows should be milked in the fields because this saved time bringing the animals to the shed. But' this entA iled two additional unpaid hours a day for the dairymaids who had to walk twice a day to the
fields. As nonmemb rs the dairymaids had no right to complain and no po er to reverse the decision. As a consequence the milking was not done carefully, the cows developed infections, output declined, and almost a year passed before the ause of the problem was discovered. Yet in the same cooperative women who were members were able
to start an experimental garden project that, by the end of the second year, provided them full-time work and temporary work for others. As Deere points out, "The women had been able to solve their economic problem because as members of the cooperative, they could demand access to its resources" (1984: 65,66).
There are differences in the composition of the female labor force in poorer and richer cooperatives. Resident married women in the latter perform less wage work, their place in the rigid sexual division of labor being taken by nonresident women or young unmarried resident women. Asset status of the cooperative also determines any compensating benefit women nonmembers might obtain from social wage formation. In richer cooperatives there might be schools, medical facilities, and even a supply of cheaper food (Fernandez 1981: 16-17, 28). But in the poorer ones, where women do more economic work, these facilities are much less developed. Thus the wealth or surplus of the cooperative, rather than women's voice in the membership, determines the rate of social wage formation, although the elements of the social wage implemented appear to be formal, such as medical and education facilities. Moreover, the benefits to young women are doubtful. In the richer cooperatives girls enjoy less education than boys because the labor of teenaged unmarried women is used in place of older women.
The inability of wives of agrarian reform beneficiaries to participate as members of the producer cooperatives cannot be explained by their past confinement to nonconflict social activities. Peruvian women have joined in peasant movements since the beginning of the century, and have actively supported agricultural workers' unions. Where
there was a physical struggle for land reform women shared in propaganda work and organized action against landlords. Deere mentions that woman's attempts to become involved in cooperative activities have sometimes met with resistance, and even threats, from husbands. Patriarchal relations continued in the family.
The agrarian reform began in 1959 with the transformation of the largest farms into state farms, or People's Farms, without land redistribution. This affected sugar and livestock production, which employed male labor. In 1963 parts of somewhat smaller farms were sold or rented by the government to new small farmers who used family labor intensively on more diversified crops. The National Union of Small Scale Agriculturalists (ANAP) was composed of male and female heads of households, and credit and service cooperatives consisted of a near-total male membership.
The agrarian refo m at that time resembled others that confirmed male membership of collective farms and redistributed small pieces of land to heads of households. But some of the new! small farmers were also state-farm workers. During the 1 60s the expansion of sugar production on state farms increased demand !for labor leading to competition for labor etween the state farms and the small private farms. Together the Federation of Cuban Women (FMC) and ANAP organized voluntary women'Is brigades to meet the seasonal labor shortage in both sectors. The FMC promoted creche to encourage this labor force. By the mid 1970s brigade members were remunerated and 'received equal pay with men, even when their employment was only temporary. Communal eating facilities were added to creche (Deere 1984: 71). Today women constitute about 50 percent of the harvest labor force in sugar, coffee, tobacco, and fruit.
In the private small-scale sector the alliance of the FMC and ANAP succeeded in incorporating women in credit and service cooperatives.! This led to an increase in women's participation in their own households' farming activities in the 1970s. i Technicall assistance !was directed to women through the continuing brigade structure.
Concurrently in the 1970s producer cooperatives started to be formed by small farmers pooling their land and equipment. Women in the FMC-ANAP brigades played a crucial role in the voluntary collectivization of small farmers (Deere 1984: 72-73).1 It is in this new agricultural sector that special emphass has been placed on the situation of women and their economic contribution (Pollitt 1982: 22). The constitution of t1e cooperatives, and women's membership of the brigades,! have resulted in increased decision making by women. In turn,! women's incorporation has had an impressive 'effect on producer cooperatives. During the second half of the 1970s not only did the number of these cooperatives increase significantly, but the policies of promoting higher productivity methods and encouraging a rationalization of labor and the best crop-mix have improved incomes. Women's motivation to advance producer
cooperatives was strengthened by the social wage formation facilitated, by' endig the isolation of homesteads through rehousing in closer settlements, as well as by the collectivization of surpluses. Good housing, domestic water supplies, sanitary facilities, electricity, health centers, schools, shops, andl creches have all been boons to women. Deere points out that the cooperation between the FMC and ANAP was a key factor in the progress of this social wage formation.
The participation of women in prereform agitation and armed struggle does not seem on its own to have had an effect on women's later status since both the transitional stage to small privatized peasant farms and the later stage of producer cooperatives can hold to a model of the peasant
household represented by its male head. The national need for women workers appears to be important. But the government's ideological commitment to women, and the nature and functioning of the organization representing women, also influenced the terms on which women joined the labor force. The FMC was a far cry from the Chilean Centros de Madres. It was ready to negotiate and exchange ideas with male-dominated organizations.
An important concern of the government has been to maintain the productivity of the mechanized haciendas and the large farms. Therefore the 1981 agrarian reform reallocated underutilized and rented land on haciendas, turned efficient haciendas or the efficient parts of them into state farms, and retained modernized large farms in the private sector. This left a relatively small amount of land for redistribution.
The Nicaraguan land redistribution policy awarded title to beneficiaries on an individual basis according to criteria that did not discriminate against women. Beneficiaries could choose to farm privately or
cooperatively, but the planners included one criterion designed to encourage producer cooperatives.
The first to receive land titles were the poorer peasants deemed the most industrious, those who had worked together in the first two years of the revolution, and families of heroes and martyrs. But women did not have to be widows of martyrs or other household heads to receive land. Included among the criteria for selection of beneficiaries, though not of paramount importance, was willingness to form some kind of cooperative. Such willingness could place a woman with a resident husband in the first preference category (Collins 1982: 92-97). Impoverished small farmers in general were a second priority category.
.Labor collectives might be formed to cultivate land previously underutilized and adjacent to a newly formed state farm or land offered rent-free by a state farm on a seasonal basis. Members of the collectives or others in their families might also work on the state farm.
But by October 1982 only 18 percent of the 2,796 existing cooperatives were producer cooperatives. Other cooperatives were: (1) credit and service cooperatives for private smallholding beneficiaries; (2) communally
cultivated land, held in common, plus individual plots; (3) pooled separate holdings of land plus individual plots; and
(4) labor collectives for temporary wage work. Types (2) and
(3) have characteristics similar to the producer
cooperatives, but the individual (household) plots affected women's contribution in the cooperative sector. The incorporation of women in all these cooperatives is
represented in the table below.
NUMBER PERCENTAGE PERCENTAGE PERCENTAGE
OF WITH ANY WOMEN WITH 50+ WITH 10-49
CO-OPS MEMBERS PERCENT WOMEN PERCENT WOMEN
COOPERATIVES 578 20.0 2.8 11.5
(1) 1274 60.1 19.5
(2) 375 54.4 2.7 18.1
(3) 45 62.2 24.5
(4) 60 15.0 1.7 8.3
Source: CIERA 1984: 26.
Several factors made producer cooperatives especially popular among women. The pooling of land meant that women heads of households did not have the problem of finding an adequate labor force for their new holdings. A member of a producer cooperative also enjoyed the benefits of a collective approach to credit and other farm services, whereas a land-refo m beneficiary who joins a credit or service cooperative is obliged to make an individual approach. Producer c operatives tend to be made up of close relatives and resembie a large extended-family enterprise. While this provides dome scope for family patriarchy, it facilitates informal sharing of all women's work as well as the continuity of past women's support practices. In a
survey of seven producer cooperatives, in three the majority of women members were found to be women heads of households (CIERA 1984: 34).
But the great majority of land beneficiaries were men. Also, although the Co6perative Law expected all members of a
family to be members of the producer cooperative, the outcome was quite different. Only 20 percent of cooperatives had women members; in less than 3 percent were women members in the majority; and in just over 11 percent women comprised between 10 and 49 percent of the membership (CIERA: 26). Membership depended oA several factors. First, there was a shortage of regular work opportunities, especially in the poorer cooperatives. Seasonal or temporary work appears to have effectively operated against membership. Second, there was reluctance on thelpart of some wives of beneficiaries to enter into regular work on the grounds of lack of experience in agricultural work, the burden ofi domestic work and child care, lack of education, disinclination to compete with men, or past experience of more profitable or prestigious alternative employment such as trading. Third, there was opposition by men to the full incorporation of women because it was alleged that women's productivity was not equal to
men's or that women were not interested in agriculture (CIERA 1984: 37, 40, 47; Deere 1983: 9).
Because the cooperatives were autonomous in determining work organization and valuation, different practices emerged. There could be: (1) integrated teams of men and women, which sometimes included a sexual division of labor within a task (such as pest-control or the application of fertilizer); (2) separate work teams of men and women with women performing work considered less heavy; and (3) women working together on a separate cooperative activity such horticulture (considered secondary but complementary to ments central agriculture). The degree of separation of menis and women's work influenced pay differentials. In integrated teams equal pay was more likely, while total separation of activities led to the greatest differentials (CIERA 1984: 51).
Given the additional burden of domestic work and child care stressed in the CIERA report, the success of the
producer cooperatives for women should perhaps not be measured in terms of their integration in full employment. Their gains might be seen in terms of what they could build on: new opportunities to earn some income, the sense of solidarity experienced by women who worked together, and their acquired confidence and expertise (52, 53, 67).
Women in the producer cooperatives are often considered not only to be committed workers, but to act as forces for cohesion and social stability. Proportionally more men than women tend to quarrel or demonstrate a dislike for
collective work. As Deere comments: "Women are less prone than men to dream of their own private plots..." (1983: 1113). Further evidence of women's greater commitment comes from bank officials who report that cooperatives made up largely of women are among the most trustworthy in the use of credit. Extension workers report that women members are intensely interested in skill acquisition, and show a willingness to experiment with new crop varieties.
But, as elsewhere, there is a problem of women's weaker voice in collective decision making. Reasons put forward in Nicaragua include their lower educational level, their reluctance to speak up in public, and time constraints imposed by domestic duties. Child-care facilities are still rare.
The Sandinist leaders have considered the relation between economic and social wages. In order to preempt regional differences in the quality of health and education, state farms and producer cooperatives are not expected to finance this part of their own social wage formation. It is also hoped that a nationally funded social wage policy will lessen demands for increases in the economic wage and therefore act against individualism (Collins 1982: 72). If
this gamblelis successful it might also have the effect of encouraging Istate farms and producer cooperatives to apply their surpluses to creating further employment to benefit members' wives. 1
This case study is an example of a reform that afforded women who were denied iand-reform benefits and membership in producer cooperatives the opportunity to farm together using collective usufructuaiy rights to a piece of land made available to them oiltside the main design of agrarian reform. For this reason it bears some similarity to the instances of Nicaraguan state farms providing a piece of land to state-farm workers or members of their families to work collectively. It can even be seen as a more extended form of the women in the Peruvian producer cooperative obtaining land for their own vegetable cultivation, although the institutional framework is not quite the same.
The Rural Land Proclamation of 1975 aimed at bringing land under group ownership and abolishing private tenancy. It stated that usufructuary rights would be granted to individuals 'regardless of sex, "sufficient to sustain himself and his family',' (Tadesse 1982: 212). In practice these rights were bestowed on heads of households in spite of a variety of former land inheritance patterns. The immediate obstacle to women being direct beneficiaries was that land was allocated only to members of the peasants' associations, who had to be legal heads of households. However, widows anA co-wives who managed independent household units and w'ere land-reform beneficiaries were allowed membership in these associations.
At the outset the creation of peasants' associations was necessary to mobilize and register potential recipients. A proclamation on the Reorganization and Consolidation of Peasant Associations provided direction for the use of their resources and for the formation of Farmers' (producer) Cooperatives,! and for the establishment of women's associations.
Because over 80 percent of rural women in Ethiopia participate in agricultural production, the peasants'
associations required a contribution of women's labor to their producer cooperatives. One of the functions of the women's associations was to mobilize women's labor for these cooperatives. Thus some women shared in the cooperative labor of peasants' associations. But with no land of their own to pool, those in the women's associations wishing to organize their lown farms depended on the acquisition of collective usufructuary rights to a piece of land allocated by the peasants' association. When they succeeded in this and formed collectives, they practiced a form of exchange labor with the peasan s' associations, facilitated by the
sexual division of labor. The peasants' associations provided the women's associations with labor and oxen for plowing in return for female labor in weeding, harvesting, and other tasks.
But to obtain access to the resources of the service cooperatives, the women's associations had to go through the peasants' associations. Although there is no information on this, it is doubtful whether this system gave the women's associations comparable access with the peasants'
associations to credit, extension service, fertilizer and seeds. There were no regulations defining the relationship between the service cooperatives and the women's associations, or indeed the position and functions of women's association within the whole institutional framework: "Oftentimes, the social image of women's and peasants' associations commonly held at field levels, is synonymous with that of husband and wife."(Kebede 1979: 10) Although some women's associations had representatives in the peasants' associations, they did not constitute anything like a women's caucus within these organs.
Nevertheless, although the gains for women were not as great as for men, they were real. Employment in any collective enterprise was an improvement on the old feudal system or working in a subordinate role in familial production. Nor was cooperative social wage formation neglected. Both peasants' and women's associations contributed cash and labor to establishing health and education services and general infrastructure. Communal child-care facilities
started to spread.
It is interesting to note that the widows and co-wives, who constituted a significant minority of the membership of the peasants' associations, often preferred not to belong also to the women's associations because in addition to the required double labor and cash contributions it was evident to them that the peasants' associations had superior political and economic clout.
Unfortunately the Ethiopian land reform failed to take root and spread. Bekele (1982), writing eight years after the first proclamation, states that cooperatives account for less than 1 percent of agricultural production, and include only 0.6 percent of farm households.
CHINA. A CASE OF TRANSITION FROM COLLECTIVIZATION TO PRIVATE INCENTIVES
Staes of the Agrarian Reformi
China's agrarian reform has evolved through several stages, from redistribution of land to the creation of large communes. In the last few years a reassessment of private
incentives has ushered in the radically different Responsibility Systemsi
The 1949 Agrarian Reform Law gave women nominal equal rights with men to land titles. But implementation was
influenced by government concern to support the patriarchal peasant family unit (S acey 1983:126-31). Thus title deeds were made out to households. Divorced women and women heads of households were almost the only women who were personally handed land titles.
In theory, then, women had individual rights to land. Many women saw this as a bargaining counter when they resisted family oppression. It also made divorce economically possible but in some areas women were not allowed to take their property with them. Therefore, in general, the effect iof the early land reform was to
strengthen the property base and operation of the domestic group as a production unit, and with that the sanctions at the disposal of the household head.
The second stage of the agrarian reform introduced mutual aid teams. Thebe were small and nominally voluntary, and amounted to an extension of former exchange-labor practices usually based on male kinship. Work implements and draft animals were also shared. Out of this system the pooling of land, or the producer cooperative, emerged. In fact, when exchange labor expands into mutual-aid teams amounting to labor collectivization using a work-point system of remuneration, a de facto pooling of land use follows. Where women's traditional contribution to agriculture was weak they were initially denied team membership. Elsewh re women-only work teams were
encouraged. These early (lower) cooperatives might have consisted of twenty to forty households. This size allowed for some economies of cale and labor rationalization, and introduced the first elements of the social wage, such as creches.
The third stage constituted the amalgamation of these cooperatives into larger (higher) cooperatives consisting of one hundred to three hundred households. The process of incorporation was slow until 1956, but in the next two years there was a rapid acce eration marked by the massive entry of women into the labor force because of further opportunities for labor rationalization and production diversification. But this did little to affect family patriarchy. The unit of membership of the cooperative, and therefore of food rations, was the household. Moreover, after 1955 women wh6 divorced their husbands were not permitted to take "t eir hypothetical share of land with them out of the cooperative" (Stacey 1983: 211).
The development f communes in 1958 marked the fourth stage. These very large units integrated agriculture,
industry, and health and education services, and became the principal units of the ownership and distribution of surpluses. They attempted to extend the social wage through communal dining halls, child-care facilities, and old people's homes. These measures generally failed due to the opposition not only of men but of some women, notably older women who had expected to enjoy the benefits derived from mother-in-law status. However, the acceleration of women's entry into agriculture was maintained, partly due to the fact that men were shifting to industry.
The production team was the basic unit of accounting, and it was at this level that valuation of work points was decided. Segregated work in the mutual-aid teams allowed for systematic discrimination against women in work-point valuation. Another problem was that women could not work full days because of their household duties. It was common at first to value men's daily work at ten points and women's as low as five points. Later a variety of valuation systems emerged throughout the country. The valuation of women's work points relative to men's was raised during the commune stage when their role in agriculture increased sharply. But discrimination could still be practiced. Data from eighteen teams in a brigade in a Fukein commune revealed the use of three grades of work points for each sex: 6, 7, and 8 for men; and 4, 5, and 6 for women (Khan 1977: 268). The highest grade for women equaled the lowest for men. Furthermore, women tended to cluster in their (own) lower grades, and men in their (own) upper grades (Davin 1976: 145). In 1976 reports started coming out of China that women in agriculture were at last obtaining equal pay for equal work.
Women were conscious of discrimination. There were several reports of women withdrawing their labor or making only half-hearted attempts to fulfill their quotas (Croll 1979: 28). Yet, as Stacey argues, with work points aggregated over all household members the issue of discrimination loses much significance. With limited total returns to all labor, higher returns to women would have subtracted from men's returns.
Income earned from work points was paid to the household head. This issue has been taken up by the Women's Federation. As early as 1948 a Women's Federation leader demanded that work points for men and women of the same household be recorded separately in order to ensure individual remuneration. Stacey comments that the communes promoted direct payment of income to individual workers
(1983: 213). In 1960 it could be said of one commune that women there had made a major advance in having payment made directly to the person who earned it (Davin 1976: 141, 146). But Croll (1983: 28) mentions that even later payments in most rural areas were made to each household in one envelope with a list of the number of work points, and their cash value, earned by each household member.
At all stages oj the agrarian reform a small plot of land close to the home was cultivated by the household. These private plots proved more profitable than working collectively. It has frequently been said that although private plots amounted to only 5 percent of cultivated land they could account for as much as 20 percent of household income. Since their cultivation presents fewer conflicts between the roles of worker and mother it has been women who have tended to work them. The disadvantage of the plots is that they have discou aged women from working away from the home and therefore from socializing beyond the family and sharing in economic decision making at the team level.
It is important to appreciate that in China household plots play a different role in the household economy than women's food fields in Africa or household food plots on settlement schemes. In China the household plot produces high-value foods tha are mainly sold at prices close to free-market values. Staple foods are obtained from work points, which are paid partly in grains and partly in cash. Thus men's 'more significant work points underwrite the family's most essential food supply, while cash income derived from the private plots supplements this.
Tbe New Responsblt Systems and Domestic Sidelines
While this profound agrarian reform has benefited women through greater food security, establishment of a broad regimen of the social wage, and greater security for divorced and widowed women, many long-standing attitudes on women's proper place persist. In the light of this it is necessary to make some remarks on the new Responsibility Systems that have been introduced in the last six years. The purposes of the Systems include offering incentives to producers, reducing he administrative costs of communes, allowing freedom in decision making iat the lowest levels, and promoting the specialization and division of labor through a new !form of diversification. They are also
intended to end conflicts of interests between private household plots and mai nstream agricultural production.
The Systems include delegating a particular task to a group, a household, 'or an individual for a precalculated
number of work points or a cash sum (with bonuses or penalties for over- or underfulfillment); and contracting a group, a household, or an individual to complete a production process with remuneration related to output, with excess of the specified target either divided between the contractor and the local collective or totally available to the contractor. For the latter -the necessary land, machinery and livestock are made available by the cooperative. The contractor is not allowed to hire labor. Initially these contracts were for secondary foods and livestock, but now they may extend to cereals.
Women have benefited from the different kinds of contracts when they have brought in greater household income. In the labor contracts women are assured of personal remuneration. But the success of these contracts in raising productivity has created surplus labor and therefore a decline in employment opportunities in the remaining collective sector in some areas. Wherever this has occurred and men have not moved into industry, there is a danger that men will be given first preference in remaining collective agriculture and women will find it difficult to obtain gainful work.
Many women have escaped this consequence through the government's policy on Domestic Sidelines, which have been increasingly promoted since 1976. These Sidelines include production from private plots, livestock raising, and handicrafts. They differ from contracts under the Responsibility Systems in that they are not expected to use resources of the cooperative, and are to be undertaken by household members only in their spare time. Little capital investment is required, and quick returns are possible. Incomes have risen sharply from these Sidelines. A 1981 report claimed that for rural China as a whole they contribute about one-third of per-capita income (Cr011 1983: 33). Women work intensively in these activities because they have either withdrawn from, or have been pushed out of, collective agricultural work. The profitability of the Sidelines is indicated by the fact that women's income from them can far exceed men's wages. But they could lead to women working in a private domestic context cut off from collective decision making.
Implcatonsof the Responsibility Systems and Domestic Sidelines for Demographic Change and Women's Status
Some characteristics of these reforms could put the clock back for women. First, production contracts often return economic activity to a household on a (still largely male) kin basis, while Domestic Sidelines are very much household activities. Second, concern has been expressed over the funding of parts of the social wage, and therefore the distribution of net gains between the economic and
social wages. "There i's plenty of evidence from areas where full responsibility to households is widespread that there is some difficulty in inducing the peasants to meet their social obligations, such as contributions to the payment of teachers and barefoo doctors" (Gray 1982: 42). Some communes have intervened to impose a small levy on contracts to households, which is paid into a collective welfare fund.
Third, there is a pronatalist element in these reforms. With uncertainty over the duration of the new policy, and past experience of having to hand over tools to the cooperative or commune, there is understandable reluctance to invest in labor-saving equipment. The stipulation that labor cannot be hired therefore places a premium on large size df the household labor forces. Small size adds to risks t at contracts cannot be met, while expanding Domestic Si delines can absorb more household labor. This has encouraged married children to maintain
joint households. But it also adds a pronatalist
incentive. The ability of the state to deliver rewards and sanctions to support its one-child policy may be weakened by the economic reforms. "The family planning campaign could only work when the production team could impose material sanctions on households. Now, with the Responsibility System, everyone produces their own food. The production team does not have Ehe power anymore to withhold grain" (Hazard 1982: 55-57).I Some cooperatives have recognized the danger by providing special incentives to households with a small number of children, such as lower fixed-output quotas (Croll 1983: 97).
Finally, there is an effect on the social status of wives and daughters. Both Croll and Hazard report that
while dowries are disappearing, brideprices and marriage expenses are rising because of the greater value of women as mothers and workers. I Girls are even being withdrawn from education after primary school to contribute family labor. One way of overcoming the risks of small families is to organize labor forcesialong clan membership lines. And a means of strengthening clan ties is to tighten the rules of clan exogamy, which inevitably means that women enter from outside the household's clan and probably the village. This has to be seenlas a factor weakening the status of young wives in the households Male clan emphasis also adds to son preference as a dau hter-in-law is gained rather than a daughter lost.
THE ISSUES REEXAMINED
Here the documentation of the case studies is drawn on to assess the issues raised in the first section. The framework for this assessment has been enhanced by what emerged from the case studies.
The Importance of Women!s Separate Rights in Land
In all studies presented here, apart from women heads of households, only in China and Nicaragua were women direct beneficiaries of land redistribution.
In China the policy of promoting peasant family patriarchy effectively placed a wife's land under the management of her marital family. Does it make much difference then if women are not direct beneficiaries? The answer must be yes, for several reasons. First, without
personal rights in land, divorced and widowed women may face gross injustice, with no parallel in the case of divorced and widowed men. The position of married women in settlement schemes appears totally dependent on residence with their spouses, while widows face an uncertain situation when land can be inherited only by a resident son. Settlement women can experience a withering of relations with their own kin due to distance and inability to continue with gift exchanges because of loss of personal income.
Land adjudication may prove to be largely a confirmation of ments de facto powers of arranging land use and appropriation over income from cash crops. But in addition it constitutes the de jure end of those traditional practices of land use protecting women, and allows men to sell the land without the consent of their wives. Agrarian reforms that focus on heads of households can ignore past matrilineal systems and put an effective end to bilateral inheritance.
Furthermore, where producer cooperatives are formed after land redistribution, only the beneficiaries of the
land reform enjoy automatic membership in the cooperative, unless there is affirmative action as in Cuba and in Nicaragua. The consequence of exclusion from membership is that nonbeneficiaries have no rights to influence cooperative resource allocation, and the disposition of its surpluses for production diversification or social wage formation.
Respect for the land rights of the existing female agricultural labor force should encourage a more efficient use of all household resources by giving greater visibility to the need to raise the productivity of women's labor and
fields. Because the importance of this point varies by type of agrarian reform it is elaborated below.
The Eflciency of Household labor and Land Use After Land Redistribution and in Settlements
The issue of efficiency involves the allocation of labor, powers of appropriating surpluses for reinvestment, and the effective choice of technology. The Iranian case indicated that when demand for labor for female-typed tasks increases, and demand for labor i for male-typed tasks decreases, through land-productivity improvements and the introduction of tractors men do not assist women. Therefore the more efficient use of land on small farms through the more intensive use of household labor can rest on an unequal sexual division of thelgreater work effort involved.
Until affirmative action is taken on a range of laborsaving technologies ,touching on women's work both in
economic and noneconomic production, the term "the efficient use of labor on small farms" is a misnomer. But even were new labor-saving appropriate technologies available, how could the effective economic decision makers in households be induced to make a capital outlay oh them? It is in the small, just-viable farm, typically the post land reform unit, that women are likely to have the least powers of appropriation over income. Had women equal rights with men in land reform they ould have some bargaining power in determining the use of net income for reinvestment in better work methods'
In areas where women manage fields or plots
separately from men land redistribution between heads of households raises the additional issue of the efficient use of all household land, and consequently the efficient distribution of labor between parcels of land. In this study the examples were the settlement schemes in Burkina Faso, Kenya, Sri Lanka;t and Tanzania.
In the first section the issue was raised of women obtaining credit without land collateral, or fertilizer without membership in service cooperatives. Women's lack of access to these resources must put in jeopardy the objective of the most efficientluse of state-subsidized resources as well as of household land and labor resources. But the problem of distortion in the allocation of resources was found to be more serious in the settlements. In all cases there appears to have been an assumption that the
productivity of womenis (or household) plots could not, or need not, be raised. Extension services were not applied to the plots, even when (as in Sri Lanka) women chose to raise cash crops rather than household-provisioning foods. For such a small piece of land, collateral could have been dispensed with even if husbands were not prepared or obliged
to stand as guarantors of loans.
In African settlements the emphasis on main cash crops gives rise to further questioning of household land and labor use. In the cases in Burkina Faso and Kenya the amount of land allocated to the household plot was smaller than moments traditional food fields that had allowed them to sell small surpluses. What criteria were established for deciding that traditional land use was less efficient than decreed settlement land use? Efficient for whom, and efficient for which ultimate goals? The case of the Mwea irrigated rice scheme in Kenya gives the clearest evidence that decreed land use was less efficient from the standpoint of womenis interests and household nutrition than traditional land use. If the criterion of an increase in cash income is used as an indicator of greater efficiency of land use, the loss of part of the former value of household provisioning agriculture must, at the very least, first be subtracted from new cash income.
Determinants of Advantages and Disadvantages for Women of CoRectives and Producer Cooperatives
Men and women join collectives as individuals or as a household. If women join at the same time as men they have, nominally at least, an equal voice in design and planning. But the sexual division of labor and attitudes to the value of women's work can lead to wage differentials, as seen in China and Nicaragua.
Where collective work is imposed without flexibility on top of work on household plots, it is not surprising that it is unpopular with women. The Tanzanian ujamaa village economy is an example of this. The complaints of women in one village that they could not be expected to put in an eight-hour day in communal fields on top of their other work is indication enough of the lack of flexibility and an
unrealistic work burden.
The traditional sexual division of labor need not emerge as a serious obstacle when women-only collectives are formed. In Ethiopia the farms organized by the women's associations exchanged labor with the (predominantly male) producer cooperatives.
Producer cooperatives are formed by holders of land or land-reform beneficiaries pooling their resources. Conditions of work for wives of cooperative members are influenced by a political commitment to women and by demand for their labor. Where producer cooperatives are formed
around former large m chanized farms employing mainly male labor, relatively few women find employment. If employment is seasonal or temporary, women may be given only piece-rate work, which allows for effective wage discrimination. Nonmembership denies women any ability to negotiate better terms.
But even when th few women beneficiaries of the land reform join producer cooperatives as members they still have to confront the sexual division of labor and wage differentials. In Nicaragua some cooperatives used mixed work teams, but in ot ers there was a clear sexual division of labor. The greater the segregation of male and female labor, the greater the work-point differentials. The Chinese experience demonstrates the difficulties that can arise in incorporating women in the cooperative labor force on equitable terms even when they have theoretical equal rights with men in land and when they are actually being urged to join the labor force. Allowing work teams to evaluate individual returns encourages cohesion in the small unit but it means that the more progressive voice of higher levels of cooperatives and communes is absent.
Despite continuing differences in remuneration, membership in a pro ucer cooperative offers substantial gains to women. First, women heads of households who obtain land can solve the problem of a small-family labor force. Second, a consequence of nonmembership can be denial of the use of some land, as in the case of Chile, whereas membership enhances claims to cooperative resources, as was successfully achieved in an instance in Peru. Membership is crucial to women's rights and abilities to contribute as well as to gain.
Third, these lrge production units are able to internalize surpluses over many households to provide for social wage formation. In China and Cuba this has been extensively reaiized,l admittedly with the help of state ideology and the activities of the women's federations. But the Chinese case demonstrated that social wage formation accelerates as the unit of ownership and distribution of surpluses become bigger.
The Value of Women's Orgzans in Agrarian Reform
The importance of mobilizing women in organizations for the design and implementation of agrarian reform is apparent from these case studies. The role of women in agitation for agrarian reform does not in itself appear to have benefited them afterward, unless there was something like a women's federation at national and local levels at the time of the reform, as in China and Cuba. The only exception among these studies was Nicaragua, a county with many widows where
recent agrarian reforms might well have been influenced by a decade of international discussion on women and development.
While land adjudication in Africa inevitably means transforming elder-directed patrilineage into individual male ownership of land there are details of traditional checks and balances protecting women, such as the status of widows and women's usufruct rights, which might have been safeguarded had women been organized to assist in reform policies. As it was, in Kenya only all-male groups assisted in the process.
Mobilizing women in organizations accentuating their homemaking roles, such as the Chilean Centros de Madres, has little influence on women's access to resources or to gainful employment in producer cooperatives or their ability to affect future cooperative policy. In China and Cuba, where the women's organizations were most effective, they not only urged women to contribute to production, but helped them to get equal conditions of work with men.
The stressful situations found in settlement schemes call for particular forms of women's support groups. Planners appear to have underestimated the time and effort required of young nuclear families to stabilize their economic position. The intention of giving these families strong economic motivation free from kinship obligations, has to be set against the resource limits of small household-labor forces and high dependency (consumer-worker) ratios that place a burden on the parents, especially the mothers. Failure to assess the extra work burden on a woman at the most difficult stage of her life cycle, and neglect of the importance of quickly reestablishing women's support networks, can lead to an unnecessarily prolonged period of underutilization of all household land, and difficulties in credit repayments.
Finally, the relationship between women's organizations at the local level and agrarian reform officials at the highest level is also important if obstacles in between are to be overcome. But a commitment to women at the highest level cannot be assumed. Personnel holding a brief for women in the prime minister's department or the agrarian reform department are even more necessary if organizing women at the local level is difficult, and scarce human resources go first to organizing men and economic production. An associated problem is that there is a prevailing mood in government circles in many countries to leave local levels of administration with a great deal of decision making in agricultural affairs. This is largely due to the recognition of the value of incentives, but also to acceptance that the authority of government does not extend as far as once believed. This is seen not only in the producer cooperatives of Peru, but also in the new cooperatives in Cuba and Nicaragua, as well as in China's
Responsibility Systems. The consequence for women's concerns is that whereas governments may now understand the need for affirmative action on these concerns, powers of planning devolve on local male-dominated groups that are unaware of this need. To leave women's issues on a back burner for a later phase of agrarian reform would be to postpone them until after resource design had been established, and options reduced or closed.
Social Wage Fornation
Basic needs such as safe domestic water, health and education facilities, land creches can be obtained only from resources mobilized above the household level. Because of this we have used the term "social wage formation." Gains from a social wage fall disproportionately to women. But directly or indirectly,! social wage formation emerges from a levy on economic production or from a subtraction of resources that might be available for economic production in the first instance. Resistance from local men to restraint on their economic wages, can be expected.
If the economic unit is expected to produce the necessary re sources, two issues are involved: the size of the unit, and 'the decision-making process to establish priorities in the social wage. The larger the economic unit the greater the scopIe for accumulating surpluses in a collective welfare fund. Also, the larger the unit the more progressive its leadership is likely to be as it is distanced from family patriarchy. i But there are some elements of the social ylage, such as 'creches, that can be organized only in much smaller units. Because the optimal scale required for different parts of the social wage varies, the readiness to implement them will also vary. Awarding production contracts to onelor more households in place of producer cooperatives might spread beyond China if planners succumb to the pressure for individual economic incentives. If, this happens, the social wage faces a threat, and countervailing or compensatory measures may be required. China is already devising these measures to circumvent the tension between the need for production units small enough to provide cohesion and incentives, and yet large enough' for internalizing a surplus for the social wage.
Agrarian Reform and Demographio Change
Settlement schemes and land redistribution that lead to family-based farm units are likely to have a pronatalist impact unless there lis an extraordinary breakthrough in small-farm technology. The ability of the male head to decide land use and to command family labor must promote intensification of cash crop production by wage-displacing means. Some evidence' suggests that in households owning
farms the use of children's labor is greater. Young children help women with domestic tasks and infant care. It is possible that with large increments in income, hired labor would displace some family labor, but whose labor is displaced may depend on who controls the income as well as what kind of technology is available. Land redistribution and settlements enhance women' s role in unpaid family labor. The return to household-based production in China demonstrates well some of the conflicts with family-size limitation. It also shows also how there can be a reversal of gains in women's personal status when their production and reproduction value to the household rises. Collectives and producer cooperatives, on the other hand, do not have structures that encourage natality.
It must be evident that the possible trade-off between the more efficient utilization of family labor and family planning goals requires careful examination by agrarianreform planners.
ALTERNATIVE DESIGNS OF AGRARIAN REFORM
In considering various options of agrarian reform, the goal of efficiency of resource allocation has been borne in mind. It is not the intention to present a list of demands for women that bears no relation to cost-effectiveness. But to be mindful of cost-effectiveness is to remember also that incentives must extend to individuals.
SinaU-scale Family Farms
Even given the suboptimal efficiency of these farms from women's viewpoint, redistribution of land between household heads should in many cases bring net advantages to women over their position as casual workers on large modernized farms or as semiserfs in a feudal setting. But it would be an admission of lack of creativity if planners settled for this in land-redistribution or settlement schemes.
In areas of customary bilateral inheritance joint husband-wife ownership or lifelong tenancy must appear to be a more natural framework of land reform. Even in cases of past patrilineal inheritance considerations of joint ownership have special merit in certain circumstances. Planners may claim that giving land to male heads of households merely fits in with traditional relations of production. But where the land reform involves strong promotion of a different land use and more marketorientation of production, it would be false to claim that relations of production within the household remain unaltered. Traditions, in the form of long-established checks and balances protecting women in a patrilineal
economy, can be seriously eroded. Advancing modernization for macroeconomic reasons, no matter what happens inside the household, can prove cost-ineffective if women are not satisfied that household resources iare being used and consumed efficiently. There are a number of reasons why a wife's equal powers n deciding land use, credit and technology acceptance, 'and of controlling income contribute to making land redistri ution more cost-effective.
Against this there is only one reason why it should not: it is administratively more cumbersome, and perhaps more costly, to deal with more than one person in a household if agricultural services are to be delivered. But this is a weak argument when examined closely. Many farming decisions can be discu sed between husband and wife in the home. Women do not ave to visit extension centers or attend all-farmer coope ative meetings. What women need is the power to prevent something--credit allocation, new crop technologies,! the alienation of income from household
consumption needs, or the sale of land--that they believe to be wrong. And if the objective of equality in this type of agrarian reform is to be respected they need to be assured of access to a livelihood from land in the event of
widowhood or divorce, a' men are.
But joint owne ship can present problems. To be
effective it might have to be backed up by legally required joint application for credit and joint agreement to sell or rent out the land. Nominal joint ownership may mean little in a situation where patriarchal attitudes are strong and institutions are accustomed to dealing only with male farmers. Joint ownership can also create a messy situation in the event of divorce. Finally, even if all these difficulties ican be ov rcome it may affect only the first postreform generation unless bilateral inheritance and endogamy are practiced.
Another option fori land reform is to give women reserve powers. These could comprise two parts: one, that no renting out or sale 'f land is legally valid unless the wife's signature is on he contract; and that in the event of divorce or widowhoo the wife obtains lifelong usufruct rights over part of the land. It should counter most of the negative effects of m~ le inheritance without interfering with it. It( should encourage respect for wives' views on crop and technology choices while at the same time not obliging women to attend meetings at difficult times. There is no chance in the foreseeable future that men will share housework and child care equally with women. Asking women to share equally in the organizational aspect of farming would just be another burden.
if men remain the direct beneficiaries of land redistribution, and if credit is granted on the basis of land collateral, 'it is difficult to see how women can be awarded joint control over credit. It is possible that joint husband-wife membership of farmer cooperatives and credit accounts could be a unilateral measure to override land ownership. Where credit is needed to raise output of secondary food crops and small livestock that are in women's province, lines of credit ought to be extended to women in their own right. Dispensing with land collateral is necessary. Women's entrepreneurial ability could be seen as the basis of creditworthiness.
Discrimination against women in extension-service delivery has been criticized on the grounds that men do not pass on information to their wives so that women may not know how properly to apply higher productivity methods. But this usually refers to crop production, which men largely or wholly control. Discrimination also occurs in that women' s agricultural activities are seen as of such secondary importance that they do not merit extension attention, even on otherwise carefully detailed settlement schemes.
Both the distortion in the allocation of household resources and the wasted opportunities for women are solid grounds for redirecting some extension resources to women' s areas of interest. The practice to date in many cases has been to add some information on vegetable and other food production to home economics services. The quality of this extension information has to be questioned when it is offered together with information on nutrition, hygiene, and breastfeeding. A more serious criticism is that what a woman is encouraged to grow is selected by the home extensionist on the basis of what she thinks the woman ought to be growing for reasons other than resource efficiency and profitability. Therefore, the main agricultural extension service must cover women's agricultural interests if their contribution is to be maximized and their choices widened.
Producer Cooperatives and Collectivized Farms
There are many possible permutations of organization and diversification of group farming, and this fact offers the hope of selecting designs to suit different conditions. It might also be helpful to consider the development of a producer cooperative or a collective farm as evolving through different stages, so that every detail need not be in place at the start.
But if all this potential is to be realized democratic structures must be in place at the outset. This is the one necessary "given" in the earliest design, for limited early
participation' inhibits the range of options to be considered later. Where only household heads are beneficiaries of the land reform, and there are insufficient wage jobs for their wives, it is easy to ignore women's suggestions for employment creation if they do not have automatic membership as residents.!
But full membership in a democratic producer cooperative has advantages to women who are already
significantly involved in agriculture. Equal work points for men and women and personal remuneration can be effectively 1 promoted., Insofar as these cooperatives
substitute for traditional arrangements of production and distribution, they also substitute for wider kinship relations, support systems, and channels of appeal against family patriarchy.
Democratic structures incorporating women are a gain to the cooperative also. I In Nicaragua it was reported that women were 'a force for social cohesion and that they expressed a somewhat greater commitment to the cooperative principle than Imen. In Cuba much the same was seen. Governments are loath to break up large modern farms into small parcels of land or to change their methods of production from mechanization for fear that this will lower output. But if nothing is changed a legacy of limiting employment to a small full-time male force is inherited. If wives of members of this kind of producer cooperative are to be able to make substantial contributions to its success then the circle of "only secondary rights to limited jobs and no rights in decision-making unless a land beneficiary, and no ability to reallocate resources until rights in decision-making" has o be broken. iThe most natural point to break the circle is to separate land rights from full membership rights, even allowing that full membership of wives does not give them automatic rights to (nonexistent) employment. Resident 'wives must be full members in the sense of having the right to present ideas, negotiate, and vote on new production possibilities. An additional women's caucus could help bX distilling ideas before they are presented to full assemblies.
These kinds of democratic structures are particularly important if there is to be official encouragement of womenonly teams and women's collectives utilizing land that must be subtracted from he land held by the larger producer cooperative., Peru, Ni aragua, and Ethiopia gave examples of how this can be done. |But the potential for women's greater contribution through more land resources, extension advice, and farm inputs--particularly if women are not to be landreform beneficiaries lin their own right--must depend on legislated rights of women in decision-making participation.
Until women can develop their own lines of production, or are absorbed in t e cooperatives' employment-creating
expansion of main production, they will be heavily dependent on their husbands for household welfare. How much of their husbands' income will be at their disposal varies with cultural attitudes. If small household plots are allocated to women on the assumption that this contributes to the family's food requirements, the effect is to release men from part of family maintenance and to leave women with no personal cash income. It is worth considering the Chinese system of paying cooperative workers in both grains and cash, as a means of ameliorating this situation. Thus part of men's work points are remunerated in the form of the staple food. Chinese men were effectively underwriting family nutrition by providing grains. This would also
increase the chances that small household plots could be used for higher-value foods (in terms of both prices and nutritional content). Part of this produce could be sold, giving the women a small cash income. Without affecting the output of mainline agriculture but merely by altering the way the mainly-male labor force is paid, opportunities are created for more valuable sideline activities of women.
A final point needs to be made in the interests of perspective. To place producer cooperatives and the new Chinese production contracts in mutually exclusive categories would be to restrict the range of alternatives. Production contracts to a household or a group of households carry regressive social implications for women, but they need not be household-based. In essence, a production contract places a particular kind of small producer
cooperative under contract to a higher authority. The means of production may be owned by a higher collective. The
contractors can be a group of individuals who decide among themselves how to organize the work. The possibilities that this option offers women must tempt any government that is in the mood for experimentation and a little risk-taking. We have already mentioned the option of women collectively working land that would otherwise go to private household plots. An obvious question is, "Why put them under a
production contract instead of leaving them open to market forces?" It may be that conditions are not auspicious for entry into the free market. Left to wider market forces the women have to find their markets. Also, there may be scope for strengthening the incorporation of women in the institutional framework of a larger producer cooperative unit if they are placed under contract to it and use its resources of livestock, tools and working capital. The
larger unit will then have a direct interest in discussing input supplies with them. Moreover, if the contracts concern the supply of food or raw materials to the larger unit (or a state marketing agency) the success of the contract will be in everybody's interests so incentives (fair prices) should be easy to negotiate. The excess of specified targets could be distributed in ways that give incentives to both parties.
What is advocated here is an adaptation of China's new Responsibility System to a typical Latin American agrarian reform.
Mobilization and Participation of Women
If some of these options on agrarian reform are to be taken up it becomes obvious that women must be informed of their rights under the legislation and be brought into the process of implementation. The earlier this is done the less likely are tensions to occur between men and women.
But a nominal i tegration of women in all farmers' organizations may not be a sufficient guarantee of women being properly informed and able to raise their voices on important design matters such as land allocation. For
instance, there havel, for instance, been complaints from women heads of households that they were given the worst land in redistribution. The whole subject of household plots requires a 1ree airing, particularly if, as in
resettlement schemes, their role is expected to change.
There is therefore a case for establishing a women's association or a women s caucus within the farmers'
association. These two options have separate merits and defects. A women's association allows all women to raise any issue they wish. Collectively they can argue the case for social wage formation. But some women may not bother to join both the farmers' and women's association, and the women's association can easily assume a Cinderella status. Much could depend on whether it is linked to a national women's organizations whose leaders have the ear of
The case for a women's caucus (as well as general women's membership) within a farmers' association is quite different. !Some women are less timid and have a clearer idea of what they want than others. The active few can distill the more nebulous hopes of all. In exercising its influence a caucus can sometimes shortcircuit a largely male attendance at a generall meeting, and argue its case directly with the executive Committee of the farmers' association. While the whole association may have to vote on a matter it is useful to have the declared support of the platform. Against the caucus idea is the danger that it will be dominated by better-educated women of a higher socioeconomic standing. But democratic procedures of election to the caucus could ensure that over time this bias is eliminated.
Whichever option is selected, something more than this may be necessary in the case of resettlement schemes. We have noted the sense of isolation that women feel among strangers, and how' the difficulties posed by time
constraints delay establishing new support networks. There
are good grounds for putting in a woman extension worker or social worker with the brief to inform women settlers on matters concerning them and to bring women together. This person could also act as an early-warning system of particular stress caused by faulty settlement design, and as a bearer of complaints and ideas from women to management.
This discussion cannot end without some mention of vertical links between local women's mobilization and
national women's councils. The supporting role of national womenis federations in China and Cuba was very important. Many other countries rely on women's bureaus variously placed (or misplaced) in ministries of social services, culture, labor, etc. But a distinction must be drawn
between the way women's federations and bureaus -usually work. The former tend to agitate for policies, for improved legislation, and for institutional reforms. The latter often spend most of their time establishing projects, and dispensing limited funds in a manner that does not allow much replication.
It is the emphasis of the women's -federations that is most needed in agrarian-reform planning. In Cuba the FMC pushed for policies on creches, on mobilizing women in brigades, and on equal pay. As a result women were
enthusiastic about producer cooperatives. Women's
federations also have an active policy of extending their organization to the local level, and maintaining channels of communication. While women's bureaus may help in agrarianreform by supplying information, or in trying to establish something for women within one agrarian-reform project, they are not a match for well-organized federations in the matter of influencing more widespread policy on and implementation of agrarian reform. But where there is no national federation, a women's bureau might succeed in demanding that it check out a proposed agrarian reform for its likely impact on women.
What is apparent from this review is that there are many different kinds of agrarian reform. Within each there are design options that can both enhance the benefits for women and increase their contribution to make the reform more successful.
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Women's Roles and Gender Differences in Development. Cases for Planners Prepared by the Populattion Council.
The Nemow Case, by Ingrid Palmer, February 1985 $6.75 ISBN: 0-931816-16-5
Sex Roles in the Nigerian Tiv Farm Household, by Mary E. Burfisher and Nadine R. Horenstein February 1985 $6.75 ISBN: 0-931816-17-3 Agricultural Policy Implementation: A Case Study from Western Kenya, by Kathleen Staudt February 1985 $6.75 ISBN: 0-931816-18-1 Kano River Irrigation Project, by Cecile Jackson Pub. date July 1985 $6.75 ISBN: 0-931816-19-X
The Ilora Farm Settlement in Nigeria, by Heather Spiro Pub. date July 1985 $6.75 ISBN: 0-931816-20-3 The Impact of Agrarian Reform on Women, by Ingrid Palmer Pub. date July 1985 $6.75 ISBN: 0-31816-21-1 The Impact of Male Out-Migration ,n Women in Farming, by Ingrid Palmer Pub. date July 1985 $6.75 1ISBN: 0-931816-22-X
Kumarian Press offers a discount on purchases of full sets of these volumes. For more information, to ask for our catalog or to place an order, write or call
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