Material Information

Added title page title:
University of Florida latinamericanist
Alternate title:
Latin americanist
University of Florida Center for Latin American Studies
Place of Publication:
Gainesville, Fla.
Center for Latin American Studies,
Publication Date:
Physical Description:
v. ;28-36 cm.


Subjects / Keywords:
Periodicals -- Latin America ( lcsh )
Study and teaching (Higher) -- Periodicals -- Latin America -- Florida ( lcsh )
Periodicals ( fast )
serial ( sobekcm )
periodical ( marcgt )


Additional Physical Form:
Also issued online.
Dates or Sequential Designation:
Vol. 1, no. 1 (Feb. 3, 1964)-
Numbering Peculiarities:
Suspended between v. 35, no. 1 (fall 1999) and v. 36, no. 1 (spring 2005).
General Note:
Latest issue consulted: Vol. 36, no. 2 (fall 2005).

Record Information

Source Institution:
University of Florida
Holding Location:
UF Latin American Collections
Rights Management:
Copyright, Patricia Alba at Center for Latin American Studies. Permission granted to University of Florida to digitize and display this item for non-profit research and educational purposes. Any reuse of this item in excess of fair use or other copyright exemptions requires permission of the copyright holder.
Resource Identifier:
337250 ( ALEPH )
5269284 ( OCLC )

Full Text

~1PR .97 co~ LISR4 ;-Y


Painful Impressions Of .


MARCH 1, 1971

A Wall Street Plot

The author of the feature article, Richard Wallace Oberdo/er, is a Doctoral degree candidate at the University of Florida. Oberdofer received the degree of Bachelor of Arts, summa cum laude, with a major in Political Science from the University of the South, Sewanee, Tenn. In June of 1970 he received his M.A. in history from the University of Florida. He is a member of Phi Beta Kappa, Phi Alpha Theta and Phi Kappa Phi.
On January 27, 1917, the Costa Rican government of Alfredo Gonzalez Flores was the victim of a bloodless coup engineered by the Minister of War, Federico Tinoco Granados. The generally exemplary political tradition of the Central American republic seemed to make this occurrence an anomaly. Officials in Washington, D.C., and especially President Woodrow Wilson, were dismayed over the unconstitutional seizure of power and on February 9 formally declared that the Tirioco regime would receive neither recognition nor support. I This negative attitude was doggedly maintained until well after the usurper fled the country two and one half years later. Much of the opposition was directly related to Wilson's conviction that officials of the United Fruit Company had masterminded the takeover, and although such a collusion could never be proven, the American President continued to harbor suspicions.
Wilson was openly critical of foreign interests which held concessions in Latin America. Too often an enterprise proved lucrative for outsiders at the expense of the country granting the award. Such a situation was, he felt, "a condition of affairs always dangerous and apt to become intolerable." 2 The United Fruit Company, which held the profitable banana acreage around Puerto Lim6n and was certainly a major landed interest in Costa Rica, was therefore well qualified to be the object of the President'c, displeasure.

Before the end of January, 1917, one Herbert J. Browne sent Wilson a note openly accusing the firm and its vicepresident and guiding spirit, Minor Cooper Keith, of direct involvement in the coup. Browne claimed that they had acted to frustrate Gonzilez's plans for land reform. Although the President merely acknowledged the letter and forwarded it to Secretary of State Robert Lansing, he must have taken the charge seriously. A definite negative impression of United Fruit's role in the affair apparently had begun to take shape in Wilson's mind from the moment word of the overthrow reached the White House. The source of the news had been a telegram from Samuel Untermeyer, Minor Keith's attorney, and an integral part of the message was a request for the recognition of Tinoco. Such haste and clear partisanship "painfully impressed" the President.3
The first report received by officials of the Department of State likewise came from an agent of United Fruit. Walter Penfield, an attorney for the corporation, telephoned J.H. Stabler of the Division of Latin-American Affairs at the latter's home on January 28 in order to relay news of the change in the Costa Rican government. He painted a rosy picture of Tinoco's popularity and nonviolent methods and urged that the United States not intervene. Any suspicions which Stabler may have entertained no doubt increased when Penfield acknowledged that the American Minister, Edward Hale, had been denied the use of the facilities at the company's wireless station to forward his report to Washington. The attorney claimed that the refusal was necessary to prevent "a violation of the neutrality laws of both the United States and Costa Rica," but the fact remained that the resultant delay afforded the agents of United Fruit a chance to present thcir arguments unchallenged.4
Stabler prepared a memorandum on Tinoco's seizure


of power and submitted it to the President. Dated February 6, the document is critical not only of the usurper's character but also of the American firm's apparent collusion. The speed with which the company had declared its support for the unconstitutional regime, the obstruction of Hale's report, and accounts of the friendship between Keith and Tinoco seemed to point to the conclusion that "the United Fruit Company must at least have known about Tinoco's plot, if it (had) not aided and abetted him in it." Stabler urged the issuance of a warning that unless the company's interference in Central American politics ceased, Washington would announce publicly the suspension of the corporation's diplomatic protection. 5
Wilson strongly agreed with Stabler's conclusions and advised Lansing that he wanted the warning issued immediately. A subsequent letter from Secretary of the Treasury William McAdoo to Samuel Untermeyer explained the President's position in clear although moderate terms; significantly, it gave no hint of possible future recriminations against United Fruit. In spite of the jaundiced opinion of the company, which was widely held in official circles and which advocates of the ousted GonzAlez regime sought to nurture carefully, the administration did not attempt to take immediate action against the corporation. 6
The decision to investigate United Fruit was finally made when dispatches from an American diplomat in Costa Rica revealed that Keith was actively supporting Tinoco with aid and counsel in spite of the policy of nonrecognition adopted by Washington. Stewart Johnson, a secretary who had taken charge of the United States Legation in San Jos6 when Hale was recalled in April, 1917, described the encouragement which the businessman was rendering Tinoco and bemoaned the fact that such influence was not exerted in support of Wilson's position. 7
When thus informed that no attention had been paid to the earlier mild remonstrance, the President decided that the time had come for "a very solemn warning." The company had known for months that Washington would not recognize contracts made with the usurper; Keith must by "recalled and silenced" or steps would be taken to discredit him publicly. Tinoco was to be told that the United States government would see that any agreements made with Keith were nullified. Pursuant to his orders, Johnson investigated the collaboration between the American entrepreneur and the Costa Rican regime; he concluded that the local management of United Fruit was not involved. The vice-president, however, had other extensive holdings in the form of plantations and manganese mines and seemed to be motivated by a desire to maximize benefits derived from private interests. As if to underscore the personal rather than corporate nature of the relationship, J oh n son cited a bit of gossip which held that Tinoco's sister was Keith's mistress. 8
In August, 1917, John Foster Dulles, a young official

in the Division of Latin-American Affairs who had surveyed conditions in Costa Rica in the spring of that year, drew up a memorandum on Minor Keith's activities and submitted it to Charles Warren of the Department of Justice. It was hoped that some grounds for prosecution could be discovered, although Dulles readily admitted that the assertions set forth in the memorandum were derived from diplomatic dispatches and did not in themselves constitute legally admissible evidence. Meanwhile, Secretary of State Lansing apparently was trying to pressure United Fruit either to clamp down on the errant executive or to repudiate his actions. If the firm refused to cooperate, it would "be deemed to be a party to Mr. Keith's evident purpose of opposing policy of the government at this crucial time.'' 9
At the instance of sympathetic businessmen and two United States senators, the officers of the corporation, including Keith, filed affidavits with the Department of
-State on January 19, 1918. In these statements the ex- ecutives affirmed their ignorance of Tinoco's revolutionary designs and asserted that "to the best of their knowledge and belief" no one else exercising authority in the company had been involved with the coup. A policy of political noninterference had "been strictly enjoined upon officers and employees" of United Fruit, and their own investigations failed to yield evidence to substantiate the accusations against them. Keith explained that a desire to protect his business interests had motivated him to urge Tinoco's recognition. The former Minister of War had established an effective government, and acceptance of his regime seemed the best possible arrangement. He added that denial of the wireless facilities to Minister Hale was made in accordance with the concession granted to the corporation; the contract specified forfeiture of rights if a telegram were allowed to be forwarded over the company's telephone lines. Keith argued that a special train had been placed at Hale's disposal by United Fruit.
Lansing informed the President of these affidavits but refrained from adding his personal evaluation of them.10 He may have realized that disagreement was futile since legal substantiation of the administration's suspicions was impossible. Attempts to prosecute Keith remained unsuccessful, even though other allegations were made which linked him to American oil interests whose shady conduct in Costa Rica seemed to suggest illicit connections with Tinoco. Not only was there no concrete evidence, but there may have been difficulties surrounding the formulation of specific charges. Since Washington neither recognized the de facto regime nor pursued a policy of active opposition to it, businessmen who supported Tinoco could not be accused formally of
criminal correspondence" with a foreign government or working to defeat American policy objectives. 11 In spite of Woodrow Wilson's repeated efforts to prose-

cute men whom he considered immoral and disloyal, nothing more than circumstantial evidence was discovered. However, the President remained convinced that the United Fruit Company had been far more than an impartial observer in Costa Rican affairs. He seems to have viewed the situation 'as if Wall Street proposed a plot'' and to have regarded Keith and his colleagues as the principal conspirators. Nothing illustrates this adamant conviction so strongly as the events surrounding the ultimate recognition of the Julio Acosta government in August, 1920. The leader of the movement which was instrumental- in Tinoco's fall from power in 1919, Acosta was the first elected President to follow the usurper. Wilson refused to recognize the regime until he had been assured by Under Secretary of State Norman Davis on two different occasions that United Fruit had in no way been influential in Acosta's election. Not until he was informed that the company stood in direct opposition to the new administration did Wilson agree to the Extension of recognition. 12


1Secretary of State Robert Lansing to Minister to Guatemala William H. Leavell, February 9, 1917, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1861-; hereafter cited as Foreign Relations, 1917), p. 306.

2Address to the Southern Commercial Congress, Mobile, Alabama, October 27, 1913, Selected Literary and Political Papers and Addresses of Woodrow Wilson, Vol. II (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1927), p. 40.
3Browne to Wilson, January 30, 1917, the National Archives of the United States, General Records of the Department of State, Decimal File, hereafter cited as D.S., 818.00/69; Wilson to his private secretary, Joseph Tumulty, no date indicated, Library of Congress Manuscript Division, Woodrow Wilson Papers, Series 4, Executive Office Files, Case File 1565; Wilson to Senator Joseph E. Ransdell of Louisiana, March 5, 1918, Ray Stannard Baker, Woodrow Wilson, Life and Letters, Vol. VIII: Armistice (New York: Doubleday, Doran and Company, Inc., 1939), p. 13; Carter Field, "U.S. Policy in Costa Rica Aid to Germany," New York Tribune, June 21, 1918, p. 6.
4Memorandum, February 6, 1917, D.S., 818.00/105%.
6Wilson to Lansing, February 7, 1917, The Lansing Papers 1914-1920, II, Foreign Relations, 1940, p. 518; McAdoo to Untermeyer, February 19, 1917, D.S., 818.00/108%; Entries of February 25, 1917, March 31, 1917, and April 6, 1917, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Chandler Parsons Anderson Diary, Ac. 5996; Manuel Castro Quesada to Lansing, February 28, 1917, Foreign Relations, 1917, p. 312.
7Johnson to Lansing, July 18, 1917, D.S., 8J8.00/182; Johnson to Lansing, July 26,1917, D.S., 818.00/191.
8Wilson to Lansing, July 21, 1917, D.S., 818.00/306; Johnson to Lansing, July 28, 1917, D.S.,818.00/193. 0
9Dulles to Warren, August 24, 1917, D.S., 818.00/234a; Dulles to Lansing, August 9, 1917, D.S., 818.00/307.

10Memorandum, no date indicated, Wilson Papers, Series 4, Case File 1565; Lansing to Wilson, February 26, 1918, D.S., 818.00/399a.
1lMemorandum, February 6, 1917, D.S., 818.00/105%; Dana G. Munro, Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy in the Caribbean, 1900-1921 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), p. 430; Memorandum, stamped February 24, 1919, D.S., 818.00/531.
12Entry of September 3, 1918, E. David Cronon, ed., The Cabinet Diaries of Josephus Daniels: 1913-1921 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1963), p. 333; Davis to Wilson June 25, 1920, Wilson Papers, Series 4, Case File 1565; Davis
-to Wilson July 13, 1920, Wilson Papers, Series 4, Case File 1565.


Latin Urbanization,

The Case of Cuba

Dr. Jorge Hardoy received both his A.A. and Ph.D. in City and Regional Planning from Harvard University, in 1955 and 1965 respectively. Dr. Hardoy has been Professor of Architecture and Urban Planning at the Universidad del Litoral, Rosario, Argentina, and most recently Visiting Professor and Acting Chairman 7t the Department of City and Regional Planning, Yale University (1970). Three of Dr. Hardoy's most recent publications are: Urban Planning in Pre-Columbian America; Urbanization Process in America from its Origins to the Present Day; and Urbanization in Latin America. The subject of the Colloquium was "Latin American Urbanization: Cuba."
The principal source of information for this study was a series of interviews with Cuban officials who are concerned with urban planning, and observations of the urban situation and activities in Cuba. This material was gathered during a one-month visit to the country in August of 1970 as a representative of the United Nations.
Published information is sparse in the area of urbanization and urban reform in Cuba. There are no official documents that deal with these topics. Urban reform activities may be seen as one of two major indicators of the results obtained by the revolutionary government, the second major one being the agrarian reform. Considering this, it is surprising that the urban aspect of the governmental policy of Cuba has received so little attention from scholars.
At the time of the revolution, Cuba was already one of the most urbanized nations in Latin America. Havana was a prime example of the primate city, with a high concentration of cultural activities and productive investment in this city. This situation had long been detrimental to effective national development. Great differences existed (continued on page 7)


Public Policy and Analysis of L.A. Political Systems

Dr. Lawrence S. Graham is an Associate Professor'in the Department of Government at the University of Texas at Austin. He holds an M.A. in Hispanic Studies from the University of Wisconsin and received his Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Florida. Graham spent one year at the University of San Marcos and six weeks at the University of Chile on a Fulbright scholarship. He has also done research in Brazil and is the author of
Civil Service Reform in Brazil: Principles and Practice (University of Texas Press, 1958). Graham's topic was "Public Policy and the Analysis of Latin Political Systems."
Within the last several years, a number of articles have appeared in the professional literature in political science or elsewhere indicating marked changed in the quantity and the quality of work by political scientists on Latin America. Two to be examined here are "Trends in Research on Latin American Politics: 1961-1967,'' an article written by Peter Ranis for the Latin American Research Review,
1968, and the introduction to the section on government and international relations by Philip Taylor and Neale Ronning in the last issue of the Handbook of Latin American Studies.
Ranis notes a growth in studies devoted to: 1. more rigorous hypothesis testing. 2. development of explanatory factors to account for political behavior and; 3. cross-national comparison through isolation of political processes. Taylor and Ronning find that four factors account for a shift in political science studies: a new generation of scholars in the hemisphere; the impact of ferment within the Catholic Church and the emergence of Christian Democratic Parties; the questioning by Latin American social scientists of the validity of methodological and value assumptions used by scholars in de-

veloped nations; and contributions to the literature made by new research centers and institutes in the United States and Western Europe.
While our methods have improved and are more sophisticated, little progress has -been made in either changing our frame of reference or considering alternative approaches to the study of government and politics in Latin America. Comparative politics has been structured by imputs of experience and knowledge from regions other than Latin America. In public administration this is especially true; 'data procedures and theory have come mostly from experience in the United States.
It must be recognized that the comparative administration movement has centered this bias to some extent by material of a theoretical nature, "ideographic" studies, and developmental administration writings. Nevertheless, this work has been done primarily by scholars with Asian experience, and imputs from the Latin American nations are inconsequential. In the Latin American region, one may encounter a body of governmental experience, attitudes towards state, and process of change, all matters that are most relevant to comparative politics and comparative administration. These desperately need to be tapped, and one way to do so is to concentrate on studies of public policy.
For assesing the facts before us, it may be instructive to examine the current status of work in political science and public administration in Latin America. Content analysis provides the most effective approach to obtaining this information. Two samples may be used in this regard:
1. 674 entries reflecting research in progress and completed Ph.D. dissertations in Latin American politics, reported byi Ranis in his

1968 LARR article, and drawing upon material in Dissertation Abstracts-1961-67, LARR (1965-67), the State Department's External Research: American Republics 1964-67, and the 1961-67 APSR. 2. 767 entries from the Handbook of Latin American Studies in the section "Politics, Government and
International Affairs, 1941-68''
In the Ranis sample, I of every 6 studies deals with an interest group, 70% of these focusing on the military, the students, and the church. Two of five studies involve descriptions of political parties. Thus, in the Ranis sample, interest group and political party research would seem to comprise almost 1/3 of political science investigation. Latin America considered as a whole, is the most researched area. Mexico, Brazil, and Chile account for 1/3 of the research attention in the Handbook of Latin American Studies sample and 58 per cent of all the work done related to 9 of the most studied Latin American republics.
The implications of these findings appear to be threefold: first, the impact of new comparative politics has been slight; second, while the tools of measurement and some of our concepts have been refined, we have failed to question the adequacy specifically for the Latin American area; and third the assumption has been that interest groups and political parties constitute the most important elements in the political process. There is a critical need to identify more explicitly those interest groups which hold power and exercise influence over decisions; what constitutes the national configurations of power; and how Latin American governments handle and process demands and pressures deriving from their environment.
Considering these implications, why then might a comparative analysis

of public policy offer a solution to the dilemma of studying Latin America? First, there is a desperate need to visualize the political process in terms of a wider setting. A broader identification of the dynamics of governmental process and program implementation in the bureaucratic arena is necessary.
Second, a focus on public policy will likewise clarify some of the prevailing myths regarding policy makers and influentials. The pluralistic assumptions of many studies have failed to take into account the general economic and political structures within which group processes occur.
A third, and equally strong argument for public policy analysis in the Latin American context is that it avoids further transfer into the Latin American environment of the politicaladministration dichotomy. In the U.S. academic structure this dichotomy is implicit in the distinction drawn between political science and public administration disciplines.
Finally, comparative analysis of public policy can draw attention to the fact that peculiar nation-state constructs in Latin America have special contributions to make to the further development of comparative politics and comparative public administration.

Charles Wagley Appointed

to UF Academic Position

Dr. Charles Wagley, Director of the Institute of Latin American Studies at Columbia University, has been appointed Graduate Research Professor of Anthropology and Latin American Studies at the University of Florida. He will assume his new position in June of this year.
Wagley is currently.President of the American Anthropological Association and is affiliated with the American Academy of Sciences. His other professional activities include membership in the American Philosophical Society, the Council on Foreign Relations, and the Center for Inter-American Relations.
Well known through his extensive writing pertaining to the Latin American region, Wagley is most often associated with his work in Brazil. He is the author of An Introduction to Brazil, Social Science Research on Latin America, The Latin American Tradition: Essays on the Unity and Diversity of Latin American Culture, and Amazon Town: A Study of Man in the Tropics. Works edited or coauthored inclued: The Tenetchara Indians of Brazil, Race and Class in Rural Brazil, and Minorities in the New World: Six Case Studies.
Wagley's name has appeared as a contributor to numerous other volumes, among them Social Change in Latin America, Continuity and Change in Latin America, Encyclopedia Britannica, The World Book, Handbook of Middle American Studies, Politics of Change in Latin America, and Contemporary Cultures and Societies of Latin America.
Dr. Wagley has been granted an Honorary Doctor of Laws degree from the University of Notre Dame. He is a Doctor, Honoris Causa, Universidade de Bahia, Brazil. Th2 Brazilian government has awarded him the Medalha da Guerra and has designated him as Comendador of the National Order of the Southern Cross, Brazil.
Prior to his appointment as Director of the Institute of Latin American Studies in 1961, Dr. Wagley served as Professor of Anthropology at Columbia and Fulbright Professor to Brazil in 1962. He has also been on the staffs of the John Simon Guggenheim Foundation and the Social Science Research Council.

Professor Works on AID Program

Dr. Harry Peirce has been working for one and one-half years in El Salvador as the Agricultural Education Advisor and Contract Chief of Party for AID-University of Florida technical assistance mission. The primary efforts of this project are directed toward the National School of Agriculture, located between San Salvador and Santa Ana, Salvador's two largest cities. This institution provides a three-year program of theoretical and practical training leading to a degree of Perito Agricola (Agricultural Expert). Inaugurated in 1956, the School

currently has a staff of 25 professors and 13 instructors.

Dr. Peirce holds the position of resident consultant to the Director and faculty and coordinates the activities of visiting consultants. Peirce enumerates as the mission's principal goals the improvement of teaching, effectiveness, the addition of the latest agricultural technology to the teaching program, the provision of teaching aids, and the review and evaluation of the curriculum.

To accomplish these aims, the USAID-University of Florida program

has provided teacher workshops and a scholarship program. Reference materials and agricultural bulletins in Spanish and English have been obtained from several sources, including the University of Florida.
In addition to supervising these projects, Peirce also acts in the capacity as consultant to the Ministry of Education. Plans are currently being developed for the establishment of four vocational agricultural schools at the secondary level. It is anticipated that the contract with El Salvador will be renewed and extended in the future.


Role of Foundations in University

Dr. James Daniel received his Ph. D. in History from the University of Texas and has written numerous articles on Colombia and on the history of the Southwestern United States. Since 1964 Dr. Daniel has been with the Rockefeller Foundation at the Universidad del Valle in Cali, Colombia. He has served as professor of History at the Universidad and has been the Foundation's representative for the Humanities and the Social Sciences. His topic, based on his experience in Cali, was entitled "The Role of U.S. Foundations in Latin American University Development."
To answer the question of why outside assistance to universities in Latin America is necessary or desirable, one must understand the changes that occurred in those institutions in the post World War II period. The dual processes of technification and modernization in Latin America created the need for both qualitative and quantitative educational change. New departments of technical and scientific training were required and more traditional departments had to be reformed. Higher education also had to expand to accept the growing numbers of students seeking admission. In trying to deal effectively with these pressures, Latin American governmental, educational and scientific leaders turned to outside sources for assistance.
The Rockefeller Foundation was approached because of its already established work in Latin America in the fields of public health, medicine and disease control. While willing to respond to requests for university assistance, financial considerations restricted the Foundation to grants to specific programs in specific departments. Recognizing a need for more concentrated efforts, it was decided to place a major emphasis on one Latin American educational institution.
The Universidad del Valle in Cali, Colombia, was selected as the institution in which the Foundation would center its major efforts. Three basic factors were decisive in this choice. First, the Universidad del Valle was relatively new, with a flexi-

ble administration and not bound by the traditions of other more established universities. Secondly, and of great importance, the personnel of the University had the desire to develop a first-class educational center. The third reason was the extent of work already under way at the Universidad de Valle. Minimum efforts by the Rockefeller Foundation had generated successful programs as a result of capable Colombian leadership in the Medical School.
Not all disciplines of the University were included in the assistance program. Areas were chosen based on the expertise that the Foundation staff already possessed and could offer to the -Universidad del Valle. Financial resources were also a consideration.
The nature of the Rockefeller Foundation assistance falls into three categories. The first category, which was given the highest priority, was funds for laboratory equipment and for library resources. The lack of these items was seen as a primary reason for the "brain drain" in Colombia, since highly qualified Colombians prefer to go to Europe and North America where these tools, which are vital to their work, are available. These first category funds also included money to supplement faculty salaries so that professors could be placed under contract on a full-time basis, as a further inducement to Colombians to remain in Colombia.
The second category has been that of sending visiting professors to aid in departmental development. The University of Florida has played a major role in this aspect of the Foundation's project. Visiting professorships are not limited to the United States, but also include professors from other Latin American nations.
The last but not least important category of funding is concerned with scholarships. In order to meet the need for faculty members, outstanding graduates of the Universidad del Valle are given the chance to pursue work toward advanced degrees in the United States, and Europe. These

individuals then return to Cali to be employed as members of the University faculty. It is through this aspect of the program that the present need for visiting professors may be reduced.
The Foundation is sometimes accused by certain groups in Colombia of interventionism because of its work in Cali. It must be pointed out that a decision not to assist also becomes a form of intervention. The decisionmaking process of the Foundation requires a request for assistance from that University itself followed by negotiation at the local level, thus making the Foundation and the University co-participants.
The reaction to U.S. presence in the Universidad del Valle is molded by several factors. The Foundation's representatives are most welcomed, or least resented, in the hard and basic science fields. In the social sciences, and especially political science, more difficult problems are being encountered.
While it is difficult to measure the success of the program, several changes may be noted. Administratively, the departmental system has been introduced to the Universidad de Valle. Other Colombian univer sities are now adopting this system. The full-time professorships which have been established, in addition to attracting outstanding Colombian students, have developed the research potential of the University and have enhanced faculty recruitment. As a result of several years of assistance by the Foundation, some disciplines of the University are considered top ranking and are staffed with highly qtialified Colombian scholars.
It should be emphasized that the changes have been brought about because Colombians were willing to introduce them and to provide the capable individuals for the additional training required to teach and administer them. The Foundation has given needed support to permit these developments. Without the cooperation of Colombian officials and other qualified personnel, however, the Foundation's work would have been extremely difficult, if not impossible.

(continued from page 3)

between rural and urban housing; there was a growing gap in the number and quality of housing units in Havana as compared with those in the other urban areas of the country. Great differences also existed between rural and urban housing.
The urban planning structure inherited by the revolutionary government was maintained in the post-1959 period. The Instituto de Planificaci6n Fisica, the agency with primary responsibilities in the urban planning area, was divided into rural and urban departments and further sub-divided into units concerned with planning at the provincial level. The Instituto had authority over the establishment of planning standards and design and over recommendations for legal actions.
Soon after the new government came to power the Instituto established one basic planning objective that was to have very broad impli-

cautions. In an attempt to reduce the emphasis given to the Havana urban complex it was decided to control the growth of that city. This was to be accomplished by two means, (1) restrictions imposed upon Havana, and
(2) the development of urban centers in other parts of the country, which would serve to create a polar equilibrium.
The current population of Havana is 1,750,000 increasing at a rate of 0.3-0.5 per cent per year. The growth rate of other Cuban cities is 8.5 per cent; Havana today has the lowest rate of the 27 Cuban cities of over 20,000 inhabitants. No new investments are being made in Havana, the port facilities have tended to stagnate and little modernization has taken place in the industrial sector. The urban fringe area has been disappearing and there is now a visual distinction between the urban and rural sectors of the Havana region. A ring of rural village centers, called the Cordon de la Havana, encircles

CLAS Moves to New Quarters

The Center for Latin American Studies now occupies its new quarters, which consist of the entire third floor of the recently completed Graduate and International Studies Building. For the first time since Latin American Studies were formally organized in 1950, with the creation of the School of Inter-American Studies, the University of Florida possesses a true physical center for Latin American Studies.
Inter-disciplinary studies and research will benefit from the fact that nineteen professors, about one third of the Latin American Faculty, now have their offices in the Center's new facilities. The departments represented are: Agricultural Economics, Anthropology, Economics, History, Latin American Studies, Linguistics, Political Science, Portugese, and Sociology. Special activities include the Aymara Teaching Project, the Latin American Urban Research Annual, and the Latin American Data Bank.
A Cartographic Research Laboratory will soon be in operation under the supervision of Dr. Gustavo Antonini, a geographer and Associate Professor of Latin American Studies, Initially this laboratory will provide cartographic services, map design and compilation to various research projects in the Latin American field. Its services will eventually be available to the entire University community.
Forty-five graduate students completing doctoral dissertations and master's theses occupy carrels in the Center's quarters. A seminar room accomodating 25 secretarial and publication spaces and two work rooms complete the facilities of the Center. When fully staffed the Center will provide a typing pool, secretarial assistance and a translating staff for the Latin American Faculty housed in its facilities.

the city. Each village contains from 100-500 families who are engaged in food production and forestation work on the outskirts of the city.
While the role played by Havana in social and economic spheres is still an important one, the creation of new urban centers is tending to decrease its predominance as the industrial and exportation center of Cuba. In the Oriente Province a new city with a target population of 150,000 is being created. This will be a center of heavy industry, employing people in a steel mill, a hydro-electric plant, and an oil refinery. The nation's second largest city, Santiago, is also the object of urban stimulation since the revolution. New sections of the urban area have been developed for the location of an industrial park, an airport and a port to provide direct competition with Havana. Santiago will concentrate on rum products, cement and metallurgical production. Under Soviet guidance prefabricated residential units are also being manufactured there, currently at the rate of 1700 units annually.
In the Province of Camaguey, urban development has been promoted to take advantage of available local resources. Bulk sugar will be handled by two new ports equipped with conveyor belts and automatic loading facilities. These modern facilities will also be used to load fertilizer and cement which will be processed in the city.
A primary stimulus leading to these reforms in urban development was the Agrarian Reform Law. This law changed the relationship existing between owners and tenants and also encouraged rapid changes in the rural power structure. It was quickly recognized that the urban areas had long been neglected and that radical reform would be required to bring about similar changes in owner-tenant relationship. Several actions were taken to attempt to relieve the immediacy of problems affecting the cities. In January of 1959 a national law was promulgated which suspended the

right to evict tenants. The following month a National Institute of Housing and Savings was established to operate a housing lottery. Rents in the urban centers were reduced at the same time. A National Planning Board was set up to oversee urban physical planning and zoning. The Board required the sale of vacant lots if the owner did not begin housing construction within a certain time period. The Board was also empowered to set the sale price of these lots.
The nation as a whole has experienced substantial increases in housing facilities and the ideal is to provide adequate housing within a thirty-year period. The natural increase in the number of new units needed annually is 40,000. Cuba is now providing 30,000 new units a year, and therefore is meeting only 3/4 of the annual need. While the total natural increase is not being met, and there is a great backlog in the number units that requires replacement, Cuba has already set a record for housing unit development of prefabricated units, having borrowed extensively from techniques practiced in Europe. Prefabrication leads to savings in iron and other materials that may be in scarce supply.
It is most difficult to evaluate the urban policies and urban reforms that have been carried out in Cuba. On the one hand the planning activi-

ties that are presently being carried out in the rest of Latin America do not appear to be solving the problems at hand. Still, one cannot be certain at this point that the Cuban approach will provide adequate solutions either. There is no Latin American country that is meeting its needs in so far as basic investment in the urban sector is concerned. The Cuban model does offer the centralized decisionmaking that will be required to attack the problem. This has permitted the Cuban government to begin to apply more radical measures, which seem to be handling the problems more effectively than other available models. If there is no strong participation by the central government of any country then there ts small probability of a solution to the World's crisis.

Dr. Dale B. Truett, Assistant Professor of Economics, has recently completed a paper to be included in a United Nations Industrial Development Organi-

zation publication, World Industrial Survey. This is a statistical survey with appropriate policy discussion sections written by consultants. Truett's contribution is entitled "Strategies for Industrial Development in Latin America," and describes recent measures taken by Latin American governments to promote industrialization. Included are discussions on tax and subsidy policies, import substitutions, export motion, and strategies for the development of small industries.
* *
Dr. J. Kamal Dow, Assistant Professor of Agricultural Economics, has been appointed Chief of Party for an assistance program between the University of Florida and the government of Ecuador. Dow will be working with the Instituto Nacional de Investigaciones Agropecuarias, Na tional Institute for Livestock and Crop Research. The goals of the project include the training of personnel and development of research activities.
* *.* *
Volume I of Latin American Urban Research, edited by Assistant Professor Felicity M. Trueblood, Center for Latin American Studies, and Assistant Professor Francine F. Rabinovitz, UCLA, has been released by the publisher, Sage Publications of Beverly Hills, California. The aims of the editors are to provide a yearly round-up of research and development relating to the urbanization of South and Central America, an exhaustive bibliography on urban and urban-related topics in the region and a forum for Latin American urban scholars.
Dr. Lyle McAlister, Professor of History, has been elected Vice-Chairman of the Conference on Latin American History, the principal association of Latin American Historians in the United States. This is the Latin American Affiliate of the American Historical Association. At the next annual meeting, in December, 1971, McAlister will assume the Chairmanship of the organization.

Center for Latin American Studies

Lot r'crsitv Of Florida (,oinc~ au/c, florida 32601

Non-Profit Org. U. S. POSTAGE
1.6 PAID Gainesville Florida
Permit No. 338

University of Florida

Gainesuille, F lorida 32601

6 IA