P 0. L C Y B -A.C K.C. : R . I N. D
S.t.Anas~M s of Two, fundamental ,tgtments of lPotr
EfArSSY OF I SRAEL
Jua4y 21, 1970
AU G 1 0 1971
.ICI SgVIET STAATEG
,Y,, IN, THE MI
wo- Eilp tal St
Ln.AValXeis gf T. -Stsmgnts !Rf Policy
I The-vurraipt 0.3oS.R. ftdoastl 'Novo* i ths''diplouatic sftd, thq
tailitery,,, are intimately related and art compononts of a aingia
policy. On* cannot t,.reat soperotoly tho, Soviet physical military:
posturs in Egypt (tjiwi continued extension of missile bases, and
the build-up of military contingents and caabst pilots),, and tho::,,.
Soviet diplo"tic, postarAo (a#- **proosed an 3uly 16 in the otata-
**n t, of the Supro"i and an I" y, 17 I A, the soviot-4gyptlai)
30int Communiquo)-o Both **rvoj viO consistoncyp the basic
Soviet strategy toot has absped, U.SS.R.,:..Oehavior- in.. tho Middlo
East sints 19.67,
2. The I*ravl-Arab disputs to i"ortont, to that. strata for
uponit* outcoms-lorgely dopendo the, *u***** or failure of the
SaViotr '"Sign. MoSCOW J$ 'not Metalry 80900inQ in a policy of
support and aid for EQypt.r It ia'PVraUjnQ Q fundamen tal Strrat#gy,,,
of Its own, one that Is dictated by Its own salf-interests and
Molculatord to schio-vo qwj*; SovItt goals. The U.S.S.R. is striving:.
for Over, in ttte "14 Olt ta$t. 1n oiw doing$ it has long sought to
"kis,'Asximum, miloogs out air the Ismal-Arab,'disputo to, enhanco its::..
own prosonceand.influence In tho-rogon,,and to a,*h.i*v.s,:..,prGd0*i-.
3. A strong Egypt vnder Nssoavt committed to a p4n-Arob doctrine,
h** throughoutooon cwmi derod by Russlo-, so, vital to the sqccw*o of
its 40,9n. $OrVto the intler*Sts 'between IM00010W and4
Cairo. An Egyptian ivcc**q over Israel, be t political oro if
necessary, oilitoryt is s kayto tho advancement of the Soviet,:
Purpose* Fd.r the Soviets, on tqyptisn triumoh would mean the
wookooing end n9utrol,4xatidn of lsra*lp a defoot for the West irn
thw M1441a Cost, and, the- *tr*ngth&n1,ng, of N*oasrls g;ri-p over the
area. -,This wouldv In, torn-t 1W to the fufther rise of Soviet'
pr**tiq* and' to the oxteasionof Soviet influence andLpower. That
power would'Pow: be books#.bath by a phy*4c*l military land and air
Provence and, oltimatoly, a formidable novel prs**nc* capable, of
free movement oroun4 th*'krtbi*n Peninsula through the Suez Canal.0
It iathlo that, the S*40 UMon owaks a* it proo"tly jains Egypt
Egyption f ailura,
in' 4L,"_Jitary' and "plamatic offorvoiveo in the
bottlo tagainat lovsol would*, In oqtwl measure, strike a serious
blow-to Soviat prv*tiq*snd Influence throughout ths::Middle Esst:
ond br#yar"d. More, thon'thetv it could load to a poooo process thgikt,
might oliainoto the larool-Av*b dispute ,and thus deprivo
Of its vhtaf instruowntfor p#norwuion' and-powor.
POLICY P O -. .U 2ND1 .2
The: Rie: nt :Soviet Midest Pronounce: nt
S. It iinthA otx th one mt a s t. w and
i eton of tht Soviet Matt p-nnounmetn te
% es n t of.the Siptme sovi,. ve uLtS:. ad th SwstaEgp an
dim.. ;- h: .;, : :' : : v A...
ain't Communique, 3loy 1?7. Both rJfleiEt the tanor of the: di -
c4hs ni that took place in Moeco beatwden Pre sident Nasset and
tha Sovetldaesht p beaten Jun. 29 nd 3uly 16.. They deserve
n eteantion became together fhay peovi4 a uwindoe on the .'
t*4* a W p e ip n -or f the U.S&ui gp ian Spol ye : v-4 ',v.
:te MAidt' lEsat, ts, light o: ta'j bowit uatetoi goals
which that policy i designed to t.aet and place inpp ativu
S.th S64iet-Egyptian (nii tary initiattivas: in the ares tsalf.
. A tuy of their teta show s them to contain paapha that.
Jap Ve -pesraft *4datstion to outifbt threat Isl *t tai awewd
d awee in U te eat etridht *t eas^ 'et therm- a fpatud
ret* e ae t a desire tfor a 'politicst. solution "to tit.dispute.
Thus: the uptee So.t statement stairs:
y sin "5pc"de ase v
.O .' o". :. . .. ;'
Expressed hare is a basic.. tenet -a of Sovia: ttiBategy. E xp is ntd,
too, sa a eleBr message directed both to Iarael and to the a et,
St ewith on .to chtt thr .
*ttuitaltBt tte' Sfl-Ara diotet a cepda t a Sove-Arab
'..'" ''. ": *. ;.f =;i ^ . . . :i .f .. . .. . .:. .'. .. ..t.. '. *. ... .. .:.:.:.: ^
i .alaetry owr and, the Soviet Union will directly 4'ittvq
battl until Ilsrael aucoube. This threat is further apetled out
i ". ia..trSoviet-Egiyptin Jitt Camaiu i fiio: ..
..Y .,. ." w 4 : ..
pp re'pph ao the Jpi :Lt Cpstwinsue:ut-, M
4tflUq twi (tfleeldeayani Lnflenress. full belii tai t
... i t.:.W W8ur00.e -. .peac:a. e in '. .: .,,t,. st- an be reali ed
only by taking- t.t neeaene wh .ch will neura -th r.
: ;n .. the fulit.plam t:"en the 22 "vembsv" 1 967
...e ur:i;..t Cen-y .atiintn! uttii n, wa! :. the cutien i t: UN..
.*:. l a. .n-.-.:..t., . ";i ." .f;* '
S.. . . .
" '< I. ".: : ".:--jv a tBtli.,." ,.:t .n i :: sl..BiftiS i )l ..::i h *h u .:i.. ;:
raw":'. *S.10itA .i:h;. h i,..^,.^^^ *:ii. .
. .. . .. .. . .. . .... ...
altl no ,r,' !, I W ,. 000 t"Y 4',::, :
Sr w w r
POLICY BACKGROUND -3- .JUY.2T, 1970
The full meaning of each of the conditions laid down in this
statement has been enlarged upon in other Soviet and Arab pro-
nouncements. Their collective purpose is to make clear to the
West that the Only kind of a political arrangement whikeh the
Soviets or the Egypti*nae will countenance ie the one : t.hat accepted
their interpretation of the Security Council reasoution. This, in
fact, has been the major Soviet effort in the Four Pdower and TuO*
Power talks for more than a year-and-a-half.
6. There are three: key dlmiandi made in that intr.pr.tation.
Each of theo refleota: baeio Soviet Egyptian doctrine against a
lasting peace and, heno., constitute a distortion of the resolution.
These demands regularly appear .in..every major Moecow and Cairo
statement on the dispute: First, Israel must pull baok on every
front to the vulnerable armistice lines, now to be designated
Seecure"o.. boundaries, This ncluds withdrawal r th.d l from the Goian
Horghts, despite Sytrias c ategorical rejection of kbh the Seciii ty
Council resolution and the 3arring mission. Second, israel must
agree .to accept within .its .old: .arieti frontiers a :.lass influx of
Paleetinian Arabs. Thia has the cliar purpose of injecting a large
hoetite body that would ultimately cause the diamefbermient of zirael
froa within. And t.hid, the object of the "political solution3 is
not final peace, nor it it explicit eevereign recognition between
the parties. This, it mustbe rmphasaizd, as ai.mush a Soviet
condition the need to preserve the Orest of the conflict intact -
as it is an Egyptian demand.
7. oast instructive within this context is the use of the More:
moderate phraseology relating to support for a political settle-
ment. A careful reading of the Supreme Soviet statement and the
Soviet-Egyptian 3oint Comrunique shousthat nouher. is reference
ade to any .Egyptian obligation to peace uith aIrael. Nowhere is
an. . p -a :.. t. ,I e L .,Lis
peace between Israe t.and the Arabs mentioned as the ultimate object
of Soviet-Egyptian diploacy. Whereverthe wcrds 'paea' or
peacefull settlement a re uied, they are: employed :in. very general
and abstract. term, applied never to slrael but to 'the Mi:.ddle
East." Thus, the Joint Communiquat
*The two sides affair. their support for the efforta...
aiMed, at esaniuga macoctal- ettlemet ip th iddle
POLICY: BACKGROUND -4- JULY 21, 1970
Q ... .. '. o
"The two side have discussed mean, and:::mei4hOds which h
will insure th: achievenmnt of a oeaceful Ptt jmnt
of the riddle East crisAi and declare their resoled-
to continue their coordination in this directions.'
,h s. t n ..vroite:
* Or, a phrased in the statement of the Suprse Boiet:.
'ThSe UQSS.R. Supreme Soviet wompletely apptvl) he
policy of the Soviet Governaent. . aimed at the
achievement of the Just pacefl political settl -ment
&of the: middle East cornfi'Ln.
I: ure as if a party to tha disp:ut goeq by the name .th' Mddtl
::et: and it s: th: Riddle East" which must soiahow join i a
political settlement of the: poblel. Theo eomi on of the nlai
'Iarei" An this context is a conai tent practice, repflbctive :o
a basic tate- of mind.
lk.atr a~t Se justified
S:a. The broader 0gloal purpo e of Soviet s tate:y 4with reepst to
the I:. r.at.. "A.ab .:diuputeic gi ven significant expression in ? p- a*.
graph of the .Supreme Soviet statement which reds as fellow s:
A.* 1n *i ag .k.an .:tAtin -the Riddle4- East, su-pprted by
nlo-osod ialit circles, is aind not only agaisti the
Arab Sta tps. nthat a
ri .hi:i:st eg h. -an ir tr' an. nh ttm W *
Spear ist an peace- o fag roes resaaLs that
passiveness in the face of th .aggressor would unite the
hand of impezra.ilietl for. new aggrell ive actionss against
othr pGeoples, agai: it otha.r :jiadpadent S states.
'This theli lifted the IsTaeleArab dispute out of its local
CsOfinei and plaes it on a. global footing. Here iA the idaolJgical
and political Justifi atifon for Soviet political involvwennt and
direat military intervention in the Riddle E ast. hat:the Soviet
Union i. saying by thi~sr that it:: muat ngage itself actively i:
sevsA the sensitivA anod etatagt m Rdset orearoads frim 'en-
.T. .: .0 .. O
S :lniaist circLaes, theai the dtini of other pplt
and .ontinenta will be threatened, to say nothing of anivasl
EtRetin Croepal n
9. Those are the major themes of the statement and the Joint
Communique. In terms:of the principples and doctrine pronounced,
they constitute a single document. They provide, too, an
authentic commentary on the fundamentals of Soviet Mideast strategy,
both with respect to the Israal-Arab dispute and the broaderr
strategic goals that dispute is calculated to serve.
10. The Soviet-Egyptian pronounoements and the escalating Soviet
military presence in the area are one and the same in object. They
complement each other, giving credibility to what adds up to a
Sliet ultimatum directed towards Isreal end those western powers
seeking a genuine peace. The underlying tone of the Soviet posture
is this: a settlement be imposed on Israel, on roacow-Caira terms;
or the Soviet Union, in pursuit of its own self-interesta, will act
directly to heighten the war further through intensified attrition
as the prelude to assault.
11. Sn aasessing the newest Soviet-Egyptian effort, a distinction
must be made between its tactics and strategy. The tactics may well
be tailored and cosmeticized in an attempt to assuage Western fears,
o .long as the strategic goals are not affected thereby. Henei the
prospect of a new and intensified RMocow-Cairo campaign, tailored to
erode Western position and to induce the Western powers to. rvise
their policies in favor of an imposed settlement in harmony. ith the
fundamental Soviet-Egyptian demands. This is a major strategic goal
calculated to deprive Israel of authentic peace and thus advance the
Soviet penetration in the area. If this goal is to be thwarted, as
it can and must, Ilrael must be enabled to stand firm in common
poture with those western powers anxious for true peace and,thus,
the containment of the Soviet expansionist policy. The Soviet
Union is pressing itae ideast power politics to the degree it is
able. To the extent it will be met by a fire and deterrent atand
will it find cause to reconsider the wisdom of its strategy
calOulated to impose the Soviet design on teasael and on. the middle