INCORPORATING THE SOCIAL SCIENCES INTO AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH:
THE FORMATION OF A NATIONAL FARM SYSTEMS RESEARCH INSTITUTE
Report of a Five Year Tour of Duty
Peter E. Hildebrand
Institute de Ciencia y Tecnologia Agricolas
The Rockefeller Foundation
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ORIGINAL GUIDELINES 2-3
FIRST GUIDELINES FROM SER 4-5
INITIAL ACTIVITIES 6-9
LA BARRANCA, A CONTROVERSIAL PROJECT WITH IMPORTANT RESULTS 9-15
TECPAN: FIRMING UP THE METHODOLOGY 15-17
GENERAL METHODOLOGY 17-23
SURVEYS AND SONDEOS 23-26
FARM RECORDS 26-29
CALCULATOR SERVICES AND STATISTICAL CONSULTING 35-37
BUDGET SUPPORT 37-39
GENERAL COMMENTS 40-43
This is a report of a five year tour of duty from October 25, 1974 to
August 31, 1979. The author, an agricultural economist and field staff
member of The Rockefeller Foundation, was assigned as Coordinator of Rural
Socioeconomics (SER) in the newly formed Guatemalan Institute of Agricul-
tural and Technology (ICTA) during this time. The experiences described are
taken from monthly reports which he used to keep the Foundation advised of
progress and activities, from published and unpublished reports, from
letters and memos with internal distribution and from recall of actions and
discussions that took place at the time. They represent his views and he
takes the responsibility for any errors of fact or interpretation.
The report is offered in the same spirit the author offered his services
to the Institute -- in the hope that through diligence, perseverance, an
open mind and hard work a new concept could be achieved and put into practice.
It is his firm conviction that the mission has been accomplished. The
social sciences are an integrated part of ICTA and the methodology developed
is being utilized as a matter of course. This makes ICTA a unique institu-
tion: it has accomplished what others are only discussing or attempting on a
pilot basis. All the technical and administrative staff, past and present,
should be proud of their contribution toward the creation of the only
National Farm Systems Institute in the world at the present time.
August 30, 1979
It is impossible to name all the people who have contributed to the
drama reported in these pages. Some are referred to in the paper by name
and others by reference to their publications. Many do not appear except as
they influenced actions that took place and are reported or alluded to. Yet
all contributed to the success of what ICTA is today. By doing the reporting,
I in no way claim the credit for what has happened in these five years; I
was only one person on a large team that required all the players to succeed.
I have often been asked what it is that makes some efforts in institu-
tion building successful and others failures. My answer is always: luck.
This I believe. Without having had the luck of encountering all those who
played a part in the Institute during these years--whether their views
coincided with my own or were counter to them--the results would not have
been the same. And if they had not been the same, the probabality is the
effort would not have been a success.
I therefore, gratefully acknowledge the contribution of everyone who
has been in ICTA during the past five years and in his own way has influ-
enced what is reported here.
INCORPORATING THE SOCIAL SCIENCES INTO AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH
This report is a discussion of the process of the incorporation of
the social sciences into an agricultural research institute. Emphasis
is on the Social Science discipline and its contribution to the development
of the Institute and the methodology being used. Though the integrated
nature of the Institute dictates that some developments regarding the
agronomic disciplines and other support sections such as publications or
seed production are included, a report emphasizing their role should
accompany this report for a more complete work on the development of the
The report is oriented both chronologically and by subject matter.
The first five sections cover the chronological events through the second
full year of operation as background to understanding the following sections
which discuss subject matter areas of particular importance. A list of
visitors to SER and its projects and a list of the staff of SER are presen-
ted in the appendix along with a complete list of the publications written
in SER to the present time. Except for a few instances, specific data are
not included in this report because they are available from the publications
referenced in the text.
In February, 1974, The Rockefeller Foundation first contacted me about
the possibility of taking a position with The Institute of Agricultural
Science and Technology (ICTA) in Guatemala. Kirby Davidson, Deputy Director
of Social Sciences, called me one morning while I was working in CEHTA in El
Salvador, to ascertain if I might be interested in working as a small farm
oriented agricultural economist in a new institute dedicated to working with
small farmers to improve the productivity of the basic grains of this
country. The Institute, he said, was going to try to integrate the social
sciences into an agricultural research institute to help the agronomists
understand the needs and problems of the small, traditional farmers of
In May, 1974, I met with Astolfo Fumagalli, then General Manager of
ICTA, Robert Waugh, Adjunct Director of ICTA and also of The Rockefeller
Foundation, Eugenio Martinez, Technical Director of ICTA and Joe Black,
Director of Social Sciences of The Rockefeller Foundation in the offices of
ICTA in Guatemala to further discuss the nature of the position as Coordina-
tor of Rural Socioeconomics (SER) in the Institute.
In this meeting it was explained that Guatemala felt if they were to
incorporate the small farmers of the country into the economic development
processes, it would be necessary to have a better understanding of their
need and limitations, something that the social sciences should be able to
provide. The aim was to develop an institute in which the social sciences
were integrated with the biological sciences to help guarantee that the
research being undertaken was in fact oriented toward the needs of the small
farmers. There was a feeling that SER should help evaluate the technology
and then help "sell" the technology that was generated to the farmers. That
is, there was an indication that part of the reason technology was not
reaching small farmers was that the selling job being done by extension was
In this meeting, I agreed to the mandate "to help sell the technology
to the small farmer." My reason for doing so was not that I thought we
should or could act as "salesmen" who could convince a client to buy some-
thing that was not necessarily what he wanted. Rather, I contemplated that
the social sciences, through a better understanding of the farmer, should be
able to help the agronomists produce a technology, or "product" that was, in
fact, something the farmers would want and be able to use in their present
Though there was general understanding,at the May meeting on what
the scope of work SER was to be, there was virtually no discussion of the
methodology to be used. This was because few precedents existed which
could be followed. Instead, there were innumerable cases in which failures
had been made or in which only partial advances had been achieved. General
guidelines had been written by the Task Force groups that worked on the
founding of the Institute and later reported in Robert K. Waugh's "Four
Years of History." The Puebla project in Mexico was the closest ongoing
program available to use as a guideline. Other projects were underway
(Ahmadu Bello University in Nigeria) or being initiated (Caqueza in
Colombia) but little or nothing was known about their methodology,
successes or failures. Hence, we began in Guatemala with a quite clean
slate on October 25, 1974, when I reported to work at ICTA.
FIRST GUIDELINES FROM SER
On January 27, 1975 we published, "The Role of Rural Socioeconomics in
ICTA" (Hildebrand, 1975a).1 This was a paper for the seminar which we
gave as part of the seminar series then being presented twice a month by
the Technical Division of the Institute, and gave our preliminary views
on our role and methodologies. During these first three months, I
frequently asked what the people in the General Manager's office and the
head of the Technical Division desired from SER. Following are some of
- "SER should help sell the technology that is developed because one
supposes the sociologist, anthropologist and economist should have the
capacity to formulate the technology in such a way that it is acceptable to
- "It is necessary to study and understand the traditional systems of
the farmers because they have been developed over many, many years."
"It is necessary that SER help in the experiments and trials that ICTA
carries out in order that the results have an economic focus because what
interests the farmer in the final instance are the economic aspects."
- "I want you and your group to evaluate the work developed by the programs
or ICTA. That is, evaluate and orient the programs because we think that the
economist, anthropologist and sociologist have more exact information about
As a result of these discussions, we considered one of the basic roles of
SER was, "...to know the small farmers and the conditions that affect them in
order to help in the design and development of technology appropriate for them."
References are listed in Appendix C.
We also presented the kinds of evaluation we were then thinking about.
We said that as we worked with the Programs discussing their projects and
trials, we were going to give them the "Why" treatment. That is, why are
you orienting the program this way, or why are you doing this trial or why
are you designing it in this way? We explained that in this way we hoped
to always make sure that the needs and limitations of the farmers were
foremost in the minds of the agronomists as they designed their work. Work
that was "interesting" but which could not be explained in terms of the
needs and limitations of the small and medium farmers should not be under-
taken in an Institute so short on resources as ICTA.
We also raised the need to have a full understanding of national policy
with respect to crop and farm size priorities so that the work of the Institute
and its programs would be in keeping with that desired by higher authorities.
We pointed out that there may be conflicts between national policy and the
personal policy of small farmers. For example, yields can be increased by
applying more fertilizer to maximize profit for farmers who have unlimited
capital. But the small farmer, with very little capital, is better off to
settle for lower yields and apply less fertilizer so that he maximizes the
productivity of scarce capital invested in that input.
- 6 -
In November, 1974, at the request of the Sorghum Program, a study was
initiated to evaluate three sorghum varieties in small and medium fincas in
eastern Guatemala. The objectives were the following:
1. Determine the behavior of the varieties for a representative group of
farmers that had planted sample packages which contained full instructions
about the technology to be used and evaluate their opinions regarding the
2. Determine how many of the farmers had utilized the practices recommended
by the Sorghum Program.
3. Determine if the small and medium farmer is able to use the recommended
technology and if not, what barriers there are to its use.
4. Explore how the technology might be modified for the different condi-
tions under which sorghum is planted in this area.
One of the first conclusions was that the yield obtained by the
farmers was very much lower than that advertised by the Institute in the
leaflet distributed with the seed and in other advertisements. The adver-
tised yields were from 70 to 76 qq/mz. Mechanized farmers obtained 26 and
non-mechanized farmers only 16 qq/mz. Hence, there was a strong recommenda-
tion made that the yields:advertised by ICTA be much more closely adjusted
to the yields the farmers could really expect to obtain. A closely associ-
ated recommendation was that farm trials be conducted under conditions much
more like those of the farmers who will be using the seed than were those
used in the development of the three varieties evaluated.
The seeds of what was to eventually become the evaluation of acceptabil-
ity based on Farmers' Tests were also planted in this report when it was
recommended that "evaluations such as the one that had just been made of
farmers who had planted sample packages of seed be conducted in the future
to determine what yields farmers can expect to obtain and what problems they
may be having with the varieties." (Reiche, et al., 1975).
For 1975 several activities were planned, all of which contributed to
the methodology being developed for integrating the social sciences into the
Institute. That which probably had the most far reaching effects was an
agro-socioeconomic study of "an important stratum" of small and medium
farmers in the Oriente of Guatemala. This, combined with the project
called, "farm trials in crop systems in the Oriente" led into what became
known as "La Barranca" which will be discussed in more detail later in this
report. Also in the eastern part of Guatemala we initiated three separate
projects with the Swine Program. One concerned the improvement in the
productivity of non-confined pigs or pigs running loose on the farms and in
the villages. Another was to work on the transfer of the CIAT technology
for pigs in confinement. The third was concerned with the production
of feed for pigs in cropping systems with special emphasis on protein sources.
The production of feeds in cropping systems was part of the project
initiated in La Barranca and met the same fate. The project on non-confined
pigs produced an important and very acceptable technology from the farmer's
point of view and could have had a significant impact on all people who
owned pigs that ran loose. ICTA, however, decided it could not promote the
practice of loose pigs by extolling a technology for it even if it could
have saved a great deal of money for many poor farmers and landless people.
As we began working with the CIAT technology for confined pigs it was
immediately evident that there were problems that would make it difficult
for the large majority of farmers in dry, eastern Guatemala to accept. In
confinement, pigs must be watered and their pens must be washed to avoid
unacceptable odors and disease. In this area, during most of the year, the
women carry water great distances in jars on their heads for the family to
use. Obviously, they would not do this to water pigs, much less to wash the
pens where they were confined. This and the fact that the technology was
only marginally economic under the best of conditions led to the abandonment
of the project as originally conceived.
In 1975 an agro-socioeconomic study was undertaken in the altiplano in
Santo Domingo Xenacoj (Corisco, 1976). This study was never as productive
as it could have been because decisions taken later moved the area of
operation to Tecpan. Also in 1975, I worked with the team in Region I
(Quezaltenango) in the design of the trials that were later to be known as
"Relevos" or Relay trials. They were based on the double corn row concept
that Tito French and I had developed in El Salvador allowing farmers to
continue producing the same amount of corn, but also including the inter-
cropping of other crops (Hildebrand, 1975b). The first Farmers' Tests (see
the section in this report on methodology) of the relay system were estab-
lished in 1978 and continued in 1979.
In Region IV (La Maquina), in 1975, we collaborated with the "Production
Team" on "Economic Farm Trials" on crop systems and fertilizer use. The
fertilizer trials eventually led to the rejection of the recommendation of
fertilizers for that area and a change in the policy of BANDESA (the agri-
cultural credit bank) and DIGESA (extension) towards fertilizer.
LA BARRANCA, A CONTROVERSIAL PROJECT WITH IMPORTANT RESULTS
Although the project at La Barranca in the Municipio of Santa Catarina
Mita, Department of Jutiapa, lasted only two years, it may well have been one
of the most important features of the five years. The survey and farm trial
proposals were written in January, 1975, as part of the training I was giving
my staff in project preparation. In February the survey work was begun.
From the beginning, it was evident to us that the largest number of small
and medium farmers in the Jutiapa area were located on the steep and often
rocky hillsides called "Ladera." In consultation with the Technical Director,
we decided to direct our first agro-socioeconomic survey to the farmers of
the Ladera because virtually nothing was known about them and their conditions.
The efforts that had been made and were planned for the Technology Testing
Team and the Commodity Programs working in the area were all on the better,
flatter and in some cases, irrigated land. Hence, no experience had been
gained working under the very adverse conditions of the Ladera. During the
"Sondeo" or reconnaissance survey and preparation of the questionnaire it
was decided to limit the survey to farmers with from 1 to 5 manzanas on
Ladera. The survey was completed during March and April, 1975.
Originally it was anticipated that our field or "Farm" trials would be
conducted on the new Production Center or Experiment Station in Jutiapa in
cooperation with the Bean Program that was interested and willing to share
funds with us (SER had no budget for such an undertaking). We chose the
poorest land on the station and planned to use bullocks instead of tractors
to prepare the land in order to stay as close as possible to the conditions
confronting the small farmers. However, the Regional Director wanted to
homogenize the Station and our desired use of bullocks and lack of use of
fertilizer did not fit within this concept, so in late March, 1975, the
decision was made with the Technical Director and the Regional Director that
we should move off the station and rent land on which to conduct our farm
trials. This undoubtedly was the best thing that could have happened,
although it was very difficult'to find land so late in the year. Utilizing
some of the farmers we had interviewed in the survey as contacts, we found
suitable land on April 1, and on April 3, it was rented.
The land, about one kilometer off the road and up a steep path, was all
in heavy overgrowth and had to be cleared. While this was underway using
the same methods employed by the farmers of the area, we continued visiting
our neighbors and becoming more familiar with their conditions and problems.
The treatments and the experimental design of the trial, which were planned
from preliminary analysis of the survey data, were modified to be more in
keeping with the local situation. Before the first rains fell, the land was
cleared and the plots staked and we waited for the first rains so we could
begin planting. On May 14, we had a good rain and we began planting on May
15 along with all our neighbors.
From the survey it was found that the most limiting resources for the
farmers in the area were labor at planting time and amount of been seed
(Reiche, et al., 1976). The trial was designed around these factors and in
such a manner as to minimize modifications to the present systems used by
the farmers so that whatever technology might be developed would be easy for
them to adopt. No insecticides nor fungicides were used and only a minimum
amount of fertilizer was included in some of the treatments (Hildebrand, et
The year was very dry and had two prolonged periods without any
rain (16 to 26 May and 25 June to 23 July). Visitors (see list in the
Appendix) were surprised, if not appalled to see field trials under such
conditions and the crops clearly demonstrated the extreme stress under which
they were growing. But it was also evident that these conditions were the
reality under which the farmers of the Ladera lived and produced. Aside
from the comments that it looked just like a trial being run by social
scientists and that it was a good thing it was well off the road, the most
usual comment was that it was obviously not worthwhile to work under these
conditions because nothing could be accomplished.
However, we did accomplish the following: We learned how the farmers
plant under those very adverse conditions and closely duplicated their
yields on our check plots. That is, we learned how to farm under their
conditions. In the best treatment, the productivity of labor for planting
was increased 64% and of bean seed 60%. On a per hectare basis the yields
in this system compared with the farmers' system were 91, 126 and 117
percent for beans, maize and sorghum respectively. We discovered that the
planting of maize and sorghum in close association under these conditions
is advantageous because the loss of one or the other allows the surviving
crop to utilize the moisture from the space that would otherwise be left
vacant. We learned that sorghum is a very important part of the human
diet in the area and is not used just for animal feed as had been supposed.
Therefore the development of varieties with better characteristics for
tortillas would be readily accepted (Hildebrand, et al., 1975). Also, and
very important, the staff from SER learned much about how to conduct field
trials, enabling them to talk on the same plane with the biological sci-
entists of the Institute.
A secondary effect of the trials at La Barranca was that they created a
tremendous amount of discussion among the technicians of ICTA concerning
the role of SER in the Institute, the folly or wisdom of working under poor
conditions like those of the Ladera and about who the "clients" of ICTA
It was evident that the agronomists were comfortable, or not threatened
by the role of SER in surveying, but this was not the case when we were
participants in field trials. Hence, a negative effect of the trials the
first year was that they tended to create more separation of the social and
biological sciences than integration. However, I feel this was more than
offset by the gain in understanding about working under the adverse condi-
tions of the traditional farmer. The difference between transferring the
conditions of an experiment station to a farm site and working under the
conditions of the farmers was evident. Low yields such as those obtained
in La Barranca normally would have been discarded as "lost trials" instead
of being used to better help understand the conditions of the small farmer.
In 1976, the second year of trials was planned and planted in
La Barranca. The trial was a continuation of the best systems from the
trial of the year before, still trying to reduce the labor requirement per
manzana for planting and increase the productivity of the bean seed. Two
support trials were designed to study the effect of different planting
distances of corn and beans on land, labor and seed productivity. Soybeans
and pigeon peas were also included in some treatments as a source of
protein for swine rations.
- 13 -
The best system from 1975 was also the best in 1976 and resulted in an
increase in productivity of capital invested in planting labor and bean seed
of 59% over the farmers' system. Results of five Farmers' Tests which SER
conducted during 1976 showed that they were able to plant 42% more land with
the same amount of planting labor, produce 75% more maize, the same amount
of beans, 41% more sorghum and 33% more income using the improved system
rather than their traditional system (Hildebrand and Cardona, 1976).
The trial on distance of planting beans in corn confirmed the hypothe-
sis that opening the distance between bean plants would increase the produc-
tivity of the seed without seriously decreasing the yield per unit of land
area and at the same time increase maize production through less competition.
As the distance between bean plants opened up from 30 to 60 cm, the produc-
tivity of the bean plants increased 81% while yield per hectare dropped only
8% and maize yield increased 16% (Hildebrand and Cardona, 1977).
As a result of the second year's trials and Farmers' Tests, it was
recommended that a larger number of Farmers' Tests be established in the
Ladera in 1977, using the system that was best in the two previous years.
It was also recommended that the Bean Program continue the work on wider
planting distances. Neither of these recommendations was accepted, however.
The primary reason is that except for the work described here, ICTA tech-
nicians have done very little work, nor desire to, under the severe condi-
tions of the Ladera, and both of these technologies pertain only to those
conditions. The technicians' reasons are two-fold: experimental error is
high under these conditions and they do not see much possibility of poten-
tial increases in production. But the fact remains that these are the
realistic conditions of the small producers in the area so they must be
dealt with if these farmers are to be helped.
- 14 -
It has been in the Oriente where there has been the most discussion
regarding who is or should be the client of the Institute. In other
regions the distinction among classes of possible clients is not nearly
so sharp. SER has always thought that to follow the mandate of the Insti-
tute, the Ladera, where the majority of farmers and the majority of grains
are, is where we should be making our major efforts. Virtually everyone
else in the Institute has always felt that it is better to work in the
more favorable conditions where there is more probability of being able to
generate a technology that will increase per hectare yields, even if this
action will favor those already more fortunate with larger farms and better
land. Recently, efforts are being made to consider criteria other than just
per hectare yields. This is a promising trend and may lead to a reconsidera-
tion of the importance of working in the Ladera of the Oriente and in other
In 1975, to evaluate the importance of the Ladera in the economy of the
Oriente, SER undertook an aerial survey of the area. The results show that
54% of_ the maize, 58% of the sorghum and 59% of the beans in the area are
grown on lands with more than 12% slope. Since the smaller farmers tend to
be located on the sloping land, this represents an even greater proportion of
all farmers. In addition, it was shown that 87% of the maize, 95% of the
sorghum and 83% of the beans are grown in association with one or more other
crops (De Leon Prera, et'al., 1977). The overwhelming evidence of the
importance of associated crops has led to the incorporation of this character-
istic in many of the trials of the Commodity Programs in the area, but the
trials continue to be conducted on flat land.
- 15 -
The last activity in La Barranca was in 1976 and this was also the last
year in which SER had field trials with sole responsibility. However, we did
have a second trial in 1976, the year of the earthquake, in Tecpan in the
Central Highlands. This activity will be described in the following section.
TECPAN: FIRMING UP THE METHODOLOGY
In late 1975, a decision was made by the Technical Director that SER
should conduct an agro-socioeconomic survey in the area centering on Tecpan
in western Chimaltenango. Because of the separation of SER from the agrono-
mists that was occurring in the Oriente, it was also decided that in Tecpan
we should work with technicians from one or more of the Commodity Programs
and from the Technology Testing Team, then located at Quezaltenango. This
survey was initiated in January, 1976, and was about 2/3 completed on Febru-
ary 4, when the earthquake struck. One person from the Technology Testing
Team participated in the survey as did one from the Bean Program. The one
from the Testing Team had to return to his own group following the earth-
quake and did not participate in the analysis of data, but we did continue
collaboration with the Bean Program.
Three manzanas were rented in the Aldea of Pueblo Viejo in Tecpan and
this served both the Bean Program and SER as a site for farm trials. In the
survey, we had detected three classes of farmers (Duarte, et al., 1977a).
Treatments were designed for each of the classes and included wheat, vege-
tables, maize, beans and fava. In addition, we planted 15 varieties of
soybeans at the request of the Technical Director to make an initial screen-
ing for him at that altitude.
The factors which were discovered to be scarcest for the small farmer
in this area were land and capital in that order. Results of the trial
indicated that some of the treatments were very efficient in the use of these
resources and utilized technology that was easy for the farmers to adopt. For
the farmers who were not able to produce enough maize for the family on the
little land they had, a system of "compact double maize rows" showed great
promise allowing an increase of 45% in production without changing the basic
technology they were using other than the planting of 50% more maize on the
same amount of land (Hildebrand et al., 1977).
For farmers who were just on the margin of being self-sufficient in maize,
a second system was devised using double maize rows widely spaced but without
reducing the normal population, and interplanting with wheat, the usual cash
crop for farmers in the area with enough land. This system produced 1,300
kg/ha of wheat while decreasing maize production by only 15%, or 250 kg/ha.
This was accomplished with the same basic technology they are presently
A third system, for, farmers who already produced maize and wheat was the
interplanting of cabbages in the wheat. This system permitted the production
of nearly 14,000 cabbages per hectare while having a slight positive effect
on the wheat, apparently because of the fertilizer used on the cabbage. It
was recommended that these systems be put in the Farmers' Tests the following
year. Once, again, it was only the personnel of SER who were permitted to
have Farmers' Tests with the technology generated by our own trials. Five
were established in 1977 and were very well received by the farmers who
planted them. The Technology Testing Team, newly formed in Chimaltenango in
1977, however, did utilize the intermediate system of double rows with wheat
in their trials and this methodology, utilizing other crops, passed into the
Farmers' Tests and is now in its second year in some areas. The system,
- 17 -
interplanting beans instead of wheat, was very well received in the area of
San Martin Jilotepeque in northern Chimaltenango.
The experience in Tecpan reinforced the thinking on the benefits of
designing field trials around the information obtained in a survey of the
area by a multidisciplinary team prior to initiation of work. It also helped
us understand the value of utilizing the local farmers both as sources of
labor and as advisors in the field trials. And once again, it demonstrated
the value of maintaining a simple technology, based on that existing in an
area with only a minimum amount of changes.
Much of the methodology now in use in the Institute was formulated
during 1975 and 1976. In this period each of the three regions having full
production teams operated slightly differently. This flexibility was en-
couraged because the methodology was in a formative stage and it was obvious
that changes would be required as better methods were devised. SER was
operating with yet a different type of methodology than that used by the
Because of its controversial and innovative nature, the methodology
being developed by SER was more widely discussed than that of the Production
Teams and the Commodity Programs. We benefited tremendously from the many
interchanges of opinions which took place with the ICTA technicians and with
the General Manager and others in the Central Offices of the Institute in
By mid 1976, following one full year of work and well into another, the
methodology that we in SER thought would be the most useful to the Institute,
to help the integration process, and aid in the contributions of the social
sciences, had been fairly well formulated. We first presented it to the
Institute on a formal basis during the presentation of results to the General
Manager in June, 1976. It was at this same approximate time that the first
attempt to describe the methodology in written form was undertaken. This
attempt was approved by the General Manager of ICTA and presented at a
conference in Bellagio, Italy, in August, 1976 (Hildebrand, 1976). However,
there still appeared to be some doubt on the part of the General Management
and the Technicdl Director concerning the exact nature of the role that
SER should play. In order to try to clear up our concepts, we requested a
three day meeting with them, one of which was to be spent in the field at our
Tecpan site. This meeting was held Dec. 6-8, 1976. Waugh and Fumagalli
attended all three days, Eugenio Martinez two, but Mario Martinez was on
On the first day we presented a description of how we had been working
to develop a methodology for integrating SER into the technology development
process in an internal paper we called "Searching for a Methodology." This
was the same methodology presented in Bellagio, but the paper discussed more
of what we considered "integration" because there was some idea we were
trying to separate ourselves from the other technicians. During the course
of the discussion, we worked on a schematic diagram to describe the method-
ology based on one that Fumagalli had developed earlier. This diagram was
what was to become known as the "Transistor Radio" diagram that is still in
The second day was spent in and around Tecpan where we discussed the
specific case of our work there. We had done a survey, conducted a crop
- 19 -
systems trial and had a farm record project underway. These activities
included three of the four components basic to our participation in the
integrated methodology of the Institute. The fourth is evaluation of ac-
ceptability of the technology that follows the Farmers' Test. Except for
farm trials these activities will be discussed in more detail in following
On the third morning Waugh, Fumagalli and Eugenio Martinez talked to me
about their idea of changing the name of the Production Teams in order to
help integration and we discussed the integration of SER into these teams --
particularly in the early aspects of work in a new area. In the afternoon,
these ideas were presented to the regional coordinators and were to be put
into practice in 1977. The differences from the methodology in use at the
time were not great and affected the procedure primarily in the first two
years in which the Institute works in a new zone.
It was proposed that during the first year, the Regional Director then
called Regional Coordinator, some members from the relevant Commodity Pro-
grams (maize, beans, etc.), two from SER and others as required would work as
a single team to conduct the agro-socioeconomic survey, design and conduct
the cropping trials based on the survey and initiate the farm record keeping
project. Heavy emphasis in the first year in both the survey and the crop
trials was to be in getting to know the farmer and the region. In the second
year the original team was to be augmented by additional personnel and the
emphasis would shift more to biological or agronomic concerns but with
continuing participation of SER. By the third year, the primary work of SER
was to be farm records and evaluations.
Discussions on methodology continued and included clearer definitions of
the Farm Trials and Farmers' Tests as well as evaluation of acceptability of
the technology generated. Evaluating the acceptability of technology in 1976
helped a great deal in understanding the function of the Farmers' Tests and a
new definition was formulated. The most important conceptual change was that
in the Farmers' Tests it is the farmer who becomes the prime evaluator rather
than the technician. The technician obtains what information he can from the
Test, but our principal evaluation is of the acceptability of the technology
to the farmers. With this new definition of the Farmers' Tests as well as
the selectivity the farmers were showing in choosing parts of components of a
complete technological package, it also became evident that the technology
being generated needed to be simpler and designed specifically for the
farmers with whom it was being tested. It was clear that it made no sense to
test on a large farm, technology that had been developed for a small farmer
who works under different conditions, or vice versa, because we could antici-
pate beforehand that much of it will be rejected as not being acceptable.
Hence, the whole concept of orientation to a specific type of farmer came
into clearer focus.
Another important effect of the change in definition of the Farmers'
Tests is that many more Tests can be carried out when it is the farmer and not
the technician who is responsible.
During this same period the concept of the agro-economic farm trials as
distinct from the agro-technical trials was developed. In the agro-economic
trials the plots are larger and the treatments usually are not replicated.
More of them can be installed to obtain a better estimate of regional response
and stability, and economic as well as agronomic information can be obtained.
A new attempt to describe the technology in written form was completed
and included in an invited address given at the 12th West Indian Agricultural
Economics Conference of the Caribbean Agro-Economic Society in Antigua on
- 21 -
April 24, 1977 (Hildebrand, 1977a). The relevant portions of this paper were
translated and submitted to the General Management in May of that year (Memo
of 15 July 77 to AFC from PEH). Eventually this was incorporated in the 1976
Report of the General Manager (Informe del Gerente) and printed in a special
issue of NOTICTA, the news and information pamphlet of ICTA, for wide distrib-
ution, and still forms the basis of the methodology in use today with only
For SER it was a major breakthrough to finally have the methodology in
officially published form. We felt this would end what had been a long
struggle to fully integrate SER into the activities of the Institute. But
even though the methodology was published and widely distributed, it ap-
parently was not read or understood by most of the technicians, nor all the
Regional Directors, because each Regional Team continued to operate along
different lines. Many times over the next year we heard the word "flex-
ibility," meaning that it was necessary to maintain flexibility so that the
methodology could continue to develop. We argued that flexibility was fine
from one year to the next, but that flexibility within the year tended to
create a disorientation that was more damaging to SER than to any of the
other programs or disciplines within the Institute. This is so, because we
work in all the regions and are dependent on a more uniform methodology
among regions especially regarding what tasks SER personnel undertake and
what tasks are assigned to the Technology Testing Team. It is also extremely
important that the Farm Trials and Farmers' Tests are conducted in a standard
format so that comparisons can be made for purposes of evaluation.
During 1978, the definition of Farm Trials was fairly well standardized,
but there continued to be a great deal of discussion about the Farmers' Tests.
Many felt (perhaps the feeling was strongest in the Maize Program) that a
- 22 -
year was lost between the Farmers' Tests and the evaluation. In a way, the
need for this wait is related to the client. For the larger, commercial
farmers who can accept or absorb a certain amount of risk, there is probably
no need for the evaluation of acceptability before the technology is released
to the extension service. But for the small, traditional farmer for whom the
methodology was developed, the wait helps assure that the technology is, in
fact, acceptable to this class of farmer who cannot accept the risk inherent
when evaluation of materials or practices is conducted only by technicians
even though they live and work in the area.
A meeting was held in Region VI in September, 1978, in which the team
from that region and SER!agreed on what the Farmers' Tests were and how they
should be managed. An important conclusion was that there should be no
"check" plot representing the farmer's own practices. In some cases the
farmers put themselves into competition with the ICTA plot and tended to use
a higher level of technology than on their own crop. In others it appeared
that they waited for instructions on what to do on the check plot like they
did on the ICTA plot so that it suffered and produced less than their own
crop. Instead of using a check plot, the suggestion was to sample from the
farmer's own field. This procedure would have three uses: 1) it would
eliminate any possible bias on the farmer's part with respect to the check
plot, 2) it could be used as a measure of yield for the farm records if the
The frequently conceived notion that a pool of technology is available
and waiting for appropriate extension techniques to get it into the hands of
small farmers is mostly invalid. Technology must be finely tuned to the
needs and conditions of the small, traditional farmer through such a process
as that described here before investment in extension activities will pay off.
- 23 -
farmer were also a record keeper, and 3) it could be used to locate sources
of error in the way the farmer measured his own yield. However, it also has
two disadvantages: 1) it requires more time on the part of the technicians,
and 2) it is subject to sampling error.
In 1979, the Farmers' Tests generally follow the model described above
except that there is still a check in most of them. However, it has been
agreed to try the sampling procedure in the Farmers' Tests in 1980. The
difference in number of Farmers' Tests that can be carried out under the new
definition compared with the old is large. Now we are involving from 50 to
150 farmers in Tests in each crop in each area of work each year, compared
with only around 15 or even less in the earlier years when the technicians
considered they were responsible for installing the Tests. Hence, the
validity of the following evaluation is greatly enhanced and the promotion
of the technology is facilitated. It is also easier under the new definition
to incorporate personnel from the extension service in the Farm Testing
procedure and this is being done.
SURVEYS AND SONDEOS
The first three full-scale agro-socioeconomic studies or surveys that
were undertaken were: 1) The Jutiapa area in the Oriente that led to the La
Barranca trials, 2) The Tecpan area that led to the trials in Pueblo Viejo,
and 3) a second survey in the Oriente in the area of Yupiltepeque (Diaz,
1977), that was designed to determine if that area could be considered part
of the homogeneous area of the Ladera in Jutiapa. All of these surveys took
at least a year to complete from initiation to publication of the report. We
began to question the need of these full-scale surveys in 1976. In my
January-February, 1977 Report, I said:
"The main purpose of the survey is to provide information for
the Regional Team to use in orienting and planning its work, and
that is accomplished now shortly after the survey is completed.
We have been writing them in the past to pass on to the Regional
Production Teams, but with the integration of SER into these teams,
that is not really necessary because the same team will be doing
its own analyzing and interpretation. Also, the information we
are now getting from the farm records which we initiate at the
same time we are doing the survey provides more accurate
information on the economic aspects. On the other hand, the
survey does provide some information from the year before the
records begin, so it may still be useful."
I indicated that a decision would be made on streamlining the surveys after
there was time to evaluate the information in the survey reports. We did,
however, continue the full-scale surveys (in Totonicapan: Duarte, 1977; and
La Blanca: Castaneda, 1978) while we were pondering their fate.
In all these full-scale surveys we utilized a "sondeo" or preliminary
survey to obtain the first impression of the area and to write the question-
naire. We were finding frequently that these first impressions, gained
through the eyes of a multidisciplinary team, with each discipline making a
contribution, were quite correct. This led us more and more to doubt the
need for spending the relatively great additional amount of resources for a
relatively small additional amount of information. This, particularly in
light of the fact that the additional information was seldom published for at
least a year, and in that time we had the information from the first year's
farm trials and from the first year's farm records.
In 1977 we conducted Sondeos in two areas (Montufar: Duarte, et al., 1977b,
and Izabal: Ruano, et al., 1977b) that were supposed to be followed by surveys
but for which there was never time to complete the full survey. We found in
both instances that the Sondeo provided a great deal of useful information
and this was appropriate to be written as a report for "internal use."
- 25 -
In 1978 we conducted three Sondeos and one survey. A Sondeo in Moyuta
in Southeastern Guatemala was the first to be conducted without the
*thought that it would be followed by a survey. We found that when
we did it on this basis, much more information was forthcoming than when
the Sondeo was conducted as a forerunner to a survey like that done in
Jalapa (the eastern Highlands) the same year. In Zacapa, in September,
1978, we began to firm up the methodology for the Sondeo. By October
the methodology was sufficiently well defined to be reported in written
form for another international conference (Hildebrand, 1978b).
Briefly, the Sondeo methodology is as follows. A technician from SER
is paired with one from the Technology Testing Team or a Commodity Program to
form an interviewing team. Approximately five such teams are formed for the
area. Following each half day's interviewing, the full group meets to discuss
the findings, raise doubts, formulate tentative hypotheses and orient the
next half day's interviewing. Interviews are without questionnaires and no
notes are taken, so the farmers are much freer with the information they
give. Convergence of opinion is surprisingly rapid, so in four or five days
enough information has usually been obtained for the team to write the report
and make recommendations on the nature of the technology that needs to be
generated for the farmers of the area. The technicians who participated in
the Sondeo will have an excellent understanding of the problems the farmers
in the area have and the conditions they face. No quantitative information
is obtained, but this is accumulated through the farm record project
that is initiated during the first year of work in the area.
By 1979, the Sondeo had become the accepted method to be used for
obtaining preliminary information for an area and five, week-long Sondeos
- 26 -
were conducted early in the year. The methodology, as now used has been
published in expanded form (Hildebrand, 1979c).
Our first survey on livestock, in Nueva Concepcion on the south coast
in early 1978, ended in idiaster when we failed to take into consideration
the interaction of the livestock with the crops. It is apparently possible
to consider crops without a full consideration of livestock, but when
livestock are to be studied, it is essential to account for the crops. As
a result of the problems with the survey in Nueva Concepcion, we have been
looking at livestock with every Sondeo whether or not it was part of the
The ICTA farm record project with small farmers began in 1975 as an
additional method of obtaining agro-socioeconomic information in areas
where "Technology Testing Teams" are assigned. The project began modestly
and grew over the years into a national project with records on many crops
and cropping systems. From the beginning, the project was conceived as a
crop record project and was not intended as a farm record program. That
is, no attempt was made to take full farm inventories, impute depreciation
costs of equipment to each crop, or to enter into household expenses and
use of farm products, etc.; rather family owned machinery and animal power,
family labor and owned land rent were all charged at the current contract
or hired cost for similar items. This characteristic had three important
advantages. One is that it held to a minimum the amount of time and bother
the farmer had to put into the data gathering process. Second, train-
ing of personnel was simplified, and third, the analyses were simplified.
This probably was one of the main reasons the project has had the success
it has enjoyed. Had it been designed as a full farm record project from
the start, it would have been so complicated that it probably would have
failed before producing enough data to demonstrate its productivity.
During the first year, two technicians from Socioeconomics were
assigned to an agrarian reform parcelization project comprised of 20 ha
farm units. These two worked with the ICTA Technology Testing Team that
had just been organized and some of the technicians from the ICTA Commodity
Programs who were also initiating programs in the area. The target number
of farmers was 30 and originally that many farmers were keeping records.
However, during that first year, 10 of the farmers dropped out leaving 20
for analysis at the end of the year. All of these farmers had maize, 5
planted rice and 15 planted sesame, so 40 separate records were kept.
From this modest beginning, the project grew in four years to
include 34 different sets of crop or crop system records in 11 work areas
and included a total of 583 separate records, Table 1. One person from
Socioeconomics was assigned to each of the work areas, and one from the
Central Office was given responsibility for supervising the farm record
Table 1. Growth of the ICTA Farm Record Project with Small Farmers.
1975 1976 1977 1978
Number of areas 1 3 8 11
Number of crops/systems 3 4 23 34
Number of records 40 93 347 583
Total area, has 390 619 1,288 1,404
In the field, a significant change was made in the personnel who were
working with the farmers on their records. Instead of using only personnel
from Socioeconomics, members of the Technology Testing Teams were also
being used in this capacity. This provided more opportunity for them to
get acquainted with farmers and helped the technicians to better understand
the farmers' problems. In return, personnel from Socioeconomics began to
participate in the field trials of the Technology Testing Teams.
The incorporation of the agronomists from the Technology Testing
Teams into the farm record project has not been without some problems.
Some have been slow to accept the work probably because of the way it was
introduced. That is, first it was undertaken by peritos agronomos with
high school level training and later agronomists with university degrees
were asked to participate. Also, the record project was added to the other
work they were doing without a reduction in other responsibilities. For
this reason, many thought of the farm records as socio-economics work they
were given to do so they put much less priority on it than on the field
trials. Third, they felt the work had been "imposed" on them and they had
not been given the opportunity to express their opinions.
In general, it has been found that an agronomist who is conducting
around 20 farm trials can work with 10 farmers on records. If a technician
is working only on farm records he can work with from 40 to 50 farmers and
provide them adequate supervision.
It has been found to be feasible, inexpensive and efficient to
organize the record system around the hand-held programmable calculators.
These calculators are now sufficiently inexpensive that each area team
could have them. In 1978, with only four programmable calculators of the
capacity required for the record analyses in ICTA, Socioeconomics was able
to complete all the analyses on time for the annual meetings for presentation
- 29 -
tion of results shortly following harvest. And these same machines were
being used at the same time by other technicians to do their farm trial
analyses for presentation at the same meetings.
In March, 1975, there was a two day meeting to discuss SER's respon-
sibilities and that of the Programming Division with respect to evaluation
of ICTA and its programs. From the beginning the idea was to have SER
participate in evaluations, but Programming, the third Division in the
Institute, also was to have evaluation functions. The meeting was attended
by Mario Martinez, Fumagalli, Waugh, Eugenio Martinez, myself and Armando
Fletes, Director of Programming. At that meeting it was decided that
Programming would have responsibility for analyzing the progress of each
program toward its stated goals; that is, number of farmers interviewed,
number of trials initiated, number of farm records established, etc. Also
they were to keep track of budget expenditures and be charged with ob-
taining the information necessary for the various reports required by the
SER was to have the responsibility for technical evaluation. This
included an analysis of the orientation of each program, its contribution
to the overall objectives of ICTA, and the efficiency of the projects in
making progress toward raising incomes and production of the small and
medium farmers. It was agreed that we would work with each of the programs
in helping to write their project proposals for the next year in such a way
that the orientation toward the goals and objectives of ICTA was clear and
the relationship between the project and the goals was evident.
In the five year plan of ICTA which was drafted in May, June and July,
1975, the section on evaluation states in part:
- 30 -
"Technical evaluation of ICTA will be in charge of SER. The
reason for putting this group in charge of evaluation is to assure
an orientation not only of the agronomic factors, but also of the
socioeconomic factors of the farmers. By doing this, the Institute
hopes to have an orientation directed towards resolving the problems
of the small and medium farmers of the country and avoid investing
in projects that would have little potential for increasing the
income of the clients or increasing national production.
"Because they are assigned the evaluation task, SER will have the
responsibility of knowing the farmers in the different priority
zones of the country. This understanding will include the agronomic,
socioeconomic and cultural factors that affect their potential to
produce and earn.
"The evaluation process will begin with the development of new
projects, continue during the execution to assure that it is being
done under conditions relevant to the farmers, include the evaluation
of recommendations and of the results of the technology when it is
placed in the farmers' hands by determining the grade of acceptance
of the technology and finally will close the circle with recommenda-
tions based on an analysis of the previously described process.
Although SER is in charge of the evaluation process, it is obvious
that in all stages it will be necessary to depend on the collabora-
tion and coordination of all the personnel of the Production and
Testing Programs and on the solution of different points of view
in a way that is satisfactory to all."
In practice this has meant that the Coordinator of SER acted equally
with all the other Coordinators and Regional Directors in the evaluation of
new project proposals and in the evaluation of research results which are
accomplished in regional meetings following the termination of the crop year.
SER has had a lesser role and a smaller impact on the execution of the projects,
but has played a strong part in the definition of Farm Trials and Farmers'
Tests, as mentioned previously. Perhaps the strongest role that SER has had
in evaluation is in the evaluation of "Acceptability" of technology based on
interviews of farmers who participated in Farmers' Tests.
The first evaluations of this nature were conducted in 1976 in La Maquina
in Region IV, Quezaltenaigo in Region I and Jutiapa in Region VI. Though two
of three studies were very useful (the one from the Jutiapa area was never
Informal translation from Spanish.
published because of various objections), they were based on three erroneous
concepts that were later changed. At first we called these studies "Evalua-
tion of Acceptance of Technology." It was soon obvious that this created a
wrong impression as to the nature of the evaluation. People thought of it
as an "impact" study, which it was not. By changing the name to "Evaluation
of Acceptability of Technology," this problem was solved. Secondly, the
"Acceptance Index" we used the first year was not appropriate. The error
originated because the first evaluation was done in La Maquina where some
of the technology being tested was already being used by many farmers. We
studied the area on which the farmer used each of the components in 1975,
in the year of the Farmers' Tests, and the area on which he used the
components the year following the Tests. The index was the percentage
increase in area using 1976 as the base year. The proportion of farmers
who used the technology was not incorporated into the index. Many tech-
nicians complained that through this void, the index was not complete. In
the second year our "Acceptability Index" was based only on data from the
year following the Farmers' Tests. It was the percentage of farmers who
put the technology component into practice on their own on even a small
part of their farm, multiplied by the percent of their crop on which they
used it and divided by 100. This index has proved to be sensitive to
farmers' opinions and useful in detecting what technology they would accept
and reject. It also has satisfied the criteria of the agronomists who
generate the technology under evaluation.
An index of 100 obviously means complete acceptability and 0 means full
rejection. We have tentatively set an index of 25 as the minimum for a
technology to be "acceptable" provided at least 50% of the farmers used it the
year following the Tests. But other, lower values can also be useful. For
- 32 -
example, if 90% of the farmers use a component, but do so only on 10% of their
crop, it can be interpreted that the technology interests them, but they want
to continue experimenting with it. If 10% of the farmers use a component on
a large percent of their crop, it means that for 90%, the technology was
rejected and is not acceptable. But for the 10%, it was obviously very accept-
able, so if one can determine the characteristics of the farmers for whom the
technology is acceptable, it can be provided to the extension service as an
"Acceptable" technology for farmers with those certain characteristics.
The third faulty concept on which the evaluations were based the first
year was the nature of the "Farmers' Tests" that had been conducted in 1975.
In most instances, the technicians installed the Tests and there was only
minor participation by the farmers. The following table demonstrates some
very interesting aspects of the development of the Farmers' Tests and the
evaluation of technology.
Table 2. Index of Acceptability of Technology for Maize Production, La
Maiquina, Guatemala 1976 to 1978.
Technology Index of Acceptability for Year1
Component 1 9 7 6 1 9 7 7 1 9 7 8
Improved seed 41 61 71
Planting distance 13 28 60
Insect control (plant) 53 66 48
Herbicides 1 12 11
Fertilizer 0 4 -
Insect control (soil) 0 4
Land preparation 0 -
Planting date 50 -
Number of components 8 6 4
Average Index 19.8 29.2 47.6
Percentage of farmers using the component on their own the year
following the test multiplied by the percent of their crop on which
they are using the component divided by 100. The year shown is
the year of the evaluation; the Tests were conducted the previous
year in each case.
Source: Busto Brol, et al. (1976a), Ruano (1978) and Chinchilla and
- 33 -
This table clearly demonstrates that farmers are very selective of the
technology components they choose. Early in the life of ICTA, a complete
technological package was being recommended. Gradually the number of components
was reduced and the index of acceptability increased accordingly. The increase
in the average index can be attributed to three factors. One is the reduction
in number of components. Second, as more was learned about the farmers, remaining
components were modified to be more appropriate to their conditions. Third, ICTA's
methodology improved so farmers were more aware of the technology being tested
and were more involved in evaluation. That is, the method of conducting "Farmers'
Tests" improved over this period of years.
That this index of acceptability does differentiate the farmers' opinions
regarding acceptability is shown by the following table taken from farm records
in the same area, but not necessarily from the same farmers who participated in
Table 3. Technology Used in Maize in La Maquina, Guatemala, 1975 to 1978.
(Percent of area in maize)
Technology1975 1976 1977 1978
Improved seed 45 60 59 85
Insect control (plant) 57 74 78 103
Herbicides 1 0 0 0
Tractor cultivation NA 35 40 49
Fertilizer use 1 5 1 0
Insect control (soil) 0 2 0 0
Number of cases 20 49 46 25
Area in maize (has) 237 574 566 318
Average yield (kg/ha) 1,948 2,078 2,013 2,324
1Does not follow trend because seed imports from Nicaragua were
stopped due to an outbreak of coffee rust in that country.
Source: Busto Brol and Calderon (1975), Busto Brol et al. (1977),
Guerra, et al. (1978) and Gonzalez, et al. (1979).
- 34 -
The use of herbicides, fertilizer and control of insects in the soil
all received very low indices (Table 2) and all are completely rejected by the
farmers for use on their own crops (Table 3). The use of improved seed and
control of insects on the plants received high indices and are being used by
the farmers on a large scale. Following is a list of crops and areas for which
evaluations have been made.
Table 4. Crops and areas for which evaluations of acceptability have been
made by SER/ICTA,.1976 to 1978
YaRegion Crop or crop system No. of Average
Year Area evaluated Components Index
1976 La Maquina IV Maize 8 19.8
Quezaltenango I Maize 7 19.3
Jutiapa1 VI Maize 5 16.8
Beans 5 2.0
Sorghum 3 0.5
1977 Quezaltenango I Maize 9 14.5
Wheat 3 44.0
La Maquina IV Maize 6 29.2
1978 Quezaltenango I Maize 7 32.4
La Maquina IV Maize 4 47.6
Sesame 1 80.0
Jutiapa1 VI Beans 7 8.0
Source: Published and unpublished reports SER/ICTA.
The evaluation of impact is being accomplished through the use of the
farm records being kept in each one of the work areas. There are not enough
resources in the Institute, nor especially in SER, to conduct the census type
survey that would be required periodically to monitor impact and use of technology
on a more adequate basis. However, it is felt that the data accumulated over
time from the farm records sufficiently demonstrate trends in adoption of the
- 35 -
technology being utilized and is an appropriate substitute for a benchmark study
and follow-up studies for which the Institute has inadequate resources.
A study conducted in 1978 demonstrates the capability of the farm records
to provide information for evaluation of technology. This study, based on three
years of farm records in La Maquina shows that improved seed and control of
insects on the plants were the technologies influencing crop yield, and also
quantified their effect on the increasing yield that was being achieved in the
area (Pelaez and Shiras, 1978).
CALCULATOR SERVICES AND STATISTICAL CONSULTING
SER "acquired" primary responsibility for providing calculator services to
the Institute and also has provided a great deal of statistical consulting since
the beginning. Initally, we obtained a contract wlth IBM for computer services
'and used their facilities for several analyses during the first two years.
In particular, the Bean Program utilized the analysis of variance and regression
programs that I brought with me from El Salvador.
However, it soon became evident that with the increasing capacities of the
hand-held, programmable calculators, much more efficiency could be achieved using
them than trying to depend on the computer. We first obtained the Hewlett
Packard 65 in 1975 and were able to program it for many of the analyses that were
being done by the technicians at that time. Later we acquired the HP-67 with a
great deal more capacity for which we wrote programs for more complicated analyses
and also to analyze the farm records. With the purchase of a TI-59, we were able
to expand, once again the analyses we are able to undertake.
At the present time, ICTA has two HP-65's, three HP-67's and one TI-59.
The HP-65's, one HP-67 and the TI-59 are located in SER where the technicians
come to use them and where they can consult with us at the time. One HP-67
is with the Bean Program and one is at the regional office in Region I,
The advantages of using the hand-held calculators are tremendous. First,
this way the technician can make his own analyses without having to invest
a great deal of time laboriously doing the calculations on a standard
calculator. He also does not need to depend on others to code, punch, run
and interpret results which is common in institutes that depend upon
computers for their analyses. Secondly, by knowing beforehand the capacity
of the calculators, the experimental design can be adjusted, keeping the
nature of the trials simpler and easier to analyze and understand. Third,
it is much more rapid to do the analyses in the field directly from field
books and save the time of coding, punching, verifying, etc., inherent in
the use of the electronic computers.
At the present time, SER has the following programs available for the
HP-67 and TI-59 calculators:
1. Analysis of variance (Anova), split plots, without limits
2. Anova, randomized blocks, up to 6 replications, no limit on
3. Missing plots, randomized blocks, up to 6 missing plots
4. Anova, without limits
5. Multiple regression, 3 independent variables
6. Multiple regression, 5 independent variables
7. Quadratic regression, 2 independent variables, with interaction
8. Linear, exponential and quadratic regression for one independent
9. Duncan's analysis
10. Tukey's analysis
- 37 -
11. Yates method
12. Farm record analysis for labor
13. Farm record analysis for inputs
14. Several different programs for converting plot data to kg/ha.
Two people in the Institute have the capacity for programming these machines
(one in SER and one in Region I) so the technology will continue to be used.
Also, plans are being made to purchase at least one calculator for each of the
regions next year.
The personnel budget varied greatly during the five years, and is not an
accurate reflection of support to Socio-economics because some were budgeted
to other units, some as part of training, and some had contracts rather than
regular appointments and were also budgeted separately. Therefore, staff budget
is not reported here. Rather, a complete list of personnel is presented in
For the central unit in Guatemala City, non-personnel services, materials
and supplies, and machinery and equipment did, however, vary significantly
during the five years, Table 5.
In general, budget support was adequate for the staff located in Guatemala
City. One of the major problems was that most of the time the budget was not
approved before work had to begin in the year. Many years we had to initiate
work only hoping that we would have the personnel requested, but not being certain.
One of the most difficult budget problems involved SER Staff located in the
regions. In 1977, the Perito Agronomos were transferred to the regions and the
budget that was deleted from the Central SER group was supposed to be added to
Table 5. Budget support for SER (excluding personnel) Central Unit, Guatemala
City, 1976-1979. (Current Dollars)
Item 1976 1977 1978 1979
Non-personnel services $12,085 $ 3,802 $ 5,760 $ 6,070
Per diem, in country 10,560 2,772 4,800 4,800
All other categories 1,525 1,030 960 1,270
Materials and supplies 10,965 5,972 4,966 5,016
Gas and oil 7,265 4,500 2,951 2,951
All other categories 3,700 1,472 2,015 2,065
Machinery and equipment 7,420 5,000 110 xxx
Vehicles and motorcycles 6,100 5,000 xxx xxx
Office equipment 1,320 xxx 110 xxx
Total excluding personnel 30,470 14,774 10,836 11,086
the regional budgets. This, however, was never accomplished so that we
were put in the position of begging from the other regional programs.
Funds were already tight and the need to share with SER did little to create
goodwill for the discipline.
In 1977 and again in 1978, attempts were made and orders given to the
Regional Directors to create specific budgets for SER regional personnel, but
that was never accomplished. The result was that the Regional Directors, seeing
that the SER personnel were budgeted through their regional Technology Testing
Teams, wanted to use them as if they were their own staff. Obvious conflicts
arose as to the nature of the work that they should be undertaking.
In 1979, even though they are still being budgeted as part of the
Technology Testing Teams of the regions, there is a much better under-
standing of the nature of their work and they are, in fact, completely
integrated into the regional teams as reported in other sections of this
report. All have responsibility for some Farm Trials or Farmers' Tests and
other technicians help them with Farm Records. Generally, budget is shared
on an equitable basis by all the technicians in a Region or Sub-region.
It is evident, though, that budgeting procedures can have important
positive and negative effects on attempts at integration of the social
sciences with the biological sciences in an agricultural institute.
What were the real accomplishments during this five year period?
Was the investment in time and funds worthwhile from The Rockefeller
Foundation's point of view, from that of the Guatemalan government and
of ICTA, and from the point of view of the small, traditional farmer of
Guatemala? I think the answer is "yes" for most. Can one say that the
social sciences were, indeed, incorporated into an agricultural institute?
If so, has this helped the agronomists provide appropriate technology to
the small and medium farmers more efficiently and in a shorter period of
time than would have been the case had the Institute not chosen to try
to incorporate the social sciences into agricultural research methodology?
Here, I think the answer:is a very definite "yes." What does the future
hold for the social sciences in ICTA? It depends.
To answer these questions, it is difficult, if not impossible to
single out the social sciences and say this or that occurred because of
the social sciences. Asmentioned in the Prologue, the results are not
due to the efforts of one or a few persons. Rather they represent the
combined effect of the efforts of everyone who was involved. There is
at least as much interaction effect among people with different points
of view and from different disciplines as there is among the factors
affecting plant and animal production. Still, it is possible to discuss
what has happened during the time the social sciences were playing a
strong role in the Institute.
Now, for the first time, the small farmer has really become a partner
in the technology generating process. He does not have to be satisfied
any longer with whatever crumbs sift down from "above" but is having an
influence on what is being done "above." Though small farmers in
- 41 -
Guatemala are only just beginning to feel the effects of the Institute
on their productivity and income, I think most of those who have been
touched by the process would be in favor of the "experience in social
Certainly, considering the farmers from the beginning of the
technology generating process has increased the speed and efficiency
with which the Institute produces technology appropriate to them. The
probability of spending several years producing a new variety that has
very limited geographical adaptability or that is rejected for not
having characteristics important to the producers is greatly reduced
under the methodology that has been developed.
ICTA, itself, still has certain reservations about the "social
science experience." Not all are convinced it has been positive. Some
technicians feel that it is not necessary to consider the farmer's point
of view. They feel that a technology that increased production is good
in and of itself. This is now a minority opinion, but it does still
exist. Unfortunately, the controversy that was created in the integration
process has been misinterpreted by some from ICTA and has been associated
with the social scientists, themselves, or with the social sciences in
general. This is a negative effect that may or may not ever be solved.
But in balance, I think that the prevailing opinion at the present time
is that the contribution of the social sciences during this period has
been positive and the value of the integrated methodology is felt.
It is more difficult to interpret the Government of Guatemala's point
of view. First, the government has changed since the activities of the
Institute were initiated. Policy changes influence how they view the
Institute. Secondly, it is difficult for the government to evaluate the
- 42 -
"impact" of a research institute. Many times this can lead to doubts
about its usefulness or productivity simply because of the measurement
Perhaps the greatest effect of the "social science experience" has
been at the international level. The Rockefeller Foundation is more
interested in this aspect than are the other groups and I think they
should be well satisfied with the international recognition and
"replicability" of this experience. ICTA has taken some pride in their
role in developing a methodology with a strong international implications
and recognition, but again, this pride is not unanimous in the Institute.
Has the social science experience led to the integration of the
social sciences into the Institute? Of this there is no doubt. It is
evident from the technicians' analyses of research results. It is
evident from the information used and discussed by the technicians as
they evaluate and plan their research program and projects. It is
evident from the demand for Sondeos from the Technology Testing Teams,
the Regional Directors and the Technical Director. It is evident from
the nature of the methodology in general. It is even evident from the
general attitude of most of the technicians in the Institute toward
their work and toward the farmers for whom they work. Yes, the social
sciences definitely have infiltrated the Institute.
What then, are the long-run prospects for the social sciences in
ICTA? This, too, is difficult to answer. During 1979, besides the
author, SER lost an anthropologist (M.A.) and a sociologist (B.A.).
Another anthropologist is out of the country studying toward an M.S.
degree and will not return for another year. This leaves one agricul-
tural economist (M.S. level), one agronomist (Ing.) with less than 2
year's experience and a new agronomist (Ing.) in the unit. One position
was vacant at the time the author left the country, and because of the
scarcity of social scientists in Guatemala, will probably also be filled
by an agronomist. In addition, the position occupied by the author had
not been budgeted either for 1979 or 1980, so the unit is suffering from
a net reduction of one position.
During the course of the 5 years, we experimented both with a
centralized organization in SER and with regionalization. It was always
hoped that we would be able to regionalize, but maintain a professional
core at the national level for supervising, consulting and the provision
of specialized expertise when required in any of the regions. Because
of budget restraints, this never came about (other than with respect to
the non-professional level Peritos). It was finally decided to maintain
a centralized unit with each person having regional and subject matter
responsibilities. Now it appears that the unit will be broken up and
only the Coordinator will remain at the national level. The advantage
is having more constant SER input at the regional levels. The disadvantage,
and danger, is that this will dilute SER efforts. My fear is the
combined effect of the loss of most social scientists in SER with the
decentralization of the unit will gradually diminish their impact over
time, providing an environment in which the agronomists will slowly
revert to their more traditional methodology as new staff who have never
been exposed to the social sciences begin to have influence on the
decision making process of the Institute.
LIST OF VISITORS BY INSTITUTION1
Iowa State University
National Ag. Committee,
Name No. of Visits
* Joseph E. Black (4)
Mary M. Kritz
* Ralph W. Cummings, Jr. (2)
* Ed Wellhausen
* John A. Pino (2)
Sue W. Almy
Larry D. Stifel
* Tito French
* Frank Calhoun
* Jesus Velez Fortuno
* Tom Burton
* John Bieber
* Mario Infante
* Fernando Fernandez
* Chris Andrew
* Max Langham
* Jose Alvarez
* Ken McDermott
also as IADS
also with UFLA
* Leo Langer
Michigan St. U.
Texas A & M
Acad. for Educ. Dev.
U. Wisconsin (Green Bay)
* Homer Eaton
* Dale Harpstead
* Rufo Bazan
* Jorge Soria
Claudio A. Oddone
William F. Whyte
Arnold Van Huis
No. of Visits
Dir. of Research
Wayne State U.
Brockport State U.
Institutions in order of first appearance.
Persons in order of first arrival.
* Visitors to the La Barranca site.
No. of Visits
LIST OF STAFF OF SOCIOECONOMICS, ICTA
Through July 31, 1979
Miriam Morales de Lopez
Carlos E. Reiche C.
Amalia Corisco G.
Peter E. Hildebrand
Sergio Rolando Ruano A.
Lidia Ines Tujab M.
Bruno Busto Brol
Essau J. Samayoa G.
Jose Angel Andrade
Osman Alfredo Calderon A.
Jaime T. Tyld W.
Carlos de Leon Prera
Roberto Bosarreyes G.
Rolando Duarte Mendez
Gilberto Santa Maria
Thelma Reyes de Guerrero
Roberto Guillermo Loranca
Daniel Jose Cardona B.
Victor Manuel Corzantes
Leonel Ortiz Orellana
Jose Teodoro Lopez Yos
Leonzo H. Godinez
Luis Pando Canella
Miguel Angel Garcia
Hector Manfredo Orozco
Esau Guerra Samayoa
Marco Tulio Palma Espina
Jose Guillermo Pelaez
Denis Amory Barrientos
Humberto R. Castaneda M.
Axel Esquite Catillo
Perfecto Apolonia Gonzalez
Maria E. Chinchilla M.
Julio Cesar Leal
Jorge Alfredo Cardona
Valerio Macz Pacay
Ag. Econ (PCV)
Reg. Dir.VI, ICTA
Station Mgr. ICTA
Tech. Testing V,
Tech. Testing I,
Tech. Testing I,
Coffee Rust Prog.
Univ. San Carlos
U.S.(U. of Cornel:
LIST OF PUBLICATIONS
1975 to August 1979
1975 Busto Brol, Bruno. 1975. Pasos sugeridos para que el Instituto
de Ciencia y Tecnologia Agrjcolas pueda tomar en consideration las
solicitudes de organizaciones interesadas en obtener asistencia
tecnica. ICTA, Guatemala.
Busto Brol, Bruno y Osman Calderon. 1975. Registros economics de
produccion con agricultores colaboradores del parcelamiento La Ma'qui-
na. ICTA, Guatemala.
Busto Brol, Bruno; Esau Samayoa y Osman Calderon. 1975. Evaluacion
del maiz ICTA Tropical 101 en varias plantaciones de la Republica de
Guatemala. ICTA, Guatemala.
Corisco, Amalia; Bruno Busto Brol y Sergio Ruano. 1975a. Evaluacion
del trabajo del Instituto de Ciencia y Tecnologia Agrrcolas en la
Cooperative Santa Lucia R.L., Departamento de Sololg y con el
Program de Vecinos Mundiales, Departamento de Chimaltenango.
Corisco, Amalia, Gilberto Santamaria y Rolando Duarte. 1975b.
Evaluacion de la Fundacion del Centavo. ICTA, Guatemala.
Hildebrand, Peter E. 1975a. El papel de socioeconomia rural en el
Institute de Ciencia y Tecnologia Agrfcolas. ICTA, Guatemala.
1975b. Multiple cropping systems are dollars
and "sense" agronomy. Invited paper presented at the Multiple
Cropping Symposium, American Society of Agronomy Meeting.
1975c. Sistemas de production agricola y
proyectos de reform agraria. Presentada en la 9a Reunion Anual
de los Institutos de Reforma Agraria de Centroamerica. ICTA,
Hildebrand, Peter E., Carlos E. Reiche y Esau Samayoa. 1975. Siste-
mas de cultivos de ladera para pequenos y medianos agricultores, La
Barranca, Jutiapa. ICTA, Guatemala.
Reiche, Carlos E., Peter E. Hildebrand y Sergio Ruano. 1975.
Evaluacion de algunas variedades de sorgo (maicillo) en pequenas y
medianas fincas del oriented de Guatemala. pp. 329-372 In Programa
Cooperative Centroamericano para el Mejoramiento de Cultivos
Alimenticios (PCCMCA) Vol. II. San Salvador, El Salvador, C.A.
Ruano A., Sergio R. 1975a. Terminologia agricola del sur-oriente
de Guatemala. ICTA, Guatemala.
*1975b. Analisis economic en ensayos comparativos
del uso de raciones con Maiz Opaco 2 y Maiz Comun, en cerdos de
engorde, realizado en la Aldea Tiucal del Municipio de Asuncion Mita.
1975c. El Altiplano,juna zona maicera en el
future? ICTA, Guatemala.
1975d. Razonamiento del enfoque del trabajo
del ICTA hacia el pequeno y median agricultor. ICTA, Guatemala.
1976 Busto Brol, Bruno; Osman Calderon y Peter E. Hildebrand. 1976a.
Evaluacion de la aceptacion de la tecnolog'a generada por ICTA para
el cultivo de maiz en el parcelamiento La Maquina, 1975. ICTA,
*1976b. Registros economics de production con
agricultores colaboradores del Parcelamiento "La Maquina". In
Informe Anual 1975-76. ICTA, Guatemala.
Corisco, Amalia. 1976. La influencia de la mujer en la production
y comercializacion agricola en el area del altiplano central. ICTA,
Hildebrand, Peter E. 1976a. Multiple cropping systems are dollars
and "sense" agronomy. Chap. 18 In Multiple Cropping. American
Society of Agronomy Special Publication No. 27. Madison, Wisconsin.
1976b. Generando tecnologia para agricultores
tradicionales: una metodologia multidisciplinaria (Generating
technology for traditional farmers: a multidisciplinary methodology)
preparado para presentarlo en la conferencia sobre: Desarrollo de
economia en regions agricolas: Busqueda de una MetodologLa.
Centro de Conferencias de la Fundacion Rockefeller. Bellagio,
Italia. ICTA, Guatemala.
Reiche, Carlos E., Peter E. Hildebrand, Sergio Ruano y Jaime T.
Wyld. 1976. El pequeno agricultor y sus sistemas de cultivos en
ladera: Jutiapa, Guatemala. ICTA, Guatemala.
Ruano A., Sergio R. 1976. Estudio antropologico de la production
porcina una important actividad en la economfa del campesino de
Jutiapa. ICTA, Guatemala.
1977 Busto Brol, Bruno, Osman Calderon y Peter E. Hildebrand. 1977.
Registros economics de malz con agricultores colaboradores del
parcelamiento La Maquina, 1976. ICTA, Guatemala.
De Leon Prera, Carlos; Jaime T. Wyld y Peter E. Hildebrand. 1977.
Alcance geografico de los sistemas de cultivo en el area piloto del
ICTA, Region VI 1975. ICTA, Guatemala.
Diaz Sch., Roberto. 1977. Situacion agro-economica de las pequenas
explotacines de ladera. Jutiapa, Guatemala. ICTA, Guatemala.
Duarte, Rolando. 1977. Tecnologia y estructura agro-socioeconomica
del minifundio, Totonicapan. ICTA, Guatemala.
Duarte M., Rolando; Peter E. Hildebrand y Sergio Ruano. 1977a.
Tecnologfa y estructura agro-socioecondmica del minifundio del
occidente de Chimaltenango. ICTA, Guatemala.
Duarte, Rolando; Sergio Ruano, Ildeberto Martinez, Emilio Merck y
Amado Navarro. 1977b. Estudio preliminary sobre las condiciones
agro-socioeconomicas del parcelamiento Montufar, Jutiapa. ICTA,
Godinez, Leonzo H., Luis M. Pando y Peter E. Hildebrand. 1977.
Registros economics de production con agricultores colaboradores en
el sistema malz-sorgo y cultivos de maiz y sorgo solo, en plano,
Asuncion Mita, Jutiapa. 1976. ICTA, Guatemala.
Hildebrand, Peter E. 1977a. Generating small farm technology: an
integrated, multidisciplinary system. An invited paper (principal
address) for the 12th West Indian Agricultural Economics Conference,
Caribbean Agro-economic Society. April 25-30, In Antigua. ICTA,
1977b. Consideraciones socioeconomicas en siste-
mas de cultivos multiples. Un informed solicitado para la Mesa Redon-
da sobre sistemas de production agricola XVI Reunion Anual de la Jun-
ta Directiva. Institute Interamericano de Ciencias Agricolas IICA.
Santo Domingo, Republica Dominicana. ICTA, Guatemala.
Hildebrand, Peter E. y Daniel Cardona. 1977. Sistemas de cultivos
de ladera para pequen~os y medianos agricultores, La Barranca,
Jutiapa, 1976. ICTA, Guatemala.
Hildebrand, Peter E., Sergio R., Ruano A., Teodoro Lopez Yos, Esau
Samayoa y Rolando Duarte. 1977. Sistemas de cultivos para los
agricultores tradicionales del occidente de Chimaltenango. ICTA,
Lopez, Jose Teodoro, Sergio Ruano, Rolando Duarte y Peter E.
Hildebrand. 1977. Registros economics de production con
agricultores colaboradores del occidente de Chimaltenango, 1976.
Ortiz 0., Leonel, Peter E. Hildebrand y Luis M. Pando C. 1977.
Registros economics de production en: maiz-frijol-sorgo;
maiz-sorgo; maiz-frijol; y maiz solo en ladera, Area Piloto ICTA
Region VI, 1976. ICTA, Guatemala.
Ruano A., Sergio R. 1977. El uso del sorgo para consume human:
caracteristicas y limitaciones. ICTA, Guatemala.
Ruano A., Sergio R., Valerio Macz Pacay y Peter E. Hildebrand.
1977a. Evaluacion de la aceptacion de la tecnologia generada por
ICTA para el cultivo de maiz en la Region I, 1975. ICTA, Guatemala.
Ruano A., Sergio R., Guillermo Valentfn F. y Marco Tulio Palma E.
1977b. Estudio preliminary sobre las condiciones agro-socioeconomicas
de una zona de Izabal (Sub-Region VII ). ICTA, Guatemala.
1978 Cardona, Daniel; Leonel Ortiz, Peter E. Hildebrand y Jose Guillermo
.Pelaez. 1978. Registros economics de producci6n en maiz, frijol,
sorgo y arroz en Jutiapa, Region VI, 1977. ICTA, Guaemala.
Casta'neda M., Humberto, Peter E. Hildebrand y Rolando Duarte. 1978.
Informe de la encuesta del parcelamiento La Blanca, 1976. ICTA,
Chinchilla, Maria E, Sergio Ruano A. y Peter E. Hildebrand. 1978.
Evaluacion de la aceptabilidad de la tecnologia generada para los
cultivos de maiz y trigo en Quezaltenango, 1976-1977. ICTA, Guatemala.
Godfnez, Leonzo, Miguel Angel Garcia y Guillermo Pelaez, 1978.
Registros economics de production en mafz y trigo. Quezaltenango y
Totonicapan, 1977. ICTA, Guatemala.
Guerra S., Esau, Perfecto A. Gonzalez, Hector Orozco, J. Guillermo
Pelaez y Peter Shiras. 1978. Registros economicos de production
en: maiz, ajonjoli y arroz, La Blanca, La Maquina y la Nueva
Concepcionv 1977. ICTA, Guatemala.
Hildebrand, Peter E. 1978a. An integrated approach to the
improvement of farm production systems. Presented at the Seminar on
the Improvement of Farm Production Systems. Sponsored by the Club
du Sahel. Bamako, Mali 20 Feb-1 March. ICTA, Guatemala.
S_1978b. Motivating small farmers to accept
change. Prepared for presentation at the conference on: Integrated
crop and animal production to optimize resource utilization on small
farms in developing countries. The Rockefeller Foundation Conference
Center, Bellagio. Italy. Oct. 18-23, 1978, ICTA, Guatemala.
Hildebrand, Peter E. and Sergio Ruano. 1978. Integrated multi-
disciplinary technology generation for small, traditional farmers of
Guatemala. Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Society for
Applied Anthropology. Merida, Mexico April 2-9. ICTA, Guatemala.
Pelaez, J.G. and P.G. Shiras. 1978. Analisis de los factors que
incident en el rendimiento de maiz en el parcelamiento La Maquina,
Guatemala. XXIV Reunion Anual del PCCMCA, San Salvador, El Salvador.
Pelaez Guillermo, Daniel Cardona y Leonel Ortiz. 1978. Analisis
agro-economico de las caracteristicas de los sistemas de cultivos de
malz, frijol y sorgo en Jutiapa, Guatemala. XXIV Reunion Anual del
PCCMCA. San Salvador, El Salvador.
Ruano A., Sergio R. 1978. Evaluacion de la aceptabilidad de la
tecnologia generada por el ICTA para el cultivo de malz en el
parcelamiento La M1quina, 1976-77. ICTA, Guatemala.
Ruano Sergio; Maria E. Chinchilla y Peter E. Hildebrand. 1978.
Evaluacion de la aceptabilidad de la tecnologia generada por el ICTA
para los cultivos de mafz y trigo en Quezaltenango. Region I,
1976/77. ICTA, Guatemala.
Samayoa G., Esau, Jose' Teodoro Lopez Y, Guillermo Pelaez y Peter
Shiras. 1978. Registros economicos de production en milpa (maiz,
frijol, haba), trigo, papa y frijol de suelo, Chimaltenango, 1977.
Samayoa, Esau; Peter Shiras y Guillermo Pelaez. 1978. Registros
economics de production de maiz y trigo en el occidente de Chimal-
tenan go, 1977. ICTA, Guatemala.
1979 Cardona, Jorge A. 1979. Registros economicos de production mal'z,
ajonjoll, sorgo, Chiquimulilla y Montufar, Region VI-3, 1978. ICTA,
Chinchilla, Maria E. 1979. Condiciones agro-socioeconomicas de una
zona maicera-horticola de Guatemala. Trabajo presentado en la XXV
Reunion Anual del PCCMCA, Tegucigalpa, Honduras, 19-23 de marzo,
Chinchilla Maria E, y Peter E. Hildebrand. 1979a. Evaluacion de la
aceptabilidad de la tecnologia generada para el cultivo de mafz en
Quezaltenango, 1977-1978. ICTA, Guatemala.
S_1979b. Evaluacion de la aceptaiblidad de la
tecnologia generada para los cultivos de maiz y ajonjolt en el
parcelamiento La Maquina, 1977-1978. ICTA, Guatemala.
Garcia, Miguel, A.; Leonzo Godinez y Maria E. Chinchilla. 1979.
Registros economics de production, Quezaltenango y Totonicapan,
Region I, 1978. ICTA, Guatemala.
Gonzalez Perfecto A.; Esau Guerra y Julio C. Leal. 1979. Registros
economics de production en maiz, ajonjolt y arroz, La Blanca, La
Maquina y La Nueva Concepcion, 1977. ICTA, Guatemala.
Hildebrand, Peter E. 1979a. Generating technology for traditional
farmers the Guatemalan experience. Prepared for presentation in
the symposium on Socioeconomic constraints to crop protection. IX
International Congress of Plant Protection, Washington, D.C., August
5-11, 1979. ICTA, Guatemala.
1979b. The ICTA farm record project with small
farmers four years of experience. ICTA, Guatemala.
S_1979c. Summary of the sondeo methodology used
by ICTA. ICTA, Guatemala.
ICTA. 1979. Condiciones agro-socioeconomicas de una zona maicera-
horticola de Guatemala. Informe de un sondeo.
ICTA. 1979. Condiciones agro-socioeconomicas de tres areas papers
de Quezaltenango -Informe de un sondeo.
ICTA. 1979. Condiciones agro-socioeconomicas del proyecto de riego-
Zacapa Informe de un sondeo.
ICTA. 1979. Condiciones agro-socioeconomicas de una zona manzanera
en Chichicastenango, El Quiche. Informe de un sondeo.
Ortiz Orellana, Leonel. 1979. Prueba agro-economica de technology
arrocera por agricultores en Jutiapa, Guatemala. Presentado en la
XXV Reunion Anual del PCCMCA, Tegucigalpa, Honduras, 19-23 de marzo,
Ortiz Leonel y Daniel Jose Cardona. 1979. Registros economics de
production maiz, frijol, sorgo y arroz Jutipa Region VI, 1978.
Palma, Marco Tulio y Jose Guillermo Pelaez. 1979. Registros
economics de production en: ma z, frijol y arroz Izabal Region
VII, 1977. ICTA, Guatemala.