Title: Policy background.
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Title: Policy background.
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Bibliographic ID: UF00072554
Volume ID: VID00011
Source Institution: The Isser and Rae Price Library of Judaica
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POLICY BACKGROUND

PRESIDENT NASSER OUTLINES

TRUE AIMS OF EGYPTIAN POLICY



































THE EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.
January 30, 1969






PRESIDENT NASSER OUTLINES

I) On the occasion of the official opening of the Session of the National
Assembly of the United Arab Republic, January 20, 1969, President Nasser
declared (in translation):

"In talking about the forces of the Arab struggle, I must
stress the glorious actions carried out by the Palestinian
resistance forces. The'rise of these resistance organizations,
the crystallizing of their objectives and the expansion of
their activities are one of the conspicuous features-of the
period after June 1967. These organizations raised a flaming
torch at a time of darkness and despair... They fulfill a
vital task in sapping the enemy's strength and spilling his
blood. In your name I express our admiration and appreciation
to the four major organizations: El Fatah, the Popular Front,
the Liberation Organization and the Arab Sinai Organization...
The Palestinian resolve must be given freedom to express
itself without hindrance. It must be given the fullest
opportunity to achieve its aspirations, without any guardian-
ship. The UAR has maintained a consistent position in this
matter since the heroic task of the Palestinian resistance
began. In pursuance of this policy, the UAR places all its
resources at the disposal of these organizations, without
condition or reservation. In line with the same policy, the
UAR appreciates the attitude taken by the Palestinian organiza-
tions in rejecting the Security Council resolution of 22 November
1967, that was accepted by the UAR. They are entitled to
reject this resolution, which may serve the purpose of eliminat-
ing the consequences of the aggression carried out in June
1967, but is inadequate for determining the Palestinian fate."

The above was given in the course of a major policy address and must
be regarded as an authoritative statement of official Egyptian policies
in regard to the cease-fire agreement and the Security Council resolution
of November 22, 1967. It is a faithful expression of Egyptian practice.
Daily experience precludes the notion that it is a propaganda exercise
for domestic consumption.

2) President Nasser, by his address, gives explicit public sanction to
a policy which has been pursued for some time. His statement asserts:
a) Arab Governments are right to encourage the terrorist
organizations. They have the duty to provide the sanctuary,
the military aid, the financial assistance and the political
support essential to their continued existence ("In pursuance
of this policy, the UAR places all its resources at the disposal
of these organizations, without condition or reservation.")

b) The general Arab struggle and that of the terrorist groups
are one. Therefore, Arab Governments -- though having formally
accepted the cease-fire -- may legitimately pursue a continuing
armed struggle against Israel through irregular forces and
terrorist organizations operating from their territories. ("In
talking about the forces of the Arab struggle, I must stress
the glorious actions carried out by the Palestinian resistance
forces... They fulfill a vital task in sapping the enemyts
strength and soill ini hi.s blood.")





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c) UAR "acceptance" of the U.N. Security Council resolution of
November 22, 1967, is a political tactic. It is a means of
achieving the strictly limited objective of bringing about an
Israeli withdrawal by political means. It is not, in UAR
policy, a step to peace. On the contrary, the armed struggle
for the ultimate liquidation of Israel has to continue. Hence,
it is logical and warranted for the terrorist organizations to
reject the Security Council resolution. ("In line with the
same policy, the UAR appreciates the attitude taken by the
Palestinian organizations in rejecting the Security Council
resolution of 22 November 1967, that was accepted by the UAR.
They are entitled to reject this resolution, which may serve the
purpose of eliminating the consequences of the aggression car-
ried out in June 1967, but is inadequate for determining the
Palestinian fate.")

3) The above principles of policy reflect the reality of UAR behavior,
A two-stage thrust is pursued, one short, the other long-term. The short-
term effort is the verbal "acceptance" of the Security Council resolution,
the demand for its "implementation" and "cooperation" with the Jarring
mission, calculated to bring about an Israeli withdrawal. No binding
commitments are intended in return with regard to those aspects of the
resolution designed to achieve "a just and lasting peace," e.g., agreed
and secure boundaries or freedom of navigation. The long-term effort is.
the exploitation of the retrieved bridgeheads, following an Israeli with-
drawal to launch a war for Israel's elimination. Hence, the logic that
the terrorists are not bound by the Security Council resolution, yet are
entitled to total Arab support, since they are an important component of
the long-term Arab design for Israel's destruction.

4) It is against these realities that Israel's attitude and actions have
to be appraised. The UAR policy and activity are in flagrant violation of
the cease-fire. In espousing them, the UAR and the other Arab States con-
cerned are repudiating the responsibilities they took upon themselves in
accepting the UN cease-fire.

5) Israel calls attention to the policy of duality maintained by the
United Arab Republic. It constitutes a total negation of the principles
and purposes of the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967,
which calls for the promotion of agreement on a just and lasting peace
based, inter alia, on "termination of all claims or states of belligerency
and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integ-
rity and political independence of every State in the area and their right
to live in peace within secure and agreed boundaries free from threats or
acts of force."







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A solemn public endorsement by the President of Egypt of an armed con-
flict to be continued even after the formal implementation of the Security
Council resolution is not an "acceptance" of the resolution but a funda-
mental repudiation of its letter and spirit.

6) Israel continues to maintain that the 20-year-old Israel-Arab conflict
can be effectively resolved only by a genuine peace negotiated and agreed
by the parties directly concerned and contractually binding upon them.
No combination of unilateral declarations, time-tables, arrangements, for-
eign power or United Nations guarantees can form a realistic, and durable
substitute for a peace treaty.




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