• TABLE OF CONTENTS
HIDE
 Frontispiece
 Title Page
 Table of Contents
 The First Punic War
 Hannibal at Saguntum
 Opening of the Second Punic...
 The passage of the Rhone
 Hannibal crosses the Alps
 Hannibal in the north of Italy
 The Apennines
 The dictator Farius
 The battle of Cannae
 Scipio
 Hannibal a fugitive and an...
 The destruction of Carthage
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Title: History of Hannibal the Carthaginian
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Table of Contents
    Frontispiece
        Frontispiece
    Title Page
        Title Page 1
        Title Page 2
    Table of Contents
        Table of Contents 1
        Table of Contents 2
    The First Punic War
        Page 1
        Page 2
        Page 3
        Page 4
        Page 5
        Page 6
        Page 7
        Page 8
        Page 9
        Page 10
        Page 11
        Page 12
        Page 13
        Page 14
        Page 15
        Page 16
    Hannibal at Saguntum
        Page 17
        Page 18
        Page 19
        Page 20
        Page 21
        Page 22
        Page 23
        Page 24
        Page 25
        Page 26
        Page 27
        Page 28
        Page 29
        Page 30
        Page 31
        Page 32
    Opening of the Second Punic War
        Page 33
        Page 34
        Page 35
        Page 36
        Page 37
        Page 38
        Page 39
        Page 40
        Page 41
        Page 42
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        Page 45
    The passage of the Rhone
        Page 46
        Page 47
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        Page 49
        Page 50
        Page 51
        Page 52
        Page 53
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        Page 55
        Page 56
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        Page 58
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        Page 60
        Page 61
    Hannibal crosses the Alps
        Page 62
        Page 63
        Page 64
        Page 65
        Page 66
        Page 67
        Page 68
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        Page 84
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        Page 87
        Page 88
        Page 89
        Page 90
    Hannibal in the north of Italy
        Page 91
        Page 92
        Page 93
        Page 94
        Page 95
        Page 96
        Page 97
        Page 98
        Page 99
        Page 100
        Page 101
        Page 102
        Page 103
        Page 104
    The Apennines
        Page 105
        Page 106
        Page 107
        Page 108
        Page 109
        Page 110
        Page 111
        Page 112
        Page 113
        Page 114
        Page 115
        Page 116
        Page 117
        Page 118
        Page 119
        Page 120
    The dictator Farius
        Page 121
        Page 122
        Page 123
        Page 124
        Page 125
        Page 126
        Page 127
        Page 128
        Page 129
        Page 130
        Page 131
        Page 132
        Page 133
        Page 134
        Page 135
    The battle of Cannae
        Page 136
        Page 137
        Page 138
        Page 139
        Page 140
        Page 141
        Page 142
        Page 143
        Page 144
        Page 145
        Page 146
        Page 147
        Page 148
        Page 149
    Scipio
        Page 150
        Page 151
        Page 152
        Page 153
        Page 154
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        Page 156
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    Hannibal a fugitive and an exile
        Page 172
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        Page 176
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    The destruction of Carthage
        Page 191
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    Advertising
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Full Text



















































ANN~ftAIUh VArUTIW~iZNUAN G*fnERM..






HISTORY


oil



HANNIBAL THE CARTHAGINIAN.





BY JACOB ABBOTT,
AWraOX 01 OWI
sem* cnunI,*" "zmir cmum = nom
rM, am.







LONDON:
THOMAS ALLMAN, 42, HOLBORN HILL.
1850.


























*AA461, RLJNTIR, IVY LAXB, ST. PAUL 5.










CONTENTS.




I. The First Pnic War ..... 1
II. Hannibal at Saguntum . .. 17
III. Opening of the Second Punic War 33
IV. The Pauage of the Rhone . 4
V. Hannibal croes the Alp . 62
VI. Hannibal in the North of Italy 91
VII. The Apennines . . .. 105
VIII. The Dictator Fabius ..... 121
IX. The Battle of Canum .. .16
X. Scipio . . . . . 150
XI. Hannibal a Fugitive and an Exile. 172
XII. The Destructioa of Carthage . 191









HANNIBAL.



CHAPTER I.
THE FIRST PUNIC WAR.
HANNIBAL was a Carthaginian general.
He acquired his great distinction as a warrior
by his desperate contests with the Romans.
Rome and Carthage grew up together on op-
posite sides of the Mediterranean Sea. For
about a hundred years they waged against
each other most dreadful wars. There were
three of these wars. Rome was successful in
the end, and Carthage was entirely destroyed.
There was no real cause for any disagree-
ment between these two nations. Their hos-
tility to each other was mere rivalry and spon.
taneous hate. They spoke a dif8rent lan-
guae; they had a different origin; and they
ived on opposite sides of the same sea. 8
they hated and devoured each other.




2 aAMiAL.
Those who have read the history of Alex-
ander the Great, in this series, will recollect
the difficulty he experienced in besieging sad
subduing Tyre, a great maritime city, situated
about two miles from the shore, on the eastern
coast of the Mediterranean Sea. Carthage
was originally founded by a colony from this
city of Tyre, and it soon became a great com-
mercial and maritime power. The Carthagi-
nians built ships, and with them explored all
parts of the Mediterranean Sea. They visited
all the nations on those coasts, purchased the
commodities they had to sell, carried them to
other nations, and sold them at great advances.
They soon began to grow rich and powerful.
They hired soldiers to fight their battles, and
began to take possession of the islands of the
Mediterranean, and, in some instances, of
points on the main land. For example, in
Spain : some of their ships, going there, found
that the natives had silver and gold, which
they obtained from veins of ore near the sur-
face of the ground. At first the Carthaginian
obtained this gold and silver by selling the
natives commodities of various kinds. Fi-
nally, they took possession of that part of
Spain where the mines were situated, and
worked the mines themselves. They dug
deeper; they employed skilful engineers to
make pumps to raise the water, which always




Tun rsiu rume waS. a
soeumulate in mines, and pretaw their
being worked to may great depth, unless the
miners have a considerable degree of scientific
and mechanical skill. They founded a city
here, which they called New Carthage. They
fortifed and garrisoned this city, and made it
the centre of their operations in Spain. This
city is called Carthagena to this day.
Thus the Carthaginians did every thing by
power of money. They extended their opera-
tions in every direction, each new extension
bringing in new treasures. They had, besides
the merchant vessels which belonged to private
individuals, great ships of war belonging to
the state. These vessels were called galleys,
and were rowed by oarsmen, tier above tier,
there being sometimes four and ive banks of
oars. They had armies, too, drawn from
different countries, in various troops, according
as different nations excelled in the different
modes of warfare. For instance, the Numi-
dians, whose country extended in the neigh.
bourhood of Carthage, on the African coast,
were famous for their horsemen. On the
other hand, the natives of the Balearic Isles,
now called Majorca, Minorca, and Ivies, wer
famous for their skill as slingers. So the Cr-
thaginians, in making up their forces, would hie
bodes of cavalry in Numidia, ani e slings




SAIWNINIAL.
In the Balearic Isles; and, for reasons ana-
logous, they got excellent infantry in Spain.
The tendency of the various nations to
adopt and cultivate different modes of warfare
was far greater, in those ancient times, than
now. The Balearic Isles, in fact, received
their name from the Greek word balleia,
which means to throw with a sling. The
youth there were trained to perfection in the
use of this weapon from a very early age. It
is said that mothers used to practise the plan
of putting the bread for their boys' breakfast
on the branches of trees, high above their
heads, and not allow them to have their food
to eat until they could bring it down with a
stone thrown from a sling.
Thus the Carthaginian power became great-
ly extended. The whole government, 'how-
ever, was exercised by a small body of wealthy
families at home. The aristocracy of Carthage
controlled and governed everything. None
but its own sons could ordinarily obtain office
or power. The great mass of inhabitants
were kept in a state of servitude and vassalage.
This state of things operated very unjustly
and hardly for those who were thus debased;
but the result was, that a very efficient and
energetic government was created.
Rome was very differently situated. Rome
had been built by some wanderers from Troy,
0




TH rFIRST PUNIC WAR. I
and it grew, for a long time, silently ad
slowly, by a sort of internal principle of Me
and energy. One region after another of the
Italian peninsula was merged in the Roman
state. They formed a population which was,
in the main, stationary and agricultural. They
tilled the fields; they hunted the wild beasts;
they raised great flocks and herds. They
seem to have been a race-a sort of variety of
the human species-possessed of a very refined
and superior organization, which, in its deve.
lopment, gave rise to a character of firmness,
energy, and force, both of body and mind,
which has justly excited the admiration of
mankind. The Carthaginians had sagacity-
the Romans called it cunning-and activity,
enterprise and wealth. Their rivals, on the
other hand, were characterized by genius,
courage, and strength, giving rise to a certain
calm and indomitable resolution and energy,
which has since, in every age, been strongly
associated, in the minds of men, with the very
wcrd Roman.
The progress of nations was much more
slow in ancient days than now, and these two
rival empires continued their gradual growth
and extension, each on its own side of the
great sea which divided them, for fie hundred
years, before they came into collision. At




6 *ANXIML
ast, however, the collision came. It orig-
vated in the following way -
By looking at a map, the reader will ee
that the island of Sicily is separated from the
main land by a narrow strait called the Strait
of Messina. This strait derives its name
from the town of Messina, which is situated
upon it, on the Sicilian side. Opposite Mes-
sins, on the Italian side, there was a town
named Rhegium. Now it happened that both
these towns had been taken possession of by
lawless bodies of soldiery. The Romans
came and delivered Rhegium, and punished
the soldiers who had seized it very severely.
The Sicilian authorities advanced to the deli-
verance of Messina. The troops there, find-
ing themselves thus threatened, sent to the
Romans to say that if they, the Romans,
would come and protect them, they would
deliver Messina into their hands.
The question, what answer to give to this
application, was brought before the Roman
senate, and caused them great perplexity. It
seemed very inconsistent to take sides with
the rebels of Messina, when they had punished
so severely the of Rhegium. Still the Ro-
mans had been, for a long time, very jealous
of the growth and extension of the Carthagi-
nian power. Here was an opportunity of
meeting and resisting it. The Sicilian autho-




wa TIMaT rOss WAS. I
ride were about calling for direct aid hfr
Carthage to recover the city, and the Wair
would probably re ut in staih g a large
body of Carthaginian troops within sight of
the Italian shore, and at a point where it
would be easy for them to make hostile incur-
rions into the Roman territories. In a word,
it was a cue of what is called political neces-
sity; that is to say, a cue in which the inter-
eats of one of the parties in a contest were so
strong that all considerations of justice, con-
sistency, and honour are to be sacrificed to the
promotion of them. Instances of this kind of
political necessity occur very frequently in the
management of public affairs in all ages of the
world.
The contest for Messina was, after all, how-
ever, considered by the Romans merely as a
pretext, or rather as an occasion, for com-
mencing the struggle which they had long
been desirous of entering upon. They evinced
their characteristic energy and greatness in the
plan which they adopted at the outset. They
knew very well that the power of Carthage
rested mainly on her command of the seaa,
and that they could not hope successfully to
cope with her till they could meet and conquer
her on her own element. In the mean time,
however, they had not a single ship nor a
single sailor, while the Mediterranean was




a* ANEIDAL
wrnred with Crthaginian ships. Not at all
daunted by this prodigious inequality, the
Roman resolved to begin at once the work of
creating for themselves a naval power.
The preparations consumed some time; for
the Romans had not only to build the ships,
but first to learn how to build them. They
took their frs lesson from a Carthaginian gal-
ley which was cast away in a storm upon the
coast of Italy. They seized this galley, col-
lected their carpenters to examine it, and set
woodmen at work to fell trees and collect
materials for imitating it. The carpenters
studied their model very carefully, measured
the dimensions of every part, and observed
the manner in which the various parts were
connected. The heavy shocks which vessels are
exposed to from the waves make it necessary
to secure great strength in the construction of
them; and, though the ships of the ancients
were very small and imperfect compared with
the men-of-war of the present day, still it is
surprising that the Romans could succeed at
all in such a sudden and hasty attempt.
They did, however, succeed. While the
ships were building, officers appointed for the
purpose, were training men, on shore, to the
art of rowing them. Benches, like the seats
which the oarsmen would occupy in the ships,
wee arranged on the ground, and the intended




TN rFIST PUNIC WA. -W
seemn were drilled every day in the move-
ments and action of rowers. The relt was,
that in a few months after the building of the
ships was commenced, the Romans had a
fleet of one hundred galleys of five banks of
oars ready. They remained in harbour with
them for some time, to give the oarsmen the
opportunity to see whether thef'could row on
the water as well as on the land, and then
boldly put to sea to meet the Carthaginians.
There was one part of the arrangements
made by the Romans in preparing their feet
which was strikingly characteristic of the do-.
termined resolution which marked all their
'conduct. They constructed machines con-
taining grappling irons, which they mounted
on the prows of their vessels. These engines
were so contrived, that the moment one of the
ships containing them should encounter a
vessel of the enemy, the grappling irons would
fall upon the deck of the latter, and hold the
two firmly together, so as to prevent the pos-
sibility of either escaping from the other.
The idea that they themselves should have say
wish to withdraw seemed entirely out of the
question. Their only fear was that the Car-
thaginian seamen would employ their superior
skill and experience in naval maneuvres in
making their escape. Mankind have always
regarded the action of the Romans in this




lU MANIBUAL.
can, a one of the mot striking examples of
military courage and resolution which the his-
tory of war has ever recorded. An army of
landsmen come down to the sea-shore, s4,
without scarcely having ever seen a ship,
undertake to build a fleet, and go out to attack
a power whose navies covered the sea, and
made her the sole and acknowledged mistress
of it. They seize a wrecked galley, of their
enemi's for their model; they build a hundred
vessels like it; they practise manoeuvres for
a short time in port; and then go forth to
meet the fleets of their powerful enemy, with
grappling machines to hold them, fearing
nothing but the possibility of their escape.
The result was as might have been ex-
pected. The Romans captured, sunk, destroyed
or dispersed the Carthaginian fleet which was
brought to oppose them. They took the
prows of the ships which they captured, and
conveyed them to Rome, and built what is
called a rostral pillar of them. A rostral
pillar is a column ornamented with such beaks
or prows, which were in the Roman language
called rostra. This column was nearly de-
stroyed by lightning about fifty years after-
wards, but it was rebuilt again, and it stood
then for many centuries, a very striking aad
appropriate monument of this extraordinay
naval victory. The Roman commander ia




TsU rnTs, roeo WAR. 11
this case was the consul Dullis. The retal
column was erected in honour of him. In
digging among the ruins of Rome, there was
found what was supposed to be the remains
of this column, about three hundred years
ago.
The Romans now prepared to carry the war
into Africa itself. Of course it was easy,
after their victory over the Carthaginian fleet,
to transport troops across the sea to the Car-
thaginian shore. The Roman commonwealth
was governed at this time by a senate, who
made the laws, and by two supreme executive
officers, called consuls. They thought it was
safer to have two chief magistrates than one,
as each of the two would naturally be a check
upon the other. The result was, however,
that mutual jealousy involved them often la
disputes and quarrels. i'
The Roman consuls, in time of war, took
command of the armies. The name of the
consul upon whom it devolved to carry on the
war with the Carthaginians, after this first
great victory, was Regulus, and his name ha
been celebrated in every age, on account of
his extraordinary adventures in this campaign,
and his untimely fate. How far the story is
strictly true it is now impossible to ascertain
but the following is the story, as the Roman
historians relate it:-





12 MANIXAL.
At the time when Regulus was elected con-
sul he was a plain man, living simply on his
farm, maintaining himself by his own industry,
and evincing no ambition or pride. His
fellow-citizens, however, observed those qulh-
ties of mind in him which they were accustomed
to admire, and made him consul. He left the
city and took command of the army. He
enlarged the feet to more than three hundred
vessels. He put one hundred and forty thou-
sand men on board, and sailed for Africa.
One or two years had been spent in making
these preparations, which time the Cartha-
ginians had improved in building new ships;
so that, when the Romans set sail, and were
moving along the coast of Sicily, they soon
came in sight of a larger Carthaginian fleet
assembled to oppose them. Regulus advanced
to the contest. The Carthaginian fleet was
beaten as before. The ships which were not
captured or destroyed made their escape in all
directions, and Regulus went on, without fur-
ther opposition, and landed his forces on the
Carthaginian shore. He encamped as soon
as he landed, and sent back word to the
Roman senate asking what was next to be
done.
The senate, considering that the great difil-
culty and danger, viz., that of repulsing the
Carthagi"in fleet, was now past, ordered




Tra nut rono WAR. I1
Begulus to send home nearly all the ships
and a very large part of the army, and with
the rest to commence his march toward Car-
thage. Regulus obeyed; he sent home the
troops which had been ordered home, and with
the rest began to advance upon the city.
Just at this time, however, news came out
to him that the farmer who had care of his
lands at home had died, and that his little
farm, on which rested his sole reliance for the
support of his family, was going to ruin.
Regulus accordingly sent to the senate, asking
them to place some one else in command of
the army, and to allow him to resign his office,
that he might go home and take care of his
wife and children. The senate sent back
orders that he should go on with his campaign,
and promised to provide support for his family,
and to see that some one was appointed to
take care of his land. This story is thought
to illustrate the extreme simplicity and plain-
ness of all the habits of life among the Romans
in those days. It certainly does so, if it is
true. It is, however, very extraordinary,
that a man who was entrusted, by such a
commonwealth, with the command of a fleet
of a hundred and thirty vessels, and an army
of a hundred and forty thousand men, should
have a family at home dependent for subsist,




14 ANIMIBAL
emce on the hired cultivation of even acres of
had. Still, such is the story.
Begulus advanced toward Carthage, con-
quering as he came. The Carthaginians were
beaten in one field after another, and were
reduced in fact to the last extremity, when an
occurrence took place which turned the scale.
This occurrence was the arrival of a large
body of troops from Greece, with a Grecian
general at their head. These were troops
which the Carthaginians had hired to fight for
them, as was the case with the rest of their
army. But these were Greeks, and the Greeks
were of the same race, and possessed the same
qualities, as the Romans. The newly-arrived
Grecian general evinced at once such military
superiority, that the Carthaginians gave him
the supreme command. He marshalled the
army, accordingly, for battle. Hehad a hun-
dred elephants in the van. They were trained
to rush forward and trample down the enemy.
He had a Greek phalanx in the centre, which
was a close, compact body of many thousand
troops, bristling with long, iron-pointed spears
with which the men pressed forward, bearing
every thing before them. Regulus was in a
word, ready to meet the Carthaginians, hbIt he
was not prepared to encounter Greeks. His
army was put to flight, and he was taken
prisoner. Nothing could exceeded the excite.




*m I mr 1M Me WAr. If
memt and exltation in the city when tey saw
Regulus, and five hundred Roman soldiers,
brought captive in. A few days before, they
had been in consternation at the imminent dan.
ger of his coming in as a ruthless and vindic-
tive conqueror.
The Roman senate was not discouraged by
this disaster. They fitted out new armies,
and the war went on, Regului being kept all
the time at Carthage as a close prisoner. At
last the Carthaginians authorized him to go to
Rome as a sort of commissioner, to propose
to the Romans to exchange prisoners and to
make peace. They exacted from him a solemn
promise that if he were unsuccessful he would
return. The Romans had taken many of the
Carthaginians prisoners in their naval combats,
and held them captive at Rome. It is cus-
tomary, in such cases, for the belligerent
nations to make an exchange, and restore the
captives on both sides to their friends and
home. It was such an exchange of prisoners
as this which Regulus was to propose.
When Regulus reached Rome he refused to
enter the city, but he appeared before the sae-
ate without the walls, in a very humble garb,
and with the most subdued and unassuming
demeanour. He was no longer, he said, a
Rema officer, or even citizen, but a Carths.
ginian prisoner, and he disavowed all right to




10 MANNIBAL.
direct or even to counsel, the Roman authorities
in respect to the proper course to be pursued.
His opinion was, however, he said, that the
Romans ought not to make peace or to ex-
change prisoners. He himself and the other
Roman prisoners were old and infirm, and not
worth the exchange: and, moreover, they had
no claim whatever on their country, as they
could only have been made prisoners in con-
sequence of want of courage or patriotism to
die in their country's cause. He said that
the Carthaginians were tired of the war, and
that their resources were exhausted, and that
the Romans ought to press forward in it with
renewed vigour, and leave himself and the
other prisoners to their fate.
The senate came very slowly and reluctantly
to the conclusion to follow this advice. They,
however, all earnestly joined in attempting to
persuade Regulus that he was under no obli-
gation to return to Carthage. His promise,
they said, was extorted by the circumstances
of the case, and was not binding. Regulus,
however, insisted on keeping his faith with
his enemies. He sternly refused to see his
family, and, bidding the senate farewell, he
returned to Carthage. The Carthaginians, ex-
asperated at his having himself interposed to
prevent the success of his mission, tortur*4




HANNIBAL AT MAUNTUM. 17
him for some time in the most cruel manner,
and finally put him to death.
The war continued for some time after this,
until, at length, both nations became weary of
the contest, and peace was made. The follow-
ing is the treaty which was signed. It shows
that the advantage, on the whole, in this first
Panic war, was on the part of the Romans.
There shall be peace between Rome and
Carthage. The Carthaginians shall evacuate
all Sicily. They shall not make war upon any
allies of the Romans. They shall restore to
the Romans, without ransom, all the prisoners
which they have taken from them, and pay
them within ten years three thousand two hun-
dred talents of silver."
The war had continued twenty-four years.


CHAPTER 11.
BAN'IBAL AT SAGUNTUM.
THi name of Hannibal's father was Hamil-
car. He was one of the leading Carthaginian
generals. He occupied a very prominent po-
sition, both on account of his rank and wealth,
and also on account of the great military en-
ergy which he displayed in the command f
the armies abroad. He carried ca the wrn
which the Carthaginians waged in Africa nd




18 *ANNIxAZ.
in Span, after the conclusion of the war with
the Romans, and he longed to commence hos-
tilities with the Romans again.
At one time, when Hannibal was about nine
years of age, Hamilcar was preparing to set
off on an expedition into Spain, and, as was
usual in those days, he was celebrating the
occasion with games, and spectacles, and vari-
ous religious ceremonies. Young Hannibal
was present. He was a bcy of great spirit
and energy, and he entered with much enthu-
siasm into the scene. He wanted to go to
Spain himself with the army, and he came to
his father, and began to urge his request. His
father could not consent to this. He was too
young to endure the privations and fatigues of
such an enterprise. However, his father
brought him to one of the altars, in the pre-
sence of the other officers of the army, and
made him lay his hand upon the consecrated.
victim, and swear that, as soon as he was old
enough, and had it in his power, he would
make war upon the Romans. This was done,
no doubt, in part to amuse young Hannibal's
mind, and to relieve his disappointment in not
being able to go to war at that time, by pre-
mising him a great and mighty enemy to fight
at some future day. Hannibal remembered it,
and longed for the time to come when he could
go to war against the Romans.




RANNIBAL AT lAOUNTUM. 1i
Hamilcar bade his son farewell, and em.
barked for Spain. He was at liberty to ex.
tend his conquests there, in all directions west
of the river Iberus. Its name, Iberus, haa
been gradually changed, in modern times, to
Ebro. By the treaty with the Romans, the
Carthaginians were not to cross the Iberua,
They were also bound by the treaty not to mec
lest the people of Saguntum, a city lying be,
tween the Iberus and the Carthaginian do,
minions. Saguntum was in alliance with the
Romans, and under their protection.
Hamilcar was, however, very restless and
uneasy at being obliged thus to refrain from
hostilities with the Roman power. He began,
immediately after his arrival in Spain, to form
plans for renewing the war.. He had under
him, as his principal lieutenant, a young man
who had married his daughter. His name was
Hasdrubal. With Hasdrubal's aid, he went
on extending his conquests in Spain, and
strengthening his position there, and gradu-
ally maturing his plans for renewing war with
the Romans, when at length he died. Has-
drubal succeeded him. Hannibal was now,
probably, about twenty-one or twenty-two years
old, and still in Carthage. Hasdrubal sent
to the Carthaginian government a request that
Hannibal might receive an appointment in the
army, and be sent out to join him in Spain.




2U HANNIBAL.
On the subject of complying with this re-
quest, there was a great debate in the Cartha-
ginian senate. In all cases where questions
of government are controlled by votes, it has
been found, in every age, that parties will al-
ways be formed, of which the two most pro-
minent will usually be nearly balanced one
against the other. Thus, at this time, though
the Hamilcar family were in power, there was
a very strong party in Carthage in opposition
to them. The leader of this party in the se-
nate, whose name was Hanno, made a very
earnest speech against sending Hannibal. He
was too young, he said, to be of any service.
He would only learn the vices and follies of the
camp, and thus become corrupted and ruined.
"Besides," said Hanno, "at this rate, the
command of our armies in Spain is getting to.
be a sort of hereditary right. Hamilcar was
not a king, that his authority should thus de-
scend, first to his son-in-law, and then to his
son; for this plan of making Hannibal," he
said, while yet scarcely arrived at manhood,
a high officer in the army, is only a stepping-
stone to the putting of the forces wholly under
his orders, whenever, for any reason, Has-
'lubal shall cease to command them."
The Roman historian, through whose narra-
ti'e we get our only account of this debate,
says that, though these were good reasons, yet




RANNIrALe AT SASNTVUM. t
strength prevailed, u usual, over wisdom, in
the decision of the question. They voted to
send Hannibal, and he set out to crown the ma
to Spain, with a heart full of enthusiasm and
joy. I
A great deal of curiosity and interest was
felt throughout the army to see him on his
arrival. The soldiers had been devotedly at-
tached to his father, and they were all ready
to transfer this attachment at once to the son,
if he should prove worthy of it. It was very
evident, soon after he reached the camp, that
he was going to prove himself thus worthy.
He entered at once into the duties of his pod-
tion with a degree of energy, patience, and
self-denial which attracted universal attention,
and made him a universal favourite. He
dressed plainly; he assumed no airs; he
sought for no pleasures or indulgences, nor
demanded any exemption from the dangers
and privations which the common soldiers had
to endure. He ate plain food, and slept, often,
in his military cloak, on the ground, in the
midst of the soldiers on guard; and in battle
he was always foremost to press forward into
the contest, and the last to leave the ground
when the time came for repose. The Romans
say that, in addition to these qualities, he was
inhuman and merciless when in open warfare
with his foes, and cunning and treacherous in




Id BAWNIBAL.
every other mode of dealing with them. It
is very probable that he was so. Such traits
of character were considered by soldiers in
those days, as they are now, virtues in them-
selves, though vices in their enemies.
However this may be, Hannibal became a
great and universal favourite in the army.
He went on for several years increasing his
military knowledge, and widening and extend-
ing his influence, when at length, one day,
Hasdrubal was suddenly killed by a ferocious
native of the country whom he had by some
means offended. As soon as the first shock
of this occurrence was over, the leaders of the
army went in pursuit of Hannibal, whom they
brought in triumph to the tent of Hasdrubal,
and instated him at once in the supreme com-
mand, with one consent, and in the midst of
universal acclamations. As soon as news of
this event reached Carthage, the government
there confirmed the act of the army, and Han-
nibal thus found himself suddenly but securely
invested with a very high military command.
His eager and restless desire to try his
strength with the Romans, received a new im-
pulse by his finding that the power was now
in his hands. Still the two countries were
at peace. They were bound by solemn trea-
ties to continue so. The river Ibers was the
boundary which separated the dominions of




HANWIBAL AT IAOUNTIr iB
the two nations from each other in Spain, the
territory east of that boundary being under the
Roman power, and that on the west under that
of the Carthaginians; except that Saguntum,
which was on the western side, was an ally of
the Romans, and the Carthaginians were bound
by the treaty to leave it independent and free.
Hannibal could not, therefore, cross the Ibe-
rns or attack Saguntum without an open in-
fraction of the treaty. He, however, imme-
diately began to move toward Saguntum, and
to attack the nations in the immediate vicinity
of it. If he wished to get into a war with the
Romans, this was the proper way to promote
it; for, by advancing thus into the immediate
vicinity of the capital of their allies, there was
great probability that disputes would arise
which would sooner or later end in war.
The Romans say that Hannibal was cunning
and treacherous, and he certainly did display,
on some occasions, a great degree of adroit-
ness in his stratagems. In one instance in
these preliminary wars, he gained a victory
over an immensely superior force in a very re-
markable manner. He was returning from
an inroad upon some of the northern provinces,
laden and encumbered with spoil, when he
learned that an immense army, consisting, it
was said, of an hundred thousand men, were
coming down upon his rear. There wea a




14 MANMNIAL.
river at short distance before him. Hiam-
bal pressed on and crossed the river by a ford,
the water, being, perhaps, about three feet
deep. He secreted a large body of cavalry
near the bank of the stream, and pushed on
with the main body of the army to some little
distance from the river, so as to produce the
impression upon his pursuers that he was
pressing forward to make his escape.
The enemy, thinking that they had no time
to lose, poured dow in great numbers into the
stream from various points along the banks;
and, as soon as they had reached the middle
of the current, and were wading laboriously,
half submerged, with their weapons held above
their heads, so as to present as little resist-
ance as possible to the water, the horsemen
of Hannibal rushed in to meet and attack
them. The horsemen, had, of course, greatly
the advantage; for, though their horses were
in the water, they were themselves raised
above it, and their limbs were free, while their
enemies were half submerged, and, being en-
cumbered by their arms and by one another,
were nearly helpless. They were immediately
thrown into complete confusion, and were
overwhelmed and carried down by the current
in great numbers. Some of them succeeded
in landing below, on Hannibal's side; but,
in the mean time, the main body of his army




BANNIIAL AT BA@VUTUn M
had returned, and was ready to receive then,
and they were trampled under foot by the
elephants, which it was the custom to employ
in those days, as a military force. As soon as
the river was cleared, Hannibal marched his
own army acrossit, and attacked what remained
of the enemy on their own side. He gained
a complete victory, which was so great and
decisive that he secured by it, possession of the
whole country west of the Iberus, except Sa-
guntum, and Saguntum itself began to be s-
riously alarmed.
The Saguntines sent ambassadors to Rome
to ask the Romans to interpose and protect
them from the dangers which threatened
them. These ambassadors made diligent
efbrts to reach Rome as soon as possible, but
they were too late. On some pretext or other,
Hannibal contrived to raise a dispute between
the city and one of the neighboring tribes, and
then, taking sides with the tribe, he advanced to
attack the city. The Saguntines prepared
for their defence, hoping soon to receive su-.
cour from Rome. They strengthened and
fortified their walls, while Hannibal began to
move forward great military engines for bat-
tering them down.
Hannibal knew very well that by his hosti.
litiea against this city, he was commencing a
contest with Rome itself, as Rome must neces-




s6 HANNIDAL.
maily take part with her ally. In fact, there
is no doubt that his design was to bring on a
general war between the two great nations.
He began with Saguntum for two reason :
first, it would not be safe for him to cross the
Iberus, and advance into time Roman territory,
leaving so wealthy and powerful a city in his
rear; and then, in the second place, it was
easier for him to find pretexts for getting in-
directly into a quarrel with Saguntum, and
throwing the odium of a declaration of war on
Rome, than to persuade the Carthaginian
state to renounce the peace and themselves
commence hostilities. There was, as hasbeen
already stated, a very strong party at Carthage
opposed to Hannibal, who would, of course,
resist any measures tending to a war with
Rome, for they would consider such a war as
opening a vast field for gratifying Hannibal's
ambition. The only way, therefore, was to
provoke a war by aggressions on the Roman
allies, to be justified by the best pretexts he
could fnd.
Saguntum was a very wealthy and powerful
city. It was situated about a mile from the
sea. The attack upon the place, and the de-
fence of it by the inhabitants, went on for
some time with great vigour. In these opera-
tions, Hannibal exposed himself to great dan-
ger. He approached, at one time, so near




HANNIBAL AT SAGUoonr. fy
the wall, in superintending the arrangements
of his soldiers, that a heavy javelin, thrown
from the parapet, struck him on the thigh.
It pierced the flesh, and inflicted so severe a
wound that he fellimmediately, and was borne
away by the soldiers. It was several days be-
fore he was free from the danger incurred by
the loss of blood and the fever which follows
such a wound. During all this time his army
were in a great state of excitement and anxiety,
and suspended their active operations. As
soon, however, as Hannibal was found to be de-
cidedly convalescent, they resumed them
again, and urged them onward with greater
energy than before.
The weapons of warfare in those days were
entirely different from those which are now
employed, and there was one, described by an
ancient historian as used by the Saguntines at
this seige, which might almost come under the
modern denomination of fire-arms. It was call-
edtheofaarica. It was a sortof javelin, con-
sisting of a shaft of wood, with a long point of
iron. This point was said to be three feet long.
This javelin was to be thrown at the enemy
either from the hand of the soldier, or by an
engine. The leading peculiarity of it was,
however, that, near to the pointed end, there
were wound around the wooden shaft long
bands of tou, which were saturated with pitch




25 IANNIIAL.
and other combustibles, and this inflammable
band was set on fire just before the javelin
was thrown. As the missile flew on its way,
the wind fanned the flames, and made them
burn so fiercely, that when the javelin struck
the shield of the soldier opposing it, it could
not be pulled out, and the shield itself had to
be thrown down and abandoned. /
While the inhabitants of Sagantum were
vainly endeavouring to defend themselves
against their terrible enemy by these and
similar means, their ambassadors, not knowing
that the city had been attacked, had reached
Rome, and had laid before the Roman senate
their fears that the city would be attacked,
unless they adopted vigorous and immediate
measures to prevent it. The Romans resolved
to send ambassadors to Hannibal to demand
of him what his intentions were, and to warn
him against any acts of hostility against Sa-
guntum. When these Roman ambassadors
arrived on the coast, near to Saguntum, they
found that hostilities had commenced, and that
the city was besieged. They were at a lor
to know what to do.
Hannibal, with an adroitness which the
Carthaginians called sagacity, and the Romans
treachery and cunning, determined not to see
these messengers. He sent word to them,
at the shore, that they must not attempt to




rANNISAL AT SASUNTUM. 21
come to his camp, for the country wu in such
a disturbed condition that it would not be
safe for them to land; and besides, he could
not receive or attend to them, for he was too
much pressed with the urgency of his military
works to have any time to spare for debates
and negotiations.
Hannibal knew that the ambassadors, being
thus repulsed, and having found, too, that
the war had broken out, and that Sagnntum
was actually beset and besieged by Hannibal's
armies, would proceed immediately to Car-
thage to demand satisfaction there. He knew,
also, that Hanno and his party would very
probably espouse the cause of the Romans,
and endeavour to arrest his designs. He
accordingly sent his own ambassadors to
Carthage, to exert an influence in his favour
in the Carthaginian senate, and endeavour to
urge them to reject the claims of the Romans,
and allow the war between Rome and Car.
thage to break out again.
The Roman ambassadors appeared at Car-
thage, and were admitted to an audience
before the senate. They stated their case,
representing that Hannibal had made war
upon Saguntum in violation of the treaty, and
had refused even to receive the communication
which had been sent him by the Roman senate
threneh then. They demanded that the Cu-




IN CANNIBAL.
thagiiuan government should disavow his acts,
and deliver him up to them, in order that he
might receive the punishment which his vio-
lation of the treaty, and his aggressions upon
an ally of the Romans, so justly deserved.
The party of Hannibal in the Carthaginian
senate were, of course, earnest to have these
proposals rejected with scorn. The othere'
side, with Hanno at their head, maintained
that they were reasonable demands. Hanno,
in a very energetic and powerful speech, told
the senate that he had warned them not to
send Hannibal into Spain. He had foreseen
that such a hot and turbulent spirit as his
would involve them in inextricable difficulties
with the Roman power. Hannibal had, he
sid, plainly violated the treaty.. He had
besieged Saguntum, which they were solemnly
bound not to molest, and they had nothing to
expect in return but that the Roman legions
would soon be investing their own city. In
the mean time, the Romans, he added, had
been moderate and forbearing. They had
brought nothing to the charge of the Cartha-
ginians. They accused nobody but Hannibal,
who, thus far, alone was guilty. The Cartha-
ginians, by disavowing his acts, could save
themselves from the responsibility of them.
He urged therefore, that an embassy of apo-
logy should be sent to Rome, that Hannibal




rANNIAL AT IAIUNTUM. 81
should be deposed aid delivered up to the
Romans, and that ample restitution should
be made to the Saguntines for the injuries
they had received.
On the other hand, the friends of Hannibal
urged in the Carthaginian senate their defence
of the general. They reviewed the history of
he transactions in which the war had origi-
nated, and showed, or attempted to show,
that the Sanguntines themselves commenced
hostilities, and that consequently they, and
not Haninbal, were responsible for all that
followed; that, under those circumstances, the
Romans ought not to take their part, and if
they did so, it proved that they preferred the
friendship of Saguntum to that of Carthage;
and that it would be cowardly and dishonour-
able in the extreme for them to deliver the
general whom they had placed in power, and
who had shown himself so worthy of their
choice by his courage and energy, into the hands
of their ancient and implacable foes.
Thus Hannibal was waging at the same
time two wars, one in the Carthaginian senate,
where the weapons were arguments and elo-
quence, and the other under the walls of Sa-
guntum, which was fought with battering ram
and iery javelins. He conquered ,n both.
The senate decided to send the Roman ambas-
sadors home without acceding to their demands,




32 HANNIBAL.
and the walls of Saguntum were battered
down by Hannibal's engines. The inhabi-
tents refued all terms of compromise, and
resisted to the last, so that, when the victo-
rious soldiery broke over the prostrate walls,
and poured into the city, it was given up to
them to plunder, and they killed and destroyed
all that came in their way. The disappointed
ambassadors returned to Rome with the news
that Saguntum had been taken and destroyed
by Hannibal, and that the Carthaginians, far
from offering any satisfaction for the wrong,
assumed the responsibility of it themselves,
and were preparing for war.
Thus Hannibal accomplished his purpose of
opening the way for waging war against the
Roman power. He prepared to enter into the
contest with the utmost energy and seal. The
conflict that ensued lasted seventeen years, and
is known in history as the second Punic war.
It was one of the most dreadful struggles be-
tween rival and hostile nations which the
gloomy history of mankind exhibits to view.
The events that occurred wil be described in
the subsequent chapters.






CHAPTER III.
OPENING 0r THrE NCOND PUNIC WAR.
WHEN the tide once turns in any nation in
favour of war, it generally rushes on with
great impetuosty nad force, and bear all be-
fore it. It was'so in Carthage in this instance.
The party of Hano were thrown entirely into
the minority sad silenced, and the friends aad
partisan of Hannibal carried, not only the
government, but the whole community with
them, and everybody was eager for war.
Besides, when Hannibal gained possession
of Saguntum, he found immense treasures
there, which he employed, not to increase his
own private fortune, but to strengthen se
confirm his civil and military power. The
Sagontines did every thing they could to pre-
vent these treasures from falling into his huaad
They fought desperately to the last, refused
all terms of surrender, and they became so
insanely desperate in the end, that, according
to the narrative of Livy, when they foand tha
the walls and towers of the city were lling
in, and that all hope of further defence was
gone, they built an enormous Are in the pub-
lic streets, and heaped upon it all the tree-
sares which they had time to collect, that Aew
'reul dstroy; and then, that mary of she
V




184 AWNNINAL
principal inhabitants leaped into the flame
themselves, in order that their hated conquer-
ors might lose their prisoners a well u their
. spoils.
Notwithstanding this, however, Hannibal
obtained vast amount of gold and silver,
both in the form of money and of plate, and
also much valuable merchandise, which the
Baguntine merchants had accumulated in their
palaces and warehouses. He used all thi pro
petty to strengthen his own political and mil.
tary position. He paid his soldiers all the ar-
rears due to them in full. He divided among
them a large additional amount, u their share
of the spoil. He sent rich trophies home to
Carthage, and present, consisting of sums of
money, and jewellery, and gems, to his fiends
there, and to those whom he wished to make his
friends. The result of this munifice, and
of the renown which his victories in Spain had
pr red for him, wu to raise him to the
higetpinnacle of infence and honour. The
Carthaginian chose him one of their nafets.
The sfetes were the supreme executive of
Acers of the Carthaginian commonwealth. The
government wa, u has been remarked be-
fore, a sort of aristdcratic republic, and repub.
lie are always very cautious about entruting
power, even executive power, to any one mgL
As Rome had two consuls, reigning jointly




n 6e0oo01 rPme WAR. 38
so th Carthaginia obe Amanally two df-
fete., a they were called at Carthage, though
the Roman writers call them indiscriminately
aufete, conaula, and king. Hannibal was
now advanced to this dignity; so that, in con-
junction with his colleague, he held the sn-
preme civil authority at Carthage, besides be-
ing invested with the command of the vat and
victoriona army in Spain.
When news of these events-the siege and
destruction of Saguntum, the rejection of the
demands of the Roman ambasadors, and the
vigorous preparations making by the Cartha-
ginians for war-reached Rome, the whole city
was thrown into consternation. The senate
and the people held tumultuous and disorderly
asemblies, in which the events which had oc-
curred, and the course of proceeding which it
was incumbent on the Romana to take, were
discused with much excitement and clamour.
The Roman ware, in at, afraid of the Car-
thagtinans. The campaigns of Hannibal in
Spain, had impresed the people with a strong
mense of the remoreless and terrible eergy
of his character; they at once concluded that
Ub plan would be formed for marching into
Italy, and they even antinlated the danger of
hib bringing the war up to the very gates of
the dty, so ae to threaten th wih the de-
iruotion which he had bright upon Beg-

4




30 HANxMIAL.
tum. The event showed how justly they ap-
preciated his character.
Since the conclusion of the first Punic war,
there had been peace between the Romans and
Carthaginians for about a quarter of a century.
During all this time both nations had been ad-
vancing in wealth and power, but the Cartha-
ginians had made much more rapid progress
than the Romans. The Romans had, indeed,
been very successful at the onset in the former
war, but in the end the Carthaginians had
proved themselves their equal. They seemed,
therefore, to dread now a fresh encounter with
these powerful foes, led on, as they were now
to be, by such a commander as Hannibal.
They determined, therefore, tp send a se.
cond embassy to Carthage, with a view of
making one more effort to preserve peace, be-
fore actually commencing hostilities. They
accordingly selected five men from among the
most influential citizens of the state-men of
venerable age, and of great public considera-
tion--ad commissioned them to proceed to
Carthage, and ask once more whether it was
the deliberate and final decision of the Cartha-
ginian senate to avow and sustain the action
of Hannibal. This solemn embassage set sail.
They arrived at Carthage; they appeared be-
fore the senate; they argued their cause, byt
it was, of course, to deaf and unwilling ears.




Tra OCOMD rPURIO WAR. 37
ihe Cartbgintn orators replied to them, each
side attempting to throw the blame of the vio-
lation of the treaty on the other. It was a so-
lemn hour, for the peace of the world, the
lives of hundreds of thousands of men, and
the continued happiness, or the desolation and
ruin of vast regions of country, depended on
the issue of the debate. Unhappily, the breach
was only widened by the discussion. Very
well," said the Roman commissioners, at last,
"we offer you peace or war, which do you
choose ?" "Whichever you please," replied
the Carthaginians; "decide for yourselves."
"War, then," said the Romans, "since it
must be so." The conference was broken
up, and the ambassadors returned to Rome.
They returned, however, by the way of
Spain. Their object in doing this, was to ne-
gotiate with the various kilgdoms and tribes
in Spain and in France, through which Han-
nibal would have to marrca in invading Italy,
and endeavour to induce them to take sides
with the Romans. They were too late, how-
ever, for Hannibal had contrived to extend and
establish his influence in all that region too
strongly to be shaken; so that, on one pre-
text or another, the Roman proposals were all
rejected. There was one powerful tribe, for
example, called the Volsciens. The ambass-
dors, in the presence of the great council of




38 XANWIBAL.
the Volaoans, made known to them the proba-
bility of war, and invited them to ally them-
selves with the Romans. The Volacians re-
jected the proposition with a sort of scorn.
" We se," said they, from the fate of a-
guntum, what is to be expected to result from
an alliance with the Romana. After leaving
that city defenceles and alone in its struggle
against such terrible danger, it is in vain to
ask other nations to trust to your protection.
If you wish for new allies, it will be beat for
you to go where the story of Saguntum is not
kown." This answer of the Volacians was
applauded by the other nations of Spain, as
far a it was known; and the Roman ambas-
adors, despairing of success in that country,
went on into Gaul, which is the name by which
the country now called France is known in
ancient history.
On reaching a certain place, which was a
central point of influence and power in Gaul,
the Roman commissioners convened a great
martial council there. The spectacle present-
ed by this assembly was very imposing, for the
warlike counsellors came to the meeting ared
completely, and in the most formidable ma-
ner, as if they wre coming to a battle, l.
stead of a consultation and debate. Tie wvo
erable ambassador laid the subject bsef
them. They domested largely on the pear'




s3 *eW e rem WaS. 90
and greatness of the Robmu, and on the car-
tainty that they should conquer in the p-
proaching contet, and they invited the Ga l
to espouse their euse, and to rise in arms and
intercept Hannibal's passage through their
country, if he should attempt to effect one.
The assembly could hardly be induced to
hear the ambassador through; and, a soon
u they had finished their address, the whole
council broke forth into cries of dissent and
dspleaaure, and even into shouts of derision.
Order ws at length restored, and the olcers,
whose duty it was to express the sentiments
of the assembly, gave for their reply, tht the
Gaul had never received anything but violence
and injuries from Rome, or any thing but
kindness and goodwill from Carthage; and that
they had no idea of being guilty of the flly
of bringing the impending storm of Hannibel's
hostility upon their own head, merely for the
sake of averting it from their ancient and im-
placable foes. Thus the ambsuadors were
everywhere repulsed. -
Hannibal began now to form his plan, in
very deliberate and cautious manner, for a
amh into Italy. He well knew that this
was an expedition of such magnitude aad
tdndo, as to require beforehand the moat
aeMa and well-considerd arrangements,
bel fr the forces which were to go, and fi




40 MANNIBAL.
the states ad communities which were to
remain. The winter was coming in. His
firt measure was to dimiss a larg portion
of his forces, that they might visit their homes.
He told them that he was intending some
great designs for the ensuing spring, which
might take them to a great distance, and keep
them for a long time absent from Spain, and
he would, accordingly, give them the inter-
vening time to tisit their families and their
homes, and to arrange their affair. This act
of kind consideration and condence renewed
the attachment of the soldiers to their com-
mander, and they returned to his camp in the
spring not only with new strength and vigour,
but with redoubled attachment to the service
in which they were engaged.
Hannibal, after sending home his soldiers,
retired himself to New Carthage, which is
further west than Saguntum, where he went
into winter quarters, and devoted himself to
the maturing of his designs. Besides the
necessary preparations for his own march, he
had to provide for the government of the
countries that he should leave. He devised
various and ingenious plans to prevent the
danger of insurrections and rebellions while
en was gone. One was, to organize an arm
for Spain out of soldiers drawn from Afris,
while the troops which were to be employed




Tas eIcoio rm WAr. 41
to garrion Carthg, and to sustain the g
verment there, were taken from Spain. By
thus changing he troop of the two owntriee,
each country wu controlled by a foreign sol-
diery, who were more likely to be faithful in
their obedience to their commanders, and less
in danger of sympathizing with the populations
which they were respectively employed to con-
trol, than if each had been retained in its own
native land.
Hannibal knew very well that the various
states and provinces of Spain, which had re-
fused to ally themselves with the Romans and
abandon him, had been led to do this through
the influence of his presents or the fear of his
power, and that if, after he had penetrated
into Italy, he should meet with reverses, there
would be great danger of defections and re-
volts. As an additional security against this,
he adopted the following ingenious plan. He
enlisted a body of troops from among all the
nations of Spain that were in alliance with him,
selecting the young men who were enlisted as
much is possible from families of considera-
inluence, and this body of troops,
nied, he sent into Carthage, giving
Sn and tribes from which they were
understand that he considered them
au soldiers serving in his aris, but
iAtagt which he should hold u mecrit




41 imnAlNAL.
for the fidelity and obedience of the countries
from which they had come. The number of
these soldiers was four thousand.
Hannibal had a brother, whose name, as it
happened, was the same as that of his brother-
in-law, Hudrubal. It was to him that he
committed the government of Spain during his
sbeence. The soldiers provided for him were,
as has been already stated, mainly drawn from
Africa. In addition to the foot soldiers, he
provided him with a mall body of horse. He
left with him, also, fourteen elephants. And
as he thought it not improbable that the
Bomans might, in some contingency during
his absence, make a descent upon the Spanish
coast from the sea, he built and equipped for
him a small feet of about sixty vesels, fifty
of which were of the first class.
The Romans, on the other hand, did not
neglect their own preparations. Though re-
luctant to enter upon the war, they still pre-
pared to engage in it with their characteristic
energy and ardour, when they found that it
couldnotbe averted. They resolved on raising
two powerful armies, one for each of the oon-
sal. The plan was, with one of these 4
advance to meet Hannibal, and with the ete
to proceed to Sicily, and from Sicily rt ti
African coast, with a view of threatening the
Carthagiian capital. This plan, if succea l.




TrBE IMO PINr o WAL,
would copel the C garthsgi a to reell a
pat or the whole of Hanalbeal' rm by r th
intended invasion of Italy to defend their own
AM=sn homes.
The force raised by the Roman mounted to
about seventy thousand men. About a third of
those were Boman soldier, ad the remainder
were drawn from various nations dwelling
in Italy and in the island of the editerra-
ean Sea which were in alliance with the
Bomans. Of these troops rix thousand were
cavalry. Of course, as the Romain intended
to cross into Africa, they needed a flet
They built and equipped one, which consisted
of two hundred and twenty ships of the largest
clas, besides a number of smaller and lighter
vessels for services requiring speed.
Lots were then drawn in a very dlema
manner, according to the Roman custom on
sch occasions, to decide on the assignment
of these two armies to the repectie consuls.
The one destined to meet Hannibl on his way
from Spain, fell to a consul named Corneliu
Seipio. The name of the other was Bem-
pronius. It devolved on him, consequently,
to ta charge of the expedition detained to
8i and Aafica. When all the angme
ea were thus made, the question was dany
pt, ina very solemn a formal mner, t
te Bme- people fr thei l te sad




44 HAWNIBAL.
decision. "Do the Roman people decide mad
decree that war shall be declared against the
Carthaginians ?" The decision was in the
affirmative. The war was then proclaimed
with the usual imposing ceremonies. Sacri-
fices and religious celebrations followed, to
propitiate the favour of the gods, and to in-
spire the soldiers with courage and confidence.
In the mean time Hannibal was moving on,
as the spring advanced, toward the banks of
the Iberus, that frontier stream, the crossing
of which made him an invader of what was, in
some sense, Roman territory. He boldly
passed the stream, and moved forward along
the coast of the Mediterranean, gradually
approaching the Pyrenees, which form the
boundary between France and Spain. His
soldiers hitherto did not know what his plans
were. It is very little the custom now for
military and naval commanders to communi-
cate to their men much information about
their designs, and it was still less the custom
then; and besides, in those days, the common
soldiers had no access to those means of infor-
mation by which news of every sort is now so
universally difused. Thus, though all the
officers of the army, and well-informed citi-
sens, both in Rome and Carthage, anticipated
and understood Hannibal's designs, his own
soldiers, ignorant and degraded, knew nothing




aN *scoW mVNIC WAR. 46
except that they were to go on some distat
and dangerous service. They, very likely,
had no idea whatever of Italy or of Rome, or
of the magnitude of the possessions, or of the
power held by the vast empire which they
were going to invade.
When, however, after travelling day after
day, they came to the foot of the Pyreness,
and found that they were rally going to pas
that mighty chain of mountains, and for this
purpose were actually entering its wild and
gloomy defiles, the courage of some of them
failed, and they began to murmur. The dis-
content and alarm were, in fact, so great, that
one corps, consisting of about three thousand
men, left the camp in a body, and moved
back toward their homes. On inquiry, Han-
nibal found that there were ten thousand more
who were in a similar state of feeling. His
whole force consisted of over one hundred
thousand. He called together the ten thou-
and discontented troops that were still in his
camp, and told them that, since they were
afraid to accompany his army, or unwilling to
do so, they might return. He wanted none
in his service who had not the courage and
the fortitude to go on wherever he might lead.
He would not have the faint-hearted and the
timid in his army. They would only be a
burden to load down and impede the courage




44 I NIAL,
d energy of the ret. So aytng, he gav
orders for them to return, and with the ret of
the amy, whoe resolution and ardour were
redoubled by this occurrence, he moved on
through the panse of the mountains.
This act of Hannibal, in permitting his
discontented soldier to return, had all the
effect of a deed of generosity in its influence
upon the minds of the soldiers who went on.
We must not, however, imagine that it was
prompted by a spirit of generality at all. It
was policy. Hannibal wa mercilesly cruel
in all caue where he imagined that severity
was demanded. It requires great sagacity
sometimes in a commander to know when he
must pnish, and when it is wisest to overlook
and forgive. Hannibal, like Alexander and
Napoleon, possesed this sagacity in a very
high degree; and it was, doubtless, the exer-
cse of that principle alone which prompted his
action on this occasion.
Thus Hannibal passed the Pyrenees. ,

CHAPTER IV.
THE PAISAGI O1 THE RHONE.
HAxmNIAL, after he had passed the Py-
mass, did not anticipate any new diicoulty till
e he would arrive at the Rhone. He kune




TB PArNAS Of Tnun uolMp. 47
Wery well that that was a brod sa rapid
river, and that he most cross it nea its
mouth, where the water wa deep and the
banks low; and, besides, it was not imps-
sible that the Romans, who were coming to
meet him under Cornelius Scipio, might have
reached the Rhone before he should arrive
there, and be ready upon the banks to dispute
hi passage. He had sent forward, therefore,
a small detachment in advance, to reconnoitre
the country and select a route, and if they met
with no difficulties they were to go on till they
reached the Alps, and explore the passage
and defles through which his army could beet
cross those snow-covered mountains.
It seems that before he reached the Pyre.
snes-that is, while he was upon the 8panish
side of them, some of the tribes through
whoe territories he had to peas undertook to
resist him, and he, consequently, had to attack
them and reduce them by force; and them,
when he was ready to move on, he left a guard
in the territories thus conquered, to keep them
in subjection. Bumourn ofthis reached aul.
The Gauls were alarmed for their own safety.
They had not intended to oppose Hannibal so
lag as they supposed that he only wished far
a safe pasge through their country on his
way to Italy; but now, when they found, hfr
what had occurred in Spin, that be wasgoing




S4 RANNIIAL.
to enmaer the countries he traversed as he
passed along, they became alarmed. They
sised their arms, and assembled in hute at
Ruscino, and began to devise measures of de-
fence. Ruscino was the same place as that in
which the Roman ambassadors met the great
council of the Gauls on their return to Italy
from Carthage.
While this great council, or, rather, assem-
bly of armie, was gathering at Buscino, Han-
nibal was at Illiberil, a town at the foot of the
Pyrenean mountains. He seems to have had
no fear that. any opposition which the Gauls
could bring against him would be successf4,
but he dreaded the delay. He was extremely
unwilling to spend the precious months of the
early summer in contending with such foes,
when the road to Italy was before him. Be-
sides, the passes of the Alps, which are difficult
and laborious at say time, are utterly imprac-
ticable except in the months of July and
August. At all other seasons .they were, in
those days, blocked up with impassable snows.
In modern times roads have been made, with
glleries cut through the rock, and with the
exposed places protected by sloping roofs pro-
jecting from above, over which storms sweep
and avalanches slide without injury; so that
now tho intercourse of ordinary travel between




WT PAaASu OWf uN B 49
Pramas IItaly, crrss the Alps, is kept p,
in so measure, all the year.
Hannibal had therefore no time to loee, ad
that circumstance made this ce am of these
in which forberance and a show of generosity
wer called for, instead of delance and forces
He accordingly nt messengers to the coenail
at RPcino to ay, in a very coaplaant sad
able manner, that he wished to se and cam-
fer with their princes in person, and that, if
they pleased, he would advance for this pr-
pao toward Rscino; or they ht, if they
preferred, come on toward him at Iliberia,
where he would await their arrival. He I.
vited them to come freely into his amp, anl
said that he was ready, i they wen withg
neve him, to go hto tbeirs, fr he had e
to Gaol a a riend dan ally, and wmaed
nothing but a free pasage through their tIe-
tory. He had made a resoluio, he said, if
the Gaol would but allowhim to keep t, that
there should not e a single word draw in
his army till he got into Italy.
The aarm and th feelings of bohtilit
which prevailed among the Gauls were great
allayed by this message. They put their samp
in motion, and went on to lliberis. The
princes and high ofcers of their armies went
to Hannibal's camp, and were received with
the highet marks of distinction and honor.




36 MIAWUIIAL.
They were loaded with presents, and went
away charmed with the afsbility, the wealth,
ad the generosity of their visitor. Instead of
opposing his progress, they became the con.
doctors and guides of his army. They took
them Art to ouscino, which was, as it were,
their capital, and thence, after a short delay,
the army moved on without any further moles-
tation toward the Rhone.
In the mean time, the Roman consul Scipio,
having embarked the troops destined to meet
Hannibal in sixty ships at the mouth of the
Tiber, set ail for the mouth of the Rhone.
The men were crowded together in the ships,
u armies necessarily must be when transpor-
ted by se. They could not go far out to sa,
for, a they had no compae in those day,
there wer no means of directing the course of
navigation, in case of storms or cloudy ske,
except by the land. The ships accordingly
made their way slowly along the shore, some-
times by means of ails and sometimes by
oars, and, after offering for some time the
hardships and privations incident to such a
voyage-the fleet entered the mouth of the
Rhone. The officerhad no idea that Banni.
bal wa near. They had only heard of his
having crossed the Iberus. They imagined
that he wau till en the other side of the
Pyrenees. They entered the Rhone by the




2 u3 PASSAes or 30aso 1S
rst brean they cme to--ad sailed without
concern up to arsilles, Imaginin that their
enemy was still hundreds of miles away, en-
tangled, perhaps, among the defiles of the
Pyrenees. Instead of that, he was safely en-
camped upon the banks of the Rhone, a short
distance above them, quietly and coolly making
his arrangements for crossing it.
When Scipio got his men upon the land,
they were too much exhausted by the sickness
and misery they had endured upon the voyage
to move on to meet Hannibal without some
days for rest. Scipio, however, selected
three hundred horsemen who were able to
move, and sent them up the river on an ex-
ploring expedition, to learn the facts in re-
spect to Hannibal, and to report them to him.
Dispatching them accordingly, he remained
himself in his camp, reorganising and recrui-
ting his army, and awating the return of the
party that he had ent to explore.
Although Hannibal had thus far met with no
serious opposition in his progress through Gaul,
it must not, on that account, be supposed that
the people through whose territories he was
passing, we really friendly to his cause, or
pleased with his presence among them. An
amy is always a burden and a curse to any
cootry that it enters, even when its only ob-
ject s to pass peacefully through. The Gaala




W AINImAL.
assumed a friendly attitude toward this dread-
ed invader, only because they thought that
by so doing he would the sooner pas and be
gone. They were too weak, and had too few
mean of resistance to attempt to stop him;
and, a the next bet thing that they could do,
reolved to render him every possible aid to
hasten him on. This continued to be the
policy of the various tribes until he reached
the rier. The people on the furthr side of
the river, however, thought it best for them
to rest. They were nerer to the Roman
territorie, and consequently, somewhat more
under Roman influence. They feared the re-
entment of the Romans if they should, even
pasvely, render any co-operation to Hannibal
in his designs; and, as they had the broad
and rapid river between them and their enemy,
they thought there wa a reasonable project
that, with its aid, they could exclude him from
their territories together.
Thus it happened that, when Hannibal
came to the stream, the people on one side
were all eager to promote, while those on the
their were determined to prevent his pa e,
both parties being animated by the ame de-
ire to free their country from uch a pet as
the presence of an army of ninety thousand
mea; so that Hannibal stood at last upon
the backs of the river, with the people on fd




PAUA on of un oWon. s.
side of dntrea waltingrd rady tf hidaI
all the boats and vessel that they eould com-
nand, and to reader every aid in their power
in the embarkation, while those on the other
were drawn up in battle array, marshall so
as to guard every place of landing, and lining
with pikes the whole extent of the shore. All
this time, the three hundred horsemen which
Scipio had dispatched, were slowly and can-
tiounly making their way up the river from
the Roman encampment below.
After contemplating the scene presented to
his view at the river for some time in silence,
Hannibal commented his preparation for
crossing the stream. He collected brt all
the boats of every kind which could be obtained
among the Gauls who lived along tie bak
of the river. These, however, only served
for a beginning, and so he next got together
all the workmen and all the tools which the
country could furnish for several mile around,
and went to work constructing more. The
Gauls of that region had a custom of making
boats of the trunks of large trees. The tree,
being felled and cut to the proper length, was
hollowed out with hatehets and adsea, an
then, being turned bottom upward, the outside
was shaped in such a manner as to make it
glide easily through the water.
There wre plenty of large trees on the




o0 WAMWMAL.
bnaks of the Rhone. Hannbal's soldiers
watched the Gauls at their work, until they
learned the art themselves. Some first assisted
their naw allies in the easier portions of the
operation, and then began to fell large trees
and make the boats themselves. Others, who
had less skill or more impetuosity, chose not
to wait for the slow process of hollowing the
wood, and they, accordingly would fell the
trees upon the shore, cut the trunks of equal
lengths, place them side by side in the water,
and bolt or bind them together so as to form
a raft. The form and fashion of their craft
was of no consequence, they said, as it was
for one passage only. Any thing would an-
swer if it would only float and bear its burden
over.
In the mean time, the enemy upon the op.
polite shore looked on, but they could do
nothing to impede these operations. Their
only hope was to overwhelm the army with
their missiles, and prevent their landing,
when they should reach the bank at last in
their attempt to cross the stream.
If an army is crossing a river without any
enemy to oppose them, a moderate number of
boats will serve, as a part of the army can be
transported at r time, and the whole gradually
transferred from one bank to the other by re-
peated trips of the same conveyances. But




PAssAa0 or nM ZoNs. a
when thene isan eemy as eoater at the
landing, it is eessary to provide the mesa
of carry over er ery large force at a time;
for if a small division were to go over b
alone, it would only throw its weak ad de-
fenceless, into the hads of the enemy. Han-
abal, tmrebor, waited until he had boats,
rafts, and oats enough constructed to cary
over a force all together, sufficiently numerous
and powerful to attack the enemy with a pros-
pect of scces.
The Romans, a wvehave already remarked,
say that Hannibal was cunning. He certainly
was not disposed, like Alexander, to trust in
his battles to simple superiority of bravery
and force, but was always contriving some
stratagem to increase the chances of victory.
He did so in this case. He kept up for many
days a prodigious parade and bustle of build-
ing boats nd rafts in sight of his enemy, as
if his sole reliance was on the multitude of
men that he could pour across the river at a
single transportation, and he thus kept their
attention closely riveted upon these prepara-
tions. All this time, however, he had another
plan in course of execution. He had sent a
strong body of troops secretly up the river,
with orders to make their way stealthily
through the forests, and cro the stream some
few mils above. This fore was intended to





move bMek fr the river, moou it shedu
cross the strwea, d come down o the
enemy in the ea, so a to attack ad bar
th there at the ame time that BHnibal wa
crewing with the main body of the amy. If
they acceededd in crossing the river afdy,
they were to build a fire in the woods on the
other side, in order that the column of smke
which should aceond from it might serm a
signal of their success to Hannibal
This detachment wu commanded by an offi-
cr named Hanno-of course, a very different
man from Hannibal' great enemy of that
name in Carthage. Hanno set out in the
night, moving back from the river, in com-
mencing his march, so a to be entirely out of
eight from the Gauls on the other side. He
had some guide belonging to the country,
who promised to show him a convenient place
for crossing. The party went up the river
about twenty-fve miles. Here they foud a
place where the water spread to a grater
width, ad where the current was s rapid,
snd the water not so deep. They got to this
Sin silence and screq, their enemies
not having suspected any such design.
As they had, therefore, nobody to oppose
the, they could cross much more easily tm the
mai army below. They made some raft for
carrying over those of the men that could not




PANASe or 3f 5 uma. W
aw and such mntions of war s would e
injured by th wet. Th ret of the mn
waded till the reached the chanel, mad th
wam, supporting themselves in part by their
buckler, which they placed beneath their
bodi in the water. Thus they all croed in
safety. They paused a day, to dry their
clothes and to rest, and then moved cautioouly
down the river until they were near enough to
Hannibal' position to allow their signal to be
seen. The ire was then built, and they gaed
with exultation upon the column of smoke
which ascended from it high into the air.
Hannibal saw the signal, ad now immedi-
ately prepared to crow with his army. The
horsemn embarked in boat, holding their
horses by lines, with a view of leading them
into the water, so that they might swim in
company with the boat. Other horses, bri-
dled and accoutred, were put into large fat-
bottomed bets, to be taken across dry, in
order that they might be all ready for service
at the instant of landing. The most vigreas
and ricient portion of the army were, of
course, selected for the fint passage, while all
thoe who, for any eause, were week or dis-
bled, remained behind, with the store and
mnuation of war, to be transported afterward,
when the first passage should have been
eabted. All this dim the enemy, on the




55 AWMIAL
opposite shore, wer gettg their ranks in
array, sad making every thing ready for a
furious assalt upon the invaders the moment
they should approach the land.
There wa something like silence and oder
during the period while the men were embark-
ing and pushing out from the land, but as they
advanced into the current, the load commb,
sad shets, and eateries, increased more and
more, and the rapidity of the current, and o'
the eddies, by which the boats and raft were
hurried down the stream, or whirled against
each other, soon produced a terric scene of
tumult and confusion. As oon as the frst
boats approached the land, the Gaul assembled
to oppose them rushed down upon them with
shower of missiles, and with those unearthly
yells which barbarous warriors always raise in
going into battle, as a means both of exciting
themselves, and of terrifying their enemy.
Hannibal's officers urged the boats on, and en-
deavoured, with as much coolnss and deliber-
ation u possible, to eflet a landing. It is,
perhaps, doubtful how the contest would have
ended, had it not been for the detachment un-
der lanno, which now came suddenly into
action. While the Gauls were in the height of
their excitement, in attempting to drive back
the Carthaginians from the bank, they were
thunderstruck at hearing the shouts and cries




PAIIAes or 01 I lONSm.
of an enemy behind them; and, on looking
around, they saw the troops of Hanao pouring
down upon them from the thickets with ter-
rible impetuosity and force. It is very dili-
cult for an army to fight both in front and in
the rear at the same time. The Gauls, after a
brief struggle, abandoned the attempt any
longer to oppose Hannibal's landing. They fed
down the river, and back into the inter,
leaving Hanno in secure posseeion of the
bank, while Hannibal and his forces came up
at their leisure out of the water, finding friend
instead of enemies to receive them.
The remainder of the army, together with
the stores and munitions of war, were next to
be transported; and this was accomplished
with little difficulty, now that there was no
enemy to disturb their operations. There was
one part of the force, however, which oc-
sioned some trouble and delay. It was a body
of elephants, which formed a part of the army
How to get these unwieldy animals across so
broad and rapid a river, was a question of no
little difficulty. There are various accounts of
the manner in which Hannibal accomplished
the object, from which it would seem that dif-
ferent methods were employed. One mode was
as follows: The keeper of the elephants se-
lected one more spirited and passionate in dis-
position than the rest, and contrived to teas




W RAWINmAL.
and trment him so a to make him angry.
The elephant advanced towards his keeper with
his trunk raised to take vengeance. The keeper
fled; he elephant pursued him, the other ele-
phants of the herd following, u is the habit
do the animal on such occasions. The keeper
ran into the water, u if to elude his pursuer,
while the elephant and a large part of the herd
pressed on after him. The man swam into the
channel, and the elephants, before they could
check themselves, found that they were beyond
their depth. Some swam on after the keeper,
and crossed the river, where they were easily
secured. Others, terriled, abandoned them-
selves t the current, and were coated down,
struggling helplessly as they went until t last
they grounded upon the shallows or points of
land, whence they gained the shore agin,
some on one side of the stream, and some on
the other.
This plan was thus only partially successil,
and Hannibl devised a more elbeotal method
for the remainder of the troop. He built an
immensely large raft, located it up to the shore,
fastened it there securely, and covered it with
earth, tur and bushes, u to make it resem-
ble a portion of the land. He then caused a
second raft to be constructed of the same sis,
and this he brought up to the outer edge of the
other, fastened it there by a temporary oa-




PAnANe W 'It UOll. I1
neeton, and covered and concealed t as e
had done the fist. The lnt of these raft
extended two hundred feet from the hore,
and was ty feet broad. The other, that is,
the outer one, wu only a little smaller. The
soldiers then contrived to allure and drive the
elephants over these raft to the outer one, the
aimals imagining that they had not left the
land. The two raft were then disconnected
from each other, and the outer one began to
moe with its bulky passeger over the water,
towed by a number of boats which had pre-
viously been attached to its outer edge.
A soon as the elephants perceived the mo-
tion, they wre alarmed, and began mmedi-
tely to look anxiously thi way and that, and
to rowd toward the edge of the raft which
was conveying them away. They found them-
salve hemmed in by water on every side, and
were terrified and thrown into eonulo.
Some were crowded of into the river, and
were drifted down till they landed below. The
rest soon became calm, and allowed themselves
to be quietly ferried across the stream, when
they found that all hope of escape and resi-
tance were equally vain.
In the mean time, while these events were
occurring, the troop of o three hundred, which
Siplo had lent up the river to ee what tidings
he could learn of the Carthaginians, were slow.




a3 HANNIBAL
ly makl their way toward the point where
Hannibal was crossing; and it happened that
Hannibal had sent down a troop of fwe hun-
dred, when he first reached the river, to see if
they could learn any tidings of the Romans.
Neither of the armies had any idea how near
they were to the other. The two detachments
met suddenly and unexpectedly on the way.
They were sent to explore and not to fight;
but as they were nearly equally matched, each
wasambitiousoftheglory ofcpturing theothers
and carrying them prisoners to their camp.
They fought a long and bloody battle. A great
number were killed, and in about the same
proportion on either side. The'Romans say
tsy conquered. We do not know what the
Carthaginians aid, but as both parties re-
treated from the field and went back to their
respective camps, it is safe to infer that nei-
the could boast of a very decisive victory.


CHAPTER V.
HANNIBAL CROSMIS THr ALPS.

It is difficult for one who has not actually
seen such mountain scenery a is presented
by the Alps, to form any clear conception of
iu magnificence and grandeur. Hannibal





had neer see the Alps, b the word w
illed then, u now, with their he.
Some of the leading features of sublimity
and grandeur which these mountains exhibit,
result mainly from the perpetual cold which
reigns upon their summits. This is owing
simply to their elevation. If we were to u-
cend in a balloon at Borneo at mid-day, when
the burning son of the tropics was directly
over our heads, to an elevation of ve or uix
miles, we should And that although we had
been moving nearer to the on all the time,
its rays would have lot, gradually, all their
power. They would fall upon us as brightly
u ever, but their het would be gone. They
would feel like moonbeams, and we should be
surrounded with an atmosphere u frosty as
that of the icebergs of the frigid sone.
Now it happens that not only the summits,
but extensive portions of the upper deliities
of the Alp, rise into the region of perpetual
winter. Of course, ice congeals continually
there, and the snow which forms fall to the
ground au now, sad accumulates in vast and
permanent stores. The summit of Mont
Blanc is covered with a bed of now of enor-
mous thickness, which is almost as much a
permanent geological stratum of the mountain
a the granite which lies beneath it.
Of course, during the winter months, the




of EANNIIAL
whe oan y of the Alps, vally as we u
hill, covered with mow. In the spring the
now melts in the valleys and plain, and
higher up it becomes damp and havy with
partial melting, and slide down the declivities
in vast avalanches, which sometimes ae of
such enormous magnitude, and descend with
nch resistless force, u to bring down earth,
rock, and even the tree of the fort in their
train. On the higher delivities, however,
and over all the rounded summits, the now
still cling to its place, yielding but very
little to the feeble beams of the sn, even in

Itere are vast ravines and valleys among
the higher Alp where the now accumulates,
being driven into them by winds uad storm
in the winter, ad sliding nto them, in great
avlanhes, in the spring. These vat depo.
aitorie of mow become changed into ice be-
low the sure; for at the rface there is a
continual melting, and the water, lowing
down through the mas, freeze below. Thus
thee are valleys, or rather raines, some of
them two or three miles wide, and ten or Af-
teen miles long, filled with ice, transparent
solid, and blue, hundreds of feet in depth.
They are called glacier. And w.at i most
utonishing in respect to these icy accumula-
tons i that, though the ice i perfectly com-




OcsIhne frt AP. N
pact and solid, the whole mas is found to be
continually in a state of slow motion down the
valley in which it lies, at the rate of about a
foot in twenty-four hours. By standing upon
the surface and listening attentively, we hear,
from time to time, a grinding sound. The
rocks which lie along the sides are pulverized,
and are continually moving against each other
and falling; and then, besides, which is a
more direct and positive prooitill of the mo-
tion of the mass, a mark may be set up upon
the ice, as has been often done, and marks
corresponding to it made upon the solid rocks
on each side of the valley, and by this means
the fact of the motion, and the exact rate of it,
may be fully ascertained.
Thus these valleys are really and literally
rivers of ice, rising among the summits of the
mountains, and flowing, slowly it is true, but
with a continuous and certain current, to
sort of mouth in some great and open valley
below. Here the streams which have flowed
over the surface above, and descended into
the mas through countless crevices and
chasms, concentrate and issue from under the
ice in a turbid torrent, which comes out from
a vast archway made by the falling ih of mass
which the water has undermined. This lower
end of the glacier sometimes presents a per.
pedicular wall hundreds of feet in height




U EAinZnAZ.
sometimes it crowds down into the fertile val-
ly, advancing in some unusually cold sum-
mer into the cultivated country, where, u it
slowly moves on, it ploughs up the ground,
carries away the orchards and fields, and even
drives the inhabitants from the villages which
it threatens. If the next summer proves
warm, the terrible monster slowly draws back
its frigid head, and the inhabitants return to
the ground it reluctantly evacuates, and attempt
to repair the damage it has done.
The Alps lie between France and Italy, and
the great valleys and the ranges of mountain
land lie in such a direction that they must be
ersaed in order to pass from one country to
the other. These ranges are, however, not
regular. They are traversed by innumerable
chams, fissures, and ravines; in some places
they rise in vast rounded summits and swells,
covered with fields of spotless snow; in others
they tower in lofty, needle-like peaks, which
even the chamois cannot scale, and where
scarcely a flake of snow can find a place of
rest. Around and among these peaks and
sammits, and through these frightful defiles
and chums, the roads twist and turn, in a
ig ag and constantly ascending course, creep.
i along the most frightful precipices, some-
times beneath them and sometimes on the
brink. penetrating the darkest and gloomiest




CROISIINO TI ALP&. W7
defs, sirting the me t impetesms sl fem
ing torrents, ad at last, perhaps, emerging
upon the surfaee of a glacir, to be lost in
interminable fields of ice and anow.
And yet, notwithstanding the awful desola-
tion which reigns in the upper regions of the
Alps, the lower valleys, through which the
streams finally meander out into the open
plains, and by which the traveller gains acces
to the sublimer scenes of the upper mountains,
are inexpressibly verdant and besatiful. They
afertilised by the deposits of cotindml in-
undations in the early spring, and the Mn
beats down into them with a genial wrmth in
summer, which brings out millions of flowers,
of the most beautiful forms and colours, au
ripens rapidly the broadest and richest fields
of grain. Cottage, of every picturesque form,
tenanted by the cultivator, the shepherds and
the herdmes, crown every little swell in the
bottom of the valley, and ling to the declivi-
ties of the mountains which rise on either
hand. Above them eternal forests of fis aad
pines wave, feathering over the steepet and
most rocky slopes with their sombre foliage.
Still higher grey precipices rise, ad spires
and pinnacles, far grander and more pictu-
esque than those constructed by mn. Be.
tween these there is sen, here and there, a
the backgreeod, vt towering mase of whi




* 3&A~NIIDAZ.,
al -ading mer, whih rown the mimmit
of the loftier mutins beyond.
Hanniba' determination to carry an rmy
into Italy by way of the Alps, instead of
tnnsportiag them by galley over the ea, has
always been regarded a one of the greatest
undertakings of ancient times. He hesitated
for some time whether he should go down the
Rhone, and meet and give battle to Scipio, or
whether he should leave the Roman army to
its course, and proceed himself directly toward
the Alps and Italy. The officers and soldArs
of the army, who had now learned something
of their destination and of their leader's plans,
wanted to go and meet the Romans. They
dreaded the Alps. They were willing to en-
counter a military foe, however formidable,
for this was a danger that they were accustomed
to; but their imaginations were appalled at
the novel and awful images they formed of
falling down precipices of rgged rocks, or of
gradually freezing, and being buried half alive,
during the process, in eternal snows. o
Hannibal, when be found that his soldiers
were raid to proceed, called the leading
portions of his army together and made them
an address. He remonstrated with them for
yielding now to unworthy fears, after having
successfully met and triumphed over such
lagers as they had already incurred. "YTe




oCoUUM 3 uAIS a
have raumnted the Pyrmess" aid be,
you have croeed the Bheme. Yorare w
actually in iht of the Alpe, whloh ar the
very gat of aces to the country of the
enemy. What do you onceive the Alps to
be They are nothing but high mountains,
after all. Snppoee they are higher than the
Pyrenmee, they do not reach to the skies;
and, ince they do not, they cannot be ln-
surmountable. They rs surmounted, in fact,
every day; they are even inhabited ad cul-
tivted, and travellers continually pass over
them to and fro. And what a single man can
do, an army can do, for an army is only a
large number of single men. In fact, to a
soldier, who hb nothing to carry with him
but the implements of war, no way can be
too diffcult to be surmounted by courage and
energy."
After anishing his speech, Hannibal, find-
ing his men reanimated and encouraged by
whatbe had said, ordered them to go to
their tents and refresh themselves, and pre.
pare to march on the following day. They
made no further opposition to going on.
Haunibal did not, however, proceed at once
directly towards the Alps. He did not know
whet the plan of Sipio mig be, who, it
will he reollected, w below him, on the
RB s, wih the Reman arm. He did nt




TU *AWNIrAL.
wish to waste s tie and b strem gth in a
contest with Scipio in Gul, but to press on,
and get across the Alps into Italy us oon as
possible. And so, fearing lest Scipio should
strike across the country, and intercept him
if he should attempt to go by the most direct
route, he determined to move northwardly, up
the river Rhone, till he should get well into
the interior, with a view of reaching the Alps
ultimately by a more circuitous journey.
It was, in fact, the plan of Scipio to come
up with Hannibal and attack him as soon as
possible; and, accordingly, as soon u his
horsemen, or, rather, those who were left alive
after the battle, had returned and informed
him that Hannibal and his army were near, he
put his camp in motion, and moved rapidly
up the river. He arrived at the place where
the Carthaginians had crossed a few days after
they had gone. The spot was in a terrible
state of ruin and confusion. The grass and
herbage were trampled down for the circuit at
a mile, and all over the space were spots of
black and smouldering remains, where the
camp-fires had been kindled. The branches
of trees lay every where around, withering in
the sun, and trees felled and left where they
lay. The shore was lined far down the stream
with ruins of boats and rafts, with weapma
which had been lost or abandoned, and uis




02to68r0 TUB ALM. TI
the bodies of thons who hid bee drowned in
the passage, or killed in the contest on the
shore. Theee, and numerous other vetiges
remained, but the army was gone.
There were, however, upon the ground,
groups of natives and other visitors, who had
come to look at the spot now destined to be.
come so memorable in history. From thee
men Scipio learned when and where Hannibal
had gone. He decided that it wa useless to
attempt to pursue him. He was greatly per-
plexed to know what to do. In the casting
of lots, Spain had fallen to him, but now
that the great enemy whom he had come forth
to meet had left Spain altogether, his only
hope of intercepting his progress wa to sail
back into Italy, and meet him a he came
down from the Alps into the great valley of
the Po. Still, as Spain had been assigned
to him as his province, he could not well
entirely abandon it. He accordingly sent
forward the largest part of his army into pain,
to attack the forces that Hannibal had left
there, while he himself, with a smaller force,
went down to the ea-shore, and sailed back
to Italy again. He expected to find Roman
forces in the valley of the Po, with which he
hoped to be strong enough to meet Hannibal
a he descended from the mountains, if he
should succeed in effect pausegeover them.




75 EANNINAL.
In the meantime Hannibal went on, drawing
nearer and nearer to the ranges of snowy
summits which his soldiers had seen for many
days in their eastern horizon. These ranges
were very resplendent and grand when the
sun went down in the west, for then it shone
directly upon them. As the army approached
to them, they gradually withdrew from sight
and disappeared, being concealed by interven-
ing summits less lofty, but nearer. As the
soldiers went on, however, and began to pene-
trate the valleys, and draw near to the awful
chams and precipices among the mountains,
and saw the turbid torrents descending from
them, their fears revived. It was, however,
now too late to retreat. They pressed for-
ward, ascending continually, till their road
grew extremely precipitous and insecure,
threading its way through almost impssable
defiles, with rugged cliff overhanging them,
and snowy summits towering all around.
At last they came to a narrow defile through
which they must necessarily pass, but which
was guarded by large bodies of armed men
assembled on the rocks and precipices above,
ready to hurl stones and weapons of every
kind upon them if they should attempt to pas
through. The army halted. Hannibal or-
dered them to encamp where they were, until
te could consider what to do. In the eour




OlOSSING 13T ALPS. 71
of the day, he learned that the mountaiaer
did not remain at their elevated poets during
the night, on account of the intense cold and
exposre, knowing, too, that it would be im.
possible for an army to traverse such a pass
as they were attempting to guard without day
lighttoguide them; for the road, orratherpth-
way, which passe through these defiles, follows
generally the course of a mountain torreat,
which flows through a succession of frightul
ravines and chasms, and often puae along
on a shelf or projection of the rock, hundreds
and sometimes thousands of feet from the bed
of the stream, which foams and roar far be-
low. There could, of course, be no hope at
passing safely by such a route without the
light of day.
The mountaineers, therefore, knowing that it
was not necessary to guard the pas at night-
its own terrible danger being then a suficit
protection-were accustomed to disperse in
the evening, and descend to regions when
they could fnd shelter and repose, end to re-
turn and renew their watch in the morning.
When Hannibal learned this, he determined
to anticipate them in getting up upon the rocks
the next day, and, in order to prevent their
etertaiing any suspicion of hi design, he
dd to be king all the arrange t
er camping for the night on the ground he




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