• TABLE OF CONTENTS
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 Front Cover
 Title Page
 Table of Contents
 One hundred and ninetieth day:...
 One hundred and ninety-first day:...
 One hundred and ninety-second day:...
 One hundred and ninety-third day:...
 One hundred and ninety-fourth day:...
 One hundred and ninety-fifth day:...
 One hundred and ninety-sixth day:...
 One hundred and ninety-seventh...
 One hundred and ninety-eighth day:...
 One hundred and ninety-ninth day:...
 Two hundredth day: Saturday, 10...














Title: Trial of the major war criminals before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 14 November 1945-1 October 1946
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Permanent Link: http://ufdc.ufl.edu/UF00076568/00002
 Material Information
Title: Trial of the major war criminals before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 14 November 1945-1 October 1946
Physical Description: 42 v. : ill. ; 24 cm.
Language: English
Creator: Gèoring, Hermann, 1893-1946
International Military Tribunal
Publisher: s.n.,
s.n.
Place of Publication: Nuremberg Germany
Publication Date: 1947-1949
Copyright Date: 19471949
 Subjects
Subject: Nuremberg Trial of Major German War Criminals, Nuremberg, Germany, 1945-1946   ( lcsh )
War crime trials -- Germany -- Nuremberg   ( lcsh )
Nuremberg, Procáes de, 1945-1946   ( rvm )
Genre: non-fiction   ( marcgt )
 Notes
Bibliography: Includes bibliographical references.
Language: "Documents admitted in evidence are printed only in their original language."
General Note: Trial against H.W. Gèoring, R. Hess, J. von Ribbentrop, R. Ley, W. Keitel, E. Kaltenbrunner, A. Rosenberg, H. Frank, W. Frick, J. Streicher, W. Funk, H. Schacht, G. Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach, K. Dèonitz, E. Raeder, B. von Schirach, F. Sauckel, A. Jodl, M. Bormann, F. von Papen, A. Seyss-Inquart, A. Speer, C. von Neurath, and H. Fritzsche, individually and as members of any groups or organizations to which they belonged.
 Record Information
Bibliographic ID: UF00076568
Volume ID: VID00002
Source Institution: University of Florida
Holding Location: University of Florida
Rights Management: All rights reserved by the source institution and holding location.
Resource Identifier: oclc - 00748042
lccn - 47031575
isbn - 0404536506

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Table of Contents
    Front Cover
        Front Cover 1
        Front Cover 2
    Title Page
        Page i
        Page ii
        Page iii
    Table of Contents
        Page iv
    One hundred and ninetieth day: Tuesday, 30 July 1946
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    One hundred and ninety-first day: Wednesday, 31 July 1946
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    One hundred and ninety-second day: Thursday, 1 August 1946
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    One hundred and ninety-third day: Friday, 2 August 1946
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    One hundred and ninety-fourth day: Saturday, 3 August 1946
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    One hundred and ninety-fifth day: Monday, 5 August 1946
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    One hundred and ninety-sixth day: Tuesday, 6 August 1946
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    One hundred and ninety-seventh day: Wednesday, 7 August 1946
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    One hundred and ninety-eighth day: Thursday, 8 August 1946
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    One hundred and ninety-ninth day: Friday, 9 August 1946
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    Two hundredth day: Saturday, 10 August 1946
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Full Text

















2100, .. 9n






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AS 2A






























~J&i~










TRIAL
OF

THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS

BEFORE

THE INTERNATIONAL

MILITARY TRIBUNAL


NUREMBERG
14 NOVEMIIIER 1945 1 OCTOBER 1946


PUBLISHED AT NUREMBERG, GERMANY
1948











This volume is published in accordance with the
direction of the International Military Tribunal by
the Secretariat of the Tribunal, under the juris-
diction of the Allied Control Authority for Germany.
















6- -


,c .-_















VOLUME XX


OFFICIAL TEXT

IN THE

ENGLISH LANGUAGE


PROCEEDINGS

30 July 1946 10 August 1946










CONTENTS



One Hundred and Ninetieth Day, Tuesday, 30 July 1946,
Morning Session ..... . . . . . . 1
Afternoon Session . . . . . . ..... 37

One Hundred and Ninety-first Day, Wednesday, 31 July 1946,
Morning Session ....... ............. 74
Afternoon Session . . . . . . ... 104

One Hundred and Ninety-second Day, Thursday, 1 August 1946,
Morning Session ....... . . . . . . 140
Afternoon Session .... ............ . 174

Ohe Hundred and Ninety-third Day, Friday, 2 August 1946,
Morning Session . . . . . . . . .. 211
Afternoon Session .... . . . . . ..... 244

One Hundred and Ninety-fourth Day, Saturday, 3 August 1946,
Morning Session ................. .... .276

One Hundred and Ninety-fifth Day, Monday, 5 August 1946,
Morning Session.. ..... . . . . . . 305
Afternoon Session .... . . . . . . 340

One Hundred and Ninety-sixth Day, Tuesday, 6 August 1946,
Morning Session ...... . . . . . . 365
Afternoon Session . . . . . . . . 398

One Hundred and Ninety-seventh Day, Wednesday, 7 August 1946,
Morning Session .... . . . . . . 433
Afternoon Session . . . . . . . 465

One Hundred and Ninety-eighth Day, Thursday, 8 August 1946,
Morning Session . . . . .... ....... 496

One Hundred and Ninety-ninth Day, Friday, 9 August 1946,
Morning Session ........ . . . . . 533
Afternoon Session .... . . . . . 572

Two Hundredth Day, Saturday, 10 August 1946,
Morning Session ...... . . . . . . 608









ONE HUNDRED
AND NINETIETH DAY

Tuesday, 30 July 1946




Morning Session

GENERAL R. A. RUDENKO (Chief Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R.):
Gentlemen of the Tribunal.
I already indicated in my opening statement that the action of
forcibly deporting peaceful civilians-men, women, and children-
for forced labor into Germany was one of the most important in the
chain of foul crimes committed by the German fascist invaders. The
decisive role in this sinister crime was enacted by the Defendant
Fritz Sauckel. During cross-examination in this courtroom, Defend-
ant Sauckel could not help but admit that during the war about
10 million slave laborers, originating both from occupied territories
and from the ranks of the prisoners of war, were utilized in Ger-
man industries and partly for German agricultural labor.
While admitting the deportation to Germany and the utilization
for the war industries of Hitlerite Germany of millions of workers
from the occupied territories, Sauckel denied the criminal character
of this action, affirming that the recruitment of labor was allegedly
carried out on a voluntary basis. This assertion is not only a lie
but a slander against the millions of honest patriots of the Soviet
Union, of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Poland, France, and Holland
who, devoted to their country, were forcibly sent for labor into
Hitlerite Germany.
The attempts of Defendant Sauckel to depict his part of Pleni-
potentiary General for the Allocation of Labor as consisting merely
in the co-ordination and control of other government labor organi-
zations are futile. As the Plenipotentiary General for the Allo-
cation of Labor, Sauckel was invested by Hitler with supreme and
all-encompassing powers and was in these activities directly and
personally subordinated to Gbring. And Sauckel extensively used
these full powers in order to deport to Germany labor from the
occupied territories.
There is no need to refer to the extensive documentary evidence
presented to the Tribunal, which irrefutably establishes the criminal







30 July 46

character of the methods of mass deportation into slavery of the
population of occupied territories, nor to the role of the Defendant
Sauckel in organizing these crimes.
How far these crimes extended is shown in the operation carried
out by the German military and civil authorities, coded under, the
name "Hay Action," which provided for the forced deportation of
children from the age of 10 to 14 into slavery, as well as for the
deportation of Ukrainian girls destined by Hitler for Germanization.
The Defendant Sauckel has tried to assure the Tribunal that he
had complied strictly with the provisions of the Geneva and Hague
Conventions concerning the utilization of labor of prisoners of war.
His own instructions, however, fully expose his lies. The Defendant
Sauckel had planned beforehand the forced utilization of Soviet war
prisoners for the war industry in Germany and never made any
distinction between them and civilian labor.
The inhuman conditions under which the foreign workers and
prisoners of war deported for slavery lived, are testified to by the
numerous documents submitted as evidence. The Defendant Sauckel
himself was obliged to admit that foreign workers were kept in
camps with barbed wire and were obliged to wear special identifi-
cation badges. The witness Dr. Wilhelm Jdger, summoned to the
Tribunal by the defendant's counsel for Sauckel, was obliged to give
a picture of the awful conditions under which the enslaved work-
ers at Krupp's works existed. After all this, the deposition of the
other witness, Fritz Wieshofer, seems actually ridiculous when, in
trying to exonerate Sauckel, he manifestly overdid it by informing
the Tribunal that he, himself, allegedly saw foreign workers walking
and enjoying themselves in the Prater in Vienna.
The Defendant Sauckel displayed great activity in committing
all these crimes. In April 1943 he personally visited the towns of
Rovno, Kiev, Dniepropetrovsk, Zaporozhie, Simferopol, Minsk, Riga,
and in June of the same year Prague, Krak6w, and again Kiev,
Zaporozhie, and Melitopol in order to speed up the deportation of
labor. And it was as a result of his journey to the Ukraine in 1943
that Sauckel expressed his gratitude for the successful mobilization
of labor forces to the Reich Commissioner for the Ukraine, Koch,
known for the drastic, cruel measures which he applied to the full-
est extent to the Ukrainian population.
And it is not mere chance that the criminal activities of Sauckel's
were so highly appreciated in Hitlerite Germany. On 6 August 1942
the Defendant G6ring declared at the conference of the Reich com-
missioners for the occupied territories:
"I do not wish to praise Gauleiter Sauckel. He does not need
it. But what he has done in so short a time in order to gather
workers and to have them brought to our enterprises is a








30 July 46


unique achievement. I must tell everybody, gentlemen, that
if each of you applied but one-tenth of the energy applied by
Gauleiter Sauckel, it would be easy indeed to fulfill the tasks
imposed upon you..."
In the article published in the Reichsarbeitsblatt for 1944 and
dedicated to Sauckel's fiftieth anniversary it was said:
"True to his political task, he pursues his responsible course
with unyielding consistency and tenacity, with a fanatical
belief. As one of the most faithful adherents of Hitler, he
draws his creative and spiritual strength from the Fiihrer's
trust in him."
When estimating Sauckel's criminal activity, Your Honors will
surely consider the tears shed by the millions of people who lan-
guished in German slavery, of the thousands of people tortured in
inhuman conditions in the workers' camps-you will consider this
and will judge accordingly.
The Defendant Arthur Seyss-Inquart was appointed by Hitler
Chief of the Civil Administration in southern Poland at the begin-
ning of September 1939, and since 12 October of the same year
Deputy Governor of Poland. He occupied this post till May 1940.
For 7 months Seyss-Inquart, under the leadership of Frank and
jointly with him, had personally conducted a regime of terror in
Poland, and he took an active part in elaborating and realizing the
plans for the extermination of many thousands of people, for the
economic plunder and enslavement of the people of the Polish State.
On 17 November 1939 Seyss-Inquart addressed the chiefs of the
administration and departments of the Warsaw Government, men-
tioning among other things that:
"When the German administration acted in the Government
General its guiding principle should be the interests of the
German Reich. By means of a severe and unrelenting admin-
istration this region should be utilized for German economy;
and, in order not to show any undue leniency, one should try
to visualize the consequences of Polish penetration into Ger-
man territory."
Two days later Seyss-Inquart instructed the Lublin Governor,
SS Brigadefiihrer Schmidt, on the same question in the follow-
ing way:
"The resources and the inhabitants of this country should
serve Germany, and they may prosper only within these
limits. The development of independent political thinking
cannot be permitted. Perhaps the Vistula will have an even
greater significance for the fate of Germany than the Rhine"
(Exhibit USA-706).







30 July 46


From the report on an official journey of Seyss-Inquart we learn
that the Governor of Warsaw, Fischer, informed the defendant that
all valuables of the Warsaw Bank in gold, precious metals, and bills
of exchange had been transferred to the Reichsbank, while the Polish
inhabitants were obliged to leave their deposits in the banks; that
the German administration was employing forced labor; that the
Lublin Governor Schmidt declared in the presence of Seyss-Inquart:
"This territory with its strongly-marked swampy nature could serve
as a reservation for the Jews; this measure would possibly lead to
a decimation of the Jews."
I draw the attention of the Tribunal to the fact that it was
exactly at Maidanek near Lublin where the Hitlerite hangmen
erected an enormous extermination camp in which they killed about
a million and a half human beings.
It is also known that Seyss-Inquart, as Frank's deputy, carried
out "special tasks" on his behalf. On 8 December 1939 Seyss-Inquart
took part in a conference at which the following subjects were dis-
cussed: The appointment of Frank as deputy to the Delegate for the
Four Year Plan and the economic exploitation of the Government
General for the best interests of the Reich; the arrival of numerous
trains with Jews and Poles from the newly-acquired territories,
which transportation would continue-according to SS Obergrup-
penfUihrer Krfiger-till the middle of December; the issuing of a
supplementary order extending labor duty to the age group 14
to 18. On 21. April 1940 the defendant took part in the conference
at which plans for forced deportation of Polish workers to Germany
were elaborated. On 16 May 1940 the defendant took part in the
elaboration of the "AB Action," which was nothing but a premed-
itated plan of mass extermination of the Polish intellectuals. In
connection with the appointment of Seyss-Inquart as Reich Com-
missioner for the Netherlands, Frank and his worthy deputy ex-
changed farewell speeches:
"I am exceedingly glad"-said Frank-"to assure you that
the memory of your work in the Government General will
live forever when the future German Reich of peace has been
created ...
"I have learned much here"-answered Seyss-Inquart "... and
this because of the initiative and firm leadership of the kind
I saw in my friend, Dr. Frank....
"... all my thoughts are connected with the East. In the East
we have a National Socialist mission, in the West we have
a task."
Seyss-Inquart's task in the West, as well as that of the other
Reich ministers and commissioners in all territories occupied by the
Germans, is well known: It is the function of hangman and plunderer.







30 July 46


My colleagues have given the details about the criminal part
played by Seyss-Inquart when annexing Austria and realizing other
aggressive plans of the Hitlerite conspiracy. They have clearly
shown how'Seyss-Inquart applied in the Netherlands the bloody
experience gained by him while collaborating with Frank in Poland.
For this reason I fully support the charges against Seyss-Inquart
as formulated in the Indictment.
As early as 1932, while still Reich Chancellor of the German
Republic, the Defendant Franz von Papen actively contributed to
the development of the fascist movement in Germany.
Papen rescinded the decree of his predecessor Brfining prohibit-
ing the activities of the SA. It was he who had overthrown the
Braun-Severing Social Democrat Government in Prussia. These
measures greatly strengthened the position of the fascists and con-
tributed to their accession to power. Thus Papen cleared the way
for Hitler. Having secured the power for the Nazis, Papen himself
assumed the post of Vice Chancellor in Hitler's Cabinet. In this
capacity Von Papen participated in the elaboration and the promul-
gation of a series of legislative acts aimed at the consolidation of
German fascism. And later on, for many years, until the collapse
of Hitlerite Germany, Von Papen remained true to his fascist
friends and participated to the utmost of his abilities in the reali-
zation of the criminal conspiracy.
The Defendant Von Papen is attempting now to explain his role
in the development of the fascist movement and in Hitler's seizure
of power in terms of the political situation of the country which,
he says, made Hitler's accession to power unavoidable. The real
motives which guided Von Papen were different: They were that he
himself was a convinced fascist devoted to Hitler.
Speaking at Essen on 2 November 1933, during the election cam-
paign for the Reichstag, Papen declared:
"Ever since Providence called upon me to become the pioneer
of national resurrection and of the rebirth of our homeland,
I have tried to support with all mjr strength the work of the
National Socialist movement and its leader; just as I, at the
time of taking over the chancellorship, have helped pave the
way to power for the young, fighting, patriotic movement,
just as I on 30 January was selected by a providential fate
to place the hands of our Chancellor and Fiihrer into the
hand of our beloved Field Marshal, so do I today again feel
the obligation to say to the German people and all those who
have kept confidence in me: The kind Lord has blessed Ger-
many by giving her in times of dire need a leader who will
lead her with -the unerring instinct of the statesman through







30 July 46


distress and weaknesses, through all crises and dangers, into
a happy future."
The International Military Tribunal will fully estimate the crim-
inal activities of the Defendant Von Papen, who played a decisive
part in the seizure of power by Hitler and in so doing contributed
in creating the dark powers of fascism which plunged the world
into bloody wars and caused unspeakable misery.
Long before the Nazis came to power the architect Albert Speer
was a personal friend of the draftsman Hitler and remained so
until the end. Not only common professional interests, but political
interests also brought them together. Speer began his career in 1932
with the reconstruction of the Brown House, the headquarters of
the NSDAP in Berlin, and in 10 years' time he was at the head of
all military construction and war production in fascist Germany.
Starting with the construction of the buildings of the Reichspartei-
tag, Speer ended by setting up the Atlantic Wall.
Speer held an important post in the Government and military
machinery of Hitler's Germany and played a direct and active part
in planning and realizing the criminal conspiracy.
What is Speer's line of defense at the Trial? Speer presents his
case in the following way: He was pressed by Hitler to take on the
post of Minister; he was an intimate friend of Hitler's, but he knew
nothing about his plans. He had been a member of the Nazi Party
for 14 years, but he was far from politics and had never even read
Mein Kampf. It is true that upon being given the lie Speer con-
fessed that he had lied during his preliminary interrogation. Speer
lied when he denied that he had ever belonged to the SA and then
to the SS. The Tribunal possesses the original file of the SS man
Albert Speer, who belonged to the personal staff of the Reichsfiihrer
SS Himmler.
Speer also held a rather high rank in the Nazi Party. In the
Party Chancellery he was a delegate for all technical questions; he
headed the Main Office for Engineering of the Party; he directed
the union of German National Socialist technicians; he was deputy
for the staff of Hess, and a leader of one of the major German Labor
Front organizations.
After all this can Speer's declaration that he was a specialist
indifferent to politics be given credence? In reality, as a close
collaborator of Hitler, Hess, Ley, and Garing, he directed German
engineering not only as Reich Minister, but also as a fascist political
leader.
Upon succeeding to Todt, Speer, as he expressed himself in his
speech before the Gauleiter, devoted himself completely to war
tasks. By means of the pitiless exploitation of the population in the






30 July 46


occupied territories and of the prisoners of war of the Allied coun-
tries, at the expense of the health and lives of hundreds of thou-
sands of people, Speer increased the production of armament and
ammunition for the German Army.
By plundering the raw materials and other resources of the
occupied territories, Speer, by all possible means, increased the war
potential of Hitler's Germany. His powers grew with every month
of the war. By Hitler's decree of 2 September 1943 Speer became
plenipotentiary and the responsible man for the supply of raw
materials, for the direction and production of war industry. He was
even commissioned to regulate the turnover of commodities, and by
Hitler's decree of 24 August 1944 Speer was practically made dic-
tator of all German offices, in Germany as well as in the occupied
territories, whose activity was in any way connected with the
strengthening of the German war potential.
And when the fascist fliers bombed peaceful towns and villages,
thereby killing women, old men, and children, when the German
artillery bombarded Leningrad, when the Hitlerite pirates sank
hospital ships, when English towns were bombed by the V-weapon-
all this came as a result of Speer's activity. Under his leadership
the production of gas and of other weapons of chemical warfare had
been greatly increased. The defendant himself, when interrogated
by Justice Jackson at the Trial, confessed that three factories were
producing gas and that they were working at full speed till Novem-
ber 1944.
Speer not only knew of methods used by Sauckel for deporting
the population from the occupied territories for slave labor, but he
himself took part, together with Sauckel, in conferences with Hitler
and of the Central Planning Board where decisions were taken to
deport millions of people to Germany from the occupied territories.
Speer kept up a close contact with Himmler; he received from
Himmler prisoners for work in war factories; branches of concen-
tration camps were organized in many factories subordinated to
Speer. In recognition of Himmler's services, Speer supplied the SS
with experienced specialists and with supplementary war equipment.
Speer has spoken quite a bit here about his having sharply
criticized Hitler's close circle, that he had allegedly had very serious
differences with Hitler and that, in his letters to Hitler, he had
written about the futility of continuing the war. When the repre-
sentative of the Soviet Prosecution asked Speer which of the persons
close to Hitler he had criticized and in what connection, the defend-
ant answered, "I shall not tell you."
It is quite evident that Speer not only did not want to, but that
in fact he could not tell, for the simple reason that he had never
criticized anyone who was close to Hitler and could not do so as







30 July 46


he was a convinced Nazi himself and belonged to this close circle.
As to the so-called serious differences, they began, as Speer ad-
mitted, when it became clear to him that Germany had lost the war.
Speer's letters to Hitler are dated March 1945. At that time Speer
could without great risk depict Germany's hopeless condition. It
was apparent to everyone and was no longer a subject of discus-
sion. And it was not by accident that after these letters Speer still
remained Hitler's favorite. It was precisely Speer whom Hitler
appointed on 30 March 1945 to direct measures for the total destruc-
tion of the industrial enterprises by obliging all Party, State, and
military offices to render him all possible help.
That is the true picture of the Defendant Speer and the real
part played by him in the crimes committed by the Hitler clique.
Constantin von Neurath's part in the consolidation of the Nazi
conspirators' power and in the preparation and realization of aggres-
sive plans is a remarkable one.
Over a period of many years, whenever traces had to be covered
up, when acts of aggression were to be veiled by diplomatic manip-
ulations, Neurath, fascist diplomat and SS general, came to the
help of the Hitlerites, bringing them his long experience of world
affairs.
May I remind you of the high official appraisal of Neurath's
activity which appeared in all the newspapers of fascist Germany
on 2 February 1943:
"Germany's leaving the Geneva Disarmament Conference on
14 October 1933, the return of the Saar territory, and the
denunciation of the Locarno Treaty will rank among the
most outstanding political events since the inauguration of
the Nazi regime. In these Baron von Neurath played a deci-
sive part and his name will always be connected with them."
In his capacity of Reich Protector of Bohemia and Moravia Neu-
rath represented to the Nazi conspirators those "firm and reliable
hands" of which General Friderici wrote in his memorandum, which
were to transform the Czechoslovak Republic into an "indissoluble
part of Germany." In order to attain that object Neurath estab-
lished the notorious "New Order," the nature of which is now
known to all.
Neurath attempted to assert here that all the atrocities were
committed by the Police and Gestapo, upon Himmler's direct order,
and that he knew nothing of them. It is quite comprehensible that
Neurath should say so, but one can hardly agree with him.
Interrogated on 7 March 1946, Karl Frank testified that Neurath
received regularly the reports of the Chief .of Security Police, as
well as those of Frank himself, regarding the "most important







30 July 46


events in the Protectorate" pertaining to the Security Police. He
stated also that it was possible for Neurath to issue directives to
the Reich Security Police, and that he did indeed do so; while, as
far as the SD was concerned, his powers were still greater, depend-
ing in no way upon the consent of the Reich Security Main Office.
I wish also to recall to your memory Paragraphs 11, 13, and 14
of the decree, issued on 1 September 1939 by the Reich Defense
Council, which proves that the Reichsffihrer SS and Chief of the
German Police carried out administrative measures in Bohemia
and Moravia with the knowledge of the Reich Protector, and that
the German Security Police agencies in the Protectorate were
obliged to inform the Reich Protector as well as the offices sub-
ordinated to him and to keep them aware of all major events.
If I add that on 5 May 1939 the Defendant Neurath appointed
an SD Leader and Plenipotentiary of the Security Police to the
post of his political reporter; if we recall the testimony read to
the court of Richard Bienert, the former Czech Minister President
under Neurath, in which it says that the Gestapo carried out
arrests on orders of the Reich Protector, we can hardly have any
doubt but that Neurath gave his sanction to the mass arrests,
summary executions, and other inhuman acts committed by the
Gestapo and Police in Czechoslovakia.
I will pass on to the events of 17 November 1939 when nine
students were shot without trial, while over a thousand were
thrown into concentration camps and all the Czech high schools
and universities were closed for 3 years.
Neurath said that he heard of these acts of terror post factum.
But we have submitted to the Tribunal a public announcement of
the shooting and arrests of the students which bears Neurath's
signature. Neurath then seeks another loophole. He declares that
Frank signed this announcement in his-Neurath's-name, and
to be more convincing he even adds that later he heard from an
official that Frank often misused his name in documents. Are
Neurath's statements to be credited? One has only to analyze
briefly the actual facts in order to answer this question in the
negative. Neurath says that Frank misused his name. What did
Neurath do in answer to this? Did he demand Frank's resignation
or his punishment for forgery? No. Did he, perhaps, report this
forgery officially to somebody? No. On the contrary, he con-
tinued to collaborate with Frank as before. Neurath says that
he heard of Frank's misuses from an official. Who is that official?
What is his name? Why was no application made to call him to
the witness stand or at least to secure his written testimony? This
is simply because nobody spoke to Neurath of Frank having forged
his signature on the documents, and nobody could have done so,







30 July 46


for there was no forgery. On the contrary, the Tribunal has
evidence which confirms the fact that the announcement of 17 No-
vember 1939 was signed by Neurath and that the terroristic meas-
ures mentioned therein were actually sanctioned by him. I am
speaking of two statements of Karl Frank who directly partici-
pated in these bloody events.
During his interrogation on 26 November 1945 Karl Frank
testified:
"This document, dated 17 November 1939, was signed by
Von Neurath, who did not protest either against the shooting
of the nine students or against the deportation of numerous
students to the concentration camps."
I quote Karl Frank's second testimony on this matter, dated
7 March 1946:
"By signing the official announcement which informed the
public of the shooting of the students Reich Protector
Von Neurath sanctioned this action. I informed Von Neu-
rath in detail of the course of the investigation and he signed
the announcement. Had he not agreed and had he demanded
a modification of the penalty, or its mitigation-and he had a
right to do so-I would have been obliged to accede to his
opinion."
In August 1939, in connection with the "extraordinary situation"
by which he proclaimed Bohemia and Moravia to be an integral
part of the Greater German Reich, Neurath issued a so-called warn-
ing. Therein he stipulated that "not only individual perpetrators
but the entire Czech population would be responsible for all acts
of sabotage" (Document USSR-495). Thereby he established the
principle of collective responsibility and introduced the hostage
system. The events of 17 November 1939, considered in the light
of this directive of Neurath, supply more irrefutable proof against
the defendant.
Starting from 1 September 1939 some 8,000 Czechs were arrested
as hostages in Bohemia and Moravia. The majority were sent
to concentration camps; many were executed or died of hunger
and torture. On this subject you have heard, Your Honors, the
testimonies of Bienert, Krejci, and Havelka. There is no doubt
that these terror acts against the Czech intellectuals were carried
out in conformity with Neurath's warning.
I need not relate in detail all the events which took place at
Lidice and later in the village- of Lestraki as they are already well
known. Were not the German invaders acting in accordance with
Neurath's warning? Did they not conform to his principle that
the entire Czech population, and not the individual persons, must
bear the responsibility?






30 July 46


It was Neurath who initiated mass terror against the Czecho-
slovak population in August 1939. He has on his hands the blood
of many thousands of women and men, children and old people,
murdered and tortured to death. And I see no difference between
Baron von Neurath and the other ringleaders of the criminal
fascist regime.
The Defendant Hans Fritzsche's part in the conspiracy, the War
Crimes, and the Crimes against Humanity is certainly greater than
it might appear at first glance.
The criminal activity of Fritzsche, Goebbels' closest assistant,
carried out systematically day after day, constitutes a very im-
portant link in the Common Plan or Conspiracy and contributed
effectively to the creation of the conditions under which the
numerous crimes of the Hitlerites were conceived and nurtured.
All the attempts made by the defendant himself and his counsel
to minimize his importance and the part he played in the per-
petration of these crimes have clearly failed.
In Mein Kampf Hitler describes the very special part attributed
to mendacious propaganda in Nazi Germany. He wrote:
"The problem of the revival of German might is not 'how
we will make weapons' but 'how we will create the spirit
which will make our people capable of bearing weapons.' If
this spirit pervades the people, the will power shall discover
thousands of ways and each of them will lead to weapons."
I am quoting from Pages 365 and 366 of Mein Kampf, sixty-
fourth edition, 1933.
Neither is it by chance that the following slogans were pro-
claimed at the Congress of the Nazi Party in 1936 at Nuremberg:
"Propaganda helped us to come to power; propaganda helps
us to keep power; propaganda will help us to conquer the world."
Owing to his position, the Defendant Fritzsche was certainly
one of the most outstanding propagandists \and also one of the
best-informed persons in Nazi Germany. He enjoyed Goebbels'
particular confidence.
As we know, from 1938 till 1942 Fritzsche was head of one of
the key departments of the Propaganda Ministry, that of the Ger-
man Press. And from 1942 until the defeat of Hitler's Germany
he was head of the German radio communication service.
Having grown up as a journalist of the reactionary press of
Hugenberg, Fritzsche, who was a member of the Nazi Party since
1933, in his capacity of Government spokesman played an important
part in the dissemination of fascist propaganda throughout Ger-
many and in the political and moral disintegration of the German
people. This was testified to in detail by witnesses such as former







30 July 46

Field Marshal of the German Army Ferdinand Schbrner and former
Vice Admiral Hans Voss. The Defendant Fritzsche's broadcasts,
intercepted by the BBC, and submitted to the Tribunal as Docu-
ment 3064-PS and Exhibit USSR-496, fully confirm these charges
of the Prosecution.
German propaganda in general, and the Defendant Fritzsche in
particular, made full use of provocative methods, lies, and slan-
derous statements, and this was especially the case when Nazi Ger-
many's acts of aggression had to be justified. For did not Hitler
himself write in Mein Kampf, Page 302:
"With the help of a propaganda skillfully and continually
applied even heaven can be represented as hell to the people
and on the contrary, the most miserable life can be rep-
resented as heaven."
Fritzsche turned out to be the best man to carry out this dirty
work.
In his affidavits, submitted to the Tribunal and dated 7 January
1946, Fritzsche gave a detailed description of the provocative
methods applied on such a vast scale by German propaganda and
by him personally in connection with the acts of aggression against
Austria, the Sudetenland, Bohemia and Moravia, Poland, and
Yugoslavia.
On 9 April and 2 May 1940 Fritzsche broadcast mendacious ex-
planations of the reasons which led to the occupation of Norway
by Germany. He declared, "Nobody was wounded, not one house
was destroyed, life and work continued unhindered as before."
Meanwhile, the official report presented by the Norwegian Govern-
ment states:
"The German attack against Norway on 9 April 1940 brought
war to Norway for the first time in 126 years: For 2 months
war was fought throughout the country, causing destruction.
Over 40,000 houses were damaged or destroyed and about
2,000 civilians were killed."
German propaganda and Fritzsche personally spread insolent
lies in connection with the sinking of the British passenger steamer
Athenia. But German propaganda was particularly active on the
occasion of Hitler Germany's treacherous attack upon the Soviet
Union.
The Defendant Fritzsche has attempted to assert that he first
heard of the attack upon the Soviet Union when he was called on
22 June 1941 at 5 o'clock in the morning to a press conference
held by Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop. As far as the aggressive
purposes of this attack were concerned, he allegedly had learned
of them only through his personal observations, in 1942. However,







30 July 46


these statements are refuted by such documentary evidence as the
report of Defendant -Rosenberg. This document establishes the
fact'that a long time before the attack upon the U.S.S.R., Fritzsche
knew of the appropriate measures which were being taken and that
in his capacity of representative of the Propaganda Ministry he
participated in the elaboration of propaganda measures for the
East by the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories.
In answer to the questions put to him by the Soviet Prosecution
during his cross-examination Fritzsche stated that he would not
have gone with Hitler had he had knowledge of the Hitler Govern-
ment's criminal orders, of which he heard for the first time here
in court. And here again, Fritzsche told the International Military
Tribunal an untruth. Thus he was compelled to admit that he had
knowledge of the criminal Hitler orders regarding the extermina-
tion of Jews and the shooting of Soviet commissars as early as
1942. And yet he continued thereafter to remain at his post and
to spread mendacious propaganda. In his broadcasts on 16 June
and 1 July 1944, Fritzsche ballyhooed the new weapons being used,
doing his best to incite the Army and the people to further senseless
resistance.
And even on the eve of the collapse of Nazi Germany, on
7 April 1945, Fritzsche broadcast an appeal to the German people
to continue their resistance to the Allied armies and to join in the
Werewolf movement.
Thus, the Defendant Fritzsche remained true to the last to the
criminal Hitlerite regime. He gave his entire self to the task of
realizing the fascist conspiracy and of perpetrating all the crimes
which were planned and carried out in order to put that conspiracy
into effect. As an active participant in all the Hitlerite crimes, he
must bear the fullest responsibility for them.
Your Honors, all the defendants have passed before you-men
without honor or conscience; men who hurled the world into an
abyss of misery and suffering and brought enormous calamities
upon their own people; political adventurers who stopped at no
evil deed in order to achieve their criminal designs; brummagem
demagogues who concealed their predatory plans behind a veil of
mendacious ideas; hangmen who murdered millions of innocent
people-these men formed a gang of conspirators, seized power
and transformed the German State machinery into an instrument
for their crimes.
Now, the hour of reckoning has come. For the past 9 months,
we have been observing the former rulers of fascist Germany. In
the dock before this Court they have suddenly become meek and
humble. Some of them even actually condemned Hitler. But they
do not blame Hitler for waging a war or for the exterminating







30 July 46


of peoples and plundering of states; the only thing they cannot
forgive him is defeat. Together with Hitler, they were ready to
exterminate millions of human beings, to enslave civilized mankind
in order to achieve their criminal aim of world domination.
But history decided otherwise. Victory did not follow upon
the steps of crime. Victory came to the freedom-loving nations.
Truth triumphed and we are proud to say that justice meted out
by the International Military Tribunal will be the justice of the
righteous cause of peace-loving nations.
The Defense spoke about humanity. We know that the concepts
of civilization and humanity, democracy and humanity, peace and
humanity are inseparable. But we, the champions of civilization,
democracy, and peace-we positively reject that form of humanity
which is considerate to the murderers and indifferent to their
victims. Counsel for Kaltenbrunner also spoke here of love for
mankind. In connection with Kaltenbrunner's name and actions
all mention of love for mankind sounds blasphemy.
Your Lordship, Your Honors, my statement concludes the case
for the Prosecution. Speaking here on behalf of the peoples of
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, I consider all the charges
against the defendants as fully proven. And in the name of the
sincere love of mankind which inspires the peoples who made the
supreme sacrifice to save for the world freedom and culture, in
memory of the millions of innocent human beings slaughtered by
a gang of murders who are now before the court of civilized man-
kind, in the name of the happiness and the peaceful labor of future
generations, I appeal to the Tribunal to sentence all the defendants
without exception to the supreme penalty-death. Such a verdict
will be greeted with satisfaction by all progressive mankind.
THE PRESIDENT (Lord Justice Sir Geoffrey Lawrence): Now
we will deal with the applications for witnesses and documents by
counsel for the SA.
MAJOR J. HARCOURT BARRINGTON (Junior Counsel for the
United Kingdom): May it please the Tribunal, there were initially
seven witnesses applied for for the SA: four for the General SA; two
for the Stahlhelm, and one for the SA Reiterkorps (Riding Corps).
Since then there has been an eighth application for a witness for
the Stahlhelm who, I understand, is to be a substitution for the
other two for the Stahlhelm. That would reduce the total number
of witnesses applied for for the SA to six. All those originally
applied for have already been heard by the Commission, but the
one recently applied for, by the name of Gruss, has not yet been
heard by the Commission; and if the Tribunal approve of that
witness, it would involve his being heard by the Commission now.





30 July 46


I apprehend that the Tribunal will have the recommendation of
the Commission before them when they are deciding this. In the
circumstances, the Prosecution only desire to say that they have
no objection to these applications.
THE PRESIDENT: That means no objection to any of them?
MAJOR BARRINGTON: No objection to any of them, on the
understanding, My Lord, that Gruss is applied for in substitution
for the other two Stahlhelm witnesses, Waldenfels and Hauffe.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. B6hm?
HERR GEORG BOHM (Counsel for SA): I have applied for the
witnesses Jiittner, Bock, Klahn, Schafer, Van den Borch, and pri-
marily Waldenfels and Hauffe to be heard as witnesses for the SA.
The witness Hauffe has been applied for because it has not been
possible to bring one witness, who had been allowed, to Nurem-
berg; that was the witness Gruss. Concerning the witness Gruss,
I should like to apply for him to be questioned before the Commis-
sion so that he can also be heard before the Tribunal. Gruss could
be called only a few days ago, although my application to hear him
had already been made in the month of May, and a search had to
be made for him for 2 months. He is an important witness for the
Stahlhelm in the SA, and because of his position of Treasurer in
the Stahlhelm he knows about conditions throughout Germany, par-
ticularly for the period after 1935. But as I can make the appli-
cation for the witness to be heard here only after he has been
before the Commission, I beg that it be granted that this witness
be heard by the Commission. I will not, however, give up the wit-
ness Waldenfels on that account, so that the situation will be that
for the SA not six but seven witnesses are to be heard, as had been
provided for originally.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, what would be the names?
HERR BOHM: Jiittner, Bock, Klahn, Schifer, Van den Borch,
Waldenfels, and Gruss.
But I should like to ask, Mr. President, since I do not as yet know
the extent of the testimony of the witness Gruss, to be permitted
to choose between the two witnesses Gruss and Hauffe. That is,
after the witness Gruss has been heard by the Commission, I should
like to be permitted to decide whether, besides the witness Walden-
fels', I shall want to apply for the witness Hauffe or the witness
Gruss for questioning.
THE PRESIDENT: Is that all you wish to say, Dr. Bohm?
HERR BOHM: In connection with the witnesses, yes, Mr. Pres-
ident, but I should like to speak in connection with the document
book for the SA, if I may be permitted.







30 July 46

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Barrington, do you wish to say anything
more about the application which Dr. Bbhm now has, which is for
seven, and not for six?
MAJOR BARRINGTON: Well, the Prosecution are of the opinion
that one witness for the Stahlhelm would be enough, but Your
Lordship will, of course, have the Commission's recommendation on
that. They will have been heard. On the question of the choice
between Gruss and Hauffe after Gruss has been heard, there would
be no objection to that, of course.
HERR BOHM: Mr. President, may I say that the Stahlhelm
within the SA comprised about one-fourth of the members of the
SA. There were about one million people who had transferred
from the Stahlhelm into the SA. And I believe that it would be in
the interest of many that the evidence be confirmed by two wit-
nesses before this Court.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will consider that matter. Now
will you deal with the documents.
MAJOR BARRINGTON: Would it be convenient to Your Lord-
ship if I started on the documents?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
MAJOR BARRINGTON: Agreement has been reached on the
document books with the exception of one group of five documents
to which the Prosecution object.
Before dealing with that group I ought to mention to the Tri-
bunal that among the other documents which were agreed to be
excluded there were a considerable number of photographs of mem-
bers of the SA Reiterkorps in civilian clothes. The great majority
of those photographs were excluded; a few have been included. But
I just want to say this, that those photographs were intended to
show that the object of the Reiterkorps was purely that of sporting
activities. Of course, the Prosecution admit that the object of the
Reiterkorps included sporting activities, although naturally the
Prosecution say that was not their only object.
With regard to the group of five documents, I think I can take
that quite briefly. I have prepared a short summary, which I think
the Tribunal have at the back of that sheaf of papers.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
MAJOR BARRINGTON: These five documents are all extracts
from writings by English writers and publicists during the period,
I think, from 1936 to 1939, and they all represent, in my submission,
the unofficial opinions and arguments of those writers. Your Lord-
ship can see roughly what they are about.






30 July 46

The first one, SA-236, is by Mr. Dawson, in The Nineteenth Cen-
tury, to the effect that Hitler's policy to the statesmen of Europe
is for peace and not war, and that Hitler has saved Germany from
chaos and collapse, that he does the same for Europe by his peace
proposals.
And then SA-237, by Dr. A. J. McDonald, from the book Why I
Believe in Hitler's Germany and the Third Reich, says:
"Perhaps the best guarantee for the stability of Hitler's regime
is his own moral purity and that which he has imposed on
Germany. He has tackled the problem of youth..."-and
so on.
SA-242 is an extract from Das Archiv quoting Professor Cornell
Evans and Professor Dawson again:
"Hitler's withdrawal from Locarno and the occupation of the
Rhineland was a good thing..."
"Hitler's peace proposals are very valuable..."
"The Versailles Treaty was unjust..."-and so forth.
And SA-246, another extract from the The Nineteenth Century,
illustrates "Germans marching into parts of their own country," and
maintains that this is justified.
And SA-247, an extract from a book by A. P. Lorry, The Case for
Germany, which says, "the complaint that Germany applies force is
wrong, and the attack on Austria cannot be called an attack."
Now, My Lord, insofar as those extracts are intended to prove
facts, they clearly don't prove any direct evidence of facts, but are
purely conclusions of fact, and as such they prejudge the issues
which are for the Tribunal to decide. If on the other hand, as is
possible, they are intended to show that these writings led the SA
to believe that the Nazi regime was a thing to be admired or was
well thought of abroad, I only need to say two things: First, these
were unofficial writings; secondly, there is no evidence to show that
they were even read by the SA. There is no evidence in any case
that they influenced the SA at all, if they were read. That is all I
can say.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Bbhm?
HERR BOHM: Mr. President, originally I did not intend to dis-
cuss the contents to the extent to which the representative of the
Prosecution has done it now. I should not like to be accused of
trying to make National Socialist propaganda. But we are con-
fronted here with short quotations from English and American
writers which cause no difficulties in translating, and from which I
did not intend to read anything here in Court as it is. Neither do I






30 July 46


intend to read the contents of these documents during my presen-
tation of evidence, but I wanted at least to have the opportunity to
refer to them during my final argument.
These quotations have appeared in German newspapers. They
also appeared in collections as, for example, Das Archiv. Thus they
were accessible to the German public and became quite well-known.
It is not as if these excerpts were translated only now, and were
not previously known to anybody in Germany. They appeared in
the Vi6kischer Beobachter and in Das Archiv, and every German
could read them and acquaint himself with them.
Without regard to the importance of the writers themselves or
the people who made those statements in their own country, these
statements are important for the Germans because the authors were
men who expressed their opinions in leading foreign countries on
current German problems. I would regret very much if the Court
could not decide that I may be permitted to enter them into my
document book. They present very little work for translation. They
are not extensive and there are no obstacles connected with them.
THE PRESIDENT: Have all the documents been translated?
HERR BOHM: I don't think they have already been translated.
A considerable number were requested.
THE PRESIDENT: Are they very long?
HERR BOHM: These five are not very long. The greater part
are extracts.
THE PRESIDENT: I don't mean the five. I.mean the other things.
MAJOR BARRINGTON: They vary, but for the most part they
are short extracts.
HERR BOHM: In my document book only a few documents
have been translated entirely, only excerpts which I shall refer to
for support during my presentation of evidence and during my final
argument. Therefore, the translation of the entire document book
will create very little work, and these documents which I shall also
have translated certainly will not present any difficulties.
THE PRESIDENT: Is there anything further you wish to say,
Dr. BBhm?
HERR BOHM: Mr. President, unfortunately I have to make
another application, which I would rather not have made, but cir-
cumstances are such that it has to be put in. I request that the wit-
nesses Fuss, Lucke, Waldenfels, Von Alvensleben, Dr. Geyer, and&
Dr. Meder should also be heard before the Commission. I have
already made applications for these Wvitnesses, for the witness Fuss
on 25 April; for the witness Lucke, on 7 May; for the witness
Waldenfels, on 21 May; for the witness Von Alvensleben, on







30 July 46


20 May; for the witness Dr. Geyer, on 25 April; and for the wit-
ness Dr. Meder, on 25 April of this year.
These witnesses are important witnesses. To give only one
example, the questioning of the witnesses Fuss and Lucke would
mean a rebuttal of one of the most important documents in this
Trial. That is Document 1721-PS in which it is charged that the
Brigadefiihrer of Brigade 50 had reported to the Gruppenfiihrer
the burning down of about 38 synagogues.
The other witnesses whose evidence, in order to shorten pro-
ceedings, I will not discuss now, whom Colonel Neave has permitted
me to question, have not yet arrived. I believe I heard yesterday
that possibly Dr. Geyer arrived a few days ago. The subjects of
evidence are important, and the length of time for the questioning
before the Commission will be very short. I cannot possibly forego
these witnesses whom I have repeatedly requested. These witnesses
must be heard, and I believe that they can be brought here in time
so that it would be possible still to hear them during the presen-
tation of evidence.
THE PRESIDENT: How many is it you are asking for?
HERR BOHM: Seven witnesses who are to be heard by the
Commission-no, six witnesses.
THE PRESIDENT: How many have you already had heard
before the Commission? I am told it is 16; is that right?
HERR BOHM: Sixteen. I could not give the exact number just
yet, but I am prepared to find out at once.
THE PRESIDENT: And how many have been brought to-Nurem-
berg for the purpose of being questioned by you?
HERR BOHM: The witnesses who. have come to Nuremberg to
be heard here were primarily the wrong witnesses. A number of
witnesses had to come two or three times until we got the right
one, for instance the witness Wolff.
THE PRESIDENT: I asked how many.
HERR BOHM: Altogether, all the witnesses who have come only
to give an affidavit, or just the witnesses who were heard by the
Commission?
THE PRESIDENT: How many witnesses have been brought?
How many persons have been brought to Nuremberg for the pur-
pose of being questioned?
HERR BOHM: Mr. President, I believe there is a matter which
has to be cleared up. Witnesses have been brought here in order
to be questioned by the Commission or by the Tribunal. But wit-
nesses have also been brought here merely to make an affidavit
about a particular subject that appeared important, witnesses who







30 July 46


would not necessarily have to be heard before the Commission or
the Tribunal. These witnesses have been sent back after they had
signed an affidavit.
THE PRESIDENT: I am asking you how many. How many?
Can't you answer?
HERR BOHM: Altogether? I would like to know whether the
question is designed to mean the people who have been heard by
the Commission, or all the witnesses who came here.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, out of the people who have come here,
some of them have been examined before the Commission and others
have made affidavits, and possibly there may be others who have
done neither. I want to know how many in all.
HERR BOHM: I believe 16. I cannot give the exact figure
because I did not question all of them. I would like permission to
determine the exact number after the recess.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.

[A recess was taken.]

THE PRESIDENT: I will deal first with the documents. The
documents to which no objection has been made will be translated
and will be admitted, subject to objections as to their admissibility.
The documents to which objections have already been made, namely
SA-236, 237, 242, 246, and 247, are all rejected and will not be
translated.
With reference to the witnesses applied for, the following wit-
nesses who have been examined before the Commission may be
examined before the Tribunal: The witness Schdfer, the witness
Jiittner, either the witness Bock or the witness Klahn according as
counsel for the SA decides; and one out of the three witnesses,
Waldenfels, Hauffe, and Gruss-to be examined before the Commis-
sion. Van den Borch is not allowed, but his evidence may be given
by affidavit. With reference to the other six witnesses for whom
application has been made, every effort is being made to trace them
and if they arrive within a week from today, that is to say, on or
before Tuesday of next week, they will be heard before the Com-
mission. That is all.
HERR BOHM: Mr. President, may I make a brief explanation?
The Court has just approved the witnesses Waldenfels, Hauffe, and
Gruss to be examined before the Commission.
THE PRESIDENT: No, the witnesses Waldenfels, Hauffe, and
Gruss have already been examined before the Commission, have
they not?







30 July 46


HERR BOHM: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: What I said was that you must choose one
out of the three witnesses: Waldenfels, Hauffe and Gruss-after.
Gruss has been examined before the Commission. One out of the
three, so that in all you will have four witnesses: Schafer, Jiittner,
one out of Bock and Kl1hn, and one out of Waldenfels, Hauffe, -and
Gruss, making four. And you will have Van den Borch on affidavit.
HERR BOHM: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Barrington, with reference to the Reich
Cabinet, I see there is one witness that has not yet been granted
as a witness, and that is the witness Schlegelberger, who has not
yet appeared before the Commission. Yes, Dr. Kempner?
DR. ROBERT KEMPNER (Assistant Trial Counsel for the United
States): Schlegelberger was questioned before the Commission
yesterday.
THE PRESIDENT: Is there any objection...
DR. KEMPNER: No.
THE PRESIDENT: Then, are there any other witnesses for the
Reich Cabinet?
DR. KEMPNER: Not that I know of.
THE PRESIDENT: It would perhaps save time if we granted
him now. Are there any documents not agreed on for the Reich
Cabinet?
DR. KEMPNER: We already examined all the documents.
THE PRESIDENT:,You agreed? Well, very well.
DR. KEMPNER: Thank you.
THE PRESIDENT: And now we will hear the witnesses for the
political leaders.
DR. ROBERT SERVATIUS (Counsel for Leadership Corps of the
Nazi Party): Mr. President, according to the decision of 25 and
26 July, I am first to offer the documents and affidavits so that they
may be incorporated into the record. Should I do that first or
should I first examine the witness? According to the decision I
should do it first and that is what I prepared.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, do it that way.
DR. SERVATIUS: According to the decision of 25 July, the evi-
dence is first to be submitted. The evaluation of the evidence is to
follow the final presentation, so that I will submit only the evidence
now without any special comment. I act according to the decision.







30 July 46

First, I present a list of the witnesses examined before the Com-
mission which I submit in evidence. There are 20 witnesses. They
are the following, if I may read the list. Does the Court consider
'it necessary for me to read the list of witnesses?
THE PRESIDENT: I do not think you need read the names of
the witnesses. If you would offer, formally, the transcripts of their
evidence before the Commission, that will be sufficient.
DR. SERVATIUS: Yes, very well. I submit the copies of the
records in evidence, the originals of which the Commission has. The
record of the witness Mohr is still missing. He is Number 7 on the
list. I have not yet received this record. I will submit it later.
THE PRESIDENT: Then the General Secretary will file the orig-
inal of the transcripts.
DR. SERVATIUS: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: And you will give it some number, I suppose,
some exhibit number?
DR. SERVATIUS: Yes, I will adjust the exhibit numbers after
consulting the General Secretary since it is not yet clear how the
documents will be arranged.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
DR. SERVATIUS: Then I submit...
THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. You will adjust that with
the General Secretary as to whether or not it is necessary to give
these transcripts on evidence before the Commission an exhibit
number or not?
DR. SERVATIUS: Yes, I will adjust it.
Then I will submit a list of affidavits which have been approved
by the Commission. There are 52 of them. The list contains those
documents the translation of which was approved by the Commis-
sion and thought especially important. The affidavits themselves
are in the hands of the Commission and I will discuss with the
General Secretary in what form they should be submitted as an
exhibit.
According to the decision, I have summed up these affidavits in
writing. If the Court wishes, I will read this summary which con-
tains an explanation of this document, but I do not believe that it
will be of great use at the moment; it will be better if it is read
later in the proper connection.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
DR. SERVATIUS: Then I would like to submit further affidavits
which are not yet available and which have not yet been dealt with
before the Commission. There are 139,000 affidavits which are







30 July 4G


divided into definite groups. These groups have been gone over by
members of the organizations who are in prison here, and one col-
lective affidavit has been made for each group. Three especially
important and typical affidavits have been added to these collective
affidavits. I could submit the majority of the pertinent documents
to the Tribunal, and will offer them to the Court if I am given the
opportunity. I would like to discuss with the General Secretary as
to how they should be submitted.
In effect, there are 12 different groups-that will be 12 affidavits
with three appendixes to the most important ones: On the Church
question, on the question of low-level flying, and on the question of
concentration camps. Those are nine groups.
Then I have two groups-that is to say, a survey of two camps-
in which there are many thousands, so that one can get a clear
picture of the opinion of the inmates of the camp. They are also
summed up in an affidavit with a few appendixes.
I have attempted to compile this great amount of material
so that the Court will be in a position to take judicial notice of
it, and I would like to submit it in its entirety so that the Court
will perhaps be able to examine some picked at random and be
convinced of its correctness.
THE PRESIDENT: As I understand it, there are 139,000 affi-
davits. You have divided them into 12 groups?
DR. SERVATIUS: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: And you have 12 collective affidavits for
these 12 groups?
DR. SERVATIUS: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: To be appended to each of these 12 col-
lective affidavits are two or three...
DR. SERVATIUS: There are three. As I have just seen, a larger
number is appended. I will go over them again and reduce them
so that there will be no more than three to each group.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Servatius, then the Tribunal thinks that
the whole 139,000 should be deposited with the Tribunal, and the
12 collective affidavits with the appended affidavits will doubtless
be of great convenience to the Tribunal. The Commission will
receive them and approve them, yes, and then they will be
deposited before the Tribunal.
DR. SERVATIUS: Then I have to submit the document books
which the Tribunal has; I have the originals of the documents
here and I submit them. There are two documents which I
cannot submit in the original-two, to be explicit, which are
at the University of Erlangen. The first one, Document PL-15, is







30 July 46


the book Die Amtstrager der Partei (The Officials of the Party).
And Document PL-78 is the book Das Recht der NSDAP (Law of
the NSDAP) by Dr. Hein and Dr. Fischer. All the others I have
submitted. A large part of the documents are taken from col-
lections of documents and from books which are already in the
library of the Prosecution. The title of these collections of docu-
ments is shown by the heading of the document concerned in the
document book. I ask that these collections of documents and books,
to be found in the library of the Prosecution, be designated as the
originals.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, subject to any objections.
DR. SERVATIUS: Then I have finished with the presentation
of evidence submitted before the Commission, and now, with the
permission of the Court, I shall call my witnesses. With the per-
mission of the Court, I will call the witness Gauleiter Kaufmann.
[The witness Kaufmann took the stand.]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please?
KARL OTTO KURT KAUFMANN (Witness): Karl Otto Kurt
Kaufmann.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear
by God-the Almighty and Omniscient-that I will speak the pure
truth-and will withhold and, add nothing.
[The witness repeated the oath in German.]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, you were a Gauleiter from 1925 to
1926 in the Gau Ruhr and from 1928 to 1945 in the Gau Hamburg?
KAUFMANN: Yes.
DR. SERVATIUS: How many people lived in these Gaue?
KAUFMANN: In the Ruhr about 7 to 8 million; in the Gau
Hamburg about 1.8 million.
DR. SERVATIUS: Do you know anything about conditions in
other Gaue?
KAUFMANN: More or less, yes.
DR. SERVATIUS: In 1921 you joined the Party and after the
dissolution of the Party again in 1925?
KAUFMANN: Yes.
DR. SERVATIUS: And in the meantime you were a laborer,
from 1921 to 1925, in the Ruhr district and in Upper Bavaria?
KAUFMANN: No, from 1923 to 1925.
DR. SERVATIUS: According to National Socialist terminology,
when is a person a political leader?







30 July 46


KAUFMANN: A man holds this position when he. has been
nominated for it, when he is in possession of the appropriate docu-
ments and has the right to wear a uniform.
DR. SERVATIUS: Were Block- and Zellenleiter among the polit-
ical leaders?
KAUFMANN: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Servatius, will you ask the date of the
witness' birth?
DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, when were you born?
KAUFMANN: I was born on 10 October 1900.
DR. SERVATIUS: Were not the Block- and Zellenleiter a dif-
ferent type of political leader from the political leaders in higher
position?
KAUFMANN: The Block- and Zellenleiter were small executive
organs of the Ortsgruppenleiter.
DR. SERVATIUS: Was the activity of the Block- and Zellen-
leiter subordinate in significance to that of the Amtsleiter in the
local groups, or in their staffs?
KAUFMANN: Under the Amtsleiter of the local groups there
were essential tasks and nonessential tasks. Those in charge of the
essential tasks were more important than those in charge of the
nonessential tasks.
DR. SERVATIUS: Were not the Block- and Zellenleiter officials
and especially important political leaders?
KAUFMANN: I have already said that they were officials, but
only small executing organs of the local group leader.
SIR DAVID. MAXWELL-FYFE (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the
United Kingdom): My Lord, I wonder if I might make a suggestion
for the consideration of the Court. I think it would be more
helpful if the translator could use the German term, because we
are all used to it in this context, and continue to use the Orts-
gruppenleiter instead of "leader of a local group," because when
we use a term like "local group" there may be some difficulty as
to what the reference is. I just put it for a suggestion. Personally,
it would be helpful to me. I don't know if the Court will agree.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly.
DR. SERVATIUS: What was the general practical activity of
the political leaders? How was it before the war and how was it
after the beginning of the war?
KAUFMANN: The activity of the political leaders was accord-
ing to the office they held. There were political leaders who were
purely technical experts and there were political leaders who had






30 July 46

tasks of political leadership. The tasks before the seizure of power
were, as in any party, essentially to make propaganda for the Party
idea, to organize the Party, and in election campaigns to recruit
votes among the population for the success of the Party. After the
Seizure of power, the essential activity of the political leaders con-
sisted primarily in social welfare work for the population and in
the realization of the social aims. In addition, there were organi-
zational questions, training tasks, and propaganda questions. During
the war these tasks were determined by the course of the war
itself and in addition to the large social problems in peacetime we
had the food and shelter problems brought about by the war.
DR. SERVATIUS: How large was the number of political leaders
before the war and during the war?
KAUFMANN: I can only give figures from my Gau. I estimate
the number of political leaders in the Gau Hamburg before the
war at about 10,000, without auxiliary branches. The number was
greatly curtailed by the fact that many were drafted during
the war.
DR. SERVATIUS: How large was the percentage of political
leaders in your Gau who were drafted for military service?
KAUFMANN: Aside from armament-for many political leaders
were only honorary officials-a maximum of 10 percent of the
Party were classed as indispensable at the beginning of the war.
DR. SERVATIUS: Who, therefore, remained in the Gau?
KAUFMANN: In 1944, in the age groups of 1900 and younger,
there were 12 for the whole Party in Hamburg, with the exception
of administration and armament.
DR. SERVATIUS: Do you mean 12 percent?
KAUFMANN: No, 12 men.
DR. SERVATIUS: And in percentage?
KAUFMANN: I estimate 6,000 political leaders.
DR. SERVATIUS: On the staffs of the Gau, Kreis, and Orts-
gruppenleiter were also the heads of the technical offices. Did these
officials of the technical offices (Amtswalter) have political leader-
ship tasks?
KAUFMANN: No. The great majority of political leaders in
the technical offices were concerned exclusively with technical
matters of their organizations.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did the officials of the. technical offices take
part in all staff discussions or were there smaller and bigger staffs?
KAUFMANN: That depended on the subject of the discussion.
If it was of general political interest a larger circle was included;







30 July 46


if it was a discussion which concerned only special offices, the
circle was limited to these.
DR. SERVATIUS: Was the office of political leader taken vol-
untarily, or as a duty, or on a compulsory basis?
KAUFMANN: Here again one must distinguish between two
periods; before the seizure of power, of course, it was voluntary.
After the seizure of power every Party member was obliged, as
a matter of principle, to co-operate. I personally considered it im-
portant to maintain the principle of volunteer work in the Gau
under all circumstances because, as you can understand, I did not
expect any political success from forced co-operation. I know that
the matter was dealt with in a similar way in other Gaue.
DR. SERVATIUS: Why did Party members refuse to take
honorary offices as political leaders; was this done for political
reasons or for personal reasons?
KAUFMANN: The reasons varied. Some refused because they
were too busy in their occupation-that is especially true of many
professions during the war; and others refused because they did
not want to expose themselves politically.
DR. SERVATIUS: What was the activity of the Blockleiter?
KAUFMANN: The Blockleiter were the assistants of the Orts-
gruppenleiter. When it was necessary in peace and in war to
approach the population, usually in the case of social measures,
the Ortsgruppenleiter used the services of the Blockleiter. In the
Gau Hamburg the Block and Zellenleiter as well as the whole
Party, in war and peace, were primarily concerned with social
work and welfare measures.
DR. SERVATIUS: From where did the Gauleiter get their in-
structions?
KAUFMANN: The Gauleiter received their instructions from
the Fuihrer. They were directly subordinate to the Fiihrer. Upon
his order they received instructions from the Deputy of the Ffihrer
and in some cases from the Party Chancellery on behalf of the
Fiihrer.
DR. SERVATIUS: Could the Reichsleiter also give instructions
to the Gauleiter?
KAUFMANN: No, the Reichsleiter were limited to their
specialized offices in the Gaue. The Gauleiter had the right to
stop measures transmitted through this channel and originating
from a Reichsleiter if he considered them inexpedient. In the case
of differences, the Deputy of the Fiihrer or the Fiihrer himself
decided.







30 July 46

DR. SERVATIUS: How were the Gauleiter instructed on political
intentions and measures?
KAUFMANN: The basic political intentions and measures of the
Fihrer were known to us through the Party program and in part
through his book Mein Kampf. Accordingly, the propaganda and
practical training of our co-workers was effected. After the seizure
of power, the Gauleiter were informed of intended political actions,
especially foreign political ones, but also domestic ones, only after
the action had taken place.
DR. SERVATIUS: Were there orders, instructions, or confer-
ences? What can you say about that?
KAUFMANN: There were conferences which took place com-
paratively seldom.
DR. SERVATIUS: In which form did these conferences take place?
KAUFMANN: For the Party leaders, in the form of Reichsleiter
and Gauleiter conferences. I must correct myself-not conferences
but meetings.
DR. SERVATIUS: What is the difference between a conference
and a meeting?
KAUFMANN: In a conference I see a possibility of discussion.
This possibility of discussion in Fiihrer conferences existed without
restriction up to the resignation of Strasser in 1932, in a limited
form until the departure of Hess, but it altogether disappeared when
Hess was no longer there. From this time on, the meetings consisted
exclusively of the issuing of orders, at which there was no possibil-
ity for discussion or for inquiry. These meetings were directed by
Bormann.
The other way was through circular letters. Through circular
letters, direct orders of the Fdihrer or orders in the name of the
Fiihrer were transmitted to us-at first through the Deputy of the
Fiihrer and later through the Party Chancellery. That was essen-
tially the channel of command that was customary.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did conferences with the Reichsleiter take
place?
KAUFMANN: I do not recall any conference at which all Gau-
leiter were present with all Reichsleiter.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did leading political leaders have special tasks
outside of their activities as political leaders?
KAUFMANN: There were high functionaries of the Party who,
besides their Party office, had State and other offices. There were
also those who were limited exclusively to their Party office.







30 July 46


DR. SERVATIUS: What was the content of the instruction which
the political leaders received through official Party channels? Must
one make a distinction between various periods-up to the seizure
of power, up to the war, and during the war?
KAUFMANN: I have already partially answered that question.
I can sum up briefly: Before the war they were of an organizational
and propagandistic nature and during the war they were deter-
mined by the tasks of war, in the main dealing with social measures.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did the political leaders receive instructions
on Point 1 of the Party program, which in effect contained the An-
schluss of Austria to Germany, and did such instructions refer to
the preparation of war of aggression?
KAUFMANN: The political leaders were in no way informed
about the Anschluss of Austria, the way in which it was done, or
the time. The Anschluss of Austria was, of course, the goal of the
Party, because Austria's desire for an Anschluss was known or
became known to the political leaders from 1918 on, through the
law of the then Chancellor Renner as a result of the plebiscite in
1921 of the Federal State of Salzburg and Tyrol, and later through
Austrian reaction to the entry of German troops or to the Anschluss.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did you receive instructions on Point 2 of the
Party program which refers to the denunciation of the Versailles
Treaty? Did .these instructions refer to the preparation of a war
of aggression?
KAUFMANN: The revision of the Versailles Treaty-and I em-
phasize revision-was an essential part of our political aims. The
political leaders were, before the war and even before the seizure
of power, of the firm conviction that this aim would have to be
achieved by way of revision, that is, by way of negotiation. The
political leaders never received any other instruction on methods
by which to attain this goal in all the time before the war.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did you receive instructions on Point 3 of the
program, which demands land for settlement? Did such instructions
refer to the preparation for a war of aggression?
KAUFMANN: This point of the program-I believe it is a point
of the program-was understood by the political leaders-and they
were instructed to that effect-to mean the return of the German
colonies. The discussions on other territories did not arise before
the war, but only during the war. I emphasize, discussion.
DR. SERVATIUS: What instructions did you receive on the
Jewish question, which is dealt with from Point 4 to 8 of the Party
program? Did such instructions refer to the removal of the Jews
because they would interfere with the war of aggression?







30 July 46


KAUFMANN: The program points on the Jewish question were
definitely set up. The attitude on the Jewish question varied greatly.
The political leaders with whom I was in contact were instructed
by me, at least, that this question could be solved only in a con-
structive way, that is, by a basic change in the existing system.
Training and propaganda on this point never had anything to do
with wars of aggression.
DR. SERVATIUS: What instruction did you receive on the
Church question, Point 24 of the Party program? Did you receive
instructions to eliminate the Church as an enemy of war?
KAUFMANN: I never received such instructions based on such
reasoning, nor did my political leaders. In spite of the interpreta-
tion which the different personalities of the Party gave this point,
the program point acknowledging positive Christianity remained
binding until the end for my political leaders. That is proved by
the fact that the'majority of the political leaders were and remained
members of the Church.
DR. SERVATIUS: What instructions did you receive on Point 25
of the Party program on the dissolution of labor unions? Were they
to be removed as opponents of war?
KAUFMANN: No. We, and that includes my political leaders,
saw in the dissolution of the labor unions only a demonstrative act of
an organic development which was taking place. The mass of union
members, even before the dissolution of the unions, were members
of the NSBO, and thus members of the National Socialist Labor
Organization.
DR. SERVATIUS: I would like to break off here. The witness
Hupfauer will be questioned more closely on this subject.
Did not the Anschluss of Austria take place with the entry of
German troops? Did the political leaders approve of this?
KAUFMANN: I have already mentioned that the political lead-
ers were neither informed nor questioned on the entry of German
troops into Austria and that they welcomed the Anschlhss all the
more because it is a historical fact that the Austrian people desired it.
DR. SERVATIUS: Was not Alsace-Lorraine again incorporated
into the German Reich, and did the political leaders approve of it?
KAUFMANN: The question of the incorporation of disputed
areas is a question of peace treaties. The political leaders were of,
the opinion that Alsace-Lorraine, for the duration of the war, was
under special German civil administration, and after the victorious
end of the war it was very possible that the incorporation of this
territory into the German Reich could and would be a German
demand, just as it was a French one after the first World War.-






30 July 46


DR. SERVATIUS: Were not the occupied territories in the East
claimed as Lebensraum and did the political leaders approve of this?
KAUFMANN: The war against Russia was described to the polit-
ical leaders by the political leadership as a preventive war. And
so this information for the benefit of the political leaders did
not-at least at the beginning of this war-contain anything con-
cerning intentions of annexation.
DR. SERVATIUS: Were not the churches in fact persecuted and
did the political leaders approve this?
KAUFMANN: It is quite possible that, in spite of the Party pro-
gram to acknowledge positive Christianity, deviation from this par-
ticular point occurred in some Gaue and the Church was exposed
to some persecution in these Gaue. The Fiihrer himself never
deviated from this point of the program in his statements.
DR. SERVATIUS: Then you did not approve of this persecution?
KAUFMANN: Not only did I disapprove of the persecution, but
I prohibited it in .my Gau.
DR. SERVATIUS: Were not the unions actually abolished and
did not the political leaders approve of it?
KAUFMANN: The political leaders and I saw in the German
Labor Front the development toward a great unified labor organi-
zation. If there were any doubts, the social achievements for the
German worker caused them to disappear.
DR. SERVATIUS: Were the political aims thus realized not con-
tained as aims in the book Mein Kampf, and thus generally known
and approved by the leaders?
KAUFMANN: The book Mein Kampf was certainly known to
part of the political leaders, and so was the Party program. The
opinion about both in the Nazi Party was like in any other party.
Some points are approved and they are the reasons for joining.
Other points do not seem to interest anybody, and the third group
of program points can even be rejected. In every party, and in the
NSDAP as well, much thinking and discussing centered around the
final aims of the Party, and this process was by no means completed.
DR. SERVATIUS: Were there then various tendencies in the
Party?
KAUFMANN: In important qtiestions of interpretation of the
program points, yes.
DR. SERVATIUS: What groups were they?
KAUFMANN: I should like to differentiate between three
large groups-the socialistic group, which in my opinion included
most of the members and followers, a more nationalistic group,
and a negative anti-Semitic group.







30 July 46


DR. SERVATIUS: What do you mean by a negative anti-Semitic
group? Is that the Streicher tendency?
KAUFMANN: If you ask me, yes.
DR. SERVATIUS: To what party tendency did you belong in the
Party?
KAUFMANN: I was and am a socialist.
DR. SERVATIUS: To what group did the majority of the Reichs-
leiter belong?
KAUFMANN: That is very difficult to say.
DR. SERVATIUS: The Gauleiter?
KAUFMANN: The Gauleiter from the industrial areas were for
the most part socialists.
DR. SERVATIUS: How about the Kreisleiter?
KAUFMANN: That depended essentially on their home district.
DR. SERVATIUS: The same is true of the Ortsgruppenleiter,
Block-, and Zellenleiter?
KAUFMANN: That is true of most of the political leaders and
for the mass of Party members.
DR. SERVATIUS: What was the political influence of the various
groups and where was the emphasis put?
KAUFMANN: That is very difficult to say. 'If you speak about
influence, I presume that most of the Party members like me
believed in the socialistic ideals of the Fiihrer. But that there were
men in his entourage who were less interested in socialism than
in other aims seems to me probable.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did you as a socialist agree with the Party
leadership?
KAUFMANN: 'I absolutely agreed with the socialistic aims of
the Fiihrer. On the other hand I did not agree with some men in
leading positions and their ideas.
DR. SERVATIUS: Why did you and other political leaders who
did not agree with these aims remain in office when you saw that
the main policy was deviating from socialist fields, and the perse-
cution of the Church and Jews started?
KAUFMANN: To begin with, at no time up to the collapse did
I or my associates have the impression that the socialist aims had
been given up. I have already emphasized that if an old National
Socialist has worked almost 25 years for his Party, it is his duty
to fight as long as possible for the realization of the aims as he
understands them, and that is not possible outside the Party but only






30 July 46


within the Party. That is one of the essential reasons why I
remained in the Party.
DR. SERVATIUS: How were the subordinate Kreis- and Orts-
gruppenleiter instructed?
KAUFMANN: To answer this question one must make a distinc-
tion between the city Gaue on the one hand and the provincial
Gaue, on the other. In the city Gau of Hamburg the political lead-
ers were frequently called together and received their instructions
and directions orally. For the provincial Gaue this was mostly done,
because of the distance, in writing, that is, their instructions were
issued orally and in writing.
DR. SERVATIUS: Were the Kreisleiter instructed to the same
extent as the Gauleiter or did they receive knowledge of only less
important matters?
KAUFMANN: Up to the beginning of the war I do not recall
any case in which my Kreisleiter-and I assume it was similar in
the other Gaue-did not learn of everything that I knew about.
During the war that did not hold entirely true for reasons of secrecy.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did the political leaders receive instructions
to commit war crimes or to permit them? How about the lynching
of low-level flyers?
KAUFMANN: Such orders as you mention were not known to
me in a direct form, that is as a direct demand. I assume you are
speaking, first, of the newspaper article by the former Reichsminister
Dr. Goebbels; second, of the well-known decree of the Reichsftihier
SS to the Police; and third, of the repeatedly mentioned circular
letter of Reichsleiter Bormann.
DR. SERVATIUS: Yes.
KAUFMANN: These orders were not clearly formulated in the
sense of your question. I admit that their interpretation could lead
to a development which then did lead in individual cases to the
events described here. These orders came through the Gaustabsamt
and were then sent from there to the competent Kreisleiter. The
order, that is, the circular letter by Bormann, was stopped by me
in my Gau-as I assume that it was done in other Gaue too-in
view of the fact that, because of the intensity of air warfare and
its results, I wanted to keep my political leaders from giving a dan-
gerous interpretation to this order. In addition, in view of the
Goebbels article and in view of Himmler's decree, I sent the Kreis-
leiter and Police presidents distinct counterorders. I hope that
similar steps were taken in other Gaue.
DR. SERVATIUS: What about the treatment of foreign workers?
Did you receive instructions tending toward war crimes in that
regard?.







30 July 46


KAUFMANN: All instructions which I know of in this field
refer exclusively to a demand for support of the social welfare
work. For me, as a socialist, it was a matter of course that my
agents-that is in this case the Labor Front and the Kreisleiter-
were instructed to take care of foreigners also, and I visited the
camps to ascertain whether this was done.
DR. SERVATIUS: What about the concentration camps with
regard to foreigners? Did you have instructions to put or help put
foreigners in concentration camps? Did you know of what happened
in the concentration camps?
KAUFMANN: I assume that the question of competence for the
concentration camps is known to the Tribunal. As the supreme
political leader of the Gau...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Servatius, I do not know what the wit-
ness means by that, that the question of competence with reference
to the concentration camps is known to the Tribunal.
DR. SERVATIUS: He did not want to say that he, as a Gau-
leiter, was not responsible for the concentration camps themselves.
He only wanted to explain that he will immediately discuss his
responsibility and will not give a long explanation on competency.
For that reason he said that he assumed the Tribunal was informed
on that matter.
THE PRESIDENT: Then, are you saying that you were in charge
of the concentration camps or responsible for them?
KAUFMANN: No, by no means.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, what do you mean by the competency
for the concentration camps?
KAUFMANN: I wanted to indicate or say that I might assume
that the Tribunal knows of this competency. If not, I am prepared
to explain it briefly.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, will you explain it briefly?
KAUFMANN: Yes. The concentration camps, during the whole
period of their formation and their management, were completely
outside any knowledge or influence of the political leaders, who
consequently had no authority as far as concentration camps were
concerned and no idea of what actually happened in them. I my-
self, if I wanted to enter a camp, had to have a special written
approval from the Reich Security Main Office. I believe that that
is sufficient explanation.
DR. SERVATIUS: Were not flyers actually lynched and was that
not so well known that every political leader knew about it and
approved it by remaining in office?







.30 July 46


KAUFMANN: I have already stated that in the Gau Hamburg
such things did not take place and since I myself learned of such
cases only as a prisoner, I must assume that my political leaders,
like myself, learned of these things only in captivity.
DR. SERVATIUS: Was not the ill-treatment of foreign workers
throughout the Reich so well known that every political leader
must have known about it and approved it by remaining in office?
KAUFMANN: The political leaders were bound to their own
districts, especially during the war. They could supervise only their
sphere of activity and what I and my political leaders in Hamburg
saw of these camps only made a favorable impression. The Kreis-
leiter had the obligation, where there were deficiencies and poor
conditions, to take steps together with the Labor Front and indus-
trial leaders to remedy them immediately.
DR. SERVATIUS: What was the relationship of the political
leaders to the State organizations, administrations, and other insti-
tutions?
KAUFMANN: The functions were completely varied and sepa-
rate, except in those cases in which one person held two or more
positions.
DR. SERVATIUS: And what relationship did the political lead-
ers have to the SA and General SS?
KAUFMANN: The SA and the General SS were independent
organizations with their own chain of command. The political lead-
ers could ask them to support their work.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did the political leaders have any executive
powers?
KAUFMANN: None at all. If they had no state function, as I
said, they were exclusively limited to their Party sphere.
DR. SERVATIUS: Could the political leaders give instructions
to the Gestapo or the SD?
KAUFMANN: That is shown from the answer to the previous
question. However, the fact that in the State Police and the SD
the vigilance over their own organizations was even more severe
than in other formations was a- matter of course.
DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, what was your relationship to the
Fiihrer?
KAUFMANN: In the first years I venerated the Fiihrer. Later
on I still venerated him but did not understand him on many points,
and the measures which are now ascribed to the Fiihrer I would
formerly not have considered possible.







30 July 46


DR. SERVATIUS: Can the political leaders, who believed Hitler
an idealist and who had no knowledge of the extermination of the
Jews and other events, essentially be considered, of good faith?
KAUFMANN: In the correct judgment of their functions and
their attitude and what they had to know or could know, this good
faith must, in my opinion, be granted to the political leaders with-
out reservation.
DR. SERVATIUS: I have no more questions to put to this witness.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.

[The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.]






30 Julv 48


Afternoon Session

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Witness, do you remember
Hitler saying in his Reichstag speech on 20 February 1938:
"National Socialism possesses Germany entirely and completely.
There is no institution in this State which is not National Socialist."
Do you remember these words, or if you do not remember the
exact words do you remember the sense of these words being stated
by Hitler?
KAUFMANN: I remember the sense of the words, but not the
words themselves.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, the extract from the
speech is in Document Book 5, in Document 2715-PS.
[Turning to the witness.] Do you agree with the sense of these
words?
KAUFMANN: No.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you think it was an exag-
geration?
KAUFMANN: I am convinced that not all institutions were at
that time National Socialist.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But you would agree that the
vast majority of institutions were National Socialist?
KAUFMANN: They were in the process of becoming National
Socialist, but that process had not been completed.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So you would agree that what
Hitler states as a fact was the aim for which he was working?
KAUFMANN: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And the method by which he
was working for that aim was through the system of political
leadership conducted by the Leadership Corps?
KAUFMANN: By that means the aim could be reached only
in part.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It was one essential method of
possessing Germany in the sense of getting complete control of the
minds and hearts and feelings of the population of Germany, was
it not?
KAUFMANN: No, in my opinion only at the beginning.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Only at the beginning? But
that was the work which had gone on from 1933 up to 1938, when
these words were spoken by Hitler?







30 July 46

KAUFMANN: It was part of the success of the Party before the
seizure of power and after the seizure of power.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let me just put a few more
words of Hitler's to show you how he expresses it:
"But above all, the National Socialist Party"-it is the same
speech-"has not only made the nation National Socialist but
has also made of itself that perfect organization..."
Is Hitler correct in giving that description of the leadership?
KAUFMANN: Yes; I would say "yes."
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now I just want to take
the matters which Dr. Servatius has referred to and ask you about
the share of the Leadership Corps in them. Let us take the question
of the Jews first.
Speaking generally and not with sole reference to your own
Gau of Hamburg, did the Political Leaders take an active part in the
demonstration of November 1938?
KAUFMANN: The information I received about that action from
other Gaue gave me the impression that such actions had indeed
taken place, but that, with exceptions, the.men responsible for these
actions had in no case been Political Leaders.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, if you say that, will you
look at Heydrich's order of 10 November.
My Lord, Your Lordship will find that on Page 79 of the Docu-
ment Book 14.
THE PRESIDENT: What page?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: 79, My Lord.
Witness, you will find it on Page 96 of the German document
book. If it is not 96, it is 97. Have you found it?
You see, this was an order from Heydrich issued at 1:20 in the
morning of the 10th, and I just want you to look at Paragraph 1:
"The chiefs of the local State Police offices or their deputies
must get in contact by telephone with the Political Leaders
(Gauleitung or Kreisleitung) who have jurisdiction over their
districts and have to arrange a joint meeting with the appro-
priate inspector or commander of the Order Police to discuss
the organization of the demonstrations. At these discussions
the Political Leadership has to be informed that the German
Police has received from the Reichsfiihrer SS and Chief of the
German Police the following instructions in accordance with
which the Political Leaders should adjust their own
measures."






30 July 46


Now, you remember the general instructions were as to the
burning of synagogues, the arrest of 20,000 Jews to be taken to
concentration camps, and the destruction or appropriation of
Jewish property. What were "their own measures" which the Polit-
ical Leadership were to take with regard to that?
KAUFMANN: First, may I point out that in the German text of
that document the passage which says that the Gauleiter had juris-
diction is hot included. I do not find it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The point I am asking you
about-we will deal with that in a moment, but what I want to
know from you is, what were "their own measures" which the
Political Leaders were to take with regard to this attack on the Jews?
KAUFMANN: I can only say the following: I myself did not take
part in the meeting of 9 November 1938. I was not informed from
Munich about the proposed action, but in the evening of 9 November
I heard from the chief of the Hamburg State Police that an action
of that kind was imminent.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is, the leader of the Ham-
burg State Police was carrying out the instructions of this para-
graph after getting in touch with you. I thought you were able to
speak for Gauleiter generally, apart from Gau Hamburg, and I
want you to tell the Tribunal what were their own measures which
the leadership of the Party were to, carry out? I mean, you must
have heard it discussed afterwards. Tell us what they were. What
were the leaders of the Party to do?
KAUFMANN: You asked me in your previous question about my
personal experiences. I had to answer that I myself was informed
by the chief of the State Police that it was proposed to carry out
this action. For the Gau Hamburg-that is what I was asked about
just now-I gave the order that officials of the State and Criminal
Police were immediately to safeguard the business streets and
residential districts of Jews in Hamburg. This measure was in the
hands of Commissioner Winke of the Criminal Police, to whom I
sent a Gau inspector to assist him. After receiving the information
through the State Police I immediately called up all the Kreisleiter
and made them responsible for the prevention of this action in their
districts.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you, in your Gau, burn the
synagogues?
KAUFMANN: No, I...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want to be exact. Were the
synagogues burned in Hamburg? That is what I should have asked
you.






30 July 46

KAUFMANN: As a result of my measures, no excesses took
place during the first night, that is the night from the 9th to the
10th. There were minor, insignificant disturbances in the night from
the 10th to the llth, and in spite of my measures, one synagogue
was set on fire, I assume by elements from outside.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: All over Germany generally, if
my memory is right, there were at least 75 synagogues burned. In
general, apart from your own Gau, is it not right that following this
order of Heydrich the Leadership Corps co-operated with the Police
to see that synagogues were burned, Jews were arrested, and Jewish
property affected, and that non-Jewish property was left secure?
KAUFMANN: I know of no order and no directive which com-
manded the Corps of Political Leaders, even outside the Gau
Hamburg, to take part in that action. I was only informed that after
the meeting of the 9th of November, Reichsminister Dr. Goebbels
made a request which then in practice led to excesses in individual
Gaue, or in many Gaue. I also know that the Delegate for the Four
Year Plan at that time said, a few days after that action, at a
meeting in Berlin, that this measure, which he condemned in the
strongest terms, was not in conformity with the intentions of the
Fiihrer and his own intentions, and he mentioned the Gau Hamburg
as an exception.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You remember that you said a
few moments ago to me that this was an occurrence which only took
place in individual instances. Here is the order of Heydrich, telling
the Police generally to get in touch with the Leadership Corps so
that they could co-operate with the Police to carry out his orders,
which were, broadly: Attack the Jews and see that you do not do
any harm to non-Jews while you are doing it. It is quite wrong
what you said a few moments ago, that this was an individual
matter. The Leadership Corps were brought into this through the
order of Heydrich, who was then Himmler's lieutenant-chief of the
Secret Police, is that not so?
KAUFMANN: No, that is not correct, the Corps of Political
Leaders was not required to accept orders from Heydrich. Orders
to the Political Leaders could be issued solely by the Gauleiter, who
received his directives from the Fiihrer or from the Deputy of the
Fiihrer, or from the Party Chancellery.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, do you remember what
took place after that occurrence? Do you remember a meeting of
the Party Court?
KAUFMANN: No.






30 July 46

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let me remind you about the
Party Court. You will find that in Document 3063-PS at Pages 81 to
88 of the same document book. Witness, it is Page 105.
KAUFMANN: Yes, I have found the page.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You have found the page-
Page 81. A meeting of the Supreme Party Court of the Party, and
it begins with a report about the events and judicial proceedings in
connection with the anti-Semitic demonstrations of 9 November
1938. If you look just after it says "Enclosure 2" it reads:
"... it was understood by all the Party Leaders present from
the oral instructions -of the Reich Propaganda Minister that
the Party should not appear outwardly as the instigator of the
demonstrations but in reality should organize and execute
them.
"Instructions in this sense were telephoned immediately-thus
a considerable time before transmission of the first teletype-
to the bureaus of their districts (Gaue) by a large part of the
Party members present."
And if you will look on to the next paragraph but one:
"At the end .of November 1938 the Supreme Party Court,
through reports from several Gau Courts, heard that these
demonstrations of 9 November 1938 had gone as far as
plundering and killing of Jews to a considerable extent and
that they had already been the object of investigation by the
Police and the public prosecutor."
And then after that it says:
'The deputy of the Fiihrer agreed with the interpretation of
the Chief Party Court, that known transgression in any case
should be investigated under the jurisdiction of the Party:
"1) Because of the obvious connection between the events to
be judged and the instructions which Reich Propaganda
Minister Party member Dr. Goebbels gave in the town hall
at the evening party of comrades. Without investigation and
evaluation of these connections a just judgment did not appear
possible. This investigation, however, could not be left to
innumerable State courts."
And then Paragraph 2 says that matters which concerned the
vital interests of the Party should also receive Party clarification
first and that the Fiihrer should be asked to cancel the proceedings
in the State courts. Now if you look on-I do not want to take too
much time-you will see that there were then 16 cases which came
up before the Supreme Party Court, and the first three cases are
matters-oh, yes, there is just one point I should have drawn atten-
tion to. Just before you come to the first case:







30 July 46


"Gau leaders and group leaders of the branches served
as jurors at the trials and decisions. The decisions, which,
for reasons to be discussed later, contain only in part the
statements of the facts, are attached."
The first three cases, which come from Rheinhausen, Nieder-
werrn, and Linz, are concerned with theft and rape. They are
allowed to go on to the State courts. The next 13-which come from
all over Germany, very different places like Heilsberg, Dessau,
Lesum, Bremen, Neidenburg, Eberstadt, Liinen, Aschaffenburg,
Dresden, Munich, and all over Germany-are 13 cases of murdering
Jews. Two of the perpetrators get the very mild sentence of a
warning and not being able to hold public office because of dis-
ciplinary violation, and as for the remaining 11, the proceedings are
suspended against them.
Now, I just want you to look at 102. If you will look at 6, that
is the shooting of a Jewish couple called Goldberg; Number 7, the
shooting of the Jew Rosenbaum and the Jewess Zwienicki; Num-
ber 10, shooting the Jewess Susanne Stern; and there is Number 5.
Number 5 is the shooting of the 16-year-old Jew, Herbert Stein.
Now, you say that you did not deal with any of these situations
yourself, is that so?
KAUFMANN: I explained clearly that I gave orders to the con-
trary in my Gau.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. I asked you, as I said at
the beginning-I want you to tell the Tribunal about it generally-
how it is that the Court of your Party, which is supposed to deal
with the discipline and decency of its members, passed over 13
cases of murder with two suspensions from public office for 3 years,
and the remaining 11 cases with all action suspended. Do not you
think that that was a disgraceful way to deal with murder?
KAUFMANN: May I say first that among the 13 cases which are
quoted here, there is only one Political Leader.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, you are not right, you
know. Cases 9 and 10 involve Ortsgruppenleiter; case 11 involves
a Blockleiter. It is true that cases 2 to 8, 12, and 15 involve people
with various ranks in the SA, and cases 11, 14, and 16 involve cases
with people in the ranks of the SS. But actually I think you will
find that cases 9, 10, and 11 involve the Political Leadership. But
that is not my point, Witness; my point is this: Here are these
members of the Party brought up before the Court of the Party,
and the Court of the Party is condoning and conniving at murder.
That is my point, and I want you to give your explanation as to
why you connive and condone at murder.







30 July 46


KAUFMANN: I saw this document which has just been sub-
mitted to me for the first time only after I was brought here to the
Palace of Justice as a witness. In view of my attitude. toward the
Jewish question and the Jewish measures, I did not under any
circumstances approve such handling of cases as is mentioned here.
I would never have approved of it if I had known about it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But, Witness, if that is your
personal view, then let us leave your personal view for the moment.
The Tribunal are considering the Leadership Corps of the Party.
Here is the highest Court of the Party. If the highest Court of the
Party gives decisions of that kind of which you intensely disapprove,
does not it show that the highest Court of the Party was rotten to
its foundations?
KAUFMANN: The Supreme Party Court should have adopted a
strong attitude toward the Ftihrer. It apparently neglected to call
to.account the creator of the whole action, the instigator of all these
excesses.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am not going to take it in
complete detail; but I just want you to look at one paragraph of the
explanation which the Party Court gives. The full explanation is
there, on Page 87.
[Turning to the Tribunal.] My Lord, that is the second paragraph.
[Turning to the witness.] Will you turn to that? I am not sure
where that will be. It will be a few pages on-112, I think, Witness.
I just want you to try and help us on this point. Havel you got a
paragraph that begins, "Also in such cases as when Jews were
killed without an order (Enclosures 13, 14, and 15)' or contrary to
orders (Enclosures 8 and 9)..."? Now, mark the numbers...
KAUFMANN: No, I have not found that paragraph.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Would you try at Page 113?
The sergeant will help you.
KAUFMANN: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you see:
"Also in such cases"-it begins-"as when Jews were killed
without an order (Enclosures 13, 14, 15) or contrary to orders
(Enclosures 8 and 9) ignoble, motives could not be determined.
At heart the men were convinced that they had done a service
to their Fiihrer and to the Party. Therefore, exclusion from
the.Party did not take place. The final aim of the proceedings
executed and also the yardstick for critical examination must
be, according to the policy of the Supreme Party Court, on
the one hand, to protect those Party comrades who, motivated
by their decent National Socialist attitude and initiative,







30 July 46

had overshot their mark and, on the other hand, to. draw a
dividing line between the Party and those who for personal
reasons misused the Party's national liberation battle against
Jewry..."
Do you say that it is decent National Socialist attitude and
initiative to murder Jewesses and children of 16?
KAUFMANN: My opinion in this matter is quite clear. I objected
to the action, and I do not at all approve the viewpoint of the Party
Court. I am convinced that the majority of the Party members are
of the same opinion.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But it must mean, must it not,
Witness-your own denunciation must mean that on the Party Court
there were a number of men who were completely devoid of any
moral sense whatever; is that so?
KAUFMANN: I cannot accept this rather far-reaching charac-
terization. I personally never had anything to do with the Supreme
Party Court, and I never had insight into its measures and judg-
ments, particularly in these and similar cases.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I do not want to take time in
trying to persuade you to condemn your old colleagues too highly,
and therefore I will leave it at that, if you agree so, far that you
disapproved strongly of the action that was taken by that Party
Court. I think you said that. If I understand you correctly, I shall
not go into it further. Is that right?
KAUFMANN: I disapprove and reject the opinion of the Party
Court as expressed in this document.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I just want to show you
that that Was not an isolated example, arid-My Lord, if Your
Lordship would be good enough to turn to, Page 45 of the same
book-no, My Lord, it is Page 46, I am sorry; and My Lord, the
document begins on Page 45, but actually what I would like Your
Lordship to look at is on Page 47. It is either on Page 50 or 51,
Witness, in the German copies.
Now, that is a document dated the 7th of June 1933, issued by
the Gau propaganda leader of the Gau Koblenz-Trier. You will see
that it is issued to all Kreis directorates, and the subject is "Jew
baiting." The first paragraph says that they will receive a list of
Jewish firms and businesses, and the second paragraph says:
"Jew baiting.
"The district directorate (Kreisleitung) will set up a committee
which has the task of directing and supervising the com-
munities in the whole district. The strength of this committee
will be determined by the Kreisleiter. You are to inform the






30 July 46


Gau propaganda directorate at once of the committees named.
The Gau propaganda directorate will then contact these com-
mittees through you."
Then it goes on to suggest a considerable number of measures
against Jews, including refraining from trading with them, and
action against anyone who does trade.
Now, that just happens to be a document which we captured
from the Gau Koblenz-Trier. I want you to tell us just how that
fits into the Party machinery. That goes from Gau propaganda to
Kreis; then, I suppose, when the Party Leaders in the various
Kreise would set up their committees, they would employ the Orts-
gruppenleiter, or the Zellenleiter and the Blockleiter to form these
committees. Is that how it would work?
KAUFMANN: The document which I have before me is a copy
of a radio message. I did not know that it was common usage in
the Gaue in 1933 to send such directives by radio, but assuming that
this directive was actually issued, then it was a measure in the Gau
Koblenz-Trier, which, to my knowledge, was not based on any order.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But you are not suggesting that
out of the 42 Gaue, Koblenz-Trier is the only Gau in which there
was Jew baiting in 1933, are you?
KAUFMVANN: No.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But what I asked you was,
assuming the instructions from the Gau were carried out by the
Kreis, would these committees be formed out of the Zellenleiter and
Blockleiter of the various parts of the Kreis?
KAUFMANN: I must assume so from the document, if I can
take it to be correct.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, assuming that it is a
verified captured document, am I right in assuming that the Kreis-
leiter of Koblenz-Trier carried out these instructions? Did they
form the Jew baiting committees out of the Zellenleiter and Block-
leiter?
KAUFMANN: Under no circumstances was that method, that
measure, common usage throughout the Reich. Under no circum-
stances did the Reich authorities issue a directive to this effect,
otherwise I would have known about it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If that is your answer I would
not occupy the time. I just wanted to show what happened in 1933
and 1938. We will now take something that happened during the
war-My Lord, if you will be good enough to turn to Page 27 and
28-Page 29 and 30, Witness.
KAUFMANN: Yes.







30 July 46


SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You see that it is a document
issued on the 5th of. November 1942 regarding jurisdiction over
Poles and Eastern nationals, and you can see that the jurisdiction
is to be placed over-if I may just read the first paragraph to you
to explain it:
"The Reichsftihrer SS has come to an arrangement with the
Reich Minister of Justice, Thierack, whereby the courts will
not ask for the usual legal procedure in the cases of Poles and
Eastern nationals. These persons of alien race are in future
to be handed over to the Police. Jews and gypsies are to be
treated in the same way. This agreement has been approved
by the Flihrer."
And then it goes on to explain that the reason for the handing
over of the Poles and for not giving them a trial is, you see that in
Paragraph 2, because: "... Poles and Eastern nationals are alien and
racially inferior people living in the German Reich territory."
I would like you to look at the end of it where it develops the
fact that considerations, for trying Germans do not apply to con-
siderations for trying Eastern nationals. Then Paragraph 3 says:
"Above expositions are for personal information. In case of
need,, however, there need be no hesitation in informing the
Gauleiter in suitable form."
My Lord, it is the last sentence of the document, that: "... there
need be no hesitation in informing the Gauleiter in suitable form."
Now, tell the Tribunal, Witness, how did the Gauleiter come to
deny Eastern nationals a trial and handing them over to the Police?
What had he to do with it?
KAUFMANN: Firstly, this document refers, in the beginning, to
a directive of the Reichsfihrer SS to his subordinate offices, that is,
not to the Gauleiter. Secondly, it remained at the discretion of the
persons who received this document, whether they would instruct
the Gauleiter in cases of need.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is what I want you to
help us on. How did it become necessary for these Police officers
and the officers of the R.S.H.A. to consult the Gauleiter about
refusing a trial. What I want you to tell the Tribunal is how the
Gauleiter came into it, unless they were helping the Police to
perpetrate this injustice like many others. How did they come
into it?
KAUFMANN: The Gauleiter did not have anything at all to do
with these things. With the permission of the Tribunal, I would
like to mention my own experience in this matter...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I would rather not. I am not
interested in your experiences. What I am interested in is why the






30 July 46


Police should be instructed to inform the Gauledter if necessary?
Tell us the sort bf circumstances in which the Police would go to
the Gauleiter-that is what I want to hear.
KAUFMANN: I do not know that; the Gauleiter did not partic-
ipate in these things.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So it is your answer that you
cannot tell the Tribunal. You cannot imagine any circumstances
which would cause Herr Streckenbach to send these instructions to
the Higher SS and Police Leader and one-half dozen Police districts?
You cannot think of anything that would cause that paragraph to
come in?
KAUFMANN: I have already said that the writer of this docu-
ment leaves it to the discretion of the recipients whether they will
instruct the Gauleiter or not. I cannot judge in which cases the
Gauleiter were instructed and in which cases they were not...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: All right, let us look at some-
thing else.
My Lord, if Your Lordship will turn to Page 24.
Witness, it is 26-Page 26 in your book. Now, that is a report
from Herr Abetz, who was the Reich Ambassador in Paris ,and it
has a very large distribution to- the Foreign Office and other places,
and it is dealing with Jews who had left Austria and had not
changed their Austrian passports for .German passports, and also
Reich German Jews who had not reported when they were abroad.
I want you to look .at the end of the first paragraph where Abetz
says:
"Suggest for the future a collective expatriation procedure
for the occupied territory of France based on lists made here
in agreement with Hoheitstrdger in which should be listed
primarily the members of the following groups..."
And then he has listed the ex-Austrians and Jews who have not
reported.'
KAUFMANN: May I ask where I can find the word Hoheits-
trdger?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You see the Number 1-well,
about three lines before that:
"Suggest for the future a collective expatriation procedure
for the occupied territory of France based on lists made here
in agreement with Hoheitstrager"-high Party leaders-"in
which should be listed primarily the members of the follow-
ing groups...
Now, is Herr Abetz suggesting that the Hoheitstrger should
make the lists of the Jews who have not complied with the







30 July 46


regulations, and therefore are to be expatriated from comparative
safety in France and brought into the Reich where, in 1942, they
would probably take a journey into the East and then be gassed?
Now, is that a normal type of duty which the Hoheitstriger did-to
make lists of offending Jews for the Reich authorities?
KAUFMANN: Firstly, this is concerned, apparently, with the
Hoheitstrager of the Auslands-Organisation. As a Gauleiter...
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, that is evident from the
word here.
KAUFMANN: I, as Gauleiter, have never been expected to, per-
form such work or such services and if I had been asked to perform
them, I would have refused to do so.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just one other point on the
Jews. Would you look at "Die Lage"?
[The document was submitted to the witness.]
My Lord, this will be Exhibit GB-534. My Lord, there are copies
of the relevant extracts. "Die Lage" is the situation report giving
the military political situation of the day.
[Turning to the witness.] You will see, if you will just look back
at the beginning, Witness, for a moment-if you will look back to
the front. Would you be good enough to look back to the front?
You will see that it is for August 1944, and it begins with an article
by the Defendant D6nitz on sea warfare. Now, you notice that at
the front it is referring to Hbngen which, I understand, is somewhere
near Aachen-NSDAP Hongen. Now, did you get that? Did you get
"Die Lage"?
KAUFMANN: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, just look at Page 23,
dealing with the Jewish problem in Hungary:
"It was a matter of course that the German offices in Hungary
did everything possible after 19 March to eliminate the Jewish
element as rapidly and as completely as was at all possible.
In view of the proximity of the Russian front, they com-
menced with the cleaning up of the northeastern area-north
Transylvania and the Carpathian province-where the Jewish
element was the strongest numerically. Then the Jews were
collected in the remaining Hungarian provinces and trans-
ported to Germany or German controlled territories. A
hundred thousand Jews remained in the hands of the
Hungarians to be employed in labor battalions."
And then it tells of the question of getting the command of the
Hungarians and of the slight difficulty of the definition of "Jew"
in Hungarian law.







30 July 46


It goes on to say, toward the end of the first paragraph:
"Up to 9 July approximately 430,000 Jews from the Hungarian
provinces had been handed over to the German authorities.
The handing over takes place on the Hungarian national
frontier up to which point the carrying out of the measures
against the Jews, and with it also the responsibility for it, is
a matter for the Hungarians."
Then I would like you to note the next paragraph, about Buda-
pest. It says:
"As a last stage the Jews from Budapest were to be deported.
It is a question of approximately 260,000. But in the meantime
pressure from enemy and neutral countries (Hull"-I suppose
that is Mr. Cordell Hull-"the King of Sweden, Switzerland,
the Pope) has become so strong that those circles in Hungary
that are friendly to the Jews attempted to influence the
Hungarian Government to prevent any further measures
against the Jews..."
Now, Witness, whoever else in Germany was ignorant about the
action taken against Jews in Hungary, everyone who got "Die Lage"
knew what the Germans were doing with regard to the Hungarian
Jews, did they not?
KAUFMANN: I have to disappoint you, Mr. Prosecutor, because
I myself see this magazine today for the first time. I do not deny
that it was sent to me but I never read it, maybe through lack of
time. I do not know to what extent other circles of the Party
received it. I myself am hearing of the measures against the Jews
in this form and of these numbers for the first time.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, just let us get the distribu-
tion of "Die Lage". It may have been bad luck that you did not read
it-or good luck; but still, it went to all Gauleiter, it went to all
Army and Navy and Air Force commands. Did it go to the Kreis
and the Ortsgruppenleiter?.
KAUFMANN: May I ask you to tell me where it says so?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am asking you whether that
is not right. You know it as well as I do,, do you not, that it went to
all Gauleiter and to Army Command?
KAUFMANN: I said to you, Mr. Prosecutor, just now that it is
for the first time-that it is possible that this booklet was sent to me,
but that I see it here in this courtroom today for the first time. I
have never read it and have never seen it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You never read it at all, do
you say?







30 July 46

KAUFMANN: I do not know this magazine "Die Lage"; I see it
for the first time here today.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So that you cannot say whether
there was any distribution to Kreisleiter or Ortsgruppenleiter?
KAUFMANN: I think this distribution is improbable, because my
attitude to the Jewish question was well known and my Kreisleiter
would, I am sure, have drawn my attention to this article.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But, as I understood you a few
moments ago., you said that it was quite possible that you might have
got "Die Lage" but you had not read it?
KAUFMANN: Yes, I am saying this under my oath.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Why did you think it was quite
possible that you might have got it, if there was not a distribution
to Gauleiter?
KAUFMANN: I did not claim that there was no distribution.
I merely asked where it said that the Gauleiter received this
magazine.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, you see, I have referred
you to. the front page, to what was put on the copy which we
happened to capture. It has got "NSDAP Hingen." It does not look
*as if it was a very restricted distribution if it got to the NSDAP at
Hbngen. I am right, am I not, that Hdngen is a village near Aachen?
Is that not right?
KAUFMANN: I do not know whether it is a village near Aachen.
I can only see a note in handwriting here, I do not know who wrote
it. I see this for the first time today.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: All right. Well, we must not take
up too much time. I will take you on to another point which
Dr. Servatius referred to. I want to ask you just one or two questions
about the lynching of Allied airmen.
My Lord, if Your Lordship will look at Page 41 of the book.
Witness, it is Page 43 for you. That is an order signed by the
Defendant Hess, of the 13th of March 1940.
My Lord, it is Document 062-PS, Exhibit USA-696, and the
subject is: "Instructions to civilian population regarding appropriate
behavior in case of landings of enemy planes or parachutists in
German territory."
It says:
"The French civilian population was directed officially and
by radio how to behave in case of landings of German
planes. Because of this fact the Commander-in-Chief of the
Air Force has requested me to instruct the civilian population








30 July 46


correspondingly by means of Party channels. The attached
directions as to procedure are to be disseminated only orally
via Kreisleiter, Ortsgruppenleiter, Zellenleiter, Blockleiter,
leaders of the incorporated and affiliated organizations of the
Party. Transmittal by official orders, posters, press, or radio
Sis prohibited."
Then it says: "Official stamp: Top Secret."
And the various matters, instructions as to the treatment of top-
secret documents.
Now if you will look on to the next page where the document
occurs, it says: "One-planes to be put under protection; two--the
airmen are to be arrested at once and restarting or destruction
prevented; three-no looting or taking of souvenirs." Now look at
Paragraph 4: "Likewise, enemy parachutists are immediately to be
arrested or made harmless."
My Lord, I think that is a better translation of "unschldlich
gemacht."
[Turning to the witness.] Now, what was "making harmless"-
murdering?
KAUFMANN: The expression "unschddlich machen" in this con-
nection is, I think, a bad choice, a dangerous choice, considering the
situation at that time and the fact that this letter emanated from the
Deputy of the Ffihrer whose humane and decent attitude was well
known.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, you see it is used. You
have already got "arrested." The "made harmless" must be
something different from "arrested." Do you not think, on con-
sideration, that the ordinary Blockleiter to whom this message was
orally given would take it that he was to murder the parachutist if
he could not arrest him? What is the purpose of all this secrecy if
"unschidlich gemacht" had not that meaning? Why have you got
about 15 different provisions as to the secrecy of this order if it did
not mean murder? There is nothing else secret in the order, is there?
Nothing else that you could not put in the hands of a Sunday school?
KAUFMANN: The order contains other points, too, apart from
Point 4. In the situation of that time, the expression "unschldlich
machen" meant that if there was any resistance, the person resisting
should be made harmless; but I admit that without an explanation
to those who received the order, the choice of words' was rather
dangerous.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, that is the Defendant
Hess. Now just look at Himmler's order of the 10th of August 1943.
My Lord, Your Lordship will find it on Page 89... [turning to
the witness] and it is 116 or 117 of your document book.







30 July 46


SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is sent on the 10th of
August 1943. It is sent at Himmler's request by one Brandt, an
Obersturmbannfiihrer, and you will see that again-look at the
orders for distribution:
"At the request of the Reichsfiihrer SS I am sending you the
enclosed order, with the request that the Chief of the Order
Police and of the Security Police be informed; they are to
make this instruction known to their subordinate offices ver-
bally. In addition, the Reichsftihrer SS requests that the
Gauleiter concerned be informed verbally of this order. It is
not the task of the Police to interfere in clashes between Ger-
mans and English and American terror-fliers who have
bailed out."
Why, again-why were Gauleiter to be informed verbally if it
was not that they were to connive at the murder of the airmen?
KAUFMANN: The intention of this order in its details is not
clear to me. I, too, received the order through the Higher SS and
Police Leader and I issued directions both to the Party, that is to
say, to the Kreisleiter, with the request to have them transmitted to
their subordinates, and to the Police president, that, under all
circumstances, the fliers should not be maltreated, but only seized
and handed over.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But that was not what the order
said, you know, if you passed it on. The order said that the Police
were not to interfere in clashes between Germans and the fliers.
In other words, they were to stand aside and let the fliers be
lynched. If you passed that on, that meant that the Leadership Corps
were going to assist and encourage no interference with lynching of
Allied airmen. That is what it comes to is it not? Well, now, I just
want to remind you, that was not the end.
My Lord, if Your Lordship turns to Pages 39 and 40-that is 41,
Witness, in your document book. That is on the 30th of May 1944.
THE PRESIDENT: Did not the witness say then that according
to his understanding these "terror-fliers" were to be seized and
turned over?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord. That is quite
different from the order.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but to whom were they to be turned
over?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Witness, to whom did you
understand were the "terror-fliers" to be handed over according to
your orders?







30 July 16


KAUFMANN: The Political Leaders, if they participated in the
arrest, were to turn the captured fliers over to the Police, and .the
Police was to turn them over to the Air Force authorities concerned.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Your orders were that the
Political Leaders who participated were to hand them over to the-
Police. Was that the Ordnungspolizei or the Sicherheitspolizei?
KAUFMANN: To the Ordnungspolizei.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now the next order is one
of Bormann's on the 30th of May 1944, and you will find it on
Page 41.
It is Page 39 of Your Lordship's.
You will see the first paragraph says:
"In the last few weeks low-flying English and American fliers
have repeatedly, from a low altitude, machine-gunned children
playing in squares, women and children at work in the fields,
peasants plowing, vehicles on the highways, trains, et cetera,
and have thus murdered defenseless civilians-particularly
women and children-in the vilest manner. Several instances
have occurred where members of the crews of such aircraft
who have bailed out or have made forced landings were
lynched on the spot immediately after capture by the
populace which was incensed to the highest degree. No, Police
measures or criminal proceedings were invoked against the
German civilians who participated in these incidents."
And you will see that that goes to Reichsleiter, Gauleiter, and
Kreisleiter, and you will see that on the next page:
"The leader of the Party Chancellery"-that is Bormann-.
"requests that the Ortsgruppenleiter be instructed concerning
the content of this circular letter orally only."
KAUFMANN: That order of Bormann is well known to me. I
had it stopped by the Chief of the Gau Staff Office, and beyond that,
for safety reasons and in view of this letter, I repeated the order
which, as I have already mentioned here, I issued to the Party and
to the Police or rather to the Police President; although in Ham-
burg, too, casualties had been caused in the ways listed in this
document.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But you do not dispute, do you,
Witness, that the purpose of that order was to encourage everyone
down to Ortsgruppenleiter riot to interfere with the lynching of
airmen?
KAUFMANN: No, that is quite evident from the wording...







30 July 46

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am not going to argue with a
written document. I prefer to show you how it was interpreted in
another Gau. Would you turn to Page 27?
If Your Lordship will be good enough to turn to Page 25 you
will find the Document L-154, Exhibit USA-335.
That is the Gauleiter Seriice, 25 February 1945, for southern
Westphalia-the Gauleiter' and National Defense Commissioner of
the Gau Westphalia South signed by one Hoffmann-and there is a
distribution to county counsellors, Kreisleiter, and staff chiefs of the
Volkssturm. It says:
"Any fighter-bomber pilots shot down are on principle not
to be protected against the indignation of the people. I expect
from all Police offices that they will refuse to lend their
protection to these gangster types. Authorities acting in con-
tradiction to the popular sentiment will be taken to account
by me. All Police and gendarmerie officials are to be informed
immediately of this, my attitude. Signed, Albert Hoffmann."
It is quite clear that in some Gaue it was interpreted as a direct
order to hold off and,not interfere in any way if these fliers were
being lynched.
However, you say that in the Gau Hamburg you gave orders that
they were to be handed over to the Police.
KAUFMANN: The document shows that the order was inter-
preted in that way in several Gaue-and I have to admit that in
view of the experiences of the last months. But I am convinced that
in some Gaue the order was handled in the same manner as in mine.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Witness, there is one point there
I would like you to explain to the Tribunal, though it is not strictly
on the Leadership Corps. Why would an SA Obersturmbannfiihrer
initial that document on 25 February 1945; why would he be
initialing it?
KAUFMANN: I did not understand the question.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If you look at your Page 27, you
will see that it is initialed by Buckemfiller, SA Obersturmbannfiihrer
and country staff chief of the Volkssturm; why would he be
initialing it?
KAUFMANN: That I do not know.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I would not trouble you.
Now, I want to take the next subject and again, I hope, deal very
shortly with what Dr. Servatius mentioned-the churches. Do you
agree that it was the general policy of the Nazi Party to do
everything in its power to weaken the influence of the Christian
churches?






30 July 46


KAUFMANN: No.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, would you look. at
Page 1 of that last book. It is Page 7 of your book and Page 1 of the
English book. That is dated the 12th of December 1941 and it deals
with a secret decree of the Reichsleiter Bormann regarding the
relationship of National Socialism to Christendom. If you would
look at the first paragraph, that deals with the finding of this decree,
a copy of a letter on the "relationship," in the papers of a Protestant
priest called Eichholz at Aix-la-Chapelle, which is supposed to
originate from Reichsleiter Bormann; and then the second paragraph
says:
"As far as this document is concerned it does in fact, as I have
ascertained, represent a secret decree of the Party Chan-
cellery signed by Reichsleiter Bormann, in which Reichsleiter
Bormann clearly points out that National Socialism and
Christendom are incompatible and that the influence of the
churches in Germany, including the Protestant Church, must
be eliminated. The decree was addressed, to Gauleiter
Dr. Meyer at Miinster on 6 June 1941."
And then it gives the reference: "I have ascertained that on
7 June 1941 the decree was also sent to the remaining Gauleiter..."
And it says that since this first paragraph of the circular decree
addressed to all Gauleiter is missing from the document in posses-
sion of Priest Eichholz, it appears it was known to the Church.
Now, do you remember getting the decree of Bormann about the
7th of June 1941? If you cannot remember the decree, you will find
it in the next two pages and I just remind you of one or two, of the
worst pieces in it. At the end of the second paragraph it says:
"Our National Socialist ideology is far loftier than the con-
cepts of Christianity, which in their essential points have been
takdn over from Jewry. For this reason also we do not need
Christianity."
And it says that if the youth does not learn about it, Christianity
will disappear; and then there are some very odd utterances and it
talks about a vital force; and if you will look toward the end of
Bormann's document, it says in the third from last paragraph:
"For the first time in German history the Fuhrer consciously
and completely has the leadership of the people in his own
hand. With the Party, its components, and attached units the
Fiihrer has created for himself and thus the German Reich
leadership an instrument which makes him independent of
the Church."
And it goes on to develop that and if you will look at the penul-
timate paragraph, in the second sentence, it says:







30 July 46

"Just as the deleterious influences of astrologers, seers, and
other fakers are eliminated and suppressed by the State, so
must the possibility of Church influence also be totally
removed."
Now that it is recalled to your memory, I should not think that
you should have forgotten a decree couched in such, shall we say,
extraordinary language as that; do you remember it?
KAUFMANN: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you still say that the National
Socialist Party leadership was not doing everything in its power to
attack Christianity?
KAUFMANN: Yes. This is a statement by Bormann which, to my
knowledge, was withdrawn a few days later upon orders of the
Fiihrer as a personal opinion of Bormann.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That cannot be so, because if
you notice, the decree was issued on the 7th of June and this decree
which, after all, is going to the RSHA, to Miiller, is the 12th of
December, which is 6 months after the decree was opened and there
is nothing in that decree about its being withdrawn. Surely, if it
had been withdrawn on the 14th.of June there would have been
something in this decree to the Security Service and Intelligence
Office of the Reich, surely they would have enough intelligence and
information to know that a decree had been withdrawn 6 months
before.
KAUFMANN: I am speaking here under oath and I say that this
decree of May was not only withdrawn, but had actually to be
sent back.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, how do you account for
the fact that the Security Police never heard about its being with-
drawn-and we discuss it in detail-let us take it in that way. I do
not know if you had heard or you may have read that the Defendant
Fritzsche here said that "even Goebbels was afraid of Bormann,"
so is it not correct that Bormann was a man who had great influence,
especially in the last years?
KAUFMANN: That is correct, but it is not correct that there was
nobody who was not afraid of him.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But there would be many who
would be influenced if Bormann was to give an anti-Christian lead
to the National Socialist Party, would there not?
KAUFMANN: Only the cadre of the Party, possibly.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I will only take two
examples and we will try to take them well spaced out. I suggest
to you that yours is typical. Let me take one in 1935.







30 July 46


My Lord, it is Document Number 1507-PS, and it is a new
document.
I cannot remember, Witness, whether you are a Catholic or a
Protestant. I have no ulterior motive. I am going to, deal with an
incident in a Catholic church. Of which are you?
KAUFMANN: I was a Catholic.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I take it quite surely you will
follow it. You will know who the people are and so. forth. This is
an incident on the 27th of March 1935, when Cardinal Faulhaber
was preaching in the cathedral at Freising and the local branch of
the Party wanted to take a record of the sermon in case His
Eminence was saying anything which might offend the Party; and
they did so by breaking one of the windows of the church and
inserting a cable which would pick up the sound so that a record
could be taken, and there were various happenings and a lot of dis-
cussion with which I shall not trouble the Tribunal, but one of the
priests of the cathedral brought the incident to the attention of the
local Wehrmacht commander and it is with regard to what he says
in relation to' the functioning of the Leadership Corps that I want
to draw your attention. You may take it from me that that is the
general incident which is described at great length and which has
accusations of exaggeration on both sides and therefore, I am only
going to take you to the passage in which the local commandant
deals with the situation.
My Lord, it is at the bottom of Page 4. My Lord, it says "Page 5,
continued at the top." Has Your Lordship got that?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, it is in the bottom
paragraph on Page 5. This is after the occurrence when the Wehr-
macht officer is making his report; he says:
"On, Monday, the 18th of this month, there came to the house
of the staff paymaster Grueber the district leader of the Nazi
women's organization, Dr. Kreis, and asked the wife of the
staff paymaster, Grueber, to come immediately with her to the
cathedral to listen to the sermon of Cardinal Faulhaber,
implying that this was Frau Grueber's duty as a member of
the Party and the Nazi women's organization. Frau Grueber's
objection that she was a Protestant was rejected as unimpor-
tant; instead it was ordered that every member of the Nazi
women's organization has to attach herself to an SA man in
civilian clothes, in which way they would be considered as
audience and not as Party members sent out for a purpose.
There is no doubt that this measure shows the intention of
disturbing the service and of causing uproarious incidents."







30 July 46


And on that, the Wehrmacht officer, very wisely you may think,
told her to rely on the fact that Herr Grueber was a paymaster or
something of that sort and he need not be mixed up with the Party
matters. But what I want to ask you about is this: The Kreisleiterin,
leader of the district women, she would, be the women's leader on
the Kreis staff of the Party, would she not? If I am wrong, correct
me. Is that her position?
KAUFMANN: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And she would not have taken.
that action of collecting the women of Munich to, come and form a
group when Cardinal Faulhaber was preaching, without the orders
of the Kreisleiter, would she? She would not, would she? It must
have been on the Kreisleiter's orders; is that not so?
THE PRESIDENT: Answer the question, please.
KAUFMANN: The incident described here is completely un-
known to me and I really cannot imagine that a serious man-in this
case a Kreisleiter-would order a measure which in its effects must
turn against the Party.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What I am referring to, you see,
is this: Here is a report of a responsible officer in the Wehrmacht.
I think he is regimental commander, and it is countersigned by his
adjutant. He is saying that the Kreisleiterin who is the women's
leader has come to, this paymaster's wife and got her to do it. What
I am putting to you is: Assuming that Mr. Griueber and this regi-
mental commander are correct-it must do for the moment-
assuming they are correct, the Kreisleiterin would not have acted
without orders from the Kreisleiter, would she?
KAUFMANN: That is probable. In my Gau, this Kreisleiter
would have been dismissed.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But are you telling the Tribunal
that...
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, I think this document speaks for
itself. i '
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship please, I think
so. My Lord, I am only going to give another example. I have to
deal with just the points raised by Dr. Servatius and limit the
examples as much as I can.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps we had better adjourn now.

[A recess was taken.]

THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, the Tribunal thinks, with refer-
ence to any documents which you may have, perhaps it would







30 July 46


save time, if they are not documents made by the witness who is
in the box, if you would just put the documents in without cross-
examination.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I will do it. It will save time.
I will welcome this. I will be glad to do as Your Lordship suggests.
It suits my purpose much better.
SDR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, the introduction of new evidence
unknown to me is, I think, inadmissible; I have no opportunity to
comment on these documents, since my own documentary evidence
is completed. All my material, affidavits, and documents have been
submitted, and my witnesses have, been examined. I do not know
how I can reply to these new documents.
THE PRESIDENT: I am sure Sir David will let the counsel for
the defense have the documents as soon as possible, and if it is
impossible for the counsel to re-examine them when he comes to
them, he can reply on the document later.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: There are copies available and
they will be given to Dr. Servatius right away. Th& next one I was
going to refer to on the question of churches is Document D-901,
which is a new document. That contains four reports by Orts-
gruppenleiter. I should have said Exhibit GB-536.
THE PRESIDENT: You gave a number to that other document,
did you, the other one you put in? Was there not another new docu-
ment you put in, 1507-PS?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: GB-535, My Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, very well.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, this document con-
sists of four reports from Ortsgruppenleiter and the comments made
upon them by the Kreisleiter. My Lord, I shall only quote to the
Tribunal the first sentence of the first two reports, which will show
what they are.
The first is the Ortsgruppe Darmstadt-Schlossgarten, 20 February
1939, "Point 9, Ecclesiastical questions." I quote:
"As the caretaker of the parish hall of the parish of
St. Martin, Blockleiter and Party Member Keil informs me
that meetings of the Confessional Front are again taking
place at the St. Martin's House, Miillerstrasse (Ortsgruppe
Gutenberg), the public being excluded. Only bearers of red
passes are admitted."
And then he makes his objection to the fact that the Bible class
is being carried on behind closed doors and he mentions the Gestapo.
The second one refers to a statement by an ecclesiastic. That is
from the Ortsgruppe Pfungstadt, 17 February 1939:







30 July 46


"Whoever leaves the Church has different taxes imposed on
him, so our much-discussed confessional pastor, Strack, said
once again on the occasion of a mothers' evening. This gentle-
man should really be rapped on the knuckles seriously for
once."
And then the third one sends a poem of the Confessional Front
and a fourth deals with the continued existence of a Protestant
youth club.
My Lord, the comments of the Kreisleiter, which are on the third
page-I will just read 1 and 2:
"Report on the political situation for the month of February
1939.
"1. The report of Ortsgruppenleiter Wimmer, St. Martin's
parish. The SD, Gestapo, and the competent Ortsgruppen-
leiter will be instructed by me.
"2. I shall request Ortsgruppenleiter Frick, who reports from
Pfungstadt, to go to the Kreisleiter tomorrow and shall get
him to name his witnesses. This will be communicated to
you and to the Gestapo (to the latter with a report of the
case). The pastor Strack is.sufficiently well known and ripe
for the concentration camp or the Special Court. His reported
statement before fellow-Germans constitutes an infringement
of the law against malice. In any case, the fellow must dis-
appear from the territory of the Kreis or Gau."
My Lord, I do not think I need trouble the Tribunal with any
more. That is the essential point.
Now, My Lord, I have two documents on slave labor which are
also new. My Lord, the first is Document 315-PS, which will become
Exhibit GB-537. My Lord, that is the minutes of a conference on
the treatment of foreign labor, on 12 March 1943.
My Lord, the object of this document is to show that it was a
deliberate and general change of policy and if Your Lordship will
look at the middle of the second paragraph, Your Lordship will find
the sentence:
"In this instance the hitherto prevailing treatment"-now that
is the point I want to emphasize-"the hitherto prevailing
treatment of the Eastern Workers has led not only to a
diminished production but has also most disadvantageously
influenced the political orientation of the people in the Occu-
pied Eastern Territories and has resulted in the well-known
difficulties of our troops. In order to facilitate military oper-
ations the morale has to be improved by a better treatment
of the Eastern Workers in the Reich."







3G July 46


Now, My Lord, the importance of that is shown when you get
that coming into the Party channels, which is shown in the next
Document 205-PS. My Lord, that will become Exhibit GB-538.
My Lord, you see, that is from a decree of the Defendant Bor-
mann. It comes from the Party Chancellery and it says:
"The Reich Propaganda Ministry and the RSHA have together
issued a memorandum concerning the treatment of foreign
laborers employed within the Reich:
"I request in the attached copy that the necessity for a firm
but just treatment of the foreign workers be made clear to
members of the Party and to' fellow Germans."
And the distribution is to Reichsleiter, Gauleiter, Kreisleiter, and
Ortsgruppenleiter.
My Lord, on Page 2, Number 1 on Page 2, the third paragraph
on Page 2, it begins:
"Everyone, even the primitive man, has a sensitive perception
of justice. Consequently, every unjust treatment has a very
bad effect. Injustices, insults, trickery, maltreatment, et cetera,
must be discontinued. Punishment by beating is forbidden.
Concerning the severe measures for insubordinate and sedi-
tious elements, the workers of foreign nationality are to be
informed correspondingly."
My Lord, the importance the Prosecution attaches to this is the
word "discontinue" in that directive.
My Lord, as Your Lordship sees the two documents together, the
connection shows that there is a definite change.
Now, My Lord, the. third document is D-884, which will become
Exhibit GB-539 and, My Lord, that is dated 28 March 1944. It is a
Party order, issued in the Gau Baden-Alsace, issued from Stras-
.bourg on 28 March 1944 and you will see it is headed "Gaustabs-
amtsleiter" and is "secret" and it deals with sexual intercourse
between foreign workers and Germans. And, My Lord, it explains
the course that is to be taken with the foreign worker and in the
case of a child resulting from the intercourse and, Your Lordship,
on the top of the second page of the document, it says:
"The following principles exist with regard to sexual inter-
course between German men and female foreign workers:
"Should the foreign female worker have been induced to
sexual intercourse by the German man (for instance by taking
advantage of a condition of dependency) she will be taken
temporarily into protective custody and then sent to another
place of work. In other cases, the foreign female worker will
be sent to a women's concentration camp. Women in the state
of pregnancy will be sent to the concentration camp only after







30 July 46


delivery of the child and the period of nursing. The treat-
ment of the German man concerned is .also the subject of
special directives. If he has seriously violated his supervisory
or disciplinary duties, female foreign workers will be taken
away from him and no more allotted to him in the future.
Further measures, depending on the circumstances of the case,
will be taken by the State Police."
It applies to the Polish race, people from the Government Gen-
eral, Lithuania, former Soviet territory and Serbia.
And then Paragraph 2 deals with the child, and first of all
Your Lordship will see at the end of the first paragraph that the
heading is:
"Regarding the treatment of pregnant foreign female workers
and children given birth to by the same in the Reich."
The last sentence in the first paragraph says:
"The procedure for an application for abortion is once more
explained below..."
And then there are various health and racial investigations.
In Paragraph 5 it says:
"If the investigations show that the progeny will be racially
satisfactory and hereditarily healthy, they will, after birth, go
to homes for foreign children to be looked after by the NSV
(National Socialist Welfare Organization)"-That is the Party
organization--"or will be looked after by families.
"In negative cases the children will be lodged in foreign
children's nurseries."
And then the last paragraph:
"I request the Kreisleiter to record immediately through the
channels indicated above, in conjunction with the Kreis-
obmann of the German Labor Front and the Kreis peasant
leader, all cases of pregnancy which have hitherto occurred
and all children hitherto born. An examination in accordance
with the new directives of all children of .foreign female
workers who were taken under the care of the NSV already
before the issue of the new instructions is also necessary."
Your Lordship will see the distribution. It is to Gauobmann of
the German Labor Front, that is the representative of the DAF in
the Gau, Gau propaganda chief, press chief, and then the Gauamts-
leiter, the person in the office of the Gau dealing with racial policy,
national health, the peasantry, national welfare, questions of race,
the Gau women's leadership, and the Gau Labor Office, and then
Kreisleiter and the Kreis of the DAF and the Kreis peasant leaders.
It goes, also, My Lord, to the Security Police and SD and the Office






30 July 46


of the Commissioner for the Reichskommissar for the consolidation
of German race.
My Lord, I am very grateful to Your Lordship for that. It saves
a considerable amount of time.
DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, I must raise a question with
regard to the evidence. Document 205-PS, which has just been sub-
mitted, was a new document; the witness was not questioned on it
at all. I assume that the evidence as such is completed and that no
new.documents can be introduced by the Prosecution. I request,
therefore, that this document be struck out. It should have been
brought before the Commission and shown to the witness; then I
would have had an opportunity of producing further evidence.
This is a fundamental question which will arise repeatedly. The
document was not submitted to the witness; its authenticity was
therefore not tested.
THE PRESIDENT: It was not submitted to the witness because
of the order that the Tribunal has just made. In order to save time,
the Tribunal suggested to Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe that he should
put the document in in that way. I said-I understood you to assent
to it-that the document should be shown to you and that you
should have an appropriate opportunity to comment upon it.
DR. SERVATIUS: I know the document, but I would like to
clarify the fundamental question of whether the evidence of the
Prosecution is finally closed or whether new documents can still be
introduced into the proceedings.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal considers that the Prosecution
can certainly call evidence and use documents if they wish to rebut
the evidence which has been called on behalf of the organization.
DR. SERVATIUS: Without showing them to the witness?
THE PRESIDENT: The only reason for not showing it to the
witness was that the document was not a document which the
witness made, and in view of that it appeared to the Tribunal to
be a matter of comment upon the document, and if you have got an
opportunity to put the document to the witness yourself or to com-
ment upon the document, you have got a full opportunity to deal
with it.
DR. SERVATIUS: Then I would also be permitted, if necessary,
to submit a counterdocument?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly. You can ask this witness
anything you like about the document.
DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, at the end the witness was
asked less about facts; rather he was confronted with an argument,
on which I think I can comment in my final speech.







30 July 46'


THE PRESIDENT: I did not quite understand what you said
then about an argument.
DR. SERVATIUS: The witness was asked about things which
were unknown to him. Examples were put to him of events in
individual Gaue, of which he knows nothing. He only had to draw
conclusions as to what interpretation was to be given to the docu-
ments.
THE PRESIDENT: On general principles, you can ask him any-
thing in re-examination which properly arises out of his. cross-
examination. If he was cross-examined upon a document, or if the
document was put in now, in the way it has been, you can ask him
any question upon the document or upon his cross-examination
upon the document.
DR. SERVATIUS: Yes; I have a'few questions.
Witness, the document, the order of the Deputy of the Fiihrer,
Hess, of 13 March 1940 was shown to you. It is Page 43 in the
German document book. The order contains instructions to the
civilian population on their conduct in the event of landings of
enemy planes or parachutists on German Reich territory. You were
referred to Number 4, where it says, "Likewise enemy parachutists
are immediately to be arrested and made harmless." You observe
that the letter is dated 1940; what was the situation in the air at
that time?
KAUFMANN: I no longer have the letter at the moment, but I
remember that it was dated 1940. My first answer to this question
was meant to express that the air situation and the whole war
situation at that time permitted only a humane interpretation of
this term, if it was looked upon as misleading.
DR. SERVATIUS: Was there not a danger that airmen would
land for espionage purposes and do not the words "to make them
harmless" refer to this type of parachutist?
KAUFMANN: In air war all sorts of people parachuted from
planes-fliers in distress, sabotage units, agents in civilian clothes,
and so on. To which of those groups these words refer, is not
clearly indicated in the text.
DR. SERVATIUS: May I call your attention to Number 2 which
says, "Fliers are to be arrested immediately and, before all, restart-
ing or destruction of the plane is to be prevented," and Number 4
says, "Enemy parachutists are likewise to be arrested and made
harmless." Does not the use of the term "likewise" show that the
order is concerned primarily only with the arrest of the airmen?
KAUFMANN: I repeat that in the war situation of 1940 I under-
stood the term "unschidlich" to mean solely to disarm them, but in
no case to maltreat or to kill them.







30 Juvly M6


DR. SERVATIUS: I have no further, questions to put to the
witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Witness, were these Political Leaders paid-
paid salaries by the Party?
KAUFMANN: No. A very small percentage, less than 1 percent,
were, in my estimate, paid officials. The majority of them were
honorary, unpaid officials.
THE PRESIDENT: That applies to all the ranks of the Party
officials, does it?
KAUFMANN: No. The amount of work involved in the higher
positions was too great to be discharged in one's spare time in an
honorary capacity along with one's own professional duties.
THE PRESIDENT: Were all the Gauleiter paid?
KAUFMANN: After the seizure of power, yes; if they did not
hold a State office.
THE PRESIDENT: And what were they paid-how much?
KAUFMANN: I myself never received a salary as a Gauleiter.
Up to 1928 I earned my own livelihood. From 1928 on, I was a
parliamentary delegate, and from 1933 I was a Reich Governor. The
cases of most of my comrades were similar.
THE PRESIDENT: You mean from 1933 on most of them had
State offices which carried salaries?
KAUFMANN: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: And what about the Kreisleiter?
KAUFMANN: Up to the seizure of power, all Kreisleiter were,
on principle, honorary and unpaid officials.
THE PRESIDENT: And after?
KAUFMANN: And later also for a number of years. I estimate
that the majority of them became officials and received salaries
from 1937 or 1938 onwards. But even then there were exceptions.
THE PRESIDENT: Became State officials you mean?
KAUFMANN: No, not State officials-Party employees.
THE PRESIDENT: And received salaries; I see. And the lower
ranks, the Ortsgruppenleiter and the Blockleiter?
KAUFMANN: No; from Kreisleiter down, all were honorary
officials.
THE PRESIDENT: Even after 1933?
KAUFMANN: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: And after 1937?







30 July 46


KAUFMANN: Also. Some of the most important members of the
staff of the Kreisleiter were paid, but the majority of his staff were
honorary officials. From Ortsgruppenleiter down, including Orts-
gruppenleiter, all were honorary and unpaid officials.
THE PRESIDENT: From what source were they paid when they
were paid?
KAUFMANN: By the Reich Treasurer of the Party.
THE PRESIDENT: And from what source did he get the money
to pay them?
KAUFMANN: From the contributions of members of the Move-
ment.
THE PRESIDENT: The funds of the Party were kept separate,
were they?
KAUFMANN: The Reich Treasurer's financial administration
was completely separate.
THE PRESIDENT: Were the accounts of the Party published?
KAUFMANN: No. I know only that occasionally at conferences
with the Ffihrer the Reich Treasurer made a brief financial report,
but that was not published.
THE PRESIDENt: 'Was there any reference to Party funds in
the State budget or the State accounts?
KAUFMANN: No. On the contrary, I had the impression that
the Reich Treasurer disposed of very extensive funds from the
revenues of the Party insurance, and from the dues of members.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you call your next witness, Dr. Ser-
vatius?
DR. SERVATIUS: With the approval of the Tribunal, I shall call
the witness Kreisleiter Willi Meyer-Wendeborn.
[The witness Meyer-Wendeborn took the stand.]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name?
WILLI MEYER-WENDEBORN (Witness): Willi Meyer-Wende-
born.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear
by God-the Almighty and Omniscient-that I will speak the pure
truth-and will withhold and add nothing.
.[The witness repeated the oath.]
THE PRESIDENT: Sit down.
DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, when were you born?
MEYER-WENDEBORN: 24 June 1891.
DR. SERVATIUS: You were a Kreisleiter in Cloppenburg, Olden-
burg, in Gau Weser-Ems for 12 years, from 1934-1945; on repeated






30 July 46


occasions you acted temporarily as head of the neighboring Kreis
Vechta; before that time you were an Ortsgruppenleiter for about
a year and a half; is that correct?
MEYER-WENDEBORN: I was in Cloppenburg for 11 years.
DR. SERVATIUS: That was from 1934 until when?
MEYER-WENDEBORN: From 1934 to 1945.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did you have knowledge of conditions in the
administration of other districts beyond your own?
MEYER-WENDEBORN: Yes; as Ortsgruppenleiter, and later as
.Kreisleiter, I was in a position to gain information, since I repeatedly
met the political leaders and the Kreisleiter.
DR. SERVATIUS: Were you, as Kreisleiter, paid a salary or were
you an honorary official?
MEYER-WENDEBORN: During the first half of my term of
office I was an honorary official; later I received a salary.
DR. SERVATIUS: What other political leaders in the Kreis-
leitung received a salary?
MEYER-WENDEBORN: The Kreis executive, the propaganda
director, the training director, and the head of the financial depart-
ment.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did the paid political leaders in the Kreis
receive special secret instructions?
MEYER-WENDEBORN: No, never.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did they have better insight into conditions?
MEYER-WENDEBORN: They saw and heard more than the
others.
DR. SERVATIUS: Of what persons did the Kreisleitung consist?
MEYER-WENDEBORN: Firstly, the main or leadership offices;
these were organization, propaganda, training, and personnel.
Secondly, the social and technical offices, such as the Kreis peasant
leader, the Obmann of the DAF (German Labor Front), the head
of the NSV, the head of the office for educators, and the head of the
office for civil servants.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did the members of the Kreisleitung when
appointed become members of the Corps of Political Leaders?
MEYER-WENDEBO'RN: An appointment as a member of the
Corps of Political Leaders did not exist. When a Party member
was appointed to. an office, he became a Political Leader.
DR. SERVATIUS: Do you know of an order of Hess forbidding
the use of the designation "political organization" or "Corps of
Political Leaders"?

a







30 July 46


MEYER-WENDEBORN: The designation "political organization"
was forbidden by the then Deputy of the FUihrer.
DR. SERVATIUS: As Kreisleiter, you held conferences in the
Kreisleitung. Who took part in these conferences?
MEYER-WENDEBORN: There were two kinds of conferences:
One, among a narrow circle, the Kreis staff, and the second, among
a larger circle, in which State and community representatives and
others who wished to bring up special matters took part.
DR. SERVATIUS: Were the subjects of the conferences purely
economic, or were political questions also discussed?
MEYER-WENDEBORN: Primarily social questions affecting the
inhabitants of the Kreis were discussed. At the end of the con-
ferences I usually gave a brief account of events in the past
few weeks.
DR. SERVATIUS: Were not critical political questions discussed
and instructions issued which might have had a reference to the
removal of obstacles in the way of waging a war of aggression, for
example, instructions on the Jewish question, the Church question,
the trade union question, and the arrest of political opponents?
MEYER-WENDEBORN: I did not have to give special instruc-
tions. We were strictly forbidden to carry on our own policies. We
never heard anything about preparations for war. When any
measures had to be taken against political opponents, it was the
affair of the State.
DR. SERVATIUS: What instructions were given on the Jewish
question and what was their aim?
MEYER-WENDEBORN: With regard to the Jewish question,
which did not have great significance in our rural Kreis, we were
concerned primarily with the basic objective, namely, the reduction
of Jewish influence to a percentage of Jews corresponding to their
total strength in Germany.
DR. SERVATIUS: What directions on the Church question did
you issue in your capacity as Kreisleiter, and what was their aim?
MEYER-WENDEBORN: The fight against the churches was for-
bidden on principle. There was no need to give any instructions on
that subject, for my men were all Catholic and had remained mem-
bers of the Church.
DR. SERVATIUS: What about the anti-Jewish actions on 9 and
10 November 1938? What instructions were given at that time?
MEYER-WENDEBORN: I received- no instructions, and was
faced with the accomplished fact. In agreement with the Landrat
I immediately freed Jews who had been arrested, and subsequently

0






30 July M6


I received strict instructions from my Gauleiter not to allow
Political Leaders or Party members to take part in these things in
any way. That is all that happened in our district.
DR. SERVATIUS: What instructions were given on the question
of the trade unions, and what was their aim?
MEYER-WENDEBORN: The measures of Reichsleiter Dr. Robert
Ley on 1 or 2 May were a complete surprise to us. We ourselves,
as Political Leaders, had nothing to do with them and no instructions
were issued.
DR. SERVATIUS: What instructions did you as Kreisleiter give
with regard to political opponents?
MEYER-WENDEBORN: The treatment of political opponents
was primarily the task of the State authorities. If I suspected any-
one of being an opponent, I always took the opportunity of having
a discussion with him, and as a result it was not necessary to take
more than a few measures.
DR. SERVATIUS: Was there not, in fact, such a close relation-
ship between the State Police and the Kreisleitung that, in practice,
the Kreisleiter could at any time arbitrarily order the arrest of
political opponents?
MEYER-WENDEBORN: That would have been a good thing.
When I repeatedly suggested that to the Gauleiter, at the time Karl
Roever, I was told that these were measures of the State which did
not concern us as Political Leaders.
DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, you misunderstood me. My question
was, did your close connections with the State Police enable you
to order arrests?
MEYER-WENDEBORN: No, I could not order arrests. I had no
close connections with the State Police, and I never had occasion
or opportunity to have anybody arrested.
DR. SERVATIUS: Was not a card index of opponents kept on
orders of the superior Party offices?
MEYER-WENDEBORN: We never kept such a card index, either
in the Kreis or in Ortsgruppe.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did the Gestapo keep such a card index, and
did you assist in keeping it?
MEYER-WENDEBORN: I cannot tell you. I was never told
about it; I do not know. In any case, I certainly did not assist in
keeping it.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did you not, as Kreisleiter, ask for general
reports on the feeling and political views of the inhabitants who







30 July 46


were listed in a local card index for the individual households, and
were these not reports of spies?
MEYER-WENDEBORN: There was no local card index for
households in my Kreis. It was intended to set up one, but that was
never done. I never asked for spy reports, and I would never have
received them; but I did ask for reports on the feeling of the people
with regard to measures taken by the State and the Party.
DR. SERVATIUS: And what was the purpose of these reports?
MEYER-WENDEBORN: We wanted to know what effect the
new laws and directives would have on the mass of the people.
DR. SERVATIUS: How did you receive your instructions from
the Gauleiter?
MEYER-WENDEBORN: I received my instructions in writing,
and also orally.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did the Kreisleiter take part in conferences
with the Gauleiter? And who was present at such conferences?
MEYER-WENDEBORN: We did not always take part; we were
there only when something of special interest to our own Kreis was
being discussed. At the conferences of the Gauleitung, the members
of the Gau offices and the consultants took part.
DR. SERVATIUS: What was discussed at these conferences?
Were they similar to the Kreisleiter conferences which you
mentioned earlier?
MEYER-WENDEBORN: They were roughly similar, but on a
larger scale ranging over the whole of the Gau.
DR. SERVATIUS: How did you instruct the Ortsgruppenleiter?
Was that done on the basis of the Gau and Kreis conferences, or
was the information which was passed on to them somewhat
changed, that is, false?
MEYER-WENDEBORN: After conferences with the Gauleiter, I
regularly passed on to. my men what I had heard there, and I passed
it on in the form in which I had heard it from my Gauleiter.
DR. SERVATIUS: How did you co-operate with the SA? Was
the SA represented in the Kreisleitung?
MEYER-WENDEBORN: I left it to the 'discretion -of the SA to
take part in our conferences. The local leader came occasionally and
listened to what we were generally discussing.
DR. SERVATIUS: Could you give orders to the SA or request
its aid?
MEYER-WENDEBORN: I could not give any orders to the SA.
I could only, through its superior officers, ask for its aid in any
propaganda measures, collections, employment assistance, and so on.






30 July 46


DR. SERVATIUS: What sort of co-operation existed between
you and the General SS? Was it represented in the Kreisleitung?
MEYER-WENDEBORN: We had no local SS leader. The SS itself
did not ask to be represented in the Kreisleitung.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did you have any insight into the measures
which the SS took with regard to protective custody and concen-
tration camps?
MEYER-WENDEBORN: No, I had no insight into that.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did you ever attempt to obtain such insight?
MEYER-WENDEBORN: Yes. It was about 1935, but I did not
succeed in obtaining it. I.was refused a visit to a concentration camp,
which I did not want to visit because of any suspected atrocities,
but because it was new to me.
DR. SERVATIUS: And what reason were you given?
MEYER-WENDEBORN: I was told to get permission through the
RSHA. I asked the. Gauleitung to do that because I was not per-
mitted- to contact the RSHA personally. The Gauleitung then
advised against it, because it would be very complicated.
DR. SERVATIUS: Do you know whether the RSHA was the com-
petent authority?
MEYER-WENDEBORN: No, I do not know.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did you in your Kreis receive or issue in-
structions with regard to the lynching of fliers who had made forced
landings?
MEYER-WENDEBORN: We had many forced landings. I never
issued and was never told to issue any instructions on this subject.
DR. SERVATIUS: But you surely know the Bormann letter and
other documents which deal with this matter.. Did you, as Kreis-
leiter, not learn of these?
MEYER-WENDEBORN: I did not receive the Bormann letter,
but I heard the article of the Reich Propaganda Minister on the radio.
DR. SERVATIUS: And then what happened in your Kreis? Was
any action taken in the spirit of Goebbels' statements?
MEYER-WENDEBORN: We continued to act according to the
general rules of warfare, and the men who landed were always
treated very well. The population regarded that as natural.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did you receive or issue instructions ordering
bad treatment of prisoners of war or foreign workers, or did you
permit such treatment?
MEYER-WENDEBORN: I could not issue instructions for pris-
oners of war; only the Armed Forces could do that. But I carefully







30 July 46


saw to it that foreign workers in our district were well treated. And
if a beating or some such incident occasionally occurred, I imme-
diately had the workers removed through the Labor Office, and the
people for whom they had been working were on purpose left
without help for some weeks.
DR. SERVATIUS: Instructions about unjust treatment of these
foreign workers did not reach you?
MEYER-WENDEBORN: No. On the contrary, I was asked to
see to it that they were well treated.
DR. SERVATIUS: Was the attitude of the Political Leaders in
your Kreis with regard to the critical political problems which we
mentioned earlier an exceptional one, or was that also the attitude
outside your Kreis, as far as you could judge? Was it a general
attitude?
MEYER-WENDEBORN: Before the war, I had the feeling that
that attitude was general. Also during the war; and then while I
was in the Fallingbostel Camp and helped to obtain affidavits, I
was able to convince myself finally that what I am saying here was
generally true for those thousands.
DR. SERVATIUS: You checked and collected these affidavits?
MEVER-WENDEBORN: Yes.
DR. S]RVATIUS: Did you not reject unfavorable ones?
MEYER-WENDEBORN: No, I never did that. There were no
unfavorable ones.
DR. SERVATIUS: Then how do you explain the incidents which
actually happened, for example, in connection with the Church
question and the Jewish question?
MEYER-WENDEBORN: We never knew of the whole extent of
these things; we heard very little. It did happen 'that one man or
another who had not forgotten some experience from the period of
the struggle to power misunderstood some instructions and wanted
to do stupid things. But in general we did not experience such
incidents and knew nothing about them.
DR. SERVATIUS: Then none came to your knowledge?
MEYER-WENDEBORN: No.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did not the attitude of the SS, and partic-
ularly the refusal to give you permission to visit a concentration
camp, cause strong misgivings? You heard rumors about these con-
centration camps, did you not?
MEYER-WENDEBORN: I did not consider this refusal to let me
visit a concentration camp as an attempt to conceal crimes, but in






30 July 46


view of the character of the SS, I assumed that it was a form of
self-glorification, and that the SS thought: These camps are in our
charge and are not the affair of the Political Leaders.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did you approve the methods of the Party in
every way?
MEYER-WENDEBORN: No, I did not always approve, and I dis-
cussed this matter with my old-time Gauleiter.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did you have serious objections?
MEYER-WENDEBORN: No, my objections were not serious ob-
jections, but after this Jewish affair in November, I had to point out
the effect which it would have abroad. I had heard that men in high
positions did not at all approve, and that gave me courage to voice
my own misgivings.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did you ever consider whether you should
continue in office or resign?
MEYER-WENDEBORN: If I had resigned, I would not have im-
proved matters, but only aggravated them; for I had been in the
Kreis for 20 years and my successor could not have known my men
so well; as it was, I could recognize mistakes in time and correct
them.
THE PRESIDENT: Is that all you want to ask?
DR. SERVATIUS: I wanted to put one or two more questions in
the morning.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, the Tribunal will adjourn.

[The Tribunal adjourned until 31 July 1946 at 1000 hours.]








ONE HUNDRED

AND NINETY-FIRST DAY

Wednesday, 31 July 1946



Morning Session

[The witness Meyer-Wendeborn resumed the stand.]
DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, did you consider the Blockleiter and
the Zellenleiter as Hoheitstriger?
MEYER-WENDEBORN: No.
DR. SERVATIUS: Do you not know that in. the Organization
Book of the Party, the Blockleiter and the Zellenleiter are defined
as Hoheitstrager?
MEYER-WENDEBORN: I read that, but I was never able to
follow it because the Organization Book started from assumptions
which were not.given.
DR. SERVATIUS: What do you understand by the term Hoheits-
triger?
MEYER-WENDEBORN: The Hoheitstrager is the leading repre-
sentative of the Movement in his district. He is entitled to give
orders to his subordinate Political Leaders and Party members.
Moreover, his official and private bearing must at all times be such
that non-Party members and State officials will respect him and
will listen to him without any legal obligation to do so.
DR. SERVATIUS: You spoke of the rights which the Political
Leaders have. Did the Blockleiter and Zellenleiter also have these
rights?
MEYER-WENDEBORN: No, they did not have them and did not
want them.
DR. SERVATIUS: Had the Blockleiter and Zellenleiter any
authority to call on the SA, the SS, or the Police?
MEYER-WENDEBORN: No, they were powerless to do so.
DR. SERVATIUS: Then it is true that the Blockleiter and the
Zellenleiter were only assistants to the Ortsgruppenleiter and had
no powers of their own?
MEYER-WENDEBORN: The Blockleiter and the Zellenleiter
were the noncommissioned officer corps of the Ortsgruppenleiter.






31 Jlbay 46


DR. SERVATIUS: I have no more questions to put to this
witness.
LIEUTENANT COLONEL J. M.G. GRIFFITH-JONES (Junior
Counsel for the United Kingdom): I have certain new documents,
two or three pages, in connection with other matters. If the Tribunal *
wishes it I could present these documents perhaps quickly in the
way the Tribunal indicated to Sir David or I could put it in the
form of cross-examination. Whatever the Tribunal thinks most con-
venient.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Griffith-Jones, if it does not interfere
with your case or cross-examination, perhaps it would be better
to put the documents in, simply indicating the page or subject.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: That will be done.
THE PRESIDENT: If there is anything particular with this
witness you may have...
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: The first matter with which I was
intending to deal is the action taken by the Leadership Corps in
connection with elections, and I would refer the Tribunal to Docu-
ment D-34 which will become Exhibit GB-540. I understand the-
Tribunal has copies of that document. That is a letter from the
NSDAP District Memel, dated 26 May 1936 and addressed to Kreis-
leiter and Organisationsleiter. It is from the NSDAP, Memel
District, and translated from the German. It refers to the Reichstag
elections of 29 March 1936 and states that in pursuance of an
inquiry from the Reich Minister of the Interior, Party member
Dr. Frick, a report is to be made on any civil servants who did
not record their votes on 29 March 1936:
"As far as such cases are known within your Ortsgruppe or
your Stiitzpunkt, you will report them to me by name, at the
latest by 3 June of this year..."
The expression "Stiitzpunkt section"-this is a smaller organization
than an Ortsgruppe and was eventually abolished but in 1936 still
existed.
"...you will report them to me by name at the latest by
3 June of this year. The information will have to be correct
under all circumstances."
Then the last paragraph, My Lord.
"This circular has to be destroyed immediately after the
matter is settled."
My Lord, the next document is Document D-897, which becomes
Exhibit GB-541, and that is a document in connection with the
plebiscite of 1938. The first point I make on that is that it shows
that the activity referred to in the letter I have just mentioned was






31 July 46


not an isolated case. My Lord, the second point upon this docu-
ment is that it shows the close co-operation between the Security
Police and the Political Leaders.
On Page 1 of that document appears a special order, dated
4 April 1938, from the Security Service of the Reichsfiihrer SS at
Erfurt, which is in Thuringia, the Gau of which Sauckel was Gau-
leiter. It is "top secret, strictly confidential," addressed to all heads
of sections and to Stiitzpunktleiter:
"Stiitzpunktleiter are to report, not later than 1800 hours on
7 April 1938, all persons in their district about whom it is
safe to assume (with 100 percent certainty) that they will vote
'no' at the impending plebiscite. (Do not forget the Inter-
national Jehovah's Witnesses.)
"Heads of sections are to support the Stiitzpunktleiter locally
as much as possible in this matter.
"This matter is also to be carried out in closest collaboration
with the Ortsgruppenleiter of the Party. The Ortsgruppen-
leiter will be instructed by the Aussenstellenleiter (head of
the branch office) personally after 1800 hours on 5 April 1938."
I think I can omit the next paragraph and then I go on:
"The tremendous responsibility which the Stiitzpunktleiter
have, in particular with regard to this report, is stressed once
more. The Stiitzpunktleiter inust have no doubts as to the
possible consequences for the persons listed in their report.
Special attention should be paid as to whether the persons
who impart such information to the Stiitzpunktleiter and from
whom the Stiitzpunktleiter make their inquiries are not
motivated by personal reasons; even Political Leaders are
not excepted from this.
"The confidential nature of this order is again emphasized.
"The order is to be minutely memorized and thereafter
destroyed immediately. Every Stiitzpunktleiter is personally
responsible to me for the complete destruction of this order."
The reasons for the necessity for accuracy appear from the
following documents. On Page 2 there are set out certain sections
of the population about whom inquiries have got to be made and
who have to be particularly watched. It will be seen in the first
paragraph:
"Increased attention is to be devoted to participation in and
the results of the plebiscite on 10 April 1938, particularly in
small towns and villages. It must, above all, be ascertained
whether the opponents are to be found in Marxist and other
circles of opposing ideologies."






31 July 46


Then under the heading "Catholicism," I draw the attention of
the Tribunal to Number 2:
S"Was any attitude expressed during church services and
similar meetings?"
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.

[A recess was taken.7

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will, if it is convenient to the
officers of the Court, not have any further recess before 1 o'clock.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: My Lord, I had reached Paragraph
Number 2 under "Catholicism" on the second page of Document
D-897: "Was any attitude expressed during church services and
similar meetings?" Perhaps I might be allowed to ask one question
of the witness upon that.
Witness, when the Ortsgruppenleiter is charged with making
the report on these matters, would it be the Block- and Zellenleiter
that he would ask for information as to what was expressed in the
various church services throughout his Ortsgruppe?
MEYER-WENDEBORN: No.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Would you tell the Tribunal who
it would be, if it would not be the Zellenleiter?
MEYER-WENDEBORN: The Ortsgruppenleiter himself would
have asked for this confidential information, if it had been inquired
for at all.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Do you think the Ortsgruppen-
leiter would be able to attend every church service in this Orts-
gruppe himself? Do you think that is physically possible for any
Ortsgruppenleiter?
MEYER-WENDEBORN: No, they would not have been able to
do that, but for such information they would always have had
special men from whom they would have obtained advice and
information.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Those special men who provided
them with advice and information are the Zellen- and Blockleiter,
are they not?
MEYER-WENDEBORN: No, they are not.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well. Well, we will leave
that. The next heading is "Protestantism." I again draw attention
to Paragraph 2 under that heading:
"Was any attitude expressed about the Anschluss or the
plebiscite during services?"







31 July 46


And the next paragraph:
"What comment did the Church press make?"
And again Number 5:
"Were the bells of all religious communities rung on the
evening of 9 April 1938 following the Fiihrer's speech in
Vienna?"
Witness, would it be the Block- and Zellenleiter who would
report whether the church bells were rung on that evening in their
districts?
MEYER-WENDEBORN: They would have been able to say that,
for if they had been rung, the Block- and Zellenleiter would have
heard them too.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I turn to the next page of the
document, the next to the ultimate paragraph:
"It is suggested that the election officials be contacted in
a suitable manner where necessary. The exertion of any kind
of pressure,, however, must be desisted from."
I turn to the next page, Page 3 of the English translation, which
is a report from the branch office of the Security Service of Weissen-
see, dated 25 April, and we begin to see how the instructions
regarding the election were carried out:
"Prior to the election, Party member Paul Fritsche from
Weissensee, Thuringia, completed a register of all persons
suspected of voting 'no.' On the election day every person
included on this list received from a specially selected official
a voting paper which was marked with a number imprinted
by means of a ribbonless typewriter."
Then it describes how the procedure worked.
The next page, I quote from the middle of the large paragraph:
"The election official... did not throw the envelope into the
voting box immediately, but tried to push it under the card-
board which is placed on the voting box to cover the slit, so
as to be able to open the envelope later at an opportune
moment."
The next document, the next page, another report from another
branch of the Security Service:
"To all Ortsgruppenleiter of the NSDAP of the Kreis of
Erfurt-Weissensee:
"The below-mentioned persons on their appearance in your
Ortsgruppen area for the purpose of carrying out their voting
duty, are to be specially watched, and the Kreisleitung of
Erfurt (SD office) is to be notified immediately."







31 July 46


There are many names; and lastly:
"By order of the Kreisleiter, this matter is to be strictly
confidential."
On the next page there is another report about a Jehovah's
Witness, Robert Siering, and his wife, who appeared in a voting
center on Sunday morning and deposited their votes after both had
been advised of their duty to vote by the Police in Griefstedt and
had been threatened with the removal of their child in case of non-
participation.
My Lord, the next document, still on the same subject, is D-902,
which will become Exhibit GB-542. On the first page of that exhibit
we have a report sent to the Erfurt branch office of the Security
Service, marked confidential. It is not clear by whom it is signed.
It is dated 7 April 1938, and reads as follows:
"After thorough and most careful examination in the area of
the Ortsgruppe of Melchendorf and in the closest co-operation
with the Ortsgruppenleiter, we have come to the following
conclusion:
"The following persons will in all probability vote 'no' at the
forthcoming plebiscite."
Then, after setting out the names, it gives what they call
"explanations" in the case of each:
"Explanation: 1) Wilhelm Messing, taken into protective
custody in 1933 because of illegal activity for the Communist
Party.. ."-and so on-"2) Walter Messing, also taken into
protective custody in 1933 for slandering the SA."
I do not think I need bother with anything further on that page.
I draw the attention of the Tribunal to the last three paragraphs
on the next page:
"Giinther Hartung, 113 Johannesstrasse, entrance Wallstrasse,
must be reported as being an enemy of the State and opposed
to the plebiscite.
"Hartung must be described as morally totally degenerate
and it is necessary to lock him up in spite of his advanced age
(70 years).
"Among other things, he referred to the German troops
on their entry into Austria as loafers. Sufficient witnesses
testifying against Hartung are available."
My Lord, on the next page, another report in connection with
the plebiscite, I draw the attention of the Tribunal to the penulti-
mate paragraph:
"The wife of the Jew Bielschowski... who was dragged along
just before closing time of the plebiscite, voted 'no,' as can
be proved."







31 July 46


Now, turn to some pages ahead, Page 7 of the English translation,
which describes how the votes were screened in another area by a
ribbonless typewriter, and then again on Page 9 of the translation,
another report:
"The laborer Otto Wiegand... was requested four times to
record his vote on the day of the election and finally voted
only under duress."
And the next report on the same page:
"The married woman Frieda Schreiner... did not vote in
spite of being repeatedly invited to do so. The above is a
fanatic member of the former association of International
Jehovah's Witnesses.
"The husband, who holds the same opinions and who was
recently involved in criminal proceedings because of them,
recorded his vote. To be sure, this was probably exclusively
for fear of renewed arrest."
My Lord, the other portion of that document that I referred to
is on Page 11, where there is shown an extract from the local
newspaper recording the united German vote, which has been
obtained by the Security Service with co-operation of the Leadership
Corps in the way in which we have seen.
My Lord, again to emphasize that these were not isolated cases,
I would refer the Tribunal to a document which has already been
put in, and it will be found on Page 91 of the small document book
that Sir David handed to the Tribunal yesterday, Page 91 of that
book, Pages 118 and 119 of the German. It is Document R-142,
Exhibit USA-481. That, it will be seen, is a report again from the
Security Service, but this time in Koblenz. I read the second
paragraph:
"The high percentage of 'no' votes and invalid votes in nearly
all cases is due to the religious attitude of the population,
whether they be Catholics or Protestants... The district
manager"-My Lord, that in the original is the "Kreis-
geschdftsfiihrer," who is one of the staff officers of the Kreis-
leiter-"the Kreisgeschiftsffihrer of the Kreis Kochem gave
the assurance that it was mostly women who voted 'no' or
whose votes were invalid. As became known here, a super-
visory control was ordered at several of the..."
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Griffith-Jones, this is already in
evidence, is it not?
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Yes, this is in evidence.
THE PRESIDENT: I do not think you need go into it.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I am much obliged.






31 July 46


I only drew the attention of the Tribunal to it. One further
document which is also in evidence will be found at Page 55 of that
same document, book, at Page 55 and then 54, the documents being
849-PS, which is Exhibit USA-354, and 848-PS, Exhibit USA-353.
The two documents together describe how the Party...
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Griffith-Jones, I do not think you
ought to comment upon documents which are already in evidence
unless they are documents upon which the witness can throw light.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: It is a little difficult to make the
point which I would have made in cross-examining the witness on
these documents if I only confine myself to the new ones without
drawing the attention of the Tribunal to other documents which
relate to the same matter.
THE PRESIDENT: If they are not new documents and you
want to cross-examine the witness about them, you can put them
to the witness.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well, Sir. I will leave that
particular subject now.
The other subject on which I had intended to cross-examine this
witness is euthanasia, or mercy killing, and the part the Political
Leaders played in those matters. My Lord, this is a new document,
D-906, which becomes Exhibit GB-543.
I would refer first of all to the second of the three documents
which are printed on the first page of that exhibit; Number 2, Martin
Bormann, 24 September 1940, a letter from the National Socialist
German Workers' Party, the Flihrer's Deputy, to the Gauleitung of
Franconia, for the attention of Kreisleiter Zimmermann:
"Your letter of 13 September 1940 was given to me by Party
member Hoffmann. The commission which was working at
Neuendettelsau is under the control of Reichsleiter Bouhler.
"The text of the notifications to relatives is being variously
worded, as I was once more assured yesterday; naturally,
however, it can happen sometimes that two families living
close to each other receive letters with exactly the same text.
"It is natural that the representatives of Christian ideology
denounce the commission's measures; it must be equally taken
for granted that all Party offices support, as far as necessary.,
the work of the commission."
Then I go back to Number 1 on that page; Gaustabsamtsleiter for
Franconia, Sellmer-that was another staff officer of the Gau staff-
handwritten note from 1 October 1940:
"Justice. Visit from Party member Blankenburg, Berlin.
Action begins in the near future. So far hardly any failures
have occurred. 30,000 finished. Further 100,000 to 120,000 are







31 July 46


waiting. The circle of those who are initiated to be kept
very small. If necessary the Kreisleiter is to be notified in
good time."
Then it goes on:
"The Fiihrer gave the order; the law is ready. At present
only clear cases, that is 100 percent ones, are being settled.
Later an extension will take place. From now on, notification
will be given in a... "-it is not clear here from the print.
And then at the end of the document-"Kreisleiter Sell-
mer... is to be informed."
I go to Number 3 which is a situation report by the Kreisleitung
of Erlangen dated 26 November 1940, dealing with the elimination
of mental patients:
"On orders from the Ministry of the Interior, signed Schulz
or Schultze, a commission consisting, among others,, of a north
German doctor and a number of students appeared some time
ago in the local sanatorium and nursing home."
And then it describes how he examined the patients who were
to be transferred to another institution on orders from the Reich
Defense Commissioner and that:
"...a Berlin transport company was to carry out the transfer
and the head of the institution was to follow the directives of
this company, which was in possession of the list of names."
In this way three transports with a total number of 370 patients
were in the meantime transferred to Sonnenstein near Pirna and to
the Linz district. It goes on:
"A further transport is to leave in January of next year. The
head of the institution..."
And then it goes on for a few lines, and starts again:
"Strangely enough various relatives received notification
after the transportation that the patients had died. In some
cases pneumonia and in others an infectious disease were
given as the cause of death.
"At the same time the relatives were further informed that
it had been necessary to cremate the body and that, if they
were interested, they could have the clothing of the deceased
sent to them. The registry office of Erlangen was also
informed by the institution of the various cases of death, and
again either pneumonia or an infectious disease was given
as the cause-illnesses which had no connection with the
previous medical history so that it is to be assumed that false
indications were given. The population is terribly disturbed
about the transfer of patients, because 'they connect it with






31 July 46


the cases of death which are becoming known in rapid succes-
sion. They speak in part openly, in part secretly, of an
elimination of patients for which there is no kind of legal
justification. Just now,, in war times, such unrest among the
population has a doubly unfavorable effect. Moreover, the
events described above give the Church and religious circles
cause to revive their attitude against National Socialism."
THE PRESIDENT: Under which part of Article 6 of the Charter
does this come?
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: It would come under Crimes
against Humanity with respect to...
THE PRESIDENT: Are they connected with war?
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: In some respect, yes, because the
purpose of this extermination of old people was to rid the Reich of
unproductive elements. My Lord, I cannot for the moment give
you the exact reference where that appears, but it does appear
upon one of the documents. That is a handwritten addition to that
document in the handwriting of the-I beg your pardon, it is an
original extract of the situation report from the Kreisleitung of
Erlangen.
The next document, My Lord, need not be dealt with at length.
The point is that a Kreisleiter is again involved and that it was
general knowledge that there were mistakes in the notification of
deaths, for instance, one family receiving two urns for one patient.
Number 5 on the next page is much the same. I draw the Tribu-
nal's attention to the middle of the large paragraph, toward the
end: "The doctor also informed me that it was well known that the
commission consisted of one SS doctor and several subordinate
doctors."
My Lord, the next document is on Page 10, Number 12, where
we have a protest, or rather, an inquiry about the death of a
relative. It is from a Mrs. Marie Kehr and I mention that'because
it is also referring to another Document 1969-PS. No, it is a new
document. It will become Exhibit GB-544, Document 1969-PS.
I would ask you to look at the second page of that document where
you have a letter from the Reich Minister of the Interior to the
Gaustabsamtsleiter in Nuremberg. He forwards Mrs. Kehr's letter
and the importance of that document is at the bottom, in ink:
"Ortsgruppenleiter, Party member Popp, is of the opinion that one
can inform Mrs. Kehr. She is calm and sensible." The document
also bears the stamp of the Kreisleiter who has been informed.
My Lord, if I might return quite briefly to the document we
were looking at, D-906, Page 6 of that document. The Ortsgruppen-
leiter in Absberg is writing about incidents which occurred on the







31 July 46

occasion of the latest removal of mentally defective persons from
an institution in that town, a sanatorium in that town. He writes
to the Kreisleiter and refers to a report of an incident which took
place and I can only emphasize that there was public knowledge
of what was happening.
And then again on Page 8, another Kreisleiter, this time in
Weissenburg, Bavaria, writes about the same disturbances and you
see that that goes to the Gau staff office in Nuremberg.
The next document, Number 11, is from a Kreisleiter in Ansbach
and he is writing about the removal of patients from yet another
sanatorium in another town; and on the top of the following page
the Ortsgruppenleiter is involved:
"Ortsgruppenleiter Reuschel is furthermore of the opinion
that he should speak about the removal of the inmates, if
possible at the next meeting of Party members, in order to
give the facts and above all to dispel the rumors that have
arisen that the inmates would very soon be put out of the
way, done away with, or poisoned."
Then at the bottom you see another handwritten note: The
Organisationsleiter, that is, the Political Leader on the staff of the
Hoheitstriger, is to be informed.
My Lord, that concludes the evidence that I was going to ask
this witness about. There is one general matter which perhaps
the Tribunal will allow me to ask a few questions about.
[Turning to the witness.1 Well, perhaps first of all I might ask
you this on that evidence, Witness. In view of the documents that
you have seen, did you yourself ever have any knowledge of this
so-called mercy killing that was going on?
MEYER-WENDEBORN: Once I heard a rumor that somewhere
in southern Germany mental patients were being done away with.
Thereupon, as was my duty, I immediately inquired of my Gau-
leiter and after a short time I received the information that this
was not true and that in the future I was not to make such in-
quiries, which were senseless as I ought to be able to see.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Why did you have to make such
inquiries?
MEYER-WENDEBORN: Because I had heard such rumors from
the population.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Did you know that colleagues of
yours in the Corps of Political Leaders were co-operating in that
system of murder?
MEYER-WENDEBORN: No, I never knew or suspected that.







31 July 46


LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Now let me ask you about one
other matter. You told the Tribunal yesterday that there was no
"Corps of Political Leaders," is that right?
MEYER-WENDEBORN: Yes.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: That is not correct, is it? They
were recognized officially as "the Corps of Political Leaders,"
were they not?
MEYER-WENDEBORN: The "Corps of Political Leaders" was
spoken of with the intention of teaching people better manners on
their appearance in public, and for that reason officers and students'
corps were pointed out as examples. There was no official "Corps
of Political Leaders" and there could not be any such corps because
the men changed constantly and had to come from all parts of the
population.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: They were called a "Corps of Polit-
ical Leaders" because on becoming a political leader you became
a member of that corps, isn't that the position?
MEYER-WENDEBORN: Since there was no real "Corps of Polit-
ical Leaders," when one was appointed one could not become a
member of it.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: And the Political Leaders are
referred to as a "Corps of Political Leaders" in the official Organi-
zation Book of the NSDAP, are they not?
MEYER-WENDEBORN: I am convinced that you can refer to
them as such. You have the book. Upon the oath that I have taken
I again want to say that I have not had time until now to read
this book carefully because my actual tasks were more important
than the lectures of this wishful dream-for I cannot call it by any
other name.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I have no further questions.
DR. SERVATIUS: [Turning to the witness.] I have a question on
Document D-897, the first one that was submitted, a letter from the
Reich Security Service, subsidiary branch Erfurt, signed by an
officer of the branch office. It is addressed to all consultants and
Stiitzpunktleiter (base or operational point leaders). The prosecutor
said that the Stiitzpunkt, which is here referred to, is a Party
agency. Is this opinion correct if you read that the letter is addressed
to all consultants and Stiitzpunktleiter and is a letter of the SS?
MEYER-WENDEBORN: I noticed that immediately, too, and I
would have referred to it myself. It can only have been a
Stiitzpunktleiter of the SD, for at that time within the political
leadership there were no more Stiitzpunkte but only Ortsgruppen.






31 July 46


Moreover, further down in this letter, in the second place, the
Ortsgruppenleiter is specially mentioned.
DR. SERVATIUS: Yes. It says there, "This matter is also to be
carried out in close co-operation with the Ortsgruppenleiter of the
Party." Is.this letter addressed to a subordinate Party agency from
a subordinate SS agency?
MEYER-WENDEBORN: At the moment I do not have the letter
here, but I recall that it was addressed to the subordinate offices
of the branch agency and states that they should contact the Orts-
gruppenleiter. It strikes me, at any rate, that the Ortsgruppenleiter
was to be informed only 1 day before, while those who received
the letter were informed 2 days beforehand and given the necessary
information. The confidence in the Party cannot have been very
great then.
DR. SERVATIUS: Was the Ortsgrup-enleiter here informed
through -the customary channels of the Party or were the higher
Party agencies skipped?
MEYER-WENDEBORN: In this case the, information was not
passed on in the official way; for it should have been done through
the higher Party agency.
DR. SERVATIUS: Therefore I can draw the conclusion then that
it is possible that the higher Party agencies knew nothing of this
action of the lower SS agencies?
MEYER-WENDEBORN: Absolutely.
DR. SERVATIUS: I have no more questions to put to the witness.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire. Will you call your
next witness, Dr. Servatius?
DR. SERVATIUS: With the permission of the Court, I call the
next witness, Wegscheider, an Ortsgruppenleiter.
[The witness Wegscheider took the stand.7
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full n/ime, please?
HANS WEGSCHEIDER (Witness): Hans Wegscheider.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear
by God.-the Almighty and Omniscient-that I will speak the pure
truth-and will withhold and add nothing.
[The witness repeated the oath.7
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, when were you born?
WEGSCHEIDER: On 30 October 1885.
DR. SERVATIUS: You were Ortsgruppenleiter out m the country
for 12 years, from 1933 to 1945, in Hirschdorf, near St. Lorenz?







31 July 46


WEGSCHEIDER: Yes.
DR. SERVATIUS: That is in the Kreis Kempten-Allglu?
WEGSCHEIDER: No, that is in the Kreis Kempten-Land.
DR. SERVATIUS: And there you were also mayor from 1933 on?
WEGSCHEIDER: Yes.
DR. SERVATIUS: You were a blacksmith and veterinary at the
same time?
WEGSCHEIDER: Yes.
DR. SERVATIUS: And, as such, you moved about a great deal
in Allgau?
WEGSCHEIDER: Yes.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did you then have insight into conditions in
the other Ortsgruppen in Allgiu?
WEGSCHEIDER: Yes, I knew the 36 Ortsgruppen in the Kreis
Kempten-Land fairly well.
DR. SERVATIUS: How many people were there?
WEGSCHEIDER: There were about 40,000 inhabitants.
DR. SERVATIUS: When did you enter the Party?
WEGSCHEIDER: On 28 March 1933.
DR. SERVATIUS: How did you become an Ortsgruppenleiter?
WEGSCHEIDER: On the occasion of the assembly at which the
Ortsgruppen were founded on 28 March 1933, I was appointed Orts-
gruppenleiter.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did you take an oath?
WEGSCHEIDER: Yes, as Ortsgruppenleiter I took an oath once.
DR. SERVATIUS: You said before the Commission that in
12 years you took the oath 12 times. Is that a mistake?
WEGSCHEIDER: That is a mistake.
DR. SERVATIUS: How did you become the local mayor?
-WEGSCHEIDER: In April 1933 the new community council was
set up. At about the end of this month the community council
elected a mayor, and I had not only the votes of the NSDAP, but
also four votes of the Social Democrat Party and one vote of the
Bavarian People's Party, and thus I was elected mayor.
DR. SERVATIUS: As Ortsgruppenleiter, did you receive a salary?
WEGSCHEIDER: No.
DR.SERVATIUS: And -how about the Ortsgruppenleiter who
were not mayors?







31 July 46


WEGSCHEIDER: They did not receive any salary either.
DR. SERVATIUS: For what reason was the office of Ortsgruppen-
leiter and mayor united in the hands of one man?
WEGSCHEIDER: In the Kreis Kempten-Land there were only
country communities, peasant communities, and probably there was
no suitable person available. Thus in 10 communities of our Kreis,
the mayor and Ortsgruppenleiter were the same person, and in
the last analysis it was more expedient.
DR. SERVATIUS: How was your Ortsgruppenleitung made up?
WEGSCHEIDER: First came the Ortsgruppenleiter,, then the
propaganda and organization, then the treasurer, a press office
leader, and later an auxiliary office leader, then two Zellenleiter
and about eight Blockleiter.
DR. SERVATIUS: What was the activity of the Block- and Zellen-
leiter?
WEGSCHEIDER: The activity of our Zellenleiter in the small
country communities proved to be futile so that in most of the
Ortsgruppen they were abolished. But the activity of the Block-
leiter can be considered purely technical in that they did only
auxiliary work.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did you consider the Block- and Zellenleiter
as Political Leaders and Hoheitstriger?
WEGSCHEIDER: No, since the work of the Blockleiter in the
small country communities was meaningless, politically, they could
in no wise be called Hoheitstriger.
DR. SERVATIUS: Why did you enter the Party and when did
you take over your office as Ortsgruppenleiter?
WEGSCHEIDER: In 1929 I believe. In the following years of
1930, '31, and '32, as I was a blacksmith by profession and as I
had very close contact with the peasants, I saw with my own eyes
how German agriculture declined year by year. In our district of
Allgdu the majority of us had joined the Bavarian Peasant League;
a few, the minority, were with the Bavarian People's Party, and
the few workers who were in the community joined the Social
Democrat Party, while a very small number were Communists.
DR. SERVATIUS: We would like to hear your personal reasons
for entering.
WEGSCHEIDER: I have already emphasized how I personally
suffered in my own district through the decline.
DR. SERVATIUS: Then it was on account of social reasons?
WEGSCHEIDER: Purely social reasons.






31 July 46


DR. SERVATIUS: What was the attitude of the other Political
Leaders in Allgu? Did they have other reasons for joining, perhaps
the fight against the Jews or the acquisition of Lebensraum?
WEGSCHEIDER: The misery was equally great in all agri-
cultural regions and so the attitude might well have been the same.
DR. SERVATIUS: What was the attitude of the Kreisleiter and
the Gauleiter?
WEGSCHEIDER: The Gauleiter and Kreisleiter were both patriots
and probably they considered their activity and their work in the
Party as beneficial to the welfare of our people and our country.
DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, in the Party program other aims are
set forth outside of the purely social ones, such as the solution of
the Jewish problem. What was the attitude of the Political Leaders
toward that question?
WEGSCHEIDER: Since there were no Jewish businesses in our
district and therefore no Jewish people lived there, this question
was not a burning one for us and hardly came into consideration.
DR. SERVATIUS: Were there no Jewish cattle dealers?
WEGSCHEIDER: No, not in the country. Only in the town of
Kempten there was a wholesale firm of cattle dealers, Loew
Brothers, and our peasants sold and exchanged cattle there.
DR. SERVATIUS: Were not steps taken against this and voices
of protest raised?
WEGSCHEIDER: No, for a long time after the assumption of
power our farmers traded with this wholesale firm of cattle dealers.
DR.SERVATIUS: The Party program also contained a demand
for settlement space. Could this be done only through conquest
and did you receive directives which indicated a preparation for
war?
WEGSCHEIDER: I did not receive any directives to that effect
and we in the country saw the solution of this settlement and
living space problem in the return of our colonies and we were
of the firm conviction that this could be achieved by peaceful means.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did not the Political Leaders also see that
a large rearmament program was in progress?
WEGSCHEIDER: We in the country saw but little of the
rearmament. Only at a Reichsparteitag-I do not recall the exact
year-did we see that there were somewhat more airplanes and
more tanks. We became convinced that a country and a people
like Germany would have to protect her borders for the sake of
her own internal reconstruction and we considered this rearmament
a necessary evil.







31 July 46


DR. SERVATIUS: Were there not aims which could be realized
only through wars of aggression, such as characterized by the
slogans, "Away from Versailles" and "Germans Unite"?
WEGSCHEIDER: We discussed this point of the program as well
and we saw the union of all German-speaking peoples based on a
plebiscite and on the self-determination rights of the German-
speaking peoples.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did not trouble arise with the Church soon
because of the Party's attitude toward the same? There were attacks
on the Church, you know.
WEGSCHEIDER: No, not in the country, especially as among
the Party members, Ortsgruppenleiter, and Blockleiter no dis-
crimination was made as to whether they were Catholics or not.
We went to church and in my particular Ortsgruppe I and my
eight Political Leaders sang in the church choir. The other church
musicians and singers, about 30 in all, were also Party members,
and belonged to some organization, such as the National Socialist
Women's Organization, the BDM, and the Hitler Youth. That ap-
plied in my district and I believe more or less it was the same case
in other districts as well.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did not the clergymen protest against the
steps being taken by the Party in the Jewish question.and did not
this lead to disputes?
WEGSCHEIDER: As I have already mentioned, there were no
Jews living in the country. Therefore, this problem was hardly
dealt with at all.,
DR. SERVATIUS: Was there not unrest because of the seizing
of political opponents and their being taken to concentration camps?
WEGSCHEIDER: In our Kreis Kempten-Land I do not know of
anyone having been taken to a concentration camp. Only in my
community, and this probably happened right after the assumption
of power, two individuals were sent to Dachau, but, what the cause
and the reason for this was I do not know for at that time I was
neither Ortsgruppenleiter nor mayor. My attention was called to
this matter when in the year 1933 a woman, Frau Bar, from Rottach
near Kempten, came to me and asked me to make an application
for the release of her husband who had been interned at Dachau
for some months, as it was not possible for her to cultivate her
large vegetable garden...
DR. SERVATIUS: You need not give us the details. Just tell
us what steps you took and what information you gave.
WEGSCHEIDER: I made an application and for several months
heard nothing more about it.







31 July 46


DR. SERVATIUS: Was the man released?
WEGSCHEIDER: Yes
DR. SERVATIUS: Did .you speak with him?
WEGSCHEIDER: Yes.
DR. SERVATIUS: What did he tell you?
WEGSCHEIDER: He told me, "I was treated fairly well, the
food was good and the treatment too."
DR. SERVATIUS: Did the Kreisleiter and Gauleiter tolerate this
more or less easy attitude or did they demand severe measures
against all who were not Party members or people who had
interests other than those of the Party?
WEGSCHEIDER: Both Gauleiter and Kreisleiter adopted the
same attitude. They both rejected severe measures and both of
them at meetings always repeatedly made clear to us that we must
gain the good will and the confidence of the people by setting a
good example.
DR. SERVATIUS: Were not SA and SS units formed in your
community so that political opponents could be terrorized?
WEGSCHEIDER: No. There were only very few groups of the
SA in the country districts. Those close by were attached to the
units in Kempten, and in remote communities, such as Obergfinz-
burg, for instance, the members of these two organizations were
united into smaller units. Their activity was purely propagandistic.
DR. SERVATIUS: Was there a unit of the SS there too?
WEGSCHEIDER: In Kempten there was a small SS cavalry unit
but you can hardly call it a unit for this group had only eight or
ten horses. It also served propaganda purposes.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did not the Party press make known to you
the extensive Party demands, as, for instance, on the Jewish
question through Der Stilrmer or on other questions through Das
Schwarze Korps? You know both of these newspapers?
WEGSCHEIDER: Both of these newspapers went far beyond
the ordinary Party program in this point. The Party program
merely specified that the Jews were to be removed from influential
positions. Apart from that these papers were hardly read in the
country.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did you not have to realize that activity of
that sort would lead to an aggressive war and to war crimes, such
as are the basis of the Indictment today?
WEGSCHEIDER: No; the activity of an Ortsgruppenleiter or of
a Blockleiter in the country was of such a nature that it could







31 July 46


hardly give grounds for such a supposition. Our work was purely
social.
DR. SERVATIUS: During the war instructions were given regard-
ing the lynching of aviators who had made emergency landings.
There was a letter of Bormann and Goebbels which gave directives
over the radio and through the press. Did you learn of such direc-
tives from the Kreisleiter?
WEGSCHEIDER: Directives of that sort never reached my hands.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did aviators make emergency landings in your
territory and were they lynched?
WEGSCHEIDER: No.
DR. SERVATIUS: What happened to them?
WEGSCHEIDER: I, myself, had the opportunity to take in an
American flier who had landed about 100 meters behind my home.
I took him into my house and fed him and after perhaps a quarter
of an hour he was sent for by the Kempten police in an auto. In
March 1945-I cannot tell you the exact day-four American
prisoners of war who had escaped from a camp at Eidrunk near
Kaufbeuren were captured after 12 o'clock by the guard who had
been stationed on the Iller bridge at Hirschdorf and brought to me.
DR. SERVATIUS: Was that the general attitude toward this
question and the ordinary way of procedure in your region of
Allgiu?
WEGSCHEIDER: Yes, that was generally so. The population
of Allgau are very good Catholics and we were all of the opinion
that such prisoners of war must actually be treated as prisoners
of war.
DR. SERVATIUS: In your Ortsgruppe and in your Kreis, foreign
workers were employed. Did you receive directives concerning the
treatment of these workers which were contrary to human dignity?
WEGSCHEIDER: No, I cannot say that I received such direc-
tives, for the assignment of foreign workers-there were about
60 of them, Polish and Ukrainian civilian workers-was handled
by the Ortsbauernfiihrer only, and in our area it was customary
for the Bauernfiihrer to discuss all matters of this kind with me.
DR. SERVATIUS: Did you not hear about the fact that these
workers were to sleep in a barn and were to receive their food
there as well?
WEGSCHEIDER: I know nothing about a directive to the effect
that these workers were to sleep in a barn and were to receive
their food there. The Labor Office only gave each Polish worker







31 July 46


a note which was to be turned over to the farmer and which said
that the Polish workers should not eat at the family table and
that they must be at home at a certain hour. In discussing this
matter with the Bauernfuihrer at that time, I told him that this
could not be done with our peasants in the Allgiu. If the foreign
worker involved behaved decently and did his work as well as a
German worker, then he was to enjoy the same rights as the
German worker.
DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, was it not the case that the com-
ments which one heard among the farmers about the Party in the
Reich were such that one would have liked to deviate from certain
points, especially during the war?
WEGSCHEIDER: No., I never noticed anything of that sort, for
we on the land all believed in the Fiihrer's love of peace, for we
knew that Hitler had lived through the horrors of the first World
War, and we were convinced of his desire for peace of which we
were told time and again.
DR. SERVATIUS: Therefore, you dispute the fact that the Polit-
ical Leaders in your district deliberately partook in a conspiracy
to terrorize the population for the purpose of waging an aggressive
war and committing war crimes?
WEGSCHEIDER: No, that was not the case.
DR. SERVATIUS: If, today, an accusation is raised that these
Political Leaders in your area were criminals, would you admit
that?
WEGSCHEIDER: No, that was not the case.
DR. SERVATIUS: I have no further questions to this witness.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I have two things about which per-
haps the Tribunal will permit me to ask a few very short questions.
The first is Document EC-68, which is Exhibit USA-205, and the
Tribunal will find it on Page 21 of their document book.
Witness, I want to ask you about the Bauernfiihrer on your
staff. The Bauernfiihrer was one of the so-called "nonpolitical"
Political Leaders, was he not? Can you hear me?
WEGSCHEIDER: I do not understand you.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I will ask you the question again.
Was the Bauernfihrer on the staff of the Gauleiter, Kreisleiter, and
Ortsgruppenleiter one of the "nonpolitical" Political Leaders who
were said to be merely expert advisers?
WEGSCHEIDER: Yes, the Ortsbauernfiihrer was only indirectly
active in the Ortsgruppen staff.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Now, look at that document and
explain to me the part that the so-called expert was playing in







31 July 48


connection with slave labor. Do you see that document? It is a
document addressed to all Kreisbauernschaften. Do you see that?
WEGSCHEIDER: Yes.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: And it would be the duty of the
Kreisbauernfiihrer to bring any regulations he received in con-
nection with foreign workers to the notice of the Kreisleiter, would
it not?
Witness, please be kind enough to answer my question. Would
it be the duty of ths.Kreisbauernfiihrer to bring to the notice of his
Kreisleiter, regulations and instructions which he received in
connection with foreign labor?
WEGSCHEIDER: I do not believe so. I believe that was left to
the discretion of the Kreisleiter of the Kreisbauernfiihrer and that
things which could not be carried through were passed by.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Are you really saying to this
Tribunal that that expert whose duty it was to advise his Kreisleiter
and keep his Kreisleiter informed and who 'was continually con-
ferring with his Kreisleiter, would never have drawn his Kreis-
leiter's attention to the instructions he had received about foreign
labor?
WEGSCHEIDER: I must mention that I still hear very poorly.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: But I am sure you can hear well
enough to answer me.
WEGSCHEIDER: Yes, now I can hear much better.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: We won't pursue that matter. We
will just see the part that this so-called nonpolitical expert was
expected to play himself. Do you see first of all that the:
"... agencies of the Reich Food Estate, Baden State Peasants
Association... have received the result of the negotiations
with the Higher SS and Police Leader in Stuttgart with great
satisfaction."
Do you ,see that?
WEGSCHEIDER: This point?
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Do you see that "the Baden State
Peasants Association and the Reich Food Estate have received the
result of the negotiations with the Higher SS and Police Leader
in Stuttgart with great satisfaction"?
WEGSCHEIDER: Yes.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Let us just see what these results
are that the Reich's food association was receiving with such
satisfaction. You see on that document that Poles are not allowed
to complain-they have no right to complain, Number 2; 3 and 4




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