• TABLE OF CONTENTS
HIDE
 Front Cover
 Title Page
 Foreword
 Map
 Table of Contents
 Introduction
 Diffusion
 Impact
 Lessons learned
 Conclusion
 Appendix A: A.I.D.'s role
 Appendix B: A.I.D. supported agricultural...
 Appendix C: A technical note on...
 Appendix D: Persons contacted
 Appendix E: Bibliography
 Appendix F: Correspondence and...














Group Title: Project impact evaluation
Title: Kitale maize
CITATION THUMBNAILS PAGE IMAGE ZOOMABLE
Full Citation
STANDARD VIEW MARC VIEW
Permanent Link: http://ufdc.ufl.edu/UF00081822/00001
 Material Information
Title: Kitale maize the limits of success
Series Title: Project impact evaluation
Physical Description: 1 v. (various pagings) : ill., maps ; 28 cm.
Language: English
Creator: Johnson, Charles W ( Charles William ), 1941-
United States -- Agency for International Development. -- Bureau for Asia
Publisher: Agency for International Development,
Agency for International Development
Place of Publication: Washington D.C.?
Publication Date: 1980
Copyright Date: 1980
 Subjects
Subject: Hybrid corn -- Kenya   ( lcsh )
Hybrid corn -- Economic aspects -- Kenya   ( lcsh )
Corn industry -- Kenya   ( lcsh )
Zea mays -- Kenya   ( mesh )
Developing Countries   ( mesh )
Genre: federal government publication   ( marcgt )
bibliography   ( marcgt )
non-fiction   ( marcgt )
Spatial Coverage: Kenya
 Notes
Bibliography: Includes bibliographical references.
Statement of Responsibility: by Charles W. Johnson ... et al..
General Note: "December 1979."
General Note: "May 1980"--Cover.
 Record Information
Bibliographic ID: UF00081822
Volume ID: VID00001
Source Institution: University of Florida
Holding Location: University of Florida
Rights Management: All rights reserved by the source institution and holding location.
Resource Identifier: oclc - 08017021

Table of Contents
    Front Cover
        Front Cover
    Title Page
        Title Page
    Foreword
        Page i
        Page ii
    Map
        Page iii
    Table of Contents
        Page iv
    Introduction
        Page 1
        Page 2
        Page 3
    Diffusion
        Page 4
    Impact
        Page 5
        Page 6
        Page 7
        Page 8
        Page 9
        Page 10
    Lessons learned
        Page 11
    Conclusion
        Page 12
        Page 13
    Appendix A: A.I.D.'s role
        Page 14
        Page 15
        Page 16
        Page 17
        Page 18
        Page 19
        Page 20
        Page 21
        Page 22
        Page 23
    Appendix B: A.I.D. supported agricultural research in Kenya and the small farmer mandate
        Page 24
        Page 25
        Page 26
        Page 27
        Page 28
        Page 29
    Appendix C: A technical note on maize breeding
        Page 30
        Page 31
        Page 32
        Page 33
        Page 34
        Page 35
        Page 36
        Page 37
        Page 38
        Page 39
        Page 40
    Appendix D: Persons contacted
        Page 41
        Page 42
        Page 43
        Page 44
        Page 45
        Page 46
    Appendix E: Bibliography
        Page 47
        Page 48
        Page 49
        Page 50
        Page 51
        Page 52
        Page 53
        Page 54
        Page 55
    Appendix F: Correspondence and documentation
        Page 56
        Page 57
        Page 58
        Page 59
        Page 60
        Page 61
        Page 62
        Page 63
        Page 64
        Page 65
        Page 66
        Page 67
        Page 68
        Page 69
        Page 70
        Page 71
        Page 72
        Page 73
        Page 74
        Page 75
Full Text
. I-


K TALE


M A I Z E


The Limits of Success


ecemzer.


c7. GOQ


















K I T A L E M AI Z E

The Limits of Success





Charles W. Johnson, Team Leader
Asia Bureau

Keith M. Byergo, Agronomist
Development Support Bureau

Patrick Fleuret, Anthropologist
Bureau for Program and Policy
Coordination

Emmy Simmons, Agricultural Economist
Bureau for Program and Policy
Coordination

Gary Wasserman, Political Scientist
Administrator's Office






Agency for International Development

Washington, D.C. 20523

December, 1979













Corn is not usually the first thing that springs to peoples' minds
when they think of Kenya. But beyond the tourist hotels and the
game parks is a poor country where 90% of the people depend on
maize for their staple food. Add to this the dire predictions of
large foodgrain shortages facing the world in the 1980s and the
importance of studying the impact of hybrid maize in Kenya becomes
clear. Not so clear, at least initially to the team, was the
relevance of "Kitale Maize" (named after the research station where
it originated) to the Agency's evaluation effort.

In the first place, many A.I'.D. people in Washington thought that
Kitale Maize was a success. Did this suggest that an evaluation
team was being organized to write a "success story" or to evaluate
a project? Certainly there had been no lack of evaluation effort
in the past. Hybrid maize in Kenya was the subject of comprehensive
treatment in 1969-70 as a part of A.I.D.'s first Spring Review of
the new cereal varieties and again in 1972, 1975, and 1978 when
special teams were sent from the U.S. to examine progress under the
succession of A.I.D. financed projects which related to breeding
maize. A.I.D. Financed at least six projects over 15 years that
involved maize breeding research in East Africa but the Agency had
nothing to do with the original genetic breakthrough; nor had it
much to do with the rapid spread of hybrid maize in Kenya. In
these circumstances doing yet another evaluation of how well A.I.D.
financed projects accomplished their individual purposes did not
make a lot of sense.

Yet, insofar as we could tell, in all of these years no one within
the Agency had taken a serious look at the impact of this new
technology on people in Kenya. With the advantage of hindsight
perhaps it would be possible to answer important questions concerning
agricultural research, its applications, its impact on people, as
well as A.I.D.'s assistance in helping people feed themselves. Why
and how did hybrid maize spread so quickly in Kenya? Did it reach
the poor majority and, if so, what difference did it make in their
lives? How.did it change the institutions, policies and economy of
the country? What are the lessons for the future that can he
learned from the Kenya experience and can they be replicated in
other countries? These questions, and others which soon arose,
more than justified the exercise. The members of the team hooe
that the following answers have done justice to the importance of
the questions.









"any Decsle In Kenya and here helped the e"ort. In Kitale, Messrs.
Kusewa, Hazel en anc Mctanya set asiae entire days to assist the
team. In Natirobi the USAID Mission rendered valuable adminiserat-ve
suDort. Wilbur Scarborough helped cuide the team for two weeks,
wnile Harold Jones generously offered his experience and insigots.
Mrs. Ester Mbajah and Miss Annah Ncum"i cave outstancinc clerical
assistance. Back in Washington Twig Johnson backstopped tne team
from the Studies Division. Finally, we are grateful to numerous
Kenvan farmers for their common sense views wnich they shared with
us.













Maize Seed Dis:2ibtc jo= in Kenva


Key:
High Potential Areas:
61 Series Hybrids
62 Series Hybrids
Medium Potential Areas:
51 Series Hybrids
Low Potential Areas:
Kat=umani C=?ccsi-es


Map:














Page

Foreword

Map iii

Table of Contents iv

INTRODUCTION 1

Hybrid Technology 1

A.I.D. & Maize 2

DIFFUSiON 4

IMPACT 5

Growth 5

Equity 7

Government Policy 9

LESSONS LEARNED 11

CONCLUSION 12

Appendices

A. A.I.D.'s Role 14

B. A.I.D. Suoported Agricultural Research in Kenya
and the Small Farmer Mandate 24

C. A Technical Note on Maize Breeding 30

D. Persons Contacted 41

E. BibliograDhy 47

F. Correspondence and Documentation 56










1964 was a good year for Kenya. Besides being Kenya's first full
year of independence 1954 saw the release of a hybrid maize laDelle
6511 for commercial production. The story of the spread anc
impact of this hybrid and the varieties developed from it parallels
the changes in Kenyan society wnicr independence was to signify.
The limits and successes of this remarkable technology provide a
microcosm of :he changes occurring in Kenya at the time. A look
at the immact of hybrid maize tells us something about the uses of
research in the Third World, something about Kenya, and something
about A.I.D.'s role in assisting both.

Kenya rests on agriculture. Although agriculture has declined from
some 40% of Gross Domestic Product in 1964 to just over 25% today,
over 90% of the population derive their livelihood from agriculture.
The major change in agriculture since independence has been the
decline in large scale farming and the increasing importance of
smallholder production. This has not only been the result of the
subdivision and Africanization of most of the large European farms,
but it also reflects an absolute growth in production among smallholders
to over 50% of the value of total marketed production -- up from
some 20% in 1960.

Maize is the primary staple food grown by smallholders. It accounts
for over half of their land devoted to food crops and nearly all
smallholders grow some variety of maize to eat and to market.
Maize is such an important food that there is little attempt to
substitute other staples even as the price of maize rises in the
market; indeed, there is great resistance to changing the maize
diet even when other foods are available. For example, a successful,
rice production scheme in Mwea, central Kenya, resulted in the
farmers' selling as much of their rice as possible in order to buy
maize for their own consumption.

The Government of Kenya defines smallholders as those who own eight
hectares of land or less; however, 75% of all smallholders actually
own less than two hectares. For the purpose of this impact evaluation
the team has used the two hectare demarcation as our definition of
the rural poor majority. The focus of our inquiries about hybrid
maize in Kenya is on this group.

Hybrid Technolovy

The commercial introduction of hybrid maize in 1964 was a result of
a lot of work and a little luck. The work started in the mid-1950s
at the urging of large-scale European farmers. The Government,
with Rockefeller Foundation suDocrt, hired Michael Harrison as a
maize breeder to work at Kitale Research Station. His early work










with local varieties had resu-led in only mixed success 'n increasing
yields. Then following his AID and Rockefeiler-sDonsorec trio :o
Mexico to collect new maize breeding lines, Harrison, in exDeriments
involving some 200 -lines, crossed an Ecuadorian line with tne nest
local variety, Kitale Synthetic I. The resulting hybrid, H611,
produced a remarkable 40% increase in yield and proved acDrooriate
to the environment of the hich Dotential areas of Kenya, with their
fertile soils, abundant rainfall and moderate temDeratures.

At the time it was assumed that the African small farmers would
continue to use the local synthetic rather than the new hybrid.
The synthetic had a wider genetic base than the hybrid, reducing
the chance of crop failure; moreover, it was an open pollinated
variety, meaning farmers didn't have to buy new seed each year as
they did with hybrid seed. However, because the hybrid was superior
in yield and enjoyed the status of a large farm croo, small farmers
demanded and purchased the hybrid seed. It was so popular that
small farmer hybrid maize production soon surpassed large farmer
output.

A.I.D. & Maize

A.I.D. first became involved with hybrid maize in Kenya in 1963.
Over the next 15 years A.I.D. committed an estimated S1.5 million in
pursuit of two primary objectives--one to develop a breeding methodology
to make regular improvements in hybrid maize; and the other to
create the institutional capacity in East Africa for maize research.
The first was a success, the second a failure.

A.I.D.'s initial involvement began from agreements with the Organization
for African Unity and East African Community (EAC) to finance basic
research in maize at Kitale (and other grains elsewhere in Africa)
under the Major Cereal Crops in Africa project. While A.I.D. got
in on the ground floor, the foundation had already been laid by
Michael Harrison. The first A.I.D. financed breeder, S.A. Eberhart
of USDA's Agriculture Research Service, began work in 1964 to make
annual improvements in the hybrid maize lines. By 1970 the breeding
program had improved yields by 25%, under research station conditions.
At the same time A.I.D. posted field trial officers to Tanzania and
Jganca to evaluate hybrid maize under commerical farming conditions
in those countries. Spinoffs from the Kitale program included a
USAID Kenya project designed to diffuse hybrids in densely populated
Vihiga District and a seed multiplication project in Tanzania.

In 1972 the East African Co-mmunitv Food Crco Resarch project
formalized tne attempt to breech hvyrics for the low altitude, low
rainfall conditions found in most of East Africa. By 1975 the
Project was redesigned to establish a regional Protein Oualitv









Labora:ory for research on hion-protein maize and to emonasize worK
on nreec'nc c sease resistant maize. Breeding for marc-nal rainfall
areas continued and was central to a new 197S project, Drv and
CroDoinc Systems Research, which came out of an evaluation in the
same yea-.

The themes of training and institution building began to be woven
into two new projects. In 1959 A.I.D. sought to build within the
East African Agriculture and Forestry Organization (EAAFRO) a
capacity for maize breeding and for linking this research to neighboring
countries. The projects were Animal and Crop Production and
Major Cereals and Legume Imorovemenz. Research conferences were
held in five East African countries and regular varietal trials of
hybrid maize were undertaken throughout the region. 1972 saw an
attempt to strengthen the institution building objective with an
A.I.D. o'fer to train 15 to 20 African scientists. The deterioration
of the EAC and the withdrawal of U.S. assistance to Uganda in 1972
hampered the achievement of the objective. The offer of U.S.
training for African scientists was renewed in 1975 along with a
substantial increase in U.S. technicians. However, the collapse of
the EAC in 1977 and the termination of the breeding program at
Kitale coincided; the third and last USDA maize breeder went home;
and the project shifted from regional auspices to the USAID Mission
in Kenya.

After some 15 years of AID involvement in maize breeding, the
following conclusions emerge. Most of the breeding program was a
success; under the direction of American scientists the original
hybrid lines were regularly improved. However, the research to
improve maize protein quality has not been successful. Nor has the
effort to develop varieties for low potential areas matched the
earlier success of hybrids in the high potential areas. Finally,
when the American breeder L. L. Darrah departed, his African colleagues
did not carry forward the breeding program.

The A.I.D. effort to create a regional maize research capacity did
not succeed. The breakup of the EAC destroyed the original concept
behind such a regional institution. But even when regionalism was
alive, the partner states were reluctant to fill training slots
with young scientists whom, they feared, would be lost to their
countries. 'Yet the national research programs were no more successful
in building their own research staffs. The Kenya Government failed
to improve salaries and benefits for its maize breeders and so
reduced the incentives for trained Kenyans to stay with the national
program. A.I.D. played a fairly ineffective role -- wnile in
periodic evaluations it criticized the failure of projects to train
Africans, A.I.D. continued the training rationale to justify support
for maize research under new projects. Today in Kenya, as elsewhere
in Eas: Afr~icndigenous maize breeding capacity remains very
limi-ed.










The reasons -or the sCread o' hybrid maize seed are at once fairly
simple and fairly complex. Simcly put, 'hybrid maize seed procucec
more of an already accepted product. While farmers demanded the
seed because of its increase yield, consumers liked the taste, color
and texture of the hybrid product. Not only was there good seed
but Kenya had the means to market it. The Kitale Research station,
with an A.I.D.-funded breeder, kept improving the hybrid lines and
churning out varieties a.dated to the different regional climates.
An aggressive private firm, the Kenya Seed Comoany, reproduced the
seed, distributed and promoted it throughout the country. Shopkeepers
sold it, farmers who used it recommended it to others, and'extension
agents demonstrated how to use it with best results. Nearly everyone
took advantage of Kenya's transportation system and marketing
organizations, both considerably more developed than those found in
most of the rest of Africa. Not surprisingly, by 1977 the technology
of hybrid seed had spread from large farmers to small and to every
region of Kenya, as illustrated below.

Percentage of Smallholders Growinc Local
and Hybrid Maize by Province

Province Local Maize Hybrid Maize

Central 95 % 67 %
Coast 94 19
Eastern 99 30
Nyanza 80 35
Rift Valley 59 92
Western 74 73

All Kenya 86 50

(Note: The totals for each Province exceed 100% because most farmers
grow both local and hybrid maize.)


Source: integrated Rural Survey 197a-75

While things seem simple enough in general the particular reasons why
farmers, particularly the poor majority of smallholders, adopted
hybrid seed are a bit more involved. Increasing production is not
the overriding goal of smallholders. As various studies have pointed
out, their primary objective is to minimize the risk of crop failure.
Within this risk constraint production is maximized. This means
that the viability of technical innovations must be clearly demonstrated
before smallholders w.ill- aao: them. What tnhs meant for hybrid
maize was that highly risk conscious farmers were not likely to
adoDt them. 'or was :ths decision an irrational one. Where soils
and climate present problems, local varieties with a wide genetic
base may produce some harvest whiie hybrid seed, with narrower
ene-tic variability, is more likely to fail completely.





-3-

Risk avoidance helps to explain some otner features co :ne spread
of hybric maize. The value of cash croc production, -or exam-:e,
was six times grea-er among those smallholders ado:tinc hycrids
than among nonacoDers. Cash croos gave farmers money to purchase
inouts needed for hybrids (i.e., fertilizers ) and tney Drovidec a
cash buffer to offset the risk of innovation. Similarly, larger
smaliholcers (2 to 8 hectares) tended to be early adopters cf
hybrid maize, while small ones tended to adopt later and to a
lesser extent. In general then, smallholders who adopted hybrid
seed tended to have more land, grow more cash crops, and earn
higher casn incomes than those who didn't. They were, in short,
the better-off of the poor majority.

To some extent the government helped the spread of hybrids by
keeping the official price of maize moving steadily upward and by
actively encouraging the use of the new seeds through its extension
service. Extension generally got mixed reviews on its performance.
Early on, extension agents were considered active and enthusiastic
promoters of hybrids, e.g., they set up as many as 5,000 maize
demonstration plots in one year. More recently enthusiasm and
effectiveness seem to have waned, perhaps because farmers came to
believe they knew more about growing hybrid maize than did the
agents. Along the way a frequent criticism of the extension service
was that it didn't recognize the difference between the needs of
large farmers and small ones, consistently recommending practices
beyond the means of poor farmers. A related example of this problem
was found in a survey of farmers around the research station at
Embu, central Kenya. The farmers who lived near the research
station actually had lower rates of adoption of hybrid maize than
those who lived 20 to 100 miles away. The nearby farmers apparently
knew what kinds of inputs the station used to grow hybrid maize
(fertilizers, insecticides, machines, etc.), and understandably
figured that such methods were beyond their means.

IMPACT

In this section we examine the various ways in which hybrid maize
affected the economy, society and government, in the context of
our particular interest in the poor majority.

Growth

During the period of very rapid diffusion of hybrid maize and prior
to the 1973-74 price explosion in fuels and fertilizers, the Kenyan
economy achieved an impressive rate of growth. From 1964 to 1972
the economy grew at 6.5% annually with a per capital increase of
nearly 50% for the period. While the share of agriculture in gross
domestic Droduct fell, the value of production increased by 67%.
At the same time the area planted to hybrid maize increased 22








times, raising the yield attributed to the new maize seed by nearly
one million tons. The impact of this increase was summed up by an
agronomist in 1973: "Without these 11 million extra bags, it is
more than likely that Kenya would have had severe food shortages in
the past decade."'

The spread oF hybrid maize thus paralleled the growth of the economy
as a whole in the 1964-72 period and has remained a bright spot in
the dull economic picture of 1973-79.

Hybrid maize has affected farmers' economic decisions, with several
implications for changes in the structure of farming in Kenya.
Hybrid maize production was promoted as part of a package of improved
practices ana inputs, although technically, a simple substitution
of the appropriate hybrid seed for local seed results in increased
production. By applying improved plant husbandry practices, for
example, it was demonstrated that a 217% increase in output per
hectare could be achieved. While the same husbandry innovations
used with local seed were estimated to return a 175% increase in
yields, the research and extension services argued that it was
easier to convince farmers to use new practices with new seeds than
to change farmers' techniques with old seeds. They seem to have
been right. Farmers did change their farming practices with the
advent of the new hybrid maize seed. Surveys show that most hybrid-
using farmers have not adopted the whole package of husbandry
recommendations but have certainly incorporated some -- presumably
with increases in yields.

The small farmer's orientation to the market has been accelerated
by the spread of hybrid maize. The importance of the commercial
climate for maize production was vividly illustrated in 1979, when
a reduction in the official purchase price for maize and the cancellation
of the major large-farm credit program happened simultaneously.
The commercial farmers were expected to react strongly -- and they
did. Maize hectarage, as estimated from seed sales, declined
dramatically. What had not been anticipated, however, was the
reaction of smallholders to the uncertain price situation. In the
past, when the official purchase price at harvest was $120 per ton,
many smallholders were only able to sell for $5C in the open market.
This year's official reduction in the maize purchase price caused
hybrid seed sales to smallholders to drop by nearly 15%. We interviewed
many farmers who had little confidence in future market conditions.
They reported that they were still growing maize for home consumption
but that they were not going to grow such substantial surpluses as
they had in years past.



li lan, Uhuru na Hybrics, p. 2










Another strong impression given the team was that smallholders a-e
now acle to use more of their limited land for cash crops. Survey
data indicate :hat smallholders who grow hybrid maize produce no
more than those who grow local maize, about 750 Kg. per holding on
the average. Given the yield superiority of hybrid, this means
that smallholders can meet all or Dart of their home consumDtion
requirements while withdrawing land from maize production. This
land can be planted to more profitable crops like vegetables,
coffee and Dyrethrum. The increased commercial activity of smallholders
in these cash crops is thus partly attributable to the use of
hybrid maize seed.

For the economy as a whole, Kenya has been more or less self sufficient
in maize for some time even though in any given year there may be a
small surplus or deficit. This performance, which in large measure
may be attributed to the successful diffusion of hybrid maize, sets
Kenya apar-, from its neighbors who must import substantial quantities
of food each year.

Equity

Innovations are usually unfair -- they reward those who have the
means to benefit from them. By releasing constraints on productive
resources, technology allows land, capital or labor to be more
fully utilized. Those people who have more access to these resources
will gain greater benefits than those who have limited access.
Consequently, it should not be surprising that hybrid maize was of
relatively greater value to those farmers with sufficient land,
labor and capital to fully utilize the innovation. More surprising
may be that large numbers of smallholders, including a substantial
number of the poor majority, did have access to the hybrid maize
technology and that they have gained improved food security as a
result.

Hybrid maize was of greater benefit to people who lived in agricul-
turally favored regions and to those farmers with larger amounts of
land (more than 2 hectares) and resources. Though bordering on a
tautology, it is true that those regions more suited to hybrid
maize benefited most from the improvements the new technology
brought. Originally designed for the requirements of the high
potential areas, chiefly Rift Valley and Western Provinces, the
adoption of hybrid maize allowed smallholders there to outpace
smallholders elsewhere. As shown by the table below, provinces
w'th high hybrid maize production also consumed more maize than
provinces with low hybrid maize production.










Average Hyorid and Local Maize Production and
Consumption Amonc Kenvan Sma'lholders, 197L-75

Province Hybrid Local Value of Home Produced alaize Consumed
Ko s) (Kcs) as % of tota2 consum7zicon

Central 250 540 11.74 %
Coast 230 420 12.55
Eastern 50 470 10.75
Nyanza 630 1,730 20.60
Rift Valley 1,970 480 24.49
Western 1,280 160 17.55

Source: Integrated Rural Survey, 1974-75

Beyond these regional differences, there was a clear relationship
between production of hybrid maize and size of holdings: the larger
the farm the more likely the smallholder was to grow hybrid maize.
In addition, it was the larger farmers who adopted hybrid maize
first. This was not thought to be particularly worrisome, so long
as small farmers followed suit within a reasonable period of time.
Lagged adoption only becomes a serious problem if the early adopters
are able to prevent the later adoption of the technology by others,
through land accumulation, cornering credit or inouts or other
means. There is no evidence that this happened in Kenya.

Nevertheless after 15 years of hybrid maize in Kenya, it seems
reasonable to conclude that there are real constraints on the poor
majority's ability to participate fully in the increased yield
potential of the hybrid seed. Here again we are addressing the
condition of those smallholders who cultivate two hectares or less.
Visits by team members to East Bunyore in Western Province and Embu
in Eastern Province revealed that the same factors that prevented
small farmers from adopting hybrid maize technology in the early
1970s are preventing them from adopting it today: fear of crop
failure and an inability to mobilize cash for the timely purchase
of inputs, particularly chemical fertilizers. The risk factor and
the lack of cash frequently mean that even when small farmers adopt
hybrid maize, they do so in a way that doesn't give them the full
benefit of increased yields. They are unable to follow the recommended
practices, particularly fertilizer and insecticide applications,
and they attempt to reuse the hybrid seed rather than buying new
stock. They also prefer to use chemicals on cash crops rather than
on a food croo like maize. As a result, the benefits derived from
hybrid maize production by the smallest farmers are probably less
than the figures on hybrid seed adoption would indicate.










Production of Hybrid and ,Local Maize
Amona Smallnolders by Size of Holding

% of Holdings in % of Holdings in
Size o Holdino (Ha.) Local Maize Hybrid Maize

Below .5 88.8 % 4. 1 %
.5 to .9 85.7 43.
1 to 1.9 89.8 44.3
2 to 2.9 88.9 51.6
3 to 3.9 82.7 52.2
4 to 4.9 91.4 47.4
5 to 7.9 68.9 74.8
8 plus 67.3 78.5

Source: Integrated Rural Survey, 1974-75

Team visits to densely populated smallholder areas showed relatively
little hybrid seed being planted and either a return to the traditional
varieties or the attempt to use second generation hybrid seed, despite
the obvious diminishing returns. Whether this is a temporary
phenomenon, reflecting recent unstable Government price policy and
uncertain market conditions, remains to be seen.

Government Policy

The development of hybrid maize technology was the result of
government actions in research. The success of this technology has
meant that Kenya has not faced the food policy decisions which have
confronted other developing countries. In large part because of
hybrid maize Kenya could continue to feed itself despite a very
high and apparently accelerating rate of population growth, and
pursue a course of rapid industralization at the same time. Hybrids
also allowed Kenya to earn foreign exchange by exporting cash crops,
most recently evident in the coffee and tea sectors. Put another
way, without -hybrid maize, population pressure would have led to a
demand for more land for food crops and a reduction in hectarage
for less essential cash crops or to the export of cash crops to
finance foodgrain imports. Hybrid maize helped to keeo the price
of food down in the cities, thus muting the pay demands of urban
workers and keeping Kenya attractive for foreign investment.
Increased maize production helped dampen possible demands for
income redistribution and the hard policy options that would have
been forced on the government. In short, hybrid maize bought time.









On the otner hand, the success of hybrid maize did confront the
government with certain policy questions over the years. in general,
the government viewed the increased production of maize more as a
problem than as an oDportunity. It continued an antiuated pricing
and marketing system more suited to dealing with the problems of
scarcity than those of abundance. The Maize ana Produce Board
(MPS) -- the government's official marketing arm -- operated at an
ever-widening margin between prices paid to farmers and asked of
consumers, yet incurred ever-increasing deficits through inefficient
and reportedly corrupt operations. The MPB responded to an obvious
neec for increased storage capacity with too little, too late. The
government has not supported, with any apparent enthusiasm, the
establishment of secondary industries based on maize. Nor did it
take adequate measures to ensure the continued success of hybrids
by guarding the flow of critical inputs, including sufficient
credit and chemical fertilizers, and support of the research facilities
which made the hybrids possible.

This last point deserves special attention since A.I.D.'s involvement
was, after all, directed to the support of agricultural research.
The government started out with a policy of high priority and
support for maize research. Now the signs of de-emohasis are
everywhere: new positions for maize breeders have not been created,
nor have salaries stayed competitive with similar positions in
private industry and the university. Some 16 years of A.I.D.
support of maize breeding, albeit on a regional level, produced
only three Ph.D. level Kenyan breeders -- none of whom is now
working in the country's maize research program. In the circumstance
it is not surprising that the comprehensive breeding improvement
program installed by U.S. technicians is no longer operating in
Kenya. The loss of the incremental benefits year to year, e.g.,
improved yields, greater disease resistance, better plant characteristics,
cannot be calculated, but based upon the benefits derived from the
program in the early years, the loss is substantial.

The pursuit of crisis policies, with respect to prices, credit, and
marketing, and the lack of a consistent research policy framework,
mirror the centalization of government control over agriculture and
a decline of policy influence from the agriculture sector itself.
Influence over policy by farmer organizations, such as the Kenya
National Farmers Union and the Kenya Farmers Association, has
diminished. Even the influence of the MPB may have weakened.
Their decline in influence has paralleled that of the European-
dominated large farm sector which created and sustained them.
Smallholders have not filled the gap with effective organizations
or pressure groups of their own, nor have the existing groups
aligned themselves with smallholder interests. Even Parliament
seems ineffective in dete-mining policy toward maize. If government
policy toward maize is to become more appropriate to the situation









at hand, it will require not only better long range planning but
wider popular participation, especially among smallholders, in its
formulation as well.

Some of these problems have not gone unnoticed. Currently the
government is investigating the moribund state of maize research
and, it is hoped, recommendations and action will be forthcoming to
correct the observed deficiencies. In the meantime, due to these
erratic policies, especially over marketing and pricing, Kenya will
likely have to import maize in 1980.

LESSONS LEARNED

1. SimDlicity and viability were the decisive technical factors
in the success of hybrid maize. Simplicity meant that farmers
coula substitute nyoric for local seed with no change in agricultural
practices, even though improved husbandry was recommended. It also
meant that hybrid maize easily replaced local maize in the market
and in the diet; no change in consumer preferences was required.
Viability meant that the hybrid maize yield increase (some 30 to
40%) could be readily perceived by farmers. The large benefits
from adopting hybrid seed and improved husbandry practices also
allowed for inefficiences elsewhere in the agricultural system,
e.g., marketing, without diminishing the appeal of the new technology.

2. The private sector was crucial in the rapid diffusion of hybrid
maize. The key was the ability of the seed producer (the Kenya
Seed Company) and the seed distributors (the vast network of small
shopkeepers) to make a profit without excessive government interference.
Conversely, the government's continuing regulation of maize marketing
has probably hindered the realization of the full potential of
hybrid maize -- probably in terms of production, almost certainly
in terms of smallholder equity.

3. Eouity cannot be expected even from the most successful technology.
While smailholcers owning two hectares or less had access to the
hybrid seed and large numbers adopted it, the benefits to them were
relatively less than those gained by farmers with more land and
more financial resources. At the same time larger smallholders did
increase mafze production and the nation as a whole increased its
food security. While perfect equity was not achieved, neither were
there any significant unfavorable consequences such as the alienation
of the poorest farmers from the land, increased sharecrooping or a
radical skewing of income. This may set Kenya apart from other
countries, e.g., Pakistan and India, where the "miracle seeds" have
been introduced and, it acoears, inequalities between wealthy and
Door farmers have been accentuated.







-12-


4. The lono-tem continuity of foreign experts was basic to the
success of the Dreeino crocram. Tnree'American maize Dreecers
spent a total of 14 years a: Kitale and this continuity ensured
constant improvement in the research.

5. Foreign advisors and finance do not automatically create an
institutional capacity to Derform agricultural research. Often the
solution is mne problem: successive generations of prcjec:s with
foreign advisors and donor finance to keep the research going.
Neither recipient governments nor A.I.D. seem to have any option when
confronted by the failure to achieve the institution building goal
and the deterioration of a breeding program but to once again
employ foreign assistance. Both parties overlook the basic causes
of failure: non-comoetitive salaries, alternative employment
opportunities, and the dominance of foreigners in the research.
The lesson for recipient governments is that its own team of
administrator-scientists must be in charge of the research agenda
and be responsible for its execution. The lesson for A.I.D. is
that prerequisites for project assistance ought to include attractive
terms of service for national scientists and technicians and a
strong host government financial commitment to research operations.

5. Pragmatism and skepticism should surround A.I.D. suDDort for
regionalism. Even in the heycay of the East African Community no
partner country was sufficiently committed to the creation of a
regional research institution that they would assign their scarce
scientific and technical talent to it. A.I.D. should support the
development of national agricultural research institutions with
strong linkages to neighboring national institutions and to inter-
national centers. This is preferable to supporting regional insti-
tutions which are intended to substitute for national capabilities.

7. Too many lessons should not be drawn from the Kenvan experience.
In most imDortant aspects Kenya's experience with hyorid maize seed
is not reclicable, at least in Africa. The initial boost given by
large-scale commercial farmers, the significant long term presence
of foreign advisors, the aggressive private seed company, and a
well developed transportation infrastructure all mark Kenya's
success as unique.

CONCLUSIONS

The bottom line of the success of hybrid maize is that it allowed
Kenya to feed itself and to industrialize rapidly at the same time
in the face of a very rapid increase in population. Kenya has had
to send relatively little of its foreign exchange on food imports.
Hybrid maize made i' possible for the country to earn foreign







--


exchange -rom tne expor: of cash croos by reducing the demand for
land for 5ood croes. Hybrid maize heipeld mocerate food prices, thus
muting Day demands of workers. In short, hybrid maize helped Kenya
avoid many of the problems most other African countries face.

There were limits to the success. An indigenous, on-going maize
research capacity has not been created in Kenya. Most of the
country's poor majority have probably not been able to participate
directly, or on a sustained basis, in achieving the increased
yields wnicn hybrid maize allows. And the policies and institutions
of the government have not changed sufficiently to allow the full
economic benefits of the technology to filter through the existing
marketing system to smallholders. Yet it is an undeniable fact
that the majority of all smallholders and a large number of the
poor majority of smallholders have had access to, and benefited
from, the hybrid maize technology. On this basis hybrid maize is
rightly regarded as a develoDment success story both by the Govern-
ment of Kenya and practitioners of the development art alike.

A.I.D. played a secondary role in the success of hybrid maize.
While supporting the research effort with U.S. Department of Agricul-
ture maize breeders, the Agency had nothing to do with the original
genetic breakthrough and very little to do with the successful
diffusion of the hybrid seed. A.I.D. shares responsibility for
the successful diffusion of the seed to neighboring countries in
Eastern Africa. The results of the training and institution building
aspects of the of A.I.D. financed projects have been notable by
their absence. But if A.I.D. can claim only partial credit for
the success of hybrids in Kenya, it perhaps has even less responsi-
bility for the limits of that success.







-14-


A.I.D. 's ROL .


The purpose of this appendix is to summarize A.I.D.'s
role in supporting research on hybrid maize in Kenya. This
sumarv is limited by the fact that the do umentai on of
the early years is fragmentary at best. However, if we
consid.D.s role in on one ece of the hbr
maize phenomenon--research at Kitale, Kenya--it will be
seen that what beaan in 1963 has continued, almost without
interruption, to the present day and is planned to continue
until 1983. While this kind of continuity is somewhat
unusual, especially after the fairly abrupt chance in
A.I.D.'s development philosophy occasioned by the "new
directions" legislation of 1973, it will also be seen that
support for basic agriculture research at Kitale has been
justified under the auspices of a number of projects each
of which had a slightly different purpose.

A.I.D. was involved in Kenyan agriculture as early
as 1957 with the arrival of the first U.S. technician, a
soils chemist who was followed by a land classification
specialist, a soils physicist and a soils mineralogist.
In 1962 A.I.D. supplied a team of experts in extension
'and later assisted in the construction and development of
fourteen farmer training centers throughout the country.
By 1963 a rural youth advisor had helped to establish the
farm youth program known as 4-K and later A.I.D. extended
technical assistance to the cooperative movement.1/

A.I.D.'s interest in Kenyan maize originated in Washington
as part of a world-wide research project on the major
cereal rains. In Africa, A.I.D.'s interest centered on
the staple food crops: maize, sorghum and millet. It is
not clear whether these research interests were the result
of a formal request from any African Government. In any
event A.I.D. signed an agreement with the Scientific and
Research Committee of the Organization of African Unity in
1964 to conduc- research work in both West and East Africa
under a roiect entitled Maior Cereal Croos in Africa
(No. 946-11-990-4191. In addition, a sezarare agreement
was executed with the East African Common Services Orcani-
zation (commonlv referred to as the EAC for East- African
Coc=unity) to utilize existing research staff and facilities
to achieve the following ob-ectives:







-15-


Sto review the world collections of sorchum, millet
and maize seeds for varieties that were resistant
-o disease, insects and other oests;

b. to determine the soil management factors which
contribute to maximum crop production;

c. to develop high yielding, disease resistant varieties
of these crops for different areas;

d. to assist seed breeders in the multiplication and
distribution of these high-yielding varieties;

e. to arrange for uniform trials of promising varieties
and hybrids in different parts of East Africa; and

to facilitate the exchange of planting materials
and information.2/

To implement these research programs A.I.D. signed an
agreement with the Agriculture Research Service (ARS) of the
U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). ARS agreed to provide
one maize breeder for assignment at the Government of
Zenya's research station at Kitale and an agronomist, sorchum
breeder and entomologist for assignment to Serere, Uganda./
However, the maize breeder was not to be a part of the Kenya
Government's research program. Within the East African
Community the charter of the subsidiary East African
Agriculture and Forestry Research Organization (EAAFRO)
permitted each country to retain responsibility for any crop
of its choice. Kenya had decided to retain responsibility
for maize research within its national proranm. In fact
beginning in 1955 Kenya had initiated work under the guidance
of the grass breeder M. N. Harrison. Subsec-ent to an A.I.D.
and Rockefeller Foundation study tour to the U.S. and Mexico
in 1959 his work resulted in a very significant yield
increase from the cross between maize varieties from Ecuador
and Kenya in 1961. This hybrid was put into commerical
production as H611 in 1962. In 1963 Kenya augmented this
breeding program with -he services of Mr. A. Y. Allan who,
under a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation, began research
work on appropriate acronomic practices to enhance the
yields of the new hybrid maize. Kenya then requested A.I.D.
assistance directlv; his was not possible but EAAFRO made
special arrangements with Kenya to support the maize research
component of the Major Cereals project. The ARS maize







-!6-


breeder S A. berhar arrived in July, 1964, to beg-n work
on the development and evaluation of breeding methods to
improve the hybrid maize lines. Local labor, materials and
supplies to support Eberhart's work--ostensibly separate
from the Kenya Government's work--were provided bv Kenva
at the Kitale Station and were reimbursed by A.I.D. thr-ugh
E2PRO to Kenya. Although the personnel at Kitale were
sponsored by different organization, e.c., Kenya, the U.K.,
Rockefeller and A.I.D., the evidence suggests that they
worked very well together. For example, details of the
comprehensive maize breeding program were jointly authored
by Eberhart, Harrison and F. .Oada in Der Zuchter in 1967.i/

There was considerable activity in East Africa with
ARS staff visiting Zaire, Ethiopia, Malawi, Tanzania and
Uganda. Further contact with research workers was engendered
through the Eastern African Cereal Research Conferences
held in Kenya (1965 and 1967), Uganda (1967), Zambia
and Malawi (1969) and Ethiopia (1971). In addition, regional
maize variety trials were conducted and included the parti-
cipation of Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Nigeria,
Tanzania, Uganda, Zaire and Zambia. The project provided
foundation seed stocks of parents of recommended hybrids and
composites to seed-producing facilities in partner states.
The A.I.D.-financed buildings and cold storage facility at
Kitale provided the means to maintain the germ plasm.
Finally, under the comprehensive breeding program dramatic
progress was made in improving the yields of the original
commericially released hybrids. By 1970 improved versions
of the original hybrids were recording yield cains of 26
percent for H 611C and 24 percent for H 613C.5/

In 1969, A.I.D. reassigned responsibility for the Major
Cereals project from its central Office of Agriculture to
the Africa Bureau and divided the Western and Eastern parts
into separate projects. In East Africa A.I.D. support for
agriculture research was further divided into two projects,
Animal and Crop Production (No. 618-11-110-644) and Major
Cereals and Lecgume Improvement (No. 613-11-130-652). Under
the former project the one element which had consequences
for maize breeding was the recruitment, by ARS, of a plant
cathol oist to head the East African Plant Quarantine
Service. Under the latter project the maize breeding











activities at FKiale were continued. In addition, two A .
field trial officers were posted to Tanzania (1970) and
UCanda (1971) to evaluate regional research findings.6/_
Launching these two projects closed the period when EA-ARC
was simply a mechanism of convenience to support an AID/-'
determ..ned research agenda. Thus, A.I.D.'s purpose changed
rom doinc research per se to the explicit coal of creating
a research capacity within EAAFRO c carry out appropriate
research and to diffuse the research findings in the region.
Agreements were signed with EAAFRO reservinc funds for U.S.
academic training for E.AARO staff and, for the first time,
EAARO agreed to finance the local costs of ARS operations
at Kitale and elsewhere.7/

On the basis of an in-depth evaluation by an A.I.D.
Washington team, A.I.D. designed a new project in 1972,
East African Community Food Crop Research (No. 618-11-110-657)
to combine the principal elements of the terminating Major
Cereals and Legume Improvement Project and the Animal and
Crop Production project and to add some new elements as
well. Briefly, the new project proposed to accomplish the
following objectives:

a. to maintain sorghum and millet research;

b. to continue research on maize breeding improvement
research at Kitale;

c. to initiate an effort to develop maize suitable
for low altitude conditions in Eastern Africa;

d. to mount a new program for legume research;

e. to initiate a new rice research program; and

f. to introduce a new regional dimension into wheat
research, which was already fairly advanced in
Kenya with Canadian assistance.

A.I.D. envisaged expanding the number of A.I.D.-financed-
technicians from nine (1971) to a total of about nineteen by
1974. Further, since there were no African entomologists
or soil scientists employed by EAAFRO, A.I.D. foresaw the
need to provide more than 50 years of academic training so










that by the end of the project, then panned for 1980, there
would be a staff of at least 15 to 20Af-rican scien-tiss
employed by the EAC, about equally divided between the Ph.D.
and Master decree levels. However, the A.I.D. project
proposal recognized the difficulty of reaching this objective:

"To accomplish this change requires not only the
recruiting and training of the recuisite scienti
Personnel but also the creation of attractive terms
of service both in te-rms of pay and in terms of oppor-
tunity for rewarding professional accomplishment.
The latter further requires adequate working facilities
and supporting staff as. well as decision making
procedures which take account of the professional
judgement of the staff in determining research
priorities. The lack of each of these recuisites
has in the past contributed to the very slow develor-
ment of EAAFRO as an effective research orcanization."8

The new A.I.D. project proposal also revealed the diffi-
culties of recruiting U.S. technicians who were both highly
qualified and attuned to the need to upgrade the skills
of their regional counterparts. Under the earlier projects
USDA had provided eight of the eleven technicians while a
private contractor, the Institute for International Education,
provided the remainder. While 11E had done a good job
recruiting personnel the A.I.D. regional office doubted
that IIE would be able to mount a team of up to nineteen
technicians and provide the required scientific backstopping.
Another option, the use of a U.S. university, was put aside
on the grounds that even a well established Faculty of
Agriculture would be forced to recruit outside of its
own staff to fill such a large and diversified team. While
A.I.D. recognized that USDA had access to the largest pool
of technicians with the required scientific skills, the
regional office expressed the following reservation:

"Descite our tredeliction for the choice of USDA...
we would not recommend that choice unless USDA is
willing to accept the new crime purpose of the project
to develop the institutional capability of EAAF. O
to conduct food crop research. This means that tran-
inc Africans to do and make decisions about researon










temporarily take Csic) precedence over research
results. also means that USDA technicians must
live with, and when necessary seek remedial action
within, EAAPFO-EAC channels rather than
obviating (sic) the obstacles by Ithe] uncontrolled
use of AID funds. It wl be a difficult adjustment
from past USDA practices and attitudes in their
conduct of research in Sas- Africa. But if USDA is
not willnc to make that adjustment then the AID and
EAC purpose in the project would be better served
by the choice of a new implementing agency."-

The new project was overtaken by political developments,
namely the cessation of U.S. economic assistance to U=anda
in 1972. One major part of the project, sorghum and
millet research, was curtailed. Furthermore, since the
East African Community did not meet after 1972 no approval
could be obtained for the new elements of the project.
What remained was the continuation of the maize breeding
methodology research at Kitale and three scientists for food
technology, plant quarantine and field trials. When it
became obvious that these activities were poorly coordinated
A.I.D. conducted another in-depth evaluation in February,
1975. The A.I.D. -financed team of U.S. university and
.USDA experts recommended that the project be redesigned to
include the following elements: establishing a regional
' Protein Quality Laboratory (PQL); continuing work on maize
breeding methodology; accelerating work on disease resistance
in maize; developing cropping systems for marginal rainfall
areas; undertaking suaar cane research; and continuing
the work of the plant quarantine station.0O/ The purpose
of the protein quality breeding program was to enhance the
lysine component in maize protein by incorporating the
Opacue-2 (high lysine) gene in high yielding maize varieties
and hybrids. The PQL was to perform chemical analyses
and supply OTpaue-2 germ plasm to the maize breeders at
Kitale. The di-sease resistance work on maize was to be
performed at Muguga, where the initial focus was to be on
virus diseases, particularly maize streak. Finally, the
Plant Quarantine Station, also at Muguga, was to continue to
protect Kenva and East Africa from the introduction of plant
diseases and pests from outside the region. The recommended





-20-


sub-projects included very ambitious objectives. For
example, disease resistant maize germ plasm was to be available
to national maize breeders by December, 1978; Opacue-2 was to
be incor-crated into the East Africa maize breeding program;
and the basic research for maize in marcin-al a al
areas was to be completed by December, 1976 ./ To accomplish
these objec-ives the -roject was to provide 45 years of
U.S. technical expertise, 30 undergraduate scholarships
in East African universities; and about 35 years of advanced
academic training in the U.S. for EAAFRO staff. -/

Meanwhile in Kenya the USAID Mission had assisted the
Government of Kenya to extend the new hybrid maize seed to
densely populated Vihiga District as one part of an inte-
grated Rural Development project (no. 615-11-810-147)
Among other things A.I.D. claimed that increases in maize
production of up to 300 percent were possible due to the
availability of the needed production credit, imroved
husbandry and hybrid seed.-' In Tanzania A.I.D. had
initiated a Seed Multiplication project (No. 621-11-130-092)
in 1970 to establish four seed farms, one in each of the
major environmental zones, which would multp-y seed for
several staple food crops, including maize."

With the collapse of the East African Community in
July, 1977, the breeding methodology program at Kitale
terminated and the Food Crops Research project shifted from
A.I.D. regional auspices to the USAID Mission in Kenya.
L. L. Darrah, the third and last ARS maize breeder, departed
Kenya at this time. In 1978 an A.I.D.-financed team of
USDA experts evaluated the project once again. Some elements
of the defunct project were then incorporated in a new
project entitled Dryland Cropping Systems Research (No. 615-0180)
alonc with a particular emphasis on dryland agriculture
in the Machakcs and Kitui areas of Kenya. The components
of the new project include the stationing of scientists
and technicians (for maize breeding, agrometeorclo-y,
agronomy, plant pathology, soil physics and agricultural
economics) at the Kenya Ariculture Research Stations at
Kitale and Muguga and a sinificant training program for.
Kenya research staff (e.a., about 14 Kenyans to be trained
to the M.Sc. level and 4 -o the Ph.D. level in U.S. institu-
tions). The project which will collaborate with an FAO










project in marginal rainfall areas, is executed to be
completed in FY 1983.i In late 1978, L. L. Darrah
returned to Kenya to review the state of maize research.
At Kitale, he found that the three Ph.D. and one M.Sc.
level staf had departed for better opportunities and that
the remaining staff lacked the historical and scientific
knowledge required to carry out the comprehensive breeding
program. The facilities and equipment at Kitale were also
deteriorating.i/

While the diffusion of hybrid maize has had a profound
impact on Kenya its impact has not been limited to only
one country. The A.I.D.-planned and financed project
activities discussed above have contributed to the diffusion
of hybrid maize in East Africa and beyond. This diffusion
is most clearly reflected in the estimates of hybrid and
composite seed exports made by the Kenya Seed Company.
On the basis of these export sales it is possible to make
a very rough estimate of the area under hybrid or improved
maize seed cultivation, i.e., one metric ton of seed will
plant approximately 42 hectares of land to the recommended
high plant density.

Estimated Area Planted to Hybrid Maize in 1978/79 from
Kenya Seed Comoany Export Sales

SCountry Estimated Area (Ha.)

Tanzania 42,000
Uganda 16,800
Ethiopia 26,500
Cameroon 210
Zaire 13,600
Mozambique 2,100
Sudan 2,100

In addition, hybrid maize based on the original Kitale
cross is grown in Zambia, Malawi, Rhodesia and South Africa.
The management- of the Kenya Seed Company anticipates further
export sales of seed to Rwanda, Burundi, Somalia and Eastern
Zaire.

In the following section we have summarized the fiscal
data for each of the A.I.D. assisted projects which relate
to hybrid maize in Eastern Africa. However, it should
be understood that most of these projects included financing












for activities other -tan breeding maize and diffusing the
technology; therefore, the sum of the obligations recorded
here is much greater than the amount of money committed to
hybri maize technology per se.


SCon try--

Worldwide


Regional


c. Africa


E. Africa


Kenya


Kenya


Kenya


Kenya


Kenya


Kenva


Kenva


Project
m4 __e


Major Cereal
Dev.*


Seed Seminars-
Nairobi

Animal & Crop
Production

Major Cereals &
Legume Improv.

E. Africa Food
Crop Research

Crop & Live-
stock Extension


Ag Coops &
Credit


Marginal, Semi-
Arid Lands

Ag System
Support Proj.

Marginal Land
Development


Project
Number


946-11-990-419


968-11-130-611


618-0644


618-0652


618-0657


615-0101


615-11-140-103


615-0164


615-0169


615-0172


Food Cros es. 615-0180
Food Croos Res. 615-0180


Rural Devel.


615-11-810-147


Seed Multip!i- 621-0092
cation


Years of Obli-
gation
initia Final


6/63


1963


5/69


5/70


6/72


6/60


8/63


1/75


8/78


1979


1979


1971

1970


XAso knwn as M. r Cerea Cros i Africa,


12/73


A. .D.
(S000C


213


Unk. Not.Avail.


6/74


338


6/74 1,068


Still
Active


1,953


12/73 2,471


12/69


357


1/75 1,134


Still 5,573 grant
Active 20,000 loan

Still 1,330 crant
Active 10,000 loan


Still
Active.


1,300


1976 1,886


Still 6,300
Active

No. 698-11-130-176.


-""Alsc known as Dryland Cropping Systems Research.











Note s

1/ International Cooperation Admiiration "Aid Level
Submission", October 30, 1959, 10, concerning the
Agricultural Investition, Develozment and Traninin
project (No. 615-11-00S) and USAID Kenya. "Corn in
Kenya, Sprinc Review New Grain Varieties", May, 969,
pp. 26-27.

2/ A.I.D., "East African Recional Procram", December, 1964,
pp. 116-118.

3/ A.I.D., "East African Community Food Crop Research"
project, No. 618-11-110-657, October 21, 1971, p.5.

A/ Litzeberger, S.C., et. al., "East African Major Cereals
Project Evaluation", September, 1972, p.5.

5/ Ibid., pp. 7-8.

6/ Ibid., p.6.

7/ Project 657, om. cit., p.6.

'8/ Ibid., p.3.

9/ Ibid., p.9.

10/ RDOEA/Arusha, "Revision of the Non-Capital Project
Paper, East African Food Crop Research", No. 618-110-
10-657, April, 1975, pp. 1-4.

1/ Ibid., logical framework, p.36ff.

12/ Ibid., p.3.

13/ A.I.D., FY 1976 Congressional Presentation, .May, 1976, p.57.

S1/ Ibid.. 93.

15/ USAIKenya, "Dryland Cropping Systems Research".
Projec- Paper Nc. E15-0180 and FY 1980 Congressional
Presentation, p.332 where the project is renamed
"Food Crcps Research" with the same number.

1 / L. L. Darrah, ."Reocrt of a -Tec ncal Consultation in
Kenya", USDA, October, 1978.








-24- :-'-"S B


1._-I.D.-Su'-- _e ~ Yaize Resear--h _n Kenva and -c -S~1i Fa-er Maa -e


The series of prj-ec-s su'su-ed e -th -,_-ae "Ki-ale Maize"
i as a deae efo-re e US Conress di- _=.D. to address the
--es Of : a.ll f-a-- -s _' the eveiozing verli. f2_ S i = is =-b a v s'.-i-isn
--3'n t ---- je-- were rnot aire exlicii-v a sll far s. Neve-
- less, the pc-i-- "id have a favorable irrac !n cerain caecies of
s-z-l-s-ae -whic sn'us the r2-a shic
vy be between r desin coals an i c achieved. The croec-
by-prc-ject review which follows a--ps o assess hcw well the Kenya
p er-s res-ndd "t small farmer needs, and.also arrpts o ident areas
tnl wi-ch the rcje-ts cul have done ze.er. Beire entlerinc hLs d"s-
c-ssio-n cne pr-, a7ry i ssu'e rmrst he ra-ised: what is a "s1&7 far'er"
in tze-~ cn-ex of Kena?

The defi-ition of a smallholder frowa-ded by the Kenya Cent-al bureau
of Statistics (and ac-cted by the USID) is any farmer with eight hec-ares
of land or less. This may seem reas-able, insofar as many Keny-an fa ers
possess fanr s h-u__drds of hectares in size, bu-~ in fact 75% of all Kenven
sa5~ll- ers assess two hectares of land or less. Clearly, prducin
creandatins :rSe for s-al llers wi-h -tc hec-ares of land will be
different than recanrendatins suitLed to those with ::ch larger amounts of
land. It is not dificult to see how the "eigh hec-.re" definition coul
lead to research and r-e= nations .na-p-o-_are to the por majori_-,"
i.e. t-hse with less than two hectares of land. The-r is no sc--e here to
-resolve this defi--i al = blem in -he c-n-rex of Kenva, but one cin-.
should be re-e.er ed. A project that a=ears o raes-ond to the small
fa-. mrandate when the definition includes thse with eight hec-taes or
less avy see csoeletel irrelevant to small fa~ers when the definiticn
is refined to include c~ oy thse with t hec--ares or less. The ?PC/-/SD
cuestic-- s on sll fa er _eleva.ce are exreel sensitive to such
defi-itional variat-in, and care should be J-ken to insue that t'ose
who are asked to answer -the questions do so wi-h a realistic and relevant
assessment of what 'sall farmers are in any ar--clar country context.

'he fi-st r-jec-, Y.a-or Cereal C-os n z---a (946-11-990-419),
-r -v'de a USL=A m-ize gene-cszs wno w~crx e a-- -ale beci-ning in 1964
--dev e an evraluatea s rmetiods -of -ai-ze e -Zr c. n "e .A
e-s-ec-i-ve, -e =---ec=- was an ex-er.Tien- -. --eed.ng retho-dolocy; at -e
sam -wie (and this is he re-ason for Ke-nvan in-res in the act--vir-7)
= ach cycle of breed-g -er-e ared new var- eas of maize, sre of whb-r ou
be e.x-ec=e be of -.n-a-s- to C r- --oa -. L. n f raczt i was f=re-
seen t~" Z Sre would s -ad rv en-t s p the eld ual2-'
_of -.e racial .---ale hyrid, o-rouced sevea,-- -! s= ^ -- =--.'- Z'. M-c-aee
=C fr R.--; 3~C-S S t oc
.ew hbriis for use by 1a--e-s-=- ( eneral-'" Eu_---ea-n)_ arre s, wh ie_ less
-xoe-sive ns Se----ize -- r--aees (enea..C as --sre r ia-e (z__- r_-1
--=e '-. .- -- --c- -'e E. e is.s-= -- .'- a--
-a s. C s^s -r- less e s 'n"a- h'r=ds because "ev c
recr- '-~ -e -=ase Cf .:vw see=d o eacf r la- ---. a- a "a'" "a!aOned
was -~ar an ac--ass-ey ---r av--l---ed seer licat-on arcS -- .







=enerpri: ,_e., Seede -r-n.), suc-ee-~e~ n .--in. v-r- seed =_vai ale
to smal cl' as __ll s '---e-sC-O e f=as. :: LS- ce lim h


-.~ as as e- -
Iequaly ip-ortant, however, must be the cr since -tha, -for ar.kein
reasons, relatively l title long maturing composite see-d was ever made
=aZae o sono daers In Comaer:.il ha Z-s r.cs ot K=enva
smalholders were never offered a choice be=w-een a high-y.ied-.n hybri
-n a =n=C-vieta- cosi :e--the coze was rain_ be _--een _ne hvoria an=
uniproved local var eties. Wa:ever -the- moiva-ion, Kenyan small

thsre i= sc" eF- rince 'ha- -- y 1% 0 the bsa2Lho lerv ark t for 'ybd-l sez
was -arger than the marrke a-cnc lare-sca.le fa-rmrs.

Tne second project, Major C-=erea and Lecume L=-rovement (6183-l-130-652),
begar. s- 1969. It continued nhe maze breeding acL-_-r, a- K-tale and also
cproided tf^o field t-ria officers -o evaluate thLe performance of -rrrove
.aize -varieties in Uganda and Ta nz=-a.

e elier project had also provided same support for field trials in
loca-ions dispersed widely t -hroughout ast Africa, but the work was generally
done by local researchers who were slow to respond to the inoCmation needs
of the Kitale breeders. The new A.I.D.-financed field trials officers were
meant to alleviate that problem. In all cases the field trials were carrie
out in pure stands on experimental clots; the investigations were to assess
the stability of proved raize varieties to varying soil, raiall,
temperature, insect and disease regimes, not to see how the maize varieties
could -co~l,-ent or replace other culti-ens within existing smallholder
farming systems. Of course, it is i --ortant to recognize that these two
experimental coals need- not conflict with- each other. In the case of hybrid
maize, for example, m =any sallholders ex-erienced little difficultV in-
corporating the new seed into existing cropping patterns, provided that
basic acro-cli-atic conditions were met. Thus de=-- d research into the
role of maize in existing faring systems would have contributed little
to making the new maize varieties mcre accessible to smal-_-lde-s. On the
other hand, there is a significant number of Kenvan smallholders (mostly
--he "poor majority" as defined above) who even today have not been able to
benefit from the adoption of hbirid maize. None of the earlier projects
were designed -i a wyv _-that ould 'hve alc wed _n = re- 0 C research to
respond o th:e needs of -ths dzsadvan-aced ca- _-- o of af hoer, altncuch
.he latest :_roec-t the series (Dr-land Crc -ic Svst.ems esearh) mav
do so. This -s rather an imor--ant -sue, and deserves O ee ex-am-ned in
mcre detail.

The A.I.D. funded breeding program was linked closely -o the needs of
larze-scale farmers, mostly because of the physical -'pri-u-y of -he Kenya
errent-.acri u'"-"=l research satiocn and ithe Keny a See. C.--manv both
f ---rese h-ion_ ave .ain=a_-nez close -=es wi. Eurocea (a later
) i e-scale fa--ers':rm te a 50 -Ce resen day. rThe
re-= rpro-r-.m- wa._s also : "ik-ed, -ifore2 te us'l, with te= ne ds of
.=-cre S_,ve" .ul=iders--cartlv -uh te Kerva See a --any Ow _=
de=~ends on te sralclder -arke-_ f- r = =r-ce ==r cr n i -m. sen
saaes, an d cartl7 throuc.h h -- services : e Ken-. .M, f
..... ...... -7=_ "s _dera-k<-n =c=in"': by 2e c r-res--=- 7C,







extension officials and personnel of the Kenvya eed Company, for instance,
allowed opor2ui- es forr Couatoi: with the beter-off category CI:
Kenya isml elders. B contrast there were no lines of co=runication what-
ever between the pant breeders and Door smalilolders--a cnic miAh note
that ne--her the Ken-ya Seed C=mpany nor the extension service was motiva-zte
to identify and transmit the re.uirenents of Door smallholders to the Kitale
maize breeders, the fore-r because the financial rewards would have been
limited and the latter because individual extension agents were presented
with little incentive (and perhaps substantial disincentive) to work with
poor farmers. In today's circumstances, of course, it is thought to be
-ne :as of a development assistance acencn to create and maintain such
lines of communication, but this was not cenerallv conceded in the 1960s.

In 1972 A.I.D. support for agricultural research at Kitale was continued
under a third project, East African Co n ity Food Cro RePsearch (618-110-11-
657). Support was now given to the development of high-yielding varieties
suited to low-altitude (i.e., medium potential) areas. All the previous
breeding work, by contrast (as well as most of that which followed) was aimed
at increasing the yields of long maturi varieties adapted to conditions
in the high potential areas of western Kenya. But during the proceeding
seven years the Kenya government maize research program (cooperating with
but distinct from the EAC program supported by A.I.D.) had produced several
maize varieties, both hybrid and composite, suited to medium potential area.
This was a consequence of political pressure--Kenyan farmers and their
elected representatives in the medium potential areas were anxious to benefit
from new maize varieties as farmers in high potential areas had been doing
for some time. This Kenyan political development may have been reinforced
by the desire of other EAC states to see the regional project become more
relevant to their needs; in any event the outcome was that the new maize
breeder at Kitale spent much time travelling to research stations elsewhere
in Kenya, attempting to spread the use of the efficient maize breeding method-
ologies that had been developed at Kitale. It may be stretching a point to
regard this development as a response to the needs of poor farmers, but it
does seem reasonable to conclude that explicit efforts were being made to
spread the benefit of the breeding methodology program more widely among
Kenvan smallholders-or indeed among East African srmallholders generally.
Unfortunately, the effort to produce maize varieties suited to the medium
po-tential areas has not accomplished much, partly because the breeding
program has become bogged down in attempts to improve the protein content
of maize, and partly due to difficulty in maintaining certain of the parent
lines.

In 1975 the ongoing regional project was redesigned. Two earlier sub-
pro-ects-- marginal areas cropping systems and breeding for disease
resistance in maize--received increased emphasis, and a new breeding for
protein quality in maize. The basic breeding work at Kitale was continued,
as were several other project activities.

The marginal areas research, undertaken by an agronomist, an agrameteor-
ologist and an agricultural economist, was aimed at assessing the response
of major food rains (including maize) to various water and soil conditions
encountered in the drier parts of East Africa, It was also foreseen that
reccmrended practices would reflect the views of the economist, -hose job
it was to develop farm management models aoro.riate to marcinal areas
cropping patterns. Clearly, this was an attempt to make plant researon








respond the nees of a relatively disadvantaged crou of snallholders.
Un-cr-un-ly, by mid-1978 relatively li-le had been accomplished by -he
technicians charged with conduc-tng this pro-gam of research, which may
explain why it is now FAO, and not A. I .D. hat has the res-onsi.ility for
ccndu--ing ada-tive resear-n in -te cropping systems project.

The new subproject to breed for disease resistance in maize initially
-iden.fied two problem areas: 1ow-co-medium a-titude (medium potential)
zones, were maize steak virus (MSV) is a significant factor affecting
maize yields; and high altitude (igh potential) zones, especially Kitale,
where sugar-cane nosaic vir-s (SC~i) is widespread. A decision was soon
made to concen-ra.te work on SO--, rather than MSV, and expensive attempts to
icent-- sources of resistance to SCMV in c=mrercially valuable germilasm
were undertaken. Only miniLmal progress was achieved in incororating
resistant gerplasm into ongoing breeding efforts, perhaps largely because
the EAC fell apart, and the Kitale effort with it, soon after the initial
screening was done.

Although there were sound reasons for the decision to focus A.I.D.-
assisted disease work on S#MV in carrercial hybrids, it is appropriate to
note that this research was considerably less relevant to the needs of roor
smrallholders than research into diseases (e.g., MSV) characteristic of the
medium oo-ential zones. Available documents make it clear that the Kenya
Seed Corcany and the Kitale breeders, as well as the government of Kenya
influenced the plant pathologist's decision to work on diseases characteristic
of the mcre developed high potential zones. Once again we see the power of
established lines of cncmunication and the disadvantage of being without these.

The protein quality laboratory at Kitale was desired greatly by all
of the EAC m;.ber states, as well as by USDA plant breeders, AID/W and the
Nairobi mission. In 1975 there was still a good deal of optimism about
the potential for raising the protein quality of maize by incoororating
the opacue-2 gene into high-yielding germplasm. Today high lysine maize
finds some place in the highly capitalized U.S. livestock feeding industry,
but associated problems of poor storage quality and reduced yields appear
to be insuperable obstacles preventing wider usage. In 1975 the protein
quality laborato-y at Kitale could be viewed as an attemt to address the
needs of maize consumers in developing countries; in 1980 this is no longer
so. There is wide agreement among maize scientists that a good deal more
basic research will have to be done into the combining qualities of high-
lysine germalasm before further practical advances can be made in maize
protein quality. Moreover, there is a question whether consumers in the
developing world need hiah-lvsine maize at all. Nutrition work done in
Kenya revealed no protein-deficiency disease associated with maize
consumption, not even in the case of hybrid maize which has much less protein
per gram than unimproved varieties. This is because maize is ordinarily
eaten in combination with leaumes that comensate for protein deficiencies
found in maize. In sum, there are good reasons for thinking the protein
quality research is marginal to the needs of small farmers and developing
nations as these needs are currently -erceived.

As a footnote, we should not overlook the possibility 'that the
unsuccessful search for ways to increase the protein cualirv of raize
may have haired breeding work aimed at releasing new improved varieties
to smallholders. Maize breeding by whatever method is a tim-consuming











t-' = ae :C~l af a C)c- ae pFaze
-bze n.u"-er of --Ze es 'e s ~~ 3- s '- -C"- =- -S---
puaZions. "To tne -e -hat a-azn-zi was directed at --=-. --E=* *,
e--r -. _-tant _-es of c- ves-icatin were i--rd. e= eZ1 va- c -fice-
Scha-g- of the Ka-man-i researn s-ao.ln, for example, I was ex'lict in
ims obser-vac- o tat c e-n for r -n -- had = -o
cre crc"osi- ra:ize vari=e-ies sui- to -ediu --- areas.

Sr-e s reoen- -rojec- ir sc---- of Kenv- ar. 1- .-ra l r=sear--' was
n -1979. Dland C ie stns research (615-01830) ex-ands .;.D.'s
st n analy-ng pro --ms of: ed gra-n z-duc-ion in Kenva '-s argi-al
-as, wle m 'n- i-i'n A.. .. s r--?, for o-_e- activities f=e =n -ai' er
rojets. While it is far too early in -= of the new projeo- to make
cpehensive sa-reer-s abou-^ the ex-ent to w-ich it res onds to the smal-
f e-anda seveal obserai-ns a-re in o-e. Fi-s-, tis -cjec is
-e fir-st in the s-ries of -rjects r-evied here t r-cad the sa-isfa-ction
cf sa--. --fa~r nes as t'- prir.- objeei-_v of the resea=h. Send,
the r---je=- des personnel and w ork plans -a a-r a---. ria a
-esearch effort- aed a- timing soil, water and econcr.c constrains
to rsallhclder prduc-tin in eari-al2. areas. Ti the rojec- -ovid~, es
tf--- a the t,-. cZ oaali- l a ear tat Sezm --
relevant to the needs of .ecr Kenvan far--rs. The special danger he-e,
reve_-a d in a close reading of t'he raize b3re -er job descro- i-C s, is that
-he ra.ize breezes h-eo for the- n-ew project wc (base- at Ki2t-e and
YMitc'a) are su---csed -o "-e for many pDit -chracerist--cs besides; croei
cuaTL v, will dev-e rcce t..re to -his n is w-ae. .s ne e
ave, br=eedinc to i =-rve ac-rnc-io car-ac-=eris-ics, vi=el cualitt and
dissease rsie s mry add.--ss ne-es of srall fa= ers; breei-ng to i=-ove
prain CualityZ is unlikely to do so.

l"he six-een-yea se-.ece of project activity outlined here presents
an Miltrestng -a-ern. The first project was to s-rt ra.ize b feeding,
and the disseniination of bree.inc marerals and -kowledce; the second
pro--ec added t o-"is pi -_sion for field _-als; the -hid; proje included
a r-a- -e crolex e-f c-*t assess 5~e nPeeds of mzta--nal. rai'-_ = areas -he
fourth -roject was e.en b~ader, seeking to anwer new questions r-eca-di
disease e resisnce and -or-=i uai ; the fifth (and l-es=) oroje- cn-
tinues all of these eaprl r ac-vities but ex-ands i-e neinal areas
.oet s..ic icano l. -r-e c~nrmcn :.-ad "- -ic these oro-ecos ,-nO
a oo-henrt -rcain has been su-or- for the basic br-eedng work d-ne ate
Ki-a e. Until recen-ly, no elmrent in any -roject succeeded i- reat g
any bu- the rcs- -cs les been this research acoivi-y and all .
far-r -- nees; at the share =:-re -he relvano of -e rsear-ch e=foS r -o
Kenvan s_-a' -ders nas creased wi-hl each e -ans on i roc=n ac-r-, .
ocnrim fCf -he =r-ent oeren -ua-i lt-rato-r.) ns mav sen

neeos co .=-asses2 "? swer i s --aa-t e-a :C-nds Of resear' ar of
---=al value: i for vield d disease resis-ae, for
_ar'e, o -r or c'-e r' .soane, or ---- -4^ =._ -- . j --
rson is-_r.o -s .. *-=Cer a----s -ra 0sf lane 7r--" to --at
=-- a wr Z7se are =e










"ere3is of c se a w.-zle ranae cf either i -w-
_- _eUs ut a" ai--.=-- c-_
a, -y-.zL-.z z maze r-we-s, and -he ac :L--leza resea- h
s--c--- v h I.. -- ve n cr rc- '0 =ses
pr=bls. Only mSage f-rs have bee r e :. assess the oer:.ance of
aE vreties wen .in't rlan' d wh -le-ies, for- instance, a- vet -he
rajci-y cf cKenvan .---, --,-" plant r.ize no ohe-r way. -- ff=-= 0
recUe the s-ze of he b rid tant, and, cor-' -a-n t~ d--in on s=C=Ce
.".-n--., mv-e -c been c,---'c '- -e ,,' p. ye
.cvy fas -- s ar- u-ba L-- ie to cr-w Ybrid e =csely bec-ause it.- I-r;ns
so :77n ,o tne sc3 =o work whatever has been dne to bced = =--'ved
?erc- a-= dur--i- ng s--race, yet ?ost-ha-rest cr-ai losses on _--L-.o -de
r s i Kenya have been esr.- d at.25-40% of total yie ls.

LHis list of 't.his not do-ne zr" -.-ae orr o acr- ._c a search
cculd be eexanzded os_-ealy, but 'ne essen-l :-==ct eis t.a= tey wea,
not one cause .o :enan for into- n--esmll f c a crk --r s into
the resea-o a-enda was ever es-ablishe*d. Te recent dry-1lan co-in
sys-c ,s c rje,- oes urthr i this dn than a earLi-e pr jeC,
but jay ncZ suc-sed i- raking snall far- needs known to the basi- plant
and soil sient-sts-ths is because res_.-sibili-v for hasiC rese-ar-
rests with AI. D bu re.sncsibili'v for adactive research is vesied in
FAO, while resoCnsib li-r for assessing socio-e=ornic const-ai- is given-l
to yetr a third a-a y, the University of Nairbi.

In sun, we find that AID su-~orted for a- icu.lt--a resea-h in Kenya
las inde bened ies sm-all fa--s. Tis is c-iause the resea-ch was
devoted to a basic food croa grown by sTrallolders everywhere in Kenya,
and was designed o aswer questions reading plant growh tha ae of
concern to all raize producers, regardless of size. Litte i -he Ar.D.
prorm, cwev-er, has been directed at the special and specific needs of
srall fa-rers. '-his is because no lis-clanned or othe-wise-were
Ee'7 established t- identi y srall far-er neies and cCrr-, -icate these to
the A. I. D. -sucprted researchers. The 1972 at-tst to do so roved abortive;
-heI 1979 t has ye to be carried thruch to catletion. Stral fa=er
inrests were addssed diec c nly when outside forces-Kenvan c.li'ical
deveClopents-ace this oblicatorvy.








-30-


APPENDIX C



A TECHNICAL NOTE ON MAIZE EFBZCDING


t. In roduc-ion


In this note we will use the following terms in .the
description of maize breeding and maize agronomy.

:Hvbrid -- A single, double or triple cross of selected
inbred lines, normally with wide variability in genetic
background, that attempts to enhance certain predetermined
characteristics such as yield, insect or disease resistance,
stalk strength, etc., and attain hybrid vigor or heterosis.

Synthetic -- This is an open pollinated variety derived
from the combination of a number of selected self pollinated
lines, the good combining ability of which has been pre-
determined by testing all possible first generation (F1)
combinations.

Composite -- Composites are open pollinated varieties
selected from the random combination of a large number of
recognized breeding lines that in theory have good combining
quality and the genetic characteristics desired for a specific
location.

Snythetics and composites are generally developed for
adverse or marginal maize growing conditions or where demand
for maize seed is not sufficient to make hybrid seed production
viable.


. Maize 3reedinc


The larce scale commercial farmers in the Western
highlands of Kenya became interested in hybrid maize in the
earvl 1950s. Their request to the Kenvan Government (GOK)
resulted in the employment of Michael Harrison as maize
breeder in 1954. Inbreeding and crossing of local varieties
did not result in hybrids of an particular superiority.
However, when the inbred lines were formed into synthetic
vari--ies in 1961, the resulting Kitale Synthetic I proved
highl successful and was the most popular variety until
h='brid, 61 was released in 1964. While a number of
i--- o uced lines, crossed wi h local lines, had been tried
in Kenya, it was .n Ecuadorian line, EC5 that crossed
wiZh the Kitale Synthet;ic I to produce the hybrid vi cr,
high vield, and desirable acronomic characteristic re-qured










by the Kenya far er. This which altitude Ecuadorian variety
was acquired wi-t a number of other Central and South
American lines during Harrison's AID/Rockefeler-sponscred
tr" to the U.S. and Mexico to collect cerm clasm and to
observe maize breeding methods. It was assumed that the
small farmer would continue to use the oen collinated
synthetic rather than purchasedd hybrid seed each year.
However, the hybrid was so superior under small farmer
manacemrent practices in the Western Eichlands that in times
of favorable cost/price ratios he readily purchased the
hybrid seed (see Table 1).



TABLE 1

AREA OF IMPROVED MAIZE GROWN IN K=NYA
1963 to 1979
(in hectares)


Larce Scale Farms


158
11,615
22,137

25,860
55,501
36,501
39,500
47,110
63,785
73,944
53,370
39,214
50,697
50,903
59,357
29,016
20,146


Small Scale Farms


4
708
8,110


15,269
46,642
51,331
64,291
97,372
149,864
206,904
264,699
292,358
352,053
377,092
429,602
407,860
347,550


Source: F.M. Ndambuki


In thi Table one can see the raid expansion of small
farmer im=rcved maize production far exceeded larce farmer
mrcduct-on after 1968.


Year

1963
1964
1965

1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979


Total

162
12,323
30,247

41,129
102,143
87,832
103,791
144,482
213,649
280,748
318,069
331,572
402,750
427,995
488,959
436,876
367,196










It was not until the unfavorable price and market-in
situation of late 1977 and 1978 that hybridd sales for 197
and 1979 declined from the 1977 peak. Even then small
farmer sales were only down 5 and 15 Dercent respectively
as compared to a 50 and 33 percent decrease for larce farmers.

Breeding programs were developed at the Kat'ani station
in Machakos for short season, low rainfall varieties in
1957; at the m-bu station in 1965 for mid-season, medium
rainfall varieties; and in 1975 at the Coast station,
Kikambala, for mid-season varieties suited to the hot,
humid, disease prevalent coastal area. Open pollinated
composite varieties were selected for the lower potential,
dry and coastal areas to meet the needs of small farmers
for low-risk crops.


TALE 2

MAIZE RECOMMENDED FOR GROWING
IN KENYA


Hybrid or Year of first Maturity classification
.variety release and remarks


Coast -- 120-150 days.
Composite 1974 -- 0-1000m. above sea
level
-- 35 bags/ha.


Katumani -- Early (100-200
Composite B 1967 days)
1000-1900m.
Marginal Rainfall
two seasons below
coffee belt, dry
woodland and bush
areas.
-- 25 bags/ha.


1967


- Medium (150-180
days)
-- 1000-1700m.
-- 40 bags/ha.
-- 20% higher yield~in
tnan local maize
(Muratha)
-- lower Kikuvu areas.
i


~i5ll


i












TABLE 2...Continued

Hybrid or Year of first Maturity classification
varie'v release and remarks


H512 1970 -- Medium (150-180
days)
-- 1200-1800m.
45 bags/ha.
25% higher yielding
than local maize
(Muratha)
-- Coffee areas.


H622 1964 -- Late (180-240 days)
-- 1000-1700m.
-- Double cross
-- 56 bags/ha.


H632 1965 Late (180-240 days)
1000-1700m.
-- Three-way cross
-- 58 bacs/ha.


H612 1966 -- Late (180-270 days)
-- 1500-2100m.
-- Single cross x
Variety
-- 65 bags/ha.


H611C 1971 -- Late (180-270 days)
1800-2400m.
-- Synthetic x Varietyl
STea and pyrethrun
Sreas
-- 62 bags/ha.










TAL-" 2... Continued


Sybrid_ or Year of first Maturity classification
var-ety I release and remarks


H613C 1972 -- Late (180-270 days)
-- 1500-2100m.
-- Single cross x
Variety.
-- 75 bags/ha.










Source: F.M. Ndambuki


In 1963 AID was requested by the Kenvan Gover-nment to
evaluate and make recommendations for their maize breeding
program. Dr. Steve Eberhart from Iowa State University
performed the evaluation and subsequently was the first
of three USDA contracted maize breeders to work at Kitale
under an AID financed regional project. He served from 1964
to 1968; Dr. Penney from 1968 to 1970; and Dr. Larry Darrah
from 1970 to 1977.

The USDA breeders introduced several different breeding
methodologies but eventually settled on the reciprocal re-
current selection (RRS) method from which was developed the
Kitale comprehensive breeding system. This involved the
maintenance oftwo separate parent populations, i.e., the
Kitale snythetic and the Ecuadorian 573, inbreeding the
population, making selections for improvement then, either
crossing with the other parent lines for hybrid, or
inbreedin for another cycle to cain further improvement.
At any point in the continuing cycles of improvement, hybrids
svnthetics or composites can be developed depening on needs
for commercial production or selection criteria. The
advantage of the RepS system is that there can be continued
izrovement of parent lines and the time frame for developing
new hvr zcs is shortenec.










An area of maize breeding research which continues today
and which is of cuestionable value is the work cn otacue and
other mutant scenes to enhance the protein cualitv of maize.
Though a great deal of research has been accom-lished in this
area, the trade off between increasing protein quality and
decreasing yields has proven to be an intractable problem.


III. Maize Acronomv


To maximize the yields of hybrids or local varieties,
it was necessary to develop a package of cultural practices
suitable to the growing environment. While a number of single
factor studies had been accomplished prior to the interest
in hybrids, it was the potential for major yield gains of six
and eicht fold that convinced researchers -o place emphasis
and consequently resources on maize agronomy.

In 1963 the Government of Kenya, with the assistance
of Rockefeller Foundation and the British Government, hired
A.Y. Allen to develop a systematic program of agronomic
research. Working closely with the maize breeding program
he conducted replicated multifactorial trials to investigate
a number of agronomic problems. The trials provided informa-
tion on the benefit of individual practices, and on the
cumulative effects resulting from the complementarity of
practices used in combination (see Table 3). Even with local
varieties, improved management provided a 3 to 4 fold potential
increase. 1000 to 1200 Kg/Ha. was the average Kenya maize
yield in 1963. Local maize with the best management yielded
4000 Kg/Ha. in Kitale on a three-year average, 1964-1966.
However, hybrids were capable of yielding 8000 Kg/Ha. under
simil ar conditions.







-36'-


FACTORS AFFCTING 1966 YIELDS AT
6 LOCArTIONS N WESTERN KENYA


actor Level Yield Diff. increased Cash Profit
(q/ha) Return Outlay per ha


Time of Early 52.8 18.6 $80.91 $ nil $80.91
planting
Late 32.4

Variety H613B 52.9 18.8 81.78 4.17 77.61

Local 34.1

Plant 36,000 49.1 11.2 48.72 2.78 45.94
popula-
tion 18,000 37.9

Weed Clean 48.4 9.8 42.63 6.96 35.67
control
Once-
late 38.6

Phoschate 56 kc. 44.6 2.2 9.57 11.65 -2.08
(P205)

0 42.4

Nitrogen 79 ka. 45.0 3.0 13.05 24.60 -11.55
(N)
0 42.0



Source: G.F. Sprague


The factors that most influenced maize production were:
1) early planting; 2) seed rate; 3) seed variety; 4) weeding;
5) fertilizer; and 6) insect control. Of these, early planting,
weeding and seed rate retired low capital inputs and could be
acc- wished even by subsistence farmers. The relative influence
of various cultural practices are deicted in Figure 1.









Conventonai
Maize Producticn

19.7 q/ha.


hybrid Seed without
mpDrovec production
practices plus phosp-
hate and nitrogen


32.7 q/ha.
S56.55 Extra Return
S 40.42 Cost


S16.13 Net


All Improvement Factors:
Hybrids, Fertilizer, Pro-
duction Practices



80.3 q/ha.
$263.61 Extra Return:
50.16 Cost

$213.46 Net
Il I


FIGURE 1.


Local Seed with
imroved production
practices of early
planting, proper
stand,.clean weeding,
no fertilizer


4c.9 q/ha.
$127.02 Extra Return
9.74 Cost

$117.28 Net


Hybrid* w/improved
production practices
no fertilizer


63.5 q/ha.
$190.53 Extra Return
13.91 Cost

$176.62 Net




*30% increased yield
for hybrid over local
ma2ze


Comparisons involving hybrid seed, fertilizers,
and improved production practices in Kenya.


Source: A.Y. Allan as presented by G.F. Szrague and modified
by K. Bver-o.


I


I










Tak=in the research findin-s from nhe station to the
farmer was the next task. Research teams established classes
and training programs for extension stiaf. This stared in
the Kitale area and eventually spread to most of the maize
growing areas of the country. The Kenya Seed Company was also
involved in extension activities. The literature and promotional
activities with small shockeers helped to inform farmers.
Demonstration plots, established by both extension staff and
progressive farmers, also helped to spread the hybrid seed.
In the early years hybrids were also promoted by the news media
and government information services. These elements in the
diffusion process are summnarized in the following Table.


TABLE 4

"FROM WHOM DID YOU FIRST HEAR ABOUT
HYBRID MAIZE?"
(All answers in percentages)



Zones in order of decreasing agricultural potential Weighted
Source Zone 1 Zone 2 Zone 3 Zone 4 Average


Extension agent 30.5 33.3 43.2 40.2 35.4
*Dealer/stockist 15.8 6.7 4.5 4.1 9.9
Friend/neighbor 42.1 50.0 44.3 18.0 44.7
Employer 3.2 0 1.1 2.7 1.7
Agricultural
show/field day 0 0 1.1 4.1 0.4
Newspaper 2.1 1.1 0 5.5 1.2
Can't recall,other 6.3 8.9 5.7 11.1 6,7
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0


Source: J. Gerhart


As shown in Table 1 the area planted to hybrid seed declined
in both 1978 and 1979; however, the adoption of recommended
practices a-cears to have been maintained or perhaps increased
in some areas. These trends are shown in Table 5.


-38-











DIS-TRBUTION OF INPUTS ,AND HUSBANDRY
IN DIFFERENT MAIZE ZONES, PERCENT


r. -- A A
ZONE
FACTOR 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 All Zones

Used HEbrid 1975 85 82 35 28 57 21 99 72 7 60
1977 93 86 48 43 79 40 98 81 15 78
1978 100 92 74 62 89 24 95 64 18 80

Traczcr cr 1975 71 71 58 28 10 47 92 44 12 53
Oxen 1977 91 64 76 43 2 77 96 45 15 71
1978 96 79 85 34 30 82 93 62 -- 75

Mecn Planer 1975 I -- -- -- -- -- 57 3 -- 9
1977 2 1 -- 7 -- 48 3 -- 17
1978 10 6 -- -- -- 4 47 -- 22

Planned Early 1975 15 7 ii 42 44 58 26 44 17 27
1977 14 13 19 36 28 29 22 32 5 21
1978 8 25 -- 10 19 20 20 26 27 19

Pla.nted Rows 1975 77 72 45 69 94 76 100 97 7 72
1977 100 81 72 79 100 74 100 100 25 88
1978 100 90 78 100 100 84 100 100 -- 87

Used 1975 64 20 4 27 60 13 90 44 2 41
Fertilizer 1977 75 22 7 36 66 23 90 35 5 52
1978 76 35 19 43 44 12 87 48 -- 48

Used 1975 25 4 5 23 36 8 57 41 -- 24
Insecticide 1977 16 2 1 29 32 11 60 26 -- 28
1978 30 10 4 24 33 12 55 29 -- 25

Th-nned 1975 62 47 54 72 51 47 47 78 23 56
1977 75 68 80 64 62 66 73 65 10 69
1978 80 83 78 76 93 72 71 79 82 81

Clean Weeded 1975 55 71 73 79 78 87 65 75 60 70
1977 84 92 93 100 98 100 98 100 90 95
1978 90 100 93 90 100 92 94 100 91 93

I--z=r- m-an.-ed 97 5 35 48 79 5 68 1 38 82 13
1977 38 44 64 71 64 80 19 5S 60 44
1978 40 27 52 43 52 40 32 38 55 45


Scurce: M P B Yield Sur-evs 1975 1978.


,-c9-












Altitue, m


Rain7fall(n


1 Bungoma, Kakameca, Kisii,
Kericho, Nandi
2 Buncoma, Kisii, Kakameca
(lower areas)
3 Nyanza (excluding Kisii)
4 Lower Meru, nmbu, Muranga,
Kirinyaga, Kiambu
5 Upper Nyeri and districts in
zone 4
6 Machakos, Kitui
7 Trans-Zoia, Uasin Gishu,
Nakuru (larce scale)
8 Highlands in Nyandarua
9 Coastal Belt


1500 2800

1200 1500
1100 1400

1100 1500

1500 2400
1000 1400

1500 2000
1800 2400
0 50


Above 1500

1200 1500
1000 1200

800 1000

1000 1500
500 800

Above 1000
800 1200
900 1200


high potential area
medium potential area
low potential area


Source: Njogu Njeru


REFERENCES:

Allard, R.W., "Principles of Plant Breeding" John Wiley & Sons, Inc.;
Third Printing, 1966, pp. 303-321.

Gerhart, John,"Diffusion of Hybrid Maize in Western Kenya, CIMMYT,
1975.

Sprague, G.F.,"The Development of Hybrid Corn Technology in the
LU.S. and Selected Countries", AID Technical Services Bulletin
No. 16, 3/75.

Njeru, Njogu, "Fifteen Years of Maize Agronomy Research, What
Dividends?", Unpublished Paper, June 1979, pp. 9-10.

Maize Handbock, Kenya Seed Co. Inc., Kitale, Kenya, 3/1979.

Nda-nuke, F.M., "A Coordinated Approach to Maize Production",
Unpublished paper, 11/1979.

Darrah, L.L., "Repcrt of a Technical Consultation in Kenya, 9
September 2 October 1978, Unpublished paper, USDA/SEA/AR.


-40-


Area





-4:-




PERS ON CSON:ACrD


Timothy Aldincion, Haarvar
Institute for International Development, Nairobi

Eugene N. Babb, Deputy
Assistant Admiinistrator
Development Support Bureau

Carolyn Barnes
REDSO/EA

Capt. E.K. Belsci
Chairman, KNFU, Nairobi

David Brokensha, Director
Social Process Research Institute
Univ. of Calif. at Santa Barbara

Preston Chitere, Assistant Lecturer
Sociology Department
University of Nairobi

John Cohen, Harvard
Institution for International Development
Nairobi

Laurie Cohen
University of Wisconsin Study Team

Michael Collinson, CI2MMYT
Agricultural Economist at ILRAD

David Court, Rockefeller Foundation
Nairobi

David Christenson, Deputy Agriculture Officer
USAID/Kenya

L.L. Darrah, U.S. Department of Agriculture

Kenneth W. EubaJks, Acriculture Officer
USAID/Kenya






David Feldman, Harvard
institute for International Development
Nairobi

Elsie Garfield, Research Associate
Institute for Develcoment Studies
University of Nairobi

John Gerhart
Ford Foundation, Nairobi

Ned Greeley, Anthrooologist
RZrSO/EA, Nairobi

Michael Harrison
Former Kenya Maize Research Coordinator at Kitale

Paul Harvey
U.S. Department of Acriculture

Charles Hash, Agriculture Project Manager
USAID/Kenya

Angelique Haugerud, Research Associate
Institute for Development Studies
University of Nairobi

E.J.R. Hazelden, Commercial Director
Kenya Seed Company, Kitale, Kenya

Allison B. Herrick, Deputy Director
USAID/Kenya

Fred Holmes, Agriculture Adviser
USAID/Kenya

Peter Hopcraft, former Director
Institute for Development Studies
University of Nairobi

Harold Jones
Office of Develcoment Resources
Africa Bureau, AID

Mr. Kekwaye
Kenya Farmers Association, Nakuru

Thomas Kerr, Harvard
Institute for International Development
Nairobi

G.M. Kimani, Assistant Director of Acriculture Research








P.K. Kusewa, Officer-In-Charge
National Agriculture Research Station
Ki-ale, Kenya

William Lefes, Procram Officer
USAID/Kenya

Alexander R. Love, Director
REDSO/EA

Ani:a Mackie, Agricultural Economist
PRDSO/EA

M.L. Macumba, Chief
Storage Division
Maize and Produce Board

Mr. Maina, Financial Director
Kenya Farmers Association
Nakuru, Kenya

B.N. Majisu, Chief
Scientific Officer
Ministry of Agriculture, Nairobi

A.M. Marimi, Officer-In-Charge
Agriculture Research Station
Katumani, Kenya

E.K. Mureithi, Assistant Director for Extension
Ministry of Agriculture, Nairobi

Mr. Mwenda, Officer-In-Charce
Agriculture Research Station
Embu, Kenya

Donald McCleland, Program Economist
USAID/Kenya

Shem Migot-Adholla, Assistant Director
Institute for Development Studies
University of Nairobi

Peter Moock, Professor
Depar-ment of Economics, Teacher's College
Columbia University











Jon Moris
Utah State University

D.M. Mosera
Maize and Produce Board
Kitale, Kenya

?.J. Mctanya, Manager
Productions and Marketing
Kenya Seed Company, Kitale, Kenya

Robert Muscat
International Development CooDeration Administration
Washington, D.C.

W.M. Mwance
Department of Agricultural Economics
University of Nairobi

F.M. Ndambuki, Maize Breeder
National Agriculture Research Station
Kitale, Kenya

Prof. Jonathan Na'weno
Ministry of Water, Nairobi

'Haven North, Deputy Assistant Administrator
Africa Bureau, A.I.D.

A.D. Olang, Maize Agronomist
National Agriculture Research Station
Kitale, Kenya

Douglas Paterson, Research Associate
Institute for Development Studies
University of Nairobi

Carl H. Penndorf, Program Economist
USAID/Kenya

Dale Pfeiffer, Office of Eastern African Affairs
AID

Felix Pinto
Nairobi








-45-


Barr- Riley
Office of Developmen- Planning
Africa Bureau, A.I.D.

Glenwood P. Roane, Director
USAID/Kenya

Wilbur Scarborough, Agriculture Research Advisor
USA~D/Kenya

H. Schmidt, Farm Management and Economics Advisor
Ministry of Agriculture
Nairobi

Satish Shah, Project Officer
USAID/Kenya

David Smock
Ford Foundation, Nairobi

Helen Soos, Assistant Program Officer
REDSO/EA

George T. Sprague
U.S. Department of Agriculture (retired)

Roy Stacy
Office of Development Planning
Africa Bureau, A.I.D.

Kathleen Staudt, Social Science Analyst
AID/W

John Thomas, Harvard
Institute for International Development
Nairobi

Mr. Wafula, Managing Director
KFA, Nakuru

Dr. Wancati
Kenya Agriculture Research Institute
Muguga, Kenya

J.M. Wauna, Depot Manager
Maize and Produce Board
Ki-ale, Kenya








-46-


.:.. Waweru
executive Dire-tcr
:KU, Nakuru

Zd~ar Winans, ?ro'esscr
Department of Aof .ropo.oav
Unlveristv of Washingto~, Seattle









APPENDIX E



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-48-


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-49-


David Dichter and Associates, "Reducing Post-Earvest Grain Storace
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-50-








L-


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Pacer No. 360, 1979.

Scie, Grant M., investmentt in International A ricu'lt al
Research: Some Economic D menslon." World BaSak S a
Wcrkinc Pacer No. 361, October, 1979.

Siecfried Schonherr and Erastus S. Mbuu, "New Extenso co
to S reaCd u Di -f: us on of Acricult-rur -- I va..."-' e -
Discussion aer N. 2C, May 17-.

E-e-- -- r'"c.. "escurce -ccaic-, -cme 3=di, tr,--59n

Pacer No. ~E, 196.











-54-






Spracue, G.F., "The Developmen:t of H'brid Corn Technolovg in
the United States and Selected Countries", A.I.D., March,
1975.

Staudt, Kathleen, "Inequities in the Delivery of Services to a
Female Farm Clientele: Some -mplications for Policy",
I.D.S. Discussion Paper No. 247, 1977.

Streeter, Carroll P., "Reaching the Developinc World's Small
Farmers", Rockefeller Foundation, 1972.

Tramman, Christopher, "Chance in Administrative Structure: A Case
Study of Kenyan Agricultural Development", Overseas Develop-
ment Institute, London U.K., 1974.

CUNP/ILO, "ZmploIyent, Incomes and Equality". ILO Geneva, 1972.

USA-D Kenya, "Acricultural Systems Sucport Project (Project
Paper)", 6-5-78. (No. 615-0169).

USAID Kenya, Development Assistance Plan, 214 pp., October 1974.

USAID Kenya, Development Assistance Plan Supplement (Agriculture),
pp. 84 plus annexes, June 1975.

USAID Kenya, Corn in Kenya, (A.I.D. Spring Review of New Cereal
Varieties), May 1969.

USAID Kenya, Drvland Cropping Systems Research Project Paper,
Project No. 615-0180, May 1979.

U.S. Depar=-ent of Agriculture, "-ndices of Acricultural Pro-
duction in Africa and the Near East, 1967-76", Economic
Research Servce No. 572, June 1977.

U.S. Decar-Tmenr of Acricul-ure, "The World Food Situation and
Prospec-s to 1985", Repcr- No. 98, December 1974.

Von Pisch.ke, J.D.,Far. Credit in Kenya: The Cor Farer Paradox,
Vcl. 2, Ins-='. r :evelopmen-: Sud.es, 0 Se-a-er, 1973.

Weasel, Pe-er, "Leessons frcm the Special R.ura-l -v-elc.n-
pi5 -- r m 5 m a- :. 1'3--, T6.













Weisel Pe-er, "The Vihiaa Maize Credi' 4 rozram.' Mimeo, 1972.

World Bank, Re,-va: E-coorc Memorand,= Progress Unaer the
Thirc Develozmert Plan, 1974-7E8 Introduticr to the Fourt:
Development Plan, 1979-83, march 1979, Renort 2441 K-.

World 3Ban, "Kenya; Econcrric Mernrand=ir", March 1979.










-AN-





























COP EEOND~NCS AND DOCUYN~~NTAT O








UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION AGENCY
AGENCY F.OR iNTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
WASHINGTON D C 2C523


OCT 24 1379

THE AO;.,NISTRATOR


M'EM.OPRDUM FOR T=E EXECUTIVE STAFF

SUBJECT: Project Impact Evaluation


I attach high priority to establishing an ex post facto
project evaluation process that will:

furnish information we need for designing future
projects;

enhance policy and program planning;

encourage project managers to get lasting results;
and

contribute to training and broadening AID staff.

Rather than relying on massive, expensive, in-depth,
academic studies performed by outside specialists, I
want to build an in-house capacity to evaluate our work
on a regular basis and to produce simple reports which
will be of use primarily to us, but also to our host
countries, the larger development community, and the
Congress.

As the first step in establishing a continuing system for
project impact evaluation, 20-30 projects will be evaluated
for impact over the next 12 months, with as many as feasible
being completed in the early part of that period. These
evaluations will be concentrated in a few representative
sectors, using comparable scopes to ensure cumulative
results, and concluding with a summary evaluation for the
sector.

The success of this effort will depend on the people involved.
Evaluation team leaders will be selected from among the
Agency's top talent. Teams will consist of approximately
3 members each representative of different disciplines
and regional backgcrunds. While comprised mostly of AID
direct-hire staff, drawn on an Agency-wide basis, the
teams should, where desirable, include host country and
outside contract professionals. Team leaders will be
assigned to projects that are generally outside their own
regional bureaus to ensure both the fact and appeaance
of objectivity. Membership on an evaluation team should












Page 2.


provide a stimulating opportunity for learning and for
career development.

The projects to be evaluated will be those that have
terminated during the previous 12-18 months or where
substantial portions of the activity have been completed.
Evaluations will generally require 2-3 weeks or less in
the host country, with perhaps an additional week or
preparation and completion of the report. All evaluations
must be written in clear, concise, simple language to
enhance the chances that they will be used. Ma-imum
length should be about 15 paces, with such annexes as
necessary for purpose or iiustration. Photos are welcome.
Anecdotal beneficiary reactions should be included where
appropriate to give a sense of local community feelings
with respect to impact.

Evaluations must report on impact, as opposed to simply
reporting effectiveness or success in delivering inputs.
While baseline data will not be available for most projects,
we assume that the best people in AID, even in the absence
of sophisticated statistics, can report sound and useful
impressic-s. We must be prepared to realize tna- tnis
exer-se will not yield scientifically precise (or even
consistent) results, but I believe it will offer us much
that is useful.

The bureaus have been asked to identify potential team
leaders. PPC, in consultation with the bureaus, will
identify projects to be evaluated. PPC will review scopes
of work, prepare guidance on core issues, nominate team
leaders and assemble teams with an Agency-wide perspective,
and review the final reports (which I will then read)
PPC will also provide appropriate, concise evaluation
orientation and collect all necessary background materials
for each evaluation. The other concerned bureaus will each
identify a special coordinator and assist in selecting
projects, preparing background materials, and insuring
mission and field support.

I recognize that over and beyond this process, individual
regions and missions will continue to conduct a variety
of evaluations of different types for their own internal
management pur-oses. To ensure that we have one central
\info ...r point for AID evaluations, all Agency evalua-
tion plans and completed reports should be shared with
PPC, even in cases where coordination is being provided
elsewhere.













Page 3.


In concluding, I want to emphasize my commitment to an
on-going, objective, intellectually stimulating evaluation
process that can help those of us who participate in it
and those of us who must make decisions based on its
results. This need not be just another bureaucratic
exercise; it can help us get to the heart of what AID
can do for the countries and peoples with whom we work.
I look forward to your wholehearted cooperation and to
being personally involved as we proceed.







,- p -- L -L c : - -
- -. ---'


ii 1~253ED -6.


201b2?Z OCT 9 .


- UN.CLAZS.S:F;___zl--i.-- .;_; -------


PPC/E
10/29/7
PPC/E


A/AID:JGSOMIER -{SUBST
AA/AFR {INFO}
AA/ASIA CINFO


AA/LAC {INFO}
AA/NE -INFO}
MP/DPC: FALLEN


3G ACTION PPCE CHRON 6 8 INFO AAAF AFEM AFEA AFSA AFCA AFCW AFDP AFHN
AFHA AFDR AAAS ASEM ASPTASSP ASSI ASPN ASDP AALA LACA LAEM LACE
ROUTINE AIDE, GENEVA, LAGOS, PARIS, ROME


AIDAC, GUATEMALA FOR SAID AND ROCAP, KARACHI FOR AAG ANDIIS,
RJB1
SE.O. 11652: N/A RJB/

NAIROBI FOR SAID AND REDSO/EA, PARIS FOR UNESCO AND

SUBJECT: PROJECT IMPACT EVALUATION
USOECD, ROME ALSO FOR AID OFFICE FRIULI
S1. BELOW IS A MEMORANDUM FROM THE ADMINISTRATOR TO THE
EXECUTIVE STAFF DATED OCTOBER 24, 1979. IT IS THE CULMINA-
TION OF DISCUSSIONS IN AID/W STARTED EARLIER THIS YEAR AND
INVOLVING ALL ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATORS, THE PROGRAM SET
FORTH BELOW HAS ALREADY COMMENCED AND WILL INVOLVE A LARGE
NUMBER OF FIELD POSTS THIS YEAR AND EVENTUALLY ALL PROGRAMS.
THE ADMINISTRATOR'S DECISION MEMORANDUM IS AS FOLLOWS:

QUOTE: I ATTACH HIGH PRIORITY TO ESTABLISHING AN EX POST
FACT~O PROJECT EVALUATION PROCESS THAT WILL:
FURNISH INFORMATION WE NEED FOR DESIGNING FUTURE PRO-
JECTS;
ENHANCE POLICY AND PROGRAM PLANNING;
ENCOURAGE PROJECT MANAGERS TO GET LASTING RESULTS;
AND
CONTRIBUTE TO TRAINING AND BROADENING AID STAFF.


RATHER THAN RELYING ON MASSIVE, EXPENSIVE, IN-DEPTH,
ACADEMIC STUDIES PERFORMED BY OUTSIDE SPECIALISTS, I WANT
TO BUILD AN IN-HOUSE CAPACITY TO EVALUATE OUR WORK ON A
REGULAR BASIS AND TO PRODUCE SIMPLE REPORTS WHICH WILL BE
OF USE PRIMARILY TO US, BUT ALSO TO OUR HOST COUNTRIES, THE
LARGER DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY, AND THE CONGRESS.
UNCL ASSIFIED


RJBERG
RJBERG
`Rd ERlG


RJBERG
20211
RJBERG


- -


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I-----~-- .-,r-,~~ -


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S-








C;i 3ITEE L E G R ANJi


__


S2 -


UNCLASSIFIED


AS THE FIRST STEP IN ESTABLISHING A CONTINUING SYSTEM FOR
PROJECT IMPACT EVALUATION, 20-30 PROJECTS WILL BE EVALUATED-
FOR IMPACT OVER THE NEXT 12 MONTHS, WITH AS MANV AS FEASI-
BLE BEING COMPLETED IN THE EARLY PART OF THAT PERIOD.
THESE EVAULATIONS WILL BE CONCENTRATED IN A FEW REPRESENTA-
TIVE SECTORS, USING COMPARABLE SCOPES TO ENSURE CUMULATIVE-
-RESULTS, AND CONCLUDING WITH A SUMMARY EVALUATION FOR THE
SECTOR.

THE SUCCESS OF THIS EFFORT WILL DEPEND ON THE PEOPLE IN-
VOLVED. EVALUATION TEAM LEADERS WILL BE SELECTED FROM
AMONG THE AGENCY'S TOP TALENT. TEAMS WILL CONSIST OF
APPROXIMATELY 3 MEMBERS EACH REPRESENTATIVE OF DIFFERENT
DISCIPLINES AND REGIONAL BACKGROUNDS. WHILE COMPRISED
MOSTLY OF AID DIRECT-HIRE STAFF, DRAWN ON AN AGENCY-WIDE
BASIS, THE TEAMS SHOULD, WHERE DESIRABLE, INCLUDE HOST
COUNTRY AND OUTSIDE CONTRACT PROFESSIONALS. TEAM LEADERS
WILL BE ASSIGNED TO PROJECTS THAT ARE GENERALLY OUTSIDE
THEIR OWN REGIONAL BUREAUS TO ENSURE BOTH THE FACT AND
APPEARANCE OF OBJECTIVITY. MEMBERSHIP ON AN EVALUATION
TEAM SHOULD PROVIDE A STIMULATING OPPORTUNITY FOR LEARNING
AND FOR CAREER DEVELOPMENT.

THE PROJECTS TO BE EVALUATED WILL BE THOSE THAT HAVE TERMI-
NATED DURING THE PREVIOUS 12-18 MONTHS OR WHERE SUBSTANTIAL
PORTIONS OF THE ACTIVITY HAVE BEEN COMPLETED. EVALUATIONS
WILL GENERALLY REQUIRE 2-3 WEEKS OR LESS IN THE HOST
COUNTRY, WITH PERHAPS AN ADDITIONAL WEEK FOR PREPARATION
AND COMPLETION OF THE REPORT. ALL EVALUATIONS MUST BE
WRITTEN IN CLEAR, CONCISE, SIMPLE LANGUAGE TO ENHANCE THE
CHANCES THAT THEY WILL BE USED. MAXIMUM LENGTH SHOULD BE
ABOUT 15 PAGES, WITH SUCH ANNEXES AS NECESSARY FOR PURPOSE
OF ILLUSTRATION. PHOTOS ARE WELCOME. ANECDOTAL BENEFI-
CIARY REACTIONS SHOULD BE INCLUDED WHERE APPROPRIATE TO
GIVE A SENSE OF LOCAL COMMUNITY FEELINGS WITH RESPECT TO
IMPACT.

EVALUATIONS MUST REPORT ON IMPACT, AS OPPOSED TO SIMPLY
REPORTING EFFECTIVENESS OR SUCCESS IN DELIVERING INPUTS.
WHILE BASELINE DATA WILL NOT BE AVAILABLE FOR MOST PRO-
JECTS, WE ASSUME THAT THE BEST PEOPLE IN AID, EVEN IN THE
ABSENCE OF SOPHISTICATED STATISTICS, CAN REPORT SOUND AND
USEFUL IMPRESSIONS. WE MUST BE PREPARED TO REALIZE THAT
THIS EXERCISE WILL NOT YIELD SCIENTIFICALLY PRECISE {OR
EVEN CONSISTENT} RESULTS, BUT I BELIEVE IT WILL OFFER US
MUCH THAT IS USEFUL.

THE BUREAUS HAVE BEEN ASKED TO IDENTIFY POTENTIAL TEAM
LEADERS. PPC, IN CONSULTATION WITH THE BUREAUS, WILL
IDENTIFY PROJECTS TO BE EVALUATED. PPC WILL REVIEW SCOPES
,OF WORK, PREPARE GUIDANCE ON CORE ISSUES, NOMINATE TEAM


-J1:; ;~~X' 135-. ;
-o-m- 353f- rr








I!-' _- i '-7 C : - -- .~


_ - -- I*_- -
7UNCLASSIFL f ___ ___ _---r-= --


LEADERS AND ASSEMBLE TEAMS WITH AN AGENCY-WIDE PERSPECTIVE,'
AND REVIEW THE FINAL REPORTS WHICH I WILL THEN READ}. PPC(
WILL ALSO PROVIDE APPROPRIATE, CONCISE EVALUATION ORIENTA-
.TION AND COLLECT ALL NECESSARY BACKGROUND MATERIALS FOR
EACH EVALUATION. THE OTHER CONCERNED BUREAUS WILL EACH
IDENTIFY A SPECIAL COORDINATOR AND ASSIST IN SELECTING PRO-
JECTS, PREPARING BACKGROUND MATERIALS, AND INSURING MISSION
*AND FIELD SUPPORT.

;I RECOGNIZE THAT OVER AND BEYOND THIS PROCESS, INDIVIDUAL
:REGIONS AND MISSIONS WILL CONTINUE TO CONDUCT A VARIETY OF
EVALUATIONS OF DIFFERENT TYPES FOR THEIR OWN INTERNAL
MANAGEMENT PURPOSES. TO ENSURE THAT WE HAVE ONE CENTRAL
.INFORMATION POINT FOR AID EVALUATIONS, *~- ALL AGENCY
EVALUATION PLANS AND COMPLETED REPORTS SHOULD BE SHARED
WITH PPC, EVEN IN CASES WHERE COORDINATION IS BEING PRO-
VIDED ELSEWHERE.

IN CONCLUDING, I WANT TO EMPHASIZE MY COMMITMENT TO AN
ON-GOING, OBJECTIVE, INTELLECTUALLY STIMULATING EVALUATION
PROCESS THAT CAN HELP THOSE OF US WHO PARTICIPATE IN IT AND
THOSE OF US WHO MUST MAKE DECISIONS BASED ON ITS RESULTS.
THIS NEED NOT BE JUST ANOTHER BUREAUCRATIC EXERCISE; IT
CAN HELP US GET TO THE HEART OF WHAT AID CAN DO FOR THE
COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES WITH WHOM WE WORK. I LOOK FORWARD TO
YOUR WHOLEHEARTED COOPERATION AND TO BEING PERSONALLY
INVOLVED AS WE PROCEED. DOUGLAS J. BENNET, JR. UNQUOTE.
YY





















S-..- .... -2 _-l. ;- -. ~UNCLASSIFIED






























*-a


253205
LASA LACO LADPLADR AANE NEDP NEPD NETC NEEI NENA NEP? AAFC PPCE
PPDR PPEM IA IIA IDCA IG MP RS SMO FM ASPD ASTR AADS CGST CTR
DIU OM PIA IT PERS ES SER AAID 39E-.






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DESIREL DISTRIBUTION


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IA IIA IDCA IG MP RS SMO FM ASPD ASTR AADS CMGT CTR DIU OM PIA IT PERS

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iU.cLASr Sl'tS I FOUTGO iN

Department o State TELEGRAM
a- e L lE "r, J


PAGE Z: OF 8: :TATE 73;;53
ORIiIN al-Ti


6736


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-----------1116S5 T83221 /34
Pr n3JI1: S!OV 7
FnM lY STATE VASHDC
TO A&P.I,:ST NAIOP.OI PRIORITY

UICLAS STATE 57233

AI:A

E.C. et201. n/A

TAGS:

SUBJECT: AID IlIPAT EVALUATION KITALE MAIZE

1. SUi JRY. AFT 'REU PRCP:EP KITALE MAIZE AS Al: APPRO-
PRIATE SUE;E:T FOR C:IE OF THE ;?.:T AID IMPACT EVALUATIONS.
MESSAGE REPORTS C; THE CD.P::O:TI:; S; THE A;C EVALUATION
TlEf,, TEE CtA": STUDY CZEIG, INITIAL THIilRINE; REGARDIIIG
IH-'J!ITRY CALLS -:::3; T;Ri'EL F E';AL"'iICII A;RK TO BEGIN
NCVtPSER 1S :; : T0 E. :Err:E"sER AID/w REQUESTS MISSION
C'iClERRECE FtR THIS ':;E;.:, ;':;,u cs Er.ETS ID0 SUGGES-
TI'NS WITH I`E:=ET TO :TU;f DESIGll, CALLS, I;n MISSIONO SUP-
PORT. ECO SU."."iRY.

I. PURPOSE. SEPTEL REPCR'ZR TUE ACT"IrISTIATS' InITITIV
CONCER.CinI; Il?:CT EV;LU;TIDC::. 'HE AFr CUREAU :USGESTE T'HE
CDOPLEX OF ACT'!ITIE: F;R T:IE ;E':ELSZP.E'T ArIC ;IFFUSI C"
XITALE MtIZE WVULD BE .VA ;FF:-"?PATE U'S E:T FCA THE FIRST
PHASE C; EVALUA:TIC'1" '.4l: IR: ::,iEAULED TO EE OEIE BY
DECEMEi? 31, 1I75. TiE ?PUt:E ;F T!: r.ET:: E i: TE RE'ORT
AID/V'S PRE';':;: T: :'TE :;; :T s r-. *-.-. ;r.-

TAH

3. EVALUATION TEA". r THER TO lAID'S DECISIONS, AN

EVALUATIEC T;EA" AS S:C:: -:LE:T::. THE TEA, LEADER !S
CHARLES W. O?'E:::;, :HIE': F THE PFRGRAM "IVISIOC
A;IA/IP :I3D TC'EL:: ":v r7? ;rICETr In BA'IGLA:E3h.
THE AGRC':^iC'T II .EITK t. tEYEc, CHIEI THE! F:CD
CROP: DIVIS:,:: :, S/AC AEI FC'E;C'"iLY F: D EC ;GRI-
CULTURE :FF I:ER ;K ::: I%;: :I: 135: -T 157E, TiE
POLITICAL S ;;E';TIST IS GA:' .:::E *A:, -S? : .AL
ASISE:7:T TC /A::.. 7C. D, :SX 'I' "UGAT AT E'.LISIA
U. A;l: IT I ;CA".R e; LS'~C4T I.'C Ct:R N It. THE
eIG'!:VLT;'. E::':;C IT '"7 :: ; : I. : ^; :C :S
SEVERAL YEAT, ..... ..' T '..IEE:; V:E:_:- iN

. - . .

THE TE ,: .^ .. T? ED ?. E 7 ; ;.KTSS'; ; A I
AFR/?T ; iG .n.


STAIE 2l:33 "- - -. -


4. IMPACT EVALUATION STU'CT DESIGN. THE TEAM HAS REA:
THE P OJE'T 3O:LCU'ETATION AV-:L;LEE IN AI0/V -;OF THE
IARICA-WIDE, REGIONAL ANO SILiTERAL PROJECTS WIICH
ADDRESS ELEME.'TE O3 KITALE I A.:L AS -ELL AS THE 196S
SPRING REVIEv ".ATERIAL.. A RESEARCH OF THE LITERATURE
IS UNDERWAY Ali; INTERVIEvS HAVE EE!;: SE UP HERE WITH
EXPERTS SU:CH 1 L. DARRA1. AIC G. "PRAGUE. WILE THE
TEAM' REVIEW OF DACUMENTTiSTli S FUR FRS: CO"*PLETE
THEY HAVE DRAFTED A PELE In;:ARY S:tYT 3ESI REPEATED:
IELOW FTR USAID/K~' iNllCRMATION ANDI :CMENT.

- A. ASSEMELE BASIC DATA FOR THE PROJE:TS: TITLES,
- NUMBERS, FUNDING, IPLEnENTATI0:1 SPAh,. ETC.

- 1. OESCRIBE THE PHENOMEIION OF CUOTE KITALE MAIZE
- UNQUOTE -- A C:'PLEX :r PROjECTS, SUPPORT' Sr
- SEVERAL CONORS, OVER THE LAST SIXTEHE : 'ORE YEARS.

- C. EXAMINE AND ANALYE NTHE LIlKAGES AMCNG AGRI-
* CIUTURAL RESEAR:Y, EXTrStIICl: A::; F;A;' EVE' UTIi-
- ZATIOIIS WHICn MAVE ArFF:TEC THE DEELO'EHVT :10
- DIFFUSION C; KITAL! MALE. BREEI ; !G E; IMPR;IEO
- PLANTING .:TERIAL: t;:: THE !E'ELOP"E.NT OF ;l*:CED
- CROPPING PRACTI CES A;: :*E. IMPROVE: STORAGE ANDl
- PROC.ESI:G TE:N!:LiCGIES GENERALLY E::::"~;AS "E
- RuA;E OF CC:I:ER:: ;CGRI:;LTURlAL ;:ESEACH SiATiICI:.
- FIEi: TESTI: lHE TE:XI::LOGI:AL I:%P:CVEt.ENTS; I
- CENTRAL TO THE! PRtCS:;-: -:0D '0 T'E EVALUATICTI O0
- TREIR POTENTIAL CE:;Ti;EUTi;::; TO PCEDUCTIC': I:::EI ES.
- HOWEVER, DISSErNTATICl: CF THE FLAHIII:; nI TERI;LS,
- CROfPING IET .CTOE A TECMIIDLCSIES FOR STORA;E AIt
- FROCESSI; n UST FOLLOW THE TESTING PHA:ES IF wiDE

- SPREAD PRCEUCTIOR IS TO BE ACHIEVE:. FARKERE,: 'ST E
- CAPAELE 0; ;:..EIIInIG HE IE .E'MATERIAL: :IC 'IIFO;-
- NATION IN THEIR PRODUCTICIN EIVIR !:I'E iT. INCREASED
- PRO.'CTICGI MAY OLY ECE SUSTAII;ED OVER TI"': IF THE
- PRODUCE CA: EE M;AY.ETIC AT Ai 'EraivhETIVE PRICE ;iN
- IF THE FINAL CO;s'MPTIOI OF THE ;,RMIlG HOU'E;LCD
- IS POSITIVELY AFFECTED. IT !: BELIEVED FARiERS: ILL
- NOT SACRA:ICE :ATISFA;;TIOn OF FOTD 1EEDS FOR THE USE
SOF A HE' TECHNOLOGY.

- D. MEASURE, TO THE EXTENT PCESIBLE, THE DEVELOPMESTAL
- IMPACT OF KM.

S (1) ECC::ILMT: ID SOCIAL 'HANGE OVER TIr'E: tr-
CIUTRAL PRC:U:TIVITY 'RE Y!EnI:! Anf CRO"'MIC
PATTEPU ; C!S'ET:;::i CF THE TE;Cl.'C ; 'VIT1'1"! E'lY;
i* flnrst AND EMPLCO.ENiI; ;:E:S ; T;HE TE;H;iiL;(;
S SMALL HOLDER CG!lu'IJ; Ti;O :' LA;ic JSE, OW;IESHI'I;
DEMOGRAOPMIC CHAII;E; RURA, E'ITERPRI:E; hC"'=:MLC
E* REHnITURE.

S () KM'S IMFTAT C1 P '.ITICAL PARTICIPATION, PUEL!:
S POL ICY A.D AiO.I:ISTRATI;N.

E- ANALYZE THE AYI!TE'N:'I:E E ;: RE?. i :.T; C OF KITALL.
- MIIE LIHNCUDINC EL:E'HrER ;N E. ;FRI:L .

- F. IDE'IT'IY THE rE' FTASTRS A t:OIATED V1TH THE
* ,UC;ES3/FAILLTE EF !TALE "T;'a.

- A. 'ESTICJ : TC EE :E:'TEEE S ST*E T:A' EF N'.EE::';E
L- EAr"E E. T SEI :ED: '. TH
LEEANiE: iT; .ME .: E :-'E :': '.Er' :f :::tLL
F 'I I ',ZlE ;E -S: -Z l. :ES': .
PLACnE:E ", THE E.,E : mI; E:; ;ii*CE:;"'i, .LL


UNLESS IF IED


.









q -


PAGE 2 CT: STATE :173C3


U !"LA S IF I-D

Departmerzt of State

STATE 2E732E


OLT ^n '

TELE E RA


- FAR!E!R *ROD':TION ADO C:N::'-?TiON: THE REALISM THE
- FIELC TEITIIN MECHArlIO- THE !7IC;A;Y AND EF7!F;E;Y
* OF THE EEtAihi:0S FOR O1T;:TliINATNl! RESEARCH PS:RUCTS:
- Il:TITUTIONAL EFFORT: T AS::'RE SMALL tARMER AC;:E:S
- TO THE TECENLO.GY; AND THE .Ar: IN WHIC: THE IMPACT
S0 THE T HHE NEW NOLOGY UFPO :.,ALL FAMERE: I; BEING
*- MNIT;RE:

5. Ik-C=U;TRY REVIEW.

- A. THE TEAM VILL i ORM AND SE READY TC 'ORK IN NAIROBI
- ON MOlDAl, NOVEMBER i5 A:;. vl. :E"pL[TE ITS FIELD
- iORK BY FRIDAY, ECE'TER ;. T aE TEi" WILL LEAVE AN
- OUTLINE CT ITS FINDINGOiiG ITH THE MIn;s;Io: 7: C."TI.ENT

- BEFORE DEPARTURE. CXUCX; JOnSON VILL ARRIVE EARLIER,
- BY IVEMBER 11 (VIA PA iSar, TO PROVIDE CDOITIO:IAL
- tBAKGROCU:D IsFO TO THE MISSION ArI;D TO C:ISLLT WITH
- MIt rs I STAFF ON OTHER MATTER: 0; CONCEIR:, IIISLUOING
- LOCISTICA SUPPORT DIO:Z~f'- EELCV.

- !. CALLS AND TRAVELS: EtE' i !S KNO'.tI ABOUT THE
- EVALUATIC PRaCBLEM THAT Tw: TEAM BELIEVE IT WILL
S EEC TO VI;IT USUALLY Y C;T AS RUP)I THE F:LLC'JING
- INITITTUTIO"S: KITALE AGRIC'.T-UR R;EE;ARCH INSTITUTE
- AID OTHER MAiZE STATIONS A3 APPRORIATE; (.E'NA EED
- CCRLPAIN, KENYA FARrEi,; ASSO IATIO (, HEA'.;ATERS,
- DALGETY'S LTD., THE fMAtI! :;: PR:UJCE EAR:, KEiIYA
- [tEITSIC:: DIVISICTI (!!!CL:D!:; THE HOME ECONEMICT
- SECT0IOIN, THE l' HEAZOUA TER:, THE DEPRTrMET AD-
- Ir.IISTERIlNG THE QUCTE ;C;A::;ED T MINIIIuM .ETURIi UN-
- CUOTE E;EDIT SCHEME, KE:lY: ITEGRATED RURAL SURVEY
- I, THE CENIRAL BUREAU ;7 :TATI:TIS, THE C:A ;TA-
- TLST1IC DIVISION, ATIICNAL RESEARCH: :;;Ui:IL, INST1-
- LUTE CO DEVELCPMEFIT STUCiES, U.K.' C:.'" C'ICE, FORD
- :;3 RCCKEFELLER FCUI;CATI:: :E;REE f:T',;:, C!Mr.YT
- RiD IC;ISAT OFFICES. IN AOD;TIS;, THE TEA, INTENDS
- TO TRAVEL TC SETOWEN 3 r~L 5 ;!STRICTCS 'ICN APE
- REPRESENTATIVE OF HIGhLt;., !;; M:ERA;TE ELEVATIONS
- OH THE OC H1AND A:D LASRE AND Sr.ALL CCL;ER: CULTI-
- VATI:5 MAIZE ON THE CTHER. THE TE A VOUL 'WEL:OME
- ,lSTIC, C'PrME;NTS AND :T':ET:TIC:: RE;SARIFIG THE EBCVE.
- VERY ROUGHLY, OST CF T TTE;l E7-YE:T~ TO EE IN
- XAIROBI FOP THE FIRST FIVE .T IG DO:YS, FOLLO.E
- BY TRAV;'L TO FIELD ::TE; :::2 ?.TE:2F TO I:AIEOE! FOR
- THE LAST : DAYS EEi:CE E :'TU'T. THE TEA". IITEDCS
- TO L'VK ISIDEFEII:ENTLY ; 2, THEREFORE, MINIMIZE THE
- BURfEN C:; THE 1S;]Si5.

E. MtSIOS SUPPORT. THE TEAM .2''L2 tPRE:2AT HOIEVERY
THE MInSIC;'S HELP ALONG TiME FCLLCOING LIES;

- A. CEDSUALTATIOHS VITH M*SSICI :TIFF. THE TiEA VOUL
- APPRECIATE C:?P:RT;;;'::' T: :I::': THE SD:Y V:TM
- USAID PERE:::;E L '.HO -E ':::T EE DE 'N T-:I SUL':TAl-
- TIVE :; 'ETECD:LOGICAL ''.SLEt: RELATI:N TC THE
- EFFORT. LE -ULO HCPE T: '::TERViEV *rE V'O'I3 ':CE:T
- MUANASER!-) ^R THE TE '":'.".L;TE t"U":' TYsTET; 'ROJ-
- tET 2:: THE 3RYLAOI :;.' ?:;ZE ;RCh.REL:?.E;1 P?.O; E:T
- S V'.LL ;: ANY USAID :!"-;'37 SEL:T OL 'R;-':2 iiaL
- "eC HAV E E'EE -5;0LT' AE *- .T '. : *:.:'. n








- TP;: ;.E *L ':ia ,;ILL E U' Tr" "; Tr ; ".::Z:;;:; D';
* 0 .2VE L2-LCT22TET2:: E


- THIS PUR'SSI BY SEPTEL. TOUR TOTAL P0: ALLCE'ENT
- WILL E' AUGrETITE BY EL! S THOUSDMC ;9 US2E E0 Tr.
- TEAM. IN ADDOTICO, TEAT JILL APPRECIATE rIS:iC'Y
- KELP IN FIRING INTERPETERS. HOWEVER, THIs VILL :EE
- TO BE 0C:;i AFTER THE DISTRICTS ARE SELECTED ;!,LL: ,
- THE TEA WOULD LIKE TO HIRE :'IE RESEARCH AS::STANT
- TO OOLLE:: C3UME.ITS, CC-Y DOC*'J.ENT, :uli;Z ;UrERS
- ET: FO THE CURATIO:I OF THE TEAM'S :CYI. THESE
- SERVICES, AS VELL AS HY MIC:ELL.ANEClU LODINlS-
- TRATIVE CSiTS, SHOULD BE CHARGED C ThE 0;:2:!1:'S
- POS A:COUNT.

HOTEL RESERVATION. REQUEST :NE It::GLE FOR
- JCHISO; FOR PERIO:S HVEB.SER 1 THRU aD:OT!BER E: AEC
* THREE SINGLES FOR S11"O'S, FLEURET AtE t AgSSERMA
- FROC" OVEMBER 12 THRU NOVEMBERR 25 AT A HOTEL ::I-
- YEHIENT TO USAID AND .ITHil CURRENT PER ;IEM LIMIT.
- ASC REQUEST OUSBLE ROOM FOR IYERGO AT THE FAIRVIEH
- FOR PERIOD IOVEMEER 18 TO NOVEMBER 25.

7. TIE EVALUETIOn TEAM VOULD APPRECIATE T"! US;AS ':
COCMEHNTS ON A:' PART OF TiH ABOEC. RESCUE; ::UN;TRY
;LE:IxR:AE A:D CONFIRMATION CO HOTEL REiERVilI NS. :MRISTOPHER


UILLASS IF IE





12065


TASS:
SU.E-T:.


ACTION:



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DIST
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AE-EASSY/ TAIRO I


UTCLAS


ID Impact Evaluation Kitale 'Kaize


SECSTATE 'AS DC

IUNCLAS NAIRO13 -c-

AIDAC

REF: (A) State 283208, (B) State 237303

1. missionn welcomes Ref A and the implications that it

has for the Agency in lessons learned from prior invest-

ments. We looked forward to participating in impact

evaluations along with our Kenyan counterparts. ,e

believe that impact evaluation for AID financed projects

is overdue. 'e support the Agency's refined thrust in

this important area.

2. Ve must confess in all candor, however, that Ref B

was a bit of a shock to the Mission. Its timing is

unfortunate because (a) the bulk of the work on our

CDSS falls in this period, (b) the Mlission has two

agriculture consulting teams in country now, and (c)


PROG: ,SLefes: acs
CL EARN C
D/DI.: AEHerr ic:__
AC-.: DChristenson ----_-


DORA FTINS 0 TE TEL. EXT. i CONTEND TS/ C .A&rFICATION AP POVE. BY.
11/14/791 230 0 Glenwood P. ?Roane, DIP-. USAIL


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a sI

f it provides little scope for paricipaic-v by U51IS

officers and Kenyans. however, ve understand that

moving the evaluation even to December 1 is not

possible. Although it is late in the ga:e we

would like to convey to team members our cor_-.ents

on the evaluation design.

3. The evaluation design, para. 4, iRef E, indicates

that the team ,-ill assess a whole series of changes

over the 16 year period of the project. There is

risk in this approach, but as long as the evaluation

report flags the risk there should be no difficulty.

This approach, however, will necessitate the con-

struction of an appropriate project purpose state-

ment. The historical purpose statement is con-

siderably more circumscribed than what will now be

necessary. The issues of marketing and prices,

social changes over time, small holder consumption,

land use and ownership patterns, for instance, may

tend to be accidents of a project whose main thrust

Swas the institutionalization of an East African

research network. The causal linkages between these

changes and the maize project may be rather tenuous,

thus difficult to corroborate. ,e are hopeful,

therefore, that the tea- will be ready to discuss

with USA its perceived purpose of Kitale Maize


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project and i-pac indicators it purports to use

to measure achievement of purpose.

4. This leads us to query AID/T, about the rma eut

of the tear. As m=ize breeding was one of its

major thrusts, it appears that a plant breeder

should have been included, particularly as the

team is interested in analyzing linkages among

research, extension and field utilization. The

alternative appears to be a superficial overview,

an exercise that the Kenya Government may not find

useful based on recent conversations with the

Permanent Secretary for Economic Planning. The

Kenya -overnment is critical of USAID evaluations

because of their excessive demands on Kenyan

institutions and personnel with little apparent

benefits resulting to them either in training

Kenyans or providing reliable results for future

use. Kenyans view evaluation as opportunities for

interchange between U.S. and their scientists.

They may.well view the make up of the teas with

some question, particularly as the chief of crop

research is a senior plant breeder who understands

the complex problems associated with plant breeding

and prcparation efforts. Te mention this only to




-UNCLAS:I,:-D
C;ass:t: csnon Or-Ol AL OPM 'C _. i


S0152.;70









C:a s ii sli


solicit the team members' ,'oeration in aelioratin- Z

difficulties that rav arise.

5. Per rescues: to provide recommendations in a hotel

convenient to the USAID office, we have confirmed

rooms (reservations for three singles) in the 'ew7

Stanley, N.oveiber 18-25. Also per your request we.

have reserved a double room in the Fairview for

Byergo, November 1C to 25. (Room will not be

available until 6 p.m.)


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S DPARI P MLN' OF STATE NAIRlC3I K EN A
VW'ASH INGTON D C 20520


November 20, 1979



Permanent Secretary
Ministry of Agriculture
P.O. Box 30028
Nairobi

Permanent Secretary
Ministry of Economic Plannina
and Community Affairs
P.O. Box 30005
Nairobi

Gentlemen:

I am writing to inform you of AID/Washington's interest in
documenting the Kenya Government's well-known success in
breeding and diffusing hybrid maize. AID's interest is of
two kinds. First, while substantial economic resources
have been allocated to agriculture research around the
world, there are only a few cases where the resulting new
technology has been widely adopted by smallholders. It is
important to AID, as well as to the larger community of
donors and developing countries, to understand the condi-
tions and critical elements of these few successful pro-
grams. Second, AID was one of several donors who assisted
the maize research effort in Kenya. In this regard, the
U.S. Congress is interested to learn about the nature of
AID's involvement with hybrid maize. AD, therefore, would
very much like to provide the U.S. Congress with a defini-
tive report on Kitale Maize by December 31, 1979. To meet
this schedule, the AID/Wash.ington Evaluation Team will need
to begin now and complete its work in Kenya by December 7,
1979. I trust that you will acree with me -hat this is an
important endeavor even though, regrettably, the prepara-
tory time for this study is very short.

To these ends, a team of ex-erts has arrived in Nairobi
from 7 AD/Washi cn and clan to be in-coun ry about -:,ree
weeks, from the period ove mber 19 thru December 7. The













2 November 20, 1979



team proposes to identify the key factors which account
for the success of Kitale Maize, as follows:

1. To collect basic data about the various project
activities which relate to Kitale Maize;

2. To examine the linkages among agricultural research,
seed multiplication, agricultural extension, credit,
on-farm utilization, and marketing, as appropriate;

3. To document, to the extent feasible, the develop-
mental impact of the expanded production of Kitale
Maize including, inter alia, changes in agricultural
productivitV (area and yields) and cropping patterns,
diffusion of Kitale. Maize within Kenya and other
suitable areas in Africa, income and employment, im-
pact on smallholder consumption, etc.; and

4. To analyze the maintenance and replication of the
agriculture research process involved in Kitale Maize
including elsewhere in Eastern Africa.

The AID/Washington team is composed of the following persons:
C. Johnson, Team Leader, who has previously served with AID
in Ethiopia, Afghanistan and Bangladesh; K. Byergo, Chief of
the Food Crops Division in AID/Washington; E. Simmons, Agri-
cu ltural Economist formerly with the Institute for Agricul-
tural Research in Nigeria; Dr. P. Fleuret, Anthropologist
with field experience in East Africa agriculture; and Dr.
G. Wasserman who was a Fulbright scholar in Kenya.

The AID team and USAID/Kcnya would very much appreciate any
suggestions your Ministry might make about the content of
this review of Kitale Maize and, in particular, the insti-
tutions which should be visited and the knowledgeable
persons who 'should be consulted. We feel that the eeam
should visit the Icllowing important institutions in Kenya:
The Agricultural Research Institute, Kitale (and the sta-
tions at Muguga, Embu, Katumani); the Kenya Seed Company;
Kenya Farmers Association; the Maize and Produce Board; the
Central Bureau of Statistics; the Acriculture Extension
Division; and the newly formed Kenya Agriculture. Research
institute. In addition, the team would apreiate the
opportunmtv to travel to important maize growing districts












3 November 20, 1979



and to discuss the diffusion of Kizale Maize with appro-
priate Government of Kenya officials and other informed
persons.

The team is prepared to travel as individuals to conserve
their time. Naturally, the team and USAID/Kenya staff are
at your disposal to discuss any aspect of this letter.

Thank you for your consideration.

Sincerely yours,



Glenwood P. Roane


cc: Mr. Z.N. Nyaranco
Undersecretary
Office of the Vice President
and Ministry of Finance











\?~lt /
cj 2-


ic.grams: "MINAO", Nazrobi
Telepnoan: Naoobj 33 25&
Whnc rcpiying picam quote
RJ. .. .......... 6 A. ./. ..
nd date


MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE
KILIMO HOUSE
CATHEDRAL ROAD
P.O. Box 3002,S NAIROBI


TO WHCM IT MAY CONC ER


AID/Washington is currently documen=inc Kenya Governmenz's
success in breeding and diffusing hybrid maize. AID had
an input in the hybrid maize development and the documentation
that is beinc done will be of some irnerest to r.enva. This
note is meant to introduce the team members who are:-

C. Johnson Team Leader,

K. Syergo,

E. Simmons,

Dr. P. Fleuret,

Dr. G. Wasserman.

Please give them the assistance they need when they visit
your station.,











G.M. KIMANI
f- E .hA)JE; .ECRETAR











OPlIONAL FORM NO. 10
JULY 1*73 EDITION
GSA Wr"R Wi1 CrR) 101.11.
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

r0 : CJohnson,Ipact Team DAT: December 6,1979

I /
FROM : C?endorf,?ROG / *


SUBJECT: Ki:ali Maize Impact-Some Thoughts on Your Presentation



Many of the comments which follow may be unnecessary as they may be
covered in your final report.

As a general comment it would seem that your report should take a
"with and without" approach to Kitali maize.Or,what would have happened
had the maize not been introduesd.This approach is necessary if you are
to really assess the socio-economic impact,especially for the poor
smallholders,or smallholders in general.This approach would also put-
Gary's comment into perspective,"It bought the Government time".Would
the absence of Kitali maize have forced the Kenyatta government to take
any different policy measures or would we have in Kenya today the food
production situation found in Zambia and other places?


With regard to lessons learned, item E, what you are really saying is
that the GOK's policy should be to optimize maize production,not merely to
cry to balance supply and demand.In fact,the policy,sector wide,should be
to optimize production,given Kenya's resource endowments.Raving said all
this,how is it a lesson learned from the Kitali experience? While an
important point,it does appear to represent a tangent from an "impact"
assessment.

The lessons learned could be organized into technical lessons learned
and policy lessons learned.Since AID did not seem to contribute very much
to the Kitale story, the lessons learned should clearly identify areas
where future AID projects could intervene to permit another "`itale- ike
experience in Kenya with other crops or in other countries.




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