Title: Policy background.
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Title: Policy background.
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Bibliographic ID: UF00072554
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POL.IC.Y B A CKG R OU N D


THE JARRING TALKS: ISRAEL'S THIRD TRY


Embassy of Israel


Washington, D.C.


January 5, 1971


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THE JARRING TALKS: ISRAEL'S THIRD TRY


1. Israel, for the third time since 1967, is about to attempt to
negotiate peace with its neighbors, Egypt and Jordan, through talks
with Gunnar Jarring, the UN Special Representative. This was conveyed
in.the Government announcement of December 28, 1970. The decision
reflected Israel's determination to exhaust every prospect, however
alight, to make the Jarring mission work despite the two abortive
efforts of the past.


Leeaona and Pereoactivee

2. The diplomatic history of the Jarring mission is important for
ita lessons and for the perspective At offered in assessing the proe-
pects of the impending talks. Its main elements can be.simply told.
In December 1967 Israel began its contacts with Ambaseader
Jarring. His mandate, as laid down by the Security Council reselutoen
of November 167, required hia "to establish and maintain contact with
the Statas concerned in order to promote agreement and aesist efforts
to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement." What followed wse, in
sum, an attempt by Jarring to bring Israel, Egypt and Jordan together
in some form of a negotiation with a view to carrying out hia mandate
in keeping with the principles of the Security Council resolution.
Between December 1967 and June 1968, Gunnar Jarring computed repeatedly
between Jarusalem, Cairo and Amman. He delivered numerous latter. from
the Government of Israel to the Governmants of Egypt and 3aodan. This
correspondence (containing proposals for a possible negotiation agenda,
expressing Israel*a desire to hear the other side'l viewed, propoaing
ideas an the major issues requiring solution, and suggesting means
hereby the parties might be brought together for discussion);either
went unanswered or failed to elicit substantive response. In Rarch
1968, Ambassador Jarring mooted the idea of convening a meeting between
the parties under his auspices. This waa rejected by the Arabs. Egypt
and Jordan declared their refusal to enter into a peace negotiation
with larael, a posture that was summed up by President Nasear in a
speech in Cairo on June 23, 1968. He said:

"The following principles of Egyptian policy are immutable:
One no negotiation with Israel. Two no peace with Israel.
Three no recognition of Israel. Four no transactions will
be made at the expense of Palestinian territories or .tha
Palestinian people."

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POLICY BACKGROUND


These were the elements of policy (originally pronounced at the
Khartoum Arab summit in September 1967) that condemned the first
Jarring effort to paralysis. The Special Representative persisted
through April 1969 in his attempts to establish a meaningful basis
for negotiations and in that same month he suspended hie mission.

3. The lesson Israel drew from this first Jarring experience was that
there could be no progress towards peace so long as the Arab view of
no negotiation, no peace, no recognition persisted. President Nasser
and the Soviet leaders gave it a name: 'political solution", as
distinct from the Israel-U.S. formula of a "peace settlement". Just
as the term, "peace settlement" had substantive meaning, namely a con-
tractually binding peace freely negotiated between the parties without
prior conditions, so did the term "political solution" have a defined
meaning in Arab-Soviet parlance. Simply put, it meant a political
arrangement much in line uith the one imposed on Israel in 1957. The
paragraphs of the Security Council resolution were made to read not as
principles for a negotiation but as articles requiring automatic
"implementation". Hence, Jarring's task uas not to bring about a
negotiation between the parties for peace, but to draw up what the
Araba and Soviets called a "timetable". That was defined to mean an
Israeli commitment to total withdrawal as a precondition for any Arab
undertaking. Such an undertaking was not to include peace with Israel
but, as in 1957, a series of political arrangements devised through
third-party intervention. With this, the Arab conditions of a
"political solution" (no negotiation, no peace and no recognition of
Israel) were to be fulfilled.


4. The essence of this doctrine was carried forward into the Four
Power talks by the U.S.S.R. which sought, unsuccessfully, to win an
interpretation of the Security Council resolution in keeping with its
terms. Such an interpretation was to serve Jarring aa guideliness"
in reviving his mission. The effort was contested by the United
States which insisted that the purpose of the Security Council resolu-
tion, and hence of the Jarring mission, was a negotiated agreement
between the parties with a view to establishing a genuine peace, not a
third-party palliative political arrangement.

Direct Soviet Intervantion

5. The suspension of the Jarring mission coincided with Nasser's
renunciation of the ceasefire and his launching of the war of attrition


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JANUARY 5, 1971






POLICY BACKGROUND


in the spring of 1969. The attrition policy a joint Egyptian-
Soviet strategy. Its purpose uwa to subject rahel. to mounting
military pressure and compel it and the U.S. teiwOrrander to the Arab-
Soviet political terms being pressed in the Four lPaver form. Whan,
by January 1970, it became clear that the strategy had failed, iMaser
made his secret trip to Roacou. There he obtained a Soviet agreement
to involve itself militarily on a combat level so as to mfak pmeaiblo
the renewal of attrition. Soviet SA-III missiles, manned by Red Army
personnel, made their appearance in the Egyptian heartland in March
1970, followed in April by Soviet combat pilot. The presence of
Russian combat troops in Egypt manning weapon installations had been
denied by both Moscou and Cairo until a few days ago, The admisaaie
of their presence uas made on January 4 by the noe Egyptian President,
Anuar Sadat, In a speech in Tanta he acknowledged that Egyptianl eiesil
sites were manned by Russian soldiers end disclosed that they had
suffered casualties. *The President", (the late Abdul Nasser) Sadat
said, *asked for Soviet soldiers until our soldiers completed their
training. These soldiers came."

6. The goal of the Soviet military intervention was to eventually
extend the ground-to-air missile system forward into the Suez Canal
battle zone in an effort to relieve the Egyptian artillery from the
harassment of Israeli aircraft and thus permit the reescalation of
heavy bombardment. for almost four months this effort uas pressed
but failed under the impact of Israel's air response.

The U.S, .nitiative

7. It uas at this juncture, in 3une 1970, that the U.S. proposed its
political initiative and, specifically, the revival of the Jarring
mission to be accompanied by a cease-fire standstill agreement to
freeze the military situation along the Suez Canal and the Jordan
River. Uhat the initiative asked of Israel wus two things: to test
the intentions of the other side in talks, albeit indirect ones; and
to riak a limited ceasefire despite the prospect of it being abused
to Egyptian-Rusaian advantage. Israel's initial hesitation uas
prompted, principally, by the risk it was required to take uith respect
to the: ceasfire (the Security Council resolution of June 1967 had
called for an unlimited and unconditional ceasefire); the notion of an
indirect.talking procedure through Jarring which had failed before;
the consistent refusal of the Arabs to meet face-to-face with I.sral,








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JANUARY 5p 1971


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POLICY BACKGROUND


reflective of a continuing non-recognition policy; and the basically
unchanged posture of Egypt and the Soviet Union which continued to
speak of a "political solution', not of a genuine peace settlement.


Unilateral Concessions

8. Israel, despite these fears, agreed in August 1970 to accept the
U.S. initiative. It did so in the belief that the risks entailed
would have proved justified if, indeed, the revived warring talks
would at least serve as an avenue to a more genuine direct nogotiatioe
out of which a peace settlement might emerge. This was the santimant
that motivated Israel to agree to a aeries of unilateral eoaceoseons
in an effort to got the talks started: it accepted the procedure of
indirect negotiation in the hope that it Mould ultimately develop into
a meaningful face-to-face dialogue; it agreed to a limited ceasefirs
and concluded an agreement with Egypt on this and on a military stand-
still; it agreed to Naw York as the site of the talks, dropping its
original request that the talks be held at a venue cloear to the Middle
East; and it agreed not to make an issue out of the Arab refusal et
delegate thair Foreign Ministers to the talks a 3Jarring had requested.
Ideedd, it may be said in retrospect that no other paaty did as mush
and risked as much in order to assure the start of the Jarring talks as
did Israel in August 1970.


The Violations

s. What happened subsequently, is matter of public record. On
September 3, 1970, the United States confirmed Israel'sa charges that
Egypt and the Soviet Union were masively violating the oaseafirs-
atandatill agreement. By thair duplicity, they succeeded in achieving
in a matter of weeks what they had failed to accomplish in the months
prior to the ceasefire. Here use a clear attempt to confront Israel
with new military facts in gross violation of a specific agresent
which Egypt had entered into. The dense missile system which Egypt,
uwth Soviet connivance, had deployed in the standstill zone under the
ceasefire screen created a change in the strategic balance and predeer d
a threat to Israal that had not existed before Aggeot 7 when the agree-
ment came into effect. It was a preconceived stroke with a milteiy
and political objective. The missiles represented a virtual ulti2uat
to Israelt either Israel accept in the Jarring talks the Egyptian-
Soviet dictat of a "political solution' or face the censequmanee of
what President Nasser termed a "military solution". Egypt and the
Soviet Union were, in fact.seeking to use the U.S. initiative to bring
about an Israeli surrender.




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10. Israel suspended its participation in the Jarring talks at the
beginning of September 1970. The Egyptian-Soviet duplicity and their
policies gave Israel no alternative. Israel called for the removal
of what observers said was the most sophisticated missile system in
the world. It demanded the restoration of the military situation as
it had existed on August 7 when the caasefire-standatill agreement
came into effect. This never happened. The missiles are still there,
deployed in the standstill zone, and complemented now by ground-to-
ground Luna missiles, the first such weapons to be introduced in the
Riddle East. Their deployment has been admitted by the Egyptian
President in his lengthy interview with the New York Timet, December
28, 1970.


10. That Israel has agreed now to make a third attempt to talk peace
with its neighbors through Jarring, despite all that has occurred, is
a reflection of its continuing resolve to leave no stone unturned in
its quest to test to the end the prospects of peace. The question is,
do the talks have a chance of success now? Certainly, if Egypt and
the Soviet Union will change their basic policy of a "political
solution". Past experience has shown that peace cannot be made by
correspondence or by questionnaires. It can only be achieved through
dialogue. As stated by Prime Minister Mair in the Knesset
(Parliament) on Decmeber 29, 1970:

lIn accordance with the guidelines of Government policy
we are going into negotiations without prior conditions,
willing and prepared not only to put forth our position
but also to listen to the proposals of the other parties
to these talks. At the same time we reject all threat
of the renewal of firing or the putting forward of any
prior conditions whatsoever."



She went on:

"The talks will be of value only if they are held in an
atmosphere of tolerance and a mutual desire to reach
agreement."


.These conditions are elementary to any kind of a meaningful
negotiation. If these intentions are now going to be shared by Egypt
and Jordan, the new round of Jarring talks holds out the prospect for
peace. Peace certainly will not flow from ultimata, nor from threats
of the kind uttered by Egyptian President Sadat in recent daya, to
wit,his remarks in Cairo on January 2:





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POLICY BACKGROUND


"Ue will not allow the ceaaafire to become permanent unless
there is a seriousness, meaning that there is a timetable
for withdrawal and for implementation of the Security Council
resolution. If not, we will not abide by the ceaaaefire.


Again, there is the element of ultimatum and the refrain of the very
same basic elements of policy that guaranteed the failure of the first
Jarring effort during '68 and '69: the notion that the Security
Council resolution has to be automatically "implemented" with Gunnar
Jarring laying down a timetablea for withdrawal, without an agreement
on peace and without reciprocal commitments directly contracted
between the parties. Such rhetoric is not the stuff of peaceful
intent. It originates in a philosophy that declares "Never, never,
never" which is what President Sadat answered when asked by the %gw
York Times on December 23, 1970, whether he would ever enter into
diplomatic relations with Israel publishedd in the Times on December 28).
The basic condition for the success of the Jarring talks lies in the
change of this outlook.


11. The Israel-Arab conflict can be ended only by contractual,
binding peace agreements. Until this is achieved and defensible
borders agreed upon Israel will maintain the ceasefire lines on all
fronts without withdrawal. The Security Council resolution was
conceived as a framework for negotiations in order to reach agreement,
signature and the implementation of the reciprocal obligations
contained in the contractual agreements reached. This is the
eessence of an Israel-Arab settlement.and it is in its pursuit that
Israel seeks now to communicate with its neighbors through the
Jarring talks.








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