• TABLE OF CONTENTS
HIDE
 Front Cover
 Table of Contents
 Preface
 Introduction
 Impact of FSR/E projects
 Core constraints in FSR/E...
 Operational constraints in FSR/E...
 Generic constraints in FSR/E...
 Effectively coping with constraints...
 Annex A - Summary of core, operational,...
 Back Matter














Group Title: Case Study - A.I.D. Farming Systems Research & Extension Projects ; No. 13
Title: Vignettes of core, operational, and generic constraints in A.I.D.-funded farming systems research and extension projects
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Permanent Link: http://ufdc.ufl.edu/UF00073355/00001
 Material Information
Title: Vignettes of core, operational, and generic constraints in A.I.D.-funded farming systems research and extension projects
Series Title: CDIE working papers
Alternate Title: Case studies of A.I.D. Farming Systems Research & Extension (FSRE) Projects, Case Study no. 13
Physical Description: 63 leaves : ; 28 cm.
Language: English
Creator: Byrnes, Kerry J., 1945-
Publisher: Center for Development Information and Evaluation, Agency for International Development
Place of Publication: Washington DC
Publication Date: 1988?
 Subjects
Subject: Agricultural extension work -- Developing countries   ( lcsh )
Agriculture -- Technology transfer -- Developing countries   ( lcsh )
Genre: government publication (state, provincial, terriorial, dependent)   ( marcgt )
bibliography   ( marcgt )
non-fiction   ( marcgt )
 Notes
Bibliography: Includes bibliographical references (leaves 54-62).
Statement of Responsibility: Kerry J. Byrnes.
General Note: Caption title.
 Record Information
Bibliographic ID: UF00073355
Volume ID: VID00001
Source Institution: University of Florida
Rights Management: All rights reserved by the source institution and holding location.
Resource Identifier: oclc - 80568752

Table of Contents
    Front Cover
        Front Cover
    Table of Contents
        Table of Contents 1
        Table of Contents 2
    Preface
        Page i
        Page ii
    Introduction
        Page 1
        Page 2
        Page 3
        Page 4
        Page 5
    Impact of FSR/E projects
        Page 6
        Page 7
        Page 8
        Page 9
        Page 10
        Page 11
    Core constraints in FSR/E projects
        Page 12
        Page 13
        Page 14
        Page 15
        Page 16
        Page 17
        Page 18
        Page 19
        Page 20
        Page 21
        Page 22
        Page 23
        Page 24
        Page 25
    Operational constraints in FSR/E projects
        Page 26
        Page 27
        Page 28
        Page 29
        Page 30
        Page 31
        Page 32
        Page 33
        Page 34
        Page 35
        Page 36
    Generic constraints in FSR/E projects
        Page 37
        Page 38
        Page 39
        Page 40
        Page 41
        Page 42
        Page 43
        Page 44
        Page 45
    Effectively coping with constraints in FSR/E projects
        Page 46
        Page 47
        Page 48
        Page 49
        Page 50
        Page 51
        Page 52
    Annex A - Summary of core, operational, and generic constraints in A.I.D.-funded FSR/E projects
        Page 53
        Page 54
        Page 55
        Page 56
        Page 57
        Page 58
        Page 59
        Page 60
        Page 61
        Page 62
    Back Matter
        Page 63
Full Text


i' !-4" \fA ;^ r, ^ .- : -





O. CDIE WORKING PAPERS


CDIE WORKING PAPER NO. 112

Case Studies of
A.I.D. Farming Systems Research & Extension (FSR/E) Projects

Case Study No. 13

Vignettes of Core. Operational, and Generic Constraints
in A.I.D-Funded Farming Systems Research and Extension Projects1

by

Kerry J. Byrnes2

Center for Development Information and Evaluation
Agency for International Development
Washington, DC 20523

December 1988


This CDIE Working Paper is one of 13 case studies prepared
for a cross-cutting analysis of A.I.D. FSR/E projects. A Review of
A.I.D. Experience with Farming Systems Research and Extension
Projects (A.I.D. Evaluation Special Study, forthcoming). Each of
the first 12 case studies in this series of CDIE Working Papers
focused on one of the following FSR/E projects:

Botswana Agricultural Technology Improvement (633-0221)
Gambia Mixed Farming and Resource Management (635-0203)
Lesotho Farming Systems Research (632-0065)
Malawi Agricultural Research (612-0202)
Senegal Agricultural Research and Planning (685-0223)
Tanzania Farming Systems Research (621-0156)
Zambia Agricultural Development Research & Extension (611-0201)
Nepal Agricultural Research and Production (367-0149)
Philippines Farming Systems Development-Eastern Visayas (492-0356)
Guatemala Food Productivity and Nutritional Improvement (520-0232)
Honduras Agricultural Research (522-0139)
ROCAP Small Farm Production Systems (596-0083)

Information on how to order the case studies on any of these
projects is provided on the last page of this report.

2Senior Social Science Analyst, Program and Policy Evaluation
Division, CDIE. This case study, prepared under a CDIE contract
with Labat-Anderson Incorporated, is based on a review of project
evaluation documentation. Interpretation of the data reported is
that of the author and should not be attributed to A.I.D. or Labat-
Anderson Incorporated.






TABLE OF CONTENTS


Page

PREFACE i

1. INTRODUCTION 1

1.1 Objective 1
1.2 Methodology 1
1.3 Overview of FSR/E's Core Characteristics 1
1.4 Constraints to FSR/E Project Impact 4

2. IMPACT OF FSR/E PROJECTS 6

Technology Development and Transfer 6
Institutionalization of FSR/E 8

3. CORE CONSTRAINTS IN FSR/E PROJECTS 12

3.1 Farmer Orientation 12
3.2 Farmer Participation 14
3.3 Locational Specificity of Technical and
Human Factors 16
3.4 Problem-Solving Approach 17
3.5 Systems Orientation 18
3.6 Interdisciplinary Approach 19
3.7 Complementarity with Commodity and
Discipline Research 23
3.8 Technology Testing in On-Farm Trials 24
3.9 Feedback to Shape Agricultural Research
Priorities and Agricultural Policies 25

4. OPERATIONAL CONSTRAINTS IN FSR/E PROJECTS 26

4.1 Stakeholder Understanding of FSR/E 26
4.2 Agricultural Research Policy or Strategy
Defining Role of FSR/E 28
4.3 Long-Term Commitment of Resources 29
4.4 Existing Research Capability and Shelf Technology 30
4.5 Consensus on FSR/E Methodology 30
4.6 Capability to Process Farming Systems Data 31
4.7 Consensus on Criteria for Evaluating FSR/E 33
4.8 Links with Extension 34
4.9 Links with Agri-Support Services 35
4.10 Links with Farmer Organizations 36






5. GENERIC CONSTRAINTS IN FSR/E PROJECTS


5.1
5.2
5.3
5.4,
5.5,
5.6'


Project Management Structure
Government Funding to Meet Recurrent Costs
Staffing with Trained Manpower
Management of Training
Management of Technical Assistance
Factors Beyond a Project's Control


6. EFFECTIVELY COPING WITH CONSTRAINTS IN FSR/E PROJECTS

6.1 Core Constraints
6.2 Operational Constraints
6.3 Generic Constraints


Annex A.


Summary of Core, Operational, and Generic
Constraints in A.I.D.-Funded FSR/E Projects.


General References

Project-Specific References


Boxes


Box 1.

Tables

Table 1.


Table 2.


Core Characteristics of FSR/E.


Frequency of Core Constraints in 12 A.I.D.-
Funded FSR/E Projects.

Frequency of Operational Constraints in 12
A.I.D.-Funded FSR/E Projects.


Table 3. Frequency of Generic Constraints in 12 A.I.D.-
Funded FSR/E Projects.








PREFACE

This report is based on case studies of 12 United States
Agency for International Development (A.I.D.) farming systems
research and extension (FSR/E) projects funded by the Agency from
the mid-1970s to mid-1980s, as follows:

Botswana Agricultural Technology Improvement (633-0221)
Gambia Mixed Farming and Resource Management (635-0203)
Lesotho Farming Systems Research (632-0065)
Malawi Agricultural Research (612-0202)
Senegal Agricultural Research and Planning (685-0223)
Tanzania Farming Systems Research (621-0156)
,Zambia Agricultural Development Research & Extension (611-0201)
Nepal Agricultural Research and Production (367-0149)
Philippines Farming Systems Development-Eastern Visayas (492-0356)
Guatemala Food Productivity and Nutritional Improvement (520-0232)
Honduras Agricultural Research (522-0139)
ROCAP Small Farm Production Systems (596-0083)

A cross-cutting analysis, A Review of A.I.D. Experience with
Farming Systems Research and Extension Projects (A.I.D. Evalua-
tion Special Study, forthcoming), assesses the impact of these
projects on agricultural technology development and transfer, and
institutionalization of FSR/E in research and extension systems.
Further, the review identifies a series of core, operational, and
generic constraints to FSR/E project impact that were present in
these projects.

Given space limitations, it was not possible in the main
report (i.e, A Review of A.I.D. Experience...), to include the
vignettes, from the case studies, that underlay the findings and
conclusions presented in that report. This CDIE Working Paper,
however, provides the interested reader with a sample of the
vignettes derived from the case studies. These vignettes are
illustrative of how the identified core, operational, and generic
constraints in these projects operated as breaks on technology
development and transfer, and institutionalization of FSR/E in
national agricultural research and extension systems. Greater
attention to these constraints by designers, implementors, and
evaluators of agricultural research and extension projects having
an FSR/E component could enhance the contribution of FSR/E to
technology development and transfer.

The intended audience for this CDIE Working Paper is the
Person having a special need for an in-depth understanding of
FSR/E in relation to agricultural research and extension. This
audience includes, but is not limited to:

FSR/E practitioners who are implementing agricultural
research and extension projects, programs, and systems;







Technical specialists who are designing or evaluating
agricultural research and extension projects involving
an FSR/E component;

A.I.D. personnel who manage or provide policy guidance
for the design, implementation, or evaluation of agri-
cultural research and extension projects that involve
an FSR/E component;

Management and field staff of public sector agencies,
private voluntary organizations (PVOs), and private
sector firms that carry out agricultural extension and
technology transfer activities and projects; and

Professionals in agricultural universities, regional
and international agricultural research centers, and
bilateral and multilateral donor agencies that are
concerned with strengthening agricultural research and
extension capacity in the developing countries.

Information on how to order any of the CDIE Working Papers
in this series is provided on the last page of this report.







1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Objective


This CDIE Working Paper provides the interested reader with
a sample of the vignettes, drawn from case studies of 12 A.I.D.-
funded farming systems research and extension (FSR/E) projects,
illustrative of the core, operational, and generic constraints to
project impact, where impact is measured in terms of development
and transfer of technology to farmers, and instittionalization
of FSR/E in national agricultural research and extension systems.
These vignettes provide evidence of the range of constraints that
have influenced the performance of FSR/E projects. This informa-
tion, in turn, can be used to identify ways in which the design,
implementation, and evaluation of FSR/E projects (or projects
including elements of FSR/E) could be improved. A cross-cutting
analysis of the 12 case studies is presented in A Review of
A.I.D. Experience with Farming Systems Research and Extension
Projects (A.I.D. Evaluation Special Study, forthcoming).


1.2 Methodology


The vignettes reported herein were derived from case studies
of 12 A.I.D.-funded FSR/E. The case study on each project was
based on a review of the A.I.D.-sponsored evaluation documents
for that project ; the 12 case studies are available as individual
CDIE Working Papers (see cover page).


1.3 Overview of FSR/E's Core Characteristics


FSR/E is a process having nine core characteristics, with
each characteristic being a necessary but not a sufficient condi-
tion for doing technically-sound FSR/E. These characteristics
are (adapted from Merrill-Sands, 1985, 1986; Wiese, 1985;
Hildebrand, 1985; and Farrington and Martin, 1987):

FSR/E is farmer-oriented. FSR/E practitioners target small-
farm families as the client group for agricultural research, with
the fundamental objective of generating technology relevant to
the management conditions of this client group. This is done by
identifying these conditions before proposing technological
solutions, and by adapting technologies to local circumstances
and needs.







FSR/E involves the client group as participants in the
research and extension process. FSR/E practitioners involve and
work with client group members (i.e., small farmers) in design-
ing, implementing, and evaluating research and extension
activities.

FSR/E recognizes the locational specificity of technical and
human factors. FSR/E practitioners identify "recommendation
domains," or groupings of farmers that are relatively homogeneous
in terms of agro-climatic, socioeconomic, and other factors. The
criteria used to classify farmers into a domain will depend on
the practitioner's objectives. A practitioner working at an
International Agricultural Research Center may develop categories
of farms grouped largely according to agro-climatic criteria,
while a practitioner in a national agricultural research system,
working in a specific region, may categorize farms according to a
set of much more specific criteria such as product mix, presence
of draft power, and household socioeconomic status.

FSR/E is a problem-solving approach. Once relatively homo-
geneous groups of farmers have been identified, a FSR/E practi-
tioner identifies the limiting technical, biological, and socio-
economic constraints to improved farm productivity and farm
family income. Data on these constraints provide a basis for
identifying technologies that may be effective in removing or
relaxing the constraints and feasible for the client group of
farming households to adopt. Thus, the primary concern of FSR/E
is helping farmers to solve problems.

FSR/E is systems-oriented. Viewing the total farm as a
system of natural and human components, the FSR/E practitioner
focuses on specific subsystems to evaluate interactions between
those subsystems, other farm subsystems, the farm as a total
system, and the environment beyond the farm. FSR/E seeks to
identify the potential for and impact on the farm of introducing
a change in the technology of a specific target subsystem.

FSR/E is interdisciplinary. Collaboration among agricul-
tural and social scientists facilitates identification of the
conditions under which small farmers operate; diagnosis of
constraints; and design, conduct, and evaluation of research and
extension activities aimed at developing and introducing improved
technologies suitable to the client group of farmers.

FSR/E complements, not replaces, conventional commodity and
discipline research. FSR/E draws upon technologies and manage-
ment strategies generated by conventional discipline and
cor.nodity research and adapts this knowledge to the agro-climatic
environment and socioeconomic circumstances of a relatively
hoogeneous target group of farmers.








FSR/E tests technologies in on-farm trials. On-farm
collaboration between farmers and FSR/E practitioners provides
each with a deeper understanding of the farming system and the
farmer's decisionmaking criteria, and allows for potentially
improved technology to be evaluated under the environmental and
management conditions in which it will be used.

FSR/E provides feedback for shaping research priorities and
agricultural policies. FSR/E provides information on farmer
goals, needs, priorities, and criteria for evaluating technolo-
gies, and how new technologies perform under farm-level condi-
tions. Results of one season's trials generate hypotheses for
testing in the next. Further, trial results provide an input to
the setting of on-station research priorities as well as to the
formulation of regional- and national-level policy.

Each of the nine characteristics must be present in a tech-
nology development and transfer (TD&T) methodology in order for
the methodology to provide a technically sound approach to doing
FSR/E. If one or more of the characteristics is missing or weak
in a TD&T methodology, the methodology really does not constitute
a technically sound FSR/E and the methodology's practitioners are
not really doing FSR/E. For example, a TD&T methodology that
emphasizes "technology testing in on-farm trials" can easily fail
to give adequate attention to the other core characteristics of
FSR/E. Thus, the FSR/E practitioner needs to be careful that he
or she does not neglect any of the core characteristics or over-
emphasize one characteristic to the detriment of the others. Box
1 provides a summary listing of these key concepts.



Box 1. Core Characteristics of FSR/E

Farmer orientation
Farmer participation
Locational specificity of technical and human factors
Problem-solving approach
Systems orientation
Interdisciplinary approach
Complementarity with commodity and discipline research
Technology testing in on-farm trials
Feedback to shape agricultural research priorities and
agricultural policies







1.4 Constraints to FSR/E Project Impact


The 12 case studies indicated that FSR/E projects were not
living up to the early expectations held for them. This prompted
several questions: Why were the projects not more successful?
Was this a failure of the FSR/E concept per se or one of design
and/or implementation? What constraints impeded FSR/E projects
from having a greater impact on technology development and trans-
fer and institutionalization of FSR/E? Analysis of the case
studies indicated that implementation and impact were impeded by
a series of factors that could be classified in terms of three
categories of constraints: core, operational, and generic.

Core Constraints -- A core constraint is present when a
project's concept of and approach to FSR/E lacks or is weak in
one or more of FSR/E's nine core characteristics, as follows:

o Farmer orientation
o Farmer participation
o Lccational specificity of technical and human factors
o Problem-solving approach
o Systems orientation
o Interdisciplinary approach
o Complementarity with commodity and discipline research
o Technology testing in on-farm trials
o Feedback to shape agricultural research priorities and
agricultural policies

Operational Constraints -- An operational constraint is
present when a practitioner's efforts to implement the FSR/E
concept are impeded by problems in any of the following areas:

o Stakeholder understanding of FSR/E
o Agricultural research policy/strategy defining role of FSR/E
o Long-term commitment of resources
o Existing research capability and shelf technology
o Consensus on FSR/E methodology
o Capability to process farming systems data
o Consensus on criteria for evaluating FSR/E
o Links with extension
o Links with agri-support services
o Links with farmer organizations

Generic Constraints -- A generic constraint is present when
implementationn of a FSR/E project is impeded by problems that can
arise in any A.I.D.-funded project, regardless of the project's
technical focus. Potential problem areas include:





5
o Project management structure
o Government funding to meet recurrent costs
o Staffing with trained manpower
o Management of training
o Management of technical assistance
o Factors beyond a project's control

In Chapter 2, vignettes from case studies of 12 A.I.D.-
funded FSR/E projects are presented to illustrate the impact of
FSR/E Projects on technology development and transfer, and
institutionalization of FSR/E. The following three chapters
provide vignettes on the core (Chapter 3), operational (Chapter
4), and generic (Cnapter 5) constraints identified as being
present in the projects reviewed. Finally, Chapter 6 provides a
number of vignettes illustrating instances where FSR/E projects
were effectively coping with core, operational, and/or generic
constraints. A summary listing of the core, operational, and
generic constraints is presented in Annex A.







2. IMPACT OF FSR/E PROJECTS

The following vignettes drawn from evaluations of A.I.D.-
funded FSR/E projects indicate that at least half of the projects
reviewed encountered major difficulties in technology development
and transfer and/or institutionalization of FSR/E in agricultural
research and extension systems.


2.1 Technology Development and Transfer


Botswana/ATIP -- The second ATIP evaluation found that, by
the project's fourth year, several technologies from station-
based research had been tested in "maximum yield" plots. But
there was "no consistency to performance nor general application
of technology" (A.I.D., 1986:22). The evaluation concluded that:
"Few interventions had been sufficiently tested and proven...to
move forward to the dissemination stage" (A.I.D., 1986:5).

Lesotho/FSRP -- By FSRP's second evaluation, TA had been
provided for nearly two years (Martin, et al., 1981). However,
there was no evidence that farmers were adopting the improved
agricultural practices developed by the project. The evaluation
concluded that the research underway would

need to be carried on for a number of years before a proven
technology exists which can be disseminated on a broad basis
to the farming community. Accordingly, it is uncertain
whether or not the Project will reach the stated objective
of reaching five percent of the households in the project
area with enterprise mixes (Martin, et al., 1981:25).

In the evaluation's view, "the normal start up period of settling
in and getting organized to do agricultural :-search work" had
impeded achievement of project outputs. Thus. it was too early
to determine how farmers would accept new practices of relevant
technology (Martin, et al., 1981:21). During the two years fol-
lowing the second evaluation, FSRP made progress with on-farm
trials. But the third evaluation cautioned that "significant
adoption probably cannot be expected to occur before the 1984-85
or the 1985-86 cropping seasons. ...verification and demonstra-
tion must occur before adoption can be expected (Dunn, 1983:36).

Senegal/ARPP -- The mid-term ARPP evaluation highlighted the
difficulty of evaluating a project that is a part of a longer-
tern effort to strengthen the research capacity of a national
agricultural research institute. When ARPP was initiated, there
was a recognition that some of the project's components might be
difficult to evaluate during the project's early years. Given









the long...time (10 to 15 years) necessary to improve agri-
cultural research systems in Senegal (as in most developing
countries), the implementors recognized that progress toward
this objective might not be clearly measurable in the first
phase of the project (St. Louis, et al., 1985:2).

Overall, the evaluation noted the dissatisfaction expressed over
the "lack of results" of Production Systems Research (PSR). But
the evaluation also noted a dilemma centering

around trying to improve farmer production systems as soon
as possible while being fairly certain that...recommenda-
tions are solid. ...PSR tries to account for the complexity
of a...system and how changes can be expected to influence
it. This...puts PSR into an extensive time frame, but...
increases...certainty that recommendations can and will be
adopted by farmers with a high probability of success. ...
Compared to the potential costs in both financial terms and
in farmer morale due to rapid dissemination of "inappropri-
ate technology," the longer term pay off of the current data
collection and analysis methods...could very well justify
the delay (St. Louis, et al., 1985:61).

Tar.zania/FSRP -- FSRP provides an example of the negative
impact on technology development that results when A.T.D. support
for a FSR/E project is provided for only a short length of time
and project support is then cut off. This project sought to
introduce FSR in the Tanzanian Agricultural Research Organiza-
tion. Despite the project's early success with "Kito" maize,
implementation was curtailed when application of the Brooke
amendment required USAID/Tanzania to reduce funding to the Mis-
sion's projects. Comparing actual to planned accomplishments,
the Project Completion Report found that FSRP had fallen short of
its targets (Faught, 1986:15). FSR had been introduced "on too
limited a scale and conducted for too short a time to have had
any significant impact" (Faught, 1986:15).

Philippines/FSDP -- The first FSDP evaluation found that
FSDP had, during its first two years, "brought about the begin-
ning of an understanding of the dynamics of farming systems and
the practices and concepts of farming systems research (Mazo, et
al., 1983:Foreword). While FSDP made progress during the next
two years in introducing new technologies in the form of improved
crop varieties and management practices, the second evaluation
was "unable to identify technologies completely ready for broad
extension" (Sajise, et al., 1985:27).









ROCAP/SFPS -- While, the first SFPS evaluation found the
project's staff troubled by the requirement to develop "tech-
packs" (technology packages) for mixed farming systems, the
evaluation noted that the success of SPFS "depends primarily upon
successfully achieving other outputs -- development of method-
ologies, institutionalization of the methodologies, and training
of country personnel -- rather than on development of technology
alone" (Mann, et al., 1981:8). Of course, training nationals in
FSR/E, developing FSR/E methodologies, and institutionalizing
FSR/E required a longer time frame than that provided by SFPS.


2.2 Institutionalization of FSR/E


Botswana/ATIP -- The second ATIP evaluation found that the
project's Logical Framework had been revised when it became

apparent that the original Logframe was overly optimistic
and unrealistic. While...ATIP...is already identifying
technical changes which will work under specific conditions,
it is not likely that these will increase grain production
by 10% or increase per capital income by 10% (as stated in
the original Logframe) (A.I.D., 1986:6).

Changes of this magnitude, the evaluation noted, could only come
about through favorable weather and a longer-term FSR/E effort.

Accordingly, USAID/Botswana's revised Logical Framework for
ATI? identified institutionalization of FSR as a key project
output. Indeed, one project output read: "Institutionalization
of FSR, with corresponding organizational structures and systems
will be in place and operating effectively" (A.I.D., 1986:8).
However, by the second evaluation, institutionalization was no
longer expected to take place

before the end of the present [TA] contract. Rather, ...the
project will have provided sufficient experience and empiri-
cal evidence by the PACD to demonstrate whether...the FSR
approach should be institutionalized (A.I.D., 1986:6).

When the PACD was extended, the rationale was to provide an
additional year in which to test the FSR approach. The evalua-
tion concluded that Botswana's severe agro-climatic conditions
had not given ATIP "an opportunity to fully test the effective-
ness of an FSR approach or develop technologies appropriate to
varying rainfall conditions" (A.I.D., 1986:5). Extending the
P.CD would provide the added time and level of effort needed to
d-aw conclusions about the appropriateness of FSR in Botswana,
and would provide the Ministry of Agriculture "tire to solidify
[its] views on the appropriateness of institutionalizing the FSR
,aproach on a national scale" (A.I.D., 1936:6).









Lesotho/FSRP -- While one FSRP objective was to develop a
FSR Unit, the second FSRP evaluation concluded that the project's
designers had been unrealistic in thinking that a FSR Unit could
be established as a separate unit within a newly created Research
Division (RD). Further, the evaluation found "a divergence [of]
thought on the...extent to which a Farming Systems Research Unit
is being or should be established within the Research Division"
(Martin, et al., 1981:8). Many RD professionals felt that the TA
team should support the building of the entire RD. The evalua-
tion recommended that FSRP reduce "its visibility as a Farming
Systems Project," that the FSR Unit not be established, and that
the project identify more closely with the RD, focusing its
resources on institutionalizing an effective research and exten-
sion capacity in the Ministry of Agriculture by orienting the
project "to the development of the Research Division as a
National Institution" (Martin, et al., 1981:23).

While the output of a FSR Unit had not been officially
changed by the third evaluation, all parties (GOL, TA team, and
USAID/Lesotho) agreed that the project should strengthen the
overall RD program rather than establish a FSR Unit. With the TA
team's departure, the final evaluation concluded that the RD had
not yet developed an adaptive research capability (Frolik and
Thompson, 1986:28). The evaluation felt that the RD lacked the
institutional capacity

to carry out an effective adaptive research program without
continuing technical assistance. The critical mass of
personnel is lacking in all sections and collectively. Some
disciplines received little, if any, support from the F3R
project. Capacity to plan, lead, and implement an effec-
tive, well-balanced, adaptive research program is a critical
need (Frolik and Thompson, 1986:iii).

Tanzania/FSRP -- FSRP was carried out within the fairly new
Tanzania Agricultural Research Organization (TARO) (Jackson and
Osburn, 1986). But the project's design had divorced TARO from
the research organization it represented. A former TA team
.enber recalled: "Institutionalization [of FSR/E] should have
begun within the research center at Ilonga, NOT in this hypo-
thetical organization that was ostensibly created to unify all
the research in the country" (A. Cunard, personal communication).
The FSRP Project Completion Report concluded that FSR/E "failed
to establish a firm organizational niche within the Government
structure" (Faught, 1986:4).

Nepal/ARPP -- The mid-tern ARPP evaluation found that the
lack of permanent personnel in the Farming Systems Research and
Development Division (FSRDD) and the Socioeconomic Research and
Extension Division contributed to ARPP's difficulty in meeting
its targets to place participants in degree programs.







Only three of ten degree candidates had been sent for higher
education mostly as a result of the shortage of permanent
staff positions within the offices scheduled to receive
training assistance. In some situations [this] has led to
the local hire of technical assistants by Ithe TA contrac-
tor] as an emerge-ncy measure to implement Project programs
and/or to provide counterpart staff to the expatriate
advisors (Rood, et al., 1988:64-65).

Thus, ARPP's attempt to base FSR activities in the FSRDD "had not
been as effective or efficient as hoped in promoting an under-
standing of FSR" (Rood, et al., 1988: 15).

Honduras/ARP -- ARP sought to institutionalize improved
agricultural research methods., ARP's third evaluation noted that
this entailed institutionalizing a Central Unit for Technical
Support (UNAT), "making that specialized technical support and
training unit part of the regular...bureaucracy so that it
continued as part of [the Ministry of Natural Resources (MRN)]
after Project assistance ended. Honduran technical leadership
and GOH funding commitments are essential for institutionaliza-
tion to succeed (Hansen, et al., 1984:17). However, the GOH did
not make a commitment to UNAT in terms of budgeting staff posi-
tions for FSR/E. As the evaluation noted:

None of the HARP professionals occupy regular DIA [Depart-
ment of Agricultural Research] line positions. There are no
institutionalized positions so no one is really counter-
parting anyone. Counterparting refers to the situation
where one person has a regular position and is advised by
someone. In HARP no one has a regular position; all are
paid, directly or indirectly, by USAID, and none have
established DIA jobs.

UNAT does not really exist except on paper, so there is no
obvious bureaucratic home for HARP. ...HARP works and is
housed in region 3...[but] it does not answer to the...MRN
Regional Director. Although HARP is apparently an MRN group
it works semi-autonomously, publishes reports that do not
credit MRN or DIA as a sponsor, [and] deals with non-MRN
institutions such as [the Centro Universitario Regional de
Litoral Atlantico] (Hansen, et al., 1984:17).

ROCAP/SFPS -- The third SFPS evaluation noted that the
Tropical Agricultural Research and Training Center (CATIE) is
funded along project lines. As a result, CATIE may lose, from
one project to the next, personnel who gained experience on an
earlier project. The evaluation's "prognosis for continued
FSR/E work at CATIE" was "pessimistic" (Zimet, et al., 1986:5-6).
On this latter point, the evaluation stated:






11
even though some personnel that worked under the FSR project
are presently working on other CATIE projects, such as
Integrated Pest Management (IPM), they are not applying the
FSR methodology. This is particularly distressing in
several cases where the [evaluation] team believes that the
[farming systems] approach would enhance the other projects.
. Given this situation..., it is not possible for the
team to state that the project has enhanced the ability of
CATIE to carry out FSR on a continuing basis. It has been
able to do so only partially under the specific case of the
SFPS project (Zimet, et al., 1986:12-13).







3. Core Constraints in FSR/E Projects


FSR/E involves nine core characteristics (Chapter 1). On
the one hand, if the FSR/E concept being implemented in a FSR/E
project lacks or is weak in one or more of these characteristics,
the project's chances of impacting on technoloc-v development and
transfer, and institutionalization of FSR/E, are likely reduced.
On the other hand, if any one or more of the nine core character-
istics is weak or missing in a project's approach to FSR/E, the
chances are likely increased that the project is not really doing
FSR/E. Thus, if one asks why the FSR/E projects reviewed did not
have a greater impact on technology development and transfer or
institutionalization of FSR/E, one explanation may be that the
concept of and approach to FSR/E in many of,these projects lacked
or was weak in one or more of the core characteristics. Whatever
was done under the name of "farming systems," it was not FSR/E or
in some way fell short of being FSR/E.

The presence of any single core constraint in a FSR/E proj-
ect could seriously impede project implementation and impact.
While core constraints were found in all of the 12 FSR/E projects
reviewed, certain constraints appeared more frequently across
projects than others. Table E-l provides the frequency of
instances of core constraints in the FSR/E projects reviewed.
The most frequently occurring constraints, appearing in at least
7 of the 12 projects reviewed, were "problem solving" orientation
and interdisciplinary approach. A threshold of 7 is significant
in the sense of being 1 more than half (6) of the 12 projects
reviewed. The FSR/E projects in which one constraint appeared
are not necessarily the same projects in which any other
constraint appeared. Vignettes illustrating each of the core
constraints are now presented.


3.1 Farmer Orientation


FSR/E is farmer-oriented. FSR/E practitioners target small-
farm families as the client group for agricultural research, with
the fundamental objective of generating technology relevant to
the management conditions of this client group. This is done by
identifying these conditions before proposing technological
solutions, and by adapting technologies to local circumstances
and needs. However, establishing a "farmer orientation" in a
FSR/E project is not something that just comes along naturally.
The case of Lesotho/FSRP is illustrative.








Table 1.


Frequency of Core Constraints in 12 A.I.D.-Funded
FSR/E Projects.


Core Constraints3


Pro ect


C.1 C.2 C.3 C.4 C.5 C.6 C.7 C.8 C.9


Botswana/ATIP

Gambia/MFP

Lesotho/FSRP

Malawi/ARP

Senegal/ARPP

Tanzania/FSRP

Zanbia/ZAMARE

Nepal/ARPP

Philippines/FSDP

Guatemala/FPNI


Honduras/ARP

ROCAP/SFPS

TOTAL


x x

x x

x x

x


x x


x x


x x x x x

x x X


x x

x


x x


1 4 5 9 4 7 2 4 6


3Key to Core Constraints:


Farmer Orientation
Farmer Participation
Locational Specificity of Technical and Human Factors
Problem-Solving Approach
Systems Orientation
Interdisciplinarity
Complementarity with Commodity and Discipline Research
Technology Testing in On-Farm Trials
Feedback to Shape Agricultural Research Priorities
Agricultural Policies


C.1
C.2
C.3
C.4
C.5
C.6
C.7
C.8
C.9


and







Lesotho/FSRP -- The second FSRP evaluation found that the TA
team's failure to develop a profile of farming systems in the
project's target area was a constraint to reaching "a consensus
on what type of farmers...and what production technologies should
receive...attention" (Martin, et al., 1981:19). "Lack of consen-
sus 20 months after initiation of the project as to who...the
target population is and what types of innovations are most
likely to improve his/her farm enterprise is a significant
liability" (Martin, et al., 1981:28).

A constraint to consensus was the existing split in agricul-
tural policy. While donor projects were aimed at the Lesotho
smallholder, the GOL was "engaged in a substantial program of
large-scale mechanized farming to make Lesotho self-sufficient in
food grains by using modern technology and inputs in a...commer-
cial operation" (Martin, et al., 1981: 31). This split carried
over into FSRP; while some felt that FSRP should aim at improving
the level of subsistence agriculture, others felt that FSRP
should develop small-scale commercial agriculture. "The project
itself is divided on this issue" (Martin, et al., 1981:31).


3.2 Farmer Participation


FSR/E involves the client group as participants in the
research and extension process. FSR/E practitioners involve and
work with client group members (i.e., small farmers) in design-
ing, implementing, and evaluating research and extension activi-
ties. Deficiencies in establishing farmer participation were
encountered in at least a third (4) of the FSR/E projects
reviewed. Philippines/FSDP provides an example.

Philippines/FSDP -- The first FSDP evaluation found evidence
that farmer participation did not go beyond farmers being asked
about their problems and giving their consent for FSDP to conduct
trials in their fields. Many farmer-cooperators appeared "to
have had little control over the choice of the cropping pattern
for the verification trials thereby suggesting that farmers have
had little say about the proposed solutions" (Mazo, et al., 1983:
32). This point was supported by a number of instances cited by
the evaluation (Mazo, et al., 1983:30, 32):

Growing crops on fields where farmers indicated another
crop as the traditional crop.

Planting crops in spite of the farmers' warning that
the timing was wrong and could bring about severe pest
infestation, with the project telling the farmers that
timing would not be an important factor because
insecticides could be applied if needed.







Planting rice in a farmer's field even after the farmer
had indicated a preference to eat corn and would now
have to buy it.

Not considering farmers' preference for the eating
qualities of the traditional rice variety and that this
variety's price was almost twice that of the variety
the project was trying to introduce.

Designing cropping trials without reference to seasonal
variability in market demand and prices or the farmer's
knowledge of these factors.

Ignoring the farmer's wife in the design of procedures
to gain farmer cooperation in identifying production.
constraints, despite evidence that the farmer's wife
plays a major role in making decisions about the
investment of family resources.

Most farmer-cooperators did not "feel or act as partners of
the site teams in the conduct of the experiments. A number...
have been involved only in plowing the field and, in many cases,
all other labor was...provided by [the Site Research Management
Unit] or by hired hands" (Mazo, et al., 1983:33). Minimal farmer
participation, combined with farmer perception that they were not
members of the field site teams, led to a situation where the
farmers had a minimal understanding of FSDP's activities. Most
farmers believed that the trials demonstrated new technology that
was already proven and that they were expected to adopt. "There
was...no appreciation...that the trials represented experiments
to test and to compare different approaches under farm condi-
tions" (Mazo, et al., 1983:33). Some farmers did not know what
crop varieties had been planted, while few farmers could provide
the rationale for rotating leguminous crops with grain crops.

One problem was that the work of the Site Research Manage-
ment Unit (SRMU) teams placed project staff in the position of
being perceived by farmers not as researchers but as extension
workers. When an evaluation team asked cooperators what was the
project's purpose, farmers usually responded "to give advice to
farmers" (Sajise, et al., 1985:46). Asked how the project had
benefited them, the same cooperators cited the new crops and
varieties, the provision of inputs (e.g., fertilizers) for crop-
ping pattern trials, and livestock dispersals. The evaluation
also noted that FSDP's extension role hid the project's main
purpose (technology development) from farmers. "Very few
farmers, cooperators and non-cooperators, had any notion that
[farming systems] involves research to develop and screen new
technologies" (Sajise, et al., 1985:47).







3. Locational Specificity of Technical and Human Factors


FSR/E recognizes the locational specificity of technical and
human factors. FSR/E practitioners identify client groups in
terms of homogeneous groups of farming systems in specific agro-
climatic zones. Difficulties in taking locationall specificity"
into account were evident in 5 of the 12 projects reviewed. The
cases of Senegal/ARPP and Philippines/FSDP are illustrative.

Senecal/ARPP -- The mid-term ARPP evaluation noted that the
project's Production Systems Research (PSR) teams had found that
it took a longer to develop cropping pattern recommendations in
on-farm trials than in on-station trials. Delays in developing
recommendations in on-farm trials, due to erratic rainfall pat-
terns, micro-variation in topography, and ethnic heterogeneity,
led ARPP into a debate on the importance of precision versus
timeliness of research findings. While the PSR team was consi-
dering the possibility of doing research on the management of
livestock in each production zone to improve the precision of
research findings, the team recognized that many other secondary
criteria could be used to define production zones but would
disperse the area into several smaller zones. This would
increase field costs, pose logistical problems, and make it
difficult for extension services to provide specific technology
packages over a larger area.

Philippines/FSDP -- The second FSDP evaluation noted that
the project's mandated focus on crops grown by upland farmers
directed research resources to previously neglected crops but
"eliminated problem identification as the first step in the
farming system approach at the site level" (Sajise, et al.,
1985:32). Most Site Researcn Management Units (SRMU) merely
targeted their efforts on farmers with less than 3 hectares of
land. Thus, there was little stratification of the target
population due an implicit assumption

that all farming households in upland areas are relatively
homogeneous.... The various sondeos, socioeconomic
profiles, and baseline studies reflected an assumption of
homogeneity with data presented largely in terms of modal
distributions. Cooperator selection and technologies being
developed and methods of working with site farmers have, as
one result, assumed homogeneity. Understanding
diversity would allow for better targeted research and
extension efforts, and would allow for a better understand-
ing of cases of adoption and non-adoption (Sajise, et al.,
1985:35, 57).







But FSDP had 72 research locations scattered over the
Eastern Visayas, with 6 sites and 12 farms per site. Several
factors impeded implementation, including staff inexperience in
implementing FSR, lack of understanding of the existing farming
systems, and the time involved in traveling between research
sites. Further, the "generally large number of locations at each
site where field tests [were] underway may have prevented the
[Site Research Management Unit] staff from spending time to fully
understand the existing systems and how these should affect the
proposed interventions (Mazo, et al., 1983:56). This led the
evaluation to conclude that FSDP had too many research locations
and recommended that the number of locations be reduced.


3.4 Problem-Solving Approach


FSR/E is a problem-solving approach. Once a region's
farming systems are grouped into homogeneous agro-climatic zones,
a FSR/E practitioner identifies the limiting technical, biologi-
cal, and socioeconomic constraints to improved farm productivity
and fare family income. Data on these constraints provides one
of the bases for identifying technologies that may be effective
in removing or relaxing the constraints and feasible for the
client group of farming households to adopt. Thus, the primary
concern of FSR/E is helping farmers to solve problems. Estab-
lishing a problem-solving approach was found to be a constraint
in at least 9 of the 12 projects reviewed. Botswana/ATIP and
ROCAP/SFPS are illustrative.

Botswana/ATIP -- The second ATIP evaluation noted that
extension workers may not have cooperated in ATIP because they
did not understand FSR. However, the evaluation team found that
senior level extension staff had a very good basic knowledge of
FSR. To the contrary, the team expressed concern that ATIP staff
:ere "not focusing enough attention on...important problems
identified by farmers, but rather on what [ATIP staff]...had
decided to do research on" (A.I.D., 1986:42).

ROCAP/SFPS -- The third SFPS evaluation noted the lack of a
"problem-solving" approach in SFPS' technique of characterizing
the farmers at project sites in each participating country. The
technique of characterizing "was observed religiously at the out-
set of each country project" (Zimet, et al., 1986:59). However,
it was not clear "precisely what were the objectives to be
achieved and how they were to be reached" (Zimet, et al., 1986:
59). Some of the problems with the characterization were:

There was limited multidisciplinary involvement of host
country and CATIE personnel during the survey process.







The survey instrument required too much time to
complete (up to four hours per respondent in Panama)
and precluded or limited the farmer from providing his
or her perspective on farming problems.

Survey data were sent to Turrialba for analysis instead
of being analyzed on site as a cooperative effort
between host country and CATIE personnel.


3.5 Systems Orientation


FSR/E is systems-oriented. Viewing the total farm as a
system of natural and human components, FSR/E focuses on specific
subsystems to evaluate interactions between those subsystems,
other farm subsystems, the farm as a total system, and the
environment beyond the farm. FSR/E seeks to identify the
potential for and impact on the farm of introducing a change in
the technology of a specific target subsystem. Difficulties in
establishing a systems orientation appeared in at least 4 of the
12 projects reviewed. An example is provided by Tanzania/FSRP.

Tanzania/FSRP -- One of the project's FSR teams identified
February as the month when there was a food shortage in Kilosa
district. In response, the FSR team designed and implemented on-
farm trials to test an early maturing maize variety known as
Kito: "Early on-farm trial results were whopping successes.
Almost all farmers were pleased. Seed is in great demand and is
reflected in scarce seed supplies" (Jackson and Osburn, 1986:9).
Kito's story illustrates the role that a systems approach can
play in identifying production problems and designing on-farm
trials to test solutions. It also brings home the necessity of
adequate research support; Kito was an on-shelf technology and
ARPP discovered and assessed its adaptability to existing farming
systems (Jackson and Osburn, 1986:10). The key was looking at
the total system rather than at only a single component.

Kito had originally not proven popular with farmers. But
the major emphasis of corn breeders had been developing high
yielding varieties for production during the Masika (long rains)
season. While the short season Kito reduced the risk of crop
failure from drought when planted in the Masika season, Kito's
yields in the Masika season were lower than full season varie-
ties. However, when planted in the Vuli (short) season, Kito
yielded as well as traditional long season varieties and provided
a harvest several weeks earlier than the traditional varieties.
Also, it was found that:







subsequent Masika season crops of maize or cotton following
Kito planted in the Vuli season yielded 20 to 30 percent
more than they did if planted after traditional full season
varieties. Over the two year period that the trials were
run approximately 50 farmers per season grew Kito and in the
1985/86 season Kito seed were sold to an additional 500
farmers (Faught, 1986:4).

Thus, commodity researchers working with a narrower commodity
focus, saw no value in the Kito variety. Their partial analysis
was incorrect, and highlighted the consequences when a total
system perspective is not adopted (Jackson and Osburn, 1986:10).

However, while the first evaluation indicated that the
diagnosis stage of FSRP had been adequately designed, the
evaluation also pointed out that project had not investigated
"all...the resource allocation decisions that farmers must make"
nor addressed "the functioning of the total system...in an
explicit systematic fashion" (Jackson and Osburn, 1986:5). The
evaluation recommended that FSRP conduct earlier-proposed market
analysis and intra-household studies "to provide...the missing
links regarding the total system" (Jackson and Osburn, 1986:5).

The evaluation also noted that most Tanzanian commodity
researchers were also part-time farmers. One would expect that
they would be "readily cognizant" of

the constraints that farmers in the area have, and in turn,
that hands-on experience would influence their commodity
research activities. Apparently this is not the case in
that the...researchers rarely, if at all, visited FSR/E...
trials. In addition the constraints that commodity
researchers had with their own farm operations were signi-
ficantly different than other farmers. ...the commodity
researchers lacked the total system perspective and were not
fully aware that other farmerss] constraints were different
(Jackson and Osburn, 1986:7; emphasis added).


3.6 Interdisciplinary Approach


Collaboration among agricultural and social scientists in
FSR/E facilitates identification of the conditions under which
small farmers operate; accurate diagnosis of constraints; and
design, conduct, and evaluation of research and extension activ-
ities aimed at developing and introducing improved technologies
suitable to the client group of farmers. Problems in achieving
an interdisciplinary approach in FSR/E were found in at least 6
of the 12 FSR/E projects reviewed. Malawi/ARP is illustrative of
how lack of an interdisciplinary approach can constrain imple-
mentation of FSR/E.







Malawi/ARP -- While the ARP Project Paper emphasized the
importance of a multidisciplinary team approach, the second ARP
evaluation found that the TA skill mix contained in the PP would
lead one "to believe that most of the expatriate researchers were
to advise on several crop programs" (Baker, et al., 1983:21).
Further, the expatriates were to work as a team, "each making
some contribution to improving the technical quality or relevance
of the various research programs to the smallholder farmer"
(Baker, et al., 1983:21). However, each TA team member tended to
work independently and to specialize in particular crops, thereby
deemphasizing the importance of a multidisciplinary approach.

A particularly difficult problem was that of defining the
role of agricultural economics vis-a-vis the Farming Systems
Analysis (FSA) section. Neither the Outputs section nor the
Logical Framework of the Project Paper listed "anything specific
for the economics section" (Baker, et al., 1983:30). Further,
the duties for the economist listed in the Long Term TA Job
Descriptions differed from the work plan of the economist
provided by the TA contractor. While the work plan listed six
objectives, there was little emphasis on supporting the FSA
section. The evaluation found that the research program of the
agricultural economics section leaned more toward

addressing macroeconomic policy issues than...economic
constraints faced by Malawi smallholder[s]. There-
fore, the evaluation team recommends that the section spend
more time in (a) farm-level trial design and analysis of
trial results, (b) determining whether or not improved
treatments benefit the farmer more than they cost him, and
(c) collaborating with the adaptive research effort via the
FSA section. If this recommendation is followed, the...work
plan of the...agricultural economist will begin to look more
like the original job description for this position outlined
in the Project Paper (Baker, et al., 1983:34-35).

Another TA position during ARP's initial two years was a
farming systems analyst to establish and serve as acting head of
the FSA section of the Department of Agricultural Research (DAR).
An anthropologist was recruited to head the FSA section. Having
identified local maize as the predominant variety in the majority
of farm cropping systems, the FSA section proceeded to conduct a
series of on-farm trials on fertilizer in local maize in the
1981-82 cropping season. One trial was designed for a cropping
system including maize, cowpea, and sunflower. There were four
treatments: (1) local maize without fertilizer, (2) local maize
with fertilizer, (3) improved maize without fertilizer, and (4)
i-proved maize with fertilizer.








Based on the harvest data for that season, the FSA section
concluded that variety made little difference without fertilizer,
and that both varieties responded to fertilizer. But including
local maize as the key treatment in the on-farm fertilizer trials
led to "a basic misunderstanding about the role of FSR" (Baker,
et al., 1983:39). While the FSA section's approach to the diag-
nostic phase of FSR had been helpful in assessing farmers' needs,

problems arose when the FSA section headed the subsequent
trial design phase. Some DAR officials and [TA contractor]
research staff believe the trial design phase should have
been a joint exercise, where agronomy takes the lead with
[the] FSA section assisting. ...the original job descrip-
tion fcr the Farming System Analyst position states...:
"Assist the Research Coordinator and research officers in...
selection and evaluation of smallholder research projects to
ensure incorporationn of local smallholder farming systems
data into research planning." (PP, Annex A, p. 11) (Baler,
et al., 1983:40).

Apparently, as the second evaluation found, the "agricul-
tural scientists...did not like the idea of a social scientist
designing, implementing, harvesting and analyzing agronomic on-
farm trials" (Baker, et al., 1983:41). Also, the evaluation team
concluded that there had been

very little [TA] team interaction between the diagnostic
survey stage and the farm trial design phase. .
Instead of assisting the rest of the team in design of
trials, the FSA section head had employed a more direct
approach.... There were few alternatives, however, as
the...DAR staff and...technical assistance [team] had no
formal mandate to work in an interdisciplinary mode; thus
the FSA section was forced to rely on recruiting voluntary
assistance. The FSA section head was forced into a
choice between proceeding using whatever manpower and
agronomic advice was available and willing to participate in
1981-82, or waiting another season to initiate on-farm
trials. As the FSA technical assistance was only funded for
the first two years of the five year project, delaying the
trials would have meant that the objectives of the FSA
workplan would have fallen short of achievement (Baker, et
al., 1983:41).

The evaluation noted that identifying the importance of
local maize was an important outcome of the diagnostic phase of
the FSR methodology being implemented by the FSA section. How-
ever, as the evaluation also noted, basing the first round of on-
farm trials on local maize varieties seemed to go counter to the
government's policy of quickly increasing per hectare yields in
smallholder fields. Further, from an agronomic point of view,








it was assumed by the...DAR researchers, based on years of
experience that the improved varieties...are genetically
superior to the local varieties in their ability to yield
well under high doses of nitrogen fertilizer and good
management. What the...[FSA section's on-farm trials]
measured, however, during only one growing season, was the
response of an improved versus a local variety using DAR-
recommended levels of fertilizer in the farmer's cropping
system (which...included both sunflower and cowpea) under
his (or her) own management. Thus, the improved variety was
subjected to two conditions for which it was not specifi-
cally bred (Baker, et al., 1983:41).

The evaluation noted that very few agronomists/breeders
would place as much emphasis on one year's data as did the FSA
section that was headed by an anthropologist. However, as the
evaluation also noted, the MOA/DAR and the TA team misinterpreted
the implications of the on-farm trials (OFTs).

What the results indicate is not that there are no dif-
ferences between varieties, but that in the particular
[Agricultural Development District (ADD)] farmer system and
under the unique farmer management during the 1981-82
season, there were no statistically significant differences
between varieties. Further, the importance of considering
alternative sets of recommendations for different levels of
farmer resources was pointed out. The...MOA/DAR-[TA]
research team should have used this information as...
positive feedback from the farm level to refine on-station
research priorities to address the issues raised by the
OFTs. They should not have reacted negatively to the
results of the OFTs. ...the way in which the FSA section
reported...results should have been positive "we believe
more on-station work could be done on improved varieties
grown...with other crops..., rather than "there are no
differences between local maize and the improved variety."

Once the...actors began to go separate ways, subsequent
contacts became less frequent and opinions about..."others"
solidified and became self-reinforcing. The FSA section
viewed the OFTs as ultra-high priority and dedicated much
time to them; other [TA team] scientists had their own
programs and priorities, and little inclination to visit
trials into which they had little or no input; some MOA
officials continued to lament...that the FSA section was
taking the lead in...farm trials (Baker, et al., 1983:41-
42).

Between the 1981-82 and 1982-83 seasons, the Chief Agricul-
ture Research Officer (CARO) and the TA team chief of party
decided to stop the FSA section's OFTs until such time as
agronomy could be "officially" involved in the effort.








3.7 Complementarity with Commodity and Discipline Research


FSR/E complements, not replaces, conventional commodity and
discipline research. FSR/E draws upon technologies and manage-
ment strategies generated by discipline and commodity research
and adapts this knowledge to the agro-climatic environment and
socioeconomic circumstances of a relatively homogeneous target
group of farmers. FSR/E cannot complement what does not exist.
Where conventional agricultural research programs are weak, it is
very difficult for FSR/E to play a complementary role in technol-
ogy development and transfer. Two of the FSR/E projects reviewed
provide cases in point: Lesotho/FSRP and Zambia/ZAMARE.

Lesotho/FSRP -- The second FSRP evaluation recommended that,
while the TA team worked to strengthen the Research Division (RD)
as a newly formed institution, the TA team needed to play "a
stronger role in the management and planning areas...to provide a
sharper focus on reaching the specific objectives of conducting
relevant research and...transferring technology to small holders"
(Martin, et al., 1981: 8). Acknoweldgement of the need for the
TA team to strengthen the RD reflected the evaluation team's
conclusion that the project's ability to complement commodity and
disciplinary agricultural research was constrained by "the
absence of an ongoing agricultural research program" (Martin, et
al., 1981:8). Indeed, Lesotho did not have a published set of
crop production recommendations.

Zambia/ZAMARE -- The second ZAMARE evaluation reported that
che project had sought, during its early efforts to institution-
alize FSR in the Research Branch, to avoid arousing animosity on
the part of Commodity and Specialist Research Teams (CSRTs)
personnel (Sutherland and Warren, 1985). Given the considerable
TA and training support that were being given to the Adaptive
Research Planning Team (ARPT) by outside agencies and the govern-
ment, the evaluation felt that there was a danger that technical
component research would be overlooked.

This is due in part to the tendency to see farming systems
research as a panacea. However, it has become very obvious
to those with ARPT that it is not, and that whilst it does
have several unique and important features it must be seen
as an integral part of the Research Branch complementing the
work of the CSRTs. For, when no technical component
research has been undertaken...., then ARPT is not able to
test any possible technological situations (Sutherland and
Warren, 1985:56; emphasis added).







3.8 Technology Testing in On-Farm Trials


On-farm collaboration of FSR/E practitioners and farmers
provides each with a deeper understanding of the farming system
and the farmer's decisionmaking criteria, and allows for poten-
tially improved technologies to be evaluated under the environ-
mental and management conditions in which they will be used.
While technology testing in on-farm trials is widely recognized
as an essential im FSR/E, problems associated with this activity
appeared in at least four of the FSR/E projects reviewed. A
major question is that of the emphasis that FSR/E practitioners
should place on testing technologies vs. validating technologies
in on-farm trials. How the question is answered has implications
for how FSR/E is carried out, in particular, for how farmers are
involved in the research process. A case in point is ROCAP/SFPS.

ROCAP/SFPS -- The third SFPS evaluation noted the following
pattern in on-farm trials conducted by the Tropical Agricultural
Research and Training Center (CATIE). First, SFPS emphasized
developing complete technological packages vs. improving single
components of production systems. Second, the "trials were
managed by researchers and the inputs were furnished." Third,
"more field management was given by CATIE staff than should be
done at the validation stage" (Zimet, et al., 1986:42). Also,
there were instances where CATIE field teams performed validation
when research was not really complete in order to conform with a
contractual obligation to validate "tech-packs." In this regard,
the evaluation team noted its belief

that validation should test the acceptability (by the pro-
ducer) of the technology.... This cannot be accomplished if
the field team is involved in the management of the produc-
tion-site or if inputs are supplied to the farmer. Thus, we
believe that CATIE validated the technical efficiency of the
technology...and did not attain the goal of validation
(Zimet, et al., 1986:41)

While CATIE recognized the importance of the evaluation
team's definition of validation (testing a technology's accept-
ability by a farmer), CATIE saw validation as a further stage of
research than CATIE was trying to accomplish under SFPS (A.I.D.,
1985). The evaluation responded by noting its belief that

a good part of the [CATIE] effort was misspent because the
validation was generally of the technology not of the
acceptability of the technology. (The result of doing the
former is a reduced frequency of adoption by producers).
What the team (as well as most practitioners) believes to be
the correct definition would have been applied had either
CATIE or ROCAP been better versed in FSR/E techniques
(Zimet, et al., 1986:126).







3.9 Feedback to Shape Agricultural Research Priorities and
Agricultural Policies


FSR/E provides feedback for shaping research priorities and
agricultural policies. FSR/E is a dynamic and iterative process
that provides information on farmer goals, needs, priorities, and
criteria for evaluating technologies, and how new technologies
perform under farm-level conditions. Results of one season's
trials generate hypotheses for testing in the next. Further,
trial results provide an input to the setting of on-station
research priorities as well as to the formulation of regional-
and national-level policy. At least six of the FSR/E projects
reviewed encountered problems in providing feedback to shape
agricultural research priorities and/or agricultural policies.
Philippines/FSDP and Botswana/ATIP are illustrative.


Agricultural Research Priorities


Philippines/FSDP -- Site Research Management Unit (SRMU)
teams were to provide researchers at the Visayas State College of
Agriculture (VISCA) with feedback on farm-level production
constraints that might be investigated in the "back-up research
program." But the proposed studies in this program were not
linked in any way with the project's farm-level trials or even
with specific problems at the project sites (Mazo, et al., 1983:
34). Further, Ministry of Agriculture and Food "site personnel
informed the Evaluation Team that they [had] not made any sugges-
tions to the VISCA Technical Team on the specific back-up
research to be conducted" (Mazo, et al., 1983:34).


Agricultural Policy


Botswana/ATIP -- The second ATIP evaluation suggested that
the project could be more effective in collecting information
from farmers about the effects of national policy on their
productivity and income, identifying possible modifications in
policy which will enhance productivity and income, and working
with colleagues in the Ministry of Agriculture to provide infor-
mation to decision makers in the Department of Planning and
Statistics (A.I.D., 1986).







4. Operational Constraints in FSR/E Projects


Implementation and impact of a FSR/E project may be
constrained when the project implementor's concept of and
approach to FSR/E lacks or is weak in one or more of the nine
core characteristic of FSR/E. Even if steps are taken to ensure
that all nine core characteristics are in place in a FSR/E
project, implementation and impact may yet be jeopardized by
operational constraints. An operational constraint is present
when a farming systems practitioner's efforts to operationalize
(implement) the FSR/E concept are impeded by problems in any of
the following areas:

o Stakeholder understanding and support of FSR/E
o Agricultural research policy/strategy defining role of FSR/E
o Long-term commitment of resources
o Existing research capability and shelf technology
o Consensus on FSR/E methodology
o Capability to process farming systems data
o Consensus on criteria for evaluating FSR/E
o Links with extension
o Links with agri-support services
o Links with farmer organizations

As may be seen in Table 2 four operational constraints--
stakeholder understanding of FSR/E, agricultural research policy
or strategy defining the role of FSR/E, concnsus on FSR/E method-
ology, and links with extension--appeared in at least 7 of the 12
FSR/E projects reviewed. An additional three constraints--long-
term commitment of resources, existing research capability and
shelf technology, and links with agri-support services--appeared
in at least five projects.

While FSR/E practitioners emphasize the importance of taking
a systems approach, implementors of FSR/E projects often paid
relatively little attention to dealing systematically with
operational constraints that could impede the practitioner's
ability to do FSR/E. Project-specific vignettes now illustrate
each operational constraint.


4.1 Stakeholder Understanding and Support of FSR/E


Successful FSR/E depends, in large part, on stakeholders
understanding of the FSR/E approach. FSR/E project implementa-
tion and impact will be impeded where project personnel fail to
ensure that key stakeholders understand, hold realistic expecta-
tions for, and fully support the FSR/E approach. This constraint
appeared as a negative factor in at least seven FSR/E projects.
Botswana/ATIP is illustrative.








Table 2.


27

Frequency of Operational Constraints in 12 A.I.D.-
Funded FSR/E Projects.


Project

Botswana/ATIP

Gambia/MFP

Lesotho/FSRP

Malawi/ARP

Senegal/ARPP

Tanzania/FSRP

Zambia/ZAMARE

Nepal/ARPP

Philippines/FSDP

Guatemala/FPNI

Honduras/ARP

ROCAP/SFPS


TOTAL


0.1

x
X



x

X

x


Operational Constraints4

0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.10

x x x x x

x x x x x

x x x x x x x x x

x x x x x

x x x


x x


x x


x x

x
X


x x


7 7 5 5 8 4 4 9 5 2


4Key to Operational Constraints:

Stakeholder Understanding of FSR/E
Agricultural Research Policy/Strategy Defining FSR/E's Role
Long-Term Commitment of Resources
Existing Research Capability and Shelf Technology
Consensus on FSR/E Methodology
Capability to Process Farming Systems Data
Consensus on Criteria for Evaluating FSR/E
Links with Extension
Links with Agri-Support Services
Links with Farmer Organizations


0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
0.10







Botswana/ATIP -- The second ATIP evaluation noted "little
indication that...FSR...had been understood and adopted" or "that
this approach is likely to be widely adopted by the [Ministry of
Agriculture] in the near future" (A.I.D., 1986: 18). Some Crop
Production Officers (CPOs) believed that Department of Agricul-
tural Field Services administrators had little or no interest in
FSR because no administrator had ever attended an ATIP-sponsored
FSR workshop. CPOs felt that "until...real interest in and sup-
port for the Farming Systems Approach are demonstrated by admin-
istration, ...it will be a waste of time for field staff to study
and develop the technique further" (cited in A.I.D., 1986:36).

The evaluation also noted that FSR is a difficult concept
"to articulate and to incorporate into an established research
and extension system, since impact may not be as easily measured
as that of a new maize hybrid or an irrigation scheme" (A.I.D.,
1986:1). Indeed, the first evaluation pointed out that a "major
conceptual difficulty in institutionalizing" FSR/E is "starting
with a 'bottom-up' approach in an organization which has an
essentially 'top-down' operating mode and decision-making struc-
ture" (Francis, et al., 1984:10). As the second evaluation
emphasized, decision makers at the national level as well as
regional and district agricultural officers need to understand
"how the farming systems approach can enhance the effectiveness
of the research and extension system" (A.I.D., 1986:1).


4.2 Agricultural Research Policy or Strategy Defining Role of
FSR/E in Research and Extension


A second operational constraint to doing FSR/E (and imple-
menting FSR/E projects) occurs when a country's agricultural
research policy or strategy does not define a role for FSR/E in
the existing research and extension system. An even more basic
constraint may be the simple lack of an agricultural research
policy and strategy. This constraint appeared in at least nine
FSR/E projects. Contrasting examples may be seen in Lesotho/FSRP
(negative) and Zambia/ZAMARE (positive).

Lesotho/FSRP -- The second FSRP evaluation found that the
Research Division lacked an agricultural research policy and
strategy and that this lack of policy and strategy had impeded
implementation of FSRP (Martin, et al., 1981).

Zambia/ZAMARE -- Adaptive Research Planning Teams (ARPTs) in
ZAMARE were operational by the project's end in six of Zambia's
nine provinces. Although each ARPT was supported by a separate
dancr, all operated under a National Coordinator reporting to the
Chief Agricultural Research Officer. Thus, the funding provided
by USAID/Zambia to the first ARPT was part of an overall program
of donor support for FSR/E in Zambia.







4.3 Longq-Term Commitment of Resources


Agricultural research cannot be successful in developing
improved technologies without a long-term commitment of
resources. FSR/E as a component of the overall agricultural
research and extension process is dependent on resources being
available to cover expenses associated with intensive field work
(e.g., fuel expenses incurred with reconnaissance surveys and on-
farm trials). These expenses need to be covered not only during
but also beyond the life of the project. Resources also will be
needed beyond the LOP for training and possibly technical assis-
tance. This constraint appeared in at least six projects, with
negative examples in five cases, and a positive example in one.
Tanzania/FSRP and Guatemala/FPNI are illustrative.

Tanzania/FSRP -- The FSRP Project Completion Report (PCR)
indicated that FSRP had been less than successful in improving
management capability within the Tanzania Agricultural Research
Organization (TARO). In this respect, the PCR noted that "the
experience of going through planning, budgeting, and monitoring
and other exercises involved in a research program jointly with
trained and experienced researchers...must have improved the
skills and capability of the TARO staff to carry out these
activities in the future" (Faught, 1986:5). However, any
"improvement in TARO management that did occur may have been
wiped out with the dismissal of the TARO Director and other top
staff shortly before USAID/[TA contractor] participation
terminated" (Faught, 1986:5). The PCR concluded that:

The major lesson that should have been learned, or perhaps
more appropriately re-learned, is that development of a
research capability and the institutionalization of such
capability is a very long term activity. Resources that are
used for short-term support of such activities are
generally, if not always, wasted (Faught, 1986:16).

Guatemala/FPNI -- An impact evaluation of FPNI concluded
that much of FPNI's progress could be attributed to the important
role that the Rockefeller Foundation and A.I.D. had played, over
a long period, in developing the research capacity of the Agri-
cultural Science and Technology Institute (ICTA). In the five
years preceding ICTA's creation, USAID/Guatemala worked with the
GOG in planning and implementing the reorganization of the public
agricultural sector. Early and sustained Mission support to ICTA
helped to ensure timely and appropriate assistance.







4.4 Existing Research Capability and Shelf Technology


FSR/E's ability to complement conventional agricultural
research depends on the ability of commodity and disciplinary
research to support FSR/E. But in many developing countries
commodity and disciplinary research are limited because of
shortages of trained research personnel and other weaknesses in
the existing research system. An important indicator of existing
research capability is the existence of "shelf technology" that
can be adapted and tested in on-farm trials. Often appropriate
technologies have yet to be developed; thus, they are not ready
"on the shelf" for FSR/E practitioners to take to the field.
Problems of this nature appeared in at least five of the projects
reviewed. Botswana/ATIP and Nepal/ARPP provide two illustrative
cases.

Botswana/ATIP -- While several technologies derived from
station-based research had been tested in "maximum yield" plots
by ATIP's fourth year, there was "no consistency to performance
nor general application of technology" (A.I.D., 1986:22). The
evaluation concluded that: "Few interventions had been suffi-
ciently tested and proven...to move forward to the dissemination
stage" (A.I.D., 1986:5). Thus, the lack of technologies derived
from station-based research impeded ATIP's ability to develop
technologies ready for extension to disseminate to farmers.

Nepal/ARPP -- The mid-term ARPP evaluation found that the
research base for technologies for hill agriculture was poor,
with a lack of technically feasible, economically viable, and
socially acceptable technologies (Rood, et al., 1988).


4.5 Consensus on FSR/E Methodolocg


While FSR/E's core characteristics define what FSR/E is,
they do not define how to do FSR/E, that is, the methodology for
doing FSR/E. In at least 8 of the 12 FSR/E projects reviewed,
lack of consensus over the methodology for FSR/E appeared as a
constraint. Two examples were Lesotho/FSRP and Philippines/FSDP.

Lesotho/FSRP -- Finding that Research Division (RD) staff
and units did not agree on the project's FSR methodology, the
third FSRP evaluation expressed concern over "the many concepts
of FSR held by either [TA team] or Basotho staff in the RD"
;(Dunn, 1983:27-28). The need for clarification on the FSR/E
approach to be followed was echoed by the fourth evaluation's
recommendation that "the FSR interpretation (there are many) for
Lesotho" be spelled out in writing, with copies...made available
to all concerned Frolik and Thompson, 1986:iv).








Philippines/FSDP -- While FSDP's Project Paper stated that
"the existing farming system is the starting point...from which
any changes and improvements must be made," the first evaluation
questioned "why...the main crop...grown by...farmers during the
past years" had been changed in on-farm trials. This "may be
viewed as tantamount to a total change" of the existing farming
system (Mazo, et al., 1983:24). Concern was also expressed that
FSDP was trying to introduce "more than one or two major modifi-
cations at the same time" in a farm, this also being "tantamount
to...total change in the farming system" (Mazo, et al., 1983:2).

As a result, the evaluation expressed concern that FSDP
staff "may be thinking incorrectly that the goal of farming
systems research is to introduce an entirely new farming system
and the role of...verification trials is to demonstrate the
superiority of [the] new system (Mazo, et al., 1983:25). An
example of this questionable approach was a project-sponsored
study of ducks that was neither linked with farmer crop produc-
tion activities nor conducted at sites where farmer-cooperators
had previously raised ducks. This indicated

a seemingly widespread misconception that the purpose of
FSDP...is to introduce a new livestock system to replace,
rather than modify, the existing systems of the farmer-
cooperators. The suggestion of one of the researchers to
have separate cooperators for livestock further displays a
serious misunderstanding of what is meant by integration of
crops and livestock under a farming systems approach to
research (Mazo, et al., 1983:25-26).

Given the proposed operational procedures for FSR/E outlined in
the second evaluation (Sajise, et al., 1985: 33-34), there is a
question of whether FSDP had established, even three years into
the project, consensus on a methodology for implementing FSR/E.


4.6 Capability to Process Farming Systems Data


FSR/E involves considerable data collection and analysis.
Lack of adequate capability to process farming system research
data will constrain doing FSR/E (or implementing a FSR/E proj-
ect). This problem may exist because of the amount of data
needing to be analyzed, lack of data analysis equipment (e.g.,
computers), or lack of personnel trained in data analysis. This
constraint appeared as a negative factor in six projects and a
positive factor in two projects. Examples from Gambia/MFP and
Senegal/ARPP are illustrative.







Gambia/MFP -- The first MFP evaluation noted that while the
Socio-Economic Unit (SEU) was generally on schedule in initiating
its surveys and studies, the same could not be said for output
delivery (Osburn, et al., 1983). There were numerous delays in
developing, pre-testing, and coding survey questionnaires. The
SEU lacked microcomputers and delays were encountered in data
processing in the TA contractor's home office. By the first
evaluation (April 1983), the results of the baseline survey, for
which the preparation for data collection had started in
September 1981, were still unavailable, largely because the SEU
lacked experience in data collection, processing, and analysis.
While the TA team's two social scientists (an agricultural
economist and a rural sociologist) provided leadership for the
development of the project's socio-economic studies, they lacked
experience in designing and conducting large-scale data collec-
tion programs, and in analyzing data with computerized data
processing. As the evaluation noted: "Learning on-the-job...
has caused unfortunate delays (Osburn, et al., 1983:70-71).

Senegal/ARPP -- While ARPP cut back over time in the amount
of data collected, the first evaluation cautioned that "there is
too great a risk that too much data will be collected and...will
never get analyzed (St. Louis, et al., 1985:37). The evaluation
observed that ARPP was facing a formidable analysis task, and
recommended that serious consideration be given to merging the
entire data set -n the TA contractor's mainframe computer. in the
U.S., in order to speed up analysis and generation of results.

Yet two of ARPP's three Production Systems Research (PSR)
teams had access to appropriate microcomputer software, and had
developed the necessary skills for data management and analysis.
As a result, ARPP had gained some experience in using micro-
computers for data analysis of production and marketing issues.

In the Casamance, ...the team has made effective use of the
FARMAP and MSTAT programs because its staff has had both the
capacity to collect needed data and to formulate sound
research and analytical approaches. They have been able to
gain an understanding of and quantify...constraints to the
production systems (St. Louis, et al., 1985:73).

However, progress in Fleuve, because of a later start, had not
been as great, while Sine Saloum had been seriously hampered, in
part, because the PSR team at this site lacked any computer
capacity because of inadequate facilities to house a computer.







4.7 Consensus on Criteria for Evaluating FSR/E


A key factor in implementing any goal-oriented activity is
obtaining feedback on the activity's progress toward its goal,
and using this feedback to determine if any needed mid-course
corrections. While clearly defined criteria are essential for
evaluating an activity, this has been a problem in evaluating
FSR/E projects. As one evaluation team pleaded: "Agreement
should be reached on some practical suggestions for conducting
FSR project evaluations which will be more satisfactory to USAID
Missions, AID/W, and project contractors" (Francis, et al.,
1984:12). While some attention has been directed to this issue
(Farming Systems Support Project, 1986; Lichte, 1987), this
attention came too late to be of any help to the FSR/E projects
reviewed in'the present study. Indeed, at least a third (four)
of these projects encountered difficulty in establishing a
consensus on criteria to evaluate a FSR/E project. Lesotho/FSRP,
Malawi/ARP, and Nepal/ARPP provide examples of some of the
problems faced in evaluating FSR/E projects.

Lesotho/FSRP -- The third FSRP evaluation used objectively
verifiable indicators (OVIs) from the Project Paper to assess the
project's progress (Dunn, 1983). But these OVIs focused on the
status of project activities (e.g., FSR Unit, farming systems
program), not on impact in terms of farmer adoption of technology
or increases in crop yield and farm income. Yet the OVIs were
useful in identifying whether FSRP was meeting its objectives or
targets. In some cases, however, the OVIs were no longer mean-
ingful or relevant. This suggested that it may not be possible
to define meaningful objectives for an FSR/E project. Two of the
OVIs for one FSRP component (FSR Unit) are illustrative.

One OVI for this component stated: Research priorities are
determined through the use of social and economic benefit/cost
techniques by 12/79 (OVIl). However, the third FSRP evaluation
found, nearly four years after the target date, that there was no
evidence that either technique was ever applied to selection of
research priorities (Dunn, 1983). In this case, the objective
implied by the OVI simply may not have been met because FSRP did
not implement the required activity; it could also mean that it
was difficult, if not impossible, to define realistic social and
economic criteria and/or to measure benefits and costs.

Another OVI stated: The FSR Unit is pursuing or considering
a program for replicating FSR/E after the project ends (OVI4).
While including the TA team in the Research Livision provided a
foundation for institutionalizing FSR/E in the Division, the
second evaluation earlier recommended that FSRP abandon the
concept of a separate FSR Unit (Martin, et al., 1981). In this
case, the objective implied by this OVI was no longer relevant by
the time of the fourth evaluation.








Malawi/ARP -- The second ARP evaluation dealt with the prob-
lem of establishing evaluation criteria by identifying three
"critical aspects" to assess the extent to which ARP's purpose
was being achieved (Baker, et al., 1983). These aspects were:
(1) Are the research programs technically sound, relevant to
smallholders' needs, and conducted in a coordinated manner? (2)
Is a research management system in place which efficiently allo-
cates financial and human resources in accordance with project
priorities? (3) Is there an adequate information dissemination
system which provides research results to the appropriate clients
of the research organization? However, the evaluation recom-
mended that benchmarks needed to be more closely and carefully
emphasized during project design, a task that may be difficult
since the farm-level problems and constraints that need to be
addressed by a FSR/E project likley are not yet known at the time
a project is being designed.

NeDal/ARPP -- The Project Paper for ARPP outlined a "Prcject
Monitoring Plan" divided into two categories (routine project
implementation monitoring and impact monitoring). The latter
category was concerned with ARPP's components (e.g., agricultural
research). While the PP listed the elements to be monitored, the
design did not include a plan of how the monitoring would be
done, by when, or by whom. Subsequently, 30 months after ARPP
started, the mid-term evaluation found that, while all parties
had complied with routine reporting requirements, the evaluation
team "could find no evidence of any specific reporting on impact
achievement..., nor any indication that the Project Paper Plan
was ever adjusted or used" (Rood, et al., 1988:87).


4.8 Links with Extension


A constraint that appeared repeatedly was the problem of FSR
establishing adequate links with extension. All of the FSR/E
projects reviewed were based in a research unit of one type or
another, not in a governmental extension organization. Given
that agricultural research in many countries traditionally has
not had strong links with extension, the basing of FSR in a
research unit automatically created a problem of how to link
research and extension. This constraint appeared in 9 of the 12
FSR/E projects reviewed. The Philippines/FSDP and Guatemala/FPNI
provide examples of this constraint.

Philippines/FSDP -- The first FSDP evaluation found that
little attention had been given to integrating project functions
and activities into existing Ministry of Agriculture and Forests
(MAF) programs. FSDP had not addressed the potential for linking
the project with the MAF's extension delivery system, despite the
presence of an MAF extension unit at all FSDP sites. The
evaluation reported that FSDP's "Special Project" status








had isolated the project from the rest of the [MAF]. Middle
and lower level MAF staff who are not part of the project
indicated a pervasive feeling that the project is not part
of [the MAF]. ...there has been little thought given to the
relationship of the project to the [Regional Integrated
Agricultural Research Stations] (Mazo, et al., 1983:46).

Guatemala/FPNI -- While the second FPNI evaluation found
that the project had made progress in developing its FSR method-
ology, ICTA yet needed to improve its links with the extension
service (DIGESA). The evaluation noted: "There seems to be a
clear recognition of the fact that ICTA simply cannot diffuse the
technology alone. It needs DIGESA and others" (McDermott, 1977a:
8). But even as ICTA was expanding its program of on-farm trials
(pruebas), "vital linkages" with the DIGESA had not been devel-
oped (McDermott, 1977a:19), nor was it clear how ICTA's recogni-
tion of the need for such links was "going to be translated into
effective action" (McDermott, 1977a: 8). While ICTA discussed
"the need to involve DIGESA...in the pruebas" (McDermott, 1977a:
8), the third evaluation concluded that an imbalance had devel-
oped in ICTA's ability to link information generation with infor-
mation transfer, suggesting a need for ICTA to improve "forward
and backward linkages between the information generation and
information transfer processes" (Mann and Dougherty, 1978:1).


4.9 Links with Agri-Support Services


The incentive for a farmer to adopt an improved technology
depends on the farmer's ability to access the services required
to support adoption and continued use of the technology. Such
services include but are not limited to agricultural credit,
production inputs, and markets. The lack of adequate links of
FSR/E with agri-support services appeared as a constraint in at
least five FSR/E projects. ROCAP/SFPS is illustrative.

ROCAP/SFPS -- The first SFPS evaluation observed that some
of the farm operations developed by the project seemed

to depend heavily upon considerably more than application of
the technology introduced. They required intensive assis-
tance by CATIE and/or national institution personnel in
obtaining credit (or directly providing resources), locating
and installing inputs, generating markets, etc. This
emphasizes the fact that improved technology is a necessary,
but far from sufficient, ingredient to transform the income
and condition of the small farmer (Mann, et al. 1981:2-3).

Improvements in the small farm system likely will not take place
unless complementary activities provide small farmers access to
markets, credit, and continuing technical assistance.








The need to leverage change in key agri-support systems had
still not been addressed by the time of the third SFPS evaluation
(Zimet, et al., 1986). In the case of annual crops, "there was
no parallel planning of commercial stocks of seeds of new crops
and/or varieties. This led to...delays in the early acceptance
of technologies tested that depended on this input" (Zimet, et
al., 1986:42). Overall, the evaluation concluded that dissemina-
tion of a new technology, an extension exercise, needs to have
strong links with agri-support institutions (e.g., credit).


4.10 Links with Farmer Organizations


FSR/E projects usually were implemented on a one-to-one
basis, that is, with the FSR/E practitioner working with the
individual farmer, despite the potential for working with and
through farmer organizations to increase the impact of assistance
efforts. Exceptions were Lesotho/FSRP and Philippines/FSDP.

Lesotho/FSRP -- The design of the FSRP provided for the
development and testing of alternative strategies for farmer
communication and education. This entailed Village Agricultural
Committees (VACs) and a group approach on communal vegetable
fields and grazing schemes. Other extension techniques (e.g.,
producing and distributing "Cropping Guidelines" and other tech-
nical publications) were also developed. But FSRP had taken no
steps to monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of these alter-
native strategies for reaching farmers (Martin, et al., 1981).
This problem was still found to exist at the time of the third
evaluation (Dunn, 1983), leading the evaluation to make two
recommendations--one that the project assess the impact of the
VACs and the group approach on adoption rates of recommended
technologies, the other that the project consider testing a
facilitator approach to communicating with farmers.

Philippines/FSDP -- The first FSDP evaluation concluded that
the project had not made any effort to involve farmer organiza-
tions or any other community organizations. "Group involvement
came only in the group meetings organized for the purpose of
briefing the farmers of the project, but all dealings between the
project and t e farmers are on [an] individual farmer basis"
(Mazo, et al., 1983:42). However, the second evaluation found
that FSDP had begun to involve farmer organizations in the
development of work plans of the Site Research Management Units
(SRUJs), the evaluation of research results, and the extension of
technologies k(ajise, et al., 1983).








5. Generic Constraints in FSR/E Projects


The preceding chapters have illustrated several points about
the A.I.D.-funded FSR/E projects reviewed: (a) that these proj-
ects had limited impact on technology development and transfer,
and institutionalization of FSR/E (Chapter 2); (b) that the
concept of and approach to FSR/E in each project lacked or was
weak in one or more of the core characteristics of FSR/E (Chapter
3's discussion of core constraints); and (c) that these projects
encountered difficulty in doing FSR/E because of the presence of
one or more operational constraints (Chapter 4).

But implementation of FSR/E projects also has been impeded
by a third type of constraint, namely,' generic constraints. A
generic constraint may be defined as a factor that can impede any
type of A.I.D.-funded project, regardless of the project's tech-
nical content. Thus, a generic constraint (e.g., mismanagement
of a project's TA component) can impede implementation of a
project, regardless of whether the project's focus is FSR/E,
self-financing primary health care, or whatever.

Six types of generic constraints were found in the FSR/E
projects reviewed (Table 3), as follows:

o Project management structure
o Government funding to meet recurrent costs
o Staffing with trained manpower
o Management of training
o Management of technical assistance
o Factors beyond a project's control

Two of the constraints--staffing with trained manpower and
government funding to meet recurrent costs--were encountered in
at least 7 of the 12 projects reviewed. Of the remaining generic
constraints, three appeared in at least five projects--project
management structure, management of training, and management of
technical assistance. Each of the constraints is now reviewed
and illustrated with project-specific examples.








Tah t 3.


Frequency of Generic Constraints in 12 A.I.D.-Funded
FSR/E Projects.


Generic Constraints5


Project

Botswana/ATIP

Gambia/MFP

Lesotho/FSRP

Malawi/ARP

Senegal/ARPP

Tanzania/FSRP

Zambia/ZAMARE6

Nepal/ARPP

Philippines/FSDP

Guatemala/FPNI

Honduras/ARP

ROCAP/SFPS


TOTAL


G. 1


G.2

x

x

x

x

x


G.3

x


G.4

x


G.5

x


G.6

x

x


5Key to Generic Constraints:

G.1 Project Management Structure
G.2 Government Funding to Meet Recurrent Costs
G.3 Staffing with Trained Manpower
G.4 Management of Training
G.5 Management of Technical Assistance
G.6 Factors Beyond a Project's Control


6While generic constraints were not identified in the case of
Zanbia/ZAMARE, there was evidence that the project had devised
methods to deal with certain generic constraints (see the Project
Description Sheet for Zambia/ZAMARE in Annex I and the supporting
case study material in Annex H).







5.1 Project Management Structure


Project management structure appeared as a constraint in at
least 6 of the 12 projects reviewed. Sometimes a project's
management structure was not adequate to handle an "unwielding
and over-ambitious" project design (e.g., Gambia/MFP). At other
times, as in the case of Nepal/ARPP, the problem was simply an
ineffective project management structure (e.g., having responsi-
bility for but not authority over the resources needed to carry
out a task). In other cases, the problem involved insufficient
planning and coordination among the TA team, the counterpart
organization, and the USAID Mission (e.g., Honduras/ARP).
Consider the following example from Nepal/ARPP.

Nepal/ARPP -- The mid-term evaluation found that ARP's
"dispersed and vaguely defined" management structure had impeded
implementation. For example, the evaluation found that the Proj-
ect Coordinator's role and authority were never defined, and that
he had not been given adequate staff to support "much real
coordinating, planning, [or] monitoring. ...even the Project
Director has not been very much involved in Project management,
especially after [the National Agricultural Research Service
Center] was established as a new ministerial body, separate from
the [Department of Agriculture]" (Rood, et al., 1988:67).


5.2 Government Funding to Meet Recurrent Costs


This constraint appeared in at least nine of the FSR/E proj-
ects reviewed. Basically, when this constraint was present,
implementation was impeded by a lack of timely availability of
salaries for personnel, fuel for vehicles, fertilizer for trials,
etc. Senegal/ARPP provides a typical example.

Senegal/ARPP -- The mid-term ARPP evaluation reported that
implementation was constrained by the inability of the Senegalese
Institute of Agricultural Research (ISRA) to meet the salaries
and operational expenses of research and secretarial staff. The
Production Systems Research (PSR) teams encountered problems in
implementing their programs because of the lack of human and
financial resources. Thus, "lack of funds at the field level...
delayed the progress of the PSR field programs" (St. Louis, et
al., 1985:xv).







5.3 Staffing with Trained Manpower


A key component in implementing a FSR/E project is ensuring
that the counterpart organization assigns trained personnel to
the project. Where trained manpower cannot be provided, be it
for lack of funded positions or lack of trained people to fill
those positions, project implementation will suffer. This
constraint appeared in at least 10 of the 12 projects. Consider
the example of Lesotho/FSRP.

Lesotho/FSRP -- The second FSRP evaluation found that imple-
mentation was impeded when the Ministry of Agriculture could only
assign a limited number of trained professionals to the Research
Division (RD) (Martin, et al., 1981). There were not enough
trained Basotho agriculturalists available who could be allowed
to leave for training, while others were assigned to work as TA
team counterparts. Also, there were delays in assigning counter-
parts and assistants to FSRP; some counterparts were not assigned
until six months to a year after the TA team's arrival.


5.4 Management of Training


Training has been one of the key inputs in the design of
A.I.D.-funded FSR/E projects. However, problems in implementing
training occurred in at least 5 of the 12 projects. Problems
included difficulties in obtaining candidates for training,
delays in obtaining clearances to send participants to training,
and the departure of TA personnel before training participant
returned to their countries. Malawi/ARP is illustrative.

Malawi/ARP -- The second ARP evaluation found that delays in
clearance to create the first position in the Farming Systems
Analysis (FSA) section and in hiring the first Malawian for that
position resulted in a year's delay before the first participant
could leave for training, while the second participant had still
not been identified (Baker, et al., 1983). Further, neither
participant was scheduled to return before the departure of the
TA team member who was serving as the acting FSA section head.
In considering the interaction between the TA team and Malawian
project staff, the evaluation also found that TA team members
"almost unanimously...regret...that they are not providing more
on-the-job training and supervision for junior research staff"
(Baker, et al., 1983:20).







The Project Paper stated that "all of the training decisions
were based on the specific needs of research.... The training
program represents the summation of specific project needs for
better trained professional researchers." However, the second
evaluation found that the eight Ph.D. candidates proposed in the
PP had been increased to 12 trainees (Baker, et al., 1983). The
evaluation noted that the increase in the number of Ph.D. candi-
dates and the greater length of a doctoral program would result
in a larger number of trainees returning after the PACD, thereby
making it difficult for them to benefit from the TA provided by
the project. This would jeopardize the output of

an established and sustained program of research relevant to
the smallholder.... It will particularly affect the
ability of the newly-returned researchers to benefit from
the guidance of the technical assistance team and the
continuity the latter have provided while participants were
absent (Baker, et al., 1983:12, 15, 17).

The Regional Inspector General's audit in November 1982 noted the
need for the project's TA component "to be synchronized with...
long-term training...to insure a reasonable overlap between
returning trainees and AID-funded expatriate researchers."


5.5 Management of Technical Assistance


All of the FSR/E projects reviewed included an expatriate
technical assistance (TA) component. Most of these 12 projects
encountered problems in managing the project's TA component. In
some cases, TA personnel lacked FSR/E experience. Indeed, many
donor-sponsored FSR/E projects were "staffed with individuals
having little or no training or experience in on-farm research
methods or team research approaches" (Baker and Norman, 1988:29).
Also, a project's TA personnel often lacked experience in the
country in which the project was being implemented. Finally,
tours of duty often lasted nor more than two years and sometimes
were less. Malawi/ARP provides an example of many of these
problems.

Malawi/ARP -- ARP was designed using A.I.D.'s "collaborative
assistance" mode which permits a Title XII university to be
selected competitively to participate in the final design of the
project and promptly commence implementation when A.I.D. approves
funding for the project. However, delays in executing the TA
contract resulted in the TA contractor losing several intended TA
team members. This, in the view of the evaluation, had a







negative impact on project implementation. It appears that
the project designers wrote the project job descriptions
with fairly specific individuals in mind but could only
field part of that team by the time the contract for tech-
nical assistance was finally signed. As a result, the
particular skills mix of the team actually fielded has not
been as comprehensive as what seems to have been intended at
the time the project was designed. For example, the PP
called for a crops agronomist who was expected to work on a
variety of food and forage crops. The individual fielded
was primarily a forage crops agronomist and as a result,
food crop agronomic research was somewhat neglected during
the early years of the project (Baker, et al., 1983:20).

The evaluation concluded that the project had failed "to
provide qualified individuals for the positions designated in the
Project Paper" (p. 8 of PES for Baker, et al., 1983). The TA
personnel would have benefited by "more experience in agricul-
tural research in developing countries, particularly in Africa"
(Baker, et al., 1983:21). Further, most short-term consultants

were in-country for a duration of two weeks or less and that
few...consultants...made repeated trips to Malawi. The team
would have preferred to see fewer...ccn-sultants, longer
durations of the consultancies and key... technical expert-
ise returning periodically to assist the ...the [Department
of Agricultural Research] (Baker, et al.. 1983:21).

A second problem in managing a project's TA component is
ensuring a smooth start up on the part of the TA team. Several
difficulties in this area arose in Lesotho/FSEP.

Lesotho/FSRP -- The second evaluation found that FSRP's
start up had been impeded by a slow start on the part of the TA
team (Martin, et al., 1981). This was caused by a number of
factors including selection of team members without the involve-
ment of the TA team leader, lack of orientation to the project
before leaving the U.S., delays in team member arrival, team mem-
bers not arriving in the sequence planned, lack of orientation
assistance by USAID/Lesotho when team members arrived, inadequate
introduction of team members and the project itself to government
agencies and other entities with which they were expected to
work, and delays in housing and office construction.

A third problem in managing the TA component of FSR/E proj-
ects has been that project administration requirements often
distracted TA personnel from their primary task, namely, doing
FSR/E. This problem appeared in at least six projects including
Botswana/ATIP and Honduras/ARP.







Botswana/AiIP -- The second ATIP evaluation found that the
TA team's chief of party (COP) was a recognized leader in FSR.
However, the COP's administrative duties limited him to spending
only 20% of his time in the field, "with much of this allocated
to routine administration" (A.I.D., 1986:56). In the evaluation
team's view, the COP needed additional administrative support.
This need was critical since ATIP team members had "limited
experience" implementing FSR/E (A.I.D., 1986:26).

Honduras/ARP -- The TA team's chief of party (COP) estimated
that 75% of his time had been spent on administration, while
approximately 50% of the agricultural economist's time had been
similarly occupied (Hansen, et al., 1984). The evaluation found
that the TA economist had become "more involved in administrative
natters and in [university] related work, substantially reducing
the time allocated to field work" (Hansen, et al., 1984:30). The
scope of this problem, and its existence in ARP as in other
USAID/Mission projects, prompted the question of why USAID
contracts fail to

recognize the essential importance of administration and
automatically provide for administrative assistance....
This Contract, like many others, only requests technical
people for technical work as if COP responsibilities were
inconsequential. In many instances this results in a COP
assuming that the technical work is what counts and trying
to minimize administrative tasks. In other instances this
results in a technically qualified COP who does not really
have the necessary administrative skills or experience
(Hansen, et al., 1984:24).

It may be noted, in passing, that the various problems asso-
ciated with the management of the TA component of FSR/E projects
do not appear to stem from any inadequacy on the part of the TA
personnel (usually from U.S. universities) who provided TA in
these projects. Indeed, a recent evaluation of the IFAD-funded
SAFGRAD FSR/E program in Africa found that inadequacies in the
management of the TA component of FSR/E projects also arose when
FSR/E projects relied on Africans to provide technical assistance
in FSR/E.

The 'Africanisation' of the technical assistance was a
worthy experiment to have included in this project since
previous experiences with non-African technical assistance
have demonstrated that there are typically many difficulties
of implementation and effectiveness with such assistance.
The present project seems to suggest that much of the same
sort of difficulties are experienced with the African
"variety", suggesting...that such difficulties...are not
ethnically related but are inherent in external technical
assistance (Anderson, et al., 1987:44).







5.6 Factors Beyond a Project's Control


The last generic constraint confronted by the FSR/E projects
reviewed was that of factors beyond the ability of a project to
control. Yet acts of nature (droughts) or man (coups, government
policies) can disrupt and impede project implementation and
impact. At least a third of the 12 projects encountered problems
in this category, as the following examples illustrate.

Botswana/ATIP -- The second ATIP evaluation found it
"difficult to document" that the project's farming systems (FS)
methodologies had made an impact (A.I.D., 1986:28). With limited
and erratic rainfall during ATIP's first four years, there was
"no indication of consistent and demonstrated increases in pro-
duction [or] income as a result of introduced technologies,
except under favorable soil and rainfall conditions" (A.I.D.,
1986:18). In effect, the long period of drought during the
project's early years effectively precluded the from project from
making the progress that project designers had anticipated.

Gambia/MFP -- Early implementation of the MFP was disrupted
by an attempted coup d'etat (Osburn, et al., 1983). However, by
the second evaluation, MFP had prepared and delivered a tested
maize production technology package to farmers (Corty, et al.,
1986). This success was demonstrate by

the increase in maize area from about 2,600 hectares at the
beginning of the project to 18,000 hectares by [the] end of
1985. The average national yield has increased from 1.6
t/ha to 2.5 t/ha and there is a significant increase in
number of maize growing farmers (Corty, et al., 1933:13a).

But most harvested maize is used locally, with marketed maize
often finding its way into Senegal where prices were as high as
D900 per ton. In October 1985, The GOG increased the producer
floor price of maize 54% (from D390 to D600). Marketing
arrangements were also changed. Instead of the Grain Produce
Marketing Board buying the crop, local cooperative societies were
authorized to buy all cereals and sell to the Gambian Credit
Union (GCl). However, farmers were able to sell in the locul
market at higher prices than those offered by the GCUs.

MFP's design provided for PL 480 Title III Program funds to
cover field operating costs and contractor logistical support
(i.e., housing, furnishings). These funds were completely
administered by the Senegalese Institute for Agricultural
Research (ISRA) through the Ministry of Economy and Finance
(MEF). But several factors made timely provision of adequate
funds impossible. For example, sales of rice were proceeding
slowly and sufficient funds were not were not being generated to
support all Title III activities at required levels.







Seneqal/ARPP -- The ability of the ARPP to plan its research
program was constrained by the rapidly changing parameters of
Senegalese agriculture (e.g., drought, rising input prices and
food import bill, and changes in institutional roles and
operating mechanisms) (St. Louis, et al., 1985).

Tanzania/FSRP -- Several factors beyond the control of the
FSRP impeded the project's ability to make an impact on farmer
adoption of improved technology. These included

a) the rigidly controlled Government market for cereals,
which gave rise to a purchase and payment system that
deprived the farmer of any incentive to produce more than
absolutely necessary, b) the UJAMA "villagization" scheme
that removed farmers from their fertile fields and gave them
infertile ones, and c) the inability of the Government to
make good on many of its promises to villagers in providing
them with services (A. Cunard, personal communication).

While two evaluations of FSRP failed to identify these factors as
constraints on project success, the evaluations did identify that
project implementation had been severely curtailed by the Brooke
Amendment, a development that could not have been foreseen.







6. Effectively Coping with Constraints in FSR/E Projects


Occasionally FSR/E project evaluations provided evidence
that FSR/E project were effectively coping with potential core,
operational, or generic constraints. Examples of such effective
coping are identified in the Project Description Sheets in Annex
I as positive (+) instances of the core, operational, and generic
constraints. Some of these positive instances are now reviewed.


6.1 Core Constraints


Farmer Participation (C.2)


Senegal/ARPP -- The first ARPP evaluation noted the contri-
bution that farmer participation made to implementation of
Production Systems Research (PSR).

Farmers were contacted in advance of the on-farm trials to
discuss their problems in a series of triparty meetings
(farmers, extension agents, PSR team). Through these
discussions, themes to be tested were formulated with the
assistance of the PSR team. Field trials were then
implemented. For large-scale on-farm trials, farmers
participated in defining the experiment design. Farmers
covered part of the cost of the experiments. For small-
scale on-farm trials, farmers received an allowance and were
compensated where yields were below normal (St. Louis, et
al., 1935:46).

Guatemala/FPNI -- A project impact evaluation of FPNI con-
cluded that, to ensure small farmer participation in technology
development and transfer, special programs need to be developed
to ensure on-farm testing of potentially improved technologies
and participation of farmers in that testing. "When such systems
are in place, the ICTA experience shows that small farmers will
assess the merits of the technology and gradually adopt it"
(McDermott and Bathrick, 1982:14).








Feedback to Shape Agricultural Research Priorities and Agricul-
tural Policy (C.9)


Botswana/ATIP -- The second ATIP evaluation found that the
project's staff collaborated with researchers in the Division of
Agricultural research (DAR) in designing and implementing on-farm
trials (A.I.D., 1986). Thus, these DAR researchers were familiar
with the project's trials and in a position to influence station-
based colleagues to place a greater emphasis in their research
agenda on problems of low-resource farmers. Also, the regional
ATIP team was able to draw on the expertise of DAR researchers in
setting the team's priorities. However, the evaluation noted the
need for ATIP field teams to collaborate more effectively (a)
with station-based researchers in describing current cropping
systems and constraints and in setting research priorities, (b)
with district-level extension agents to facilitate feedback to
station-based researchers, and (c) with the Department of
Agricultural Field Services in studying the process of adoption
and the effects of adoption on production (A.I.D., 1986).

Zambia/ZAMARE -- The second ZAMARE evaluation found that the
Commodity and Specialist Research Teams (CSRTs) worked closely
with regional Adaptive Research Planning Teams (ARPTs) in design-
ing and implementing on-station verification and on-farm trials.
This was encouraging because inadequate communication between
ARPTs and CSRTs was recognized as a potential problem since the
initiation of the ARPTs. Faced by the potential for inadequate
communication between an ARPT and the CSRTs, the ARPT national
coordinator established a series of mechanisms to facilitate a
two-way flow of information between an ARPT and the CSRTs. These
mechanisms included:

Involving CSRT scientists in the exploratory surveys.
This served to guide the development of the verifica-
tion survey questionnaire and to apprise an ARPT's
members of relevant technological solutions that
already exist.

Involving CSRT scientists in Pre-Research Committee
Meetings in which ARPT members presented the problems
identified during the surveys or trials, and proposals
for technical component research and on-farm trials.
Following approval of proposed ARPT adaptive research
by the Research Committee, the CSRT scientists would
comment on the details of each trial.

Providing CSRT scientists with agronomic data sheets
(uninterpreted but quantitative summaries of ARPT
survey data on agronomic practices and problems in
farmers' fields).








Formulating crop research strategies based on the
quantified data collected on farmer systems and CSRT
scientists' knowledge of what research is feasible.

Using standard formats for ARPT to present ARPT-
identified problems to CSRT researchers, for commodity
researchers to prepare crop profiles on new varieties
for ARPTs, and for outlining adaptive research trials.

These mechanisms facilitate the ARPT in providing information on
farmers' problems requiring component research, and feedback on
research conducted under farmer conditions. The CSRTs, in turn,
provided information on possible technologies available for on-
farm experimentation (Sutherland and Warren, 1985:56-57).

Seneaal/ARPP -- A "lesson learned" from the ARPP was that
combining Production Systems Research (PSR) with macro-economic
analysis in the same project, while carried out by a separate
group than that implementing PSR, proved to be a good idea since
both activities tended to reinforce each other and produce timely
and objective results (St. Louis, et al., 1985:xiv).


6.2 Operational Constraints


Agricultural Research Policy/Strategy Defining FSR/E's Role (0.2)


Zarbia/ZAMARE -- Adaptive Research Planning Teams (ARPTs) in
ZAMARE were operational by the project's end in six of Zambia's
nine provinces. Although each ARPT was supported by a separate
donor, all operated under a National Coordinator who reported to
the Chief Agricultural Research Officer. USAID/Zambia funding of
the first ARPT was part of an overall program of donor support
for FSR/E in Zambia, in which FSR/E was a systematic component of
the government's agricultural research policy.


Long-Term Commitment of Resources (O.3)


Guatemala/FPNI -- The project impact evaluation concluded
that much of FPNI's progress could be attributed to the important
role that the Rockefeller Foundation and A.I.D. had played, over
a long period, in strengthening the research capacity of the
Agricultural Science and Technology Institute (ICTA). In the
five years preceding ICTA's creation, USAID/Guatemala worked with
the Government of Guatemala in planning and implementing the
reorganization of the public agricultural sector. Early and
sustained USAID/Guatemala support to ICTA helped to ensure timely
and appropriate assistance.








Capability to Process Farming Systems Data (0.6)


Senegal/ARPP -- Two of ARPP's three Production Systems
Research (PSR) teams had access to appropriate microcomputer
software, and had developed the necessary skills for data
management and analysis. As a result, ARPP had gained some
experience in using microcomputers for data analysis of
production and marketing issues.

In the Casamance, ...the team has made effective use of the
FARMAP and MSTAT programs because its staff has had both the
capacity to collect needed data and to formulate sound
research and analytical approaches. They have been able to
gain an understanding of and quantify...constraints to the
production systems (St. Louis, et al., 1985:73).


Consensus on Criteria for Evaluating FSR/E (0.7)


Guatemala/FPNI -- The Agricultural Science and Technology
Institute (ICTA) calculated an Acceptance Index to measure farmer
acceptance of each technology tested in farmer-managed trials.
The index was the percent of farmer collaborators who continued
to use a technology in the year following its testing in their
own fields, multiplied by the percentage of the farmers' land on
which they apply the technology. An Index of 50 was required
before a new technology would be considered as satisfactory. The
1979 Indices for maize revealed that, in the highlands where
subsistence farming predominated, two out of five Indices had
reached 50 by 1979. In the coastal area where commercial small
farms predominated, two out of four recommendations had surpassed
50 in both 1978 and 1979. This suggested "that increasing num-
bers of farmers who have collaborated in field testing of tech-
nologies recommended by ICTA are adopting these recommendations.
Interviews with ICTA personnel and with individual farmers
supported this impression" (McDermott and Bathrick, 1982:9).


Links with Agri-Supoort Services (0.9)


Zambia/ZAMARE -- The second ZAMARE evaluation found that the
project was providing its research output (i.e., basic cereal and
oil seed) to ZAMSEED, the only seed supplier in Zambia. ZAMSEED








(has] every incentive to work with the project, as their
lifeline is new varieties..released by the [Ministry of
Agriculture and Water Development] research branch. ZAMSEED
makes direct and in-kind contributions to the project/pro-
gram and cooperates in the production, certification, super-
vision and pricing of seed for national distribution (Yohe,
et al., 1985: p. 3 of Africa Bureau Executive Summary).


Links with Farmer Organizations (0.10)


Philippines/FSDP -- The first FSDP evaluation concluded that
the project had not made any effort to involve farmer organiza-
tions or any other community organizations. "Group involvement
came only in the group meetings organized for the purpose of
briefing the farmers of the project, but all dealings between the
project and the farmers are on [an] individual farmer basis"
(Mazo, et al., 1983:42). However, the second evaluation found
that FSDP had begun to involve farmer organizations in the
development of work plans of the Site Research Management Units
(SP-MUs), the evaluation of research results, and the extension of
technologies (Sajise, et al., 1983).


6.3 Generic Constraints


Government Funding to Meet Recurrent Costs (G.2)


Guatemala/FPNI -- While the evaluation of ROCAP/SFPS found
that SFPS had difficulties in getting the Agricultural Science
and Technology Institute (ICTA) to support SFPS activities in
Guatemala, the impact evaluation of FPNI found that ICTA had
supported FPNI research activities. FPNI's experience in
supporting ICTA demonstrated the need to ensure that a research
institution has adequate authority and resources to carry out its
mandate. ICTA's semi-autonomous status provided flexibility for
the Institute to implement new programs, hire personnel, and make
independent contractual arrangements.


Management of Training (G.4)


Senegal/ARPP -- The mid-term ARPP evaluation noted that
implementation had initially been constrained by weaknesses in
the process of selecting candidates and/or establishing creden-
tials for training. The project's budget estimates indicated
that 75% of total project cost was to support human resources
development and/or professional training.








Eleven researchers of the Senegalese Institute of Agricul-
tural Research (ISRA) had completed Masters' degrees and nine
more were purusing a Masters' degree by the end of 1984. The
evaluation concluded the the project's long-term training sub-
component "made a major contribution to the Senegalisation of the
scientific staff of ISRA. This is one of its major achievements
despite constraining circumstances" (St. Louis, et al., 1985:55).
The evaluation attributed much of the project's success to having
paid attention to training, in terms of the number of individuals
trained and the qualifications and/or background of those
selected for training (St. Louis, et al., 1985:xiv).

Zambia/ZAMARE -- The second ZAMARE evaluation found that
early action by USAID/ZAMBIA was instrumental in implementing
participant training, with the result that trained Zambians were
scheduled to return to their posts while the TA team was still in
the field. "Most AID development assistance projects don't see
equipment and supply purchases until the second to fourth year of
a project and often trainees don't return until after a project
has terminated" (Yohe, et al., 19852).

Guatemala/FPNI -- FPNI's impact evaluation concluded that
FPNI had successfully attained the project purpose of developing
and strengthening the capability of the Agricultural Science and
Technology Institute (ICTA) to conduct adaptive research on and
farm-level testing of improved technology for basic food crops.
In addition to donor-provided TA and Government of Guatemala
budgetary support, two factors contributed to this success: (1)
ICTA arranged for selection and efficient phasing of the ICTA
professionals who participated in advanced degree training
programs; and (2) ICTA developed an in-service training program.

With respect to degree and short course training, "timing of
the arrival and departure of [TA) was programmed in relationship
to simultaneous massive training so that expatriate line officers
were replaced by trained Guatemalans" (McDermott and Bathrick,
1982:Appendix E-3). This approach enable research to proceed,
while the Guatemalans were obtaining advanced degree or short
course training under FPNI or Rockefeller Foundation funding.
During this period, FPNI and the Rockefeller Foundation provided
funding for TA specialists to serve in line, not advisory, posi-
tions in ICTA, implementing the research program. The third FPNI
evaluation noted that the TA specialists played "a major role in
program design and execution" (Mann and Dougherty, 1978:16). As
Guatemalans completed their studies, they returned to ICTA to
assume research and/or research management positions.







Management of Technical Assistance (G.5)


Senecral/ARPP -- The mid-term ARPP evaluation found that the
phasing in of the Production Systems Research teams had been an
effective means to avoid placing excessive strain on available
financial and human resources (St. Louis, et al., 1985:xiv).

Zambia/ZAMARE -- USAID/Zambia's Project Support Unit (PSU)
afforded the TA team excellent logistical support. The PSU pro-
vided backstopping services to the TA contractor, with the cost
of these services being covered by funds retained by the Mission
from the project's budget. The PSU, in collaboration with the TA
contractor, was instrumental in ensuring that equipment and
supplies were available to TA team members upon their arrival in
country. Also, ZAMARE provided funding for two Zambian staff
persons to assist the TA team leader in handling the administra-
tive details involved in implementing the project. This enabled
the team leader to focus a greater percentage of his time on
providing leadership for implementation (Yohe, et al., 1985).

Guatemala/FPNI -- The FPNI impact evaluation concluded that
one of the factors contributing to the project's success was
ICTA's use of expatriate TA personnel to fill operational line
management and technical positions within ICTA, while ICTA
professionals were pursuing advanced degree training programs.







Annex A. Summary of Core, Operational, and Generic Constraints
in A.I.D.-Funded FSR/E Projects.


This Annex summarizes the core, operational, and generic
constraints identified in this project, per the following codes:
core (C), operational (0), and generic (G).

Core Constraints (C)

C.1 Farmer Orientation
C.2 Farmer Participation
C.3 Locational Specificity of Technical and Human Factors
C.4 Problem-Solving Approach
C.5 Systems Orientation
C.6 Interdisciplinary Approach
C.7 Complementarity with Commodity and Discipline Research
C.8 Technology Testing in On-Farm Trials
C.9 Feedback to Shape:
a. Agricultural Research Priorities
b. Agricultural Policies

Operational Constraints (0)

0.1 Stakeholder Understanding of FSR/E
0.2 Agricultural Research Policy/Strategy Defining Role of FSR/E
0.3 Long-Term Commitment of Resources
0.4 Existing Research Capability and Shelf Technology
0.5 Consensus on FSR/E Methodology
0.6 Capability to Process Farming Systems Data
0.7 Consensus on Criteria for Evaluating FSR/E
0.8 Links with Extension
0.9 Links with Agri-Support Services
0.10 Links with Farmer Organizations

Generic Constraints (G)

G.1 Project Management Structure
G.2 Government Funding to Meet Recurrent Costs
G.3 Staffing with Trained Manpower
G.4 Management of Training
G.5 Management of Technical Assistance
G.6 Factors Beyond a Project's Control




An analysis of these constraints in 12 FSR/E projects appears
in A Review of A.I.D. Experience with Farming Systems Research and
Extension Projects, A.I.D. Evaluation Special Study (forthcoming),
available from A.I.D.'s Document and Information Handling Facility
(per instructions on last page of this report).







GENERAL REFERENCES8


Anderson, Jock R., Herve Wiaux, and Piero Broniz
1987 Report of the Joint IFAD and Ministry of Co-Operation
(France) Review Mission of the OAU/STRC/SAFGRAD Framing
Systems Research Programme, IFAD TA 110.

Farrington, John and Adrienne Martin
1987 Farmer Participatory Research: A Review of Concepts and
Practices. Discussion Paper 19. Agricultural Admini-
stration (Research and Extension) Network, Agricultural
Administration Unit, Overseas Development Institute,
London, England.

Hildebrand, Peter E.
1985 "On-Farm Research: Organized Community Adaptation,
Learning and Diffusion for Efficient Agricultural
Technology Innovation," Farming Systems Support Project
Newsletter, 3(4)(Fourth Quarter):6-9.

Merrill-Sands, Deborah
1985 A Review of Farming Systems Research. A paper prepared
for the Technical Advisory Committee, CGIAR.

1986 "Farming Systems Research: Clarification of Terms and
Concepts," Experimental Agriculture, 22:87-104.

Wiese, Karen
1985 Farming Systems Research: Issues for Evaluation, prepared
for PPC/CDIE, U.S. Agency for International Development,
Washington, D.C. 20523.









8 Additional references on FSR/E are listed in four volumes
of the Bibliography of Readings on Farming Systems, Farming Systems
Support Project, International Programs, Institute of Food and
Agricultural Sciences, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida
32611. Document Numbers are as follows:

Year Volume Document No.

1984 1 PN-AAR-839
1985 2 PN-AAU-145
1986 3 PN-AAV-904
1987 4 PN-AAY-255







PROJECT-SPECIFIC REFERENCES


Botswana/ATIP Agricultural Technology Improvement Project
(611-0201)

A.I.D.
1986 Second External Evaluation of Agricultural Technology
Improvement Project, May-June, 1986. (PD-AAU-907)

Byrnes, Kerry J.
1988 Botswana Agricultural Technology Improvement Project
(633-0221), CDIE Working Paper No. 112--Case Study No. 1,
Cen-ter for Development Information and Evaluation,
Agency for International Development, Washington, D.C.
(PN-ABC-073).

Francis, Chuck, Cornelia Flora, Boyd Whittle, and Howard Sigwele
1984 First External Evaluation of Agricultural Technology
Improvement Project, July, 1984. (PD-BAU-445)


Gambia/MFP Mixed Farming and Resource Management Project
(635-0203)

A.I.D.
1985 Project Paper for The Gambia Agricultural Research and
Diversification Project. (PD-AAR-016).

Byrnes, Kerry J.
1988 Mixed Farming and Resource Management Project (635-
0203), CDIE Working Paper No. 112--Case Study No. 2,
Center for Development Information and Evaluation,
Agency for International Development, Washington, D.C.
(PN-ABC-074)

Corty, Floyd L., William Derman, Udai R. Bishnoi, and James T.
O'Rourke
1986 Final Evaluation of Gambia Mixed Farming and Resource
Management Project. (PD-BBE-211)

Osburn, James, Robert Adams, Ans Burgett, Thomas Eponou, Howard
Sprague, and Gloria Steele
1983 Early Mid-Term Evaluation of Gambia Mixed Farming and
Resource Management Project. (PD-BAN-055)







Guatemala/FPNI Food Productivity and Nutritional Improvement
(520-0232)

A.I.D.
1975 Project Paper for the Food Productivity and Nutritional
Improvement Project. (PD-AAA-947-B1)

1977 Project Appraisal Report for the Food Productivity and
Nutritional Improvement Project. (PD-AAA-947-F1) (See
McDermott, 1977)

1978 Project Evaluation Summary for Food Productivity and
Nutritional Improvement Project. (PD-AA-947-Gl) (See
Mann and Dougherty, 1978)


Byrnes,
1988





DeWalt,
1988


Kerry J.
Food Productivity and Nutritional Improvement Project
(520-0232), CDIE Working Paper No. 112--Case Study No.
10, Center for Development Information and Evaluation,
Agency for International Development, Washington, D.C.
(PN-ABC-082)

Billie R., and Robert Hudgens
Farming Systems Research/Extension at the Instituto de
Ciencia y Tecnologia Agricolas in Guatemala. A report
prepared as part of Cooperative Agreement 58-319R-8-014,
Identification of Results of Farming Systems Research
and Extension Activities, awarded to the University of
Arizona, Office of Arid Land Studies.


Harpstead, Dale D., Ralph W. Cummings, Jr., Fernando Fernandez,
J. Kenneth McDermott, and Edwin J. Wellhausen
1975 A Review: The Institute of Agricultural Science and
Technology in Guatemala (ICTA).

Mann, F., and D. Dougherty
1978 Evaluation of Food Productivity and Nutritional
Improvement Project.

McDermott, J. K.
1977a Report of an Evaluation of ICTA.

1977b Trip Report on Evaluation of ICTA, AID/W Technical
Assistance Bureau/Office of Agriculture.

McDermott, J. K., and David Bathrick
1982 Guatemala: Development of the Institute of Agricul-
tural Science and Technology (ICTA) and Its Impact on
Agricultural Research and Farm Productivity. Project
Impact Evaluation No. 30, U.S. Agency for International
Development. (PN-AAJ-178)








Honduras/ARP Agricultural Research Project (522-0139)

A.I.D.
1978 Project Paper for Agricultural Research Project.
(PD-AAB-952-BI)

1980 Project Evaluation Summary (PES) of the First Evaluation
of the Agricultural Research Project. (PD-AAJ-774) For
complete evaluation, see Laird, et al., 1980.

Beausoleil, Joseph, Gordon Appleby, Fernando Fernandez, Daniel
Galt, Robert Hudgens, and Michael Weber
1981 Second Evaluation of USAID/Honduras Agricultural
Research Project. (PD-AAJ-313).

Byrnes, Kerry J.
1988 Honduras Agricultural Research Project (522-0139), CDIE
Working Paper No. 112--Case Study No. 11, Center for
Development Information and Evaluation, Agency for
International Development, Washington, D.C. (PN-ABC-083)

Galt, Daniel, Alvaro Diaz, Mario Contreras, Frank Peairs, Joshua
Posner, and Franklin Rosales
1982 Farming Systems Research (FSR) in Honduras, 1977-81: A
Case Study, Working Paper No. 1, Department of Agricul-
tural Economics, Michigan State University, East
Lansing, Michigan 48824-1039. (PN-AAM-827)

Hansen, Art, Mason E. Marvel, Vernon B. Cardwell, and Gustavo
Arcia
1984 Third Evaluation of Honduras Agricultural Research
Project. (PD-AAR-620).

Laird, Reggie, Franklin Martin, Astolfo Fumagalli, Manuel Ruiz,
and Robert K. Waugh
1980 La Evaluacion del PNIA Febrero 1980.


Lesotho/FSRP Farming Systems Research Project (632-0065)

Byrnes, Kerry J.
1988 Lesotho Farming Systems Research Project (632-0065),
CDIE Working Paper No. 112--Case Study No. 3, Center for
Development Information and Evaluation, Agency for
International Development, Washington, D.C. (PN-ABC-075)

Dunn, James F.
1983 Project Evaluation Summary of Special Evaluation of
Farming Systems Research Project, conducted by Cal
Martin, Dan Galt, and Carolyn Barnes. (PD-AAM-972)







Dunn, James F. and Byron Bahl
1980 Project Evaluation Summary of a Preliminary Evaluation
of Farming Systems Research Project. (PD-AAG-092)

Frolik, Elvin F. and William N. Thompson
1986 Final Evaluation of Farming Systems Research Project
(XD-AAV-915-A)

Martin, Cal, Ken McDermott, Ned Greeley, and Tom Bebout
1981 Interim Evaluation of Farming Systems Research Project
(PD-AAI-396)


Malawi/ARP Agricultural Research Project (612-0202)

Baker, Murl, Joan Atherton, Daniel Galt, Curtis Nissly, Frank
Mwambaghi, and Henry Mwandemere
1983 Evaluation Report for Malawi Agricultural Research
Project. (PD-AAM-810)

Byrnes, Kerry J.
1988 Malawi Agricultural Research Project (612-0202), CDIE
Working Paper No. 112--Case Study No. 4, Center for
Development Information and Evaluation, Agency for
International Development, Washington, D.C. (PN-ABC-076)

Thorne, Marlowe D.
1981 Report of First Internal Evaluation of Malawi
Agricultural Research Project, November-December 1981.
(PD-AAN-267)


Nepal/ARPP Agricultural Research and Production Project
(367-0149L

A.I.D.
1984 Project Paper for Nepal Agricultural Research and
Production Project. (PD-AAQ-449)

Byrnes, Kerry J.
1988 Nepal Agricultural Research and Production Project (367-
0149), CDIE Working Paper No. 112--Case Study No. 8,
Center for Development Information and Evaluation,
Agency for International Development, Washington, D.C.
(PN-ABC-080)

Rood, Peter G., R.K. Patel, Badri N. Kayastha, Remsh Munamkami,
Narayan Regmi, Ben Stoner, and Tish Butler
1988 Report of Mid-Term Evaluation of Nepal Agricultural
Research and Production Project. WPI Inc., P.O. Box
2077, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02238.







Philippines/FSDP Farming Systems Development Project-Eastern
Visavas (492-0356)

A.I.D.
1981 Project Paper for Farming Systems Development Project-
Eastern Visayas. (PD-AAM-430)

1987 Audit of Farming Systems Development Project-Eastern
Visayas. (PD-AAV-833)

Byrnes, Kerry J.
1988 Farming Systems Development Project--Eastern Visayas
(492-0356), CDIE Working Paper No. 112--Case Study No.
9, Center for Development Information and Evaluation,
Agency for International Development, Washington, D.C.
(PN-ABC-081)

Mazo, Jose V., Rebecca V. Barbusa, James Beebe, Emiliana N.
Bernardo, and Agapito C. Tauro
1983 Report on the Process Evaluation of Farming Systems
Development Project--Eastern Visayas. (PD-AAP-045)

Sajise, Percy, Doyle Baker, Sam Fujisaka, David Hitchcock,
Inocencio Bolo, and Enrique Pacardo
1985 Mid-Project Evaluation Report of Farming Systems
Development Project--Eastern Visayas. (PD-CAM-419)


ROCAP/SFPS Small Farmer Production Systems (596-0083)

A.I.D.
1983 Project Evaluation Summary (PES) of Second Evaluation of
Small Farm Production Systems Project. (PD-AAM-808)

1986 Project Evaluation Summary (PES) of Third Evaluation of
Small Farm Production Systems Project. (PD-AAT-736)

Byrnes, Kerry J.
1988 Small Farmer Production Systems Project (596-0083), CDIE
Working Paper No. 112--Case Study No. 12, Center for
Development Information and Evaluation, Agency for
International Development, Washington, D.C. (PN-ABC-084)

Hobgccd, Harlan H., Rufo Bazan, Rollo Ehrich, Francisco Escobar,
Twig Johnson, and Marc Lindenberg
1980 Central America: Small-Farmer Cropping Systems, A.I.D
Project Impact Evaluation Report No. 14, Washington,
D.C.: Agency for International Development.
(PN-AAH-977)








Jones, James C.
1985 Farming Systems Research and Extension in CATIE: 1975-
1985. Notes and Observations. A report prepared for the
Centro Agronomico Tropical de Investigacion y Ensenanza.

Mann, Fred L., Donald Esslinger, Albert R. Hagan, and Harry C.
Minor
1981 Central America--Evaluation of Projects: Small Farm
Production Systems (SFPS) and Agricultural Research and
Information System (PIADIC) (596-0083 and 596-0048).
(PD-AAJ-278)

Zimet, David, Joseph Conrad, Edwin C. French, and Federico Poey
1986 Evaluation Report on CATIE Small Farm Production
Systems. (PD-AAT-736)


Seneaal/ARPP Agricultural Research and Planning Project
(685-0223)

A.I.D.
1981 Project Paper for the Senegal Agricultural Research and
Planning Project. (PD-BAE-227)

1984 Project Amendment for the Senegal Agricultural Research
and Planning Project. (PD-BAV-474)

Bernsten, Richard
1982 "Mission Report-Summary, Overview, Observations.
Senegal Agricultural Research and Planning Project,"
East Lansing, Michigan: Michigan State University,
Agriculture Economics Department, February, 1985.

Byrnes, Kerry J.
1988 Senegal Agricultural Research and Planning Project (685-
0223), CDIE Working Paper No. 112--Case Study No. 5,
Center for Development Information and Evaluation,
Agency for International Development, Washington, D.C.
(PN-ABC-077)

Eicher, Carl K.
1982 "Reflections in the Design and Implementation of the
Senegal Agricultural Research Project," MSU/ISRA, Dakar,
October 14, 1982.

Sall. S., M. Kamanga, and J. Posner
1982 "Recherche sur les Systems de Production en Casamance,"
Note Methodologique, Centre de Recherches Agricoles de
Djibelor, ISRA, Djibelor.








St. Louis, Robert, C. Franklin Casey, and Kham T. Pham
1985 Mid-Term Threshold Evaluation of the Senegal
Agricultural Research and Planning Project.


Tanzania/FSRP Farming Systems Research Project (621-0156)

Byrnes, Kerry J.
1986 Tanzania Farming Systems Research Project (621-0156),
CDTE Working Paper No. 112--Case Study No. 6, Center for
Development Information and Evaluation, Agency for
International Development, Washington, D.C. (PN-ABC-078)

Consortium for International Development (CID)
1983 Tanzania Farming Systems Research (621-0156) Project
Workplan (Years 1 and 2). (PD-BAO-051)

Cunard, A.
1985 End of Tour Report, Tanzania Farming Systems Research
Project.

Faught, William A.
1986 Project Completion Report: Tanzania Farming Systems
Research Project. (PD-AAU-448)

Jackson, Robert I. and Donald D. Osburn
1986 Report of Evaluation of the Tanzanian FSR Project and
Related Activities Land Development and Station
Development at Ilonga. (PD-BBB-811)


Zambia/ZAMARE Agricultural Development Research & Extension
Project (611-0201)

A.I.D.
1980 Project Paper for Zambian Agricultural Development
Research and Extension Project. (PD-AAG-766)

Benoit, Randy, Bantayehu Gelaw, and Kenneth McDermott
1983 Evaluation of Agricultural Development Research and
Extension Project (ZAMARE). (PD-AAN-807)

Byrnes, Kerry J.
1988 Zambia Agricultural Development Research and Extension
Project (611-0201), CDIE Working Paper No. 112--Case
Study No. 7, Center for Development Information and
Evaluation, Agency for International Development,
Washington, D.C. (PN-ABC-079)








Kean, Stuart A. and Lingston P. Singogo
1988 Zambia Organization and Management of the Adaptive
Research Planning Team (ARPT), Research Branch, Ministry
of Agriculture and Water Development. Special Series on
the Organization and Management of On-Farm Client-
Oriented Research (OFCOR). OFCOR Case Study No. 1. The
Hague, Netherlands: International Service for National
Agricultural Research.

Sutherland, Alistair and Mike Warren
1985 Socio-Economic Component of the USAID Mid-Term
Evaluation of the Zambia Agricultural Research and
Extension Project (ZAMARE). (Appendix 3 of Yohe, et al.,
1985; PD-BAW-778)

Yohe, John, Loy Crowder, Earl Kellogg, Eugenio Martinez, and
Eugene Pilgrim
1985 Report on Midterm Evaluation of Agricultural Development
Research and Extension Project (ZAMARE). (PD-BAW-778)








HOW TO ORDER REPORTS IN THIS SERIES

This CDIE Working Paper is a case study that was prepared for a
cross-cutting analysis of A.I.D. FSR/E projects, A Review of A.I.D.
Experience with Farming Systems Research and Extension Projects,
A.I.D. Evaluation Special Study (forthcoming). A total of 13 case
studies were prepared. These may be ordered from the A.I.D.
Document and Information Handling Facility, 7222 47th Street, Suite
100, Chevy Chase, MD 20815. Telephone: (301) 951-9647. Please
request CDIE Working Paper No. 112, followed by the required Case
Study No. and PN number.

Botswana Agricultural Technology Improvement Project (633-0221),
CDIE Working Paper No. 112--Case Study No. 1. (PN-ABC-073)

Gambia Mixed Farming and Resource Management Project (635-0203),
CDIE Working .- r No. 112--Case Study No. 2. (PN-ABC-074)

Lesotho Farming Systems Research Project (632-0065), CDIE Working
Paper No. 112--Case Study No. 3. (PN-ABC-075)

Malawi Agricultural Research Project (612-0202), CDIE Working Paper
No. 112--Case Study No. 4. (PN-ABC-076)

Senegal Agricultural Research and Planning Project (685-0223), CDIE
Working Paper No. 112--Case Study No. 5. (PN-ABC-077)

Tanzania Farming Systems Research Project (621-0156), CDIE Working
Paper No. 112--Case Study No. 6. (PN-ABC-078)

Zambia Agricultural Development Research & Extension Project (611-
0201), CDIE Working Paper No. 112--Case Study No. 7. (PN-ABC-079)

Nepal Agricultural Research and Production Project (367-0149), CDIE
Working Paper No. 112--Case Study No. 8. (PN-ABC-080).

Philippines Farming Systems Development Project-Eastern Visayas
(492-0356), CDIE Working Paper No. 112--Case Study No. 9. (PN-ABC-
081)

Guatemala Food Productivity and Nutritional Improvement Project
(520-0232), CDIE Working Paper No. 112--Case Study No. 10. (PN-ABC-
082)

Honduras Agricultural Research Project (522-0139), CDIE Working
Paper No. 112--Case Study No. 11. (PN-ABC-083)

ROCAP Small Farm Production Systems Project (596-0083), CDIE Working
Paper No. 112--Case Study No. 12. (PN-ABC-084)

Case Study Vignettes of Core, Operational, and Generic Constraints
in 12 A.I.D.-Funded Farming Systems Research and Extension Projects,
CDIE Working Paper No. 112--Case Study No. 13. (PN-ABC-127)




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