• TABLE OF CONTENTS
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 Title Page
 Table of Contents
 Foreword
 Summary
 Acknowledgement
 Project data sheet
 Glossary
 Map of Guatemala
 Project setting
 Project description
 Conclusions and lessons learne...
 Evaluation methodology
 ICTA approach to technological...
 The role of improved seed
 Acceptance of ICTA technology
 Institutional development






Group Title: Project impact evaluation ;, no. 30
Title: Guatemala, development of the Institute of Agricultural Science and Technology (ICTA) and its impact on agricultural research and farm productivity
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STANDARD VIEW MARC VIEW
Permanent Link: http://ufdc.ufl.edu/UF00071936/00001
 Material Information
Title: Guatemala, development of the Institute of Agricultural Science and Technology (ICTA) and its impact on agricultural research and farm productivity
Series Title: Project impact evaluation
Physical Description: 1 v. (various pagings) : ill., 1 map ; 28 cm.
Language: English
Creator: McDermott, J. K ( James Kenneth ), 1922-
Bathrick, David D
United States -- Agency for International Development. -- Bureau for Development Support
United States -- Agency for International Development. -- Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination
Publisher: U.S. Agency for International Development
Place of Publication: Washington D.C.?
Publication Date: 1982
 Subjects
Subject: Agriculture -- Research -- Guatemala   ( lcsh )
Genre: federal government publication   ( marcgt )
non-fiction   ( marcgt )
 Notes
Statement of Responsibility: by J.K. McDermott, David Bathrick.
General Note: "Development Support Bureau."
General Note: "Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination."
General Note: "February 1982."
General Note: "PN-AAJ-178"--Cover.
Funding: Electronic resources created as part of a prototype UF Institutional Repository and Faculty Papers project by the University of Florida.
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Bibliographic ID: UF00071936
Volume ID: VID00001
Source Institution: University of Florida
Holding Location: University of Florida
Rights Management: All rights reserved by the source institution and holding location.
Resource Identifier: oclc - 08343187

Table of Contents
    Title Page
        Page i
        Page ii
    Table of Contents
        Page iii
        Page iv
    Foreword
        Page v
        Page vi
    Summary
        Page vii
        Page viii
    Acknowledgement
        Page ix
        Page x
    Project data sheet
        Page xi
        Page xii
    Glossary
        Page xiii
        Page xiv
    Map of Guatemala
        Page xv
    Project setting
        Page 1
        Stagnating agricultural productivity
            Page 1
        ICTA's origin
            Page 1
        Traditional and ICTA models of agricultural research
            Page 2
            Page 3
        ICTA's first two years
            Page 4
    Project description
        Page 4
        Page 5
        Impact on crop productions
            Page 6
            The seed delivery system
                Page 6
            Genetic improvement and increased yields
                Page 7
                Page 8
            Improved farmer-accepted practices
                Page 9
        Impact on ICTA as an institution
            Page 10
            Improved on ICTA as an institution
                Page 10
            The role of expatriates
                Page 10
            Increased governmental support
                Page 11
    Conclusions and lessons learned
        Page 12
        Conclusions
            Page 12
        Lessons learned
            Page 12
            Page 13
            Page 14
    Evaluation methodology
        Page A
        Page A 1
    ICTA approach to technological development
        Page B
        Page B 1
        Page B 2
        Page B 3
        Page B 4
        Page B 5
        Page B 6
        Page B 7
        Page B 8
        Page B 9
        Page B 10
    The role of improved seed
        Page C
        Page C 1
        Page C 2
        Page C 3
        Page C 4
        Page C 5
    Acceptance of ICTA technology
        Page D
        Page D 1
        Page D 2
        Page D 3
        Page D 4
        Page D 5
        Page D 6
    Institutional development
        Page E
        Page E 1
        Page E 2
        Page E 3
        Page E 4
        Page E 5
        Page E 6
        Page E 7
Full Text
0/. /o0

30 o 3o p/;.












GUATEMALA: DEVELOPMENT OF THE INSTITUTE OF AGRICULTURAL SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY (ICTA) AND ITS IMPACT ON AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH
AND FARM PRODUCTIVITY






PROJECT IMPACT EVALUATION NO.








by


J. K. McDermott, Team Leader
(Development Support Bureau)

David Bathrick
(Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination)







U.S. Agency for International Development

December 1981


The views and interpretations expressed in this report are those of the
authors and should not be attributed to the Agency for International
Development.









CONTENTS

Page


Summary.................................................................. .ii

Acknowledments............................................................ ix

Project Data Sheet......................................................i

Glossary.............................................. .................

MapD......... ...............................................................

I. Project Setting.......... ................ .......... .. ..... .......... ....

A. Stagnating Agricultural Productivity.....e............................
B. ICTA's Origin................... ............ ..................
C. Traditional and ICTA Models of Agricultural Research.................2
D. ICTA's First Two ears...........................................4

II. Project Description......................................................4

III. Project Impact ........................ ...................................6

A. Impact on Crop Production............................................6
1i The Seed Delivery System.........................................6
2. Genetic Improvement and Increased Yields.........................7
3. Improved Farmer-Accepted Practices...............................9
B. Impact on ICTA as an Institution..................................... 10
1. Improved Qualifications of Staff................................10
2. The Role of Expatriates ................. ....................... 10
3. Increased Governmental Support..........*.......................11

IV. Conclusions and Lessons Learned.........................................12

A. Conclusions .......................................................... 12
B. Lessons Learned...................................................12

APPENDIXES

A. Evaluation Methodology
B. ICTA Approach to Technology Development
C. The Role of Improved Seed
D. Acceptance of ICTA Technology
E. Institutional Development











FOREWORD


In October 1979, the Administrator of the Agency for International
Development (AID) initiated an Agency-wide ex-post evaluation system
focusing on the impact of AID-funded projects. These impact evaluations are
concentrated in particular substantive areas as determined by AID's most
senior executives. The evaluations are to be performed largely by Agency
personnel and result in a series of studies that, by virtue of their
comparability in scope, will ensure cumulative findings of use to the Agency
and the larger development community. This study, Guatemala: Development
of ICTA and Its Impact on Agricultural Research and Farm Productivity, was
conducted in May 1980 as part of this effort. A final evaluation report
will summarize and analyze the results of all the studies in this sector,
and relate them to program, policy, and design requirements.







-vii-


SUMMARY


During the decade of the sixties, food production in Guatemala barely
kept pace with the demands of a growing population. In 1970, the Government
of Guatemala initiated a restructuring of public agencies to provide coordi-
nated service to small food-producing farms. An innovative organization,
the Institute of Agricultural Science and Technology (ICTA), emerged from
this restructuring with responsibilities for generating and promoting the
use of improved technologies in basic food crops. AID supported this
restructuring with a series of loan and grant projects beginning in 1970.

In 1975, AID approved the Food Productivity and Nutrition Project. Its
purpose was to increase the production and nutritive quality of basic food
crops in Guatemala and to strengthen and develop ICTA as an institution. Of
$1,730,000 allocated for the project, $1.2 million was for expatriate
technical assistance, including plant breeding experts and other technicians
who staffed ICTA.while project-sponsored Guatemalans were being trained to
assume positions within the new institute.

Three crops, maize, beans, and sorghum, were targeted for increased
production. Working with experts from international agricultural research
centers, ICTA personnel developed new varieties and tested them under small
farm conditions by collaborating with farmers. With the assistance of the
Inter-American Development Bank, a seed service was organized to process
seed and help maintain genetic quality.

New varieties of both maize and beans were introduced and increased
yields have been recorded. Using improved seed and other technologies
recommended by ICTA, collaborators have obtained increased yields. Gains in
maize have been primarily in lowland varieties, but one new highland variety
is promising. The impact of new seed on maize production is expected to
increase as the amount of seed produced increases.

New varieties of beans may reduce or eliminate the need for costly pro-
grams to control Golden Mosaic. New varieties of sorghum were not released
until 1980 and thus could not be evaluated. However, they appear markedly
superior to previously available varieties.

In addition to developing and recommending improved seed, ICTA devel-
oped and recommended other farming practices related to increased yields,
such as planting distances, seed densities, fertilizer applications, and
weed and insect control. Indices of acceptance developed by ICTA indicate
that increasing numbers of farmers who have collaborated in the field
testing of such new technologies are adopting ICTA recommendations. Inter-
views with ICTA personnel and with individual farmers support this impres-
sion.

The AID project facilitated and hastened the strengthening of ICTA as
an institution. The number of ICTA staff increased and staff qualifications
improved. Expatriates facilitated the research work of ICTA and its growth
as an organization. With project support, 10 Guatemalans received advanced







-viii-


training and by 1979 and 1980, they were returning to ICTA to replace ex-
patriates.

However, high attrition rates among personnel with advanced degrees are
a serious problem for ICTA. Rigid salary schedules are apparently respon-
sible, but ICTA managers have been unsuccessful in efforts to obtain the au-
thority to revise these schedules. With the departure of expatriate
advisors, these high attrition rates may make sustaining and expanding the
present ICTA system more difficult.

Some confusion remains regarding the respective roles of ICTA and
DIGESA, the extension service of the Ministry of Agriculture, particularly
as ICTA's approach to research draws on some techniques of traditional
extension methodology. ICTA and DIGESA are working on this problem, and it
seems likely that new patterns of relationships will develop.

ICTA has come to represent a new model for agricultural research that
planners and researchers in other countries are studying and attempting to
replicate. If there is continued and increased support from the Government
of Guatemala, it will be able to sustain and expand its present activities.







-ix-


ACKNOWLEDGMENTS


The team thanks the Institute of Agricultural Science and Technology
(ICTA) for supporting and assisting this evaluation. Marc Antonio Martinez,
of the socioeconomic section, escorted the team and facilitated access to
both information and personnel. ICTA data and reports were consulted.
Regional directors and other personnel within ICTA, the Directorate General
of Agricultural Services (DIGESA), and the National Agricultural Development
Bank (BANDESA) talked openly with team members. In addition, 30 farmers who
were collaborating with ICTA and its sister agencies gave freely of their
time to answer questions during farm visits. The team is grateful to all of
these persons for their assistance and cooperation. ICTA has earned a repu-
tation as a candid organization that shares openly with others. The team's
experiences corroborate that impression. Finally the team expresses its
gratitude to the USAID Mission for the assistance provided.







-xi-


PROJECT DATA SHEET


1. Country: Guatemala

2. Project Title: Guatemala Food Productivity and Nutrition Improvement

3. Project Number: 520-11-130-232

4. Project Implementation:

a. Project Authorized-1975
b. Final Obligation-1979
c. Final Input Delivery--1980

5. Project Completion-Final Disbursement: fiscal year 1980

6. Project Funding:

a. AID Predecessor Projects:
Rural Development (loan) $ 675,000
Agricultural Development (grant) 380,000
b. AID Food Productivity and
Nutrition Improvement Project 1,700,000
c. Other Donors:
Rockefeller Foundation 1,500,000
Inter-American Development Bank 2,100,000

Grand Total $6,355,000

7. Evaluations: 1975, 1976, and 1978

8. Responsible Mission Officials During Life of Project:

a. Mission Directors: Robert Culbertson, Edward Coy
b. Project Officers: Carl Koone, David Schaer, Clem Weber

9. Host Country Exchange Rates:

a. Name of Currency: Quetzal
b. Exchange Rate at Time of Project: Q1 : $1







-xiii-


BANDESA


CIMMYT


CIAT


DIGESA


ICTA


IDB


INDECA

Hectare (Ha)

Manzana (Mz)

Plan Puebla


Quetzal


GLOSSARY


Banco de Desarrollo Agricola (Agricultural Development
Bank)
I
Centro International para Majoramiento de Maiz y Trigo
(International Center for Maize and Wheat Improvement),
Mexico

Centro International de Agricultura (International
Center of Tropical Agriculture), Colombia

Direccion General de Servicios Agricola (General
Agricultural Services Bureau), Ministry of Agriculture,
Guatemala

Institute de Ciencias y Tecnologia Agricola
(Institute of Agricultural Science and.Technology)

Inter-American Development Bank

National Agricultural Marketing Agency

2.5 acres

0.7 of a hectare, about 1.7 acres

A CIMMYT project in Puebla, Mexico, that pioneered
methodologies of working closely with the farmer in
technology innovation.

Guatemala currency unit, equal to one dollar












f/
..,. *




M EXICO j


1. I BELI2











Lago de
*
/ %





Totonicapan
*O HONE
Quezaltenango

Mazatenango Guatemala .J
0 Mazatenango /


Cuilapa* 0
Jutiapa


EL SALVADOR


Guatemala
-..-International Boundary
@ Capital
0 Sites Visited

0 25 50 Miles
0 25 50 Kilometers


)URAS


:E












I. PROJECT SETTING


A. Stagnating Agricultural Productivity

In the late 1960s, the Government of Guatemala conducted a comprehen-
sive assessment of its rural areas. The assessment indicated that food
production was just barely keeping pace with growing demand and that rural
incomes and farmer productivity were stagnating. Minimal increases in
production had been achieved primarily by increasing the land area devoted
to agriculture. Particularly affected were the bean and maize staple food
crops. Although bean production had doubled between 1960 and 1970, total
acreage had increased almost three times. During the same period of time,
yields of maize, the most important food crop in Guatemala, had scarcely
increased at all. While the export subsector of agriculture contributed
$211 million of foreign exchange in 1972, well above the $21 million agri-
cultural import bill, the country still had to import maize and beans.
Increasing amounts of foreign exchange were being allocated to purchase
basic food imports. Complicating the problem, it was observed that the
availability of sufficient arable land was becoming a major constraint to
maintaining needed production levels.

To correct this situation, the five-year. development plan issued in
1970 responded by initiating fundamental changes in the structure of the
public agriculture sector. For the first time, significant public funds
were allocated for improving small farmer productivity through the creation
of an improved agricultural service system. Within the public agricultural
sector, semiautonomous institutes were created to serve the small-farm food-
producing sector. The first two institutes formed were the National Agri-
cultural Marketing Agency ('INDECA), with responsibilities for marketing, and
the National Agricultural Development Bank (BANDESA), with responsibilities
for credit services. Initially research and extension functions were
retained within the Ministry of Agriculture in a centralized agency, the
Directorate General of Agricultural Services (DIGESA). Beginning in 1970,
AID provided developmental assistance to these new agencies. This
restructuring consolidated functions and decentralized control by dividing
Guatemala into homogenous agro-ecological regions where services could be
better coordinated.


B. ICTA's Origin

Continuing this restructuring process, agricultural research respon-
sibilities were subsequently assigned to the Institute of Agricultural
Science and Technology (ICTA), a new institute created in 1973. Like the
other semiautonomous institutes, ICTA was organized outside the Ministry of
Agriculture, but with a board of directors chaired by the Minister of Agri-
culture. The semiautonomous status of the institutes provided them with
flexibility to plan and implement new programs, hire personnel, and make
independent contractual agreements. In the absence of rigid guidelines,
planners hoped that ICTA would develop new operational methodologies to link












I. PROJECT SETTING


A. Stagnating Agricultural Productivity

In the late 1960s, the Government of Guatemala conducted a comprehen-
sive assessment of its rural areas. The assessment indicated that food
production was just barely keeping pace with growing demand and that rural
incomes and farmer productivity were stagnating. Minimal increases in
production had been achieved primarily by increasing the land area devoted
to agriculture. Particularly affected were the bean and maize staple food
crops. Although bean production had doubled between 1960 and 1970, total
acreage had increased almost three times. During the same period of time,
yields of maize, the most important food crop in Guatemala, had scarcely
increased at all. While the export subsector of agriculture contributed
$211 million of foreign exchange in 1972, well above the $21 million agri-
cultural import bill, the country still had to import maize and beans.
Increasing amounts of foreign exchange were being allocated to purchase
basic food imports. Complicating the problem, it was observed that the
availability of sufficient arable land was becoming a major constraint to
maintaining needed production levels.

To correct this situation, the five-year. development plan issued in
1970 responded by initiating fundamental changes in the structure of the
public agriculture sector. For the first time, significant public funds
were allocated for improving small farmer productivity through the creation
of an improved agricultural service system. Within the public agricultural
sector, semiautonomous institutes were created to serve the small-farm food-
producing sector. The first two institutes formed were the National Agri-
cultural Marketing Agency ('INDECA), with responsibilities for marketing, and
the National Agricultural Development Bank (BANDESA), with responsibilities
for credit services. Initially research and extension functions were
retained within the Ministry of Agriculture in a centralized agency, the
Directorate General of Agricultural Services (DIGESA). Beginning in 1970,
AID provided developmental assistance to these new agencies. This
restructuring consolidated functions and decentralized control by dividing
Guatemala into homogenous agro-ecological regions where services could be
better coordinated.


B. ICTA's Origin

Continuing this restructuring process, agricultural research respon-
sibilities were subsequently assigned to the Institute of Agricultural
Science and Technology (ICTA), a new institute created in 1973. Like the
other semiautonomous institutes, ICTA was organized outside the Ministry of
Agriculture, but with a board of directors chaired by the Minister of Agri-
culture. The semiautonomous status of the institutes provided them with
flexibility to plan and implement new programs, hire personnel, and make
independent contractual agreements. In the absence of rigid guidelines,
planners hoped that ICTA would develop new operational methodologies to link












I. PROJECT SETTING


A. Stagnating Agricultural Productivity

In the late 1960s, the Government of Guatemala conducted a comprehen-
sive assessment of its rural areas. The assessment indicated that food
production was just barely keeping pace with growing demand and that rural
incomes and farmer productivity were stagnating. Minimal increases in
production had been achieved primarily by increasing the land area devoted
to agriculture. Particularly affected were the bean and maize staple food
crops. Although bean production had doubled between 1960 and 1970, total
acreage had increased almost three times. During the same period of time,
yields of maize, the most important food crop in Guatemala, had scarcely
increased at all. While the export subsector of agriculture contributed
$211 million of foreign exchange in 1972, well above the $21 million agri-
cultural import bill, the country still had to import maize and beans.
Increasing amounts of foreign exchange were being allocated to purchase
basic food imports. Complicating the problem, it was observed that the
availability of sufficient arable land was becoming a major constraint to
maintaining needed production levels.

To correct this situation, the five-year. development plan issued in
1970 responded by initiating fundamental changes in the structure of the
public agriculture sector. For the first time, significant public funds
were allocated for improving small farmer productivity through the creation
of an improved agricultural service system. Within the public agricultural
sector, semiautonomous institutes were created to serve the small-farm food-
producing sector. The first two institutes formed were the National Agri-
cultural Marketing Agency ('INDECA), with responsibilities for marketing, and
the National Agricultural Development Bank (BANDESA), with responsibilities
for credit services. Initially research and extension functions were
retained within the Ministry of Agriculture in a centralized agency, the
Directorate General of Agricultural Services (DIGESA). Beginning in 1970,
AID provided developmental assistance to these new agencies. This
restructuring consolidated functions and decentralized control by dividing
Guatemala into homogenous agro-ecological regions where services could be
better coordinated.


B. ICTA's Origin

Continuing this restructuring process, agricultural research respon-
sibilities were subsequently assigned to the Institute of Agricultural
Science and Technology (ICTA), a new institute created in 1973. Like the
other semiautonomous institutes, ICTA was organized outside the Ministry of
Agriculture, but with a board of directors chaired by the Minister of Agri-
culture. The semiautonomous status of the institutes provided them with
flexibility to plan and implement new programs, hire personnel, and make
independent contractual agreements. In the absence of rigid guidelines,
planners hoped that ICTA would develop new operational methodologies to link







-2-


the needs and concerns of farmers more closely with the generation and
testing of new technologies.

ICTA was carefully designed to address four specific problems identi-
fied during the rural sector assessment: (1) the lack of an adequate tech-
nology for the small farmer, (2) inadequate farm testing of the technology
being recommended, (3) lack of evaluation of farmer acceptance of a recom-
mended technology, and (4) the researchers' lack of knowledge of farmer
problems and their insufficient contact with the extension agents.

Planning for ICTA development took two years, involved five work groups
including scientists from Guatemala and other Latin American countries, and
personnel of both AID and the Rockefeller Foundation. The experiences from
similar international agricultural research projects were carefully consid-
ered. The International Center for Maize and Wheat Improvement (CIMMYT)
Plan Puebla Project in Mexico was particularly important. This project was
a pioneer effort in bringing research into closer contact with both the
farmers and extension agents. Another antecedent was the AID-predecessor
Point IV program in Guatemala which helped establish a research service in
the Ministry of Agriculture. Guatemalan scientists from this research-
education tradition played a major role in the creation of ICTA.

Both AID and the Rockefeller Foundation played major roles in devel-
oping and implementing the new organizational structure. AID's intimate
participation with this important research initiative and close coordination
with the Rockefeller Foundation over a long period permitted it to play a
major role in policy and strategy formulation.


C. Traditional and ICTA Models of Agricultural Research

To fully appreciate the significance of ICTA and the research method-
ology developed, its divergence from traditional approaches to agricultural
research must be recognized. In the traditional model, research and exten-
sion are separate processes. Scientists working in experiment stations
conduct research and develop new technologies. Recommendations are commun-
icated to farmers through extension service workers who make farm visits,
prepare demonstration plots, and issue publications. Through these promo-
tional activities, it is expected that farmers will recognize the advantages
of the new technologies and will adopt them as their own.

Station research is conducted along commodity lines with the roles of
the various disciplines carefully defined. Research in plant breeding, for
example, is conducted independently of research in soils. Biological and
physical scientists predominate in technology development.

In the traditional model, yield optimization rather than profitability
enhancement objectives are emphasized. New technologies that increase pro-
ductivity are assumed to be applicable and beneficial to all farmers. Al-
though large farm operators may be the first to accept the new technologies,
it is assumed that eventually small farm commercial operators will follow
suit through the process of technology "trickle down." Nonadopters are







-3-


considered to be resistant to change because of "laziness" or "irrational
behavior."

ICTA was organized around an innovative concept and style of operation
that has come to be called "farming systems research" (although ICTA itself
makes almost no use of that term). This operating style brings the research
entity into much closer contact with the farmer-client than does the tradi-
tional research methodology. The ICTA approach accomplishes two things. By
helping research personnel to know and to understand the farmer, it enables
them to direct their research efforts to seeking technology improvements
that are relevant to his system. Because ICTA was assigned the small farm
operator as its exclusive client, it directs its efforts toward generating
technology relevant to small farm systems. Secondly, innovations are tested
by small farmers in their system before being released or recommended for
use on small farms. The style involves on-farm research, with minimal ex-
periment station research. The ICTA system deemphasizes the experiment
station. ICTA has no central research station. Its regional stations,
called "production centers," are neither large nor elaborately equipped.
The maintenance of genetic purity and most of the plant variety crossings
are done here. Almost everything else is done on farms. Laboratory faci-
lities are also meager. Most research (75 percent) takes place on individ-
ual farms with only 25 percent of research being conducted on experiment
station sites. Farmers collaborate in the process of research by employing
recommended practices and by evaluating the results and opinions as to
appropriateness. Employing this approach, farmer confidence with new tech-
nologies results in considerable informal dissemination to other farmers
even before information is released to extension workers and officially
promoted. Accordingly, the traditional gap separating agricultural research
and extension is significantly reduced.

In the ICTA model, research is directed toward specific agro-ecological
areas representative of a larger universe. The focus is on technologies
that can be implemented and that are profitable for use by the small farm
producers.

Research is conducted by interdisciplinary teams. The knowledge of
various disciplines, such as plant breeding, entomology, economics, and
sociology, is focused on a particular crop or a prevalent mix of crops
appropriate to the mixed cropping activities employed within the farm
enterprise. Social scientists contribute by studying how farmers make
management decisions and how innovations can be introduced which are
respectful of family labor constraints, customary behavior patterns, and
cultural practices. Input/output budgets to assess the profitability of
each recommendation are carefully developed and analyzed.

Thus, while the traditional model represents a unidirectional flow of
information from scientists to farmers, the ICTA model represents a multi-
directional flow of information among scientists in different disciplines
and farmers who are collaborators in the research and testing of new tech-
nologies. Appendix B provides a more detailed explanation of the tradi-
tional and ICTA approaches to agricultural research.







-4-


D. ICTA's First Two Years

During ICTA's first two years of operation, the traditional organiza-
tion of departments on the basis of agricultural disciplines was changed.
Instead, a National Commodity Programs system was developed which brought
together the various scientific disciplines to focus on specific crops.
Experiment stations were renamed "Production Centers" and became the head-
quarters of ICTA in each region. Farm-level testing of existing technolog-
ical information and plant varieties was initiated in three areas.

ICTA leaders assisted by expatriate advisors developed guidelines for
conducting farm level research. These guidelines were flexible so that
research methodologies could evolve out of the experiences gained in the
field. ICTA planners also specified that they should determine farmer ac-
ceptance or nonacceptance by introducing these new technologies to farmers
directly and incorporating farmer evaluations into the research effort.

Initially, as the research facilities and functions were transferred
from DIGESA to ICTA, the two organizations cooperated closely. However,
frictions soon developed. ICTA was assuming not only the research responsi-
bilities formerly assigned to DIGESA, but according to DIGESA was also
taking on some of the unspecified responsibilities for "extension" which
were DIGESA's domain. Some of DIGESA's most talented people accepted posi-
tions in the new institute. ICTA personnel were better paid and were free
of some of the Ministry of Agriculture regulations that constrained DIGESA
personnel. Furthermore, as a new organization, ICTA was receiving
considerable attention, both nationally and internationally.

The ICTA organizational and technology development system is presented
in detail in Appendix B.


II. PROJECT DESCRIPTION

During a five-year period, beginning in 1976, the Food Productivity and
Nutrition Improvement Project's aim was to increase the production and
nutritive quality of basic food crops in Guatemala and to strengthen and
develop ICTA. AID obligated $1,730,000 to provide research and outreach
programs designed to increase yields of Guatemala's basic food crops and to
improve human nutrition through the development and utilization of high-
yield food crops with improved nutritional value. The Mission estimates
that additional support to ICTA from two earlier projects amounting to over
$950,000 was provided as a result of a restructuring of the public agricul-
ture sector. That included almost 10 person-years of technical assistance
in beans, vegetables, and regional research and extension coordination.

At the time the project was approved, high-lysine maize was being
intensively tested by AID's Technical Assistance Bureau (TAB), CIMMYT, and
others. This new maize contained larger amounts of the amino acid lysine
and this significantly improved its protein quality. Project plans called
for the creation of a special unit in ICTA to work on high-lysine maize, but







-4-


D. ICTA's First Two Years

During ICTA's first two years of operation, the traditional organiza-
tion of departments on the basis of agricultural disciplines was changed.
Instead, a National Commodity Programs system was developed which brought
together the various scientific disciplines to focus on specific crops.
Experiment stations were renamed "Production Centers" and became the head-
quarters of ICTA in each region. Farm-level testing of existing technolog-
ical information and plant varieties was initiated in three areas.

ICTA leaders assisted by expatriate advisors developed guidelines for
conducting farm level research. These guidelines were flexible so that
research methodologies could evolve out of the experiences gained in the
field. ICTA planners also specified that they should determine farmer ac-
ceptance or nonacceptance by introducing these new technologies to farmers
directly and incorporating farmer evaluations into the research effort.

Initially, as the research facilities and functions were transferred
from DIGESA to ICTA, the two organizations cooperated closely. However,
frictions soon developed. ICTA was assuming not only the research responsi-
bilities formerly assigned to DIGESA, but according to DIGESA was also
taking on some of the unspecified responsibilities for "extension" which
were DIGESA's domain. Some of DIGESA's most talented people accepted posi-
tions in the new institute. ICTA personnel were better paid and were free
of some of the Ministry of Agriculture regulations that constrained DIGESA
personnel. Furthermore, as a new organization, ICTA was receiving
considerable attention, both nationally and internationally.

The ICTA organizational and technology development system is presented
in detail in Appendix B.


II. PROJECT DESCRIPTION

During a five-year period, beginning in 1976, the Food Productivity and
Nutrition Improvement Project's aim was to increase the production and
nutritive quality of basic food crops in Guatemala and to strengthen and
develop ICTA. AID obligated $1,730,000 to provide research and outreach
programs designed to increase yields of Guatemala's basic food crops and to
improve human nutrition through the development and utilization of high-
yield food crops with improved nutritional value. The Mission estimates
that additional support to ICTA from two earlier projects amounting to over
$950,000 was provided as a result of a restructuring of the public agricul-
ture sector. That included almost 10 person-years of technical assistance
in beans, vegetables, and regional research and extension coordination.

At the time the project was approved, high-lysine maize was being
intensively tested by AID's Technical Assistance Bureau (TAB), CIMMYT, and
others. This new maize contained larger amounts of the amino acid lysine
and this significantly improved its protein quality. Project plans called
for the creation of a special unit in ICTA to work on high-lysine maize, but







-5-


these plans were subsequently set aside because no genetic material suitable
for the highlands, was available. Instead, the project focused on conven-
tional maize, Guatemala's predominant food crop and most important staple
food.

The Project funds were allocated for technical assistance, participant
training, and equipment. Most of the AID resources ($1.2 million) supported
expatriate technical assistance, including plant breeding experts from Texas
A & M University, the International Tropical Agriculture Center (CIAT), and
other expatriate technicians who staffed ICTA while Guatemalans were re-
ceiving advanced degree training. The quality of the technical assistance
provided and the way in which it was employed were important factors in the
successful institutional development work that was observed. Most of the
expatriate assistance was in line positions. For example, two leaders of
the three original regional production teams were AID-supported contract
personnel. One of them was later transferred into the position of technical
director, where he supervised all technical operations. The other served as
training supervisor as well as production team leader before becoming leader
of the national sorghum program. Both were replaced as production team
leaders by Guatemalans, and all teams in the newly activated regional
programs were staffed by Guatemalans.

The project used a variety of contractors, each of which made a major
contribution. The sorghum breeder and several other technicians were pro-
vided through Texas A & M University. Two maize breeders were contracted
from CIMMYT, and a CIAT contract provided two bean breeders. The plant
breeding experts provided access to the world's best stock of germ plasm as
well as other support. The technician promoted to the top technical posi-
tion in ICTA was provided by a Puerto Rican.consulting firm.

It is the consensus among ICTA personnel that this assistance was
crucial. It performed several functions. First, it provided manpower to
staff ICTA while its own people were being trained. Second, it provided
ICTA with both technical competence and help in making its new concept oper-
ational. Finally, it facilitated the development of linkages with the in-
ternational agricultural research centers and U.S. centers, which serve as
repositories of the world's stock of commodity technology. Parenthetically,
the work in Guatemala fed back into these worldwide entities to their own
benefit.

The project provided $140,000 for the training of ICTA personnel in the
United States and elsewhere. Additional funds were allocated for equipment
needs, including pickup trucks, maize sellers, threshers, and other field
equipment.

At the time the project was approved, ICTA was working in the Highlands
(Quetzaltenango), Eastern (Jutiapa), and Coastal (La Maquina) regions, three
major geographical areas where large concentrations of small farmers were
producing basic food crops. ICTA operations were later expanded to include
all six regions of Guatemala, although activities within two of the regions
were on a reduced scale.







-6-


Other donor agencies were important to the project, and the Mission
assumed its share of the responsibilities in orchestrating those efforts.
The Rockefeller Foundation was heavily involved in the original design of
ICTA, and, just as important, its personnel played key roles in resolving
problems to make the concept operational. The Foundation provided a special
consultant to the director general and an experiment station development
specialist, both from its permanent staff. It provided the chief of the
socioeconomics section for four years and the technical director for two
years. The success of the AID project owes much to this group.

The Inter-American Development Bank handled the seed program, which was
one of the originally designed delivery systems, via a loan for facilities
and a grant for technical assistance.

The Food Productivity and Nutrition Improvement Project targeted three
crops, maize, beans, and sorghum, for increased production. Maize is the
most important food crop in Guatemala. Beans are the principal source of
protein for most of the rural (and urban) poor. Sorghum was included
because it is an important crop in the Eastern area and can be used in many
of the same ways that maize is used.


III. PROJECT IMPACT

To completely separate the Impact of the Food Productivity and Nutri-
tion Improvement Project from the impact of other AID assistance is an
impossible task. Even separating AID assistance from that provided by the
Rockefeller Foundation and the Inter-American Development Bank is diffi-
cult. The three donors worked together exceptionally well in designing and
implementing the new approach to agricultural research and in financing
different'aspects of a unitary effort.

A new seed delivery system, for example, was an integral part of the
original AID project design. When the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)
expressed an interest in supporting this part of the project, AID retained
contingency plans until the IDB commitment was firm. IDB provided a loan
for facilities and a grant for technical assistance to enable the creation
of this new seed delivery system. The team's evaluation of this new system
is included because the merchandizing of improved seeds is an integral part
of the impact of the AID project.


A. Impact on Crop Production


1. The Seed Delivery System

Before ICTA was created, the merchandising of seeds was under state
control. With the development of ICTA, the Government of Guatemala modified
its seed regulations and procedures to encourage the development of a
privately controlled seed industry. Under the new system, ICTA works with
international research centers to develop and test improved germ plasm. New







-6-


Other donor agencies were important to the project, and the Mission
assumed its share of the responsibilities in orchestrating those efforts.
The Rockefeller Foundation was heavily involved in the original design of
ICTA, and, just as important, its personnel played key roles in resolving
problems to make the concept operational. The Foundation provided a special
consultant to the director general and an experiment station development
specialist, both from its permanent staff. It provided the chief of the
socioeconomics section for four years and the technical director for two
years. The success of the AID project owes much to this group.

The Inter-American Development Bank handled the seed program, which was
one of the originally designed delivery systems, via a loan for facilities
and a grant for technical assistance.

The Food Productivity and Nutrition Improvement Project targeted three
crops, maize, beans, and sorghum, for increased production. Maize is the
most important food crop in Guatemala. Beans are the principal source of
protein for most of the rural (and urban) poor. Sorghum was included
because it is an important crop in the Eastern area and can be used in many
of the same ways that maize is used.


III. PROJECT IMPACT

To completely separate the Impact of the Food Productivity and Nutri-
tion Improvement Project from the impact of other AID assistance is an
impossible task. Even separating AID assistance from that provided by the
Rockefeller Foundation and the Inter-American Development Bank is diffi-
cult. The three donors worked together exceptionally well in designing and
implementing the new approach to agricultural research and in financing
different'aspects of a unitary effort.

A new seed delivery system, for example, was an integral part of the
original AID project design. When the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)
expressed an interest in supporting this part of the project, AID retained
contingency plans until the IDB commitment was firm. IDB provided a loan
for facilities and a grant for technical assistance to enable the creation
of this new seed delivery system. The team's evaluation of this new system
is included because the merchandizing of improved seeds is an integral part
of the impact of the AID project.


A. Impact on Crop Production


1. The Seed Delivery System

Before ICTA was created, the merchandising of seeds was under state
control. With the development of ICTA, the Government of Guatemala modified
its seed regulations and procedures to encourage the development of a
privately controlled seed industry. Under the new system, ICTA works with
international research centers to develop and test improved germ plasm. New











varieties are released to private growers who multiply them for the first
generation under ICTA supervision to maintain both genetic purity and
freedom from weed contamination. ICTA provides its processing and storage
facilities to the commercial growers for a fee, and the seed is labeled
"ICTA certified." ICTA never takes ownership; growers are responsible for
merchandising. After ICTA release of the seed, no public agency has author-
ity to regulate the seed industry or maintain quality safeguards.

The evaluation team found this system to be working well at the present
time, although the absence of regulation may lead to problems at a later
date. Commercial seed growers sell first-generation seed as "ICTA certi-
fied." Second generation seed is now being sold under brand names that
associate it with ICTA, suggesting that the public has confidence in ICTA.

2. Genetic Improvement and Increased Yields

The AID evaluation team found that the project's investment in plant
breeding and improved seed has resulted in increased yields of both maize
and beans. All farmers visited spoke of the increased yields they attrib-
Suted to ICTA technologies.

Using ICTA data on increased yields resulting from the production of
ICTA-developed seed, the evaluation team calculates that improved seed for
maize alone was worth more than $7 million to Guatemala agriculture in
1979. A calculation based on data provided by ICTA indicates that seed
developed by ICTA was worth at least $10 million to Guatemalan agriculture
in 1979, compared to the ICTA budget of $4 million. This calculation
pertains only to that part of the ICTA genetic material which flowed through
the ICTA seed system. Seed sales considerably decrease the Guatemalan
foreign exchange levels previously spent on seed import. The data and
calculation are shown in Appendix C. Field data gathered from the coastal
area indicate that 95 percent of the farmers now use ICTA-developed
varieties, compared with less than 50 percent in 1975 using improved
varieties.

Since there is a strong interaction between the genetics of the maize
plant and the ecology of an area, ICTA has been working with a number of
different varieties to accommodate the extreme variations of the Guatemalan
climate. Most of the productivity gains so far have come from lowland
maize. In the highlands, no single improved variety has been found to
produce greater yields than native varieties over a very broad area. How-
ever, a new variety-Guatean Xela-appears promising because it matures
three weeks earlier than some of the native material. Since maize can
barely mature in the 11-month growing season of the highlands, the earlier
maturity of this new variety could be an important contribution in farming
operations.

It is unlikely that Guatemalan maize will have much impact on other
countries because maize is a highly site-specific crop. However, the
methods being used for maize improvement by ICTA, in collaboration with
CIMMYT, are based on open pollination, and varieties within Guatemala can be
expected to improve steadily over time, even without the release of new
varieties.











Furthermore, the impact of ICTA maize seed is expected to increase
through increases in the number of seed producers and the amount of seed
produced. ICTA's goal is to produce 3.8 million pounds of seed maize in
1980 and 6 million pounds per year by 1985. In 1978, ICTA was producing
less than 1.8 million pounds of seed maize.

With beans, the evaluation team found the impact of the project's in-
vestment to be most pronounced in the area of disease. Using ICTA data on
increased yields resulting from the production of ICTA-developed seed, im-
proved bean seed available was estimated to be worth only $32,000 to
Guatemalan agriculture in 1979.

However, in the lowlands, as in other parts of the world, beans have
been plagued by the Golden Mosaic, a devastating disease carried by the
white fly. A Colombian variety of bean, Suchitan, was introduced into
Guatemala and approved for multiplication in 1977. In 1979, enough seed was
produced to plant about 1,700 acres in 1980. This new variety shows consid-
erable promise. In ICTA on-farm tests, Suchitan, under severe attack by
Golden Mosaic virus and without treatment had yields about equal to the best
of Guatemala's varieties which were grown under an ideal and costly disease-
control program. Three varieties with a higher level of tolerance than
Suchitan to Golden Mosaic were released in 1980 and may represent a genetic
breakthrough.

The evaluation team was unable to assess the project's investment in
sorghum. Since no new sorghum material passed through the ICTA seed system
in 1978, data were not available to calculate increased yields. Prior to
1975, with AID assistance, ICTA had produced some improved sorghum and
distributed enough seed to plant 4,500 acres. The impact of this earlier
assistance was not evaluated.

In 1980, however, ICTA released four new varieties of sorghum that
appear to be markedly superior. They have been widely tested in ICTA farm
trials and observed by farmers in 25 field days. Their yields in 1979
averaged 300 percent higher than traditional native varieties.

Common native varieties flower in 165-170 days. ICTA has developed
materials that flower in 135 days. These new varieties could enable sorghum
to be produced in areas in which the.rainy season is too short for any of
the native varieties.

One of the new varieties has a gene that increases the photosynthetic
efficiency of the crop so that some high-yielding temperate zone sorghum
varieties yield equally well in the shorter days of the tropics. Another
variety has a cooking quality that is almost equal to that of maize, both in
home cooking and in commercial products. Several companies have shown
interest in the new sorghums for use in snack and specialty foods, in baby
foods, and as an extender of wheat flour. These new varieties show promise
of having a significant impact on sorghum production in Guatemala and in
other countries also.








-9-


3. Improved Farmer-Accepted Practices

In addition to developing and recommending improved seed, ICTA develops
and recommends other farming practices related to increased yields. These
may include recommended planting distances, seed densities, fertilizer ap-
plications, and weed and insect control. Since recommended practices vary
from region to region, both in substance and in value to the farmer, the
extent of acceptance is difficult to measure, and any relationship between
acceptance and increased yields is impossible to isolate from other con-
tributing factors.

Within each region, however, ICTA does calculate an Acceptance Index
for each recommendation. This index represents the percentage of colla-
borators continuing to use a recommended technology multiplied by the
percentage of their land on which they are using it. Fifty has been estab-
lished as the Acceptance Index required before ICTA considers the new tech-
nology satisfactory. This is a stringent test; all farmers could be using
the new technology and the Acceptance Index could still be less than 50.

The Acceptance Index was not designed for impact evaluation. It
records acceptance for a changing group of ICTA collaborators. Measurements
are taken only during the first year after collaborators have participated
in an ICTA field test. Thus, no inferences can be drawn regarding mass
acceptance. In spite of these limitations, the Acceptance Index offers the
only statistical information available on the "acceptance" of ICTA technol-
ogy.

The evaluation team examined the 1979 Acceptance Indices for maize pro-
duction in two geographic regions of Guatemala-the Highlands (Totonicapan)
and the Coast Area (La Maquina). A detailed analysis, reported in Appendix
D, reveals that Acceptance Indices in both areas were noticeably increasing
over the five-year period 1975-1979. In the Highlands, where subsistence
farming predominates, two out of five indices had reached 50 by 1979; in the
Coastal Area, where small commercial farms predominate, indices for three of
the four recommendations surpassed 50 in both 1978 and in 1979.

The Acceptance Indices in these two areas suggest that increasing
numbers of farmers who have collaborated in field testing of technologies
recommended by ICTA are adopting these recommendations. Interviews with
ICTA personnel and with individual farmers supported this impression.

Two specific examples of ICTA's impact in improving farm practices came
to the attention of the evaluation team. In the Highlands, where fertilizer
is essential and costly, farmers had been using a fertilizer containing
equal parts of nitrogen and phosphorus, even though the needs for nitrogen
were much greater. Thus to apply adequate nitrogen, it was necessary to
waste phosphate. One farmer visited by the evaluation team estimated that
by using ICTA technology-spacing, rate of seeding, and nitrogen fertilizer-
he had doubled production while reducing fertilizer cost by one-half.

In the Coastal region (La Maquina), ICTA field tests revealed that the
use of fertilizer did not increase yields significantly. These findings







-10-


were shared with BANDESA, whose Regional Credit Office was at this time
requiring borrowers to use fertilizer. As a result, the fertilizer require-
ment was eliminated by BANDESA, and money which had formerly been allocated
for fertilizer became available for loans to more farmers


B. Impact on ICTA as an Institution

The evaluation team believes that one of the most important outcomes of
the AID project was the development of ICTA as a new institution supporting
an innovative system for conducting agricultural research. AID provided
assistance during a period when ICTA was defining and elaborating its role
and stabilizing its program and procedures. This assistance both facili-
tated and hastened the strengthening of the newly established institute.


1. Improved Qualifications of Staff

The strengthening of ICTA's institutional capacity is reflected in the
improved qualifications of ICTA staff. In 1970, when the agricultural
research system was being assessed, 50 technicians were responsible for
agricultural research throughout Guatemala. Most were peritos agronomos,
high school graduates with some agricultural trade school preparation. Only
38 percent had B.S., M.S., or Ph.D. degrees.

By 1976, when the Food Productivity and Nutrition Improvement Project
was approved, ICTA staff had increased to 145 technicians, 65 percent of
whom had earned B.S., M.S., or Ph.D. degrees. In 1979, 76 percent of ICTA's
159 .technicians had B.S. or higher degrees. This strengthening of the
qualifications of ICTA personnel occurred in all technical and support units
except the socioeconomic unit. Additional information on improved staffing
and other institutional development factors is presented in Appendix E.

At all levels of the ICTA system, the evaluation team was impressed
with the knowledge of ICTA personnel and their commitment to the ICTA system
of agricultural research. During visits to 30 farms, all ICTA personnel
knew and understood the farm enterprise and related well with farmers who
were collaborating in research.


2. The Role of Expatriates

ICTA program leaders expressed the unanimous opinion that expatriate
assistance enabled ICTA to benefit quickly from the scientific work being
done outside Guatemala. Expatriate personnel were highly qualified and
closely linked with international supplies of improved germ plasm. In the
opinion of ICTA leaders, expatriate assistance facilitated the screening and
testing of new varieties and the development of new recommended technolo-
gies.

AID-supported expatriates functioned in both management and technical
positions. With their assistance, ICTA continued to develop as an organi-
zation, and research programs advanced while Guatemalans were receiving







-10-


were shared with BANDESA, whose Regional Credit Office was at this time
requiring borrowers to use fertilizer. As a result, the fertilizer require-
ment was eliminated by BANDESA, and money which had formerly been allocated
for fertilizer became available for loans to more farmers


B. Impact on ICTA as an Institution

The evaluation team believes that one of the most important outcomes of
the AID project was the development of ICTA as a new institution supporting
an innovative system for conducting agricultural research. AID provided
assistance during a period when ICTA was defining and elaborating its role
and stabilizing its program and procedures. This assistance both facili-
tated and hastened the strengthening of the newly established institute.


1. Improved Qualifications of Staff

The strengthening of ICTA's institutional capacity is reflected in the
improved qualifications of ICTA staff. In 1970, when the agricultural
research system was being assessed, 50 technicians were responsible for
agricultural research throughout Guatemala. Most were peritos agronomos,
high school graduates with some agricultural trade school preparation. Only
38 percent had B.S., M.S., or Ph.D. degrees.

By 1976, when the Food Productivity and Nutrition Improvement Project
was approved, ICTA staff had increased to 145 technicians, 65 percent of
whom had earned B.S., M.S., or Ph.D. degrees. In 1979, 76 percent of ICTA's
159 .technicians had B.S. or higher degrees. This strengthening of the
qualifications of ICTA personnel occurred in all technical and support units
except the socioeconomic unit. Additional information on improved staffing
and other institutional development factors is presented in Appendix E.

At all levels of the ICTA system, the evaluation team was impressed
with the knowledge of ICTA personnel and their commitment to the ICTA system
of agricultural research. During visits to 30 farms, all ICTA personnel
knew and understood the farm enterprise and related well with farmers who
were collaborating in research.


2. The Role of Expatriates

ICTA program leaders expressed the unanimous opinion that expatriate
assistance enabled ICTA to benefit quickly from the scientific work being
done outside Guatemala. Expatriate personnel were highly qualified and
closely linked with international supplies of improved germ plasm. In the
opinion of ICTA leaders, expatriate assistance facilitated the screening and
testing of new varieties and the development of new recommended technolo-
gies.

AID-supported expatriates functioned in both management and technical
positions. With their assistance, ICTA continued to develop as an organi-
zation, and research programs advanced while Guatemalans were receiving







-10-


were shared with BANDESA, whose Regional Credit Office was at this time
requiring borrowers to use fertilizer. As a result, the fertilizer require-
ment was eliminated by BANDESA, and money which had formerly been allocated
for fertilizer became available for loans to more farmers


B. Impact on ICTA as an Institution

The evaluation team believes that one of the most important outcomes of
the AID project was the development of ICTA as a new institution supporting
an innovative system for conducting agricultural research. AID provided
assistance during a period when ICTA was defining and elaborating its role
and stabilizing its program and procedures. This assistance both facili-
tated and hastened the strengthening of the newly established institute.


1. Improved Qualifications of Staff

The strengthening of ICTA's institutional capacity is reflected in the
improved qualifications of ICTA staff. In 1970, when the agricultural
research system was being assessed, 50 technicians were responsible for
agricultural research throughout Guatemala. Most were peritos agronomos,
high school graduates with some agricultural trade school preparation. Only
38 percent had B.S., M.S., or Ph.D. degrees.

By 1976, when the Food Productivity and Nutrition Improvement Project
was approved, ICTA staff had increased to 145 technicians, 65 percent of
whom had earned B.S., M.S., or Ph.D. degrees. In 1979, 76 percent of ICTA's
159 .technicians had B.S. or higher degrees. This strengthening of the
qualifications of ICTA personnel occurred in all technical and support units
except the socioeconomic unit. Additional information on improved staffing
and other institutional development factors is presented in Appendix E.

At all levels of the ICTA system, the evaluation team was impressed
with the knowledge of ICTA personnel and their commitment to the ICTA system
of agricultural research. During visits to 30 farms, all ICTA personnel
knew and understood the farm enterprise and related well with farmers who
were collaborating in research.


2. The Role of Expatriates

ICTA program leaders expressed the unanimous opinion that expatriate
assistance enabled ICTA to benefit quickly from the scientific work being
done outside Guatemala. Expatriate personnel were highly qualified and
closely linked with international supplies of improved germ plasm. In the
opinion of ICTA leaders, expatriate assistance facilitated the screening and
testing of new varieties and the development of new recommended technolo-
gies.

AID-supported expatriates functioned in both management and technical
positions. With their assistance, ICTA continued to develop as an organi-
zation, and research programs advanced while Guatemalans were receiving







-11-


advanced training. Under the AID project, 10 ICTA professionals (1 Ph.D.
candidate and 9 M.S. candidates) were sent to universities in the United
States and other countries for advanced degrees. They began returning to
ICTA in 1979 and 1980 to replace expatriates.


3. Increased Governmental Support

One of the best indicators reflecting the positive results obtained
from this project was the dramatic increase in financial assistance provided
to ICTA. During the course of the AID project (1976-1980), the government's
budget to ICTA more than doubled, from $2.3 million to $4.7 million. Such
increases have resulted in the improved capacity of the technical and sup-
port units described in Appendix E. In the future, however, additional
resources will be required to sustain ICTA's present system and permit its
expansion. Additional numbers of highly trained professionals will be re-
quired over the next five years. At present, there is a very high attrition
rate among personnel with advanced degrees, especially among M.S. and Ph.D.
technicians. For example, of the seven technicians with M.S. degrees in
1976, only four remain with ICTA. The others are now employed by the
private seed industry.

With the departure of expatriate advisors, high attrition rates among
personnel with advanced degrees may make sustaining and expanding the pres-
ent system more difficult. Higher salary levels would probably reduce the
attrition rate, but ICTA has not been successful in efforts to obtain from
the government the authority to revise its salary schedules and the re-
sources to pay higher salaries. The team believes that ICTA's high attri-
tion rates among trained personnel are a serious matter and could threaten
ICTA's future.

One closing note concerns the need for more effective working relation-
ships between ICTA and the extension organization, DIGESA. The quasi-
extension activities carried out by ICTA have resulted in some confusion
about the respective roles of the two organizations. Team interviews sug-
gest that personnel in DIGESA, BANDESA, and the Ministry of Agriculture's
Sectoral Planning Office do not fully appreciate the difference between
ICTA's techniques of informal diffusion and DIGESA's responsibility for
formal dissemination of recommended new technologies. Most extension agents
interviewed lacked knowledge of the functioning of the ICTA system and were
unfamiliar with specific ICTA recommendations or their benefits.

Recent developments suggest that this problem is being addressed. The
credit management responsibilities of DIGESA agents have been eliminated,
making extension work their principal field responsibility. ICTA has devel-
oped a comprehensive program to train DIGESA personnel in all aspects of the
ICTA technology development system. The new ICTA Director, who was the
former DIGESA Deputy Director, is likely to encourage greater cooperation
between ICTA and DIGESA. Thus, it seems likely that new patterns of rela-
tionship between ICTA and DIGESA will eventually be worked out.







-12-


IV. CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED


A. Conclusions

ICTA serves as a pioneer among agricultural research institutions. It
was one of the first national agricultural research institutions within the
developing world to organize an innovative methodology for the generation of
technology appropriate to small farm conditions. The methodology developed
fits within the broad frame of farming systems research. The evaluation
team concludes that within a relatively short period, significant insti-
tutional, operational, and research accomplishments have been produced.

Under the ICTA system, significantly improved seed varieties and cul-
tural practices acceptable to the small farmer were developed for maize,
bean, and sorghum. Farmer awareness of the importance of improved seed has
been so developed that a thriving seed industry has developed almost com-
pletely within the private sector. The estimated value obtained from the
increased production calculated from "ICTA certified" seed is more than 2.5
times that of the total ICTA budget, and represents a considerable foreign
exchange savings of funds heretofore spent on imported seed. Compared with
the pre-ICTA 1970-1972 averages for maize, all ICTA collaborators record
yield figures at least double earlier averages.

Around the world, ICTA has come to represent a new approach for
agricultural research with agricultural planners and researchers studying
ICTA as a model for possible replication. A structure similar to ICTA's is
being proposed in Honduras. The U.S. University Consortium for Interna-
tional Development is sending 32 Latin American researchers to ICTA to
observe the system. Cornell University has selected ICTA for a case study
model for a farming system research publication.


B. Lessons Learned

The evaluation team summarizes the lessons learned from ICTA as follows:

1. "Farming system research" has been almost romanticized by some stu-
dents of agricultural research. This evaluation serves as one of the
first studies to bring hard data to this new topic. The ICTA approach
to technology development demonstrates clearly the positive benefits
derived from this unconventional approach for generating acceptable
small farmer technologies and practices.

2. The ICTA project demonstrates the important role of USAID in
working cooperatively with countries over a long period. During the
five year pre-ICTA period, AID worked with the Government of Guatemala
in planning and implementing the reorganization of the public agri-
cultural sector. AID's early and sustained involvement in the devel-
opment of ICTA facilitated the provision of assistance that was both
timely and appropriate. Many of the important interactions took place







-12-


IV. CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED


A. Conclusions

ICTA serves as a pioneer among agricultural research institutions. It
was one of the first national agricultural research institutions within the
developing world to organize an innovative methodology for the generation of
technology appropriate to small farm conditions. The methodology developed
fits within the broad frame of farming systems research. The evaluation
team concludes that within a relatively short period, significant insti-
tutional, operational, and research accomplishments have been produced.

Under the ICTA system, significantly improved seed varieties and cul-
tural practices acceptable to the small farmer were developed for maize,
bean, and sorghum. Farmer awareness of the importance of improved seed has
been so developed that a thriving seed industry has developed almost com-
pletely within the private sector. The estimated value obtained from the
increased production calculated from "ICTA certified" seed is more than 2.5
times that of the total ICTA budget, and represents a considerable foreign
exchange savings of funds heretofore spent on imported seed. Compared with
the pre-ICTA 1970-1972 averages for maize, all ICTA collaborators record
yield figures at least double earlier averages.

Around the world, ICTA has come to represent a new approach for
agricultural research with agricultural planners and researchers studying
ICTA as a model for possible replication. A structure similar to ICTA's is
being proposed in Honduras. The U.S. University Consortium for Interna-
tional Development is sending 32 Latin American researchers to ICTA to
observe the system. Cornell University has selected ICTA for a case study
model for a farming system research publication.


B. Lessons Learned

The evaluation team summarizes the lessons learned from ICTA as follows:

1. "Farming system research" has been almost romanticized by some stu-
dents of agricultural research. This evaluation serves as one of the
first studies to bring hard data to this new topic. The ICTA approach
to technology development demonstrates clearly the positive benefits
derived from this unconventional approach for generating acceptable
small farmer technologies and practices.

2. The ICTA project demonstrates the important role of USAID in
working cooperatively with countries over a long period. During the
five year pre-ICTA period, AID worked with the Government of Guatemala
in planning and implementing the reorganization of the public agri-
cultural sector. AID's early and sustained involvement in the devel-
opment of ICTA facilitated the provision of assistance that was both
timely and appropriate. Many of the important interactions took place







-12-


IV. CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED


A. Conclusions

ICTA serves as a pioneer among agricultural research institutions. It
was one of the first national agricultural research institutions within the
developing world to organize an innovative methodology for the generation of
technology appropriate to small farm conditions. The methodology developed
fits within the broad frame of farming systems research. The evaluation
team concludes that within a relatively short period, significant insti-
tutional, operational, and research accomplishments have been produced.

Under the ICTA system, significantly improved seed varieties and cul-
tural practices acceptable to the small farmer were developed for maize,
bean, and sorghum. Farmer awareness of the importance of improved seed has
been so developed that a thriving seed industry has developed almost com-
pletely within the private sector. The estimated value obtained from the
increased production calculated from "ICTA certified" seed is more than 2.5
times that of the total ICTA budget, and represents a considerable foreign
exchange savings of funds heretofore spent on imported seed. Compared with
the pre-ICTA 1970-1972 averages for maize, all ICTA collaborators record
yield figures at least double earlier averages.

Around the world, ICTA has come to represent a new approach for
agricultural research with agricultural planners and researchers studying
ICTA as a model for possible replication. A structure similar to ICTA's is
being proposed in Honduras. The U.S. University Consortium for Interna-
tional Development is sending 32 Latin American researchers to ICTA to
observe the system. Cornell University has selected ICTA for a case study
model for a farming system research publication.


B. Lessons Learned

The evaluation team summarizes the lessons learned from ICTA as follows:

1. "Farming system research" has been almost romanticized by some stu-
dents of agricultural research. This evaluation serves as one of the
first studies to bring hard data to this new topic. The ICTA approach
to technology development demonstrates clearly the positive benefits
derived from this unconventional approach for generating acceptable
small farmer technologies and practices.

2. The ICTA project demonstrates the important role of USAID in
working cooperatively with countries over a long period. During the
five year pre-ICTA period, AID worked with the Government of Guatemala
in planning and implementing the reorganization of the public agri-
cultural sector. AID's early and sustained involvement in the devel-
opment of ICTA facilitated the provision of assistance that was both
timely and appropriate. Many of the important interactions took place







-13-


outside of any specific project context in exchanges between the resi-
dent USAID Mission, AID/Washington technical staff, and Guatemalan
counterparts.

3. This project demonstrates the potential that AID has for helping
develop and strengthen national agricultural institutions. While
assisting in the design phase of ICTA, AID was able to call on the U.S.
research tradition, its earlier institutional development work in
Guatemala, and the varied experiences of the international agricultural
research centers of which it is the largest supporter, and to collabo-
rate with other donors such as the Inter-American Development Bank and
the Rockefeller Foundation. AID's capability for effectively utilizing
the resources of other donors to augment the work of national-level
programs is well illustrated by the ICTA experience.

4. This project demonstrates the importance of investing simultan-
eously in human, institutional, and technological resources and the
comparative advantage AID has in institutional development work. One
of the most important outcomes of the project was the development of
ICTA as an institution supporting an innovative system appropriate to
small farmer needs. The project provided assistance during a period
when ICTA was defining and elaborating its role and stabilizing its
program and procedures. With expatriate assistance, ICTA was able to
develop an organization and advance its research programs while Guate-
malans were receiving advanced training.

5. The nature of the ICTA methodology directed toward producing
farmer-accepted technology caused confusion between the roles of
research and extension. The ICTA approach requires the formulation of
new relationships between research and extension substantially dif-
ferent from the past. The same type of innovative thinking needed to
develop the ICTA methodology must be done for DIGESA, the extension
service.

6. ICTA's links to international agricultural research centers and to
U. S. centers of technology expertise were highly productive. Technol-
ogies and concepts from these centers were applied in Guatemala, and
through these same centers the Guatemalan experience is coming to the
attention of other countries around the world. Both AID as an agency
and its Missions within each country should evaluate these interna-
tional resources and consider ways to make them more useful in future
research and development efforts.

7. Responding to the multiple-cropping systems employed on most small
farm enterprises, the ICTA project documents the important role inter-
disciplinary technological and sociological coordination plays within
small farmer agricultural research projects.

8. The high attrition rate of ICTA's advanced degree scientists is a
concern to many developing country research institutes. The present
government salary structure has no ready means of addressing this
problem. Given the proven macroeconomic benefits ICTA provides to






-14-


incentive arrangements to retain this needed scientific expertise
should be considered.

9. The project demonstrates that to assure small farmer participation
in the development process, special systems need to be developed and
information feedback systems employed to test technology results. When
such systems are in place, the ICTA experience shows that small farmers
will assess the merits of the technology and gradually adopt it.

10. This project demonstrates the essential need for flexibility in the
implementation of a project. The project as designed on paper bore
little resemblance to the implemented project, which was flexible
enough to reorient resources to changed circumstances and priorities in
a way that produced effective results.

11. The ICTA experience shows the need in institution-building projects
to develop these linkages that provide the resources and authority that
the institution needs to continue. This component, if neglected,
threatens the success of the entire enterprise.



































APPENDIX A


EVALUATION METHODOLOGY







A-i


EVALUATION METHODOLOGY


During a three-week period in May 1980, the evaluation team visited the
AID Mission in Guatemala City and three regions in which ICTA was working.
The team leader was familiar with the background and development of the
project. A second team member, an agricultural development officer, had no
previous direct experience with ICTA or the project. Marc Antonio Martinez,
of ICTA's socioeconomic section, escorted the team to each of the three
regions.

The regions chosen for evaluation were the first three in which ICTA
had worked. These regions-La Maquina on the coast, Quetzaltenango in the
highlands, and El Oriente in the dry interior-differ markedly in geograph-
ical characteristics and have had the longest possible experience with ICTA
as a new organization.

The team visited the Production Centers in each region, spending ap-
proximately two days at each location. Meetings were held with the regional
directors of ICTA, DIGESA, and BANDESA, with ICTA production team leaders,
commodity team personnel, expatriate advisers, and with ICTA field person-
nel. All expatriate advisers and about half of all ICTA field personnel
were interviewed. In each region, several DIGESA and BANDESA field per-
sonnel were also interviewed.

Meetings with individuals were generally held on the first day at each
Production Center. On the second day, team members dispersed for visits to
ICTA's on-farm research and testing sites. Working separately, team members
interviewed on a random basis a total of 30 farmers who were collaborating
with ICTA and farmers living in the same area to determine knowledge and
acceptance of ICTA technology. Additional time was spent in Guatemala City
consulting with AID Mission staff and reviewing the data collected.
































APPENDIX B,


ICTA APPROACH TO TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT










ICTA APPROACH TO TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT


I. Introduction

ICTA was one of the first national agricultural research institutions
to develop a methodology and structure for generating technology appropriate
to the agro-ecological, agro-economical, and social conditions of the small
farmer. The methodological system has been acclaimed to be one of the best
of its type.* The purpose of this appendix is to describe one of the more
relevant though least measurable of the ICTA project "impacts": the devel-
opment of a technology development system responsive to the needs of the
small farmer.


II. Traditional Approach to Technology Development/Transfer

Over the years the generation and transfer of agricultural technology
has traditionally been conducted from a dichotomous institutional struc-
ture. The scientific researcher assigned to a central research station has
developed "recommendations" for the extension agent to disseminate to the
awaiting farmer. An illustration of this top-down, unidirectional tech-
nology flow is depicted below.


Chart B-1. Traditional Model for Technology Development


Technology Generation


--- Central Station
Research



Extensionist
Change Agent



Users




*Michigan State University's D. D. Harpstead wrote, "ICTA's objectives are
aimed at-generating technology and providing assistance in increasing the
production income and general welfare of the small scale farmer of Guatemala.
In this task, ICTA's philosophies, approaches, and procedures are unsurpassed
in the developing world."






B-2


Though in certain countries this model has worked, particularly for the
well-endowed farmer, the small farmer has not been a significant beneficiary
of new technology. Universally, research station yields were double and
triple those of the small farms. The accounts of green revolution technol-
ogy adoption have demonstrated that new technology was not neutral in scale.
The traditional approach seldom accounted for the constraints of the small
farmer. Consequently, to assure small farmer adoption, technology more
appropriate to the problems and resources of that group must be developed.
The following comments deal with the reasons why traditional approaches have
not always provided broadly accepted technology for the small producer.

A. Research

- The "biological architect" has conducted research work under controlled
and optimum conditions. Seldom were farmer conditions used as the
reference point for generating technology. The scientist usually was
unaware of the myriad of constraints affecting the small farmer and
tended to view farmers as a homogenous lot. The complex factors
related to risk aversion, climate, soil, off-farm employment oppor-
tunities, family labor constraints, and local cultural practices were
seldom studied.

- Research was not directed to the specific problems of the small farmer
but rather to increasing yield per land unit. Profitability improve-
ment, rather than strict yield maximization which usually requires more
capital intensive technology, is a principal factor for small farmer
new technology acceptance.

- Research recommendations were usually site specific to the station and
had little relation to soil and climate variations on a wide geographic
area and particularly to the adverse conditions of the upland small
farmer.

- Seldom were social science skills included within the research staff.

- Seldom were followup farmer evaluations conducted.


B. Extension

- Since researchers did not develop their findings based on farmer needs
and realities, the extensionists' confidence in the new recommendations
was low. The extensionists, consequently, were continually in a state
of confusion or misunderstanding both in their work with the user and
in the generation of new technology.

- The "better educated" researcher was often viewed by the extensionists
as being too sophisticated in approach. This impression was compounded
through the researchers' distance from farm realities.

The traditional system assumed ready farmer acceptance if the exten-
sionist could only "persuade" the small farmer. The system did not






B-3


consider that other supporting services (for example, credit or mar-
keting) along with profitable price relationships had to be made
available if new technology was to be adapted.


III. Restructuring the Agricultural Sector

In the late 1960s the government undertook a major assessment of rural
Guatemala. Among the many findings, it was observed that food production
was not keeping pace with local demand and that the income levels of rural
residents were declining. To redress this situation, the 1971-1975 Rural
Development Plan identified the small farmers as the focus for a policy to
increase employment and income levels. Basic grains production, the tradi-
tional crops of the small farmer, was to be emphasized. Diversification,
where feasible, into more remunerative crops was also encouraged.

To help facilitate this impetus toward economic development centered on
the small farmer, a major reorganization of the public agriculture sector
was undertaken. (See Chart B-2.) The Ministry of Agriculture was
restructured to permit the Minister to be the principal coordinator
("rector") of the agriculture sector. A series of new support agencies
(most of which would be autonomous) directed to technology development
(ICTA), extension (DIGESA), credit (BANDESA), marketing (INDECA), and
forestry (INAFLOR) were established. ICTA's responsibility was to "develop
technology and promote its use for the well being of the population." It
was not to concern itself with science, but to have a technology
promotablee" for the rural traditional sector. In effect, ICTA was charged
with bridging the gap between technology generation and transfer and farmer
acceptance. Extension responsibilities were delegated to DIGESA. Guatemala
was divided into regions and a regional coordination of services was
instituted.


IV. ICTA Organization

The ICTA charter provided it with a certain administrative flexibility
regarding administration, purchasing, salary levels, hiring, contracting,
and program budget. Expatriate advisors were given power to function
temporarily in a managerial capacity in various line positions. In
addition, the charter provided encouragement to take full advantage of the
work being done at the international agricultural centers and foreign uni-
versities.*






*In this regard the team observed the close ties with CIAT, CIMMYT, CIP, and
Texas A & M University, and the positive benefits to the institutions through
this arrangement. The centers, in turn, need strong national centers which
can do adaptation tests and screening.






Char j, I. O


P "- C A FtI+ liLA L


L ATICOIAL
PLANNING COUNCIL


WATIO AIL
S PLANNING OFFICE


I .


I. i

*. t


I-
I
I
SI

I
I
I.
I
I
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X~tI
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- -- ------------------- I- .,,,


ESj -T R (PAS)


* *

:0IOCltlTING COH'MITTrl
PRIV4Tf SrCTO'



SI
I






B-5


Organizationally, the ICTA structure was simplified through the
creation of three units. (See Chart B-3.) The Technical Unit for Produc-
tion was the unit of most interest to this study. Within this unit a
commodity program focus was integrated with across-the-board socioeconomic,
technology validation, soil management, and training support functions along
with the technical services groups for experimentation, seed processing
plants, soils laboratory analysis, and publications services. Commodity,
support, and service groups were coordinated at the national level. All
support offices were directed either by expatriate scientists or Guate-
malans, most of whom had at least an M.S. degree. This unit provided
orientation and technical support to the regional levels.

At the regional level, controlled research activities were conducted at
a "production center" whose activities were closely linked with farm prob-
lems and farm trials. Although the ICTA system required decentralization of
authority, it also required a national- level technical support capacity.
The regional director was responsible for coordinating a team that included
representatives from the national level commodity program and from the tech-
nology validation group. These team members were responsible for regional
research and data collection, analysis, and report preparation, respectively.


V. ICTA System

ICTA has developed a system directed toward reducing the negative aspects
of traditional systems. An effort has made to bridge the gap between
technology generation and transfer by establishing a closer linkage with the
farmer. The ICTA system establishes research priorities based on farmer
needs, conducts most of its testing at the farm level, and conducts field
studies to determine farmers' costs and acceptance associated with each
recommendation. The process of screening technology through collaborating
farmers produces a series of recommendations proven to be both acceptable and
profitable for the small farmer.

The series of interrelated events developed to institutionalize farmer/
research collaboration are sketched in Chart B-4. In practice, this wheel
depiction of the ICTA is a never-ending continuum of activities. The emphasis
is on understanding the farmer's system and ICTA interacting with this system.
A discussion of these various activities in sequential order is presented in
the following section.


A. Reconnaisance-Socioeconomic Survey

Research plans are not established at national headquarters but are
developed regionally. In developing these plans, farmers' needs and
practices and the technologies available are taken into consideration.




.....


Chart
hA


LECAL ADVISOR



.-rPUBLIC ELATIOIS


TECHNICAL UNIT
FOR PRODUCTION


I'AOCGRA UNIT









GENERAL PLANNING


PROD'JCf IOt ( tllt
'L'~ftn '.ALI E"
TC.fHjL O S IhESn.G


RtaGiN IV I

fr:Ctai<,. i C.,, Li:t.l L I' |
"'rutitf" AD I
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SOIIr.KInt
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Chart B-4. The ICTA Process




Formal ICTA
BANDESA


xxxxxxxxxx
x A. Regional x
x Reconnaissance x
x x
X X X X X X X X X .XSrVey
xXXxxxxxxX Survey

Research
Plan







Promising
Varieties
X X X XX X X X X X
x
x C. On-Farm Controlled
x Experimentation x
xxxxxxxxxx x


Farm Register
and Validation Data


Promising
Varieties


F. Diffusion


Continual
Feedback


Regional
Production
Center


xxxxxxxx
x x X x x X X X
x E. Acceptance x
x Evaluation x
x x
xxxx X X X


Farm Register
and Validation
Data

xxxxx


x D. Farmer's Evaluation x
x x
xxxxXxxxx X


.key

Small farmers x x x
Exchanges


Informal


xxxx x X










Prior to the preparation of the plan, a reconnaissance study is con-
ducted by a multidisciplinary team. First, all available data relating to
climate, production activities, soil, population, and other relevant factors
are obtained. Then, several teams consisting of one agricultural scientist
and one social scientist are formed. During a two-week period, these teams
visit as many farmers as possible, examining traditional practices employed,
land tenure relationships, cropping activities, yield patterns, the avail-
ability of labor, and many other factors. At the end of each day of farm
visits, the results are reviewed and team members rotate. After two weeks,
all results are jointly analyzed and a report describing the agrosocio-
economic conditions is prepared. This report serves as the basis for
identifying problems and developing a research plan.

In subsequent years, the report is revised as ICTA personnel work
closely with farmers and obtain additional data.


B. Production Centers-Controlled Experimentation

An annual regional research plan is prepared jointly by regional pro-
duction teams and national commodity program personnel. The plan is pre-
pared with research priorities directed toward immediate or intermediate
application to the problems identified. Some controlled research takes
place at the regional production center. According to all the researchers
consulted, such controlled research cannot be bypassed. Nonexploratory
research directed for immediate application, such as evaluation of germ
plasm provided from an international center, is conducted. At this level,
commodity program scientists conduct their research. Germ plasm and other
technology which passes the production center screening move to on-farm
experimentation, and even some of the original screening is being done on
the farm.


C. On-Farm Controlled Experimentation

To provide a technical field evaluation of the more promising pro-
duction center findings and to assess farmers' interest, controlled exper-
imentation is conducted on farms. ICTA believes that the scientific work
must be controlled and evaluated by scientists who must also become know-
ledgeable of farmer practices. In the 30 plots visited, none of the farmers
had more than five manzanas of farm land. A member of the technology vali-
dation unit conducts these tests. ICTA supplies the necessary inputs and
technical supervision, while the farmer is encouraged to collaborate.. The
collaborator receives the harvest. The new technology is always compared
with the traditional practices as a control. The research work is conducted
with experimental design. The technician prepares various statistical
analyses of these results and makes comparisons with the control crop. Re-
sults of these analyses are used by ICTA for planning subsequent activity.
Only about 20 percent of ICTA's work is done on the production center. Over
the last few years, from 800 to 1,000 farmers per year have participated in
farm level research and testing.






B-9


D. Farmer's Evaluation-On-Farm Testing

Innovations surviving the ever-narrowing screening process must undergo
a final test under the farmer's multicropping conditions. The purpose of
this test is to observe how the new technology is actually administered by
the farmer on a small portion of his land and to get his opinions as to
appropriateness. There is virtually no ICTA control in on-farm testing.
Only that technology which ICTA believes is a definite improvement enters
this phase. The collaborating farmer is expected to provide his own
inputs. (If the prescribed inputs are not available, ICTA will "lend" them
with reimbursement provided after harvest marketing.) To avoid overwhelming
farmers with too many recommendations, no more than three new practices are
tested simultaneously. As in the farm experimentation, a comparison of the
ICTA technology with traditional technology is made.

During both the farm experimentation and farmer evaluation steps, one
technology validation technician is required to work with'10 collaborators
in the maintenance of daily farm trial registers. Simple sheets are used to
record both family and off-farm labor requirements (wage rate for both in-
cluded), appropriate input applications data, cultural practices employed,
and yield and income data. Weekly, monthly, and cropping cycle analyses of
these data are made using specially designed programs written for handheld
calculators. Since 1975, when 40 collaborators were participating each
year, the number of registers maintained has more than doubled. Each regis-
ter is reviewed with the collaborator. In each region visited some of the
farmer collaborators had independently incorporated this system or had
developed a similar system to prepare them for better farm management
decisions.


E. Acceptance Evaluation

With completion of the farmer evaluation stage, the most important
issue now confronting ICTA is the determination of what recommendations the
farmer will accept on his own. Before the formal diffusion process is ini-
tiated with DIGESA and BANDESA, ICTA makes a determination of technology
acceptance by the collaborating farmer. During the first cropping cycle
after the farmer's evaluation, the collaborating farmer is visited by ICTA
socioeconomic personnel to determine the degree of farmer acceptance and the
extent of land devoted to the recommendation. An Acceptance Index (AI) is
calculated to represent the percentage of joiners within a region who are
using a new practice multiplied by the percentage of the land on which they
used it. In discussions with farmers, explanations for the rate of accept-
ance are recorded. If the AI for a particular recommendation is above 50, a
fairly strict test, it is considered ready for DIGESA diffusion. If the AI
is below 50, additional testing is required. AI clearly supports the view
that farmers are the ultimate evaluators of technology. Appendix D reviews
AI data obtained in two regions.

In concluding this discussion of the ICTA technology generation pro-
cess, it is appropriate to observe that all expatriate research scientists,
who were accustomed to working in conventional systems, respect the ICTA
system and enjoy working in it.






B-10


F. Diffusion

Although the ICTA system generates technology with a proven relevance
for small farm systems, a formal system for technology diffusion must be
developed in order for massive small farmer application. ICTA's interaction
with the farmer, particularly through the periodic field days, provides for
an informal technology diffusion system. (Through the ICTA system, it is
estimated that 20,000 farmers have been exposed to the new technology.)
There has been some confusion regarding the roles of ICTA and DIGESA. The
ICTA system is not an extension program but does use some extension tech-
niques in its research methodology.

The impact of the ICTA system will be limited until an improved
technology diffusion system for the small farmer has been developed. The
team is left with an uneasy dilemma. The institutionalization of an innova-
tive technology development system generating appropriate technology has not
been maximized because of the absence of a similar system for technolgoy
diffusion. Our impressions from extensive field sessions with DIGESA and
BANDESA "change agents" were that although there were some truly dedicated
agents, deficiencies remained. For example, most extension agents did not
possess much knowledge of (1) the economic benefits derived from new tech-
nology application, (2) how the ICTA technology development system func-
tioned, or (3) specific ICTA recommendations.

A comprehensive system capable of diffusing the ICTA recommendations is
needed. This same observation has been reported in all annual project eval-
uations.

In this regard, we did observe a few positive signs indicating that the
government was trying to address this problem. For example, the Quetzalte-
nango Regional Agriculture Sector Coordination Unit, CORDECA, had just in-
stitutionalized a coordination of service program exercises based on
participating agency priorities. ICTA and DIGESA had selected technology
transfer as the priority topic, as had other agencies. Specific activities
supportive of this priority, which included monthly progress evaluation,
were being developed. Other examples of an improved technology transfer
process include: (1) greater ICTA/DIGESA coordination based on the recent
naming of the previous DIGESA Deputy Director as the new ICTA Director; (2)
the decision to remove DIGESA from its prior BANDESA credit management
responsibilities, thus making extension work DIGESA's principal field
responsibility; and (3) the comprehensive training program ICTA had
developed for training DIGESA personnel on all aspects of the ICTA
technology development system.

































APPENDIX C


THE ROLE OF IMPROVED SEED






C-1


TEE ROLE OF IMPROVED SEED


Improved seed offers several advantages in technology. It is a package
of Improved technology (genetic technology) that is relatively easy to
deliver because farmers are always looking for improved seed. Furthermore,
it is easy for farmers to make their own test of this innovation and to
adopt it without changing any other farming practices. Improved seed can
often provide a profit incentive to change other farming practices and thus
may become the first in a series of innovations. Once introduced, improved
seed tends to persist. Farmers can save their own seed and can sell it to
others. Given the widespread importance of crops, even small improvements
make big differences when applied to total acreage. Seed is also relatively
easy to merchandise. Growers, processors, and merchants can sell seed for
their own profit, minimizing the need for investments of public resources.

ICTA is exploiting all of these advantages. With the help of the
international research centers, it is developing and testing improved germ
plasm. For some commodities the improvement seems dramatic. Through its
style of on-farm testing, farmers can observe the new seed and sometimes
start its diffusion even before ICTA is satisfied with its testing. The
evaluation team visited four farmers who were using an improved variety of
beans that they had seen in a local on-farm test. They had bought the seed
from the farmer before its official release by ICTA.

ICTA works with several commodities-wheat, rice, sesame, maize, beans,
and sorghum-but the USAID contract addressed only the last three, providing
about five years of assistance in each. In all three cases, the assistance
was supplied under contract by international entities with both expertise
and a worldwide collection of germ plasm. CIMMYT provided two maize
breeders, CIAT provided two bean breeders, and Texas A & M University pro-
vided a sorghum breeder. (ICTA also worked with CIMMYT on wheat and with
CIAT on rice using IRRI genetic material, but these were not under the USAID
contract.)

After developing and testing, ICTA releases improved varieties of seed
to private growers who multiply them under ICTA supervision to maintain both
genetic purity and freedom from weed contamination. ICTA provides proces-
sing and storage facilities to the commercial growers for a fee, and the
first generation seed is released with the label "ICTA certified." Second
generation seed is now being sold under brand names that associate it with
ICTA, suggesting that the public has confidence in ICTA seed.

Using ICTA data on the supervised production of "ICTA certified" seed,
Sthe evaluation team attempted to estimate its impact on Guatemalan agricul-
ture. Tables C-l, C-2, and C-3 present data for five crops. Since only
maize and beans were supported by AID project funds, the following dis-
cussion of the tables focuses on these two crops.

Table C-1 describes the estimated amount of "ICTA certified" seed
available from growers in 1978. Twenty-three growers produced maize seed,
using 583 manzanas of land, while only two growers produced bean seed, using










Table C-1. Estimated Amount of "Icta Certified" Seed Available From Growers, 1978


Crop Number of Area of Seed Average Seed Estimated Amount of
Growers Production Production "ICTA Certified"
mz** cwt/mz*** Seed Available
cwt


Maize 23 583 30 17,490

Beans 2 17 15 255

Rice 7 120 75 9,000

Wheat 4 43 35 1,505 0

Sesame 4 45 12 540


Not all of the seed developed by ICTA is included in these calculations, because some companies and
associations produce seed outside the ICTA system.

** mz = manzana = 0.7 hectares approximately 1.5 acres.

*** cwt = hundredweight


Source: ICTA. Calculations made by the authors.











Table C-2. Estimated Increased Production of Five Crops Resulting From Production of "ICTA Certified" Seed, 1978*


Crop Estimated Amount of Seed Needed Estimated Farm Increased Estimated Increase
"ICTA Certified" For Planting Areas Planted Yield**** in Crop Production
Seed Available cwt/mz*** mz cwt/mz cwt
cwt**


69,840

320

9,000

940

9,000


1,047,600

1,600

180,000

17,920

36,000


* Not all of the seed developed
produce seed outside the ICTA


by ICTA is included in these
system.


calculations, because some companies and associations


** cwt = hundredweight

*** mz = manzana 0.7 hectares approximately 1.5 acres.

**** Increased yields obtained over traditional unimproved varieties.


Source: ICTA. Calculations made by the authors.


Maize

Beans

Rice

Wheat

Sesame


17,490

255

9,000

1,505


540


0.25

0.75

1.00

1.60

0.06


---










Table C-3. Estimated Value of Increased Production Resulting From Production of "ICTA Certified" Seed, 1978*




Crop Estimated Increase in Price Estimated Value of
Crop Production $/cwt*** Increased Production
cwt** $


Maize 1,047,600 7.00 7,333,200

Beans 1,600 20.00 32,000

Rice 180,000 10.00 1,800,000

Wheat 17,920 11.50 206,080

Sesame 36,000 25.00 900,000


Total 10,271,280


* Not all of the seed developed by ICTA
associations produce seed outside the


is included in these calculations,
ICTA system.


because some companies and


** cwt = hundredweight

*** The Guatemalan quetzal is equal to one dollar. Price used is quoted from ICTA bulletins.


Source: ICTA. Calculations made by the authors.






C-5


17 manzanas of land. By multiplying average seed production per manzana by
the area devoted to seed production, the estimated amount of "ICTA certi-
fied" seed available can be calculated-an estimated 17,490 hundredweight of
maize and an estimated 255 hundredweight of beans.

Using these estimates, Table C-2 develops estimates of increased pro-
duction resulting from this seed. Estimates of farm areas planted are
derived from estimates of the amount of seed available and information on
amount of seed needed for planting one-manzana. Then, using data on in-
creased yields obtained from "ICTA certified" seed, increased crop produc-
tion is estimated--more than 1 million hundredweight of maize and 1,600
hundredweight of beans.

Table C-3 estimates the value of this increase in crop production,
using prices quoted in ICTA bulletins. For maize, the value is estimated to
be more than $7 million; for beans, the value is estimated to be approxi-
mately $32,000. For all five crops presented, the total value of increased
production is estimated to be more than $10 million.

Considering that the total ICTA budget in 1979 was only $4 million,
this estimated impact on Guatemalan agriculture is indeed impressive. In
one respect, the estimate may overstate the case. The figures used to
represent increased yield refer to increases obtained over the traditional,
unimproved seed. Perhaps not all of the "ICTA certified" seed is replacing
that quality of seed. Nevertheless, to some extent the calculated value is
underestimated because it does not include either ICTA genetic material that
is produced independently or second generation ICTA seed that is sold on a
commercial scale without ICTA supervision. As seed quality improves and
seed production increases, even greater impacts may be expected.




































APPENDIX D


ACCEPTANCE OF ICTA TECHNOLOGY






D-1


ACCEPTANCE OF ICTA TECHNOLOGY


I. Introduction

As reported in Appendix B, ICTA attempts to measure farmer acceptance
during the first cropping cycle after farmers collaborate in the on-farm
testing of ICTA recommendations by sending ICTA personnel to determine what
recommendations, if any, farmers have adopted voluntarily. For each region,
an Acceptance Index (AI) is calculated; the percentage of collaborators con-
tinuing to use the recommended technology is multiplied by the percentage of
land they are using it on. Fifty has been established as the AI required
before ICTA considers its recommendations to be ready for diffusion to large
numbers of farmers. This is a stringent test; all farmers could be using
the recommended technology and the AI could still be less than 50.

Since Acceptance Indices measure acceptance only during the first year
after on-farm tests, they may underrepresent the eventual acceptance in new
recommendations by conservative farmers. Also, by focusing exclusively on
ICTA collaborators, the Acceptance Indices permit no inferences to be drawn
regarding mass acceptance. In spite of the limitations, the AI offers the
only overall impression available of the acceptance of ICTA technologies by
collaborating farmers.

To reflect some of the differences and complexities encountered in
developing acceptable technologies for small farmers, the evaluation team
examined AI data for two dissimilar regions. Since maize is the principal
crop of the small farmer in Guatemala, only that crop will be discussed.


II. The Highlands-Totonicapan


A. The Setting

In the central highlands of Guatemala, large numbers of small farmers
work on small fragmented farms. The average total area cultivated by each
farmer is only 0.6 hectares. Most of the land is intercropped in the tradi-
tional milpa (maize, beans, and horse beans) developed by their Mayan ances-
tors. The most important crop is maize. Conservatism has hindered the
rapid introduction of improved maize seed. Many farmers take great pride in
their criollo (native) seed that has been passed from generation to genera-
tion. Some farmers feel so strongly about their seed that they refuse to
follow ICTA recommendations for thinning maize seedlings because this would
"kill" the remaining plants.

Only 20 percent of farmers depend exclusively on their own farm for
their livelihood. Farming activities are carried on primarily for subsis-
tence. Except for the extensive use of chemical fertilizers, "modern" farm
practices were not widely practiced when ICTA began working in the region.






D-2


B. ICTA Recommendations and Their Acceptance

In 1975, nine recommendations were introduced for testing; all were
modified as a result of farmers' evaluations and AI feedback. By 1979,
ICTA's recommendations had been reduced to five. Table D-1 compares
traditional practices with ICTA recommendations.


Table D-1. Comparison of Traditional Practices, 1977, and
ICTA Recommendations, 1979, for Maize
in the Totonicapan Area


Treatment Traditional Practices ICTA Recommendations


Seed varieties criollo San Marceno
Seed density 6.5 personnel. 4 per mound
Distance between rows 1 meter 1 meter
Planting distances 1 meter .6 meters
Thinning lower leaves constant not'necessary
Fertilizer applications 1 application of 2 applications of
16-20-0, 150 lbs/mz 20-20-0, total of
80-90 lbs/mz


Source: ICTA reconnaissance survey, 1977, and ICTA records, 1979.


Table D-2 presents Acceptance Indices for each ICTA recommendation over
a five-year period. Since the recommendations were made with a changing
group of collaborating farmers and were being modified during this five-year
period, they must be interpreted with care. The data presented show yearly
fluctuations and limited consistency. Only seed density and fertilizer
recommendations had indices approaching or exceeding 50 in 1979.

The AI can lead to misleading interpretations. If recommendations are
-accepted gradually over a period of time, this will not be reflected in the
AI. Apparently, that is what has happened in Totonicapan. Although the San
Marceno variety of maize will bring substantially increased yields, it has
not been accepted rapidly because of the strong tradition associated with
traditional seed.






D-3


Table D-2.


Acceptance Indices for ICTA Recommendations
for Maize, Totonicapan, 1975-1979


Year
ICTA
Recommendations 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979


Varieties 4 54 19 23 20
Seed density 10 64 30 30 50
Planting distances 7 4 13 44 17
Fertilizer, first
application 0 0 0 6 73
Fertilizer, second
application 21 4 4 69 43



Yearly average 8.4 25.2 13.2 34.4 40.6


Source: ICTA


When adoption alone is examined (without regard to the percentage of
land involved) a different picture emerges. Table D-3 presents the percent-
age of collaborators voluntarily adopting ICTA's recommendations (although
possibly on a small area) in 1975 and 1980. The data clearly reveal an
overall increase in the percentage of collaborators adopting ICTA recommen-
dations. An average of 40 percent more collaborators adopted ICTA recom-
mendations in 1980 than in 1975.


C. Farm Visits

This more positive impression concerning adoption of ICTA recommenda-
tions was reinforced by collaborators who met with the AID evaluation team.

A dramatic example of rapid technology diffusion was described by a
former ICTA collaborator who is also the president of a 200-member coopera-
tive. During the first year after collaborating with ICTA (at the time the
AI was being calculated), he was using ICTA's San Marceno seed on less than
half of his land. The following year, however, he planted his entire farm
with San Marceno. At the same time, the cooperative purchased 400 pounds of
ICTA seed. Only 25 pounds remained unplanted at the time of the team's
visit.







D-4


Table D-3.


Percentage of Totonicapan Collaborators Adopting
ICTA Recommendations in 1975 and 1980


ICTA Percentage of Collaborators Adopting
Recommendation 1975 1980


Varieties 12 59
Seed density 25 40
Planting distances 0 46
Seedling thinning 18 17
Fertilizer, first
application 6 73
Fertilizer, second
application 6 73



Average for all
recommendations 11 51


Source: ICTA



III. Coastal Area-La Maquina


A. The Setting

The La Maquina area consists of a former hacienda that was subdivided
20 years ago into about 1,400 farms each with 20 hectares. Distribution was
made to farmers, most of whom came from the highlands. This experience in
pioneering may make farmers in this area more inclined to adopt new recom-
mendations rapidly. The principal crop is maize with many of the farmers
planting sesame and rice during the two growing seasons.. Rainfall is unpre-
dictable, although the area is considered humid, not semiarid. During peak
periods, extra labor is contracted, usually people from the highlands. Both
DIGESA and BANDESA have offices within the settlement.

Although the emphasis is on small commercial farming, the ICTA recon-
naissance study revealed that only 3 percent of the area was planted in
improved varieties of maize seed. Insects caused severe problems, yet the
use of pesticides and herbicides was limited. A majority of farmers did,
however, use chemical fertilizers.







D-5


B. ICTA Recommendations and Their Acceptance

ICTA recommendations for La Maquina focused on insect control, the use
of improved seed, the elimination of fertilizer applications, and advice on
other practices such as soil preparation and seeding distances.

The recommendation that fertilizer be eliminated grew out of ICTA's
analysis of the collaborators' economic registers in 1976. Results showed
that the use of fertilizer did not increase yields significantly. Rather,
using fertilizer increased production costs by 38 percent, thereby reducing
profitability by 29 percent. These findings were shared with BANDESA which
at that time was requiring the application of fertilizer on farms receiving
credit. BANDESA eliminated the fertilizer requirement.

Table D-4 presents Acceptance Indices for four ICTA recommendations
over a five-year period. For the seed varieties and seeding distances
recommendations, acceptance increased gradually. For the weed control and
insecticide recommendations, an overall increase in acceptance is recorded.


Table D-4.


Acceptance
La Maquina


Indices for
1975-1979


ICTA Recommendations for Maize,


Year
ICTA
Recommendations 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979


Seed varieties 47 53 61 71 69
Seeding distances 16 28 36 54 52
Weed control 19 38 12 11 31
Insecticide 36 59 70 66 56


Yearly average 29.5 44.5 44.8 50.5 52


Source: ICTA



C. Field Visits

Of particular interest has been the acceptance of improved seeds. In
1976, a majority of farmers planted criollo seed. By 1980, 95 percent of
the farmers were using ICTA's improved varieties, according to slaes











personnel who provided supplies to local farmers. Field visits corroborated
this high acceptance of seed and the other ICTA recommendations described in
Table D-4. On all farm visits except one, those recommendations that had
high Als were being utilized.

One farmer reported putting 50 percent of his land into ICTA seed the
year after he was introduced to it, and almost 100 percent into ICTA seed
the following year. The average yield increase he attributes to ICTA
technology is between 44 and 50 lb per cuerda. Recently, he has purchased
five silos. All of his neighbors have since adopted ICTA's recommendations.

One of his neighbors, however, chose to accept only one of ICTA's rec-
ommendations. A 71-year-old farmer, who had divided part of his land for
the use of his four sons, learned of the recommended planting distances
through DIGESA agents. By incorporating only this recommendation, yields
had increased from five to eight bags of grain per cuerdo.

Several years previously, the farmer had tried ICTA seed on a small
area, but because of a dry growing season had lost most of his crop. Conse-
quently, he chose to retain his criollo seed. In talking further with this
farmer, the evaluation team observed his high reverence for God's control
(Dios manda today) over the "santa tierra" and related reluctance to take on
any risk or debt. His criollo seed and ICTA planting recommendations appar-
ently provide him with what he feels is sufficient.


D. Conclusion

Based on a variety of analytical techniques and field visits, we are
satisfied that there is a high rate of acceptance by small farmers of tech-
nology. Not only was "acceptance" recorded but in our visits with over 10
farmers in each of the three areas visited, all farmers could explain in
detail what the new technology was and why it was better than what they had
earlier used. The technology required less seed and fertilizer than that
traditionally used. Though it was impossible to measure economic impact,
all farmers visited spoke of the increased yields they attributed to ICTA
technology. Compared with the pre-ICTA 1970-1972 average yield of 16.2
quintals per manzana, all ICTA records with collaborators showed yields at
least doubling this and in the Jatiapa Region, yields more than four times
the early average were recorded.


































APPENDIX E


INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT











INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT


I. Introduction

One of the project's most important outcomes is establishment of an
institutional capacity capable of supporting the ICTA technology development
system described in Appendix B. This was one of the principal project pur-
poses.*

The team believes purpose compliance was attained because of:

1. Government selection of high quality management and technical
personnel who understand and are committed to applying the concepts of
the appropriate technology development system

2. Use of competent scientific and management expatriate personnel

3. Selection and efficient phasing of advanced degree programs for
ICTA professionals

4. Government budgetary support

5. Development of inservice training programs


The aim of this appendix is to describe the AID project's institution
building activities.**


II. Pre-ICTA Agricultural Research Institutional Structure

Guatemala agricultural research in 1970 had a limited staff of trained
personnel receiving limited budget support. In 1969, the Division de Inves-
tigacion Agropecuaria of the Ministry of Agriculture, the largest government
agricultural research structure, consisted of but 50 technicians most of
whom were trade school agriculturalists, 2 Ph.D.'s, 10 M.S.'s, 7 B.S.'s, and
31 P.A.'s (perito agronomos-high school graduates with some agricultural
trade-school preparation). Their annual research budget was $400,000. No




* The original Project Paper explains that one of the stated purposes was to
"Improve the Government of Guatemala's capability to develop, screen, and to
introduce new and/or improved seed varieties, cultural practices and crop
mixes while putting presently available improved farming techniques into
practice."

** As earlier discussed, the Rockefeller Foundation played a major role in
this process. Other donor assistance was provided by the Inter-American
Development Bank and the Taiwan Horticulture Advisory Team.






E-2


system had been developed to evaluate the results of their new technology at
farm level.*

As mentioned in Appendix B pursuant to the agricultural assessment, the
importance of increased attention to small farmer development was identi-
fied, and a comprehensive organizational structure was developed. As stated
in the national rural development plan, agricultural technology development
was to be revitalized. In support of this initiative, both the Rockefeller
Foundation and AID performed principal institution-building roles.


III. Institution Building

We were impressed with the number and quality of professionals observed
on all levels of the ICTA system. At the field level, all personnel whom we
met related well with their collaborators and knew and understood the farm
enterprise and its problems. Each knew the other on a first-name basis. We
were also impressed with the knowledge that ICTA personnel had on the vari-
ous steps in their system and their commitment to that system. The opinion
of non-ICTA personnel working in other Ministry of Agriculture offices was
that within the agricultural sector, ICTA had the best personnel. These are
all important outcomes of the institution-building process. Four factors
which we believe are responsible in varying degrees for these positive ob-
servations relate to technical assistance, graduate level training, govern-
ment budget, and inservice training.


A. AID Technical Assistance

As observed earlier, the capacity of the pre-ICTA research structure to
implement the technology change process defined in the Rural Development
Plan was weak. Accordingly, it was decided that the quickest means to get
research moving would be the contracting of expatriate expertise. The ICTA
legislation reflected this observation, for it permitted the assignment of
expatriate personnel to operational line management and technical positions.
It was believed that from these positions, greater impact in program design
and execution could be made. The Rockefeller Foundation provided technical
assistance through the contracting of (1) an "advisor" to the ICTA director,
(2) the chief of the socioeconomic unit, (3) the director of the technical
unit, and (4) an experiment station development expert.

All played major roles in developing the systems described in Appen-
dix B. AID's project-funded technical assistance was directed to support of
national commodity programs and regional production teams. One AID contract
person was promoted to director of the technical unit. Over 70 percent of




* Lehman Bon Fletcher, Eric Graber, William C. Mernil and Erik Thorbecke,
Guatemala's Economic Development: The Role of Agriculture, Iowa State
University Press, Ames, Iowa, 1970.





E-3


the project's $1.7 million budget was for the contracting of expatriate as-
sistance.* Originally this project financed coordinators of the bean, sor-
ghum, and horticulture commodity programs; the director of pathology work in
the bean program; the senior specialist and a-program geneticist for maize;
two regional production team directors, one of whom also directed inservice
training; and later the director of the technical unit. The maize, bean,
and sorghum crop programs are ICTA's major research programs.

During private individual conversations with ICTA office directors, it
was their unanimous opinion that without this heavy injection of expatriate
assistance, ICTA could not have benefited as quickly from the scientific
work being done at the international centers and elsewhere in the world. It
was also their opinion that the progress made in variety screening and
testing for developing the new recommendations would not have been possible
without this assistance. It was reported to us that all "advisors" inte-
grated themselves in a team-like fashion within the ICTA system and made
major contributions in their assigned work.

The timing of arrival and departure for this assistance was programmed
in relationship to simultaneous massive training so that the expatriate line
officers were replaced by trained Guatemalans.** Such a system served as
the foundation from which research could be conducted, while simultaneously,
Guatemalans were sent for advanced training. All project-funded technical
assistance is scheduled to finish this year.


B. Advanced Training

Key to the temporary "replacement" of Guatemalans with expatriates was
the provision of graduate level training at U.S. and third country sites
(the majority went to Latin American universities) and short course train-
ing at the international agricultural centers. Under the AID project, 10
ICTA professionals (one Ph.D. and nine M.S.'s) were sent for advanced
degrees. Most of them began returning from their training in January 1979,
with the last one to return in September 1980. In addition, the Rockefeller
Foundation has provided graduate degree assistance. For example, in 1979,
14 ICTA professionals were being sponsored to receive degrees (2 Ph.D.'s and
12 M.S.'s).




* Principal contracts were with CIMMYT, CIAT, Texas A & M University, and
Services Tecnices del Caribe. The remaining monies were for training-
$140,000; commodity, nutritional analysis-$311,000; and miscellaneous costs.

**An example is the four and one-half year activities of contract advisor
Carlos Crisostome Vergare. He started as the first coordinator of the project
at La Maquina, became the Director of ICTA in Region IV, and later became the
head of the Technical Production Unit in the Central Office. In each instance
he was replaced by a Guatemalan who had received advanced training. After
serving as the head of the Technical Unit, he served as the advisor of the new
Guatemalan head for a seven-month period so as to assure a smooth transition.






E-4


There are many examples of the institutional improvement outcomes from
this training. One such case is the seed program. In 1974, this office
consisted of two professionals with no advanced training. Within a two-year
period, the office director had received his M.S. in Brazil, and two tech-
nicians received courses in seed production at CIAT and CIMMYT. Resulting
from this training program, a firm foundation of advanced degree agricul-
tural and social scientists and administrators throughout ICTA was devel-
oped. These graduates replaced the original heavy input of expatriate
assistance.


C. Government Support

Commensurate with the priority placed on agricultural research, the
government support has increased over ten-fold over the last ten years. In
1969 (at the time the agricultural assessment was underway), the annual
budget was $400,000 whereas in 1980 it was over $4,000,000. Since the ini-
tiation of AID's support, the government's budget to ICTA has more than
doubled. The annual budgetary increases during the life of the project show
substantial increases.



Table E-1. ICTA Annual Budget
(in millions of dollars)


1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980

2.0 2.3 2.9 3.3 3.8 4.7


Although there is an impressive increase associated with the project,
it is still modest when compared to studies on comparative amounts spent on
world agricultural research programs. A study by Boyce and Evenson con-
cluded that a reasonable government expenditure for research would be about
2 percent of the value of gross agricultural product. Using the World
Bank's Country Economic Memorandum for Guatemala (February 4, 1980) the
1979 gross agricultural product (adjusted on 1975 price index and 7 percent
inflation in 1978) was $1,204 billion. According to the "recommended" re-
search budget levels, the government would thus have to provide an addi-
tional $19 million for research.

Though possibly insufficient in total magnitude, the results of the
increased budget have greatly strengthened ICTA's institutional capacity.
Whereas in 1976 ICTA had 4 Ph.D.'s, 4 M.S.'s, 86 B.S.'s, and 51 P.A.'s in
their staffing pattern, in 1979 there were 3 Ph.D.'s, 15 M.S.'s, 103 B.S.'s,
and 38 P.A.'s. All technical and support units except the socioeconomic







E-5


unit have been strengthened substantially.* For example, in 1976 the maize
program was upgraded by the eliminating of 5 P.A.'s and an increase of 3
B.S.'s, 2 M.S.'s, and 1 Ph.D. The sorghum unit which had but 3 P.A.'s and 1
B.S. in 1976 was increased to 4 B.S.'s, 2 M.S.'s, and 1 Ph.D. The field
level technology validation unit was the most strengthened, increasing from
7 B.S.'s and 1 M.S. in 1976 to 38 B.S.'s and 3 M.S.'s in 1978.

Paradoxically, while major budget increases have permitted impressive
institutional development accomplishments, additional resources to sustain
this structure will be required. Budgetary limitations are perhaps the
biggest constraint affecting ICTA's capacity to maintain its present system
and to permit its expansion. Resulting from the high professional qualifi-
cations ICTA has imposed, the extensive degrees and inservice training the
program has funded, and the high esteem prevailing in the private sector
toward ICTA, annual attrition rates have never been less than 10 percent.
Particularly vulnerable are the M.S.-level and above technicians. Three of
the seven M.S.-trained ICTA personnel on board in 1976 have since departed.
It is estimated that if that trend continues, within a two-year period 7 of
the 17 advanced degree-trained technicians will have departed. During the
time of our evaluation, the chief of the technical production unit left
ICTA. He had been trained for several years by technical advisors and had
received his M.S. With the departure of expatriate advisors, the future of
ICTA depends upon a reversal of this significantly high attrition rate among
advanced degree holders. The government must now "pay" for its successes.
Although costs are high, they are justified by returns.

The above concern is directed toward maintaining the existing ICTA
structure. However, to address the unattended regions and to expand into
fruit and vegetable production, additional research personnel are required.
To respond to this growing demand, additional numbers of highly trained pro-
fessionals will be required over the next five years. Table E-2 shows ICTA
projected increases. (There has been no provision for funding such a large
increase in M.S. professionals over the next five years.)

To sustain this significantly increased capacity, a comprehensive study
reflecting the importance to Guatemala of maintaining and strengthening the




* Regrettably, one of the more innovative components of the project is the
only one to have declined professionally. Resulting from their reluctance to
be assigned to field offices and salary differences, most of the social
science professionals trained by the highly regarded Rockefeller Foundation
funded "advisor" departed from ICTA during 1979. The one remaining veteran
left during 1978 to receive his Ph.D. but will be returning to the unit this
year. Unlike the former staff which had occupied the central office, the new
staff, composed of two economists and two agriculturalists (twb of whom had
prior ICTA field experience), has three of them assigned to Regional level
offices on a full-time basis. Considering the vital role of this unit and the
strengthening that has taken place ICTA-wide, this is the one unit that will
require additional institutional strengthening.






E-6


ICTA system and its pool of trained agricultural and social scientists
should be undertaken.



Table E-2. Increased ICTA Staffing Needs

Professional 1980 1985

P.A. 38 38
B.S. 103 130
M.S. 15 56
Ph.D. 2 3
158 227



D. Inservice Training

Although there has been an attrition rate of noticeable importance, at
the same time improved varieties and cultural practices are being developed.
We believe that one explanation for this is the attention ICTA has directed
to inservice training. The proof of this training was that at all levels of
operation the ICTA system was well articulated and institutionalized. As a
result of the knowledge transmitted through this inservice training program,
when vacancies do occur, quick adjustments can usually be made. The new-
comer usually arrives with a basic knowledge of what is necessary to get the
job done.

A selected group of 10 new hires are given a nine-month course each
year. in the theory and practice of the ICTA system. The course includes
ICTA methodology, problem identification, data gathering and analysis, crop
technology, farm management, and communication skills. Much of the training
orientation is similar to that of the CIAT training program. We were im-
pressed with the organization and the practical orientation of the course
outline. For several years, ICTA manned one of its regional production
teams with trainees from this program.

One observation from our meetings with other agencies of the public
agriculture sector (USPA, DIGESA, and BANDESA), was their lack of a
comprehensive understanding of the ICTA technology-generation system. One
means to address this deficiency and the problems cited earlier with DIGESA
is the Technology Institutional Liaison course ICTA developed for DIGESA.
For the second consecutive year this program has provided two-day-a-week
training courses to selected DIGESA programs. When the ICTA budget was
readjusted because of increased gasoline costs, some DIGESA participants
decided to pay their own transportation costs instead of dropping out. This
indicates the dedication of some DIGESA personnel.










Program expansion based on an extension of ICTA's professional role and
an increase in program understanding on the part of non-ICTA participants
will require the development of new inservice training programs.

In conclusion, it can be said that in relation to the original project
purpose of improving ICTA's institutional capacity, every selected "indi-
cator" has been surpassed. Resulting from this accomplishment, some unan-
ticipated outcomes have been observed. The present model is serving an
international audience of agricultural planners and researchers as a model
for possible replication. A structure similar to ICTA's is being developed
in Honduras. The Consortium for International Development is sending 32
Latin American researchers to ICTA to observe the ICTA system. The IDB is
also preparing a $20 million loan to further assist ICTA.

The concern is not over the accomplishments of this project at the end
of its present association with AID, but rather, over how an institutional
structure so impressive in its present arrangement can be maintained and
expanded. Additional government support to cover higher salary levels is
one issue that will require closer attention.




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