• TABLE OF CONTENTS
HIDE
 Front Cover
 Title Page
 Table of Contents
 List of Tables
 Foreword
 Introduction
 Development of the economic...
 Appendix I: Design and research...
 Development of the political structure...
 Campaign and electoral decisio...
 The voter survey: Analysis
 The new decision-making struct...
 The voter survey: Design
 Conclusion
 Appendix II: Interview schedule...
 Appendix III: Data on the election...
 Appendix IV: Cross-tabulation of...
 Back Cover






Group Title: political restructuring of a community
Title: The political restructuring of a community
CITATION THUMBNAILS PAGE IMAGE ZOOMABLE
Full Citation
STANDARD VIEW MARC VIEW
Permanent Link: http://ufdc.ufl.edu/UF00086046/00001
 Material Information
Title: The political restructuring of a community
Alternate Title: University of Florida, Studies in Public Administration, no. 27
Physical Description: vi, 68 p. : tables. ; 23 cm.
Language: English
Creator: McQuown, Ruth
Hamilton, William R.
Schneider, Michael P.
Publisher: Board of Trustees, University of Florida
Place of Publication: Gainesville, Fla.
Publication Date: 1964
Copyright Date: 1964
 Subjects
Subject: Municipal government -- Case studies -- United States   ( lcsh )
Politics, Practical -- Case studies   ( lcsh )
Genre: non-fiction   ( marcgt )
Case studies   ( lcsh )
 Notes
Statement of Responsibility: by Ruth McQuown, William R. Hamilton and Michael P. Schneider.
 Record Information
Bibliographic ID: UF00086046
Volume ID: VID00001
Source Institution: University of Florida
Holding Location: University of Florida
Rights Management: All rights reserved by the source institution and holding location.
Resource Identifier: oclc - 01447909
lccn - a 64007671

Table of Contents
    Front Cover
        Front Cover 1
        Front Cover 2
    Title Page
        Page i
        Page ii
    Table of Contents
        Page iii
    List of Tables
        Page iv
    Foreword
        Page v
        Page vi
    Introduction
        Page 1
        Page 2
        Page 3
        Page 4
        Page 5
    Development of the economic structure
        Page 6
        Page 7
        Page 8
        Page 9
        Page 10
        Page 11
    Appendix I: Design and research techniques for post-election survey
        Page 60
        Page 61
        Page 62
        Page 63
        Page 64
    Development of the political structure prior to 1963
        Page 12
        Page 13
        Page 14
        Page 15
        Page 16
        Page 17
        Page 18
        Page 19
    Campaign and electoral decision
        Page 20
        Page 21
        Page 22
        Page 23
        Page 24
        Page 25
        Page 26
    The voter survey: Analysis
        Page 30
        Page 31
        Page 32
        Page 33
        Page 34
        Page 35
        Page 36
        Page 37
        Page 38
        Page 39
        Page 40
        Page 41
        Page 42
        Page 43
        Page 44
        Page 45
        Page 46
    The new decision-making structure
        Page 47
        Page 48
        Page 49
        Page 50
        Page 51
        Page 52
        Page 53
        Page 54
        Page 55
        Page 56
        Page 57
    The voter survey: Design
        Page 27
        Page 28
        Page 29
    Conclusion
        Page 58
        Page 59
    Appendix II: Interview schedule for post-election survey
        Page 65
    Appendix III: Data on the election statistics and the survey sample
        Page 66
    Appendix IV: Cross-tabulation of the sample vote and various variables
        Page 67
        Page 68
    Back Cover
        Back Cover 1
        Back Cover 2
Full Text











THE POLITICAL RESTRUCTURING OF A COMMUNITY


by

Ruth McQuown
Assistant Professor of Political Science
University of Florida

William R. Hamilton
Michael P. Schneider


Public Administration Clearing Service
of the
University of Florida
Studies in Public Administration No. 27
1964











TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
List of Tables iv
Foreword v
Chapter
I. Introduction 1
II. Development of the Economic Structure 6
III. Development of the Political Structure Prior to 1963 12
IV. Campaign and Electoral Decision 20
V. The Voter Survey: Design 27
VI. The Voter Survey: Analysis 30
VII. The New Decision-Making Structure 47
VIII. Conclusions 58
Appendices 60








LIST OF TABLES
Table Page
1. Issue-Orientation Cross-Tabulated with the Vote 32
2. Group-Orientation Cross-Tabulated with the Vote 33
3. Candidate Orientation Cross-Tabulated with the Vote
in the Fields-Carpenter Race (Fields' Scale Score) 33
4. Candidate-Orientation Cross-Tabulated with the Vote
in the Fields-Carpenter Race (Carpenter's Scale
Score) 34
5. Candidate-Orientation Cross-Tabulated with the vote
in the Endicott-Glover-Wilkerson Race (Endicott's
Scale Score) 34
6. Candidate-Orientation Cross-Tabulated with the Vote
in the Endicott-Glover-Wilkerson Race (Glover's
Scale Score) 34
7. Candidate-Orientation Cross-Tabulated with the Vote
in the Endicott-Glover-Wilkerson Race (Wilkerson's
Scale Score) 34
8. Confidence Intervals for the Independent Variable, Issue-,
Group-, and Candidate-Orientation 35
9. A Summary of Multivariate Analysis of Issue,
Group-, and Candidate-Orientation Using Vote as the
Dependent Variable 36
10. Importance of Issues and the Respondent's Feeling on
the Issues 38
11. Awareness of and Position on the Issues Cross-Tabu-
lated with the Vote 39
12. Age Cross-Tabulated with Vote 40

13. Education Cross-Tabulated with Vote 41
14. Occupational Status of the Heads of Households
Cross-Tabulated with the Vote 42
15. Length of Residence Cross-Tabulated with the Vote 42








FOREWORD

This study by Dr. Ruth McQuown, Assistant Professor of Political
Science, William R. Hamilton, and Michael P. Schneider, formerly
graduate students in the Department of Political Science, all of the
University of Florida, represents a significant addition to the con-
tributions made by political scientists of that institution to the field
of local government. Beginning in 1961, with studies focused on
council-manager government, professors from this department have
been publishing their research findings on various aspects of local
government. It seemed advantageous, therefore, to bring together into
a coordinated single monograph two master's theses completed in
1963 about a particular city and related research on the same com-
munity carried on by Dr. McQuown. All separate segments in this
monograph deal with a single basic subject: political decisions by
both the electorate and leaders in 1963 that constituted change in the
political style of the community.
Superficially, this study may appear to be merely another one
that illustrates rivalry between "town and gown" in a college or uni-
versity community. But the alliance between professionals associated
with newer industries and the university faculty against the native-
born downtown business leaders represents a much more universal
type of politico-socio-economic cleavage. That cleavage is the conflict
between "outsiders" and "insiders" or, as Robert B. Merton puts it so
aptly, between "cosmopolitans" and "locals." Therefore, towns and
cities which have experienced the rise of political competition after
experiencing the inmigration of new classes of people with values
and life styles different from those long prevalent in the community
usually go through a struggle generally similar to that of Townley.
The ability of some of Townley's new groups to organize cohesively
for political purposes and to articulate their views possibly accelerated
the dynamics of change in political style in that city. Such accelera-
tion merely makes Townley more convenient to study without in any
way making it atypical.
As is customary in community studies of the kind presented here,
the city and all its leaders, factions, and institutions are given ficti-
tious names. The anonymity of all interviewees and major actors is
guaranteed in this way. Extensive interviewing in the community
took place in 1962 and 1963.








William R. Hamilton received financial aid from the Florida Cen-
ter for Education in Politics of Tallahassee, Florida, for the survey
he conducted of Townley voters following the 1963 city council elec-
tion. The grant from the Center financed his interviewing staff and
machine analysis. From Dr. Charles D. Farris, Associate Professor of
Political Science of the University of Florida, he received guidance
and direction on planning the survey, survey techniques, and statisti-
cal analysis. Dr. Gladys M. Kammerer, chairman, Dr. Ruth
McQuown, and Dr. Elmo Jackson served as his supervisory commit-
tee.
Michael P. Schneider did his thesis under the direction of the
following committee: Dr. Ruth McQuown, chairman, Dr. Ernest R.
Bartley, and Dr. Arthur W. Thompson.
Dr. Ruth McQuown did all the editorial work of weaving these
theses together into a unified whole, and conducted all of the basic
research on the political and economic background of the community.
Other studies of local politics and administration will be published
by Public Administration Clearing Service from time to time as they
are completed in our continuing research program.

GLADYS M. KAMMERER
DIRECTOR, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
CLEARING SERVICE
April 1964








CHAPTER I


INTRODUCTION

This is a study of political change in a medium-sized Southern
city (estimated at 52,000 in 1963) which in the 1960's has been
undergoing a change in its style of politics. That community, identi-
fied here by the fictitious name of Townley, has changed from a
monopolistic to a competitive style of politics.1 One aspect of the
movement toward competitiveness in politics has been the struggle
in Townley over what might be called the "privatization" of power2
as opposed to decision-making by official organs of government. The
present study attempts to explore the significance of that change for
our understanding of politics at the local level, especially the mean-
ingful relationships between changes in the economic structure and
those in the political structure. The 1963 election for two vacancies on
the Townley city council gave majority control over the formal repre-
sentative machinery of decision-making of the city government to two
major groups in the economic structure which previously had been
excluded from representation on that body. Subsequent analysis of
the electorate and the election returns made clear that an articulate
segment of the electorate consciously established itself as a crucial
nucleus of voters for any future electoral decision.
In terms of their numbers, political skills, economic importance to
the community, and electoral mandate, this new group appeared to be
in a position to exclude from the decision-making process the group
1Competitive political style is used as defined in Gladys M. Kammerer,
Charles D. Farris, John M. DeGrove, and Alfred B. Clubok, The Urban Politi-
cal Community (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1963), page 6. This term
means the existence of at least two leadership cliques competing on a con-
tinuing basis for elective office. As used in that study, it can embrace con-
sistent winning of council elections by one clique so long as an opposition
clique continues to exist and challenge in elections. An alternation of cliques
is not required for competition to prevail. The other term used by these
authors, monopoly, is defined as a regular winning of council seats by one
leadership clique with no continuing opposition from a rival leadership clique.
However, "self-starters" may file as candidates for office. Opposition, as it
occurs, therefore, is an individual matter and not structured by a rival clique.
2See E. E. Schattschneider, The Semisovereign People (New York: Holt,
Rinehart, and Winston, 1960), pp. 36-43 for a useful discussion of how narrow-
ing the area of conflict on issues to settlement among private interests as their
concern alone increases the power of their interests.








which it had displaced in majority dominance on the city council.
The new majority's behavior in the first two major decision-making
situations with which it was confronted after the election indicated
that this might be the case, but a third such situation suggested that
the actual decision-making parameters would have to be moved to
include not only the former dominants but also another emerging
group.
These factors appeared to manifest themselves in this whole pro-
cess of change: increasing pluralism since World War II in the socio-
economic structure of the community; increase in the size and num-
bers of economic organizations whose decision-making centers were
outside the community; the creation and growth of a civic organiza-
tion which raised issues, supported candidates, and canvassed for
votes; and, most recently, the awareness and reaction of local Negroes
to the nation-wide movement for social equality. Thus the variables
of change in the economic structure and the location of controls over
the various segments of that structure as well as other social structures
in the community suggested themselves as significant for analysis.
As Robert Dahl has pointed out in his theorizing and research on
community power, however, the political power structure is a product
not only of economic power but also of political skills.8 Sheer eco-
nomic power may count for little or nothing in influencing political
decisions unless the holders of that power also possess the skills and
the knowledge of how to apply them in gaining access to the decision-
making structure in the political process. The Townley community
became acutely aware of what the possession and use of political skills
could mean prior to and during the 1963 city council election by
a group which previously had never exhibited any capacity for
acquiring access. Therefore, the mediating effect of political skills be-
came another variable to be considered.
The present study, then, was undertaken to discover something
about the present nature of the actual political decision-making struc-
ture and the significance of the above factors in whatever is its newly
developed configuration. If change is to be explained, however, we
must understand the relative position of these factors in previous con-
figurations of the structure and how their absence or presence affected
the political structure. Therefore, unlike many "static" studies of
"community power," which describe social, economic, and political

SRobert A. Dahl, Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American
City (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), p. 315.








"power" relationships at only one point in time, the present study
attempts to make a "dynamic" analysis which seeks to account for
changes in relationships.
Before stating the general framework which guided the present
analysis, the reader should understand the theoretical concepts and
definitions which are both implicit and explicit in this study. While
political and economic systems are not empirically distinct, they may
be treated as distinct for analytical purposes in order to understand
the whole process of the social system.4 As used in this study, the term
political decision-making structure refers to the total configuration of
individuals and groups who are major participants in the formal
public decision-making process. The economic structure is defined as
the total configuration of economic groups in the community. Finally,
political skill is defined as the ability to gain access to political
decision-making so as to achieve a significant part of the goals for
which access is desired.
With that conceptual orientation in mind, the following very gen-
eral hypothesis was formulated to guide the present study: the extent
to which the political decision-making structure of a community in-
cludes all of the major economic groups in the community will be
determined by the character of the economic structure, the extra- or
intra-community locations of control over the economic groups, and
the political skills of those groups. Thus the hypothesized independent
variables are economic structure of the community and the extent of
extra-community control over economic groups within the commu-
nity. Because the concept of political skills of groups and leaders
may be thought of as representing the application of such economic
influence, it becomes an intermediate independent variable. As hy-
pothesized, the inclusiveness or exclusiveness of the political decision-
making structure in the community is the dependent variable in the
analysis.
The analysis explores the hypothesis by focusing on certain crucial
decisions made by the major actors (groups and individuals) in the
political process examined here. It should be recognized that a deci-
sion may be one to act or not to act; that the alternatives available
in making it are determined by the perceptions and values of the
decision-maker and by the past and anticipated decisions of that actor
as well as other decision-makers in the environment; and that a

4Heinz Eulau, The Behavioral Persuasion in Politics (New York: Random
House, 1963), pp. 20-21.








decision may have unanticipated as well as anticipated consequences.
For this reason, an examination of decisions and how they are made
can tell us a great deal about what the decision-maker values, with
whom he interacts, and what he might be expected to decide in the
future.
Democratic theory attaches great importance to decisions at the
polls by the electorate as well as to decisions by the representatives
elected through that electoral process. These are two different kinds
of democratic decisions, and the normal assumption is that the second
set of decisions is made within the general context of values deter-
mined by the first set of decisions, i.e., at the polls. However, Townley
had never had a real opportunity for choice at the polls, and con-
sequently decisions by representatives who had never had to make
explicit their values or their means for achieving their values re-
stricted the community's access to. their decision-making processes.
Therefore, politics in Townley in 1963 takes on a two-fold impor-
tance, and, therefore, a two-fold analysis is necessary. One aspect of
the importance of the changes that occurred in Townley in 1963 is
that the election for city council was issue-oriented, and the other
aspect of importance is that issues, as such, actually began to emerge
publicly through open public consideration and disposition by the
elected representatives. This analysis, therefore, centers around a)
the perceptions and judgments of the actual electorate as to issues
and candidates in the city council election; and b) decisions by the
elected council subsequently made and issues that became public
knowledge in the first few months following the election.
The first step in the study was to identify the nature of the politi-
cal and economic structures of the community prior to the 1963 elec-
tion. For this purpose, an extensive analysis was conducted through
intensive interviewing throughout the community. This analysis used
a combination of Hunter and Dahl techniques in discovering com-
munity power structure, approaches which seek to discover actual
decision-makers through both power attributed to "notables" and the
influence of such "notables" in issue resolution.5
Next, the political campaign of 1963 for two seats on the city
council was analyzed as it was conducted primarily through news-
paper advertisements, in the belief that such public evidence reflected
decisions which the candidates and the groups supporting them had

5Floyd Hunter, Community Power Structure: A Study of Decision Makers
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1953), and Dahl, op. cit.








made with regard to other groups and individuals in the community.
For this purpose a modified quantitative-content analysis was made
of the newspaper advertisements, which traditionally have been the
primary public medium through which campaigns for the city council
have been conducted in Townley. This type of content analysis is con-
cerned with what actually was said and how often it was said. The
now highly developed techniques for achieving precision in counting
and presenting the data were used to the extent that they were
deemed appropriate for this study.6
The electoral decision was then analyzed in terms of certain
characteristics of the voters, including their attitudes toward and per-
ceptions of the issues, the candidates and their group affiliations; and
the relationships between these variables and the voters' actual elec-
toral choice. For this purpose a community-wide opinion survey based
on a systematic sample of actual voters was conducted immediately
after the election.
Lastly, three major decisions, made by the city council within a
few months after the election, were examined against the foregoing
background, in terms of who participated in their making, how they
were made, and their content. Information for this purpose was drawn
from newspaper accounts and interviews with some participants.

6Bernard Berelson, Content Analysis in Communciation Research (Glen-
coe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1952).








CHAPTER II


DEVELOPMENT OF THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE

Townley is the county seat of Cleveland County in a Southern
state. Its 1963 population of over 52,000 represented an increase of
some 20,000 by virtue of an annexation accomplished by special
legislative action after the 1960 census.
Agriculture had served as the backbone of the economy of the
community prior to the turn of the century. A few "home industries"
-an iron foundry, tannery, saw mills, and other similar activities-
had developed in the town. During the first three decades of the
present century, wood products and chemical fertilizers became im-
portant products in the area's economic life.
The location of a technical college, which later became a full-
fledged university, was one of the most significant events in the eco-
nomic and social history of Townley. This occurred shortly after the
turn of the present century. Enrollment remained quite small dur-
ing the early years, with a 3,000-student figure not quite achieved
until the mid-thirties. By 1930, the college achieved university status
and through its faculty increased the number of "professionals and
semi-professionals" in the employed population to almost 15 per cent
of the total employed in the community. In addition, the previously
small trade complex of the community, especially wholesale and retail
trade, then accounted for over 17 per cent of those employed. Those
working in "manufacturing and mechanical industries" constituted
approximately 18 per cent of the employed people in Townley, but
almost one-half of these were in building and related occupations. In
the absence of any large-scale industries, however, the largest single
economic group in the town was that of domestic and personal serv-
ice, which included 30 per cent of the employed population and kept
the average individual income level low. Negroes made up only about
one-half of this force.
In terms of significance for the future political structure, the
Great Depression of 1929 brought the next major change in the
economy of the community. As mortgages and taxes became due and
the hard hit farmers and lumbermen were unable to pay them, land
was foreclosed and sold for the tax lien by the sheriff from the steps
of the courthouse. Those with even a small amount of cash were able
to obtain rather sizeable land holdings, which later, as an object of









speculation, would aid some of these people in the consolidation of
their political power in the community. In addition, these purchases
enabled some new persons to enter the economic and political
decision-making structure of the area. Thus, land remained a major
element in the base of the economy, but in a form other than for
agriculture.
World War II caused little immediate change in the total com-
munity, other than the temporary loss of the younger male popula-
tion. When the war was over, some of the young men who returned
were impatient with the somewhat slow pace of their city. These
young veterans, and a number of displaced veterans from other parts
of the country who came to Townley after the war, were interested in
making their own fortunes. However, they found that the major
financial interests were monopolized by a relative few in the "estab-
lished order" in the community, who were not willing to change the
community except on their own terms. Under those circumstances the
more vigorous of the new men permitted themselves to be co-opted'
into the established group, so as to gain access to financial resources
in Townley. These younger men will be referred to hereafter as
"Boomers" and the older group as "Colonels." The combined group-
ing will be identified as Standpatters.
At this point, a discussion of the role of banks in Townley is
necessary. In most small and medium-sized communities banks are
at the core of the financial and economic structure. This was the case
in Townley at the close of the war, because outside capital had shown
little willingness to invest in the community. Thus, the local banks
were free to make financial decisions as to how and where the com-
munity should develop and who should develop it. Up to this time,
the university's growth had been slow though steady and, therefore,
the economic impact of its growth could be absorbed by the "down-
town" financial decision-makers without upsetting their own plans.
The principal bank around which the economic and political leaders
clustered was the Townley National Bank. Its chief rival in the early
period had been the Shea County Bank. Shea sold the bank as well
as his extensive real estate holdings to an outside industrial and
banking complex, who renamed it the State Bank of Cleveland

1Philip Selznick defines "co-optation" as "the process of absorbing new
elements into the leadership or policy determining structure of an organization
as a means of averting threats to its stability or existence." TVA and the
Grass Roots: A Study in the Sociology of Formal Organizations (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1953) p. 13.








County. It later became the National Bank of Cleveland County and
now services primarily the local interests of its outside owners. Until
the last few years, when it became obvious that the expansion of its
land holdings in the county around Townley had serious implications
for the development of the community, this bank had not played a
pervasive role in either the economy or politics of the town. Since
then, however, their concern with the politics of the county was
openly evidenced when a local agent of this interest sought (unsuc-
cessfully) a local seat in the state legislature.
In 1947, some of the co-opted "Boomers" opened a new bank,
Security Trust, in order to facilitate their expanding subdivision
developments, and also to capture some of the new depositors accom-
panying the university's post-war growth. Although apparently estab-
lished with the blessings of the older group, the Security Trust had
obviously become a strong competitor of the Townley National be-
cause of the former's more liberal policy toward "taking risks." In
1951, another group of the co-opted young developers opened the
Merchants' Exchange Bank, originally a savings and small loan bank
but now a full-fledged commercial operation. This bank has experi-
enced rapid growth since 1960. During the early part of this period
of bank development, the Townley National apparently continued its
dominant position in the "downtown" economic structure. More re-
cently, however, there have been clear evidences of its inability to
dominate in what could develop into a "bank war," especially since
the purchase of its controlling stock by an outside banking corpora-
tion with regional holdings.
Caught up in the nation-wide trend, the university grew rapidly
in the post-war period, in the size of both its student body and
faculty. From 1935 to 1963 its student enrollment had increased
almost five-fold. Location of a new medical-school complex at the
university during the 1950's had greatly enhanced the growth occur-
ring in other parts of the institution.
"Downtown" economic leaders worked hard to influence the de-
cisions which finally brought the medical school to the community.
It appears, however, that some of the older, original dominants in
that structure were especially hard-working in this effort. From their
general behavior patterns both before and after the event, it is not
inappropriate to surmise that, faced with the general wave of growth,
they preferred that it be in the direction of such "quiet, clean," and
what they though would be politically-neutral institutions rather than
outside-directed, unpredictable industries. However, the co-opted








"Boomers" apparently concentrated their efforts-directed especially
through the local Chamber of Commerce-toward attracting "clean"
industries to the community. A crucial element in the success of their
efforts was the presence of the university, which proved to be attrac-
tive to some highly-professionalized research industries. Today the
community has a plant from each of two major nation-wide manu-
facturing organizations: Mid-States Products and Great Northern
Corporation. The community will soon have another large "institu-
tion," as a result of a recent decision of the Veteran's Administration
to locate a new hospital in Townley.
As already suggested, this population growth made it possible for
large-scale real estate development to become a major economic ac-
tivity in Townley for the first time in its history. Previously noted,
too, was the opportunity which the increased population, with its new
purchasing power and need for housing, gave to some of the younger
men to establish commercial banks. An additional need was created
for home mortgages, which the commercial banks were not permitted
to write. This opened up opportunities for some access to the eco-
nomic decision-making structure to a group of businessmen and
lawyers who were not in the group of co-opted "Boomers." The
former had not been found acceptable to the dominants in the struc-
ture for a number of reasons, including differences perceived in
social and economic origins and in interpretations as to the competi-
tive "rules of the game." At any rate, the "excluded" groups estab-
lished the Townley Building and Loan Association. Each of the other
banks, however, was quick to counter by setting up its own savings
and loan association. These relationships can be seen in the inter-
locking boards of directors of the various organizations.
In the post-war years agriculture continued to decline in impor-
tance to the economy of the community. Other groups, however, in
addition to those already mentioned, were playing an increasing eco-
nomic role. The staffs of various state institutions and agencies
located in Townley had greatly increased. Today the university and
this set of university state organizations provide by far the largest
single source of payrolls in Townley. It is estimated that state and
federal sources provide more than 30 per cent of the community's
purchasing power.
In terms of their institutional patterns of work and decision-
making, sources of recruitment, and other characteristics, local gov-
ernment employees-city and county-may be thought of as separate
groups. Among these is what will be described later in this study as








a politically significant sub-group: the approximately 350 people
employed by the city-owned organization which operates the water,
sewer, and electrical power systems for the community. This organi-
zation has an annual budget several times greater than that for the
remainder of city government. Furthermore, as will be shown later,
the administrative independence of the utilities director makes him
an important economic figure in the community through his control
over contracts with and favors to business and industrial firms in the
community.
Thus it was possible to identify as of 1963 at least four major
organizational groupings in the economy, each with its own peculiar
set of work patterns, centers, and processes of economic decision-
making, need for resources, and inter- and intra-organizational pat-
terns of social relationships. Each of these economic groupings
includes various strata of people who can be classified according to
the level of their skills, formal training, and incomes. In these terms,
the university and other state institutions and agencies would consti-
tute one such grouping, for each includes professionally-trained and
professionally-oriented personnel, in at least the higher hierarchical
levels; a staff of middle-income clerical, secretarial, and admin-
istrative personnel, and lower level service and labor employees.
Important both economically and politically is the fact that the
decision-making center for each component of this grouping is located
outside the local community and is subject to influences from all over
the state. Similar to this group in politically significant ways is the
one which includes the two, relatively new, industrial plants, both
part of nation-wide business organizations. Like the university-
institutional grouping, the Mid-States Products group in particular
has professionally oriented personnel in its top hierarchy as well as
throughout the organization.
A third group is, of course, the "downtown-controlled" collective
of developers, merchants, service managers, banks, and other finan-
cial institutions. It is hardly necessary today to dwell on the "cul-
tural" distinctiveness of such a group-volumes have been written
on the subject. If further proof is required, it can be found in the
later discussion of their coalescence in political decision-making
against the other groupings in Townley.
Analytically identifiable as a fourth group are the city and county
employees, whose "cultures" include their interaction with political
dominants in the community but whose behavior in elections is in-
dicative of their tendency to identify with their peers in other groups.








Nevertheless, it is significant for politics that control over their
economic welfare is locally-based.
Another socio-economic grouping in Townley must be identified
for purposes of political analysis: the lowest income stratum in the
community. Although this stratum to some extent cuts through and
is included in all of the groupings noted above, many of the people
in it are not identified with such groups. It includes some retired peo-
ple; younger unemployed and unemployable individuals; itinerant
unskilled laborers; semi-skilled workers, especially in the building
trades, who shift from one employer to another; and a large number
of service employees who work in private households and in small
business establishments. Approximately three-fourths of the people in
this broad grouping are whites; the remaining one-fourth are almost
all Negroes. Because some of these people are not connected with any
organized economic establishment and others work for a number of
temporary employers in any one year, they cannot be said to be a
part of the economic "culture" of the institutional, industrial, or
"downtown" groupings already identified. Furthermore, if we rec-
ognize that, at the present time at least, Negroes are distinct from
whites in the same economic class, in the sense that even if trained
for higher-level employment the former have not been absorbed into
the "culture" of the various groups discussed above, then we are
justified in treating the Negroes analytically as a separate economic
grouping. Furthermore the desire for economic equality is certainly
a major factor in their behavior. As will be discussed later in this
study, their behavior in all their relationships in the community is
increasingly determined by decisions made by Negro leaders outside
the community.
The economic structure of the Townley community, then, has
been pluralistic. Even before World War II, but especially since that
period, there have been several different sub-structures within which
economic decision-making takes place, and some are centered within
the community while some are influenced mainly from without the
community. As this study seeks to show, which ones are included in
the political decision-making structure depends upon their relative
relationships to each other, the extent to which they have independ-
ence from local control, and the level of their political skills. The
following chapter attempts to show how these variables affected the
various groups up to the time of the 1963 city election.








APPENDICES


APPENDIX I*

DESIGN AND RESEARCH TECHNIQUES FOR
POST-ELECTION SURVEY

1. The Sample.-The sample used in this research utilized only
the actual voters in the specific election under analysis. From the poll
lists of those who voted in the March, 1963 election a systematic
sample was drawn.
The city grouped precincts together by twos or threes to consti-
tute seven larger areas out of twenty-three precincts used in state and
national elections. The first step in determining the sample was pos-
sible only after the final election results were tabulated. Each area's
vote was expressed as a percentage of the total vote. Then the re-
quired sample was set as 210 with the hope of getting a usable sample
of 200. To each of the areas was attributed that proportion of the
sample that was its proportion of the total vote. The resulting figures
gave a sample which was distributed geographically in the same
ratio as was the actual vote.
The second step involved dividing the total sample into the total
vote. This was done in order to yield every nth voter. The number
figured out to be 31; from each area the writer took every thirty-
first voter beginning with a number selected from a table of random
digits. In this case, the number was one so that every thirty-first,
sixty-second, ninety-third, etc., name was chosen from each area.
This procedure yielded a total fixed-address sample of 209 which
deviated from the desired sample due to rounding-off processes. Of
the 209 interviews sought, 159 interviews were completed. The failure
to obtain the remainder was due to wrong addresses, absence from
the city, and refusals to be interviewed because of a connection with
the city government or the candidates personally. It appears to the
writer that in survey took at the local level this attrition rate will
always be a problem. The voters are closer to the participants and
tend to identify with them more than in a national or state election.
This systematic or every nth sample is not a probability sample
and it does not fully meet the requirements of random sampling

*Written by William R. Hamilton.








theory. It is, however, not biased by human elements and can be
taken to be representative of the population sampled. As example of
proof is the percentage of Negro voters which appeared in the sample
as opposed to an actual enumeration. In the sample the Negro per-
centage was 4.78 per cent whereas from an actual enumeration of the
rolls the percentage was 6.18 per cent.
2. Error in the Sample.-To test the validity of the sample ob-
tained in the research, confidence intervals were applied to the sam-
ple percentage of vote for particular candidates. The results are
shown below.

Confidence Intervals
Candidate Actual Vote Sample Vote P=.05
Fields 69.4% 78.6% 72.2- 85.0
Endicott 61.8 70.2 63.1- 77.3

The reader will notice that there is an error of around 8 or 9
per cent between the sample proportion and the actual proportion of
the vote. It will also be noticed that neither of the confidence inter-
vals includes the actual percentage received by either candidate. An
explanation is forthcoming. First, the sample was not purported to
be a random sample, and the technique of confidence intervals can
be assumed to be valid only if the sample design is based on strict
probability theory. Second, approximately 6 per cent of the respond-
ents revealed answers to all of the questions except the vote ques-
tions. Assuming that the previous findings are correct, the voters
included in that 6 per cent were found to demonstrate a tendency
toward the Standpatters. Only one of these voters had come to Town-
ley after 1953, ten either worked for local government or local busi-
nesses, and ten were group-oriented toward the Standpatters. If these
were Standpatter voters, then the large error toward the Reformer
candidates would be alleviated.
Not to be discarded as a reason for such a high error in favor
of the winners is a post-election bandwagon effect. Unless previous
analyses of post-election studies are invalid, this type of research in-
variably shows an error toward the winners.
3. The Interview Schedule.-Difficulty in gauging what might
be the attitude and opinions of the voters in this particular election
was experienced by the author as a result of the situational aspects
of the research. Certainly there were many variables in this election
with which the voters of Townley had never before been confronted.








For this reason, the questions dealing with attitudes were worded
as free response or open-ended questions. This gave the respondent
the opportunity to relate his true feelings and not be hampered by a
possible invalid structure of fixed answers. It was then possible to
take these free responses and understand more fully their structure
during the coding process and only then reduce the data to quantified
material.
For some other questions such as the type of firm worked for,
education, age, and length of time lived in Townley, free response
questions were also used. These types of data, although factual, might
have a peculiarity to Townley residents. Therefore, establishment of
preconceived categories might possibly submerge meaningful relation-
ships.
In the case of all other personal characteristics, fixed response
or closed-end questions were used. These questions, such as vote,
sex, and race are characteristics for which the structure is readily
apparent.
The schedule, shown in Appendix II, ran three pages and took
only an average of ten minutes of interviewing to complete.
4. The Interviewing.-The interview schedule was pre-tested by
the writer and another graduate student and found to elicit from the
respondents the type of information needed. Therefore, the schedule
was retained virtually intact from the original formulation. The
actual interviewers were all students. They were either political
science or journalism majors and ranged from sophomores to master's
degree candidates. There were thirteen interviewers including the
writer, and each interviewer was assigned from eight to sixteen
interviews.
The writer was fortunate in obtaining a Negro student to serve
as a member of the interviewing staff. This situation alleviated an
additional bias which plagues many surveys dealing with sensitive
information. Of the ten Negroes in the sample, nine were contacted
by the interviewer and only one refused. The information recorded
on the Negroes' interview schedules appeared to be as interesting and
extensive as other respondents in their socio-economic class.
There were three one-hour training sessions for interviewers. For
the most part actual interviewing took place within ten days after the
election. This included three days to draw the sample and a week of
interviewing. The last interview was completed twenty days after the
election but there were not, in the few late interviews, any references








to post-election happenings, and, therefore, these interviews were
assumed to be valid.
The total field time for interviewing was 132 hours. This included
travel time as well as the minimum of two call-backs.
5. Coding and Method of Analysis.-Coding, or the quantifying
of raw data from the interview schedules into code numbers punched
onto IBM cards, was the next step. Each punch related to a specific
attitude or fact about each individual.
For example, the question concerning party preference was coded
thus: one for Democrat, two for Republican, and three for Inde-
pendent. One of these numbers was then punched in a card column
designated as the party preference column. Each respondent had a
card, giving a deck of 209 cards and each of these cards had a party
preference column.
For the free response questions (those questions which were
answered in the respondent's own words) a sample of forty was
selected from the total sample and read through for each question.
From these responses the writer acquired a feeling of the true situa-
tion and established categories appropriate to each of the questions.
Each of the categories was assigned a code number.
As the final coding began, the writer was cognizant of new cate-
gories of responses arising. When this occurred, the established codes
were revised, and the entire process began once again until all of the
responses would fit into the established categories. This type of pro-
cedure assured the accurate measurement of the code numbers in
relation to the actual structure which the population attributed to a
given situation.
The coding procedures for the fixed answer questions were much
simpler. The structure of the questions had been determined before
the actual interviewing began, and the respondents merely had to
respond to a number of alternative choices. For coding purposes, the
choices for each question were assigned code numbers; these num-
bers were then punched onto the cards.
6. Methods of Analysis.-For tabulating and summarizing the
information on the IBM cards, a model 83 IBM sorter was used. This
machine provides for sorting and counting automatically by columns
and by the code number punched in each column.
The main tool for analyzing the data collected was multivariate
analysis and cross-tabulation. These procedures involve the dividing
of a variable or question into its various attributes (categories) and








the viewing of the relationship which occurs when each of these attri-
butes is again divided by another variable or question. For example,
the variable, age, was broken into three attribute groups; young,
middle age, and old. Then each of the groups was analyzed to deter-
mine whether its members voted more heavily for Reformer candi-
dates or for the Standpatter candidates. This procedure allowed the
writer to determine whether one of these groups was more inclined
to vote for a specific candidate than were the others.
By this method of multivariate analysis and cross-tabulation,
data can be analyzed to the extent of determining what attitudes and
characteristics were more inclined to push a voter into one or the
other camps.








CHAPTER III


DEVELOPMENT OF THE POLITICAL STRUCTURE
PRIOR TO 1963

FORMAL STRUCTURE OF CITY GOVERNMENT
Townley is formally governed by the council-manager plan of
municipal government with some peculiar modifications. The city
council consists of five councilmen elected to three-year staggered
terms. No member of the council may serve more than two consecu-
tive terms. The mayor is merely a ceremonial figure with no formal
powers delegated by the charter other than ceremonial duties and
presiding over council meetings. He is selected annually from one
of the holdover councilmen.
A city plan board is appointed by the council to deal with the
problems of developing community planning, formulating plans into
proposals, and making recommendations on zoning. However, the
council has the final word on such matters as approval or rejection
of plans and zoning recommendations, within certain restrictions as
to procedure set forth in the city charter. The size of the plan board
is set by ordinance.
Administration of the city varies from that of most council-
manager communities on the matter of manager jurisdiction. The
city manager, appointed and dismissed by the city council, has but
limited administrative control. The making of the general fund
budget is delegated to the finance director, as are the other fiscal
tasks. The finance director, however, is appointed by and directly
responsible to the council itself and not to the manager. Thus he has
equal status with the manager.
The city charter establishes the director of the utility complex as
administratively independent of the city manager and responsible
only to the council. This department employs some 350 persons and
has a budget several times greater than that for all other functions
of the city combined. The utility director frequently has been accused
of establishing departmental policies without referral to the commis-
sion and even, on occasion, of proceeding counter to commission
orders. The utility director, therefore, may be attributed a status
superior to that of the city manager, despite what appears to be equal
status on an organization chart. As suggested in the previous chap-
ter, the city utility department may be considered a separate eco-








nomic segment of the community and an administrative decision
center apart from much of the rest of city government.
As is true of most communities, the city attorney plays a major
role in the government, in that his advice is usually the only authori-
tative legal advice which the council receives. In this role, therefore,
he frequently is able to make policies for the council merely by stat-
ing a legal opinion.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE DECISION-MAKING STRUCTURE
The "Colonels" and the "Sergeants."-During the 1920's, two
distinct political groups emerged in Townley, seemingly related to a
division in the United Daughters of the Confederacy. One group con-
sisted of bankers and large land holders and may be identified as the
"Colonels." The rival group, made up of smaller merchants and
tradesmen, may be styled the "Sergeants." The single real issue be-
tween the two groups was the advocacy by the "Sergeants" of mu-
nicipal ownership of the light plant.
Initially the "Colonels" favored privately-owned utilities because
several dominant members of that group held large interests in one
of the state's electric power companies. The feud between the "Colo-
nels" and the "Sergeants" over ownership of the city light plant
lasted until the 1940's, at which time the "Colonels" realized that the
revenue potential from publicly-owned utilities might enable the city
to hold property taxes at a reasonably low level. The case for private
ownership of utilities, therefore, was abandoned after World War II.
Actually, the division between these two groups probably has been
exaggerated. Although the "Sergeants" played the role of principal
critic of the "Colonels," the latter dominated city government
throughout most of the period. The "Sergeants" had little to offer in
the way of concrete programs. Because they had few young recruits
and lacked the political skills to obtain young recruits, they were not
able to continue as a political force in the community. Moreover,
when their chief issue of public ownership of utilities was accepted
by the "Colonels," the "Sergeants" were without a cause, for they
were in general agreement with the "Colonels" on most other issues.
Thus the "Colonels" were in a commanding position to control the
government of the city unchallenged. The record yields no evidence
of any decisions, formal or informal, made by the city government
under their rule which would have upset the economic and political
status quo.








The "Boomers."--As noted earlier, with the end of World War II
the younger men returned to Townley. The end of the war brought,
in addition, some newcomers, contemporary in age with them, who
also were interested in making their fortunes. These younger men
perceived that the growth of the university and the community in
general could mean economic opportunities in land development and
in the establishment of businesses related to building construction.
The new group of younger men soon recognized the need to gain
access to the financial structure of the community. Older business
leaders preferred an amiable accommodation to the younger group,
which was not, in any event, strong enough for an economic battle
with the "Colonels." Thus the younger businessmen permitted them-
selves to be co-opted into the old "Colonels" group.
As the young "Boomers" moved into active leadership roles, in-
cluding membership on the city council, the decisions of city govern-
ment began to reflect their influence. These young men began to
sponsor and work for better schools and more municipal services.
They also employed their skills in opening up new channels for access
to state government decision-making, as these channels previously
had been pre-empted by a state legislator from the county whose
economic and political influence was of a state-wide nature. However,
the record indicates that the expanded municipal services were pro-
vided primarily to a few new subdivisions developed by some of
the "Boomers." In 1957, the "Boomers" began a policy of granting
rebates on charges for extension of sanitary sewers and storm sewers
by the city to new subdivisions. The costly rebates were earmarked
only for developers stipulated in special ordinances, determined at
closed meetings of the city council. Significantly, the developers so
stipulated always happened to be identifiable as "Boomers."
The Standpatters.-These new policies, however, meant higher
property assessments and higher taxes, an anathema to the "Colo-
nels." Tensions resulted between the two groups, even up through the
1963 election, but never became public because both factions presum-
ably realized that the only means to retain control of city government
was through co-operation. Together they maintained a monopolistic
power structure which effectively dominated all major public deci-
sions made in the city until 1963. Probably an important factor in
their unity and effectiveness was the fact that their cohesiveness and
dominance as a group was never noted publicly until 1963, when
the Reform League and the Reformer candidates openly identified
them as a unified group they called "Standpatters." Their only op-








position up to that time had been from "self-starters" in the commu-
nity, most of whom apparently hoped to be co-opted into the existing
power structure. The one local newspaper, whose owner and editor
had social and economic ties with the political dominants, never ad-
mitted to the existence of a cohesive "group" of decision-makers.
Other factors contributing to the long dominance by the Standpatters
were the requirement of a separate registration for city voting for
many years until 1963 and the low level of participation in city coun-
cil elections even among the limited number of registrants. The news-
paper followed a policy of never endorsing any candidate editorially,
but there were many instances of failure to cover events or develop-
ments which would have been damaging to the status of the Stand-
patters with which it was allied.
The Reformers.-The faculty of the university was a significant
element in the changing political complexion of Townley. Prior to
the 1940's, the faculty was constituted largely of many local persons
woh had left the city only for their graduate training. Some of the
faculty married daughters of local business and professional men and
were helpful when the latter needed a channel of access to the univer-
sity. During the 1950's, the university community grew more rapidly
as a result of population growth in the state. The new faculty mem-
bers, brought to Townley from many different parts of the nation,
became concerned about the manner in which city government seemed
to exclude everyone but the Standpatters from consideration in re-
solving city policy questions and seemed to allocate resources for the
benefit of the Standpatters only.
The political "teeth" of the faculty had been pulled in the early
1950's, however, by a policy statement issued by the university presi-
dent, which went far beyond the rationale of the Hatch Act in for-
bidding any kind of political activity by university personnel in local
or state politics. Speculation has attributed this move to the need of
the then-president to secure the state-wide influence of the ubiquitous
local legislator in order to obtain a medical school for the university.
In thus making political eunuchs of the university faculty, the legis-
lator probably represented the interest of the Standpatters.
Faculty concern became active in early 1961, after the first pro-
fessional city manager of Townley was fired. At a testimonial dinner
for the "retired" manager, a group which consisted of university
faculty, professional personnel from Mid-States Products, and a small
miscellany of other Townley residents formed the nucleus of a "good
government" organization. Membership in this organization was








opened to the public and it was named the Reform League of Town-
ley, now popularly called the Reformers.
The organization of the Reformers was the first manifestation of
strength of the educated professional population that had moved to
Townley. in the 1950's. Its original purpose, in the words of the sev-
eral articulate political scientists who have been active in group, was
"to bring Townley government into the twentieth century in terms of
responsible leadership and organization and policies in the public
interest." This involved, among other things, reorganization of the
government to bring the utility department under control by the city
manager. Ultimately it moved further into active political work by
seeking candidates for the city council who would support Reformer
goals and by aiding them with both money and campaign workers.
In 1961, the Reformers "rang door bells" to help elect Henry Tolliver
to the city council.
As is frequently true of many monolithic power structures, the
Standpatters closed ranks against the Reformers but never took that
organization very seriously as competitors for governmental control.
Even the election of Tolliver did not seem to impress the Standpat-
ters. They appeared merely to regard him as a popular old-timer
resident who would have won without the Reformers, a very plausi-
ble supposition in view of the fact that his downtown business was
patronized largely by "old" Townley. They even retained this per-
ception of Tolliver after his public exposure on the council of the
"secret" rebates to certain developers.
In 1962, a misunderstanding within the Reformer executive
board resulted in no candidate being put forth by that organization
for the one council seat to be filled that year. This lapse enabled an
"agent" of the Standpatters to win the election unopposed. During
this period, the city council, still dominated by the Standpatters, con-
tinued its practice of spot zoning and the letting of city contracts for
the benefit of its own members. At the same time, Councilman Tolli-
ver, assisted by the Reformers, fought against those practices pub-
licly, pointing out their cost to the city.
By 1963, the Reformers had worked to obtain two candidates
from their own membership for the two council seats at stake in the
election. One candidate, Mark Fields, was a technician in a local
federal-state program who had been a long-time resident of the com-
munity and was also the brother of a state legislator from the county.
Fields was pitted against Simon Carpenter, an incumbent Standpat-
ter. For the other seat, vacated by a Standpatter councilman ineligi-








ble to run for re-election, the Reformers made a bolder choice. They
supported a young chemist, Bradley Endicott, who held an important
position at Mid-States Products and was a mere six-year resident in
the community. His major opponent, McKinley Glover, was a long-
time resident, a car dealer, a member of the county zoning board,
and a minor figure in the Standpatter power structure. Pat Wilker-
son, a third candidate in the race for the seat sought by Endicott and
Glover, was a downtown clothier who shared some of the Reformer
perspectives but not all of them. Primarily supported by one of the
local service clubs, he also drew some support from the remnants of
the old Sergeants' group. A small group of dissident persons in the
Reformers attempted to swing that organization's support to him, but
failed in this attempt.
Certain factors undoubtedly favored the Reformers in the elec-
tion. One was an extensive annexation of suburban territory that had
greatly increased the city electorate. In 1960, an unsuccessful annexa-
tion referendum had been held in the city and the surrounding built-
up areas. The unincorporated areas defeated the proposal by a large
margin. State law permits annexation without recourse to referendum
or the courts by special act of the legislature, passed without opposi-
tion if backed by the local legislative delegation. The local legislative
delegation took advantage of this and secured passage of a special act
in the 1961 session to annex those areas. Resentment welled up in
the newly annexed areas, and the antagonism led to serious challenge
by a local resident against the university-oriented state senator in the
1962 Democratic Primary.
In 1962, university faculty finally effected repeal of the policy
which had prevented their participation in local politics. They were
then free to work actively to win the re-election of the state senator,
and showed their strength in a bitterly fought contest into which, it
is claimed, much money had been poured by a combine of state-wide
industrial interests against the senator.
However, annexation had another effect on the Townley political
process. Many of the persons in the annexed areas were well-educated
university or professional types and some had a keen awareness of
the political situation as it had existed. This potential interest group
was to become a source of strength for the Reformers. Furthermore,
with annexation only a single voter registration, that of the county,
was needed, and this had the effect of additionally increasing the
electorate.
An important new element had recently been added to the politi-








cal situation in the community-the local newspaper was purchased
by a publishing "chain" controlled from outside the state and with no
local identifications. Under new ownership the newspaper began to
reassess the political situation. This reassessment was made, of course,
according to their own perceptions and values, which led them to
identify with at least some of the values of the Reformers. This was
expressed in terms of both news coverage and editorial policy.
Despite these changes, the Standpatter city council continued its
standard practices down to the eve of the election. A tacit under-
standing had existed between the university and the city to keep com-
mercial establishments from spreading to the area across the street
from the main campus. The city, however, upset this understanding
when the privately-operated Co-Op House sold its building at the main
campus corner to a group of realtors, who immediately requested
rezoning that corner for a gasoline service station. Because the com-
munity had an abundance of service stations and because the numer-
ous requests to rezone residential areas for additional stations were
seldom refused by the Standpatter council, resentment built up. The
university community became exercised over rezoning the Co-Op
corner. The president of the university protested the rezoning before
the council, and petitions signed by 500 property owners protested
rezoning. Nevertheless, the council voted to rezone, and an election
issue was "ready made."
In 1962, the utility director had his consulting engineer make a
study of power plant needs, which were found inadequately met. An
expansion plan, involving a cost of five million dollars, was recom-
mended by the engineering firm and the utility director. As was its
custom, the council met in a secret "emergency" session to approve
an issue of revenue certificates to pay for this expansion. Thereby
two more election issues were developed by early 1963. The first-
secret meetings-although often necessary in local government, are
generally distasteful to the general public, and are particularly ob-
noxious to an "educated public." The second issue revolved around
the question of how much power plant expansion was really neces-
sary in relation to cost. In addition, the notion of private ownership
of the power plant was raised again.
Finally, the city government had embarked upon an extensive
sewer project in the newly annexed area in West Townley, populated
largely by university and professional people. Residents were upset
when they received large sewer construction assessments, and even
more so when their lawns became ugly trenches from the laying of








the pipe lines. Further, residents of these areas claimed they needed
"sewering" less than East Townley, largely a Negro slum area; but
the city council completely omitted the latter area from sewer plans.
In the 1963 campaign, the Reform League of Townley took on
all the aspects of a local political party. Its candidates ran as a team;
it had a well defined action program of issues, which it publicized;
it raised funds for the campaign; and, perhaps most important, it had
a large organization of precinct workers who canvassed the entire
community on a door-to-door basis. The Standpatters were either un-
aware of these moves; or, if aware, discounted them or did not
possess the political skill to counteract them. Standpatter failure in
this respect might have been due to the fact that they never experi-
enced a challenge on so broad a scale. Their response was to conduct
an extensive media campaign, through both newspaper advertise-
ments and radio commercials.
Thus Townley moved from an agricultural and mercantile com-
munity to one including large public institutions and light industry.
The political power configurations had developed along the lines of
monopoly over public decision-making by the "downtown" social and
economic grouping, but now new social and economic groups in the
community were demanding inclusion in the political structure.








CHAPTER IV


CAMPAIGN AND ELECTORAL DECISION

Developments which provided the setting for the March 19, 1963
election for two seats on the Townley city council have been dis-
cussed in the previous chapters. As explained in Chapter III, the
candidates for one of these seats (designated Seat One) included the
incumbent, Simon Carpenter, who was considered to be the repre-
sentative of the "Colonels" faction of the Standpatters and Mark
Fields, who was endorsed by the Reform League. The candidates for
the other council seat (Seat Two) consisted of McKinley Glover, who
appeared to be the representative of the "Boomers" faction of the
Standpatters; Bradley Endicott, who was endorsed by the Reformers;
and Pat Wilkerson, who supported some, but not all, of the stands
taken by the Reformers and, therefore, had not been endorsed by
that group.'

THE ADVERTISING CAMPAIGN
The content of the campaign can be viewed as reflecting the past
structure of decision-making in the community and also as setting
the stage for a new structure. The decisions made by the candidates
in the campaign, as expressed in their public appeal for votes, would
reflect the nature of, and influences on, their past decisions and their
expectations in this regard as to future decisions. At the same time,
the campaign decisions would create expectations on the part of the
voters and the other candidates, with consequences both anticipated
and unanticipated.
The primary indicators chosen for this purpose were the paid
advertisements on behalf of the candidates which appeared in the
only local newspaper, the Townley Journal, during the campaign
period. Certainly other "commitments" were made by the candidates
which did not appear in the advertisements. The advertisements,
however, were read by the general public and proved to be the most
widespread source of communication to the public in the campaign.
This was borne out by the results of the survey (discussed in Chap-
ters V, VI, and VII) conducted after the election.
1Because neither of the two major contending groups-the Standpatters
and the Reformers-was seriously affected by Wilkerson's candidacy, his cam-
paign will be dealt with only briefly later in this chapter.








The techniques used for analyzing the advertisements were those
of "content analysis," as developed and discussed in connection with
communications research.2 Content analysis was used for the present
study to determine with some precision what was said by the candi-
dates and how often they said it. It was further used to explore other
relationships which will be made clear as the chapter unfolds. It was
assumed that very little distortion took place in the technical process
of presentation of candidates' views by the advertisement writers.
The advertisements were of two general types. The first type con-
sisted of the large advertisements in which the candidates could
elaborate on their "positions." The other type consisted of small ad-
vertisements in which the name of the candidate appeared along with
some of his personal identifications. The purpose of the former was
to present the "issues" and "platforms," while the purpose of the lat-
ter was to emphasize the candidate's name and to identify him with
the voter's own identifications in terms of such things as progressive,
democratic, long-time resident, businessman, and so on.
Prior to the campaign, the Reform League had recognized that
the election of both of its candidates was crucial to its attempts to
"break into" the political decision-making structure of the commu-
nity. As it already had succeeded in electing Henry Tolliver to the
council, it needed two more councilmen to command a majority.
Control over the formal structure of government would insure some
initial access to the decision-making structure. It could become an
integral part of that structure, however, only if the coalition of eco-
nomic elements led by the Reformers remained coalesced as a voting
bloc. Thus both Fields and Endicott were endorsed by the Reformers,
and the decision was made that they would run as a "team," sharing
the expenses and advertisements equally. In addition, it was decided
that Councilman Henry Tolliver would serve as campaign treasurer
and that this would be made public.
The Reform League then proceeded to publicize its endorsements
of the candidates and to organize a campaign for their election. Funds
were raised, precinct captains and workers were organized to ring
door bells in every city precinct on behalf of the candidates, and
newspaper advertisements were sponsored. In other words, the Re-
formers took on all the aspects of a local political party.
Analysis of the ads on behalf of the Reformer candidates reveals
that every ad appealed for both candidates. Further, out of ten large

2See especially Berelson.








ads in their campaign, the Reformers directly sponsored four while
the candidates inserted six on their own behalf. In four of these ten
ads, the need for these men to have a "majority" on the city council
was stressed heavily. In this connection, six ads identified these candi-
dates with Henry Tolliver, including one in the form of a letter from
Tolliver himself to the voters.
The Standpatter3 groups also made decisions in relation to the
campaign. Because of its monopoly over the political decision-
making structure, these "elites" had never publicly admitted their
existence as a unified group. Thus the decision was predetermined
that the two Standpatter candidates would conduct separate public
campaigns. This would require that each candidate must appear as an
"independent," representing "the interest of the entire community"
rather than that of any particular group or interest. Furthermore, it
would require that they attack their opponents-Fields and Endicott
-as being representatives of a "special interest" group rather than
of the community-at-large.
Analysis of the ads confirms these expectations: there were no
ads in which these two Standpatter candidates appeared jointly. Car-
penter used twelve large ads, while Glover used nine large ads. Both
attacked their opponents for representing a "power bloc," for being
puppets of the Reformers, and for representing "minority-group"
power. This was done in almost every one of their ads. Twelve large
ads were divided equally in that attack by the two Standpatter candi-
dates.
In viewing the campaign chronologically, one would expect that
Fields and Endicott, as members of an "out-group," would take the
initiative in beginning the campaign and defining the basis on which
it would be waged. Thus, on March 3, 1963, the first ad for either
side appeared in the local newspaper, on behalf of Fields and Endi-
cott.
Because of the "cultures" from which they came and their asso-
ciations with the Reformers, Fields and Endicott could be expected
to be issue-oriented, in terms both of the kinds of policies they were
concerned with and the methods used in carrying out policies. In
this regard, they could be expected to present themselves favorably
and their opponents, especially the incumbent Carpenter, unfavor-

SThe reader should be reminded here that, as used in the remainder of
this study, the term Standpatter refers to a group consisting of the "Colonels"
and "Boomers."








ably. Analysis of the ads reveals such "rational" behavior on the part
of Fields and Endicott. In approximately 50 per cent of their total
number of ads, they concentrated on attacking the public records and
positions of Carpenter and Glover. The remaining 50 per cent they
used primarily to present themselves favorably on issues.
In the first ad, Fields and Endicott raised what would be the
major issues in the campaign: the behavior of the dominants in 1)
allowing spot zoning in residential neighborhoods, a practice which
Fields and Endicott strongly attacked in their ads on eight separate
occasions; 2) holding "secret" meetings of the city council, men-
tioned on six separate occasions; and 3) calling for the expansion of
the municipal electric plant without public awareness of the pros
and cons of the problem. In addition, the notion of "it's time for a
change," a cumulative summation of all the issues, and a campaign
theme in its own right, was prominently mentioned repeatedly in the
ads and, as later noted, was to be the over-riding theme given to the
voters.
Zoning, then, was to be the most frequently-raised issue in the
campaign conducted in these ads by the Reformer candidates. As
already noted, the previous decisions of the city council in granting
variances to property owners to permit the construction of gasoline
service stations in residential neighborhoods had been a constant
source of irritation to many in the community. This was especially
true of the middle-income, professional people represented in the Re-
form League whose primary financial investments were generally
limited to their homes. These people would have a major concern for
the maintenance of residential property values. This concern becomes
more understandable when one realizes that college faculty members,
in particular, are somewhat mobile and usually must sell their homes
when they change employment, i.e., when they leave the university.
The response to the first ad came four days later, on March 7,
when the incumbent Carpenter listed the various programs he had
supported, and Glover listed his promised program. The ground was
thus laid for move and counter-move, attack and counter-attack.
Carpenter and Glover were faced with a different situation from
that of Fields and Endicott. Although the former two were running
independently of each other, both had to gear their campaigns along
the same lines. Furthermore, because of their Standpatter commit-
ments, they would have to rely on their "personal" identifications
rather than issues. This was especially the case for Carpenter, who,
as an incumbent, would have to run on his record. Carpenter used








nine large ads to emphasize his personal qualities and qualifications,
and only four ads to deal with what he considered to be the issues.
In addition, he used more than thirty-five small ads which dealt
only with his personal qualities, such as the democratic, progressive,
businessman, independent, and experienced candidate. None of his
small ads dealt with issues.
Despite his Standpatter connections, Glover was in a more flexi-
ble position than Carpenter, in that Glover had not held city office
and, therefore, was not bound by a record of formal public decisions.
This will be dealt with in more detail later in this chapter. Because
he was a Standpatter, but also because he was relatively unknown to
the public, Glover used eight ads to make known his personal quali-
ties and only four for issues.
The early portion of the campaign found Fields and Endicott
openly identifying themselves with the Reform League and its sub-
stantive program. This was done in three major advertisements. When
Carpenter and Glover attacked them as "clique" controlled, the Re-
former candidates countered in three ways. First, they argued that
the Reformers endorsed them because of their very "independence."
Secondly, and especially as the Standpatter attack increased toward
the end of the campaign, Fields and Glover declared their own inde-
pendence of any group "control" in two major ads. Finally, they
attacked the Standpatter candidates as representing a "secret group
which has dominated Townley." At no time, however, did they ever
declare any intentions of disassociating themselves from the Reformers.
The point has been made that Glover, because he had never held
city office and was not widely known in the electorate, held a more
flexible position than did Carpenter. In addition, Glover was closely
identified with the "Boomers," while Carpenter "tended" toward the
"Colonels" group. The campaign made perfectly clear, however, that
both of these Standpatter factions stood united vis-a-vis the Reformer
candidates. Yet the Standpatters needed to elect only one candidate in
order to retain a three-to-two majority on the city council. It is pos-
sible that the "Boomers" may have encouraged Glover to disassociate
himself from Carpenter in the public perceptions; but this is only
speculation. The point is that Glover did alter his approach as the
campaign progressed
As Carpenter came in for increasingly strong attack by the Re-
formers, Glover appeared to have made a new decision. Because he
had no prior formal involvements in city government, he was in a








position to capitalize on the issues raised by the opposition. He could
use those same issues and in the process disassociate himself from
Carpenter. During the middle of the campaign, he proceeded to do
just that in his advertisements. Even earlier in the campaign, as a
matter of fact, he had attempted to use confusion tactics which might
tend to associate him in the minds of some with the Reformers. Obvi-
ously recognizing the value of identification with that active group,
Glover had three ads dealing with Reformer issues and three which
would thoroughly confuse many readers. In the latter ads some
readers might easily have believed that he was a Reformer candidate.
However, he dropped that approach toward the end of the campaign
and came closer to the Carpenter strategy.
Candidates on both sides had positive proposals on some substan-
tive subjects which they raised from time to time in the ads, but
these subjects never became a persistent theme. Standpatter candi-
dates, especially, mentioned the need for more business firms. Fields
and Endicott referred to the necessity of studying the slum clearance
and public housing problems and of extending sewers to East Town-
ley, but these points were never emphasized and were dropped from
the ads as the campaign progressed. All three of these problem areas
involve the Negroes in Townley. None of the candidates risked an
overt newspaper appeal to the Negroes.
Pat Wilkerson, the third candidate in the race involving Glover
and Endicott, conducted his campaign in a minor key, but he did
manage to have a small ad in the newspaper almost every day. These
ads listed his identification with business, a service club, and with the
idea of "good government" generally.


THE REFORMER CANVASS

Mention was made earlier in this study of the fact that the com-
munity of Townley had been introduced to the door-to-door canvass
for candidates in 1961, when the Reformer nucleus had "rung door
bells" for Henry Tolliver in his race for the city council. Only a few
canvassers were involved in that effort, although there were indica-
tions that their work was reflected in the voter turnout. In 1963,
however, the Reformers systematically organized and deployed a
force of 160 volunteer canvassers, mostly Reformer members, through-
out every precinct in the newly enlarged city. In the two weeks
preceding the election, these people went from house to house of reg.








istered voters "reminding" them to vote and leaving with them cam-
paign materials for Fields and Endicott.4
Candidates on both sides spoke before meetings of various organ-
ized civic groups in the community and, of course, interacted with
their own friends, neighbors, business associates, and employees. In
addition to their newspaper advertising, Carpenter and Glover kept
radio listeners reminded of their candidacies at frequent intervals
throughout each day with paid announcements and brief statements.
There was no activity, however, on behalf of Carpenter and Glover
comparable to that conducted by the Reformer canvassers for Fields
and Endicott.

THE ELECTORATE AND THE ELECTION
On March 19, 1963, the voters went to the polls and made their
electoral decision. A new record for voter turnout was set in that
election: 6,474 persons voted. Among the Seat One candidates, Simon
Carpenter received 1,969 votes to Mark Fields' 4,482. In the Seat
Two race, the vote for Glover was 1,907, that for Wilkerson was 536,
and Bradley Endicott received 4,031. Wilkerson's candidacy obvi-
ously had drawn votes away from Endicott. Nevertheless, the results
of the election were overwhelming for the Reformer candidates and
provided a clear mandate for "change." Two days later, as part of
the new majority on the city council, Henry Tolliver was chosen
mayor and the new groups in the community had achieved access
to the formal decision-making structure of the city.
The present study cannot presume to answer the question, "Why
did the voters vote as they did?" It does, however, offer some in-
formation as to the characteristics of the electorate who had made
this change, and what they perceived about the political situation
and the major participants in deciding to vote as they did. Data from
an opinion survey conducted in the city immediately following the
election and from analysis of occupational characteristics of those
who actually voted suggest some interesting inferences which can be
made about the people involved in this political process, discussed in
Chapters V, VI, and VII which follow.

4Negro neighborhoods were reached through other means designed by sev-
eral Negro members of the Reformers.








CHAPTER VI*


THE VOTER SURVEY: ANALYSIS

In the case of research planned around future events it is not
always possible, of course, for a researcher to predict social phe-
nomena accurately before they occur. It is necessary for him, never-
theless, to formulate what he "thinks" will occur in order that he may
establish a point of departure and a frame for conceptualization. This
formulation usually takes the form of hypotheses, stating that specific
variables or aspects of the situation will affect other variables in a
certain manner.
If, however, the hypothesis or hypotheses are invalidated, the re-
searcher must not keep his findings "under a bushel." In many cases,
a disproved or unsupported hypothesis will invalidate a long-held
myth of social science. In other instances, the nuances or implications
of the research may give the researcher an entirely different insight
into the relationships of the variables under study and may provide
for more fruitful research in the future.
Parts of the hypotheses in this study were not supported by the
data collected. Nevertheless, the reporting of such negative results
has significance: the indication of the direction and force or lack of
direction of voters' perceptions contributes to an understanding of
the electoral process. Furthermore, further research may profit
from it.


VOTER ORIENTATION TO ISSUES, GROUPS, AND CANDIDTAES

This hypothesis deals with the effect of three variables on the
voter's decision for whom to vote. As mentioned in Chapter IV, the
three variables used were issue-orientation, group-orientation, and
candidate-orientation. It was assumed that in this election, and prob-
ably for the first time in Townley, issues would have a greater effect
on a voter's decision than would the other two variables. Issue-
orientation was earlier defined as the extent of agreement a voter had
with the stands of either the Reformers or the Standpatters on issues.
Group-orientation refers to voters' favorable or unfavorable percep-
tion of the groups clustered around the candidates, and candidate-

*The author of this chapter is William R. Hamilton.








orientation means the acceptance or rejection of a candidate's per-
sonal characteristics by the voter.
Issue-orientation was measured by an open-ended question con-
cerning the issues that a respondent considered important in the
campaign. These free responses were then scaled to permit measure-
ment of two items. First, the magnitude of the variable was measured
by counting the number of issues mentioned. Second, the direction of
the issues was measured (pro-Reformer or pro-Standpatter).X The
scores for each interview were then cumulated, arrayed in a fre-
quency distribution, and cut at appropriate intervals, giving five scale
scores.2
Group-orientation was measured in much the same manner as
was issue-orientation except that an open-ended question asking about
the voters' knowledge and acceptance of groups was utilized. Ambigu-
ous answers were coded if the author could distinguish as to which
group the respondents were referring. Some respondents were not
aware of the names of some of the groups but usually gave an ade-
quate description of them.
Candidate-orientation was measured by asking each respondent
about his attitude toward certain personal characteristics of each
candidate. In this case, the direction was either for or against the
specific candidate.3
Even though candidate-orientation correlates statistically with the
vote to approximately the same degree as do the other variables, this
variable proved troublesome in the coding process because the largest
number of responses to the question fell in the "no response" cate-
gory. This suggests a weakness in candidate-orientation as an inde-
pendent variable affecting the voter's decision.
In Table 1 the reader can see that issue-orientation correlates
with the decision, for whom to vote. The reader will remember that
the 16 cases contained in the Carpenter-5 cell are highly issue-
oriented-toward the Standpatters. The opposite direction and magni-

1The count ranged from five to zero issues mentioned by the respondent.
Directions-plus or minus-were then assigned to each issue.
2For example, +5 and +4 were designated scale score 1 (pro-Reformer)
and -3 and -2 were designated scale score 5 (Standpatter).
3The author encountered difficulty in delineating answers to the questions
about candidates as to whether the answers were measuring personal character-
istics or issues. Whenever the answers in such cases were found to refer to
issues, the responses were simply coded under the issues variables.









tude are shown-by the 82 cases in the Fields-1 cell. The lowest degree
of issue-orientation is shown by the two cells for each seat under
column 3. The respondents who comprise these cells did not men-
tion any issues.4


TABLE 1

ISSUE-ORIENTATION CROSS-TABULATED WITH THE VOTE

Vote Issue-Orientation
Pro-Ref. Pro-Stand.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Total
Seat #1
Fields 32 31 32 25 5 125
Carpenter 1 4 6 7 16 34
Total 33 35 38 32 21 1591


Seat #2
Endicott
Glover-Wilk.b
Total


tau=.401a P=.01

30 28 30 18 5
3 6 8 15 15
33 34 38 33 20
tau=.438 P=.01


111
47
158


a Hubert Blalock discusses the computation and meaning of Kendall's tau in Social
Statistics (New York: McGraw Hill Book Co., 1960), pp. 321-324.
b The votes for Wilkerson and Glover were combined to make the races comparable,
i.e., both 2x5 tables. In addition, the support drawn by these two candidates apparently
came from the same type of voter.

The two correlation figures derived by the use of Kendall's tau
for grouped data5 seem relatively high but can only be meaningful
when compared with the same measures for group-orientation and
candidate- orientation cross-tabulated with the dependent variable,
vote.


4A small percentage of these cases is comprised of respondents who men-
tioned an equal amount of issues in both directions, thereby cancelling their
scores to a zero or a scale score of 3.

5Hubert Blalock states when speaking of Kendall's tau for grouped data,
"Notice that the numerical value of tau is relatively small in spite of what on
inspection appears to be a moderately strong relationship. Since it can be
shown that tau can reach unity only when all cells are empty except those in
the diagonal, we can seldom expect to get a value of tau approaching unity."
(Social Statistics [New York: McGraw Hill Book Company, 1960], p. 323.)









TABLE 2
GROUP-ORIENTATION CROSS-TABULATED WITH THE VOTE

Vote Group-Orientation
Pro-Ref. Pro-Stand.
(1) (2) (3) (4) Total
Seat #1
Fields 28 51 43 3 125
Carpenter 2 4 12 16 34
Total 30 55 55 19 159


Seat #2
Endicott
Glover-Wilk.
Total


tau=.411 P=.01

24 47 39 1
6 8 16 17
30 55 55 18
tau=.375 P=.01


111
47
158


Apparent by inspection of Table 2 is the meaningful relationship
of the group-orientation variable to the decision for whom to vote.
Although in the race for Seat Two the relationship does not appear
to be as strong as in the case of Seat One, the values of the taus are
close enough to consider random behavior as the cause for this minor
discrepancy.
Candidate-orientation is shown by Tables 3 through 7, each repre-
senting one of the five candidates. These tables show the weakness
of orientation to the candidates backed by the Reformers as far as
voter attitudes toward such candidates show up among their sup-
porters. The Standpatter candidates, in contrast, seemed to receive
from their own voters no more positive candidate orientation. The
candidate-orientation variable is divided into only three attributes
because of the large number of "no response" answers. Because this
left only a few responses either pro or con, it would not have been
feasible to divide the variable further.
TABLE 3
CANDIDATE-ORIENTATION CROSS-TABULATED WITH THE VOTE
IN THE FIELDS-CARPENTER RACE (FIELDS' SCALE SCORE)

Vote Candidate-Orientation
Pro-Fields None Anti-Fields Total
Fields 59 61 5 125
Carpenter 4 16 14 34
Total 63 77 19 159
tau=.361 P=.01









TABLE 4
CANDIDATE-ORIENTATION CROSS-TABULATED WITH THE VOTE IN
THE FIELDS-CARPENTER RACE (CARPENTER'S SCALE SCORE)
Vote Candidate-Orientation
Pro-Carp. None Anti-Carp. Total
Carpenter 21 13 0 34
Fields 13 63 49 125
Total 34 76 49 159
tau=.345 P=.01

TABLE 5
CANDIDATE-ORIENTATION CROSS-TABULATED WITH THE VOTE IN
THE ENDICOTT-GLOVER-WILKERSON RACE
(ENDICOTT'S SCALE SCORE)
Vote Candidate-Orientation
Pro-End. None Anti-End. Total
Endicott 43 65 3 111
Glover-Wilk. 3 30 14 47
Total 46 95 17 158
tau=.402 P=.01

TABLE 6
CANDIDATE-ORIENTATION CROSS-TABULATED WITH THE VOTE IN
THE ENDICOTT-GLOVER-WILKERSON RACE
GLOVER'SS SCALE SCORE)
Vote Candidate-Orientation
Pro-Glover None Anti-Glover Total
Glover 21 15 0 36
End.-Wilk. 5 82 35 122
Total 26 97 35 158
tau=.461 P=.01

TABLE 7
CANDIDATE-ORIENTATION CROSS-TABULATED WITH THE VOTE IN
THE ENDICOTT-GLOVER-WILKERSON RACE
(WILKERSON'S SCALE SCORE)
Vote Candidate-Orientation
Pro-Wilk. None Anti-Wilk. Total
Wilkerson 6 4 1 11
End.-Glover 15 99 33 147
Total 21 103 34 158
tau=.120 P=.13








In general, the values of tau for the candidate-orientation vari-
able were lower than those for the other two variables. In order to
discover whether or not these differences were statistically significant,
however, the confidence intervals for each tau were computed. As
Table 8 shows, the correlation measures for each independent vari-
able overlapped into the range of each of the other independent
variables, indicating that there was no difference in the universe that
each of these variables imposed on the voter. The analysis, there-
fore, does not support the major hypothesis-that there would be a
significant difference between the variables and that issue-orientation
would be the best determinant of the vote.
In order to determine whether or not the voters actually perceived
a separation of these variables which were conceptually distinct,
multivariate analysis was applied using all three of the independent
variables. This permitted an analysis of the relationship between the
orientation of voters to each independent variable-candidate, issue,
and group-and each of the other of three variables. A statement
could then be made about the issue-vote correlation of the highly
group-oriented Reformer voters or about the highly group-oriented
Standpatter voters.6 The detailed results of that analysis are too
lengthy to present here, but Table 9 summarizes the analysis, show-
ing, for each attribute of the control variable, which independent
variables correlate significantly with the vote.
TABLE 8
CONFIDENCE INTERVALS FOR THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES,
ISSUE-, GROUP-, AND CANDIDATE-ORIENTATION
Confidence Interval
Independent Variables Tau (P=.05)
Issue-Orientation
Seat #1 .401 .202 .600
Seat #2 .438 .242- .634
Group-Orientation
Seat #1 .411 .213-.609
Seat #2 .375 .176 -.574
Candidate-Orientation
Fields .361 .157- -.565
Carpenter .345 .139 .551
Endicott .402 .203- .601
Glover .461 .267 .655
Wilkerson .120 -.098 .338
6This analysis was performed with every possible combination of inde-
pendent variables.









TABLE 9
A SUMMARY OF MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF ISSUE-,
GROUP-, AND CANDIDATE-ORIENTATION USING
VOTE AS THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE


Independent
Variable
Issue-
Orientation







Group-
Orientation









Candidate.
Orientation



Independent
Variable
Issue-
Orientation



Candidate-
Orientation


Dependent
Variable


Fields/Carp.

Carp./Fields

End./Glov.-Wilk.

Glov./End.-Wilk.

Fields/Carp.
Carp./Fields



End./Glov.-Wilk.

Glov./End.-Wilk.



Fields/Carp.
Carp./Fields
End./Glov.-Wilk.
Glov./End.-Wilk.
Variable
Dependent

Fields/Carp.
End./Glov.-Wilk.



Fields/Carp.
Carp./Fields
End./Glov.-Wilk.
Glov./End.-Wilk.


Group-
Orientation Fields/Carp. nsig nsig sig
End./Glov.-Wilk. nsig nsig sig
a Sig means that the independent variable correlated significantly with the dependent
variable in each particular case. Nsig means the opposite: that the independent variable
had no effect.
b These deviant cases may be explained by the fact that the votes for Glover and
Wilkerson were combined to produce the pro-Standpatter category and therefore might not
be a "pure" Standpatter vote.


Candidate-Orientation Controlled
Pro-Fields None Anti-Fields
nsiga sig sig
Anti-Carp. None Pro-Carp.
nsig nsig sig
Pro-End. None Anti-End.
nsig sig nsigb
Anti-Glov. None Pro-Glov.
nsig nsig sig
Pro-Fields None Anti-Fields
nsig sig sig
Anti-Carp. None Pro-Carp.
nsig nsig sig
Pro-End. None Anti-End.
nsig sig nsigb
Anti-Glov. None Pro-Glov.
nsig nsig sig
Group-Orientation Controlled
Ref. None Stand.
nsig nsig sig
nsig nsig sig
sigh nsig sig
nsig nsig sig


Ref. None Stand.
nsig nsig sig
nsig nsig sig
Issue-Orientation Controlled
Ref. None Stand.








In Table 9 the correlations for all of the attributes shown in the
left-hand columns under the control variables appear as nonsignifi-
cant except in a single case. This suggests that the majority of the
voters were oriented toward the Reform League or its candidates
with reference to all three of the variables. These voters either could
not articulate any differentiation among the variables or were a very
homogeneous group who were satisfied by all of the offerings of the
Reform League-its issue positions, its entity as a public association
endorsing candidates, and the candidates it eventually endorsed.
The voters who were oriented toward the Standpatters with refer-
ence to at least one variable (right-hand columns under the control
variables in Table 4) appeared to have more structure to their politi-
cal thinking. In each case, with the exception of two, apparently
there were enough cross pressures at work on these voters to force
some of them to make a decision as to which of the orientations were
more important to them, and some of them followed their Reformer-
orientation even though it was antithetic to their feeling on another
variable.
The original hypothesis was not supported. There appeared to
be no ordering of importance among issue-orientation, group-
orientation, and candidate-orientation within the electorate as a
whole. In fact, the majority of the voters appeared to embrace all
of the variables with almost equal importance. Only in the case of
actual cross-pressures did the voter evidence that he perceived a dif-
ference in the variables and this occurred among only those who
were in some way Standpatter-oriented.

REFORMER ISSUES AND THE VOTERS
Although it was shown in the earlier discussion that there was
no difference among the three variables in correlation with the vote,
the analysis indicated that issues were at least as important as the
other two variables. It was also demonstrated that issues correlated
significantly with the vote among those who were Standpatter-
oriented. The next step, then, was to determine whether or not the
Reformers' initial issues were the most important ones to the elec-
torate and whether or not there was any correlation between a voter's
awareness of and position on these issues and his choice of candidates.
The issues which the Reformers broached as the most important
during the election were: (1) an end to spot zoning and development
of a broad planning and zoning program; (2) a more thorough study








of the utilities bond issue which had been passed by the city council
just prior to the campaign; and (3) abolition of all secret meetings
of the city council from which newspaper reporters and the public
had been barred. The primary importance of these three issues in
the Reformer campaign was later confirmed by the content analysis
of newspaper ads discussed earlier in the present study. Other issues
raised during the campaign included those relating to capital im-
provements, reorganization of city government, annexation, and the
"slating" or "bloc" candidacies of both Reformer candidates and
their association with Councilman Tolliver.

TABLE 10
IMPORTANCE OF ISSUES AND EACH RESPONDENT'S
FEELING ON THE ISSUES

Number of Issue Stand
Issue Sample Mentioning Pro-Ref. Pro-Stand.
Zoning 47% (79) 92% 8%
Power plant 37 (62) 65 35
Secret meetings 34 (57) 81 19
Time for a change 25 (35) 95 5
Capital improvements 11 (18) 94 6
Slate approach 7 (11) 55 45
Reorganization of govt. 6 (10) 100 0
Annexation 6 (10) 20 80
Other issues 13 (21) 95 5

As Table 10 indicates, the results of the analysis showed that the
voters agreed with the ordering of these three issues by the Reform-
ers. Among those responding to the questions concerning issues, 47
per cent felt that zoning was an important issue, 37 per cent men-
tioned the power plant investigation, and 34 per cent were interested
in the problem of secret meetings. Table 10 also provides another
significant point: that the notion of "time for a change" was im-
portant to the voters. This kind of cumulative issue is usually raised
by a challenging, reform-type group, and the Reform League of
Townley was no exception.
Table 11 shows the voters' stands on these four issues correlated
with the decision for whom to vote. Although it indicates that the
secret-meetings issues was nonsignificant, the taus were in the hypo-
thesized direction as were the taus for the other three issues.






TABLE 11
AWARENESS OF AND POSITION ON THE ISSUES
CROSS-TABULATED WITH THE VOTE


Mentioned
Issue
Pro-Ref.

59


Zoning
Did Not Mentioned
Mention Issue
Issue Pro-Stand.


Total

124
33
157



110
46
156


tau=.184 P=.04

53 56 1
13 28 5
66 84 6
tau=.191 P=.04


Seat #1
Fields
Carpenter
Total

Seat #2
Endicott
Glov.-Wilk.
Total



Seat #1
Fields
Carpenter
Total

Seat #2
Endicott
Glov.-Wilk.
Total

Vote
Seat #1
Fields
Carpenter
Total

Seat #2
Endicott
Glov.-Wilk.
Total



Seat #1
Fields
Carpenter
Total

Seat #2
Endicott
Glov.-Wilk.
Total


tau=.196 P=.04

32 77 0
3 41 2
35 118 2
tau=.216 P=.02


Secret Meetings

38 82 5 125
4 24 4 32
42 106 9 157
tau=.150 P=.08

32 75 4 111
10 31 4 45
42 106 8 156
tau=.083 P=.22
Power Plant

33 82 9 124
4 19 11 34
37 101 20 158
tau=.216 P=.02

30 76 4 110
6 26 15 47
36 102 19 157
tau=.290 P=.01
Time For a Change







It can be concluded, therefore, that the voters felt that the issues
originally raised by the Reformers were the most important and that
there was a definite correlation between the voter's awareness of
issues and attitude toward issues perceived on the one hand, and his
preference for Reformer candidates, on the other hand. The writer
also concludes that the overriding issue, time for a change, was not
only an issue, but was stretched by the voters to mean candidate-
and group-orientation as well. This would help to explain the findings
with respect to the major hypothesis, i.e., that a majority of those
who supported Reformer-candidates did so under the influence of all
three variables-issues, groups, and candidates.
POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS AND THE VOTE
Although the character of Townley's population definitely had
been changing throughout the nineteen-fifties, this had not been evi-
dent in the city elections because of the lack of a "flag" around which
the newer types in the community could rally. It appeared that the
formation of the Reform League had brought this changed character
into the open and indicated potential cleavages among groups within
the community. With real competition taking place for the first time
in city politics, the author assumed that certain groups would cluster
around certain candidates, and that this would be demonstrated by a
significant relationship between certain population characteristics of
the voter and his electoral decision. To test this hypothesis, four inde-
pendent variables of the population characteristics were used: age,
education, occupation of head of household, and length of residence
in Townley.
TABLE 12
AGE CROSS-TABULATED WITH VOTE
Vote Age
22-35 36-49 50-up Total
Seat #1
Fields 36 49 39 124
Carpenter 9 11 14 34
Total 45 60 53 158
tau=.058 P=.29
Seat #2
Endicott 32 .46 33 111
Glov.-Wilk. 13 15 19 47
Total 45 61 52 158
tau=.071 P=.25
Even though the low values of taus in Table 12 indicate that the
relationship between age and vote was not completely random, these
values were not significant, and, therefore, the variable was discarded
as having no bearing on the vote.








TABLE 13
EDUCATION CROSS-TABULATED WITH VOTE
Vote Education
0-11 12 13-15 16 16+
Years Years Years Years Years Total
Seat #1
Fields 15 24 28 30 26 123
Carpenter 6 12 10 4 2 34
Total 21 36 38 34 28 157


Seat #2
Endicott
Glov.-Wilk.
Total


tau=.208 P=.025

13 24 25 28
9 13 13 5
22 37 38 333
tau=.161 P=.055


21 111
7 47
28 158


With regard to education, on the other hand, the relationship was
in the direction hypothesized; the higher an individual's education,
the more probable he was to vote for the Reformer candidates. The
values of tau in Table 13 demonstrate that a positive relationship
existed between the two variables. As the educational level of the
electorate rose, voters were more inclined to vote for the Reformer
candidates.7
The readers will notice in Table 13 that 41 per cent of those vot-
ing in the election had at least a college education. Furthermore, a
relatively large number of these had academic training above the
bachelor's degree level. It is among this latter group that the rela-
tionship falters somewhat from the hypothesized direction toward
increasing tendency to vote for Reformer candidates as one's educa-
tional level is raised. This is probably due to the remnants on the
university faculty of the pre-World War II professors who were, by
and large, from the Townley area and tended to support the Stand-
patter group.
A relationship very similar to that between education and elec-
toral choices is shown by Table 14, which relates the voter's occupa-
tional status to his voting decision. This table makes evident that
there was a tendency for professional people to vote for Reformer
candidates. The fairly large number of professionals who voted for
the Standpatter candidates can be accounted for by the fact that a
preponderance of the actual voters were professionals. Over 60 per
cent of the electorate fell in the professional category, while the re-
7Although the significance level for the election of Seat #2 is somewhat
high, it is close enough for acceptance, given the closeness of its tau value as
compared to that of tau for Seat #1.








maining 40 per cent was composed of clerical and blue collar workers.
The percentage of Standpatters' vote, however, was much higher in
the clerical category and still higher in the blue collar category.

TABLE 14
OCCUPATIONAL STATUS OF THE HEADS OF HOUSEHOLDS
CROSS-TABULATED WITH THE VOTE

Vote Occupational Status


White Blue
Professional Collar Collar


76
14
90


14
10
24


tau=.198 P=.025

68 21 14
22 13 11
90 34 25
tau=.164 P=.05


Total

114
34
148


103
46
149


In terms of population characteristics the writer further assumed
that long-time Townley residents would tend to support the Stand-
patter candidates while people newer to the community would sup-
port the Reformer candidates. This hypothesized relationship proved
to be the strongest of the population variables when cross-tabulated
with the vote.
Table 15 shows the tendency of newly arrived voters to be more
favorable to the Reformer candidates than those who had lived in
Townley from a time prior to World War II. The latter were more
inclined to vote for the Standpatter candidates.

TABLE 15
LENGTH OF RESIDENCE CROSS-TABULATED WITH VOTE
Vote Beginning of Residence
Seat #1
Pre-1945 1946-1953 1954-1962 Total
Fields 33 32 57 122
Carpenter 20 8 6 34
Total 53 40 63 156
tau=.253 P=.01
Seat #2
Endicott 29 28 53 110
Glov. Wilk. 25 12 10 47
Total 54 40 63 157
tau=.281 P=.01
42


Seat #1
Fields
Carpenter
Total

Seat #2
Endicott
Glov.-Wilk.
Total








Of the four population variables examined, therefore, it was only
between age and electoral choice that a significant correlation did
not appear. As to both the occupational- and educational-status vari-
ables, a higher correlation was shown between each successively higher
level of attainment and a tendency to vote for the Reformer candi-
dates rather than the Standpatters. Length of residence of the voter
showed the most significant relationship: the newer residents favored
very heavily the Reformer candidates while the old-timers voted more
heavily for the Standpatters.
In general, then, the voters showed a high tendency to vote for
the candidates who were most like themselves in personal character-
istics.


LENGTH OF RESIDENCE AS A CONTROL VARIABLE

Because length of residence proved to be the population variable
showing the highest correlation with voter decision, the author con-
cluded that use of this variable as a control on the other population
variables would be analytically advisable.
Using occupation, education, and type of employers as independ-
ent variables, the analysis indicated that the newer people in town
tended to vote very heavily for the Reformer candidates regardless
of the newcomers' attributes on the independent variables. Older resi-
dents, on the other hand, appeared to have more structure to their
voting decisions and tended to be affected in the hypothesized direc-
tion by the independent variables. Because a majority of the newer
residents tended to be highly-educated professionals who worked
either for the university or Mid-States Products, it was assumed that
they would support the Reformers. Yet the analysis showed that
newly-arrived clerical and blue-collar workers, who were not so
highly-educated, also voted very heavily for the Reformers.
Thus it was the newer residents in town who, regardless of orien-
tation and social characteristics, were chiefly responsible for the over-
whelming majority for the Reformers.

8st was assumed by the author that employees of the university and Mid-
States Products would vote more heavily for the Reformers, while employees of
local businesses and to a lesser degree, employees of local government, would
support the Standpatters. First order correlations of this variable cross-tabulated
with the vote are shown in Appendix IV.








CONCLUSIONS
The major hypothesis of the survey research was unconfirmed by
the analysis. There appeared to be no significant difference among
the three voter-orientation variables-issues, groups, and candidates
-in the extent to which they correlated with the voter's decision.
All three of the variables correlated significantly high with voter de-
cision, but their taus all fell within the same confidence interval,
thereby rendering any ranking of the variables meaningless. It was
important to note, however, that issue-orientation correlated with the
voter choice at least as highly as did the other two variables in an
election which represented the first time in the city's recent history
that issues were used as a basis for appeal.
The battle lines which were drawn on issues by the opposing
groups-the Reformers and the Standpatters-were extended through
the whole electorate in Townley's city election in 1963. The foregoing
analysis of the post-election survey showed some of the effects which
this had on the voters. There was a significant correlation between
how a person reacted to specific issues and which candidates he sup-
ported. In other words, the more issue-oriented a voter was in any one
direction, the more inclined he was to vote in that direction. Of the
three major issues which the Reformers raised, two-zoning and the
utility bond investigation-appear to have paid them dividends in a
higher percentage of the vote. In the light of the findings with re-
spect to the first hypothesis, however, it is impossible to say whether
these voters were mainly interested in the Reformer issues or were
not swayed also by either candidate or group-orientation in the
same direction.
Among the population variables of age, education, occupational
status, and length of residence, only age failed to show a significant
relationship with the voter's decision. The relationships of these
population variables, however, appeared much more meaningful when
viewed within the control variable: length of residence. Older resi-
dents in Townley apparently were more affected by these variables
and tended to vote in the direction predicted by the original hypothe-
sis, that is, pro-Standpatter. The newer residents, on the other hand,
regardless of their attributes on any of the population variables,
tended overwhelmingly to support the Reformers. Ninety-one per cent
of those who came to Townley after 1953 voted for the Reformer
candidates.
Group-orientation, or knowledge and acceptance of group action,








also correlated highly with the voter's electoral choice and also inter-
correlated highly with issue-orientation. The correlation of each of
these individual kinds of orientations of the voters with their elec-
toral choices suggests that the Reformers had succeeded in creating
an issue-oriented political party along much the same lines of many
third parties that have appeared in our national politics. When multi-
variate techniques were applied to the variables, however, another
and different interpretation can be made. The relationship which had
existed between all three of the orientations and the vote disappeared
among the Reformer-oriented voters but remained among the Stand-
patter voters. Such an analytical result indicates that Reformer sup-
porters did not differentiate between the issues, their sense of group
attachment, or their attraction to the personal traits of the candi-
dates. It would be a mistake to assume that all Reformer supporters
were politically unsophisticated simply because they did not dis-
criminate among these orientations. Rather, it is fair to suggest that
the Reformers offered to a large proportion of the electorate a num-
ber of attractive aspects that were inextricably related to each other.
First, the issues raised by the Reformers are in general, "good
government" issues raised by all reform groups. Even some of the
voters who were oriented toward the Standpatters in other ways were
attracted to these issues. It is unlikely that a large segment of the
population would be opposed to good zoning practices and open com-
mission meetings. Second, the voters who were the strongest for the
Reformers were familiar with "groupiness." They were, by and large,
members of large institutions such as the university, Mid-States Prod-
ucts, or other large government agencies located in Townley. They
would have little of the inherent aversion to group endorsement that
many of the individualistic Standpatters appeared to have. Third, the
Reformer candidates were both college graduates; the Standpatter
candidates had never graduated from high school. The former could
appeal to the high proportion of college-educated people who reside
in a university own. Also, one candidate, Endicott, had lived in
Townley for only six years. He would naturally appeal to that 40 per
cent of the actual voters who came to Townley after 1953.
Therefore, the author feels that the supporters of the Reform
League candidates were caught up in a protest movement against the
established political clique. Whether the Reform League artfully
chose their candidates and presented their issues correctly or whether
the time was simply "ripe" for any progressive organization to cap-
ture the rising discontent remains to be seen. Nevertheless, the Re-








form League was the catalyst that provided the rallying point for
these newcomers to Townley. Although it was not only the highly-
educated, professional newcomers that totally embraced the Reform
League, this group constituted a major proportion of the organiza-
tion's supporters. Fully 35 per cent of the vote received by the Re-
form League candidates came from this group.
How long the Reform League can maintain itself and continue
to hold the majority of seats on the city council remains a question
to be answered by further events and further research. How much of
a countervailing force of opposition from the Standpatters this com-
petitive campaign of 1963 will generate is also a question only the
future can answer. It is evident from this research, however, that the
newer, high level, "good government" reformers effected a "revolu-
tion" which appears to be the first in recent Townley history.








CHAPTER VII


THE NEW DECISION-MAKING STRUCTURE

The foregoing chapters in this study have traced the process
through which a coalition of economic interests had demanded
entrance to the political decision-making structure of the city of
Townley, a community long monopolized by a locally-controlled
"downtown" business group. The intruders were newcomers to the
community, to a great extent independent of local control over their
incomes, were oriented outward, and were activated by an articulate
leadership with education and political skills, which consciously
asserted the group's right to be an integral part of the structure. They
were assisted by a segment of the electorate which identified with
their goals and approved of their methods. The mandate was for the
new people and the "changes" they promised.
When, after the March, 1963, election, Fields and Endicott as-
sumed their offices on the city council, they would become the new
controlling majority on that body, together with Henry Tolliver. As
the holdover member of the new majority, Tolliver immediately was
chosen as mayor. The formal machinery of government through
which these men were to work, however, was almost completely
manned by Standpatters.
The two minority members of the council both had repeatedly
demonstrated their close identity with Standpatter values and meth-
ods, albeit with the "Boomer" faction. More important, the city
manager, whose execution of these policies would be crucial to the
success or failure of the new majority's program, was a minion of the
Standpatters. He had been appointed (after the firing of the previous
manager) upon his acceptance of an agreement that he would "stay
out of" matters such as zoning, the utilities system, and the finance
department. He had never shown any evidence of even resenting this
lowly role.
The new majority would be faced with the problem of making
"policy" for electric and water utilities and sewer facilities which
were included in an "empire" larger than the remainder of city gov-
ernment itself. This empire was ruled by a director who, with his
independent authority guaranteed by the city charter and his influ-
ence over some 350 employees, was independent not only of the city
manager but, to a great extent, of the council itself. His loyalties ap-
peared to be, first, to himself and second, to the Standpatters.








Those whom the electorate had mandated to make a "change"
also would be confronted with trying to determine financial policy to
be executed by-not an empire builder-but a hardworking man
who, as finance director, had been faithful in carrying out the de-
cisions of the previous Standpatter councils.
In the office of city attorney, the new majority would work with
a man who was closely identified with the "Boomer" faction of the
Standpatters but whose political conditioning (as a state legislator
but made a "lame-duck" by recent reapportionment) undoubtedly
would make it possible for him to achieve some kind of working
agreement with the new group.
The plan board, whose recommendations on zoning the new coun-
cilmen would receive and act upon, consisted of the following: three
"Boomer"-oriented men; a physician whose later behavior indicated
basic differences with the Standpatters; and a law professor who had
been active in the Reformers. The new council later filled a vacancy,
left by a "Boomer," with an architect from the university. The physi-
cian, architect, and law professor, with the latter as chairman, formed
a majority on the plan board which would later be important to the
city council.
These, then, were the major figures around, through, and with
whom Mayor Tolliver and Councilmen Fields and Endicott would
attempt to bring about "change." An understanding of this complex
will enlighten the following discussion of the three major decision-
making situations which confronted the new majority within the first
three months after the election.

"THE CO-OP CORNER"
The privately-owned Co-Op House was located on one of the most
valuable pieces of property in the city-on the corner of a major
highway and the "main" street, across from the university campus.
Because of the house's age and poor condition, its private owners
had made plans to sell the property and build a new house elsewhere.
Following the normal pattern in Townley, the property was bought
by a group of local businessmen who sought to have it rezoned in
order to erect a gasoline service station on it for a large oil company.
For a number of years the university had had a "gentlemen's agree-
ment" with the city government that the areas immediately border-
ing the university would not be marred by such enterprises. Never-
theless, in March, 1962, the city council, then controlled by the








Standpatters, voted four-to-one in favor of the rezoning, despite ob-
jections from the city plan board, the university president, a large
number of citizens, and the local board of realtors. Councilman
Henry Tolliver cast the lone dissent.
Although residential property was not directly involved in this
case, many people were incensed by the action, especially those in
the Reform League. A number of residential neighborhoods in Town-
ley had already experienced such rezoning for gas stations; there-
fore, the Co-Op House proved to be an issue on which many people
throughout the community could be united.
Thus the zoning policies of the Standpatter city council had be-
come an election issue in the 1963 campaign, and the victorious
Fields and Endicott (together with Tolliver) were committed to
change those policies. Upon taking their seats on the new council,
they were informed that a building permit already had been issued,
in an apparent move to foreclose any attempt by the new majority to
rezone the property back to its former status. The city manager had
authorized the issuance of this permit after the election, fully aware
of the position of the new majority in this matter. On the advice of
the city attorney, the new councilmen decided it was legally imprac-
tical to attempt rezoning. Yet, the new majority deemed themselves
committed to prevent the station from being built.
Under another police power of the city government, the new
council passed, by a three-to-two margin, an ordinance recommended
by the plan board prohibiting the storage of inflammable materials
within 250 feet of the property line on which public buildings are
located. The university was well within that distance of the rezoned
property. However, the city was still faced with the possibility of a
suit challenging the new ordinance. When, therefore, the oil company
decided to drop its option on the property, the local owners of the
property immediately found another large oil company interested in
the Co-Op House corner and proceeded on the assumption that they
would not be challenged in their plans to build a gas station there.
However, when a building permit is issued and the permitted fails
to build, that permit then becomes void, and a new builder must
apply for a transfer of the permit or request a new one. When the
new permit was applied for, the city administrative officials who had
once been so eager to issue the original permit with such speed, re-
fused to issue a new one for the new oil company. As of this writing,
the matter is in the courts and the situation remains unchanged.








The new majority on the city council had made good its cam-
paign pledge to "change" both methods of making decisions and the
effect of decisions, especially those dealing with zoning matters.

"THE CHICAGO STORE"
Even before the last decisions had been made involving the Co-
Op House corner, a new issue on zoning came before the city council.
The alternatives for decision in this case were more numerous and
more complex than those in the Co-Op House case.
The local outlet of the nation-wide chain of Chicago Stores is
located in the rapidly deteriorating downtown area which surrounds
the court-house square. An important part of this area is owned by
a member of the "Colonels" faction of the Standpatters, whose very
prosperous business establishment is located on one side of the
"square" but who has never recognized the need to remodernize the
area. For several years, the Chicago Store had been planning a large
expansion into a new building on some new site with adequate park-
ing facilities. Such an expansion would have increased the tax rolls
and, it was assumed, would have provided some new jobs in the
community.
The present landlord of the local store is one of the most promin-
ent figures in the "Boomer" faction. The nationally-established pol-
icy for all in the Chicago chain stores is to lease the local store build-
ing, with the landlord receiving a guaranteed rent plus a specified
share of the gross receipts of the business. When the decision was
made to expand the local store, the present landlord initiated negotia-
tions to combine some land, on which he and his business partner
already had the option to buy, with an adjoining tract owned by an-
other "Boomer." This latter tract of land had already been zoned for
shopping-center development. The tract belonging to the landlord of
the Chicago Store had not been zoned for this purpose. Both tracts,
however, were essential to the planned expansion at that location.
Although a planning consultant' had advised the Chicago Store that
this planned location by no means was the most desirable for its pur-
poses, the "Boomer" landlord's proposal was the least costly one that
had been presented to the company.
The two "Boomers" then went to the city plan board to ask for

1This consultant was a member of the same firm which was under contract
at the time with both the city and county governments to assist in their com-
munity "plans." This poses an interesting problem in "conflict of interest."








the necessary rezoning. Immediately the residents in the surrounding
area were up in arms. Although the proposed Chicago Store tract
was on a major thoroughfare of the city, the property adjacent to it
on all sides was residential, and included homes of many university
people and-very important-of some "Colonels." Once again resi-
dential property value became an issue. In addition, this city
thoroughfare also was the major federal highway running through
the city. A large discount store had been opened north of the pro-
posed Chicago Store tract and was already creating a serious traffic
problem. With the coming of an interstate highway to the west of the
city, a new Chicago Store certainly could be expected to create addi-
tional traffic problems, as it would attract much out-of-town business.
As was later brought out in the public hearings, the location of a
Chicago Store complex at this particular place would require an ex-
tensive program of new street construction by the city.
The city plan board, now chaired by the law school professor,
recommended in a three-to-two vote against the proposed rezoning.
Immediately the "Boomer" owners of the tract appealed to the city
council. The residents in the area secured a large number of signa-
tures on a petition opposing the rezoning, but were unable to secure
enough signatures to make necessary the requirement of a four-fifths
majority of the council for rezoning. The plan board also had called
for a "building moratorium" along that part of the street involved in
the controversy.
The local newspaper, which had "rejoiced" in the election of the
new councilmen although it had not officially endorsed any candi-
dates, had taken previous editorial stands against the rezoning of
residential property and had supported the council on the Co-Op
House issue. However, on the Chicago Store issue, the newspaper
reversed itself and fought hard, on both the editorial and front pages,
for rezoning. The bitter attacks which it made on the city council
after the Chicago Store decision leads one to wonder what caused
this abrupt change. Obviously in recognition of the commitments of
Fields and Endicott on zoning issues and their behavior in the Co-
Op House case, the attack was concentrated upon Mayor Henry
Tolliver. For a period of two weeks the mayor was the real villain,
yet he stood firm in support of the plan board.
At the council meeting which was to decide the fate of the tracts
in question, those who spoke on behalf of the rezoning request in-
cluded the local manager of the Mid-States Products plant. It should
be pointed out that the speaker was Councilman Endicott's superior








at Mid-States Products, and that both the company and Endicott
probably would benefit from the public impression that the firm was
not a rubber stamp for Endicott's ideas.
The council proceeded to vote against the rezoning by a three-
to-two margin, with the Standpatter councilmen dissenting. In addi-
tion, the council, by the same margin, voted to support the plan
board's proposal for a "building moratorium" until new planning
studies could be completed. Thus the new council had met the issue
"head on." The commitment to protect residential neighborhoods,
made in the campaign, again was honored. Like the oil companies,
the Chicago Store officials apparently had completely failed to rec-
ognize the significance of the changes which the election had made
in the decision-making structure.
Another point of significance emerged from the decision on the
Chicago Store. As noted earlier, the Standpatters contained two fac-
tions, the "Colonels" and the "Boomers." Also noted were the con-
cealed "tensions" between these factions. The Chicago Store issue
served to bring these tensions to the surface, for the residential areas
involved in the controversy contained a large number of "Colonels"
and their employees and friends. The proposed move of the Chicago
Store from the courthouse square symbolized the apparent doom of
the "downtown" area in which the "Colonels" had heavy investments.
That these investments might be saved by an urban renewal program,
they had refused to recognize. In addition, the move threatened the
values of their own homes, and in this they shared the fears of many
of those who brought the new majority to power. The Chicago Store
issue had made "strange bed-fellows" indeed!

"THE HUMAN RELATIONS COMMITTEE"
During the 1963 election campaign for the city council in Town-
ley, there was no overt appeal to the Negro vote through the news-
paper ads-there the appeal was indirect and was not sustained in the
campaign. However, the Reform League has several Negro leaders in
its membership, and these people were "active" in their neighbor-
hoods. Furthermore, candidates on both sides appeared before or-
ganized Negro groups to discuss their stands. Actual Negro voter
turnout in the election, however, was low. Although a record number
of whites voted in the election-approximately 41 per cent of the
more than 15 thousand registered-only 399 Negroes, or about 19 per
cent of the 2,143 registered, turned out to vote. The failure of Town-








ley Negroes to vote in that election, despite the efforts to encourage
them to the polls, would appear to be in keeping with what political
scientists have been discovering in the South generally; that Negroes
in Southern communities do not vote in great numbers unless the
election directly involves issues of race.
In terms of public pledges on policies which would benefit
Negroes primarily, the Reformers probably made the stronger appeal
by the promise of sewers for the East Townley district. As the post-
election survey showed, those Negroes who did vote had felt a need
for "change" in decision-makers as well as policies. Immediately after
the election, Negroes had access to the new majority on the city coun-
cil but not in the sense that Negroes would become an integral part
of the total decision-making structure with the power to insist that
they be consulted on major decisions. This picture, however, was
somewhat altered, at least temporarily, by a new problem which
confronted the city council.
During April and May of 1963, Negro demonstrations in Birm-
ingham, Alabama, ignited the national Negro community. By the
middle of May, cities throughout both North and South were experi-
encing "non-violent" Negro demonstrations. Townley was not immune
to potential demonstrations. During the months of April and May,
Negro students at the university in Townley, along with some white
students, "tested" various eating establishments. It should be noted
that the university had integrated its undergraduate schools in the
previous year without publicity or tension. Most of the restaurants
refused to serve the Negro students although a few yielded. The
Townley Negro community became increasingly restless as it took its
cues from the national movements. The test then turned toward the
movie theaters which also refused to admit Negroes. When Negro
students picketed one of the theaters, white harassment led to vio-
lence and several persons were seriously injured in later episodes of
violent retaliation. Townley had "made" the front pages of newspapers
throughout the nation and was placed on the map of racial disorder.
The local newspaper "played down" the violence in Townley. For
some time, however, it had carried its own, as well as syndicated,
editorials and articles deploring the inequality in treatment of
Negroes, especially in facilities of city and county governments.
City officials were deeply concerned over the turn of events, espec-
ially when the police seemed unable to keep order. The community
itself was shaken by the violence and particularly by the image of
Townley that such violence had produced. To a community like








Townley, which is trying to attract "blue ribbon" industry, an image
is vital. The events during those few days in May had all but de-
stroyed the desired image of the community.
The structure of government became important in this situation.
Although Townley has a council-manager form of government in
which the mayor is primarily a ceremonial figure, the mayor is in a
strategic position, especially in appointing committees. Soon after the
demonstrations began, but prior to the violence, Mayor Tolliver an-
nounced to the city council that he intended to appoint a committee
of white and Negro citizens to cope with the problem. At this point,
the city council, as a body, neither accepted nor rejected the an-
nounced plan.
After violence began to break out, Tolliver immediately announced
his appointments of persons whom he identified as "moderates" from
both the white and Negro communities as members of a Human Re-
lations Committee. As finally constituted, the committee consisted of
eight white and four Negro members. With the possible exception of
one woman lawyer who had some indirect identifications with the
Reformers, all of the white members were prominent businessmen
from both the "Colonels" and "Boomer" factions of the Standpatters.
Interestingly one of the "Colonels" was to become a key figure in
achieving and maintaining consensus among the white members. The
Negro members included men from all of the diverse Negro leader-
ship groups in the community, although the committee did not in-
clude the young man who was the most militant of that group. No
university faculty member was named to the committee. Tolliver
named himself as "temporary" chairman. He then undertook negotia-
tions with local Negro leaders, and succeeded in obtaining from them
a promise of a "cooling-off" period of approximately one week to
give the committee an opportunity to do its work. In keeping with its
position on desegregation, the newspaper put aside its bitterness
toward Tolliver, resulting from the Chicago Store issue, and sup-
ported his moves.
The local business leaders were in a difficult position. Most of
them had strong feelings on the matter of race as a result of their
cultural heritage. On the other hand, they were vitally concerned
about the image of the community, as that image affected their long-
range growth. Further, the business community shared middle-class
values which did not allow for violence. Nevertheless, the mayor's
first announcement of committee action came as a surprise to many
in the community-the committee had accepted fully the principle of








integration as the basis for all its future recommendations. One of the
first Negro requests was that the city remove all signs of segregation
from its physical plant facilities. These were immediately removed.
When the restaurant owners asked the city council whether or not
they supported the policy positions of the Human Relations Commit-
tee, the council voted to approve that committee's recommendation.
Thus Mayor Tolliver secured acceptance of the committee by the full
city council, with no dissenting votes.
As a result of the integration crisis, some of the Negro "elite"
had gained access to the political decision-making structure of the
community. However, that access was gained by the threat and fact
of violence, and it remained to be seen whether they could retain that
access after the resolution of immediate racial problems. It seemed
unlikely that they could retain access unless Negroes could be organ-
ized into a substantial and cohesive bloc of voters.
Certainly in a Southern community racial disturbance always
carries a potential for increasing the electoral participation not only
of Negroes but also of whites who feel threatened by even token
racial integration, especially low-income, poorly educated whites.
Social science research has given increasing attention in the last few
years to the behavior of this latter group, who tend to be non-
democratic in their value orientations and to be non-participators in
the political process due to their insulation from politics and the
difficulty of reaching them through mass media of communication.
Normally, these apathetics have little knowledge of or interest in
political events and little feeling that participation in politics will
accomplish anything, at least in national and state elections. At the
local level, however, their alienation from the rest of the community
is sometimes expressed by their voting in local elections, usually
against middle-class values, especially when they can be reached by a
demagogic appeal to their fears about what they do not understand.
Most Southern university faculty people and middle-class people
who are university educated seem to accept integration of public
facilities more readily than those with less education. Apparently
when racial integration is manipulated into an election issue, the
whites of the working-class and the less-educated of the middle-class
can be rallied by an appeal to racial bias against the better-educated
members of the community. Thus on a highly-charged emotional issue
of this kind, persons who normally do not vote may be drawn to the
polls in vastly increased numbers.
Prior to 1963, the voter turnout in Townley had been low, which








indicated widespread apathy. In the 1963 election, the great increase
in those voting was made possible by a change in both the registra-
tion and, more importantly, the annexation of primarily middle-class
areas of the community. These people tend as a class to vote much
more consistently than do lower-class people.
As already noted, at the time of the 1963 election, Townley had
had no racial disturbance, and in that election none of the candi-
dates made an overt appeal for Negro votes. The campaign was
"pitched" primarily to the middle-class voter. Thus there was noth-
ing which would have the effect of mobilizing the "alienated" white
voter. Subsequent racial violence, ensuing progress in integration,
the enhanced status and at least temporary access of some Negro
leaders to the political decision-making structure, and the inevitabil-
ity of increased self-awareness of the Negro community-inherent
in all these was the likelihood of the "alienated" whites in Townley
being aroused in future campaigns to express their fears of this
change and those whom they might identify with it.


The framework for decision-making in the issues discussed above
was being shaped, of course, long before the campaign and election-
its design was in the "culture" from which the new majority and
many of their supporters came, and in their resentments over exclu-
sion from the political process in the community. The campaign,
however, made the values of that "culture" explicit, and the election
apparently authorized the new group to apply those values. In the
first two decision-situations confronting them after the election, the
new majority was occupied with insuring its own inclusion in the
decision-making structure, to the temporary exclusion of those who
had once monopolized it. The new majority, however, was committed
by nature and by the campaign to opening the channels of access to
decision-making. In addition, they possessed the learned techniques
of "political skills." When confronted with an issue-integration-
which cut across the interests of the entire community, they were
able to identify the alternatives, grasp the initiative given them by
formal authority, and draw all groups into the decision-making struc-
ture to find a solution to the immediate problem. This rational pro-
cess of seeking solutions to problems was basic in the value system
of the Reformers. In this case, however, it was fraught with danger
for their political future. For one thing, in so finding a solution to
the integration crisis, they were forced to turn for help to those








whom they had displaced, the Standpatters. Another danger lay in
the possible consequences of the solution itself, i.e., a policy of con-
tinued measures toward integration.
As expressed in the concepts developed by Donald E. Stokes, a
"position" type of issue or election does not disturb basic values or
bring them into question but merely concentrates on the choices
among identifiable and reasoned alternatives within an accepted
frame of values. In contrast a "valence" type of issue hinges on gen-
eralized stands that usually invoke emotionalism. In most communi-
ties, when race becomes an issue, it becomes a "valence" type of issue
and serves as a flag or standard to which persons emotionally
aroused by the issue can be rallied to vote. From the time that the
Human Relations Committee was created and some integration of
facilities was begun, the Reform League worried that these develop-
ments might be converted into a "valence" issue by the Standpatters
and thus evoke an outpouring in the next election of lower-class white
voters previously indifferent or alienated.2

2Donald E. Stokes, "Spatial Models of Party Competition," American Poli-
tical Science Review LVII (June 1963), 368-377.









CHAPTER V*


THE VOTER SURVEY: DESIGN

As suggested in the foregoing analysis of the 1963 campaign in
Townley, three items appeared to be somewhat foreign to previous
elections in that community. First, the Reform League conducted a
campaign based on issues, and by the election date had established
the issues as they identified them. In contrast to past city elections
which were characterized by only token public campaigning on clear-
cut issues, voter interest ran high in the 1963 election.
Second, the Reformers had finally closed ranks and mobilized
enough strength to "endorse" candidates and effectively canvass for
them. This type of "open endorsement" by a formal citizen organiza-
tion was completely new to Townley. Heretofore, bloc support had
existed but had not been openly advertised or acknowledged. Factions
had backed their candidates in a quiet, word-of-mouth manner.
The third difference from previous elections was that one of
the Reformer candidates was a newcomer to Townley, only six years
a resident. It was definitely a new experience for most Townley resi-
dents to be confronted by a candidate of such recent residence. Two
years earlier the Reformers had launched and supported a victorious
candidate, Henry Tolliver, but he had been a long-time resident and
downtown businessman and some observers had attributed his victory
to this fact.
The purpose of the analysis was to probe why voters had cast
their votes for particular candidates. It did not seek to discover why
people vote or do not vote. If the three variables or aspects of the
election which were new to Townley are significant in explaining
electoral behavior, it is important to understand how the voters
perceived these variables in a campaign which was eventually to
effect a major change in the formal power structure. To discover such
perceptions of the electorate, the basic research tool utilized was a
sample survey. Because of the central theme of the study, it was im-
portant to discover the motivations and reasons of those who actually
went to the polls. For this reason, the population sampled was limited
to the actual voters. Future election studies of broader scope may
cover the total electorate, but for this election the voters were the
most important to study. Regardless of the outcome of the election,
*The author of this chapter is William R. Hamilton.








it was important to discover how the perceptions of these voters
were related to the actual electoral choices which they made.
As noted earlier, the interviewing for this post-election study be-
gan immediately following the election. The majority of the inter-
views were completed within ten days after the election, but for a
variety of reasons some required as long as two weeks for completion.

HYPOTHESES
The basic assumption of this survey analysis was that there would
be a significant difference between those who voted for the Reformer-
supported candidates and those who voted for the Standpatter-
supported candidates in terms of issue-orientation, group-orientation,
candidate-orientation, and population characteristics.
Issue-orientation, as that phrase is used in this study and in con-
trast to its use in previous studies of electoral behavior, measured not
only the amount but also the direction of issue-orientation. In other
words, issue-orientation is defined as the extent of agreement which
a voter has with either of the two groups' respective stands on the
issues.
Group-orientation is defined as a voter's agreement with either
the Reformers or the Standpatters as perceived entities in the elec-
tion. It also measured both direction and extent of that agreement.
Therefore, these two variables allowed a respondent to be classi-
fied within a range extending from highly issue-oriented toward the
Reformers, through low issue-orientation toward either group, to
highly issue oriented toward the Standpatters.
Candidate-orientation measured only the direction of the voter's
reaction to each candidate. Magnitude was not measured due to diffi-
culty in the coding process which is explained in the Appendix.
The major hypothesis of this survey analysis involved the extent
of correlation between each of these variables and the voter's electoral
choice in the 1963 Townley city election. The author assumed that
issue-orientation would be the aspect of that election which would be
the most important to the voter. Group-orientation, with some inter-
correlation with the first variable, was assumed to correlate highly
but not so highly as issues. The last variable, candidate-orientation,
was assumed to correlate poorly. Although no empirical research on
past elections in Townley had been done, it appears that this order-
ing of the variables is a complete reversal from that of previous city
elections.








The first minor hypothesis deals with the specific issues which
the Reformers introduced into the campaign. The author assumed
that the voters would be more. aware of the issues which the Re-
formers considered important in the campaign and furthermore that
those voters who were aware of these issues would tend to favor the
Reformer's position and vote more heavily for the Reformer-endorsed
candidates.
The second minor hypothesis is that a different set of population
characteristics would be found among those who voted for the Re-
former candidates from those who supported the Standpatter candi-
dates. The younger, more highly-educated, professionally trained, and
recent immigrants to Townley were assumed to favor the Reformer
candidates. In other words, the candidates and the voters would re-
semble each other. The older, less educated, non-professional, and
long-time Townley residents would tend to favor the Standpatters.
These hypotheses, as well as other possible correlations will be
analyzed in the following chapter.








CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION

In the foregoing chapters, an attempt has been made to show how
the political decision-making structure of the city of Townley became
more congruent with its economic configuration, after the city elec-
tion in March, 1963. After World War II, there had been a marked
incongruence between those two structures: the economic structure
was pluralistic and competitive, while the political structure was
monolithic and monopolistic. The nature of, and methods used in
making, three sets of major political decisions since the March elec-
tion indicate that the political structure, too, had become pluralistic.
Whether it also will become permanently competitive, in the sense
that the various groups now included in it will compete regularly for
control over the formal machinery of city government, is yet to be
seen.
Implicit throughout the analysis have been the elements of change
made explicit in the major hypothesis which guided the study: that
the extent to which the political decision-making structure of a com-
munity includes all of the major economic groups in the community
will be determined by the character of the economic structure, the
extra- or intra-community locations of control over those groups, and
the political skills of the groups. The usefulness of the hypothesis
perhaps will become apparent through some of the implications for
the study of local politics suggested by the behavior described in the
preceding chapters.
The analysis made within this framework has enabled us to see
the importance of forces outside the control of the actors in a given
system in bringing about changes in that system. These forces are
major determinants of the economic structure of a community and
thereby of its political structure. This is too often ignored by political
scientists in their attempts to explain political phenomena, especially
in local communities. At the same time, the analysis has underscored
the fact that some actors in a political system may be in a position
and have the capacity to facilitate or delay the system's response to
pressure from such outside forces.
Another major implication of the analysis is its suggestion of
the importance of middle-class intellectuals as a political "power
bloc." This group has been overlooked by most political scientists and
sociologists in their concentration on labor, and corporation and








political executives as effective political groups. Perhaps Townley
is atypical, but an examination similar to the present one of univer-
sity communities such as Ann Arbor, Michigan, and Madison, Wis-
consin, for example, might be most revealing in this regard.
The present study also suggests the importance of bankers and
their banks in any attempt to describe the local political process.
Again, this group has been almost completely ignored in the com-
munity "power structure" studies.1
These, then, have been some of the implications which the hypo-
thetical framework allowed the present authors to see in their work,
which otherwise might have been merely a "dead end" exercise in
discovering who makes political decisions in one community and how
the voters perceived those decision-makers and the issues in one
election.

1For an important exception, however, see Gladys M. Kammerer et al., The
Urban Political Community: Profiles in Town Politics (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin Company, 1963).











APPENDIX I1*


INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR POST-ELECTION SURVEY

1. Did any of the candidates or friends of the candidates contact you in any way and
ask you to vote for them?
Which ones?
2a. Now I would like to ask you about some of the important issues that were brought
out during the campaign. What issues that the candidates disagreed on seemed most
important to you?
Anything else that you can think of?
2b. You mentioned (issue #1), were you for or against it?
How about (issue #2? (and so on)
Interviewer: Repeat question 2b for each issue mentioned.
3a. Sometimes groups such as business organizations, civic groups, unions, and certain
types of citizens back particular candidates. Do you know if any groups in town
backed any of the candidates in the last election?
3b. Which candidate did the organization back?
3c. In general, would you say you disagreed or agreed with this group's feeling and ideas?
Interviewer: Repeat question 3b and 3c for each organization mentioned.
So far we have been talking about the positions that the candidates took on
issues. Now I would like to ask you about the good and bad points of each of the
candidates as a person; about their personal characteristics.
4a. Was there anything about Fields as a person that made you want to vote for him?
4b. Was there anything about him that made you want to vote against him?
5a.-8b. Repeat of questions 4a and 4b for Carpenter. Endicott, Glover, and Wilkerson.
9. Which candidate did you vote for in the Wilkerson-Endicott-Glover race?
10. Which candidate did you vote for in the Carpenter-Fields race?
11. May I ask your birthdate?
12. What was the name of the last school you attended?
What was the last grade you complete in that school?
13. Who is regarded as the head of your household?
What is his (her) (your) occupation?
14. Who does he (she) (you) work for? (name of firm)
15. Were you living in the city before annexation or were you brought in after it passed?
Before_____ after
16. About what year did you come to the Townley area to live?
17. Do you rent or own your home? Rent Own
18. What political party are you registered under? Demo ____ Rep. Ind.
19. What was the major source that you depended on for your information about the
election? Newspaper- Radio TV-- Friends........Public Meetings__
Stop Questions . Thank you very much ..
20. Sex of respondent? Male emale___
21. Race of respondent? White -N on-white-_.
I certify that this interview was conducted with
(name) at (time) on (date).

(Signature)
*Designed by William R. Hamilton.









APPENDIX II1*

DATA ON THE ELECTION STATISTICS
AND THE SURVEY SAMPLE

(BY AREAS)


Fields
Carpenter
Total
Endicott
Glover
Wilkerson
Total
Average for both
elections
Area percentage of
total vote
Area percentage times
sample #210
Actual sample drawn
Number of completed
interviews
Attrition rate


#1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6 #7 Total
494 735 945 628 1102 392 186 4482
188 297 431 290 239 359 165 1969
682 1032 1376 918 1341 751 351 6451
448 680 836 559 1041 319 148 4031
192 283 412 269 229 358 164 1907
46 73 134 84 79 79 41 536
686 1036 1382 912 1349 756 353 6474


684 1034 1379 915 1345 754

10.6 16.0 21.3 14.1 20.8 11.7

22 33 45 30 44 25
22 33 44a 30 44 25

17 21 35 25 34 18
21 36 20 17 25 28


5.5 100%

11 210
11 209

9 159
18 24%


a The deviation here was due to rounding-off processes.
*Tabulated by William R. Hamilton.










APPENDIX IV*

CROSS-TABULATION OF THE SAMPLE VOTE
AND VARIOUS VARIABLES


Variable


Issue-orientation
Pro-Reformer
Low
Pro-Standpatter
Group-orientation
Pro-Reformer
Low
Pro-Standpatter
Candidate-orientation (Fields)
Pro
Med
Anti
Candidate-orientation (Carp.)
Pro
Med
Anti
Candidate-orientation (End.)
Pro
Med
Anti
Candidate-orientation (Glov.)
Pro
Med
Anti
Candidate-orientation (Wilk.)
Pro
Med
Anti
Length of Residence
Before 1945
1946-1953
1953-1962


Candidates
Fields Carp. End. Glov. Wilk.

63 5 58 5 4
32 6 30 6 2
29 23 23 25 5


28 2
52 4
44 28

59 4
61 16
5 14

13 21
63 13
49 0


33 20
32 8
57 6


24 1 5
48 6 2
39 29 4


43 2
65 25
3 9

3 21
74 15
24 0

10 5
74 24
27 6

29 22
28 7
53 7


*Tabulated by William R. Hamilton.









CROSS-TABULATION (Continued)


Variable


Occupation
Professional
White Collar
Blue Collar
Student
Other
Age
21-35
36-49
50-up
Education
Some schooling
Graduated high school
Some college
Graduated college
Post-graduate degree
Annexation
In city before
Brought into city
Media importance
Newspapers
Radio
TV
Friends
Public meetings
Type of employment
University
Mid-States Products
City of Townley
Cleveland county
Other govts and large
branch offices
Local businesses
Other
Sex
Male
Female
Race
White
Negro
Party Affiliation
Democrat
Republican
Independent


Candidates
Fields Carp. End. Glov. Wilk.

72 14 65 16 6
24 10 21 8 5
14 9 14 11 0
4 0 3 1 0
8 1 8 0 0


52 13 48
72 21 63










University of Florida Home Page
© 2004 - 2010 University of Florida George A. Smathers Libraries.
All rights reserved.

Acceptable Use, Copyright, and Disclaimer Statement
Last updated October 10, 2010 - - mvs