Title Page
 Table of Contents
 Original guidelines
 First guidelines from ser
 Initial activities
 La Barranca, a controversial project...
 TECPAN: Firming up the methodo...
 General methodology
 Surveys and sondeos
 Farm records
 Calculator services and statistical...
 Budget support
 General comments
 List of visitors by institutio...
 List of staff of socioeconomics,...
 List of publications

Group Title: Incorporating the social sciences into agricultural reserach : the formation of a national farm systems research institute
Title: Incorporating the social sciences into agricultural reserach
Full Citation
Permanent Link: http://ufdc.ufl.edu/UF00073328/00001
 Material Information
Title: Incorporating the social sciences into agricultural reserach the formation of a national farm systems research institute
Physical Description: 43 leaves : ; 28 cm.
Language: English
Creator: Hildebrand, Peter E
Instituto de Ciencia y Tecnologâia Agrâicolas (Guatemala)
Publication Date: 1979
Subject: Agricultural innovations -- Guatemala   ( lcsh )
Field experiments -- Guatemala   ( lcsh )
Genre: government publication (state, provincial, terriorial, dependent)   ( marcgt )
bibliography   ( marcgt )
non-fiction   ( marcgt )
Spatial Coverage: Guatemala
Bibliography: Includes bibliographical references.
Statement of Responsibility: Peter E. Hildebrand.
General Note: Cover title.
General Note: "Report of a Five Year Tour of Duty by Peter E. Hildebrand."
General Note: "The Rockefeller Foundation, New York, December 1979."
 Record Information
Bibliographic ID: UF00073328
Volume ID: VID00001
Source Institution: University of Florida
Rights Management: All rights reserved by the source institution and holding location.
Resource Identifier: oclc - 76894442

Table of Contents
    Title Page
        Title Page
    Table of Contents
        Page i
        Page ii
        Page iii
        Page 1
    Original guidelines
        Page 2
        Page 3
    First guidelines from ser
        Page 4
        Page 5
    Initial activities
        Page 6
        Page 7
        Page 8
    La Barranca, a controversial project with important results
        Page 9
        Page 10
        Page 11
        Page 12
        Page 13
        Page 14
    TECPAN: Firming up the methodology
        Page 15
        Page 16
    General methodology
        Page 17
        Page 18
        Page 19
        Page 20
        Page 21
        Page 22
    Surveys and sondeos
        Page 23
        Page 24
        Page 25
    Farm records
        Page 26
        Page 27
        Page 28
        Page 29
        Page 30
        Page 31
        Page 32
        Page 33
        Page 34
    Calculator services and statistical consulting
        Page 35
        Page 36
    Budget support
        Page 37
        Page 38
        Page 39
    General comments
        Page 40
        Page 41
        Page 42
        Page 43
    List of visitors by institutions
        Page 44
        Page 45
        Page 46
    List of staff of socioeconomics, ICTA
        Page 47
    List of publications
        Page 48
        Page 49
        Page 50
        Page 51
        Page 52
        Page 53
Full Text
I *



Report of a Five Year Tour of Duty


Peter E. Hildebrand

Institute de Ciencia y Tecnologia Agricolas



The Rockefeller Foundation

New York

December, 1979


















, J


This is a report of a five year tour of duty from October 25, 1974 to

August 31, 1979. The author, an agricultural economist and field staff

member of The Rockefeller Foundation, was assigned as Coordinator of Rural

Socioeconomics (SER) in the newly formed Guatemalan Institute of Agricul-

tural and Technology (ICTA) during this time. The experiences described are

taken from monthly reports which he used to keep the Foundation advised of

progress and activities, from published and unpublished reports, from

letters and memos with internal distribution and from recall of actions and

discussions that took place at the time. They represent his views and he

takes the responsibility for any errors of fact or interpretation.

The report is offered in the same spirit the author offered his services

to the Institute -- in the hope that through diligence, perseverance, an

open mind and hard work a new concept could be achieved and put into practice.

It is his firm conviction that the mission has been accomplished. The

social sciences are an integrated part of ICTA and the methodology developed

is being utilized as a matter of course. This makes ICTA a unique institu-

tion: it has accomplished what others are only discussing or attempting on a

pilot basis. All the technical and administrative staff, past and present,

should be proud of their contribution toward the creation of the only

National Farm Systems Institute in the world at the present time.


August 30, 1979


It is impossible to name all the people who have contributed to the

drama reported in these pages. Some are referred to in the paper by name

and others by reference to their publications. Many do not appear except as

they influenced actions that took place and are reported or alluded to. Yet

all contributed to the success of what ICTA is today. By doing the reporting,

I in no way claim the credit for what has happened in these five years; I

was only one person on a large team that required all the players to succeed.

I have often been asked what it is that makes some efforts in institu-

tion building successful and others failures. My answer is always: luck.

This I believe. Without having had the luck of encountering all those who

played a part in the Institute during these years--whether their views

coincided with my own or were counter to them--the results would not have

been the same. And if they had not been the same, the probabality is the

effort would not have been a success.

I therefore, gratefully acknowledge the contribution of everyone who

has been in ICTA during the past five years and in his own way has influ-

enced what is reported here.



This report is a discussion of the process of the incorporation of

the social sciences into an agricultural research institute. Emphasis

is on the Social Science discipline and its contribution to the development

of the Institute and the methodology being used. Though the integrated

nature of the Institute dictates that some developments regarding the

agronomic disciplines and other support sections such as publications or

seed production are included, a report emphasizing their role should

accompany this report for a more complete work on the development of the


The report is oriented both chronologically and by subject matter.

The first five sections cover the chronological events through the second

full year of operation as background to understanding the following sections

which discuss subject matter areas of particular importance. A list of

visitors to SER and its projects and a list of the staff of SER are presen-

ted in the appendix along with a complete list of the publications written

in SER to the present time. Except for a few instances, specific data are

not included in this report because they are available from the publications

referenced in the text.

-2 -


In February, 1974, The Rockefeller Foundation first contacted me about

the possibility of taking a position with The Institute of Agricultural

Science and Technology (ICTA) in Guatemala. Kirby Davidson, Deputy Director

of Social Sciences, called me one morning while I was working in CEHTA in El

Salvador, to ascertain if I might be interested in working as a small farm

oriented agricultural economist in a new institute dedicated to working with

small farmers to improve the productivity of the basic grains of this

country. The Institute, he said, was going to try to integrate the social

sciences into an agricultural research institute to help the agronomists

understand the needs and problems of the small, traditional farmers of


In May, 1974, I met with Astolfo Fumagalli, then General Manager of

ICTA, Robert Waugh, Adjunct Director of ICTA and also of The Rockefeller

Foundation, Eugenio Martinez, Technical Director of ICTA and Joe Black,

Director of Social Sciences of The Rockefeller Foundation in the offices of

ICTA in Guatemala to further discuss the nature of the position as Coordina-

tor of Rural Socioeconomics (SER) in the Institute.

In this meeting it was explained that Guatemala felt if they were to

incorporate the small farmers of the country into the economic development

processes, it would be necessary to have a better understanding of their

need and limitations, something that the social sciences should be able to

provide. The aim was to develop an institute in which the social sciences

were integrated with the biological sciences to help guarantee that the


research being undertaken was in fact oriented toward the needs of the small

farmers. There was a feeling that SER should help evaluate the technology

and then help "sell" the technology that was generated to the farmers. That

is, there was an indication that part of the reason technology was not

reaching small farmers was that the selling job being done by extension was

not adequate.

In this meeting, I agreed to the mandate "to help sell the technology

to the small farmer." My reason for doing so was not that I thought we

should or could act as "salesmen" who could convince a client to buy some-

thing that was not necessarily what he wanted. Rather, I contemplated that

the social sciences, through a better understanding of the farmer, should be

able to help the agronomists produce a technology, or "product" that was, in

fact, something the farmers would want and be able to use in their present


Though there was general understanding,at the May meeting on what

the scope of work SER was to be, there was virtually no discussion of the

methodology to be used. This was because few precedents existed which

could be followed. Instead, there were innumerable cases in which failures

had been made or in which only partial advances had been achieved. General

guidelines had been written by the Task Force groups that worked on the

founding of the Institute and later reported in Robert K. Waugh's "Four

Years of History." The Puebla project in Mexico was the closest ongoing

program available to use as a guideline. Other projects were underway

(Ahmadu Bello University in Nigeria) or being initiated (Caqueza in

Colombia) but little or nothing was known about their methodology,

successes or failures. Hence, we began in Guatemala with a quite clean

slate on October 25, 1974, when I reported to work at ICTA.



On January 27, 1975 we published, "The Role of Rural Socioeconomics in

ICTA" (Hildebrand, 1975a).1 This was a paper for the seminar which we

gave as part of the seminar series then being presented twice a month by

the Technical Division of the Institute, and gave our preliminary views

on our role and methodologies. During these first three months, I

frequently asked what the people in the General Manager's office and the

head of the Technical Division desired from SER. Following are some of

the responses:

- "SER should help sell the technology that is developed because one

supposes the sociologist, anthropologist and economist should have the

capacity to formulate the technology in such a way that it is acceptable to

the farmers."

- "It is necessary to study and understand the traditional systems of

the farmers because they have been developed over many, many years."

"It is necessary that SER help in the experiments and trials that ICTA

carries out in order that the results have an economic focus because what

interests the farmer in the final instance are the economic aspects."

- "I want you and your group to evaluate the work developed by the programs

or ICTA. That is, evaluate and orient the programs because we think that the

economist, anthropologist and sociologist have more exact information about

farmers needs."

As a result of these discussions, we considered one of the basic roles of

SER was, "...to know the small farmers and the conditions that affect them in

order to help in the design and development of technology appropriate for them."

References are listed in Appendix C.


We also presented the kinds of evaluation we were then thinking about.

We said that as we worked with the Programs discussing their projects and

trials, we were going to give them the "Why" treatment. That is, why are

you orienting the program this way, or why are you doing this trial or why

are you designing it in this way? We explained that in this way we hoped

to always make sure that the needs and limitations of the farmers were

foremost in the minds of the agronomists as they designed their work. Work

that was "interesting" but which could not be explained in terms of the

needs and limitations of the small and medium farmers should not be under-

taken in an Institute so short on resources as ICTA.

We also raised the need to have a full understanding of national policy

with respect to crop and farm size priorities so that the work of the Institute

and its programs would be in keeping with that desired by higher authorities.

We pointed out that there may be conflicts between national policy and the

personal policy of small farmers. For example, yields can be increased by

applying more fertilizer to maximize profit for farmers who have unlimited

capital. But the small farmer, with very little capital, is better off to

settle for lower yields and apply less fertilizer so that he maximizes the

productivity of scarce capital invested in that input.

- 6 -


In November, 1974, at the request of the Sorghum Program, a study was

initiated to evaluate three sorghum varieties in small and medium fincas in

eastern Guatemala. The objectives were the following:

1. Determine the behavior of the varieties for a representative group of

farmers that had planted sample packages which contained full instructions

about the technology to be used and evaluate their opinions regarding the


2. Determine how many of the farmers had utilized the practices recommended

by the Sorghum Program.

3. Determine if the small and medium farmer is able to use the recommended

technology and if not, what barriers there are to its use.

4. Explore how the technology might be modified for the different condi-

tions under which sorghum is planted in this area.

One of the first conclusions was that the yield obtained by the

farmers was very much lower than that advertised by the Institute in the

leaflet distributed with the seed and in other advertisements. The adver-

tised yields were from 70 to 76 qq/mz. Mechanized farmers obtained 26 and

non-mechanized farmers only 16 qq/mz. Hence, there was a strong recommenda-

tion made that the yields:advertised by ICTA be much more closely adjusted

to the yields the farmers could really expect to obtain. A closely associ-

ated recommendation was that farm trials be conducted under conditions much

more like those of the farmers who will be using the seed than were those

used in the development of the three varieties evaluated.


The seeds of what was to eventually become the evaluation of acceptabil-

ity based on Farmers' Tests were also planted in this report when it was

recommended that "evaluations such as the one that had just been made of

farmers who had planted sample packages of seed be conducted in the future

to determine what yields farmers can expect to obtain and what problems they

may be having with the varieties." (Reiche, et al., 1975).

For 1975 several activities were planned, all of which contributed to

the methodology being developed for integrating the social sciences into the

Institute. That which probably had the most far reaching effects was an

agro-socioeconomic study of "an important stratum" of small and medium

farmers in the Oriente of Guatemala. This, combined with the project

called, "farm trials in crop systems in the Oriente" led into what became

known as "La Barranca" which will be discussed in more detail later in this

report. Also in the eastern part of Guatemala we initiated three separate

projects with the Swine Program. One concerned the improvement in the

productivity of non-confined pigs or pigs running loose on the farms and in

the villages. Another was to work on the transfer of the CIAT technology

for pigs in confinement. The third was concerned with the production

of feed for pigs in cropping systems with special emphasis on protein sources.

The production of feeds in cropping systems was part of the project

initiated in La Barranca and met the same fate. The project on non-confined

pigs produced an important and very acceptable technology from the farmer's

point of view and could have had a significant impact on all people who

owned pigs that ran loose. ICTA, however, decided it could not promote the


practice of loose pigs by extolling a technology for it even if it could

have saved a great deal of money for many poor farmers and landless people.

As we began working with the CIAT technology for confined pigs it was

immediately evident that there were problems that would make it difficult

for the large majority of farmers in dry, eastern Guatemala to accept. In

confinement, pigs must be watered and their pens must be washed to avoid

unacceptable odors and disease. In this area, during most of the year, the

women carry water great distances in jars on their heads for the family to

use. Obviously, they would not do this to water pigs, much less to wash the

pens where they were confined. This and the fact that the technology was

only marginally economic under the best of conditions led to the abandonment

of the project as originally conceived.

In 1975 an agro-socioeconomic study was undertaken in the altiplano in

Santo Domingo Xenacoj (Corisco, 1976). This study was never as productive

as it could have been because decisions taken later moved the area of

operation to Tecpan. Also in 1975, I worked with the team in Region I

(Quezaltenango) in the design of the trials that were later to be known as

"Relevos" or Relay trials. They were based on the double corn row concept

that Tito French and I had developed in El Salvador allowing farmers to

continue producing the same amount of corn, but also including the inter-

cropping of other crops (Hildebrand, 1975b). The first Farmers' Tests (see

the section in this report on methodology) of the relay system were estab-

lished in 1978 and continued in 1979.

In Region IV (La Maquina), in 1975, we collaborated with the "Production

Team" on "Economic Farm Trials" on crop systems and fertilizer use. The


fertilizer trials eventually led to the rejection of the recommendation of

fertilizers for that area and a change in the policy of BANDESA (the agri-

cultural credit bank) and DIGESA (extension) towards fertilizer.


Although the project at La Barranca in the Municipio of Santa Catarina

Mita, Department of Jutiapa, lasted only two years, it may well have been one

of the most important features of the five years. The survey and farm trial

proposals were written in January, 1975, as part of the training I was giving

my staff in project preparation. In February the survey work was begun.

From the beginning, it was evident to us that the largest number of small

and medium farmers in the Jutiapa area were located on the steep and often

rocky hillsides called "Ladera." In consultation with the Technical Director,

we decided to direct our first agro-socioeconomic survey to the farmers of

the Ladera because virtually nothing was known about them and their conditions.

The efforts that had been made and were planned for the Technology Testing

Team and the Commodity Programs working in the area were all on the better,

flatter and in some cases, irrigated land. Hence, no experience had been

gained working under the very adverse conditions of the Ladera. During the

"Sondeo" or reconnaissance survey and preparation of the questionnaire it

was decided to limit the survey to farmers with from 1 to 5 manzanas on

Ladera. The survey was completed during March and April, 1975.

Originally it was anticipated that our field or "Farm" trials would be

conducted on the new Production Center or Experiment Station in Jutiapa in

cooperation with the Bean Program that was interested and willing to share

funds with us (SER had no budget for such an undertaking). We chose the

10 -

poorest land on the station and planned to use bullocks instead of tractors

to prepare the land in order to stay as close as possible to the conditions

confronting the small farmers. However, the Regional Director wanted to

homogenize the Station and our desired use of bullocks and lack of use of

fertilizer did not fit within this concept, so in late March, 1975, the

decision was made with the Technical Director and the Regional Director that

we should move off the station and rent land on which to conduct our farm

trials. This undoubtedly was the best thing that could have happened,

although it was very difficult'to find land so late in the year. Utilizing

some of the farmers we had interviewed in the survey as contacts, we found

suitable land on April 1, and on April 3, it was rented.

The land, about one kilometer off the road and up a steep path, was all

in heavy overgrowth and had to be cleared. While this was underway using

the same methods employed by the farmers of the area, we continued visiting

our neighbors and becoming more familiar with their conditions and problems.

The treatments and the experimental design of the trial, which were planned

from preliminary analysis of the survey data, were modified to be more in

keeping with the local situation. Before the first rains fell, the land was

cleared and the plots staked and we waited for the first rains so we could

begin planting. On May 14, we had a good rain and we began planting on May

15 along with all our neighbors.

From the survey it was found that the most limiting resources for the

farmers in the area were labor at planting time and amount of been seed

(Reiche, et al., 1976). The trial was designed around these factors and in

such a manner as to minimize modifications to the present systems used by

the farmers so that whatever technology might be developed would be easy for

11 -

them to adopt. No insecticides nor fungicides were used and only a minimum

amount of fertilizer was included in some of the treatments (Hildebrand, et

al., 1975).

The year was very dry and had two prolonged periods without any

rain (16 to 26 May and 25 June to 23 July). Visitors (see list in the

Appendix) were surprised, if not appalled to see field trials under such

conditions and the crops clearly demonstrated the extreme stress under which

they were growing. But it was also evident that these conditions were the

reality under which the farmers of the Ladera lived and produced. Aside

from the comments that it looked just like a trial being run by social

scientists and that it was a good thing it was well off the road, the most

usual comment was that it was obviously not worthwhile to work under these

conditions because nothing could be accomplished.

However, we did accomplish the following: We learned how the farmers

plant under those very adverse conditions and closely duplicated their

yields on our check plots. That is, we learned how to farm under their

conditions. In the best treatment, the productivity of labor for planting

was increased 64% and of bean seed 60%. On a per hectare basis the yields

in this system compared with the farmers' system were 91, 126 and 117

percent for beans, maize and sorghum respectively. We discovered that the

planting of maize and sorghum in close association under these conditions

is advantageous because the loss of one or the other allows the surviving

crop to utilize the moisture from the space that would otherwise be left

vacant. We learned that sorghum is a very important part of the human

diet in the area and is not used just for animal feed as had been supposed.

Therefore the development of varieties with better characteristics for

-12 .-

tortillas would be readily accepted (Hildebrand, et al., 1975). Also, and

very important, the staff from SER learned much about how to conduct field

trials, enabling them to talk on the same plane with the biological sci-

entists of the Institute.

A secondary effect of the trials at La Barranca was that they created a

tremendous amount of discussion among the technicians of ICTA concerning

the role of SER in the Institute, the folly or wisdom of working under poor

conditions like those of the Ladera and about who the "clients" of ICTA

really were.

It was evident that the agronomists were comfortable, or not threatened

by the role of SER in surveying, but this was not the case when we were

participants in field trials. Hence, a negative effect of the trials the

first year was that they tended to create more separation of the social and

biological sciences than integration. However, I feel this was more than

offset by the gain in understanding about working under the adverse condi-

tions of the traditional farmer. The difference between transferring the

conditions of an experiment station to a farm site and working under the

conditions of the farmers was evident. Low yields such as those obtained

in La Barranca normally would have been discarded as "lost trials" instead

of being used to better help understand the conditions of the small farmer.

In 1976, the second year of trials was planned and planted in

La Barranca. The trial was a continuation of the best systems from the

trial of the year before, still trying to reduce the labor requirement per

manzana for planting and increase the productivity of the bean seed. Two

support trials were designed to study the effect of different planting

distances of corn and beans on land, labor and seed productivity. Soybeans

and pigeon peas were also included in some treatments as a source of

protein for swine rations.

- 13 -

The best system from 1975 was also the best in 1976 and resulted in an

increase in productivity of capital invested in planting labor and bean seed

of 59% over the farmers' system. Results of five Farmers' Tests which SER

conducted during 1976 showed that they were able to plant 42% more land with

the same amount of planting labor, produce 75% more maize, the same amount

of beans, 41% more sorghum and 33% more income using the improved system

rather than their traditional system (Hildebrand and Cardona, 1976).

The trial on distance of planting beans in corn confirmed the hypothe-

sis that opening the distance between bean plants would increase the produc-

tivity of the seed without seriously decreasing the yield per unit of land

area and at the same time increase maize production through less competition.

As the distance between bean plants opened up from 30 to 60 cm, the produc-

tivity of the bean plants increased 81% while yield per hectare dropped only

8% and maize yield increased 16% (Hildebrand and Cardona, 1977).

As a result of the second year's trials and Farmers' Tests, it was

recommended that a larger number of Farmers' Tests be established in the

Ladera in 1977, using the system that was best in the two previous years.

It was also recommended that the Bean Program continue the work on wider

planting distances. Neither of these recommendations was accepted, however.

The primary reason is that except for the work described here, ICTA tech-

nicians have done very little work, nor desire to, under the severe condi-

tions of the Ladera, and both of these technologies pertain only to those

conditions. The technicians' reasons are two-fold: experimental error is

high under these conditions and they do not see much possibility of poten-

tial increases in production. But the fact remains that these are the

realistic conditions of the small producers in the area so they must be

dealt with if these farmers are to be helped.

- 14 -

It has been in the Oriente where there has been the most discussion

regarding who is or should be the client of the Institute. In other

regions the distinction among classes of possible clients is not nearly

so sharp. SER has always thought that to follow the mandate of the Insti-

tute, the Ladera, where the majority of farmers and the majority of grains

are, is where we should be making our major efforts. Virtually everyone

else in the Institute has always felt that it is better to work in the

more favorable conditions where there is more probability of being able to

generate a technology that will increase per hectare yields, even if this

action will favor those already more fortunate with larger farms and better

land. Recently, efforts are being made to consider criteria other than just

per hectare yields. This is a promising trend and may lead to a reconsidera-

tion of the importance of working in the Ladera of the Oriente and in other

difficult conditions.

In 1975, to evaluate the importance of the Ladera in the economy of the

Oriente, SER undertook an aerial survey of the area. The results show that

54% of_ the maize, 58% of the sorghum and 59% of the beans in the area are

grown on lands with more than 12% slope. Since the smaller farmers tend to

be located on the sloping land, this represents an even greater proportion of

all farmers. In addition, it was shown that 87% of the maize, 95% of the

sorghum and 83% of the beans are grown in association with one or more other

crops (De Leon Prera, et'al., 1977). The overwhelming evidence of the

importance of associated crops has led to the incorporation of this character-

istic in many of the trials of the Commodity Programs in the area, but the

trials continue to be conducted on flat land.

- 15 -

The last activity in La Barranca was in 1976 and this was also the last

year in which SER had field trials with sole responsibility. However, we did

have a second trial in 1976, the year of the earthquake, in Tecpan in the

Central Highlands. This activity will be described in the following section.


In late 1975, a decision was made by the Technical Director that SER

should conduct an agro-socioeconomic survey in the area centering on Tecpan

in western Chimaltenango. Because of the separation of SER from the agrono-

mists that was occurring in the Oriente, it was also decided that in Tecpan

we should work with technicians from one or more of the Commodity Programs

and from the Technology Testing Team, then located at Quezaltenango. This

survey was initiated in January, 1976, and was about 2/3 completed on Febru-

ary 4, when the earthquake struck. One person from the Technology Testing

Team participated in the survey as did one from the Bean Program. The one

from the Testing Team had to return to his own group following the earth-

quake and did not participate in the analysis of data, but we did continue

collaboration with the Bean Program.

Three manzanas were rented in the Aldea of Pueblo Viejo in Tecpan and

this served both the Bean Program and SER as a site for farm trials. In the

survey, we had detected three classes of farmers (Duarte, et al., 1977a).

Treatments were designed for each of the classes and included wheat, vege-

tables, maize, beans and fava. In addition, we planted 15 varieties of

soybeans at the request of the Technical Director to make an initial screen-

ing for him at that altitude.

The factors which were discovered to be scarcest for the small farmer

in this area were land and capital in that order. Results of the trial

16 -

indicated that some of the treatments were very efficient in the use of these

resources and utilized technology that was easy for the farmers to adopt. For

the farmers who were not able to produce enough maize for the family on the

little land they had, a system of "compact double maize rows" showed great

promise allowing an increase of 45% in production without changing the basic

technology they were using other than the planting of 50% more maize on the

same amount of land (Hildebrand et al., 1977).

For farmers who were just on the margin of being self-sufficient in maize,

a second system was devised using double maize rows widely spaced but without

reducing the normal population, and interplanting with wheat, the usual cash

crop for farmers in the area with enough land. This system produced 1,300

kg/ha of wheat while decreasing maize production by only 15%, or 250 kg/ha.

This was accomplished with the same basic technology they are presently


A third system, for, farmers who already produced maize and wheat was the

interplanting of cabbages in the wheat. This system permitted the production

of nearly 14,000 cabbages per hectare while having a slight positive effect

on the wheat, apparently because of the fertilizer used on the cabbage. It

was recommended that these systems be put in the Farmers' Tests the following

year. Once, again, it was only the personnel of SER who were permitted to

have Farmers' Tests with the technology generated by our own trials. Five

were established in 1977 and were very well received by the farmers who

planted them. The Technology Testing Team, newly formed in Chimaltenango in

1977, however, did utilize the intermediate system of double rows with wheat

in their trials and this methodology, utilizing other crops, passed into the

Farmers' Tests and is now in its second year in some areas. The system,

- 17 -

interplanting beans instead of wheat, was very well received in the area of

San Martin Jilotepeque in northern Chimaltenango.

The experience in Tecpan reinforced the thinking on the benefits of

designing field trials around the information obtained in a survey of the

area by a multidisciplinary team prior to initiation of work. It also helped

us understand the value of utilizing the local farmers both as sources of

labor and as advisors in the field trials. And once again, it demonstrated

the value of maintaining a simple technology, based on that existing in an

area with only a minimum amount of changes.


Much of the methodology now in use in the Institute was formulated

during 1975 and 1976. In this period each of the three regions having full

production teams operated slightly differently. This flexibility was en-

couraged because the methodology was in a formative stage and it was obvious

that changes would be required as better methods were devised. SER was

operating with yet a different type of methodology than that used by the

production teams.

Because of its controversial and innovative nature, the methodology

being developed by SER was more widely discussed than that of the Production

Teams and the Commodity Programs. We benefited tremendously from the many

interchanges of opinions which took place with the ICTA technicians and with

the General Manager and others in the Central Offices of the Institute in

Guatemala City.

By mid 1976, following one full year of work and well into another, the

methodology that we in SER thought would be the most useful to the Institute,

18 -

to help the integration process, and aid in the contributions of the social

sciences, had been fairly well formulated. We first presented it to the

Institute on a formal basis during the presentation of results to the General

Manager in June, 1976. It was at this same approximate time that the first

attempt to describe the methodology in written form was undertaken. This

attempt was approved by the General Manager of ICTA and presented at a

conference in Bellagio, Italy, in August, 1976 (Hildebrand, 1976). However,

there still appeared to be some doubt on the part of the General Management

and the Technicdl Director concerning the exact nature of the role that

SER should play. In order to try to clear up our concepts, we requested a

three day meeting with them, one of which was to be spent in the field at our

Tecpan site. This meeting was held Dec. 6-8, 1976. Waugh and Fumagalli

attended all three days, Eugenio Martinez two, but Mario Martinez was on


On the first day we presented a description of how we had been working

to develop a methodology for integrating SER into the technology development

process in an internal paper we called "Searching for a Methodology." This

was the same methodology presented in Bellagio, but the paper discussed more

of what we considered "integration" because there was some idea we were

trying to separate ourselves from the other technicians. During the course

of the discussion, we worked on a schematic diagram to describe the method-

ology based on one that Fumagalli had developed earlier. This diagram was

what was to become known as the "Transistor Radio" diagram that is still in


The second day was spent in and around Tecpan where we discussed the

specific case of our work there. We had done a survey, conducted a crop


- 19 -

systems trial and had a farm record project underway. These activities

included three of the four components basic to our participation in the

integrated methodology of the Institute. The fourth is evaluation of ac-

ceptability of the technology that follows the Farmers' Test. Except for

farm trials these activities will be discussed in more detail in following


On the third morning Waugh, Fumagalli and Eugenio Martinez talked to me

about their idea of changing the name of the Production Teams in order to

help integration and we discussed the integration of SER into these teams --

particularly in the early aspects of work in a new area. In the afternoon,

these ideas were presented to the regional coordinators and were to be put

into practice in 1977. The differences from the methodology in use at the

time were not great and affected the procedure primarily in the first two

years in which the Institute works in a new zone.

It was proposed that during the first year, the Regional Director then

called Regional Coordinator, some members from the relevant Commodity Pro-

grams (maize, beans, etc.), two from SER and others as required would work as

a single team to conduct the agro-socioeconomic survey, design and conduct

the cropping trials based on the survey and initiate the farm record keeping

project. Heavy emphasis in the first year in both the survey and the crop

trials was to be in getting to know the farmer and the region. In the second

year the original team was to be augmented by additional personnel and the

emphasis would shift more to biological or agronomic concerns but with

continuing participation of SER. By the third year, the primary work of SER

was to be farm records and evaluations.

Discussions on methodology continued and included clearer definitions of

the Farm Trials and Farmers' Tests as well as evaluation of acceptability of

20 -

the technology generated. Evaluating the acceptability of technology in 1976

helped a great deal in understanding the function of the Farmers' Tests and a

new definition was formulated. The most important conceptual change was that

in the Farmers' Tests it is the farmer who becomes the prime evaluator rather

than the technician. The technician obtains what information he can from the

Test, but our principal evaluation is of the acceptability of the technology

to the farmers. With this new definition of the Farmers' Tests as well as

the selectivity the farmers were showing in choosing parts of components of a

complete technological package, it also became evident that the technology

being generated needed to be simpler and designed specifically for the

farmers with whom it was being tested. It was clear that it made no sense to

test on a large farm, technology that had been developed for a small farmer

who works under different conditions, or vice versa, because we could antici-

pate beforehand that much of it will be rejected as not being acceptable.

Hence, the whole concept of orientation to a specific type of farmer came

into clearer focus.

Another important effect of the change in definition of the Farmers'

Tests is that many more Tests can be carried out when it is the farmer and not

the technician who is responsible.

During this same period the concept of the agro-economic farm trials as

distinct from the agro-technical trials was developed. In the agro-economic

trials the plots are larger and the treatments usually are not replicated.

More of them can be installed to obtain a better estimate of regional response

and stability, and economic as well as agronomic information can be obtained.

A new attempt to describe the technology in written form was completed

and included in an invited address given at the 12th West Indian Agricultural

Economics Conference of the Caribbean Agro-Economic Society in Antigua on

- 21 -

April 24, 1977 (Hildebrand, 1977a). The relevant portions of this paper were

translated and submitted to the General Management in May of that year (Memo

of 15 July 77 to AFC from PEH). Eventually this was incorporated in the 1976

Report of the General Manager (Informe del Gerente) and printed in a special

issue of NOTICTA, the news and information pamphlet of ICTA, for wide distrib-

ution, and still forms the basis of the methodology in use today with only

small modifications.

For SER it was a major breakthrough to finally have the methodology in

officially published form. We felt this would end what had been a long

struggle to fully integrate SER into the activities of the Institute. But

even though the methodology was published and widely distributed, it ap-

parently was not read or understood by most of the technicians, nor all the

Regional Directors, because each Regional Team continued to operate along

different lines. Many times over the next year we heard the word "flex-

ibility," meaning that it was necessary to maintain flexibility so that the

methodology could continue to develop. We argued that flexibility was fine

from one year to the next, but that flexibility within the year tended to

create a disorientation that was more damaging to SER than to any of the

other programs or disciplines within the Institute. This is so, because we

work in all the regions and are dependent on a more uniform methodology

among regions especially regarding what tasks SER personnel undertake and

what tasks are assigned to the Technology Testing Team. It is also extremely

important that the Farm Trials and Farmers' Tests are conducted in a standard

format so that comparisons can be made for purposes of evaluation.

During 1978, the definition of Farm Trials was fairly well standardized,

but there continued to be a great deal of discussion about the Farmers' Tests.

Many felt (perhaps the feeling was strongest in the Maize Program) that a

- 22 -

year was lost between the Farmers' Tests and the evaluation. In a way, the

need for this wait is related to the client. For the larger, commercial

farmers who can accept or absorb a certain amount of risk, there is probably

no need for the evaluation of acceptability before the technology is released

to the extension service. But for the small, traditional farmer for whom the

methodology was developed, the wait helps assure that the technology is, in

fact, acceptable to this class of farmer who cannot accept the risk inherent

when evaluation of materials or practices is conducted only by technicians
even though they live and work in the area.

A meeting was held in Region VI in September, 1978, in which the team

from that region and SER!agreed on what the Farmers' Tests were and how they

should be managed. An important conclusion was that there should be no

"check" plot representing the farmer's own practices. In some cases the

farmers put themselves into competition with the ICTA plot and tended to use

a higher level of technology than on their own crop. In others it appeared

that they waited for instructions on what to do on the check plot like they

did on the ICTA plot so that it suffered and produced less than their own

crop. Instead of using a check plot, the suggestion was to sample from the

farmer's own field. This procedure would have three uses: 1) it would

eliminate any possible bias on the farmer's part with respect to the check

plot, 2) it could be used as a measure of yield for the farm records if the

The frequently conceived notion that a pool of technology is available
and waiting for appropriate extension techniques to get it into the hands of
small farmers is mostly invalid. Technology must be finely tuned to the
needs and conditions of the small, traditional farmer through such a process
as that described here before investment in extension activities will pay off.

- 23 -

farmer were also a record keeper, and 3) it could be used to locate sources

of error in the way the farmer measured his own yield. However, it also has

two disadvantages: 1) it requires more time on the part of the technicians,

and 2) it is subject to sampling error.

In 1979, the Farmers' Tests generally follow the model described above

except that there is still a check in most of them. However, it has been

agreed to try the sampling procedure in the Farmers' Tests in 1980. The

difference in number of Farmers' Tests that can be carried out under the new

definition compared with the old is large. Now we are involving from 50 to

150 farmers in Tests in each crop in each area of work each year, compared

with only around 15 or even less in the earlier years when the technicians

considered they were responsible for installing the Tests. Hence, the

validity of the following evaluation is greatly enhanced and the promotion

of the technology is facilitated. It is also easier under the new definition

to incorporate personnel from the extension service in the Farm Testing

procedure and this is being done.


The first three full-scale agro-socioeconomic studies or surveys that

were undertaken were: 1) The Jutiapa area in the Oriente that led to the La

Barranca trials, 2) The Tecpan area that led to the trials in Pueblo Viejo,

and 3) a second survey in the Oriente in the area of Yupiltepeque (Diaz,

1977), that was designed to determine if that area could be considered part

of the homogeneous area of the Ladera in Jutiapa. All of these surveys took

at least a year to complete from initiation to publication of the report. We

began to question the need of these full-scale surveys in 1976. In my

January-February, 1977 Report, I said:

24 -

"The main purpose of the survey is to provide information for
the Regional Team to use in orienting and planning its work, and
that is accomplished now shortly after the survey is completed.
We have been writing them in the past to pass on to the Regional
Production Teams, but with the integration of SER into these teams,
that is not really necessary because the same team will be doing
its own analyzing and interpretation. Also, the information we
are now getting from the farm records which we initiate at the
same time we are doing the survey provides more accurate
information on the economic aspects. On the other hand, the
survey does provide some information from the year before the
records begin, so it may still be useful."

I indicated that a decision would be made on streamlining the surveys after

there was time to evaluate the information in the survey reports. We did,

however, continue the full-scale surveys (in Totonicapan: Duarte, 1977; and

La Blanca: Castaneda, 1978) while we were pondering their fate.

In all these full-scale surveys we utilized a "sondeo" or preliminary

survey to obtain the first impression of the area and to write the question-

naire. We were finding frequently that these first impressions, gained

through the eyes of a multidisciplinary team, with each discipline making a

contribution, were quite correct. This led us more and more to doubt the

need for spending the relatively great additional amount of resources for a

relatively small additional amount of information. This, particularly in

light of the fact that the additional information was seldom published for at

least a year, and in that time we had the information from the first year's

farm trials and from the first year's farm records.

In 1977 we conducted Sondeos in two areas (Montufar: Duarte, et al., 1977b,

and Izabal: Ruano, et al., 1977b) that were supposed to be followed by surveys

but for which there was never time to complete the full survey. We found in

both instances that the Sondeo provided a great deal of useful information

and this was appropriate to be written as a report for "internal use."

- 25 -

In 1978 we conducted three Sondeos and one survey. A Sondeo in Moyuta

in Southeastern Guatemala was the first to be conducted without the

*thought that it would be followed by a survey. We found that when

we did it on this basis, much more information was forthcoming than when

the Sondeo was conducted as a forerunner to a survey like that done in

Jalapa (the eastern Highlands) the same year. In Zacapa, in September,

1978, we began to firm up the methodology for the Sondeo. By October

the methodology was sufficiently well defined to be reported in written

form for another international conference (Hildebrand, 1978b).

Briefly, the Sondeo methodology is as follows. A technician from SER

is paired with one from the Technology Testing Team or a Commodity Program to

form an interviewing team. Approximately five such teams are formed for the

area. Following each half day's interviewing, the full group meets to discuss

the findings, raise doubts, formulate tentative hypotheses and orient the

next half day's interviewing. Interviews are without questionnaires and no

notes are taken, so the farmers are much freer with the information they

give. Convergence of opinion is surprisingly rapid, so in four or five days

enough information has usually been obtained for the team to write the report

and make recommendations on the nature of the technology that needs to be

generated for the farmers of the area. The technicians who participated in

the Sondeo will have an excellent understanding of the problems the farmers

in the area have and the conditions they face. No quantitative information

is obtained, but this is accumulated through the farm record project

that is initiated during the first year of work in the area.

By 1979, the Sondeo had become the accepted method to be used for

obtaining preliminary information for an area and five, week-long Sondeos

- 26 -

were conducted early in the year. The methodology, as now used has been

published in expanded form (Hildebrand, 1979c).

Our first survey on livestock, in Nueva Concepcion on the south coast

in early 1978, ended in idiaster when we failed to take into consideration

the interaction of the livestock with the crops. It is apparently possible

to consider crops without a full consideration of livestock, but when

livestock are to be studied, it is essential to account for the crops. As

a result of the problems with the survey in Nueva Concepcion, we have been

looking at livestock with every Sondeo whether or not it was part of the

primary focus.


The ICTA farm record project with small farmers began in 1975 as an

additional method of obtaining agro-socioeconomic information in areas

where "Technology Testing Teams" are assigned. The project began modestly

and grew over the years into a national project with records on many crops

and cropping systems. From the beginning, the project was conceived as a

crop record project and was not intended as a farm record program. That

is, no attempt was made to take full farm inventories, impute depreciation

costs of equipment to each crop, or to enter into household expenses and

use of farm products, etc.; rather family owned machinery and animal power,

family labor and owned land rent were all charged at the current contract

or hired cost for similar items. This characteristic had three important

advantages. One is that it held to a minimum the amount of time and bother

the farmer had to put into the data gathering process. Second, train-

ing of personnel was simplified, and third, the analyses were simplified.

This probably was one of the main reasons the project has had the success

27 -

it has enjoyed. Had it been designed as a full farm record project from

the start, it would have been so complicated that it probably would have

failed before producing enough data to demonstrate its productivity.

During the first year, two technicians from Socioeconomics were

assigned to an agrarian reform parcelization project comprised of 20 ha

farm units. These two worked with the ICTA Technology Testing Team that

had just been organized and some of the technicians from the ICTA Commodity

Programs who were also initiating programs in the area. The target number

of farmers was 30 and originally that many farmers were keeping records.

However, during that first year, 10 of the farmers dropped out leaving 20

for analysis at the end of the year. All of these farmers had maize, 5

planted rice and 15 planted sesame, so 40 separate records were kept.

From this modest beginning, the project grew in four years to

include 34 different sets of crop or crop system records in 11 work areas

and included a total of 583 separate records, Table 1. One person from

Socioeconomics was assigned to each of the work areas, and one from the

Central Office was given responsibility for supervising the farm record


Table 1. Growth of the ICTA Farm Record Project with Small Farmers.

1975 1976 1977 1978

Number of areas 1 3 8 11

Number of crops/systems 3 4 23 34

Number of records 40 93 347 583

Total area, has 390 619 1,288 1,404

Source: SER/ICTA.

28 -

In the field, a significant change was made in the personnel who were

working with the farmers on their records. Instead of using only personnel

from Socioeconomics, members of the Technology Testing Teams were also

being used in this capacity. This provided more opportunity for them to

get acquainted with farmers and helped the technicians to better understand

the farmers' problems. In return, personnel from Socioeconomics began to

participate in the field trials of the Technology Testing Teams.

The incorporation of the agronomists from the Technology Testing

Teams into the farm record project has not been without some problems.

Some have been slow to accept the work probably because of the way it was

introduced. That is, first it was undertaken by peritos agronomos with

high school level training and later agronomists with university degrees

were asked to participate. Also, the record project was added to the other

work they were doing without a reduction in other responsibilities. For

this reason, many thought of the farm records as socio-economics work they

were given to do so they put much less priority on it than on the field

trials. Third, they felt the work had been "imposed" on them and they had

not been given the opportunity to express their opinions.

In general, it has been found that an agronomist who is conducting

around 20 farm trials can work with 10 farmers on records. If a technician

is working only on farm records he can work with from 40 to 50 farmers and

provide them adequate supervision.

It has been found to be feasible, inexpensive and efficient to

organize the record system around the hand-held programmable calculators.

These calculators are now sufficiently inexpensive that each area team

could have them. In 1978, with only four programmable calculators of the

capacity required for the record analyses in ICTA, Socioeconomics was able

to complete all the analyses on time for the annual meetings for presentation

- 29 -

tion of results shortly following harvest. And these same machines were

being used at the same time by other technicians to do their farm trial

analyses for presentation at the same meetings.


In March, 1975, there was a two day meeting to discuss SER's respon-

sibilities and that of the Programming Division with respect to evaluation

of ICTA and its programs. From the beginning the idea was to have SER

participate in evaluations, but Programming, the third Division in the

Institute, also was to have evaluation functions. The meeting was attended

by Mario Martinez, Fumagalli, Waugh, Eugenio Martinez, myself and Armando

Fletes, Director of Programming. At that meeting it was decided that

Programming would have responsibility for analyzing the progress of each

program toward its stated goals; that is, number of farmers interviewed,

number of trials initiated, number of farm records established, etc. Also

they were to keep track of budget expenditures and be charged with ob-

taining the information necessary for the various reports required by the


SER was to have the responsibility for technical evaluation. This

included an analysis of the orientation of each program, its contribution

to the overall objectives of ICTA, and the efficiency of the projects in

making progress toward raising incomes and production of the small and

medium farmers. It was agreed that we would work with each of the programs

in helping to write their project proposals for the next year in such a way

that the orientation toward the goals and objectives of ICTA was clear and

the relationship between the project and the goals was evident.

In the five year plan of ICTA which was drafted in May, June and July,

1975, the section on evaluation states in part:

- 30 -

"Technical evaluation of ICTA will be in charge of SER. The
reason for putting this group in charge of evaluation is to assure
an orientation not only of the agronomic factors, but also of the
socioeconomic factors of the farmers. By doing this, the Institute
hopes to have an orientation directed towards resolving the problems
of the small and medium farmers of the country and avoid investing
in projects that would have little potential for increasing the
income of the clients or increasing national production.

"Because they are assigned the evaluation task, SER will have the
responsibility of knowing the farmers in the different priority
zones of the country. This understanding will include the agronomic,
socioeconomic and cultural factors that affect their potential to
produce and earn.

"The evaluation process will begin with the development of new
projects, continue during the execution to assure that it is being
done under conditions relevant to the farmers, include the evaluation
of recommendations and of the results of the technology when it is
placed in the farmers' hands by determining the grade of acceptance
of the technology and finally will close the circle with recommenda-
tions based on an analysis of the previously described process.
Although SER is in charge of the evaluation process, it is obvious
that in all stages it will be necessary to depend on the collabora-
tion and coordination of all the personnel of the Production and
Testing Programs and on the solution of different points of view
in a way that is satisfactory to all."

In practice this has meant that the Coordinator of SER acted equally

with all the other Coordinators and Regional Directors in the evaluation of

new project proposals and in the evaluation of research results which are

accomplished in regional meetings following the termination of the crop year.

SER has had a lesser role and a smaller impact on the execution of the projects,

but has played a strong part in the definition of Farm Trials and Farmers'

Tests, as mentioned previously. Perhaps the strongest role that SER has had

in evaluation is in the evaluation of "Acceptability" of technology based on

interviews of farmers who participated in Farmers' Tests.

The first evaluations of this nature were conducted in 1976 in La Maquina

in Region IV, Quezaltenaigo in Region I and Jutiapa in Region VI. Though two

of three studies were very useful (the one from the Jutiapa area was never

Informal translation from Spanish.

31 -

published because of various objections), they were based on three erroneous

concepts that were later changed. At first we called these studies "Evalua-

tion of Acceptance of Technology." It was soon obvious that this created a

wrong impression as to the nature of the evaluation. People thought of it

as an "impact" study, which it was not. By changing the name to "Evaluation

of Acceptability of Technology," this problem was solved. Secondly, the

"Acceptance Index" we used the first year was not appropriate. The error

originated because the first evaluation was done in La Maquina where some

of the technology being tested was already being used by many farmers. We

studied the area on which the farmer used each of the components in 1975,

in the year of the Farmers' Tests, and the area on which he used the

components the year following the Tests. The index was the percentage

increase in area using 1976 as the base year. The proportion of farmers

who used the technology was not incorporated into the index. Many tech-

nicians complained that through this void, the index was not complete. In

the second year our "Acceptability Index" was based only on data from the

year following the Farmers' Tests. It was the percentage of farmers who

put the technology component into practice on their own on even a small

part of their farm, multiplied by the percent of their crop on which they

used it and divided by 100. This index has proved to be sensitive to

farmers' opinions and useful in detecting what technology they would accept

and reject. It also has satisfied the criteria of the agronomists who

generate the technology under evaluation.

An index of 100 obviously means complete acceptability and 0 means full

rejection. We have tentatively set an index of 25 as the minimum for a

technology to be "acceptable" provided at least 50% of the farmers used it the

year following the Tests. But other, lower values can also be useful. For

- 32 -

example, if 90% of the farmers use a component, but do so only on 10% of their

crop, it can be interpreted that the technology interests them, but they want

to continue experimenting with it. If 10% of the farmers use a component on

a large percent of their crop, it means that for 90%, the technology was

rejected and is not acceptable. But for the 10%, it was obviously very accept-

able, so if one can determine the characteristics of the farmers for whom the

technology is acceptable, it can be provided to the extension service as an

"Acceptable" technology for farmers with those certain characteristics.

The third faulty concept on which the evaluations were based the first

year was the nature of the "Farmers' Tests" that had been conducted in 1975.

In most instances, the technicians installed the Tests and there was only

minor participation by the farmers. The following table demonstrates some

very interesting aspects of the development of the Farmers' Tests and the

evaluation of technology.

Table 2. Index of Acceptability of Technology for Maize Production, La
Maiquina, Guatemala 1976 to 1978.

Technology Index of Acceptability for Year1
Component 1 9 7 6 1 9 7 7 1 9 7 8

Improved seed 41 61 71
Planting distance 13 28 60
Insect control (plant) 53 66 48
Herbicides 1 12 11

Fertilizer 0 4 -
Insect control (soil) 0 4
Land preparation 0 -
Planting date 50 -

Number of components 8 6 4
Average Index 19.8 29.2 47.6

Percentage of farmers using the component on their own the year
following the test multiplied by the percent of their crop on which
they are using the component divided by 100. The year shown is
the year of the evaluation; the Tests were conducted the previous
year in each case.

Source: Busto Brol, et al. (1976a), Ruano (1978) and Chinchilla and
Hildebrand (1979b).

- 33 -

This table clearly demonstrates that farmers are very selective of the

technology components they choose. Early in the life of ICTA, a complete

technological package was being recommended. Gradually the number of components

was reduced and the index of acceptability increased accordingly. The increase

in the average index can be attributed to three factors. One is the reduction

in number of components. Second, as more was learned about the farmers, remaining

components were modified to be more appropriate to their conditions. Third, ICTA's

methodology improved so farmers were more aware of the technology being tested

and were more involved in evaluation. That is, the method of conducting "Farmers'

Tests" improved over this period of years.

That this index of acceptability does differentiate the farmers' opinions

regarding acceptability is shown by the following table taken from farm records

in the same area, but not necessarily from the same farmers who participated in

the Tests.

Table 3. Technology Used in Maize in La Maquina, Guatemala, 1975 to 1978.
(Percent of area in maize)

Technology1975 1976 1977 1978

Improved seed 45 60 59 85
Insect control (plant) 57 74 78 103
Herbicides 1 0 0 0

Tractor cultivation NA 35 40 49
Fertilizer use 1 5 1 0
Insect control (soil) 0 2 0 0

Number of cases 20 49 46 25
Area in maize (has) 237 574 566 318
Average yield (kg/ha) 1,948 2,078 2,013 2,324

1Does not follow trend because seed imports from Nicaragua were
stopped due to an outbreak of coffee rust in that country.

Source: Busto Brol and Calderon (1975), Busto Brol et al. (1977),
Guerra, et al. (1978) and Gonzalez, et al. (1979).

- 34 -

The use of herbicides, fertilizer and control of insects in the soil

all received very low indices (Table 2) and all are completely rejected by the

farmers for use on their own crops (Table 3). The use of improved seed and

control of insects on the plants received high indices and are being used by

the farmers on a large scale. Following is a list of crops and areas for which

evaluations have been made.

Table 4. Crops and areas for which evaluations of acceptability have been
made by SER/ICTA,.1976 to 1978

YaRegion Crop or crop system No. of Average
Year Area evaluated Components Index

1976 La Maquina IV Maize 8 19.8

Quezaltenango I Maize 7 19.3

Jutiapa1 VI Maize 5 16.8
Beans 5 2.0
Sorghum 3 0.5

1977 Quezaltenango I Maize 9 14.5
Wheat 3 44.0

La Maquina IV Maize 6 29.2

1978 Quezaltenango I Maize 7 32.4

La Maquina IV Maize 4 47.6
Sesame 1 80.0

Jutiapa1 VI Beans 7 8.0

1Not published

Source: Published and unpublished reports SER/ICTA.

The evaluation of impact is being accomplished through the use of the

farm records being kept in each one of the work areas. There are not enough

resources in the Institute, nor especially in SER, to conduct the census type

survey that would be required periodically to monitor impact and use of technology

on a more adequate basis. However, it is felt that the data accumulated over

time from the farm records sufficiently demonstrate trends in adoption of the

- 35 -

technology being utilized and is an appropriate substitute for a benchmark study

and follow-up studies for which the Institute has inadequate resources.

A study conducted in 1978 demonstrates the capability of the farm records

to provide information for evaluation of technology. This study, based on three

years of farm records in La Maquina shows that improved seed and control of

insects on the plants were the technologies influencing crop yield, and also

quantified their effect on the increasing yield that was being achieved in the

area (Pelaez and Shiras, 1978).


SER "acquired" primary responsibility for providing calculator services to

the Institute and also has provided a great deal of statistical consulting since

the beginning. Initally, we obtained a contract wlth IBM for computer services

'and used their facilities for several analyses during the first two years.

In particular, the Bean Program utilized the analysis of variance and regression

programs that I brought with me from El Salvador.

However, it soon became evident that with the increasing capacities of the

hand-held, programmable calculators, much more efficiency could be achieved using

them than trying to depend on the computer. We first obtained the Hewlett

Packard 65 in 1975 and were able to program it for many of the analyses that were

being done by the technicians at that time. Later we acquired the HP-67 with a

great deal more capacity for which we wrote programs for more complicated analyses

and also to analyze the farm records. With the purchase of a TI-59, we were able

to expand, once again the analyses we are able to undertake.

At the present time, ICTA has two HP-65's, three HP-67's and one TI-59.

The HP-65's, one HP-67 and the TI-59 are located in SER where the technicians

36 -

come to use them and where they can consult with us at the time. One HP-67

is with the Bean Program and one is at the regional office in Region I,


The advantages of using the hand-held calculators are tremendous. First,

this way the technician can make his own analyses without having to invest

a great deal of time laboriously doing the calculations on a standard

calculator. He also does not need to depend on others to code, punch, run

and interpret results which is common in institutes that depend upon

computers for their analyses. Secondly, by knowing beforehand the capacity

of the calculators, the experimental design can be adjusted, keeping the

nature of the trials simpler and easier to analyze and understand. Third,

it is much more rapid to do the analyses in the field directly from field

books and save the time of coding, punching, verifying, etc., inherent in

the use of the electronic computers.

At the present time, SER has the following programs available for the

HP-67 and TI-59 calculators:

1. Analysis of variance (Anova), split plots, without limits

2. Anova, randomized blocks, up to 6 replications, no limit on

3. Missing plots, randomized blocks, up to 6 missing plots

4. Anova, without limits

5. Multiple regression, 3 independent variables

6. Multiple regression, 5 independent variables

7. Quadratic regression, 2 independent variables, with interaction

8. Linear, exponential and quadratic regression for one independent

9. Duncan's analysis

10. Tukey's analysis

- 37 -

11. Yates method

12. Farm record analysis for labor

13. Farm record analysis for inputs

14. Several different programs for converting plot data to kg/ha.

Two people in the Institute have the capacity for programming these machines

(one in SER and one in Region I) so the technology will continue to be used.

Also, plans are being made to purchase at least one calculator for each of the

regions next year.


The personnel budget varied greatly during the five years, and is not an

accurate reflection of support to Socio-economics because some were budgeted

to other units, some as part of training, and some had contracts rather than

regular appointments and were also budgeted separately. Therefore, staff budget

is not reported here. Rather, a complete list of personnel is presented in

Appendix B.

For the central unit in Guatemala City, non-personnel services, materials

and supplies, and machinery and equipment did, however, vary significantly

during the five years, Table 5.

In general, budget support was adequate for the staff located in Guatemala

City. One of the major problems was that most of the time the budget was not

approved before work had to begin in the year. Many years we had to initiate

work only hoping that we would have the personnel requested, but not being certain.

One of the most difficult budget problems involved SER Staff located in the

regions. In 1977, the Perito Agronomos were transferred to the regions and the

budget that was deleted from the Central SER group was supposed to be added to

38 -

Table 5. Budget support for SER (excluding personnel) Central Unit, Guatemala
City, 1976-1979. (Current Dollars)

Item 1976 1977 1978 1979

Non-personnel services $12,085 $ 3,802 $ 5,760 $ 6,070

Per diem, in country 10,560 2,772 4,800 4,800

All other categories 1,525 1,030 960 1,270

Materials and supplies 10,965 5,972 4,966 5,016

Gas and oil 7,265 4,500 2,951 2,951

All other categories 3,700 1,472 2,015 2,065

Machinery and equipment 7,420 5,000 110 xxx

Vehicles and motorcycles 6,100 5,000 xxx xxx

Office equipment 1,320 xxx 110 xxx

Total excluding personnel 30,470 14,774 10,836 11,086

the regional budgets. This, however, was never accomplished so that we

were put in the position of begging from the other regional programs.

Funds were already tight and the need to share with SER did little to create

goodwill for the discipline.

In 1977 and again in 1978, attempts were made and orders given to the

Regional Directors to create specific budgets for SER regional personnel, but

that was never accomplished. The result was that the Regional Directors, seeing

that the SER personnel were budgeted through their regional Technology Testing

Teams, wanted to use them as if they were their own staff. Obvious conflicts

arose as to the nature of the work that they should be undertaking.

39 -

In 1979, even though they are still being budgeted as part of the

Technology Testing Teams of the regions, there is a much better under-

standing of the nature of their work and they are, in fact, completely

integrated into the regional teams as reported in other sections of this

report. All have responsibility for some Farm Trials or Farmers' Tests and

other technicians help them with Farm Records. Generally, budget is shared

on an equitable basis by all the technicians in a Region or Sub-region.

It is evident, though, that budgeting procedures can have important

positive and negative effects on attempts at integration of the social

sciences with the biological sciences in an agricultural institute.

40 -


What were the real accomplishments during this five year period?

Was the investment in time and funds worthwhile from The Rockefeller

Foundation's point of view, from that of the Guatemalan government and

of ICTA, and from the point of view of the small, traditional farmer of

Guatemala? I think the answer is "yes" for most. Can one say that the

social sciences were, indeed, incorporated into an agricultural institute?

If so, has this helped the agronomists provide appropriate technology to

the small and medium farmers more efficiently and in a shorter period of

time than would have been the case had the Institute not chosen to try

to incorporate the social sciences into agricultural research methodology?

Here, I think the answer:is a very definite "yes." What does the future

hold for the social sciences in ICTA? It depends.

To answer these questions, it is difficult, if not impossible to

single out the social sciences and say this or that occurred because of

the social sciences. Asmentioned in the Prologue, the results are not

due to the efforts of one or a few persons. Rather they represent the

combined effect of the efforts of everyone who was involved. There is

at least as much interaction effect among people with different points

of view and from different disciplines as there is among the factors

affecting plant and animal production. Still, it is possible to discuss

what has happened during the time the social sciences were playing a

strong role in the Institute.

Now, for the first time, the small farmer has really become a partner

in the technology generating process. He does not have to be satisfied

any longer with whatever crumbs sift down from "above" but is having an

influence on what is being done "above." Though small farmers in

- 41 -

Guatemala are only just beginning to feel the effects of the Institute

on their productivity and income, I think most of those who have been

touched by the process would be in favor of the "experience in social


Certainly, considering the farmers from the beginning of the

technology generating process has increased the speed and efficiency

with which the Institute produces technology appropriate to them. The

probability of spending several years producing a new variety that has

very limited geographical adaptability or that is rejected for not

having characteristics important to the producers is greatly reduced

under the methodology that has been developed.

ICTA, itself, still has certain reservations about the "social

science experience." Not all are convinced it has been positive. Some

technicians feel that it is not necessary to consider the farmer's point

of view. They feel that a technology that increased production is good

in and of itself. This is now a minority opinion, but it does still

exist. Unfortunately, the controversy that was created in the integration

process has been misinterpreted by some from ICTA and has been associated

with the social scientists, themselves, or with the social sciences in

general. This is a negative effect that may or may not ever be solved.

But in balance, I think that the prevailing opinion at the present time

is that the contribution of the social sciences during this period has

been positive and the value of the integrated methodology is felt.

It is more difficult to interpret the Government of Guatemala's point

of view. First, the government has changed since the activities of the

Institute were initiated. Policy changes influence how they view the

Institute. Secondly, it is difficult for the government to evaluate the

- 42 -

"impact" of a research institute. Many times this can lead to doubts

about its usefulness or productivity simply because of the measurement


Perhaps the greatest effect of the "social science experience" has

been at the international level. The Rockefeller Foundation is more

interested in this aspect than are the other groups and I think they

should be well satisfied with the international recognition and

"replicability" of this experience. ICTA has taken some pride in their

role in developing a methodology with a strong international implications

and recognition, but again, this pride is not unanimous in the Institute.

Has the social science experience led to the integration of the

social sciences into the Institute? Of this there is no doubt. It is

evident from the technicians' analyses of research results. It is

evident from the information used and discussed by the technicians as

they evaluate and plan their research program and projects. It is

evident from the demand for Sondeos from the Technology Testing Teams,

the Regional Directors and the Technical Director. It is evident from

the nature of the methodology in general. It is even evident from the

general attitude of most of the technicians in the Institute toward
their work and toward the farmers for whom they work. Yes, the social

sciences definitely have infiltrated the Institute.

What then, are the long-run prospects for the social sciences in

ICTA? This, too, is difficult to answer. During 1979, besides the

author, SER lost an anthropologist (M.A.) and a sociologist (B.A.).

Another anthropologist is out of the country studying toward an M.S.

degree and will not return for another year. This leaves one agricul-

tural economist (M.S. level), one agronomist (Ing.) with less than 2

43 -

year's experience and a new agronomist (Ing.) in the unit. One position

was vacant at the time the author left the country, and because of the

scarcity of social scientists in Guatemala, will probably also be filled

by an agronomist. In addition, the position occupied by the author had

not been budgeted either for 1979 or 1980, so the unit is suffering from

a net reduction of one position.

During the course of the 5 years, we experimented both with a

centralized organization in SER and with regionalization. It was always

hoped that we would be able to regionalize, but maintain a professional

core at the national level for supervising, consulting and the provision

of specialized expertise when required in any of the regions. Because

of budget restraints, this never came about (other than with respect to

the non-professional level Peritos). It was finally decided to maintain

a centralized unit with each person having regional and subject matter

responsibilities. Now it appears that the unit will be broken up and

only the Coordinator will remain at the national level. The advantage

is having more constant SER input at the regional levels. The disadvantage,

and danger, is that this will dilute SER efforts. My fear is the

combined effect of the loss of most social scientists in SER with the

decentralization of the unit will gradually diminish their impact over

time, providing an environment in which the agronomists will slowly

revert to their more traditional methodology as new staff who have never

been exposed to the social sciences begin to have influence on the

decision making process of the Institute.

Appendix A


Rockefeller Foundation


Ford Foundation


Iowa State University

National Ag. Committee,


Name No. of Visits
* Joseph E. Black (4)
Mary M. Kritz
* Ralph W. Cummings, Jr. (2)
* Ed Wellhausen
* John A. Pino (2)
Sue W. Almy
Larry D. Stifel
Woodward Wickham
Kirby Davidson

* Tito French
* Frank Calhoun
* Jesus Velez Fortuno
* Tom Burton
* John Bieber
Tom Walker

Wes Craig
Santiago Friedman
Reed Hertford

John Nickel
Eduardo Alvarez
* Mario Infante
Alberto Valdez
* Fernando Fernandez
Alex Grobman

Harry Wing
Lehman Fletcher

Rafael Samper
Ernesto Davila

* Chris Andrew
* Max Langham
* Jose Alvarez

Ron Tinnenmeier
* Ken McDermott
Leo Hessar
Howard Steele
*Duane Jelinek
Jim Riordan

U. Minnesota


also as IADS

also with UFLA


also ADC

I .

* Leo Langer

Standard Fruit


Michigan St. U.




Cornell U.


Rodale Press





Texas A & M



Acad. for Educ. Dev.


U. Wisconsin (Green Bay)

* Homer Eaton
David Sauerwine
Jorge Gonzalez

Don Winkleman

* Dale Harpstead
Leonard Kyle
Kim Wilson

Hugo Manzano
Jack Traywick
S.N. Lohani

* Rufo Bazan
* Jorge Soria
Damon Boynton
Joe Saunders
bMron Shenk
Pedro 0noro
Ed Locatelli
Benjamin Quijandria

Claudio A. Oddone

William F. Whyte
Jim Converse
Foster Cady

Hugh Roberts

Richard Hardwood

Bruce Johnston

Doug Horton
Raymond Meier
Robert Werge

Arnold Van Huis

Ken Laurent

Warren Barham

Ed Weber

Hubert Zandstra

Richard Tenney

Roy Bronson

Emil Haney

No. of Visits

Vice President
Dir. of Research

also IDIAP







Wayne State U.


U. Arizona

Brockport State U.
(New York)

Damaris Chea

Dan Gait
Joshua Posner

Carol Browner

Bill Shaner
Bill Schmehl
Perry Phillips

Doug Williams

Sherwood Lingenfelter

Institutions in order of first appearance.
Persons in order of first arrival.

* Visitors to the La Barranca site.

No. of Visits


Appendix B


Through July 31, 1979



Miriam Morales de Lopez
Carlos E. Reiche C.
Amalia Corisco G.
Peter E. Hildebrand
Sergio Rolando Ruano A.
Lidia Ines Tujab M.
Bruno Busto Brol
Essau J. Samayoa G.
Jose Angel Andrade
Osman Alfredo Calderon A.
Jaime T. Tyld W.
Carlos de Leon Prera
Roberto Bosarreyes G.
Rolando Duarte Mendez
Gilberto Santa Maria
Thelma Reyes de Guerrero
Roberto Guillermo Loranca
Daniel Jose Cardona B.
Victor Manuel Corzantes
Leonel Ortiz Orellana
Jose Teodoro Lopez Yos

Leonzo H. Godinez
Luis Pando Canella
Miguel Angel Garcia
Hector Manfredo Orozco

Esau Guerra Samayoa

Jose Hoffman
Marco Tulio Palma Espina
Jose Guillermo Pelaez
Denis Amory Barrientos
Humberto R. Castaneda M.
Axel Esquite Catillo
Perfecto Apolonia Gonzalez
Maria E. Chinchilla M.
Peter Shiras
Julio Cesar Leal
Jorge Alfredo Cardona
Christina Gladwin
Santos Garcia
Valerio Macz Pacay
Sandra Calderon

Ag. Econ.
Bilingual Secy.
Ag. Eng.
Perito Agron.
Ag. Eng.
Ag. Econ.
Perito Agr.
Perito Agr.
Perito Agr.
Perito Agr.

Perito Agr.
Ag. Econ.
Perito Agr.
Perito Agr.

Perito Agr.

Ag. Econ (PCV)
Perito Agr.
Ag. Eng.
Perito Agr.
Ag. Eng.
Perito Agr.
Perito Agr.
Ag. Econ.
Perito Agr.
Perito Agr.
Ag. Econ.
Perito Agr.
Perito Agr.
Ag. Eng.





to present
to present
to present
to present
to present
to present
to present
14/3/76 +
to present
to present

to present
to present


to present
to present
to present
to present
to present
to present
to present


Pvt. Business

Reg. Dir.VI, ICTA

Pvt. Business
Station Mgr. ICTA
Soils ICTA


San Carlos


Gerencia, ICTA

Tech. Testing V,

Pvt. Business

Tech. Testing I,
Tech. Testing I,
Pvt. Business

Coffee Rust Prog.
Univ. San Carlos

U.S.(U. of Cornel:






Appendix C


1975 to August 1979

1975 Busto Brol, Bruno. 1975. Pasos sugeridos para que el Instituto
de Ciencia y Tecnologia Agrjcolas pueda tomar en consideration las
solicitudes de organizaciones interesadas en obtener asistencia
tecnica. ICTA, Guatemala.

Busto Brol, Bruno y Osman Calderon. 1975. Registros economics de
produccion con agricultores colaboradores del parcelamiento La Ma'qui-
na. ICTA, Guatemala.

Busto Brol, Bruno; Esau Samayoa y Osman Calderon. 1975. Evaluacion
del maiz ICTA Tropical 101 en varias plantaciones de la Republica de
Guatemala. ICTA, Guatemala.

Corisco, Amalia; Bruno Busto Brol y Sergio Ruano. 1975a. Evaluacion
del trabajo del Instituto de Ciencia y Tecnologia Agrrcolas en la
Cooperative Santa Lucia R.L., Departamento de Sololg y con el
Program de Vecinos Mundiales, Departamento de Chimaltenango.
ICTA, Guatemala.

Corisco, Amalia, Gilberto Santamaria y Rolando Duarte. 1975b.
Evaluacion de la Fundacion del Centavo. ICTA, Guatemala.

Hildebrand, Peter E. 1975a. El papel de socioeconomia rural en el
Institute de Ciencia y Tecnologia Agrfcolas. ICTA, Guatemala.

1975b. Multiple cropping systems are dollars
and "sense" agronomy. Invited paper presented at the Multiple
Cropping Symposium, American Society of Agronomy Meeting.
Knoxville, Tenn.

1975c. Sistemas de production agricola y
proyectos de reform agraria. Presentada en la 9a Reunion Anual
de los Institutos de Reforma Agraria de Centroamerica. ICTA,

Hildebrand, Peter E., Carlos E. Reiche y Esau Samayoa. 1975. Siste-
mas de cultivos de ladera para pequenos y medianos agricultores, La
Barranca, Jutiapa. ICTA, Guatemala.

Reiche, Carlos E., Peter E. Hildebrand y Sergio Ruano. 1975.
Evaluacion de algunas variedades de sorgo (maicillo) en pequenas y
medianas fincas del oriented de Guatemala. pp. 329-372 In Programa
Cooperative Centroamericano para el Mejoramiento de Cultivos
Alimenticios (PCCMCA) Vol. II. San Salvador, El Salvador, C.A.

Ruano A., Sergio R. 1975a. Terminologia agricola del sur-oriente
de Guatemala. ICTA, Guatemala.

*1975b. Analisis economic en ensayos comparativos
del uso de raciones con Maiz Opaco 2 y Maiz Comun, en cerdos de
engorde, realizado en la Aldea Tiucal del Municipio de Asuncion Mita.
ICTA, Guatemala.

1975c. El Altiplano,juna zona maicera en el
future? ICTA, Guatemala.

1975d. Razonamiento del enfoque del trabajo
del ICTA hacia el pequeno y median agricultor. ICTA, Guatemala.

1976 Busto Brol, Bruno; Osman Calderon y Peter E. Hildebrand. 1976a.
Evaluacion de la aceptacion de la tecnolog'a generada por ICTA para
el cultivo de maiz en el parcelamiento La Maquina, 1975. ICTA,

*1976b. Registros economics de production con
agricultores colaboradores del Parcelamiento "La Maquina". In
Informe Anual 1975-76. ICTA, Guatemala.

Corisco, Amalia. 1976. La influencia de la mujer en la production
y comercializacion agricola en el area del altiplano central. ICTA,

Hildebrand, Peter E. 1976a. Multiple cropping systems are dollars
and "sense" agronomy. Chap. 18 In Multiple Cropping. American
Society of Agronomy Special Publication No. 27. Madison, Wisconsin.

1976b. Generando tecnologia para agricultores
tradicionales: una metodologia multidisciplinaria (Generating
technology for traditional farmers: a multidisciplinary methodology)
preparado para presentarlo en la conferencia sobre: Desarrollo de
economia en regions agricolas: Busqueda de una MetodologLa.
Centro de Conferencias de la Fundacion Rockefeller. Bellagio,
Italia. ICTA, Guatemala.

Reiche, Carlos E., Peter E. Hildebrand, Sergio Ruano y Jaime T.
Wyld. 1976. El pequeno agricultor y sus sistemas de cultivos en
ladera: Jutiapa, Guatemala. ICTA, Guatemala.

Ruano A., Sergio R. 1976. Estudio antropologico de la production
porcina una important actividad en la economfa del campesino de
Jutiapa. ICTA, Guatemala.

1977 Busto Brol, Bruno, Osman Calderon y Peter E. Hildebrand. 1977.
Registros economics de malz con agricultores colaboradores del
parcelamiento La Maquina, 1976. ICTA, Guatemala.

De Leon Prera, Carlos; Jaime T. Wyld y Peter E. Hildebrand. 1977.
Alcance geografico de los sistemas de cultivo en el area piloto del
ICTA, Region VI 1975. ICTA, Guatemala.

Diaz Sch., Roberto. 1977. Situacion agro-economica de las pequenas
explotacines de ladera. Jutiapa, Guatemala. ICTA, Guatemala.

Duarte, Rolando. 1977. Tecnologia y estructura agro-socioeconomica
del minifundio, Totonicapan. ICTA, Guatemala.

Duarte M., Rolando; Peter E. Hildebrand y Sergio Ruano. 1977a.
Tecnologfa y estructura agro-socioecondmica del minifundio del
occidente de Chimaltenango. ICTA, Guatemala.

Duarte, Rolando; Sergio Ruano, Ildeberto Martinez, Emilio Merck y
Amado Navarro. 1977b. Estudio preliminary sobre las condiciones
agro-socioeconomicas del parcelamiento Montufar, Jutiapa. ICTA,

Godinez, Leonzo H., Luis M. Pando y Peter E. Hildebrand. 1977.
Registros economics de production con agricultores colaboradores en
el sistema malz-sorgo y cultivos de maiz y sorgo solo, en plano,
Asuncion Mita, Jutiapa. 1976. ICTA, Guatemala.

Hildebrand, Peter E. 1977a. Generating small farm technology: an
integrated, multidisciplinary system. An invited paper (principal
address) for the 12th West Indian Agricultural Economics Conference,
Caribbean Agro-economic Society. April 25-30, In Antigua. ICTA,

1977b. Consideraciones socioeconomicas en siste-
mas de cultivos multiples. Un informed solicitado para la Mesa Redon-
da sobre sistemas de production agricola XVI Reunion Anual de la Jun-
ta Directiva. Institute Interamericano de Ciencias Agricolas IICA.
Santo Domingo, Republica Dominicana. ICTA, Guatemala.

Hildebrand, Peter E. y Daniel Cardona. 1977. Sistemas de cultivos
de ladera para pequen~os y medianos agricultores, La Barranca,
Jutiapa, 1976. ICTA, Guatemala.

Hildebrand, Peter E., Sergio R., Ruano A., Teodoro Lopez Yos, Esau
Samayoa y Rolando Duarte. 1977. Sistemas de cultivos para los
agricultores tradicionales del occidente de Chimaltenango. ICTA,

Lopez, Jose Teodoro, Sergio Ruano, Rolando Duarte y Peter E.
Hildebrand. 1977. Registros economics de production con
agricultores colaboradores del occidente de Chimaltenango, 1976.
ICTA, Guatemala.

Ortiz 0., Leonel, Peter E. Hildebrand y Luis M. Pando C. 1977.
Registros economics de production en: maiz-frijol-sorgo;
maiz-sorgo; maiz-frijol; y maiz solo en ladera, Area Piloto ICTA
Region VI, 1976. ICTA, Guatemala.

Ruano A., Sergio R. 1977. El uso del sorgo para consume human:
caracteristicas y limitaciones. ICTA, Guatemala.

Ruano A., Sergio R., Valerio Macz Pacay y Peter E. Hildebrand.
1977a. Evaluacion de la aceptacion de la tecnologia generada por
ICTA para el cultivo de maiz en la Region I, 1975. ICTA, Guatemala.

Ruano A., Sergio R., Guillermo Valentfn F. y Marco Tulio Palma E.
1977b. Estudio preliminary sobre las condiciones agro-socioeconomicas
de una zona de Izabal (Sub-Region VII ). ICTA, Guatemala.

1978 Cardona, Daniel; Leonel Ortiz, Peter E. Hildebrand y Jose Guillermo
.Pelaez. 1978. Registros economics de producci6n en maiz, frijol,
sorgo y arroz en Jutiapa, Region VI, 1977. ICTA, Guaemala.

Casta'neda M., Humberto, Peter E. Hildebrand y Rolando Duarte. 1978.
Informe de la encuesta del parcelamiento La Blanca, 1976. ICTA,

Chinchilla, Maria E, Sergio Ruano A. y Peter E. Hildebrand. 1978.
Evaluacion de la aceptabilidad de la tecnologia generada para los
cultivos de maiz y trigo en Quezaltenango, 1976-1977. ICTA, Guatemala.

Godfnez, Leonzo, Miguel Angel Garcia y Guillermo Pelaez, 1978.
Registros economics de production en mafz y trigo. Quezaltenango y
Totonicapan, 1977. ICTA, Guatemala.

Guerra S., Esau, Perfecto A. Gonzalez, Hector Orozco, J. Guillermo
Pelaez y Peter Shiras. 1978. Registros economicos de production
en: maiz, ajonjoli y arroz, La Blanca, La Maquina y la Nueva
Concepcionv 1977. ICTA, Guatemala.

Hildebrand, Peter E. 1978a. An integrated approach to the
improvement of farm production systems. Presented at the Seminar on
the Improvement of Farm Production Systems. Sponsored by the Club
du Sahel. Bamako, Mali 20 Feb-1 March. ICTA, Guatemala.

S_1978b. Motivating small farmers to accept
change. Prepared for presentation at the conference on: Integrated
crop and animal production to optimize resource utilization on small
farms in developing countries. The Rockefeller Foundation Conference
Center, Bellagio. Italy. Oct. 18-23, 1978, ICTA, Guatemala.

Hildebrand, Peter E. and Sergio Ruano. 1978. Integrated multi-
disciplinary technology generation for small, traditional farmers of
Guatemala. Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Society for
Applied Anthropology. Merida, Mexico April 2-9. ICTA, Guatemala.

Pelaez, J.G. and P.G. Shiras. 1978. Analisis de los factors que
incident en el rendimiento de maiz en el parcelamiento La Maquina,
Guatemala. XXIV Reunion Anual del PCCMCA, San Salvador, El Salvador.

Pelaez Guillermo, Daniel Cardona y Leonel Ortiz. 1978. Analisis
agro-economico de las caracteristicas de los sistemas de cultivos de
malz, frijol y sorgo en Jutiapa, Guatemala. XXIV Reunion Anual del
PCCMCA. San Salvador, El Salvador.

Ruano A., Sergio R. 1978. Evaluacion de la aceptabilidad de la
tecnologia generada por el ICTA para el cultivo de malz en el
parcelamiento La M1quina, 1976-77. ICTA, Guatemala.

Ruano Sergio; Maria E. Chinchilla y Peter E. Hildebrand. 1978.
Evaluacion de la aceptabilidad de la tecnologia generada por el ICTA
para los cultivos de mafz y trigo en Quezaltenango. Region I,
1976/77. ICTA, Guatemala.
Samayoa G., Esau, Jose' Teodoro Lopez Y, Guillermo Pelaez y Peter
Shiras. 1978. Registros economicos de production en milpa (maiz,
frijol, haba), trigo, papa y frijol de suelo, Chimaltenango, 1977.
ICTA, Guatemala.

Samayoa, Esau; Peter Shiras y Guillermo Pelaez. 1978. Registros
economics de production de maiz y trigo en el occidente de Chimal-
tenan go, 1977. ICTA, Guatemala.

1979 Cardona, Jorge A. 1979. Registros economicos de production mal'z,
ajonjoll, sorgo, Chiquimulilla y Montufar, Region VI-3, 1978. ICTA,

Chinchilla, Maria E. 1979. Condiciones agro-socioeconomicas de una
zona maicera-horticola de Guatemala. Trabajo presentado en la XXV
Reunion Anual del PCCMCA, Tegucigalpa, Honduras, 19-23 de marzo,

Chinchilla Maria E, y Peter E. Hildebrand. 1979a. Evaluacion de la
aceptabilidad de la tecnologia generada para el cultivo de mafz en
Quezaltenango, 1977-1978. ICTA, Guatemala.

S_1979b. Evaluacion de la aceptaiblidad de la
tecnologia generada para los cultivos de maiz y ajonjolt en el
parcelamiento La Maquina, 1977-1978. ICTA, Guatemala.

Garcia, Miguel, A.; Leonzo Godinez y Maria E. Chinchilla. 1979.
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