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Title: Policy background
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U. OF F. LIBRARY


POLICY


BACKGROUND


Contents


1) Eban Enumerates Nine Principles
for Program of Lasting Peace
2) Arab Reaction to Israel Peace
Plan
3) President Johnson Orders Talks
on Jet Sales to Israel















THV ,I"LASSY OF ISPJL
lashington, D.C.
October 13, 1968



















4, i rV












































i .a3AOr


4'." 1




1. EBAN ENUMERATES NINE PRINCIPLES FOR PROGRAM OF LASTING PEACE,
A'T U.N. GENERAL ASSEMiLY, OCTOBER 8, 1968


a) Reiterating Israel's readiness to conclude a lasting peace with

its Arab neighbors, Foreign Iiinister Eban, in his address before the

U.N. General Assembly on October 8, 1968, enumerated a detailed proced-

ure wheareby peace can be achieved.

b) The peace program he presented is founded upon nine basic prin-

ciples:

i) The Establishment of Peace: The situation to follow the

existing cease-fire has to be a just and lasting peace, duly negotiated

and contractually expressed. The essence of peace is much more than

non-belligerency; it commits both parties to the proposition that their

20-year-old conflict is at a permanent end. This is in keeping with

the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967, which called for

the establishment of peace and not for any intermediate or fragmentary

arrangements such as those which exploded in 1967.

ii) Boundaries: Within the framework of peace, Israel would

be willing to replace the cease-fire lines by permanent secure and rec-

ognized boundaries with each of the neighboring Arab states, and to

carry out the disposition of forces in full accord with the boundaries

agreed upon under the final peace. By this means, the central purpose

of the Security Council resolution of 1967 would be fulfilled.

iii) Mutual Non-Aggression: In addition to the establishment

of agreed territorial boundaries, Israel would be ready to discuss othe

agreed security arrangements designed to avoid the kind of vulnerable

situation which caused hostilities in the summer of 1967. The instru-

ment establishing peace should contain a pledge of mutual non-aggressio

iv) Open Frontier: iWhen agreement is reached on the establish

ment of peace with permanent boundaries, the freedom of movement of

people and goods now existing in the area, especially in the Israel-

Jordan sector, should be maintained and developed. The concept of free

dom of movement could include free port facilities for Jordan oi- Isrr

Mediterranean coast and should include mutual access to places of

ious and historic association.

v) Freedom of Navigation: Arrangements for guarantee

dom of navigation in the international waterways of the area






unreserved, precise, concrete, and founded on absolute equality of

rights and obligations between Israel and the other littoral states.

vi) Refugees: 1) A conference of Iviiddle Eastern States should
be convened, together with the GovernmeAns contributing to refugee

relief and the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations in order to

chart a five-year plan for the solution of the refugee problem in the

framework of a lasting peace and the integration of the refugees into

proau(A.:t- life. This conference could be called in advance of peace

negotiations. 2) Under the peace settlement., joint Refugee Integration

and Rehabilitation Commissions should be established by the signatories

in order to approve agreed projects for refugee integration in the

middlel e East, with regional and international aid. 3) As an interim

measure, Israel has decided to intensify and accelerate action teo-widen

the uniting of families scheme, and to process "hardship cases" among

refugees who had crossed to the East Bank during the June 1967 fighting.

vii) Jerusalem: Israel does not seek to exercise unilateral

jurisdiction in the Holy Places of Christianity and Islam. Israel's

policy is that the Christian and Mioslem Holy Places should come under

the responsibility of those who hold them in reverence, and Israel would

like to discuss appropriate agreements with those traditionally con-

cerned.

viii) Acknowledgement and Recognition of Sovereignity, Integ-

rity, and Right to National Life: This principle, inherent in the U.N.

Charter and expressed in the Security Council resolution of November,

1967, is of basic importance. It should be fulfilled through specific

contractual engagements to be made by the Government of Israel and of

the Arab States to each other by name.

ix) Regional Cooperation: The peace discussion should examine

a common approach to some of the resources and means of communication

in the region in an effort to lay the foundations of a Middle Eastern

community of sovereign states.

) The Jarring I.ission: Mr. Eban said that Israel continues to be

ready to exchange ideas and clarifications on certain matters of sub-

stance through Ambassador Jarring with any Arab Government willing to

establish a just and lasting peace with Israel.-





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"d) No Comparable Arab Peace Initiative: He pointed out that no

Arab spokesman has yet addressed himself to Israel in similar detail or

the specific and concrete issues involved in peacemaking. Referring tc

the integral and interdependent character of the points at issue, the

Foreign Miinister appealed to Arab Governments to give them deliberate

consideration and to explore their detailed implications with Israel

in the normal and appropriate frameworks.


2. ARAB REACTION TO ISRAEL PEACE PLAN


a) The immediate response to the Israeli peace program came from

the Egyptian President. It was totally negative. Nasser, in a speech

on October 10, said that Egypt would resort to force in the absence of

an "honorable" peace settlement. The "honorable" peace settlement con-

templated is Israel's capitulation through an unconditional withdrawal,

with the return to the anarchic conditions that led to three wars in

two decades. Peace, in other words, is conceivable only on Arab terms,

the alternative being war. The peace that Israel offers, on the other

hand, is not one that is to. be imposed by any one side. It is to be

freely negotiated and contracted. Unlike Egypt, Israel does not

threaten further war if the UAR or any other Arab State rejects its

offer. But it insists on maintaining the present cease-fire agreement

until replaced by a settlement hammered out through mutual negotiation

based on the complete equality of all the parties concerned.

b) President Nasser's tone was echoed in the words of the Egyptian

Foreign Minister Riad in his address to the U.N. General Assembly on

October 10. Laced with familiar invectives, Riad's address was yet

another slam of the door in the face of Israel's appeal for peace, an

appeal backed by substantive proposals widely acclaimed as providing a

new basis for progress of the Jarring mission. In the words of the

Washington Post, October 11: "At the least, the Israeli proposals keep

the Jarring mission alive, and with it, the hope of talking, not fight-

ing. No similarly constructive Arab peace proposal is on public reco-

...It is past time for the Arabs to submit, either at the General I'

bly or through Mr, Jarring, their own substantive proposals for







Instead, the Egyptian representative launched a propaganda barrage

against Israel, never once addressing himself to the Israeli proposals,

except to dismiss them as "semantic man uvei-s."


3. PRESIDENT JOHNSON ORDERS TALKS ON JET SALES TO ISIREL

a) President Johnson, on October 9, 1968, instructed Secretary of

State Dean Rusk to enter into negotiations for the sale of jet aircraft

to Israel. The Presidential announcement, contained in a statement by

Mr. Johnson on signing the Forsign Aid Authorization Act, read as

follows:

"I have taken not, 't See. 651 concerning the sale of
planes to Israel. I ui, *,tzn it to be the sense of
the Congress that --

'The President should take such'steps as may be
necessary, as soon as practicable after the date
of enactment of this section, to negotiate an
agreement with the Government of Israel providing
for the sale by the United States of such number
of supersonic planes as may be necessary to pro-
vide Israel with an adequate deterrent force
capable of preventing future Arab aggression by
off-setting sophisticated weapons received by
the Arab States and to replace losses suffered
by Israel in the 1967 cor.flict.'

"In the light of this expression of the sense of Con-
gressi I am asking the Secretary of State to institute
negotiations with the Government of Israel and to re-
port to me."

b) The measure taken now by the President gives expression to the

statement contained in the joint communique he issued with Premier

Eshkol on January 8, 1968, following their talks at the Texas ranch.

The communique read, in part:

"The President and the Prime Minister considered the
implications of the pace of rearmament in the Middle
East and the v.'ays and means of coping with this sit-
uation. The President agreed to keep Israel's mili-
tary defense capability under active and sympathetic
examination and review in the light of all relevant
factors, including the shipment of military equip-
ment by others to the area,"

c) With the continued refusal of the USSR to contemplate measures

to reduce the arms race in the Middle East, and the uninterrupted flow

of Communist weapons to Arab countries, particularly Egypt, the .balance

of arms has been seriously upset. This situation assumes a grave dimen-

sion in the light of the Arab Governments' refusal tG consider peace










-5-


in consort with Israel, and in view of their repeated acts of aggres-

sion in violation of the cease-fire agreement and threats for renewed

total war.

d) Reacting to the President's announcement, Prime Minister Eshkol

issued the following statement on October 10, 1968, in which he ex-

pressed Israel's gratification at the measure:

"I had the opportunity during my meeting with Presi-
dentL Johinon in 1964, at the time of my visit to his
ranch L-t the beginning of this year, and on other
occasions as ,cll, to gain a close insight into his
deep friendship for the people of Israel and his
understanding of Israel's security needs.

"In the joint communique issued on January 8, 1968,
following our talks, the President agreed to closely
examine the arms balance in the region. Enshrined
in this balance is tho surest guarantee for the pre-
vention of war and the fostering of peace. The in-
discriminate flow of Soviet arms to the area has un-
dermined this balance and has intensified the tension.

"Israel aspires to a true peace, a stable peace, a
secure peace.

"I welcome the President's directive of yesterday,
it being a correct step in the direction of deter-
ring aggression,

"It is my hope that the negotiation will proceed at
a speedy pace and that the planes, so urgently needed
for Israel's defense, will be delivered in the near
future.

"I wish to take advantage of this opportunity to
express my deep appreciation to the United States
President for all he is doing in the cause of peace
in our region."




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