Front Cover
 Title Page
 Table of Contents
 List of Tables
 Acronyms and abbreviations
 Global economy
 Politics and policies
 Projected trends in supply and...
 Intellectual property law...
 Information technology and information...
 Strategy questions for CIMMYT
 Back Cover

Group Title: Global trends influencing CIMMYT's future : prepared by the Global Trends Task Force in support of strategic planning at CIMMYT
Title: Global trends influencing CIMMYT's future
Full Citation
Permanent Link: http://ufdc.ufl.edu/UF00077492/00001
 Material Information
Title: Global trends influencing CIMMYT's future
Physical Description: vi, 46 p. : ill. ; 28 cm.
Language: English
Creator: Brandon, Ed
Morris, Michael L
Publisher: CIMMYT
Place of Publication: Mexico?
Publication Date: c2003
Subject: Agriculture -- Research   ( lcsh )
Agricultural innovations   ( lcsh )
Genre: bibliography   ( marcgt )
non-fiction   ( marcgt )
Bibliography: Includes bibliographical references (p. 46).
Statement of Responsibility: prepared by the Global Trends Task Force in support of strategic planning at CIMMYT ; Ed Brandon ... et al. ; Michael Morris (Chair).
Funding: Electronic resources created as part of a prototype UF Institutional Repository and Faculty Papers project by the University of Florida.
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Bibliographic ID: UF00077492
Volume ID: VID00001
Source Institution: University of Florida
Holding Location: University of Florida
Rights Management: All rights reserved by the source institution and holding location.
Resource Identifier: oclc - 56072747
isbn - 9706481117


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Table of Contents
    Front Cover
        Front cover
    Title Page
        Page i
        Page ii
    Table of Contents
        Page iii
    List of Tables
        Page iv
    Acronyms and abbreviations
        Page v
        Page vi
        Page 1
        Page 2
        Page 3
        Page 4
        Page 5
        Page 6
        Page 7
        Page 8
        Page 9
        Page 10
        Page 11
        Page 12
        Page 13
        Page 14
        Page 15
        Page 16
        Page 17
    Global economy
        Page 18
        Page 19
        Page 20
    Politics and policies
        Page 21
        Page 22
        Page 23
        Page 24
        Page 25
        Page 26
    Projected trends in supply and demand of maize and wheat
        Page 27
        Page 28
        Page 29
        Page 30
        Page 31
        Page 32
        Page 33
        Page 34
    Intellectual property law and practice
        Page 35
        Page 36
        Page 37
        Page 38
        Page 39
        Page 40
    Information technology and information processing
        Page 41
        Page 42
        Page 43
    Strategy questions for CIMMYT
        Page 44
        Page 45
        Page 46
    Back Cover
        Back cover
Full Text

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Global Trends Influencing

CIMMYT's Future

Prepared by the Global Trends Task Force in

Strategic Planning at CIMMYT

Support of

Ed Brandon, Javier Ekboir, Janet Lauderdale,

Erika Meng, Michael Morris (Chair),

Shawn Sullivan, and David Watson*

All the authors were members of the Global Trends Task Force and were CIMMYT staff or
consultants at the time of writing the report.

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CIMMYT (www.cimmyt.org) is an internationally funded, non-profit, scientific research, training,
and development organization. CIMMYT serves as a catalyst and leader in a global innovation network
that changes people's lives for the better. Drawing on effective science and partnerships, CIMMYT
creates, shares, and uses knowledge and technology to improve the livelihoods of the world's poor
who depend on maize and wheat. CIMMYT is one of 16 food and environmental organizations known
as the Future Harvest Centers (www.futureharvest.org). Located around the world, the Future Harvest
Centers conduct research in partnership with farmers, scientists, and policymakers to help alleviate
poverty and increase food security while protecting natural resources. The Centers are supported by
the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) (www.cgiar.org), whose members
include nearly 60 countries, private foundations, and regional and international organizations. Financial
support for CIMMYTs research agenda also comes from many other sources, including foundations,
development banks, and public and private agencies.

C International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center (CIMMYT) 2003. All rights reserved. The opinions
expressed in this publication are the sole responsibility of the authors. The designations employed in
the presentation of materials in this publication do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever
on the part of CIMMYT or its contributory organizations concerning the legal status of any country,
territory, city, or area, or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.
CIMMYT encourages fair use of this material. Proper citation is requested.

Correct citation: CIMMYT (International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center). 2004. Global Trends
Influencing CIMMYTs Future. Prepared by the Global Trends Task Force in Support of Strategic Planning
at CIMMYT. Mexico, D.F.: CIMMYT.

Abstract: This publication reviews emerging challenges and opportunities in the scientific, economic,
social, and political context in which CIMMYT operates. Papers are presented on: demographics; welfare;
environment; global economy; politics and policies; projected trends in supply and demand of maize
and wheat; intellectual property law and practice; and information technology and information
processing. These are discussed in terms of CIMMYT's present work and future mission. A number of
strategic questions have been presented to encourage consideration and discussion on a range of
issues, such as the role of agricultural technology in alleviating poverty and the organization, targeting,
and focus of CIMMYTs work.

ISBN: 970-648-111-7
AGROVOC descriptors: Agricultural development; Development aims, policies, programmes;
Development plans; Planning; Right of access; Trends; Political systems;
Social policies; Economic policies; Partnerships; Research institutions;
Information processing; Technological changes
AGRIS category codes: E14 Development Economics and Policies
A50 Agricultural Research
Dewey decimal classification: 658.57

Printed in Mexico.

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Acronyms and Abbreviations
Chapter 1. Introduction
Chapter 2. Demographics
Chapter 3. Welfare
Chapter 4. Environment
Chapter 5. Global Economy
Chapter 6. Politics and Policies
Chapter 7. Projected Trends in Supply and Demand of Maize and Wheat
Chapter 8. Intellectual Property Law and Practice
Chapter 9. Information Technology and Information Processing
Chapter 10. Strategic Questions for CIMMYT

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Table 2.1.
Table 2.2.
Table 2.3.
Table 2.4.
Table 2.5.
Table 2.6.
Table 2.7.

Population statistics
Aging of the world population
Countries receiving highest percentages of GDP from remittances
Refugee status, end of 2000
Gender differences

9 Table 3.1. Malnutrition rates, coverage of vitamin A supplementation, and iodized
salt consumption
10 Table 3.2. Prevalence of undernourishment in developing countries and regions
10 Table 3.3. The 20 worst countries for child mortality
11 Table 3.4. Basic health indicators
12 Table 3.5. Global summary of the HIV/AIDS epidemic, December 2002
12 Table 3.6. Regional HIV/AIDS statistics and features, end of 2002
14 Table 3.7. Education statistics
15 Table 3.8. Importance of agriculture to the labor force

19 Table 5.1. Number of people living on less than US$ 1 per day
19 Table 5.2. Number of people living on less than US$ 2 per day

Table 7.1a.
Table 7.1b.
Table 7.2a.
Table 7.2b.

Utilization of maize, 1997-2020
Utilization of wheat, 1997-2020
Area, yield, production of maize, 1997-2020
Area, yield, production of wheat, 1997-2020

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Acronyms and abbreviations

APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
CBD Convention on Biological Diversity
CEE/CIS CEE: Central and Eastern Europe; CIS: Commonwealth of Independent States
CGIAR Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research
CO2 Carbon dioxide
DFID Department for International Development (UK)
DMCA Digital Millennium Copyright Act
EC15 Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom
EPC European Patent Convention
EPO European Patent Office
EU European Union
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FSU Former Soviet Union
FTAA Free Trade Area of the Americas
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GEF Global Environment Facility
GM, GMOs Genetically modified, genetically modified organisms
GNP Gross National Product
IARC(s) International agricultural research centers)
IDP Internally displaced persons
IFPRI International Food Policy Research Institute
IMF International Monetary Fund
IMPACT International Model for Policy Analysis of Agricultural Commodities and Trade
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
IP/IPR Intellectual Property/ Intellectual Property Rights
ISO International Organization for Standardization
IT Information technology
IWIS International Wheat Information System
LAN Local area network
MNC Multinational corporation
MTA Material transfer agreement
NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement
NGO(s) Non-governmental organizations)
ODA Overseas Development Assistance
PCT Patent Cooperation Treaty
PGRFA Plant genetic resources useful for food and agriculture
PSR Potential support ratio (number of persons aged 15 to 64 years per one older
person aged 65 years or older)

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Transnational corporations
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
United Nations Conference on Environment and
United Nations Development Programme
United Nations Environment Programme
United Nations Population Fund
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
United Nations Children's Fund
West Asia/North Africa
World Commission on Environment and Development
World Intellectual Property Organization
World Trade Organization

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CIMMYT embarked upon a major strategic planning
exercise in 2003 to reaffirm the continuing relevance of
the Center's mission, evaluate the effectiveness of the
Center's organizational structure and operating
modalities, and identify ways in which the Center may
want to reposition itself to improve its effectiveness over
the next 10-15 years. If CIMMYT is to fulfill its mandate,
clearly it will have to be able to respond to emerging
challenges and seize emerging opportunities in the
scientific, economic, social, and political environments.

To support strategic planning, six Task Forces were formed
to prepare background reports on topics of particular
1. Scenario Building
2. Global Trends
3. Science
4. Partnerships/Networks/Systems
5. Organizational Structure and Management
6. Fundraising

This report presents the findings of the Global Trends Task
Force. Thejob assigned to the Global Trends Task Force-
to examine likely future trends in factorsthat will impinge
on CIMMYT's mission-was in a sense different from the
jobs assigned to many of the other Task Forces. In most
cases, the work of the other Task Forces could be
accomplished through introspection and discussion,
drawing mainly on knowledge acquired by Task Force
members through direct experience. In contrast, the work
of the Global Trends Task Force required systematic
surveying of the current thinking by leading experts in a
number of specialized fields. This implied the need to
undertake a series of literature reviews.

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During a series of organizational meetings, members of
the Global Trends Task Force identified eight "themes"
or "contexts" that are likely to shape the environment
in which CIMMYT will operate:
1. Demographics
2. Welfare
3. Environment
4. Global Economy
5. Politics and Policies
6. Projected Trends in Supply and Demand of Maize and
7. Intellectual Property Law and Practice
8. Information Technology and Information Processing

This report is an assemblage of eight separate papers
prepared on each of these themes by various staff
members. The objectives of each paper were to review
the current state of thinking in each of the theme areas,
to summarize the consensus view regarding likely future
trends, and, where relevant, to present summary data
to be used by others during strategic planning.

Given the broad range of topics covered in the papers,
the Task Force members decided that it would not be
worthwhile attempting to produce a single synthesis
report. The value of the papers lies precisely in the detail
they provide on each of the themes. For this reason, all
of the papers are included in this report as separate
chapters, and no attempt has been made to rewrite them
to give one authorial voice. Readers who are interested
in a particular theme are encouraged to refer directly to
the relevant paper. Please note that due to the
crosscutting nature of several of the themes, a number
of topics are addressed in more than one paper.

Seeking ways to exploit the many important insights that
had been gained during the course of preparing the
papers, the Task Force members met to discuss the
implications of their findings for strategic planning. We
decided that the best way to stimulate reflection and
discussion would be by drawing up a list of strategic
questions for CIMMYT that have arisen from our work.
The final section of this report presents the strategic

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Janet Lauderdale

The demographics of the world are changing. Despite
some advances in poverty reduction, continuing high
fertility rates in the least developed countries greatly
exacerbate the problems of poverty, with women and
children generally paying the highest price. Furthermore,
most population increases are predicted to occur in
urbanized areas of the developing world. In only a few
years, half of the world's population will be urbanized
for the first time in history. Although fertility rates are
very high in some countries, the world's population as a
whole is aging, leaving fewer economically active workers
to support the young and the elderly. Migration from
less developed countries to industrialized countries is
increasing to such an extent that more and more
countries are enacting legislation to control it. However,
migration is notjust between countries, but also from
rural to urban areas, as people seek to escape poverty
and find a better life.

Population and Fertility
Having many and unplanned children imposes a heavy
burden on families, and pregnancy and childbirth pose
serious health risks for poor women. High levels of fertility
contribute directly to poverty, reducing women's
opportunities, as well as money available for children's
education and health. Having a large family can also
reduce or prevent savings and increase overall vulnerability
and insecurity. The poor suffer from the direct effects of
their large numbers-for example, the existence of large
pools of unskilled workers lowers wage rates,
landholdings must be divided among more inheritors, and
schools become over-crowded. People become less and
less able to escape from poverty.

The world's population had reached 6.3 billion in 2001
(Table 2.1, data broken down by region) and is expected
to increase to 6.8 billion by 2010 and 7.6 billion by 2020

Table 2.1. Population statistics.

Sub-Saharan Africa
N sub-Saharan Africa
C&W sub-Saharan Africa
S sub-Saharan Africa
E sub-Saharan Africa
Middle East and North Africa
South Asia
East Asia and Pacific
Latin America and Caribbean
CEE/CIS' and Baltic States
Industrialized countries
Developing countries
Least developed countries


of world

Population annual Fertility
growth rate (%) ratet
1970-90 1990-2001 2001
2.9 2.6 5.6

Average annual rate
of reduction of
fertility rate (%)
1960-90 1990-2001
0.2 1.1

Source: UNICEF (2003).
STotal fertility rate: The number of children that would be born per woman if she were to live to the end of her child-bearing years and
bear children at each age in accordance with prevailing age-specific fertility rates.
CEE/CIS: CEE Central and Eastern Europe. CIS Commonwealth of Independent States. Countries included in the CEE/CIS and Baltic
States category include: Albania; Armenia; Azerbajan; Belarus; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Bulgaria; Croatia; Czech Rep.; Estonia;
Georgia; Hungary; Kazakhstan; Kyrgyzstan; Latvia; Lithuania; Moldova, Rep. of; Poland; Romania; Russian Federation; Slovakia;
Tajikistan; TFYR (the former '.'i, i i i Rep.) Macedonia; Turkey; Turkmenistan; Ukraine; Uzbekistan; and ,', i i ;

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(FAOSTAT 2003). Seventy-nine percent of the world's
people live in developing countries (UNFPA 2002), and
China and India alone account for 37% of the world's
population (UNICEF 2003).

Population is currently increasing by 77 million people
per year. Six countries account for almost half of the
world's annual population growth: India (21%), China
(12%), Pakistan (5%), Nigeria (4%), Bangladesh (4%),
and Indonesia (3%). Ninety-seven percent of the global
population increase takes place in less developed countries
(United Nations Population Division 2002a).

There is good evidence that population growth has a
strong impact on economic development. In Brazil, for
example, the effect of declining fertility has been a 0.7%
increase in economic growth, and similar effects have
been seen in other countries (UNFPA 2002). Reductions
in fertility levels change the demographics of a population

temporarily, forming a larger group of working-age people
to support relatively fewer older and younger dependents.
This provides a window of opportunity for growth with
fewer dependents, which a country may or may not take
advantage of, before the population in general ages and
produces more elderly dependents.


It is estimated that the number of persons aged 60 years
or older was 629 million in 2002 and will increase to
almost 2 billion by 2050. This means that there will be
more older (over 60) persons than children (0-14 years)
for the first time in history. Currently 1 of every 10 persons
is aged 60 years or older (Table 2.2, data broken down
by region), but according to United Nations projections,
the ratio will be 1 in 5 persons by 2050 and 1 in 3 persons
by 2150. The percentage of older people is much higher
in developed regions, but the pace of aging is faster in

Table 2.2. Aging of the world population.

of population

Sub-Saharan Africa
N sub-Saharan Africa
C&W sub-Saharan Africa
S sub-Saharan Africa
E sub-Saharan Africa
Middle East and North Africa
South Asia
East Asia and Pacific
Latin America and Caribbean
CEE/CIS' and Baltic States
Industrialized countries
Developing countries
Least developed countries

of population
aged 60 or older

Under 18 Under 5 2002
51 17 5
52 18 5
52 17 5
52 17 5
53 17 4
44 13 6
41 12 7
32 8 9
37 11 8
27 6 16
20 5 20
38 11 8
50 16 5


Potential support ratio (PSR)

15-64 /65+




Source: UN Population Division (2002b).
Note: Regional averages were calculated by taking average percentages per region, as raw data were not available for the number of
people 60 to 65 years of age. Regional averages were also calculated using populations 60 years and above for which data were
SPotential support ratio: the number of persons aged 15 to 64 years per one older person aged 65 years or older.
CEE/CIS: CEE Central and Eastern Europe. CIS Commonwealth of Independent States. Countries included in the CEE/CIS and Baltic
States category include: Albania; Armenia; Azerbaian; Belarus; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Bulgaria; Croatia; Czech Rep.; Estonia;
Georgia; Hungary; Kazakhstan; Kyrgyzstan; Latvia; Lithuania; Moldova, Rep. of; Poland; Romania; Russian Federation; Slovakia;
Tajikistan; TFYR (the former '.'i, i i i Rep.) Macedonia; Turkey; Turkmenistan; Ukraine; Uzbekistan; and ",', -I, i ;

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developing countries. The older population itself is aging,
with more people living into their eighties and beyond.
Women live longer than men, and currently there are 81
men per 100 women in the older population (globally).
The ratio is lower in more developed regions, with 71
men per 100 women compared to 88 men per 100
women in less developed regions (United Nations
Population Division 2002b).

The potential support ratio (PSR) isthe number of persons
aged 15 to 64 years per 1 older person aged 65 years or
older. This gives an indication of the dependency burden
on potential workers. Between 1950 and 2002, the PSR
fell from 12 to 9 people of working age per each person
aged 65 years or older. By mid-century, the PSR is
projected to fall to 4 working-age persons for each person
aged 65 years or older (United Nations Population Division

More older people are working longer in developing
countries than in developed countries, due to limited
retirement schemes and relatively small incomes. Twenty-
one percent of men aged 60 years or older are
economically active in more developed regions, compared
with 50% of men in less developed regions. In the case
of older women, 10% are economically active in more
developed regions, compared with 19% in less developed
regions (United Nations Population Division 2002b).

Although the world population as a whole is aging, a
high proportion of the population in the least developed
countries is under 18 years of age-above 50% for sub-
Saharan Africa, which in 2001 had the highest fertility
rate and has had the lowest annual reduction of the
fertility rate from 1960-2001 (Table 2.1). Its demographics
are hard hit not only by the high fertility rate, but also by
the past and future loss of a large part of its economically
active population due to HIV/AIDS. A smaller labor force
supporting a greater number of dependents will impede
development and may force more children and older
people into the workforce to survive.

Developing countries are becoming increasingly
urbanized, although the amount and rate of urbanization
depends on the region of the world.




Forty-seven percent of the world's population, or 2.9
billion people, lived in urban areas in the year 2000 (Table
2.3). This percentage was 30% in 1950 and is expected
to increase to 56%, or 4.2 billion people, by 2020, and
to 5 billion by 2030. If current growth rates continue,
the number of the world's urban and rural dwellers will
be equal by 2007.

Almost all population growth from 2000 to 2030 is
expected to occur in urban areas, most of it in the less
developed regions of the world. Little growth is expected
in the more developed regions, which are already largely
urbanized and have much lower population growth rates.
Urban populations in less developed regions are expected
to increase from 2 tojust under 4 billion people between
2000 and 2030.

The growth rate of the world's urban populations is
expected to be nearly double the rate of the population
as a whole, and urban populations should double in 38
years. However, the growth rate is much higher in less
developed regions, whose urban population should
double in only 29 years. Rural populations in less
developed regions, on the other hand, are expected to
peak around 2025 and then start to decline, as they have
in more developed regions since the 1950s. Most of the
growth in urban areas in less developed regions will be
due to rural-urban migration and the transformation of
rural settlements into cities.

Currently, about 79% of the population in industrialized
countries lives in urban areas, followed by 76% in Latin
America and the Caribbean. Regions such as sub-Saharan
Africa, South Asia, and East Asia and the Pacific have
much lower levels of urbanization. Although percentages
of urban dwellers may be low in Asia and Africa, the
actual number of people is greater than in Europe, Latin
America and the Caribbean, North America, and Oceania
combined. Asia, followed by Africa, is expected to have
the largest rural population during 2000-2030.

Although there will be an increase in the number and
population of mega-cities, a relatively small proportion
of people live in such mega-cities. Small- to medium-
sized cities will experience much higher rates of growth.

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Most urban growth in developing countries will occur in
small cities of 500,000 or less, or in cities with populations
over 15 million.

Agricultural production and policies will be affected as
the world becomes more urbanized. Feeding large urban
areas requires policies that promote efficient, large-scale
production and reasonable prices, as they do in the
developed world. As urban populations increase,
productive land will disappear. Improved infrastructure
will be needed to deliver agricultural products to urban
populations, and the role of urban agriculture will become
more and more important (United Nations Population
Division 2002c).

However, as policies change to favor urban areas, the
rural poor could become increasingly marginalized, and
rural areas are where the most severe poverty is likely to


Migration has both positive and negative impacts on
countries and economies. It can facilitate the transfer of
skills and enhance cultural diversity, but can also cause
countries of origin to lose human resources and
destination countries political, economic, and/or social
tensions. For good or bad, migration has demographic,
economic, social, and political causes and consequences,
such as brain drain and brain gain, worker remittances,
human rights issues, social integration, xenophobia,
human trafficking, and national security.

Worker remittances can contribute significantly to a
country's GDP This is particularly true in less developed
countries, where remittances on average make up 4.6%
of the GDP, though they are much higher in some
countries (Tables 2.4 and 2.5).

Table 2.3. Urbanization.

Sub-Saharan Africa
N sub-Saharan Africa
C&W sub-Saharan Africa
S sub-Saharan Africa
E sub-Saharan Africa
Middle East and North Africa
South Asia
East Asia and Pacific
Latin America and Caribbean
CEE/CISS and Baltic States
Industrialized countries
Developing countries
Least developed countries

Percentage of

Average annual growth
rate of urban population (%)1
1970-90 1990-2001
5.2 4.7

T UNICEF (2003); TFAOSTAT (2003).
CEE/CIS: CEE Central and Eastern Europe. CIS Commonwealth of Independent States. Countries included in the CEE/CIS and Baltic
States category include: Albania; Armenia; Azerbaian; Belarus; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Bulgaria; Croatia; Czech Rep.; Estonia;
Georgia; Hungary; Kazakhstan; Kyrgyzstan; Latvia; Lithuania; Moldova, Rep. of; Poland; Romania; Russian Federation; Slovakia;
Tajikistan; TFYR (the former'.', i,, i Rep.) Macedonia; Turkey; Turkmenistan; Ukraine; Uzbekistan; and ',', -I,, i ;

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Percentage of

Percentage of

Most emigration is from developing countries; developed
countries generally have positive net levels of
immigration. Almost 1 in 10 people living in developed
countries is a migrant, compared to 1 in 70 in developing
countries. In 1995-2000 more developed regions gained
an estimated 2.3 million migrants per year from less
developed regions, with the greatest net gains in North
America, followed by Europe and Oceania. The net
emigration rate was highest for Latin America and the
Caribbean, with 1 migrant per 1,000 people leaving the

Migrants currently make up 3% of the world's population,
with most living in Europe (56 million), Asia (50 million),
and North America (41 million). A number of countries
are trying to lower immigration levels, and in 2001 40%
of countries had policies to lower immigration (United
Nations Population Division 2002a).

As of 2000, almost a quarter of all countries felt that
migration levels were too high. Policies regarding
emigration are very similar between developed and
developing countries, with 1 in 5 countries having policies
in place to restrict levels of emigration.

Political, economic, and other types of refugees are a
significant group within the world's migrant population.
In the year 2000, there were almost 22 million refugees,
or displaced persons, in the world (Table 2.6). Increasing
levels of migration are symptomatic of problems in
countries of origin. While migration relieves the pressure
on the poor by providing an opportunity for escape and
for sending remittances back home, it can also contribute
to the impoverishment of a country, as the best and
brightest seek better opportunities elsewhere.

Table 2.4. Migration.

Migrant stockT
(% population

Net migration (average annual)
rate per 1000 people

Workers' remittances
as% GDP

Sub-Saharan Africa 2.3 0.0 0.6
N sub-Saharan Africa 1.9 -0.1 2.3
C&W sub-Saharan Africa 2.6 -0.1 1.8
S sub-Saharan Africa 2.3 0.0 0.0
E sub-Saharan Africa 1.9 0.2 0.0
Middle East and North Africa 5.6 0.0 1.5
South Asia 0.9 0.0 2.2
East Asia and Pacific 0.5 0.0 0.1
Latin America and Caribbean 1.2 -0.1 0.9
CEE/CIST and Baltic States 7.3 -0.1 0.7
Industrialized countries 4.6 0.1 0.1
Developing countries 1.4 0.0 1.2
Least developed countries 1.6 0.0 4.6
World 2.9 0.0 0.2
Source: United Nations Population Division (2002a).
SMigrant stock: For most countries, the mid-year estimate of the number of people who are born outside the country For countries
lacking data on place of birth, the estimated number of non-citizens.
CEE/CIS: CEE Central and Eastern Europe. CIS Commonwealth of Independent States. Countries included in the CEE/CIS and Baltic
States category include: Albania; Armenia; Azerbajan; Belarus; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Bulgaria; Croatia; Czech Rep.; Estonia;
Georgia; Hungary; Kazakhstan; Kyrgyzstan; Latvia; Lithuania; Moldova, Rep. of; Poland; Romania; Russian Federation; Slovakia;
Tajikistan; TFYR (the former '.'i, i i i Rep.) Macedonia; Turkey; Turkmenistan; Ukraine; Uzbekistan; and '', i I, i i

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Table 2.5. Countries receiving highest percentages of
GDP from remittances.
Total remittances
remittances as% GDP
(millions of US$) 2000
Jordan 4,913 22.5
Samoa 159 18.7
Yemen 18,349 15.1
Albania 3,134 14.1
El Salvador 6,278 13.3
Cape Verde 427 13.2
Nicaragua 5,071 13.2
Bosnia and Herzegovina 3,977 12.9
Jamaica 2,576 10.9
Ecuador 12,646 9.6
Vanuatu 197 8.2
Sri Lanka 18,924 7.1
Honduras 6,417 6.9
Dominican Republic 8,373 6.8
Morocco 29,878 6.6
Sudan 31,095 5.8
Nigeria 113,862 5
Source: United Nations Population Division (2002a).


Women often have unequal access to everything from
education to food to credit. In many areas they are legally
unable to own land and completely vulnerable to decisions
made by their male relatives. They are often also the
victims of violence. There is frequently great disparity in
the education offered to women versus men in the least
developed countries, particularly in South Asia (Table 2.7).
This has an important impact on malnutrition and,
ultimately, on child survival, contributing to the cycle of

In 1995, the Fourth World Conference on Women
described the "feminization of poverty." There was a
consensus that women should have an active interest in
economic and social development, and should be involved
in planning and implementing strategies to alleviate
poverty. However, there has been little systematic effort
invested in alleviating poverty among women. The
disparity in the number of women versus men living in
poverty has increased over the past decade. The problem
is worst in the poorest countries, for they have the greatest
gender disparities in education and health (UNFPA 2002).

Table 2.6. Refugee status, end of 2000.

Region of asylum/
Latin America & Caribbean
Northern America
Source: UNHCR (2000).



12,062,075 947,236



Others of concern



Varioustt ofconcern
30,242 6,060,106
349,801 8,449,903
1,264,882 5,576,425
8,526 575,534
400 84,514

767,492 5,998,501 369,055 1,653,851 21,798,210

Persons recognized as refugees under the 1951 Convention/1967 Protocol, the 1969 OAU Convention, in accordance with the
UNHCR Statute, persons granted a humanitarian or comparable status and those granted temporary protection.
Persons whose application for refugee status is pending in the asylum procedure or who are otherwise registered as asylum-seekers. In
countries with various stages in the asylum procedure, a case (person, family) may have been counted more than once.
Refugees who have returned to their place of origin. The 1999 figure refers to returns during 1998-1999; the 2000 figure refers to
2000 only
Persons who are displaced within their country and to whom UNHCR extends protection and/or assistance in pursuance to a special
request by a competent organ of the United Nations.
Internally displaced persons (IDPs) who have returned to their place of origin during the past two years.
t Other groups of concern to UNHCR.

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Table 2.7. Gender differences.

Life expectancy:
females as a%
of males 2001

Adult literacy rate:
females as a %
of males 2001

Gross enrollment ratios:
females as a % of males'

Primary school

Secondary school

Sub-Saharan Africa 103 78 87 82
Middle East and North Africa 104 72 88 92
South Asia 101 61 82 71
East Asia and Pacific 107 86 101 94
Latin America and Caribbean 110 98 97 108
CEE/CIS' and Baltic States 113 97 95 99
Industrialized countries 108 99 103
Developing countries 105 80 91 88
Least developed countries 103 66 84 85
World 105 87 92 92
Source: UNICEF (2003).
SGross primary or secondary school enrollment ratio: The number of children enrolled in a level (primary or secondary), ii 11. Ii .. of
age, divided by the population of the age group that officially corresponds to the same level.
CEE/CIS: CEE Central and Eastern Europe. CIS Commonwealth of Independent States. Countries included in the CEE/CIS and Baltic
States category include: Albania; Armenia; Azerbaian; Belarus; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Bulgaria; Croatia; Czech Rep.; Estonia;
Georgia; Hungary; Kazakhstan; Kyrgyzstan; Latvia; Lithuania; Moldova, Rep. of; Poland; Romania; Russian Federation; Slovakia;
Tajikistan; TFYR (the former '.,'i I i i Rep.) Macedonia; Turkey; Turkmenistan; Ukraine; Uzbekistan; and "'. .1.. i i ;

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Janet Lauderdale


Malnutrition and poverty are highly correlated with many
of the conditions of poverty, including poor-quality food,
lack of education, poor sanitation, and lack of potable
water. Malnutrition is not only caused by poverty: it is
one of the causes of poverty. Malnutrition is influenced
not only by the amount and type of foods consumed,
but also by additional factors such as disease, sanitation,
and access to health care. There is a vicious cycle between
disease and malnutrition in that disease can cause
malnutrition and malnutrition can lower resistance to
disease. Even mild malnutrition can lower a child's
resistance to disease. It is estimated by the United Nations
Children s Fund (UNICEF) that over half of child deaths
are associated with malnutrition. The most critically
vulnerable groups are developing fetuses, children up to
the age of five, and women before and during pregnancy
and while breastfeeding.

Aside from disease and dietary intake, malnutrition is also
affected by social, political, and cultural elements such as
lack of political stability or discrimination against women.
Lack of access to good education and correct information
is also a major cause of malnutrition, as are war and

Although adequate overall energy intake is necessary for
survival, intake of various micronutrients is essential as well.
For example, vitamin A deficiency can cause blindness,
reduce resistance to illness, and even cause death; iodine
deficiency can damage intellectual capacity; anemia can
cause problems in pregnancy and childbirth resulting in
death; folate deficiency in pregnant mothers can cause
birth defects such as spina bifida; and vitamin D deficiency
can lead to poor bone formation, including rickets.

Countries have various types of programs to deal with
nutritional problems, such as education, feeding programs,
supplementation, and fortification programs. Although

Table 3.1. Malnutrition rates, coverage of vitamin A supplementation, and iodized salt consumption.
Percentage of under-fives (1995-2001) Perc
suffering from: Vitamin A ho
Underweightt Wasting$ Stunting supplementation co

and severe

coverage rate
Moderate Moderate (6-59 months)'
Severe and severe and severe 2000

entage of

Sub-Saharan Africa 29 9 10 40 77 67
Middle East and North Africa 14 4 6 22 -53
South Asia 46 17 15 45 42 53
East Asia and Pacific 17 -4 21 80
Latin America and Caribbean 8 1 2 16 81
CEE/CIS and Baltic States* 7 2 4 16 39
Industrialized countries
Developing countries 27 10 8 32 56 68
Least developed countries 36 10 11 43 78 54
World 27 10 8 32 56 67
Source: UNICEF (2003).
SUnderweight: Moderate and severe below minus two standard deviations from median weight for age of reference population;
severe below minus three standard deviations from median weight for age of reference population.
I 1I i, I Moderate and severe below minus two standard deviations from median weight for age of reference population.
Stunting: Moderate and severe below minus two standard deviations from median height for age of reference population.
Vitamin A: PF-i -Ir -i.- of children aged 6-59 months who have received at least one high dose of vitamin A capsules in 2000.
SCEE/CIS: CEE Central and Eastern Europe. CIS Commonwealth of Independent States. Countries included in the CEE/CIS and Baltic
States category include: Albania; Armenia; Azerbaian; Belarus; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Bulgaria; Croatia; Czech Rep.; Estonia;
Georgia; Hungary; Kazakhstan; Kyrgyzstan; Latvia; Lithuania; Moldova, Rep. of; Poland; Romania; Russian Federation; Slovakia;
Tajikistan; TFYR (the former '. 'i, i i Rep.) Macedonia; Turkey; Turkmenistan; Ukraine; Uzbekistan; and ",', -,, i i

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they have had varying levels of success, and the number
of malnourished people in the world has decreased, the
rate of decrease has slowed. It is estimated that almost
800 million people around the world still suffer from
under-nutrition (FAO 2002). National nutrition studies are
not always carried out, and nutritional status is often
deduced from looking at smaller studies. The regions of
the world with the highest levels of malnutrition in children
under five, and of overall undernourishment, are sub-
Saharan Africa and South Asia (Tables 3.1 and 3.2).
Although the proportion of people affected is highest in
sub-Saharan Africa, the actual number of people is higher
in South Asia due to much higher concentrations of

Table 3.2. Prevalence of undernourishment in
developing countries and regions.
Number of Percenl
people undernc
undernourished in t
1998-2000 popul
(millions) 1998-
Developing world 798.8 1
Asia and the Pacific 508.1 1
East Asia 128.4 1
Oceania 1.3 2
South East Asia 63.5 1
South Asia 314.9 2

Latin America and
the Caribbean
North America
Central America
South America
Near East and North Africa
Near East
North Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa
Central Africa
East Africa
Southern Africa
West Africa
Countries in Transition
Commonwealth of
Independent States
Baltic States
Eastern Europe
Source: FAO (2002).


tage of



population. This is not to say that these are the only areas
affected. Although malnutrition levels may be lower
overall in other areas of the world, there are still areas of
extreme poverty that must not be ignored. For example,
even in relatively wealthy countries such as Mexico, there
are still many people living in extreme poverty.


The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) uses the
under-five mortality rate as the best overall indicator of
health in a country. Children in the first five years of life
are most vulnerable for that is when death is most likely
to occur. A ranking of the under-five mortality rate shows
that in the 20 worst countries, all except Afghanistan are
located in sub-Saharan Africa (Table 3.3). In these
countries, 18-32% of children die before the age of five.
The least developed countries, led by sub-Saharan Africa,
have the highest child mortality rates and the lowest rates
of annual reduction in child mortality (Table 3.4).

Table 3.3. The 20 worst countries for child mortality.

mortality rank

mortality ratet

Sierra Leone 1 316
Niger 2 265
Angola 3 260
Afghanistan 4 257
Liberia 5 235
Mali 6 231
Somalia 7 225
Guinea-Bissau 8 211
Congo, Dem. Rep. 9 205
Zambia 10 202
Chad 11 200
Burkina Faso 12 197
Mozambique 12 197
Burundi 14 190
Malawi 15 183
Mauritania 15 183
Nigeria 15 183
Rwanda 15 183
Central African Rep. 19 180
Cote d'lvoire 20 175
Source: UNICEF (2003).
SUnder-five mortality rate: Probability of dying between birth
and exactly five years of age expressed per 1,000 live births.


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Life expectancy is also the lowest in the least developed
countries, particularly, again, in sub-Saharan Africa, where
there has been very little improvement over the past 30
years. This trend is partly due to HIV/AIDS, which is
lowering life expectancy in countries where it is prevalent,
but also to generalized poverty in the region. Poverty
factors such as poor maternal education and restricted
access to health care, sanitation, and water have always
critically affected health. For example, sub-Saharan Africa
also has the lowest percentage of people who have access
to improved drinking water and sanitation facilities. Clean
drinking water and sanitation are basic to reducing child
mortality and diseases in general.


Approximately 42 million people were infected by the HIV/
AIDS virus at the end of 2002 (Table 3.5). The highest
number by far is in sub-Saharan Africa (Table 3.6), but as
HIV/AIDS spreads to more densely populated regions of
the world, this may change. For example, though
prevalence rates are low in South and Southeast Asia,
the actual number of people infected is quite high. In
addition, prevalence rates in South and Southeast Asia
have increased by 10% since 2001, and this area of the
world accounts for 20% of new HIV/AIDS infections. The
problem is particularly serious in China and India, which
have 1 million and 4 million people, respectively, living
with HIV

Table 3.4. Basic health indicators.


rate of


at birth


rate of



Sub-Saharan Africa
N sub-Saharan Africa
C&W sub-Saharan Africa
S sub-Saharan Africa
E sub-Saharan Africa
Middle East and North Africa
South Asia
East Asia and Pacific
Latin America and Caribbean
CEE/CISI and Baltic States
Industrialized countries
Developing countries
Least developed countries

1.1 0.4 4 44

Source: UNICEF (2003).
t Under-five mortality rate: Probability of dying between birth and exactly five years of age expressed per 1,000 live births.
t Average annual rate of reduction refers to the under-five mortality rate.
SLife expectancy at birth: The number of years newborn children would live if subjected to the mortality risks prevailing for the cross-
section of population at the time of their birth.
CEE/CIS: CEE Central and Eastern Europe. CIS Commonwealth of Independent States. Countries included in the CEE/CIS and Baltic
States category include: Albania; Armenia; Azerbajan; Belarus; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Bulgaria; Croatia; Czech Rep.; Estonia;
Georgia; Hungary; Kazakhstan; Kyrgyzstan; Latvia; Lithuania; Moldova, Rep. of; Poland; Romania; Russian Federation; Slovakia;
Tajikistan; TFYR (the former '.'i, i i i Rep.) Macedonia; Turkey; Turkmenistan; Ukraine; Uzbekistan; and ",', I.. i ;

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Table 3.5. Global summary of the HIV/AIDS epidemic, December 2002.

Number of people
living with HIV/AIDS

People newly infected
with HIV in 2002

Total 42 million 5 million
Adults 38.6 million 4.2 million
Women 19.2 million 2 million
Children under 15 years 3.2 million 800,000
Source UNAIDS (2002).

Table 3.6. Regional HIV/AIDS statistics and features, end of 2002.

AIDS deaths in 2002
3.1 million
2.5 million
1.2 million

Sub-Saharan Africa
North Africa & Middle East
South & South-East Asia
East Asia & Pacific
Latin America
Eastern Europe & Central Asia
Western Europe
North America
Australia & New Zealand

Epidemic living with
started HIV/AIDS
Late '70s, early '80s 29.4 million
Late '80s 550,000
Late '80s 6.0 million
Late '80s 1.2 million
Late '70s, early '80s 1.5 million
Late '70s, early '80s 440,000
Early '90s 1.2 million
Late '70s, early '80s 570,000
Late '70s, early '80s 980,000
Late '70s, early '80s 15,000
42 million

and children
infected with
3.5 million
5 million


HIV- Main mode(s)
positive of transmission
adults who for adults
are women living
(%) with AIDS
58 Hetero
55 Hetero, IDU
36 Hetero, IDU
24 IDU, hetero, MSMY
30 MSM ,IDU hetero
50 Hetero, MSM
27 IDU
20 MSM, IDU, hetero

Source: UNAIDS (2002).
SThe proportion of adults (15 to 49 years of age) living with HIV/AIDS in 2002, using 2002 population numbers.
Hetero (heterosexual transmission).
SIDU (transmission through injecting drug use).
MSM (sexual transmission among men who have sex with men).

Less than 4% of people in low- and middle-income
countries receive antiretroviral treatment, mainly due to
the cost. Without treatment, the average time of survival
from the time of infection is 9-11 years. Less than 10%
of people with HIV/AIDS have access to care and treatment
for opportunistic infections.

Studies indicate that HIV/AIDS can have an impact on
food security, although results are not easily quantifiable.
According to FAO, 7 million agricultural workers in 25
severely affected African countries have died from AIDS
since 1985, and 16 million more could die in the next 20
years, if massive, effective programs are not mounted.

, -s,


As more people die of AIDS, less labor is available. It is
easy to see that there will be a huge impact on food
security in these countries.

It may be difficult for women and children left without a
male figure to head the family to carry out all the labor
needed to plant and harvest their crops. A number of
studies show a shift toward crops requiring less intensive
labor and/or capital input, especially within families where
the husband has died of AIDS. This usually means moving
away from cash crops to subsistence crops. Often women
cannot manage to plant all the land available to them. In
these cases, they are very likely to lose the land to



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acquisitive relatives of their dead husbands, which leaves
them very much at risk. If the wife subsequently dies of
AIDS, the children could be left in child-headed
households, although most are absorbed into the families
of other relatives. Children might also be left alone on
the land to retain their rights to the use of the land.
Although child-headed households are relatively rare, they
are increasing. Both women and children have reduced
access to information and credit and are less physically
able to do heavy labor, particularly land preparation. This
is especially true if the women are sick with AIDS
themselves. These issues are complex, and it is not clear
what impact they will have on overall food security.

Households with AIDS patients are often forced to spend
all their extra income, as well as compromise their future
income, to pay for medical expenses and funeral costs.
They are often left in extreme poverty and unable to
support themselves. Direct costs are further exacerbated
by local customs concerning funerals, which require that
families and neighbors refrain from working for anywhere
from a few days to a few weeks after someone dies. If
this occurs during a critical period of the cropping cycle,
it can have very negative effects on the harvest, further
worsening the family's position.

Parents of young children that die of AIDS are not able to
pass their knowledge down to the next generation.
Therefore, much traditional knowledge can be lost,
particularly in areas of high AIDS prevalence. AIDS also
kills agricultural researchers and extension workers,
reducing research and services to farmers.

HIV/AIDS can both affect malnutrition and be affected
by it. The immune system is undermined by both protein-
energy and micronutrient malnutrition, and HIV/AIDS can
hinder the body's ability to absorb and process different
macro- and micronutrients. Problems endemic to poverty
such as diseases, poor gender relations, migration, and
other socioeconomic factors have an effect on HIV.

The impact of HIV/AIDS on affected families in agricultural
communities can be devastating, pushing the survivors
into destitution that could last for generations to come,
with probable heavy impact on their ability to carry out
small-scale agricultural production.

0 1 .'

Although access to education has improved substantially
over the past decade, it varies across regions and is clearly
related to both poverty and gender (Table 3.7). In some
areas, such as Latin America, almost all children complete
the first grade, but subsequent dropouts are high. In other
regions, high percentages of children never attend school
at all.

The amount and quality of education received is strongly
influenced by poverty levels. The poor, in general, receive
much less education than the non-poor. In almost all
developing countries, children (6-14 years) from the
wealthiest 20% of the population are much more likely
to be enrolled in school than children from the poorest
40% (UNFPA 2002). However, the gap varies greatly across
countries for several reasons. One may be the distance to
school. For example, children in rural areas tend to have
to travel much farther to reach school. Also, government
spending on education may favor wealthier families at
the expense of the poor; for example, some governments
spend more on higher education rather than primary and
secondary education, which affects the poor more. The
quality of the schools affects school retention and
attainment. Poor curricula, textbooks, teaching methods,
teacher training, pupil:teacher ratios, and parental
participation all affect educational outcomes. The price
of tuition and textbooks may also be too high, particularly
ifjobs are scarce and if prospects for higher incomes with
more education are low.

Evidence for the benefits of maternal education on health
and nutrition, child survival, and lower fertility is plentiful.
It is estimated that gains in women's education accounted
for 43% of the reduction in child malnutrition between
1970 and 1995 (UNFPA 2002). Educated women are in
general more likely to receive adequate prenatal care, be
attended by skilled assistance at the delivery of their
babies, and use contraception. Paternal education has
much less of an impact, yet girls are much less likely to be
educated than boys in many parts of the world. Some of
the contributing factors include: distance to schools and
fear of sexual harassment on the way; lack of schools for
girls; attitudes that discourage girls from seeking and
pursuing higher education; social expectations that girls

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Table 3.7. Education statistics.
Male (%) Female (%/

Sub-Saharan Africa
Middle East and North Africa
South Asia
East Asia and Pacific
Latin America and Caribbean
CEE/CISI and Baltic States
Industrialized countries
Developing countries
Least developed countries

school entrants
grade* five
N) (%)

1995-99 (gross)
Male Female

77 76
52 62
77 77

Source: UNICEF (2003).
SNet primary school attendance: PF- -I r 1 of children in the age group that officially corresponds to primary schooling who attend
primary school. These data come from national household surveys.
Primary school entrants reaching grade five P-i' -Ir i- of the children entering the first grade of primary school who eventually
reach grade five.
SGross secondary school enrollment ratio: The number of children enrolled in secondary school, i- 11. I-.. of age, divided by the
population of the age group that officially corresponds to the same level.
CEE/CIS: CEE Central and Eastern Europe. CIS Commonwealth of Independent States. Countries included in the CEE/CIS and Baltic
States category include: Albania; Armenia; Azerbaian; Belarus; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Bulgaria; Croatia; Czech Rep.; Estonia;
Georgia; Hungary; Kazakhstan; Kyrgyzstan; Latvia; Lithuania; Moldova, Rep. of; Poland; Romania; Russian Federation; Slovakia;
Tajikistan; TFYR (the former '.,'i i i i Rep.) Macedonia; Turkey; Turkmenistan; Ukraine; Uzbekistan; and '', .1.. i ;

will only become wives and mothers and therefore do
not need education; and low expectations that future
financial benefits will be recovered by educating girls. The
disparity is particularly evident in sub-Saharan Africa, the
Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia. The educational
gender differential becomes even more pronounced at
higher educational levels.

Overall, educational prospects for girls from poor families
in developing countries tend to be quite low. As this has
a very strong impact on family health and child survival, it
contributes greatly to continuing poverty levels in
developing countries (UNFPA 2002).


-k' iN



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Role of Agriculture
By 2005, it is estimated that half the world's population
will live in urban areas, which means that productive
land will increasingly be converted to urban use. Fewer
people will be involved in producing food for urban areas
(Table 3.8). At the same time, population will increase,
particularly in urban areas. Feeding everyone will place a
heavy burden on the agricultural sector. It will also require
improved infrastructure to get affordable food to the
people who need it. This trend seems to imply the need
for more intensive agricultural cultivation to keep pace.
Countries that are less competitive agriculturally will have
to import most of their food supplies. Unfortunately, with
increasing globalization, developing countries may
become less and less able to compete with developed
countries, which can afford heavy agricultural subsidies.



` ; i

Primary Secondary

Adult literacy rate
Males Females Total

,, I

. Af.A
." q


as %
of total

of total
labor force

as %
of total

of total
labor force


Change in
labor as %
of total

Sub-Saharan Africa 61 63 52 48 58 52 48 -5
N sub-Saharan Africa 77 78 56 44 72 56 44 -6
C & W sub-Saharan Africa 51 52 53 47 47 52 48 -5
S sub-Saharan Africa 70 72 47 53 69 46 54 -3
E sub-Saharan Africa 79 80 49 51 76 49 51 -4
Middle East and North Africa 30 30 57 43 25 51 49 -5
South Asia 54 59 61 39 53 60 40 -6
East Asia and Pacific 60 62 53 47 55 53 47 -7
Latin America and Caribbean 21 20 83 17 16 82 18 -4
CEE/CIS and Baltic States 18 19 55 45 16 54 46 -3
Industrialized countries 4 3 64 36 2 64 36 -1
Developing countries 51 55 56 44 49 56 44 -6
Least developed countries 70 71 52 48 65 51 49 -6
World 42 45 56 44 41 56 44 -4
Source: FAOSTAT (2003).
SCEE/CIS: CEE Central and Eastern Europe. CIS Commonwealth of Independent States. Countries included in the CEE/CIS and Baltic
States category include: Albania; Armenia; Azerbajan; Belarus; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Bulgaria; Croatia; Czech Rep.; Estonia;
Georgia; Hungary; Kazakhstan; Kyrgyzstan; Latvia; Lithuania; Moldova, Rep. of; Poland; Romania; Russian Federation; Slovakia;
Tajikistan; TFYR (the former '., l 'i i i Rep.) Macedonia; Turkey; Turkmenistan; Ukraine; Uzbekistan; and '.' ,1, 1. i ;

The level of understanding of nutritional needs has grown
tremendously since the early days of the Green Revolution,
when most efforts went into simply creating enough
energy to feed the world (thus the emphasis on cereal
crops). It is now clear that it is important not only to
address the need for total energy requirements but the
need for micronutrients as well. Concentration on cereal
crops, although important, is not sufficient to meet the
world's nutritional needs. More effort should be made to
encourage a greater diversity of crops to provide sufficient
macro- and micronutrientsto support a healthy population
at an affordable cost. Biofortification of cereal crops may
be one way to reach this goal, but producing affordable
dietary diversity is a more important one.

Biotechnology holds promise for getting more and better-
quality foods to the market more quickly and efficiently
than with conventional breeding. For example, genetically
modified organisms (GMOs), if people accept them, could
play an important role in developing nutritionally
enhanced crops such as golden rice, but whether they
would have a nutritional impact remains to be seen.
Pathways to adoption by those in need can be quite
complex, and there has been much resistance to the
adoption of GMOs in the past. It has been suggested that
biotechnology's greatest potential is not in GMOs, but in
tools such as molecular markers and proteomics, which
could significantly improve the efficiency of conventional
plant breeding in some situations and cropping systems.
Whether or not nutritionally enhanced GMOs would be
accepted and adopted remains to be seen and is an area
for further study.

F' )

4 1

Table 3.8. Importance of agriculture to the labor force.

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* Environment

Erika Meng and Dave Watson

Agriculture and the Environment
With global per capital food availability at unprecedented
high levels, the concern over the existence of an adequate
world food supply has gradually been replaced by
concerns over the distribution of the food supply in
addressing hunger, malnutrition, and poverty and about
the sustainability of natural resources in effortsto intensify
agricultural production. The prospect of negative effects
on the environment from agricultural technologies is now
shaping the debate on food and environmental policies.
Sustainable agriculture practices have been defined as
those "that meet current and future societal needs for
food and fiber, for ecosystem services, and for healthy
lives, and that do so by maximizing the net benefit to
society when all costs and benefits of the practices are
considered" (Tilman et al. 2002). Past mismanagement
of natural resources in agricultural production has reduced
the sustainability of most of the world's ecosystems. The
pool of biodiversity has declined due, in large part, to an
expansion of agricultural land. This decline has contributed
to the current situation in which more than one-third of
the existing biodiversity is located in only 1.4 % of the
world's land (World Bank 2003a). Growing demand for
agricultural land caused approximately two-thirds of the
total deforestation of the world's tropical forests to occur
in the last two decades (Pinstrup-Anderson 2002). Up to
30% of irrigated land, 40% of rainfed agricultural land,
and 70% of rangelands are affected by soil erosion,
salinization, and compaction. This has contributed to an
estimated cumulative loss in productivity over three
decades of 12% of total production. Most African
countries have been affected by seriously large losses of
soil nutrients (World Bank 2003a).

Adequate supplies of water and, more importantly, the
distribution of these supplies also present serious concerns
for the future sustainability of agricultural practices. While
aggregate water supply is projected as adequate for the
next 30-50 years (World Bank 2003a), critical local and
regional shortages are forecast, particularly in China,
South Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa. Irrigated
land in these areas is not expected to be adequately
provisioned with water to maintain per capital food
production at present levels. Africa's water resources, until
now largely unexploited, are unlikely to offer much



potential due to geographic and climatic conditions as
well as infrastructural and financial constraints (World
Bank 2003a). Water utilization for agriculture is also facing
increasing competition from high-value uses in urban
areas and those related to environmental conservation.
The fact that many water sources cross multiple borders
increases the likelihood of future water-based cross-border
conflicts. Focused efforts to increase water-use efficiency
and to promote rational water-use policies are vital to
ensure sustainability of food production in these water-
constrained regions.

Improved nutrient-use efficiency will also contribute to
the sustainability of agricultural production. Excessive
application of pesticides and fertilizers affects human
health, contaminates water and soil, and also has
implications for ecosystem health. Effects of non-point
sources of pollution include ozone formation, air pollution,
eutrophication, and greenhouse gas emissions (Tilman
et al. 2002).

Agricultural technology will need to adjust rapidly to
address increased scarcity of key natural resources through
increased crop yields, increased efficiency of input use,
lower impact pest management, sustainable crop
management techniques, and improved animal
husbandry. Efforts should be made to develop technology
with active interaction among and between scientists and
farmers to maximize utilization.

Global Climate Change
The impacts of climate change on agriculture will be direct
and indirect. Direct impacts include changes in
temperature, precipitation, length of growing season,
atmospheric CO2 concentration, and the influence of
these changes on crop development. Indirect effects
include changes in the impacts of pests, diseases, and
weeds (to date, there has been no quantification of these
impacts), and the combined effects of changes in biotic
and abiotic factors on the economics of farming systems.
Evidence continues to support the findings of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC 1995)
that, unless CO2 levels more than double over the coming
decades, it should still be possible to produce enough
food for a growing population, despite climate change.



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However, there are serious concerns over the regional
impacts of climate change. The IPCC Special Report (IPCC
1997) further suggests that, due to higher temperatures,
the risk of crop failure and subsequent hunger will increase
in the tropics and subtropics. Rainfed cropping systems
will be most affected, particularly where staple crops are
at or near their maximum temperature tolerance, and/or
there are other biotic and abiotic factors reducing farming
system resilience and increasing vulnerability. Subsistence
farmers and pastoralists are likely to be hit hardest.

The IPCC Report (1997) also suggests that many middle
to high latitudes are likely to experience increases in
productivity, although this is highly dependent on the
duration and intensity of rainfall, length of growing
season, temperature changes, and crop type. It states that
in "areas where agricultural systems are adapted to
current climate variability and/or where market and
institutional factors are in place to redistribute agricultural
surpluses to make up for shortfalls, vulnerability to


changes in climate means and extremes generally is low.
Other factors also will influence the vulnerability of
agricultural production in a particular country or region
to climate change-including the extent to which current
temperatures or precipitation patterns are close to or
exceed tolerance limits for important crops-per capital
income, the percentage of economic activity based on
agricultural production, and the pre-existing condition of
the agricultural land base."

Elevated CO2 concentrations are expected to affect wheat
and maize differently. As far as wheat is concerned,
current CO2 levels are below concentrations that saturate
photosynthesis. Experiments utilizing elevated CO2 levels
have increased wheat yields by up to 30%. However,
when CO2 levels are elevated for maize, there is very little
response. Experimentswith elevated CO2 levels have also
increased water-use efficiency, dry matter, and seed yields
in cereals. However, it must be noted that this response
is highly mediated by increased temperatures.

.1 .' r

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Global Economy

Erika Meng

Since 1980, an unprecedented level of global economic
integration and linkages through trade, migration, and
capital flows has taken place. Unlike past periods of
increased trade and movements of labor and capital, this
integration has for the first time involved developing
countries in international markets for manufactured goods
and services instead of being primarily commodity based.
Technological change, particularly advances in
transportation, information, and communications, has
been singled out as a key impetus. Trade liberalization,
domestic economic reforms, and regional trade
agreements have also all been identified as major factors
in fueling globalization. Those developing countries that
have become increasingly integrated into the global
economy have enjoyed relatively rapid growth levels and
larger increases in per capital GDP (Dollar and Collier 2002).

Nevertheless, the ability of all developing countries to
participate in and benefit from globalization has been very
unequal due in part to geographical disadvantages, poor
economic policies, and armed conflicts experienced by
some countries. Trade-distorting national and regional
policies, such as subsidies and non-tariff barriers
perpetuated by industrialized countries, also impede
equitable progress and distribution of benefits.
Globalization has been blamed for rising levels of poverty
and increasing income inequality. It has also sparked strong
concerns regarding what has been perceived as an
increasing homogenization of cultural and social diversity.
Countries excluded from or marginalized by globalization,
as well as some rural areas in countries recently integrated
into the global economy, are experiencing increased
vulnerability. However, the ideology and rhetoric in the
debate surrounding globalization often prevents objective
analysis of its impacts. According to the World Bank
(2003b), world inequality increased at a rapid rate prior
to 1980 and has stabilized in the years since. Poverty levels
in those countries integrating into the global economy
have declined. However, the approximately 2 billion people
living in countries that have not participated in global
integration have not enjoyed similar benefits. Those
impacts, particularly with respect to poverty and inequality,
are uncertain and require additional research and



One of the more indisputable developments related to
globalization is the declining importance of agriculture
in many developing country economies. The proportion
of GDP and exports related to the agricultural sector has
been steadily decreasing, with implications for the
demand and supply of human capital in this sector.
Another important issue is the growing significance of
agricultural trade, domestic and international, on food
security for urban populations. The role of the public
sector is also changing, given the increased role of markets
and of the private sector in the globalized economy.
Funding for agricultural research is likewise on the decline
in many countries.

The dynamics of poverty are most heavily affected by
overriding economic and political factors, such as the
presence/absence of stable governments, absence of
conflict, fair representation of all groups in society, aswell
as intangible relationships, such as those between the
poor and non-poor and the powerless and powerful
(World Bank 2001). Currently, the largest absolute
numbers of the extremely poor, defined as those living
under US$ 1 per day, reside in South Asia and sub-Saharan
Africa (Table 5.1). These regions also contain the largest
proportion of poor people as a percentage of the total
population (World Bank 2003b). For an alternative
measure of poverty, the number of people living on less
than US$ 2 per day, the number rises from 1.17 billion
people to 2.8 billion people in 1999 (Table 5.2). The largest
absolute numbers reside in South Asia and East Asia and
Pacific, while the largest population shares are found in
South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa.

Future poverty trends will dependent greatly on growth
in domestic economies, but slow growth (less than the
3.7% annual growth in GDP predicted to be necessary),
especially in sub-Saharan Africa, will make it difficult to
attain the United Nations Millennium Goal to halve by
2015 the proportion of people living on under US$ 1 per
day and suffering from hunger.

The majority of the world's poor population (the World
Bank reports a figure of over 70%, from the total
population of approximately 3 billion people) still lives in
rural areas. Populations in rural areas are also expected



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to continue to grow in most low-income countries.
Vulnerable groups, including women and the uneducated,
are at risk of becoming increasingly marginalized. Women
are particularly vulnerable to chronic poverty due to
inequality in income distribution, access to inputs, and
incomplete control over property and earned income
(Cagatay 2001). However, the role of women in the rural
household economy is increasing in importance as more
responsibility and a larger burden of social costs are borne
by women.

Rural-urban linkages, through labor migration and
integration into markets, are increasingly recognized as
important forces for poverty alleviation. Access to non-
farm income and risk diversification alternatives,
particularly in countries such as Mexico and China, are

Table 5.1. Number of people living on less than US$ 1 pel

Sub-Saharan Africa
East Asia and Pacific (with China)
Excluding China
South Asia
Latin American and Caribbean
Eastern Europe and Central Asia
Middle East and North Africa
Total excluding China
Source: World Bank (2003b).


playing a key role in shaping the poverty profiles that we
observe today. The large majority of urban migrants come
from rural areas, and the economic characteristics of these
migrants their access to land, water, education, and
other resources prior to the migration will play a large
role in determining what conditions and future they will
face after moving to the urban environment (World Bank
2003b). With 2 to 2.5 billion rural people estimated to
become urban residents by 2050, this connection between
rural and urban poverty is very important.

Some of the policy instruments that have been proposed
to address factors essential to the alleviation of poverty,
income inequality, and hunger include: (1) investment in
public goods and institutions; (2) rural infrastructure
development; (3) promotion of effective private markets;

Number (millions)
1990 1999

t Share is the percentage of the population living at or below the poverty line (US$ 1 per day).

Table 5.2. Number of people living on less than US$ 2 per day.

Sub-Saharan Africa
East Asia and Pacific (with China)
Excluding China
South Asia
Latin American and Caribbean
Eastern Europe and Central Asia
Middle East and North Africa
Total excluding China


Number (millions)
1990 1999
386 480
1114 897
295 269
1010 1128
121 132
31 97
50 68
2712 2802
1892 2173

Source: World Bank (2003b).
t Share is the percentage of the population living at or below the poverty line (US$ 2 per day).

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(4) restructuring research and education systems to be
more stable with respect to funding and more sensitive
to needs of smallholders; and (5) improved coordination
between farmers and markets. Research has also
suggested that addressing inequalities in asset distribution
could be effective in poverty reduction, especially for
countries with low projected rates for growth of GDP
(Deiniger and Olinto 2000).

Income Distribution
Measures of income distribution need to include both
trends in global income inequality over time as well as
the level of inequality at a given point in time. While rapid
growth in many developing countries has had a positive
effect on closing inequality gaps, income inequality on a
global level remains at an extremely high level with large
gaps between the incomes of the richest and the rest of
the world population. At today's current high level of
global inequality, the richest 1 % of total world population
earns as much income as the poorest 57% (World Bank
2003b). The level of inequality between the north and
south has been somewhat offset by fast growth in both
China and India. Nevertheless, regional disparities remain
large, and inequality within countries, which is not picked
up by aggregate data, is also increasingly serious. Data
show that among 73 countries with 80% of the world's
population, inequality between rich and poor has
increased in 48 countries and decreased in only 4 (UNDP

There is an increasing consensus that the food problem is
a poverty problem and that increased economic and
political empowerment is a key factor in reducing poverty.
The paradigm in development policies is gradually shifting

to foster greater participation of the poor. Moreover,
because the majority of the world's poor still live in rural
areas, mostly concentrated in Asia and Africa, achieving
overall poverty alleviation goals will require a specific focus
on the reduction of rural poverty.

Markets and Infrastructure
The role of access to markets for agricultural producers is
recognized as increasingly important, and the role of the
private sector in enhancing growth and reducing poverty
has been reassessed. Today, the availability of food at a
global level is higher than ever before. The reduction in
costs of transport, communications, and information has
contributed greatly in this regard. Domestic economic
reforms in many developing countries have also played a
large role in enabling the development of rural and urban
markets. However, these developments are far from
uniform across regions and within countries. Issues of
food accessibility at regional and local levels still remain
serious. Depressed world prices and large local price
fluctuations contribute to vulnerability in local areas. The
effect on prices of continuing agricultural subsidies and
tariff and non-tariff barriers, legislated by industrialized
countries, cannot be downplayed. Given the weakness
of institutions in many developing countries, the
continued presence of trade and other policies not
conducive to efficient performance, and the uneven
distribution of benefits from globalization, it is clear that
privatization and liberalization alone are not necessarily
sufficient to ensure access to markets and to reduce
poverty. Developing a more diversified rural economy,
which builds on and fosters rural-urban linkages, can
provide more opportunities for rural residents and can
stabilize fluctuations in income and wealth.


4 A




Politics and Policies

David Watson

The objective of this chapter is twofold: to provide a
concise overview of major global trends in politics and
policies, specifically in the areas of agriculture, food, trade,
development, and environment; and to provide insights
into possible policy trajectories over the next 20 years.
For the purpose of this paper, policy is defined as a
dynamic process of negotiation and contestation that
allocates values, sets goals (and the means of achieving
them within a specified situation), and results in a course
of action or inaction.

The direction and duration of individual policies are
notoriously difficult to predict, as they have the capacity
to change significantly over a short period of time. Change
is usually initiated by new political priorities, brought about
by current world events and the changing positions and
strengths of competing and/or complementary interests/

In order to realistically encapsulate policy trends, this
review will concentrate on two major policy goals:
economic growth and sustainable development, which
will still be relevant in 2020 even if their importance/
prioritization change.

Economic Growth
As humanity enters the 21st century, economic growth
remains the primary objective of governments across the
globe. However, disagreement exists regarding the most
appropriate means of achieving it. The sections below
address three key strategies employed to promote
increased economic growth. These strategies are
globalization, regionalization, and localization.

The process of globalization began in the early 1970s,
after the break-up of the Bretton Woods system of
national economic organization, and it has accelerated
rapidly over the past 30 years. Many economists and policy
makers argued, and continue to argue, that globalization
is the optimum level of organization to ensure economic
growth. It was private corporations, however, that
embraced the process of globalization. Their intent was
to maximize market opportunities in the 1990s, when
world trade grew at more than twice the rate of outputs
(Buckley 1996). Corporations were/are almost obliged to

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operate at the global level in order to remain competitive.
In the agrifood sector, growth of national, multinational
(MNCs), and transnational corporations (TNCs) during this
period has been staggering.

In response to private-sector lobbying and internal
economic advice, many national governments have
developed policies and institutions that underpin
globalization. The World Trade Organization (WTO), with
over 122 member states, is the most powerful of the new
institutions. In 1999, 110 out of 152 developing countries
were members of the WTO (World Bank 2000). The WTO
isthe principal regulatory mechanism for agriculture, food,
and trade.

Many believe that, in a globalized world, future
opportunities will arise from a variety of sources: changes
in consumer habits; reductions in surface and air
transportation costs; advances in biotechnology; and the
continued liberalization of global trade rules. Increasing
consumer incomes and declining demand for frozen,
canned, and other processed foods are already creating
a demand for high-value added products rather than
homogeneous bulk goods. Falling transportation costs
already enable firms to supply new markets with fresh

The World Bank has made deregulation and market
liberalization a condition of loan receipt. World Bank
stipulations have tended to follow what came to be
known asthe "Washington consensus" (an approach that
has recently been discredited). This approach stipulates
that loan recipient countries adhere to a number of
structural criteria: fiscal discipline; redirection of public
expenditure towards education, health, and infrastructure
investment; tax reform through broadening the tax base
and cutting marginal tax rates; interest rates that are
market determined and positive (but moderate) in real
terms; competitive exchange rates; trade liberalization
(replacement of quantitative restrictions with low and
uniform tariffs); openness to foreign direct investment;
privatization of state enterprises; deregulation/
abolishment of regulations that impede entry or restrict
competition, except for those justified on safety,
environmental, and consumer protection grounds;
prudential oversight of financial institutions; and legal
security for property rights.

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Concerns over trade liberalization
and market deregulation
Many governments are less enthusiastic about the process
of globalization than the World Bank, and they have been
slow to liberalize and deregulate their markets. However,
many economists suggest that only a fraction of the
feasible gains from liberalized agriculture have been
realized, exactly because many countries have been
reluctant to scale down barriers.

Governments are concerned about several issues,
including the transfer of power from national and
supranational state apparatus to international state
systems and MNCs/TNCs, and the subsequent, and highly
unpredictable, distribution of the costs and benefits
associated with this transfer of power. Indeed, many
commentators suggest that the European Union's (EU's)
ability to manage its rural areas would be greatly
compromised if WTO-sponsored globalization and trade
liberalization removed all measures of agricultural
protection. The growing centralization of financial
structures through which credit money is created,
allocated, and putto use, particularly the resulting increase
in the power of finance over production, is another cause
for concern. Foreign direct investment now far exceeds
developed country government investment in developing
countries. In many cases, the value of TNCs now exceeds
the total income of the countries in which they make
their investments, endowing TNCs with extraordinary
political and economic power.

Foreign direct investment is now recognized as the driving
force behind the increasingly integrated global economy.
However, foreign direct investment is concentrated in a
small number of countries in Southeast Asia and Latin
America and is often both speculative and transitory. In
addition, even though international trade has increased,
it often takes place within TNCs and does not always
benefit developing countries. According to Watkins (1994)
66% of the benefits of the 1993 GATT (General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) Accord were expected
to go to developed countries.

Environmental impacts of world trade are not being
properly addressed by the WTO. Although the WTO
rulings refer strictly to international trade policy, the
agreements made by the organization have far-reaching

4 A



implications for economic development, peace, security,
and environmental protection worldwide. The WTO does
have a committee on trade and environment, but it
focuses exclusively on how environmental measures may
impact negatively on trade. It is possible to regulate trade
in certain products in order to protect humans, animals,
plants, or health. There is often no reference as to how
the product has been produced and no consideration of
how trade liberalization may aggravate or cause
environmental damage. It is also likely that food safety
policies will stifle trade and that disputes over market
access and production methods will continue. The EU and
USA continue to battle over hormones in cattle feed and
genetically modified (GM) maize and soy. Many believe
that large corporate lobbies ensure that MNCs are virtually
beyond international regulation. The MNCs put profit first
and hold no allegiance to any particular place, community,
or environment.

International trade isthe most significant aspect of global
economic activity. The new WTO will, to a large extent,
determine patterns and processes of resource exploitation
and will have a considerable impact on progress towards
sustainable development. However, environmentalists are
generally fearful of the poor prospects of sustainable
development achievable through trade liberalization.
Indeed, the World Bank and several non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) now support developing countries
in WTO negotiations. The World Bank developed the
Integrated Framework for Trade and Development in the
least developed countries, in order to support them in
their WTO negotiations.

In response to concerns associated with globalization,
many governments have taken a more cautious position
and have only partially deregulated and liberalized their
markets. Examples include the EU and the USA, which
are still pursuing a relatively protectionist position when
it comes to agriculture, food, and trade, even though the
goal of self-sufficiency is slowly being superseded by that
of self-reliance.

Kenya's Director of Internal Trade, Seth Otieno, says that
trade liberalization has been a disaster for many in Kenya.
In Swaziland, the importation of sugar products from EU
countries has undermined the local industry. Freer trade,
especially in agricultural produce, has worked to "threaten



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or destroy the livelihoods of millions of farmers" and to
keep people poor. Even though many African leaders
accept globalization as a long-term goal, they stress that
it must be accompanied by reform in developed countries,
to make the terms of trade fairer to Africa.

The African director of the International Labour
Organization, Regina Amadi-Njoku, suggests that
globalization is responsible for the decline in Africa's status
in the global economy and that pressures for economic
liberalization in Africa from the International Monetary
Fund (IMF), World Bank, and Western governments have
had negative effects on the development process. Action
Aid and Oxfam say that EU and US financial support for
their farmers givesthem big advantages in trade and ruins
African farmers by subjecting them to unfair competition.
They argue that these countries protect their own farmers
but demand that African countries cut subsidies to theirs.
In a submission to the UK Government, Oxfam calls for
globalization to be underpinned by global rules and
institutions that place human development above the
pursuit of corporate self-interest and national advantage.
However, those in favor of globalization say that Africa
needs better economic management and more trade
liberalization, in order to stimulate sustainable economic
growth and the alleviation of poverty. To conclude, it is
suggested that over the next 25 years it will become harder
to sustain the momentum of trade liberalization (World
Bank 2000).

Regional trade deals are flourishing as it becomes
increasingly difficult to get multilateral trade talks off the
ground. The EU stands as one of the world's most
successful and largest regional trade blocs. Other regional
trade blocs and free trade alliances/lobbyists include the
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and the Cairns
Group. Even though regional trade agreements (RTAs)
could undermine the WTO and lead to counterproductive
decisions, they have proven ability to harmonize
regulations and adopt minimum standards. Negotiations
are now underway to create the Free Trade Area of the
Americas (FTAA). However, Brazil's new left-wing
government is likely to prove the main stumbling block
to this US-led effort for closer regional integration.

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Argentina and Venezuela also have political or economic
reasons for resisting further integration. This may mean
that the USA will have to settle for a series of bilateral
deals with some of the smaller Latin American nations
such as Chile and Costa Rica. The business communities
of many developing countries (including Brazil) express that
they are comfortable behind the high tariff barriers that
protect their industries. Slow growth in the area has also
reduced incentives for closer economic integration. In
conclusion, in the absence of a global free-trade pact (and
US leadership), Western Hemisphere countries have either
signed or are negotiating over 50 regional trade pacts.

The term "localization" reflects the growing desire of
people for a greater say in their government and manifests
itself in the assertion of regional identities. It pushes
national governments to accept that decision making at
regional and city levels is the best way to manage changes
affecting domestic politics and patterns of growth. The
localization of economic, political, social, and
environmental systems is the latest phenomenon and a
goal sought by many environmental NGOs. Most
assessments of economic localization suggest that either
a steady-state zero or negative economic growth model
should be applied. Many governments, particularly in
developed countries, are engaged in a process of both
political and environmental localization that has promoted
popular participation in decision-making and enhanced
local autonomy. Many plural-politics community groups
and NGOs continue to actively encourage citizen
participation. Polycentric philosophies are also being
adopted in the EU. However, there are concerns that
vigorous political activity involving many organized grass
roots groups entrenched in assertive societies will
substantially reduce the scope for autonomous
government action. Central governments may lose their
ability to take immediate and strategic action.

Sustainable versus Unsustainable
During the 1970s and 1980s, the world witnessed a
proliferation of global and local environmental NGO
movements, culminating in three main achievements: (1)
the Meadows Report (Meadows et al. 1972), which

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adopted a Malthusian approach, proclaimed that
environmental policies and economic growth were
incompatible, and called for steady-state zero growth and
more radical bio-economic communities based on organic
agriculture; (2) the World Commission on Environment
and Development (WCED) 1987 Report, "Our Common
Future," known as the Brundtland Report, which
developed 27 principles of sustainable development; and
(3) more recently, the Agenda 21 action plan, developed
for and accepted at the UNCED (United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development) Earth
Summit in 1992, which contain a blue print for achieving
global sustainable development.

Unfortunately, much of this momentum has been lost.
The world economic recession, which began at the end
of the 1990s, has concentrated attention on the
promotion of economic growth with less concern for the
environment and equity. Today, the Brundtland Report
and the concept of sustainable development are seen in
profoundly ambiguous ways. On the one hand, they have
stimulated the most significant political responses to
environmental concerns to date. Most world governments
have adopted sustainability concepts and are involved in
on-going policy debates. On the other hand,
environmentalists criticize the anthropocentrism and
vagueness which make it possible to espouse concepts
of sustainability without any significant change to priorities
and practice. Most politicians assume that the degree of
change advocated by the Report is far too radical to be
contemplated, let alone implemented. Environmentalists
are beginning to argue that not only is sustainability
virtually impossible to define in practical terms, but that
it is also, in principle, the minimum environmental
standard anyone could possibly advocate.

Are we to believe that contemporary society-nature
interactions are dictated solely by free-market capitalism?
The answer is clearly no. However, sustainability initiatives
are, on the whole, under-funded and under-prioritized.
Since the Earth Summit, there has been a significant
decline in official Overseas Development Assistance (ODA).
As summarized by Pingali (2002):

The ODA from major bi-lateral and multi-lateral donors
dropped from 14 billion dollars in 1988 to less than 8
billion dollars in 1999. Much of the decline in ODA was




for support to projects dealing with crop production and
agricultural services. During the last decade, lending to
agriculture by International Financial Institutions has
dropped in absolute terms as well as a proportion of
loans. World Bank lending for agriculture declined from
close to 4 billion dollars in 1990 to 1 billion dollars in the
year 2000.

The reduction in ODA can be partially explained by the
fact that declining food prices and abundant global food
supplies have created a perception that the food problem
has been solved, particularly in the context of globally
integrated food markets. Agriculture also has a
diminishing share of national GDP, and increased
urbanization and its problems make rural poverty seem
less important in comparison. There is also a growing
belief that getting macroeconomic and trade policies right
will automatically move people out of poverty, and there
is an increasing sense of complacency about our ability
to tackle the problems of food and agriculture (Pingali

Overseas Development Assistance generally offers no
profit for donors and low interest repayments for
recipients, on the funding of research, development, and
infrastructure development activities. Thus ODA basically
transfers resources from wealthy to poor nations (often
those with whom the donor has historic ties, particularly
former colonies). Views vary as to whether or not this is
a good tactic. Some say it is necessary for development;
others say that it perpetuates neo-colonial dependency
(Todaro 1997).

To conclude, the limited progress made at the World
Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg,
South Africa, 2002, and the failure of the USA to ratify
the Kyoto agreement are the most recent demonstrations
of the declining priority of sustainable development.
Indeed, the Commission on Sustainable Development
estimates that an extra US$ 125,000,000,000 every year
in aid would be required to implement Agenda 21,
approximately double of what is spent now (Bramble

The unfounded belief, in the 1960s and 1970s, that
stimulating fast economic growth in developing countries
would automatically lead to fast social and political

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change, can primarily be attributed to traditional
economic analysis, focusing on GDP and GNP, and
omitting distributional entitlements. At the dawn of the
21st century, nearly half of the world's population was
classified as living in poverty, surviving on less than US$ 2
per day (World Bank 2001). These people often struggle
to acquire the bare necessities of life. Many are under- or
malnourished, have inadequate shelter and clothing, and
have limited access to health and educational services.
Global distribution of the world's poor is not uniform,
with most living in developing countries. According to
the World Bank (2001), the average income in the richest
20 countries is 37 times the average in the poorest 20.
This gap has doubled in the past 40 years.

Spatially, rural and agricultural development has been
uneven and often inequitable, such that perhaps as many
as one person in five lives in a world where food is
plentiful, yet is denied to them (Conway 1997). Resource-
poor agriculture is a major challenge for sustainable
development, initiating calls for a "doubly green
revolution" (Conway 1997). There is little evidence to
show that liberalized trade policies have served to enhance
the resource base or empower the poor. Indeed,
contemporary crises in major economies, such as those
in Southeast Asia and Latin America, suggest that
economic gains made in the past decade are themselves
short-term and can be very quickly reversed, as witnessed
by the massive capital outflows which preceded the
economic crisis in Indonesia in 1998.

According to Pingali (2002), even though the private
sector will play an increasingly important role in the
development and dissemination of technology in the
developing world, it will not cater to the needs of small-
scale and subsistence farmers, particularly in marginal
production environments. The need for investment in
public goods that enhance the productivity of
marginalized households continues to be urgent and

The World Bank group is the major source of multilateral
aid for developing countries, lending/investing US$
20,000,000,000 in 1996 (World Bank 2001). According
to the World Bank (2001), each dollar lent brings in 2-3
dollars from other agencies, private banks, and recipient

0; 1

governments. Therefore, the rhetoric and action of the
World Bank are crucial in determining the prospects for
sustainable development. At the dawn of the new
millennium, the World Bank has begun to focus
substantial attention on local initiatives that encompass
promoting opportunity, facilitating empowerment, and
enhancing security (World Bank 2001).

Structural adjustment programs have been the principal
mechanisms of the World Bank and IMF to address debt.
However, there has been much criticism thatthis approach
has resulted in the export-led mining of natural resources.
In the 1980s, Ghana lost 75% of its forests during the
course of its economic adjustment. Structural adjustment
has also been accused of widening socio-economic and
gender disparities, further impoverishing some of the
poorest people in society, and compounding
environmental degradation. "Debt-for-nature swaps,
piloted in the 1980s, have been successfully used by NGOs
to alleviate debt and protect habitats. The first projects
were piloted in Ecuador and Bolivia.

Interestingly, an increasing percentage (33%) of ODA
funds are now channelled through NGOs. The proportion
ranges from 10% in the UK to 80% in Belgium and Italy
(Elliott 1999). In 1993, there were over 18,000 NGOs in
the Philippines and at least 50,000 NGOs in developing
countries. The environment and the pursuit of sustainable
development have been the primary factors responsible
for promoting the growth and importance of NGO
activities globally and for stimulating interactions between
these organizations and state and/or international
development institutions. In the 1970s and 1980s, NGOs
were involved in only 13 World Bank projects. In 1997,
47% of World Bank operations involved NGO
participation in some capacity. When projects are
disaggregated by discipline, NGOs were involved in 43
agriculture-based and 12 environment-based projects,
which was 81% and 100% of projects, respectively. NGOs
are increasingly involved in planning, evaluating, and
implementing projects.

The WCED recognized the key role that NGOs could have
in fostering sustainable development, based on their
proven ability to secure popular participation in decision-
making. Experience is suggesting that this can best be

rr ~r~

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4 1

secured through processes of planning and action, which
put people's priorities first rather than those defined by
outside actors and agencies. The rise of the middle class
in developing countries is also linked to environmental
NGOs. There has been a proliferation of these groups in
South and Southeast Asia and Latin America, but very
few in Africa, due to slow economic development. These
increasingly professional NGOs lobby states, businesses,
and multilateral institutions regarding their environmental
policies. Some NGOs are also currently promoting
alternative "fair trade" agricultural systems. However,
concerns exist regarding the unaccountability of NGOs.

According to the World Bank (2001), poverty alleviation
and sustainable environmental management can also be
achieved through global initiatives. These include: (1) the
promotion of global financial stability and opening the
markets of rich countries to the agricultural goods,
manufactures, and services of poor countries; (2) bridging
digital and knowledge divides, thus bringing together
technology and information to people throughout the
world; (3) providing financial and non-financial resources
for international public goods, especially medical and
agricultural research; (4) increasing aid and debt relief to
help countries take actions to end poverty within a
comprehensive framework that puts countries themselves,
not external agencies, at the center of the design of
development strategy and ensures that external resources
are used effectively to support the reduction of poverty;
and (5) giving a voice to poor countries and poor people
in global forums, such as through international links with
organizations for the poor.

The World Bank, in conjunction with UNEP (United Nations
Environmental Programme), established the Global
Environment Facility (GEF). Its role is to assist least
developed nations in tackling global environmental
problems, biodiversity, water management, and energy
conservation. However, the GEF has a pitifully small
budget with which to achieve Earth Summit targets. In
1995, the GEF's budget was US$ 103,000,000.

Many national ODA policies now embrace the need for
comprehensive and integrated approaches to poverty
alleviation and development. The UK's Department for
International Development (DFID) presents one example:



.1'L -

Development assistance is an important part of the way in
which we can help tackle poverty But it is by no means
the only aspect of our relationship with developing
countries. Both nationally and i, i..... 11 ..1 ill there is a
complex web of environmental trade, investment,
agricultural, political, defense, security and financial
issues, which affect relations with developing countries.
These are driven by a range of policy considerations, all of
which affect the development relationships. To have a real
impact on poverty we must ensure the maximum
consistency between all these different policies as they
affect the developing world. Otherwise, there is a risk that
they will undermine development, and development
assistance will only partly make up for the damage done
(DFID 1997).

The UN's Millennium Declaration recognizes its "collective
responsibility to uphold the principles of human dignity,
equality, and equity at the global level." By the year 2015,
the UN aims to halve the proportion of the world's people
living on less than US $ 1 per day, halve the proportion of
people living in extreme poverty, and halve the proportion
of people suffering from hunger (UNDP 2001).

The UNDP report called for: (1) innovative partnerships
and new incentives for research and development; (2)
improved management of intellectual property (IP) to
balance both public and private interests; (3) increased
investment in technologies for developing countries,
which are needed but not provided by the global market,
and (4) regional and global institutional support to build
the technological capacity of developing countries (UNDP

To conclude, global institutions and the private sector
(underpinned by power bases in the developed world)
will continue to promote and/or accelerate uneven
capitalist development unless developing nation states are
empowered to rebalance political and economic
asymmetries (both domestic and international) and ensure
an increasingly equitable distribution/redistribution of the
benefits of global economic activity. Likewise, unless the
rhetoric of sustainability is wholeheartedly embraced by
powerful (global-supranational-national) actors and
translated into action, the extreme poverty, vulnerability,
and environmental mismanagement witnessed today will


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Projected Trends in Supply

and Demand of Maize and Wheat
Javier Ekboir and Michael Morris

Demand for cereals such as maize and wheat can be
projected with greater certainty than supply, because the
"key drivers" affecting changes in demand-population
growth, income growth, and urbanization-are
characterized by a certain amount of inertia and unlikely
to change dramatically in the short run.

Over the next 20 years, global demand for maize is
projected to grow at roughly the same rate as in the recent
past. The composition of demand will continue to change,
with feed use of maize increasing more rapidly than food
use in both developed and developing countries (Table
7.1a). As a result of projected faster growth in feed use,
the market for yellow maize will expand relative to the
market for white maize. However, demand for white
maize will remain strong in certain countries and regions,
including Mexico, Central America, and Eastern and
Southern Africa, and white maize is likely to command a
modest price premium in these markets. Meanwhile, niche
markets are likely to emerge for certain types of specialty
maize (including maize with suitable industrial
characteristics and maize with improved nutritional
quality), assuming that appropriate germplasm becomes
available and the necessary market structures develop.
Studies conducted in southern Mexico show that the
emergence of these markets requires institutional
development and new breeding methodologies to
develop varieties with the right traits (Bellon pers. comm.).
These markets could be important for small-scale farmers,
as they may enable them to produce a differentiated
product that would not be in competition with the
cheaper maize produced by the largest producers.

Demand for maize will be very concentrated. By 2020,
the four largest consumers (China, USA, Brazil, and sub-
Saharan Africa) will account for approximately 70% of
world demand. China will become a major importer
because of its rapidly growing livestock industry. Food
consumption of maize will remain concentrated in Eastern
and Southern Africa, Mexico, and the smaller Latin
American countries.

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Over the next 20 years, global demand for wheat will
continue to grow, but somewhat more slowly than in the
recent past. Most of the world's wheat crop will be used
for human consumption, although feed use of wheat will
remain important in the EU and in parts of Eastern Europe
(Table 7.1b). Turkey, Central Asia, and the WANA (West
Asia/North Africa) Region are expected to remain the
leading wheat consumers in 2020. In these countries and
regions, increased demand for wheat, fueled by strong
population growth, will more than offset declining per
capital consumption. Wheat consumption per capital is
expected to increase sharply in Southeast Asia, most
notably in Vietnam, Myanmar, and Thailand. Since these
increases in wheat consumption will not be matched by
increases in domestic production, Southeast Asia is
expected to become a major wheat importer.

Supply of cereals is harder to project than demand,
because production in major exporting countries could
change dramatically in response to policy changes, which
are very difficult to predict. In the cases of maize and
wheat, producer subsidies in the EU and USA are currently
encouraging chronic overproduction. Surplus grain is sold
on the international market or given away as food aid,
depressing international prices and undermining
production incentives in other countries. Policy reforms
in the EU and USA could significantly alter current
production patterns, but despite much talk, relatively little
progress has been achieved in recent years toward
reforming European and American cereals policies.

Looking ahead, it is possible to envision two different
scenarios. If the EU and USA continue to support maize
and wheat production, global markets are likelyto remain
awash in grain, international prices are likely to remain
low, and current production patterns are unlikely to
change significantly. If, on the other hand, the EU and
USA are successful in implementing policy reforms that
result in significant reduction in the support afforded to
maize and wheat producers, international prices could
strengthen, and new players could enter into the market.

- r .4.
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Table 7.1a. Utilization of maize, 1997-2020.
Utilization Food Feed
(million t) (%) (%)
United States 183.1 2.1 75.8
EC 15 37.6 5.6 77.0
Japan 15.9 17.9 74.9
Australia 0.3 26.3 67.9
Other developed countries 18.1 22.3 61.0
Eastern Europe 28.1 5.2 84.4
Former Soviet Union 7.5 14.6 74.8
Central Asia 0.5 26.4 64.3
Rest Former Soviet Union 6.9 13.7 75.6
Latin America 75.6 29.5 55.3
Mexico 21.5 56.2 21.9
Brazil 33.7 9.5 79.5
Argentina 4.5 5.5 55.9
Colombia 2.7 57.6 40.3
Other Latin America 13.2 39.7 50.6
Sub-Saharan Africa 28.7 76.4 8.9
Nigeria 5.7 54.7 20.0
Northern Africa 3.7 88.2 3.6
Central and Western Africa 4.9 76.4 4.7
Southern Africa 7.6 79.8 9.5
Eastern Africa 6.7 84.6 4.8
West Asia/North Africa (WANA) 18.3 33.8 56.8
Egypt 7.9 46.6 41.8
Turkey 3.0 47.1 39.6
Other WANA 7.5 15.2 79.4
South Asia 13.7 76.5 6.0
India 10.7 79.9 1.9
Pakistan 1.3 58.7 19.7
Bangladesh 0.0 71.4 7.1
Other South Asia 1.8 68.2 21.3
Southeast Asia 23.1 38.5 50.7
Indonesia 9.9 78.1 6.0
Thailand 4.4 0.7 96.3
Malaysia 2.3 3.4 91.5
Philippines 4.6 11.3 76.3
Vietnam 1.5 20.2 74.5
Myanmar 0.2 55.4 36.1
Other Southeast Asia 0.1 88.8 6.9
East Asia 135.6 11.0 74.9
China 125.6 10.5 76.2
South Korea 8.1 10.1 71.6
Other East Asia 1.9 49.4 4.7
Asia 172.4 19.9 66.2
Rest of the world 0.1 56.8 39.2
Developed world 290.5 5.3 75.8
Developing countries 295.0 28.7 57.3
World 585.5 17.1 66.4
Source: IMPACT model, IFPRI. n.a. = not available.

2020 Food growth Feed growth
Utilization Food Feed 1980-97 97-2020 1980-97 97-2020

(million t) (%)
227.3 1.9
40.0 5.2
15.4 15.6
0.4 24.2
21.4 21.5
31.5 3.5
7.6 11.8
0.6 23.1
6.9 10.8
118.1 24.9
30.6 51.6
55.5 6.7
6.9 4.6
4.1 54.7
21.1 34.6
52.1 75.7
10.4 53.2
6.7 87.7
9.5 75.7
13.4 79.3
12.1 84.3
27.8 27.7
11.6 39.5
3.8 41.1
12.5 12.9
19.0 70.4
13.7 74.3
2.2 54.1
0.0 66.7
3.1 64.6
38.8 31.6
14.3 75.5
8.2 0.4
3.7 2.4
9.1 6.5
3.0 15.4
0.3 45.0
0.2 86.9
252.1 4.4
238.3 4.0
11.5 5.9
2.3 47.9
309.8 11.9
0.1 55.0
343.7 4.5
508.0 22.3
851.6 15.1

(%) (%/yr)
75.9 4.5
77.4 3.6
77.3 2.0
69.8 4.7
61.8 1.0
86.1 -0.4
77.6 15.8
67.5 n.a.
78.5 n.a.
60.3 2.1
26.6 2.2
82.2 1.0
56.8 1.8
43.2 4.0
55.7 2.1
9.6 3.6
21.4 12.4
4.1 4.2
5.5 3.6
10.0 2.5
5.1 2.3
63.2 4.5
48.9 3.0
45.5 7.9
81.7 7.6
12.2 2.6
7.5 3.1
24.3 2.0
4.8 13.6
24.9 0.3
58.0 3.5
8.6 4.9
96.5 8.4
92.4 6.2
81.1 -3.8
79.3 -0.5
46.2 1.8
8.5 0.3
81.8 -3.3
82.8 -3.8
75.8 12.9
6.2 2.3
74.5 -0.6
41.3 1.5
76.3 2.5
63.9 1.2
68.9 1.4

(%/yr) (%/yr) (%/yr)

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Table 7.1b. Utilization of wheat, 1997-2020.
Utilization Food Feed
(million t) (%) (%)
United States 35.3 68.2 24.7
EC 15 80.6 43.9 43.7
Japan 6.7 87.6 6.8
Australia 3.6 35.9 18.8
Other developed countries 13.9 53.9 34.6
Eastern Europe 31.6 46.5 33.9
Former Soviet Union 73.0 55.5 24.5
Central Asia 14.0 69.5 10.9
Rest Former Soviet Union 59.0 52.1 27.7
Latin America 29.6 82.4 7.2
Mexico 5.3 70.9 13.3
Brazil 8.7 89.5 4.0
Argentina 5.7 73.5 5.3
Colombia 1.1 98.3 0.0
Other Latin America 8.9 85.9 8.6
Sub-Saharan Africa 9.4 93.1 0.5
Nigeria 1.4 92.8 3.3
Northern Africa 3.6 89.2 0.0
Central and Western Africa 2.0 96.4 0.0
Southern Africa 1.5 96.5 0.0
Eastern Africa 1.0 95.7 0.0
West Asia/North Africa (WANA) 75.1 75.4 8.2
Egypt 11.8 79.1 8.8
Turkey 20.1 63.7 5.2
Other WANA 43.2 79.8 9.4
South Asia 93.5 88.6 1.2
India 66.9 87.4 1.2
Pakistan 19.5 91.5 1.8
Bangladesh 2.9 93.4 0.0
Other South Asia 4.3 89.9 0.2
Southeast Asia 7.8 95.4 2.4
Indonesia 3.7 98.1 0.0
Thailand 0.6 98.9 0.0
Malaysia 0.8 66.2 23.9
Philippines 2.1 99.9 0.0
Vietnam 0.5 98.6 0.0
Myanmar 0.1 92.4 0.0
Other Southeast Asia 0.0 100.0 0.0
East Asia 124.4 86.6 3.3
China 119.8 87.3 2.4
South Korea 3.6 63.2 36.2
Other East Asia 1.0 87.6 2.1
Asia 225.7 87.7 2.4
Rest of the world 0.3 88.7 0.0
Developed world 244.8 52.9 32.1
Developing countries 340.1 84.7 4.1
World 584.9 71.4 15.8
Source: IMPACT model, IFPRI. n.a. =not available.

2020 Food growth Feed growth
Utilization Food Feed 1980-97 97-2020 1980-97 97-2020

(million t) (%)
44.8 67.9
84.9 44.5
7.7 88.2
4.6 35.6
17.5 53.6
33.4 43.0
75.3 54.4
18.2 69.1
57.1 49.7
41.3 80.6
7.4 68.0
11.7 88.3
7.5 72.5
1.6 98.3
13.2 83.3
19.1 93.1
2.8 92.4
7.2 89.2
4.2 96.5
2.9 96.6
2.0 95.8
111.0 74.9
16.9 77.8
26.2 62.7
67.9 78.9
147.1 88.3
100.7 87.0
33.7 91.2
4.9 93.4
7.7 89.8
13.0 95.5
5.7 98.1
0.9 98.8
1.4 67.8
3.8 99.8
0.9 98.6
0.2 92.6
0.0 100.0
159.8 84.9
153.4 85.8
4.9 55.1
1.5 89.7
319.8 86.9
0.5 89.0
268.2 52.7
491.7 83.9
759.8 72.9

(%) (%/yr)
25.0 2.4
43.2 0.2
6.2 0.9
19.1 0.6
34.9 2.3
37.4 -0.8
25.6 -1.2
11.3 n.a.
30.2 n.a.
9.2 1.4
16.2 1.2
5.3 1.5
6.3 1.4
0.0 4.9
11.3 1.2
0.5 3.6
3.7 0.9
0.0 4.8
0.0 4.3
0.0 2.7
0.0 4.6
9.2 3.0
10.1 3.1
6.2 2.2
10.2 3.4
1.6 3.5
1.6 3.7
2.1 4.0
0.0 1.9
0.2 0.9
2.3 4.1
0.0 6.7
0.0 6.8
22.3 0.8
0.0 6.0
0.0 -4.3
0.0 2.2
0.0 -3.1
5.1 3.2
3.9 3.2
44.3 1.6
0.0 0.2
3.4 3.3
0.0 2.1
32.5 0.1
5.1 3.1
14.7 2.0

(%/yr) (%/yr) (%/yr)
1.0 7.5 1.1
0.3 4.6 0.2
0.6 -2.2 0.2
1.0 1.1 1.1
1.0 3.8 1.0
-0.1 -0.1 0.7
0.0 -5.8 0.3
1.1 n.a. 1.3
-0.3 n.a. 0.2
1.4 3.3 2.5
1.3 2.9 2.4
1.2 n.a. 2.5
1.1 1.6 2.0
1.6 n.a. n.a.
1.6 1.8 2.9
3.1 9.3 3.7
3.1 9.3 3.7
3.1 n.a. n.a.
3.3 n.a. n.a.
2.9 n.a. n.a.
3.0 n.a. n.a.
1.7 3.2 2.3
1.5 2.2 2.2
1.1 -3.9 1.9
1.9 9.7 2.4
2.0 3.6 3.1
1.8 3.9 3.1
2.4 3.5 3.1
2.3 n.a. n.a.
2.6 -4.2 2.8
2.2 31.3 2.1
1.9 n.a. n.a.
1.9 n.a. n.a.
2.5 31.3 2.1
2.7 n.a. n.a.
2.8 n.a. n.a.
2.2 n.a. n.a.
2.7 n.a. n.a.
1.0 4.8 2.9
1.0 2.8 3.2
0.8 32.2 2.3
1.8 -8.0 n.a.
1.5 4.7 3.0
2.5 n.a. n.a.
0.4 -0.3 0.5
1.6 3.8 2.6
1.2 0.1 0.8

1* 4

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The area planted to cereals could also expand significantly
in parts of the WANA Region and Central Asia, although
this would require technical change (improved water
management techniques and improvements in crop
management practices).

At the global level, supply of maize will keep pace with
demand for the foreseeable future, since most of the
major producing countries and regions have considerable
capacity to expand production quickly in response to
favorable changes in price incentives. Assuming no major
changes in producer support policies, the USA will remain
the world's largest maize producer (297 million tons) in
2020, followed by China (259 million tons), Brazil (54
million tons), Eastern Europe (40 million tons), and the
EC151 (39 million tons) (Table 7.2a). Most of the maize
produced by these countries will be yellow maize destined
for domestic and international feed markets. Maize
production will continue to increase slowly in developing
countries where maize is an important food staple,
although production will continue to experience
significant year-to-year variability in some countries and
regions, especially where maize is grown in drought-prone
environments (e.g., eastern and southern Africa, parts of
Central America). Most maize produced for food will
continue to be white maize.

The distribution of global maize production could change
if policy reforms succeed in reducing the level of support
afforded to producers in the EU and USA. Brazil and
Argentina, both of which have considerable amounts of
untapped crop land, could increase their importance in
the world maize market under such a scenario (assuming
additional investment in transportation infrastructure,
e.g., roads and port facilities).2 In particular, Brazil could
become self sufficient or even have a small surplus that
could be exported. Developing countries in which maize
is produced mainly for domestic food consumption,
especially those in eastern and southern Africa, would
remain largely unaffected by movements in international
maize prices.

Global supplies of wheat will also keep pace with demand.
As with maize, most of the major wheat-producing
countries and regions have considerable capacity to
expand production quickly in response to favorable
changes in price incentives. Supplies will therefore have
little trouble keeping pace with demand increases fueled
by population growth, income growth, and urbanization.
Barring major policy changes, China and the EC15 will
remain the world's largest wheat producers in 2020,
followed by India, the USA, the FSU (former Soviet Union),
WANA, Pakistan, and Turkey (Table 7.2b).

Long-term trends measured at more aggregated levels
may, however, conceal some important shifts in the
location of wheat production, particularly in areas where
agriculture is becoming more and more intensified.
Throughout most of South Asia and large parts of East
Asia, wheat is grown as part of intensive irrigated cropping
systems. Pressure for further intensification, combined
with rising prices for scarce land and water resources, as
well as reduced support for crop prices, is forcing
commercial producers in these systems to shift out of
wheat into higher-value crops and/or crops that are more
water-efficient and hence more profitable.

Grain quality factors may also play a role in determining
future production patterns for wheat. International
markets are expected to become increasingly segmented,
with separate channels for different grades and qualities,
so producers who have the capacity to target specialized
niche markets are likely to enjoy a competitive advantage.

Trade in cereals, including maize and wheat, is expected
to continue to grow. Future trade growth will be
associated with increasing production and consumption
of food and feed (caused by a global population that will
get larger, richer, and more urbanized). In addition,
agricultural trade is likely to get a boost from the policy
side. In the name of economic efficiency, more developing

EC15 consists of the following countries: Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and United Kingdom.
As was mentioned above, technical change could also enable Argentina and Brazil to greatly expand their supply
of grains and oilseeds even if USA and the EU continue to subsidize agriculture.

, It



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Table 7.2a. Area, yield, production of maize, 1997-2020.
1997 2020 Area growth Yield growth
Area Yield Production Area Yield Production 1980-97 97-2020 1980-97 97-2020
(million ha) (t/ha) (million t) (million ha) (t/ha) (million t) (%/yr) (%/yr) (%/yr) (%/yr)

United States 29.4 8.1 238.8
EC 15 4.2 8.7 36.9
Japan 0.0 2.5 0.0
Australia 0.1 5.9 0.4
Other developed countries 4.9 3.6 17.6
Eastern Europe 7.0 4.1 28.6
Former Soviet Union 2.7 2.6 7.1
Central Asia 0.2 2.6 0.5
Rest Former Soviet Union 2.5 2.7 6.6
Latin America 28.1 2.6 74.1
Mexico 7.8 2.3 18.0
Brazil 12.5 2.6 32.1
Argentina 3.1 4.9 15.1
Colombia 0.5 1.7 0.9
Other Latin America 4.2 1.9 7.9
Sub-Saharan Africa 20.7 1.3 26.2
Nigeria 4.1 1.3 5.4
Northern Africa 2.6 1.5 3.8
Central and Western Africa 4.4 1.1 4.7
Southern Africa 5.6 1.2 6.6
Eastern Africa 4.0 1.4 5.7
West Asia/North Africa (WANA) 2.0 4.8 9.5
Egypt 0.8 7.1 5.8
Turkey 0.5 3.9 2.1
Other WANA 0.6 2.6 1.6
South Asia 8.0 1.6 13.2
India 6.1 1.7 10.3
Pakistan 0.9 1.5 1.3
Bangladesh 0.0 1.0 0.0
Other South Asia 1.0 1.6 1.6
Southeast Asia 8.5 2.4 20.1
Indonesia 3.6 2.6 9.4
Thailand 1.3 3.4 4.5
Malaysia 0.0 1.8 0.0
Philippines 2.6 1.6 4.2
Vietnam 0.6 2.5 1.6
Myanmar 0.2 1.9 0.3
Other Southeast Asia 0.1 1.7 0.1
East Asia 25.2 4.9 123.2
China 24.6 5.0 121.9
South Korea 0.0 4.0 0.1
Other East Asia 0.6 2.0 1.2
Asia 41.7 3.8 156.5
Rest of the world 0.0 0.6 0.0
Developed world 48.3 6.8 329.4
Developing countries 92.5 2.9 266.3
World 140.7 4.2 595.7
Source: IMPACT model, IFPRI. n.a. = not available.

30.7 9.7 297.2
4.1 9.6 39.1
0.0 3.5 0.0
0.1 7.5 0.5
5.2 4.6 23.9
7.5 5.3 39.6
2.9 3.6 10.4
0.2 3.7 0.7
2.7 3.6 9.7
31.8 3.9 123.2
8.5 3.2 27.6
13.9 3.9 54.2
3.7 7.2 26.5
0.6 2.5 1.5
5.0 2.7 13.4
25.8 1.8 45.6
4.9 1.8 8.8
3.1 2.0 6.2
5.8 1.6 9.3
7.1 1.6 11.4
5.0 2.0 9.8
2.3 5.8 13.4
0.9 9.2 8.2
0.6 4.0 2.6
0.8 3.4 2.6
8.9 2.1 18.8
6.5 2.1 13.9
1.0 2.2 2.1
0.0 0.0 0.0
1.4 2.0 2.8
8.9 3.5 31.0
3.8 3.4 13.1
1.3 5.5 7.2
0.0 2.4 0.1
2.8 2.7 7.5
0.7 3.5 2.5
0.2 2.4 0.5
0.1 2.3 0.2
29.6 7.1 209.1
28.9 7.2 207.3
0.0 5.6 0.1
0.7 2.4 1.6
47.4 5.5 258.8
0.0 0.7 0.0
50.4 8.1 410.6
107.3 4.1 441.0
157.7 5.4 851.6

; A "

-0.1 0.2
0.4 -0.2
n.a. n.a.
0.7 0.6
-0.5 0.3
-0.5 0.3
-0.8 0.3
n.a. -0.5
n.a. 0.3
0.6 0.5
0.8 0.4
0.5 0.5
0.3 0.8
-0.8 0.4
0.9 0.8
3.2 1.0
14.0 0.7
4.7 0.8
2.3 1.1
1.5 1.1
1.5 1.0
0.2 0.7
0.1 0.4
-0.4 0.7
1.0 1.1
0.4 0.4
0.2 0.3
1.0 0.4
0.2 0.0
0.7 1.2
0.3 0.2
1.6 0.2
-0.5 0.1
8.3 0.0
-1.3 0.3
3.1 0.5
1.5 0.8
-2.0 0.5
1.2 0.7
1.2 0.7
-3.0 0.4
-0.8 0.3
0.8 0.6
4.8 -0.1
-0.2 0.2
1.2 0.7
0.7 0.5

countries will abandon failed policies to ensure national
food self-sufficiency and replace these with more
commercially-oriented agricultural policies designed to
ensure national food security. In many cases, they will
promote commercial production of export crops and
embrace grain imports to meet domestic production
shortfalls. At the same time, agricultural policies will
become increasingly linked with trade policy, with the
result that efficiency considerations may become less
important in determining production and consumption
decisions. In spite of these changes, however, it is unlikely
that all developing countries will be able to meet the
additional demand for food through trade alone, implying
that domestic production will have to increase as well.

International trade in maize is expected to continue
expanding for the foreseeable future, fueled by strong
demand for feed. Assuming no radical changes in current
policies, the USA will remain the world's dominant maize
exporter, while the EU, East Asia, Southeast Asia, and
WANA Region will remain major maize importers. Patterns
of global trade are unlikely to change significantly, unless
the USA proves unable or unwilling to adapt to the
evolving regulatory environment relating to GMOs. Maize
trade within Asia is expected to expand especially rapidly,
with future trade flows depending largely on
developments in China. Maize trade within Latin America
will increase as well, with Brazil an increasingly dominant

While the overall global picture is one of increasing trade
in maize, there will be exceptions. Some developing
countries, especially in eastern and southern Africa, will
continue to make limited use of international markets
because of the high transportation costs involved in
accessing them.

Global trade in wheat is also expected to expand. As in
past years, most wheat will be traded from developed
countries to developing countries. Assuming no significant
change in policies, the USA will remain the largest
exporter, followed by Canada, Australia, the EU, and
Argentina. Smaller producers (mainly in Central Asia and
eastern Europe) should be able to consolidate their share

4 A


of the market. Some of these countries could emerge as
significant exporters, but only after important investments
to modernize machinery stocks and marketing
infrastructure. China is likely to revert to importing large
quantities of wheat, with erratic swings in yearly import

Implications for CIMMYT
How will these projected developments in global maize
and wheat markets affect CIMMYT and its partners,
especially the poor in developing countries?

In a world that is becoming more populated, wealthier,
and more urbanized, and one in which economic activities
are increasingly linked through commercial relationships,
food production and consumption will depend
increasingly on national and international markets. The
role of markets will vary from country to country
depending on many factors, including the level of general
economic development, the quantity and quality of
transportation and communication infrastructure, the
efficiency of marketing institutions, and the incentives
created by agricultural as well as non-agricultural policies.
In developing countries, markets will be particularly
important in provisioning urban areas with imported food.
Markets will have less influence in determining food
supplies in rural areas, at least in the short to medium
term, because high transactions costs will prevent them
from functioning efficiently in these areas.

Future developments in international markets for maize
and wheat will be greatly influenced by economic policies
enacted in a small number of dominant exporting and
importing countries. Commercial farmers will be affected
directly by agriculture and trade policies, which will affect
prices and thereby influence production decisions. Non-
commercial farmers will be affected more indirectly.
Globalization will bring increased competition into local
markets, making it more difficult to sell occasional
surpluses. Lower international prices will reduce the
profitability of maize and wheat production, forcing many
farmers to look to other avenues to increase their incomes,
including off-farm employment. For many rural
households in developing countries, agriculture in general,
and maize and wheat cultivation in particular, will shift
from being the main component of a livelihood strategy



t A
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Table 7.2b. Area, yield, production of wheat, 1997-2020.
1997 2020 Area growth Yield growth
Area Yield Production Area Yield Production 1980-97 97-2020 1980-97 97-2020
(million ha) (t/ha) (million t) (million ha) (t/ha) (million t) (%/yr) (%/yr) (%/yr) (%/yr)

United States 24.9 2.7
EC 15 17.2 5.8
Japan 0.2 3.4
Australia 10.9 1.9
Other developed countries 12.9 2.3
Eastern Europe 9.5 3.3
Former Soviet Union 47.2 1.4
Central Asia 13.2 1.0
Rest Former Soviet Union 34.0 1.6
Latin America 9.5 2.4
Mexico 0.8 4.4
Brazil 1.6 1.7
Argentina 5.9 2.4
Colombia 0.0 2.1
Other Latin America 1.2 2.4
Sub-Saharan Africa 1.6 1.7
Nigeria 0.0 2.1
Northern Africa 1.2 1.4
Central and Western Africa 0.0 1.3
Southern Africa 0.1 3.8
Eastern Africa 0.2 1.7
West Asia/North Africa (WANA) 26.4 1.9
Egypt 1.0 5.7
Turkey 9.4 2.1
Other WANA 16.0 1.6
South Asia 37.7 2.4
India 25.9 2.6
Pakistan 8.3 2.1
Bangladesh 0.7 2.1
Other South Asia 2.8 1.4
Southeast Asia 0.1 0.9
Indonesia 0.0 0.0
Thailand 0.0 0.7
Malaysia 0.0 0.0
Philippines 0.0 0.0
Vietnam 0.0 0.0
Myanmar 0.1 0.9
Other Southeast Asia 0.0 0.0
East Asia 30.2 3.8
China 29.8 3.8
South Korea 0.0 3.9
Other East Asia 0.4 0.9
Asia 68.0 3.0
Rest of the world 0.0 1.8
Developed world 122.7 2.6
Developing countries 105.4 2.7
World 228.1 2.6
Source: IMPACT model, IFPRI. n.a. = not available.


25.8 3.3 86.0
16.8 6.1 103.2
0.2 4.0 0.6
11.4 2.3 26.6
12.8 3.0 38.1
9.5 4.0 38.3
48.6 1.7 81.3
14.3 1.2 17.1
34.2 1.9 64.2
11.7 3.4 39.3
0.8 5.2 4.1
1.8 2.5 4.5
7.7 3.4 25.7
0.0 2.8 0.1
1.4 3.4 5.0
2.2 2.3 5.1
0.0 3.5 0.1
1.7 2.0 3.2
0.0 1.8 0.0
0.2 4.2 0.7
0.4 2.6 1.0
28.8 2.5 73.2
1.2 6.9 8.6
10.0 2.6 25.6
17.6 2.2 38.9
40.2 3.2 127.4
27.8 3.4 94.0
8.8 2.9 25.7
0.8 2.9 2.2
2.8 2.0 5.5
0.1 1.1 0.1
0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0 0.8 0.0
0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0 0.0
0.1 1.1 0.1
0.0 0.0 0.0
30.1 4.7 140.7
29.7 4.7 140.2
0.0 4.8 0.0
0.4 1.3 0.5
70.3 3.8 268.2
0.0 2.2 0.0
125.1 3.0 374.1
113.1 3.4 385.7
238.2 3.2 759.8

H r t :. . .,

S .. *
.1 Ak

-0.9 0.2
0.1 -0.1
-1.0 -0.2
-0.3 0.2
-0.2 0.0
0.6 0.0
-1.3 0.1
n.a. 0.3
n.a. 0.0
-0.4 0.9
0.5 0.0
-3.6 0.5
0.7 1.1
-2.3 0.8
0.2 1.0
2.4 1.5
7.1 0.5
2.6 1.4
0.8 2.1
0.9 2.3
1.9 1.8
0.7 0.4
3.4 0.8
0.1 0.3
1.0 0.4
0.9 0.3
0.9 0.3
1.1 0.3
3.2 0.1
0.7 0.1
0.2 0.8
n.a. n.a.
n.a. 0.0
n.a. n.a.
n.a. n.a.
n.a. n.a.
0.1 0.8
n.a. n.a.
0.1 0.0
0.2 0.0
-12.7 0.0
-1.8 0.1
0.6 0.2
n.a. n.a.
-0.7 0.1
0.5 0.3
-0.2 0.2

0.9 1.0
2.5 0.2
0.7 0.7
2.5 0.8
1.7 1.1
0.2 0.9
0.1 0.6
n.a. 1.0
n.a. 0.6
2.9 1.4
0.8 0.8
3.9 1.7
2.6 1.5
2.5 1.3
3.2 1.5
1.3 1.4
-0.7 2.2
1.8 1.3
4.1 1.4
2.1 0.5
-0.2 1.8
2.1 1.2
3.5 0.8
0.7 0.9
3.1 1.5
2.6 1.3
3.0 1.2
1.7 1.4
0.7 1.4
0.6 1.6
0.0 0.6
n.a. n.a.
n.a. 1.0
n.a. n.a.
n.a. n.a.
n.a. n.a.
0.0 0.6
n.a. n.a.
3.8 0.9
3.8 0.9
1.2 1.0
1.3 1.6
3.2 1.0
2.5 0.8
1.4 0.6
2.9 1.1
2.0 0.9

to being just one element in a diversified portfolio of
income-generating activities. At the same time, new
opportunities will emerge to produce and market non-
traditional crops or to find off-farm employment.

Research policies will affect both commercial and non-
commercial farmers by determining their technology
choices. In the case of maize, commercial farmers are
generally well served by profit-oriented private firms, so
it is not clear what CIMMYT can or should be doing for
them. Non-commercial maize farmers, on the other hand,
receive little or no attention from the private sector, so
clearly CIMMYT has a role to play in providing them with
technology. In the case of wheat, the issue is less clear,
since technology development for wheat (especially
breeding) is usually carried out by public organizations,
which have suffered major erosion in funding in recent

These projected developments in global maize and wheat
markets have a number of important implications for
1. Many developing countries will rely increasingly on
international markets to satisfy domestic food
consumption requirements, especially those of urban
consumers. In most of these countries, increasing the
productivity of maize- and wheat-based farming systems
will have relatively little impact on urban poverty

2. For the foreseeable future, lack of reliable access to
markets will force hundreds of millions of poor rural
households in developing countries to produce maize
and wheat for home consumption or to purchase locally
produced maize and wheat. Many of these households
could benefit from sustainable, productivity-enhancing
technologies for maize and wheat production that are
appropriate to their circumstances. However, productivity
increases in maize- and wheat-based farming systems
will not be enough to raise most of these households
out of poverty. New income-generating activities, both
on- and off-farm, will have to enter into their livelihood
3. Experimental evidence (not reviewed in this chapter)
suggests that improved germplasm alone is unlikely to
lead to significant productivity increases in maize- and
wheat-based farming systems, particularly in unfavorable
environments characterized by severe abiotic and biotic
stresses. Improved germplasm could, however, boost
productivity if it is adopted in combination with improved
crop management practices. The need to combine
germplasm with management practices has important
implications for research, extension, and policy design.
4. Even in countries with flourishing private seed industries,
many poor maize and wheat farmers are unable to afford
improved seed or find suitable varieties (Morris 2002;
Heisey et al. 2002). The weakening of public research
and extension institutions is compounding this problem.
Policy actions will be needed to implement effective
technology delivery systems that can reach farmers who
are currently being bypassed.

4 A





t A
i -: V.

Intellectual Property

Law and Practice

Shawn Sullivan

Changing Perceptions of
Developing Countries as Markets
for Commercial Products
Although for-profit enterprises may want to do good for
the poor of the world, there are three major
considerations (according to a representative from
Monsanto) that may make sharing their technology
1. Companies do not want to destroy possible future
commercial markets for their products. At least some
developing countries increasingly show the prospect of
a market where money can be made, albeit only in the
long term. One of the reasons for this perception is the
fact (discussed in detail below) that it is becoming
increasingly more cost-effective for companies to protect
their innovations with patents in developing countries.
2. Even when a company has no present interest in a
particular geographic or product market, it generallywill
not donate technology for humanitarian uses if there is
a perception that such a donation may help the
company's competitor.
3. Increasingly agricultural technology is of such a nature
that it cannot simply be delivered to its intended users
in developing countries without the need for further
involvement by the technology developer. Transgenic
technologies, in particular, may require "resistance
management" strategies (as in the case of technologies
making use of pesticidal or herbicidal qualities),
continuous monitoring and training by the technology
developer, and possibly someone to assume monetary
liability for product failure or other unplanned events.
Before donating technology for humanitarian uses, the
owner of the technology wants to be certain that he/
she has minimized the risk of having to remain involved
in, or of incurring liability because of, the humanitarian

The points made above by the Monsanto executive echo
similar comments made by other multinational developers
of biotechnology and are relevant to the rest of this

Changes in Patent Law
In 1980, the US Congress passed the Bayh-Dole Act, which
enabled universities and other not-for-profit entities to
retain intellectual property rights in their federally funded
inventions.3 In the same year, in Diamond v Chakrabarty,
the Supreme Court of the United States held that
genetically engineered bacteria could be the subject of
patents under the United States' general utility patent

Five years after Chakrabarty, the patent appeals board of
the US Patent and Trademark Office held that the utility
patent statute includes plants as patentable subject
matter.5 This ruling made it possible in the USA to obtain
"dual protection," i.e., protection of plant varieties by
both utility patents and plant breeders' rights, a practice
which the US Supreme Court recently endorsed.6 In
response to these changes, private companies and
universities actively sought and obtained US product and
process utility patents on a variety of biotechnology tools
and processes.7

Similar developments occurred in Europe. Article 53(b)
of the European Patent Convention (EPC) provides that
"European patents shall not be granted in respect of ...
plant or animal varieties...."8 However, in a series of
decisions by the technical appeal boards of the European
Patent Office (EPO) beginning in the 1980s, the prohibition
on patenting of plant varieties has been held not to

Pub. L. No. 96-517, 6(a), 94 Stat. 3019-28 (1980)(codified at 35 U.S.C. 200-12 (1'' I,
447 U.S. 303 (1980).
227 U.S.PQ. 443 (Bd. Pat. App.&lnterf. 1985).
534 U.S. 124 (2001).
See, e.g., United States Patent 4,536,475 (issued Aug. 20, 1985, for plant vector); United States Patent 4,407,956
(issued Oct. 4, 1983, for cloned cauliflower mosaic virus DNA as plant vehicle); United States Patent 4,237,224
(issued Dec. 2, 1980, for process for producing biologically functional chimeras).
The European Patent Convention was signed into existence in Munich as the Convention on the Grant of
European Patents, Oct. 5, 1973, 1065 U.N.TS. 255, 13 I.L.M. 270.

F' )

4 1

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preclude the patenting of hybrids9 and other groupings
of plants that may include varieties, so long as the patent
does not claim a single plant variety.10

As a result of legislative limitations on patentable subject
matter, most developing countries avoided the first waves
of patents on biotechnology innovations that appeared
in the United States and Europe in the 1980s and early
1990s. For example, in Mexico, under the 1970s' Leyde
Invenciones y Marcas, essentially all biotechnology
inventions, even pharmaceutical products and the
methods for manufacturing them, were not patentable.
Similar legislation in other countries rendered the filing
of biotechnology patent applications futile.

By the late 1980s, however, developed countries were
actively pressuring developing countries to conform their
patent legislation to US and European standards. In the
case of Mexico, the USA employed trade sanctions to
penalize the disregard of existing Mexican legislation and
made the strengthening of Mexican IP laws an inseparable
part of the negotiations leading to the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). As a result, NAFTA, signed
in September 1992, required Mexico to substantially
reform its patent and other IP legislation by, among other
things, allowing the patenting of previously excluded
subject matter,11 strengthening its regime for protection
of trade secrets,12 and providing specific mechanisms to
enforce IP rights.13

Also in the 1980s and 1990s, the USA and Europe utilized
the Uruguay Round of trade discussions under the GATT
as a forum to advocate stronger IP protection in all
countries. This effort led in 1994 to the Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) of
the WTO. Like no other broadly multilateral IP treaty before
it, TRIPS imposes on all WTO member states the obligation
to conform the substantive provisions of their IP laws to
certain minimum requirements. In particular, WTO
members are required to provide IPR protection-either
through patents or an effective sui generis system, or
both-for plant varieties.14

The deadlines for implementation of TRIPS have now
expired (with limited exceptions) for all but the least
developed countries. As a result of national legislation in
developing countries implementing TRIPS, many of the
legal barriers that formerly prevented the patenting of
biotechnology inventions have been removed.15

The cost of patent filing has also diminished substantially
as a result of the increasing accession of developing
countries to the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT), which
makes it possible to seek patent protection for the same
invention simultaneously in a number of countries by filing
a single international application. In a PCT application
the applicant designates the PCT-member countries in
which the applicant wishes the application to be

9 No. T320/87 Hybrid Plants/Lubrizol, 1990 O.J. EUR. PAT. OFF. 71 (1988).
O1 No. G 1/98 Transgenic Plant/Novartis II, 3/2000 O.J. EUR. PAT. OFF. 111, 2000 EUR. PAT. OFF. REP. 303 (Dec. 20, 1999). See
also No. T49/83 CIBA GEIGY/Propagating Material, 1984 O.J. EUR. PAT. OFF. 112 (1983) (plant propagating material
chemically treated to confer herbicide resistance was patentable).
1 NAFTA, Part VI, art. 1709.
2 NAFTA, Part VI, art. 1711.
3 AFTA, Part VI, arts. 1714-18.
14 In 1999, the WTO's TRIPS Council was scheduled to re-open the discussion on the wording of Article 27.3(b) in order to
conduct a mandatory "review" of this sub-paragraph. The Seattle conference was disrupted by violent protests, however,
and the delegates failed to reach agreement on Article 27.3(b). On December 17, 1999, the WTO General Council
formally postponed any decisions on how to proceed with issues outstanding from the disrupted Seattle meeting.
15 Some who oppose the patenting of living organisms have taken heart from the December 6, 2002 decision of the
Canadian Supreme Court in The Commissioner of Patents v. The President and Fellows of Harvard College, in which the
Harvard "oncomouse"-and seemingly all "higher life forms"- were held not to be patentable under the current
Canadian patent legislation. However, it is important to note that there the court found no inherent bar to patentability
but simply concluded that the existing legislation did not extend patentable subject matter to the higher life form
invention. The court expressly recognized the ability of the Canadian Parliament to provide for such patents, and lobbying
efforts to overturn the court's decision legislatively have already begun.




yi ;
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, II

processed. The application is then subjected to an
"international search" by one of the major national patent
offices, and a report is issued concerning literature that
might affect the patentability of the invention. Thereafter
(up to 30 months after the initial application filing) the
application may enter the "national phase" in the
countries designated by the applicant, and the patent
offices of those countries judge the application in light
of their national patent laws.

Patent Cooperation Treaty applications have proliferated
dramatically since the treaty was concluded in 1970.
Presently 118 countries are members of the PCT,16 61 of
which are classified as developing nations.17 Worldwide
PCT applications increased from 2,625 in 1979 to 67,007
in 1998. The average number of countries designated
per PCT application was 6.66 in 1979 and grew to 71.74
by 1998.18

These increases arose in part because of activity in
developing countries, where PCT applications skyrocketed.
According to the World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO), PCT applications in developing countries increased
by 679% from only 609 in 1997 to 5,379 in 2000,19 with
the greatest percentage increases in China (188%), India
(102.6%), the Republic of Korea (53.1%), and Mexico

Because many of the legal and practical obstacles to
patenting of bioscience inventions in developing countries
have diminished, patent applicants are increasingly seeking
protection in those countries. Thus in Mexico patents have
been issued for transgenic viruses,21 isolated plant genes
useful for the improvement of agricultural crops,22 and
isolated nucleotide sequences in DNA, such asthose found
in Bacillus thuringiensis, which have industrial
applications.23 In addition, there are now pending in
Mexico patent applications covering transgenic plants24
and transgenic animals developed for testing purposes.25

16 World Intellectual Property Organization, Update 182/2003 New Contracting Parties to WIPO-Administered Treaties in
2002 (Jan. 15, 2003), http://www.wipo.int/pressroom/en/updates/2003/upd182.htm.
17 1.11. 11 i ii l these presently include Mexico, Colombia, Costa Rica, Uruguay Zimbabwe, Malawi, Kenya, Turkey,
Kazakstan, India, Georgia, China, and the Philippines -countries where CIMMYT conducts much of its work.
18 About the Patent Cooperation Treaty, http://www.wipo.org/pctlen/treaty/about.htm.
19 Institute Mexicano de la Propiedad Industrial, 2001 INFORME ANNUAL 1.3.
20 Id.
21 See, e.g., Mexican Patent No. 203299 (awarded July 25, 2001 to Canadian government for transgenic insect virus useful
as a biopesticide); Mexican Patent No. 191782 (awarded April 19, 1999 to Rhone-Poulenc Rorer S.A. for a recombinant
virus useful for gene therapy and treatment of lipoprotein deficiency).
22 See, e.g., Mexican Patent No. 201029 (awarded March 9, 2001 to Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc. for the use of a gene
from a mutant maize plant); Mexican Patent No. 197189 (awarded June 27, 2000 to Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc. for
isolated and purified DNA sequences useful for the expression of traits in the pollen of maize).
23 See, e.g., Mexican Patent No. 196561 (awarded May 22, 2000 to Mycogen Corporation for isolated components of
Bacillus thuringiensis useful as a pesticide for control of cockroaches); Mexican Patent No. 195706 (awarded March 28,
2000 to Abbott Laboratories for isolated components of Bacillus thuringiensis to control, inter alia, Spodoptera frugiperda,
S. exigua, Plutella xilostella and Tricho plusia ni); Mexican Patent No. 194835 (awarded January 11, 2000 to Mycogen
Corporation for, inter alia, nucleotide sequences that code for crystal toxic proteins to control aphids in agricultural
24 See, e.g., Mexican Patent App. 9805799 (filed July 17, 1998 by DeKalb Genetics Corp., covering "un metodo para
conferir la tolerancia o resistencia a la tension por agua o sal en una plant monocotiledonea, y/o alternar el contenido
osmoprotector de una plant monocotiledonea, para introducir un segment de ADN preseleccionado en la plant. Esta
invencion tambien se refiere a las celulas y semillas transformadas y al crecimiento de plants fertiles a partir de las celulas
transformadas y a su pollen").
25 Mexican Patent App. 9605550 (filed Nov. 13, 1996 by Regents of the University of California and covering "un gen de PrP
artificial, un animal transgenico que contiene al gen, y un ensayo en donde el animal transgenico se utiliza para detectar la
presencia de priones patogenicos en una muestra, o para diagnosticar una causa de muerte").




1 *.

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In light of the above, it seems likely that, within a few
years, the practice of patenting biotechnology inventions
in Mexico (and other developing nations) will be practically
indistinguishable from practices that currently prevail in
Europe.26 This means that although the most frequent
restrictions posed by intellectual property laws for the
Centers of the Consultative Group on International
Agricultural Research (CGIAR) to date have been imposed
contractually (i.e., through material transfer agreements),
in the future, CGIAR Centers are likely to have to face
the same "patent thicket" that exists in industrialized
countries today.

Intellectual Property in Data
Collections and Literary Works
Because genomic databases and other compilations of
data have become critical to research in some fields of
agricultural research, developments concerning
proprietary claims to data will be relevant for CGIAR
Centers in the future.

The ability of high-speed computers to manipulate data
in increasingly useful ways has generally augmented the
commercial value of data. Compilers of data wish to
extract as much of that value as they can, with the aid of
legal doctrines (such as copyright law) and devices (such
as nondisclosure agreements).

Traditionally copyright law has been said not to protect
an idea in itself but only the expression of the idea.
Consistent with this concept, in Feist Publications, Inc. v
Rural Telephone Service,27 the US Supreme Court rejected
the idea that the effort involved in obtaining data (i.e.,
where facts have been gathered through the "sweat of
the brow" of investigation and compilation) justified
granting the compiler of facts an exclusive right to use
the data. Therefore, if compilations of data are made

public (in Feistthe data consisted of telephone numbers
and related data disclosed in a telephone directory), only
those elements of the compilation that express a minimal
element of creativity, such as original elements in the
selection, arrangement and display of the data, can be
protected by US copyright law.

The Feist decision had a number of impacts. First,
developers of commercial databases mounted an intensive
lobbying effort in the USA and Europe to obtain special
protection for databases. In the USA, these efforts have
yet to succeed. In Europe they were more successful. In
the EU, Council Directive 96/9/EC of 11 March 1996 on
the Legal Protection of Databases requires EU member
states to "provide for a right for the maker of a database
which shows that there has been qualitatively and/or
quantitatively a substantial investment in either the
obtaining, verification or presentation of the contents to
prevent extraction and/or re-utilization of the whole or
of a substantial part evaluated qualitatively and/or
quantitatively, of the contents of that database." Two
important cases28 that have been referred to the European
Court of Justice may eventually flesh out the parameters
of this still-new, sui generis form of IP right.

A second result of Feist has been increasing reliance by
database developers on the use of trade secrets to
maintain the commercial value of data compilations. To
obtain access to many genomic databases, it is often
necessary to sign highly restrictive contracts, in which the
user agrees not to divulge to third parties data from the
compilation or to use the data for any purposes other
than those specified in the contract.

At the same time that these developments have occurred,
copyright law itself has been strengthened considerably.
Four years ago, the widely criticized US Digital Millenium
Copyright Act (DMCA) handed to US copyright holders a

The practice is likely to continue to differ somewhat from that in the USA, where plant varieties can be patented as well as
protected by plant breeders' rights. Mexican law currently prohibits the patenting of plant varieties. In addition, the above
comparison of Mexican with European practices refers only to the practice of applying for and obtaining patents. The
issues pertaining to enforcement of patents are quite different and much more basic in Mexico than in Europe and are
likely to remain so for some time.
449 U.S. 808 (1990).
William Hill v. British Horseracing Board and Fixtures Marketing Limited v AB Svenska Spel.

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variety of unprecedented rights over their literary and
artistic works. Less well-known is the fact that the WIPO
Copyright Treaty, which is now in force and growing in
acceptance among both industrialized and developing
countries, requires member states to enact provisions
similar to those of the DMCA, including its controversial
prohibition on circumvention of measures adopted by the
copyright holder to prevent reproduction of the work.29

The impact of these and other legislative developments
in the field of copyright and data protection has been to
give authors and compilers of data greater incentives to
withhold their works from the public domain by providing
potent legal weapons against persons who would
appropriate those works to their own use without

The International Undertaking on
Plant Genetic Resources30

On November 3, 2001, in Rome, representatives of 116
nations approved the International Treaty on Plant Genetic
Resources for Food and Agriculture.31 The Treaty has many
implications for claims of IP rights for germplasm. It will
come into force 90 days after the 40th instrument of
ratification has been deposited with FAO. A Governing
Body will be established to implement the Treaty.

The Treaty applies only to plant genetic resources useful
for food and agriculture (PGRFA). Its purposes are: (1) to
encourage conservation of PGRFA in order to preserve
and enhance the genetic diversity of plant species and
varieties of value to food or agriculture; (2) to provide a
basis for rewarding farmers for their contributions in

conserving, improving, and making available PGRFA; (3)
to elaborate further the system of national sovereignty
over genetic resources first established at the Convention
on Biological Diversity (CBD), while ensuring that such
exercise of sovereignty does not hinder international
exchange of PGRFA; and (iv) to create a multilateral system
of access and benefit sharing to coordinate exchanges

The Treaty's Multilateral System of Access and Benefit-
Sharing will apply to an initial annex of 35 food crops
and 32 genera of forages. Maize and wheat are
specifically identified among the listed food crops.

Not all crops listed in the Treaty annex will be subject to
the Multilateral System. It covers only listed PGRFA (1)
which are "in the public domain" and managed and
controlled by member states, and (2) which are held in
ex situ collections by international agricultural research
centers (IARCs) of the CGIAR and other institutions.

Treaty Article 12 provides for facilitated access to PGRFA
within the Multilateral System. Covered materials will be
made available subject to a standard material transfer
agreement (MTA). Recipients of PGRFA accessed through
the system may not "claim any intellectual property or
other rights that limit the facilitated access to the [PGRFA],
or their genetic parts or components, in the form received
from the Multilateral System." Recipients who
commercialize such materials will have to pay into a
financial mechanism an equitable share of benefits arising
from such commercialization. Such payments will not be
mandatory if the product is made available without
restriction to others for further research and breeding.

Article 11 of the WIPO Copyright Treaty provides, "Obligations concerning Technological Measures-Contracting
Parties shall provide adequate legal protection and effective legal remedies against the circumvention of effective
technological measures that are used by authors in connection with the exercise of their rights under this Treaty or the
Berne Convention and that restrict acts, in respect of their works, which are not authorized by the authors concerned
or permitted by law."
This portion of this paper is taken from an article submitted for publication and therefore may be subject to third party
copyright interests.
Two nations-the USA and Japan-conspicuously declined to approve the Treaty, purportedly because of concerns

about the effect of the Treaty on IP rights. il, I I i the USA reconsidered its objections and signed (but has not
yet ratified) the Treaty.

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Benefits shared under the Multilateral System are required
to flow primarily to farmers, especially in developing
countries and countries with economies in transition, who
conserve and sustainably utilize PGRFA.

Only nation states may sign the Treaty. However, Article
15 calls upon IARCs to enter into agreements with the
Governing Body to make PGRFA in the ex situ collections
that are held in trust for humanity available through the
Multilateral System. The current MTAs governing access
to in-trust materials will be revised, and IARCs will be
required to recognize the Governing Body's authority to
provide policy guidance concerning exsitucollections that
are subject to the Treaty. In return, member states will
make materials available through the Multilateral System
to IARCs that sign such agreements.

The full impact of the Treaty on IP rights affecting CGIAR
Centers remains to be seen. However, it is plain that if
the Treaty comes into effect (and all indications are that
the minimum of 40 ratifications for the Treaty to enter
force will be attained), the character of CGIAR Centers
as producers of international public goods will be
reinforced for the first time in indisputably binding legal
documents. CGIAR Centers will have considerably less
discretion than today over the terms and conditions under
which they may make PGRFA covered by the treaty
available to others. Thus the use of germplasm (but not
necessarily other products of research) by CGIAR Centers
as "bargaining chips" in order to obtain funds or access
to technology will largely be eliminated.

Technology Diffusion Strategies
CGIAR research institutes sometimes obtain licenses of
third-party technology orjointly develop new technology
with third parties. In these instances, the public institution
must negotiate with the third party/ies over the extent to
which the center will be permitted to use the technology
for humanitarian purposes. One model of "humanitarian
use" licenses has permitted not-for-profit institutes to
diffuse proprietary technology for the benefit of
"subsistence farmers." However, as mentioned in previous
chapters, the nature of poverty is changing, and licenses
permitting the use of technology to help subsistence
farmers may not be of much use in combating the most
intractable problems of hunger and malnutrition.

The preferred scope of licenses for humanitarian uses may
be an unrestricted right to use the subject technology in
a particular territory where it is most needed. However,
as it becomes more and more feasible for companies to
obtain IP protection in developing countries, and as those
countries come to be perceived as future profit centers,
IP owners are likely to be even less generous than at
present in permitting the use of their own technology
and will bargain harder over restrictions on use ofjointly
developed technology. Public institutes may have to work
harder to develop "bargaining chips," i.e., proprietary
technology of their own which can be offered to third
parties in exchange for access to commercial technology.

For the foreseeable future, IP issues affecting public
international research are likelyto become more complex.
This does not mean that research will become impossible
for the public sector. However, IP issues will require greater
attention and sophistication on the part of the research

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Information Technology

and Information Processing

Ed Brandon

Predicting the future of the information technology (IT)
field is a difficult task, largely because there are no good
trends that one can use. Technically, the field is fast
changing, although some will argue that the wheel is
constantly being re-invented. Also the IT world is very
much a seesaw, with booms and busts, and it is
characterized by great swings in reaction to external
changes. So, for example, while 9/11 changed the world,
it was a huge shock wave to the IT sub-world,
compounding the bust of the .com companies and shifting
some emphasis away from improved functionality and
performance to improved security and support for military

The Average User
Scientists graduating today have some programming skills,
and tools available to them are easier to use and more
powerful than in previous times. This is a trend that will
continue. It does not mean that IT shops will be required
to do less programming, as the big systems (from financial
to specialized systems such as CIMMYT's wheat system
[IWIS]) will always require specialized IT skills to develop
and/or implement. But it does mean that scientists can
do more manipulation/interpretation/projection with their
own data, or with subsets of data extracted from larger
systems. In addition, scientists know what is possible and,
therefore, what to ask for in the way of functionality of
the larger systems.

At the support level, there are still many who use a
computer as an expensive typewriter and who do not
know how to use the office productivity tools effectively,
although this too should change for the better over time.

Issues about GMOs make CGIAR Centers more likely
targets for attack than the average organization. Just as
viruses are expected generally to increase in number and
in complexity, we can also assume that attackers will
increase in numbers and be more sophisticated in their
endeavors. Therefore, some attention will be diverted
away from productive work to defensive work in IT shops
in all the Centers.

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The World Wide Web
Although the Web has been around for 15 years in some
circles, and popularly for perhaps half that time, much
of the world remains e-challenged.

Even in developed countries, e-commerce is not as widely
accepted as above-average users might expect. Recent
surveys show that significant percentages of families
remain unconnected and that as few as 2% actually use
the Internet for e-commerce. Fear about security (use of
credit cards, identity theft, etc.) is widespread and hard
to overcome. Acceptance is, of course, much higher for
companies, governments, and institutions. Business-to-
business usage is much higher than personal usage.

Business is moving, slowly but surely, to using Web-based
applications in place of client/server (LAN, Local Area
Network) or stand-alone systems. This trend should
accelerate, unless great security shocks hit.

Scientists know much more than many other users about
the potential of the Web and the information and
information tools available on the Internet. The challenge
is to better access this goldmine of resources, and to
improve the integration of systems at the level of the
Web. This will be the driving force in all major software
development in the next few years, from operating
systems functionality to application development.
CIMMYT's IT unit sees Web-based applications as the
wave of the future for its systems, but it will be a number
of years before the goal is reached.

Standardization in the computer field (e.g., hardware,
software, data exchange formats) is important to success
in continued automation of research activities and the
exchange of information, but it is not in itself essential.
But standardization remains an elusive goal. Standards
organizations (especially the ISO, International
Organization for Standardization) are seen today as being
too slow to implement global/system-wide standards,
and de facto industry standards are more the norm. Often
a new standard is another approach, so that the gap
between goals and reality will remain for some time to

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E-challenged areas, including low bandwidth and e-mail
support for Web-based systems, will remain in some cases
for some time, so global systems must continue to be
developed with this in mind.

Many areas of the world are still e-challenged, either for
lack of an appropriate infrastructure, or regulatory
constraints and monopolistic service provision, or both.
While the WTO rules will, in time, address the latter issue,
it will be a very slow process, with signatory countries
continuing to use restrictive practices.

On the other hand, new technologies, such as voice and
video over the Internet, demand enormous increases in
bandwidth, which can be difficult to support. Voice will
definitely move rapidly to the Internet, and some phone
companies in developed countries are already routing
some or all of their long distance services this way
(unbeknownst to the users). The Internet has the ability
to allow a complete bypassing of the phone companies
in the future.

Video over the Internet or the phone (video conferencing)
remains an expensive option to implement in-house, and
is still not available in many parts of the world. It will take
longer to come, and it is impossible to predict how
widespread its usage will be, or when.

Although it will prove difficult for the CGIAR to advance
to more shared and harmonized systems, IT managers
are committed to moving in that direction. The most
successful efforts to date have been at the infrastructure
level, where the focus has been, and will remain initially,
in the area of administrative systems and other aspects
of infrastructure support. It is anticipated that progress
on the scientific system side will be slower.

Changes in the IT Industry
More shakeups in the IT industry are anticipated (such as
changing standards, consolidation of key companies, and
shifting of software development activities from the
expensive developed countries to newly-industrialized
countries). More consolidation will result in lack of
competition in the short run. This trend may well lead to
more political and practical support for more open-source

According to Michael Tiemann, Chief Technical Officer,
Red Hat: "The industry right now is clearly out of balance.
Many people would argue now that there is an oversupply
of technology and an undersupply of quality. There's
undersupply of competition, there's oversupply of
incompatibility" (C|Net: http://news.com.com/1200-

At this time, the transfer rate of data using wireless
technology is still relatively slow. These transfer rates will
increase, but so will the rates on LANs; wireless will always
lag. The reception range will never be large (perhaps a
hundred meters) but it will increase in popularity and
usefulness, allowing business travelers to hook up easily
to the Internet wherever they are, to connect to corporate
systems when in meeting rooms, and so on.

Instant Messaging
It is probably too early to see how the technology related
to instant messaging will develop, but clearly this area
will also grow and no doubt change. Standardization is
critical here, so it is bound to improve.

Open-Source Software
Open-source development of software (software
developed by numerous persons online, with an open
license that makes the software available and free) is
probably over the acceptance hurdle, especially in the
academic environment, though it remains taboo to the
great majority of the business world. But even here there
are interesting exceptions, such as IBM.

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Issues facing the future of open source are:
* Support when things don't work
* Copyright, digital rights, and other looming IP issues
* Standardization
*Acceptance in the business world generally
* Security is proving to be the next challenge for LINUX,
the open-source operating system (CINet: http://

Other Trends
The mainframe computer is far from dead, and IBM is
having considerable success selling its latest models. On
the other hand, there is considerable interest in grid
computing, where operating systems and programming
approaches are being adopted to allow very large numbers
of microcomputers and servers to work together to solve
a single but complex problem. Work continues in many
other fields that are not new, and have not always shown
promise, such as artificial intelligence. But most of these
fields are of little consequence to smaller organizations.

What Does This Mean for CIMMYT
Information is key to research-having access to it to
develop the research, being able to store it, interrogating
it in the future for further research, and disseminating it.

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The reliance on IT systems will only increase, as CIMMYT
triesto involve more players in its research and as it needs
to integrate systems from more diverse sources.

The key to success is to bridge the gap over the Web,
finding ways to integrate external data sources with our
own data kept on CIMMYT servers, and in turn make
this available on the Internet.

CIMMYT will need to continue to increase bandwidth to
support greater exchange of all forms of data, principally
over the Web. It must also keep in lock-step with others.
Over time, CIMMYT must be able to support more
demanding types of information exchange in real time
(e.g., voice, video). CIMMYT will also need more
integrated systems making as much relevant information
as possible available to the user in a single location, single
system, or single portal. Finally, CIMMYT must move to
Web-based systems, away from LAN-based systems, but
with continued support for e-challenged partners and

The demands on IT will not decrease, and CIMMYT must
remain committed to making maximum use of IT in
support of its research and administration.

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H Strategy Questions for CIMMYT

Questions Relating to the Role of Questions Relating to the
Agricultural Technology in Targeting of CIMMYT's Work
A lu.: i MP *

ie Ev iLiy i-uE *V j LY
* How important are wheat- and maize-specific
technologies for alleviating poverty?
*How should CIMMYT's work on maize and wheat be
linked to work being done by others that focuses on the
overall farming system?
*How should CIMMYT's work on agricultural technology
be accommodated into more holistic approaches that
deal with both agricultural and non-agricultural issues
(e.g., the sustainable livelihoods framework)?
* How important is conventional plant breeding for
alleviating poverty?
*How important is biotechnology for alleviating poverty?
*How important will genetically engineered crops be for
alleviating poverty?
* How important are crop and resource management
technologies for alleviating poverty?
* Within CIMMYT's portfolio of research activities, what
emphasis should be placed on increasing productivity
versus increasing sustainability of resource use?
* What role can nutritionally enhanced crops play in
improving the nutritional status of the poor?

SShould CIMMYT explicitly target the poor? If so, how
should the poor be defined?
*Should CIMMYT target the rural poor, the urban poor,
or both?
*Should CIMMYT target marginal environments, favored
environments, or both?
*Should CIMMYT target commercial farmers, non-
commercial farmers, or both?
*Should CIMMYT target specific geographical regions and/
or mega-environments? If so, how should those regions
and/or mega-environments be identified?
*Should CIMMYT consider global climate change when
setting research priorities?
*Should CIMMYT consider the impact of HIV/AIDS when
setting research priorities?

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Questions Relating to CIMMYT's Questions Relating to the
Niche Organization and Focus of
* What should be the relative em
s isahp within CIMMY

with regard to research and technology dissemination
for (a) plant breeding, (b) crop and resource
management, and (c) policy analysis?
* What should be CIMMYT's role in conserving and
facilitating the utilization of crop genetic resources?
*What should be CIMMYT's role in influencing policies of
importance to achieving our mandate?
* What should be CIMMYT's role in facilitating technology
and information flows (e.g., linking local innovation
networks with global knowledge)?
* What role should CIMMYT play in strengthening
partners, given that past efforts often have not resulted
in stronger institutions?
* In what types of innovation networks should CIMMYT
participate, and with whom should CIMMYT partner?
*How should CIMMYT collaborate with the private sector
in areas of common or complementary interests?
*How can CIMMYT identify research areas in which the
private sector is unlikely to invest?

H *
4 1

* What measures should CIMMYT introduce to ensure
maximum flexibility in its strategy, in an extremely
dynamic and uncertain environment, which is likely to
be characterized by dramatic shifts in the location of
consumption and production?
*What mechanisms should CIMMYT introduce to ensure
that strategic planning becomes a continuing and
institutionalized activity?
* Should CIMMYT determine priorities in response to
emerging niche markets or proactively seek to create
new niche markets (e.g., nutritionally enhanced crops)?
* What should be the balance between an "on the
ground" CIMMYT and a virtual CIMMYT (e.g., web-
based versus face-to-face interactions)?
* What concrete actions should be taken to ensure that
CIMMYT staff have the capacity to take advantage of
rapidly evolving information technology tools?
* What responsibility does CIMMYT have to ensure that
our partners possess the capacity to take advantage of
rapidly evolving information technology tools?
* In an environment in which intellectual property laws
are likely to become increasingly restrictive, what
intellectual property should CIMMYT consider protecting,
and how?
*Given declining trends in funding from traditional donors,
should CIMMYT rely increasingly on income from
commercial ventures?
*How can CIMMYT reconcile its two-crop mandate with
the knowledge that more holistic approaches to poverty
alleviation are needed?
*Does CIMMYT need to reshape its external image?

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