• TABLE OF CONTENTS
HIDE
 Front Cover
 Title Page
 Acknowledgement
 Introduction
 Workshop recommendations
 Appendix A: Invited presentati...
 Appendix B: Workshop attendees
 Bibliography






Group Title: Technical paper - Florida Sea Grant College Program ; no. 75
Title: Recommendations for hurricane preparations and responses for boating communities and industries
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 Material Information
Title: Recommendations for hurricane preparations and responses for boating communities and industries
Series Title: Technical paper Florida Sea Grant College Program
Physical Description: 70 p. : ill., maps ; 23 cm.
Language: English
Creator: Villanueva, Maria L
Pybas, Donald W
Publisher: Florida Sea Grant College Program, University of Florida
Place of Publication: Gainesville FL
Publication Date: 1994
 Subjects
Subject: Hurricanes -- Economic aspects -- Florida   ( lcsh )
Natural disasters -- Economic aspects -- Florida   ( lcsh )
Boating industry -- Florida   ( lcsh )
Genre: government publication (state, provincial, terriorial, dependent)   ( marcgt )
non-fiction   ( marcgt )
 Notes
Bibliography: Includes bibliographical references (p. 69).
Statement of Responsibility: edited by Maria L. Villanueva and Donald W. Pybas ; sponsored by the Florida Sea Grant College Program in cooperation with the University of Miami Boating Research Center and the Florida Sea Grant Extension Program.
General Note: "June 1994."
Funding: This collection includes items related to Florida’s environments, ecosystems, and species. It includes the subcollections of Florida Cooperative Fish and Wildlife Research Unit project documents, the Florida Sea Grant technical series, the Florida Geological Survey series, the Howard T. Odum Center for Wetland technical reports, and other entities devoted to the study and preservation of Florida's natural resources.
 Record Information
Bibliographic ID: UF00076872
Volume ID: VID00001
Source Institution: University of Florida
Holding Location: University of Florida
Rights Management: All rights reserved by the source institution and holding location.
Resource Identifier: oclc - 31765096

Table of Contents
    Front Cover
        Front Cover 1
        Front Cover 2
    Title Page
        Page i
    Acknowledgement
        Page ii
        Page iii
        Page iv
        Page v
        Page vi
    Introduction
        Page 1
        Page 2
        Page 3
    Workshop recommendations
        Page 4
        Page 5
        Page 6
        Page 7
        Page 8
        Page 9
        Page 10
        Page 11
        Page 12
        Page 13
        Page 14
        Page 15
        Page 16
        Page 17
        Page 18
        Page 19
        Page 20
        Page 21
        Page 22
        Page 23
        Page 24
        Page 25
        Page 26
    Appendix A: Invited presentations
        Page 27
        Page 28
        Page 29
        Page 30
        Page 31
        Page 32
        Page 33
        Page 34
        Page 35
        Page 36
        Page 37
        Page 38
        Page 39
        Page 40
        Page 41
        Page 42
        Page 43
        Page 44
        Page 45
        Page 46
        Page 47
        Page 48
        Page 49
        Page 50
        Page 51
        Page 52
        Page 53
        Page 54
        Page 55
        Page 56
        Page 57
        Page 58
        Page 59
        Page 60
        Page 61
        Page 62
        Page 63
        Page 64
    Appendix B: Workshop attendees
        Page 65
        Page 66
        Page 67
        Page 68
    Bibliography
        Page 69
        Page 70
Full Text


SRecommendations for Hurricane
S Preparations and Responses
for Boating Communities
and Industries


ev.RYBODY' Q 'I


Maria L. Villanueva and Donald W Pybas editors


Florida Sea Grant College Program


TP-75
















Florida Sea Grant College is supported by award of the
Office of Sea Grant, National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, grant
number NA 36RG-0070, under provisions of the National
Sea Grant College and Programs Act of 1966. This paper is
funded by a grant from The National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration. The views expressed herein
are those of the authors) and do not necessarily reflect
the views of NOAA or any of its sub-agencies. This
information is published by the Sea Grant Extension
Program which functions as a component of the Florida
Cooperative Extension Service, John T. Woeste, Dean, in
conducting Cooperative Extension work in Agriculture,
Home Economics, and Marine Sciences, State of Florida,
U.S. Department of Agriculture, U.S. Department of
Commerce, and Boards of County Commissioners,
cooperating. Printed and distributed in furtherance of
the Acts of Congress of May 8 and June 14, 1914. The
Florida Sea Grant College is an Equal Opportunity-
Affirmative Action employer authorized to provide
research, educational information and other services only
to individuals and institutions that function without
regard to race, color, sex, age, handicap or national
origin. The information in this publication is available in
alternate formats. Information about alternate formats is
available from Educational Media and Services, University
of Florida, PO Box 110810, Gainesville, FL 32611-0810.
Printed 09/94.


Cover photo: Bill Matilla







Recommendations for Hurricane
Preparations and Responses
for Boating Communities and Industries

Edited by
Maria L. Villanueva
Boating Research Center University of Miami
Rosenstiel School of Marine and Atmospheric Science
and
Donald W. Pybas
Florida Sea Grant Extension Program
Dade County, Florida


Sponsored by the Florida Sea Grant College Program
in Cooperation with
the University of Miami Boating Research Center
and the Florida Sea Grant Extension Program
June, 1994
Technical Paper 75
$4.00

Florida Sea Grant College Program University of Florida
P.O. Box 110409
Gainesville, FL 32611-0409
904-392-2801




0








ii

Acknowledgements


The University of Miami Boating Research Center and
the Sea Grant Extension Program thank the participants of
the workshop for their cooperation. The editors are also
grateful to the following individuals for their suggestions
and comments of the draft manuscript: Dr. Edward K. Baker
of the University of Miami Boating Research Center, Phil
Everingham of Merrill-Stevens Boat Yard, Jim Flannery of
Soundings Magazine, Ted Crosby of CIGNA Loss Control
Services, Mr. Ernie Braatz of Boat/US and Caroline Knight of
the Department of Community Affairs of the Florida Coastal
Management Program. Marlen Alvarez, Kellyalexis Fisher, and
Clay Clifton of the University of Miami Division of Marine
Affairs and Policy provided valuable assistance in organizing
the workshop.











Table of Contents


Acknowledgements .................

List of Figures ......................

List of Photographs ..................

1.0 Introduction ....................

2.0 Workshop Recommendations ......

A. Pre-Hurricane Planning and Preparation

B. Post-Hurricane Response and Recovery

C. Pre-Hurricane and Post-Hurricane
Communication and Coordination ....

Appendix A Invited Presentations ....


. ii

. iv

. iv


.. . . .. 1

. . . 4

. . . 4

........... 13


........... 18

........... 27


Appendix A.1
Boater and Marina Hurricane Preparation ...

Appendix A.2
Marine Industries Hurricane Preparation ....

Appendix A.3
Post-Hurricane Salvage and Recovery .......

Appendix A.4
Pre- and Post-Hurricane Information
Dissemination and Information Sharing .....

Appendix A.5
Government, Industry, Academic and Boater
Groups Coordination ....................

Appendix B Workshop Attendees ............

Bibliography ...............................


... 28


... 37


... 46


... 52



... 60

... 65

... 69


I











List of Figures

1 Institutional Links of Marine Community
Hurricane Planning ........................... 3

2 1990 Hurricane Study Area ..................... 29

3 Estimated Location of Boat Storage Facilities
in Dade County ............................ 30

4 Estimated Location of Boat Yards, Boat Dealers
and Boat Manufacturers in Dade County .......... 33


List of Photographs

Post Hurricane Andrew at Black Point Marina
Bill M atilla ... ...........................

Drystack Building at Black Point Marina
Hal Wonless ...............................

Vessel "Leviathan" on Elliot Key, only known boating
ities, two people died.
Bob Gregg ...................................

Sailboat after the storm, Black Point Marina
Jay Bogaards ..............................

Stardock mooring, Crandon Marina
Bob Gregg ...............................


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1.0 Introduction

Recent hurricane experiences revealed the lack of
cooperative and coordinated efforts between the public
and private sectors of marine interests. Many segments of
both the private and public sectors do not have the nec-
essary plans to efficiently prepare for, and respond and
recover from, a catastrophic event. Hurricanes, such as
Hurricane Andrew, which hit the greater Miami area (Dade
County, Florida) in August 1992, can cause severe damage
to wet berthed boats and destroy thousands of boats on
trailers or dry storage. Additionally, boat storage facilities,
boat repair facilities and other marine businesses can be
damaged by a storm and deemed non-operational for a
long period of time. These events can be especially diffi-
cult for local economies that depend on boating and
boating related activities. It is apparent that coordinated
plans for hurricane preparation, and response and recov-
ery should be developed to address the needs of the
boating sectors of coastal communities. On November 17-
18, 1993, a workshop was convened at the University of
Miami Rosenstiel School of Marine and Atmospheric Sci-
ences to address the development of a framework for
marine community hurricane planning.
The workshop was sponsored by the Florida Sea
Grant College Program and conducted by the University of
Miami Boating Research Center and the Sea Grant Exten-
sion Program. The workshop addressed the need to re-
evaluate marine hurricane policies and programs. Invited
participants from various regulatory and enforcement
agencies, municipal and county government, marine
industry and the boating community were asked to ex-
plore and recommend alternative strategies and imple-
mentation of pre-hurricane preparation and post-hurri-
cane response and recovery plans for boating communi-
ties. The recommendations of this workshop are listed in
this report, along with invited presentations that set the
stage for the workshop discussion groups. The need for
developing a conceptual framework for organizing local
marine community hurricane preparedness and response


U









and recovery plans was demonstrated in this workshop.
Figure 1 illustrates the complexity of the undertaking as
recommended by the following document.
Specifically, the objectives of the workshop were:

1. To facilitate exchange of hurricane experiences
and information among different agencies and
marine groups,

2. To review and reevaluate current policies and
programs affecting hurricane preparation, response
and recovery, the effectiveness of these programs,
and policies with recent hurricane experiences,

3. To recommend pre- and post-hurricane strategies
for the boating communities and recommend
how these strategies can be implemented through
development of a response and recovery frame-
work, and

4. To increase institutional links and information
sharing among agencies and marine organizations
involved in pre- and post-hurricane operations (see
Figure 1).





















Figure 1
Institutional Links of Marine Community Hurricane Planning
Government Agencies


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2.0 Workshop Recommendations

A. Pre-Hurricane Planning and Preparation


Recommendation Al

Boat owners should have a Boater Hurricane Prepared-
ness Plan. The plan should contain a concise review of
materials, the steps to be taken to prepare the physical
environment of the boat itself, and, if need be, a
prearranged agreement with a storage facility or
property owner that will allow storage of the boat
during a hurricane.



A checklist of procedures for each step in a hurricane
preparedness plan is a good reminder of important items
that can reduce the amount of time trying to figure out
what is left to do under a stressful situation.
Prior planning is the key to successful preparation.
Experience has proven that boater hurricane preparedness
education and preparation can reduce loss of property for
both the boat owner and others. Knowing what prepara-
tions to make ahead of time, having appropriate supplies
available, and knowing where to take a boat, if evacuation
is necessary, can go a long way in survival with little or no
damage. However, if one is unfortunate enough to be in the
path of the worst sector of a severe hurricane, preparation
can only go so far. This is when luck comes into play.

la. Boaters should practice the routine of getting the
boat ready and executing an evacuation under normal,
relaxed circumstances. During an actual hurricane the time
to accomplish preparations may be greater than normal due
to boat traffic/bridge openings, lines at retail suppliers, and
boatowners' preparations of their homes and/or businesses.
Use a sunny weekend day to practice.









lb. The boat owner should take into consideration that
a hurricane may strike during a time of absence and should
plan accordingly. Prior arrangements should be made with
someone who is familiar with the hurricane plan, the boat,
and the evacuation site.

Wind borne debris poses as much of a threat to boats
as does water borne flotsam and waves. Trailerable boats
should be moved away from waterfront areas. One should
take into consideration that storage on the leeward side of
a building may reduce damage from debris. Tying down a
boat near or under a tree is not a good idea.

1c. Larger vessels may be hauled out on low-boy transport
trailers with prior arrangements or contracts with commer-
cial haulers. The marina office should be aware of these
arrangements and maintain appropriate records.

Id. Insurance companies should motivate boaters to be
pro-active concerning hurricane preparedness by providing
a discount for those who have a hurricane plan and make
every attempt to execute it. These rates should be for the
boat owner who actually writes a formal plan and files it
with the insurance company. Financial incentive could be a
useful tool.



Recommendation A2

Boat Storage Facilities should have a written Hurri-
cane Plan. The plan should establish the sequence of
events that are to go into effect on a set time frame.




2a. Operators of marinas and other boatstorage facilities
need to evaluate the docks and design criteria for load
under storm conditions. Key factors that need to be exam-


U









ined for surviving a hurricane, especially if boats are stored
in-water in the facility, are: docking boats in the slips for
which they were designed; not overloading dock structures;
proper maintenance of storage facilities including replacing
deteriorated piles, docks and hardware on finger piers;
properly retrofitted or designed and engineered docks;
marina personnel should have assignments for securing the
facility.

Many public marinas are administered by non-marine
oriented agencies. These agencies may not understand that
expedient removal of a damaged or sunken boat in a marina
can reduce collateral damage to other boats, the marina's
facilities, possibly minimize environmental damage from fuel
spills, and prevent loose boats from impacting sensitive
habitats.
Marina managers, especially in publicly run facilities,
may not be able to allow access to boat owners, insurance
representatives, marine salvor operators and other person-
nel for safety or security reasons due to loss of communica-
tions with superiors. If cooperative efforts are made to
share information obtained on site, the result will be fewer
requests for access to impacted areas.
Marina management should establish written policies
and procedures for the following procedures: when and how
the facility will be closed; what security measures will be put
in place; what credentials will be required post-hurricane;
what back-up modes of communication will be available; and
who authorizes salvage and removal of vessels.
Personnel should be given certain tasks for which they
will be responsible. All personnel should be familiar with the
overall plan and assist with all aspects of the plan. The plan
should include these checklists: (1) what equipment is to be
shut off; (2) what materials need to be on hand prior to a
hurricane; (3) materials needed after the storm to get the
facility up and running as quickly as possible; (4) how to
control access to the facility for safety and security reasons;
(5) a list of tenants' contact phone numbers and status of
their boat should be established; and (6) determine what
records to remove from the marina when preparations are
complete and personnel are evacuated from the site. These
records may prove invaluable after the hurricane. Review









the Hurricane Plan with marina staff at least annually. Walk
through procedures and check emergency equipment
periodically.

2b. Marinas should require boat owners to have a written
Hurricane Preparedness Plan and insurance prior to entering
into a contract to store the boat in the marine facility. Some
localities and/orstates have laws prohibiting mandatory boat
evacuation from marinas. If boats are to be left in a marine
facility, the boat owner is still obligated to prepare for the
hurricane so as to minimize damage to the boat, marina and
other boats.

Marina and boat storage facilities should have ade-
quately designed and installed docks and piles for increased
survivability with boats in them. Alternative configuration
or "tethering equipment" may be considered to secure boats
in slips. If facilities will experience a storm surge, boats
should be oriented "bow in" toward the oncoming water
wherever possible. Larger boats should be moved to slips
further from the marina entrance to lessen the potential for
being torn loose and impacting smaller boats or docks
"behind" them on adjacent docks.

2c. Each marina tenant should prepare a hurricane plan.
The plan should be on file with the dockmaster. The plan
should indicate who will be responsible for the boat in the
event of a storm and what the actions of that person will be.
Boating education and hurricane awareness campaigns
should emphasize that the boat owner is responsible for
his/her own boat and its preparation prior to a hurricane.

Hurricane planning is not just a piece of paper but,
actually reaching an agreement with whomever a boat
owner expects to work for him on his behalf, including a
trailering company of large vessels, for moving boats of
absentee owners or absentee captains, even pre-arranged
agreements with a towing company.
Drystack stored boats may need to be removed by
trailer as the structure may not be adequate to withstand
hurricane force winds. Drystack facilities vary in quality of


I,









design, construction, and maintenance. During hurricane
preparation, the following questions should be addressed.
(1) Is there a need to remove boats from the top level of
racks? (2) Should lower tiered boats be tied down? (3) Is
there a need to remove loose materials from exterior areas?
Additionally, the battery switches on all boats should be set
to the off position as damaged boats may leak fuel after a
hurricane and pose a very dangerous situation, especially in
enclosed facilities.
Many drystack customers do not purchase trailers
when purchasing their boats. Therefore, alternate trailering
services, rentals, etc., need to be explored. If a trailered
removal by a contractor is arranged, then the marina facility
should be notified.

2d. Private marine facilities should obtain adequate
insurance coverage for property, liability, and especially,
insurance to cover the period of time that the marina is
unable to operate as it may be months before the business
can open and generate income. By redesigning or retro-
fitting marina docks and facilities, insurance companies may
be more inclined to underwrite these facilities. Hopefully a
proactive loss prevention plan can assist marina facility
owners in acquiring needed insurance.


Recommendation A3

Boater education programs that specifically deal with
hurricane preparation and planning should be devel-
oped.



It is evident that even though boaters have hurricane
plans, they are not necessarily followed. A major education
program should be undertaken to encourage more people
to formulate a plan and to execute measures for preparing
their boats, whether they leave them in the marinas and
"triple up" their lines versus actually moving their boats,










evacuating them to a safe haven or to a safer place. This
would initiate some thought process as to whether they
move their boats or prepare them on site.

3a. Boater education should be more relevant to the
boater's geographic location and needs. Current boating
education programs such as the Power Squadron and Coast
Guard Auxiliary do not adequately address hurricane and
heavy weather preparations in basic boating classes. These
organizations also do not offer specialty classes on hurricane
preparation, especially relating to ground tackle, selecting
chafing gear, and harbors of refuge (hurricane havens) in
coastal areas prone to hurricanes. However, these organiza-
tions are already highly motivated and in place and should
have major involvement in hurricane preparedness educa-
tion locally.

3b. Marina facilities should organize and conduct educa-
tional seminars and demonstrations at the marina for ten-
ants and boat owners. These seminars and demonstrations
could be sponsored by the marine industry associations and
local government agencies. The seminars and demonstra-
tions accomplish two things: 1) they provide goodwill and
a sense of caring on the part of marina management toward
their customers; and 2) they better prepare the boater and
the marina facility for an increased chance of survival from
a hurricane. Managers should provide for hands-on training
using experienced boaters as volunteers, Coast Guard Auxil-
iary or Power Squadron personnel. Boaters should be
encouraged to attend and participate. If necessary, incen-
tives such as lunch or a raffle for free supplies may be used
to attract boaters.

If the facility has a ship's store, provide "hurricane
packages" of required items, especially plenty of lines or
have a vendor set up a tent and sell supplies during the
training. Many experienced boaters are willing to share their
knowledge in the common interest of boating and seaman-
ship to protect their boats. (On the other hand, many
boaters seem to regard their insurance coverage as all that
is needed and will not prepare for a hurricane).


i











Recommendation A4

Vessels need to be evacuated inland or moved out of
slips to open areas in the marina basin at the earliest
time possible, when it is still safe to move the boats.
Most hurricane prone coastlines do not provide
adequate protection for all types of boats.




Coastal marinas are not a viable sanctuary for a vessel
of any type during a direct hurricane threat. Most wet slip
marinas are not designed to accommodate vessels during
storm surge and/or heavy winds. These elements tend to
push and pound boats against pilings and/or lift pilings,
docks and other vessels, etc. Slips are too narrow to allow
for the violent motion of a vessel in a hurricane.

4a. Emergency Management offices should advise boaters
to evacuate coastal marinas when it announces the Hurricane
Watch. The concept of a "boater's warning" to coincide with
the issuing of the National Weather Service Hurricane Watch
should be developed. In other words, move the level of
concern up one level instead of waiting for the Hurricane
Warning. This would recommend that boaters act at the
Watch. Experience with Hurricane Andrew in the Miami area,
using the concept of a "boaters warning" time frame, would
have required action on Thursday morning or approximately
72 hours prior to landfall. In the case of boaters surveyed
after Hurricane Andrew, over 60 percent indicated that they
moved their boat less than 24 hours prior to the storm
(Baker and Villanueva, 1993).

Many questions face a boater who has decided to
evacuate his boat prior to a storm. These include: (1) where
do I go?; (2) Are there safe, sheltered waters for hurricane
evacuation?; (3) How many boats can be accommodated in









these identified areas?; (4) Are there legal and physical
restrictions in accessing these safe areas?; and (5) Are there
draw or swing bridges along the path to a safe haven?
Improved technology.has been developed for moor-
ings through the use of helical screw anchors that provide
improved holding ability over concrete or granite block
mooring anchors. This technology also has a decreased
potential for environmental impact during installation and
during use by boats.
Consideration should be given to establishment of
permanent mooring fields in areas where suitable. Evalua-
tion of vulnerability of potential sites and the feasibility of
public/private partnerships in developing and administering
hurricane mooring fields on publicly owned submerged
lands needs to be undertaken.
Doubling up of moorings in appropriate sites for
regular day-to-day moorings and for hurricane moorings
could be explored as a cost effective approach while provid-
ing an efficient use of wet stored boating facilities where
large numbers of sailboats moor.

4b. Marine trade associations should inventory local and
regional facilities that can store boats in the event of a
hurricane. The inventory should include the names, ad-
dresses, and phone numbers of the storage facilities, the
type of boats that could be stored, fees, facility rules, and
the boat owners' responsibilities. This information should be
provided to marina operators and to boat owners.

4c. Well known safe havens (especially those inland
beyond draw bridges) need a well defined and organized
emergency plan to permit access by boats in the event of a
hurricane. Bridges have land evacuations routes using them.
When will the bridges be closed and locked down? Who
orders this? Does there need to be an organized flotilla plan
to keep bridge openings to a minimum during hurricane
preparations?

4d. An oversight advisory committee responsible to a
local emergency management agency should be formed.
Committee make-up should include representatives from the


III








12

Department of Transportation, Florida Marine Patrol, United
States Coast Guard, Department of Environmental Protection,
knowledgeable representatives of the boating community,
and others. The committee should address these issues well
ahead of hurricane season. A standing written policy should
be established by the appropriate authorities and distrib-
uted to all parties, especially bridge tenders. Review of
procedures should be conducted at least annually to insure
all parties are aware of current policies.









B. Post-Hurricane Response and Recovery


Recommendation B1

Boat storage facilities should develop post-hurricane
response plans which address timely communication
with local agencies and timely facilities access.




Timely communication and facility access impact just
about every member of the marine community; boat
owners, marina operators, underwriters, marine salvors, boat
yards and others.

la. Boat storage facilities should have a prearranged
identification system for key employees at a marina. This
would allow insurance adjustors, contracted marine salvors
and other necessary personnel into a safe area declared so
by the marina dockmaster or appropriate on-site party. Boat
owners who want to stabilize or secure their vessels after
the storm should be allowed into the facility if it is deter-
mined safe. Marina operators should establish limited access
control by allowing only a few people in at a time for spe-
cific purposes.

Numerous outside agencies, especially disaster relief
agencies, may request access to marine facilities shortly after
a storm. The marina operator, who has employees or a
cadre of trained and knowledgeable volunteers can expe-
dite these activities by escorting people through the facility.
Uncontrolled access to marinas should not be allowed due
to dangerous conditions such as fuel spills and other hazards.
Controlled access limits personal injury or possible loss of life
and may limit or prevent property damage and/or looting.

lb. Marinas should consider doing their own hurricane
documentation, for instance, videotapes of boats in the


III









facilities, before and after the storm. Detailed records and
plans of the facility are very important in insurance settle-
ments and disaster assistance programs. Boat storage facili-
ties should keep their records and site plans where they can
be evacuated from the site so they can be readily available
for post-hurricane repairs.

1c. Communication with the boat owners and the marine
community by marina management of both private and
public marine facilities should be established as soon as
possible. The economy of a given community may be largely
dependent on marine business activities associated with
boat storage facilities. If false expectations are established
concerning repairs and reopening of damaged facilities, the
boating community (of which most are taxpayers) will view
the agency and/or the local government as not meeting
their responsibilities. III will and legal action can be pre-
vented by communicating an accurate assessment of the
extent of damages, estimation of repair or replacement time
of facilities, and possibly limited service at less severe
damaged facilities for boats that need to be moved out of
safe havens after the hurricane.


Recommendation B2

The Marine Industry Association should develop an
inventory of local and regional boat repair facilities.
This inventory should establish how many boats can
be handled by any one repair facility at a time.





The association should also identify possible staging
areas for damaged and salvaged boats until insurance
adjustors and marine surveyors determine the extent of
damage and disposition of the boat.









2a. The marine industry associations should set up a
clearinghouse of all insurance companies and marine inter-
ests. They should have a listing and status of which boat
yards are available, which are open, type of work that can be
done in the facility, and which are merely storage yards.

2b. The marine trade associations should also explore
establishing a communications "hot line" outside the im-
pacted area. This hot line could be used to determine the
extent of available repair facilities still in operation so that
boats do not need to be removed from the area.


Recommendation B3

Insurance personnel should provide input from a
marina facility to be shared in a clearinghouse opera-
tion set up outside the impacted area. This would
provide all interests with information on the status
and needs of each marina site.




3a. A clearing house concept could be developed by
insurance companies with protocol response, catastrophe
"cat" teams reporting back to a central site with shared
information on the boats' general condition in given loca-
tions. This would assist underwriters, insurance adjustors,
marine surveyors, and contracted marine salvors. Shared
information through a clearing center would expedite
finding insured boats when access to many areas will be
restricted for days after a hurricane.

Insurance companies and pre-arranged salvor opera-
tors should be on file with the marina where an insured boat
is a tenant. The boat owner should provide this information
to the marina management with his dockage contract.
Depending on the facility, procedures for access by contrac-
tors can be a problem. Pre-arranged access can reduce the










post-hurricane response time and thus the loss exposure to
a boat.

3b. Industry standards should be established concerning
salvor or towing services. Contracted services such as tow-
ing have been established through membership organiza-
tions such as Boat/US. Freelance salvor operators may be a
potential.problem as some boaters without insurance may
hire them without a contract and get charged exorbitant
amounts to raise a boat off the bottom. On the other hand,
legitimate salvor operators may be denied access to a marina
because they do not have a contract with an insurance
company or the public agency that manages the facility.


Recommendation B4

Standardized scale, high quality, aerial photography
should be provided for assessing marine facilities,
boat related losses, and environmental damage
caused by the hurricane.



4a. Complete overflight photography of the hurricane
impacted area, especially the coastal nearshore and inshore
areas, should be flown just prior to and immediately after a
hurricane. A system through a state emergency manage-
ment agency should be responsible for requesting this type
of assistance from the Federal Emergency Management
Administration (FEMA). FEMA in turn can access high technol-
ogy photography from capable agencies or the military.

4b. Many local police or other agencies have the ability to
take low level aerial photographs from the helicopters they
use for fly-overs to assess damage to impacted areas and for
relief efforts soon after the storm. These photographs can
be available within hours after the storm.











Recommendation B5


An efficient system of finding damaged or sunken
vessels should be established. Insurance companies,
marine patrol, surveillance satellites, Sea-Grant gener-
ated aerial photography, and an 800-number "boat
lost and found" should be elements of this system.




5a. A clearinghouse for information on boats found as
reported by the field officers of the Coast Guard and local
agencies is necessary. In Florida, arrangements could be
made with the Bureau of Vessel Registration with the Depart-
ment of Environmental Protection to provide the informa-
tion on owners of boats found. An entity which already has
the information is the University of Miami Boating Research
Center. The roles of an education/research center and vessel
registration agencies as clearinghouses should be explored
and defined for each state prone to hurricanes.


U









C. Pre-hurricane and Post-hurricane Communication
and Coordination



Recommendation C1

The position of a Marine Coordinator in local, re-
gional, and especially state Offices of Emergency
Management, should be established. The coordinator
would be responsible for working closely with marine
industry and boating interests, public agencies
responsible for boating and public safety, water
management, drawbridge control, and boater educa-
tion outreach program.



The local emergency management agencies have
minimal staffs. They have tremendous responsibility to the
community, as a whole, for many types of civil emergencies.
These include nuclear accidents, major plane crashes, and
severe storms. Coordinating storm preparations such as
evacuation shelters, damage assessment, relief personnel
and supplies, responding to outside relief agencies and the
media is an overwhelming task.
The experiences with Hurricane Andrew have shown
the devastation of the marine community with over 900 wet-
stored boats sunk or damaged (Antonini, et al., 1993). In
addition, hundreds of dry stored boats were destroyed, and
several major marina complexes were severely damaged or
destroyed. It was apparent that the marine community was
left on its own for hurricane planning and preparation. With
the exception of an educational publication developed and
distributed to registered boat owners in Dade County,
marine interests were essentially on their own to prepare for









a hurricane event.1

la. Each coastal county, as part of it's emergency opera-
tions should have a Marine Coordinator whose sole interest
is marine related. This person would function out of the
emergency operation center and would coordinate any
marine interests regarding hurricane preparations and
response. The Marine Coordinator would be responsible for
hurricane related boater education, identification and
evaluation of local safe havens, and distribution of informa-
tion on safe havens in each county. This position would be
part of both the county and state hazard mitigation plan.
The coordinator would be responsible to relay the plan,
coordinate communications, and get feedback and make
sure the plan is what the community wants and supports.

lb. The Marine Coordinator of the emergency manage-
ment agency should be designated as the liaison between
the local government agencies and the boating commu-
nity/marine industry. With the marine coordinator, liaison
with the U.S. Coast Guard and state marine police should be
an on-going process for hurricane preparation and other
marine disasters such as major petroleum spills. Coordinated
educational programs should be established cooperatively
with marine facilities and agencies for the boating commu-
nity.

Ic. Once a hurricane emergency has been declared, the
Marine Coordinator would coordinate evacuation, establish
communication, and be involved with recovery operations
and respond to security problems and looting.




' Note: It is recognized that human life and safety needs are
paramount to other sectors of the community and that boating
interests will take a lower priority during the immediate aftermath of
a catastrophic hurricane event. Emergency relief resources will focus
on human needs and transportation of supplies to areas impacted.






















Pre-hurricane and post-hurricane plans and policies
will be of no value during a hurricane if they are not commu-
nicated and coordinated properly. Past hurricane experi-
ences have shown that a major problem encountered in pre-
hurricane preparation and post-hurricane recovery and
response was the breakdown or lack of communication
among agencies and institutions involved.

2a. The Hurricane Committee should be responsible for
communication and coordination of plans and policies of all
agencies and institutions involved with hurricane planning
and preparation. The plans and policies should be written
down. If plans and policies conflict, the Hurricane Commit-
tee should take the initiative to resolve the conflict. Prior to
a hurricane season, the Hurricane Committee should review
all hurricane plans and policies. If there are new plans and
policies, these should be properly communicated and
coordinated prior to the hurricane season.

2b. The Hurricane Committee should compile a list of
hurricane-related informational material including resources
that can be tapped in the recovery phase. The latter should
include sources of specialized equipment, material and
supplies and offices that can offer city, county, state and
federal assistance with specific information on what they
have, how much they have, what they can do, and how they
can be contacted.


Recommendation C2

Create a Hurricane Response Committee made up of
boaters, representatives from the marine industry,
local and state regulatory and enforcement agencies,
Department of Transportation, US Coast Guard, and
the Marine Coordinator. Members of this committee
will work together to ensure effective communica-
tion and coordination of pre-hurricane and post-
hurricane efforts.










Recommendation C3

Provide a separate communication center with a
separate communication channel for marine interests
within the Emergency Operations Center of the
Office of Emergency Management. This center would
provide the marine community and boating interests
with their own information links. The Marine Coordi-
nator would have the responsibility and the authority
for the communication center.



The marine communication center would be the
center of marine information network. Itwould provide the
major information link among the state and local agencies,
marine industry associations, marine businesses, boat stor-
age facilities, and boaters in the event of a hurricane. The
Marine Coordinator, through the marine communication
center, would gather important information from various
sectors of the marine community and relay this information
to appropriate parties. Ideally, it should be able to answer
questions and issues facing the marine community during a
severe storm.

3a. The Marine Coordinator should coordinate with other
groups and agencies which also provide communications
services in the event of the hurricane. Foremost of these
groups are the US Coast Guard, marine police, and marine
trade associations. Communication activities of these groups
should not conflict with one another but should comple-
ment one another.

3b. The communication system should be flexible and
compatible with other communication systems for efficient
operation. The use of VHF marine radios, cellular phones, 800
numbers, and amateur radio (HAM) portable transmitters
should be explored and developed at the local, regional, and
statewide levels. Communication equipment may be dam-


U









aged during a hurricane. Alternative or backup equipment
needs to be planned for.


Recommendation C4

The marine communication center should develop
and coordinate a strong communications link with
the US Coast Guard and the marine police.




The US Coast Guard and the marine police are highly
motivated groups which already have the resources for
operational communications systems in place. These groups
can provide timely on-site information about navigation,
mariner's safety, and assessment of marine facilities. Any
communication system is useless if you cannot get the
information from the people on site. Information is needed
from people who are at the site. Members of the US Coast
Guard Auxiliary are trained mariners who have the resources
to access on-site information that can be relayed to the
marine communication network through their existing
communication systems.











Recommendation C5

The marine industry associations should play a vital
role in communications in response to a hurricane.
The marine industry associations should explore the
establishment of a hot line where members of the
marine community can call before and after the
hurricane for information.



5a. The marine industry hotline could be established
through the use of an '800' number, VHF radio, or HAM radio
network. The marine industry hot line should work hand in
hand with the marine communication network through the
Office of Emergency Management.

5b. Marine trade associations should work closely with the
central Marine Coordinator to provide updated information
of the status of marinas and boat repair yards.


Recommendation C6

Research and outreach programs for pre-hurricane
preparation and post-hurricane response and recov-
ery should be identified and developed.




6a. Research as to where potential safe havens (or histori-
cally believed safe havens) are needs to be conducted. For
example, an evaluation of water depth, obstructions, bottom
type, and location of shoreline landowners needs to be
conducted by a non-biased entity such as a university re-
search group or advisory organization.


U







24


6b. The mechanics of how to establish a mooring field, its
administration and supervision, the permitting process,
access to and procedure for evacuation to the mooring field
when a storm threatens, needs to be explored. Is the
concept to be a public facility, private, or cooperative
effort? With most submerged lands in public ownership it
would seem that the public sector would have a major role
in any "hurricane mooring" plan. Identification of appropri-
ate locations, bottom types, etc., needs to be conducted
and an investigative evaluation of appropriate sites and
design evaluation of proposed technology undertaken byan
objective research entity.








































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27

Appendix A


Invited Presentations

NOTE: Sections in italic type are questions or comments
from workshop participants other than the speakers.









Appendix A.1

Boater and Marina Hurricane Preparation
Dr. Edward K. Baker
University of Miami Boating Research Center

The first map (Figure 2) shows the geographic area for
our study. This area is divided into three sections: 1) from
Monroe County line to Kendall Drive (SW 88th St), 2) SW 88th
Street to the mouth of Miami River, and 3) from the mouth
of Miami River to the Broward County line. From previous
studies, we have found that the types of boats and boating
activities in these areas are different, hence better
estimates of boating population are obtained through this
stratification.
Figure 3 shows the marinas in Dade County. These are
the ones with more than a hundred slips and Black Point is
right here where a lot of damage was incurred (See Baker
and Villanueva, 1993). Black Point was generally considered
a safe haven prior to Hurricane Andrew. For those people
who actually moved their boats, those who moved north
did well, those who moved south didn't do so well. Sea
Grant has graciously published our study and we have
enough copies here for everyone to take a copy. It goes into
a lot more detail about the particular actions of boaters
prior to the storm.
What we found was that in the central region,
including the Coconut Grove Sailing Club, where everyone
was required to leave the marina, 100% of the people
evacuated. The amount of damage incurred by those who
moved to the north was very small. However, those in Black
Point and Homestead who didn't move their boats incurred
extensive damage. One might ask, "What recommendation
can then be made about moving your boat when a
hurricane is approaching?" To this question I would respond,
"Move your boat out of path of the storm and do it early
on."
In 1990, when we asked boaters in our survey at what
point would they move their boats, we had over 50% who
said they were going to move them more than 48 hours
before the estimated landfall of the hurricane.





























































U












I remember the weekend before Hurricane Andrew
very well. On Thursday, the news reports of Hurricane
Andrew were buried on the back pages of the Miami Herald.
Not big news. Friday, it was a little more serious. Saturday,
it was front page news, headlines. We had very good
weather that weekend. It was hot but good weather.
However, forecasters also said that with the hurricane two
days away, there is a 1200 mile margin of error in the
prediction of estimated landfall. When a hurricane or a
storm is 200 miles away with a 1200 mile error in prediction,
there is not an awful lot you can do to prepare.
In any event, there was plenty of opportunity on that
Saturday for boat owners to move their boats. But it turns
out, less than 4% of boaters in general moved their boats
more than 48 hours before the estimated landfall.
Forty percent of berthed boat owners did move their
boats more than 48 hours before the storm. In general, less
than 4% of all boat owners moved their boats. People just
weren't that concerned. No one anticipated the strength of
the storm. It is difficult to anticipate and forecast a storm.
In regards to preparation, we have a lot of people
who basically said, "I will not move my boat. I have a safe
place for it." In 1990, people thought the Miami River would
be a safe place to put their boats. But there was a lot of
publicity that went out about flood control. There was
going to be a lot of water coming down to the Miami River.
There were signs in the 1990 study that a lot of
people might not be prepared. In the 1990 study of berthed
boat owners, less than 10% had contractual arrangements
made. Only 50% of the people made plans where they had
arranged a pick up. Only 50% did dry runs of their plans.
There are many things that boat owners have to think
through to prepare their boats. Where are you going to
move the boat? Who will be there to make sure that the
boat is secure? Who will come around to pick up
the captain? Certainly, making a dry run makes a lot of
sense.
We were very fortunate. There are a few major
marinas in the south: Black Point, Matheson Hammock, and
Homestead. The number of marinas increases as you go
north. If the hurricane had veered a little to the north,


U









you'd probably have seen a lot more problems.
The boaters' response after the hurricane, was
certainly optimistic. A lot of boaters are back in the water
right after the hurricane. They are optimistic in using their
boats and returning to the water at the same level of
activity as before the hurricane.
If we look at the data, the boat owners anticipated
level of activity after the hurricane is higher than before the
hurricane. There is a statistical significant increase of the
anticipated frequency of boat use from 'before' to 'after'
the hurricane. This is an interesting phenomenon. This is
similar to what happened to Coca Cola when they intro-
duced the 'new' Coke. People began to pay more attention
to the 'old' Coke. The phenomenon is the same with a
boyfriend, girlfriend, husband or wife who are taken for
granted. When someone else pays attention to them, then
you again become more interested in them.
After the hurricane, boaters perhaps realized that
boating is not something you take for granted. So you give
it a little more of your attention and interest. And perhaps
that is something that we have done with the event of
Hurricane Andrew where we raised the level of awareness.
I think people now are anxious in getting information about
hurricane preparedness.
Figure 4 shows the locations in Dade County of the
businesses that we included in our study (boat yards, boat
dealers and boat manufacturers). The concentration is again
in the northern region. These are the firms who responded
to our survey and we have only a few observations. We have
even fewer responses from the firms in the south region
that incurred the most damage.
Generally, many marinas have a hurricane plan. The
majority have hurricane preparedness plans. I am not sure
what those plans are. I have not examined copies of the
plans. If I've learned anything in the last year going to
seminars like this, it is that Hurricane Andrew has taught





























































i









every marina to devise a hurricane plan and to think
through what steps or preparation for the storm need to be
taken. From our study, about 80% of all marinas require
insurance of boats in their slips. That probably will go up to
nearly 100%. But I think the level of awareness has increased
after Hurricane Andrew and we are going to see a lot more
marinas taking a more serious look at what their hurricane
plan is, how they will disseminate this information to the
boat owners in the marinas, and what steps need to be
taken. I think in the future, we will see more cooperation
between insurance companies and marinas to work
together to evaluate effective hurricane evacuation plans
for the marinas.
In our study, we did try to contact all boat manufac-
turers, boat dealers, and boat yards in the county. Our
response rate from boaters was very good. For berthed
boat owners, we had a 50% response. All large public
marinas and 30% of other private marinas responded. There
were about 80 marinas in Dade County. From boat yards,
boat manufacturers, and boat dealers, we got a very poor
response rate. This is an area where we, as a group, need to
work on. I know it is inconvenient sometimes to answer
surveys, but in all our correspondence and all our contacts
we always offered a lot of help from our research assistants.
Unless we have the information coming from the industry,
it is very difficult to process and correlate and disseminate
the information in a meaningful way.

What sort of scenario would you recommend now on
how boaters and the local agencies can approach the
hurricane in terms of preparation?

The recommendation of our study is primarily
focused on additional training and additional information
and workshops on seamanship. As far as I know the county
is responding in that way. In fact this workshop, sponsored
by Florida Sea Grant, is in response to that kind of recom-
mendation.









The county came out with a booklet on hurricane
preparation before Hurricane Andrew. They were supposed
to have been mailed to all registered boaters in June 1992.

I think that is a very good point. I think in response to
the 1990 study and also to other factors in Dade County, the
county did respond by providing this Hurricane Manual for
Marine Interests to all registered boat owners in the county.
But keep in mind the level of awareness.
We all get bombarded with a lot of things in our mail
day after day. You have to be aware of what the real
concerns are. Hurricane Andrew has raised the level of
awareness here, but we still have a lot of things to do. For
example, I think in terms of seamanship training or seminars
on how to tie your boats would be valuable.

My comment about the report, the county neglected
to include a map where people will see where the hurricane
holes are. I know they used to have this map. I think this is
valuable to have this information and let people decide
whether to use it or not.
I think in this storm, seamanship was not much of a
factor. But still seamanship training and seminars would be
a good way to go. I don't think the next hurricane would be
as devastating as Andrew. There was not much you could do
with that hurricane. It is hard to make any recommendation.

You must have read our report. That is what the
conclusion section of our report said. It is very hard drawing
conclusions from this work. But if you are unlucky and the
storm happened to pass directly over your hurricane hole,
you probably would not have been successful in riding out
the storm. That is what our recommendations and conclu-
sions would be.

I still believe that seamanship is very important. I
heard a lot of people in my marina who said that their boats
survived because they put two or three lines to tie their
boats. When one line snapped during a hurricane, there is
still another line securing the boat.








36

When you pass by some marinas, you will see boats
with flimsy lines securing them. People spend thousands of
dollars for their boats and trailers but do not spend enough
for boat accessories to properly secure their boats. In any
case, seamanship is still very much needed. Dade County
produced a video for Cable Tap (public television) about
tying your boat on a trailer inland or in the water.









Appendix A.2

Marine Industries Hurricane Preparation
Richard Bischoff2
Marine Council of Greater Miami

The Marine Council is an organization including
industry members, consumers, and boaters. It has been
active for many years trying to be the voice of the boating
community and put together a multitude of interests that
exist. If you really think about it, the marine community is
almost unlike any other segment of our society. It requires
more interaction, I believe, between public and private
interests than almost any other area. Running an airport
requires a lot of public and private cooperation. The marine
community requires even more than that. I think what will
come out at the conclusion of this meeting is that we need
more cooperation. We need more public-private coopera-
tive efforts to solve the problems that we have and that is
what we aim for,
I congratulate Sea Grant and the steps that they have
done with legitimate statistics on what our problems were
and how we might solve it. But very honestly, as part of the
Marine Council, I am illegitimate, and I get to tell you what
we learned, our conclusions, which are not necessarily
scientific and which you might not agree with in this
workshop. What I will do is to throw those up and see if you
disagree with them or agree with them and take them a
little further.
Let's paint the scene first, on Hurricane Andrew, then
we'll go to the marine industry. Contrary to popular belief,
that we didn't know what was coming until Sunday or
Saturday, my understanding is that the National Weather
Service, with every computer model they have said it was
coming to Dade County. If that is true, and I now believe it
is, why didn't we get warnings much earlier than we did?
One of the conclusions we reached is that we need an


2A review copy of the transcript was sent to the speaker but no
comments were received.









earlier warning system. Folks don't need to wait to know if
the storm is to be a direct hit if it is a major hurricane.
Boaters should be obligated to move their boats if that
storm even has the substantial possibility of hitting this
area. You may not know where to go, north or south; but
one should know that you go inland.
There is no marina built in this county that I am aware
of that will sustain a major hit such as Hurricane Andrew
with boats in its slips. We don't build slips like that. We
probably can't economically build a slip thatwill allow a boat
to stay in it during a major storm. The slips don't have the
width, the length, the height necessary. They don't have
the strength. Let's not kid ourselves that staying in the
marina is a wonderful thing to do. Moving inland is more
wonderful and it's been proven in major hurricanes that I
am aware of. Moving inland is better and the probability of
survival for the vessel is better.
Marinas are going to require that boaters have a lot
more insurance.
Another conclusion that we have reached is that the
failure to rebuild the public marinas in Dade County has
been a greater economic loss to this community than
Hurricane Andrew. Most of the boats are insured but you
cannot repurchase a wet slip for a stored vessel that is not
trailerable and that has no parking space for it. That is a
conclusion that we all talk about. Why is it that all private
marinas are up and running? Why is it that most of the
public marinas are not? And there are some exceptions to
that which I apologize because I give credit to those marina
managers who try to keep them up and running.
But frankly, most other marinas were insured. Those
marinas which charged more per foot than any other
marina in competition weren't insured and I ask the
question why are public marinas not insured? Because they
are self insured. They are self insured and they are not
open. Not only not open, if they are like my marina at
Bayside, they won't open for a long time. The economic
scene. Again the charge for boat per foot is higher in public
marinas. You always self insure when you have the capital
to be able to bear the risk. If the city doesn't, and I don't
think they do, they shouldn't be self insured, very frankly,









nor should the county. Why is it that Federal Emergency
Management Agency is the only one that will rebuild docks
in Dade County. That's the conclusion that we really ought
to talk about.
The public enterprise sector, they cannot rebuild the
industry because there is no place to put it. Look at the
marine industry and realize the difficulties we have in its
preparations and its result. I wrote a list of all the different
parts of the marine industry and I tried to get some
statistics and I just didn't fare well, very frankly. I think now
we have better statistics than the ones that I was able to
get. If you want a list that would take the full gamut of the
marine industry, one would include passenger ship industry,
commercial shipping industry, and one which is substantial
in this area, the port facilities. Think about each one of
these. Think about what you know about them after the
hurricane. Some include the port facilities as part of
recreation.
The commercial marine businesses runs the full
gamut, from manufacturers to dealers; some are water-
front, some are not. The marinas themselves, the water-
front property owners, the boat owners, the boat
manufacturers, the insurance agency, and so on. Each one
of those will have their own story about the hurricane. But
there are few marine communities with interests as diverse
as this one. The Great Lakes have their own problems but
you really feel that they don't have many diverse interests
fighting each other or not cooperating with each other, as
South Florida possibly does.
What's the scope of the marine industry? The
statistics I obtained show that the recreational boating
industry is a $3.4 billion industry. They indicate there are
770,000 registered boats in Florida, but you then have to
define if it includes documented vessels. I don't think it
does. I think it is just for registrations.
There are three million boat operators in Florida;
40,000 employees in an industry, that is only for recreational
boating according to 1987-1988 statistics and 6400 busi-
nesses in the marine industry. Again, it is much larger than
that.


I I









Dade County has 50,000 registered boats. Eighty-three
percent of those registered boats are less than 26 feet in
length.
Which marine industries were prepared when the
hurricane arrived, and which ones are better prepared now?
Those are the questions that we are supposed to address
here. They make sense. What experiences have occurred?
If you take each one of these industries, you probably have
your own views of which one is best or better prepared.
Which ones fared well? Passenger ships, commercial
shipping, marine businesses, marinas, clubs, waterfront
property owners, boat owners, boat manufacturers,
insurance agencies, boat for hire (charter). Boat for hire
fared very well as an industry. They required insurance,
marine enforcement and education.
One thing to remember that even with the warning
Saturday morning, which was more than 48 hours before
Andrew's landfall, the conditions prior to Hurricane Andrew,
in my opinion, were the best possible that one could ever
see. We all had warning, knew it is coming, we had a
weekend, and the wind was blowing all of two knots. All day
Saturday and Sunday we could not have had better
preparation conditions than we had and we will unlikely
have that next time. Even with the kind of warning that we
had, there were people moving around Friday afternoon
and it is interesting to see those that were and those that
were not. There were boats moving and everybody else in
the world was in Home Depot or getting water. There was
a lot of advance warning and the conditions were perfect.
I didn't bring the dirty pictures, the bows sticking up
and the bows sticking down, and there were holes through
those. I think most of you have seen those pictures.
Estimated loss of 2,000 plus boats, 15,000 plus boats
estimated damaged. Those that were inland fared very well.
I believe in Coral Gables waterway, we had two boats go
down, I own one of them. Only two down in Coral Gables
waterway. Think about it. Many marinas were damaged and
they were damaged seriously. They were damaged by flying
debris. As far as I know, most of all the private facilities are
open. However, with the public marinas: 44 slips in Pelican
Harbor Marina; 198 in Crandon Marina, 2/3 full now; Dinner









Key Marina 582 wet slips with about 1/3 of Dinner Key open;
Matheson Hammock Marina 252 slips, zero available; Black
Point Marina 178 slips and 300 drystack racks, zero available.
They started construction of slips in Black Point
Marina. Talking about racks in Black Point, how would you
think about owning a boat in a rack in Dade County. It
never occurred to me to leave a boat in a rack during the
hurricane. What am I missing?
You are a seaman, that's what's the difference, right?
I don't buy that. You know what it is about? Put a boat in
a rack, inside a building, a nice facility. You know what,
most of these people didn't buy trailers for their boats.
That wasn't true ten years ago, in my experience. Most of
the people have trailers sitting around in their backyards, or
in facilities somewhere because that is an expensive
commodity to buy and keep. I don't know what percentage.
Facilities don't provide trailer parking. They just stack boats
in the racks. But you can't move a boat in a rack. It needs
a trailer. When you buy a boat, the dealer puts it in the
water, then you store it in the rack. Then you don't need
the trailer. I think we need to think about that. Maybe rack
facilities need ground storage where boats from the top tier
can be stored during a storm. But it never occurred to me
to have a boat five tiers up in a storm. Think about that. It
is strange to me that anyone would even consider a rack as
a viable place for survival in a much less wind than a
hurricane.
Closure of Miami River bridges. The conclusion here is
that we need public and private cooperation. But for a
year, we were told when the bridges would be closed at
certain wind speeds. They lied. All of the sudden, during
Hurricane Andrew, they closed it specifically when the wind
was two knots. It prevented commercial ships from leaving
which planned to leave. It prevented a lot of boat owners
who planned on bringing their boats up the river and who
had contracts and who had done their planning and done it
right. How are we going to solve that problem? If there is
a cooperative effort, then we will know when the bridges
are going to be closed. My understanding is that the
Department of Transportation is going to repeat this
negligent act of Andrew and do it again. Contrary to Coast


1 11U









Guard regulations, and contrary to the desires of those in
the river and those who are going up the river. And that is
what the community should try to figure out with some
coordination.
Ft. Lauderdale has a flotilla plan to go up the New
River. We here are not touched by a ten foot pole. Terrific.
I don't know where the lawyers went. Quite a mistake,
especially in the River where there are those who are
interested parties that want to leave and those interested
to get in. I think it is a terrible mistake to make, that we
can't come up with some public and private curative effort
to assist people to move vessels inland where they need to
be.
The other thing that we concluded, not as scientists,
is to stop worrying about where there are holes. Bad
storms are here, tornadoes and hurricanes. I mean it's
mother nature. The best example I know is my house in
Stiltsville in Biscayne Bay south of Key Biscayne. It weighed
4600 pounds, was 26 feet long, equaling 150 pounds per
foot, pilings 30 to 40 feet in depth and 90 feet of dock.
Believe me, it's gone. Never found again. How do you
move concrete pilings in the wind? I don't know. But the
water helped push it somewhere.
But we shouldn't worry about it anymore. There were
houses and there were facilities damaged way beyond the
nucleus of that storm. That Is why boaters need to move
their boats inland where they reduce the chances of
something like that happening.
Another conclusion. What are the experiences in the
industry? You may know of the experiences with the other
segments of the industry. But we know that coastal marinas
are not adequate as hurricane refuges. This is important
with the lease or evacuation issue. Because I have seen how
county directors can say, "The best thing one can do is to
stay in one's slip," which may be true for two hours before
the full force wind. Don't risk lives. We helped the county
do that and change some of those leases. But the state of
Florida changed that. What they have done, in my view, is
say that, anybody that requires removal from a marina prior
to hurricane, that's unlawful." No lease can do that. Private
property, a private marina, why can't they do that, unless









they risk peoples lives. That is why we say that it is not in
the best interest for boats to be left in the coastal marinas.
They are not designed for it. We could create breakwaters
to protect the coastal marinas and other properties. That is
what the rest of the world does. Marinas in South America
and in Europe have done that. Why haven't we talked about
it?
Maybe we should establish hurricane moorings. It's
been done around the world, especially in the Caribbean.
The hurricane mooring systems, we have seen a lot of that.
But the public facilities and government sectors say, "That
is not our job." Private industry says, "How can we do that
without your help?" There has to be a cooperative effort
and I don't think it has been done.
Should we develop a flotilla plan, a sanctuary
(hurricane haven) guide? This guide or manual we helped
develop here one and a half years ago didn't tell people
where to go. I have the feeling that the governmental
entities, which is ironic, were more concerned with liability
aspects. But why don't we do a service to the people in
terms of where the sanctuaries might be. I do not have
good answers for it. We do not coordinate at all the timing
of evacuation and location of inland refuges. Ft. Lauderdale
does. We should be able to figure it out. We close the
Miami River as an evacuation center. I offered to go to
Tallahassee to tell the Department of Transportation that
Miami River is not a barrier island. We need some coopera-
tive effort. The Coast Guard Flotilla Plan two years ago was
at least a cooperative effort. There was an intent. Without
an intent, it is a disaster.
Everyone knows we criticize. Where is the plan. The
Coast Guard has a plan. Florida Marine Patrol has a plan. I
am sure the Coral Gables marine patrol has a plan. Most
have plans. But is it not in the best public interest to assist
the people and let them access safe refuge.
It never crossed my mind to close Miami River on a
Sunday morning at 10 o'clock with no adverse weather
conditions, with no warnings or no publications thereafter.
Seeing the boats come up and wondering if it will ram the
bridge. It constitutes negligence.


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Did you ever find out why they closed the bridges?

We heard the evacuation order from Office of
Emergency Management and that evacuation order seemed
to us to make sense to close the bridges to comply with the
order.

Did you ask the Coast Guard about the closures?

The Coast Guard reminded them. We have yet to
meet with them to coordinate this stuff. That is just one of
the things in my messages of public and private coopera-
tion. It needs to be done.
We need to build more boat ramps for removal
capabilities. I believe if you go up Boca Raton in a quarter
of a mile, you will find more ramps there than South Dade
has in its entirety. Remember that a high percentage of
boats in Dade are 26-feet and below. Many boats in Miami
use ramps. They are trailered in the backyards. We
bottleneck our ramps every weekend. Having ramps would
be of a benefit in the event of the storm. Boats which are
normally trailered could be removed from the water and
other storage facilities.
There were a number of concerns that many of the
resources were not made available for the preparation of
the storm, during the storm, and after the storm. I guess
the classic example is no sanctuary assistance, no guides, no
hotlines, no help to boat owners. There seems to be no real
help to the industry. There's the story of the vessel that
ended up almost to Cutler Road; the vessel's owner had
made arrangements with the Port of Miami to tie up there
at the port as a sanctuary during the storm. When they
went to do so, they were turned down. They were turned
away in the face of the storm when there is a risk of life and
property damage.

In the city of Coral Gables. Do people know what the
status of the laws is, or does Coral Gables have a position on
parking your boats in the waterways? Nobody knows what
the situation is.









The public safety and assistance. Again, without the
Flotilla Plan, without government assistance to the boating
segment of our society, what is our situation with respect
to public assistance to those who want to move their boats
and have them operating after the fact? These people are
caught in catch 22. That is a problem.
What will happen next time? I guess we won't have
a major hit next time. I guess statistics say that. It could
however be far worse if the hurricane was further to the
north. The industry would have been impacted more. I
guess more boats will be left in the marinas. I guess it is
unfortunate because the laws do not provide for education
but yet it is trying to protect lives.
The recovery experience hopefully will get out, be
disseminated, publicized because of its value in reaching
conclusions. I made suggestions that I hope we can talk
about in the workshop. I hope we can have an earlier
warning system. I hope we can have better service
information. I hope we can have industry survival concerns.
I hope we have more planning in the industry, and in the
public and government entities.
There is more than merely economics involved not-
withstanding the use of statistics. There is the quality of life
issue that I find politicians here will listen to. There is an
awful lot of people living in this area who are proud of this
area because they feel that boating is a wonderful aspect of
a fine quality of life. Twelve months in a year. I have kids
who sail these waters 12 months a year. That is the quality
of life people find in this area. Why is it that we have
governments who are more concerned in getting money
for racetracks to bring in tourists than improving and
maintaining the quality of life among its residents? When
the government, the industry and the public get together
more on the same wavelength, we will all like that. That is
my message to the marine community.


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46

Appendix A.3

Post-hurricane Salvage and Recovery
Dr. Gustavo Antonini
Geography Department
University of Florida


My presentation is called Location Assessment of
Hurricane Andrew Damaged Vessels in Biscayne Bay. Our
original intent was to inventory and prioritize for removal
of damaged vessels. However 2/3 of these vessels were
removed within three months of the storm. Theoretically,
the problem was removed. However, another question
remained, namely what was the potential impact to the
environment from damaged or sunken vessels. If damage to
bay habitat occurred, where would we look? The vessels
were already removed. Our study therefore was recast to
answer these questions and to provide local and state
authorities ex-facto analysis.
The primary purposes) of the study were to locate
sunken vessels, characterize vessel condition, relate damage
of sunken vessel to habitat area, identify potentially
impacted areas and rate potential impact by vessel
concentration.
Other objectives are to evaluate post-storm aerial
photography to assess damage, to assess feasibility of the
geographic information system (GIS) for post-storm analy-
sis, and to recommend improvement in damage assess-
ment.
The geographic area for the study is Biscayne Bay and
its major tributaries. The area is bounded by 79th St.
Causeway in the north and Card Sound in the south which is
90% in Dade and 10% in Monroe. The focus of the study is
damaged/sunken vessels which are 100m from the shoreline
upland and within the tidal and submerged habitat areas.
The sources of the data are the aerial photos which were
taken within a day or two to several months after the
hurricane from private sources, and state and local agencies
and NASA. Another source of data are reports from Florida
Marine Patrol (FMP) and the Army Corps of Engineers.









How did we go about the study? First, sunken vessels
were identified from aerial photos. Vessel conditions were
characterized and locations were mapped. Second, ecologic
units were synthesized and digitized from the maps. Third,
vessel locations were; (1) overlain on ecologic units; (2) vessel
concentrations were determined; (3) vessel concentrations
were scaled; and (4) potential impactors were identified.
There were 918 vessels damaged and sunken in the
study area. We mapped vessels by the following vessel
conditions: fully submerged, partially submerged, floating,
aground, or undetermined condition.Then we characterized
the vessel by location and came up with the following: 1/3
were submerged, 1/3 were aground and 1/3 were floating
and undetermined. Boats in the marinas were included.
A habitat map of Biscayne Bay by the Dade County
Department of Environmental Resource Management
lumped habitats according to the following types: hard
bottom, seagrasses, and bare bottom substrate. In addition,
we have the mangroves and upland. So there are five
habitat units covering this area. This ends the preparation of
the source of materials.
Next we took these sources and combined source
maps to identify the location of sunken vessels in habitat
units. (Example, 59% of damaged vessels occurred in barren
substrate.)
Then we determined vessels concentration per unit
area. We scaled the information in the area. For example, 4
cells, which account for 389 vessels or about one-third of
the damaged vessels, were located in about one-fourth km.
Then we determined vessel damage epicenter and we
plotted vessel location. We then showed the distribution of
vessels damaged from this center. Finally, on a regional
basis, we graphed vessel location in relation to hurricane
eyewall at the time of landfall.
Next we looked at potential impacts. What we did is
to put buffer zones around each vessel, using GIS, to
estimate potential influence on habitat. We assumed that
100-meters would be a good potential impact on bay water
habitat and 50-meters for tidal habitat. We then calculated
the ratio of buffered areas to vessel count to get a relative
aerial density to find its low, medium, high, and very high


i




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potential impact on the environment. For example, 59.9%
of low potential impact in barren substrate, while 36.9% of
very high impact on seagrasses.
Next, we identified the geographic cells where these
are situated and we mapped them. We identified nine
locations and you are all familiar with them, the Miami River,
Coral Gables Waterway, North Bay, Virginia Key, Kings Bay,
Key Biscayne, Dinner Key, Coral Bay and Ocean Reef. We
wanted to see how they measured up to each other in
terms of potential impact relative to each other. Dinner Key
is the highest in terms of potential impact relative to
seagrasses, mangrove, upland, etc. We were getting a
measure of relative impact on the environment.
Hurricane Andrew put Miami's moored recreation
vessels on the storm track. Damaged vessels were in Dinner
Key Marina area, Picnic Island, where 1/3 of sunken vessels
in the area are located. Fifty percent of damaged vessels are
within the area defined by Rickenbacker in the north and
Kings Bay in the south. The vessels affected are in the
marinas, anchorages, and recreational areas.
What are the lessons from Hurricane Andrew? First,
expect significant vessel damage for category 4 and 4+
storms. Open bay is high risk. A good example is Dinner Key
Anchorage.
Second, hurricane holes which have soft or soft-
medium bottom type offer poor holding conditions. A good
example is No Name Harbor on Key Biscayne. Many of these
harbors' type cannot hold the vessels.
Third, moored vessel vulnerability is affected by a
number of factors. Site suitability, owner vigilance, owner
experience, pre-storm preparation are all important. Which
is more important and why? These are few questions that
need to be addressed. Furthermore, why do you have more
damage in some locations than in other locations? Why in
some particular location some vessels fared well while some
are totally or partially damaged? How can you rate potential
damage to a hurricane site and vessel?
Fourth, storm damage assessment requires the timely
access of large scale aerial photography and high resolution
satellite imagery. The photography available was World War
II vintage. At best, they were piecemeal and missions lagged









weeks after the storm. Most frustrating is the picture
delivery which lagged weeks after the mission. When
dealing with post-storm recovery, it is a particularly a vexing
problem.
Fifth, the GIS technology makes feasible mapping and
analyzing large geographic databases. There are problems
though with the use of the GIS. It is not a turn-key opera-
tion. There are problems in acquiring files and you must rely
on informal networks. Scales and various map resolutions
require extensive editing.
Sixth, there is need to devise a method to determine
the potential impact of sunken vessels in marine and shore
habitat. A benefit of the work is it provides narrowing down
the surge area to focus impact zone.
Our recommendations are to develop a vulnerability
indexing system to rate the relative habitat potential of
mooring sites to a range of storm events. This would permit
potential ranking of boat facilities, public, private, marinas,
residential docks and anchorages. This will provide boaters
and marina industry guidelines for future storm events.
Example, insurance premiums could be based on location of
boats. The second recommendation is that boaters should
be provided with information on bottom conditions for
storm havens in the form of large scale maps. Third, we
recommend government assistance in getting good aerial
photos of hurricane impaired areas using, not the types of
hand held cameras but of state of the art technology, and
providing these pictures in a timely fashion to managers
and other users.

About the environmental impact on the habitat, is
that the impact of the removal or the damage caused by the
sunken boats?

What I am talking about is that in a span of the day or
less than a day, hours, you have a thousand boats that are
sunk or damaged in some way. They were then removed. Is
there any residual impact that occurred that we are not
aware of, particularly to sensitive bay habitat area like
seagrasses and mangroves that ought to be looked at? We









have no record of that because again, vessels were removed
quickly.

How can we distinguish if the habitat was damaged
by the sinking of the boat, or the removal or salvage of the
boat, or if the damage was caused by the hurricane itself?
Like the mangroves. How can we distinguish between
the two? All mangroves were flattened, how will you
determine if that was caused by boat removal, the force of
the hurricane, or by the sinking of the boat?

Now, we're looking at overlaying the location of the
damaged vessel by aerial interpretation to the surrounding
bay habitat or tidal habitat and we are saying that the vessel
may, it's a conditional statement, may have an impact. If the
state or local agencies are interested in determining
whether or not there is an impact, where are they going to
look? It is a big bay area. Where were the vessels. What kind
of habitat was it?

But does it basically deal with how to identify areas to
look for some damage?

Yes, but if it is a fine substrate, it is basically unimpor-
tant. But if they are seagrass or mangrove areas, then it is a
prime concern.

I think you mentioned about the impact to habitat
with the sunken vessel. But how can you compare a 32 ft
sailboat damage to a boat that can cause how many
thousand gallons of fuel to spill?

But how many of these type of vessels are there?
These are relatively smaller vessels. About 99% are 50-feet
and under, basically recreational vessels. The number of
large commercial vessels was minimal. I do want to make a
point on the matter of site suitability. For many years I did
agricultural planning where site suitability is a standard
operating procedure in farm planning. You find out what
kind of soil is needed, etc. before making an investment on
a particular crop. Similarly, if a facility is built in an urban







51

area it is important to find out what kind of services are
there particularly from the standpoint of insurance. These
kind of considerations are not put in the equation in
determining how suitable a berth is for locating a vessel. We
found for example, that many of these canals facing east-
west had a much higher rate of incidence than north-south
canals and so forth. Secondly, many of these canals were not
designed for boat traffic. They were designed to scoop up
buried material to build land. And some developers found
it commanded a lot of money. So it was an afterthought to
use the canals as access channels and tie-ups for boats. They
were designed for storm water run off, etc. These kind of
considerations has had an impact on the suitability or lack
thereof of many of these residual canals serving as a tie up
facility for boats. And it's going to matter. And I think that
boaters need to be aware of the degree of risk based upon
the suitability of where his boat is in addition to the way he
prepared himself. Thank You.


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Appendix A.4

Pre- and Post-Hurricane Information Dissemination and
Information Sharing
Hernando Vergara 3
Dade County Office of Emergency Management

I brought with me a manual entitled Hurricane Manual
for Marine Interests. There are many things mentioned in
the manual which are important. This manual will help me
address the issue of public information sharing at the time
of emergency. That's one factor why this booklet was put
together. Some of you here were involved in the prepara-
tion of this booklet. During the preparation, we all argued
about some major points in hurricane preparation but we
were able to reach an agreement. It was not easy putting
this booklet together because of the many factors that
were considered. The main one is, what do you tell boaters
at the time the hurricane approaches when the marinas tell
them that they have to move their vessels out. Dade County
does not have areas which it can recommend without
getting involved in legal issues. In light of this, the best
thing is for those vessels to remain in the marinas. Even
some municipalities today do not agree with our office
regarding this policy. But I think they are beginning to
understand what we had intended in enforcing this policy.
In the last year, the Florida legislature has supported us in
this policy and will be changing the law whereby marinas
will not force people out in time of the hurricane. I don't
know exactly when that will take place but I think it will be
next year.
I would like to start my presentation by showing a
video tape that we use to inform boaters of hurricane
preparation. The segment of the tape that I will show you
is about 2 1/2 minutes. After we view this segment, I will get
to some issues that we discussed before and then to
questions and answers to address your concerns.


SA review copy of the transcript was sent to the speaker but no
comments were received.









(The 2 1/2 minutes video shows how to prepare a boat
for the hurricane. It shows the proper way of securing wet
berthed boats in a marina and trailered boats at home.)
A question was asked before about how boats that
were properly tied up compared with those that were not
properly tied up and how much damage they incurred. An
actual study was conducted and I have copy of the study in
the office. If you are interested in the study, I can mail
copies to you. Basically, boats that were properly tied up
received less damage. This is one of the things that were
discussed in the hurricane preparation booklet. Most
recommendations we have in the booklet are still valid with
the new lessons from Andrew. Another concern was raised
about predicting the storm, and how difficult it is to
determine where it will go. When Andrew became a threat
to us, our office began taking actions on Friday. The storm
struck on Monday morning. On Friday, we put out the first
warning to boaters. It went out at 4PM to the news media.
We relied on the news media to convey this information to
everyone. Some local stations put it out. But I don't think a
lot of stations did. At that time we urged boaters to begin
to take action, to begin preparation in securing their vessels.
They need to start right before the wind speeds start
picking up because then it becomes increasingly dangerous
to move vessels. Those boats that remained in the marinas
obviously sustained more damage than those in areas that
were more inland. The decision to stay or go if you had a
boat tied up in the marina was based on individual
contracts, in some cases. But most of the boatowners with
boats in the marinas ignored the evacuation. I don't think it
would have made one bit of difference if Black Point had
evacuated. The damage to the marina would have been the
same. The storm surge is inevitable and it creates a lot of
problems to the marina, whether boats are there or not. It
was suggested to have a breakwater at the marinas to
prevent the rush of waters going in. But the storm surge
may ride on top of that as well. Once the water is in, it is not
effective. During the hurricane, a sunken boat, an artificial
reef, was moved 1000 feet from its original location. It was
in about 80 feet of water. It was not in even in the area
where the eye of the storm was. The under current was so


I I I









strong that even an artificial reef was moved.
Some organizations represented here worked closely
with us in preparing the hurricane manual. There were some
concerns that were brought up as to which point the
bridges to Miami River will be locked down. You have to
remember that there comes a time when we have to weigh
factors of what is more important, the boating population
or the county residents? That's why we made the decisions
that boaters should not bring their boats up the Miami River
because it was used to discharge water from the Everglades
and we need to have that access available. If there were too
much water, we would be flooding the rest of the city and
we couldn't allow that to happen. If we had all these boats
blocking the path of the Miami River, we would have a lot of
damage flowing to the sides.
One of the things you have to remember is that
Hurricane Andrew was a dry storm and it moved very
quickly. So it actually didn't dump as much water as we
expected it would. So we were lucky in that sense.

But it's possible that with the higher tide the more
water will flow underneath a boat?

But you have to remember that there will be other
debris breaking up boats and causing them to sink. And
these will in turn push the water to the side.

Excuse me for a moment. But I have a boat and my
boat floats. When the tide comes up, my boat goes up and
when the tide goes down, my boat goes down. When
properly set up in the river, the river is the ideal and only
place that the boat should be berthed because it is a
hurricane hole. Cutting the area off to boaters is a disservice.
Miami River is the perfect and ideal place for hurricane hole
and the business about the boat breaking the bridge free is
just ludicrous.
What about the business of one of these freighters in
Miami getting free and blocking the waterway?
I think you should have boaters involved in the
decision of how the river should be used.


I


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These were arguments that we went through for
years in trying to come up with this manual. Finally all these
agencies agreed.

If you are talking about the Hurricane preparedness
and the issue of the Miami River... The Dade County
managers issue the order of evacuation. The Department of
Transportation made the decision to lock down the bridges.
And now he (Hernando) is justifying the decision.

The point that he is making I understand is that many
years ago, the county used to have the flotilla plan, where
they invited the boaters to bring their boats up the Miami
River. People got used to that idea. And they really didn't
look at the consequences that it might bring. The director
of the Office of Emergency Management, looked this over.
She then started negotiating with the South Florida Water
Management District and other agencies. We started
analyzing the impact if boats in the Miami River started
breaking up and caused flooding in the city. The potential
damage was'far greater than when you have boats breaking
up in the marinas.

Can we get you to invite the boating public because
I sat in one of those meetings and the guys from South
Florida Water Management District know zero about the
boats or flooding. I don't have any idea where you are
coming up with your answers. I don't like to pick on you
because you are much younger than I am. And the flotilla
didn't last that long, by the way. Just a few years. To some
of us, that is just some small speck of history, but for you its
probably some big piece of time.
It is a good point. We always think of our little boats
going up the river. What we have to realize when we look at
the salinity dams where all this water is flowing through, is
that these areas are blocked by Icrge freighters. These
freighters are high up in the river and would block the flow
of water which will then flood the city. My question is, if
they don't allow our boats up the river, why do they permit
the large freighters high up the river which will cause more
damage due to blocking? Why don't you require all ships to


U







56

leave?

We issued the evacuation at 8AM Sunday morning.

There was no evacuation Sunday morning. There was
nobody downtown to evacuate.

Well, there comes a time when you look at overall
picture, we need to get people out and we need to have
that road for evacuation.

But there was nobody there to evacuate.

We are going back five years here. The message I got
from you and that the message coming from your office is
first, that you are best off in leaving your boats in the
coastal marinas. That is not correct. That is not the message
that is supposed to come out from your office. The message
that was supposed to come out from your office, and I
thought it was doing so, is that don't go try to move your
boat in the eye of the storm in risk of life. Everyone here
agrees with that. The question is that of timing. But it is not
best to leave your boat in the coastal marinas if you do it
early.

When the wind reaches a certain speed or when an
order of evacuation is issued, these people need to be out
as well. We cannot have those bridges raised and impede
traffic. When bridges go up, it can cause traffic jams. And
we have the people coming from the Beach going in and
out. People are going to the shelters. Everyone will be
evacuating from the Beach and we open up shelters in
specific areas. We are not going to tell them which one to
go to. But we have to clear the roads for that.

What is evident and what will happen is that sooner
or later Dade County is going to close down the bridge. If
you can beat the bridge closing go for it. There are no
penalties in these things. If you are up there, you're up
there. By navigation, they can't stop you from going up the
river.










I think it must be addressed that the river is a primary
protection for boats in Dade County. The river must be used
for protection of the boats. The rule should be fixed and
whatever the rules are they should be stuck with. And they
should be followed. And your office should be the lead
agency. And you should coordinate the hurricane prepared-
ness.

It was published here in the manual on page 15. It
states the reason why we say not to take the boats in the
river, with the Miami River Hurricane Planning criteria.

Do you know that the attendees at this workshop are
almost all boaters and they all disagree with the last
statement?

Well, I am surprised since we went through this
before when we put this booklet together. But the thing to
remember is that people should start taking their own
responsibility for their own boats and Dade County wants to
play that message strongly. It is your responsibility to find
a spot for your boat when a hurricane threatens.

We found one but can't get to it.
In Ft. Lauderdale we have a very different scenario.
The boating community is recognized as having a major
impact. Sonny Irons was one of the people involved in the
pre-hurricane evacuation. We have experimented with
different scenarios and time periods. We now estimate that
we have about 3 1/2 hours after the order is issued to
evacuate our boats. That gives us 3 1/2 hours in our flotilla
plan to bring the largest boats up, the ones that require
bridge openings. It still allows for evacuation because we
have a shared usage of the bridges and waterways. And that
is what it should be. It is not locked up just for the boaters,
nor down just for the cars. Police officials organized and
orchestrated moving about the bridges. We estimate 3 1/2
hours now but it will probably be 5 1/2 hours. Because you
must realize that when the storm happens in September or
October, we really can't do anything in 31/2 hours. But when


U









you start in ground zero and say evacuate and all the
bridges are shut down, you'll just strain the marine
community without realizing it.
Why is it different in the Miami River versus the one in
Ft. Lauderdale? In Ft. Lauderdale they have a large marine
industry as well. Dade County position does not support
that. Did the county get that position by logic or by dictate?
I've been involved in this from the beginning. It's all
backwards. From the initial postulation of the 6 foot water
wall coming out to the river. It's a stupid postulation and
they don't mention it anymore. We have a presentation at
your facility put on by the South Florida Water Management
District. And that's real engineers there. And they told you
what the relative importance of the Miami River basin is, and
it is not that significant. I tried to push that the scenario
with the large boat breaking free and improperly moored is
no more danger to the land side than taking the bridge out
and sinking. It is more dangerous. How about the cargo
containers? The upper end of the river is lined with them.
But they are not going to blow into the river. But blaming
the boating community? I'm getting tired of the boating
community taking the trash of everything. With all this
science, nobody is taking steps in developing something. I
am obviously not blaming your office because I've worked
with your office. I've worked with Kate Hale, and I thought
we have things working. We addressed the bridge closing. It
was the people from the Department of Transportation
which made an awful decision. They did not consult with
the Coast Guard. These are the people who ordered the
bridges closed. I don't know where you get this information
about the Miami River and bridge closings. It sounds like very
old information to me.

Again Dade County doesn't have a problem with those
orders that are already in place. But again at the time we
issued the evacuation, we could not afford to have all the
traffic there. First of all we need the support of other
agencies to have the coordination of opening the bridges
because they have to get out of the way also. The US Coast
Guard, when the winds are so high, will have to evacuate
too. And the people are on their own. And we frankly


L







59

wanted to make a plea here and we do not want to make
the wrong impression.

It was 12 hours in between when you actually closed
the bridges and when it is actually required to close the
bridges. At least 12 hours.

Well that is why we are again being honest with the
boating community and we are giving them the facts. I
know you guys are not happy ...

We don't close bridges in St. Pete because we are in
Miami Beach. Nobody would mind if somebody will make a
judgement call to save lives. It is the idiocy of making
judgement call to evacuate a barrier island such as Miami
Beach that doesn't go across Brickell Avenue bridge. Believe
me it doesn't. And this is for the Department of Transporta-
tion. Who do we need to talk to to shed some light on this
situation? We really have regressed in the last 4 years. I am
upset too. There has never been any comment from your
office on the closing of the bridges prematurely until today.
There has never been a justification by your office that
Miami River is not a safe haven for boats. This is new and I
am bothered with this. There should be some clarification
about this soon.


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Appendix A.5

Government, Industry, Academic and Boater
Groups Coordination
Caroline Knight
Department of Community Affairs
Florida Coastal Management Program

I am from the Florida Coastal Management Program
of the Department of Community Affairs in Tallahassee. Our
office would like to work closely with you, the boating
community. As you know, Secretary Shelly has been here
working with the post hurricane recovery and this is the
area that she perceives needs more work.
The Govenor's Commission (Lewis Commission)
prepared a post-hurricane Andrew report and there is a
section on the evacuation problems of the marinas. I have
only one copy. We will mail copies to you if you are
interested in getting one. One of the recommendations of
the Commission's report is that there be legislation on the
hurricane preparation of the marina. It will be a part of Bill
911. This marina bill cannot really answer all the questions in
hurricane preparation. We are now working with several
groups in the boating community. Frank Herhold (Executive
Director of the Marine Industry Association of South Florida)
is reviewing it to see if there are some changes needed in
the legislation. The Department of Insurance is required to
file a report in response to this legislation. It is a one page
report. They didn't have specific problems with it butas you
can see they raised other questions. One of the questions is,
is it the responsibility of the boat owners to find a hurricane
haven for their boats? Another is to clarify the responsibili-
ties of other agencies in the hurricane preparation, such as
the event of a bridge lock down.
The Florida Coastal Management Program (FCMP) is
housed under the office of the Secretary of Community
Affairs. FCMP is a network of programs. The Florida Coastal
Program is funded through NOAA and the Office of Coastal
Resources Management. FCMP works closely with 11 state
agencies. One of the most important things for the program
is to get feedback from you. We operate through the









Interagency Management Committee (IMC) of Florida. IMC is
chaired by Secretary Shelly. This body meets regularly and
is attended by top administrators. They discuss issues
relevant to coastal programs. They are the state regulation
agencies and funding agencies. This body is there and they
want to hear from you. As part of the outreach program,
we have a Citizen Advisory Committee (CAC). TheCAC
has a boating subcommittee. Another subcommittee
responsible for boating interests is the Boating Advisory
Committee. That committee is run through the South
Florida Waterway Management of the Florida Marine Patrol.
One of the major issues being worked on is marina
siting. Where should marinas be located? What variables
come into play in siting a marina. What agencies should be
responsible in siting marinas? There are a number of
questions involved. Again we are working with marine
industry and marine community boating advisory commit-
tee and government agencies to look for recommendations.
There are also mitigation and litigation concerns.
Hurricanes are a reality in Florida. The other reality is
that hurricanes go on a cycle. It is estimated that we will
have several hurricanes in Florida in the next 10 years. The
population in Florida has greatly increased in the last decade
and you can see the growth especially in coastal areas. We
had a lot of migration with people not familiar with the area
and who are not prepared for the hurricanes. With the
interface between land and sea you will be faced with a
number of legal issues. What you do on land is not
necessarily what you do on the sea. We have almost 700,000
registered boats and a lot of those boatowners do not know
what to do in hurricane.

Documented vessels in Florida are also required to
register. Visitors, if they are here for more than 90 days are
supposed to get Florida vessel registration. Non-motorized
vessels are not required to be registered. There are more
than a million vessels in Florida which means that there is
one vessel for every 12 residents in Florida.
A hurricane is a natural occurrence in Florida. We have
more and more vessels. Yet prior to Hurricane Andrew, the
state, nor any of its agencies, was involved in any hurricane









plan, nor involved in any evacuation plan relative to the
water. Right now it does not coordinate with the county or
any local agency in any evacuation plan. But still they do not
see any responsibility to this industry, which provides so
much money to Tallahassee, to assist them in their time of
most need.

You are right because I think I am the first person
assigned to it. I also would like to comment that the marine
field is not an exact science. I had to work with the various
people here in this workshop whom I have asked to help me
in getting information about marine interests. Marinas and
the marine industry also have some responsibility. You must
work together to get your message through.
One of the areas that the marine industry could be of
great help to us is to provide us with marine related data.
There is a scarcity of marine related data. But whatever data
is available is most of the times unknown to us. But you
folks have it on the top of your head.
Another issue I am working on is the non-point
pollution source. The state wants to come up with a plan on
non-point pollution sources. Marinas are part of that
program. We would like to solicit your ideas and recommen-
dations to help us come up with a plan.
One last message is that there is money for hazard
mitigation. Think what is needed. We thought here about
education programs, about informing boaters what to do
and how to do it. The state has money for this type of
program. So what you need to do is think what exactly is to
be done. Will it be done by the government or non-profit
entities? Also our Coastal Management Program is receiving
application for grants and hazard mitigation is one of the
things that we think will be addressed again.

Sea Grant will publish the history of hurricanes in
Florida. Sea Grant also did some economic impact studies on
recreational boating in the seventies.

If there is some form of legislation, it usually comes
with some funding. And that funding, if channeled properly,
should be utilized by the boating community. The boating









community would probably have some input. In Monroe
County, we are trying to get some mitigation money from
marinas to improve their risk during major storms or
hurricanes. It would be advantageous to upgrade facilities
and capabilities and find ways to alleviate the effects of
wave actions. You folks are in the same position here. Dade
County and every coast in the Eastern Seaboard would
probably do the same. The hazard mitigation is through the
Division of Emergency Management and the Office of the
Secretary of Department of Community affairs.
There are a lot of people in South Florida because
they probably want to locate here. They want to boat and
enjoy the waters. There's a lot of people and they put
pressure in the state which becomes unbalanced. People in
Tallahassee would probably say "Well, we can eliminate
growth by eliminating the reasons why people come to
South Florida. Take away their marinas, make it a dangerous
place to live. People can't recreate down here. They will go
to Georgia and the state doesn't have to deal with the
problems associated with boating.
I would like to make a point right now. I think if you
need to take information back to Tallahassee, you need to
tell them that they need to mandate, that we must have
representation, especially representatives from the Offices
of Emergency Management, Department of Transportation
and the Florida Marine Patrol. I have had many meetings in
the last 13 years with these agencies and always we did not
have representation. They are the ones who should take
leadership and lead these things from the state's stand-
point. I don't know if we can make headway unless we have
that type of representation.
Through the Division of Emergency Management, go
to the secretary level and say, "Hey Mitigation plans are
coming out and there is nothing that circulates in the public
much less input review by the people who will be affected
by it." We are on every list coming down from Tallahassee.
We are not a secret down here. It is sometimes frustrating.
As boaters, as a community, we need to get out together,
There's a whole lot of things that we are left in the dark
about. Take the subject of manatee plans that were
proposed in Tallahassee without much notice and they've


I









only asked for the input when everything was already
written in the plan. So we don't have our act together and
we cannot address the situation. The hazard mitigation
hasn't gone to any agencies here except one in Dade
County. What concerns me is FEMA is mandating this
mitigation plan and FEMA is not NOAA.

After seeing the hazard mitigation document report
of Hurricane Andrew, the 11/2 pages of the marine related
report and the recommendations that they put in there are
ludicrous. They say that we should have all floating docks, all
pilings should be 15 feet in the air and other things that
don't necessarily fit. And this will count! They got this three
weeks after the hurricane. They get a snapshot of what has
a significant impact to us. People are fighting tooth and
nails.

They are afraid of the surveys of what was damaged
and what was missing. Dade County without FEMA is a
disaster.


I










Appendix B


Pre-Hurricane Preparation and Post-Hurricane
Responese and Recovery Workshop

University of Miami-RSMAS
November 17 18, 1993

WORKSHOP ATTENDEES


Gustavo Antonini
Department of Geography
University of Florida
Gainesville, FL 32611
Tel: (904) 392-6233

Edward K. Baker
Boating Research Center
University of Miami-RSMAS
4600 Rickenbacker Causeway
Miami, FL 33149
Tel: (305) 361-4012
FAX: (305) 361-4675

Natalie Bauta
Metro Dade
Planning Department
111 NW 1st St
Miami, FL 33128-1972
Tel: (305) 375-2835

Mike Brescher
Crandon Marina
Marine Council
4000 Crandon Blvd
Key Biscayne, Fl 33149
Tel: (305) 361-1281


John A. Brennan
City of Miami
Miami Waterfront Board
2336 Swanson Ave.
Miami, FI 33133
Tel: (305) 856-6373

Jay Bogaards
Dockmaster
Black Point Marina
24775 SW 87th Ave.
Homestead, Fl 33032
Tel: (305) 248-4092

Rick Bischoff
Marine Council
Suite 3400
One Biscayne Tower
2 South Biscayne Blvd.
Miami, Fl. 33131
Tel: (305) 378-6016

Ernie Braatz
Boat/US
880 Pickett St.
Alexandria, Va 22304
Tel: (703) 823-9550


W










James C. Cato
Director Florida Sea Grant
P.O. Box 110400
Gainesville, Fl 32511-0400
Tel: (904) 392-5870

Marion Clarke
Program Leader
Sea Grant Exten. Program
P.O. Box 110405
Gainesville, Fl. 32611-0405
Tel: (904) 392-1837

Ted Crosby
Area Marine Manager
CIGNA -Loss Control Services
7771 W. Oakland Park Blvd.
#138
Ft. Lauderdale, Fl. 33351
Tel: (305) 749-9655

Ralph Dodge
Dockmaster
Matheson Hammock Marina
9610 Old Cutler Rd.
Coral Gables, Fl. 33156
Tel: (305) 665-5475

Phil Everingham
Vice President
Merril Stevens
1270 NW 11th St.
Tel: (305) 324-5211

Ronald Elkind
Marine Council
8901 SW 78th Ct
Miami, FL 33156
Tel: (305) 460-2384


Jim Flannery
Soundings
2170 SE 17th St.
Suite 208
Ft. Lauderdale, Fl 33316
Tel: (305) 523-6419

Betty Fleming
Miami River Coordinating
Committee
9405 NW 41st St.
Miami, FI 33178
Tel: (305) 471-8297

Bob Gregg
Risk Management Specialist
111 NW 1st St.
Miami, Fl. 33128-1987
Tel: (305) 375-4280 ext. 8080

Doug Gregory
Monroe County Extension
Director, Monroe County
Agricultural Services
5100 College Road
Key West, Fl. 33040-4364
Tel: (305) 292-4501

Hernando Vergara
Metro Dade Office Of Emer-
gency Management
5600 SW 87th Ave
Miami, Fl 33173
Tel: (305) 273-6700

Frank Herhold
Executive Director-MIASF
2312 South Andrews Ave.
Ft. Lauderdale, Fl 33316
Tel: (305) 524-2733
Fax: (305) 524-0633










Randy Hoff
Coral Gables Police
Marine Patrol
2801 Salcedo St
Coral Gables, FL 33134
Tel: (305) 460-1600
FAX: (305) 460-5414

Sonny Irons
Ft. Lauderdale
Marine Advisory Committee
1309 SW 5th Court
Ft. Lauderdale, Fl 33312
Tel: (305) 527-5172

Caroline Knight
Dept. of Comm. Affairs
FL Coastal Magt. Affairs
FL Coastal Magt. Prgrm.
2740 Centerview Drive
Tallahassee, Fl 32399-2100
Tel: (904) 922-5438

Representative from the
Florida Marine Patrol
District 6
1275 NE 79th St
P.O. BOX 381906
Miami, FI 33138
Tel: (305) 325-3346

Frank Lawlor
Marine Extension Agent
Clayton E. Hutcheson
Agricultural Center
449 N. Military Trail
West Palm Beach, FI 3415
Tel: (305) 233-1745


James Mitchell
Commander (b)
7th Coast Guard District
Brickell Plaza
Federal Bldg
909 SW 1st Ave
Mimai, FL 33131-3050
Tel: (305) 536-5698

Diane Molinari
Dinner Key
Anchorage Association
P.O. Box 331791
Coral Gables, Fl 33133
Tel: (305) 794-4234

Don Pybas
Sea Grant Exten. Program
Dade County
4600 Rickenbacker Cause-
way
Miami, Fl 33149
Tel: (305) 361-4017

Cleaette Fritz
Public Assistance
Disaster Field Office
36th and Le Juene
P.O. Box 4022
Miami, Fl 33159-4022
Tel: (305) 526-2442
FAX: (305) 526-4069

David D. Ray
Marine Council
Marine Industry Association
of Greater Miami
P.O. Box 43125
Miami, Fl 33243-1251


I'










Maria E. Villanueva
Boating Research Center
University of Miami- RSMAS
4600 Rickenbacker Cause-
way
Miami, Fl 33149
Tel: (305) 361-4012

Don Winston
Park Manager
Homestead Bayfront Park
9698 N. Canal Dr.
Homestead, Fl. 33033
Tel: (305) 247-1543

Billy Wagner
Monroe County Emergency
Management Services
490 63rd St.
Marathon, FL 33050
Tel: (305) 289-6018
FAX: (305) 289-6013


Keven Cote
Dept. of Environmental
Resources Management
Metro Dade
33 SW 2nd Ave
Miami, FL 33131
Tel: (305) 372-6789

Jose Diaz
Dept. of Environmental
Resources Management
Metro Dade
33 SW 2nd Ave
Miami, FL 33131
Tel: (305) 372-6789


I








69

Bibliography



Antonini, G.A., P.W. Box, E. Brady, M. Clarke, H.R. Ledesma, J.L.
Rahn, Location and Assessment of Hurricane Andrew Dam-
aged Vessels on Biscayne Bay and Adjoining Shore Areas, Vol.
1:Text and Appendices, TP-70A, Florida Sea Grant College,
June, 1993.

Baker, Edward K., and Maria L. Villanueva, Analysis of Hurri-
cane Andrew Economic Damage and Recovery Options for
the Boating, Marina and Marine Service Industries, TP-72,
Florida Sea Grant College, October, 1993.

Dade County Office of Emergency Management, Hurricane
Manual for Marine Interests, Undated.







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