Front Cover
 Rt. Hon. Herbert Morrison
 Rt. Hon. Anthony Eden
 The Rt. Hon. Sir Kingsley Wood,...
 Colonel Oliver Stanley
 Rt. Hon. Sir Stafford Cripps

Title: British speeches of the day
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Table of Contents
    Front Cover
        Front Cover 1
        Front Cover 2
    Rt. Hon. Herbert Morrison
        Page 1
        Page 2
        Page 3
        Page 4
    Rt. Hon. Anthony Eden
        Page 5
        Page 6
        Page 7
    The Rt. Hon. Sir Kingsley Wood, M.P.
        Page 8
        Page 9
        Page 10
        Page 11
        Page 12
        Page 13
    Colonel Oliver Stanley
        Page 14
        Page 15
        Page 16
        Page 17
    Rt. Hon. Sir Stafford Cripps
        Page 18
        Page 19
Full Text




British Speeches of the Day

RT. HON. HERBERT MORRISON, Home Secretary and Minister of
Home Security, February 24, 1943.

RT. HON. ANTHONY EDEN, Secretary of State for Foreign Afairs,
December 2, 1942.

SIR KINGSLEY WOOD, Chancellor of the Exchequer,
February 2, 1942.

COLONEL OLIVER STANLEY, Secretary of State for the Colonies,
March 7, 1943.

SIR STAFFORD CRIPPS, Minister of Aircraft Production,
February 6, 1943.

IN O,. I7
r *^

Issued March 1943.

CHICAGO: . . .


Number 1

The following papers are issued regularly by the British Information
Services, N. Y. and may be obtained on application:

BRITAIN-a monthly magazine, illustrated. (10 cents a copy or
$1.00 a year).

BRITISH SPEECHES OF,THE DAY-a monthly collection of important
speeches made by British Ministers. (free)

of current background information on Britain (mimeographed). (free)

The following publications may be obtained gratis on application:

BRITAIN PLANS (Official statements September 1941-
September 1942).

SELBCTED SPEECHES by Rt. Hon. Winston Churchill

FIRST THINGS FIRST (Speeches by Rt. Hon. Herbert Morrison,
December 20, 1942 and January 10, 1943).

Home Secretary and,~Minister of Home Security
London, February 24, 1943

There are two separate ways of approaching the question of the post-war organi-
zation of the world and they'each lead to the same destination.
One is political and springs from a consideration of the fundamental quesiton of
security. How do we plan to safeguard international peace in the future? Obviously,
the immediate post-war task is to disarm the aggressor nations, and to put it beyond
possibility that they can trouble the peace of the world again, until enough time has
elapsed for a genuine and deep change of heart and mind among their misguided and
deluded peoples. It is natural and right to look forward to a period in which the victori-
ous allies of the United Nations will constitute themselves guardians of world peace.
Among the United Nations, special responsibility rests upon the great powers, particu-
larly on Russia, the United States, China and ourselves, as wielders of what will be an
overwhelming preponderance of the armed might in the world. The sword of world
justice and world sovereignty will be in the hands of these four nations. What the next
stage will be is shown by the history of every politically developed country of the world.
First you have the forging, whether by slow development or quick military action,
of the sword of power. Then comes the problem of backing the power with consent,
of securing a firm political basis for the necessary engine of government or control
That will be the world's problem, too. The four great powers must see to it that in the
course of time they mobilize, behind the elective power they will wield, the free consent
of all the free peoples of the world, including the politically reconstituted nations who
have been the victims of the Axis. Without that, the sword, however mighty its blade
and keen its edge, will soften or splinter in their hands.
This points towards the creation in due time of a genuinely representative world
political association. I do not attempt to give it a name, for names may raise memories
or rouse prejudices. This association must provide a means by which the peoples of the
world will find the necessary solutions for world problems. No more must such solutions
be sought by an unregulated and precarious balance of power or by the perilous bargain-
ings of separate armed nations. It must be sought by reasoned and moderate joint
approaches to questions of difficulty and problems of change, approaches in which there
is a general readiness to sacrifice the old idea of unrestricted national sovereignty in the
interest of common action.
If that is a Utopian ideal, then the hope of world peace is an illusory hope, for
only by this means can that hope be realized. Nor is this Utopia-if it be Utopia-a
private dream of my own. His Majesty's Government must all be Utopians. They have
committed themselves, through the mouth of the Foreign Secretary in a fine parliamentary
speech last December-nothing like as well-known as it should be-to precisely this
objective. A world association is the aim, fully representative (as the League of
Nations was not), with a unified resolve to work out and implement a positive policy
(such as the League of Nations had not), and possessing (as the League's did not) a
force fully sufficient to achieve its agreed purposes and restrain those who would impede
But, incidentally, remember that this does not necessarily mean a very great force.
We hear a good deal of an international police force, mentioned as though it meant
occupation by military forces of all dangerous or strategically significant parts of the
world for all time. A police force means no such thing. It means a civil agency of
inspection, supervision and control, with a military force in the background that need
only be of moderate size, though sufficient for the purpose because it has no competing
military forces to reckon with.
We need not, thank heaven, look forward to the indefinite maintenance of heavy
arms burdens after the clean-up period, always provided and this brings us back to

the starting point, that the crucial problems of world or anization have been solved and
that aggressive nations such as Germany are not permitted even the beginnings of
dangerous rearmament. We must not be lazy or slack about this.
We and the other United Nations must be ready at all times to jump, by military ,
action if need be, on any potential aggressor directly he begins to prepare. There must
be no sloppiness about it, no waiting while the danger grows as we did with the Nazis.
So much, then, for the approach from the point of view of security. The second
great approach is by way of those concrete economic and social problems whose solution
is as essential to the permanent success of a security policy as genuine security is to the
world's progress.
The over-riding need is to secure an expanding volume of production and trade
production within each nation, and trade between them.
The problem is to take the necessary measures to bring this about and to remove
the obstacles in the way of it. *
One thing the world must not do: it must not surrender to economic and financial
things as they are. It cannot ignore facts; it must be practical and sensible. But, no
less, it has the duty wisely to direct the forces of production and to shape them to the
public ends.
Take a topical British example. In the House of Commons debate on the Beveridge
Report last Thursday, I made two issues plain. To enter into large and growing
financial commitments without a proper survey of public finances as a whole and tak-
ing due, but not timorous, account of other financial factors, would be madness. The
British electorate, including the working class electorate, will not stand for that. But
in the same speech, I also stressed-and I make it plain now in and to the City of
London itself, a place that at times needs such a reminder-that we must not sit back
andaccept the national income with its financial consequences as it is. We have to be
active in changing financial facts.
It is essential that steps be taken to increase the national production and income.
Not only that, but to see to it that it is fairly and equitably distributed. We shall not
get the best out of our people unless they know that more production and more effort
will bring a better standard of life as its reward. We have to get away from that
abominable set of economic circumstances in which more production sometimes meant
more unemployment, and more effort meant more poverty. Poverty in the midst of,
and at times because of, plenty has been a disgrace to us all. War has substantially
ended that shame. It will be a scandal if peace starts it up again.
In short, as I have been urging for years past, "Man must become the master and
not the slave of material things."
That doctrine should go for Britain. It should also go for the world. Let all man-
kind assert its dignity and mastery.
What, then, are the main first steps in international policy leading to that end?
In the sphere of world economic relationships let us look first at three great focal
problems, three C's-currency, commodities, commerce. We. have to find a means of
organizing our monetary relationships that will foster an expanding world trade in-
stead of emphasizing the nationalist obstacles in its way. It must be stable without
being rigid. It must enable credit balances to fertilize instead of freezing the world's
resources. It must reflect the real weights in the international economic balance without
turning those weights into millstones round the necks of the nations. This may sound
theoretical, but I believe there is enough general agreement among the world's economic
and financial experts to secure, with a certain amount of give and take, an agreed solution.
-The same is true, I am convinced, of the problem of finding a means to avoid
those catastrophic changes in the prices of the great basic foods and raw materials upon
which world prosperity and the security of the peoples so directly depend.
And thirdly, there is the problem of recqpciling the concern which each country
feels for the state of its own industry and the social balance of its own community with
the requirements of an expanding world economy and the over-riding need to increase

the wealth of all nations by a maximum exchange of their goods and services. Here,
too, I believe a practicable answer can be found in terms of international organization
and in a form-this is essential-which will enable centrally-planped systems like the
Russian, the so-called Liberal systems, and mixtures of the two, all to participate
Though this is hot the time to go into details, it is iy conviction that the technical
means of solving all these problems can be found, and that what is required now is a
determined application of the minds of the nations to the achievement of the agreed
Then, in close association with the three C's, is the question of international control
of investment so as to send the world's capital surpluses to the points where they will
do the most good. Places that are the most backward and starved for capital are not
always those which offer the readiest commercial return on investment. This is where
international control and, I may add, international self-control and long-term thinking
are required. This is one of the ways in which we shall give reality to the Atlantic
Then there are questions of international labor standards, international health
standards and policies and, more important almost than any other, the elaboration of an
international food and nutrition policy which, rightly developed, can itself be one of
the most powerful of all forces in aid of an expanding world economy.
Some of these problems are upon us now, at least in the form of their wartime
equivalents and precursors, the problems of supply and raw materials, the allocation of
relief and rehabilitation. The other problems, if they are not now actually \ipon us,
can clearly be foreseen in their general post-war shape.
The more constructively and systematically we are thinking about these things in
the governing centers of the United Nations, the more surely we are creating the very
stuff and content of post-war international relationships.
So whether we approach the whole matter from the side of politics or from the
side of economics and social affairs, we are led irresistibly to the same conclusion. We
cannot make progress except in organized association. We cannot, none of the United
Nations can, get on satisfactorily with its own affairs except by taking thought for the
affairs of the rest. The impact upon the rest of the world of events in some countries
may be greater according to their size, their material resources, their human skill and
their moral leadership. But it is true of all, of the smallest state as well as the greatest,
that what they have to contribute counts greatly. That is true both positively and
negatively. Each has the power to give; each also has the power to become an economic
or a social plague-spot infecting the rest.
These questions cannot be left until the morrow of the armistice. Mr. Eden, in
the speech to which I have referred, makes it quite clear that this is the view of His
Majesty's Government. And another spokesman in America, the Under Secretary of
State for Foreign Affairs, had made the same point a few days earlier. He said:
"Another essential is the reaching of an agreement between the United Nations, before
the armistice is signed, upon those international adjustments which we believe to be
desirable and necessary for the maintenance of a peaceful and prosperous world for the
We may have to look forward to some years of worldwide war yet. It may be-
no one can prophesy either way-that the European peace will come upon us com-
paratively soon. Too many are conducting themselves as if the war were all over bar the
shouting. But anyone who knows something of the history of Anglo-American
cooperation in the field of supply.will know that even under the most favorable auspices,
with every door of mutual comprehension and communication wide open, it takes a long
time to rub off all the corners, to learn all the mutual lessons and to shake down into a
harmoniously working international unit. This limited and two-sided experience
sharpens the lesson of the need for getting on with the many-sided job that waits in
those even wider fields of which I have spoken.

And what shall be the role of Great Britain herself in this international association
of nations? She has, I would suggest, three parts to play.
In the first place, of the great powers who will inevitably play a leading part .in
hammering out the solutions to these problems, she is the oldest and politically the most
experienced. I do not suggest that she has always used her experience to the full. What
I do say is that she has the opportunity to draw once again for the benefit of all the
world upon that fund of political sagacity and wisdom which has served her and other
nations well in many crises of the past.
She has had longer experience in self-governnent than any country; she has had
a wider experience in world government in all areas, among peoples of all levels of
development than any; she has enjoyed-and oddly enough in some respects I think
that is the right word-she has enjoyed in this war a moral bath and can approach the
tasks of the peace with her instincts and her energies refreshed and renewed. Here is
the quality of skill or genius-call it which you will-which created the first self-govern-
ment (and I need not remind an audience in the City of London how far back that goes),
which nourished the Mother of Parliaments and which has shown evidence of its con-
tinuing vitality in the creation of a world society of self-governing dominions. Need we
doubt that this power and this people can contribute a fund of moral authority, leader-
ship and wisdom to the post-war councils of the nations?
Secondly, the ties of geography, closer than ever in the days of the airplane, make
us a part of Europe. So does tradition, a common culture in art, letters, music, archi-
tecture, in scientific theory and its application and, in many respects, in politics, too. Yet
by our membership of a world-wide Commonwealth and by the ties of a common
language and like institutions which bind us to the United States of America, we are
inevitably far more than European.
We must be a link between Europe and the world, in some respects perhaps an
interpreter, for with our sister nations of the Commonwealth we may be able to explain
the modes of thought, aspirations and policies of the New World to the Old, and of
the Old World to the New. In particular, we may be able to play a part in developing
and cementing relations of friendship between our two great allies, the Russians and the
They have already a great deal in common in those attributes of great size and
large-scale industrial.development which play so great a part in shaping the outlook of
nations. But it may be that we shall find ourselves able to strengthen their mutual
understanding since we shall share with each of the problems and preoccupations which
form no part of the direct experience of the other. With Russia we share a direct and
first-hand concern with the crucial problems of reorganization, development and peace
in Europe; with America, a sea-going, world-wide outlook.
Lastly, it is my conviction that we have a peculiar part to play in world develop-
ment because of the fact that our interests are in so many respects world-wide and
thus identical with the interests of international understanding. Since her growth to
the full stature of a world-power, Great Britain has been a foremost exponent and
practitioner of those ideas and policies which have best served the cause of world
solidarity. Whatever tells most powerfully in favor of peace on sea and land, of good
understanding among the nations, of expanding commerce and greater political freedom
tells powerfully in favor of the interests of Britain and the British Commonwealth. Not
for the first time do I emphasize the point that this is one of our greatest claims to a
position among the leaders of the nations and to the confidence of our associates.
To be frank, I would add that in the period between the two wars, not the most
glorious in our history, we tended to slip back from our own standards towards policies
of separatism and sectionalism and a reluctance to assume full responsibilities in world
citizenship. In our defense, I would only plead that we were by no means the first back-
sliders either in economics or politics. Indeed, we might claim whatever share of the
credit may be due to those who formed the rearguard of that sorry procession of retreat
and defeat which heralded the onset of war. But I hope that future generations will be

able to look back upon that phase as just a tragically mistaken interlude, and that we
shall from now on set our feet again upon the course of international policy which will
range Great Britain as a powerful friend on the side of expansion, peace and progress
in the world.
And so I leave my theme, having, I hope, shared with you the mood which I feel,
a mood qf reasoned optimism about the future of our people and of the world, but a mood
also of eagerness to see us, with our Allies, planning now the future world that we wish
to see. These are the formative years. The sinister forces of chance and chaos must
shape a future that will loom darkly over the lives of our children unless we here and
now begin to shape that future consciously according to our vision.

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
House of Commons, December 2, 1942
[Extract from the speech referred to by Mr. Morrison in the preceding speech]

May I refer to what my honorable Friend said about the administration of the re-
lieved countries? He drew a comparison between the thorough German method and
our own which he feared was not so good. We are at work on these things, and I think
the House will admit that the planning, for instance, of the North African operation,
even in these details, was fully complete. But there is a distinction which the House
must not forget between the German method, which is the method adopted by an invad-
ing army, in occupied countries and our position when we shall arrive as liberators and
when the governments and local authorities of those countries will, I trust, be given the
task of setting order in their own areas. The last thing I desire is that the impression
should get abroad that we want to arrive in Europe to impose our methods and our will
on the countries which have suffered so long from Germany, so though . we think of
these things, we have to approach them with some thought for the sensibilities of the
countries which have suffered so much.
Next,... I should like to say something about our foreign policy now, and about the
trends of that policy so far as it is possible to judge it in the midst of the storms of war.
In the first place, may I submit that foreign policy is a continuous process, going on all
the time, and that what we do now in the midst of war determines the future much
more than what our dreams about an ideal future may happen to be. Here and there
there is a tendency to suggest that foreign policy is in abeyance in wartime. If anybody
would spend a day at the Foreign Office he would learn that that is not so. In fact, the
manner in which and the extent to which we succeed or fail to succeed in cooperating
with our Allies now will, to a very large extent, determine the course of post-war
foreign policy. I have served at the Foreign Office in what was called peace, but was
much more like undeclared war, and have also served in a period of war, and I have.
been impressed by the extent to which, since hostilities have broken out, the Powers
fighting together have, been able to integrate their foreign policy. It is a depressing
thought, but it seems to need an alliance in war to bring about those results which
might have prevented the war could they have been realized in peace. But there it is,
and our aim must be to ensure that this realization which we can achieve now in war
is continued in peace, and it is not going to be easy, because we shall get the inevitable
The moment the armistice is signed and hostilities are over there will be a desire
to let up, a desire to cut our responsibilities, and yet whether we are able to maintain
peace or not afterwards will depend on whether we can carry through this cooperation
which we have now established with other great Powers, in particular with the United

States of America, with Soviet Russia and with China. I was glad to hear one or two of
my honorable Friends utter a note of warning about the need for this. sustained effort
after the Armistice. I believe that is where we, as Members of this House, will have a
responsibility and an opportunity. There will be an immense temptation for everybody
to relax and to say, "Everything is over," and naturally we shall feel infinitely more cheer-
ful; but in passing over into the period of Armistice and peace we must sustain the
effort we are making now. We have got to do it or we shall find we have lost the
greater part of what we have been fighting for.
I have spoken of four great Powers, ourselves, Russia, the United States of America
and China, but I must make it plain that I do not visualize a world in which those four
Powers try to clamp down some form of big-Power dictatorship over everybody else.
What will happen when the fighting is over is that these great Powers, and particularly
ourselves the United States and Russia, will have a virtual monopoly of armed strength,
and that armed strength must be used in the name of the United Nations to prevent a
repetition of aggression. But other Powers, be they great, be they small, provided they
are willing to play their part, will, I trust, be secured in the enjoyment of that inde-
pendence for which they have fought and suffered so long. Indeed, it is essential that
the independence of these other countries should be restored if we are to create a free
international society in Europe. And so I say that in any world system that is to operate
all States will have to play their part.
Now I should like to say a few words about our own position in all this, and then
a few words about each of our great Allies. About ourselves first. Our foreign policy
is to a large extent dictated by our geographical position. Whether we like it or not,
.we are part of Europe. Whether we like it or not, we are also the centre of a great
Imperial Commonwealth, and so we are, in that sense, a world Power too.
Our duty is to act as a bridge, and there is nobody who can play that part but us-
nobody else. It is to us that the nations of Europe will look, and I believe are looking
now, for a message as to our attitude after the war. That is the question they are asking.
What is our message to them? I would like to try, in half a dozen sentences, to give
that message and to see whether the House approves of it. There are two alternatives,
broadly speaking, open to us. We can say, in effect, to Europe, "Europe is the concern
of Europeans? We wish our friends well. Good luck to you; but, when Hitler crashes,
it will be for you to work our your destiny as best you can." I hope we shall not give
that answer. If we give that answer, we abdicate our responsibilities and we are, as I
believe, writing a charter for future German aggression. I would like our answer to be
different. I would like our answer to be, "Whatever we can do to help-you to re-
establish your ruined economies we will do. The first need of Europe will be to build
up an enduring system of defense against the possibility of renewed German aggression.
We are prepared to make our contribution to that system and we are prepared to do this
because we understand full well that peace and security in Europe are part of our own
peace and security and never again shall we turn our backs on Europe." Th:;t, I hope,
is our message to Europe.
If the peoples are to be free and have a chance to devote themselves, as the over-
whelming majority of them wish to devote themselves, to the arts of peace, there must
be common action between us of the British Commonwealth, the United States and
Russia. What hope is there that we can achieve such cooperation? I believe there is
much hope. I may not have been optimistic in what I have told the House so far, but
here I think there are grounds for hope.
. Our general object is to form a world system for ensuring the peaceful develop-
ment of all peoples; but there is an essential preliminary to all this which we must never
forget. It is to restrict let us hope for all time, the aggressive power of Germany and
Japan. I make no mention of Italy, because I do not regard that as a major problem.. ..
I want to say one word about the greater-I do not kripw about the greater, but at any
rate the nearer, of the two outlaw States, Germany. During the last 70 years-these are
unpleasant historical facts which we have to face-successive German Governments have

consciously and consistently pursued a policy of world domination. This policy and the
philosophy that is behind it is the first threat to enduring peace, and it will be the first
and imperative duty of the United Nations on the morrow of their victory to'elaborate
such a settlement as will -make it impossible for Germany again to dominate her neigh-
bors by force of arms. That lies at the root of the business and it would be sheer folly to
allow some non-Nazi German Government to be set up, and -then, so to speak, to trust
to luck. The rooting out of the old false gods will be a long and strenuous business, but
it must be accomplished.... It means, I hope, that whatever political idea is practiced
in this country, we shall be free of this nightmare.
Some Members may want to know what machinery I visualize. There are certain
international services which have gone on during the war which have not died, and
which may render great service after the war. There are the international health services
and economic services and the work done by the International Labor Organization. We
shall need that work more than ever after the war. The I.L.O. has struggled manfully,
and with considerable success, to remove, certain of the evils which are among the root
causes of war: low standards of living, insecurity, and unemployment. Unless we can
cure those evils, no peace structure can be enduring. The I.L.O. must be strengthened
and developed. I should like to see it become the main instrument giving effect to
Article 5 of the Atlantic Charter. Somebody may say, "How is all this to be done?
What is the machinery to give effect to it?" I would reply that although the machinery
is important, it is, unfortunately, less important than certain other ingredients which are
essential to the maintenance of peace. The old League of Nations failed, not because
its machinery was faulty but because there was not the representation or the force or the
drive behind it.
To my mind, there are three indispensable attributes . for any international
organization if it is to have a chance to achieve its purpose. First, it must be fully
representative of the Powers that mean to keep the peace. The old League was not.
Second, the Powers themselves must have the unity and the determination to arrive at
agreed ahd positive decisions. And the third, and perhaps the most important of all,
is that they should have the force behind them to give effect to their decision.
Let us take heed a little from the lessons of the past, and let us try to learn them.
I believe that out of this organization of the United Nations, based in the first instance
on understanding between ourselves, the United States and Russia, a great opportunity
opens to us. After the last war there was, quite naturally, a sudden reaction against mili-
tarism in all its forms and hatred of war . with the result that nations were reluctant
to contemplate the use of force even to keep the peace. After this war we must, in my
submission, be ready to make our military contribution to the United Nations to enable
them to keep the peace. I repeat, the task is going to be a heavy one, but there is an
opportunity-a great opportunity. Also, one's hopes, perhaps the main hope lie in the
factor to which we are not always sensible in these islands-the unparalleled suffering
which has been caused by the German and Japanese hordes. Coventry, Rotterdam,
Chungking, Warsaw, Belgrade, Stalingrad-all these events are more eloquent decla-
rations of unity than the words any statesman can use. The Americans who have died
in the Solomons and in North Africa, by their deaths have pledged their country to
work together after the war more deeply than any speech can do. So I say that the
simple lesson is that, however great the effort, we have to make our cooperation in
peace as true and as effective as it now is in these war years. There has never been a
more skillful and complete cooperation than the cooperation in North Africa. Are we
really to admit we can only achieve this in battle? It is inconceivable. It can be done,
and it must be done. Please God, we do not forget these lessons in the years that lie

Chancellor of the Exchequer
House of Commons, February 2, 1943

... It is obvious that a world-wide war of such an unprecedented, devastating and
crippling character must mean that not only this country but the whole world will be
much poorer, and much disabled, and that in many countries there will continue to be
acute distress, misery, and bankruptcy. The economic disturbance caused by this war
is much greater than that caused by the last. There has already been a much deeper and
more widespread shortage of all kinds of civilian supplies. Active military operations
have already spread over a far wider area, and have even now entailed greater destruction
and economic disturbance. We have drawn more heavily on our reserves and foreign
assets. The economic position of this country will indeed be far from easy; and it
could become dangerous, No new economic theory or financial manipulations, how-
ever ingenious, can displace or alter this hard but inescapable fact. We should be living
in a fool's paradise if wishful thinking led us to believe that a great and cruel war brings
in itself better and happier days. That does not mean that we need feel depressed about
the future. I would reaffirm my unshaken confidence in our will and power to surmount
our difficulties; and, as we have already shown during the war, in still graver times than
this, our difficulties and dangers are but a challenge to all that is best in us and a spur
to all that we can achieve.
There is a basic consideration which we must always keep in mind, and a basic
objective. As regards Britain itself, we shall find, for some time, a fundamental
change in our economic position. Before 1914 we were a very substantial creditor
country, and the monetary income we were obtaining from our shipping and foreign
investments was of substantial importance to our whole economy. The last war shook
that position, though it did not break it down, but for a number of years between the
wars, and particularly in certain industries which had previously made our great staple
exports, there was a decline in the volume of exports. We suffered especially as the
result of the international depression which swept the world in the early thirties, and
we suffered an appreciable diminution of our foreign income. I regret to say that that
process has been taken further and at a much faster rate under the conditions of the
present war, and we shall have to face a considerable adverse balance of international
payments, a considerable loss of overseas investments and exchange resources, and a
serious position in relation to our export trade.
The basic objective that we must set ourselves is active employment for tLe people
of this country. It is not only that we must not repeat the tragic story of the years
between the wars, but that we must realize that in all our hopes for the future will depend
upon our success in achieving this. If we are to succeed, it will depend by no means
upon Government policy alone, nor shall we achieve prosperity and security painlessly
and comfortably. It will largely depend upon the enterprise of industry and trade, the
skill of our workpeople, the courage of our investors, and the willingness of all to work
for the better things we all desire to achieve. And no plans or schemes of post-war
economy, wise and progressive as they will have to be, can in fact take the place of ex-
pansion, efficiency and enterprise. But Governments, for their part, can cert; inly do
much in cooperation and good will to secure the necessary conditions upon which the
steady advancement of mankind can be achieved, just as narrow and selfish conceptions
can defeat it. During the twar our main economic task has been to transfer resources
both of equipment and labor from the production of unessential civilian requirements
to use in the Armed Forces or in the production of munitions, essential goods and
The outstanding problem of the transitional period immediately after the end of
the war will be to reverse all this and transfer our resources as quickly and smoothly
as possible back to peace time use, to promote employment and to revive export This


transfer-we cannot disguise it-will undoubtedly have its difficulties, but there is
another, and I think more hopeful side, which I should like to put before the House. We
must not assume that all the industries engaged even on war work are doing work of
a kind entirely different from their peace time work. Iron, steel, engineering, ship-
building, the motor and aircraft industries, may all have had an especial emphasis during
the war on certain aspects of their production, but the productivity of these industries
is greater than ever, and the switch over should not, as we may well anticipate, be long
There is a further aspect which should serve to stimulate that transfer. There
will be a very considerable shortage of all kinds of goods for civilian requirements.
Stocks of clothing, furniture and household equipment will have to be renewed. UFhere
will be a high demand for capital goods to re-equip and stock our civilian industry. War
damage to property will have to be made good, and considerable provision will have to
be made for the housing of our people. Side by side with the efforts we shall have to
make for the necessary increase in our export trade there will be additional demands
for goods and services in this country. I know that many may well be disposed to re-
gard the end of the war as a time for ease and the spending of money freely and widely.
Such feelings are natural enough after a long period of hard work and considerable
strain but in many respects these days after the war will be very much like those of war
itself, and in some cases even more difficult. Much will depend upon our endeavors, our
patience, our discipline, our saving and particularly our willingness to continue to bear
restrictions, at any rate for a time, and to shoulder burdens not for our own sakes alone
but for those others whose sufferings and hardships have been so severe and cruel. While
a continuation of many of the discomforts of the war economy will, therefore, be in-
evitable during the transitional period if orderly development of economic life is to be
achieved they need only be temporary. As channels of trade re-open and resources are
transferred, so something more like equilibrium will be. established, and there should
then be hopeful possibilities not only of restoring but also of progressively raising our
standards of living. Technical progress after the war, as in past years, should enable
real production to be steadily increased, and there should be many opportunities, if we
take advantage of them and act with forethought, that should make it possible year by
year to increase and to improve the community's capital equipment and thereby to raise
progressively the national income.
It should be obvious that if at a time when goods are in short supply there is a
widespread effort to spend money freely the only result can be to force up the price of
goods. I think this can be said, that fortunately there is a much wider recognition of the
fundamentals of economics in many quarters to-day, that it is goods which in the end
are riches, that the man with 1 and two coupons is to-day much richer than the man
with 2 and no coupons, that it is not worth having money if there are insufficient
goods to buy, and that power and willingness to work are worth in many respects more
to the nation than money. Finally, that though remuneration, wages and benefits may
be raised the real matter is the purchasing power of money, and that if 2 buys no
more than 10s. formerly did one is no better off and may be worse off . One of the
first of our problems in the economic field will be to guard against the danger of
inflation. Our recovery and progress will both alike be impossible unless inflation
and deflation alike are avoided. We must profit by our bitter experience and learn
the lessons of 1919-24. While it would be wrong to see that whole period as one
of widespread economic distress, it is equally wrong to forget the grave economic
and human troubles that arose from the rapid rise in prices in the boom of 1919-20 and
the depression that followed, with all that it involved to some of our trades and busi-
nesses, particularly to those who were employed in them. Inflation will undoubtedly
be one of our greatest dangers after the war, and there is no doubt that inflationary
tendencies will then be more potent even than they are in war to-day, and that they may
last longer than after the last great war.
...The main problem in'this part of the post-war period will not be that of stimu-

lating the effective demand for goods and services but rather of controlling and directing
it so as to secure the orderly recovery of our economic life, including above all adequate
production for export. It may well be that it will be desirable to continue the policy of
the stabilization of the cost of living and the prices of goods in common use on the lines
we are maintaining to-day. While the main object of policy after the war must be to re-
move limitations of supply as soon as possible, the controls which relate to the demand
for scarce materials or manufacturing capacity will have to be carefully coordinated
with such a general stabilization policy. The Government believe that, subject to certain
conditions, it should be possible for the general price level to settle down after the war
at a figure not far different from what it is at present, without imposing an impossible
burden on the Exchequer. Two other controls which, I think, would be regarded
generally as in all our interests are the control, of the release of raw materials and the
control of issues of capital, in order, in the case of the latter, to see that capital irrigates
those developments which are nationally most important and to help, with other
measures, to make it available on reasonable terms.
I come now to the second great problem-the restoration of the balance of pay-
ments. It is improbable that at least for some time after the war we shall be able to
dispense with the limitation of imports, but restriction of imports cannot be our major
instrument. The chief imports to this country are foodstuffs and raw materials, both
of which are essential for the standard of living. Too many people forget that we
import much of what we need to maintain our standard of living and our manufacturing
capacity. In 1938 we imported, at 1938 prices, about 850,000,000 worth. This was
divided into 418,000,000 for food and drink, including tea, coffee and cocoa, and also
tobacco; 315,000,000 for raw materials and semi-manufactures; 45,000,000 for motor
oil, and not quite 75,000,000 for finished products. These imports were paid for
partly by the money we earned on shipping freights, the income derived from our invest-
ments abroad and a small sum for commission on various types of business, but mainly
by our exports. We are not likely to finish the war in the same relative position of
shipping as in the inter-war years, or, still less, before 1914. We have realized, as I
have already indicated, a substantial portion of our investments and put them into the
war. Some others have been damaged and will have to be reconstructed. It will take us
time to recreate the sources of monetary income represented by shipping and foreign
investments. We must therefore rely in the main upon a considerable expansion of
exports. They are our life blood. Upon them will largely depend our standard of life
after the war, and our future hopes and plans for the betterment of this country greatly
rest upon them. No nation's interest in the maximum growth and freedom of com-
merce will be as great as ours. We shall want to secure as large a volume of inter-
national commerce under conditions as free from restrictions as is possible consistent
with our commitments. Unless, in fact, we can effect a great move forward in our
export trade our relatively high standard of living must inevitably fall. We must never
forget that we can only achieve this by providing our customers with the goods and
commodities they want at prices which they are able and willing to pay, and we shall
have, I am afraid, ... to compete with others both as regards price and quality, and we
must make a profit. Therefore, I would say . there must be a high priority for the ex-
port trade in all our post-war efforts, and if we can get that right, most things may be
possible, and at an earlier time. . Whatever changes in economic organization this
country may embark upon as a result of the lessons of the past years, it is certain that
for the immediate period after the war a very large part of productive industry will
depend on free enterprise. Our efforts may well take the form in certain cases of public
enterprises, ... but there will still be the same need for enterprise and initiative and
it must be given a fair chance. When we look back at the period between the wars
we may be tempted to believe that it was a period of continuous unemployment. It was
not. There were years of very bad trade and years of relatively good trade, taking the
country's production as a whole, but throughout the period there persisted an obstinate
inability on the part of some of our most important industries to recover their 1914

position. These industries employed large numbers, and some of them were localized
so that we had the tragic spectacle of areas of the country suffering from continued
unemployment, much heavier than the average of the country ....
We are clearly living in an era of very considerable industrial change and it is
obvious that a rigid industrial structure would be impossible. Our leaders in trade and
industry have played ... a splendid and important part in the war effort, and I know that
they have rightly given much consideration to the vital matters that I have been dis-
cussing. But undoubtedly we shall have to adapt and develop our industrial and
commercial organizations, machinery and methods to new and unexampled conditions.
We shall have to regain our technical leadership and pay more and more attention to
training and scientific research and go on steadily developing new and more efficient
processes. War in all industrial countries releases a high potential of invention and
development over a much shorter period than would ordinarily occur. Behind the
present scene we can discern very important changes at work, such as the chemistry of
oil, the development of plastics, the increasing use of light alloys and new processing for
foodstuffs. Our industrial skill and experience will be thrown away unless we turn
ourselves willingly to the new products. For development, the mobility or fluidity, of
labor and all the similar things we talk about to-day, all in fact mean, in no small degree,
the willingness of capital, management and labor to turn to these new things, while
maintaining and improving many of those old and substantial undertakings which have
served us so well in the days before the war and during the war itself.
I would like to indicate three or four ways in which I think the Government, for
their part, can make a large contribution to this very important matter. First, and above
all, they can make a great contribution by their general policy in regard to foreign affairs,
their continuing interest in the promotion of the export trade and their policy internally
in relation to finance and the economic development of their general social policy. In
these ways the Government can certainly help to produce conditions under which natural
forces leading to good employment and active trade have their chance and in which our
true assets of commercial enterprise and industrial skill and experience can take their
full part. A great part of our industry as a whole, including service industries such as
power and transport, is engaged in supplying the needs of the ordinary consumer, and
if these needs are met at proper cost, one of the underlying conditions for active employ-
ment will be fulfilled. Then there is the provision of capital equipment, which the
Government can no doubt directly stimulate. We shall have a large building program
to undertake to repair the ravages of war, to overtake the arrears of building of all kinds
which the war has interrupted, to extend public utilities and, in particular, to continue
and extend our housing program. A well-considered building program, planned for
several years ahead, can produce an immediate effect upon unemployment and can help
to stabilize it. But it will need not only materials for the construction of the houses
and for the work on the houses themselves, but also all the products of the trades which
supply the internal needs of a household. There will be many other possibilities in
this respect, but we must remember that the fountain of capital resources upon which
the capital requirements of the country depend is not an inexhaustible spring. It is fed
by the savings of the country each year. If we draw off too much for one type of capital
requirement we may run the risk that other forms of capital requirement will be starved
or severely affected. ...
Furthermore, when industrial investment is hesitant or stationary, the properly
timed stimulus of capital equipment by measures of credit and in other ways can help
to bring the processes of production into gear. Such a general policy, linked with a
policy of cooperation in the international field, may go far not only to reduce or prevent
the tragic swings of commercial and industrial prosperity which caused so much dis-
appointment and bitterness between the wars, but may-go a good way towards securing
confidence and good employment, which must be the basis of our future prosperity ....
The present abnormal level of taxation presses not only on each taxpayer but upon
industry, but we must not forget that our community has received great benefits. For

instance, Britain to-day has the best and most extensive social services in the world and
in many other ways can rightly point to a large advance over other nations. I see that
it has been estimated-and I think with truth and accuracy-that the approximate net
burden of taxation, local rates and other compulsory contributions per head of our total
population was 5 19s. in the years 1913-14, that in 1937-38 it had reached 24 16s.,
and in 1941-42 had grown still further to 51 14s.
We must be prepared for a continuance of considerable taxation after the war, not
only to discharge the obligations which the war has cast upon us but also to pay for the
maintenance of the comparatively high standard of our services. I realize, however, that
future yields of taxation must come out of the annual productivity of the country and
that if taxation is above the figure that is absolutely necessary, it will certainly have the
effect of depressing and retarding that activity. The aggregate gross personal income of
the country in 1941-42 was estimated at 6,350,000,000, of which 4,750,000,000, or
75 per cent., was in incomes of less than 500 a year and 1,600,000,000 in incomes of
500 a year and over. Income Tax and Surtax took 295,000,000 from the incomes
below 500 a year and 625,000,000 from the incomes of 500 a year and over. As I
have said to the House before, if everything over 2,000 was taken from people with
incomes of over 2,000 a year, I should obtain only an extra 30,000,000, and if it
were necessary to obtain further substantial sums in this way, it is obvious that we should
have to look to the lower income groups.... ,
There are two other things which, above all, we must secure for the nation. There
is one to which I have referred-the restoration of trade and business and active employ-
ment. The other, in my judgment, is paramount, for no business or trade is possible
and no social or economic security can be obtained without it. We must, first and
above all, nake adequate provision for our contribution to the Armed Forces which will
be necessary after the war for international security, so that we shall ensure that there
is no repetition of the evil and aggression which twice within a generation have brought
such disasters to the world. That, I believe, is rightly demanded above everything else,
and whatever the price that bill must be paid. After that, we have to consi er a large
number of matters which undoubtedly have strong merits. Agriculture, ho:lsing, edu-
cation, roads, forestry, Colonial development, civil aviation, have all been me ntioned in
the course of the Debate, as well as Social Security itself. Our willingness t( deal with
them is not in doubt; our capacity to do so and the extent to which we can -neet them
must obviously depend upon the measure of international security we can enjoy after the
war, our success in maintaining employment, and the growth of our national income ...
When we turn to our long-term problems, their solution again depends not only on
our own actions and policy but upon those of others. The Atlantic Charter firmss the
necessity for the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field, and
Article 7 of the Mutual Aid Agreement refers to the need to promote mutually
advantageous economic relations between America and ourselves and the betterment of
worldwide economic relations between all the United Nations. . On this nd on all
other major policies we must, of course, act with the knowledge and cooperation of the
Dominions and of India, and, of course, it is essential that we should have he active
cooperation of our Allies. The Government attach the greatest importance to getting
such an agreed policy settled and worked out well before the end of the war on bold and
constructive lines. Just as so much depends upon national unity at home in connection
with our domestic affairs, so in the wider world sphere what President Roosevelt has
described as "Victory in Peace" depends upon the United Nations remaining together
as strongly and as firmly as they have done in war. We believe that the best future for
mankind lies in full cooperation and good understanding between all the peoples of the
United Nations and that our policy must be continually directed to that end and purpose.
Mr. Cordell Hull said the other day with great force that it is impossible for anly nation
or group of nations to prescribe the methods or provide the means by which any other
nation can accomplish or maintain its own political and economic independence; but he
also said:
"It is for all nations to give and to receive help."

I believe that in all those great affairs a strong and prosperous British Empire can
continue to take its full part in the leadership of world affairs and the advancement of
There is, I think, a large measure of agreement as to the main directions in which
we can advance. First, we need a policy of expansion so that employment is maintained
and production series the ends of consumption. We need an expansion in international
trade and the orderly reduction of unnecessary barriers and other practices which interfere
with the flow of goods between one country and another and give lasting benefit to
neither. Secondly, we need a strong effort to prevent those disastrous swings in the
prices of the raw materials and primary products of the world. We are apt to forget
that a large majority of the people of the world are engaged not in industry but in pro-
ducing foodstuffs and other primary products. Thirdly, we need an international
monetary mechanism which will serve the requirements of international trade and avoid
any need for unilateral action in competitive exchange depreciation. Fourthly, there is
another phase of international economic cooperation which has proved itself and which
we hope will be of increasing importance-the work of the International Labor Office,
with its interest in the standard of working conditions in all countries, a matter which is
not only of great interest in itself but has a great bearing on the orderly development
of international trade. Finally, as the world begins to settle down after the war and each
country has a clearer picture of its own resources, we may well need some international
organization for assisting the direction of international investments for development.
While we are not likely to be in a position to make long-term loans in the transitional
post-war period, there is every reason to expect that we shall take our place again when
the difficulties of readjustment have been overcome. These are some of the main lines
of development in which we hope to see full economic cooperation between the nations,
as envisaged in Article 7 of the Mutual Aid Agreement.
As one example of the thought we are giving to problems in this field, I should like
to say something a little more detailed about the need for constructing again the inter-
national exchange system. This is something in which all nations have the same degree
of interest, since without it the wheels of international commerce cannot be expected to
run smoothly. We want a system in which blocked balances and bilateral clearances
would be unnecessary. We want an orderly and agreed method of determining the
value of national currency units to eliminate unilateral action and the danger which it
involves that each nation will seek to restore its competitive position by exchange de-
preciation. Above all, we want to free the international monetary system from those
arbitrary, unpredictable and undesirable influences which have operated in the past as
the result of large-scale speculative movements of short-term capital. We want to secure
an economic policy agreed between the nations and an international monetary system
which will be the instrument of that policy. This means that, if any one Government
were tempted to move too far either in an inflationary or a deflationary direction, it
would be subject to the check of consultations with the other Governments, and it
would be part of the agreed policy to take measures for correcting tendencies to dis-
equilibrium in the balance of payments of each separate country. Our long-term policy
must ensure that countries which conduct their affairs with prudence need not be afraid
that they will be prevented from meeting their international liabilities by causes outside
their own control. If the objects of Article 7 of the Mutual Trade Agreement are to
be attained, it is essential to maintain an increased volume of world trade, and in this
the monetary mechanism which I have indicated must play a very important part. There
is nothing secret about any of these ideas. They are in themselves sensible and reason-
able objectives, and it is right that various groups should go on working upon them.
Their ideas, we may well hope, will converge. We shall, I need hardly say, be ready
and willing at any time to use our wide experience of international commerce and
trade, gathered over the centuries, so as to give these ideas practical shape in the interest
of all nations ....

Secretary of State for the Colonies
Oxford Conservative Association, March 7, 1943

... The Office to which I have come, the Colonial Office, must, at all times, have been
of absorbing interest but never more absorbing than now when the whole question of
the British Colonial Empire is exciting more interest than ever before, both at home
and abroad. This added interest is particularly noticeable abroad, especially in the
UnitedStates. There are some in that great country who obviously emphatically believe
the old adage, 'Spare the rod and spoil the ally.' They feel, no doubt with justice, that
a continuous pointing out of our faults and frailties, and underlining our sins of omission
and commission, is the one thing needed to stimulate and encourage us to greater efforts
in the common cause. It is true that of the great volume of friendly criticism and dis-
interested advice which comes to us from across the water, much is directed to our
Colonial Empire, or, rather, to the American conception of our Colonial Empire. I am,
however, going to confess that I am guilty of a heresy. I am more interested in what
Britain thinks of the British Empire than in what the United States think of it. It is for
this reason that if I know the people here are interested in our Colonies, are instructed
about our Colonies, and, being both interested and instructed, are satisfied with our
Colonies, then indeed I should feel content. Because the people here yield ro no other
people in a sense of humanity and the desire for progress and their attachment to
liberty. ... To my mind, the three questions we have got to put to ourselves ind answer
are, what sort of Colonial Empire is it, what sort of Colonial Empire do we want it to be,
and what have we got to do about it? Let me try to answer all these three questions.
First of all, what sort of Empire is it? The first thing that strikes anyone in a
study of our Colonial Empire is its infinite variety: over fifty territories of every size,
every climate, every race, and every stage of economic and social development. Neither
in politics, economics nor social welfare is it possible to find any common yardstick of
any one measure applicable to all. In each one of them problems are quite different and
so, in each one of them, will have to be the solution.
I often hear people talk about a Colonial Charter. If by this you mean a state-
ment of general principles which animate us in the administration of our Colonial
territories, then it is possible to give one. It has, in fact, been stated. I will try to re-
state it tonight. But, if you mean by Colonial Charter some common plan of execution
or some common timetable of achievement, then the infinite variety of the Colonial
territories makes anything of the kind quite impossible.
Now what sort of job have we made in these fifty Colonial territories which in
the past we have been administering? My own view is that, as far as things are con-
cerned which we set out to do, we have done them well. What were they? *First there
was the re-establishment of rule of law-the attempt to establish safety for life and
property in areas, many of which had never known security for either. This establish-
ment of law and order is neither so easy nor so inevitable as it seems after its been
established and has become to be regarded as permanent. Not even the fiercest critic of
our Colonial Administration can deny that we have succeeded to the full in the establish-
ment of the rule of law.
The second thing we set out to do was to give an example of impartial justice and
incorruptible administration. Here again, I think, no one will deny that we have
succeeded in our object, and we have set up standards which, if only they can be main-
tained in changing conditions and progress towards self-government, will be of lasting
benefit to the Colonies.
Thirdly, we set ourselves the task of preventing exploitation, and here one meets
many misconceptions of the financial relationship between the Colonies and ourselves.
We exact no contribution from the Colonies to the Central Exchequer. Our tariff
advantages are everywhere slight and, in great areas, non-existent. Mining and produc-

tion are regulated so as to provide not only a fair reward for the enterpriser who has
taken the risk, but also a substantial benefit to the Colony as a whole. Nor have we
placed obstacles in the way of other nations who wish access to our Colonial products....
Lastly, we have set out to devote the income of the Colony to the benefit of that
Colony. Of course, results have varied greatly for the income has varied greatly, but
all over our Colonial Empire you will find examples of good communications, good
health services, valuable agricultural research, improving higher education, and valuable
assets built up out of the Colonial revenues.
Now those are the things that in the last century and the beginning years of this
century, we set out to do in our Colonial territories. Within those limits we have done
them well, and within those limits we have no need to be ashamed of the past. If we
were still satisfied with those limits we could equally afford to be complacent about the
present. But are we still satisfied? Can we still be satisfied? Many years ago we
declared it was our intention to act as trustees for the Colonial Empire and we have fully
lived up to that promise. But in every conception of trusteeship there are limitations
with which I do not believe we can in future be content. I am myself a trustee for a
number of people. I set out to do for them on a small scale what we set out on a large
scale to do for the Colonial Empire. I try to safeguard their estate from exploitation,
to preserve it intact, to improve it as far as possible and to see that the income of the
estate is enjoyed by the recipient of trust. But, as a trustee, I feel no obligation to go
further than that. I feel no call to make up out of my own pocket any deficiency in the
income of the beneficiary, to risk my money to improve' the beneficiary's estate. Can
we be satisfied in future with such negative conception of trusteeship?
The second question was, what sort of Empire do we want to see, and I will divide
the answer into three parts: political, economic and social.
With regard to the political future, successive British statesmen have announced
that our ultimate aim in the Colonial Empire is to see self-government established in the
various territories. We have been sincere in those declarations in the past and we are
equally sincere when we repeat them to-day. This country with a longer history of real
self-government perhaps than any other, has the best reason to know what benefits flow
to the development of individual character and of individual life from the rights of self-
government, benefits which we believe far outweigh any loss of cold efficiency which
self-government may bring. But, sincere as we are in our aims for 4e future, it is no
good blinding ourselves to the realities of the present.
Self-government is not just a gift. It is also a responsibility, and we have to
recognize that in our fifty territories to-day where we find all differing stages of political
development. Some territories which have for years been practising to a greater or lesser
extent, self-government, have reached already an advanced stage of political education
and nothing but short, and perhaps quick, stages lie between them and real self-govern-
ment. But others are in different stages. They have behind them fewer years of settled,
orderly life, less opportunities for political training, and less realization of political
responsibilities. In their cases the stages by which we advance must necessarily be slow...
We have, I think, in the last few days given real earnest of our sincere desire
for self-government whenever and wherever practicable. The recent proposals which
were made to Jamaica for a reform of their Constitution means a great advance on the
road to responsibility for the administration of their own affairs.
Meanwhile, while thesh various territories are progressing by varying methods and
at varying stages towards this ultimate goal, what is the political set-up of the British
Colonial Empire to be? I am convinced that the first and fundamental principle is that
the administration of the British Colonies must continue to be the sole responsibility of
Great Britain. I myself give no support to a theory which I think now gains a few
adherents, that it would be for the benefit of a particular Colony, or for the benefit of
the world as a whole, that the Colony should be administered by some international
body. I can think of nothing which is more likely, in practice, to break down and less
likely to lead to the steady development of a territory concerned. Administration, the

_,ght to administer, in other words sovereignty, is not merely a right to power: it also
carries with it many responsibilities. Responsibilities in future in the Colonial Empire
will not be confined to making laws or keeping order. They will entail, as I have tried
to show before and as I will deal with more fully later, financial and economic aid on a
large scale.
But if we alone are prepared to take that responsibility and are prepared to make
those financial sacrifices which flow from our responsibility, then we alone are in a
position to exercise the control and to have the power.
But quite apart from these practical considerations, I believe that any suggestion for
an international administration ignores the real feelings of the people in the territories
concerned. Years of historic connection, years of steady and, in some places, spectacular,
progress, have built up between the British and the local inhabitants a real bond of
sympathy and affection. It is not affected by the natural desire for an even further
advance, for quicker progress and for more independence and responsibility, and I
believe the people themselves would deeply resent a substitution of a new polyglot and
perhaps an ephemeral administration for the British connection which they know and
respect. But because I believe strongly that the administration must remain British,
and the sovereignty national, it does not mean I exclude the possibility of close inter-
national cooperation. Indeed, under present circumstances, I regard such cooperation
not only as desirable, but essential. Developments of modern transport and modern
communication have brought close together vast areas which before were widely
separated. Many of their problems to-day are common problems and can only be solved
in cooperation. Problems of transport, economics, health, &c. far transcend boundaries
of a particular political unit, and I, therefore, should welcome the establishment of
machinery which enabled such problems to be discussed and "solved by common efforts.
But I should want this machinery to be real, not to be a nice theory or a pretty picture,
but something which grappled with realities and really got down to the fa ts of the
Now let me turn to the economic side. What we want to see in the Colonial
territories is a maximum economic development, first of all in the interests of the
Colonies themselves and then of the world as a whole. We have never in the past and
we shall not in the future desire to see this economic development from purely selfish
motives or on purely selfish lines. The direct benefits to our own economy may be
small in the future as they have been small in the past. But the indirect benefits can
become incomparably great....
But how are we going to get that maximum economic development? In the first
place we must admit that the extent to which we can reach the maximum depends upon
the general world set-up. The Colonies as a whole are territories of primary producers
and such territories can never hope to reach maximum prosperity except in an
expansionist world where products move freely across the seas, where the demand is
increased rather than the supply restricted, and where the use of a product depends more
upon its essential utility than upon the particular country of its origin. It musr be the
hope of anyone responsible for the British Colonial Empire that that is the sort of
economic world set-up that the United Nations are going to be able to provide after
the war.
But within the general framework of world economy there is much we ourselves
can do towards the development of our Colonies. They are now, and probably must
always remain, in default of quite unexpected discoveries, preponderantly agricultural
in character. But there are many problems of soil fertility and soil erosion, of animal
disease, of better agricultural methods, of better marketing, or of processing of agri-
cultural products, and of new uses for old production, which can be solved and which
will need time, skill and above all, money, for their solution. But although these terri-
tories will remain predominantly agricultural, we must not exclude the possibility, and
indeed the necessity, of secondary industries to absorb some at least of the labor as it
becomes more highly skilled. I think this country approaches the development of

secondary industries in the Colonies in no selfish spirit. They are quite content to see
a secondary industry established where the local market can materially support it, or
where it is a necessary adjunct to the surrounding agriculture. What we don't want to
see, because we believe it neither in the interest of this country nor in the interest of
the territory itself, is a wholly unnatural and uneconomic -secondary industry fostered
behind abnormal barriers.
Lastly, with regard to social development our object is to see the various peoples of
the various territories develop themselves along the lines of their own national aptitude,
their own culture, and their own tradition. In other words, we want to see good
Africans, good West Indians, good Malayans, and not imitation Englishmen.
There is obviously an immense amount to do in the development of the various
social services in the Colonies. We have just published a report by Sir Frank Stockdale,
Commissioner under the Welfare and Development Act foi the West Indies. It is not
only the best detailed survey of the problems, but the most detailed survey of the possible
solutions which has ever been done of any part of the British Colonial Empire. But it
does show what a great deal remains to be done in the West Indies, and we can assume,
when we come to make equally detailed surveys of the other parts of the Empire, that
there will be just as much, if not more, to be done there. It is clear we shall never have
the development of social services which is vitally necessary were we to adhere rigidly
to the old rule that each Colony must pay its own way.
We got, in the past, into a vicious circle. Economic developments necessitated the
development of social services because if you were to develop economically you wanted
the better health, better education, the greater skill, the greater sense of responsibility
which only the development of social services could give. But, on the other hand, social
services could not be developed without economic development which would bring an
increased revenue and increased ability, therefore, to bear the cost of the social services.
That vicious circle was broken once and for all in 1940 by the passage of the Colonial
Development and Welfare Act which provides five million pounds a year for ten years
for expenditure on welfare and development together with an additional sum for ex-
penditure on research.
It is true that under war conditions, the difficulties of importing materials, diffi-
culties of labor engaged on war work, it has not yet been possible to spend even the sum
allowed for in that Act. But, because we have not been able to do it under quite
abnormal conditions which the war has produced in the Colonial Empire, it does not
mean that after the war we shall find this sum is too much. On the contrary, we are
likely to find it is too little. I well foresee that after the war I shall have to ask for
more and much will depend upon the answer given to that question. But if we intend,
as intend we must, that the Colonial Empire shall be something of which we can be
really proud, this country has got to spend large sums of money for some years. But
we have always got to bear this in mind, that we don't want to set up in any Colony
a top-heavy structure of social services which, whatever the future of the economic
development of the Colony may be, the Colony itself will never be able to carry. For
to contemplate not merely a period of financial assistance from this country which will
enable the Colony subsequently to bear its own burdens, but a continual receipt of large
subsidies from the British taxpayer, is to make a mockery of the ideal of self-government.
How can any Colony hope for self-government if it has for ever to rely for its accustomed
standard of social services on large contributions from this country?
... We are entering now into a dynamic period in Colonial development. It is not
going to be a time where things will gradually and slowly evolve. It is a time when we
shall be faced with many difficult situations and have many difficult decisions to make, to
go fast here where it appears to be dangerous, to go slow there, even if it appears to be
over-cautious. Decisions will depend upon our democracy, and democracy can only act
rightly if it knows and appreciates the facts.
The second essential is that we should be ready now for the developments which
are bound to take place after the war. It is true that during the war war-time difficulties

may prevent a great deal being done. But there is no reason why we should not be
getting everything ready. I am not one who does not believe in the importance of
planning. I spent a year in the Joint Planning Staff and I know- wat looking ahead
means in military affairs. I cannot think it is any less important in civil matters. We
have got to think things out in advance and be ready for them when they come. Other-
wise,-we will have nothing but a series of makeshifts, improvisations and half-measures
which can only result in chaos....

Minister of Aircraft Production
Aberdeen University, February 6, 1943
Since the last war, our democracy has made great progress. All classes have become
more politically conscious and they are not now so easily misled by empty slogans!,
Education is the great defense of democracy and education has taken strides forward in
recent years.
But one factor is liable to militate against the control by the people of the post-war
development. This war more than any of its predecessors has drawn in almost every
man and woman in the country. There has been no normalcy, no rest for any. The
whole population will be vastly wearied when the end comes and it will be harder than
ever before to stir the people to a realization of how easily their democratic power may
be used for what may-seem plausible, but will turn out to be disastrous, purposes.
Our own native vigor of mind and body alone will be able to save us from the
soothing call to rest and restoration. It is for this reason that the Youth of our country
will have so important a part to play in our survival.
The atmosphere of the battle, the driving force of self-sacrifice will have gone, the
note of urgency and endeavor will have passed. Let me remind you in one quotation
of what Field Marshal Smuts has said about the quality of peace:
If war in future is to be rendered impossible we must see to it that its
function, so far as it has been beneficient in the past, be discharged by some
other means. Peace must be dynamic; it must keep the door open to reform
and to freedom and must not become an inc bus on human progress. The
springs of reform, of progress and of freedom must not be frozen under a
deadly peace.
The beneficence of war of which the Field Marshal speaks is its power to change
intolerable situations, that is, its revolutionary power. We must make peace, too, capable
of revolutionary change if we are to rid ourselves of war.
We, as a people have chosen, and chosen deliberately, the way of democratic
change, which has its drawbacks and its delays, but which we believe, since we are
democrats, can be used to work the will of the people.
We approach now one of those rare and great testing times of the power of our
democracy. Can it prevent the spell from being broken, can it mobilize the longing,
the hopes, the desires of the mass of the people to be effective against the interests of
reaction and the apathy of war-weariness?
We do not want to repeat once again the experience after other wars. We can see
that action taken earlier and a greater effort by the people might have changed the whole
history of our country and perhaps of the world.
This time, at least, we are forewarned of the dangers of apathy; we may easily fail
not only in our progress, but to preserve our democracy itself. Defeated totalitarianism
may, like the French revolution, impress its form and ideas upon the victorious nations
unless we are awake to the danger and-determined in the action that we shall take.

The war has developed for us many mechanisms for political and economic
cooperation, many controls and much machinery of planning. These we have created
because the call for efficiency has been held to over-ride every special interest. This
same spirit, this same stress upon the supreme priority of the common weal we must
carry through the armistice and into the peace. Much that we have built up for
purposes of war we can adapt quickly and easily to the needs of peace.
Those needs are many; a closer knit and more soundly planned cooperation be-
tween the United Nations; a world economy based, not on scarcity and starvation, but
upon plenty and happiness, and a means of giving the world a degree of effective
security in which we can exercise the arts of peace rather than those of war.
But over and above all these is the need for higher standards and better living
conditions for the common people in every country of the world. Our business is to
secure this, first and foremost for our own people. It can be done. We have the pro-
ductive capacity if we like to use it, but we must decide in whose interest that power of
production is to be used when the war is over.
That is a decision which must be taken by the electors of our democracy. It is a
simple and a fundamental decision, which, once taken, the experts and the technicians
must be instructed to implement. The time to agree upon that basic principle of
priorities is now while we still cooperate for the purpose of victory. By so doing we
can make certain that our victory will not be barren and will stretch out and through the
years of peace as well as those of war.

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