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Title: Saint Vincent government gazette
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 Material Information
Title: Saint Vincent government gazette
Alternate Title: Government gazette
St. Vincent government gazette
Physical Description: v. : ; 35 cm.
Language: English
Creator: Saint Vincent
Publisher: G.P.O.
Place of Publication: Kingstown, St. Vincent
Kingstown St. Vincent
Publication Date: September 16, 1952
Frequency: weekly
regular
 Subjects
Subject: Gazettes -- Periodicals -- Saint Vincent   ( lcsh )
Genre: federal government publication   ( marcgt )
legislation   ( marcgt )
periodical   ( marcgt )
Spatial Coverage: Saint Vincent and the Grenadines -- Saint Vincent
 Notes
Dates or Sequential Designation: v. 1, no. 1 (1868)-v. 112, no. 48 (Tues., 23 Oct. 1979)
General Note: Description based on: Vol. 111, no. 1 (Tues., 3 Jan. 1978); title from caption.
General Note: Supplements which accompany some numbers contain extraordinary issues, ordinances, statutory rules of order, etc.
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Bibliographic ID: UF00077473
Volume ID: VID01558
Source Institution: University of Florida
Holding Location: University of Florida
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Resource Identifier: oclc - 19844741
lccn - sn 89018505
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Succeeded by: Government gazette

Table of Contents
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    Statutory Rules and Orders No. 73: The Prices Control (Amendment No. 31) Notice, 1952
        Page C-201
        Page C-202
Full Text





















SAINT VINCENT


GOVERNMENT GAZETTE


aublishedI uthra itb.


VOL. 85.] SAINT VINCENT, TUESDAY, 16 SEPTEMBER, 1952. [No. 49.


No. 456.
LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL MEETING.

A meeting of the Legislative Council will be held at the Council Chamber,
Kingstown on Thursday 18th, September, 1952, commencing at 10 a.m.
The Order of the Day of this meeting is published with this issue of the
Gazette.
A cordial invitation to attend is extended Jo the general public.
16th September, 1952.
(A. 1/1949).
No. 457. No. 458.
HER MAJESTY'S CORONATION, RESIGNATION.
JUNE, 1953. -
--- Mr. JOHN HUMFREY as A.D.C. and
SEATS ALONG PROCESSION ROUTE. Private Secretary to His Excellency the
Governor of the Windward Islands with
It is notified for general information effect from 4th September, 1952.
that a small number of seats on official 16th September, 1952.
stands along the route of the Coronation (A. 9/1942).
Procession in London will be available
for sale to persons who are normally No. 459.
resident in the Windward Islands. RESUMPTION.
Some of these seats will be covered, bnt
the majority will be uncovered, the cost With reference to Gazette Notice No.
being about 5. 10. and -3. 10. a seat 41 of 26th August, 1951, Dr. S. D.
respectively. GUN-MUTNRO, Resident Surgeon, resum-
Any person desirous of obtaining ed duties with effect from 1st September,
seats should apply to the Administrator, 1952.
Government Office, Kingstown nol later 16th September, 1952.
than 30th September, 1952. (P. F. 492)
No applicant will be eligible fo or m Pre
than two seats and tickets will not be No. 460.
transferable. ASSUMPTION OF DUTIES.
16th September, 1952.
(C. 14/1952). With reference to Government Notice:








S/5 5














-276 SAINT VINCENT, TUESDAY,


No. 413 of 19th August, 1952. Mr.
DUDLEY JOHNSON who vas appointed
-on 3rd September, arrived in the Colony
on 10th September, 1952 and assumed
duties as Registrar and Additional
Magistrate on that day.
16th September, 1952.
.(P. F. 631).


No. 461.
TRANSFERS.

The following transfers have been
-ap proved with effect from 1st September,
1952 :-
Mrs. A. E. CATO, Junior Clerk,
Treasury, to Government Office;
Miss EDNA HOPE, Juntioi Clerk,
Charitable Department, to Treas-
ury.
16th September, 1952.
,(P. Fs. 196, 472).


No. 462.
APPOINTMENTS.

The undermentioned persons have
been appointed to comprise a Committee
to examine and make recommendations
for the amendment of the Explosives
and Petroleum Ordinance, Chapter 180,
of the Laws of St. Vincent and any
.amendments thereto:-
The Honourable Crown Attorney,
(Chairman),
S,, Colonial Treasurer,
,, Superintendent of Police,
Honourable R. E. BAYNES,
A. L. GUNN, Esq.,
C. H. FINDLAY, Esq.
16th September, 1952.
(T. 34/1950).

No. 463.
MARRIAGE OFFICERS.

The Reverend DESMOND GEORGE
MASON has been appointed a Marriage
Officer for the whole Colony, with effect
from 16th September, 1952.
16th September, 1952.
.(J. 22/1951).

No. 464.
Pastor PERCIVAL DICK and Pastor
CONRAD SUTHERLAND as Marriage Offi-
cers of the Colony in respect of the
-congregation of the Christian Pilgrim


Ch1irch, with effect from 16th Septem-
ber, 1952.
16th September, 1952.
(J. 2-2/1951).

No. 265.
LEAVE NOTICES.

VACATION LEAVE.

Mr. J. T. F. HAZELL, Sanitary Inspec-
tor. Medical Department, one year's
vac:ition leave with effect from 15th
Septe nber, 1952.
16th September, 1952.
(P. F. 440).

No. 466.
EXTENSION OF LEAVE.

With reference to Notice No. 133 pub-
lished in lie Gazette of 18th March,
1952, Miss VIDA CROPPER, Chief
Operator, Electricity & Telephone De-
partment, has been granted 28 days'
extension of leave with effect from 10th
September, 1952.
16th September, 1952.
(P. F. 95).

No. 467.
LEGISLATION.

The under-mentioned Ordinances
which have been assented to by His
Excellency the Governor are published
for general information with this issue
of the Gazette:-
No. 21 of 1952.-An Ordinance t
amend the Money Lending
Ordinance.
(F. 8/1940).

No. 22 of 1952.-An Ordinance to
amend the Electricity Supply and
Refrigeration Ordinance, 1937.
(J. 16/1943).


No. 23 of 1952--Ai,
amend the Stamp
Ordinance, 1952.
(F. 41/1943).
16th September, 1952.


Ordinance t
(Amendmen


No. 468.
The following Document is pub-
lished with this issue of the Gazette :-
S.R. & O. No. 73.-The Prices Control
(Amendment No. 31) Notice,
1952.
(J. 5/1951).
16th September, 1952.


16 SEPTEMBER, 1952.--(No. 49).














SAINT VINCENT, TUESDAY, 16 SEPTEMBER, 1952.-(No. 49). 277


No. 344.
HURRICANE NOTICE.

It is hereby notified for general information that in the event of a hurri-
cane threatening or approaching the Island, the following warnings will be
given :


(Cautionary Warning
l A s (when news received of
including the an approaching hurricane)
Grenadines Warning to take cover


Cautionary Warning



Kingstown ... Warning to take cover


15th July, 1952.
(W. 25/1949).


- A white flag with a black
centre will be flown from
all Police Stations.

- Church bells will ring for a
period of five minutes.
- A white flag with a black
centre will be flown from
the Police Barracks.

- The Government Cotton Gin-
nery whistle and a siren
from the Police Barracks
will be blown for a period
of five minutes.


By Command,


A. V. KING,
Government Secretary.


GOVERNMENT OFFICE,
16th September, 1952.


DEPARTMENTAL AND OTHER NOTICES.


AGRICULTURAL NOTICE.

VEGETABLE SEEDS.

It is hereby notified for general information that a new shipment of vege-
table seeds has arrived and will be on sale at the office of the Department of
Agriculture on week days between the hours of 9 a.m. and 12 noon and from
1 p.m. to 4 p.m. at the following prices:-


Cabbage Succession
Early Jersey Wakefield
Early Flat Dutch Steins
Carrot Oxheart & Chatenay
Beets Detroit Dark Red
Beans Kentucky Wonder Wax
,, Pole Lima
Cucumber Arlington White Spine
Egg plant Black Beauty
Tomato Marglobe
S Giant Ponderosa
Turnip Early White Flat Dutch
Onion Early Yellow Globe
Okra White Velvet
Lettuce Mingonette


29c.
39c.
39c.
27c.
20c.
6c.
6c.
28c.
83c.
85c.
85c.
20c.
45c.
lic.
39c.


lic.
lec.
1ec.
7c.
6c.


8c.
21e.'
22c.

6c.
12c.
4c.
10c.


pkt.
pkt.
pkt.
pkt.
pkt.


pkt.
pkt.
pkt.
pkt.
pkt.
pkt.
ukt.
pkt.


J. M. CAVE,
Superintendent of Agriculture.


28th August, 1952.














278 SAINT VINCENT, TUESDAY,


CONTROL NOTICE.

With reference to Control Notice
dated 6th May, 1952, forbidding the
importation into the colony from Cana-
la of certain items which might have
been affected by Foot and Mouth Dis-
ease, notice is hereby given that this
prohibition has been removed as a re-
sult of Canada's now being declared free
of Foot and Mouth disease.

G. C. H. THOMAS,
Acting Controller of Supplies.
6th September, 1952.
(M. 2/1942).


BRITISH CARIBBEAN CURRENCY BOARD.

FORGED CURRENCY NOTES.

Several forgeries of British Caribbean
Currency Notes of the ten dollar de-
nomination have been observed recently.
A note of the one dollar denomination
is altered to represent a ten dollar note.
The word "One" on the face of the note
is removed and the word Ten" substi-
tuted and the numeral " is added to
the numeral "1" in the corners of the
note. The colour of the one dollar note,
which is red, is also treated to make it
similar to the brown colour of the
genuine ten dollar note.
The public is advised to scrutinise the
word Ten" and the numerals 10" as
well as the colour of ten dollar notes
before acceptance. Careful scrutiny
will disclose the alterations that have
been made, if the note is not genuine.
L. SPENCE.
Executive Commissioner.
British Caribbean Ciurency
Board.
BnITISH CARIBBEAN CURRENCY
BOARD,
TREASURY CHAMBERS,
PORT-OF-SPAIN,
TRINIDAD, B.W.I.
28th August, 1952.


WAR DAMAGE PAYMENTS (FAR EAST).


Secretary, Board of Trade, (Insurance
and Companies Dept.,) Lacon House,
Theobalds Road, London, W.C.1.
2. The final (late for receipt of claims
is the 31st October, 1952, after which the
schemes will be closed.
Dated this 2nd day of September, 1952.
D. ELSON WEEKS,
Custodian of Enemy Property
(G. 1/1948).*



SAINT VINCENT.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE.
WINDWARD ISLANDS AND LEE-
WARD ISLANDS.
(Original Jurisdiction)
A.D. 1950.


Suit No. 2.
Between
JOHN A. DaSOUZA
and
SAMUEL GEORGE


Plaintiff,

Defendant.


NOTICE is hereby given that on Satur-
day the 4th day of October, 1952, between
the hours of 32 o'clock noon and 3 p.m.,
there will be put up for sale at the Court
House in Kingstown the undermention-
ed goods and chattels the property of
the abovenamed defendant SAMUEL
GEORGE levied upon by virtue of a writ
of seizure and sale issued in the above
suit :-
One house the sides boarded and the-
roof covered with galvanize iron
situated at Stubbs in St. George's
Parish.
Dated the 10th day of September, 1952.
D. ELSON WEEKS,
Acting Registrar Supreme Court.



NOTICES.

KINGSTOWN TOWN BOARD.


All persons having claims for war
damage payments (Fr East) nder the Notice is hereby given that Mr.
damnare payments (Fir Etst) titndertheE. V. L. WIIrsON hai ,s been absent from
United Kingdomn Far Eastern Private L WIL s een absent f
Chattels Scheme, 1946, the United King- the Island for more than thirty days
don't Extended F:r Eastern Private without leave of tlihe board contrary to
Chattels Scheme,. J949. mnd the Burma Section 7. subsection (1) (c). Cap. 209 of
Business Scheme, 1941. shonuld obtain. the R1.vised1 laws of St. Vinctnt and
if thlv blave not al o:idl done sn, :,i consquenltlv has ceased to le au Electedi
application formn frim and make th. Member of the above Baard.
necessary declaration to the Assistant 10.i September, 1952.


i I


16 SEPTEMBER, 1952.--(No. 49).














SAINT VINCENT, TUESDAY, 16 SEPTEMBER, 1952.-(No. 49). 279


KINGSTOWN TOWN BOARD
BYE-ELECTION.

Notice is hereby given that in accord-
ance with Section 24 of the Kingstown
Board (Election of Members) Bye-Laws,
the Warden of Kingstown will be in
attendance at the Court House, Kings-
town, on Monday 29th September, 1962.
between the hours of 0 a.m. and 2 p.m.
for the purpose of receiving nominations
for one candidate to fill the seat recently
vacated by Mr. E. V. L. WILSON.
2. Should a poll be required, it will
b taken at the Court House on Monday
6th October, 1952, between the hours of
9 a.m. and 12 noon, and from 1 p.m.
to 4.30 p.um.
V. I. G. da SILVA,
Warden and Presiding Officer*
10th September, 19-2.


NOTICE.


THE CALLIAQUA TOWN BOARD.

The Public is hereby notified that the
free taking of Sand from the Calliaqua
beach is strictly prohibited as from
September 1st, 1952.
2. Any one who wants Sand must in
future arrange with the Clerk for the
purchase of the Sand from the above
named beach.
3. The P ices are as follows:-
1 cent per barrel up to 50 barrels.
$5.00 (five dollars) flat Rate for
large quantities.

JOHN DOUGAN,
Clerk.


PRINTED BY THE GOVERNMENT PRINTER, AT THE GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE,
KINGSTOWN, ST. VINCENT
[ Price 24 cents. I

















DATE, J.: By clause 5 of his will the testator left the residue of his personal
estate to his trustees upon trust to pay and transfer the same to a body corporate
established under the laws of Saint Vincent for the purpose of establishing and
founding a bank.................on the terms, directions and conditions" thereafter set out.
Clauses 6 and 8 of the will read as follows :-
"6. I hereby direct my trustees to use their best endeavours in
incorporating by statute a Body to manage and direct the said Bank, the
Directors of which shall be composed of the Administrator, the Colonial
Treasurer and four other persons to be appointed annually at the general
meeting of the body corporate or if any vacancy necessitates it by the
Executive Council of Saint Vincent."
8. I hereby declare that the object of the Bank will be primarily to
assist the planters and agriculturalists of Saint Vincent by way of loans at a
sufficiently low rate of interest as is compatible with the proper operation of
the Bank."
The only other clause of the will to which reference need be made is clause 4,
in which the testator, after directing that out of his personal estate a sum
sufficient to provide an annuity of 100 for a named person was to be set aside and
invested in proper securities, went on to say that his executors may in their
discretion invest the sum so set aside "in the shares, securities or stock of the
bank to be established in accordance with his directions.
The first duty of this Court must obviously be to ascertain what the testator
meant by the language he employed. The question is, not what his actual
intention was, but what is the meaning of the words he has used; and, as was
emphasised by Sir Wilfred Greene, M.R., in Re Diploc/c, Wintle v. Diplock, (1941) 1
All E.R., at page 199, words are to be construed in their natural and grammatical
sense unless there is something in the context of the will, read as a whole, which -
imposes a different meaning upon them."
There can, I think, be no doubt that the testator wanted the residue of his
personal estate to be used in the establishment and operation of a bank and
intended the planters and agriculturists of Saint Vincent" to derive some benefit
from the bank by way of loans at low rates of interest not incompatible with the
proper operation of tha bank. But did he mean to benefit in this way only
"planters and agriculturists"? If so, did he mean only "planters" who were
" agriculturists "? Was it his intention that these loans should be applied solely
to the promotion of agriculture? or was he, in using the expression planters and
agriculturists merely designating the class of persons he wished to assist?
All these questions become pertinent once it is accepted, as, indeed, it must be,
that the bequest in this case creates a perpetuity and is for that reason void unless
it comes within the fourth division of Lord Macnaghten's classification of legal
charities-that is to say, unless it is held to be beneficial to the community, or an
appreciably important section of the community, in a sense which the law
recognizes as charitable. In Re Strakosch, (1949) 2 All E.R., at page 8, Lord Green,
M.R., said:
"In Williams Trustees v. Inland Revenue Commissioners the House of
Lords has laid down very clearly that in order to come within Lord
Macnaghten's fourth class the gift must be not only for the benefit of the
community but beneficial in a way which the law regards as charitable. In
order to satisfy the latter it must be within the 'spirit and intendment' of the
preamble of the statute of Elizabeth. That preamble set out what were then
regarded as purposes which should be treated as charitable in law. It is
obvious that as time passed and conditions changed common opinion as to
what was properly covered by the word charitable also changed. This has
been recognized by the courts as the most cursory examination of the cases
shows. In order to be within the spirit and intendment of the preamble we
take it that one must find something charitable in the same sense as the
recited purposes are charitable..................The benefit, as we understand it, does
not have to be in any way ejusdem generis with the recited purposes, but it
has to be charitable in the same sense."
In the present case the appellant contends that the object of the testator's
bounty is the general promotion of agriculture-a purpose held to be within the
spirit and intention of the statute of Elizabeth in Inland Revenue Commissioners
v. Yorkshire Agricultural Society, (1928) 1 K.B. 611.
For the reasons stated by the learned Chief Justice in the judgment against
which this appeal has been brought, I entirely agree that the testator, in using the
expression planters and agriculturists in clause 8 of the will, meant to benefit
both planters and agriculturists alike and manifested no desire to exclude anyone
falling within either class; and that the planters and agriculturists of St. Vincent
do constitute a very important section of the community.
















To my mind the main difficulty in the case lies in deciding whether clause 8
of the will, read in its natural and grammatical sense can fairly be said to be
capable of the construction that all loans granted to planters and agriculturists at
low rates of interest (the testator's bounty) must be applied (directly or indirectly)
towards the promotion of agriculture. In order to qualify as a charitable trust it
is, as I understand the law, not enough that the loans may be applied towards that
purpose; if the words of the will are not capable of meaning that the loans must
be used for that purpose and that purpose only, the bequest is deprived of any
charitable nature. That proposition finds support in the general principles recited
by Sir Wilfred Greene (as he then was) at the commencement of his judgment in
Re Diplock, Wintle v. Diplock (supra) :
"Two matters fall to be considered in this appeal-namely, the true
construction of the relevant parts of the testator's will and the legal
principles which ought to be applied to the will as so construed. Those
principles are not in doubt. I propose to refer to three passages only out of
the many authorities which have been cited to us. The first is to be found in
the words of SIR WILLIAM GRANT in Morice v. Durham (Bp.), 9 Vcs., at p. 406 :
'The question is not whether he (the Trustee) may not apply it upon
purposes strictly charitable, but whether he is bound so to apply it.'"
Re Diplock was reviewed in the House of Lords sub nom Chichester Diocesan
Fund and Board of Finance (Incorporated) v. Simpson and Others, (1944) 2 All
E.R. 60. The decision of the Court of Appeal was affirmed, and at pages 70 and 71
of the report Lord Porter is recorded as having said this :
But in truth, however anxious one may be to strain the language used
so as to benefit charities only, the weight of authority is too great to be
readily overthrown. Two matters of principle in the interpretation of wills
are firmly established; (i) The testator must make his own will and not
leave his executors to make their own choice of the objects of his bounty,
subject to this that a general gift to charity will be upheld. It is not
however enough that he should leave property under a disposition in
pursuance of which his assets may be disposed of to charities or for some
other purpose, not even though his executors in fact apply them only to
charitable purposes. 'The question is.' said Sir W. Grant, M.R., in James v.
Allen (1817), 3 Mer. 17, at p. : '.............................what authority would this court have
to say that the property must not be applied to purposes however so
benevolent, unless they also come within the technical denomination of
charitable purposes? If it might, consistently with the will, be applied to
other than strictly charitable purposes, the trust is too indefinite for the
court to execute.'"
This rule of construction is again stated by Lord Greene, M.R., in Re Osmund,
(1944) 1 All E.R., at page 263, thus :
It is not open to dispute that, where the language of a gift upon its
true construction makes it possible for the subject matter of the gift to be
applied for non-charitable purposes, that gift is not a good charitable gift
even although the greater part of the purposes may be truly charitable. It
is sufficient to destroy the charitable nature of the gift if on its true
construction it is possible for those administering the property to go outside
the scope of charity ".
The fact that the testator's will is capable of being read in the wider sense,
which would permit of the application of loans to purposes other than agricultural,
would, of course, not invalidate the bequest if the will is also genuinely capable of
the narrower construction. This is amply borne out by the following passage
taken from the judgment of Lord Henworth, M.RP., in Re Bain, Public Trustee v.
Ross, (1930) 1 Ch., at page 230 :
'. .................the proposition is not disputed that, where possible, a
construction ought to be given to the terms of a will which will enable it to be
upheld. Thus in Bruce v. Presbytery of Deer, L.R.1 H.L. Sc. 96, 97, Lord
Chelmsford L.C. said: When it is said that charitable bequests must
receive a benignant construction, the meaning is, that when the bequest is
capable of two constructions, one which would make it void, and the other
which wv3i:d render it effectual, the latter must be adopted.' "
I levert now to the particular question which arises in this case : whether
clause 8 of the testator's will is really capable of the construction that loans
granted to plant&':; and agriculturists must be used for agricultural purposes only.
In so far as this aspect of the case is concerned, I have been unable to derive any
assistance whatever irom iracding the other parts of the will; and I am clearly not
entitled to import words which do not appear in clause 8 if a sensible construction
can be put on the clause as it stands. In support of this proposition I turn first to
the judgments delX-!red in the House of Lords in Hunter v. Attorney-General,
(1C.i A.C. 3CK. The Earl of Halsbury, L.C., at pages 317 and 318, referring to the
decision of the Court of Appeal which was reversed, says this :
















"I admit that it is a plausible mode of putting the difficulty; but is it in
reality anything else than giving a startling illustration of what the
consequences would be if the testator, notwithstanding his general intentions,
had not made sufficient provision for giving effect to his intentions?.......................
And after all it is only what always happens when the testator forgets to give
verbal expression to what may nevertheless be in his mind..................The plain
fact remains in this will that the testator has not declared the trust that the
Court of Appeal have imagined for him, and no apt words have been found to
fit or give effect to his supposed intentions; and I think your Lordships are
not justified in taking such a liberty of interpretation. That certainly would
be a strange mode of construing a will, that because you cannot find what
else he must ha-:s intended to be done with his money except something of
that nature, although it is admitted that there are no words in the will to
convey the intention which it is :U'gestc he had in his mind, you can
mvent provisions and impose conditions which the testator himself has not
introduced. With the utmost respect f'r he learned iudgcs of the Court of
Appeal, I say that that would bce a.mitn ;. U.tiitude ci intcrpr, ticn and a
looseness in the application of words in wills cx,_resing the e-neral
intentions of the te. .ator which, although thi: particular case it might do
no harm, vi.ould let in a mode of int rpreti~ir ville which would cast upon the
Court, in almicst 'very case of a defectively mede will, tho necessity of
makingg the will for the testat.or-nct inter prtin thc word. which he has
actuallyy used.
At page 319 of the report Lord Shand s.unmmarises the position hus : but
assuming he had ha.t intention, he has in :ny opinion failed to e:xpr~-e it and I
say so of coura-e taking i.te will as a whole. The oquetion is net one -c: speculative
reasoning : Wha co you think wvas 'tno tes^ator's intention?-but \/at has he
expressly or by impLrjrion (but by necessary implication where impic.*tion only is
relied on) expressec by the terms used? Then there are the coni..nts of Lord
Davey at page 321 : You must construe the words of the will fairly, and if you
find a charitable p'iO'pose sufficiently cl-arly expressed the Court wil) give effect to
it. If you do not find any such definite 'xpr".ssion, you are not at :1... to supply
it from more or lets well-founded speculation of what the testator would probably
have wished or intended if his attention had been dr.e.wn to the omission."
In this same connection I quote, lastly, from the judgment of Warrington, L.J.,
in Re Evans, Public Trustee v. Evans, (1920) 2 Ch., at at pages 320 and 321 :
Now are we at liberty to give such a construction in this case? In Earl
of Hardwicke v. Douglas, 7 Cl. & F. 795, 815, the Lord Chancellor, Lord
Cottenham-it is true in a dissenting judgment, but I think that does not
detract from the force of what I am about to read, as it clearly expresses the
law-said this: 'It is not, according to my impression of the rule upon
which the Courts have acted, consistent with the principles of construction
to set aside the effect of elear and unambiguous words because there is
reason to suppose that they do not produce the effect which the testator
intended they should produce. If there be any ambiguity, then of course it
is the duty of all Courts to put that construction upon the words which seems
best to carry the intention into effect; but if there he no ambiguity, however
unfortunate it may be that the intention of the testator shall fail, there is no
right in any Court of Justice to say those words shall not have their plain
and unambiguous meaning.' Now, it seems to me this is exactly a case to
which those remarks apply. The words have their plain and unambiguous
meaning; apparently they do not carry out what appears to have been the
deshe of the testator; but if they do not do so it is because the testator has
unfortunately used words which do not carry out that desire. If however
those words are clear, it is not the function of the Court to give them another
interpretation founded upon what it believes to have been the intention and
desire of the testator. Whatever way the argument is put, it all results in
this : that the Court is asked to construe those words in a sense which is not
according to their unambiguous grammatical meaning, and that I think it is
impossible for it to do. I confess I have arrived at this conclusion with
considerable regret, because I think the testator has unfortunately used
words which do not give effect to what he intended to be done and which he
would not have used if his intention had been more directly drawn to them;
but it seems to me that the safer course, and the one more in accordance
with principles upon which wills have to be construed, is to do that which I
think ought to be done rather than to strain the words of the testator so as
to give them another meaning ".
The case specially urged upon us by the appellant in favour of the application
of a benignant construction to the present bequest is Re White, White v. White,
(1893) 2 Ch. 41. There the testator left his property to the following religious
societies, viz. to be divided in eaual shares
















among them ", but did not insert the names of the societies before executing his
will. Lindley, LJ., delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal, said (pp. 11
and 52) :
"The words of the testator's will are insufficient to show what kind of
religious societies he meant. They may, or may not, have been 'charitable'
as well as 'religious', and, as all religious societies are not charitable, we
should, in the absence of authority, be unable to come to the conclusion that
'charity' was intended, and we should, therefore, be of opinion that the
result was an intestacy.
It is, however, impossible, we think, seriously to deny that the testator
intended his property to be given to some religious societies for religious
purposes. His property was to be divided amongst certain societies; but
what for? The only rational answer to this question must, we think, be for
the purposes of those societies;' and, the societies being themselves described
as 'religious societies', the purpose for which the testator gave his property
must be treated as religious purposes. It is true that these are not necessarily
'charitable' purposes, and in a particular case a 'religious' society may be
shewn not to be a 'charitable' society. This was the case in Cocks v.
Manners, Law Rep. 12 Eq. 574. But the authorities shew that a bequest to a
religious institution, or for a. religious purpose, is prima facie a bequest for
a charitable' purpose."
So far as I can see Re White laid down no new rule of construction. It simply
held that a gift to "religious societies ", without specification of any particular
societies or purposes, is by implication a gift for religious purposes since those are
the normal purposes of religious societies. The court, be it noted, was there
dealing with societies. These are not formed simply for the sake of forming them::
they are created for specific objects and are governed by rules designed to carry
out, directly or indirectly, those objects. Their officers are, for instance, not free
to use their funds for purposes dehors those objects. Such arguments may with
equal force, be used where the gift is to a religious institution. But the same line
of reasoning surely cannot be applied in the case of a bequest enabling loans at low
rates of interest to be made available to "planters and agriculturists "-a large
number of individuals, who can in no way be presumed to be fettered by rules and
regulations similar to those governing established societies and institutions.
If the testator intended the loans to be expended solely on the promotion of
agriculture-as he may well have done-in my opinion he has at any rate failed
to use words in his will which adequately convey that intention, and, however
unfortunate the consequences, the Court clearly is not justified in making any
interpolation. It was to a misfortune of this general nature that Lord Goddard,
*C.J., was referring in Re Diplock (supra) when he said (at p. 204) :
I agree, because the cases which have been cited, which are binding on
this court, make it impossible for the judgment below to be upheld. For
myself, perhaps owing to the fact that I was not brought up in this branch
of law, I cannot feel any enthusiasm for this rule. Indeed, when I find a
rule which says that, if property is left to trustees to give to charitable and
benevolent purposes, that is good, but, if it is for charitable or benevolent
purposes, it is not, I regard it with some distaste. That was described by SIR
WILFRID GREENE, M.R., in Re Hor'ocks, Taylor v. Kershaw, (1939) P. 198, as a
trap into which the unskilled draughtsman not infrequently falls. For
myself, I cannot have any doubt that the draughtsman in this case fell into
a trap, because it is obvious that the testator's intention was to leave the
money to charity in the popular sense of the term, and, if he had said, 'I
want to leave it to charitable or benevolent objects,' and if it had been
pointed out to him, 'If you use those words, the money will go, not to charity,
but to your first cousins once removed,' of whose existence he himself
probably did not know, then, provided the testator was of sound mind and
memory and understanding, there is not the least doubt that he would have
said : Cut out the word 'benevolent.'" The fact that I do not regard this
rule with the respect which one should ever pay to long-existing rules is
neither here nor there, and the cases oblige me to hold that this gift is void."
In the light of all these authorities I am forced to the conclusion that the
bequest before us is not beneficial to the community in a sense which the law
recognizes as charitable, and is therefore invalid. It is thus unnecessary for me
to go on to deal with the numerous arguments advanced regarding the word
primarily in clause 8 of the will. I will content myself with simply stating that
in that respect I am in general accord with the views of the learned President of
this Court.

(Sd.) W. A. DATE,
6th August, 1952J
6th August, 1952















IN THE COURT OF APPEAL FOR THE WINDWARD ISLANDS AND LEEWARD
ISLANDS ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE WINDWARD
ISLANDS AND LEEWARD ISLANDS.

ST. VINCENT CIRCUIT
Suit No. 1/1952
Between :-
The Attorney General of the Windward Islands Appellant
and
William Horatio Boardman and
Wilmot Henry Hadaway Respondents
His Lordship R. J. Manning, Acting Puisne Judge

JUDGMENT.
1. Henry Langlie Wilmot Hayward died on the 2nd June, 1946. The bulk of
his early life had been spent in agricultural pursuits in St. Vincent; he attained a
high grade of efficiency as a manager; and ultimately he became comparatively
wealthy and at one time owned a large number of estates. His wealth was used in
loans to the owners of estates in the island and to owners of house property in
Kingstown and other parts of the island. These loans were made by way of
mortgage on the security of the property concerned and at a rate of interest which
varied from 6 to 7 per cent; compound interest in some cases.
2. In clause 6 of his will he directed his trustees to use their best endeavours
in corporating by statute a body to manage and direct" a bank. Clause 8 was as
follows :-
"I hereby declare that the object of the bank will be primarily to assist the
Planters and Agriculturalists of St. Vincent by way of loans at a sufficiently low
rate of interest as is compatible with the proper operation of the bank."
3. At the time of his death he owned freehold property in Kingstown. This
was left to certain persons for life. On their deaths the property was to be
.converted into personalty and paid to the bank.
4. An annuity was directed to be paid to William Horatio Boardman, one of
the executors and trustees. The sum set aside would fall into the residue on the
death of Mr. Boardman.
5. Clause 5 dealt with the residue and was as follows :-
Upon trust as to the residue of my personal estate to pay and transfer the
same to a body corporate established under the Laws of St. Vincent for the
purpose of establishing and founding a Bank within two years of the grant of the
probate of this my Will on the terms, directions and conditions hereinafter set
out." These terms referred io the appointments of Directors and a Managing
Director and to the object of the bank as set out in clause 8.
6. Probate was granted to one executor on the 17th February, 1947; and to a
second executor on the 28th May, 1947. A third executor had renounced.
7. The executors who had proved "used their best endeavours" as directed
by the testator, and on the 4th May, 1948, an ordinance was passed by the
Legislative Council of St. Vincent to create a body corporate to be known as the
Henry Hayward Agricultural Credit Bank and to provide for the management
thereof. The bank was established by statute with perpetual succession.
8. The fund, however, having vested in the bank, would become inalienable;
and a perpetual trust would be imposed on the bank to carry out the wishes of the
testator. The trustees became aware that a fIaw might exist which would wreck
the intentions of the testator. They took but an originating summons to
determine the validity of the bequest to the bank. The Attorney-General of the
Windward Islands was made a defendant. The summons was heard before the
Chief Justice of the Leeward Islands and the Windward Islands on the 5th, 6th,
and 9th July, 1951. The argument was conducted on the assumptions that the
bequest to the bank offended against the perpetuity rule; that the perpetuity rule
is part of the law of St. Vincent; and that the promotion of agriculture is a
charitable object in the legal sense.
9. Judgment was delivered on the 9th October, 1951. The only question that
had to be decided was whether the bequest to the bank was for the promotion of
agriculture.
10. On this point the learned Chief Justice said:-
I find it difficult to take the view that because a legacy is left for the purposes
of assisting planters and agriculturists with loans, that this fact compels the use
of the loans or reasonably implies that they must be used for agricultural purposes
















or for the promotion of agriculture; still less am I convinced that it is for the
relief of the poor; all that the testator has done is to say what persons must have
claims to loans from the bank and on what terms. If he had intended otherwise
it would have been easy for him to express that intention."
Later, citing from re Osmund, 1944, 1 All E. R. 262,
"It is sufficient to destroy the charitable nature of the gift if on its true
construction it is possible for those administering the property to go outside the
scope of charity." The learned Chief Justice found that the trust under review
offended against this rule as laid down in Re Osmund, and that as a charitable
trust it has been ineffectually created and is invalid; besides it is too indefinite for
the Court to execute and fails also on that ground." He held that the testator
died intestate-as regards the sum concerned and that it must go to the next of kin.
11. The Attorney-General appealed. The grounds of appeal were
(a) That the learned judge was wrong in holding that the said Will does not
create a valid charitable trust.
(b) That the judgment is wrong in law.
(c) That the learned judge was wrong in holding that the deceased died
intestate with reference to his residuary estate.
Ground (b) was abandoned. Ground (c) was not separately argued. There was
no separate ground challenging the finding of the learned Chief Justice that the
trust failed on the ground that it was too indefinite for the Court to execute; but
I am satisfied that this was adequately covered by the wording of ground (a).
12. We are indebted to Mr. Hannays and Mr. Wharton for a very full
presentment of the arguments, and for citations from many authorities laying
down the principles which are to guide us in deciding this appeal. I am not going
to cite any passages from these authorities; this has been done in the judgment of
the learned President; and it is clear that both counsel are agreed on the principles
to be applied. Where they differ is as to the interpretation of the testator's
intention, to be gathered from the words he has used.
13. Mr. Hannays' argument was developed on the following lines. The trust
fell within the purview of the Statute of Elizabeth in that it was for the benefit of
the community. If you can extract the fact that charity predominates, then it
does not matter that the charity carries on activities that are not charitable;
provided that these other activities are ancillary to the main object. (In re Hood,
1931, 1 Ch. 240). If the words of the testator are open to two constructions then
that construction must be adopted which will enable the will to be upheld. (In re
Bain, 1930, 99 L.J. Ch. 171). In the present case the words may be construed in
the sense that planters and agriculturists are to be assisted for the promotion of
agriculture; this is the sense that must be adopted; it shows that the dominant
object of the bank was charity; and it did not matter that the bank might engage
in the details of other business usual in banking. The testator had himself
indicated the primary object of the bank; loans to these classes of persons at a low
rate of interest. The loans were to be to planters and agriculturalists as such,
and were consequently for the promotion of agriculture. It was not necessary fbr
the testator to say for the promotion of agriculture "; this meaning was implicit
in his words.
14. Mr. Wharton said that all that the gift did was to designate one class
of persons to be assisted at low rates of interest; and it was left open to the bank
to decide what other persons, not belonging to this class, were to be assisted. If
loans are made to the class of persons designated they may be used for other than
agricultural purposes. If the testator had intended the gift to be for the promotion
of agriculture he could not have avoided saying so. The use of the word "primarily"
indicated that other objects were contemplated which were not necessarily
charitable. These objects might be entirely independent of, and not merely
ancillary to, the primary object.
15. The view I take is as follows : The dominant object of the bank was to
assist the planters and agriculturalists of St. Vincent by way of loans at a
sufficiently low rate of interest as is compatible with the proper operation of the
bank." The use of the word primarily indicates this. The bank may engage in
other business; but any profits derived from this go to increase the amount of
capital available for loans to planters and agriculturalists; and will also render
possible a still further reduced rate of interest for these persons. This other
business is therefore ancillary in the strict sense; it helps the dominant object.
16. The dominant object having been ascertained; the next question is
whether it is charitable, t-hat is, whether the testator intended that these loans
should be for the promotion of agriculture. What he desired was that these
classes of persons, with whom he had been in close contact all his life, should,
when they needed assistance by way of loan, be assisted by making the burden as
light as possible. Many loans would be required for purely agricultural purposes,
such as putting more land into cultivation or the purchase of mechanical














3

equipment. Loans might also be needed in cases of financial difficulty due to bad
years, unseasonable weather, or ill luck. Other loans might be needed in cases of
financial difficulty due to the expense of a serious illness, or the necessity for a
holiday; or in cases of genuine distress. I think it was the intention of the testator
that the classes of persons he mentioned should be assisted, and assisted in the
instances I have mentioned, and in all other instances where assistance might be
required. The word assist" is the important word in clause 8; it excludes cases
where assistance is not required, including the instances suggested by Mr. Wharton
of a loan required to buy a valuable picture, or a loan required in order to lend it at
a higher rate of interest.
17. It is thus that I interpret the intention of the testator. It is the plain
meaning of his words; and I do not think that any other construction can be placed
on them. Many of the loans, it may be said, a large majority of them, would be
clearly for the general promotion and improvement of agriculture. These would
include not only those for the purchase of equipment, for the acquiring of extra
land, for purchases of the freehold by tenants, for extended cultivation of land
already occupied; but also loans to help to tide over a bad year. As regards the
other loans, it may be said in general that if persons engaged in some particular
industry are privileged, when they need assistance, to obtain that assistance by a
loan on easy terms, the help thus given is bound to benefit the industry. This
must also apply to those engaged in agricultural pursuits. The conclusion must be
that all loans contemplated by the testator would tend to the general promotion
of agriculture.
18. It will be seen that I agree with the learned Chief Justice on the
construction of clause 8. I agree that loans may be made to planters and
agriculturalists for purposes that are not agricultural. I agree that apart from
such loans the business of the bank may include transactions that are not for the
promotion of agriculture. Where I differ is firstly in my conclusion that the
testator intended that these classes of persons should be assisted, when they
needed assistance, and that such assistance will help to promote agriculture, even
if the assistance is not required for agricultural purposes. Secondly, I had no
difficulty in reaching the conclusion that this assistance for the promotion of
agriculture was the dominant intention; and that all other activities of the bank,
though not connected with the promotion of agriculture, were intended to help the
dominant intention.
19. I hold that a valid charitable trust has been established. In the view I
have taken I do not find that it is too indefinite for the Court to execute. I am for
allowing this appeal.

(Sd.) R. J. MANNING,
Puisne Jtdge.
St. Vincent, B.W.I.
6th August, 1962
















.IN THE COURT OF APPEAL FOR THE WINDWARD ISLANDS AND LEEWARD
ISLANDS.

*On appeal from the Supreme Court of the Windward Islands and Leeward Islands
(St. Vincent Circuit)

In the matter of the Estate of Henry Langlie Wilmot Hayward, deceased
and
In the matter of the Trusts of the Will of the said Henry Langlie Wilmot Hayward,
deceased
Between :-
The Attorney General of the Windward Islands
Appellant
and
William Horatio Boardman and Wilmot Henry Hadaway
Respondents
L. C. Hannays Q.C., with Stanley deFreitas, for Appellant.
L. E. Wharton Q.C., with E. A. C. Hughes, for Respondents.

JUDGMENT.
This is an appeal from a judgment of the learned Chief Justice of the
Windward Islands and Leeward Islands dated the 9th October, 1951, in which he
found that a certain trust, purporting to be a charitable trust, under the Will of
Henry Langlie Wilmot Hayward, deceased, was ineffectually created and invalid;!
and too indefinite for the Court to execute.
By his will dated the 28th November 1944, to which a codicil was attached,
Henry Langlie Wilmot Hayward, deceased, appointed the respondents his executors
.and trustees. The testator died on the 2nd June, 1946. Probate of the said will
and codicil was granted to the respondent William Horatio Boardman on the 17th'
February, 1947, with power reserved to make a like grant to Wilmot Henry Hadaway,
the remaining executor; and on the 28th May, 1947, the said like grant was made.
In the will of the Testator there are the following provisions :-
"2. I devise and bequeath all my real and personal estate whatsoever,
and wheresoever to my Trustees to sell call in and collect the same at such
times as they may consider suitable and advantageous (except as hereinafter
directed in paragraph 3 hereof) and after paying my funeral and
testamentary expenses to hold the same upon the trusts hereinafter
mentioned.
"3. Upon trust (a) as to my freehold property, namely part of Lot
Number 78 Halifax Street, Kingstown, for the term of the natural life of
William Horatio Boardman who shall be at liberty to reside there free of all
expenses and to receive the income thereof and after the death of the said
William Horatio Boardman to convert the said property into personalty and
hold the same upon trust for the purposes set out in paragraph 5 hereof.
(b) as to my freehold property, namely the remaining portion of Lot
Number 78 in Middle Street, Kingstown, for the term of the natural lives of
Henrietta Elizabeth Christopher and Rose Amanda Mack who shall be at
liberty to reside there free of all expenses and to receive the income thereof
in equal shares and upon the death of the said Henrietta Elizabeth
Christopher and Rose Amanda Mack to convert the said property into
personalty and hold the same upon trust for the purposes set out in
paragraph 5 hereof.
4. Upon trust as to my personal estate to set aside and invest in proper
securities a sum sufficient to produce an annuity to be paid as follows :-
To William Horatio Boardmari the sum of 100 per annum payable
in equal monthly instalments for the term of his natural life. Provided
nevertheless that my Executors may in their discretion invest the sum
to be set aside under this paragraph in the shares, securities or stock of
the Bank to be established in accordance with my directions hereinafter
contained.
"5. Upon trust as to the residue of my personal estate to pay and
transfer the same to a body corporate established under the laws of Saint
Vincent for the purpose of establishing and founding a Bank within two
years of the grant of the probate of this my will on the terms, directions and
conditions hereinafter set out.

















"6. I hereby direct my Trustees to use their best endeavours in
corporating by Statute a Body to manage and direct the said Bank, the
Directors of which shall be composed of the Administrator, the Colonial
Treasurer and four other persons to be appointed annually at the general
meeting of the body corporate or if any vacancy necessitates it by the
Executive Council of Saint Vincent.
7. I hereby empower the said Directors to appoint or dismiss a
Managing Director of the Bank, who is to be subject to their control and
direction.
"8. I hereby declare that the object of the Bank will be primarily to
assist the Planters and Agriculturalists of Saint Vincent by way of loans at a
sufficiently low rate of interest as is compatible with the proper operation of
the Bank."
Upon application by summons dated the 16th day of May, 1950, the respondents
sought to have the following questions determined :-
"Whether upon the true construction of the will of the testator and in
the events which have happened the trust contained in clauses 5, 6, 7 and 8
and the supplemental provisions of clause 3 thereof, is a valid and effective
public (or charitable) trust or is invalid and fails (to any and if any to what
extent) or is void for uncertainty, vagueness or remoteness or as infringing
the rule against perpetuities (or inalienability) or for any other reason?
"2. If it shall be decided that the said trust is invalid or void or
otherwise fails, whether the testator died intestate in respect of the property
comprised therein and/or whether the gift falls into and forms part of the
residuary estate or is applicable cy-pres or how otherwise the same ought to
be applied?
3. If it shall be decided that the testator died intestate as aforesaid
and/or that the said gift falls into his residuary estate, is the said William
Horatio Boardman (or who else of the next of kin) the person solely entitled
beneficially on such intestacy and/or to the residuary estate and for what
share or interest?
4. If and so far as may be necessary (but not otherwise) administration
of the estate of the testator."
All parties consenting, this application was heard in open Court by the
learned Chief Justice of the Windward Islands and Leeward Islands on the 5th,
6th, and 9th days of July, 1951. In his judgment, to which reference has already
been made, the learned Chief Justice found that the trust contained in the
abovementioned clauses of the said will was ineffectually created and was invalid
and was also void for being too indefinite; he further declared that in that
respect the testator died intestate and the sum at the disposal of the trust must
go, subject to all just charges, if any, to the testator's next of kin whoever they
may be.
From the said judgment the appellant has appealed on the following grounds:
That the learned Judge was wrong in holding that the said Will does
not create a valid charitable trust.
"2. That the Judgment is wrong in law.
3. That the learned Judge was wrong in holding that the deceased
died intestate with reference to his residuary estate."
At the outset learned Counsel for the respondents pointed out that ground 2 of
the grounds of appeal contained no particulars as required by rule 6 of the Court
of Appeal Rules 1940 and was vague and general in terms. Learned Counsel for
the appellant intimated to this Court that he proposed to base his case upon
grounds 1 and 3 of the grounds of appeal and ground 2 was therefore abandoned.
It is common ground that the bequest contained in the will of the testator,
which is the subject of this appeal, offends against the rule against perpetuities,
which may be shortly enunciated as follows :-An executory device or other future
limitation to be valid must vest, if at all, within a life or lives in being and twenty-
one years and a possible period for gestation. The whole question to be decided in
this case is whether the trust created under the will of the testator is a charitable
trust, which is one of the perpetual interests to which the above rule admittedly
has no application.
It is the general law that a trust is not charitable and entitled to the privileges
which charity confers unless it is within the spirit and intendment of the preamble
to the Statute of Elizabeth (43 Eliz. 0.4). In his speech in the case of The
Commissioners for Special Purposes of Income Tax vs. Pemsel (1891) A.C. at page
583, Lord Macnaghten says :-" Charity in its legal sense comprises four principal
















"divisions: trusts for the relief of poverty; trusts for the advancement of
" education; trusts for the advancement of religion, and trusts for other purposes
" beneficial to the community, not falling under any of the preceding heads."
The above classification of charitable trusts is still considered good law, but it
has been pointed out in subsequent cases that Lord Macnaghten did not mean that
all trusts beneficial to the community are necessarily charitable. It is not enough
to say that the trust in question is for public purposes beneficial to the community
or is for the public welfare; you must also show it to be a charitable trust. (See
In Re Macduf (1896 2 Ch. Div. 451; A.G. vs. National Provincial Bank (1924) A.C.
265; Trustees of Williams Trusts vs. Inland Revenue Commissioners (1947) 1 All
E. R. 519.
In order to ascertain whether the trust in question is a charitable one or not,
in my view two questions arise :-
(1) Is the relevant gift one for the benefit of the community? and
(2) If so, is it charitable in the legal sense?
In order to answer these questions it is necessary to ascertain the intention of the
testator, as expressed in the relevant clauses of the will above referred to.
It was argued before the learned Chief Justice that the words planters and
agriculturists in clause 8 of the will should be taken to mean planters who are
agriculturists; the word "and" being a conjunctive ought not to be construed
disjunctively except by force of the appropriate context. The learned Chief
Justice, however, found that the testator meant to benefit both planters and
agriculturists alike and there was no desire on his part to exclude anyone from
either class. With that view I am in entire accord. It may be added that this
aspect of the case was not pursued before us by Counsel for the respondents.
It therefore appears to me that the first question this Court has to decide is
whether the testator meant that the undoubted benefit he wished to confer on
planters and agriculturists should be so conferred on them in their character as
such, so that agriculture might be benefitted or that for some reason he wished to
establish a fund out of which a certain class of persons could be assisted with
loans at a low rate of interest, irrespective of the purpose for which the money was
lent. It has been submitted to us that the testator had made the bulk of his
fortune by lending money to planters and that he wished the Bank created by him
to continue to do so; that he wished the money lent out by the Bank to be properly
secured and that planters and agriculturists were in a position to give that
security by an incumbrance on their properties; that the testator having made a
fortune wished his "name, fame and glory" perpetuated by the formation of a
Bank whose primary object was the lending of money to this class of person
irrespective of for what purpose this money was borrowed. Candidly I am not
impressed by these submissions. I readily concede that the testator may have
wished his name perpetuated by the formation of this Bank; but that he should
specifically stipulate that planters and agriculturists should be accommodated at
a sufficiently low rate of interest as is compatible with the proper operation of the
Bank, seems to me to indicate that it was his intention to benefit not only planters
and agriculturists as such, but also their calling, namely :-agriculture. It also
appears to me that a merchant or professional man with, e.g. household property
in Town, would be in a position to provide as good, or perhaps better, security for a
loan as a planter or agriculturist.
It is perfectly true that no one is allowed to make a will for a testator. The
authorities are clear on that point. In the case of the Chichester Diocesan Fund
vs. Simpson (1944) 2 All E. R., at p. 70, Lord Porter in his speech says :-" The
testatorr must make his own will and not leave his executors to make their choice
"of the objects of his bounty, subject to this that a general gift to charity will be
"upheld." In the same case, Lord Simonds, at page 72, says :-" My Lords, in
"stating the question for your Lordships' consideration I have said that it turns
"upon the meaning and effect of the testator's will. Advisedly I have put meaning
"before effect. For I approach this will, as I approach any other will, with the
"resolve to find the testator's intention from the language that he has used. When
"I have found it, I consider its effect. If there is an ambiguity, it may be that I
"am at liberty to choose that construction which will give legal effect to the
"instrument rather than that which will invalidate it. Where the testator's
"words would, if no question of invalidity arose, leave no doubt in my mind, I am
"not at liberty to create an ambiguity in order then to place what is sometimes
"called a benignant construction upon the will."
But it is also equally true that where a will is capable of two interpretations, one
that will give effect to the instrument and the other invalidate it, the former is to
be preferred. Or to put it in another way, where possible the Court ought to put
such a construction on the terms of a will which will enable the gift to be upheld.
In the case of In Re Bain : Public Trustees vs. Ross (1930) 99 L.J. (Ch. Div.) 171,

















Lord Hanworth M.R. at page 173 says as follows :-" On the other hand, the
" proposition is not disputed that, where possible, a construction ought to be given
"to the terms of a will which will enable it to be upheld." Then in Bruce v.
Presbytery of Deer, Lord Chelmsford said (L. R. 1 H. L. (Sc.) at p. 97) : When it
"is said that charitable bequests must receive a benignant construction, the
"meaning is, that when the bequest is capable of two constructions, one which
"would make it void, and the other which would render it effectual, the latter
"must be adopted. I cite that to show that the Court ought not to be astute or
"officious to try and find some means of rendering the words of the bequest of no
" effect."
In Re Davis (1932) 48 T.L.R. 539 : In his judgment Clauson J., though finding
the bequest in that case ineffective said he did not forget the principle that a
charitable trust must receive a benevolent construction.
In the case of In Re White (1893) 2 Ch. 41, 52, there was a bequest to the
following religious societies with a blank after these words which was not filled
in. It was held that the gift was for religious purposes and that being for religious
purposes it ought to be treated as a gift for charitable purposes in the absence of a
contrary intention. In that case Lindley, L.J. said :-" It is, however, impossible,
" we think, seriously to deny that the testator intended his property to be given to
"some religious societies for religious purposes. His property was to be divided
"amongst certain societies; but what for? The only rational answer to this
"question must, we think, be 'for the purposes of those societies'; and the
"societies being themselves described as 'religious societies,' the purpose for which
" the testator gave his property must be treated as religious purposes."
With that case in mind and the cardinal rule of construction enunciated
above that where possible the Court should uphold the gift, I have come to the
conclusion that on a true construction of the terms of the will it was the intention
of the testator that these loans are to be made to planters and agriculturists at a
low rate of interest in their character as such and therefore for agricultural
purposes and no other. Had that not been his intention it appears to me that he
would not have specifically singled out planters and agriculturists in his will.
Having regard to the above finding I have no hesitation in holding that in a
community like that of St. Vincent, whose very life-blood is agriculture, the
formation of a Bank, the primary object of which is the making of loans to
planters and agriculturists for agricultural purposes at a low rate of interest, is a
project for the benefit of the community.
It was admitted by Counsel on both sides that if it is found that the bequest
under consideration is for the promotion of agriculture it is prima facie a
charitable trust. Authority for this proposition may be found in the case of the
Inland Revenue Commissioners vs. Yorkshire Agricultural Society (1928) 97 L.J.
-K. B. 100.
At page 108 Atkin L. J. says :-"I myself have no doubt at all that if the
" question had to be considered with regard to a charitable bequest for the general
"improvement of agriculture, including, if you please, specific mention of the
' encouragement or holding of an agricultural show, that such a bequest would be
"held to be a charitable bequest. I myself, therefore, have no doubt that in this
" case this society was established, and was established for charitable purposes."
At page 111 Lawrence L.J. says as follows :-" Dealing, however, with the general
"promotion of agriculture, which is the particular purpose here, and without
"going through the numerous cases decided upon other purposes, I have arrived
"at the clear conclusion that it comes within the spirit and intention of the
" Statute of Elizabeth as interpreted by many eminent Judges, and probably much
"more within that spirit and intention than many other purposes which have been
"held to be charitable on the sole ground that they are for the benefit of the
" community. In my opinion it would require a bold advocate to contend that a
"bequest of a legacy or share of residue upon trust for the general promotion of
"agriculture was void for perpetuity or uncertainty, and the Attorney-General
"would, in my opinion, have an easy task in defeating the claims of the residuary
"legatees or next-of-kin to the fund devoted to that purpose and in obtaining an
"order for the settlement of a scheme for the administration of the trust."
In the circumstances I also find that the relevant gift under the will of the testator
is a charitable one.
There is, however, another aspect of the case to be considered. It was
submitted to us with some force that the use of the word primarily in clause 8
of the testator's will necessarily implies that the Bank may be established for
purposes, other than and independent of, the primary purpose and that if that is
so the trust is void. In support of that proposition we were referred to various
authorities such as the Chichester Diocesan Fund vs. Simpson (1944) 2 All E. R.














61. As was pointed out, however, by Counsel for the appellant the charitable
object of the trust in those cases was not the dominant or primary object of the
subject but merely an alternative object thereof.
In the words of Lord Greene M. R. in the case of In Re Osmund, Midland Bank
Executor and Trustee Co. Ltd. vs. The Attorney General and Mason (1944) 1 All
E. R. at page 263-" It is not open to dispute that, where the language of a gift
" upon its true construction makes it possible for the subject-matter of the gift to
" be applied for non-charitable purposes, that gift is not a good charitable gift even
" although the greater part of the purposes may be truly charitable. It is sufficient
" to destroy the charitable nature of the gift if on its true construction it is possible
" for those administering the property to go outside the scope of charity."
It appears to me that he true question we have to decide is whether any other
object to which the charity may be applied is independent of or merely ancillary or
subservient to the primary or dominant purpose of the gift.
It must not be forgotten that the testator has directed that a Bank be
established the primary object of which is to assist planters and agriculturists by
iondinu them money at a low rate of interest. It therefore logically follows that
the activities of this Bank cannot go outside ordinary banking business, all of
which have one object in view, namely :-the making of profits. It also follows
that these profits can only ultimately be utilized for one object, i.e. the assistance
of planters and agriculturists in the manner set out by the testator, or, in other
words, for the dominant or primary purpose of the trust. It therefore appears to
follow, that any activity undertaken by the Bank other than the assistance of
planters and agriculturists must be ancillary or subservient to the primary or
dominant object of the trust.
In the case of Inland Revenue Commissioners vs. Yorkshire Agricultural
Society (1928) 97 L. J. K. B. at page 108 Lord Atkin says :-" There can be no doubt
that a society formed for the purpose merely of benefiting its own members,
"though it may be to the public advantage that its members should be benefited
"by being educated or having their aesthetic tastes improved or whatever the
"object may be, would not be for a charitable purpose, and if it were a substantial
"part of the object that it should benefit its members I should think that it would
"not be established for a charitable purpose only. But, on the other hand, if the
"benefit given to members is only given to them with a view of giving
encouragement and carrying out the main purpose which is a charitable purpose,
"then I think the mere fact that you benefit the members in the course of
promoting your charitable purpose would not prevent the establishment being
"for charitable purposes only." And at page 112 Lawrence L. J. says :-" It is a
"common thing for a charitable institution to offer all kinds of privileges and
"benefits which are in no sense charitable in order to obtain funds for the purpose
of carrying out its objects. As an instance I might mention the giving of dinners,
"dances and theatrical entertainments, all of which entail an expenditure of
"money on non-charitable objects incurred for the purpose of obtaining funds to
"be applied for the charitable objects of the institution. Many charitable
"institutions, in return for annual subscriptions or donations, offer special benefits
"to the persons who become its members. None of the operations of this kind
"result in making the purposes of the institution non-charitable."
In my judgment, the testator under his will has created a good and valid
charitable trust not too indefinite for the Court to execute and I so declare.
This appeal is allowed.
The costs of the appellant and respondents of, and occasioned by this appeal,
shall be paid out of the estate as between solicitor and client.
There shall be liberty to apply.

ALEX. R. COOLS-LARTIGUE,
6th August, 1952 Puisne Judge.





201


SAINT VINCENT.

STATUTORY RULES AND ORDERS,

1952, No. 73.


PRICES CONTROL (AMENDMENT NO. 31) NOTICE.

(Gazetted 1Cth September, 1952).

1. Short title. This Notice may be cited as the Prices Control
(Amendnmnt No. 31) Notice.

2. Amendment. The prices set out hereunder are the Maximum prices
for whica the articles enumerated may be sold in the Colony and the First Schedule
Part B to the Prices Control Order 1C47 (S.R. & O. No. 25) is hereby amended by
deleting all the words, figures and symbols occurring in the columns opposite the
articles : Table Butter-' Dairymaid'," Table Butter-' Swift'," Cooking
Butter-' Q.B.B.'," Margarine-Glowspread, Mellokreem, Velvo Kris," "Corned
Eacf-' Evift '," Fli-' Salt," and substituting therefore the following:

FIRST SCHZDULI-PART B.


Article.


Table Bnt
DAiryn:


tdr-
mid '


Table Butter-
Swift

Cooking Batter-
Q.B.B.


Margarine-Glowspread


Maximum Wholesale Price.



$84.33 per case of
72-L lb. tins
66.97 pr es. of
12-5 lb. tins
$5.59 per tin

$57 70 per cs. of
48-16 oz. tins

S$9.75 per cs. of
48-16 oz. tins

$13.64 per e,. of
24-1 lb. tins


Maximum Retail Price.


Area A" i Area B"


$1.35 per t'n

$1.29 per lb.


$1.36 pertin

$1.30 .er lb.


Area '" "

$1.37 per tin

$1.31 per 11.


$1.38 pertin $1.39pertin $1.40 pertin


$1.17 per tin $1.18 per tin $1.19 per tin


64c. per tin


65c. per tin


66c. per tin


[P.T.o.]






202
L^jU-j


Article.


Mellokreen






Velvo Kris

Corned Beef-
Swift


Fine Salt


i1aximnum Whllolesale Price MJax

Aret., "A"

$13.,25 per cs. of 62c. per till
24-1 lb. tins

$1(.18 per cs. of Glc. per 11).
;-5 lb. tins
c2.70 per 5 lb. tin


$12.85 per cs, ,of
24-1 b11). tin

$33.94 p-r ce. of
48-12 oz. tins

$7.57 pt r bag of 187 lbs.


imulm retail IPrice.


Area B" Area U. "


63c. pri tin


62c. per lb.


1(.e. per til)n (;2(. per till


1c. per tin 82c. per tin


5c. per lb). 51c. ip r 11).


64c. per tin


63c. per lb.



63: '. per tin


83 p, r tin


Gc. )tr l)b.


Area "A means the town of Kingstown and within one mile thereof.
Area "B" means all other places throughout the Colony other than those
mentioned in Areas A nnd C ".
Area C means all the villages of Overland, Sandy Bay, Owia, Fancy, Windsor
Forest and the St. Vincent Grenadines.

Made by the Compeltnt Authority under section 30 of the Prices Control
Order (S.R. & O. No. 25) this 12th day of September, 1952.
G. C. H. THOMAS,
Acting Controller of Supplies.
(J. 5/1951).


PRINTED BY THE GOVERNMENT PRINTER, AT THE GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE,
KINGSTOWN, ST. VINCENT.
SPrice 8 cents. I
1952.


- I~ -----




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