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-0 5.

HOUSE OF LORDS, May 13, 1947

Viscount Bruce of Melbourne: My Lords, I crave Your Lordships' indul-
gence for a maiden speech. I have never been privileged to be a Member
of another place in this country, but for some years I was a Member of
another place in another country. Even there, in that young Parliament,
it was always the practice to extend every consideration to the "new boy."
I am sure that in this Mother of Parliaments that practice is even more
rigidly observed.

The matter I have brought to the attention of your Lordships' House
is the Report of the Preparatory Commission on World Food Proposals.
That Report arose out of proposals that were put forward by Sir John
Boyd Orr at the Copenhagen Conference of the Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations. Those proposals of Sir John's had
both a humanitarian and an economic aspect. The humanitarian aspect
was to try to raise the dietary standard of the people in all countries of the
world. The economic objective was that if you raised food standards the
world over it would mean a great stimulus to agriculture; and as agricul-
ture is incomparably the greatest industry in the world, employing some-
thing like 60 per cent of the people who are gainfully employed in the
world, Sir John Boyd Orr's view was that that was probably the best way
to stimulate a general economic advance.
Those proposals received the general approval of the Copenhagen Con-
ference, and the Preparatory Commission were appointed to consider ways
and means by which they could be implemented. I had the honor to be
appointed the independent Chairman of that Commission. The Commis-
sion met in Washington in the latter part of October, and we submitted
our full Report at the end of January. I have a strong feeling that the
findings of that Report have not received the consideration that they
deserve. Almost as soon as we met we became certain of some fundamental
facts. The first was that in the task we had been set of increasing the
consumption of food there was no possibility of achieving anything that
really would matter in the scale of the world's economic situation. The
second fact that we discovered was that even if agriculture were stimulated
in every direction, it was impossible to consider that development of agri-
culture save in the setting of the total economy of every country, because
there is not a single country in the world where agriculture does not play
almost a principal part in its total economy.
The third thing that was brought home to us was that we could not
think merely in terms of food consumption and agriculture, but we had
to get down to the fundamentals of the world economic situation. And,
greatly daring, we did it. The last thing I wish to bring to your Lordships'
notice is that we found we were in a unique position for any international
conference I have ever heard of or attended. At an international confer-

House of Lords, May 13, 1947

ence you have to arrive at some result, some conclusion; you have differing
opinions, and you have to compromise and get some basis on which every-
one will agree. We saw that there was not the slightest need for us to
agree about anything. We could have put in separate reports on every
single thing. All we were asked to do was to consider the facts. If any
delegation did not agree with the views of other delegations there was no
objection to their putting in a minority report, a dissenting report, any-
thing they liked. In the light of that it is somewhat remarkable that when
the Report was published there was not one dissenting view or reservation.
I think that is almost unique.

The first thing with regard to food, we discovered, was that there was
a considerable amount that could be done with regard to the dietary level
in advanced countries. For example, before the war, in the two richest
countries in the world, the United Kingdom and the United States, one-
third of the people were living on a dietary below the standard necessary
for health. I would describe these two as more advanced countries. I
believe many countries are going ahead to bring up their dietary stand-
ards; but we found that if the maximum were to be achieved in this direc-
tion it must have a direct relation with the general economic situation, and
that you could really achieve nothing worth while merely by raising the
dietary standard of the thousand millions who are living at the present
time on a standard that is far below the standard necessary to health.
We also discovered that the majority of countries could raise their
dietary standard by developing agriculture in their own countries. But
obviously it is economically impossible for the advanced high standard
countries to produce the food for the low-standard countries because of
their low purchasing power. They could not pay for the food. We found
that, with modern technique and modern science, there is no particularly
insuperable objection or difficulty in the way of the less advanced coun-
tries raising their dietary standards. We also discovered this somewhat
difficult fact: that the production of food could probably be increased by
modern methods in those countries by as much as tenfold, and even more,
but it would be done with a very reduced labor force, and you have not
contributed very much if you do it in that way.
I give a simple illustration. To deprive a man who has been deriving
a precarious living from driving a wooden plow of even that precarious
livelihood means that you would create a situation that would be worse
than the one with which you started. Consequently, we came to the definite
conclusion that, with any agricultural development, you must have parallel
industrial development. We strongly stress in the Report that you have
to start very modestly. All you would do at the beginning would be to
put into operation the first processing of agricultural products. That would
employ people on the spot. But if you are to get anywhere with that you
must progressively expand until you work up to the point where you may
have great developmental schemes carried out-water-works, irrigation
plans, great power schemes and things of that sort.

World Food Proposals [LORD BRUCE]

Then we found that though all these things were very attractive, they
would cost a great deal, and while some of the money for them could be
found in some of those countries, the hard fact was that great external
credits would have to be provided if they were to do these things. When
we came to that point, we considered whether it was necessary to make
what will be probably the greatest developmental effort ever made in
history. We considered whether there were any urgent reasons why this
vast task had to be undertaken. On the humanitarian side it was obvious
that it should be done. It is the greatest blot on our civilization today
that there are tens of millions of people in the world living at a standard
which is far below that necessary for health. There are countries where
the expectation of life is barely 30 years, whereas in more advanced coun-
tries it is from 67 to 70 years. In addition to these tens of millions of
people, there are millions who are living at a mere subsistence level and
are in deadly peril all the time of starvation. On humanitarian grounds
we did not have much trouble and we did not take long.

We then examined the position from the economic angle, totally ignor-
ing the humanitarian side and every decent human instinct. We just
looked at it as a cold, hard, economic question: Was it economically neces-
sary or not? The conclusion that we came to was that it was absolutely
necessary, in the interests of the world as a whole, to do it. We considered
the matter in three phases. We examined the period between the two
wars and what had happened then and why it had happened. We looked
at the position as it is today, and then we examined what appeared to be
the future probabilities. Taking the between-the-wars period, we found
that in the war of 1914-1918, in order to win the war, production was very
considerably expanded. The all-over expansion was something like 40
per cent. When the war finished, everything went fairly well for some
three or four years. With the exception of a slight recession in 1921, which
was very soon overcome, things went on quite well. They went well
because the world was re-equipping, restocking and repairing the devas-
tation of the war.
But that came to an end, and when it came to an end the world found
itself in a position where production that had been stimulated for war
effort far exceeded the purchasing power that existed in the world at that
time. The result was that you had every country trying to get rid of its
exportable surplus in some market or other. Every country started pro-
tecting itself against the inrush of those things that people were trying
to sell. They took action to protect their own economy. The result was
that we ran into the crisis of 1929-1932 with all its unemployment and
human suffering. In 1933, the Monetary and Economic Conference was
held in London, representatives of 65 nations attending. They deliber-
ated for a considerable time and the only single conclusion they reached
was that the way to deal with the world's ills was to restrict production.
I am happy to remember today that I, as the Australian delegate at that
Conference, absolutely refused to accept that decision. I pointed out that

House of Lords, May 13, 1947
if we were to tell the world that all that could be offered to the millions of
people who were out of employment-there were literally tens of millions,
possibly hundreds of millions out of employment-by those 65 nations was
restriction of production, we were heading for the worst social upheaval
that the world had ever seen.
I went on to add that it seemed to me that we should be merely creat-
ing a breeding ground for Nazism, Fascism and Communism. Unfortu-
nately, after I had said that in the plenary session I was approached, and it
was pointed out to me that as Germans, Italians, and Russians were there,
it was not really very tactful of me to say that. As a result of those repre-
sentations, I agreed to strike out that last bit. I have never regretted any-
thing more in my life. That conference, as I say, recommended restric-
tion of production. It was a ghastly failure. We had a little improve-
ment for a while, but by 1938 the world was just heading for another
economic depression worse than that of 1929-1932. Then the war came
and saved us from. it, even if it gave us something much worse. In the
interval minds have changed. It is almost impossible today to find any-
body who advocates restriction of production as being necessary to cure
the world's ills. Every person-that is, every thinking person, I believe-
is in favor of expansion of production and consumption.
The next point we took was the situation after the war which has just
ended. We examined the position in 1946. We found that production
had been increased infinitely more in this war than it was increased in
the 1914-1918 war, that in the North American Continent alone-in volume,
not in figures-industrial production has been increased by over 100 per
cent and agricultural production by approximately 30 per cent. The
equivalent figures for 1914-1918 were 35 per cent for industry and 10 per
cent for agriculture. When we examined the position we found that
exactly the same things were happening after this war as happened after
the last. Taking the world as a whole, everybody is rather busy at the
moment and engaged in restocking, re-equipping and restoring the devas-
tation of the war. But it is very difficult to see, when that is over, how
exactly the same thing is not to happen all over again; that there will not
be the purchasing power necessary to absorb this enormously increased
production, and that we shall then have the possibility of heading into a
depression even worse than that of 1929-1932. The conclusion we came to
was that the position at the end of this war was much the same as at the
end of the last, but it was charged with a potential disaster much more
serious. We could not escape the conclusion that if a depression of that
sort came, the amount of human suffering and unemployment that would
be caused would be beyond anything we had ever experienced.
I, personally, believe that if it came in America the situation would be
infinitely worse than it has ever been. During the between-the-war-years
American unemployment was announced as amounting to 10,000,000. The
C.I.O. maintain that it was 16,000,000. I am perfectly certain that if depres-
sion did come, American unemployment would reach 25,000,000 to 30,000,-
000. I want to stress that what I am saying is not an expression merely of my
own views. I cordially agree with the findings of the Report, but they are

World Food Proposals [LORD BRUCE)

not merely my views; nor are they the views of a group of experts, econo-
mists, or financiers. They are the expression of views of the 17 Governments
who have signed the Report, and who have unanimously agreed to what I
have just been saying. These 17 Governments include those of the United
Kingdom and the United States of America, the two greatest industrial and
commercial countries in the world. They also include those of Canada and
Australia, two great exporting countries which are rapidly developing indus-
trially. They include the Governments of a number of European countries.
France, Belgium, Holland, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. They also include
the Governments of the two great population centers of the world, China
and India. If the noble Lords will take the trouble to look at the Report,
they will find all this is said, and it has been subscribed to by all these
Governments. I do not think it is at all unreasonable to ask what these
Governments are to do about it.

We must take into account what is being done, or attempted, at the
present time. We have one very good factor, in that almost every nation
has accepted the idea of the national necessity for the maintenance of full
employment. Governments can achieve that up to a certain point, I
believe, by adjustments to their own economy. They can go a consider-
able way to maintain full employment, but I venture to say that that can-
not be sustained indefinitely by internal economic manipulations. (I am
not using the word "manipulations" in any offensive manner.) Upon a
sufficient amount of production, consumption, and trade in the world will
depend the maintenance of that basis of full employment which we all
want to see. The other effort that is being made is at the International
Trade Conference now being held in Geneva. This has as its objective
the lowering of tariff barriers, the getting rid of prohibition and quotas,
and the establishment of what one might call a more respectable and higher
standard for international trade in general. These ideals are admirable,
and I am sure everybody would desire them to succeed, but we have to be
realists in this world, and every one of the subjects with which they are
dealing at Geneva is highly charged with political dynamite. It will be a
miracle if (save over a longish period by evolution) we can achieve what
it is hoped to achieve at Geneva at the present time. Even if the Confer-
ence do succeed beyond one's wildest dreams, I venture the opinion that
this is not going to increase to any vast extent the total volume of world
The other effort that is being made is through the agency of the Eco-
nomic and Social Council and all the specialist agencies of the United
Nations. I want to say at this point that I do not think any of us are quite
satisfied that these agencies are showing the necessary determination and
efficiency to accomplish the objective for which they were created. In say-
ing that, I am not overlooking one very hopeful event that happened very
recently; that is, the appointment, at the recent meeting of the Economic
and Social Council, of the Economic Council for Europe. That is the first
step, and it is an invaluable step, but it must be followed up.

House of Lords, May 13, 1947

I want to visualize how this affects Britain, and what is Britain's posi-
tion at the present moment. I apologize for the simplicity of the way in
which I am going to put it, but I am rather unhappy that the people of
this country do not understand the position, and they are getting more
and more confused by the explanations that are given to them. These
explanations are generally too technical, and apparently too well-informed,
for them fully to understand what it all means. It is not a very complicated
matter, and it is relatively simple for the people to understand where
we are at the present moment. Britain's position is exactly the same as
that of any individual citizen. The individual citizen has the responsi-
bility of providing for himself, for his wife, and for those dependent upon
him for clothing and housing. Britain has to provide the necessary im-
ports of food and raw material to keep the household going. If he has a
plan that he thinks will be successful, the individual can probably borrow
money, and he can live on that money until his plans come to fruition.
Britain is in somewhat the same position at the present moment. She
has borrowed-and has credits in America and Canada. But the individual,
if his plans do not succeed and he is not able to meet his obligation, prob-
ably becomes bankrupt, and has to live very hardly and precariously for
the rest of his days, unless something happens to relieve him. Unless
Britain can find out of her own resources the credits that are necessary
to pay for raw materials and food she has to import, her position is exactly
the same. We should never lose sight of this, because unless we can solve
that problem the future is very dark indeed. I want to explain how
Britain has done it in the past, and how she must do it at the moment.
Britain has been very prosperous; she provided far more than her needs
and imports, and she became a creditor nation. But during this century
she had various sources from which her money came-investments over-
seas, her invisible exports and her exports. During the war we sacrificed
our investments overseas, and the volume of our invisible exports-ship-
ping, banking, insurance, and all those things-has now diminished sub-
stantially. We are driven back to the point where we have to rely pri-
marily on our exports in order to meet our necessary commitments.
That is clearly recognized. The Government are conducting a great
campaign to bring home to the people the necessity for exports, and to
that end we have planned production, intensification of effort by the
workers, no reduction of hours or increased pay save against increased
production, more efficient management and control, and the moderniza-
tion of our plant and equipment. All this is designed to increase our pro-
duction and to put us in the position where we can reach the target we
have set ourselves of exporting 75 to 100 per cent more than we exported
in the year before the war. All this is to the good, but there is another
essential. It is not enough to produce; we must know where we are to
sell what we produce. That is the problem we are up against, and we
have to think pretty hard.
The position is that before the war, on production as it then was, mar-
kets were not big enough to absorb what the various nations of the world

World Food Proposals [LoRD BRUCE]

wished to export. The result was that nations were forced to protect them-
selves. They had high tariffs, quotas, prohibitions, currency controls, and
all that sort of thing. But in a speech-a great speech in my opinion-the
other day, Mr. Dean Acheson said some significant things which we would
do well to dwell upon in this connection. He said:
"Our exports"-
that is, United States exports-
"of goods and services to the rest of the world during the current year, 1947, are
estimated to total $16,000,000,000, an all-time peacetime high. Before the war our
exports of goods and services fluctuated around $4,000,000,000 annually."
That is, that in this year, 1947, America, in exports and services, is send-
ing out to the world four times what she was sending out before the war.
I agree that this is an exceptional year. Probably American exports and
services are greater and are not quite normal, but I am perfectly certain
that they are going to remain very much above the $4,000,000,000
referred to.
Another sentence from Mr. Dean Acheson makes that, to my mind,
very clear. He said:
"When the process of reconversion at home is completed, we are going to find
ourselves far more dependent upon exports than before the war to maintain levels
of business activity to which our economy has become accustomed."
With that extra flood of American exports into the world, without some
terrific development in production, consumption and world trade, I main-
tain that there will be no hope of Britain selling in the markets of the
world the extra 75 to 100 per cent. For that reason it seems to me that
Britain has to think, and think very hard, and to determine what is to
be her policy. And she has not too long to do it. The American and
Canadian credits are running out. Next year they will be terminated.
It is clear that it is impossible that in the period of another 18 months, or
even two years, Britain will have reached a point where she can see her
way out of this difficult situation and meet all her requirements out of
her own resources.
Consequently, there is an atmosphere quietly growing now that per-
haps there ought to be another credit. I want to make my own position
perfectly clear. I offered no objection to the first credit. I saw, despite
many arguments that were used, that it was absolutely necessary. After
her terrific sacrifices, and after the complete dislocation of the whole of
her economy as part of her war effort, Britain could not possibly re-estab-
lish herself and reorientate the whole of her economic situation without
a breathing space. She had to have that. I take no violent objection
to another credit, provided-and the proviso is important-we could see,
as a result of the credit, that we should get to the position where we could
meet our obligations out of our own resources. Unless it were on that
basis, I would be violently opposed to another credit.

I want also to suggest what I venture to think are the two methods
by which the United Kingdom could achieve this position. The first is
by the resolute implementation of international co-operation for the expan-

House of Lords, May 13, 1947

sion of world trade through the Economic and Social Council and the
specialized agencies of the United Nations. The alternative is for the
United Kingdom, in association with other British countries and such non-
British countries as are prepared to co-operate, to form a sterling group
to attempt to bring about an increase of consumption, production, and
trade over a more limited area. With regard to the second, I believe a
great deal could be done. I believe if we are driven against the wall, we
can do it. I believe we can save ourselves that way, if it is necessary. But
we have to recognize that that method is only second best. It will not
bring a new era of happiness and prosperity to the world.
For that reason, we must cast it out of our minds until we have
exhausted every possibility of bringing about a great participation by the
nations of the world in the development of plans to increase consump-
tion, production, and world trade. Until we are convinced that that can-
not be done we ought to leave the second course out of our minds. When
we are convinced-if unhappily that is the position-we can come to it.
We should set ourselves resolutely to work; and I am convinced that what-
ever may happen to other nations we shall get through on that basis.
For the moment, I urge that we forget it. If we are going on with world-
wide co-operation, we have to consider exactly where we are going. We
were all greatly encouraged by Mr. Dean Acheson's speech. Personally,
I think it was a speech of great vision, realism, and courage, and it will
be very helpful in the present situation.
In what I am going on to say I may appear to differ from Mr. Acheson,
but I want to make it clear that I am differing only as to methods. With
the broad conception and the general idea behind his speech, I am in
entire accord. The point I want to make is that if Britain-whose very
existence depends upon the result-is to stake everything on international
co-operation, there must be a greater certainty than exists at the present
time that that is going to succeed. I want to suggest a few points. The
first I would urge is that if we are to have a great development of agri-
culture and industry in the world, the instrument through which we have
to work must be the United Nations, through its Economic and Social
Council and the specialized agencies. This task-really the greatest the
world has ever undertaken-cannot be left to any individual nation, and
that fact is brought out very clearly in our Report. The task is too big
for any individual nation to take on. I would point out that the United
States of America was a signatory to our Report. It must be on that wide
The other fact we have to bear in mind which is involved in this plan
is the development of the latent resources of the less advanced countries
of the world. We have to remember that a number of those countries are
developing strong nationalistic tendencies. Those countries are also quite
determined that nobody is going to dominate their internal position; and
even where there is one individual country coming forward and offering
to help them-offering finance and so on-there will be a reluctance to ac-
cept such aid, because those nations would see behind it, through economic
means, a domination being established over their country. To use an

World Food Proposals [LORD BRUCE)
old tag, the attitude of those smaller and less advanced countries is rather
in the nature of timeo Danaos et dona ferentes," which could be trans-
lated that those countries "fear great countries even when they come
bearing gifts in their hands." I do not believe you could ever persuade
them to agree to such help if it were on the basis of an individual country
and not through this great world agency.
The next point to which I want to refer is that the specialized agencies
(and for the moment I would include the Economic and Social Council)
must be made more effective instruments; they must have defined and
practical tasks set. All those agencies, and the Economic and Social Coun-
cil itself, are the children of international conferences, and to all inter-
national conferences go the representatives of anything up to 60 nations.
They all make speeches through their various delegates, they make sug-
gestions; they make recommendations, and, when the party ends, those ideas
are all embodied in resolutions and recommendations to the unfortunate
executive of the agency which has to carry the thing out.
This overloading of the machine is not entirely unknown in other than
international spheres. I believe I have even heard it suggested in this
country But it is outstanding in these international organizations, and
the position we found with regard to the Food and Agriculture Organiza-
tion was that as a result of Hot Springs-where the first conference was
held-Quebec, and Copenhagen, the political parents had fastened on to
the unfortunate organization 350 recommendations and resolutions, 150
of which were marked as urgent. The thing is utterly impossible. With
an unlimited staff working for years they could not have done what they
were asked to do. Our recommendation was that the Director-General of
F.A.O. should pick out what are the immediate, vital tasks which he is
in a position to accomplish with the staff that he has, or any staff that he
can see in sight, and then put them up to his next conference to secure
their endorsement. I believe the same thing must be done by the Secretary-
General of the United Nations, and by the Director, or whatever is the
head, of any other of these bodies; because unless this situation is cleared
up, and the staffs can do their work in an atmosphere where they will not
be overwhelmed, we shall not get anywhere with any of these bodies to
which such high hopes have been attached.
Another observation I venture to make is that, if we are to pin our
faith to international co-operation and to these agencies, then the nations
must be prepared to allow some of their better men to go and take part in
them. I can speak from personal experience of this. At the moment every
Government (one might forgive them, hard-pressed as they are with all
the problems of today) is reluctant to let anybody go who is doing a use-
ful job. But they must let some of them go, or these things will be a failure,
merely run by second-rate people. This is a great danger, and it is hap-
pening at the present moment. I would urge that strongly upon all the
Governments concerned. I apologize for the length at which I am speak-
ing. If your Lordships will forgive me upon this occasion, I promise
never to offend again.

House of Lords, May 13, 1947

The next point to which I want to refer is that there is no body under
the United Nations, in the form of an agency or anything else, which deals
with the question of industrial development. As I have tried to point
out, industrial development must proceed parallel with agriculture, and
there ought to be some organization that is the opposite number to F.A.O.
I should imagine the way it would have to be done is by an ad hoc body
to be created until such time as the International Trade Organization is
brought into existence, which organization, of course, it was contemplated
would do this job. But you cannot have a hiatus until the International
Trade Organization does come into existence. Therefore, I think an ad
hoc body must be created.
The other thing that must be done is that all these agencies must be
co-ordinated. That point is brought out in our Report, but I venture to
say it is not put with sufficient emphasis, for the not unnatural reason that
we were a body representing 17 Governments, and, after all, the United
Nations is composed of 50 or 60, and to go too far in saying that one of those
agencies-namely, the Economic and Social Council-might get on with
its job a little more effectively was not felt to be quite the right thing to do.
We have, however, put it in the Report. I have had an opportunity of
seeing the whole position, and I have no hesitation in saying that at the
moment there is no co-ordination between these vital and essential bodies.
The Economic and Social Council under the Charter of the United Nations
was given the task of providing that co-ordination. I suggest it is abso-
lutely essential. If we are to commit ourselves to international co-operation'
to do these things, then there must be co-ordination between all these
specialized agencies, and the Economic and Social Council must be made
to do the job that was entrusted to it by the Charter itself.

A fundamental of any development scheme is that the latent resources
of the undeveloped countries must be developed. The first thing that
would be necessary, if you are to do that, is to give the help of experts
and technicians from the more advanced countries to other countries, to
advise them upon the projects and schemes that they put forward. That
would not involve great expenditure, but it is urgent and ought to be
done immediately. A point that is brought out in the Report is that, if
our views are sound, when the final restocking and re-equipping of the
world has been completed and the devastation has been restored, we shall
then run into recession. If any of these plans have been started, or any
of these proposals worked out, the demands would just begin to come to
hand when we are likely to be faced with this recession. That point is
seriously urged-that these countries should get the help of technicians and
experts at the earliest possible moment.
Another point is that some great credits will be required. In our Re-
port we have examined all the various sources from which those credits
might come, and we emphasize very strongly that the major responsibility
must rest on the Bank of International Reconstruction and Development,
which was created for this very purpose but which unhappily has not yet

World Food Proposals [LORD BRUCE]
got into its stride, although I understand it has now approved the first
loan to Prague. But if it is to do the job, and the job is to be worth while,
it will require very great resources. Under the Charter of the Bank there
a vast capital is provided.
But the idea behind the Bank is not that all the nations that are sub-
scribers to the International Bank will find the monies directly and in
their apportioned share. What is proposed is that the Bank has, as its
members, all the nations that have subscribed-and the majority of the
nations of the world have-and their obligations under the Charter to
find certain monies is the guarantee of the obligations which the Bank
itself will issue. The Bank itself will issue its own security for the amounts
it is lending to the different countries of the world, and those securities
will have behind them the guarantee of all the member nations. Now
the question has to be faced: How is the Bank going to get its securities
taken up? It is perfectly obvious that the greater part of those securities
will have to be taken up in the United States, for the simple reason that
the United States is the great creditor nation. Other nations really can-
not subscribe in the way the United States can, to take up these securities.
That question will have to be threshed out with the American authorities.
Before we can enter into any international scheme of this sort we must
see where the money is to come from.
I would venture another point which I think must be dealt with, and
that is the terms upon which the Bank is going to get its money. I go
to the length of saying that the Bank ought to get its money on fraction-
ally better terms than the premier securities issued by the United States
Government. I agree that that is going a very long way, but I will give
you my reason for saying it. The securities of this International Bank
will be unique as against any security in the world. They will not have
the backing of any one Government; they will have the backing of all
the Governments that are members of the Bank. The second point we
have to bear in mind is that it is no good thinking in terms of great de-
velopment schemes for the world unless they can get their money cheaply.
Schemes of this sort cannot carry high interest rates if they are to succeed,
and it is vital that they should succeed.
I have very nearly finished, and I apologize once more to your Lord-
ships for detaining you so long. Of course, there are a great number of
Americans who say, "Well, when is America going to cease to be the fairy
godmother to the world?" They are quite convinced that they are doing
all this in the interests of the other poor nations of the world, and quite
overlook the fact that the nation most vitally concerned by all this is
America herself, because she is the country with the great production, and
if she cannot sell that production then it is inevitable that she must come
to economic disaster. America is the country most vitally concerned in
this matter and we must say so. If we are to get anywhere in this world
we have to say what the present position is.
I greatly welcome the reinforcement Mr. Dean Acheson gave to this
idea the other day which, putting it very broadly, was as follows: It is not

House of Lords, May 13, 1947

charity by America to the world, it is enlightened self-interest. That is
exactly what it is. There are a great number of people in this country
who say, "We should not say anything about the part America ought to
play in the development of the world." They beseech us to remember
that America is gradually becoming more world conscious, that she is
gradually shedding her isolationism, and, above all, that we should not
do anything that would embarrass or cause her any difficulty. They sum
it all up by saying, "We ought to be very tactful with the Americans."
With that I totally and absolutely disagree. The Americans are a virile,,
forthright people and they like plain speaking. To my mind, what we
have accomplished up to date is to make them wonder what we are up
to and what card we have got up our sleeve. Tell them the facts, speak out,
and America will never resent it. If you try and be tactful with them you
will come to disaster. May I indicate that I am only expressing a per-
sonal view, and that it has nothing to do with the Report of the Com-
mission of which I was Chairman.
It seems to me, in any case, that we have not very much alternative
as to what we are going to do at this moment, because we have to see what
our future is. To my mind, Britain cannot drift into a position of re-
quiring further credit without a positive policy that holds out some pros-
pect of emerging from her difficulties and again meeting her commitments
out of her own resources. If that is so, we certainly have to say what Is
in our mind and get the points cleared up. The last point I desire to
make is that I think we have to face this situation and endeavor to get
international co-operation with an absolute determination to succeed.
Let there be any halfheartedness, and failure is certain. We must go
forward, determined to achieve this co-operation, and it seems to me there
is every reason why we should succeed. At the present time the world
has the greatest opportunity it has ever had. It is also faced with a
great peril to our western civilization; but on that point I do not propose
to delay your Lordships now.
During the nineteenth century the world made the greatest social and
economic progress that has ever been seen. During that period living
standards were advanced and everything went forward. There is no
reason why we cannot repeat that in the twentieth century. People will
tell us that there are no new continents to open up-with the possible
exception of Africa-that there is no new North America, and no new
Australia. My reply to that is that there is something of even greater
value, and that is all that modern science has taught us and modern
technique enables us to do. I believe that if we went forward to attack
the latent resources of the undeveloped countries, we could achieve, over
the next century, something as big and even greater than was achieved
in the nineteenth century. In the nineteenth century, Britain was the
great creditor nation and Britain led the world. Today America is the
great creditor nation, and it is to America that we must look for leader-
ship. This, to my mind, is the hour of America's opportunity; and I
pray God that, in the interests of the whole of the people of the world,
America will rise to the height of that opportunity. I beg to move for
Papers. [House of Lords Debates]

HOUSE OF LORDS, May 14, 1947

Lord Lindsay of Birker: My Lords, I beg to move the Motion standing
in my name. We are committed to a great increase in the university popu-
lation of this country, an increase justified and necessitated by reasons
I will explain to your Lordships. But we cannot double the number of
undergraduates in this country, and we should have to double them to
attain-perhaps I should say even to attain-the Scottish quantitative stand-
ard. We should have to multiply them more than eight times to attain the
quantitative standard of the United States. We cannot do any of these
things, not even the first, without raising all sorts of questions about the
effect of this revolution on our university system.

I shall try to say something as shortly as possible about these questions,
but I wish to urge the Government to appoint not a Royal Commission
but a Committee, either by asking the University Grants Committee to
appoint a sub-committee of their own members for this special purpose,
perhaps co-opting some people from outside, or preferably, by appoint-
ing a Departmental Committee on which the University Grants Committee
would be largely represented. That is what I urge the Government to do.
The Government have been most generous in providing money for the
expansion of universities. Will they provide just a little of that rarer
quality-reflection on the subject? That is all I ask, but I regard it as of
very great importance, and I hope I shall be able to convince your Lord-
ships of its great importance.
Great changes are imminent in the university education of Great Britain
-particularly in the university education of England-and this is a neces-
sary concomitant of the great revolution in English education brought
about by what I may call the Butler Act, that very great educational
reform. The revolution brought about by the Butler Act may be des-
cribed shortly as the removal of the great reproach on English education
-that secondary education was confined to a small proportion of the popu-
lation. In my view English secondary education was (not only in some
ways; I will put no qualification on it) the best in the world. In my experi-
ence of American universities I used to observe that boys from school
could begin research work in England about two years before they could
be trusted to begin research work under the American educational system;
that is, that the secondary education of this country was about two years
ahead of the secondary education in America. On the other hand, it was
confined to a comparatively small proportion of the population.
In 1938 (the last year for which I have figures) only 28 per cent of
the boys and girls of this country stayed at school beyond the age of 14.
The Butler Act has now removed that reproach-and it was a reproach.
We are now committed to providing secondary education for all. But
(and this is what I want your Lordships to notice particularly) that great

House of Lords, May 14, 1947

reform was connected with changed views as to the nature and quality
of education. The Butler Act did not simply say: "Let us ensure that
all the boys and girls in this country shall have access to what we now call
secondary education" (at that time the education of the grammar school),
but, "Let us bring it about that secondary education shall have three sides
-the grammar school, the technical school, and what is to be called the
modern school." I am sure part of the great wisdom of the Butler Act
was that it realized that when you attempt to make secondary education
available for all, you do not take merely the kind of education which
evolved when it was preserved for a minority. You ask yourself quite
seriously: If we are to have secondary education for all, ought that
secondary education to take on new forms? The Butler Act-or, at any
rate, the reforms accompanying it-said "Yes." That is, you do not just
have grammar schools, but also technical and modern schools.
As anyone concerned with education-particularly secondary education
-is aware, the problem which arises from. this reform is: Can we combine
a high standard of English secondary education with a great increase in
numbers-a threefold increase in numbers? I think we can, but only so
long as we recognize the point which the Butler Act has already recognized:
that for those great numbers there must be different kinds of secondary
education-all, I hope, of a high standard. If we had said: "Let us con-
fine ourselves to calling the education given in grammar schools 'secondary
education'." I do not believe we could, for one moment, have multiplied
the pupils going to grammar schools without affecting the standard of the
grammar schools.

The same problem faces us with regard to university education in
England. I think the university education of this country is of a very
high standard; but it is confined to a small proportion of the population.
Will your Lordships just consider these startling figures of the relative
numbers of university students per one thousand of the population in
different countries? The last figures I have are for 1934. In that year
the figures were these: In Italy, one in every 808 of the population went
to a university; in Germany, one in every 604; in Holland, one in every 579;
in Sweden, one in every 543; in France, one in every 480; in Scotland, one
in every 473; in the United States of America, one in every 125; in
England, one in every 1,013; in Wales, one in every 741. That seems to
me to make a very strong prima facie case. Can we really suppose that
the standard of the intelligence of the English is so low, compared with
the standard of the intelligence of any nation, that there should be that
proportion? The answer is: "Nonsense." There is no question or shadow
of doubt that those proportions are due to social and historical factors;
and they ought to cease.
Do we really believe (I continue putting the point quite generally) that
we need university education as little as all that-one in every 1,013? Lately
there have been a great many more detailed considerations of this ques-
tion. For example, there is the well-known Barlow Report. The Barlow

University Education [LORD LINDSAY)

Report came to the conclusion that in order to produce the number of
properly trained scientists necessary to use our scientific possibilities in
industry and elsewhere, we must, at least, double the output of properly
trained scientific graduates in this country. The Report added-I do not
think with less reason, but perhaps with less giving of reasons-that, in
the opinion of the Committee, the same increase should take place in
arts students. I hope to explain to your Lordships why that is so. In
any case, they did recommend the doubling of the university output of
scientists, with a corresponding increase in arts students. Anyone who
sees what is happening in the universities at the present time, or who,
like me, is continually requested to make room for the ever-increasing
number of young men who want to study in already overcrowded colleges,
must, I think, see that the pressure on the universities at the present time
is not just the temporary effect of the combination of men coming back
from the war and the ordinary number of applicants from the schools.
There are increased demands, and there are demands from new sources;
and I am sure those demands will continue and, indeed, even further
Let me enumerate some of the factors making for that increase. There
is, first, the point made by the Barlow Report. I should have thought
that it was a commonplace that the prosperity and success of our industry
depends to an extraordinary extent on the way in which it is fertilized
by research, and that that fertilization by research depends on the number
of scientists which the universities, or, at any rate, institutions of that
caliber, can supply. Not only is there an increased reliance on research,
but there is also an increased reliance on the universities to organize and
direct it. That in itself produces (this is what the Barlow Report says)
an ever-increasing demand for more students, and, therefore, for more
teachers, more laboratories, and so on.
Further, there is the enormous increase in the national school system
which has been brought about by the Butler Report, with its consequent
increase in the need for teachers. You cannot discuss education at the
present time with any local education authority without coming across the
problem of teachers. One of the greatest defects of English education at
the present time is the size of classes. I think that is a greater defect than
anything else, and it cannot be put right without more teachers. The
supply of teachers cannot be produced without increasing the number of
people passing through the secondary schools and the universities, and
at the moment we just cannot do it. No doubt all kinds of things are
being tried, like emergency training schemes, and so forth, but it cannot
properly be done, I am sure, without a great increase in the provision of
education for teachers, and that has to be done in universities or in
institutions of the university standard.
Then, again, there is the additional demand for professional men-
especially, for example, for doctors. The Barlow Report, adopting that
curious use of English which confines science to biology, physics, mathe-
matics, geology, and what are called the various pure sciences-except for

House of Lords, May 14, 1947

mathematics, I think they are all comparatively pure-refuses that des-
cription to medicine. Medicine is not a science, apparently; it is some
empirical art. Nevertheless, we do know that if we are to have a properly
equipped health service we must have a far greater number of trained
doctors. They ought to be university trained, and they ought to have
some understanding of what research means. That would involve a great
increase in the number of medical undergraduates. I do not think there
is any escape from that.
Further, there are demands from professions which have not hitherto
relied on the universities, which is a very interesting development. More
and more businesses concerned with problems of management are going
to the universities, not just for a man trained in the technical aspect of
business but for one trained in problems of management, welfare, and
things of that kind. There is also a great demand for training in what
one may roughly call social service. I had the interesting experience
last year of having a conference with some dozen representatives of local
education authorities, who were meeting with the Oxford University Extra
Mural. I was very impressed with the fact that these local education
authorities, confronted with the expansion of the social services, were ask-
ing more and more for men trained in the universities to deal with all
sorts of problems concerned with the social services-welfare, and so on.
There are then increasing demands on the universities for specialized
instruction, not necessarily leading to a degree. For example, just a
month ago, when my college thought it had finally met all the demands
for room for undergraduates and had really gone as far as it possibly
could in that direction, the Colonial Office came along and said that they
wanted to bring 150 people to Oxford for special training in the Colonial
Service, and would we mind taking 12? Well, we did mind, but we took
them. Another interesting development to which I should like to call
your Lordships' attention is the increasing demand on the universities
for-to take a phrase from the Army-"refresher courses." One of the
results of the annoying habit of science to develop so rapidly is that
graduates who go into medicine, or into the various spheres where scienti-
fic knowledge is used, find that that knowledge rapidly becomes out of
date. It is well worth while to bring people back to the universities for
short periods for refresher courses. That is a fairly recent development.
I am sure it is going to grow, and I am sure it will be beneficent.

We talk quite lightly about the indispensability of research, but I do
not consider that knowledge which reaches nobody but its discoverer is
worth very much. That is a heretical thing for a university teacher to
say-I ought to believe in knowledge for its own sake-but I really do not
think knowledge is much good unless you manage to spread it through
the people and use it in the population. It is very important, therefore,
to see that those people, workers of all kinds in the community, whose
success depends on their scientific knowledge, should be kept abreast of
modern scientific changes. We all from time to time have sighed and

University Education [LORD LINDSAY]

thought how pleasant it would be if science would take a rest for 12 or
15 years; but in our better minds we know that it would be a bad thing,
and, in any case, we know that science will not do so. We must deal with
that fact. Then, further, there is the whole growing field, sometimes called
extra-mural and sometimes called adult education, for which the need
of teachers is, I think, almost unlimited. Thus it appears to me that
there is no question at all that the demand that our university population
should be doubled is justified, if by university education you mean some-
thing quite wide-namely, education which people undergo whole-time
between the ages of, let us say, 17 or 18 and 21 or 22. I think that demand
is there now, but once the effect of multiplying by more than three the
number of boys and girls receiving secondary education has shown itself,
I very much doubt if the present proposed doubling will be enough.

Suppose one leaves that further prospect alone, and takes this desire
to double the university population. I submit that that in itself raises
some very serious questions which ought to be considered. Are we to do
this simply by asking existing institutions to preserve their character and
to double their numbers? Can we expect institutions to preserve their
character and their standard if they double their numbers? The Univer-
sity Grants Committee-which I mention with the greatest respect, because
I think it is a wonderful institution-has, so far as I understand, already
completed the procedure of asking universities and university colleges how
much they think they can add to their numbers, supposing that they are
given money for staff and buildings and they are assured, through the
far-sighted views of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, that they will be
given that money. When you add up their answers the figures come to
80 per cent out of the 100 per cent required.
The State will provide the money; the Chancellor of the Exchequer
has very largely increased the grant which the State gives through the
University Grants Committee to the universities, and the money is there,
or promised. The buildings at the present time are held up for the want
of licenses, and universities are troubled about the question of staff. I
do not think that the problem of staff will be a problem for very long.
Nobody who, like myself, is teaching at the present time in a -university
and knows something of the remarkable quality of the ex-Servicemen-
many of whom have only just returned-can doubt that in a few years there
will be a very remarkable supply of potential university teachers. They
will have to have some training in research before they can profitably teach,
and it will probably be, let us say, 1949 before this present shortage dis-
appears. But that is only a matter of time.
Therefore, one might suppose that by the mere increase in the num-
bers in existing institutions the problem will be solved-or as nearly solved
as political problems ever are in this evil world. But I want to ask whether
that is the best way to do it. Is there room, for example, for new institu-
tions? Should we take only the institutions which exist and double their
numbers, or should we have new university colleges? They will have the

House of Lords, May 14, 1947
disadvantage at first of being small, but being small is not always a disad-
vantage for a new institution. If they are small they may also be experi-
mental, and there are proposals for such colleges. I am familiar with one
such proposal from the city of Stoke-on-Trent, and your Lordships may
have seen in the papers similar demands from York, Carlisle, Brighton and,
I think, other places. Ought that to be done? I do not think anybody
knows, and at any rate I do not think any authoritative body has seriously
considered the question.
Thirdly, and connected with that, should these new foundations be
of the existing type? Are we quite clear that what we call the setup in
English university education-Oxford and Cambridge, and what are some-
times called the Civic and sometimes the Red Brick Universities-should
be merely perpetuated? Is there not room possibly for further experi-
ments? Anyone who is acquainted with modern American university
education will know that in spite of a lot of things about it-especially
its great State universities-at which we laugh, it has in the last 10 to 15
years made some extraordinarily interesting experiments in small colleges.
I need only mention, for example, an interesting small college at Anna-
polis, which was started five to 10 years ago. There have been more
which have started with new ideas and made great contributions to the
possibilities of university education.
At the present time, besides universities which are capable of granting
degrees and maintaining their 6wn standards, there are the university
colleges-places like Exeter, Hull, Nottingham, Leicester and Southampton.
Their students take their degrees with the University of London, and I
think in the past the University of London has done the greatest service
in this respect for the standard of growing institutions. I am not sure
now whether that is the right pattern. I am not sure whether the obli-
gation to work for the degrees of the University of London does not to
some extent fetter the initiative and the experimenting of the smaller
institutions. I do not say that positively and dogmatically, but I want
to know, and I want someone to look into it.
I myself have had something to do with the proposed experiment at
Stoke-on-Trent. Ever since I first knew it-about 30 years ago-the city
of Stoke-on-Trent has hoped to have a university college. When this
demand for increasing the university population was made, and there was
a prospect that this dream might be realized, the promoters of the scheme
sat down to ask themselves what kind of university college they ought to
have. They took the view-I think rightly-that a local university college
should have a close relation to the distinctive characteristics of the locality
it serves. The distinctive characteristics of Stoke-on-Trent are the pottery
industry and a quite extraordinary development of social services and
adult education. Therefore, if it is to have a university college it should
have a Chair of Applied Ceramics and first-class teaching in physical
That is not to say that it should not have sections dealing with the
sciences on the other side, which would make special emphasis-I do not
like the word but it is difficult not to use it-on what we may call sociology

University Education [LoRD LINDSAY]

-social services, economics, social organization in all kinds of ways. Some
people approve that idea, and some are shocked about it. I do not pre-
tend to be impartial about it because I favor it; but again, I want that
examined. I do not want it pushed aside by people saying that it has not
so far been done and ought not to be done. We want to be able to fol-
low the experimentation which goes on in America. It might be a great
pity if this expansion were used only in a stereotyped way and made more
rigid than the existing pattern of university education.
Fourthly, are there alternatives to meeting all demands for higher edu-
cation, especially higher vocational education, than simply by expanding
the universities? Is there a place in this country for specialized institutions
like those very famous institutions known as M.I.T. or Cal. Tech.? Here
I can say with pleasure that the noble Lord, Lord Cherwell, agrees with
me. He always does, when he speaks of what he knows. Or, is there a
place for institutions like the Ecoles des Sciences Politiques or des Etudes
Polytechniques of France, or the great German Handelshochschule. My
noble friend wrote a letter to The Times last August about that-I think
most convincingly. I do not know the answer, but again I want that ex-
amined. I do not want it to go by default that there should not be such
Further, is there a place in this country for the equivalent of what
is called the American college; that is, the small college giving only a
Bachelor's degree and not the high degrees? These colleges have done
some very interesting things. Here I should like to raise a much larger
question, on which I feel much less positive. How far ought we to have,
besides our old academic universities, something like the American model?
So far, in discussing the prospects of expanded university education in this
country, most people have asked, How many persons are there who do
not now come to our existing universities but who could come to them
and take their existing courses, and not lower the standard? That is much
the same as if, when considering the recent great reform in secondary
education, we had thought only of boys and girls coming to the grammar
Consider the real meaning of that extraordinary American figure of
one in 125 going to a university. Many of the institutions to which these
American undergraduates go we should not consider universities. The
President of Chicago, President Hutchins, relieving a burdened heart on
the subject of American university education, recalls that the answer to
his protest against specialized vocational education was that at one time
the University of California founded a "Fellowship in Cosmetology," on
the very reasonable ground that the practice of "cosmetation" was increas-
ing in California more rapidly than any other profession. There are
ridiculous examples of that kind. And yet I think that part of the great
technical efficiency of America, of which in some ways we are seeing more
and more every day, is connected with the fact that this enormous propor-
tion of American young men have gone to some whole-time institution up
to the age of 21 or 22.

House of Lords, May 14, 1947

I was talking in 1942 to a professor of physics at Los Angeles. Like
another professor of physics, one with whom I am confronted, he had
done a great deal to make our war effort more efficient. I remember his
saying that his experience was that there was absolutely nobody to touch
the English Honors graduate-the first class research student. On the
other hand, he said: "Because a very great proportion of our Army-a
far greater proportion than of your Army-have had not only secondary
but some sort of university training, the application of those brilliant ideas
of your research students is far more easily possible in the American Army
than in the British Army." I do not know how far the noble Lord, Lord
Cherwell, can bear that out; it seems to me the best prima facie case for
such a system, and a good example of the contrast between English and
American university education.
Each has the defects of its qualities, and our business is to try to in-
crease the numbers, as Americans realize to an overwhelming degree
that their business is to increase their quality. I do not want to do any-
thing whatever to lower the standard of the existing English universities
or of that type of education, but I am not at all sure that there is not a
strong case for imitating the Americans in having whole-time education
up to university age. If we did that, we should go very far.

The other point I want to make is how, and how soon, can we expand
universities in this way? At the present time staffs are very much over-
worked. I find it difficult to convince the greater part of the population
that university teachers do work hard. They are overworked on their
own standard-which is, I think, a very high standard. They have to
spend far too much time in administration, and in advising the Govern-
ment and all kinds of bodies. Instead of doing our proper job we are-
I will not say wasting our time-obliged to give instruction to less informed
people. The demand for that kind of advice is very great indeed. I hap-
pened quite recently to come across three instances in which outside bodies
of great importance-one was the Colonial Office and the others were bodies
of equal importance-have come to the university and said: "Would you
lend us 'A.B.' for a year or two years?" That is a demand which is very
hard to resist. When a college is asked by the Colonial Office to second
one of its teachers who alone has the specific knowledge needed for his
particular job, it seems to me that in the national interest one is bound
to encourage him to go; to say to him: "This is your laboratory, and we
will second you for the year." To do that sort of thing to any extent
means increased university staffs, and we cannot increase them quickly;
further, university people of the right standard cannot be quickly trained.
In these times the universities are finding it more and more difficult
to do their proper job and to turn out men with the sort of training that
they ought to have. After all, the highest kind of training-at least the
highest kind of scientific training-depends upon the university under-
graduate being in close touch with the scientific "swell." If you have too
many undergraduates you use your great scientists in administration, and

University Education [LORD LINDSAY]

so lose something extraordinarily precious. You cannot do these things
automatically. Therefore, I want this matter considered. I want some-
body to get down to this and think it out.

Finally, there is one other sphere in which universities are expected
to play an important part-the sphere of adult education. How best are
universities to fit in with the local education authorities. How best are
they to do their work in adult education? Your Lordships will notice,
I hope, that I am not offering answers to these questions; I am only ask-
ing that they should be considered. There have always been Reports.
There have been the Barlow Report, the Percy Report on Engineering, the
Loveday Report on Agriculture, and others; but to my knowledge there has
been no general consideration of the new university problems, of what
the new university setup ought to be. I submit that it is now time that
there should be such consideration, but not, I think, by a University Com-
mission. I say that, partly because a University Commission would take so
long, and partly because university administrative and other staffs are so
overladen at the present time that the burden upon them involved by the
operation of a full-blown Commission would be intolerable.

On the other hand, there is the proposal to ask the University Grants
Committee to make a survey. No one admires the University Grants
Committee more than I do. It is a most beautiful piece of administrative
machinery, by which the State is enabled to give large financial grants to
the other universities and yet not disturb their independence. I know
of nothing like that Committee. I rejoice to think that in that task of
cherishing the independence of the universities, the present Government
are at one with previous Governments. I am very glad indeed that the
Chancellor of the Exchequer has enlarged what is called the "remit" of
that Committee, and strengthened its personnel. But I have this doubt.
This is a Committee whose business it is year by year to consider grants
to the universities. Is that the best Committee to look at the whole setup,
with the idea, perhaps, of some revolutionary change?
The freedom of the university is vital, and yet from time to time that
freedom has been disturbed, and I think justifiably disturbed, by Com-
missions. Your Lordships may remember the description of oriental gov-
ernment as "absolutism tempered by occasional assassination." The
government of the University of Oxford and of most universities in this
country, is purely syndicalism tempered by occasional Commissions. I
think it is good that the State or some authoritative body should from
time to time look at it from the outside and consider what ought to be
done. All professions tend to think how well they do their job, to wonder
why anybody should conceive that it could be done better or differently.
Even my own superior profession is not immune from that academic dan-
ger. Therefore, I have an uneasy suspicion that if only the University
Grants Committee, or even that other great body-which I mention with

House of Lords, May 14, 1947

all respect-the Vice-Chancellors' Committee were asked to report on this
matter, you wougl find how surprisingly satisfactory everything was. If
I had to report on my Institution I am sure that I should say that, con-
scious as I was of the difficulties of other colleges, my own was all right.
Therefore, I should feel happier if this inquiry which I want to con-
sider these long-term problems were in the hands of an independent Com-
mittee on which the University Grants Committee should be strongly
represented, and on which additional members should be appointed. That
is what I want to ask the Government to do. In saying what I have said
I am not in any way reproaching the Government. I rejoice in what they
have done for universities, but I think that there might be a danger of
our stereotyping the present setup and making the development of univer-
sity education in this country too rigid, unless some body of considerable
weight wrestles with these problems. The material is all there; there have
been all these Reports; but nobody has looked at the problem as a whole. I
hope the Government will see that somebody does so. I beg to move for
[House of Lords Debates]

HOUSE OF COMMONS, May 15, 1947

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Ernest Bevin): I wel-
come the opportunity to present to the House a statement-which, I am
afraid, must be taken in the nature of an interim report-on the steps which
have been taken to date in the work of preparing a peace treaty with
Germany. Before I left London I indicated that it would be wrong to
expect too much from the Moscow Conference in the matter of providing
the final settlement of a peace treaty with Germany. I ask the House to
recognize that the form in which we create the new Germany, the methods
adopted for its government, and the mapping out of its future position
in the society of nations will take a long time to realize. It is both im-
portant and complicated. It is as well to remind ourselves that there is
no German Government to deal with, and that the result of the war was
a tremendous smash, with world-wide effects, in which Hitler carried out
his intention of bringing down with him the whole fabric of the German
State. In consequence, there are no precedents to work to, and time is
required before a final settlement can be reached-in fact, the whole of
Middle Europe has really to be rebuilt as a result of this war.
On the other hand, if the task is unduly delayed-and I think the
Moscow Conference brought out the difficulties in all their broad reality,
the differences of approach, and the objectives which the respective Powers
were endeavoring to reach, so that we know now what we have to face
at the next Council of Foreign Ministers-as I say, if the task is unduly
delayed, then the difficulties will get worse instead of better. It is a ques-
tion now of bringing to a head the next stage in the organization of Ger-

Foreign Afairs [MR. BEVINJ

many. I would say at the outset, on many of these issues-Germany and
Austria, and, in addition, the relations between East and West-that if
they are not brought to a much more satisfactory conclusion at the London
Conference in November, no one can prophesy the course the world will
I regard the London Conference in November, with the issues now
brought clearly before us, as probably the most vital in the world's history.
On behalf of this nation, I will certainly work hard to try to reach a con-
clusion, but I must remind the House that this settlement does not lie
in the hands of His Majesty's Government alone. I welcome this Debate,
because all of us are anxious, I am sure, to make the best contribution we
can. I give the House-the assurance that His Majesty's Government will
take into account any points or suggestions which are made. I shall not
speak in any controversial sense, but purely objectively, and I am sure
the House will approach the problem with the same sense of responsibility.

Dealing first with the methods of approach, I would say that the Con-
ference opened with the examination of the Control Council's Report. It
was a voluminous and a very valuable report. Much in that report had
been agreed by the representatives of the Powers in Berlin, but a very
large amount had not, and that which had not found agreement raised
great and fundamental issues, which we proceeded to examine. The
British delegation felt that they must take steps to avoid misunderstanding
in the future, and therefore reserved their position on separate items, until
we could see the picture as a whole arising out of these discussions. This
was a wise decision, and other delegations came to a similar view later,
as the issues were found to dovetail, as it were, one into the other. Arising
out of the report came such questions as demilitarization, de-Nazification,
democratization, territorial reorganization and the problem of displaced
persons, as well as a large number of vital economic questions.
In this connection, there has, unfortunately, grown up the habit of hurl-
ing charges about some of these problems. I do not think it is wise. This
happened particularly about de-Nazification when that was discussed. His
Majesty's Government were accused of employing Nazis, and of protecting
them. When examined, the accusation was found to be quite untrue.
Out of the names given me, only one was of a person still in employment,
and he had been acquitted by the proper court of being a Nazi. In turn
I, of course, had to give the Soviet delegation, as a result of our informa-
tion, names of Nazis employed by them, which were not disputed. When
one examines the enormous task that the Control Council and the adminis-
tration were given to do, in rooting out the worst elements of Nazism
after the indoctrination carried on by Hitler, one realizes that they have
done a great job. Therefore, I think it is better in future, for all of us, if
we find that we have an idea that one or the other of the Powers is not
doing what- we feel ought to be done in administration, to communicate
with one another and investigate it rather than make it a first-class issue
between Powers.

House of Commons, May 15, 1947

All these things led on to a discussion of fundamental issues in which
agreement was found on some points, divergence of opinion on others,
and disagreement on the remainder. I will try to set out briefly the ad-
vances which were made and where the fundamental differences exist. The
method that I adopted was to bring all these proposals together. I did
this in a document called Supplementary Principles to Govern the Treat-
ment of Germany. We circulated it to the Council of Foreign 'Ministers
on 31st March. I claim that this document set forth a constructive and
comprehensive plan, not for the final solution of Germany, but for the
next stage. It is strictly related to the carrying out of the Potsdam Agree-
ment, and supplements, in the light of experience, the principles contained
in that Agreement.
I am not one of those who want to turn down the Potsdam Agreement.
What I want to do is to carry it out in all its phases, without question and
without qualification, and, if I may say so, without selection, which is
very important. The document to which I refer gives our point of view
on the political and economic principles, reparations and the level of in-
dustry in Germany, and covers not only points of major importance, but
also minor questions which cannot be ignored. Here let me say that
there is a tendency to try to settle points of major importance ignoring
consequential minor questions-that is minor questions of the moment-
but these minor questions eventually loom into big questions affecting
interpretation and action and lead to disagreements. I will not today
weary the House by going through this document, but in order that it may
be read in the context with what I have to say, I will, with permission,
arrange for it to be immediately available in the Vote Office.

When we came to deal with demilitarization, the whole question of
reparations, past, present and future, came up. And on this, if I may
deal with the past for a moment, our position has been as follows. We
agreed to the Potsdam decision; we proceeded to operate it; but in operat-
ing it, it was found to be bound up with economic unity and a balanced
economy, and when this economic unity was not achieved, difficulties ob-
viously arose with regard to the part of the Potsdam Agreement dealing
with reparations. It was part of a combined whole. In addition, the
basis of Potsdam reparations, depended on the level of industry. It was
decided at Potsdam, for instance, that sufficient plant should be left in
Germany to give the Germans a reasonable standard of life, but to restrict
any danger of Germany maintaining a war potential. For instance, what
are now known as "Category I plants" are war plants. I agreed at once
that they should be removed urgently, irrespective of the fact that other
parts of the Potsdam Agreement were not being given effect. I thought it
was better to have no further argument about what were purely war plants
and that, therefore, we would deliver them where possible to the Russians
and to the other Allies in accordance with the proportion decided at
Arising next is the question of the plants known as "Categories II, III


Foreign Affairs [MR. BEVIN]

and IV," which are based on a steel output of 7/2 million tons, which
figure I have always protested against as being too low and needing revision.
If you were to take as reparations all the plant at present scheduled under
Categories II, III and IV-much of which can be used for peaceful pur-
poses-you would do a grave injustice and create a worse position than
that which was left in 1918, and possibly have to restore them to Germany
again in order to produce a reasonable and balanced standard of life.
To take them away and then have to replace them is a stupid process.
However, it is interesting to note that His Majesty's Government have
always adhered, as a yardstick, to a German steel capacity of 11 million
tons. It was worked out, I believe, in 1944 when we were examining the
post-war industrial level of Germany, and it has turned out to be correct.
Soviet Russia and the United States argued for a long time for 5.8 million;
then they came to 71/ million; now the Soviet Union says 10-12 million,
and the Americans appear to be hovering round a similar figure. I
regret the delay over this level of industry business. It has not been pos-
sible to organize the thing properly because this was not settled. It cer-
tainly handicapped the Moscow Conference in dealing with other problems,
and it is regrettable that agreement was not reached earlier on this ques-
tion and the problem faced in terms of reality.
Again, the problem of the level of German industry brought up the
question-raised by the Russians-of reparations from current production.
The House will be aware of His Majesty's Government's views on this
matter. In the document to which I have referred, I indicated that we
have not closed our minds to this but we must take first things first. They
are as follows: the economic unity of Germany, a balanced economy, and
the repayment of what we have had to put in to keep the Germans alive
since the occupation. I think that is a legitimate claim. I am not talk-
ing about extraneous expenditure; I am talking about what we have had
to put in to keep the show alive, and the sooner that is got through, and
settled, the sooner we can see what, if anything, can be done in connection
with current reparations. But I do not think it will be out of place at
this moment if I draw a deduction from what happened after the end of
the 1914-18 war which has led us to adopt this attitude. I will not go into
great detail, but a few figures will illustrate the point I am making.
In the Versailles settlement, the original demand for reparations from
Germany was for payment of 18,500 million sterling spread over 35
years. The impossibility of payment on this scale was soon realized,
and the demand for reparations was scaled down by successive stages, with
the result that, when reparations ceased in 1932, Germany had paid only
some 900 million sterling. Of this sum, about 515 million sterling was
paid out after 1924 under the Dawes and the Young Plans. Immediately,
in connection with that, long-term loans were advanced to Germany
amounting to 475 million sterling, and these figures take no account
of the short-term loans made to Germany from abroad in the same period,
which were estimated to have brought Germany's short-term indebtedness
in 1932 to a total of 700 million sterling at the 1932 rate of exchange.
I have no intention of following a policy which allows us once again

House of Commons, May 15, 1947

to be placed in a position of making loans on a scale which we know to
be quite irrecoverable from Germany. Furthermore, the effects of the
reparations settlement after the 1914-18 war cannot be judged in terms of
money alone. Reparations took the form of deliveries in kind and deliv-
eries of plant, equipment, and ships, as well as of cash. This was, as I
have said, followed by foreign loans which enabled Germany then to re-
equip herself with modern equipment, in addition to forcing her-or
attempting to force her-to find foreign exchange for the purpose of repara-
tions, this in many cases putting her far ahead of her competitors. In fact,
we had the old stuff and she had the new, and this helped Germany
ultimately to build up her efficient war potential to start the second world
war. That is a process which I think, after an experience of only 25 years
ago, statesmen ought not to follow.

Reparations bring up another problem which is fundamental, and
that is, what was agreed to in these various Conferences during the war?
We are sometimes accused of going back on agreements. But that is not so.
It is true it was suggested at Yalta that 20 billion dollars or 5,000 million
sterling should go to the Allies, of which 10 billion dollars or 2,500 mil-
lion sterling should go to the Soviet Union. Nothing was settled. When
we looked into this in the days of the Coalition Government, we then
estimated that yearly payments on this basis would be roughly equivalent
to German pre-war gross exports, not allowing anything for imports, in
an average year between the two wars.
These exchanges of views were never regarded as binding, and in fact
the British delegation at that time reserved their position. It is also inter-
esting to note that figures of less than 20 billion dollars were also men-
tioned at the same conference. No one was committed to anything.
Then, at Potsdam, I was clearly under the impression-it should be re-
membered I arrived at the take over very late as the result of the right
hon. Gentleman the Member for Woodford (Mr. Churchill) coming back
for the count-that so far as the Western zones were concerned we had
settled reparations by the following decision embodied in the words of
the Potsdam Agreement:
"The proceeds of exports from current production and stock shall be available
in the first place as payment for 'approved' imports."
And it is indicated that this decision is made "in accordance with the
Crimea decision," which was the Yalta decision. It is, therefore, clear that
until there is a balance of payments in Germany, export proceeds from
current production must go towards paying for imports, and the taking of
reparations from current production, although not expressly excluded, can-
not be considered until that stage is reached. I, therefore, was unable at
Moscow to accept the argument that the discussion of reparations at Yalta
represented a decision binding on us to agree to the taking of reparations
from current production now. In addition, I was under definite instructions
from His Majesty's Government that we would not, and could not, agree to
the principle of reparations from current production, which involved Great

Foreign Affairs [MR. BEVIN]
Britain and the British people and the other Allies virtually in paying
reparations to another Ally. Things did not move so well, when we could
not agree on this question. But, I think the whole matter is causing some
thought among all the Powers, and at the next meeting-now that we
understand the position-some solution may be found.

Here I desire to make our position very clear. We have no desire that
Germany should escape payment of her contribution to the rehabilitation
of countries to whom she did so much damage. She must not be allowed to
escape. We must be careful to ensure that the cost is imposed on Germany,
and not on the peoples of other countries who had to put up with her
attacks. As I said at the outset, the problem of reparations immediately
gave rise to the question of economic unity. In this we have been handi-
capped in two ways. In the first place, we agreed at Potsdam to central
administrations in certain fields, and we have been anxious to operate this
agreement ever since. It was to the advantage of the Allies that this should
be done. France, who was not present at Potsdam, could not agree, because
of the claims she had in regard to the Ruhr, the Rhineland and the Saar.
Therefore, as unanimity is necessary in these things and was not obtained,
the agreement was not operated.
Further, it was not operated on the economic side, because it was
understood that there would be a pooling of all the foodstuffs and pro-
duction in the four zones, and proper collection and delivery with a view
to getting a balanced economy in Germany. Had these things been effec-
tively carried out, as agreed, it would have been to the advantage of all
the Allies, and would have helped us now to deal with these other prob-
lems which have since become so acute. But the fact that these arrange-
ments were not operated is not the fault of His Majesty's Government, nor
of any influence from Great Britain.
If the Council of Foreign Ministers is to build conditions of political
stability in the world, it is absolutely essential that no hindrance should
be put in the way of getting economic stability. It is almost impossible
for us to achieve satisfactory results unless the two things go together, or,
at least, are worked on together.
I now turn to the question of political development. Here there is a
divergence of opinion arising largely out of historical difficulties, which
affect the approach of the nations in different ways. At Yalta, there was
a discussion on this problem also, but no agreement was reached. That
discussion was on the basis that Germany should be dismembered, and in
fact a committee was set up to study the question, but it did not get very
far. At Potsdam, the Soviet delegation swung right away from the position
foreshadowed at Yalta, and proposed the central agencies to which I have
referred, presumably to lead up to a centralized Germany. That was the
new policy at Potsdam, as against the conception at Yalta. The United
States, who are concerned about a powerful and centralized Germany, have
always taken the view that, to a very large extent, the new Germany should
rest more and more on the Linder, or on provincial organizations. The

House of Commons, May 15, 1947

French want to go even further and give more power to the Linder to
deal with such subjects as nationality, diplomatic relations, and so on.
The British delegation tried to combine the elements of federalization
and centralization, influenced, I admit, to a very large extent, by our own
constitutional experience in Canada, Australia, and other parts of the
Commonwealth who have developed constitutions of this character.
In presenting our statement, we urged that we should not get involved
in slogans because there has been an attempt to say that the Western
Powers wanted to federalize Germany for all sorts of vile reasons. It really
does not help discussion to deal with foreign affairs in this way. As
there was a tendency to make another first-class quarrel by using such
terms as federalization and centralization, as if they were points of con-
flict, I was anxious that they should be abolished. After all, it is a
purely practical problem in which we must arrive at a conclusion, which
will preserve the political and economic unity of Germany on essential
matters, but which does not over-centralize Germany so that she can again
endanger our security.
We, therefore, approached the question by the method that we should
specify the matters which should be embodied in the powers of the cen-
tral government, and the residual powers, not so specified, should be left
with the Liinder. I feel that if as a result of the discussion we can get a
further objective constitutional approach, much work may be done between
now and November, and these differences of approach may be reconciled.
For instance, one very important point was the desire that the police
should be a national institution, under the control of the central govern-
ment. We strongly objected to that, yet we are conscious that, as in this
country and other countries circumstances may arise in which there should
be some authority at the center in connection with the police, just as there
is here in the Home Office, and in similar institutions in other countries.
We did succeed in arriving at a tentative decision, which I thought
was very encouraging, that the control of the police, their organization,
etc., should rest with the Ldnder with the executive authority over the
police residing in the Liinder, but that certain functions with regard to
the investigation of crime and other matters, which may be worked out,
might be co-ordinated, so that the State might have the advantage of the
police. The main objective we have to reach in this matter is to prevent
the development again in Germany of a police State, which is the very
antithesis of democracy. It does not matter how many elections there are;
if there is a powerful secret police, operated by a single Minister, in secret,
which can inculcate fear into the people of a country, there is no democracy;
you are not within miles of it. I made it clear that this must not be
created again. Nothing could be more terrifying than the Hitler police
methods with the development of the Gestapo and everything associated
with it.
Further, the Soviet delegation took the line that we should follow the
pattern of the Weimar Republic for the constitution of Germany. We
agreed that there were many things there which would be useful as a
study, but I had to remind the Council that the President of the Weimar


Foreign Affairs [MR. BEVIN]

Republic had the power to suspend the whole Constitution, which he
did. It was agreed unanimously that such powers as that could not go
again into a new constitution. There were many points in the Weimar
Constitution which would be dangerous to the Allies and to peace, but
there were other points which could be taken into account when building
up the new constitution of Germany. Then there is the question of elec-
tions. As the House knows, nearly all countries on the Continent favor
proportional representation. Personally, I have never been enamoured
of it, but I do not mind whether there are elections similar to our own,
or ones conducted under proportional representation. I think the Germans
are entitled, after discussion, to work that out and not to have imposed
on them one system or the other. What we have to be careful about is
that we do not create in Germany a system which leads to the one-party
system or one-party control.

A matter which I regarded with deep concern was the failure to reach
agreement on the Four-Power Treaty. At the end of the 1914-18 war, the
United States withdrew from Europe, and I must say that in Paris, when
Mr. Byrnes revealed the willingness of the United States for 25 years, and
later for 40 years or 50 years, to enter into an agreement with the rest of
us for the demilitarization and disarmament of Germany, I began to have
visions of peace in Europe for centuries. To us, to France, to all the
Western Powers, this was a vital and important decision. Unfortunately,
the Soviet delegation were not willing to accept the American proposal
unless there was added to it a number of matters not directly related to it,
and upon which we had been unable to agree at the Conference itself.
The United States delegation clearly felt that the inclusion of these mat-
ters would make it impossible to reach agreement on the Treaty at all.
I felt that here was the United' States, responding to the suggestion
which has been urged all over the world that East and West should come
together, and actually designing and planning a great bridge between the
two views to make harmony where there had been at least discord hitherto.
Even if this American proposal did not cover all that was required, the
very establishment of this link, as foreshadowed in the Treaty, would alter
the course of world affairs. I hope and trust that, on reflection, all of us
will be able to strive, between now and November, to create an atmosphere
in which a beginning can be made with a Treaty of this character. If we
do not grasp it now, the chance may never come again. Fortunately, the
Secretary of State, Mr. Marshall, with whom I was glad to have the oppor-
tunity to work, made it clear that the offer had not been withdrawn. I
can only repeat that I trust that wiser counsels will prevail, and that an
attempt will be made in the manner I have indicated.

I now turn to the Ruhr. The claim has been put forward that the
Ruhr should be put under Four-Power control. I regard this claim as
untenable, so long as there is not complete and genuine economic unity

House of Commons, May 15, 1947

in Germany. When such a unity has been achieved, we are willing that
the production and allocation of resources of the Ruhr, in common with
the production and allocation of all the resources of Germany, should be
dealt with under Four-Power control, acting under the authority of the
Control Council. We cannot accept the view that the Ruhr should be
singled out at this time for special treatment. Partial economic unity is
not possible. It would be wrong for us to agree to put the Ruhr under
this control at a time when other parts of Germany are treated as close
In spite of the efforts made, we were unfortunately unable to reach
agreement on another very important matter affecting the preparation of
the German Peace Treaty. The principal point of disagreement under
this head is the question of the extent and method of the participation of
Allied States in the preparation of a draft Peace Treaty. There is strong
feeling among countries who poured their troops and their money into
this great struggle, against being kept on the outer fringe, so to speak, and
not allowed to take part in the reshaping of the world. I have been
anxious to secure the most liberal rights of participation at all stages. I
attach the highest importance to the Dominion Governments, in particular,
who were in the war from 1939 to the end, obtaining such rights as a
recognition of their contribution to victory. A number of other points
were left outstanding on this matter, and the whole question is being
further studied.
We then turned to the question of territorial claims against Germany.
It was hoped that the Deputies or a special commission, would have been
instructed to deal with this, and to report at the next meeting. Unfor-
tunately the Soviet delegation claimed that the new German-Polish frontier
had been settled at Potsdam, and should therefore be excluded from
examination. We were asked to accept the provisional frontier as final,
in spite of the fact that it was agreed at Yalta, and confirmed at Potsdam,
that the final delimitation of the Western frontier of Poland should await
the peace settlement. I am perfectly certain that if this had operated
the other way, and we had made such a claim to the Peace Conference
for a settlement, it would not have been tolerated by our friends for a
All I ask is proper treatment. When one has entered into agreement
it should be carried out as it was intended. The territory between the
Eastern and Western Neisse, it seems, has been filled up, but I am not so
sure about the territory between Frankfurt and the Baltic, which is a
great agricultural area. Before territory of this kind is finally handed
over-and I pronounce no opinion as to what the final view of His
Majesty's Government would be-one is entitled to have the facts before
giving a final decision. That is all I have asked. We have an open mind
on the matter, but we accept the view that Poland must be compensated
for what was taken away from her by Soviet Russia in the East. The fact
is that the Polish population has dropped from 35 million to 22 million,
but there are, as I said the other day, a large number of Poles abroad and,

Foreign Affairs [MR. BEVIN]

if they come back and are given the land in the manner promised to us
at Potsdam, it may create a different situation; but there have been so
many handicaps which, happily, have now been removed.
In the territorial field, we supported the French claim to the Saar-
that is the Saar of the 1919 peace settlement. There are claims from Lux-
emburg, Holland, and Czechoslovakia, as well as a very small claim from
Belgium which really aims at straightening the frontier to include a small
part of the railway which runs inconveniently. In any case, I trust that
we shall be able to succeed, and not one of us, in my view, should deny
to the other the right of getting the facts, nor should we expect a decision
to be made without knowledge of the facts.
There were a number of points upon which, for the time being, agree-
ment could not be reached. If we can achieve agreement on the eco-
nomic principles, however, these other points have a reasonable chance
of settlement. Here are illustrations. There is little difference of opinion
now between at least three delegations about the future operation of Ger-
man political parties and trade unions on an all-German basis. If that
can be agreed ultimately, it will shape the course, to a very large extent,
of the political and economic organization in that country. We also made
some progress on the question of population transfers. I assure the House
that this is one of the greatest difficulties that has to be overcome. Density
of population has to be worked out over the whole of Germany if we are
to get a decent Germany at all.

The questions of refugees, overcrowding, and so on, present great prob-
lems, but we discussed the matter very fully. I was sorry that the sugges-
tion was not adopted that a German commission be established in order
to study how refugees who have already been received into Germany,
should be most equitably distributed. I shall press for that again. On
this, also, three delegations were in agreement, but the French delegation,
who had themselves other important proposals to make for the emigra-
tion of Germans from Germany, were, unfortunately, unable to agree.
The present overcrowding in Germany is worst of all in our zone, and
that tends to depress the standard of life there as against the other areas.
Another vitally important question is that of freedom of movement, since,
unless there is complete freedom to travel throughout the country as a
whole and to take work and to settle down where work and houses are
to be found, there can be no chance of developing a peaceful and demo-
cratic Germany. Three delegations found it possible to agree on this
all-important principle, but one was unable to accept it at present.
I could give many more examples indicating each detailed point which
was made, but I will not weary the House. Although it may seem tedi-
ous, I assure hon. Members it was more tedious for me for six weeks sit-
ting there. Someone said to me the other day, "You must have been born
again." I asked why, and he replied "Because nobody can remember you
with the patience you have got now."
I turn to a number of points upon which agreement was reached.

House of Commons, May 15, 1947

The Council agreed to a law already passed by the Control Council for
the liquidation of Prussia. We pressed for agreement also, and I am glad
that we succeeded, on the repatriation of German prisoners of war. We
have made returns of the members of former German armed forces and
auxiliary services at present in our hands. The Control Council will find
this very useful in planning for the absorption of these returned men into
the economy of Germany. Secondly, we agreed that the repatriation of
German prisoners should be completed by 31st December, 1948.
Mr. Stokes (Labor): Too late.
Mr. Bevin: My hon. Friend very kindly sent me letters with his views, but
I remind him, quite seriously, that to absorb over two million people into
an economy of that character without preparation, might create terrible
difficulties. As no properly worked out plans have been received, I think
it wise to let a steady ratio go back, who can be settled peacefully, as the
industries develop. At least we agreed to that. On the important ques-
tion of political principles a number of points were agreed but, as I have
said, we did not finally put it in the protocol because, this time, we want
to see a complete scheme. There is one matter upon which we made great
progress but failed to reach final agreement. We had proposed that a
German representative body should be nominated at an early date to
advise the Control Council on various matters, including the details of
the provisional German constitution. The Council did agree, with cer-
tain reservations, to the date when the Advisory Council should be estab-
lished, and to its functions. Unfortunately, the proposal broke down on
the question of the composition of the Council. There was a difficulty
between the Linder concept and that of the centralized institutions. If
it is to survive afterwards, I think it unwise to go on having these things
prepared by the Control Council and then find that they have no roots
at all in the country. The association of the Germans with this task at
this stage, especially those who know what Hitlerism meant to the coun-
try, will be very helpful.

Then, as I indicated earlier, we had a long discussion on the division
of powers between the provisional central government that would be estab-
lished, and the various Lander, in order to ensure that the central govern-
ment has sufficient authority, within certain well defined fields. A broad
measure of agreement was reached upon which power should be handed
to them. We agreed that certain legal, economic and financial powers
might be within the competence of the central government. The Council
agreed that the whole question of the provisional political organization
of Germany should be developed by the Deputies, and I hope to see prog-
ress made by the time the London Conference meets. I do not want the
House to assume that because I am not presenting a report of agreement
on everything, there are very strong divergencies. The Conference has
reached a stage in which we got a consensus of opinion even though we
had not really reached the exact form for finding agreement.

Foreign Affairs [MR. BEVIN]

There is another matter on which we reached agreement and that was
complete land reform throughout Germany by the end of this year. That
gets rid of the foundations of the old German General Staff and breaks
up the land. I think it will make for greater efficiency and particularly
for reorganization. Agreement was also reached on another very impor-
tant matter, namely free exchange of information and democratic ideas
throughout Germany. Instead of holding the opinions confined within
the zones, there must be free exchange of views. Upon de-Nazification
we all decided that it should be speeded up, and that responsibility for
completing it would be placed upon the appropriate German authorities.
It was not merely a question of the military government getting rid of it;
the Germans must take a share in getting rid of Nazism in their own
country. In response to a request of mine the Soviet delegation gave an
undertaking to liquidate all Category C warships in their possession, which
include an aircraft carrier and a heavy cruiser, and they gave an under-
taking that that would be completed by August, 1947. I gave an assur-
ance that the Dientsgruppen of which the Soviet had complained would
be disbanded in the British zone at the end of the year apart from those
required for minesweeping at sea, and 5,000 skilled men whom it would
be impossible to replace before March, 1948. I think it will be a good
thing to clean up this business and remove the cause of the complaint.
On the last day of the Conference we briefly discussed a Resolution
which is vital to us and to the Allies. It was a Resolution which Mr. Mar-
shall had tabled, about the size of the Allied occupation forces in Germany.
We have agreed to instruct the Control Council to consider this matter
and to report to us not later than 1st June, 1947, as to what size our
respective occupation forces should be on 1st September, 1947. I think
it is a good thing to have these forces regulated on a Four-Power basis
and remove any dispute about them.

I now turn to the present and the future. I have already stated that
the Potsdam Agreement has failed to function as it was intended to func-
tion. It is clear that it can only function if supplemented and strength-
ened in the light of existing circumstances, and on the lines of the prin-
ciples to which I have referred. I am not now going into the reasons for
the failure. It has thrown up a great deal of bitterness and a great deal
of misunderstanding, and the fact that it did not function caused us and
the United States to enter into the fusion agreement. As regards the
present state of the fusion agreement, I have this to say-it must be made
to work and it must be treated as an urgent economic operation in the
interests not only of Germany but of France and the liberated countries;
in fact, of Europe as a whole. The restoration of the economy of Ger-
many, of France, and of the other liberated countries depends on coal,
but we cannot get the coal, steel and other production needed unless the
workers are fed. Unfortunately there is and there will be for the next

House of Commons, May 15, 1947

three months a serious shortage of food. When once this critical period
is surmounted-and the prospects of imports of grain for May and June
are much better than they have been for some months past-I believe there
is hope of a better food ration for the Germans in the future. More food,
more home production, economic recovery-that is the cycle, but it will
not be achieved without a will on the part of the Germans themselves to
face difficulties and to contribute to their own recovery.
After all, it is not Germany but the whole world that is short of food,
and this is a result of the war for which Germany was responsible. I know
that the German workers are depressed and hampered by low rations, but
the responsibility for their present predicament is their own. We will do
our best to help and we are in close and constant consultation with the
United States Government on this vital problem of food and production.
It is the German people who must work their passage back to economic
recovery and to a standard of life that they can maintain. In fairness 1
should point out that it is not only collections of grain from German
sources that have fallen short. Difficulties for Germany have also arisen
from the supplying countries, for a variety of reasons, being considerably
behind schedule. It is a combination of factors. Apart from food, the
remedy for the present difficulties of Germany lies in the successful fusion
first of the British and American zones, and then of the other two zones
with the combined British and American zones, as soon as they are ready.
The fusion agreement as I have stated so often is open for the others to
join. Ultimately, I hope and believe it will lead to the creation of a
unified Germany.

On my way back from Moscow I stopped in Berlin and held discus-
sions with the Chancellor of the Duchy and the British authorities there.
A number of points in connection with the operation of the fusion agree-
ment have been under discussion between our and the American repre-
sentatives in Berlin. I am able to make the following report on these
discussions. The first issue concerned the use of the funds which had
been made available for the importation of raw materials. It is clear, in
view of the limited size of these funds, that great care must be exercised
in their expenditure and safeguards taken to ensure that exports will result
so that the money expended may be replaced. On practical grounds, it
is very difficult to relate every import to an export. The issue has now
been resolved by an agreement, which sets out in quite a clear manner
the extent to which the available funds may be used. Under the plan,
it is permitted to anticipate the future proceeds of export to a strictly
limited extent. I consider after studying it, that it offers a sound and
workable solution, while at the same time it ensures that the available
funds are laid out wisely and carefully.
The next matter which has been under discussion relates to the status
of the bi-zonal German agencies, which have been established and their
effectiveness for the execution of their task. Agreement has been reached

Foreign Affairs [MR. BEVIN)

upon an ordinance which will define these matters and ensure that the
decisions and orders of the bi-zonal agencies shall have binding effect on
those to whom they are issued. The Ldnder administrations are, rightly,
responsible for implementing instructions put out by the bi-zonal agencies
except for such matters as railways which obviously have to be admin-
istered centrally. However, it is established that the Linder governments
must take prompt action on decisions put up to them by the bi-zonal
agencies. Heavy penalties for the infringement of these orders will be
prescribed, but we shall not limit ourselves to penalties. We have decided
to adopt methods which will give every encouragement to increase produc-
tion. The chairmen of the bi-zonal agencies will be given a measure of
executive authority to enable them to act when the committee governing
the operation is not in session.
Under this agreement we will get greater efficiency and control, and
I welcome the decision that all bi-zonal agencies shall be concentrated in
one place as rapidly as practical considerations permit, and that place is
Frankfurt. The final bi-zonal agencies must operate efficiently, and they
must be associated with the Germans and the Allied Military Government.
I am happy to say that General Robertson and General Clay have reached
agreement in principle on the machinery to achieve this objective. The
actual details of this machinery are now being worked out. I am confident
that agreement will be reached very soon. To sum up, the British and
American representatives in Germany have now reached such agreement
as will enable the operation of our fusion arrangements to function suc-
cessfully, and I am appreciative of the spirit of co-operation on the part
of the American representatives which makes it possible for me to say this
today. For our part, we are throwing all our efforts into the reconstruc-
tion of a peaceful Germany, with the two provisos that no additional
burden can be imposed upon the British taxpayer and that Germany does
not again become a menace to the peace of the world.

Now a word about socialization. I have seen in the London press this
morning some reports from America which indicate the powerful imagina-
tion of journalists' minds. We adhere to the principle of the public own-
ership of the basic German industries. At the moment the coal and steel
industries in the British Zone are vested in the Commander-in-Chief. He
is not, however, the owner; he holds them, as it were, in trust. It would
be impossible if we wished it, or if anybody wished it, to return these
industries to their former owners. Public ownership is the only remedy.
But we must be careful to safeguard the rights of our Allies and ourselves.
I am not in favor of breaking up these basic industries, as a piece of organi-
zation, into a lot of small parts. If there is to be a reasonable and peace-
ful economy, the only way to organize it with security, and later on create
a situation in which international control and supervision can be devised
to operate, is by some form of public ownership. Against that there have
been no questions about the business at all. What we have agreed to do,
in connection with it, is not only to act ourselves but, as the Germans have

House of Commons, May 15, 1947

to operate them and develop them, to consult German opinion on the
matter as we go along.
This great problem of Germany has now, by decision of the Cabinet,
been placed under the Foreign Office and the Foreign Secretary. It was
found that the day-to-day administrative problems could not be separated
from policy. I want, however, to pay a tribute to my hon. Friend the
Minister of Pensions who, in the chaos which followed the close of the
war both in Germany and in Austria, was given a very difficult task indeed.
He manfully dealt with the complicated problems of the administration of
Germany from the outset. I extend a welcome to the Chancellor of the
Duchy, and I promise him that, in dealing with this job, he will not rust up.
In addition, I shall welcome the opportunity now to make contact
with the workers and others in Germany and encourage them in their reso-
lution to recover from their present plight and work their way back with
the rest of Europe into a peaceful, prosperous and democratic way of life.
In fact, if I can get any time to do so, I should be glad to meet the miners
and steelworkers of the Ruhr in order to discuss matters at first hand with
my colleagues out there. I think I ought to pay a tribute to the Com-
mander-in-Chief, to Sir Sholto Douglas and General Robertson, and many
of the other executives out there, who have been under fire a good many
times. I have looked into the job in the few weeks I have been more
closely associated with the administration, and if one has regard to the
bombed conditions, the chaos and the difficulty of evolving order out
of the whole thing, the removal of millions of displaced persons and trans-
planting them back to various countries, I think we may well be proud
of the administrators that we found for this job.

I turn to Austria. It was my hope that in Moscow we should
succeed in agreeing on an Austrian Treaty. It would have been a big
contribution to the return of normality in the Danube Basin and would
have resulted in the withdrawal of troops from the whole of that area.
Our failure to agree on an Austrian Treaty arose from our inability to
settle the question of German assets in Austria. This question has a
long. history. We agreed at Potsdam that no reparations should be ex-
tracted from Austria, but that German assets in Austria should be
included as one of the sources from which German reparations were
to be made, and for this purpose the U.S.S.R. renounced any claims
to German assets in Western Austria, and the Western Powers renounced
any claims to German assets in Eastern Austria. Unfortunately, the Pots-
dam Agreement did not define what a German asset was. The action taken
in Eastern Austria by the Soviet authorities since the Potsdam Agreement
has shown that they interpret the term to cover everything which was
nominally German, irrespective of how it was acquired. The House will
appreciate that in a country like Austria, whose economy was integrated
with that of Germany after 1938, and which was subject to the whole
body of Nazi law directed against certain classes of German and Austrian
nationals, such as the Jews, and against the rights and interests of the


Foreign Affairs [MR. BEVIN]

United Nations, it was essential to unravel many of the transactions, by
which property came into German hands before accepting the whole of
it as being bona fide German property.
In the Moscow declaration about Austria, the three Governments agreed
that Austria, as the first free country to fall a victim to Hitlerite aggres-
sion, should be liberated from German domination, and the three Gov-
ernments stated that they regarded the annexation imposed upon Austria
by Germany as null and void, and considered themselves in no way bound
by any changes effected in Austria since that date. I well remember the
right hon. Gentleman the Member for Warwick and Leamington (Mr.
Eden) impressing upon the House what the agreement was when he came
back, and we were happy to see that result, because of the difficult situa-
ation which the Anschluss had created. In my view, it would be wholly
inconsistent with the spirit and letter of that declaration to accept as
valid all the transference of property which was made after 1938 by the
Nazi laws and methods. It is our view that it is wholly inadmissible for
us to recognize, and worse still to seek to profit from, Nazi misdeeds at
the expense of innocent victims. We have tried with all kinds of formulas
to settle this matter, but we have not succeeded. During the meeting
of the deputies in London, however, we did suggest trying to settle it
on a factual basis, and in the end everybody came back to that method,
and a Commission with an expert committee has now been set up with a
view to getting the facts and then reconciling the 'differences.
This problem of German assets shows what words mean in handling
international affairs. In all the other treaties dealing with the question
of the property of United Nations nationals we used the words "taken
under force or duress," which is intended to deal, of course, with the in-
direct methods that may be adopted. In this case the Soviet delegation
wanted us to agree to "direct force." I think it is perfectly obvious that
that is not exactly what it is sought to say, and we were unable to agree.
However, I say no more about it now, because the Four-Power Commission
are there, and will be starting their work. I am hoping that they will
work very speedily because, while there are such matters as Yugoslavia's
territorial and financial claims, the restoration of United Nations property,
rights and interests in Austria, and the treatment of Austrian property in
the territory of the United Nations, this is the essential thing, and if we
can get this problem settled I think the others will fall into place. The
thing I must emphasize before I pass from Austria is that it is no good
restoring the independence of a country if at the same time a method is
devised which puts a very large portion of its economy under indirect or
direct influence from outside. Neither is it wise to have anything in the
nature of giving to any property taken under those conditions special
treatment outside the law of the country. We must adhere to that.

Just a word about our own relationships with the Soviet Union. I met
Generalissimo Stalin and discussed with him the question of revising the
Anglo-Soviet Treaty of Alliance of 1942. We agreed that we should get

House of Commons, May 15, 1947

on with it. There have been four meetings already, and the matter is
still under consideration. I am hoping that we shall be able to arrive at
agreement on arrangements which will have been built up in peacetime
conditions, and not merely as a result of wartime needs. That would
give it an element of permanence which would be very desirable. I want
to point out that, in dealing with this Treaty, I have had in mind the
obligations which would be imposed, and the need to relate them to the
Four-Power Treaty to which I have referred, so that in the establishment
of these links and relationships everything contributes to what will be
in the end a complete organism.
I also dealt with the question of trade, and the results have been an-
nounced to the House. There are other matters, but I do not think I
will weary the House with them now, except to mention one item in rela-
tion to Poland which is of outstanding importance. I notice that in cer-
tain quarters it has been suggested that I have altered the policy of His
Majesty's Government towards Poland. I have done nothing of the sort.
In the Potsdam discussions I was given certain pledges which were not
fulfilled, and great difficulties ensued. Now, as soon as I see that there is
apparently a change of approach, I am willing to respond immediately
under such circumstances. On 20th March, 1946, I stated in the House
that, while we would not use force to compel the Poles to return to Poland,
I nevertheless wanted them to go back. I have never disguised our firm
conviction that all of them ought to go back; in that we have been perfectly
consistent all the way through.
At present, co-operation between us and the Polish Government in
connection with the return of the Poles is much better than it has ever
been. I think there is an understanding in Poland even with regard to
our intentions about the Polish Resettlement Corps, and thq denunciations
that went on about it have ceased. The Polish Government now see that
we are trying to get a planned and organized method of dealing with a
very vexed problem, and perhaps the House may be interested in what we
have done with regard to repatriation from here. We have sent back
from the United Kingdom to Poland over 66,000 Polish Servicemen. This
does not include a considerable number of Poles who were repatriated
direct from Italy and Germany. For instance, 12,280 Servicemen went
back to Poland direct from Italy. About 28,000 men in the United King-
dom are still awaiting repatriation, which we are speeding up. These
people were held up because the Baltic was frozen, and because of the
very bad weather. They are being sent back now at the rate of 15,000
a month, so that this back-log should be cleared before the end of June.
In addition, since the end of March, just over 10,000 volunteers for re-
patriation have come forward. I think there is a better understanding
of the genuineness of our motives and of our desire not to desert the men
who fought with us, but to get them to go back to their own country.
I am convinced now that I can say to the Poles with greater confidence,
that they can return to Poland with a better feeling than they have hitherto
thought possible. The trade, financial and other agreements which have
been worked out and will be put into effect will, I believe, have a good

Foreign Affairs [MR. BEVIN]

effect on both our countries. In addition, I have been in touch with all
the other countries in Europe, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and the Balkans,
and I find a greater response towards us now than there has been since
the close of the war. A more friendly feeling is beginning to develop, and
if only we can get trade going, in coal and other things, and get produc-
tion in this country to help make our contribution to them, next year
it will be a great advantage to us in our own economy in regard to food
and in many other ways.

Last of all, I want to make a reference to the very happy event that
took place when I left this House to go to Moscow, and to the welcome
which I received in France at Dunkirk on the occasion of the signature
of the Treaty of Alliance between the United Kingdom and France. When
M. Bidault and I met there, it was, I must confess, an emotional moment,
full of the memories that Dunkirk has for all of us. In signing that Treaty
we have confirmed that, while Germany may be down and out at the
moment and is not a danger, we do not forget what France has suffered
from Germany during the past years, and the natural feeling which exists
there, "If Germany revives again, will she endanger France's security?"
It is the policy of His Majesty's Government to leave France in no
doubt as to our attitude, and as anyone who reads this Treaty will see its
purpose is to provide for mutual assistance in the event of any renewal
of German aggression. It makes our position clear at the outset both to
the French and to the Germans, in the hope that it will cause French
confidence to grow and cause the new Germany to take the right course,
and be under no misapprehension that she can break Treaties or ignore
obligations with impunity. That is the spirit in which this Treaty was
signed and I hope that future Governments will never falter or fail, nor
leave France in the position she was in when Hitler entered the Rhineland
and when the other events which led up to the war took place. This
Treaty is intended to be a pledge on the part of the British people to stand
with France for our mutual security and development, in the hope that
together we can make a great contribution to the rebuilding of the world.
Working together, in co-operation, we shall help all our other Allies, help
towards European peace, help towards world peace, and be of benefit, I feel
sure, to humanity for generations to come.
[House of Commons Debates]



Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations,
to the Canadian Royal Empire Society

Montreal, May 22, 1947. I propose to discuss the performance to date of
the United Nations and attempt-although it is full early to do this-to
estimate its future prospects.
I will consider first the United Nations in its most important role of
watching over the maintenance of international peace and security. This
duty is assigned (by Article 24 of the Charter) primarily to the Security
Council, and it is therefore to that body that I shall first address myself.

Before I go into any detail, I should like to emphasize one point-
probably already in the mind of most of my hearers-that the United Na-
tions is not in itself any cure-all. It has in itself no magic powers of heal-
It has, or should have, two functions: (1) it should serve as a forum
in which international problems can be investigated and discussed; and
(2) it should provide a center in which all the Nations (or rather their
Governments) can consult together and through co-operation seek a just
and acceptable solution of difficulties.
On the one hand, it reflects the international mood, and on the other,
it provides machinery, if the Member Governments wish to use it, for heal-
ing differences and finding solutions.
To take first of all the former of these two functions-that of a forum
for discussion. This is one of the most obvious benefits that the United
Nations is able to offer. But, like most things, it can be used well or ill.
There may be cases where two or more States, unable to compose their
differences, voluntarily resort to the United Nations, either to the General
Assembly or to the Security Council, to have them resolved. Therc may,
again, be cases where one or more Member States (or the Secretary Gen-
eral, for that matter, under Article 99 of the Charter) may think it neces-
sary to bring to the attention of the United Nations a situation in any part
of the world which they claim constitutes a threat to international peace
and security.
It is, of course, right that in such cases resort should be had to the
United Nations. But this facility should not be abused. I am sorry to say
that there have been cases which seem to have been brought to the
Security Council by certain Members not directly concerned, and who
are hard put to it to justify their claim that the situation of which
they complain constitutes a threat to world peace. I am afraid that
our Security Council got off to a bad start in London at the begin-
ning of last year. One or two 'very doubtful cases were put on the

The United Nations: Its Future and Prospects [SIR ALEXANDER CADOGANJ

Agenda without warning, and an acrimonious debate was initiated and
pressed to a vote. That is not the way to use the Security Council. It
is not even in accord with the spirit of the Charter. In the case of a
dispute, Article 33 directs that the parties should resort in the first place
to direct settlement between them and lists possible peaceful means of
settlement that might be employed. It would be in the spirit of the
Charter, in all cases, that any Member of the United Nations who wishes
to invoke the Security Council should first try to find other peaceful
means of settling the dispute or remedying the situation. Of course if
that attempt fails, then resort must be had to the Security Council.
But again, when the matter does come before the Council, I believe
that at that stage we should be wise to take a leaf out of the book of
the League of Nations, and devise some regular procedure for attempt-
ing a reconciliation of views. No doubt each party should be heard first,
but I believe that, after that, instead of pursuing a discussion, Gadarene
fashion, to a vote, it would be well to make a practice of appointing a
sub-committee or a rapporteur to sit with the parties, preferably in private,
to seek an acceptable solution. I know that there are many people who
will inveigh against what they would call this reversion to "secret diplo-
macy." Of course it isn't anything of the sort. The sub-committee, or
the rapporteur, would have to report results in public to the Security
Council: only the processes are often conducted better out of the range
of search-lights, radio, and television.
In those cases which were put on the Agenda of the Security Council
in early days, it is difficult to avoid the inference that action has been
prompted by a political-propaganda motive. The initiators of these cases
seem to have had as their principal objective the blackening of a fellow-
Member pd the scoring of points at his expense.
To give one instance, I would say that this applied to the case brought
last year by the Government of the Ukraine who affected to see a threat
to world peace arising from the presence of British troops in Greece. I am
not afraid to make this criticism publicly, as I already made it at the
Security Council itself during the hearing of the case.
Not only can the discussion of such cases achieve no positive good;
the acrimony of the discussion does positive, and gratuitous, harm.
Most of these cases have, fortunately, failed, and it is to be hoped
that we may not see their recurrence.

Then, as to the second function of the United Nations-seeking through
co-operation a just and acceptable solution. What has been the record,
and what are the prospects of the Security Council in this respect?
Now it happened to fall to my lot, during ten years, to attend all the
most important meetings of the League of Nations at Geneva, and I am
therefore in the position of being able to make a comparison-I hope an
objective one-between the technique of Geneva and that of New York
(and London before that).
During most of the period at Geneva, it must be admitted that there

Montreal, May 22, 1947
was a different, easier, international atmosphere, and that may have facili-
tated the operation of a different technique.
They were not all saints at Geneva, but the men who went there
went, it seems to me in retrospect, in a better, and a rather humbler,
mood. There were men there, distinguished men, men of authority, dis-
posed to negotiate and with the power to do so. They did not come there
with their line strictly laid down and their minds unalterably made up.
They came, generally, to work together for agreement. They had their
successes, and that gave them a corporate sense, almost a sense of a higher
That was easier for the Members of the League Council, because apart
from political differences that might arise they had an amount of work
to do in the economic, social, and other fields. They had to deal with
questions that did not always involve national rivalries, and the study of
which united them in the common cause of humanity. I have always
thought, and urged, that one of the defects of the United Nations is
that the Security Council is strictly confined to the handling of disputes.
This gives it little opportunity for corporate work, and breeds a rather
snarly atmosphere of antagonism.
At Dumbarton Oaks, it was urged that the political importance of the
Security Council must not be obscured, and its high mission of maintain-
ing peace must not be blurred by an accumulation of work on social,
hygienic, and other matters. Indeed, it was at that time urged that the
United Nations itself as a whole should be kept free from such extraneous
It was not until the San Francisco Conference that reluctant assent
was secured to the United Nations undertaking such duties, and even
then they were kept carefully from the Security Council and assigned to
a new body, the Economic and Social Council. Perhaps that was inevi-
table. The insistent and increasing claims of the complicated problems
that beset the modern world might have overwhelmed the Security Council.
But it remains a fact that the latter is the worse off for being debarred
from all constructive work. There is just a hope that the Security Council
may find in the work on Disarmament and Security, now entrusted to it,
a field in which it may be able to work harmoniously to a common end.
And I shall hope to say a word about that later. But what I have just
been saying emphasizes what I said earlier, that the United Nations, like
the League, is essentially only an instrument ready to hand and ready to
be used in the right way, if the Governments are minded so to use it.
Of course it all depends on that. A Stradivarius violin is nothing more
than an assemblage of wood and catgut. It takes a musician to get harmony
out of it. A gorilla can tear the most horrifying discords from the best
piano ever constructed. But if the player is at fault, there is no sense
in blaming it on the instrument-still less in smashing it to pieces.

Then, while we are still on the Security Council, that body has one
particular defect of which we have heard a good deal-the Veto.

The United Nations: Its Future and Prospects [SIR ALEXANDER CADOGAN]

I should like to detain you for a short while to recall the history and
origins of the Veto, because that may make it clear that it is not so much
the Veto as its misuse that we have to complain of. Again, the fault is not
so much in the instrument, as in the playing of it.
Decisions of substance had to be taken by the League Council by
unanimous vote. In other words, every Member had the power of veto.
I remember when, even during the war, our Government began to think
out the shape of the future world organization, there were some who
said that the rule of unanimity must go; that it was absurd and an anach-
ronism. As a matter of fact, I could remember only two cases in the
history of the League where a proposal had been vetoed by a single Mem-
ber. But that was the decision; the new organization must take decisions
by a majority vote, whether a simple majority or two-thirds.
But then, on reflection, it became open to question whether it was
reasonable to suppose that a Great Power could be expected in all cases
to accept the verdict of a majority in a matter which it might consider to
be vital to it. And the rule was devised whereby decisions should be
taken by a majority, provided that the majority included the concurring
votes of all the five Permanent Members of the Security Council. Now
that may seem to be very unfair, but it is not entirely nonsense. Under
the League, a Great Power could equally refuse to obey the will of a
majority. And a Great Power, if it feels itself to be strong enough, can
always resist the enforcement of any decision against it. That might mean
war, and if it did, that would be the end, for the time being at any rate,
of the organization itself. I do not say it is a good rule, but I do say
that it is not an absurdity invented to bedevil the proceedings of the
Security Council.
On the other hand, the misuse of the Veto, such as we have seen fre-
quently in the short life of the United Nations is very definitely a grave
For instance, a Great Power A puts up a far-reaching proposal and
fails to carry it. Another Member of the Council then proposes some-
thing less far-reaching, but which would go a good way towards the solu-
tion of the difficulty or the remedying of a dangerous situation. Because
it does not go far enough to suit Great Power A, the latter vetoes it and
it cannot come into effect although it commands the votes of a sufficient
majority, including the other four Permanent Members. So all action
is blocked, and nothing can be done.
Again, a Great P'ower A has vetoed the admission of certain States
to the United Nations organization simply because these States have not
been in diplomatic relations with it-a qualification nowhere to be found
in the Charter.
This is arbitrary and senseless misuse of the Veto.
I said just now that I could not remember more than two occasions
on which a Veto was imposed at Geneva. A Veto has been imposed on
the Security Council, I think, at least 11 times in its short history. That
shows the difference, which I have already alluded to, of the international
atmosphere in the earlier and in the present organization.

Montreal, May 22, 1947

The Veto, of course, has been the object of much criticism during the
past year. At the Assembly of last autumn, we consulted with our fellow
possessors of this right, in order to see whether we could arrive at some
understanding as to the manner in which we should in practice exercise
it and as to the limitations on its use which we could voluntarily impose
upon ourselves. One of our suggestions was that abstention on the part
of a Permanent Member would not imply a veto. The wording of Article
27 of the Charter (which prescribes the rules for voting) says that, "Deci-
sions on all other matter (i.e., other than purely procedural) shall be
made by an affirmative vote of seven Members including the concurring
votes of the Permanent Members." This might strictly be taken to mean
that where one Permanent Member had abstained from voting the motion
had not received the concurring votes of all the Permanent Members and
had therefore been vetoed. We were unable at that time to secure agree-
ment on our interpretation, but I am happy to say that it has now been
established in practice that a proposal that receives the requisite seven
votes is adopted provided that there is no adverse vote on the part of
any of the Permanent Members. This is a great step forward. Under
the old interpretation, it might have been practically impossible for a
Permanent Member to vote for a particular proposal of which he dis-
approved. He can now abstain without vetoing it.
I should like to add that, so far, His Majesty's Government in the
United Kingdom have gone to great lengths to avoid exercising their right
of veto, which they have never yet employed.

The General Assembly is, of course, the supreme body of the United
Nations, though in the political sphere in the maintenance of peace and
security it has not such direct powers and responsibilities as the Security
Council. It is a much larger body, and by that the more cumbrous. It
may make recommendations, but its recommendations are not reinforced
by any article such as Article 25 of the Charter which lays down that,
"The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the
decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter."
But there is no Veto in the Assembly. Questions of substance are decided
by a two-thirds majority; and, consisting as it does of all States Members
of the United Nations, its recommendations must carry exceptional weight.
There may develop a tendency to turn away from the Security Council
and rather toward the General Assembly.
Lately, my Government have submitted the Palestine problem to the
Assembly. It is, of course, too early as yet to say whether this experiment
will prove successful. The Assembly, in this case, is asked to accept a
grave responsibility, and to undertake a task of exceptional difficulty. It
is, at the same time, offered a great opportunity, and we must all hope
that it will prove itself worthy of the trust that is thus placed in it.
Thus far, I have considered the activities and possibilities of the
United Nations from the point of view of its primary duty of keeping
the peace-in a sense, a negative function.

The United Nations: Its Future and Prospects [SIB ALEXANDER CADOGAN)

The United Nations now has to address itself to a task midway be-
tween negative and positive-disarmament and security. Disarmament
is negative; security is positive-very positive. And the two, my Govern-
ment maintain, are inseparable. Without going so far as to say, as some
do, that if you get a real degree of security, disarmament will follow
automatically, I will say that, unless you get some security, you will get
very little disarmament. No State wants to burden itself with the main-
tenance of bloated armaments just for the fun of the thing. At least
no respectable State does so. And we must assume that with the dis-
appearance, for the moment, of Germany and Japan, there are none but
respectable States. Except in the case of deliberate aggressors, States
maintain armaments out of fear of their neighbors. Therefore, you have
got to attack the cause of the disease-distrust.
I suggest that it may be a mistake to attempt at the outset to produce
a complete and ready-made Disarmament Convention. I would much
sooner try to secure agreement on what may appear a minor, even a
timid, restriction on armaments, and see whether that produces any meas-
ure of security which would encourage States to go a step further in dis-
armament, leading to even further security and mutual confidence. I do
not believe that too ambitious schemes are going to lead to sound results.
If we make a modest beginning, do not revile us, but encourage us to
further efforts. We cannot put the roof on the house before we have
laid the foundations. I used often at Geneva to listen to speeches about
the future of the League. A common simile was that it was like an oak
tree that would grow in strength until all the nations of the world would
seek shelter under it. Unfortunately, those very speakers who indulged
in this figure of speech often showed, by their action, that they desired to
pull up the sapling by the roots and use it as an umbrella-which is
bad for the tree.
We must avoid putting too great a strain on the young growth.

There is one particular aspect of the regulation of armaments on which
you may expect me to say a word-the work of the Atomic Energy Com-
mission in which the peoples of the whole world take, or certainly should
take, a direct and vivid interest.
Here I might explain that, although I have the honor to represent
the United Kingdom Government on the Commission, my knowledge of
the technical side of the subject is-to put it at its highest-strictly limited.
On that side of it, I enjoy the advice of the best brains that Britain can
produce-and they are pretty good ones; and when history comes to be
written, it will be known that they made a very large contribution to
that first big bang that was heard and seen over the desert of New Mexico.
The Commission is primarily a political body, dependent for all tech-
nical knowledge on its technical advisers, by whom it is well served. It
is doomed to grapple with the political aspects of the problem, and some-
one must have thought that I was capable of helping in this task.

Montreal, May 22, 1947

But, leaving aside the political aspects, and trespassing for a moment
on the technical field, there are one or two things that I am going to
venture to say. In the first place, I am an optimist regarding the pos-
sibility of controlling this new and terrible force.
Whether and when it can be used effectively for peaceful purposes I
would not dare to guess. Every effort is being devoted to developing this
side of it. I have no idea with what success. But when it comes to the
problem of controlling its sinister capabilities, there are considerations
which, if I have not misunderstood our scientific and technical mentors,
give some ground for hope.
In the present state of our knowledge and technique-and I must
emphasize those words because no one knows what discoveries tomorrow
may bring forth-there are certain encouraging facts:
(1) To make an atomic bomb, you have to start from certain partic-
ular raw materials.
(2) Present information suggests that Providence has concentrated
those raw materials, in sufficient quantities, in certain restricted
and rather few areas.
(3) The conversion of the raw material into dangerous material, in
dangerous quantities, is a very difficult process, requiring enor-
mous plants which cannot easily be concealed.
In the present state of our knowledge and technique-I repeat those
words again-it should not be beyond the bounds of human ingenuity
to devise an effective system of control and inspection.
That is what we are trying to do. That is what we must do. I am
not unhopeful, and I should go on striving until some new development
smashes all that we may have done, and we have to make a fresh start.
We have a long road to travel yet. Sometimes we appear to advance, but
then we slip back again. We can only resolve to spare no effort ulti-
mately to reach our goal.
If we can devise an effective system of control, we shall have served
humanity well. But if we do that, the old-fashioned arms-guns, tanks,
aeroplanes and all the rest of it-will come into their own again. That
is why we shall still have to tackle general disarmament. The regulation
of the old-fashioned arms might have been superfluous while atomic bombs
held the balance. If the atomic bomb is controlled, we shall not have
completed our task until we have established control over the whole
range of armaments as we know them, and as we can see their logical devel-
opment in the future. That is why the Assembly Disarmament Resolu-
tion, which grew out of a proposal of the Soviet Government, retains
all its importance. The Security Council is bound to devote its energies
to a consideration of it, and to plan, as best it can, a balanced and
reliable control of all armaments.

Then there is the obviously positive work of the United Nations per-
formed, or at least allowed to, the Economic and Social Council. I am

The United Nations: Its Future and Prospects [Sin ALEXANDER CADOGAN]

not particularly qualified to speak to you about this, as I have no active
part in it and have no more knowledge of it than is open to all of you.
That Council may have taken on more than it can easily deal with effec-
tively at the moment, but I have no doubt whatever that it will be able
to make a large and valuable contribution to the economic and social
betterment of the world.
If the nations come to realize the interdependence, in these days, of
all the countries of the world, if they could glimpse the height of well-
being that might be attained by co-operation, it may be that the Govern-
ments in time will develop a more co-operative spirit.
In the time at my disposal-or in the time that I dare demand of
your patience-I fear that I have been able to give only a very hasty, and
scrappy, survey of this young organization and its activities.
The principle point which I wanted to make is that the United Nations
is not a compelling power that can bring peace to the world. It is an
instrument that can, and I hope will, be used in God's good time when
the nations wish rightly to use it. We have still got to hope and pray
for that time to come. In the meanwhile, we must keep the instrument
in order, perfect it, and develop it against that happy time.
Its proper use depends on factors that one does not at present find
existent, but which may develop.

I remember, in 1925, Sir Austin Chamberlain, at the League Assembly,
holding up as an example the British Commonwealth of Nations. The
Members of the League were rather shocked. But, of course, the Common-
wealth was and is an example to the world. It is a league, or an organiza-
tion, of independent governments who express their individual views on
every question. These views are naturally not always identical. As in
the case of individuals, the several governments of the Commonwealth
may draw different inferences from the same set of facts, and they very
often do. It never distresses me much if that happens, because I know
that if another member of the Commonwealth reaches a different con-
clusion from that of my Government, it is because he has made a different
evaluation of the evidence; not because he has judged it by different
standards. His standards of morality and his ideals are the same as ours.
Any difference is a purely intellectual one.
Of course, this is easier in the case of the Commonwealth than it is in
that of the United Nations. We have many links that bind us together,
by nature or tradition-the Crown, common heritage, a shared tradition.
Our common heritage gives us a sturdy individualism and independence
of thought, and yet, with that, we can generally agree on fundamentals.
We often differ on details, but when it comes to the fundamentals, it is
impressive to reflect that the Governments of the United Kingdom, Canada,
Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa were-I think it is correct to
say-the only ones that fought through the whole of two world wars.
If it is too much to expect that the United Nations can in any near
future emulate the spirit and employ the technique of the Members of

Question Time in the House of Commons

the British Commonwealth, I am nevertheless sure that the latter, by
their example, can keep ever before the minds of their fellow Members
of the United Nations the ideal at which all should aim. That is occasion-
ally recognized, even if grudgingly, by individual Members of the United
Nations outside our particular pale. They have taken the first step of
recognizing our achievement, and respecting it; perhaps one day they
may find a means of paying it the sincerest form of flattery.
[Official Release]



The first hour of every sitting day in the House of Commons is devoted to
answering questions which Members of Parliament put to Ministers. A
selection of some of the questions asked during May, 1947, is included
below, together with the Ministers' answers.

Mr. E. P. Smith (Conservative) asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer
what he estimates to be the sum received annually by the U. S. film indus-
try from exhibition in Great Britain; and to what extent this is set off
by receipts of the British film industry from exhibition in the U.S.A.
The Chancellor of the Exchequer (Mr. Dalton): About 17 million.
On the second part of the Question, I am afraid I cannot add anything
to the reply which I gave to the hon. and gallant Member for Central
Glasgow (Colonel Hutchison) on 15th April.
[May 6, 1947]
Mr. Erroll (Conservative) asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies
which colonial Governments are still providing food subsidies in order to
prevent further rises in the cost of living; and what sums are set aside
from taxation for this purpose.
The Secretary of State for the Colonies (Mr. Creech Jones): As the
Answer is rather long. I will circulate it in the OFFICIAL REPORT.
Mr. Erroll: Can the Minister say what the future policy of his Depart-
ment regarding subsidies in the Colonies is going to be?
Mr. Creech Jones: That is under consideration now.
Following is the answer:
The following Colonies subsidize foodstuffs from ordinary local revenue
to the extent shown:

Question Time in the House of Commons

Colony and estimated expenditure on subsidization for the financial year 1947 or 1947-48.

Kenya ............... 100,000 Cyprus .............. 650,000 (a)
Tanganyika .......... 20,000 St. Helena ............ 10,000 (a)
Zanzibar ............. 10,000 Trinidad ............ 306,000 (b)
Northern Rhodesia.... 92,000 Jamaica .............. 231,000 (a) (b)
Malayan Union........ 2,700,000 British Honduras...... 23,000 (a)
Singapore ............ 817,000 British Guiana........ 250,000
Mauritius ............ 300,000 Barbados ............. 55,000 (c)
Malta ................ 620,000 (a) Fiji .................. 96,000
Palestine ............. 2,500,000 (b)
The following Colonies subsidize foodstuffs from sources other than
ordinary local revenue, e.g., commodity marketing funds:
Aden Leeward Islands (d)
Seychelles Windward Islands (d)
In a few of the above cases it has not been possible to exclude the
cost of subsidies to certain commodities other than food.
(a) These territories receive certain assistance from United Kingdom funds.
(b) Estimates for the financial year 1946 or 1946-47.
(c) Estimates for the period April-June, 1947, when the position will be reviewed.
(d) The position regarding food subsidies and the means of financing them is under
review. [May 7, 1947]

Mr. Harrison (Labor) asked the Secretary of State for the Home Depart-
ment if he will consider issuing firearms to the police to enable them better
to protect themselves from the armed criminals who are becoming an in-
creasing menace to the general community and the police.
The Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mr. Ede): Firearms
are available for use by police officers who are competent to use them and
who wish to have the opportunity of carrying them for purposes of self-
defense when engaged on specially dangerous duty. In my view the dis-
advantages of the general arming of the police would heavily outweigh
any possible advantage. [May 8, 1947]

Mr. Warbey (Labor) asked the President of the Board of Trade whether
he will make a statement on the progress of the negotiations for a trade
agreement with Poland.
The President of the Board of Trade (Sir S. Cripps): The following
is an agreed statement regarding the trade discussions, which have resulted
in provisional understandings on a number of matters:
1. Agreement in principle was reached with the Polish Delegation,
which recently visited this country, on a number of questions relating to
the long-term development of Anglo-Polish trade. Both countries desire
to restore the pre-war pattern of trade. Poland used to export to the
United Kingdom principally foodstuffs (bacon, butter, eggs) and timber,

Question Time in the House of Commons

and the import of these commodities would gladly be resumed. Poland
wishes to purchase again from United Kingdom traders the machinery
and raw materials so urgently required in the reconstruction of the Polish
2. The arrangements-provisionally agreed are as follow. Poland plans
to place orders with United Kingdom traders over the next three years
(chosen as the period of the Polish Three-Year Plan) for raw materials
(e.g., wool, rubber, tin, graphite) and other goods, up to a value of 20
million, and for machinery and other capital goods up to a value of 15
million. During this period, Poland proposes to export to the United
Kingdom goods to a total value of 23 million (5, 8 and 10 million,
respectively, in each year). It is designed that exports should consist
largely of goods essential to the United Kingdom economy and that food-
stuffs should occupy an important place. In the first year, the Polish
offers include eggs and poultry; in the later years, bacon and butter ex-
ports would be resumed. China, glassware, textiles and furniture, of
types to suit United Kingdom requirements, are among the manufactured
goods which Poland is able to offer in the first year.
3. There is a gap of 12 million between the Polish program of pur-
chases and the prospective earnings from Polish exports to the United
Kingdom. Both sides are contributing to filling this gap. The Polish
Government have offered to supply 0.8 million of coal (about 250,000
tons) for delivery in the first year, when it is important to build up United
Kingdom stocks. They also intend to use, for purchases in the United
Kingdom, 2 million of the Polish gold which will be due to be released
under the Financial Agreement when it is ratified. In addition, the
Polish Government expect to have available about 1 / million from the
realization of various assets in the United Kingdom which will be released
when the Anglo-Polish Property Agreement, at present under discussion,
is concluded.
4. As the United Kingdom contribution, the Polish Government will
be allowed to use 1.5 million of a former gift of surplus stores for the
purchase of raw wool, included in the Polish import program for raw
materials. Further, Export Credits Guarantee Department are prepared
to give guarantees to British manufacturers for contracts for machinery
and other capital goods on terms providing for payment of 60 per cent
of the order by the time of shipment, leaving 40 per cent on which credit
would be extended for a reasonable period. These terms will facilitate
the placing of orders up to a value of 15 million for machinery and other
capital goods.
5. The above understandings are at present provisional only. Polish
experts will shortly visit the United Kingdom to investigate the possibili-
ties of purchasing United Kingdom goods and to conclude contracts for
the sale of Polish goods. (An egg contract has already been made.) A
further meeting of the two official delegations will take place when these
investigations have been completed (in about a month's time) in order
to confirm the provisional understandings already reached.
[May 8, 1947]

Question Time in the House of Commons
The Under-Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs (Mr. Bottomley):
With your permission, Mr. Speaker, I should like to make a statement
about the recent discussions with the Delegation from the Newfoundland
National Convention. As hon. Members will be aware, a National Con-
vention, elected by the people of Newfoundland, has been meeting in the
island since last September. The Convention was constituted to consider
the financial and economic situation of the island and, in the light of
this, to make recommendations to His Majesty's Government in the United
Kingdom as to the possible forms of future government to be put before
the people of Newfoundland at a National Referendum at which they
would vote for the form they preferred.
At the end of February the Convention passed a Resolution asking
the United Kingdom Government to receive a delegation from the Con-
vention to make inquiries as to the financial and fiscal relationship between
the United Kingdom and Newfoundland which might be expected in the
event of the people of Newfoundland deciding upon either continuation
of commission Government, or restoration of responsible Government, or
some other form of Government. His Majesty's Government readily agreed
to this proposal and a delegation consisting of the Chairman and six other
members of the Convention recently came to London.
Three meetings have been held with the Delegation, at which my noble
Friend the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs has answered specific
questions which had been put to him. He was accompanied at these
meetings by the Governor of Newfoundland (Sir Gordon Macdonald)
and the Commissioner for Justice and Defense (Mr. A. J. Walsh). He
indicated to the Delegation that it is the desire of the United Kingdom
Government that the same close and friendly relationships should exist
between the two countries as have always existed. On the financial side
it was explained to the Delegation that it would always be our desire to
help Newfoundland within our means; but my noble Friend thought it
right to make clear, as was explained in this House on 11th December,
1945, that the special difficulties of our financial position must preclude
us from undertaking commitments beyond our power. Hon. Members
are well aware of the immense problems which beset us today in the finan-
cial field, which indeed are greater than was expected at the time when
that statement was made.
My noble Friend was therefore unable to hold out any hope, in response
to a direct enquiry by the Delegation, that the United Kingdom Govern-
ment could consider taking over from Newfoundland liability for the
public loan of about 17,800,000, which the United Kingdom Government
guaranteed in connection with the establishment of the Commission of
Government in 1934. We shall, of course, continue our guarantee and
he indicated that we are prepared to proceed, in agreement with the
Newfoundland Government, with a conversion operation at the earliest
possible date which would reduce the interest payments from the New-
foundland Exchequer. Moreover, in present financial circumstances, the
Delegation were informed that the United Kingdom Government would

Question Time in the House of Commons
not give such firm assurances as they sought that we should continue to
purchase from Newfoundland large quantities of such commodities as
frozen fish and iron ore. We recognize the importance of the industries
concerned to the island's economy and I assured them that we shall always
strive to do our best to assist, but it must be remembered that Newfound-
land has a dollar currency and our measure of assistance must depend
upon our general dollar position.
I need not trouble hon. Members with further details of the meetings.
Nearly all the questions raised by the Delegation had in fact been under
careful consideration for some time, having already been raised by the
Commission of Government. As to the more general financial questions
of the future, my noble Friend told the Delegation that, if the people of
Newfoundland at their Referendum decided in favor of the continuation
of Commission Government for a further period, the United Kingdom
Government would continue to be responsible for Newfoundland's financial
stability. If, on the other hand, the people decided for Responsible Gov-
ernment, this would mean that full responsibility for Newfoundland's
finances would rest with the Newfoundland Government and people, and
that the responsibilities undertaken by the United Kingdom Government
in 1934 would cease.
I am sure that the talks which we have had with the Delegates have
been useful and we hope that the people of Newfoundland will, at the
forthcoming referendum, choose the form of Government best suited to
the interests of their country. [May 13, 1947]

Mr. Rees-Williams (Labor) asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies
if he will make a statement on the establishment of a legislative council
for the Colony of Singapore.
The Secretary of State for the Colonies (Mr. Creech Jones): Yes, Sir.
His Majesty's Government have given careful consideration to the report
of the Committee appointed by the Governor in April, 1946, to consider
this question, and to the Governor's own recommendations, and the fol-
lowing principal decisions have now been reached. The Council will
have an unofficial majority. There will be four ex officio members and
five nominated official members. On the unofficial side, there will be nine
elected members; six of these will be elected by popular ballot of registered
voters (British subjects over the age of 21 without property or literacy
stipulations). For this purpose the island of Singapore will be divided
into four electoral districts, two urban districts each returning two mem-
bers and two rural districts each returning one member. The remaining
three elected members will be elected by the Chambers of Commerce. In
addition, the Governor will have discretion to select not more than four
nominated unofficial members. The Singapore Order in Council, 1946,
provides for a maximum of two such members, but since a communal basis
for elections to the Council has been rejected, it is necessary to increase
this maximum in the interest of any section of the community who might
otherwise have been represented inadequately or not at all. These deci-
sions have been published locally and the Council will be set up as soon
as possible. [May 14, 1947]

Question Time in the House of Commons

Mr. Keeling (Conservative) asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies
whether, in view of the estimated profit of 22,000,000 obtained by the
West African Produce Board from the sale of cocoa, produced chiefly in
the Gold Coast, he proposes to revise the allocation to the Gold Coast of
3,500,000 to be provided by the British taxpayer under the Colonial
Development and Welfare Acts.
The Secretary of State for the Colonies (Mr. Creech Jones): I should
like to correct the estimated figure I gave the House on Wednesday, 7th
May, from 22,000,000 to 20,000,000. Of this the share capital to the
Gold Coast will be between 12,000,000 and 13,000,000. These accumu-
lated trading profits are not available for the general purposes of the terri-
tories concerned but are held in trust for the producers and are intended
to be used for purposes of benefit to them, especially price stabilization, as
set out in the recent White Paper on West African Cocoa Marketing. I
have no intention of revising the Gold Coast's allocation of the funds
available under the Colonial Development and Welfare Acts.
[May 15, 1947]

Mr. Cooper (Labor) asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer what is the
number and name of each separate organization, society, or association
which claims to sponsor the interests of, or improvements in the practice
of, art, music, industrial design, medicine, fine arts, and education, receiv-
ing a direct Exchequer grant from public funds, such as the British Council
and the Arts Council, but excluding hospitals, universities, and colleges
of art and technology; and also the amount of such. grants in each case
covering any one period of 12 months or by way of lump sum grant during
the last five years.
The Chancellor of the Exchequer (Mr. Dalton): The following table
shows grants made in the three years 1943-44 to 1945-46 and the amounts
included in the Estimates for 1946-47 and 1947-48.
1943-44 1944-45 1945-46 1946-47 1947-48

British Council (General grant in aid) 1,882,346 2,460,000 1,817,000 2,454,000 2,913,000
Do.: (Payment for services on be-
half of Colonial Office, and, in
1947-48, India and Burma Office) 342,490 491,000 587,000
UNESCO ......................... 10,836 185,000 154,000
Arts Council of Great Britain (for-
merly CEMA) .................... 115,000 175,000 235,000 550,000 390,000
British Academy .................. 1,000 1,000 1,000 2,500 2,500
Medical Research Council .......... 215,000 250,000 295,000 465,000 698,000
Bureau of Hygiene and Tropical
Diseases ........................ 1,000 1,000 3,000 2,800 3,000
Council of Industrial Design ....... 4,000 55,000 100,000 164,000
The table excludes (on the analogy of the organizations expressly excluded in the
terms of the Question) grants to museums, art galleries, libraries, schools of music, dra-
matic art, and archaeology, and to responsible bodies recognized for direct grant by the
Minister of Education under the Further Education Regulations, e.g., in the Adult
Education field. [May 23, 1947]
[ May 23, 1947]

Other Speeches and Debates

IN MAY, 1947

Texts can be consulted in the Library of British Information Services:
those speeches delivered in the House of Lords or the House of Commons
are published in full in "Hansard," copies of which may be bought
through B.I.S. For prices see page 380.

House of Commons, May 2. Mr. Arthur Henderson.

House of Lords, May 7. Lord Woolton.

House of Commons, May 15. Mr. Anthony Eden.

House of Lords, May 15. Marquess of Reading.

House of Commons, May 23. Professor Savory.

British Speeches of the Day was started
in 1943, when wartime conditions made
communication difficult and slow. With
the current Transatlantic mail services,
and particularly with HANSARD available
more rapidly, the usefulness of British
Speeches of the Day has diminished, and
its publication will cease with this
issue. British Information Services will
endeavor to supply copies of important
British speeches on request.


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