Title: Policy background.
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PO LIC Y BACKGR FOUND


THE COMPONENTS OF A SECURE PEACE


APR i 11W













EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.

March 10, 1971


OVERSIZE







THE COMPONENTS OF A SECURE PEACE


1. On March 5, 1971, UN Secretary General U Thant issued a report
to the Security Council on the Jarring talks. In it he referred to
the moat recent documents which Egypt and Israel had transmitted to
Ambassador Jarring. Both documents, the Egyptian (February 15,
1971), and the Israeli (February 26, 1971), comprise the basic
positions of the respective parties as submitted to Jarring in
response to his secret Aide Memoire of February B, 1971. The
central proposition of his paper was that:

"Israel would give a commitment to withdraw its forces
from occupied UAR territory to the former international
boundary between Egypt and the British Mandate of
Palestine. The UAR would give a commitment to enter
into a peace agreement with Israel and to make explicitly
therein to Israel on a reciprocal basis various under-
takings and acknowledgements arising directly or
indirectly from paragraph 1(11) of Security Council
resolution 242 (1967)."

The Secretary General made the above public in his report (para: 8)
and than went on to issue the following Judgement, (para. 14):

"I wish, moreover, to note with satisfaction the positive
reply given by the UAR to Ambassador Jarring's initiative.
However, the Government of Israel has so far not responded
to the request of Ambassador Jarring that it should give
a commitment on withdrawal to the international boundary
of the UAR."

And in paragraph 15 he went on to may:

"I appeal, therefore, to the Government of Israel to give
further consideration to this question and to respond
favorably to Ambassador Jarring's initiative."

2. Treated in the following pages is an analysis of:
a) The boundary principle as related to Security Council
resolution 242;
b) The substance of the Egyptian reply to Ambassador Jarring,
February 15, 1971;
c) The Soviet posture in light of the Egyptian document;
d) The Egyptian-Soviet political strategy in the current
diplomatic phase;
a) The Israeli reply to Ambassaador Jarring, February 26, 1971.

The Boundary Principol

3. The authority of the UN Secretary General is defined by the
United Nations Charter. It does not include the right to determine
Israel's future boundary. It is not the UN Secretary General who






POLICY BACKGROUND


will have to live with Egypt once those boundaries, whatever they
are, are delineated. Israel and Egypt are the parties to the talks
that have hardly got under way, and it will be they alone who
will determine what their mutual boundary shall be in negotiation.
This remains true, notwithstanding the persistent efforts of the
Soviets and the Egyptians to cultivate an international climate in
support of an imposed settlement in keeping with the 1957 precedent.
At that time, it will be recalled, the UN was employed as the
instrument of imposition upon Israel under the impetus of the
Russian threat of force and the American threat of sanctions.
Egypt and the Soviet Union cannot but drau encouragement now from
the kind of value judgement the Secretary General has publicly
uttered on the positions of the respective aides.

The Conception of the Resolution

4. By arbitrarily determining that Israel shouldd give a commit-
ment on withdrawalto the international boundary of the UAR," Israel
is denied the right of even presenting its territorial case in a
negotiation with Egypt. (The 'international boundary' referred to
is one and the same as the 5th of 3une 1967 line. Any impression
that the withdrawal envisaged does not include the Gaza Strip is
erroneous. The intention is to effect a total Israel withdrawal.)

5. Nowhere in Security Council resolution 242, which is the basis
of the Jarring talks, is it stated that the border of which the
Secretary General speaks is the "ascure and recognized boundary" of
which the resolution speaks. That boundary, according to the reso-
lution, is to be delineated in negotiation between the parties.
As ita sponsors have publicly affirmed, the resolution was
deliberately phrased so as to permit a genuine border negotiation.
Its author, the then British Ambassador to the UN, Lord Caradon,
said in the Security Council on November 22, 1967, when the resolu-
tion was presented, that "any action to be taken must be within the
framework of permanent peace and withdrawal must be to secure
boundaries." No lees an eminent authority than Eugene Roetou, the
then U.S. Under Secretary of State, reaffirmed very recently the
centrality of the territorial negotiation as conceived by the reso-
lution. He wrote:

"...Paragraph 1(1) of the resolution calla for the
withdrawal of Israeli armed forces 'from territories
occupied in the recent conflict', and not 'from the
territories occupied in the resent conflict.'.
Repeated attempts to amend this sentence by inserting


MARCH 109 1971


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POLICY BACKGROUND


the word 'the' failed in the Security Council. It
is therefore not legally possible to assert that
the provision requires Israeli withdrawal from all
the territories now occupied under the ceasefire
resolution to the armistice demarcation lines."
(American Journal of International Law, Vol 64,
1970, p. 69)

Israel accepted the resolution and agreed to cooperate with the
Jarring mission precisely because it linked the establishment of a
"just and lasting peace" with the establishment of "secure and
recognized boundaries," other than the June 5, 1967 lines.


Israel's Fundamental Policy on the Boundary Question

6. Under no circumstances will Israel surrender its right to a
free negotiation with Egypt of this most crucial of issues. It will
resist all pressures, from whatever the source, be they military or
political, that aim at resurrecting Israel's past territorial vul-
nerability by precluding the negotiation of future secure bounda-
ries. Israel permitted this to happen once before by acquiescing in
the imposed solution in 1957. It will not squander its territorial
security again. Israel is ready, in peace, to withdraw from the
ceasefire lines. But this time the withdrawal will be to boundaries
that are secure, and shall be rendered so by geography. As stated
on March 7, 1971 by Prime Minister Golda Rair in an interview with
the British Independent Television:

W*e say that a new border, a negotiated border, will
be somewhere between the oeaeefire line and the June
4 line, 1967."

This is the meaning of the provision contained in Paragraph 4 of
Israel's document to Ambassador Jarring of February 26, 1971.
(see attached paper) It read:

"Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from the lIrael-UAR
ceasefirs line to the secure, recognized and agreed
boundaries to be established in the peace agreement.
Israel will not withdraw to the pre-June 5, 1967 lines."

At a press conference in Jerusalem on March 7, following the publi-
cation of the U Thant report, Foreign Minister Eban again reiterated
this fundamental principle of policy: "Our position," he empha-
sixed, "is and remains as stated on the 26th of February 1971. in
ParaGraph Four of that dooumant."

The Territorial Security Concept

7. When Israel speaks of secure boundaries it means, above all,
the elimination once and for all of those territorial focii of past
aggression; the removal of those geographic conditions that have in


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MARCH 10, 1971






POLICY BACKGROUND


the past tempted attack on vulnerable frontiers and on exposed
shipping lanse. Consider, as an example, the case of the Straits
of Tiran. Twice in ten years the Straits wear subjected to Egyptian
blockade, so easily facilitated by control of Share al-Sheikh. And
twice did such Egyptian aggression trigger major confrontations
between the two countries, in 1956 and 1967.
In 1957 Israel, faced by a joint Soviet-American front against
it, yielded to pressure and withdraw from Sharm el-Sheikh and the
rest of Sinai and the Gaza Strip, back to the old exposed armistice
line and thus was deprived of the opportunity to conclude a secure
peace with Egypt. Israel accepted under duress a mixed bag of
international arrangements and assurances that ware designed to
buttress its fragile frontier with Egypt, but which were to collapse
upon their very first testing in May-June 1967.
Israel will have nothing to do with conception of this kind
again. It will not withdraw from and surrender a location such aa
Sharm el-Sheikh to the protection of international arrangements and
guarantees that, by their vary substance cannot but be tenuous.
Aftsr two wars and intermittent tension between them, Israel has the
right to maintain with its own forces the security of Sharm el-
Sheikh, its only link with East Africa and Asia.

The Substance of the Egyptian Document

8. In its reply to Jarring of February 15, 1971, Egypt stated that
it is prepared, under certain condition, to enter into a peace
agreement with Israel. As will be seen in the attached Israeli
document to Ambassador Jarring of February 26, 1971, Israel welcomed
this readiness on the part of Egypt to entertain, after 22 years of
belligerency, the conclusion of a peace agreement between the two
countries. Normal international procedure would suggest that,
having presented their basic positions, Egypt and Israel should
proceed now, under Ambassador Jarring's auspices, towards a detailed
and concrete negotiation on their respective terms with a view to
reconciling their diffareness and drawing up their peace agreement.

9. The Egyptian condition for a peace agreement with Israel are
ultimative. Unlike the Israeli proposal, they make no allowance for
a negotiation process to bridge the profound differences that inavi-
tably axist after more than two decades of hostility. In the
Egyptian document, Israel ia required to marry out a total uith-
drawal from Sinai and the Gaza Strip, indeed from all the territoe.
rias on every front. It isa furthermore, expected to renounce its
eovmreign rights on the refugee issue and give entry to a mass Arab


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MARCH 10, 1971





POLICY BACKGROUND


influx. (President Sadat in his address of March 7, 1971, when he
announced the abrogation of the caasefire, referred to the above
two clauses when he said: "Egypt's inea qua non conditions are:
complete withdrawal from all territories occupied in 3une 1967,
and the observance of the legitimate rights of the people of Pales-
tins.") With respect to the obligations Egypt itself would be pre-
pared to assume towards Israel, nowhere is there any direct commit-
ment to Israel on the crucial question of freedom of navigation
through the Straits of Tiran and through the Suez Canal. And, as
the instrument of guarantee of the Egyptian version of a settlement,
Egypt conceives of international security arrangements much in line
with those of 1957.

The Meaning of the UAR Terms
10. But for the expression of willingness to enter into a peace
agreement, the UAR response to Ambassador Jarring reveals that
Egypt's position has not changed one iota from its traditional
posture. Its terms are a restatement, without deviation, of Egypt's
classic political doctrine. As they stand, they are devoid of
practical expression of what normal peaceful relations between
states are supposed to mean. Above all, they fail to address them-
selves to the elimination of the root cause of the past conflict
which ia the key to a future peace that will be secure. That root
cause is the boundary issue. As its condition for peace, Egypt
would have Israel restore its past territorial vulnerability. This
Israel will never do. It will not do so because the political and
military realities of the present and the political and military
contingencies of the future are such that a settlement without rea-
sonable geographic security would be a paper paaoa alone.

ha Soviet Poetura and tha Egyptian Proposal
11. The Egyptian proposal is not an independently conceived docu-
ment. Its conception, if not its language, was devised- n laaes
consultation with the Soviet Union in the furtheranae of a oammon
strategy. The extent of the intimacy of military and political
coordination between Moscou and Cairo was alluded to by the Egyp-
tian President himself in his address of March 7, 1971. Divulging
that on the eve of the Egyptian termination of the oaaasfire he
had made, at the invitation of the Soviet leaders, a secret trip
to Moscow on March 1-2, 1971, Sadet dealarodt

"Everybody knows the role the Soviet Union has played
until now...I wish to expraea my absolute satisfaction
with my diacuseione In Rsaoow which covered all subjects.
The USSR will continue its full and positive support of
the UAR."


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MARCH 10, 1971






POLICY BACKGROUND


12. The primary Soviet goal in involving itself so decisively in
every major Egyptian move, is its quest to maintain and consolidate
its power position in the Middle East, with Egypt as the base. To
achieve this, it must maintain its credibility in Arab eyes by hold-
ing out to them the real hope that it can deliver the political
victory they seek over Israel, i.e. total Israeli withdrawal. With-
out that, Soviet influence in Egypt and throughout the Middle East
is ultimately threatened. Russia was ready,in the Spring of 1969,
to encourage Egypt to employ limited military action war of attri-
tion in the attempt to' put teeth into the effort to achieve the
goal of total withdrawal. It gave Egypt avery backing in the attri-
tion campaign and when, in the winter of 1970, Nasser found himself
on the verge of total collapse, the Soviet Union moved in and
involved itself directly on a combatant basis with ground personnel,
missiles and pilots. The fighting escalated and so did the risks of
a wider confrontation, while the result justified neither. The
Soviet Union accordingly advised its client state to shift, for the
time being, the emphasis from the military to the diplomatic.

The Diplomatic Strategy

13. This is the backdrop against which the Egyptian response
to the American peace initiative and later, the decision "to enter
into a peace agreement" on the condition of a total Israeli with-
drawal, should be seen. The object remains as before the eviction
of Israel from all the occupied territories through the imposition
of an Egyptian-Soviet style settlement. Having shelved for the time
being the military option, the Soviets and the Egyptians have now
set themselves the task of winning American pressure on Israel so as
to compel it to withdraw totally, thus recreating the international
conditions that had made 1957 possible. This is the strategic goal
in which President Sadat, in coordination with the Soviets, is
currently engaged.

14. In a speech before the representatives of the Palestinian
terrorist organizations in Cairo on February 28, 1971, Sadat summed
up in the following words the objectives of his strategy as:
"a) The deepening of the commitment of our friend.
b) The neutralization of the adversary.
) The isolation of the enemy."

(In the UAR political lexicon, the Soviet Union is "the friend", the
U.S. is the adversaryy" and Zarael, "the enemy.")


MARCH 109 1971


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POLICY BACKGROUND


15. Central to the implementation of this strategy ia the driving
of a wedge between the United States and Israel as occurred in 1957.
Once done, Israel is rendered isolated both in the international
councils, and perhaps, too, in the field. The conditions would then
be set to enable Russia to activate the Security Council and/or the
Four Pouer forum on behalf of an Arab interpretation of Security
Council resolution 242. Thus, the groundwork would be laid for an
imposed international political arrangement and, failing that, the
possible condonement of a Soviet-Egyptian military effort to impose
the arrangement by force. That was the scenario of 1957.

16. The tactical play which Sadat has utilized in his attempt to
drive a wedga between Israel and the United States is his acceptance
of an invitation "to enter into a peace agreement with Israel."
That offer is made subject to a central condition which Egypt and
the Soviet Union know Iarael will never accept and will be even
prepared to fight over if necessary: the issue of total withdrawal.
Egypt and the Soviet Union understand that the only prospect of ever
possibly winning a total withdrawal would be through imposition.
For this to happen Israel has to be rendered internationally isola-
ted, and for that to occur a U.S. movement away from Israel is
required. Then the prospect would be opened for a Four Power common
front against Israel and the conditions created for an imposed
political arrangement. It was to facilitate this prospect that
Egypt and the USSR introduced a new element into the political dis-
cussion. It is a semantic one: the use of the term 'peace agree-
ment', presented as though it were an unprecedented conceaaion.
Having used the term, Egypt is now demanding of the U.S. that it
deliver Israel on the territorial matter. "The U.S.," Sadat said
in his speech of March 7, "uill not be able to evade this
obligation."

Fruit of 3oint Israel-U.S. Policy

17. Unlike thoas of Egypt and the USSR, the policies of Israel and
the U.S. are not identical. But, ever since 1967, they have met on
the critical principle that this time there will be no imposition
of a settlement, but a true peace, one that is freely negotiated
between the parties. That principle has generated policies and
actions on the part of Zlesel and the United States that have pro-
duced results which have advanced the peace process. Israel's
tenacious mtand in the field; the U.S. maintenance of the local
military balance of power through the sale of weapons to Iraeel;
the overall US political etanoa; and its deterrent actions that


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MARCH 10, 1971






POLICY BACKGROUND


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MARCH 10, 1971


uers applied during the second half of 1970 these together have
been the policies that compelled Egypt and Russia to turn, for the
time being at least, from the military option to the diplomatic
one. Now, an Arab leader has used the words, "peace agreement
with Israel." Leaving aside for the moment the tactical motive
which inspired the words, the fact is that for the first time in
22 years they have been uttered. (For 22 years it was widely
suggested that were an Arab leader to even pronounce such word,
his political and physical assassination would automatically
follow)

18. This is movement. It is progress of a kind that would have
been thought inconceivable a year and more ago. Surely, if *ur-
ther movement is to be registered beyond the realm of semantics
and into the arena of a genuine peace with security, it will be,
in the first instance, by keeping to these proven policies. In
1969-70 Egypt and the Soviet Union tried the option of war and
failed. They turned to diplomacy. Now they are trying, through
diplomacy, to achieve their goal of a total Israeli withdrawal by
means of an imposed settlement. This too must be made to fail if
they are to ever contemplate the option of a genuine peace with
security, freely negotiated between the parties, that will eradi-
cate the conflict once and for all. The United Statee can help
bring this about by continuing to stand fast against any attempt
to impose a settlement.

Peace With Security

19. The essence of lasting peace is the creation of a new pattern
of relations between Israel and its neighbors. This will never be
achieved if Israel is to be made strategically vulnerable again.
The only kind of peace which will prove oredible and therefore
lasting is the one that offers Israel territorial security, there-
by removing the temptation of future aggression. Israel will not
flinch in its insietenoe on the establishment of neu and secure
boundaries through a free exchange with Egypt. It will not with-
draw as it did in 1957, unless it is to boundaries that have been
freely negotiated and that replace the irrational and exposed
demarcation lines which served in the paet as the true invitation to
attack. After three ware of survival fought alone and 22 years of
insecure and unrecognized borders, Israel is resolved this time to
settle for nothing less then a peace which also offered it a rea-
sonable margin of territorial security. This is the eessnoa of the
Israeli peace proposal of February 26, 1971, the text of which is
attached.







TEXT OF DOCUMENT TRANSMITTED BY THE ISRAEL AMBASSADOR TO 4
THE U.N. nMR YOSEF TEKOAH. TO AMBASSADOR GUNNAR WARRING,
FEBRUARY 26, 1971



Pursuant to our meetings on 8 February and 17 February, I am
instructed to convey to you, and through you to the UAR, the
following:

Israel views favorably the expression by the UAR of its
readiness to enter into a peace agreement with Israel and
reiterates that it is prepared for meaningful negotiations
on all subjects relevant to a peace agreement between the two
countries.

The Government of Israel dishes to state that the peace
agreement to be concluded between Israel and the UAR should -
inter alia include the provisions set out below.

A) Israel would give undertakings covering the following:

1. Declared and explicit decision to regard the conflict
between Israel and the UAR aa finally ended, and termination
of all claims and states of war and acts of hostility or
belligerency between Israel and the UAR.

2. Respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty,
territorial integrity and political independence of the UAR.

3. Respect for and acknowledgement of the rights of the UAR
to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries.

4. Withdrawal of Israel Armed Forces from the Israel-UAR
cease-fire line to the secure, recognized and agreed bounda-
ries to be established in the peace agreement. Israel will
not withdraw to the pre-June 5, 1967 lines.

5. In the matter of the refugees and the claims of both
parties in this connection, Israel is prepared to negotiate
with the Governments directly involved on:

a) The payment of compensation for abandoned lands and
property.

b) Participation in the planning of the rehabilitation
of the refugees in the region. Once the obligations of
the parties towards the settlement of the refugee issue
have bean agreed neither party shall be under claims
from the other inconsistent with its sovereignty.

6. The responsibility for ensuring that no warlike act, or
act of violence, by any organization, group or individual
origimatee from or is committed in the territory of Israel
against the population, armed forces or property of the UAR.

7. Non-interference in the domestic affairs of the UAR.

8. Non-participation by Israel in hostile alliances against
the UAR and the prohibition of stationing of troops of other
parties which maintain a state of belligerency against the
UAR.





26 February 1971 2a


B. The UAR undartakings in the peace agreement with slrael
would include:

1. Declared and explicit decision to regard the conflict
between the UAR and Israel as finally ended and termination
of all claims and states of war and acts of hostility or
belligerency between the UAR and Israel.

2. Respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty,
territorial integrity and political independence of larael.

3. Respect for and acknowledgement of the right of Israel
to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries to
be determined in the peace agreement.

4. The reeponeibility for enduring that no warlike act or
act of violence, by any organization, group or individual
originates from or is committed in the territory of the UAR
against the population, armed forces or property of Israel.

5. Non-interference in the domestic affaire of Israel.

6. An explicit undertaking to guarantee free passage for
larael ships and cargoes through the Suez Canal.

7. Termination of economic warfare in all its manifesta-
tione, including boycott, and of interference in the normal
international relations of Israel.

8. Non-participation by the UAR in hostile allianope
against Israel and the prohibition of stationing of troops
of other parties which maintain a state of belligerency
against Israel.
The UAR and Israel should enter into a peace agreement
with each other to be expressed in.a binding treaty in
accordance with normal international law and precedent, and
containing the above undertakings.

The Government of Israel believes that now that the
UAR haa, through Ambassador Jarring, expressed its willing-
ness to enter into a pace agreement with Israel, and both
parties have presented their basic positions, they should
now pursue their negotiations in a detailed and concrete
manner without prior conditions so as to cover all the
points listed in their respective documents with a view to
concluding a peace agreement.


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