Title: Policy background.
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Title: Policy background.
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P O L I C Y B A C K GR O U N D


CONTENTS

1. Outside Pressures Will Not Deter
Israel in Quest for Genuine Peace
2. Highlights from the Address by Israel's
Prime Minister, Mrs. Golda Meir, May 5, 1969































THE EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
Washington, D.C.


May 6, 1969







OUTSIDE PRESSURE? DILL NOT DETER ISRAEL
li QUEST Fui GLNUIfNL PACE


1. The Nature of the Peace
The Prime minister r of Israel, Mrs. Golda Meir, has given clear
expression to the peace formula which constitutes the foundation of
Israel's policy. Speaking at the opening of the Summer Session of
the Knesset (Parliament) on May 5, Mrs. Meir declared:


The only situation that can replace the cease fire
is permanent peace, namely: the final and declared
liquidation of the Areb-Israeli conflict.
Peace must be expressed in signed peace treaties
between Israel and each of the neighboring states.
The governments of the region, and not external
factors, are responsible for working out the drafting
of the peace treaties.
The peace treaties must include agreement on
agreed, secure, and recognized.boundaries.
The peace treaties must annul claims of belligerency,
blockades, boycotts, interference with free navigation,
the existence and activity of organizations or groups
engaged in preparing or executing sabotage from bases
and training camps on territories of states signatory
to peace treaties.
Within the framework of peace, we must strive for
n system of relations to be based on wide regional
cooperation for the development and prosperity of the
Middle East.


2. Arab Strateq:, in Wake of Four Power Talks
Mrs. Meir began her major policy statement with a reference to
political and security developments in the wake of the Four Power
talks,. The initiation of these talks, she pointed out, has been
accompanied by intensive activities on the part of Arab leaders on
three planes, in their effort to influence the consultations:


Firstly, they endeavoured to terrorize international
public opinion with the imminence of all-out warfare
which could spread outside the region.
Secondly, in order to enhance the impact of their
propaganda, regular Arab armies in the South and the
East began to aggravate the situation on the borders
by unprecedented violations of the Cease-Fire. Egypt
even cast doubts on the existence of the cease fire.
Terrorists were ordered to step up their activities.
Thirdly, to win the sympathy of public opinion,
Arab rulers made a series of deceptively moderate
statements centered around Hussein's visit to the
United States.


3. Perspective on Cease-Fire Violations
Dwelling on the Arab political motive in perpetrating cease-fire
viola ions wi'-h unprecedented intensity, and on Israel's military
evaluation of the actual situation in the area, the Premier commented:








POLICY BACKGROUND


Occasionally our region is portrayed as being on the
point of an explosion which may spread beyond the area.
There is no justification for this contention. We live
in this region, and are perfectly familiar with the
actual state of affairs. Israel cannot permit herself
to err in her evaluation of the situation or under-
estimate the gravity of the dangers. Nor can it exag-
gerate them. We have learnt not to create pipedreams.
To the best of our judgment, the Arab countries can-
not at present permit themselves to wage total war. This
assessment has a firm foundation. But our forces are
ready for any eventuality, even for the eventuality of
a mistake in this forecast.


4. Outside Pressures-Will Not Deter Israel in Quest for Genuine Peace
Emphasizing Israel's determination not to compromise on the question
of peace, Mrs. Meir made the following statement:


Now, proposals are again made that we put our trust
in arrangements that do not satisfy our simple demands
for full, genuine peace agreements. Israel is not prepared
for this. No nation which has not experienced the danger
that hung over our heads has the right to demand that we
agree to any plan that does not constitute a genuine peace
settlement, achieved as a result of mutual talks.


The Prime Minister concluded her address with the words:

I hope and trust that, over the sound of canons
and the tumult of hostility, the voice of Israel calling
for peace will reach lovers of peace in the Arab world.
This call goes out not in any meek or apologetic tone.
Aggression, threat of war and international
pressures will not deter us. We shall not tire of our
just struggle, nor shall we relinquish our aspirations
and our striving for peace.


-2-


May 6, 1969




HIGHLIGHTS FROM THC ADDRESS BY
ISRAEL'S PRIME MINISTER MRS. GOLD MEIR
IN THE KNESSET (PARLIAMENT)
MAY 5, 1969



On March 17, my government was presented to the Knesset, and the
principles of the government's policy were outlined.
In that address I repeated Israel's call to the Arab states to meet
us in order to establish peace in the Middle East, and, until the present
situation is replaced by permanent peace, to fully uphold the cease-
fire arrangements. Our appeal failed to obtain the hoped-for response.
In the political-security arena, events have meanwhile taken place to
which I must make reference.


Arabs Seek to Terrorize International Opinion
In February, a consultative framework on the Middle Eastern situation
was set up by the four Big Powers. Towards the establishment of the
framework, Arab leaders began and continue intensive activities on three
planes:
Firstly, they endeavoured to terrorize international public opinion with
the imminence of all-out warfare which could spread outside the region.
Secondly, in order to enhance the impact of their propaganda, regular
Arab armies in the South and the East began to aggravate the situation
on the borders by unprecedented violations of the cease-fire: Egypt
even cast doubts on the existence of the cease-fire. Terroritsts were
ordered to step up their activities.
Thirdly, to win the sympathy of public opinion, Arab rulers made a series
of deceptively moderate statements centered around Hussein's visit to the
United States.


The Hussein Record
Appearing in Washington on April 10, 1969, Hussein said: "If before
the war, on June 1, 1967, the Arabs had agreed to put an end to the state
of belligerency with Israel, afford access to Sharm-el-Sheikh and the
Suez Canal, recognize her rights to live in peace and security, etc. -
if the Arabs had agreed to such conditions on June 1, 1967, such a step
would have been dramatic, constituting a great concession on the part of
the Arabs,and Israel could not have failed to recognize the generosity
of the proposal, nor could anyone throughout the world.
"The Arabs are offering Israel precisely this proposal and the Israelis
have rejected it."
We read these words in bewilderment. According to concepts customary
among civilized nations, peace is not a favor bestowed by one party upon
the other. Even by the lights of Hussein, we must ask: why did he not
make this proposal to us? The answer is well known: on June 1, 1967, the
Arab rulers were thoroughly occupied in preparations for war, hoping
they would be able to destroy us once and for all, as they have themselves
declared.







May 6, 1969


POLICY BACKGROUND


SIn that speech Hussein tried to prop up his argument by referring to
President Eisenhower, through selective quotations from the latter's.
statements made in February, 1957, after the Sinai Campaign. For some
reason or other, Hussein forgot to quote the public announcement made
by the United States President in 1957, which stated that there were no
grounds for assuming that Israel's right to sail her ships in the Suez
Canal would be violated, but if it were violated, the.family of nations
would have to act vigorously.
King Hussein speaks of an "if" which never existed in the first place,
but turns a blind eye to the state of affairs which really existed in the
early days of June, 1967, developments which'were caused by him. He
deliberately ignores'a political fact,the historic importance of which
can scarcely be overestimated: Oh June 5, 1967, the Jordanian King
received a message from the Prime Minister of Israel. In this message,
the Prime Minister promised, as Hussein himself states in his memoirs,
that if Jordan refrained from intervening, no harm will come to her.
If he had complied with this appeal, matters would have been different.


Jordanian Occupation of Jerusalem
Hussein goes on talking about Arab Jerusalem. Since when has the
city been under Arab rule? Jordanian rule was imposed on part of-
Jerusalem by violence. The Jordanian army expelled Jews from the Old
City, desecrated Jewish shrines, and destroyed synagogues and cemeteries.
The Jordanian government refused to comply with the armistice agreement
it signed. Jews were deprived of the right to worship at the holy sites
that are \deeply anchored in Jewish history, long before the Arabs came
to the land. A't the .National- Pr.es.s Clu-b "in Wa'shingtoni the.Ki'ng said
he was not obliged to stop the Fedayeen raids against Israel, The
world is aware of the activities of the Fedayeen that the King is not
obliged to stop. They are placing infernal machines in places where
crowds congregate: markets, supermarkets, terminals; firing upon
civilian aircraft, continuous shelling of peaceful villages, sniping
farmers in fields in the Jordan Valley.


The Hussein "Peace Plan-"
After preparing the ground with words, Hussein introduced a so-
called six-point plan for a settlement in the Middle East which was
a sort of climax to the Arab campaign of moderation. His plan was
presented to world public opinion as a major contribution and a turning
point.
Anyone glancing at the Six Points will soon realize that they contain
nothing but an Arab interpretation of the Security Council resolution.
And indeed, they were so described by King Hussein himself on his return'
to Amman:
The time has come for the Arab rulers to learn-the real lesson from
an analysis of "What would have happened-if. . ", in order to obviate
future inevitable failures resulting from their own futile policies.







POLICY BACKGROUND


In any event, Israel is determined to draw the lesson from its own
experience, as well as that from other nations, and these lessons are
embodied in her policy. No one can turn the wheel back to the position
of June 1, 1967, just as no one can bring back to life our dear ones
who were killed in June, 1967, in a war which the Arab leaders headed
by Nasser, joined by the Jordanian King forced upon Israel and the
Arab states, instead of heeding the call of Israel's Prime Minister.
I know of no precedent in military history of a country which,
having been attacked by its neighbors and having succeeded in over-
coming its attackers, continually begs the vanquished aggressors to
agree to peace, whilst defeated aggressors persist in their obduracy.
This rejection is the source of the lack of progress towards peace and
of the aggravation of the situation in the region.


Arabs Not Ready for Total War
Occasionally, our region is portrayed as being on the point of an
explosion which may spread beyond the area. There is no justification
for this contention. We live in this region, and are perfectly familiar
with the actual state of affairs. Israel cannot permit herself to err
in her evaluation of the situation or underestimate the gravity of the
dangers. Nor can it exaggerate them. We have learnt not to create
pipedreams.
To the best of our judgment, the Arab countries cannot at present
permit themselves to wage total war. This assessment has a firm
foundation. But our forces are ready for any eventuality, even for the
eventuality of a mistake in this forecast.
Arab propagandists are spreading in the capitals of the world mis-
leading forecasts as to what is likely to happen in this region in the
coming months, if a settlement dictated by the Arabs is not reached.
I do not intend to refute these assessments. I prefer to deal with
the main subject which occupies this region at this historic period.
For twenty years, our region has been the focus of unrest and war.
And now, more than ever, -after June 1967, a trenchant question arises:
is this situation unavoidable, or is there any possibility of opening
a new chapter in the life of the region a chapter of peace and coop-
eration? This subject stands at the forefront of the political
struggle, which has now lasted for nearly two years.
Statesmen and formulators of public opinion in the world must not
become accustomed to the Arab refusal for peace. They must not regard
every unbinding statement by one Arab leader or another, about a
cessation of belligerency, etc, as a manifestation of moderation and
acts of charity towards Israel.


-3-


Mvay 6, 1969







POLICY BACKGROUND


Israel Will Agree Only to Peace
Now, proposals are again made that we put our trust in arrangements
that do not satisfy our simple demands for full, genuine peace
agreements. Israel is not prepared for this. No nation which has
not experienced the danger that hung over our heads has the right to
demand that we agree to any plan that does not constitute a genuine
peace settlement, achieved as a result of mutual talks.
There are some who object and attempt to refute our attitude on
the question of peace. Theyask: why insist on direct negotiations and
mutually signed peace treaties? Why place so much trust in signatures
of Arab rulers after they have violated agreements all these years?
Such questioners contradict themselves. If there can be no reliance
on signed treaties of peace, how can we rely on verbal declarations
which could easily be denied? We are well aware how Arab peoples are
being educated to hatred and to aspirations of vengence and destruction.
It is just because of this poisonous education that has been continuing
for twenty years that we attribute educational and social significance
of the first rank to the very fact of direct conversations, leading
to the mutual signature of peace treaties.


Peace Defined
It is possible that in our struggle for peace we shall face most
severe political tests. We shall not give our consent to illusory
and ephemeral solutions.
The only situation that can replace the cease-fire is permanent
peace, namely: the final and declared liquidation of the Arab-Israeli
conflict,
Peace must be expressed in signed peace treaties between Israel
and each of the neighboring states.
The governments of the region, and not external factors, are
responsible for working out the drafting of the peace treaties.
The peace treaties must include agreement on agreed, secure,
and recognized boundaries.
The peace treaties must annul claims of belligerency, blockades,
boycotts, interference with free navigation, the existence and activity
of organizations or groups engaged in preparing or executing sabotage
from bases and training camps on territories of states signatory to
peace treaties.
Within the framework of peace, we must strive for a system of
relations to be based on wide regional cooperation for the development
and prosperity of the Middle East.
I hope and trust that, over the sound of canons and the tumult
of hostility, the voice of Israel calling for peace will reach lovers
of peace in the Arab world. This call goes out not in any meek or
apologetic tone.


-4-


May 6, 1969










POLICY BACKGROUND -5- May 6, 1969


Agression, threat of war and international pressures will not
deter us. We shall not tire of our just struggle, nor shall we
relinquish our aspirations and our strivings for peace.




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