POLICY B A C K G R 0 U N D


THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION
ON PEACE IN THE luIDEAST
AND
THE FUTURE OF THE JARRING MISSION
























THE EI.BASSY OF ISRAEL
Vtashington, D.C.


November 11, 1968


POLICY


B A C G R U N




L )


"In declarations and statements made publicly and to Lr.
Jarring, my Government has indicated its acceptance of the Secur-
ity Council resolution for the promotion of agreement of the
establishment of a just and lasting peace. I am also authorized
to reaffirm that we are willing to seek agreement with each Arab
State on all matters included in that resolution."
On lay 31, 1968, Foreign Linister Eban reiterated this statement in
the Knesset (Parliament.)

The above is sufficient to refute the Arab propaganda allegation that

Israel has refused to accept and implement the Security Council resolution
as a framework for a peaceful settlement.

L) Resolution Calls for Agreement
5) The essence of the matter is not that Israel refuses "acceptance"
and "implementation" of the resolution, but that it emphasizes "agreement."

The need "to promote agreement" is stated in the resolution itself, while

the idea of "implementing" it without agreement is not only impossible
but also contrary to its purpose and to the rights and obligations.of the
parties under international law. Isra6l's emphasis on agreement is valid

and legitimate in terms of the Charter, as well as of the resolution
itself. The Israel declarations on acceptance and implementation as sub-
ject to agreement are more soundly based than those of the UAR which

ignore the vital provision of agreement.

6) Every facet of Israel's policy is in harmony with the principles

laid down in the resolution. -A&s coiifi~ie-d by the records of the Security

Council, the resolution is not of itself, self-executing. It is con-
cdived as a list of principles on which the parties could base their agree-

i-ent. It postulates two central themes: "the establishment of a just ,and

lasting peace," and agreement on the establishment of "secure and recog-

nized boundaries."
7) Cn October 8, 1968, the Israel Foreign Linister, Abba Eban, pre-

sented to the U.N. General Assembly a nine-point peace program based, in

its entirety, upon the principles laid down in the Security Council reso-

lution. (See "Policy Background," Oct. 13, 1968.) It dealt with: a) the

establishment of peace; b) the establishment of secure and agreed bound-

aries; c) security agreements; d) the establishment of open frontiers;

e) freedom of navigation; f) refugees; g) Jerusalem; h) acknowledgement
and recognition of sovereignty, integrity and right to national life;

i) regional cooperation.






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3) Arab Irrotestations of "Acceptance" and "Interpretation"

8) The United Arab Republic and Jordan have, on numerous occasions,

protested their adherence to the Security Council resolution and that they

are, accordingly, cooperating with the Jarring mission. At no time, how-

ever, have thdir spokesmen clarified what they meant by acceptance.

Indeed, no Arab spokesman has yet addressed himself in any detail on the

specific and concrete issues involved in the peace-making process, as did

Israel before the U.N. General Assembly on October 8, 1968. To "accept"

a resolution while refusing to spell out its implication is an unreason-

able attitude, propagandistically motivated and unworthy of the high

issues at stake.


F) Arab Interpretation Dictated by Khartoum Formula

9) The UAR interpretation of the resolution is dictated by the Khar-

toum formula, and the supremacy of that formula has been officially re-

peated since the Security Council resolution was adopted. On July 16,

1968, the Egyptian Foreign Linister Riad stated in an interview on the

Egyptian Television:

"As to Arab policy, I always reiterate what was agreed upon
in Khartoum, that we are not prepared to recognize Israel, nego-
tiate with her or sign a peace treaty with her."

And President Nasser, in his speech of July 23, 1968, declared:

"The following principles of Egyptian policy are immutable;
one, no negotiations with Israel; two, no peace with Israel;
three, no recognition of Israel."

10) It is this policy which commits the Arabs to read into the Coun-

cil resolution the single dictate of an unconditional Israeli withdrawal

to the June 4, 1967, lines. This, however, is neither requested in the

resolution nor is it reconcilable with its central purpose to achieve

agreement on secure and recognized boundaries within the framework of a

just and lasting peace. The Arab demand to seek a change in the cease-

fire dispositions outside a peace arrangement is an irrational course for

which there is no international authority or precedent.

11) The reason why the Jarring mission has made no evident progress

since its initiation a year ago is precisely because in Arab thinking,

the Khartoum formula supersedes the Security Council formula. This, too,

explains why Arab spokesmen, to the extent they have made pronouncements

on a political settlement, couch them in declaratory generalities without





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reference to specifics. Certainly, peace cannot be advanced by declar-

ations accompanied by a refusal to negotiate. Arab policy seeks to use

the Security Council resolution not as an instrument for making peace,

but as an obstacle or alibi to prevent its attainment.

0) Israel's View of Resolution's Implementation

12) Israel's policy is that the secure and recognized boundaries

spoken of in the resolution should be determined by mutual agreement be-
tween the parties as part of a permanent contractual peace which binds

both parties.

V'ithin the context of such a peace treaty, the conflict between the

UA2 and Israel would be liquidated. There would be freedom of passage

of Israeli as well of other flagships through the Suez Canal as soon as

it is opened to navigation, and freedom of navigation through the Straits

of Tiran. V'ithin the-framework of peace, the cease-fire lines will be

replaced by permanent, secure and recognized boundaries and the disposi-

tion of forces will be carried out in full accordance with what is agreed.

'ith regard to the refugee question, Israel proposes a conference of

,..'.ddle East States, together with the Governments contributing to refugee'

relief and the U.N. Specialized Agencies, in order to chart a five-year

plan for the solution of the problem in the frameworkoof a lasting peace

and the integration of the refugees into productive life.


II) Future of Jarring ..ission Depends on Arab Clarifications

13) In order to promote these purposes, Israel, as stated by its

Foreign Linister Eban in his address before the U.N. General Assembly on

October 8, 1968, continues to be willing to exchange views on certain

substantive matters through Ambassador Jarring. In this context, Israel

has again asked the Arab Governments to give deliberate consideration to

the Israel peace proposals and to explore their detailed implications with

Israel in the normal and appropriate frameworks.

14) For the Jarring mission now to move forward, the Arab Governments

have to review their position on anumbcrof basic matters implicit in the

Security Council resolution. The nature of their conclusions will deter-

mine whether they genuinely seek a peaceful settlement (and thus give
meaning to the Jarring mission) or whether they still consider themselves






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-- Thus, Israel is entitled to know whether the Arab Governments are,

in fact, willing to establish a just and lasting peace.

-- Do they accept the need for agreement between themselves and Israel?

-- Do they agree with the view of the term "secure and recognized

boundaries" as indicating a concept different from the previous armistice

lines which were described in the 1949 Agreement as follows:

"The Armistice Demarcation Line is not to be construed in any
sense as a political or territorial boundary and is delineated
without prejudice to the rights, claims and positions of either
party as regards the ultimate settlement of the ialestine problem,"

Consequently, would these Governments be prepared to seek an agreement

with Israel for replacing the cease-fire lines by a secure and recognized

boundaries acceptable to all the Governments concerned?

-- V,'ould the Arab Governments join with Israel, within a context of

peace, in working out arrangements which would give security against the

kind of vulnerable situation which caused a breakdown of the peace in the

summer of 1967?

,-- 'hat would the precise policy and action of the UA1 be regarding

.assage of ships of Israeli flags from the day on which the Suez Canal is

opened?

-- Vhat is the Arab Governments' reaction to the refugee proposal sub-

iL.itted by Israel on October 8, 1968?

-- Do the Arab Governments agree to terminate all claims of states of

belligerency, and to respect and acknowledge Israel's sovereignty, integ-

rity and right to national life? Are they prepared to fulfill this prin-

ciple through specific and contractual engagements to be made by the

Governments of Israel and of each Arab State, to each other, by name.

I) V:recise Iositions lhust Be Defined on Irinciples of resolution

15) These questions are not posed rhetorically or polemically. Israel

Ais entitled to ask them, for they constitute the main elements of the See

curity Council resolution. The Israel Government reaffirms its decision

to give priority in its international relations to the maintenance of co-

operatioi. with Amb. Jarring in fulfillment of his mandate for the promotion

of agreement between the parties. The patient pursuit of avenues leading

to permanent peace is a vital international objective. Recent events along

the cease-fire line have emphasized its urgent importance. Any party which

chooses to break off the effort would assume heavy responsibility. Inter-

national experience in othe-r conflicts Jil ustrates the value of persever-

ance, even in mo-onts -hen diver;e.:e s sc 0 broa..