• TABLE OF CONTENTS
HIDE
 Front Cover
 Title Page
 Table of Contents
 Preface
 Acknowledgement
 Summary
 Glossary
 Project data sheet
 Map of bolivia
 Chapter I: The context
 Chapter II: Analysis of program...
 Chapter III: Analysis of program...
 Chapter IV: Lessons learned
 Appendix A: Logical frameworks...
 Appendix B: Project interventi...
 Appendix C: Project impacts
 Appendix D: Special development...
 Appendix E: Lessons learned
 Appendix F: Supplements
 Publication list by topic






Group Title: A.I.D. Project Impact Evaluation report no. 57
Title: Bolivia
CITATION PAGE IMAGE ZOOMABLE PAGE TEXT
Full Citation
STANDARD VIEW MARC VIEW
Permanent Link: http://ufdc.ufl.edu/UF00054775/00001
 Material Information
Title: Bolivia integrated rural development in a colonization setting
Series Title: A.I.D. project impact evaluation report
Physical Description: l v. (various pagings) : ill., maps ; 28 cm.
Language: English
Creator: Solem, Richard R ( Richard Ray ), 1943-
Publisher: U.S. Agency for International Development
Place of Publication: Washington D.C.?
Publication Date: 1985
 Subjects
Subject: Rural development -- Bolivia   ( lcsh )
Genre: federal government publication   ( marcgt )
bibliography   ( marcgt )
non-fiction   ( marcgt )
Spatial Coverage: Bolivia
 Notes
Bibliography: Includes bibliographical references (p. F-26-F-29).
Statement of Responsibility: by Richard Ray Solem ... et al..
General Note: "January 1985."
General Note: "PN-AAL-043"--Cover.
Funding: Electronic resources created as part of a prototype UF Institutional Repository and Faculty Papers project by the University of Florida.
 Record Information
Bibliographic ID: UF00054775
Volume ID: VID00001
Source Institution: University of Florida
Holding Location: University of Florida
Rights Management: All rights reserved by the source institution and holding location.
Resource Identifier: oclc - 12083944

Table of Contents
    Front Cover
        Page i
    Title Page
        Page ii
        Page iii
        Page iv
    Table of Contents
        Page v
        Page vi-vii
    Preface
        Page viii-ix
    Acknowledgement
        Page viii-ix
    Summary
        Page x-xi
    Glossary
        Page xii- xiii
    Project data sheet
        Page xiv-xv
    Map of bolivia
        Page xiv-xv
    Chapter I: The context
        Page 1
        Early pioneers
            Page 1
        National awakening
            Page 1
        Land and opportunity
            Page 2-3
    Chapter II: Analysis of program interventions
        Page 2-3
        A. Physical infrastructure
            Page 4-5
            1. Roads
                Page 4-5
            2. Wells
                Page 4-5
            3. Buildings and equipment
                Page 6-7
        B. Settlement patterns
            Page 6-7
        C. Services
            Page 8-9
            1. Seetler orientation
                Page 8-9
            2. Community development
                Page 8-9
            3. Agricultural support
                Page 10-11
    Chapter III: Analysis of program impacts
        Page 12-13
        A. Economic impacts
            Page 14-15
        B. Social impacts
            Page 16-17
            1. Health
                Page 16-17
            2. Education
                Page 18-19
            2. Sense of well-being
                Page 18-19
            3. Future expectations
                Page 18-19
            4. Political context
                Page 18-19
        C. Environmental impacts
            Page 20-21
    Chapter IV: Lessons learned
        Page 20-21
        A. Lessons for integrated rural development
            Page 20-21
            1. Continuity of commitment
                Page 20-21
            2. Program adaptability
                Page 20-21
            3. Motivation
                Page 20-21
            4. Close program monitoring
                Page 22-23
            5. Participation
                Page 22-23
            6. Comprehensiveness of scope
                Page 22-23
            7. Proximity
                Page 22-23
            8. Self-help
                Page 22-23
            9. Self-capitalization
                Page 22-23
            10. Flexibility of implementing organizations
                Page 22-23
        B. Resettlement lessons
            Page 22-23
            1. Assessment of resource potential
                Page 22-23
            2. Settlement node (spontaneous vs directed)
                Page 22-23
            3. Basic physical infrastructure
                Page 24-25
            4. pioneering stage
                Page 24-25
            5. The dependency syndrome
                Page 24-25
            6. Turnover
                Page 24-25
            7. Consolidation and growth
                Page 24-25
    Appendix A: Logical frameworks (1974 and 1979 projects)
        Page 1
        Page 2-3
    Appendix B: Project interventions
        Page 1
        Page 2-3
        Page 4-5
        Page 6-7
        Page 8-9
        Page 10-11
        Page 12-13
        Page 14-15
        Page 16-17
        Page 18-19
        Page 20-21
    Appendix C: Project impacts
        Page 1
        Page 2-3
        Page 4-5
        Page 6-7
        Page 8-9
        Page 10-11
        Page 12-13
        Page 14-15
        Page 16-17
        Page 18-19
        Page 20-21
        Page 22-23
        Page 24-25
        Page 26-27
        Page 28-29
        Page 30-31
        Page 32-33
        Page 34-35
        Page 36-37
        Page 38-39
    Appendix D: Special development issues
        Page 1
        Page 2-3
        Page 4-5
        Page 6-7
        Page 8-9
    Appendix E: Lessons learned
        Page 1
        Page 2-3
        Page 4-5
        Page 6-7
        Page 8-9
        Page 10-11
        Page 12-13
        Page 14-15
        Page 16-17
        Page 18-19
        Page 20-21
        Page 22-23
        Page 24-25
        Page 26-27
    Appendix F: Supplements
        Page 1
        Page 2-3
        Page 4-5
        Page 6
        Page 6a
        Page 7
        Page 8-9
        Page 10-11
        Page 12-13
        Page 14-15
        Page 16-17
        Page 18-19
        Page 20-21
        Page 22-23
        Page 24-25
        Page 26-27
        Page 28-29
    Publication list by topic
        Page 1
        Page 2-3
        Page 4
        Page 5-6
        Page 7-8
Full Text

~r4-o4/
I,
i 2


A.I.D. Project Impact Evaluation Report No. 57
Bolivia: Integrated Rural Development
in a Colonization Setting


January 1985


U.S. Agency for International Development (A.I.D.)


0 00















BOLIVIA: INTEGRATED RURAL DEVELOPMENT
IN A COLONIZATION SETTING




AID PROJECT IMPACT EVALUATION REPORT NO. 57






by

Richard Ray Solem, Team Leader
(AID/Washington)


Richard J. Greene, Attorney/Social Scientist
(Consultant)

David W. Hess, Anthropologist
(USAID/Peru)

Carol Bradford Ward, Demographer
(AID/Washington)

Peter Leigh Taylor, Social Scientist
(Consultant)




U.S. Agency for International Development

January 1985




The views and interpretations expressed in this report are
those of the authors and should not be attributed to the Agency
for International Development.

































A.I.D. EVALUATION PUBLICATIONS

**A complete list of reports issued in the A.I.D. Evaluation
Publication series is included in the back of this document,
together with information for ordering reports.

































It's not easy here. It's hot and the mosquitoes are bad. But
I want to stay. I feel better now because I work for myself.

San Julian settler













TABLE OF CONTENTS


Page

Preface .... ........ ... ............ .. ........... ..... ..... viii

Acknowledgments......................... ..... ................ix

Summary.... ........ ................... ................... ... .x

Glossary................... ............ ........ .......... xii

Project Data Sheet...... ............ .......................xiv

Map of Bolivia ...............................................xv


I. The Context ..............................................

A. Early Pioneers .................. ........ .......
B. National Awakening. ................................1
C. Land and Opportunity ........................... .. .2

II. Analysis of Program Interventions...................... 3

A. Physical Infrastructure............................ 4
1. Roads ................................... ..... ..... 5
2. Wells....................................... 5
3. Buildings and Equipment.........................6
B. Settlement Patterns ................................ 6
C. Services ................... .. ........... .... .... .. 8
1. Settler Orientation............................. .. 9
2. Community Development .......................... 9
3. Agricultural Support ...........................11

III. Analysis of Program Impacts ............................13

A. Economic Impacts .... .. ........................... 14
B. Social Impacts....................................17
1. Health ............. ........... .................17
2. Education ......................................18
3. Sense of Well-Being...........................18
4. Future Expectations.............................18
5. Political Context..............................19
C. Environmental Impacts ..............................20


pr-












Appendices to the Report


TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)


Page

IV. Lessons Learned........................................21

A. Lessons for Integrated Rural Development...........21
1. Continuity of Commitment.......................21
2. Program Adaptability........................... 21
3. Motivation..................................... 21
4. Close Program Monitoring....................... 22
5. Participation..................................22
6. Comprehensiveness of Scope.....................22
7. Proximity..................................... 22
8. Self-Help.....................................22
9. Self-Capitalization............................23
10. Flexibility of Implementing Organizations......23
B. Resettlement Lessons............................... 23
1. Assessment of Resource Potential................23
2. Settlement Mode (spontaneous vs. directed).....23
3. Basic Physical Infrastructure...................24
4. Pioneering Stage...............................24
5. The Dependency Syndrome.........................24
6. Turnover......................................24
7. Consolidation and Growth.......................25


A. Logical Frameworks (1974 and 1979 projects).......A-l

B. Project Interventions.............................B-l

A description of the two AID project interventions
(a 1974 loan, primarily for road construction, and
the 1979 follow-up grant, primarily for technical
services) and an analysis of them at the Input/Output
level. This appendix is of interest to project de-
signers and managers.

C. Project Impacts...................................C-l

A discussion of the impacts of project interventions
at the Purpose/Goal level. These are viewed first
from the perspective of the settler/farmer, and sub-
sequently from a national perspective. This appendix
is of special interest to project designers and eval-
uators. Consult the appendix outline for selective
reading of economic, social, or environmental ques-
tions.

D. Special Development Issues........................D-l

A brief review of the project from the perspective of
several broad development concerns, project replica-
bility, and sustainability. This appendix is primar-
ily of interest to project designers and evaluators.

E. Lessons Learned...................................E-l

A distillation of the entire project experience into
guidance for future efforts. To better enable se-
lective reading, lessons are divided between those
applying to integrated rural development and those
applying to resettlement. These lessons are of in-
terest to project designers, managers, evaluators,
and policy-makers alike.

F. Supplements......................................F-l

1. Evaluation Methodology
2. List of Contacts
3. Photographs
4. Settler Profiles
5. Memorandum to USAID Regarding Future
Interventions
6. Bibliography


Page








-viii-

PREFACE


ACKNOWLEDGMENTS


A 3-week evaluation cannot do justice to a project that
has been going on for nearly 10 years and has involved so many
participants and program variations. To really understand what
has happened in the lives of the settlers of Chane-Piray and
San Julian would require living among them for an extended
period, observing their economic activities first-hand, and
sharing their hardships and hopes for the future during long,
evening-time conversations. Since this was not possible, im-
pressions from travels through the two settlement zones and
brief conversations with several score settlers and a dozen
project and public officials had to suffice.

From the start, it was apparent that we would have diffi-
culty separating integrated rural development (IRD) and settle-
ment issues. This project, unlike the usual IRD project, did
not involve reinforcing or supplementing existing infrastruc-
tures. At project inception most of the Chane-Piray and San
Julian project areas were virgin forest. Thus, in reading this
report, it must be borne in mind that the integrated rural
development is taking place within the broader context of new-
lands settlement.

The water is further "muddied" because the two projects
evaluated (a 1974 infrastructure loan and a 1979 technical ser-
vices grant) are carried out in two distinct settlement zones,
one (Chane-Piray) which had already experienced considerable
activity at project inception and the other (San Julian) which
was just being opened to settlement. This difference in stage
of settlement life cycle appears to have had a major effect on
relative responsiveness to project innovations since in most of
the older Chane-Piray zone, systems for community organization
and farming were already established.

Our mandate from the Office of Evaluation was to evaluate
these projects within the context of integrated rural develop-
ment and determine what lessons may be applied to other IRD
projects. This was our first priority. It soon became clear,
however, that USAID/Bolivia had its own agenda--to determine
whether further additional support to the project activity is
warranted after scheduled completion in 1983. Within the time
available, we did our best to address this concern as well, and
our response to USAID is attached as Appendix F-5.


The team would like to thank USAID/Bolivia for providing
invaluable support while we were in-country: John Rifenbark,
the Project Manager, and Henry Bassford, the Mission Director,
for the important background information they provided, and the
motor pool for supplying a car and driver for the field visits.
Thanks are also due to Harry Peacock, Javier Balivian, and
others at the Foundation for Integral Development (FIDES) for
arranging meetings, food, and lodging while we were in the set-
tlement zone, contracting air transport for a project over-
flight, and answering endless questions; and to Melvin Pozo and
Willie Lawrence-Jones at the Center for Tropical Agricultural
Research (CIAT) for their coaching on technical problems and
issues.

Finally, we must thank the settlers of Chane-Piray and San
Julian. Their willingness to speak openly and honestly with
our exotic little party of foreigners made all the difference
in our work. Without this first-hand contact we could not have
appreciated the settlement experience as we learned to. If our
impact evaluation "rings true" anywhere, it is in the quotes
from settlers sprinkled throughout the main text and Appendix
F-4, Settler Profiles.








-viii-

PREFACE


ACKNOWLEDGMENTS


A 3-week evaluation cannot do justice to a project that
has been going on for nearly 10 years and has involved so many
participants and program variations. To really understand what
has happened in the lives of the settlers of Chane-Piray and
San Julian would require living among them for an extended
period, observing their economic activities first-hand, and
sharing their hardships and hopes for the future during long,
evening-time conversations. Since this was not possible, im-
pressions from travels through the two settlement zones and
brief conversations with several score settlers and a dozen
project and public officials had to suffice.

From the start, it was apparent that we would have diffi-
culty separating integrated rural development (IRD) and settle-
ment issues. This project, unlike the usual IRD project, did
not involve reinforcing or supplementing existing infrastruc-
tures. At project inception most of the Chane-Piray and San
Julian project areas were virgin forest. Thus, in reading this
report, it must be borne in mind that the integrated rural
development is taking place within the broader context of new-
lands settlement.

The water is further "muddied" because the two projects
evaluated (a 1974 infrastructure loan and a 1979 technical ser-
vices grant) are carried out in two distinct settlement zones,
one (Chane-Piray) which had already experienced considerable
activity at project inception and the other (San Julian) which
was just being opened to settlement. This difference in stage
of settlement life cycle appears to have had a major effect on
relative responsiveness to project innovations since in most of
the older Chane-Piray zone, systems for community organization
and farming were already established.

Our mandate from the Office of Evaluation was to evaluate
these projects within the context of integrated rural develop-
ment and determine what lessons may be applied to other IRD
projects. This was our first priority. It soon became clear,
however, that USAID/Bolivia had its own agenda--to determine
whether further additional support to the project activity is
warranted after scheduled completion in 1983. Within the time
available, we did our best to address this concern as well, and
our response to USAID is attached as Appendix F-5.


The team would like to thank USAID/Bolivia for providing
invaluable support while we were in-country: John Rifenbark,
the Project Manager, and Henry Bassford, the Mission Director,
for the important background information they provided, and the
motor pool for supplying a car and driver for the field visits.
Thanks are also due to Harry Peacock, Javier Balivian, and
others at the Foundation for Integral Development (FIDES) for
arranging meetings, food, and lodging while we were in the set-
tlement zone, contracting air transport for a project over-
flight, and answering endless questions; and to Melvin Pozo and
Willie Lawrence-Jones at the Center for Tropical Agricultural
Research (CIAT) for their coaching on technical problems and
issues.

Finally, we must thank the settlers of Chane-Piray and San
Julian. Their willingness to speak openly and honestly with
our exotic little party of foreigners made all the difference
in our work. Without this first-hand contact we could not have
appreciated the settlement experience as we learned to. If our
impact evaluation "rings true" anywhere, it is in the quotes
from settlers sprinkled throughout the main text and Appendix
F-4, Settler Profiles.









-xi-


SUMMARY

Two AID projects aimed at promoting new-lands settlement
in the subtropical lowlands of eastern Bolivia were evaluated.
The first project, a 1974 loan of $9,700,000, was aimed primar-
ily at providing basic physical infrastructure--penetration
roads, wells, and settlement patterns. The second project, a
1979 grant of $1,482,000, focused on providing technical assis-
tance to settler families and communities--orientation during
the first months, and cooperative and community development
activities, agricultural extension, etc., over a longer period.

Project activities were carried out at two sites separated
by 250 kilometers--some 5 hours of travel time on existing
roads. Chane-Piray, where initial settlement began in the
early 1960s, covers an area of some 4,000 square kilometers
between the Chane and Piray Rivers. The San Julian zone, which
is 5,000 square kilometers in size, experienced initial settle-
ment in 1972 but as late as 1979 was still largely unpopulated.

Implementation of the two projects was the shared respon-
sibility of several Bolivian entities. The AID counterpart
agency in the Bolivian Government was the National Colonization
Institute (INC). INC carried out the road construction through
a contract with a private Bolivian general contractor. INC
provided for well drilling and certain technical services with
its own staff. AID's implementing agent for the bulk of tech-
nical services was the Foundation for Integral Development
(FIDES), a private Bolivian foundation made up of several
church-related development and missionary groups who had long
been working with lowland settlers. Project evaluators looked
at activities from the two projects and the two settlement
zones jointly because they were inextricably mixed. Conclu-
sions were drawn from several perspectives:

SInterventions. Analysis of inputs and outputs re-
sulted in low marks for physical infrastructure work
supervised or carried out by INC, and very high marks
for technical services carried out by FIDES.

SImpacts. Economic and social impacts at the micro-
level, though far from fully realized, appear to be
mixed in Chane-Piray and very positive in San Julian.
The difference is attributable to the greater and
earlier influence of FIDES in the San Julian zone. At
the macro-level, economic, social, and environmental
impacts are also substantial and generally positive.
Still unknown, however, are the long-term impacts of
(a) merging primarily highland Indian settlers into


the social/political structure of the Spanish ancestry
lowlanders and (b) replacement of virgin hardwood
forests with crop and pastureland.

-Special Development Issues. The projects were re-
viewed from the perspective of certain broad develop-
ment concerns:

Replicability. The basic design is a good one and
bears repeating.

Sustainability. High marks are earned in commun-
ity and cooperative development and low marks on
maintenance of infrastructure.

-Lessons Learned. A number of significant lessons were
drawn from the project experience, primarily relating
to the very successful work with community and cooper-
ative development and agricultural systems. For the
sake of selective reading these are broken into les-
sons related to IRD and lessons related to resettle-
ment.









-xii-


GLOSSARY


Altiplano

Barbecho


Brecha Casarabe


Camba



Campesino

CIAT


CIU

CORDECRUZ


FIDES

GOB

IDB

INC

Interior

Kolla


Latifundia

MNR

NADEPA


Nucleo


OP

Oriente


Highlands plateau

Secondary growth on previously
cleared land

Main road in San Julian which con-
nects the central nucleos

Slang term describing descendants of
the 16th century Spanish settlers in
the eastern lowlands of Bolivia

Rural inhabitant

S Center for the Investigation of Trop-
ical Agriculture

United Churches Committee

Regional Development Corporation for
Santa Cruz

Foundation for Integral Development

Government of Bolivia

Inter-American Development Bank

National Institute of Colonization

Rural Bolivian highlands

Slang term describing immigrants from
the Bolivian highlands

- Feudal landholding system

- National Revolutionary Movement

- Associated Nucleos for Agricultural
and Livestock Production

Colony of 40 families with a central
well

- Orientation Program

- Eastern Bolivian lowlands


OXFAM

PCC

PIR

POR

Valles


SAID


- Oxford Famine Relief Committee

- Consolidation of Colonization Project

- Leftist Revolutionary Party

- Worker's Revolutionary Party

- Highland valleys contiguous tohigh-
land plateau

United States Agency for Internation-
al Development


-xiii-









PROJECT DATA SHEET


Project Authorization/ Funding ($000) Implementing Responsible AID
Project Number Completion Dates AID Other Agency Mission Officials

Sub-Tropical National
Land Institute of
Development 511-T-050 FY 1975-1981 9,700 5,607 Colonization Alex Gary

Colonization
Consolida-
tion in the Foundation
Bolivian for Integral
Sub-Tropics 511-0514 FY 1979-1984 1,482 604 Development John Rifenbark













x











0!




4Z.
__-- .xo
-*
D /~i~~e /n









PROJECT DATA SHEET


Project Authorization/ Funding ($000) Implementing Responsible AID
Project Number Completion Dates AID Other Agency Mission Officials

Sub-Tropical National
Land Institute of
Development 511-T-050 FY 1975-1981 9,700 5,607 Colonization Alex Gary

Colonization
Consolida-
tion in the Foundation
Bolivian for Integral
Sub-Tropics 511-0514 FY 1979-1984 1,482 604 Development John Rifenbark













x











0!




4Z.
__-- .xo
-*
D /~i~~e /n








- xvi -


I. THE CONTEXT


A. Early Pioneers


When tillage begins, other acts follow.
The farmers, therefore, are the founders of
civilization.
Daniel Webster

The first settlers to attempt farming in Bolivia's eastern
lowlands (the Oriente) were Spanish colonizers who came up from
Paraguay in 1559. Supported by a Jesuit mission, they estab-
lished the settlement of Santa Cruz de la Sierra. Their
descendants, who came to be called Cambas, created the agri-
cultural economy that characterized the region until midway
through the 20th century.

Life for the Camba settlers was difficult. Cut off from
markets and transportation arteries, their farming and ranching
activities were subsistence oriented. Lacking the sedentary
labor force available in the highlands (Indians in the Oriente
were hunters and gatherers), Camba settlers elected to use re-
source-management techniques that treated land as a free good
and labor and capital as scarce goods. Survival was thus ac-
complished, but growth was minimal.


B. National Awakening


For centuries there has been no Bolivian
culture. We have been Aymara, Quechua, or
Spanish. Only now, here in the Oriente,
are we developing a Bolivian identity.
San Julian settler

By the dawn of the 20th century a tiny but tough regional
enclave had developed in the Santa Cruz Department. Cut off as
they were from the rest of Bolivia, both physically and cultur-
ally, a strong current of separatism existed among Camba lead-
ers. Had international events not intervened, this drive for
regional autonomy might well have resulted in political divi-
sion.

The outbreak of hostilities between Bolivia and Paraguay
(the Chaco War of 1934-1936) finally called national attention
to the Oriente. Ox cart trails, which had previously been the
region's only link to highland population centers, were re-
placed by roads suitable for motorized transportation. Sol-
diers followed, most of them highland Indians conscripted from








- xvi -


I. THE CONTEXT


A. Early Pioneers


When tillage begins, other acts follow.
The farmers, therefore, are the founders of
civilization.
Daniel Webster

The first settlers to attempt farming in Bolivia's eastern
lowlands (the Oriente) were Spanish colonizers who came up from
Paraguay in 1559. Supported by a Jesuit mission, they estab-
lished the settlement of Santa Cruz de la Sierra. Their
descendants, who came to be called Cambas, created the agri-
cultural economy that characterized the region until midway
through the 20th century.

Life for the Camba settlers was difficult. Cut off from
markets and transportation arteries, their farming and ranching
activities were subsistence oriented. Lacking the sedentary
labor force available in the highlands (Indians in the Oriente
were hunters and gatherers), Camba settlers elected to use re-
source-management techniques that treated land as a free good
and labor and capital as scarce goods. Survival was thus ac-
complished, but growth was minimal.


B. National Awakening


For centuries there has been no Bolivian
culture. We have been Aymara, Quechua, or
Spanish. Only now, here in the Oriente,
are we developing a Bolivian identity.
San Julian settler

By the dawn of the 20th century a tiny but tough regional
enclave had developed in the Santa Cruz Department. Cut off as
they were from the rest of Bolivia, both physically and cultur-
ally, a strong current of separatism existed among Camba lead-
ers. Had international events not intervened, this drive for
regional autonomy might well have resulted in political divi-
sion.

The outbreak of hostilities between Bolivia and Paraguay
(the Chaco War of 1934-1936) finally called national attention
to the Oriente. Ox cart trails, which had previously been the
region's only link to highland population centers, were re-
placed by roads suitable for motorized transportation. Sol-
diers followed, most of them highland Indians conscripted from








- xvi -


I. THE CONTEXT


A. Early Pioneers


When tillage begins, other acts follow.
The farmers, therefore, are the founders of
civilization.
Daniel Webster

The first settlers to attempt farming in Bolivia's eastern
lowlands (the Oriente) were Spanish colonizers who came up from
Paraguay in 1559. Supported by a Jesuit mission, they estab-
lished the settlement of Santa Cruz de la Sierra. Their
descendants, who came to be called Cambas, created the agri-
cultural economy that characterized the region until midway
through the 20th century.

Life for the Camba settlers was difficult. Cut off from
markets and transportation arteries, their farming and ranching
activities were subsistence oriented. Lacking the sedentary
labor force available in the highlands (Indians in the Oriente
were hunters and gatherers), Camba settlers elected to use re-
source-management techniques that treated land as a free good
and labor and capital as scarce goods. Survival was thus ac-
complished, but growth was minimal.


B. National Awakening


For centuries there has been no Bolivian
culture. We have been Aymara, Quechua, or
Spanish. Only now, here in the Oriente,
are we developing a Bolivian identity.
San Julian settler

By the dawn of the 20th century a tiny but tough regional
enclave had developed in the Santa Cruz Department. Cut off as
they were from the rest of Bolivia, both physically and cultur-
ally, a strong current of separatism existed among Camba lead-
ers. Had international events not intervened, this drive for
regional autonomy might well have resulted in political divi-
sion.

The outbreak of hostilities between Bolivia and Paraguay
(the Chaco War of 1934-1936) finally called national attention
to the Oriente. Ox cart trails, which had previously been the
region's only link to highland population centers, were re-
placed by roads suitable for motorized transportation. Sol-
diers followed, most of them highland Indians conscripted from













communities where they had been held in virtual slavery by the
prevailing latifundia farming system.

Bolivia's highland army did not fare well in the tropics
where the war was fought. The mud, heat, and mosquitoes took a
heavy toll. To make matters worse, Paraguay's tough, well-
adapted army of Guarani Indians fought tenaciously on their
home ground. The result was a string of military setbacks for
Bolivia culminating in the loss of a large piece of her nation-
al domain.

The war had a positive side, however. It drew national
attention to the Oriente, and opened roads to the region. It
also caused a regional economic boom as the presence of the na-
tional army created a market for Camba agricultural production.

The Bolivian soldiers--Quechua and Aymara Indians accus-
tomed to serfdom on crowded barren farms in the highlands--were
perplexed. As fighting men they were being told they were
Bolivians, with the rights and responsibilities of national
citizenship. As farmers, they were intrigued by vast, unoccu-
pied lands stretching as far as the eye could see. The seeds
for change in the Oriente were planted during the Chaco War.


C. Land and Opportunity

The land is so fertile that if you throw a
seed to the ground, it takes root; if you
discard an orange, a tree appears.
Chane-Piray settler

In 1952 Bolivia's feudal landholding system, the latifun-
dia, collapsed. No longer would land be concentrated in the
hands of a relatively few "Spanish" landlords. No longer could
these feudal masters demand Indian labor without compensation.
Land reform, and the attendant social revolution, was underway.

The twin phenomena of exposure to the rich, unoccupied
lowlands as soldiers, followed by destruction of the bonds of
the latifundia system, had an unsettling effect on that
generation of Indians which experienced both. Their eyes were
opened, and then they were freed. It was a dynamic time for
people for whom change had always been measured in centuries.

For most, freedom meant an opportunity to lay claim to
that hectare of barren land they had been farming as tenants.
For others, it meant an opportunity to move to town, where op-
portunities seemed greater. For a few it meant a complete
break with the past--a chance to carve a new life out of the
wilderness.


Although settlement of the Bolivian Oriente by highland
Indians had been.an intermittent government policy since the
Chaco War, with irregular efforts throughout the latter
1930s and 1940s, after the 1952 revolution it commanded serious
attention. Programs to direct settlement to designated areas
through various incentives (free land, roads, wells, and set-
tler stipends) were implemented. The vast majority of program
participants were highland Indians, better known by their Camba
hosts as Kollas.
He comes looking for work, for economic
betterment, not just land.
FIDES official

Many of these new settlers were farmers who viewed the
government grant of 10- to 50-hectare land parcels as an op-
portunity to secure their own and their children's future.
Others, however, were businessmen "at heart" who, for lack of
opportunity, had labored in agricultural pursuits. For them
the free land was viewed as a stepping-stone to preferred op-
portunities in the service sector. A period of pioneering was
simply the price of a better future.

This, then, was the context for AID's integrated rural
development/resettlement programs in the Bolivian Oriente:
vast areas of rich, alluvial soils blanketed by impenetrable
forest and criss-crossed by rivers which were at times raging
torrents and at times gentle trickles, combined with highly
motivated migrants from the totally alien climate and ecology
of the high Andean planes.

II. ANALYSIS OF PROGRAM INTERVENTIONS


Stated objectives in the two AID projects evaluated (Sub-
tropical Lands Development, 1974; and Colonization Consolida-
tion, 1979) were roughly the same: to increase food production
and improve living standards among small farmers. The projects
were also similar in that they directed resources toward the
same two settlement areas, the 4,000 square-mile Chane-Piray
and the 5,200 square-mile San Julian zones of Santa Cruz De-
partment (see project area map). They were very different,
however, in the resource mix employed (inputs), and the immedi-
ate results (outputs) realized.

Although the 1974 AID project contained a wide range of
integrated rural development (IRD) activities, the bulk of its
funds were slated for physical infrastructure investments:
access roads to open new areas for settlement, and deep wells
to provide settlers with safe drinking water. The 1979 proj-
ect, on the other hand, which covered an area that already had













communities where they had been held in virtual slavery by the
prevailing latifundia farming system.

Bolivia's highland army did not fare well in the tropics
where the war was fought. The mud, heat, and mosquitoes took a
heavy toll. To make matters worse, Paraguay's tough, well-
adapted army of Guarani Indians fought tenaciously on their
home ground. The result was a string of military setbacks for
Bolivia culminating in the loss of a large piece of her nation-
al domain.

The war had a positive side, however. It drew national
attention to the Oriente, and opened roads to the region. It
also caused a regional economic boom as the presence of the na-
tional army created a market for Camba agricultural production.

The Bolivian soldiers--Quechua and Aymara Indians accus-
tomed to serfdom on crowded barren farms in the highlands--were
perplexed. As fighting men they were being told they were
Bolivians, with the rights and responsibilities of national
citizenship. As farmers, they were intrigued by vast, unoccu-
pied lands stretching as far as the eye could see. The seeds
for change in the Oriente were planted during the Chaco War.


C. Land and Opportunity

The land is so fertile that if you throw a
seed to the ground, it takes root; if you
discard an orange, a tree appears.
Chane-Piray settler

In 1952 Bolivia's feudal landholding system, the latifun-
dia, collapsed. No longer would land be concentrated in the
hands of a relatively few "Spanish" landlords. No longer could
these feudal masters demand Indian labor without compensation.
Land reform, and the attendant social revolution, was underway.

The twin phenomena of exposure to the rich, unoccupied
lowlands as soldiers, followed by destruction of the bonds of
the latifundia system, had an unsettling effect on that
generation of Indians which experienced both. Their eyes were
opened, and then they were freed. It was a dynamic time for
people for whom change had always been measured in centuries.

For most, freedom meant an opportunity to lay claim to
that hectare of barren land they had been farming as tenants.
For others, it meant an opportunity to move to town, where op-
portunities seemed greater. For a few it meant a complete
break with the past--a chance to carve a new life out of the
wilderness.


Although settlement of the Bolivian Oriente by highland
Indians had been.an intermittent government policy since the
Chaco War, with irregular efforts throughout the latter
1930s and 1940s, after the 1952 revolution it commanded serious
attention. Programs to direct settlement to designated areas
through various incentives (free land, roads, wells, and set-
tler stipends) were implemented. The vast majority of program
participants were highland Indians, better known by their Camba
hosts as Kollas.
He comes looking for work, for economic
betterment, not just land.
FIDES official

Many of these new settlers were farmers who viewed the
government grant of 10- to 50-hectare land parcels as an op-
portunity to secure their own and their children's future.
Others, however, were businessmen "at heart" who, for lack of
opportunity, had labored in agricultural pursuits. For them
the free land was viewed as a stepping-stone to preferred op-
portunities in the service sector. A period of pioneering was
simply the price of a better future.

This, then, was the context for AID's integrated rural
development/resettlement programs in the Bolivian Oriente:
vast areas of rich, alluvial soils blanketed by impenetrable
forest and criss-crossed by rivers which were at times raging
torrents and at times gentle trickles, combined with highly
motivated migrants from the totally alien climate and ecology
of the high Andean planes.

II. ANALYSIS OF PROGRAM INTERVENTIONS


Stated objectives in the two AID projects evaluated (Sub-
tropical Lands Development, 1974; and Colonization Consolida-
tion, 1979) were roughly the same: to increase food production
and improve living standards among small farmers. The projects
were also similar in that they directed resources toward the
same two settlement areas, the 4,000 square-mile Chane-Piray
and the 5,200 square-mile San Julian zones of Santa Cruz De-
partment (see project area map). They were very different,
however, in the resource mix employed (inputs), and the immedi-
ate results (outputs) realized.

Although the 1974 AID project contained a wide range of
integrated rural development (IRD) activities, the bulk of its
funds were slated for physical infrastructure investments:
access roads to open new areas for settlement, and deep wells
to provide settlers with safe drinking water. The 1979 proj-
ect, on the other hand, which covered an area that already had











roads and wells, was able to concentrate its resources on so-
cial and technical services in support of the settlement pro-
cess.

Physical infrastructure activities under the 1974 project
were implemented primarily through Bolivia's National Coloniza-
tion Institute (INC), a national government agency with head-
quarters in La Paz. Road construction was contracted for from
a Bolivian general contracting firm working under general su-
pervision by INC and the USAID. Wells were established by INC
staff directly. Social and technical services under the 1979
project were contracted from the Foundation for Integral Devel-
opment (FIDES), a Bolivian foundation established by several
church-related organizations which had long been involved in
resettlement support.

Investment in physical infrastructure, especially roads,
required relatively large amounts of money over a short period.
The work was completed with little or no involvement of the
target populace. Because the work preceded the settlers, their
tendency was to take it for granted, as though it had always
been there. Alternatively, activities under the 1979 project
(e.g., community and cooperative development and agricultural
extension) involved such close collaboration with the settlers
themselves that success or failure in this area was as much a
result of the means by which services were delivered as the
nature of the services themselves.

Specific project activities in the Chane-Piray and San
Julian IRD program fall into three broad categories: (1) phy-
sical infrastructure, (2) settlement designs, and (3) a range
of complementary services. The analysis that follows provides
a brief review of the activities in each category.


A. Physical Infrastructure


Access and water are fundamental. Every-
thing else we do depends upon specific cir-
cumstances which change from place to place
and time to time.
FIDES official
The projects evaluated provided for a range of outputs
which can be characterized as physical infrastructure. Roads
to open up the areas targeted for settlement, deep wells to
provide healthful drinking water, and certain rudimentary
buildings and equipment were viewed as basic, minimal infra-
structure requirements for settler survival.


1. Roads


When I first went into Cuatro Ojitos we had
no road. Because there was no road, our
crops had no value.
i Chane-Piray settler
Construction and maintenance of access roads were at once
the greatest expense and the greatest disappointment of AID's
IRD efforts in Chane-Piray and San Julian. Costing roughly
$8.5 million (some 75 percent of the funds expended in the 1974
project), the intended output was to have been 180 kilometers
of all-weather access roads and 800 kilometers of perpendicular
trails in Chane-Piray and San Julian. The result was half that
targeted.

The Bolivian general contractor responsible for building
both roads went out of business before completing the work.
The roadwork done prior to this failure ranged from all-weather
quality in places to very much below standard in others. A
road, like a chain, is only as strong as its weakest link. The
below-standard portions have thus rendered both the Chane-Piray
and San Julian roads unusable during the rainy season.

Road maintenance has also been a problem. The government
entity for road maintenance in the settlement zones is the
National Colonization Institute (INC), and INC has not per-
formed this chore adequately. From time to time the settlers
have organized themselves to deal with road repair problems.
Especially troublesome low or soft spots have been filled by
settlers, and rustic bridges have been constructed where
needed. In general, though, the problem of road maintenance
can only be solved through use of heavy equipment and importa-
tion of gravel--both tactics well beyond the means of the set-
tlers.


2. Wells


In Yapacani, people went into the forest
with water on their backs, worked till it
was gone, then came out for more. Farm
development was impossible under those con-
ditions.
FIDES official
Efforts to provide good well water were generally success-
ful. Except for a few communities where, after repeated bor-
ings, drillers settled for water which was bad tasting and
slightly diarrhetic due to high mineral content, the settlement











roads and wells, was able to concentrate its resources on so-
cial and technical services in support of the settlement pro-
cess.

Physical infrastructure activities under the 1974 project
were implemented primarily through Bolivia's National Coloniza-
tion Institute (INC), a national government agency with head-
quarters in La Paz. Road construction was contracted for from
a Bolivian general contracting firm working under general su-
pervision by INC and the USAID. Wells were established by INC
staff directly. Social and technical services under the 1979
project were contracted from the Foundation for Integral Devel-
opment (FIDES), a Bolivian foundation established by several
church-related organizations which had long been involved in
resettlement support.

Investment in physical infrastructure, especially roads,
required relatively large amounts of money over a short period.
The work was completed with little or no involvement of the
target populace. Because the work preceded the settlers, their
tendency was to take it for granted, as though it had always
been there. Alternatively, activities under the 1979 project
(e.g., community and cooperative development and agricultural
extension) involved such close collaboration with the settlers
themselves that success or failure in this area was as much a
result of the means by which services were delivered as the
nature of the services themselves.

Specific project activities in the Chane-Piray and San
Julian IRD program fall into three broad categories: (1) phy-
sical infrastructure, (2) settlement designs, and (3) a range
of complementary services. The analysis that follows provides
a brief review of the activities in each category.


A. Physical Infrastructure


Access and water are fundamental. Every-
thing else we do depends upon specific cir-
cumstances which change from place to place
and time to time.
FIDES official
The projects evaluated provided for a range of outputs
which can be characterized as physical infrastructure. Roads
to open up the areas targeted for settlement, deep wells to
provide healthful drinking water, and certain rudimentary
buildings and equipment were viewed as basic, minimal infra-
structure requirements for settler survival.


1. Roads


When I first went into Cuatro Ojitos we had
no road. Because there was no road, our
crops had no value.
i Chane-Piray settler
Construction and maintenance of access roads were at once
the greatest expense and the greatest disappointment of AID's
IRD efforts in Chane-Piray and San Julian. Costing roughly
$8.5 million (some 75 percent of the funds expended in the 1974
project), the intended output was to have been 180 kilometers
of all-weather access roads and 800 kilometers of perpendicular
trails in Chane-Piray and San Julian. The result was half that
targeted.

The Bolivian general contractor responsible for building
both roads went out of business before completing the work.
The roadwork done prior to this failure ranged from all-weather
quality in places to very much below standard in others. A
road, like a chain, is only as strong as its weakest link. The
below-standard portions have thus rendered both the Chane-Piray
and San Julian roads unusable during the rainy season.

Road maintenance has also been a problem. The government
entity for road maintenance in the settlement zones is the
National Colonization Institute (INC), and INC has not per-
formed this chore adequately. From time to time the settlers
have organized themselves to deal with road repair problems.
Especially troublesome low or soft spots have been filled by
settlers, and rustic bridges have been constructed where
needed. In general, though, the problem of road maintenance
can only be solved through use of heavy equipment and importa-
tion of gravel--both tactics well beyond the means of the set-
tlers.


2. Wells


In Yapacani, people went into the forest
with water on their backs, worked till it
was gone, then came out for more. Farm
development was impossible under those con-
ditions.
FIDES official
Efforts to provide good well water were generally success-
ful. Except for a few communities where, after repeated bor-
ings, drillers settled for water which was bad tasting and
slightly diarrhetic due to high mineral content, the settlement











roads and wells, was able to concentrate its resources on so-
cial and technical services in support of the settlement pro-
cess.

Physical infrastructure activities under the 1974 project
were implemented primarily through Bolivia's National Coloniza-
tion Institute (INC), a national government agency with head-
quarters in La Paz. Road construction was contracted for from
a Bolivian general contracting firm working under general su-
pervision by INC and the USAID. Wells were established by INC
staff directly. Social and technical services under the 1979
project were contracted from the Foundation for Integral Devel-
opment (FIDES), a Bolivian foundation established by several
church-related organizations which had long been involved in
resettlement support.

Investment in physical infrastructure, especially roads,
required relatively large amounts of money over a short period.
The work was completed with little or no involvement of the
target populace. Because the work preceded the settlers, their
tendency was to take it for granted, as though it had always
been there. Alternatively, activities under the 1979 project
(e.g., community and cooperative development and agricultural
extension) involved such close collaboration with the settlers
themselves that success or failure in this area was as much a
result of the means by which services were delivered as the
nature of the services themselves.

Specific project activities in the Chane-Piray and San
Julian IRD program fall into three broad categories: (1) phy-
sical infrastructure, (2) settlement designs, and (3) a range
of complementary services. The analysis that follows provides
a brief review of the activities in each category.


A. Physical Infrastructure


Access and water are fundamental. Every-
thing else we do depends upon specific cir-
cumstances which change from place to place
and time to time.
FIDES official
The projects evaluated provided for a range of outputs
which can be characterized as physical infrastructure. Roads
to open up the areas targeted for settlement, deep wells to
provide healthful drinking water, and certain rudimentary
buildings and equipment were viewed as basic, minimal infra-
structure requirements for settler survival.


1. Roads


When I first went into Cuatro Ojitos we had
no road. Because there was no road, our
crops had no value.
i Chane-Piray settler
Construction and maintenance of access roads were at once
the greatest expense and the greatest disappointment of AID's
IRD efforts in Chane-Piray and San Julian. Costing roughly
$8.5 million (some 75 percent of the funds expended in the 1974
project), the intended output was to have been 180 kilometers
of all-weather access roads and 800 kilometers of perpendicular
trails in Chane-Piray and San Julian. The result was half that
targeted.

The Bolivian general contractor responsible for building
both roads went out of business before completing the work.
The roadwork done prior to this failure ranged from all-weather
quality in places to very much below standard in others. A
road, like a chain, is only as strong as its weakest link. The
below-standard portions have thus rendered both the Chane-Piray
and San Julian roads unusable during the rainy season.

Road maintenance has also been a problem. The government
entity for road maintenance in the settlement zones is the
National Colonization Institute (INC), and INC has not per-
formed this chore adequately. From time to time the settlers
have organized themselves to deal with road repair problems.
Especially troublesome low or soft spots have been filled by
settlers, and rustic bridges have been constructed where
needed. In general, though, the problem of road maintenance
can only be solved through use of heavy equipment and importa-
tion of gravel--both tactics well beyond the means of the set-
tlers.


2. Wells


In Yapacani, people went into the forest
with water on their backs, worked till it
was gone, then came out for more. Farm
development was impossible under those con-
ditions.
FIDES official
Efforts to provide good well water were generally success-
ful. Except for a few communities where, after repeated bor-
ings, drillers settled for water which was bad tasting and
slightly diarrhetic due to high mineral content, the settlement










areas enjoy the use of well-located, functional wells. Main-
tenance is handled by the settlers themselves and is good and
timely, except where they are obliged to turn to outsiders for
spare parts.

3. Buildings and Equipment

Two agricultural resource centers were to be built, one in
each zone. Construction was contracted to INC. The Chane-
Piray Center was completed and taken over by the Center for
Tropical Agricultural Research (CIAT), a Santa Cruz-based
public/private research organization. This center is a big
success. The San Julian center was never 'completed nor staffed
consistently by INC, and thus the building is falling into dis-
repair.
A sanitary post provided under the loan was largely com-
pleted and is in use. A mobile health unit has not worked out.
It is not currently in operation and most of its equipment has
been stolen.
At the nucleo (colony of 40 families with a central well)
sites themselves, the project provided for two shelters each,
one for settlers to sleep under until homes could be built and
the other to keep the food dry. Basic building and farming
equipment was also provided. These investments were very mod-
est, but had substantial pay-offs.
Looking at physical infrastructure investments overall, it
seems that these projects were well conceived. The roads
planned were appropriate, and failure of the contractor to com-
plete them and of INC to maintain them were not predictable.
The wells planned were well designed and, in fact, are sub-
stantially completed (one per village instead of the planned
two each). Finally, the buildings and equipment planned were,
by and large, well chosen. Failure of the INC to complete the
San Julian agricultural service center, and to operate it or
the Chane-Piray Center, could not have been predicted. Because
of the poor road quality and staffing problems, the mobile
health unit functioned for only a short time. However, struc-
tures and equipment at the nucleo sites were well chosen and
well utilized.

B. Settlement Patterns

When we laid out the settlements "piano-
key" fashion, with a parcel every 200
meters, everyone was on the road, but it
was a long walk to town.
FIDES official


One of the greatest successes of the two projects evalu-
ated cost virtually nothing. This was the settlement design,
the nucleo pattern. The nucleo is such a great improvement
over the earlier, "piano key" settlement design that many farm-
ers abandoned already established "piano key" parcels to start
anew in nucleos. Illustration 1 below shows the differences
between these two settlement patterns.

Illustration 1. "Piano Key" and Nucleo Settlement Designs


School Water


"Piano Key"
Amenities
located at
one end of
colony.
Farm homes
located on
individual
tracts.


Nucleo
Amenities
and farm
homes lo-
cated in
central
circle.


Penetration Road--


--Penetration Road


In both cases the area allocated for development of a
central community is equal. The basic amenities, a well and
school, are also equal. There are some profound differences,
however.
In the "piano key" settlement design the farmer must
choose between living on his land or living near the well. In
the nucleo the farmer has it both ways. Because farmers in
"piano key" settlements make different decisions, some opting
to stay on the land, others to live in town, development of
community organizations and spirit is curtailed. Likewise, the
process of secondary industry development is retarded. Running
a shop, renting a draft animal, or threshing your neighbor's
rice are all easier "sidelines" to develop when the entire pop-
ulace lives within shouting distance of one another.


r Z. 1





J7










areas enjoy the use of well-located, functional wells. Main-
tenance is handled by the settlers themselves and is good and
timely, except where they are obliged to turn to outsiders for
spare parts.

3. Buildings and Equipment

Two agricultural resource centers were to be built, one in
each zone. Construction was contracted to INC. The Chane-
Piray Center was completed and taken over by the Center for
Tropical Agricultural Research (CIAT), a Santa Cruz-based
public/private research organization. This center is a big
success. The San Julian center was never 'completed nor staffed
consistently by INC, and thus the building is falling into dis-
repair.
A sanitary post provided under the loan was largely com-
pleted and is in use. A mobile health unit has not worked out.
It is not currently in operation and most of its equipment has
been stolen.
At the nucleo (colony of 40 families with a central well)
sites themselves, the project provided for two shelters each,
one for settlers to sleep under until homes could be built and
the other to keep the food dry. Basic building and farming
equipment was also provided. These investments were very mod-
est, but had substantial pay-offs.
Looking at physical infrastructure investments overall, it
seems that these projects were well conceived. The roads
planned were appropriate, and failure of the contractor to com-
plete them and of INC to maintain them were not predictable.
The wells planned were well designed and, in fact, are sub-
stantially completed (one per village instead of the planned
two each). Finally, the buildings and equipment planned were,
by and large, well chosen. Failure of the INC to complete the
San Julian agricultural service center, and to operate it or
the Chane-Piray Center, could not have been predicted. Because
of the poor road quality and staffing problems, the mobile
health unit functioned for only a short time. However, struc-
tures and equipment at the nucleo sites were well chosen and
well utilized.

B. Settlement Patterns

When we laid out the settlements "piano-
key" fashion, with a parcel every 200
meters, everyone was on the road, but it
was a long walk to town.
FIDES official


One of the greatest successes of the two projects evalu-
ated cost virtually nothing. This was the settlement design,
the nucleo pattern. The nucleo is such a great improvement
over the earlier, "piano key" settlement design that many farm-
ers abandoned already established "piano key" parcels to start
anew in nucleos. Illustration 1 below shows the differences
between these two settlement patterns.

Illustration 1. "Piano Key" and Nucleo Settlement Designs


School Water


"Piano Key"
Amenities
located at
one end of
colony.
Farm homes
located on
individual
tracts.


Nucleo
Amenities
and farm
homes lo-
cated in
central
circle.


Penetration Road--


--Penetration Road


In both cases the area allocated for development of a
central community is equal. The basic amenities, a well and
school, are also equal. There are some profound differences,
however.
In the "piano key" settlement design the farmer must
choose between living on his land or living near the well. In
the nucleo the farmer has it both ways. Because farmers in
"piano key" settlements make different decisions, some opting
to stay on the land, others to live in town, development of
community organizations and spirit is curtailed. Likewise, the
process of secondary industry development is retarded. Running
a shop, renting a draft animal, or threshing your neighbor's
rice are all easier "sidelines" to develop when the entire pop-
ulace lives within shouting distance of one another.


r Z. 1





J7












A final, more subtle advantage of the nucleo settlement
design often expressed by settlers is the security it provides.
Migration from one's place of birth in the highlands to remote,
alien jungle surroundings is a traumatic event. Proximity to
fellow pioneers means a lot in such circumstances. The perils
of snake bite, fever, and even loneliness are much mitigated
when one has a close neighbor.


C. Services


How did you know what the people needed?
By living with them, listening to them.
FIDES official

The most significant feature of the two AID projects, par-
ticularly of the 1979 settlement consolidation program, was the
quality and appropriateness of the economic and social services
provided to the settlers. Physical infrastructure investments
were well chosen but implemented with mixed results. The nu-
cleo settlement design, though a radical departure from tradi-
tion, was so well received by settlers that implementation went
very well. The greatest challenge, however, was development
and delivery of an appropriate package of settler services.
This task required unusual sensitivity, dedication, and talent
on a sustained basis throughout the life of the project. How
this was accomplished merits close attention.

Much depended on a mystique--a social com-
promise with the campesino that came from
religious roots. We understood that salva-
tion had to be reflected in all aspects of
life, not just the spirit.
FIDES official

FIDES was the principal implementing agent for the 1979
consolidation project. Working in cooperation with INC, FIDES
helped to design project interventions and implement all but
the physical infrastructure components.

Though FIDES was newly established in 1979, its directors
and staff brought with them experience in new-lands settlement
in Bolivia's Oriente going back to the early 1960s. Some had
been Methodist and Catholic missionaries in the settlement
zones. Others were development specialists associated with the
Mennonite Church. Among them were both Bolivians and North
Americans.

What all FIDES leaders "brought to the table" in 1979 was
long experience on the front lines of new-lands settlement,
vivid memories of the hardship and suffering entailed, and


uncommon dedication to the task of making the settler's life
more bearable, of increasing his chances for success. In the
final analysis, it was these characteristics that made the
difference, that enabled FIDES's employees to determine from
day to day what needed doing and how to do it, and gave them
the determination to stick with a task until success was
achieved.

Project services in the consolidation program can be bro-
ken down into three general categories: (1) settler orienta-
tion, (2) community development, and (3) agricultural support.


1. Settler Orientation


During the first night we huddled together
like sheep under our shelter. I don't know
if it was to keep warm, or because we were
afraid.
San Julian settler

The FIDES orientation program for new settlers began with the
inception of each community. Fear of the alien environment was
much reduced by the presence of experienced, sympathetic FIDES
staff, some of them settlers themselves from nearby communi-
ties. Panic at not knowing how to cope with tasks as familiar
as building homes with different materials, and farming with
different crops, was quickly alleviated through the instruction
of FIDES extension agents. The heavy toll of sickness was
reduced through reliance on the advice of health promoters con-
cerning local foods, mosquito control, and parasite infesta-
tions.


2. Community Development


It is important that the campesino do
things with his own hands. Paternalism
only makes him dependent.
FIDES official

The basic theme in FIDES's approach to settler services
was self-help. Project services were not provided for the set-
tlers, but rather developed with them. Even decisions on which
services would be required were made by the settlers.

The FIDES staff operated, in effect, as methodologists.
They helped settlers determine the range of choices available
and how to choose among them. Rarely, however, did FIDES make
unilateral decisions.












A final, more subtle advantage of the nucleo settlement
design often expressed by settlers is the security it provides.
Migration from one's place of birth in the highlands to remote,
alien jungle surroundings is a traumatic event. Proximity to
fellow pioneers means a lot in such circumstances. The perils
of snake bite, fever, and even loneliness are much mitigated
when one has a close neighbor.


C. Services


How did you know what the people needed?
By living with them, listening to them.
FIDES official

The most significant feature of the two AID projects, par-
ticularly of the 1979 settlement consolidation program, was the
quality and appropriateness of the economic and social services
provided to the settlers. Physical infrastructure investments
were well chosen but implemented with mixed results. The nu-
cleo settlement design, though a radical departure from tradi-
tion, was so well received by settlers that implementation went
very well. The greatest challenge, however, was development
and delivery of an appropriate package of settler services.
This task required unusual sensitivity, dedication, and talent
on a sustained basis throughout the life of the project. How
this was accomplished merits close attention.

Much depended on a mystique--a social com-
promise with the campesino that came from
religious roots. We understood that salva-
tion had to be reflected in all aspects of
life, not just the spirit.
FIDES official

FIDES was the principal implementing agent for the 1979
consolidation project. Working in cooperation with INC, FIDES
helped to design project interventions and implement all but
the physical infrastructure components.

Though FIDES was newly established in 1979, its directors
and staff brought with them experience in new-lands settlement
in Bolivia's Oriente going back to the early 1960s. Some had
been Methodist and Catholic missionaries in the settlement
zones. Others were development specialists associated with the
Mennonite Church. Among them were both Bolivians and North
Americans.

What all FIDES leaders "brought to the table" in 1979 was
long experience on the front lines of new-lands settlement,
vivid memories of the hardship and suffering entailed, and


uncommon dedication to the task of making the settler's life
more bearable, of increasing his chances for success. In the
final analysis, it was these characteristics that made the
difference, that enabled FIDES's employees to determine from
day to day what needed doing and how to do it, and gave them
the determination to stick with a task until success was
achieved.

Project services in the consolidation program can be bro-
ken down into three general categories: (1) settler orienta-
tion, (2) community development, and (3) agricultural support.


1. Settler Orientation


During the first night we huddled together
like sheep under our shelter. I don't know
if it was to keep warm, or because we were
afraid.
San Julian settler

The FIDES orientation program for new settlers began with the
inception of each community. Fear of the alien environment was
much reduced by the presence of experienced, sympathetic FIDES
staff, some of them settlers themselves from nearby communi-
ties. Panic at not knowing how to cope with tasks as familiar
as building homes with different materials, and farming with
different crops, was quickly alleviated through the instruction
of FIDES extension agents. The heavy toll of sickness was
reduced through reliance on the advice of health promoters con-
cerning local foods, mosquito control, and parasite infesta-
tions.


2. Community Development


It is important that the campesino do
things with his own hands. Paternalism
only makes him dependent.
FIDES official

The basic theme in FIDES's approach to settler services
was self-help. Project services were not provided for the set-
tlers, but rather developed with them. Even decisions on which
services would be required were made by the settlers.

The FIDES staff operated, in effect, as methodologists.
They helped settlers determine the range of choices available
and how to choose among them. Rarely, however, did FIDES make
unilateral decisions.












A final, more subtle advantage of the nucleo settlement
design often expressed by settlers is the security it provides.
Migration from one's place of birth in the highlands to remote,
alien jungle surroundings is a traumatic event. Proximity to
fellow pioneers means a lot in such circumstances. The perils
of snake bite, fever, and even loneliness are much mitigated
when one has a close neighbor.


C. Services


How did you know what the people needed?
By living with them, listening to them.
FIDES official

The most significant feature of the two AID projects, par-
ticularly of the 1979 settlement consolidation program, was the
quality and appropriateness of the economic and social services
provided to the settlers. Physical infrastructure investments
were well chosen but implemented with mixed results. The nu-
cleo settlement design, though a radical departure from tradi-
tion, was so well received by settlers that implementation went
very well. The greatest challenge, however, was development
and delivery of an appropriate package of settler services.
This task required unusual sensitivity, dedication, and talent
on a sustained basis throughout the life of the project. How
this was accomplished merits close attention.

Much depended on a mystique--a social com-
promise with the campesino that came from
religious roots. We understood that salva-
tion had to be reflected in all aspects of
life, not just the spirit.
FIDES official

FIDES was the principal implementing agent for the 1979
consolidation project. Working in cooperation with INC, FIDES
helped to design project interventions and implement all but
the physical infrastructure components.

Though FIDES was newly established in 1979, its directors
and staff brought with them experience in new-lands settlement
in Bolivia's Oriente going back to the early 1960s. Some had
been Methodist and Catholic missionaries in the settlement
zones. Others were development specialists associated with the
Mennonite Church. Among them were both Bolivians and North
Americans.

What all FIDES leaders "brought to the table" in 1979 was
long experience on the front lines of new-lands settlement,
vivid memories of the hardship and suffering entailed, and


uncommon dedication to the task of making the settler's life
more bearable, of increasing his chances for success. In the
final analysis, it was these characteristics that made the
difference, that enabled FIDES's employees to determine from
day to day what needed doing and how to do it, and gave them
the determination to stick with a task until success was
achieved.

Project services in the consolidation program can be bro-
ken down into three general categories: (1) settler orienta-
tion, (2) community development, and (3) agricultural support.


1. Settler Orientation


During the first night we huddled together
like sheep under our shelter. I don't know
if it was to keep warm, or because we were
afraid.
San Julian settler

The FIDES orientation program for new settlers began with the
inception of each community. Fear of the alien environment was
much reduced by the presence of experienced, sympathetic FIDES
staff, some of them settlers themselves from nearby communi-
ties. Panic at not knowing how to cope with tasks as familiar
as building homes with different materials, and farming with
different crops, was quickly alleviated through the instruction
of FIDES extension agents. The heavy toll of sickness was
reduced through reliance on the advice of health promoters con-
cerning local foods, mosquito control, and parasite infesta-
tions.


2. Community Development


It is important that the campesino do
things with his own hands. Paternalism
only makes him dependent.
FIDES official

The basic theme in FIDES's approach to settler services
was self-help. Project services were not provided for the set-
tlers, but rather developed with them. Even decisions on which
services would be required were made by the settlers.

The FIDES staff operated, in effect, as methodologists.
They helped settlers determine the range of choices available
and how to choose among them. Rarely, however, did FIDES make
unilateral decisions.










-10-


A participatory approach to decision-making was encouraged
from the first day of each settlement's orientation. Building
upon century-old traditions of social organization in the high-
land communities, FIDES encouraged settlers to work together
toward the common good. Everything from cooking to home con-
struction to land clearing was done jointly. Survival through
cooperation and self-help was the theme. FIDES staff, which
had the know-how and the rudimentary grubstakess" of equipment
and food, made themselves available to the settlers. These
services were transitory, however, and in a few short months
settlers would be on their own. It was thus imperative that
the settlers learn to organize for the struggle.

FIDES's technique for ensuring that progress initiated
during orientation would continue into the future was to
encourage development of formal settler organizations with
responsibility to provide for critical functions. Wherever
possible, such organizations were to require no sustained out-
side support.

Health committees were formed to provide guidance in the
areas of sanitation and treatment of illness. In some of the
nucleos, these committees appointed a health promoter who
served as a combination pharmacist/nurse. In return for the
health promoter's time dispensing medicine and advising on
health problems, the health promoter would receive a profit on
drug sales and/or be freed from traditional community labor
obligations. While the promoter was in training other settlers
would labor on his/her farm--an extension into a new field of
traditional Indian labor-exchange customs.

Cooperatives were organized to deal jointly with economic
problems beyond the ability of individual farmers. Consumer
cooperatives helped with group buying, thus greatly cutting the
time and expense of acquiring supplies from the distant cities.
In some cases, marketing cooperatives have been organized to
strengthen the settler's hand in sale of his produce. Like-
wise, agricultural credit cooperatives have been tried, albeit
with mixed success due to the disruptive impact of Bolivia's
soaring inflation.

Finally, FIDES also encouraged settler organization to
deal with broader problems, problems which depended upon
government services. Thus even the growth of political organi-
zations has been more rapid than usual at San Julian. The
Federation of San Julian colonists has been particularly active
in lobbying the government to repair or upgrade the zone's
roads, to maintain water wells, even to deal with the problem
of road destruction caused by overweight logging trucks.

The evaluation team noted a tendency on the part of USAID/
Bolivia staff to downplay the importance of FIDES's community


development work, to look on it as nonsubstantive and "do
gooder" in nature. We feel this is a critical misreading of
the situation. More than anything else, it is the ability of
settler communities to solve their own problems which will
facilitate the achievement of the long-term viability of the
new-lands settlement program.


3. Agricultural Support


Settlers are threatened from all sides.
Floods often destroy crops in the fields.
Wet roads and high rivers sometimes prevent
timely marketing. Government price fixing
can eliminate profits. Soaring inflation
makes planning and purchase of new inputs
difficult. The best form of strategy is
one that provides insurance against these
threats. Broad diversification, with a
subsistence base, is the key to long-term
survival.
FIDES official
The settlers who claimed parcels of virgin forest in San
Julian came from a variety of backgrounds. Some were cambas
who had lived their entire lives in the lowlands, if not as
farmers then as hunters or tradesmen. Others were "stepmi-
grants," highlanders who had long since moved to the Oriente
and worked here and there as laborers, often on farms. Many,
however, had had no prior experience with life in the lowlands.
All of these people would require technical support if they
were to succeed as agricultural pioneers, so a strong program
of practical, no-frills agricultural extension was developed as
a key part of FIDES's portfolio of services.

The crux of FIDES's agricultural support effort was a
strategy that encouraged insurance against the harmful effects
of elements outside the settlers' control--weather, market ac-
cess, crop prices, and availability of inputs. The strategy
was manifested in a farm development plan which, while offering
no quick road to wealth, minimized farmer risk and dependence.
This farm development plan can be characterized as self-capi-
talizing.

The first step in FIDES's farm development plan is to en-
courage farmers to plant several hectares of annual crops for
sale. This matched the settlers' natural tendency. Kolla set-
tlers, particularly, are business oriented and want to grow
crops they can sell.


-11-









-13-


The second step is to establish a subsistence base in case
the annual crop is flooded, there is no market-access due to
impassable roads, or the price is so low that it cannot be sold
profitably (farm-gate prices are extremely volatile in Boli-
via). This base can be established through cultivation of gar-
den and orchard crops adjacent to the settler's home. With the
tremendous range of crops grown in the lowlands, settlers with-
in a nucleo could thus ensure year-round availability of a wide
variety of foodstuffs, even when the cash crops were unprofit-
able.

The third step in the farm development plan is to plant
improved pasture on soils exhausted after 2 to 3 years dedi-
cated to annual crops. Pasture has more value than the natural
secondary forest regrowth because it feeds nutrients to the
soil faster and it can be eaten by livestock. Planting of per-
ennial trees and pasture are virtually cash-free ways of in-
creasing the value of a farm parcel over time.

The fourth step is to introduce livestock. Proceeds from
the sale of annual crops might be kept in a sock or in the bank
earning interest, but the best alternative is to invest it in a
chicken, pig, or cow. The advantage of owning livestock in
Bolivia is that it is a hedge against the twin hazards of
flooding and inflation--it "floats" on both. At the same time,
it is highly liquid. If cash is needed for an emergency, or to
buy seed, it is an easy matter to sell a pig.

The fifth step in FIDES's farm development plan is only
beginning to be achieved by a handful of the San Julian farm-
ers. This is the introduction of animal traction. Mechanized
plowing requires less human labor than hand cultivation, thus
allowing cultivation of increased acreage. Likewise, it ap-
pears to increase yields. With pasture available, the cost of
maintaining draft animals is minimal. The step into mechaniza-
tion based on animal traction can thus be made naturally, with
minimal risk. The amount of money needed to buy draft animals
or a small plow is not so great as to require credit. It can
be generated through the sale of a good crop, or other live-
stock.

With a tractor I can plant 50 hectares, but
where will I get the labor to weed and har-
vest 50 hectares?
Chane-Piray settler
To really understand the significance of FIDES's self-
capitalizing farm development model, one must contrast it with
the strategy generally opted for in earlier settlements, in-
cluding Chane-Piray.


Because of their strong commercial orientation, in most
instances settlers put all their energies into a single cash
crop. If it grew and they could get it to market and sell it
at the right price, they prospered. If any of those circum-
stances failed to materialize, they failed. With no subsis-
tence crops to fall back on, they were then forced to abandon
their parcels and seek employment elsewhere.

When things worked out, however, such farmers did very
well indeed. Profits were then typically invested in labor to
clear, plant, and harvest additional hectares of the same crop.
With several successful years in a row, such farmers might gen-
erate enough revenue to buy tractors, mostly on credit, and
increase their plots and yields even faster.

The problem with this system is that the exclusively cash-
crop farmer is like the proverbial gambler who, when playing
blackjack, puts all of his winnings back on the table every
time. He can increase his assets very fast if he is lucky, but
when his luck turns he loses everything. Chane-Piray has had
very few big successes among its original settlers and a great
many failures. San Julian, on the other hand, is developing
more consistently, with economic failure being the exception.

FIDES's approach to promoting its agricultural services
had been accomplished through (1) the operation of a small nur-
sery where experiments are carried out and agricultural inputs
are marketed, (2) the services of several very modestly sala-
ried agricultural extensionists who actually live and work
among the settlers, and (3) the development of a network of
unpaid model farmers who receive particular attention on their
own farms ingreturn for taking the lead in trying out new prod-
ucts and techniques. Simple, low budget, and practical, it has
laid a solid footing for sustained agricultural development in
the San Julian settlement zone.


III. ANALYSIS OF PROGRAM IMPACTS


The acid test of project effectiveness is whether it
achieves the desired results. What were the impacts, who felt
them, and how have they changed things?

To get a feel for how to approach this, the evaluation
team turned first to the 1974 and 1979 Project Papers. Both
projects shared similar objectives: to improve the quality of
life of project participants (the settlers) and to increase
agricultural output from the project areas. The remainder of
this section deals with these two subjects from the perspective
of economic, social, and environmental impacts.









-15-


A. Economic Impacts

Chane-Piray is an area which includes a number of differ-
ent settlements developed without much planning over several
decades. Although AID's 1974 project provided for interven-
tions similar to those introduced in San Julian (basic infra-
structure and settler services), their effect there was less
profound. Farm development habits were already well developed
in Chane-Piray, and AID's technical advisors (the same people
who later formed FIDES) did not stay around long enough to
change them. There was no consolidation project (as there
would be in 1979) to provide support beyond the pioneering
stage. Left to their own instincts, settlers in the AID-
supported communities of Chane-Piray chose the same high-risk/
high-gain farm development strategy as their predecessors from
earlier settlements.

The result is that the economic impact of resettlement on
individual families in Chane-Piray has been very uneven. Farm-
ers "rolled the dice," often putting all their hopes on a sin-
gle cash crop, and the result was success for a few and failure
for the great majority.

The influence of exogenous variables is simply too great
for monocultural, cash-oriented farming systems. If the rains
don't wash out the crop, preventing harvest, they may wash out
the road, preventing marketing. When the farmer does make it
to market, a risk exists that his crop will have little value
due to oversupply or government price intervention. If he is
paid in cash, he risks erosion of his capital due to the 100+
percent inflation.

The evaluation team noted that a great many of the farms
in Chane-Piray appear to be caught in the "barbecho crises."
This is the phenomenon wherein the farmer cuts and burns sever-
al hectares, plants it for 2 to 3 years until declining crop
yields and increasing weed infestation make it uncultivable,
then moves to new acreage, letting the former parcel return to
secondary forest growth, or barbecho. One can exit from this
cycle through cash-crop farming only with an unusual run of
luck.

A good crop sold at the right time, with proceeds rein-
vested in labor to clear and plant more land (one man cannot
farm more than 3 hectares by hand), provides a start to exiting
the "barbecho crises." Two or three good years in a row might
give the farmer the resources to hire large equipment to "ma-
chine-clear" a parcel of land and make a down-payment on a
tractor for machine cultivation. Several more years of good
luck might enable him to pay off the tractor loan, but the need
for hard currency for spare parts still remains. The odds
against so much good fortune are high.


The evaluation team noted that many farms in Chane-Piray
are now mechanized. Some concentration of land-holdings has
also taken place as the mechanized farmers sought economies of
scale. Conversations with settlers in the region indicate that
the successful farmers are usually second-generation settlers--
people who arrived with some capital and expertise and bought
out their pioneer predecessors. Development officials in the
area indicated that most of the tractors and harvesters ob-
served in the fields were financed by high-leverage equipment
loans offered at very concessionary (in light of inflation,
generally negative) rates. Despite such arrangements, it was
noted that over 50 percent of such loans are in default, and
that the need to pay cash fof spare parts is taking an increas-
ingly heavy toll on such farmers.

In the San Julianisettlement zone, AID "got in on the
ground floor," and developments there reflect this fact. All
San Julian communities'enjoyed the same basic infrastructure
investments, the same nucleo settlement design, and for the
most part they benefited from the same orientation program at
the pioneering stage. When one adds to that the additional 5
years of technical support not available in Chane-Piray
(through AID's 1979 consolidation program), it seems safe to
attribute critical differences in economic impacts at Chane-
Piray and San Julian to the greater AID involvement in San
Julian.

For the most part, San Julian farmers have abandoned the
high-risk/high-gain cash-crop orientation prevalent in Chane-
Piray and other settlement areas. San Julian developed the
less risky, pore economically and environmentally sound strate-
gy of self-capitalization (see "Agricultural Support," Section
II.C.3 above).

The economic impact of this farm development strategy on
individual project beneficiaries has been profound. Farmers
everywhere were confident and talked of growth. Even in nu-
cleos 17 and 20, where serious floods had destroyed crops only
several months prior to the team's visit, there was no evidence
of parcel abandonment or settler disillusion. Indeed, in sev-
eral nucleos, female settlers bragged of the abundance and
variety of fruits, vegetables, and livestock. No doubt the
flood wreaked havoc with savings, but it had not interfered
with the ability of settlers and communities to carry on.

With the earliest farms in San Julian barely 11 years old,
and the average age perhaps 4 years, none has yet reached eco-
nomic maturity through self-capitalization. Many have made
impressive progress, however. Small orchards are common. Pas-
ture development has been slower than hoped (due to difficulty
in determining appropriate grass varieties for the area and
obtaining seeds) but is also progressing. About 20 farmers








-16-


invested in animal traction. Most farmers still have fewer
than 10 of their 50 hectares cleared, so prospects for future
improvement exist if the land is developed properly.

From a micro-economic perspective, it was apparent to the
evaluation team that although resettlement proved remunerative
for many families in both Chane-Piray and San Julian, there
were two critical differences:

-Ultimate beneficiaries in Chane-Piray are often not
the intended beneficiaries. Better capitalized sec-
ond-generation farmers have replaced the original pio-
neers.

-The rate of success in developing farms from a pio-
neering stage to one of consolidation and growth is
several times greater in San Julian than in other
Bolivian settlement zones.

Chane-Piray represents the normal development pattern for
Bolivian settlements. Changes in that pattern in the San Jul-
ian zone are felt to be due to the greater extent and influence
of AID's interventions,there.

From a macro-economic perspective the impact of resettle-
ment efforts in Chane-Piray and San Julian is just beginning to
be felt. A stated goal of both the 1974 and 1979 projects was
to increase agricultural production in the Bolivian Oriente.
In 1974, much of the Chane-Piray zone and virtually all of San
Julian were uninhabited virgin forest, so clearly there was
nowhere to go but up. Although there had long been exploita-
tion of tropical hardwoods, particularly mahogany, in both
areas, the difficulties of access made even that a fairly mar-
ginal income producer.

With the opening of the areas to settlement, the change
has been dramatic. The road from the Chane-Piray settlement
zone into the Santa Cruz market center is lined with produce
laden trucks during harvest times. San Julian, younger and
less-developed agriculturally, likewise carries on a lively
commerce with the nearby Montero and Santa Cruz market center.

Long-run impact, however, is likely to be far greater. In
San Julian, for example, fully 80 percent of the land available
for cultivation has not even been touched. Because basic sub-
sistence needs are met by the first several hectares under cul-
tivation, it is clear that the proportionate contribution to
the overall economy will be greater from later farm growth.

Likewise, growth of secondary industries is only beginning
to be felt in San Julian. As production rises, agricultural


processing and marketing businesses should emerge. As dispos-
able incomes rise, there should be a marked effect in the near-
by cities of Montero and Santa Cruz. More time is needed to
see how great these secondary impacts will be.

B. Social Impacts

The evaluation team also noted some very significant so-
cial impacts of resettlement on the lives of settler families.
During 3 days of interviewing in San Julian, families were
queried regarding health and education concerns, overall sense
of well-being, and future expectations. The cause-effect link-
age between project interventions and these social impacts is
less clear than in the case of economic impacts, so they are
offered with appropriate disclaimers.

1. Health


Health issues are a major concern throughout San Julian.
Making the adjustment from life in the semiarid altiplano to
life in the tropical rainforest is jolting. Snakes, ticks, and
mosquitoes are all new threats. Each year many men and women
are killed during tree-felling and forest-burning operations.
Death during childbirth is still very common.

To the extent possible with support and guidance from
project personnel, the settlers in San Julian have organized to
combat health perils. Health committees have been organized in
each community. These committees have selected fellow settlers
as health promoters who, in exchange for profits from drug
sales and other compensation from the community, provide rudi-
mentary health care and purchase and dispense drugs.

This self-help system, although very rudimentary, fills
the health care void that existed in the wilderness. There is
no formal health care facility in the San Julian zone. The
nearest rudimentary hospital is in Montero which, depending
upon road and river conditions, is anywhere from a day's to a
week's journey away.

Interestingly enough, the settlers' greatest complaint in
the area of health care is the unreliability of the roads.
They resent the loss of so many lives because hospitals cannot
be reached in a reasonable time period, and it frustrates them
that the road access problem is beyond their ability to solve.


-17-








-16-


invested in animal traction. Most farmers still have fewer
than 10 of their 50 hectares cleared, so prospects for future
improvement exist if the land is developed properly.

From a micro-economic perspective, it was apparent to the
evaluation team that although resettlement proved remunerative
for many families in both Chane-Piray and San Julian, there
were two critical differences:

-Ultimate beneficiaries in Chane-Piray are often not
the intended beneficiaries. Better capitalized sec-
ond-generation farmers have replaced the original pio-
neers.

-The rate of success in developing farms from a pio-
neering stage to one of consolidation and growth is
several times greater in San Julian than in other
Bolivian settlement zones.

Chane-Piray represents the normal development pattern for
Bolivian settlements. Changes in that pattern in the San Jul-
ian zone are felt to be due to the greater extent and influence
of AID's interventions,there.

From a macro-economic perspective the impact of resettle-
ment efforts in Chane-Piray and San Julian is just beginning to
be felt. A stated goal of both the 1974 and 1979 projects was
to increase agricultural production in the Bolivian Oriente.
In 1974, much of the Chane-Piray zone and virtually all of San
Julian were uninhabited virgin forest, so clearly there was
nowhere to go but up. Although there had long been exploita-
tion of tropical hardwoods, particularly mahogany, in both
areas, the difficulties of access made even that a fairly mar-
ginal income producer.

With the opening of the areas to settlement, the change
has been dramatic. The road from the Chane-Piray settlement
zone into the Santa Cruz market center is lined with produce
laden trucks during harvest times. San Julian, younger and
less-developed agriculturally, likewise carries on a lively
commerce with the nearby Montero and Santa Cruz market center.

Long-run impact, however, is likely to be far greater. In
San Julian, for example, fully 80 percent of the land available
for cultivation has not even been touched. Because basic sub-
sistence needs are met by the first several hectares under cul-
tivation, it is clear that the proportionate contribution to
the overall economy will be greater from later farm growth.

Likewise, growth of secondary industries is only beginning
to be felt in San Julian. As production rises, agricultural


processing and marketing businesses should emerge. As dispos-
able incomes rise, there should be a marked effect in the near-
by cities of Montero and Santa Cruz. More time is needed to
see how great these secondary impacts will be.

B. Social Impacts

The evaluation team also noted some very significant so-
cial impacts of resettlement on the lives of settler families.
During 3 days of interviewing in San Julian, families were
queried regarding health and education concerns, overall sense
of well-being, and future expectations. The cause-effect link-
age between project interventions and these social impacts is
less clear than in the case of economic impacts, so they are
offered with appropriate disclaimers.

1. Health


Health issues are a major concern throughout San Julian.
Making the adjustment from life in the semiarid altiplano to
life in the tropical rainforest is jolting. Snakes, ticks, and
mosquitoes are all new threats. Each year many men and women
are killed during tree-felling and forest-burning operations.
Death during childbirth is still very common.

To the extent possible with support and guidance from
project personnel, the settlers in San Julian have organized to
combat health perils. Health committees have been organized in
each community. These committees have selected fellow settlers
as health promoters who, in exchange for profits from drug
sales and other compensation from the community, provide rudi-
mentary health care and purchase and dispense drugs.

This self-help system, although very rudimentary, fills
the health care void that existed in the wilderness. There is
no formal health care facility in the San Julian zone. The
nearest rudimentary hospital is in Montero which, depending
upon road and river conditions, is anywhere from a day's to a
week's journey away.

Interestingly enough, the settlers' greatest complaint in
the area of health care is the unreliability of the roads.
They resent the loss of so many lives because hospitals cannot
be reached in a reasonable time period, and it frustrates them
that the road access problem is beyond their ability to solve.


-17-










-18-


2. Education

The San Julian settlers also give high priority to the
education of their children, and in this area the news is uni-
formly good. Settlers organized to construct schools at the
very outset of each nucleo's development. A deal was struck
between the settlers political federation and the national
government that with a community-built school in place, the
government would supply a teacher.

This quid pro quo has worked fairly well. An adequate
school building was seen in every third nucleo (children from
lateral nucleos attend school in the central nucleo), and
attendance appeared to be high. For education beyond sixth
grade, children must be sent to boarding-school in Montero.
Because the great majority of settler families are very young,
lack of secondary schools has not yet imposed a general hard-
ship.


3. Sense of Well-Being

Interviews revealed that San Julian's settlers are gener-
ally happy and secure. The evaluation team met no one who re-
gretted the move and no one who felt "worse-off" for having
made a break with an earlier life. This is not to say that
there were no complaints. Settlers took every opportunity to
complain about road access and express frustration at their
inability to deal with it. They also complained of lack of
adequate government support for farm extension and well main-
tenance (responsibilities of INC): Interwoven in all the com-
plaints, however, was a sense of "By golly, we're going to do
something about this!" San Julian's settlers are not passive
people who submit to whatever life deals them. Rather, they
are a confident, take-charge group who feel, and indeed are, in
control of their own lives.


4. Future Expectations

Queries as to where settlers expected to be in 1 year, 5
years, and 10 years elicited interesting responses. Many had
trouble dealing with a long time horizon, but all expected to
be doing better over the next several years. Their feelings
were generally couched in terms of farm development: bringing
more hectarage and new fruit tree's into cultivation and pro-
duction, or acquiring more livestock.


-19-


This confidence in prospects for growth cannot be over-
stated. The feeling seemed to be one of inevitability--that
time and energy were sure to be rewarded. One of the settlers
captured it in a phrase when he said concerning an earlier set-
tlement effort, "I lost two years in Yapacani." Time seems to
count for something in San Julian.

No doubt ownership of 50 hectares of land, most of it not
even cleared yet, has much to do with the prevailing sense of
optimism. The evaluation team also believes, however, that
FIDES's success in selling the self-capitalization farm devel-
opment model, in which dependence upon outside influences is
minimized, has contributed greatly to settlers' feelings that
they can accomplish whatever they are willing to work for.

One cloud hanging over future expectations is the continu-
ing concern over the settlers' land ownership rights. Settlers
enjoy a "right to use" their 50-hectare parcels, but they do
not have title. This "right to use" has been considered suf-
ficient claim to enable sale of a parcel when a settler has
elected to raise money in this way. It has not prevented reoc-
cupation by another party in the event of abandonment, however;
nor have Bolivian banks felt free to claim ownership of farms
pledged as collateral for defaulted loans.

It is clear that if a farmer wishes to gain formal title
to his settlement parcel, he may do so. Some have. The prob-
lem is that the red tape and related expenses are so great that
few have felt it worth doing.

Settlers in Chane-Piray and San Julian would feel better
if they had clear titles to their settlement parcels, but the
evaluation team found no one who was "losing sleep" over the
issue.


5. Political Context

A major social change resulting from the Chane-Piray and
San Julian resettlement efforts (as well as other settlement
activities not supported by AID) is the impact on the demo-
graphy as well as the social and political life in the Santa
Cruz Department. Prior to .the advent of resettlement programs,
there were very few Kollas in the region. With the lure of
free land, there has been a major influx of Quechua- and Ay-
mara-speaking highlanders, bringing with them their traditions
of social organization, a penchant for commerce, and boundless
energy and ambition.

For the native Camba, agriculture and ranching are well-
regarded pursuits that one might follow for the pure enjoyment










-18-


2. Education

The San Julian settlers also give high priority to the
education of their children, and in this area the news is uni-
formly good. Settlers organized to construct schools at the
very outset of each nucleo's development. A deal was struck
between the settlers political federation and the national
government that with a community-built school in place, the
government would supply a teacher.

This quid pro quo has worked fairly well. An adequate
school building was seen in every third nucleo (children from
lateral nucleos attend school in the central nucleo), and
attendance appeared to be high. For education beyond sixth
grade, children must be sent to boarding-school in Montero.
Because the great majority of settler families are very young,
lack of secondary schools has not yet imposed a general hard-
ship.


3. Sense of Well-Being

Interviews revealed that San Julian's settlers are gener-
ally happy and secure. The evaluation team met no one who re-
gretted the move and no one who felt "worse-off" for having
made a break with an earlier life. This is not to say that
there were no complaints. Settlers took every opportunity to
complain about road access and express frustration at their
inability to deal with it. They also complained of lack of
adequate government support for farm extension and well main-
tenance (responsibilities of INC): Interwoven in all the com-
plaints, however, was a sense of "By golly, we're going to do
something about this!" San Julian's settlers are not passive
people who submit to whatever life deals them. Rather, they
are a confident, take-charge group who feel, and indeed are, in
control of their own lives.


4. Future Expectations

Queries as to where settlers expected to be in 1 year, 5
years, and 10 years elicited interesting responses. Many had
trouble dealing with a long time horizon, but all expected to
be doing better over the next several years. Their feelings
were generally couched in terms of farm development: bringing
more hectarage and new fruit tree's into cultivation and pro-
duction, or acquiring more livestock.


-19-


This confidence in prospects for growth cannot be over-
stated. The feeling seemed to be one of inevitability--that
time and energy were sure to be rewarded. One of the settlers
captured it in a phrase when he said concerning an earlier set-
tlement effort, "I lost two years in Yapacani." Time seems to
count for something in San Julian.

No doubt ownership of 50 hectares of land, most of it not
even cleared yet, has much to do with the prevailing sense of
optimism. The evaluation team also believes, however, that
FIDES's success in selling the self-capitalization farm devel-
opment model, in which dependence upon outside influences is
minimized, has contributed greatly to settlers' feelings that
they can accomplish whatever they are willing to work for.

One cloud hanging over future expectations is the continu-
ing concern over the settlers' land ownership rights. Settlers
enjoy a "right to use" their 50-hectare parcels, but they do
not have title. This "right to use" has been considered suf-
ficient claim to enable sale of a parcel when a settler has
elected to raise money in this way. It has not prevented reoc-
cupation by another party in the event of abandonment, however;
nor have Bolivian banks felt free to claim ownership of farms
pledged as collateral for defaulted loans.

It is clear that if a farmer wishes to gain formal title
to his settlement parcel, he may do so. Some have. The prob-
lem is that the red tape and related expenses are so great that
few have felt it worth doing.

Settlers in Chane-Piray and San Julian would feel better
if they had clear titles to their settlement parcels, but the
evaluation team found no one who was "losing sleep" over the
issue.


5. Political Context

A major social change resulting from the Chane-Piray and
San Julian resettlement efforts (as well as other settlement
activities not supported by AID) is the impact on the demo-
graphy as well as the social and political life in the Santa
Cruz Department. Prior to .the advent of resettlement programs,
there were very few Kollas in the region. With the lure of
free land, there has been a major influx of Quechua- and Ay-
mara-speaking highlanders, bringing with them their traditions
of social organization, a penchant for commerce, and boundless
energy and ambition.

For the native Camba, agriculture and ranching are well-
regarded pursuits that one might follow for the pure enjoyment










-18-


2. Education

The San Julian settlers also give high priority to the
education of their children, and in this area the news is uni-
formly good. Settlers organized to construct schools at the
very outset of each nucleo's development. A deal was struck
between the settlers political federation and the national
government that with a community-built school in place, the
government would supply a teacher.

This quid pro quo has worked fairly well. An adequate
school building was seen in every third nucleo (children from
lateral nucleos attend school in the central nucleo), and
attendance appeared to be high. For education beyond sixth
grade, children must be sent to boarding-school in Montero.
Because the great majority of settler families are very young,
lack of secondary schools has not yet imposed a general hard-
ship.


3. Sense of Well-Being

Interviews revealed that San Julian's settlers are gener-
ally happy and secure. The evaluation team met no one who re-
gretted the move and no one who felt "worse-off" for having
made a break with an earlier life. This is not to say that
there were no complaints. Settlers took every opportunity to
complain about road access and express frustration at their
inability to deal with it. They also complained of lack of
adequate government support for farm extension and well main-
tenance (responsibilities of INC): Interwoven in all the com-
plaints, however, was a sense of "By golly, we're going to do
something about this!" San Julian's settlers are not passive
people who submit to whatever life deals them. Rather, they
are a confident, take-charge group who feel, and indeed are, in
control of their own lives.


4. Future Expectations

Queries as to where settlers expected to be in 1 year, 5
years, and 10 years elicited interesting responses. Many had
trouble dealing with a long time horizon, but all expected to
be doing better over the next several years. Their feelings
were generally couched in terms of farm development: bringing
more hectarage and new fruit tree's into cultivation and pro-
duction, or acquiring more livestock.


-19-


This confidence in prospects for growth cannot be over-
stated. The feeling seemed to be one of inevitability--that
time and energy were sure to be rewarded. One of the settlers
captured it in a phrase when he said concerning an earlier set-
tlement effort, "I lost two years in Yapacani." Time seems to
count for something in San Julian.

No doubt ownership of 50 hectares of land, most of it not
even cleared yet, has much to do with the prevailing sense of
optimism. The evaluation team also believes, however, that
FIDES's success in selling the self-capitalization farm devel-
opment model, in which dependence upon outside influences is
minimized, has contributed greatly to settlers' feelings that
they can accomplish whatever they are willing to work for.

One cloud hanging over future expectations is the continu-
ing concern over the settlers' land ownership rights. Settlers
enjoy a "right to use" their 50-hectare parcels, but they do
not have title. This "right to use" has been considered suf-
ficient claim to enable sale of a parcel when a settler has
elected to raise money in this way. It has not prevented reoc-
cupation by another party in the event of abandonment, however;
nor have Bolivian banks felt free to claim ownership of farms
pledged as collateral for defaulted loans.

It is clear that if a farmer wishes to gain formal title
to his settlement parcel, he may do so. Some have. The prob-
lem is that the red tape and related expenses are so great that
few have felt it worth doing.

Settlers in Chane-Piray and San Julian would feel better
if they had clear titles to their settlement parcels, but the
evaluation team found no one who was "losing sleep" over the
issue.


5. Political Context

A major social change resulting from the Chane-Piray and
San Julian resettlement efforts (as well as other settlement
activities not supported by AID) is the impact on the demo-
graphy as well as the social and political life in the Santa
Cruz Department. Prior to .the advent of resettlement programs,
there were very few Kollas in the region. With the lure of
free land, there has been a major influx of Quechua- and Ay-
mara-speaking highlanders, bringing with them their traditions
of social organization, a penchant for commerce, and boundless
energy and ambition.

For the native Camba, agriculture and ranching are well-
regarded pursuits that one might follow for the pure enjoyment










-18-


2. Education

The San Julian settlers also give high priority to the
education of their children, and in this area the news is uni-
formly good. Settlers organized to construct schools at the
very outset of each nucleo's development. A deal was struck
between the settlers political federation and the national
government that with a community-built school in place, the
government would supply a teacher.

This quid pro quo has worked fairly well. An adequate
school building was seen in every third nucleo (children from
lateral nucleos attend school in the central nucleo), and
attendance appeared to be high. For education beyond sixth
grade, children must be sent to boarding-school in Montero.
Because the great majority of settler families are very young,
lack of secondary schools has not yet imposed a general hard-
ship.


3. Sense of Well-Being

Interviews revealed that San Julian's settlers are gener-
ally happy and secure. The evaluation team met no one who re-
gretted the move and no one who felt "worse-off" for having
made a break with an earlier life. This is not to say that
there were no complaints. Settlers took every opportunity to
complain about road access and express frustration at their
inability to deal with it. They also complained of lack of
adequate government support for farm extension and well main-
tenance (responsibilities of INC): Interwoven in all the com-
plaints, however, was a sense of "By golly, we're going to do
something about this!" San Julian's settlers are not passive
people who submit to whatever life deals them. Rather, they
are a confident, take-charge group who feel, and indeed are, in
control of their own lives.


4. Future Expectations

Queries as to where settlers expected to be in 1 year, 5
years, and 10 years elicited interesting responses. Many had
trouble dealing with a long time horizon, but all expected to
be doing better over the next several years. Their feelings
were generally couched in terms of farm development: bringing
more hectarage and new fruit tree's into cultivation and pro-
duction, or acquiring more livestock.


-19-


This confidence in prospects for growth cannot be over-
stated. The feeling seemed to be one of inevitability--that
time and energy were sure to be rewarded. One of the settlers
captured it in a phrase when he said concerning an earlier set-
tlement effort, "I lost two years in Yapacani." Time seems to
count for something in San Julian.

No doubt ownership of 50 hectares of land, most of it not
even cleared yet, has much to do with the prevailing sense of
optimism. The evaluation team also believes, however, that
FIDES's success in selling the self-capitalization farm devel-
opment model, in which dependence upon outside influences is
minimized, has contributed greatly to settlers' feelings that
they can accomplish whatever they are willing to work for.

One cloud hanging over future expectations is the continu-
ing concern over the settlers' land ownership rights. Settlers
enjoy a "right to use" their 50-hectare parcels, but they do
not have title. This "right to use" has been considered suf-
ficient claim to enable sale of a parcel when a settler has
elected to raise money in this way. It has not prevented reoc-
cupation by another party in the event of abandonment, however;
nor have Bolivian banks felt free to claim ownership of farms
pledged as collateral for defaulted loans.

It is clear that if a farmer wishes to gain formal title
to his settlement parcel, he may do so. Some have. The prob-
lem is that the red tape and related expenses are so great that
few have felt it worth doing.

Settlers in Chane-Piray and San Julian would feel better
if they had clear titles to their settlement parcels, but the
evaluation team found no one who was "losing sleep" over the
issue.


5. Political Context

A major social change resulting from the Chane-Piray and
San Julian resettlement efforts (as well as other settlement
activities not supported by AID) is the impact on the demo-
graphy as well as the social and political life in the Santa
Cruz Department. Prior to .the advent of resettlement programs,
there were very few Kollas in the region. With the lure of
free land, there has been a major influx of Quechua- and Ay-
mara-speaking highlanders, bringing with them their traditions
of social organization, a penchant for commerce, and boundless
energy and ambition.

For the native Camba, agriculture and ranching are well-
regarded pursuits that one might follow for the pure enjoyment









-20-


of them. They know how to enjoy rural life, and self-reliance
and individuality are dominant traits.

The new migrants, the Kollas, have a different perspec-
tive. Businessmen at heart, they often view farming as an en-
terprise like any other. Everything else being equal, many
would choose to engage in commerce. Often, where farming is
elected, it is only because of the opportunity for free land.

So far, the Camba power structure is intact in the Santa
Cruz Department. The influx of highlanders is viewed with un-
ease, but no direct threat is yet felt. The gradual reconcili-
ation of these two distinct racial and cultural groups could
well have a major impact on the political and social destiny of
all Bolivia.


C. Environmental Impacts


The ecological disruption caused by converting virgin
hardwood forest to farmland and settler communities is substan-
tial. It greatly increases the likelihood of water-related
soil erosion and depletion of nutrients essential for plant
growth. It affects wildlife as their natural habitat is de-
stroyed. By definition, land clearing eliminates the hardwood
forest--a resource that is incompatible with cultivated crops.

A basic premise in both AID projects was that such ecolog-
ical disruption is justifiable if the end result is development
of a viable agricultural base that will enable Bolivian farmers
to earn a better living while helping the nation to feed it-
self. It is toward this objective that agricultural advice has
been directed.

Based upon experience to date, it appears that the objec-
tive of establishing permanent farms is viable. Problems with
water-related soil erosion have not been severe because the
terrain is level and, thus far, plots have been small. Deple-
tion of soil nutrients is combatted through rotating fields
over a 10- to 20-year cycle where permanent slash and burn ag-
riculture is practiced, and rotating over a several-year cycle
where appropriate forage crops are identified. The impact on
wildlife is still of little concern because (1) little food was
being garnered there anyway, and (2) the overall stock of vir-
gin forest in Bolivia is enormous, so there is alternative hab-
itat for displaced animals.


IV. LESSONS LEARNED

AID's two IRD projects in the Chane-Piray and San Julian
settlement areas provide numerous valuable development in-
sights. The opportunity project technicians had to learn from
experiences in the older Chane-Piray settlement area and there-
by make adjustments in the inputs and strategies implemented in
San Julian was helpful. The presence of many of the same proj-
ect advisors (FIDES staff) during the life of both projects and
for many years previously also contributes to the importance of
the project as a laboratory for learning.

Because both the 1974 and 1979 projects were billed as
integrated rural development programs, most of the lessons
learned carry an IRD focus. Both projects were also resettle-
ment programs, however, so lessons that are unique to the re-
settlement experience are discussed separately.

A. Lessons for Integrated Rural Development


1. Continuity of Commitment

Long-term continuity of program activities, personnel, and
implementing agencies is critical to the effectiveness of IRD
programs. Only with a long-term organizational commitment can
lasting social and economic impacts be reasonably expected.


2. Program Adaptability

The ability to adapt individual elements of an IRD program
is critical to long-term success. Because IRD tends to be com-
prehensive in scope, it is almost certain that changes affect-
ing individual program elements will occur. Demographic, so-
cial, economic, political, and environmental developments can
have a major effect on the needs of program participants and
their ability to function successfully. The implementing agent
in an IRD program must have the capacity to assess these
changes and their probable impacts and to adjust activities and
emphases accordingly.

3. Motivation


Motivation in IRD projects must be directed toward success
with overall program objectives, not with individual program


-21-









-20-


of them. They know how to enjoy rural life, and self-reliance
and individuality are dominant traits.

The new migrants, the Kollas, have a different perspec-
tive. Businessmen at heart, they often view farming as an en-
terprise like any other. Everything else being equal, many
would choose to engage in commerce. Often, where farming is
elected, it is only because of the opportunity for free land.

So far, the Camba power structure is intact in the Santa
Cruz Department. The influx of highlanders is viewed with un-
ease, but no direct threat is yet felt. The gradual reconcili-
ation of these two distinct racial and cultural groups could
well have a major impact on the political and social destiny of
all Bolivia.


C. Environmental Impacts


The ecological disruption caused by converting virgin
hardwood forest to farmland and settler communities is substan-
tial. It greatly increases the likelihood of water-related
soil erosion and depletion of nutrients essential for plant
growth. It affects wildlife as their natural habitat is de-
stroyed. By definition, land clearing eliminates the hardwood
forest--a resource that is incompatible with cultivated crops.

A basic premise in both AID projects was that such ecolog-
ical disruption is justifiable if the end result is development
of a viable agricultural base that will enable Bolivian farmers
to earn a better living while helping the nation to feed it-
self. It is toward this objective that agricultural advice has
been directed.

Based upon experience to date, it appears that the objec-
tive of establishing permanent farms is viable. Problems with
water-related soil erosion have not been severe because the
terrain is level and, thus far, plots have been small. Deple-
tion of soil nutrients is combatted through rotating fields
over a 10- to 20-year cycle where permanent slash and burn ag-
riculture is practiced, and rotating over a several-year cycle
where appropriate forage crops are identified. The impact on
wildlife is still of little concern because (1) little food was
being garnered there anyway, and (2) the overall stock of vir-
gin forest in Bolivia is enormous, so there is alternative hab-
itat for displaced animals.


IV. LESSONS LEARNED

AID's two IRD projects in the Chane-Piray and San Julian
settlement areas provide numerous valuable development in-
sights. The opportunity project technicians had to learn from
experiences in the older Chane-Piray settlement area and there-
by make adjustments in the inputs and strategies implemented in
San Julian was helpful. The presence of many of the same proj-
ect advisors (FIDES staff) during the life of both projects and
for many years previously also contributes to the importance of
the project as a laboratory for learning.

Because both the 1974 and 1979 projects were billed as
integrated rural development programs, most of the lessons
learned carry an IRD focus. Both projects were also resettle-
ment programs, however, so lessons that are unique to the re-
settlement experience are discussed separately.

A. Lessons for Integrated Rural Development


1. Continuity of Commitment

Long-term continuity of program activities, personnel, and
implementing agencies is critical to the effectiveness of IRD
programs. Only with a long-term organizational commitment can
lasting social and economic impacts be reasonably expected.


2. Program Adaptability

The ability to adapt individual elements of an IRD program
is critical to long-term success. Because IRD tends to be com-
prehensive in scope, it is almost certain that changes affect-
ing individual program elements will occur. Demographic, so-
cial, economic, political, and environmental developments can
have a major effect on the needs of program participants and
their ability to function successfully. The implementing agent
in an IRD program must have the capacity to assess these
changes and their probable impacts and to adjust activities and
emphases accordingly.

3. Motivation


Motivation in IRD projects must be directed toward success
with overall program objectives, not with individual program


-21-









-20-


of them. They know how to enjoy rural life, and self-reliance
and individuality are dominant traits.

The new migrants, the Kollas, have a different perspec-
tive. Businessmen at heart, they often view farming as an en-
terprise like any other. Everything else being equal, many
would choose to engage in commerce. Often, where farming is
elected, it is only because of the opportunity for free land.

So far, the Camba power structure is intact in the Santa
Cruz Department. The influx of highlanders is viewed with un-
ease, but no direct threat is yet felt. The gradual reconcili-
ation of these two distinct racial and cultural groups could
well have a major impact on the political and social destiny of
all Bolivia.


C. Environmental Impacts


The ecological disruption caused by converting virgin
hardwood forest to farmland and settler communities is substan-
tial. It greatly increases the likelihood of water-related
soil erosion and depletion of nutrients essential for plant
growth. It affects wildlife as their natural habitat is de-
stroyed. By definition, land clearing eliminates the hardwood
forest--a resource that is incompatible with cultivated crops.

A basic premise in both AID projects was that such ecolog-
ical disruption is justifiable if the end result is development
of a viable agricultural base that will enable Bolivian farmers
to earn a better living while helping the nation to feed it-
self. It is toward this objective that agricultural advice has
been directed.

Based upon experience to date, it appears that the objec-
tive of establishing permanent farms is viable. Problems with
water-related soil erosion have not been severe because the
terrain is level and, thus far, plots have been small. Deple-
tion of soil nutrients is combatted through rotating fields
over a 10- to 20-year cycle where permanent slash and burn ag-
riculture is practiced, and rotating over a several-year cycle
where appropriate forage crops are identified. The impact on
wildlife is still of little concern because (1) little food was
being garnered there anyway, and (2) the overall stock of vir-
gin forest in Bolivia is enormous, so there is alternative hab-
itat for displaced animals.


IV. LESSONS LEARNED

AID's two IRD projects in the Chane-Piray and San Julian
settlement areas provide numerous valuable development in-
sights. The opportunity project technicians had to learn from
experiences in the older Chane-Piray settlement area and there-
by make adjustments in the inputs and strategies implemented in
San Julian was helpful. The presence of many of the same proj-
ect advisors (FIDES staff) during the life of both projects and
for many years previously also contributes to the importance of
the project as a laboratory for learning.

Because both the 1974 and 1979 projects were billed as
integrated rural development programs, most of the lessons
learned carry an IRD focus. Both projects were also resettle-
ment programs, however, so lessons that are unique to the re-
settlement experience are discussed separately.

A. Lessons for Integrated Rural Development


1. Continuity of Commitment

Long-term continuity of program activities, personnel, and
implementing agencies is critical to the effectiveness of IRD
programs. Only with a long-term organizational commitment can
lasting social and economic impacts be reasonably expected.


2. Program Adaptability

The ability to adapt individual elements of an IRD program
is critical to long-term success. Because IRD tends to be com-
prehensive in scope, it is almost certain that changes affect-
ing individual program elements will occur. Demographic, so-
cial, economic, political, and environmental developments can
have a major effect on the needs of program participants and
their ability to function successfully. The implementing agent
in an IRD program must have the capacity to assess these
changes and their probable impacts and to adjust activities and
emphases accordingly.

3. Motivation


Motivation in IRD projects must be directed toward success
with overall program objectives, not with individual program


-21-









-20-


of them. They know how to enjoy rural life, and self-reliance
and individuality are dominant traits.

The new migrants, the Kollas, have a different perspec-
tive. Businessmen at heart, they often view farming as an en-
terprise like any other. Everything else being equal, many
would choose to engage in commerce. Often, where farming is
elected, it is only because of the opportunity for free land.

So far, the Camba power structure is intact in the Santa
Cruz Department. The influx of highlanders is viewed with un-
ease, but no direct threat is yet felt. The gradual reconcili-
ation of these two distinct racial and cultural groups could
well have a major impact on the political and social destiny of
all Bolivia.


C. Environmental Impacts


The ecological disruption caused by converting virgin
hardwood forest to farmland and settler communities is substan-
tial. It greatly increases the likelihood of water-related
soil erosion and depletion of nutrients essential for plant
growth. It affects wildlife as their natural habitat is de-
stroyed. By definition, land clearing eliminates the hardwood
forest--a resource that is incompatible with cultivated crops.

A basic premise in both AID projects was that such ecolog-
ical disruption is justifiable if the end result is development
of a viable agricultural base that will enable Bolivian farmers
to earn a better living while helping the nation to feed it-
self. It is toward this objective that agricultural advice has
been directed.

Based upon experience to date, it appears that the objec-
tive of establishing permanent farms is viable. Problems with
water-related soil erosion have not been severe because the
terrain is level and, thus far, plots have been small. Deple-
tion of soil nutrients is combatted through rotating fields
over a 10- to 20-year cycle where permanent slash and burn ag-
riculture is practiced, and rotating over a several-year cycle
where appropriate forage crops are identified. The impact on
wildlife is still of little concern because (1) little food was
being garnered there anyway, and (2) the overall stock of vir-
gin forest in Bolivia is enormous, so there is alternative hab-
itat for displaced animals.


IV. LESSONS LEARNED

AID's two IRD projects in the Chane-Piray and San Julian
settlement areas provide numerous valuable development in-
sights. The opportunity project technicians had to learn from
experiences in the older Chane-Piray settlement area and there-
by make adjustments in the inputs and strategies implemented in
San Julian was helpful. The presence of many of the same proj-
ect advisors (FIDES staff) during the life of both projects and
for many years previously also contributes to the importance of
the project as a laboratory for learning.

Because both the 1974 and 1979 projects were billed as
integrated rural development programs, most of the lessons
learned carry an IRD focus. Both projects were also resettle-
ment programs, however, so lessons that are unique to the re-
settlement experience are discussed separately.

A. Lessons for Integrated Rural Development


1. Continuity of Commitment

Long-term continuity of program activities, personnel, and
implementing agencies is critical to the effectiveness of IRD
programs. Only with a long-term organizational commitment can
lasting social and economic impacts be reasonably expected.


2. Program Adaptability

The ability to adapt individual elements of an IRD program
is critical to long-term success. Because IRD tends to be com-
prehensive in scope, it is almost certain that changes affect-
ing individual program elements will occur. Demographic, so-
cial, economic, political, and environmental developments can
have a major effect on the needs of program participants and
their ability to function successfully. The implementing agent
in an IRD program must have the capacity to assess these
changes and their probable impacts and to adjust activities and
emphases accordingly.

3. Motivation


Motivation in IRD projects must be directed toward success
with overall program objectives, not with individual program


-21-









-20-


of them. They know how to enjoy rural life, and self-reliance
and individuality are dominant traits.

The new migrants, the Kollas, have a different perspec-
tive. Businessmen at heart, they often view farming as an en-
terprise like any other. Everything else being equal, many
would choose to engage in commerce. Often, where farming is
elected, it is only because of the opportunity for free land.

So far, the Camba power structure is intact in the Santa
Cruz Department. The influx of highlanders is viewed with un-
ease, but no direct threat is yet felt. The gradual reconcili-
ation of these two distinct racial and cultural groups could
well have a major impact on the political and social destiny of
all Bolivia.


C. Environmental Impacts


The ecological disruption caused by converting virgin
hardwood forest to farmland and settler communities is substan-
tial. It greatly increases the likelihood of water-related
soil erosion and depletion of nutrients essential for plant
growth. It affects wildlife as their natural habitat is de-
stroyed. By definition, land clearing eliminates the hardwood
forest--a resource that is incompatible with cultivated crops.

A basic premise in both AID projects was that such ecolog-
ical disruption is justifiable if the end result is development
of a viable agricultural base that will enable Bolivian farmers
to earn a better living while helping the nation to feed it-
self. It is toward this objective that agricultural advice has
been directed.

Based upon experience to date, it appears that the objec-
tive of establishing permanent farms is viable. Problems with
water-related soil erosion have not been severe because the
terrain is level and, thus far, plots have been small. Deple-
tion of soil nutrients is combatted through rotating fields
over a 10- to 20-year cycle where permanent slash and burn ag-
riculture is practiced, and rotating over a several-year cycle
where appropriate forage crops are identified. The impact on
wildlife is still of little concern because (1) little food was
being garnered there anyway, and (2) the overall stock of vir-
gin forest in Bolivia is enormous, so there is alternative hab-
itat for displaced animals.


IV. LESSONS LEARNED

AID's two IRD projects in the Chane-Piray and San Julian
settlement areas provide numerous valuable development in-
sights. The opportunity project technicians had to learn from
experiences in the older Chane-Piray settlement area and there-
by make adjustments in the inputs and strategies implemented in
San Julian was helpful. The presence of many of the same proj-
ect advisors (FIDES staff) during the life of both projects and
for many years previously also contributes to the importance of
the project as a laboratory for learning.

Because both the 1974 and 1979 projects were billed as
integrated rural development programs, most of the lessons
learned carry an IRD focus. Both projects were also resettle-
ment programs, however, so lessons that are unique to the re-
settlement experience are discussed separately.

A. Lessons for Integrated Rural Development


1. Continuity of Commitment

Long-term continuity of program activities, personnel, and
implementing agencies is critical to the effectiveness of IRD
programs. Only with a long-term organizational commitment can
lasting social and economic impacts be reasonably expected.


2. Program Adaptability

The ability to adapt individual elements of an IRD program
is critical to long-term success. Because IRD tends to be com-
prehensive in scope, it is almost certain that changes affect-
ing individual program elements will occur. Demographic, so-
cial, economic, political, and environmental developments can
have a major effect on the needs of program participants and
their ability to function successfully. The implementing agent
in an IRD program must have the capacity to assess these
changes and their probable impacts and to adjust activities and
emphases accordingly.

3. Motivation


Motivation in IRD projects must be directed toward success
with overall program objectives, not with individual program


-21-









-20-


of them. They know how to enjoy rural life, and self-reliance
and individuality are dominant traits.

The new migrants, the Kollas, have a different perspec-
tive. Businessmen at heart, they often view farming as an en-
terprise like any other. Everything else being equal, many
would choose to engage in commerce. Often, where farming is
elected, it is only because of the opportunity for free land.

So far, the Camba power structure is intact in the Santa
Cruz Department. The influx of highlanders is viewed with un-
ease, but no direct threat is yet felt. The gradual reconcili-
ation of these two distinct racial and cultural groups could
well have a major impact on the political and social destiny of
all Bolivia.


C. Environmental Impacts


The ecological disruption caused by converting virgin
hardwood forest to farmland and settler communities is substan-
tial. It greatly increases the likelihood of water-related
soil erosion and depletion of nutrients essential for plant
growth. It affects wildlife as their natural habitat is de-
stroyed. By definition, land clearing eliminates the hardwood
forest--a resource that is incompatible with cultivated crops.

A basic premise in both AID projects was that such ecolog-
ical disruption is justifiable if the end result is development
of a viable agricultural base that will enable Bolivian farmers
to earn a better living while helping the nation to feed it-
self. It is toward this objective that agricultural advice has
been directed.

Based upon experience to date, it appears that the objec-
tive of establishing permanent farms is viable. Problems with
water-related soil erosion have not been severe because the
terrain is level and, thus far, plots have been small. Deple-
tion of soil nutrients is combatted through rotating fields
over a 10- to 20-year cycle where permanent slash and burn ag-
riculture is practiced, and rotating over a several-year cycle
where appropriate forage crops are identified. The impact on
wildlife is still of little concern because (1) little food was
being garnered there anyway, and (2) the overall stock of vir-
gin forest in Bolivia is enormous, so there is alternative hab-
itat for displaced animals.


IV. LESSONS LEARNED

AID's two IRD projects in the Chane-Piray and San Julian
settlement areas provide numerous valuable development in-
sights. The opportunity project technicians had to learn from
experiences in the older Chane-Piray settlement area and there-
by make adjustments in the inputs and strategies implemented in
San Julian was helpful. The presence of many of the same proj-
ect advisors (FIDES staff) during the life of both projects and
for many years previously also contributes to the importance of
the project as a laboratory for learning.

Because both the 1974 and 1979 projects were billed as
integrated rural development programs, most of the lessons
learned carry an IRD focus. Both projects were also resettle-
ment programs, however, so lessons that are unique to the re-
settlement experience are discussed separately.

A. Lessons for Integrated Rural Development


1. Continuity of Commitment

Long-term continuity of program activities, personnel, and
implementing agencies is critical to the effectiveness of IRD
programs. Only with a long-term organizational commitment can
lasting social and economic impacts be reasonably expected.


2. Program Adaptability

The ability to adapt individual elements of an IRD program
is critical to long-term success. Because IRD tends to be com-
prehensive in scope, it is almost certain that changes affect-
ing individual program elements will occur. Demographic, so-
cial, economic, political, and environmental developments can
have a major effect on the needs of program participants and
their ability to function successfully. The implementing agent
in an IRD program must have the capacity to assess these
changes and their probable impacts and to adjust activities and
emphases accordingly.

3. Motivation


Motivation in IRD projects must be directed toward success
with overall program objectives, not with individual program


-21-








-22-


elements. Over time some activities may diminish in importance
while others increase. IRD implementers must be willing to
recognize this and adjust accordingly.


4. Close Program Monitoring

IRD is a dynamic process in which linkages between outputs
and purposes are subject to change. Close program monitoring
is required so that quick identification of changing benefici-
ary needs and appropriate suggestions for input/output adjust-
ments can be made.


5. Participation


The best IRD program is "of, by, and for" the beneficiary
population. By involving them from inception to close, imple-
menting agencies can ensure the high level of communication
essential to program responsiveness and applicability.


6. Comprehensiveness of Scope

IRD implementers must share the broad perspective of the
beneficiary population. They must identify all elements neces-
sary to goal achievement, invest the bulk of funds in priority
areas, then stand ready to assist in resolution of other con-
straints wherever possible.


7. Proximity

Proximity of implementing agency personnel to program
beneficiaries greatly facilitates IRD by improving two-way dia-
logue. The best way to appreciate a farmer's problems is to
spend time with him on the farm.

8. Self-Help


Long-term success of an IRD program is contingent upon the
ability of beneficiaries to eventually stand on their own feet.
This suggests development of support systems (e.g., extension,
credit, and training systems) which are no more elaborate or
expensive than necessary, and which are largely under the con-
trol of the beneficiaries themselves.


-23-


9. Self-Capitalization


Rapid farm capitalization through the use of subsidized
credit may lead to rapid production gains, but it is likely to
be uneconomic (from the perspective of national resource allo-
cation) and risky (from the perspective of long-run farm via-
bility). If development of a viable farm economy is a program
aim, then a farm growth model that operates within normal eco-
nomic constraints is preferable.


10. Flexibility of Implementing Organizations

Institutions charged with implementing IRD should have the
ability to adapt strategies and resource allocations to suit
changing circumstances. Decentralized decision-making and the
ability to respond to feedback from field personnel are posi-
tive attributes. Front-office orientation and institutional
rigidity are detrimental to IRD.

B. Resettlement Lessons

1. Assessment of Resource Potential

Assessment for new-lands settlement should go beyond quick
resource reconnaissance and identification of sites for roads,
wells, and communities. Where possible it should also include
experimental farming so that a preview of environmental re-
sponse can be seen. Lack of foreknowledge concerning farming
systems can prove very expensive.

2. Settlement Mode (spontaneous vs. directed)


In Chane-Piray and San Julian, experience was gained with
a wide range of settlement modes. The purely spontaneous
settlements in which settlers moved in with no support were
cheapest in terms of dollar cost per family, but devastatingly
expensive in terms of failure rate. The highly directed set-
tlement efforts, in which settlers were "sold" on migration and
given generous support including resettlement allowances, were
expensive and likewise suffered high failure rates. Motivation
seemed to be lacking. The most success was obtained through a
combination of self-selection and provision of essential sup-
port services (e.g., water and roads). Both the human and re-
source elements must be present for resettlement to work.








-22-


elements. Over time some activities may diminish in importance
while others increase. IRD implementers must be willing to
recognize this and adjust accordingly.


4. Close Program Monitoring

IRD is a dynamic process in which linkages between outputs
and purposes are subject to change. Close program monitoring
is required so that quick identification of changing benefici-
ary needs and appropriate suggestions for input/output adjust-
ments can be made.


5. Participation


The best IRD program is "of, by, and for" the beneficiary
population. By involving them from inception to close, imple-
menting agencies can ensure the high level of communication
essential to program responsiveness and applicability.


6. Comprehensiveness of Scope

IRD implementers must share the broad perspective of the
beneficiary population. They must identify all elements neces-
sary to goal achievement, invest the bulk of funds in priority
areas, then stand ready to assist in resolution of other con-
straints wherever possible.


7. Proximity

Proximity of implementing agency personnel to program
beneficiaries greatly facilitates IRD by improving two-way dia-
logue. The best way to appreciate a farmer's problems is to
spend time with him on the farm.

8. Self-Help


Long-term success of an IRD program is contingent upon the
ability of beneficiaries to eventually stand on their own feet.
This suggests development of support systems (e.g., extension,
credit, and training systems) which are no more elaborate or
expensive than necessary, and which are largely under the con-
trol of the beneficiaries themselves.


-23-


9. Self-Capitalization


Rapid farm capitalization through the use of subsidized
credit may lead to rapid production gains, but it is likely to
be uneconomic (from the perspective of national resource allo-
cation) and risky (from the perspective of long-run farm via-
bility). If development of a viable farm economy is a program
aim, then a farm growth model that operates within normal eco-
nomic constraints is preferable.


10. Flexibility of Implementing Organizations

Institutions charged with implementing IRD should have the
ability to adapt strategies and resource allocations to suit
changing circumstances. Decentralized decision-making and the
ability to respond to feedback from field personnel are posi-
tive attributes. Front-office orientation and institutional
rigidity are detrimental to IRD.

B. Resettlement Lessons

1. Assessment of Resource Potential

Assessment for new-lands settlement should go beyond quick
resource reconnaissance and identification of sites for roads,
wells, and communities. Where possible it should also include
experimental farming so that a preview of environmental re-
sponse can be seen. Lack of foreknowledge concerning farming
systems can prove very expensive.

2. Settlement Mode (spontaneous vs. directed)


In Chane-Piray and San Julian, experience was gained with
a wide range of settlement modes. The purely spontaneous
settlements in which settlers moved in with no support were
cheapest in terms of dollar cost per family, but devastatingly
expensive in terms of failure rate. The highly directed set-
tlement efforts, in which settlers were "sold" on migration and
given generous support including resettlement allowances, were
expensive and likewise suffered high failure rates. Motivation
seemed to be lacking. The most success was obtained through a
combination of self-selection and provision of essential sup-
port services (e.g., water and roads). Both the human and re-
source elements must be present for resettlement to work.








-22-


elements. Over time some activities may diminish in importance
while others increase. IRD implementers must be willing to
recognize this and adjust accordingly.


4. Close Program Monitoring

IRD is a dynamic process in which linkages between outputs
and purposes are subject to change. Close program monitoring
is required so that quick identification of changing benefici-
ary needs and appropriate suggestions for input/output adjust-
ments can be made.


5. Participation


The best IRD program is "of, by, and for" the beneficiary
population. By involving them from inception to close, imple-
menting agencies can ensure the high level of communication
essential to program responsiveness and applicability.


6. Comprehensiveness of Scope

IRD implementers must share the broad perspective of the
beneficiary population. They must identify all elements neces-
sary to goal achievement, invest the bulk of funds in priority
areas, then stand ready to assist in resolution of other con-
straints wherever possible.


7. Proximity

Proximity of implementing agency personnel to program
beneficiaries greatly facilitates IRD by improving two-way dia-
logue. The best way to appreciate a farmer's problems is to
spend time with him on the farm.

8. Self-Help


Long-term success of an IRD program is contingent upon the
ability of beneficiaries to eventually stand on their own feet.
This suggests development of support systems (e.g., extension,
credit, and training systems) which are no more elaborate or
expensive than necessary, and which are largely under the con-
trol of the beneficiaries themselves.


-23-


9. Self-Capitalization


Rapid farm capitalization through the use of subsidized
credit may lead to rapid production gains, but it is likely to
be uneconomic (from the perspective of national resource allo-
cation) and risky (from the perspective of long-run farm via-
bility). If development of a viable farm economy is a program
aim, then a farm growth model that operates within normal eco-
nomic constraints is preferable.


10. Flexibility of Implementing Organizations

Institutions charged with implementing IRD should have the
ability to adapt strategies and resource allocations to suit
changing circumstances. Decentralized decision-making and the
ability to respond to feedback from field personnel are posi-
tive attributes. Front-office orientation and institutional
rigidity are detrimental to IRD.

B. Resettlement Lessons

1. Assessment of Resource Potential

Assessment for new-lands settlement should go beyond quick
resource reconnaissance and identification of sites for roads,
wells, and communities. Where possible it should also include
experimental farming so that a preview of environmental re-
sponse can be seen. Lack of foreknowledge concerning farming
systems can prove very expensive.

2. Settlement Mode (spontaneous vs. directed)


In Chane-Piray and San Julian, experience was gained with
a wide range of settlement modes. The purely spontaneous
settlements in which settlers moved in with no support were
cheapest in terms of dollar cost per family, but devastatingly
expensive in terms of failure rate. The highly directed set-
tlement efforts, in which settlers were "sold" on migration and
given generous support including resettlement allowances, were
expensive and likewise suffered high failure rates. Motivation
seemed to be lacking. The most success was obtained through a
combination of self-selection and provision of essential sup-
port services (e.g., water and roads). Both the human and re-
source elements must be present for resettlement to work.








-22-


elements. Over time some activities may diminish in importance
while others increase. IRD implementers must be willing to
recognize this and adjust accordingly.


4. Close Program Monitoring

IRD is a dynamic process in which linkages between outputs
and purposes are subject to change. Close program monitoring
is required so that quick identification of changing benefici-
ary needs and appropriate suggestions for input/output adjust-
ments can be made.


5. Participation


The best IRD program is "of, by, and for" the beneficiary
population. By involving them from inception to close, imple-
menting agencies can ensure the high level of communication
essential to program responsiveness and applicability.


6. Comprehensiveness of Scope

IRD implementers must share the broad perspective of the
beneficiary population. They must identify all elements neces-
sary to goal achievement, invest the bulk of funds in priority
areas, then stand ready to assist in resolution of other con-
straints wherever possible.


7. Proximity

Proximity of implementing agency personnel to program
beneficiaries greatly facilitates IRD by improving two-way dia-
logue. The best way to appreciate a farmer's problems is to
spend time with him on the farm.

8. Self-Help


Long-term success of an IRD program is contingent upon the
ability of beneficiaries to eventually stand on their own feet.
This suggests development of support systems (e.g., extension,
credit, and training systems) which are no more elaborate or
expensive than necessary, and which are largely under the con-
trol of the beneficiaries themselves.


-23-


9. Self-Capitalization


Rapid farm capitalization through the use of subsidized
credit may lead to rapid production gains, but it is likely to
be uneconomic (from the perspective of national resource allo-
cation) and risky (from the perspective of long-run farm via-
bility). If development of a viable farm economy is a program
aim, then a farm growth model that operates within normal eco-
nomic constraints is preferable.


10. Flexibility of Implementing Organizations

Institutions charged with implementing IRD should have the
ability to adapt strategies and resource allocations to suit
changing circumstances. Decentralized decision-making and the
ability to respond to feedback from field personnel are posi-
tive attributes. Front-office orientation and institutional
rigidity are detrimental to IRD.

B. Resettlement Lessons

1. Assessment of Resource Potential

Assessment for new-lands settlement should go beyond quick
resource reconnaissance and identification of sites for roads,
wells, and communities. Where possible it should also include
experimental farming so that a preview of environmental re-
sponse can be seen. Lack of foreknowledge concerning farming
systems can prove very expensive.

2. Settlement Mode (spontaneous vs. directed)


In Chane-Piray and San Julian, experience was gained with
a wide range of settlement modes. The purely spontaneous
settlements in which settlers moved in with no support were
cheapest in terms of dollar cost per family, but devastatingly
expensive in terms of failure rate. The highly directed set-
tlement efforts, in which settlers were "sold" on migration and
given generous support including resettlement allowances, were
expensive and likewise suffered high failure rates. Motivation
seemed to be lacking. The most success was obtained through a
combination of self-selection and provision of essential sup-
port services (e.g., water and roads). Both the human and re-
source elements must be present for resettlement to work.








-22-


elements. Over time some activities may diminish in importance
while others increase. IRD implementers must be willing to
recognize this and adjust accordingly.


4. Close Program Monitoring

IRD is a dynamic process in which linkages between outputs
and purposes are subject to change. Close program monitoring
is required so that quick identification of changing benefici-
ary needs and appropriate suggestions for input/output adjust-
ments can be made.


5. Participation


The best IRD program is "of, by, and for" the beneficiary
population. By involving them from inception to close, imple-
menting agencies can ensure the high level of communication
essential to program responsiveness and applicability.


6. Comprehensiveness of Scope

IRD implementers must share the broad perspective of the
beneficiary population. They must identify all elements neces-
sary to goal achievement, invest the bulk of funds in priority
areas, then stand ready to assist in resolution of other con-
straints wherever possible.


7. Proximity

Proximity of implementing agency personnel to program
beneficiaries greatly facilitates IRD by improving two-way dia-
logue. The best way to appreciate a farmer's problems is to
spend time with him on the farm.

8. Self-Help


Long-term success of an IRD program is contingent upon the
ability of beneficiaries to eventually stand on their own feet.
This suggests development of support systems (e.g., extension,
credit, and training systems) which are no more elaborate or
expensive than necessary, and which are largely under the con-
trol of the beneficiaries themselves.


-23-


9. Self-Capitalization


Rapid farm capitalization through the use of subsidized
credit may lead to rapid production gains, but it is likely to
be uneconomic (from the perspective of national resource allo-
cation) and risky (from the perspective of long-run farm via-
bility). If development of a viable farm economy is a program
aim, then a farm growth model that operates within normal eco-
nomic constraints is preferable.


10. Flexibility of Implementing Organizations

Institutions charged with implementing IRD should have the
ability to adapt strategies and resource allocations to suit
changing circumstances. Decentralized decision-making and the
ability to respond to feedback from field personnel are posi-
tive attributes. Front-office orientation and institutional
rigidity are detrimental to IRD.

B. Resettlement Lessons

1. Assessment of Resource Potential

Assessment for new-lands settlement should go beyond quick
resource reconnaissance and identification of sites for roads,
wells, and communities. Where possible it should also include
experimental farming so that a preview of environmental re-
sponse can be seen. Lack of foreknowledge concerning farming
systems can prove very expensive.

2. Settlement Mode (spontaneous vs. directed)


In Chane-Piray and San Julian, experience was gained with
a wide range of settlement modes. The purely spontaneous
settlements in which settlers moved in with no support were
cheapest in terms of dollar cost per family, but devastatingly
expensive in terms of failure rate. The highly directed set-
tlement efforts, in which settlers were "sold" on migration and
given generous support including resettlement allowances, were
expensive and likewise suffered high failure rates. Motivation
seemed to be lacking. The most success was obtained through a
combination of self-selection and provision of essential sup-
port services (e.g., water and roads). Both the human and re-
source elements must be present for resettlement to work.








-22-


elements. Over time some activities may diminish in importance
while others increase. IRD implementers must be willing to
recognize this and adjust accordingly.


4. Close Program Monitoring

IRD is a dynamic process in which linkages between outputs
and purposes are subject to change. Close program monitoring
is required so that quick identification of changing benefici-
ary needs and appropriate suggestions for input/output adjust-
ments can be made.


5. Participation


The best IRD program is "of, by, and for" the beneficiary
population. By involving them from inception to close, imple-
menting agencies can ensure the high level of communication
essential to program responsiveness and applicability.


6. Comprehensiveness of Scope

IRD implementers must share the broad perspective of the
beneficiary population. They must identify all elements neces-
sary to goal achievement, invest the bulk of funds in priority
areas, then stand ready to assist in resolution of other con-
straints wherever possible.


7. Proximity

Proximity of implementing agency personnel to program
beneficiaries greatly facilitates IRD by improving two-way dia-
logue. The best way to appreciate a farmer's problems is to
spend time with him on the farm.

8. Self-Help


Long-term success of an IRD program is contingent upon the
ability of beneficiaries to eventually stand on their own feet.
This suggests development of support systems (e.g., extension,
credit, and training systems) which are no more elaborate or
expensive than necessary, and which are largely under the con-
trol of the beneficiaries themselves.


-23-


9. Self-Capitalization


Rapid farm capitalization through the use of subsidized
credit may lead to rapid production gains, but it is likely to
be uneconomic (from the perspective of national resource allo-
cation) and risky (from the perspective of long-run farm via-
bility). If development of a viable farm economy is a program
aim, then a farm growth model that operates within normal eco-
nomic constraints is preferable.


10. Flexibility of Implementing Organizations

Institutions charged with implementing IRD should have the
ability to adapt strategies and resource allocations to suit
changing circumstances. Decentralized decision-making and the
ability to respond to feedback from field personnel are posi-
tive attributes. Front-office orientation and institutional
rigidity are detrimental to IRD.

B. Resettlement Lessons

1. Assessment of Resource Potential

Assessment for new-lands settlement should go beyond quick
resource reconnaissance and identification of sites for roads,
wells, and communities. Where possible it should also include
experimental farming so that a preview of environmental re-
sponse can be seen. Lack of foreknowledge concerning farming
systems can prove very expensive.

2. Settlement Mode (spontaneous vs. directed)


In Chane-Piray and San Julian, experience was gained with
a wide range of settlement modes. The purely spontaneous
settlements in which settlers moved in with no support were
cheapest in terms of dollar cost per family, but devastatingly
expensive in terms of failure rate. The highly directed set-
tlement efforts, in which settlers were "sold" on migration and
given generous support including resettlement allowances, were
expensive and likewise suffered high failure rates. Motivation
seemed to be lacking. The most success was obtained through a
combination of self-selection and provision of essential sup-
port services (e.g., water and roads). Both the human and re-
source elements must be present for resettlement to work.








-22-


elements. Over time some activities may diminish in importance
while others increase. IRD implementers must be willing to
recognize this and adjust accordingly.


4. Close Program Monitoring

IRD is a dynamic process in which linkages between outputs
and purposes are subject to change. Close program monitoring
is required so that quick identification of changing benefici-
ary needs and appropriate suggestions for input/output adjust-
ments can be made.


5. Participation


The best IRD program is "of, by, and for" the beneficiary
population. By involving them from inception to close, imple-
menting agencies can ensure the high level of communication
essential to program responsiveness and applicability.


6. Comprehensiveness of Scope

IRD implementers must share the broad perspective of the
beneficiary population. They must identify all elements neces-
sary to goal achievement, invest the bulk of funds in priority
areas, then stand ready to assist in resolution of other con-
straints wherever possible.


7. Proximity

Proximity of implementing agency personnel to program
beneficiaries greatly facilitates IRD by improving two-way dia-
logue. The best way to appreciate a farmer's problems is to
spend time with him on the farm.

8. Self-Help


Long-term success of an IRD program is contingent upon the
ability of beneficiaries to eventually stand on their own feet.
This suggests development of support systems (e.g., extension,
credit, and training systems) which are no more elaborate or
expensive than necessary, and which are largely under the con-
trol of the beneficiaries themselves.


-23-


9. Self-Capitalization


Rapid farm capitalization through the use of subsidized
credit may lead to rapid production gains, but it is likely to
be uneconomic (from the perspective of national resource allo-
cation) and risky (from the perspective of long-run farm via-
bility). If development of a viable farm economy is a program
aim, then a farm growth model that operates within normal eco-
nomic constraints is preferable.


10. Flexibility of Implementing Organizations

Institutions charged with implementing IRD should have the
ability to adapt strategies and resource allocations to suit
changing circumstances. Decentralized decision-making and the
ability to respond to feedback from field personnel are posi-
tive attributes. Front-office orientation and institutional
rigidity are detrimental to IRD.

B. Resettlement Lessons

1. Assessment of Resource Potential

Assessment for new-lands settlement should go beyond quick
resource reconnaissance and identification of sites for roads,
wells, and communities. Where possible it should also include
experimental farming so that a preview of environmental re-
sponse can be seen. Lack of foreknowledge concerning farming
systems can prove very expensive.

2. Settlement Mode (spontaneous vs. directed)


In Chane-Piray and San Julian, experience was gained with
a wide range of settlement modes. The purely spontaneous
settlements in which settlers moved in with no support were
cheapest in terms of dollar cost per family, but devastatingly
expensive in terms of failure rate. The highly directed set-
tlement efforts, in which settlers were "sold" on migration and
given generous support including resettlement allowances, were
expensive and likewise suffered high failure rates. Motivation
seemed to be lacking. The most success was obtained through a
combination of self-selection and provision of essential sup-
port services (e.g., water and roads). Both the human and re-
source elements must be present for resettlement to work.








-22-


elements. Over time some activities may diminish in importance
while others increase. IRD implementers must be willing to
recognize this and adjust accordingly.


4. Close Program Monitoring

IRD is a dynamic process in which linkages between outputs
and purposes are subject to change. Close program monitoring
is required so that quick identification of changing benefici-
ary needs and appropriate suggestions for input/output adjust-
ments can be made.


5. Participation


The best IRD program is "of, by, and for" the beneficiary
population. By involving them from inception to close, imple-
menting agencies can ensure the high level of communication
essential to program responsiveness and applicability.


6. Comprehensiveness of Scope

IRD implementers must share the broad perspective of the
beneficiary population. They must identify all elements neces-
sary to goal achievement, invest the bulk of funds in priority
areas, then stand ready to assist in resolution of other con-
straints wherever possible.


7. Proximity

Proximity of implementing agency personnel to program
beneficiaries greatly facilitates IRD by improving two-way dia-
logue. The best way to appreciate a farmer's problems is to
spend time with him on the farm.

8. Self-Help


Long-term success of an IRD program is contingent upon the
ability of beneficiaries to eventually stand on their own feet.
This suggests development of support systems (e.g., extension,
credit, and training systems) which are no more elaborate or
expensive than necessary, and which are largely under the con-
trol of the beneficiaries themselves.


-23-


9. Self-Capitalization


Rapid farm capitalization through the use of subsidized
credit may lead to rapid production gains, but it is likely to
be uneconomic (from the perspective of national resource allo-
cation) and risky (from the perspective of long-run farm via-
bility). If development of a viable farm economy is a program
aim, then a farm growth model that operates within normal eco-
nomic constraints is preferable.


10. Flexibility of Implementing Organizations

Institutions charged with implementing IRD should have the
ability to adapt strategies and resource allocations to suit
changing circumstances. Decentralized decision-making and the
ability to respond to feedback from field personnel are posi-
tive attributes. Front-office orientation and institutional
rigidity are detrimental to IRD.

B. Resettlement Lessons

1. Assessment of Resource Potential

Assessment for new-lands settlement should go beyond quick
resource reconnaissance and identification of sites for roads,
wells, and communities. Where possible it should also include
experimental farming so that a preview of environmental re-
sponse can be seen. Lack of foreknowledge concerning farming
systems can prove very expensive.

2. Settlement Mode (spontaneous vs. directed)


In Chane-Piray and San Julian, experience was gained with
a wide range of settlement modes. The purely spontaneous
settlements in which settlers moved in with no support were
cheapest in terms of dollar cost per family, but devastatingly
expensive in terms of failure rate. The highly directed set-
tlement efforts, in which settlers were "sold" on migration and
given generous support including resettlement allowances, were
expensive and likewise suffered high failure rates. Motivation
seemed to be lacking. The most success was obtained through a
combination of self-selection and provision of essential sup-
port services (e.g., water and roads). Both the human and re-
source elements must be present for resettlement to work.








-22-


elements. Over time some activities may diminish in importance
while others increase. IRD implementers must be willing to
recognize this and adjust accordingly.


4. Close Program Monitoring

IRD is a dynamic process in which linkages between outputs
and purposes are subject to change. Close program monitoring
is required so that quick identification of changing benefici-
ary needs and appropriate suggestions for input/output adjust-
ments can be made.


5. Participation


The best IRD program is "of, by, and for" the beneficiary
population. By involving them from inception to close, imple-
menting agencies can ensure the high level of communication
essential to program responsiveness and applicability.


6. Comprehensiveness of Scope

IRD implementers must share the broad perspective of the
beneficiary population. They must identify all elements neces-
sary to goal achievement, invest the bulk of funds in priority
areas, then stand ready to assist in resolution of other con-
straints wherever possible.


7. Proximity

Proximity of implementing agency personnel to program
beneficiaries greatly facilitates IRD by improving two-way dia-
logue. The best way to appreciate a farmer's problems is to
spend time with him on the farm.

8. Self-Help


Long-term success of an IRD program is contingent upon the
ability of beneficiaries to eventually stand on their own feet.
This suggests development of support systems (e.g., extension,
credit, and training systems) which are no more elaborate or
expensive than necessary, and which are largely under the con-
trol of the beneficiaries themselves.


-23-


9. Self-Capitalization


Rapid farm capitalization through the use of subsidized
credit may lead to rapid production gains, but it is likely to
be uneconomic (from the perspective of national resource allo-
cation) and risky (from the perspective of long-run farm via-
bility). If development of a viable farm economy is a program
aim, then a farm growth model that operates within normal eco-
nomic constraints is preferable.


10. Flexibility of Implementing Organizations

Institutions charged with implementing IRD should have the
ability to adapt strategies and resource allocations to suit
changing circumstances. Decentralized decision-making and the
ability to respond to feedback from field personnel are posi-
tive attributes. Front-office orientation and institutional
rigidity are detrimental to IRD.

B. Resettlement Lessons

1. Assessment of Resource Potential

Assessment for new-lands settlement should go beyond quick
resource reconnaissance and identification of sites for roads,
wells, and communities. Where possible it should also include
experimental farming so that a preview of environmental re-
sponse can be seen. Lack of foreknowledge concerning farming
systems can prove very expensive.

2. Settlement Mode (spontaneous vs. directed)


In Chane-Piray and San Julian, experience was gained with
a wide range of settlement modes. The purely spontaneous
settlements in which settlers moved in with no support were
cheapest in terms of dollar cost per family, but devastatingly
expensive in terms of failure rate. The highly directed set-
tlement efforts, in which settlers were "sold" on migration and
given generous support including resettlement allowances, were
expensive and likewise suffered high failure rates. Motivation
seemed to be lacking. The most success was obtained through a
combination of self-selection and provision of essential sup-
port services (e.g., water and roads). Both the human and re-
source elements must be present for resettlement to work.








-22-


elements. Over time some activities may diminish in importance
while others increase. IRD implementers must be willing to
recognize this and adjust accordingly.


4. Close Program Monitoring

IRD is a dynamic process in which linkages between outputs
and purposes are subject to change. Close program monitoring
is required so that quick identification of changing benefici-
ary needs and appropriate suggestions for input/output adjust-
ments can be made.


5. Participation


The best IRD program is "of, by, and for" the beneficiary
population. By involving them from inception to close, imple-
menting agencies can ensure the high level of communication
essential to program responsiveness and applicability.


6. Comprehensiveness of Scope

IRD implementers must share the broad perspective of the
beneficiary population. They must identify all elements neces-
sary to goal achievement, invest the bulk of funds in priority
areas, then stand ready to assist in resolution of other con-
straints wherever possible.


7. Proximity

Proximity of implementing agency personnel to program
beneficiaries greatly facilitates IRD by improving two-way dia-
logue. The best way to appreciate a farmer's problems is to
spend time with him on the farm.

8. Self-Help


Long-term success of an IRD program is contingent upon the
ability of beneficiaries to eventually stand on their own feet.
This suggests development of support systems (e.g., extension,
credit, and training systems) which are no more elaborate or
expensive than necessary, and which are largely under the con-
trol of the beneficiaries themselves.


-23-


9. Self-Capitalization


Rapid farm capitalization through the use of subsidized
credit may lead to rapid production gains, but it is likely to
be uneconomic (from the perspective of national resource allo-
cation) and risky (from the perspective of long-run farm via-
bility). If development of a viable farm economy is a program
aim, then a farm growth model that operates within normal eco-
nomic constraints is preferable.


10. Flexibility of Implementing Organizations

Institutions charged with implementing IRD should have the
ability to adapt strategies and resource allocations to suit
changing circumstances. Decentralized decision-making and the
ability to respond to feedback from field personnel are posi-
tive attributes. Front-office orientation and institutional
rigidity are detrimental to IRD.

B. Resettlement Lessons

1. Assessment of Resource Potential

Assessment for new-lands settlement should go beyond quick
resource reconnaissance and identification of sites for roads,
wells, and communities. Where possible it should also include
experimental farming so that a preview of environmental re-
sponse can be seen. Lack of foreknowledge concerning farming
systems can prove very expensive.

2. Settlement Mode (spontaneous vs. directed)


In Chane-Piray and San Julian, experience was gained with
a wide range of settlement modes. The purely spontaneous
settlements in which settlers moved in with no support were
cheapest in terms of dollar cost per family, but devastatingly
expensive in terms of failure rate. The highly directed set-
tlement efforts, in which settlers were "sold" on migration and
given generous support including resettlement allowances, were
expensive and likewise suffered high failure rates. Motivation
seemed to be lacking. The most success was obtained through a
combination of self-selection and provision of essential sup-
port services (e.g., water and roads). Both the human and re-
source elements must be present for resettlement to work.








-25-


3. Basic Physical Infrastructure


7. Consolidation and Growth


Certain physical resources are essential to survival:
water, over the very short term; access, over the medium term;
and viable community lay-outs, over the long term. If these
elements are not provided, successful new-lands settlement is
not possible.


4. Pioneering Stage


The first year in the life of a settler family is a daily
test of survival. Water to drink, food to eat until a crop can
be harvested, tools for farming, a roof to keep the rain off
while sleeping--all these elements are critical and none can be
taken for granted. In San Julian these elements were provided
by the IRD program until the settlers' first crop could be har-
vested and sold. Without such support the program would have
been limited to settlers with sufficient capital to self-
finance the transition period.


5. The Dependency Syndrome


Although certain services are essential if settlers are to
survive in their new environment, such support should not en-
gender a habit of depending upon others to solve one's prob-
lems. By electing support services which are as simple and
affordable as possible, and involving settlers in their per-
formance through self-help, the dangers of dependency can be
minimized.


6. Turnover


A commonly accepted notion in resettlement is that turn-
over of a settler's parcel is bad--that it reflects failure of
the resettlement program. However, it is apparent' from the
Chane-Piray and San Julian experience that this has not been
the case there. Turnover of a settler's parcel is as likely to
be viewed as the culmination of a successful effort as of a
failure. It is really a question of settler perspective.


Consolidation and growth of new-lands settlements cannot
be accomplished through quick infusions of capital and subsi-
dized credit. To be real and sustainable, change must be an
outgrowth of the settlers' own efforts and based on their own
resources. They must know how to organize for the task, and
they must have a viable strategy for accomplishing it.


-24-








-25-


3. Basic Physical Infrastructure


7. Consolidation and Growth


Certain physical resources are essential to survival:
water, over the very short term; access, over the medium term;
and viable community lay-outs, over the long term. If these
elements are not provided, successful new-lands settlement is
not possible.


4. Pioneering Stage


The first year in the life of a settler family is a daily
test of survival. Water to drink, food to eat until a crop can
be harvested, tools for farming, a roof to keep the rain off
while sleeping--all these elements are critical and none can be
taken for granted. In San Julian these elements were provided
by the IRD program until the settlers' first crop could be har-
vested and sold. Without such support the program would have
been limited to settlers with sufficient capital to self-
finance the transition period.


5. The Dependency Syndrome


Although certain services are essential if settlers are to
survive in their new environment, such support should not en-
gender a habit of depending upon others to solve one's prob-
lems. By electing support services which are as simple and
affordable as possible, and involving settlers in their per-
formance through self-help, the dangers of dependency can be
minimized.


6. Turnover


A commonly accepted notion in resettlement is that turn-
over of a settler's parcel is bad--that it reflects failure of
the resettlement program. However, it is apparent' from the
Chane-Piray and San Julian experience that this has not been
the case there. Turnover of a settler's parcel is as likely to
be viewed as the culmination of a successful effort as of a
failure. It is really a question of settler perspective.


Consolidation and growth of new-lands settlements cannot
be accomplished through quick infusions of capital and subsi-
dized credit. To be real and sustainable, change must be an
outgrowth of the settlers' own efforts and based on their own
resources. They must know how to organize for the task, and
they must have a viable strategy for accomplishing it.


-24-








-25-


3. Basic Physical Infrastructure


7. Consolidation and Growth


Certain physical resources are essential to survival:
water, over the very short term; access, over the medium term;
and viable community lay-outs, over the long term. If these
elements are not provided, successful new-lands settlement is
not possible.


4. Pioneering Stage


The first year in the life of a settler family is a daily
test of survival. Water to drink, food to eat until a crop can
be harvested, tools for farming, a roof to keep the rain off
while sleeping--all these elements are critical and none can be
taken for granted. In San Julian these elements were provided
by the IRD program until the settlers' first crop could be har-
vested and sold. Without such support the program would have
been limited to settlers with sufficient capital to self-
finance the transition period.


5. The Dependency Syndrome


Although certain services are essential if settlers are to
survive in their new environment, such support should not en-
gender a habit of depending upon others to solve one's prob-
lems. By electing support services which are as simple and
affordable as possible, and involving settlers in their per-
formance through self-help, the dangers of dependency can be
minimized.


6. Turnover


A commonly accepted notion in resettlement is that turn-
over of a settler's parcel is bad--that it reflects failure of
the resettlement program. However, it is apparent' from the
Chane-Piray and San Julian experience that this has not been
the case there. Turnover of a settler's parcel is as likely to
be viewed as the culmination of a successful effort as of a
failure. It is really a question of settler perspective.


Consolidation and growth of new-lands settlements cannot
be accomplished through quick infusions of capital and subsi-
dized credit. To be real and sustainable, change must be an
outgrowth of the settlers' own efforts and based on their own
resources. They must know how to organize for the task, and
they must have a viable strategy for accomplishing it.


-24-








-25-


3. Basic Physical Infrastructure


7. Consolidation and Growth


Certain physical resources are essential to survival:
water, over the very short term; access, over the medium term;
and viable community lay-outs, over the long term. If these
elements are not provided, successful new-lands settlement is
not possible.


4. Pioneering Stage


The first year in the life of a settler family is a daily
test of survival. Water to drink, food to eat until a crop can
be harvested, tools for farming, a roof to keep the rain off
while sleeping--all these elements are critical and none can be
taken for granted. In San Julian these elements were provided
by the IRD program until the settlers' first crop could be har-
vested and sold. Without such support the program would have
been limited to settlers with sufficient capital to self-
finance the transition period.


5. The Dependency Syndrome


Although certain services are essential if settlers are to
survive in their new environment, such support should not en-
gender a habit of depending upon others to solve one's prob-
lems. By electing support services which are as simple and
affordable as possible, and involving settlers in their per-
formance through self-help, the dangers of dependency can be
minimized.


6. Turnover


A commonly accepted notion in resettlement is that turn-
over of a settler's parcel is bad--that it reflects failure of
the resettlement program. However, it is apparent' from the
Chane-Piray and San Julian experience that this has not been
the case there. Turnover of a settler's parcel is as likely to
be viewed as the culmination of a successful effort as of a
failure. It is really a question of settler perspective.


Consolidation and growth of new-lands settlements cannot
be accomplished through quick infusions of capital and subsi-
dized credit. To be real and sustainable, change must be an
outgrowth of the settlers' own efforts and based on their own
resources. They must know how to organize for the task, and
they must have a viable strategy for accomplishing it.


-24-








-25-


3. Basic Physical Infrastructure


7. Consolidation and Growth


Certain physical resources are essential to survival:
water, over the very short term; access, over the medium term;
and viable community lay-outs, over the long term. If these
elements are not provided, successful new-lands settlement is
not possible.


4. Pioneering Stage


The first year in the life of a settler family is a daily
test of survival. Water to drink, food to eat until a crop can
be harvested, tools for farming, a roof to keep the rain off
while sleeping--all these elements are critical and none can be
taken for granted. In San Julian these elements were provided
by the IRD program until the settlers' first crop could be har-
vested and sold. Without such support the program would have
been limited to settlers with sufficient capital to self-
finance the transition period.


5. The Dependency Syndrome


Although certain services are essential if settlers are to
survive in their new environment, such support should not en-
gender a habit of depending upon others to solve one's prob-
lems. By electing support services which are as simple and
affordable as possible, and involving settlers in their per-
formance through self-help, the dangers of dependency can be
minimized.


6. Turnover


A commonly accepted notion in resettlement is that turn-
over of a settler's parcel is bad--that it reflects failure of
the resettlement program. However, it is apparent' from the
Chane-Piray and San Julian experience that this has not been
the case there. Turnover of a settler's parcel is as likely to
be viewed as the culmination of a successful effort as of a
failure. It is really a question of settler perspective.


Consolidation and growth of new-lands settlements cannot
be accomplished through quick infusions of capital and subsi-
dized credit. To be real and sustainable, change must be an
outgrowth of the settlers' own efforts and based on their own
resources. They must know how to organize for the task, and
they must have a viable strategy for accomplishing it.


-24-









A-1


APPENDIX A

LOGICAL FRAMEWORKS


SUB-TROPICAL LANDS DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (1974 LOAN)


Program or Sector Goals


Increase the productivity and income of small farmers whose
opportunities are severely limited in the Bolivian highlands.

Increase production of food crops.

Establish a pattern for new lands development in the Bolivian
Oriente through small farmer settlement.


Project Purpose


Assist migrant small farmers to increase their productivity and
income in the lowland settlements.


Outputs


all-weather penetration roads in the Chane-Piray and San Julian
colonization zones

lateral dry weather trails in both zones

one agricultural service center constructed and operating in
each zone

potable water wells in each new community

health post constructed and operating in each zone and mobile
health unit provided and put into operation

orientation of settlers at each new community

distribution of land to settlers ahd subsequent attainment of
legal titles to settler parcels

settlement and clearing of land by settlers and commencement of
agricultural production












extension and research services in operation

limitation of cooperative and credit programs

completion of a land resource study to determine the suitabil-
ity of other areas for settlement


Inputs


land

equipment, materials, and contract services for construction of
roads, trails, and agricultural and health centers

well drilling equipment and services

mobile health unit


CONSOLIDATION PROJECT (1979 GRANT)


Program or Sector Goal


Increase per capital incomes and raise standard of living among
settlers in the Bolivian lowlands.


Project Purposes


Develop and test models for consolidation of colonization areas
for wider application in the Bolivian lowlands.

Increase agricultural productivity in the San Julian
colonization area.


technical assistance for Otputs


extension services
research
orientation
co-op organization
credit administration
land resource study


diversified family farm systems established
A
consumer cooperatives established
credit committees formed
marketing organization established
training programs conducted
investigations and reports conducted


Inputs


coordinator of research on colonization
general researchers
interdisciplinary extension teams
technical backstopping personnel
technical consultants
consumer co-op store clerks
extension team equipment and supplies
radio programming
credit











APPENDIX B

PROJECT INTERVENTIONS


I. INTRODUCTION


A. Sub-Tropical Lands Development Project


Interventions under AID's 1974 loan for Sub-Tropical Lands
Development ranged from provision of roads, wells, and other
physical infrastructure elements, which absorbed the lion's
share of project funds, to activities to advertise settlement
opportunities and orient new communities. During orientation
settlers were provided "know-how" appropriate to the settlement
zone in such subjects as nutrition, sanitation, building con-
struction, basic agricultural practices, and small farmer
organization. They were also given guidance and support in
development of community solidarity and group decision-making
processes.

The specific outputs and amounts planned to be spent and
actually spent in these pursuits are shown in Table B-l.

The amount allocated to a given intervention was not nec-
essarily proportionate to its significance. The planned cost
of penetration roads, for instance, was over $4,000,000 in AID
funds, while the orientation program was to cost only $150,000.
Although the evaluation team found that the project designers
were right in considering roads essential, it also found that
the orientation program made a contribution to the success of
the project which was disproportionate to its cost. It was a
major factor in reducing the serious health, nutrition, and
agricultural production problems encountered in previous un-
guided colonization efforts. It is also credited with laying
San Julian's strong base of social and organizational struc-
tures which have provided an important psychological and emer-
gency support system while increasing the settlers' ability to
deal with longer range problems and opportunities.


B. Consolidation Project


Interventions under the Consolidation Project are pre-
sented in Table B-2.

Also as a result of these outputs, an average of 2.5 addi-
tional hectares were to be put under production by each farmer.
This target was more than doubled.












Table B-l. Planned and Actual Outputs and Expenditures,
Chane-Piray and San Julian


Quantity Expenditures
Planned Actual Planned Actual

Chane-Piray

Penetration Road 80 km 43 km $ 2,681,730 Undetermined

Agricultural Service
Center 1 1 272,000 Undetermined

Administrative (30%) 318,000 Undetermined


San Julian

Penetration Road 100 km 32 km 4,223,400 Undetermined

Access Trails 800 km 180 km 1,574,000 Undetermined

Agricultural Service
Center 1 1* 272,000 Undetermined

Deep Wells 200 40 325,000 Undetermined

Sanitary Post and
Mobile Health Unit 195,000 Undetermined

Resource Study, Survey,
and Delineation of
Plots, Community
Blocks, and Access
Trails 410,000 Undetermined

Information and
Orientation Programs 150,000 Undetermined

Credit 500,000 Undetermined

Administrative (65%) 675,000 Undetermined

Total $11,596,130


Table B-2. Planned and Actual Interventions Under
the 1979 Consolidated Project


Quantity
Intervention Planned Actual

Model Farms 24 8 1

Consumer Cooperative 40 39

Credit Committees 50 42 2

Marketing Organizations 70 1 3

Courses (given by agricultural
and crop agents and home and
family credit and marketing
advisors) 920 -- 4/

1 The model farmer concept was changed due to jealousies
aroused by designating farmers for preferential services. At
present, interested and capable farmers are assisted on a
less formal basis. The number of such farmers exceeds 24.

2 Figures as of July 1982, based on 44 settled nucleos.

3 Only one central marketing organization was established as of
1982. Some 39 farmers from one nucleo used it the first
year.

4 Rather than giving formal courses, FIDES extensionists live
in the colonization zone and are in constant dialogue with
farmers. The effects of this approach are easily equivalent
to the targeted 920 courses.


Planned and actual expenditures for inputs to the 1979
Consolidation Project are presented in Table B-3.


*Construction was never completed, and the
disrepair.


building is falling into











Table B-3. Planned and Actual Expenditures for Inputs
to the 1979 Consolidation Project


Expenditures
Category Planned Actual

Personnel $560,374 $331,022

Training 2,797

Operating Costs 348,026 107,198

Commodities 144,500 153,388

Construction 56,036 56,476

Capital Fund 225,000 204,328

Risk Sharing 1,666

Contingency 665

Overhead 98,945

Other 147,000

Total $1,480,936 $956,485


II. INPUT/OUTPUT ANALYSIS


A. Infrastructure


1. Roads


Before discussing the road construction process in the
evaluated project, it is worthwhile to understand the
importance of this intervention. The distance from the nearest
significant market (Montero, population 40,000) to the closest
of the San Julian settlements (nucleo 1) is 140 kilometers
(km). The most distant nucleo lies some 195 km away. The
major market in the area, Santa Cruz, lies 50 km beyond Mon-
tero.


The first 50
Julian zone has a
permitting speeds


km of the road from Montero into the San
reasonably well-maintained gravel surface
of up to 50 km per hour in the dry season


Key to Nucleos
C Founded in 1972
E Foundedin 1973
SFounded in 1974
SFounded in 1975
C Founded in 1976
0 Founded in 1977
0 Founded in 1978


San Julian


San Ramon








B-6


with perhaps two slow-downs per kilometer for large pot holes.
At km 65, vehicles are ferried across the Rio Grande river.
This natural barrier varies in width from about 20 meters at
the end of the dry season to perhaps 600 meters during peak
rains. During the dry season the river is shallow and barges
are pushed across the channel by hand. During the rainy season
the same barges are propelled by outboard motor.

It takes about 4 hours to traverse the road from Montero
to the nearest settlement during the dry season, and about 5
hours during the wet season provided there is no special delay
at the ferry. Delays at the ferry of up to 3 to 4 days are
sometimes encountered. The 50 km road from Santa Cruz to
Montero is of well-maintained asphalt and can be traversed at
high speeds.

At km 107 the road from Montero into San Julian divides,
with the fork going into the heart of San Julian called the
Brecha Casarabe (Brecha). Fifty of the San Julian settlements
(nucleos) are encountered after the road forks, and nine prior
to the fork along what is called the German road.

The Brecha is a traveler's nightmare. The term "pothole"
is a euphemism for the 1 to 2 1/2 feet deep cavities with which
the road is pitted, requiring vehicles to slow down to a 5- or
10-mile an hour average speed even during the dry season, and
which are altogether impassable during the rainy season. The
potholes can rarely be skirted since several are generally
strung across the road at the same weak point. At the end of
the dry season it takes 6 hours to negotiate by truck the 87 km
of the Brecha from the German road to the last nucleo, number
51. In a period of light rains it can take up to 12 hours,
provided the road is not closed at some point and the vehicle
does not get stuck. After prolonged heavy rains during the
rainy season, the road is impassable.

The effect of such transportation difficulties on market-
ing of settler produce cannot be overstated. Truckers do not
want to enter the area at any price, and those who are caught
there at the beginning of the rains pay a heavy penalty. The
roads may be impassable for months at a time, so both produce
and truck time are lost.

This difficulty with road transport also exacts a toll on
human life due to the frequent difficulty or impossibility of
transporting injured or sick persons, or women experiencing
childbirth complications, to appropriate health providers. The
problems are even worse for the lateral settlements connected
to the Brecha by 5-km, dry-weather trails, although these are,
in some cases, actually in better shape than the Brecha since
they receive less use.


Settlements on the Brecha are arranged in rows of three
across, with the middle one being along the road and the others
at 5 km to either side.

At km 70 from the German road, between nucleos 44 and 47,
a 2- or 3-km segment of the Brecha is submerged in up to a
meter and a half of water after a heavy rain. The frustration
of the settlers with these conditions was communicated to the
evaluation team at nucleo 47 where we were detained by a dozen
settlers who had strung a heavy cable across the road and,
thinking we were from one of the organizations concerned with
road maintenance, politely but firmly led us to the community
center to discuss the problem. The main burden of their com-
plaint was that villagers were dying because it was impossible
to get them to health care providers during rainy season.

Other, less obvious consequences of the lack of an ade-
quate road are cultural isolation, difficulty in getting
teachers for the village schools, and expense in getting agri-
cultutal inputs and consumer goods in and equipment (e.g.,
pumps and chainsaws) out for repair. At present, access to
extension services is not a problem because they are supplied
by the highly motivated FIDES extensionists who live in the
colonization zdne. However, when funding for the project ends,
and if the Bolivian Government becomes responsible for exten-
sion services, they may well diminish sharply or even come to a
halt. Government extensionists normally live outside the zone
and, lacking funds for transport, are likely to be infrequent
visitors.

The sources of the road problem were (1) failure of the
Government of Bolivia (GOB) and AID to supervise construction
and enforce contract standards, (2) withdrawal of GOB funding,
and (3) failure to provide for maintenance. These problems are
not unique to the colonization zone or to Bolivia. However,
the situation in the colonization zone does suggest a solution.
The settlers have attempted, with limited success, to impose
timber extraction fees on the loggers whose heavy loads (5
metric tons per truck is typical) cause rapid deterioration and
high maintenance requirements. With government backing the
settlers might extract some assistance from these loggers in
road maintenance.

It is conceivable that road maintenance could be better
handled at a local government level. Central government per-
formance in road maintenance in most of Latin America has been
notoriously deficient. Moreover, George Lodge found in studies
in Panama in the late 1960s and early 1970s that local
governments were able to construct bridges much more cheaply
than the central government. The San Julian settlers are
probably less sophisticated than Panamanian local government
officials but perhaps they could, with the help of FIDES, learn













to manage road maintenance. Each nucleo might be made
responsible for maintenance of the road to the center of the
next nucleo toward the German road, with penalties for failure
of maintenance.

Approximately 70 percent of the required maintenance could
be done by the settlers themselves using the indigenous minka
system of community labor. Mechanical equipment and skilled
labor would be required for the other 30 percent. This input
could be managed by the settlers with administrative support
and longer range training.

One interesting possibility for improving and maintaining
the roads would be to require loggers to bring gravel on their
trucks on their way to the logging sites. The trucks currently
run empty on the way in. Such an in-kind "toll" might be easi-
er to impose than a monetary tax.


2. Access Trails


The access trails at San Julian were constructed by the
Institute Nacional de Colonizacion (INC). They were bulldozed
without drainage or bridges, and are subject to flooding, hav-
ing been planned as dry season roads. However, they are needed
all year round and so used, with some difficulty. Better ele-.
vation and drainage might have been worth the investment.
Since these trails are only 5 km (each) in length, they do not
pose so severe a transportation barrier as the penetration
road.


3. Wells


No surface sources of water safe for human consumption are
found in the colonization zone. Therefore, a well drilling
program was necessary. By way of contrast, in certain early
Chane-Piray settlement efforts farmers went into the forest
with 20 kilos of water on their backs, worked 2 days, then went
back for more.

The original project design provided for two wells per
nucleo. Only one nucleo has a second well, this because the
water in its first well was not potable. Several communities
have none, which represents a serious health threat as they
must get their water from ditches or swamps. In those nucleos
which have enjoyed the greatest population growth, the well is
in constant use. This requires villagers to wait for water,
and it also results in well siltation from overuse during the
dry season.


The INC, which is in charge of well drilling, puts off
the settlers with the excuse that it lacks time and resources
to put in the wells. However, a large stockpile of well pipe
was observed at the INC office, and the team encountered no one
who knew where the time and money budgeted for drilling are
invested.

The villagers are responsible for their own pump mainten-
ance, having been taught the main procedures in the orientation
program. The INC has been supplying parts, although it is not
required to do so. The settlers have become dependent on this
source of supply and, because it is not always reliable, the
pumps are sometimes down for long periods. One nucleo's pump
was down for over a year due to INC failure to supply the
needed part. This is a typical example of the sort of depen-
dency problem which can easily develop in resettlement, as well
as other rural development projects. It is a strong argument
for not giving the beneficiaries anything they can get for
themselves, except perhaps on an explicitly temporary basis.

Well drilling and parts supply might be better handled by
a settler organization such as a co-op. Such an organization
could be more easily controlled and would be more responsive.

This is also a good example of the sort of problem arising
in the course of a project which requires redesign, and of the
need for follow-on and continuity to bring the settlers to the
point where they can maintain and, it is hoped, expand their
gains.


4. Buildings and Equipment


Two agricultural resource centers were to be constructed
under the project, one in each of the two colonization zones.
Construction was under contract with the INC. The Chane-Piray
center was completed and taken over by the Center for Tropical
Agricultural Research (CIAT), a quasi-governmental Bolivian
organization. The center in San Julian was never completed.
The INC watchman who is supposed to guard the premises is not
being paid and is spending his time trying to earn a living
elsewhere.

The sanitary post provided for under the loan was nearly
completed and is in use. A mobile health unit was also pur-
chased. It is now immobile and most of its equipment has been
stolen. This would seem to say something about the advisabili-
ty of providing sophisticated equipment in such an environment
without developing adequate mechanisms for security and mainte-
nance.








B-10


Minimal facilities, consisting of corrugated roofs on
poles, were provided to receive the settlers in the nucleos and
lodge them during orientation. It was up to the settlers to
provide walls if they wished. Materials were also provided for
self-help construction of a storage building for food provided
for the first 4 months of settlement and for a co-op. The
handling of these structures is typical of the project's empha-
sis on self-help. Responsibility for school construction also
rests with the communities. Self-help construction lowers
project costs while accustoming settlers to taking responsi-
bility for their own needs rather than depending on outsiders.
The evaluation team considers this an important feature of the
project with potential long-term payoffs of great consequence.


5. Land Distribution and Preparation


Two hectares of land were cleared by INC at the center
of each nucleo to facilitate settlement. The settlers, in
another example of how the project is structured for self-
reliance, clear another hectare on each parcel by communal
labor during orientation. This occurs before parcels are allo-
cated so that the settlers don't know whether they are working
on their own parcel or somebody else's. (In one case, where
parcels were allocated before clearing, it did not go well.)
The purpose of this system was to get the clearing process off
to a fast start. Subsequent clearing may be mechanized or by
hand, and individual or communal, depending on the means and
preference of the individual settlers. It is often necessary
to clear the same ground twice.

Parcels in San Julian are 50 hectares per family. In
other resettlement projects, e.g., the Inter-American Devel-
opment Bank-sponsored Yapacani and Chane-Piray, 20-hectare
parcels proved to be too small. The 50-hectare size permits
fallowing of land, including planting in leguminous pasture, to
refertilize soil.

Because few of the Chane-Piray and San Julian settlers yet
have titles to their land, due to the complexity and cost of
bureaucratic procedures, only the improvements are sold. FIDES
has hired a lawyer to work on this problem and will probably
get a grant from the Inter-American Foundation for titling.
Though community approval is not legally required for sale,
such approval is encouraged by FIDES as a requirement. Any
purchaser of whom the community disapproves is thus in for a
difficult time.

Soil analysis of the zone was conducted before settlement.
However, equality of land value is a problem, since the simpler
course was chosen of distributing parcels of equal size rather


than equal value. Parcels are generally distributed by "draw-
ing lots," with rumors of influence being brought to bear in
rare cases. The fact remains, however, that the parcels are
inherently unequal because of differences in land quality and
location, and the project does not try to compensate for this
by varying plot size. Any parcels found to have less than 70-
percent usable land can be exchanged for others but, beyond
this, any attempt at achieving equality of holdings was viewed
as too difficult.


B. Settlement Patterns


A number of things were done in the San Julian area to
promote cohesion and cooperation among the settlers. Some of
these were direct, e.g., organization of co-ops and health com-
mittees. Others were indirect or structural, e.g., settlement
of the settlers in villages rather than strung-out on individ-
ual farmsteads along a road. It is impossible, without a
lengthypand expensive research effort, to determine the effect
of the structural inputs. However, a reasoned judgment is pos-
sible. The following features of the project seem likely to
have promoted cohesion among the settlers:


Land holdings in San Julian radiate from a center in a
pie-shaped pattern, rather than being spread out along
a road "piano key" fashion. Thus, the settlers can
live near their land while still living in a village.

A 2-hectare area at the center of the pie is cleared
for a village site and two dormitory sheds are con-
structed to provide temporary lodging for the set-
tlers. These facilities encourage cooperation among
the settlers by bringing everyone together during the
all-important first several months of each community.

A well is placed in the center for the village area,
thus promoting centralization even as it provides for
the settlement's safe water needs.

Villages are arranged in blocks of nine (three rows
and three columns), oriented toward the central vil-
lage, and later facilities and services, such as
schools, health posts, and stores, are channeled into
the central village.


Although the time and resources available to the impact
evaluation team did not allow a scientific investigation of the
causal connection between these measures and the impact of the


B-11








B-13


B-12


project, they seem to have been influential. Discussion with
and observation of settlers in the project area tended to con-
firm this. A number of the problems faced by the settlers
could be more successfully confronted by group action and mutu-
al support than on an individual basis: clearing land in the
village area and constructing houses; providing orientation in
subjects such as agricultural technology, nutrition, and
health; providing primary health care systems; organizing to
obtain credit, purchase inputs, and market produce; receiving
extension-type education; and obtaining the psychological bene-
fits of a sense of security from being with other people in the
new and difficult environment.

It is reasonable to suppose that these measures had an
effect on the relatively low turnover rate experienced by the
San Julian project. The settlers to whom we spoke felt that
the nucleo settlement pattern was superior to the "piano key"
pattern not only in promoting cohesion but in facilitating
necessary meetings.

Another probable effect of the nucleo pattern was to re-
duce abandonment and accelerate the adoption of new agricul-
tural, health, and nutrition practices by the settlers, and of
economically beneficial'settler organization. Both of these
effects seem likely to have improved the efficiency of the
project.

One problem with the pie-shaped settlement patterns is
that the several parcels bordering on the penetration road and
lateral trails enjoy far greater accessibility than the others.
This creates some jealousy among settlers. However, FIDES.is
of the opinion that this disadvantage is outweighed by the
overall advantages of the nucleo settlement pattern.


C. Materials and Services


1. Orientation


Another novel project feature which contributed to reduced
abandonment and increased benefits was the orientation program.
Drawing on experienced settlers, the orientation program pro-
vided new settlers with information about agriculture, health,
and nutrition which would help them adapt to their new environ-
ment. The settlers interviewed were unanimous in praising this
input. The only complaint about it was that the initial orien-
tation should have been followed up with similar orientation at
subsequent stages of settlement. In fact, the project did
provide ongoing extension services in home and cooperative
extension and health education as well as in agricultural


technology. Sometimes this was done for an entire village, and
sometimes on an individual basis.

A November 1978 evaluation of San Julian by Michael
Nelson, a regional development specialist/economist, is worth
quoting with regard to the effect of the orientation.


The evolution of the various nucleos over the past
3-4 years suggests that colonists, many of whom had
little knowledge of tropical agriculture and no
capital resources, have made a faster start and
retained greater momentum than that demonstrated by
similar people in projects such as Yapacani where
considerably higher per capital investments have been
made. This accelerated rate of development must, in
large measure, be attributed to the orientation
activity. One may also speculate that as the colon-
ists ha* marketing opportunities and receive the
credit and extension s rvices to exploit them, the
dynamics for community organization set in train
during the initial 4 months may yield a multiplier
effect in terms of higher levels of production,
capital accumulation and on-farm employment as well
as linked investment and employment in non-farm
activities in some of the central nucleos.

The nature and extent of these potential multiplier
effects and the extent to which they may be attrib-
uted to orientation will remain in the realm of
crystal ball gazing for some time. Nevertheless,
there would appear to be sufficient reason to expect
a relationship between orientation and accelerated
development to justify examination of the 4-5 year
experiment over a longer period in search of lessons
which may be applied in similar controlled or even
in spontaneous situations.


The nucleos which received follow-up extension services
soon after the orientation did better according to FIDES than
those where follow-up was delayed. FIDES believes that soli-
darity was lost, bad habits were formed, and skepticism grew
where there was a time gap. This seems very plausible.


2. Promotion


Some "preorientation" was done with prospective settlers,
but this was discontinued because of FIDES's principal advi-
sor's concern that it aroused excessive expectations. At









B-14


present all settlers seeking participation in the project do so
on their own initiative, and there is more demand than the GOB
can respond to.


3. Material Supports


Settlers are provided with food for the first 4 months,
seed for a first crop and, later, after the health committee
and co-op are formed, a start-up fund for the pharmacy (to be
replenished from sales) and a stock of agricultural inputs as a
starter for the cooperative. There have been problems with
converting these start-up stocks into viable revolving funds
because of the rapid pace of inflation and failure to peg sales
proceeds to replacement costs, especially for agricultural
input purchases involving credit. This problem will be dis-
cussed in more detail in the section on cooperatives below.
The fact remains that an innovative sort of grubstake is in-
volved here. The supplies are put into a cooperative purchas-
ing system with the economies of scale, lower markups, and
institutionalization of supply inherent in such an arrangement.


4. Perennials


To encourage the settlers to plant perennials such as
citrus fruits, the project maintains a nursery in the San
Julian area which breeds, sells and, to a lesser extent, tests
plants. Currently available are oranges, tangerines, figs,
pineapples, cacao, coffee, mango, coconut, papaya, and chiri-
moya. The purpose of this program is to improve the settlers'
nutrition and provide possible additional sources of income.

The plants are sold, rather than given, to the settlers--
another example of the project's effort to combat dependency
and make input flows self-financing as much as possible. The
plants are advertised through roadside displays, extensionists,
model farmers, word of mouth, and volunteer salesmen.

The nursery tries to capitalize on existing technology,
using proven varieties. The project does test some new varie-
ties and is negotiating an agreement with the Bolivian quasi-
governmental agriculture research organization, CIAT, to in-
spect the plants periodically and provide technical advice.
The purpose of this aspect of the program is as much to get'
CIAT involved in the San Julian area and give it access to a
nursery for study of perennials (since turnover of personnel
and funding changes make it difficult for it to maintain a
nursery) as to test new varieties per se. CIAT, however, has


done some testing, for instance of the coffee variety being
propagated by the nursery.

Information on care of the plants is provided to the pur-
chasers by FIDES extensionists. A close record is kept of
where plants go so that FIDES can go back for budwood and to
monitor settler successes and problems. This also provides
feedback as to whether particular varieties are difficult for
the settlers to manage.

In 1982, 9,384 plants were sold by the nursery: 5,612
orange trees, 2,487 tangerine trees, 602 fig trees, 574 coconut
trees, and 109 others.


5. Annuals


FIDES has purchased improved seed varieties through the
AID-financed certified seed program and put them into the set-
tler co-ops for sale on consignment. Garden seeds are empha-
sized, to promote better nutrition, but other improved varie-
ties which are not readily available from commercial sources
(e.g., pasture legumes) are also provided.


6. Livestock


Livestock are provided to settlers in cooperation with the
Heifer Project. The involvement of Heifer International, along
with CIAT, illustrates another principle of FIDES's operations.
They like to involve other organizations wherever possible.

Livestock is given to settlers under a contract which-
requires formation of a livestock committee, with community and
outside representatives, to which the recipient must turn over
progeny from the animals, giving the first heifer in the case
of cattle. The recipient must have 1 hectare under pasture, a
shelter and a water source, and must take a course in animal
care (e.g., nutrition, disease control, deticking, and pasture
cultivation). Afterwards the recipient is obliged to care for
the animal in accordance with the training received. If he
does not do so, and repayment is threatened, the livestock
committee can, under the contract, take the animal away. Live-
stock paid into the committee is distributed on the same condi-
tions as the original animals.

The training and experience in animal husbandry received
by the settlers as a result of this program is considered as
important by FIDES as the distribution of animals, if not more
so. Not only is the participating farmer educated, but other


B-15








B-16


B-17


armers, particularly the members of the livestock committee, in the field. Knowledge of Quecha is also an important plus.
earn from his example. Co-op and.home extensionists are chosen in a similar manner.
Once theperson is chosen, his technical strengths and
Animal Traction weaknesses are looked at more closely to see where he needs
support and training and what he can do best.

FIDES is also conducting a small experimental/demonstra-
-ion project in the use of animal traction, full-scale mechan- The selection process is much more rigorous and cogent
ion procting been found uneconomical for most of the settlers than that usually applied by government extension programs,
nation having been found uneconomical for most of the settlers which are more likely to select on the basis of personal or
t present levels of know-how The participating farmers are a e aae eco aion o
-equired to select their animals and pay for them in advance family connections, academic record, or other indication of
(experience has demonstrated that farmers don't pay if the technical expertise. In the opinion of the evaluation team
animalss die, and won't care for them as well if they are pur- this is an important element in the success of the project and
chased on credit). Credit is provide for stump removal, at- a strong argument in favor of hiring independent extension
nses, a plow, a c tivator, barbed wire, agricultural inputs agents through a project management agency that knows its

and, sometimes, a horsecart. So far, only limited progress has clients' problems intimately.
been made with animal traction. Some of the farmers who have #
been made with usiastic action some less so. ts use has grown There is a question, of course, of sustainability. What
slowly. Eight farmers started with the program in the demon- happens to such an extension service after the project termi-
stration phase. Four of these dropped out and some 15 others nates? FIDES is interested in experimenting with a system
wherein the extensionists would contract with groups of set-
have since joined. tiers for help with specific combinations of crops, while pro-
viding seed and other inputs on credit. Payment would be a
modest base salary and a percentage of the crop. This system
8. Farming Systems has several interesting features: the credit gives the farmer
an incentive to try it, and the profit-sharing element reduces

animal traction is art of one of two farming systems the farmer's risk while providing an incentive to the exten-
being propagated by the project, one emphasizing annual crops sionist to furnish good service. In FIDES's opinion such a
and animal traction and the other emphasizing livestock. Both system is most likely to work with extensionists who have al-
involve cultivation of perennials and fallowing of land with a ready helped the farmer under the project and demonstrated
their ability to increase farmer income.
cover of pasture, often leguminous.
10. Credit
9. Extension Services


Three kinds of extension services are provided under the
project, agricultural (providing mainly agronomic advice),
cooperative (focusing on organization), and home (dealing with
family nutrition, health, and secondary employment). The ex-
tensionists live in the nucleos and are often settlers them-
selves.
In hiring an agricultural extensionist FIDES looks for
individuals with at least basic technical-level training in
agriculture as well as some field experience. The basic cri-
terion is whether the individual appears trainable. This is
considered more important than knowledge per se, though the tw,
usually go together. Next, FIDES looks for attitude--does the
candidate respect the farmers? One way the FIDES interviewers
get at this is by asking the candidate what he learned working


Credit has been supplied through cooperatives for home
use items, such as knitting wool, pots and pans, and basic
consumption items, as well as for agricultural inputs. Loans
are secured by the signatures of the majority of the members of
the nucleo credit committee which must approve the loan, thus
spreading both the risk and pressure for timely repayment. The
credit programs are in trouble both at the FIDES and local
levels, however, due to rapid inflation. FIDES lent money to
the cooperatives with long repayment periods, with the result
that the money was worth much less when repaid than it had been
when lent. The cooperatives have had a similar experience and,
as a result, have greatly reduced their credit programs.

FIDES is preparing to mount an education campaign to deal
with this problem and is considering the possibility of loans
in which the debt is indexed to the price of a product such as









B-18


rice. FIDES's hypothesis is that this will make the adjustment
for inflation more readily acceptable to the borrowers, as
their debt stays the same in kilos, rather than increasing
radically in monetary terms.

An interesting consequence of credit for land clearing is
that the co-op must subsequently lend the same farmer money to
hire labor for weeding and harvesting or else he can't effec-
tively farm all the land cleared and the loan is jeopardized.
Given the limited amount of money available to the co-ops, this
results in a few farmers getting a disproportionate share of
the credit.


11. Health

Primary health services in 16 or more of the San Julian
nucleos are supplied by two to three "promoters" trained, sup-
ported technically, and provided with an initial supply of
drugs by FIDES.

The promoters receive 6 months of weekly classes conducted
by the same FIDES nurse who subsequently supervises their
work. Their compensation is fixed by a Nucleo Health
Committee. Some derive a profit from the sale of drugs, some
have been compensated by other members of the nucleo providing
labor on their farms while they were in training, some are
compensated by being freed of community labor obligations, and
some are entirely volunteers. It is significant that here, as
in other contexts, FIDES sought to create a system that was
self-financing.

Twenty-seven of the nucleos share three paramedics (one in
the center of each block of nine nucleos) receiving small sala-
ries from the GOB. These nucleos, however, are also closest to
the German road and have relatively ready access to health
services at the National Institute of Colonization and at Mon-
tero and Santa Cruz.

The drugs are sold by the promoters and new supplies are
purchased from the FIDES pharmacy from the proceeds of such
sales. This caused a decapitalization similar to that experi-
enced by the co-ops, until the GOB began to subsidize and thus
stabilize drug prices. Drug funds accumulated from sales range
from 2,000 to 30,000 pesos, approximately U.S.$10-$140 at the
official rate of exchange, and U.S.$2-$35 at the free market
rate as of October 15, 1983.


12. Repair Services


FIDES is attempting to encourage establishment of a gen-
eral repair service in the colonization zone by locating a
suitable mechanic and providing him credit. This innovative
intervention is typical of the flexibility, adaptability, and
comprehensiveness FIDES has brought to the project, and has
been possible only because of the length and continuity of
FIDES's involvement.


D. Organization


1. Health Committees


As already noted, health committees promoted by FIDES
exist in each nucleo. These committees select a health pro-
moter, establish his/her compensation, and handle or oversee
the drug fund. Such committees were originally organized dur-
ing the orientation period, but most became inactive due to
decapitalization of the drug fund, lack of supervision, and a
high rate of turnover of committee members and promoters.

In April 1982 FIDES contracted a full-time nurse to reside
in nucleo 38. She encouraged the reorganization of health
committees and drug funds, and a health post stocking a wide
variety of drugs was established outside nucleo 38.

Once again, FIDES endeavored to place basic responsibility
for maintaining and managing services on the shoulders of the
settlers, so as to encourage development of a sustainable,
self-reliant system.


2. Model Farms


Originally, extension efforts were focused on model farm-
ers selected by one community. The system was dropped, how-
ever, as the model farmers tended to become isolated from the
rest of the community due to the special attention and access
to credit they were getting. Some of these model farmers also
acquired an attitude that they were owed something. Though
FIDES extensionists still give special attention to innovative
and effective farmers, they are no longer singled out as
"model" farmers.


B-19








B-21


B-20


3. Cooperatives


Cooperatives formed in the project have five divisions,
created at different times: consumer, agricultural input,
savings and loan, home input, and marketing. We have already
discussed the decapitalization these cooperatives have suffered
due to lending policies which do not compensate adequately for
the very rapid inflation experienced in Bolivia in recent
years.

The only other readily available measure of cooperative
progress is membership. With approximately 3,000 farmers in
the San Julian settlement zone as of September 1983, membership
in the savings and loan (S&L) division of the cooperatives,
which parallels general membership, has progressed as follows:

January 1979 311
January 1980 524
January 1981 598
July 1982 703
June 1983 889


There is considerable, though not complete, overlap between S&L
membership and other memberships.

There are three levels to the cooperative system: nucleo,
central (one for each nine nucleos) and the general San Julian
Co-op for the whole colonization zone. Only the last has legal
personality. The central cooperatives have warehouses and set
policies on such matters as dues charged the nucleos and sales
to nonmembers. The nucleos also set dues for their own mem-
bers.

The home-input division of the cooperatives has been par-
ticularly noteworthy for its effect in promoting the participa-
tion of women.


4. Marketing

There are two problems stemming from the colonization
zone's distance from its markets, Montero (140 to 195 km) and
Santa Cruz (190 to 245 km), and the poor state of roads in the.
zone. First, middlemen cannot be relied upon to appear when
produce is available for sale or to offer affordable prices
when they do. Second, since the settlers sell small amounts of
produce and therefore have little opportunity to learn how to
market effectively, individual sales are both inefficient and
ineffective. Therefore, the San Julian Cooperative, in late


1982, began to organize a marketing function at the zonal
level. It is too soon to say how effective this effort is
going to be. As of June 1983, 35 settlers, all in one nucleo,
marketed rice through their cooperative at a profit of over
$1,000. The cooperative management team wishes to use this
fund for advances on the purchase of more produce. However,
cooperative members initially preferred to see the profits
distributed. This issue has not yet been resolved. More tech-
nical assistance will be required to make the marketing opera-
tion viable.


5. Community Decision-Making


FIDES seer economic efficiency on the one hand, and equity
and group process on the other, as being sometimes in conflict.
FIDES feels that there are times when economic efficiency must
prevail over group process. At the same time, they feel there
is a need to develop group decision-making ability, for reasons
of equity and because there are so many issues and problems in
the colonization zone which can most effectively be addressed
by group action. To promote group decision-making, the orien-
tation program confronts the settlers with the need to make
decisions from the beginning. They start with short-term imme-
diate needs such as how to prepare breakfast, using the food
provided by the orientation program, and progressing to more
complex and future-oriented decisions such as how to lay out
the village and how parcels will be distributed. In subsequent
phases of the settlement consolidation process, existing, rep-
resentative community organizations, such as the health, live-
stock, and credit committees, are encouraged and used by FIDES
as much as possible. The settlers are consulted by FIDES on
all important decisions.


III. CONCLUSIONS


The following significant generalizations can be made
about the above project interventions:

The interventions evolved from project experience
rather than following a fixed "blueprint."

The project administrators took an unusually broad
view of beneficiary needs, one embracing all obstacles
to achievement of project goals, rather than limiting
themselves to narrow technical objectives.









B-22


-- Heavy emphasis was placed on developing the benefici-
aries' capacity to meet their own needs and avoid
dependency.

Host government inputs proved unreliable.

Roads and wells proved very important, but physical
infrastructure was otherwise successfully kept at a
minimum.

-- The physical layout of the settlements had an impor-
tant influence on the outcome of the project.

Much stress was placed on community organization.
Capability to respond to future problems was thus
developed.

The importance of these intervention characteristics is
apparent. They have been made possible by the nature of the
implementing agent and the commitment of its personnel, by the
amount of time they were in-country, and by the flexibility
they were allowed. The significance of the interventions and
the underlying conditions which made them possible will be
explored more fully in Appendix E, Lessons Learned.


APPENDIX C

PROJECT IMPACTS

I. INTRODUCTION


There are some who say that the idea of colonizing the
lowland is a mistake. Farmers come to the Oriente with no
capital or experience in tropical agriculture. The majority
end up as subsistence farmers who are able to manage only a few
hectares per year. A few lucky farmers do well, mechanize, buy
up surrounding farms, and monopolize all resources. The income
inequity that has prevaJled in the highlands is only trans-
planted to the lowlands. A few prosper while the majority suf-
fer.

The environment is destroyed as farmers abandon parcels
that are no longer fertile, leaving land covered with barbecho
(secondary growth). The social traditions developed over cen-
turies in the highlands are lost in the move to the oriente.
Individualism prevails as social organization breaks down. The
original goals of colonization are never realized.

While some of these points may be valid, interviews with
settlers in San Julian indicate that most people were glad they
had come to the Oriente and they planned to stay. Might the
experience of the people in the San Julian and Chane-Piray
areas have been different than that of the majority of spontan-
eous or government-directed settlers?

The San Julian and Chane-Piray consolidation project did
much to make the transition from the highlands to the lowlands
an easier one. As mentioned above, the majority of settlers
prefer life in the oriented to the alternative in the Interior.
Settler turnover in these zones has been quite low compared
with that in the spontaneous settlement areas.

In the sections below, the impacts of AID's interventions
in Chane-Piray and San Julian are discussed. Treated first are
economic and social impacts at the micro-level, and these are
followed by discussion of economic, social, and environmental
impacts at the macro-level.











II. MICRO-LEVEL IMPACTS


A. Economic Impacts

1. Stages of Development

The question of whether the new-lands settlement in which
AID has been involved in Chane-Piray and San Julian has been
economically satisfactory at the farm level must address sever-
al issues within the context of a dynamic and variable process.
Michael Nelson (1978) developed a settlement stage framework
consisting of the following three steps:

Pioneer
Consolidation
Growth

The pioneer stage is characterized by new settlement and clear-
ing of the forest. The consolidation stage involves the devel-
opment of the community and its infrastructure. A phase of
growth should then follow. This framework has been used in the
planning and implementation of the"AID projects in Chane-Piray
and San Julian. The goal of both projects has been to acceler-
ate development by reducing the time required to pass through
the preliminary stages, facilitating the growth of stable, pro-
ductive economic activities.

Although both areas have been settled by highland migrant
farmers, they are significantly different in several ways.
Chane-Piray settlement is much older than San Julian settle-
ment, since it began in the mid-1960s. San Julian settlement
began in 1972, grew slowly until 1975, and from 1976 to 1980
experienced a tremendous increase in new settlements. Chane-
Piray has been settled by spontaneous settlers, who originally
entered the area when it was opened up by a Gulf Oil Company
exploration trail. San Julian, on the other hand, has been a
semi-directed effort from the beginning and has received out-
side support ranging from the original settlement design to
ongoing technical extension services. The differences in
settlement age and degree of technical guidance have had a
significant impact on the types of economic problems encoun-
tered and the way in which they are addressed in each case.

Perhaps the most dramatic difference between these two
areas, in terms of agricultural production, is that Chane-Piray
finds itself in the midst of the "barbecho crisis." Barbecho
refers to once-cleared and cultivated land that has been left
to be reclaimed by secondary jungle growth. As very little
virgin forest remains in the area, cultivation must take place


C-3

on barbecho, where production is characterized by higher labor
costs, increased weed and insect problems, and falling yields.
In San Julian, on the other hand the "chaqueado" still predom-
inates, in which high forest is cut and burned and the rich but
thin virgin soil exploited. Production costs are lower, weeds
and insect infestation are minimal, and yields are favorable.

Because of the general scarcity of data the evaluation
team found it difficult to make a comparative assessment of
economic impacts over an extended period of time in the two
areas. This would have given a more concrete sense of the "be-
fore and after" situations. An effort is made here to present
the best4picture available of certain key economic issues re-
lating to agricultural production. Section 2 below provides a
comparative description of farm production and income in Chane-
Piray and San Julian. Section 3 discusses the production tech-
nologies available to the farmers and highlights the reasons
for the choices they make as well as some of the short- and
long-term problems they subsequently encounter. Section 4
deals with the efforts of the farmers and FIDES, within the
panorama laid out in the first two sections, to work out alter-
native farming systems that will allow a more stable, secure,
and productive existence for the small farmer.


2. Farm Production and Income

Rains, soils, and other production-related ecological con-
ditions change every 25 kilometers (km) in the two areas. In
San Julian alone, four ecological regions exist. The types of
crops cultivated vary accordingly. Following is a brief de-
scription of the two areas contrasting their land use, yield,
production, and profit.


a. Chane-Piray

Most of the settlers in Chane-Piray are small commercial
farmers, producing rice and corn as their principal crops.
However, in the southern part of the region, there are a sig-
nificant number of larger commercial farmers, producing cane,
rice, corn, and soybeans. In the wetter northern area where
cane cultivation is not appropriate, rice and corn are the ma-
jor crops. Yucca, soybean, plantain, and vegetables are also
raised.

Individual farm plots total 120,000 hectares (ha) with
farm sizes officially ranging from 10 to 50 ha, based on the
varying size of initial government land grants. The size of
the initial plot is not particularly meaningful, however,












because of the tendency to buy up extra land or to control
several plots through family members. Larger operators have
tended to follow the earlier pioneers, often buying up and
consolidating lands first cultivated by the earlier arrivals.
A significant land rental market also exists.


Land Use. Accurate, up-to-date information on farm pro-
duction in Chane-Piray is difficult to find. The Maxwell and
Pozo survey provides useful information although its survey
sample was small. Few respondents in that area were cultivat-
ing all their land. The majority, 70 percent, were working
less than 20 percent of the lands available to them. Most of
the rest still worked well under half their land. Fifty-three
percent of the total lands worked were planted with rice, 11
percent with corn, 5 percent with plantain, and 3 percent with
yucca. Relatively little land was dedicated to permanent
crops, such as coffee, cacao, and citrus trees. Seventy-two
percent of the Chane-Piray respondents reported no permanent
crops although 24 percent did have up to 2.5 ha in permanent
crop production. A similar situation was found in the estab-
lishment of pastures: 63 percent had no pasture and only 8
percent had more than 10 ha of pasture. I

The small amount of virgin forest still available in
Chane-Piray severely limits the options of the farmers. Sixty-
five percent of the respondents had no virgin forest left.
Most of the farmers find themselves with the greater part of
their lands in barbecho, reclaimed by secondary growth. Thir-
ty-five percent of the survey respondents indicated that over
80 percent of their lands was in barbecho. The rest had up to
80 percent in barbecho with none having less than 20 percent.


Yields. A 1980 CORDECRUZ report on the 220,000 ha area
around San Pedro found rice yields in barbecho lands to be be-
tween 1,400 and 2,120 kilograms per hectare (kg/ha). Pure
maize stand yields were 1,840-2,070 kg/ha. Maize planted in
alternative rows with rice yielded 320-415 kg/ha. Rice worked
with machines yielded 2,120-3,000 kg/ha and pure maize, 2,300-
2,760 kg/ha.


Farm Production. On the average, individual farm produc-
tion is higher in Chane-Piray than in San Julian. The Maxwell
and Pozo survey found that 89 percent of the respondents pro-
duced up to 9.7 tons of rice annually with an average of 5.6
tons. An average of 2.3 tons of corn was produced by farmers
in the same area. Twenty-two percent produced over 2.5 tons.


Marketing. Although a significant proportion of the an-
nual crops produced in the area is destined for family con-
sumption or seed, more rice is marketed than in San Julian.
Maxwell and Pozo reported that the respondents sold an average
of 4.3 tons of rice. Seventy-eight percent marketed up to 9.9
tons. Fourteen percent sold none. Most of the maize produced
never reached the market as 64 percent of the respondents mar-
keted no corn.


Gross Crop Income. In recent years agricultural prices
have fluctuated tremendously, reflecting the high inflation
characterizing the national economic crisis and the adverse
weather conditions, such as drought and flooding, in different
areas of Bolivia. For example, in the 1982 rice harvest, a
fanega (177 kg) of rice began with a price of $b2,000 (Bolivian
pesos). In September of 1983, only a year later, it sold at
over $b24,000, or a twelvefold increase. Consequently, it is
very difficult to evaluate the present state of agricultural
prices and their impact on production.


Farm Profit and Family Income. Average farm profits in
Chane-Piray are higher than in San Julian. Eighty-six percent
of those in the Maxwell aqd Pozo survey reported a farm profit
of up to U.S.$1,600 ($b25 = U.S.$1.00 in 1979). Twenty-five
percent reported between U.S.$200.00 and U.S.$800.00, and 24
percent reported a profit of up to U.S.$200.00. The average
profit was U.S.$855.00. Nonagricultural income was shown to be
relatively insignificant as 80 percent received no such income.
Only 7 percent earned over U.S.$400.00 in nonagricultural in-
come, while 13 percent earned up to U.S.$400.00.


b. San Julian


The San Julian settlers, unlike those in Chane-Piray, have
only recently begun to break out of subsistence into commercial
cropping. The principal crops are rice and maize, with the
latter concentrated in the more southern areas where rainfall
is less. Yucca, potatoes, green peppers, onions, and other
vegetable crops are produced throughout the zone. There are
still relatively few large commercial farm enterprises. Due to
the government policy, the size of individual farm plots is al-
most uniformly 50 ha. As in Chane-Piray, individual families
often control several plots through family members. Some land
rental also exists.


Land Use. The Maxwell and Pozo study in 1979 included in-
terviews with 54 settlers in southern San Julian in nucleos 3,











4, and 5. Although this implies a bias in the sample because
of different climatic conditions, greater access through the
German highway to markets and inputs, and older areas of set-
tlement, the results can indicate certain patterns that are
meaningful for the zone as a whole.

Maxwell and Pozo found that 92 percent (as opposed to 70
percent in Chane-Piray) of the respondents worked less than 20
percent of their total available land. This reflects the fact
that San Julian is a newer settlement. A wider survey of the
area also carried out in 1979 indicated that the average set-
tler had 2.1 ha in annual crops (Wing). Many more settlers in
San Julian have perennials than in Chane-Piray. Permanent
crops have been consistently promoted by development agencies
in San Julian since its settlement. Maxwell and Pozo found
that 60 percent of their respondents had up to 2.5 ha of perma-
nent crops. The amount of land converted to pasture is not so
encouraging, however. Maxwell and Pozo found that 87 percent
had no pastures established. Only 13 percent had up to 2.5 ha.

Unlike in Chane-Piray, the settlers in San Julian have
less of their lands in barbecho. This is mainly a function of
the age of the settlement: the areas of earliest settlement in
the zone, which are represented in the Maxwell and Pozo survey
sample, show the most barbecho. Fifty-one percent of their
respondents stated that up to 20 percent of their lands was in
secondary growth although half of the farms had no barbecho.
Wing found that the average farm had 0.3 ha in fallow and sec-
ondary growth, relatively less because his sample included new-
er nucleos along the Brecha Casarabe. The greatest part of the
settlers' land remains as unexploited virgin forest. All of
the farmers in the Maxwell and Pozo San Julian sample reported
having over 80 percent virgin forest, an average per settler
family of 46 ha.


Yields. FIDES personnel indicate that rice yields tend to
be 1,417-2,120 kg/ha. Corn yields are 2,760-3,220 kg/ha with
as much as 4,600 kg/ha reported with the use of improved corn
varieties. These yields were as good or better than those re-
ported in Chane-Piray. Obviously, yields vary over time be-
cause of weather conditions, input availability, labor supply,
and other variable factors.


Farm Production. Information on individual farm produc-
tion in San Julian is scarce. Individual farm production in
San Julian is somewhat lower on average than in Chane-Piray,
again a situation related to its more recent settlement. The
Maxwell and Pozo survey showed that 98 percent of the respon-
dents produced under 9.7 tons of rice in 1979. The average was


2.3 tons. In regard to corn production, 47 percent produced
less than ,5 ton; 41 percent produced between .55 and 2.5 tons.


Marketing Poor road conditions and inadequate market in-
formation discourage more commercially oriented production.
Fewer colonists in San Julian than in Chane-Piray marketed rice
although 45 percent did market up to 1.9 tons; 21 percent sold
between 2.1 and 3.9 tons, and the average sold was 1.3 tons.
Proportionately more of the San Julian corn production reached
the market than in Chane-Piray; 47 percent sold at least some
corn. The average corn marketed was 0.5 ton.


Farm Profit and Family Income. The Maxwell and Pozo sur-
vey showed that the average farm profit in the older nucleos
was U.S.$548 ($b.25 = U.S.$1), a good deal lower than that of
Chane-Piray. Ninety-eight percent of the respondents earned a
total farm profit of less than U.S.$1,600. However, propor-
tionately more were found in the middle, with 45 percent earn-
ing between U.S.$200 and U.S.$800. Twenty-four percent earned
less than U.S.$200. In his 1978 survey including the newer
colonies, Wing found an annual on-farm gross income of U.S.$317
($b20 = U.S.$1).

Unlike in Chane-Piray, nonagricultural income plays a more
significant role in the generation of resources. Many San
Julian settlers who were formerly wage laborers continue to
leave the zone during the off-season to search for off-farm
work. Maxwell and Pozo found that although 56 percent had re-
ceived no such income, 32 percent earned up to U.S.$200 in this
manner. Eight percent earned between U.S.$201 and U.S.$800.
The farmers in San Julian had a total family income only
slightly-lower than those in Chane-Piray.


San Julian


Total Income (U.S.$)

0-250
251-500
501-1,000
1,001-1,500
($b20 = U.S.$1)


Respondents (%)

16
24
30
16


Source: Maxwell and Pozo, 1979: Table 137.

Farm production in Chane-Piray and San Julian is still
basically subsistence dominated, although there are significant
signs of consolidation and, to some extent, growth stages, as












seen in the increasingly market-oriented production and the di-
versification of agriculture. The San Julian farmers are pro-
ducing slightly less than the farmers in Chane-Piray, although
their yields are as good or better. While less rice was mar-
keted from San Julian than from Chane-Piray, more corn came
from San Julian. Farm incomes in San Julian were only a little
lower than in Chane-Piray, and income earned from outside
sources was higher. What is significant is that farmers in a
new settlement with less cleared land and less capital are do-
ing nearly as well as those in a settlement begun many years
earlier.


3. Production Technology

Traditionally, the small farmer chooses the slash and burn
system; it is a rational choice, involving considerable knowl-
edge and management skills. It maximizes labor, the most
available production factor, and minimizes dependence on out-
side inputs. However, it involves great risk taking, does not
encourage the transition to commercial farming, and tends to
lead to the barbecho crisis. Section a below explores the
basis for using slash and burn and some of the short- and long-
term problems associated with it.
Mechanization, for the small farmer, often seems to be an
attractive alternative to the traditional system. It replaces
hand labor, allowing a significant increase in the area culti-
vated. It can increase yields under proper conditions. How-
ever, it basically implies a heavy credit investment, increases
dependence on outside inputs, and requires an effective main-
tenance and repair component. It also involves more intensive
tillage with potential adverse environmental impacts. Mechani-
zation is discussed in Section b.

Finally, Section c deals with animal traction as an alter-
native or a supplement to traditional hand labor and mechaniza-
tion. It can reduce the small farmer's risks and increase his
capacity to work the land. Its investment costs are lower than
with mechanization. Dependency on outside inputs is decreased
and local multiplier effects are significant. On the other
hand, significant initial-capital and labor investments are
necessary. Pastures must be established and considerable
skills must be mastered to manage and maintain the system.


a. Slash and Burn Cultivation

"The settler family, not the land or the water resources,
is the main resource, and the new lands settlement can


only catalyze a process of area development if the settler
family has the incentive and the opportunity to produce."
(Scudder, 1981:10)

Slash and burn cultivation involves the progressive cut-
ting down and burning of virgin forest, followed by the plant-
ing of subsistence and commercial crops, usually on a small
scale. The overwhelming majority of settlers in San Julian use
the slash and burn production method as do three-quarters of
all farmers in Chane-Piray. The choice of this method does not
necessarily imply the absence of technical knowledge on the
part of the farmer. Maxwell, Stutley, and Bojanic (1982),
commenting on farm development in the San Pedro area of
Chane-Piray, observed that the small farmer manages a complex
business with a high degree of rationality. Slash and burn
cultivation, in order to be a successful production strategy,
requires an intimate understanding of the management of limited
capital and labor resources.

Curtis, in his 1979 evaluation of the first phase of this
project, observes that there are two patterns of slash and burn
agriculture. The first is a purely migratory pattern where
land is cleared and farmed until yields begin to fall off.
These used plots, usually about 3 ha, are then abandoned for
new virgin forest where the farlier repeats the process. The
second pattern is a more stable one in which a plot is cleared,
exploited for 2 or 3 years, then left fallow while the farmer
moves on. Eventually, he returns to cultivate the original
land which has regained some fertility over time.

Slash and burn cultivation is a land-extensive, labor-
intensive operation, requiring little capital investment. In
Santa Cruz, land is not the limiting factor. Large entrepre-
neurs have exploited great expanses of land in this fashion al-
though success still depends on investment in large quantities
of labor. The land worked by the small farmer is usually lim-
ited to the 2 to 5 ha he can clear and keep clear with just his
and his family's labor. There is little dependence on off-farm
inputs that require capital investment since the average small
farmer begins with little other than hand tools and seeds.

Slash and burn production, then, emphasizes the maximiza-
tion of the most available factor of production: labor.
Castro (1978) estimates that the system requires a labor input
of 41-51 persondays/ha of which 20-30 persondays are for land
clearing, 6 persondays for burning, and 15 persondays for
planting. Given the resources available to the average farm
family, he calculated that the system requires 227 persondays
per year, 199 of which are family labor and 28 are hired labor.








C-10


Slash and burn agriculture has its disadvantages, however.
First of all, it is physically dangerous. In San Julian, for
example, by mid-October of the 1983 land clearing season, 12
deaths had been reported from accidents, most involving falling
trees. Another disadvantage of the system is that it is usual-
ly not self-capitalizing. In order to maintain and increase
its profitability, generated capital must be reinvested in
labor. As the amount of cultivated land exceeds that which the
farmer can handle without hired labor, his risk increases dra-
matically. The system does not facilitate the escape from sub-
sistence to commercial farming, which requires extremely shrewd
management and considerable risk taking. Because of its high
risk, those who make a "success" of slash and burn agriculture
tend to be those who seize upon the right moment to sell out
and invest in nonfarm ventures, such as a truck or small res-
taurant.

Perhaps the major disadvantage of slash and burn agricul-
ture in Santa Cruz, and that which makes it untenable in the
long term, is that it tends to lead the farmer into the bar-
becho crisis. The farmer tends to farm newly cleared land only
1 or 2 years. He avoids working in barbecho because of the
higher level of insect infestation and the competition with
weeds. Expensive inputs are then required which make produc-
tion costs much higher. Soil fertility and yields are lower
since the layer of topsoil is relatively thin. Maize, for ex-
ample, tends to yield an average of 3,220 kg the first year,
drops below 2,760 kg the second year, and to less than 1,840 kg
in the third year. The small traditional farmer's answer to
this is to move to more fertile areas, leaving his old lands to
be consolidated by large, mechanized farmers or cattle opera-
tors.

Table C-l shows a reasonably successful slash and burn ex-
perience from the producer's point of view. It assumes that in
the third and fourth year, the farmer is able to find and use
increasing amounts of hired labor. Three major ideas are sug-
gested in this model.

The farmer is making a profit each year which is rein-
vested in the next year's expansion of production.

This is a "game of roulette" which can set the farmer
back to zero in the case of crop failure in even one
year, minus a significant proportion of his nonrenew-
able resource, virgin forest.

The farmer may confront the barbecho crisis in the
ninth year, forcing him to abandon his land for new
forest or to find an alternative production strategy.


Table C-l. Traditional Slash and Burn Modell


Years

50 Hectares 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Annual Crops 1 2 4 6 11 15 15 15 15 12

New Clearing 1 1 3 3 7 8 7 8 7 5

Barbecho 0 0 1 2 4 8 15 23 30 38

Uncleared Forest 49 48 45 42 35 27 20 12 5 0

1Assumptions: 1. Farmer cultivates land 2 years before moving
on to new forest
2. Favorable market conditions
3. Reinvestment of returns in production expan-
sion
4. Maximum cultivation of 15 ha a year because
of labor constraints at harvest


This model is a suggestion of what is possible given the
small farmer's goals. The actual progression varies widely as
does the point at which virgin forest is exhausted.


b. Mechanization


Mechanization often offers an attractive alternative to
traditional hand labor. A replacement for the time-consuming,
backbreaking hand labor carries a great deal of-appeal for the
traditional farmer in Santa Cruz. Mechanization implies the
use of capital to replace labor in two ways: through the use
of tractors in land preparation and through the purchase of
inputs such as herbicides and insecticides. The use of machin-
ery allows an increase in farmed area and can also allow a more
intensive working of the land. It may also be used selective-
ly, in conjunction with traditional hand labor or animal trac-
tion.

The acquisition of farm machinery implies a heavy credit
repayment and the purchaser often suffers a severe cash flow
problem. The investment in machinery may be justified, how-


C-11








C-12


ever, especially if money is borrowed at fixed rates, given the
highly inflationary situation in Bolivia.

Mechanization for the small farmer has other complica-
tions. Machine clearing is not as desirable since it tends to
destroy the valuable top soil. Also, in order to introduce
farm machinery, tree stumps must be removed from the land.
Mechanization increases dependence on outsiders for critical
inputs while increasing the farmer's risks. It requires con-
siderable foreign exchange for the purchase of machines and
replacement parts, and fuel costs are high and continue to
rise. It requires the existence of repair facilities and well-
trained personnel. Machinery breakdown at critical moments in
the production cycle, especially given the limitations on work-
ing days imposed by seasonal rains, can be disastrous for the
small farmer.

In order to be economically feasible, the machinery must
be used effectively and continuously. Castro estimates that
120 ha a year would have to be plowed and harrowed by one trac-
tor in order to break even. However, the question of economic
feasibility is an extremely complicated one which depends on
many factors. If used strategically and effectively by a large
farmer or a group of smaller farmers, it can be a favorable
alternative or supplement to traditional hand labor or animal
traction.

Farm machinery is often used on a contract basis by indi-
viduals or groups of small farmers. It may be used at critical
production times such as land clearing to substitute for large
quantities of scarce labor. However, for the hirer, the
machinery must be available at the opportune moment or its
utility is lost and the reliance on its input becomes a serious
liability. The contract machinery pool also raises crucial ad-
ministrative issues, such as who gets priority and when.

If the cultivated area is increased through the introduc-
tion of machinery used solely for land clearing, hand labor
must be able to keep pace during later critical production per-
iods. For example, if 15 ha are cleared by machines and
planted, sufficient labor must be found to work intensively
during the short weeding season. Likewise, sufficient labor
must be available to harvest the larger crop. Many farmers in
this situation have been forced to abandon unharvested crops in
the fields because of hired labor shortages.


Yield. The introduction of machinery may cause an in-
crease in crop yields. It has been observed in Chane-Piray
that yields can be higher on fields in barbecho when they are
worked with machinery. CORDECRUZ found that rice yields were
2,600 kg/ha with machinery as opposed to 1,760 kg/ha with hand


labor. Corn yields increased from about 1,950 kg/ha with hand
labor to 2,520 kg/ha with machinery. Again, this yield in-
crease depends on the presence of the machinery inputs at the
proper time.


Ecological Impact. The impact of motorized machinery on
the soils is much more adverse than that of traditional hand
labor or animal traction. Machine clearing, unless done skill-
fully and conscientiously, can remove the thin top layer of
fertile soil. Its use in cultivation implies heavy tillage
that further damages the land, as opposed to the no tillage of
the traditional system and the mlhimum tillage of animal trac-
tion. Heavy reliance on mechanization and intensive, prolonged
cultivation will require the introduction of fertilizers to
maintain the fertility of the tropical soils, an expensive in-
put tied to foreign-exchange.


c. Animal Traction


The development of animal traction as a technological al-
ternative to traditional hand labor and motorized mechanization
has been going on in Santa Cruz for over 20 years. The Menno-
nite colonists in several areas use animal traction and are a
valuable source of experience and expertise as well as of basic
equipment. Also, several development agencies have been study-
ing and experimenting with animal traction over the same period
of time, including the Mennonite Central Committee, the Menno-
nite Economic Development Association, the Methodist Church, La
Merced Cooperative, and the Foundation for Integral Development
(FIDES). They found that animal traction, while not by any
means a "cure-all," is a feasible technology, as either a sub-
stitute for or a supplement to traditional hand labor and mo-
torized mechanization.

One of the most significant obstacles in the use of animal
traction is the prejudice of many people who consider it to be
a second-rate technology. It is often difficult to overcome
the preference for a "more advanced" technology even when it
may not be the most economically beneficial.


Advantages of Animal Traction Over Traditional Hand Labor.
Animal traction can significantly reduce the risks of the small
farmer. It allows him to capitalize, thereby reducing opera-
tional expenses for a given crop. Unlike the traditional hand
labor system, with animal traction he does not have all of his
capital riding on the success of one year's crop.


C-13








C-14


C-15


Animal traction can increase the farmer's capacity to work
his land, thereby facilitating his emergence from subsistence
farming to commercial farming. A farmer using animal traction
in heavy soil without tractor support can work 4 to 5 ha. In
sandy soil, he can work 5 to 10 ha.

Total family labor may be used more effectively and the
peaks in labor demand at critical production periods may be
leveled out. Castro estimates that the total number of person-
days per hectare required with animal traction is reduced from
40 to 29. The labor demand is distributed more evenly because
the women and children participate in the ongoing maintenance
of animals and pastures. The return to family labor may be
increased because it uses the family's resources more effi-
ciently. Table C-2 shows how labor costs can be lowered
significantly with the use of animal traction. Fixed costs,
however, are higher.


Table C-2.


Comparative Costs of Traditional and
Animal Traction Systems
(in Bolivian pesos)


Traditional System Animal Traction
Other Other
Labor Variable Fixed Labor Variable Fixed
Crop Costs Costs Costs Costs Costs Costs

Corn 2,200 1,255 540 825 1,525 1,540
Rice 3,050 1,370 540 1,410 1,270 1,540


Source: Castro, 1978:28


Advantages of Animal Traction Over Mechanization. The
minimum tillage of animal traction is less damaging to the soil
than the intensive tillage of mechanization. The foreign ex-
change costs of animal traction, unlike those of motorized
mechanization, are very low and fuel costs are zero. Invest-
ment costs per hectare are lower. Animal traction teams are
more economically viable with as little as 4 to 7 ha under cul-
tivation and with a capacity of up to 12 ha. A 35-horsepower
tractor, on the other hand, is not economically viable with
less than 40 ha under cultivation. The cash costs of operating
the teams are a small fraction of the cash costs of mechaniza-
tion. Animal traction makes the farmer less dependent on out-
side sources for critical inputs and decreases the risks of a


parts shortage. Farmers are more insulated from the input mar-
ket, and the availability of services at the proper moment is
virtually assured. The local multiplier effects of animal
traction are higher than with motorized mechanization since the
creation of an internal network of supportive components is en-
couraged. Draft animals can be bred, veterinary services de-
veloped, and implements built and repaired in the area. Animal
traction can also be combined with the use of mechanization for
the initial land clearing which is a prerequisite to the intro-
duction of horse-drawn equipment. Tractor support in this case
can increase the area that can be worked effectively.


Disadvantages of Animal Traction. Although the initial
costs of animal traction are less than that of machinery, the
farmer still needs considerable capital to get started. For
the small farmer, the equipment itself is relatively expensive
and may require him to work winter as well as summer crops.
Another major obstacle is the strong investment in the land
preparation necessary before introducing animal traction. The
returns from the removal of tree stumps necessary before intro-
ducing equipment are questioned by technical people in the
field. Although stump removal allows a higher yield on plowed
land and facilitates winter cropping, the rate of return de-
pends on several other variable factors, such as soil, weed
control, insect damage, and efficient system management.

The establishment of pastures is also costly. Improved
seeds are often difficult to obtain and require considerable
labor input over an extended period of time. The establishment
of pastures also requires a shift in exploitation strategies to
one involving a more long-term commitment to the land. For
many subsistence farmers, time and money invested in pastures
is "wasted" considering the heavy demand made on their labor
resources by their annual crops. The difficulties involved in
establishing pastures have been a major impediment to the via-
bility of animal traction in Chane-Piray and San Julian.

Another serious obstacle to the use of animal traction is
that good draft animals are difficult to obtain in eastern
Bolivia, as are harnesses and cultivating equipment. An ade-
quate supply of replacement parts and other hardware must also
be available. Repair facilities, including blacksmithing, are
imperative in order to avoid the same kind of maintenance prob
lems that are encountered with motorized mechanization. The
farmer must learn how to select, train, and care for his draft
animals. He must also learn the appropriate tillage technique
related to the unique production conditions on his own land.
He must possess an adequate knowledge of agronomic procedures
such as the appropriate plant population, seed varieties, and
crop rotation in relation to the type of tillage being carried
out. The first experience in animal traction in the Cuatro









C-16


Ojitos area in the 1960s demonstrated that unless these materi-
als and technical inputs are available, the application of
animal traction technology is not usually replicable beyond a
few model farms.


4. Diversified Family Farm Systems


Farmers in both Chane-Piray and San Julian are pursuing
basically identical production strategies involving annual
crops and the traditional slash and burn system. However, the
older Chane-Piray area has not seen a timely development of al-
ternative strategies more appropriate for long-term economic
stability. It now finds itself in the midst of the barbecho
crisis. Its options for an escape from its dead end in a man-
ner favorable to the small farmer's situation are limited. In
San Julian, however, there is still time to develop appropriate
technologies and farming systems that could enable,the small
farmer to have a more compatible long-term relationship to his
environment and a more stable, improved standard of living.
The following two sections discuss how the farmers in the two
areas are coping with their problems and limitations. At great
social and economic cost, farmers in Chane-Piray have on their
own found several responses to the dilemmas posed by the tradi-
tional system. In San Julian, an alternative farm system is
being promoted that should allow the problems of the tradition-
al system to be addressed before the barbecho crisis is
reached. A model of a farm in San Julian is presented to il-
lustrate what farmers are doing to avoid the problems encoun-
tered in Chane-Piray.


a. Chane-Piray.


Maxwell, Stutley, and Bojanic (1982) observe that about
1,500 farms in the San Pedro area have begun to develop a more
diversified, stable agriculture with greater capital and higher
income. Three major "avenues of escape" from the barbecho
crisis have been observed:

Stump removal and partial mechanization (plowing) with
either a tractor hired for land preparations or the
use of hand labor

Cattle operations

Permanent cropping (small-scale)


The 1979 survey found that 16 percent of the respondents
had undertaken stump removal and shifted to partial mechaniza-
tion. Seven percent of the total respondents had livestock
operations. Farms classified as permanent cropping operations
made up 5 percent of the total.

Maxwell, Stutley, and Bojanic have found that the farmers
with livestock are faring better than those without. Although
all farmers face seasonal gash and labor problems, those with
diverse sources of income re able to manage their cash flow
more successfully. These researchers point out that alterna-
tive strategies based on minimum tillage, livestock, and per-
manent crops show promise.


b. San Julian

The main thrust of AID-supported technical agricultural
assistance in San Julian has been toward the development and
promotion of a diversified farming model. This model should
establish the small farm as a stable, self-capitalizing, com-
mercial enterprise that will allow the farmer to avoid the
greatest problems posed by secondary jungle growth.

The diversified farming model promoted in San Julian has
two main variations: an emphasis on annual cropping or an em-
phasis on livestock, primarily cattle. Each proposes a multi-
ple crop sequence involving both annual and permanent crops,
the elimination of barbecho with leguminous plants that serve
both as cover and forage, the introduction of livestock, and
the use of animal traction. The concepts of graduality, capi-
talization, and diversification are stressed in both cases.

The model is a gradually evolving one which moves the
farmer from traditional slash and burn cultivation through
stages of increasing complexity, eventually leading to a highly
integrated system. This should allow the incremental develop-
ment of managerial skills and technology and reduce risks
through a balanced growth of the debt load. The farm operation
is expanded, although forest cover is removed at a slower rate
than in the traditional system. The barbecho cycle is broken
as incremental stump removal and leguminous overcropping allow
the introduction of animal traction equipment and the beginning
of livestock production.

The model is designed to be largely self-capitalizing.
Net worth is built up through cleared land, simple infrastruc-
ture, animal traction equipment, and the natural increase of
herds and permanent crops. The use of timber sales to generate
development capital has been suggested. A relatively low pro-
portion of purchased inputs is required since many inputs, such


C-17









C-19


C-18


as those for livestock production, are produced on-farm. Cred-
it needs are kept as low as possible in relation to gross in-
come and net worth.

The diversification of the model spreads out the market
and physical risks involved in production. Income is less vul-
nerable to crop failure and price drops. Cash flow and labor
requirements are better distributed. Also, dependence on out-
side sources for material and financial inputs is reduced as
the integrated system becomes established.

The model described below is not intended to be a strict
and rigid plan for introducing changes; it should, instead,
demonstrate the relationships among integrated components of
the system. The farmer's progress through the model varies de-
pending on a wide range of internal and exogenous factors.

Figure C-1 shows that some innovation is introduced in the
first year with the establishment of perennial plants. How-
ever, it is in the second year that more extensive innovation
begins. By the second or third year, the farmer has 1 ha on
which he has his house,' garden, and small animals and 4 ha of
annual crops produced after slash and burn clearing and some
perennial plants.


Figure C-1. Diversified Farm Model, Year 2-3


URBAN
AREA
NUCLEO


1 ha:
2 ha:
3 ha:


home, garden, small animals
slash and burn annual crops in 2nd year
slash and burn annual crops and perennial plants in
1st year


Figure C-2 shows that by the fifth to the seventh year,
permanent pastures have been established in areas previously
cultivated with annual crops. The farmer has 2 ha of permanent
plants, a 2-ha uncleared woodlot, 5 ha in annual crops on land
both with and without stumps, 5 ha of uncleared forest, and an
additional 5 ha with tree stumps and planted in corn and peren-
nial plants. With sufficient credit, the farmer introduces
animal traction or cattle at this stage.


Figure C-2. Diversified Farm Model, Years 5-7


URBAN
AREA -
NUCLEO


(1) 1 ha: home, garden, small animals
(2) 2 ha: permanent pasture
(3) 2 ha: perennial plants
(4) 2 ha: woodlot (uncleared)
(5) 5 ha: annual crops in rotation
(6) 5 ha: pastures on rotation program (mix)
(7) 2 ha: woodlot
(8) 5 ha: corn/perennial plants, cleared by slash and burn,
with no stump removal

Introduction of cattle and/or
Introduction of animal traction, with sufficient credit


In the ninth to eleventh years, the model takes one of two
diverging paths, toward an emphasis on annual cropping worked
with animal traction or toward an emphasis on cattle production
(see Figures C-3 and C-4). In the annual cropping variation,
the 5 ha previously in rotated annual crops are put into pas-
ture. The next 5 ha are in annual crops, worked with animal
traction and tractor support. Beyond the woodlot, 10 ha are in
leguminous pastures and cover and are in the process of natural
stump decay. Five ha of perennial plants, 10 ha of cover
crops, and 5 ha in annual crops follow.

The cattle production variation of the model has 10 ha of
pastures put in behind the first woodlot, followed by an addi-
tional 2 ha of uncleared forest. Five hectares of annual
crops, 5 ha of calf pasture, and 5 ha of a leguminous overcrop
follow. After that, an additional 5 ha of perennial plants or
pasture are established, then 10 ha of pasture. Approximately
1 ha is used for fence rows.

The use of model farm families in San Julian has proved
useful in demonstrating the feasibility of the innovations
described in the previous section. However, FIDES learned that
incorporating self-identification into the model family selec-
tion process was most effective. Of the eight model families
selected by community vote in nucleo 17, four proved to be ef-
fective, self-motivated, diversified farmers. Following that









C-21


experience, additional model farm families were identified and
supported more informally rather than being set publicly apart
from their peers.


Figure C-3. Diversified Farm Model, Years 9-11:
Annual Cropping Emphasis



URBAN
AREA (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
NUCLEO -


1% 1 *. hmn tardn smal11 animals


permanent pasture
perennial plants
woodlot
pasture (with stump removal in rotation program)
annual crops under animal traction with tractor
support
woodlot
pasture and cover (stumps are being removed)
perennials (no stump removal)
cover (stumps to be removed)
annual crops with perennials


Figure C-4. Diversified Farm Model, Years 9-11:
Cattle Emphasis


AREAN (2 () 4 () 6) () 8) (9 10 ( 1
URBAN
AREA (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
NUCLEO


home, garden, small animals
permanent pasture
perennial plants
woodlot
pasture (with stump removal in rotation program)
woodlot
annual crops
calf pasture
cover crop (legume) rotation
perennials or pasture
pasture
fence rows


The introduction of permanent plants such as citrus, cof-
fee, and cacao trees was well received. Through a concentrated
and extended effort, about 10 thousand citrus trees of several
varieties were sold to settlers in 35 communities. Coffee and
cacao seeds were distributed among groups of settlers in sever-
al communities to be germinated and then transplanted on the
farms. Some 20,000 plants were distributed in this fashion.
Half of the plants raised were returned to FIDES to be sold to
other settlers. FIDES estimates that there were 2,100 ha of
permanent plants in all of San Julian in 1983, including those
from other sources. Acquisition of these new plants with the
settlers' own resources was felt to be an important prerequi-
site expression of commitment to their incorporation into di-
versified farming. Just recently, 500 fruit and nut plants of
45 varieties were imported from Brazil to be field tested and
made available to the settlers.

The promotion of winter crops such as beans and improved
corn was emphasized. Although settlers were open to experi-
menting with winter crops such as beans, the lack of an ade-
quate and timely market was a major problem. The trials of
improved corn showed better yields than traditional corn, al-
though the number of farmers who could purchase improved corn
seed through the cooperative was limited because of supply
problems. It also has been observed that a need exists for
educating farmers to distinguish the quality of annual crop
varieties since farmers are often unaware of the true grade of
their products.

The establishment of pastures has been a slow process.
The high costs in time and labor as well as the problem of
obtaining improved pastures have been the major limiting fac-
tors. The amount of improved pastures in the area is growing,
however. Most nucleos are reported to have at least some pas-
tures which can be used for multiplication purposes. FIDES es-
timates that 1,200 ha of pastures have been established along
the Rio Grande-Los Angeles road.

Sixteen head of cattle have been introduced in three
nucleos through a FIDES dairy cattle program. Cattle commit-
tees have been formed in each participating community to admin-
ister the distribution of the animals. Two new calves have
been born and are to be returned to the appropriate committee
to be delivered to another farmer. Each beneficiary must have
at least 1 ha of pasture, a water source, and a basic livestock
shelter.

The promotion of animal traction appears to be most effec-
tive when theory and on-farm demonstrations are combined with
the availability of the necessary material inputs in the area.
The equipment has been made available as consignment articles
through the settlers' cooperative. The incorporation of


% 1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)

(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)


(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)


C-20









C-23


C-22


farmers already using the equipment on their land as part of
the demonstrations is most convincing to the interested farmer
who has doubts about his ability to learn the necessary skills.
The existence of a repair facility within the area is the only
input not yet available, although the establishment of such a
facility is planned.

Perhaps the most important lesson learned on the promotion
of diversified farming from the FIDES Consolidation Project in
San Julian is that widespread adoption of the integrated model
(illustrated above) as an alternative to the traditional system
cannot take place until all of the components involved are
available and in place in the area. Even the demonstration of
the innovative concepts through model farmers is not sufficient
unless interested farmers can translate their interest into a
concrete commitment in action. The components for a diversi-
fied farming enterprise are now in place in the San Julian
zone, with the exception of the new animal traction repair
facility. Permanent plants, various winter crops, improved
pastures, dairy cattle, animal traction equipment, and agricul-
tural inputs are available to farmers interested in diversify-
ing their operations. FIDES personnel in the area who have
experience in other colonization zones state that for the first
time in the last 20 years, all of these components are present
and available to settlers looking for an alternative to tradi-
tional production methods.

FIDES's understanding of the issues described above and
its responses to them were developed through many years of
experience. Technical assistance activities have been based on
a profound familiarity with the options open to the small
farmer. They have been dedicated to helping the settler estab-
lish a stable, productive farm so that his options, whether
they be to remain permanently on his parcel or to use it as a
more effective stepping stone in his efforts toward a better
life, will be less limited by factors outside his control.

The main agricultural development problem faced in Chane-
Piray is the barbecho crisis. There, it seems that the dire
predictions of colonization's critics alluded to earlier are
becoming realized. A stable land tenure has not been estab-
lished by most small farmer settlers. Some lucky settlers have
done well, but the process tends toward one of consolidation of
small farms, extensive mechanization or introduction of large
cattle operations, and monopolization of most of the resources
by a few. Depending on the perspective, this situation may or
may not be all negative. But from the point of view of those
promoting a more equitable access to resources and opportuni-
ties and a wider distribution of the benefits of new-lands
settlement, the present scenario and future prospects of Chane-
Piray are not as satisfactory as could be hoped.


The evaluation team felt that in San Julian there is the
time, the knowledge, the capability, and the will to avert the
most negative consequences of an unself-conscious development
process. Based on the information provided in the previous
sections, it is safe to say that the San Julian settlers are
faring better than their counterparts in Chane-Piray fared at
the same stage of development. The AID-supported interventions
over the years have played an important role in San Julian's
relative success. Although the predominant production strategy
continues largely along traditional lines, there is, to a sig-
nificant degree, an awareness on the part of the settlers of
the need for a diversification of activities and more enlight-
ened strategies that take into account both their own long-term
interests and those of the environment that gives them suste-
nance.


B. Social Impacts


1. Response Capability


The settlers' basic needs are met when they first arrive
in the lowlands. During the orientation period in the San
Julian project, settlers are provided with enough to eat and a
roof over their heads. For the first critical months, these
provisions are absolutely necessary for survival. As the
months and years pass, however, the settlers are obliged to
fend for themselves. FIDES can provide services, advice, and
support to the community, but how it responds to the services
provided depends upon individual settler initiative. Through-
out the Consolidation Project emphasis has been placed on
avoiding dependency on outside agencies. The orientation pro-
gram stresses independent problem-solving. If the settlers in
San Julian are going to survive, they must have the ability to
work together to achieve goals.

Response capability has many facets. It can mean the
ability to organize to assert one's needs, either as a group or
through an effective representative. It can mean the ability
to solve problems whether they are technical or organizational.
It has a motivational aspect involving a willingness to help
others and an optimistic belief that situations are improvable.
The response capability of the settlers in San Julian appears
to be well developed. Some examples are provided below of how
the community responded t6 various obstacles.









C-24


a. Marketing Program c. Flood Emergency Response
a. Marketing Program


Up until 1982, the San Julian Multipurpose Cooperative had
four sections, including branches for savings and loans, con-
sumer goods, agricultural inputs, and home inputs. In 1983, a
new component was formed to market crops on a community level.
Cooperative members joined together to take all of the funds
available and combine them with two small outside loans.
Thirty-five to thirty-eight cooperative members in one NADEPA
participated. A cooperative member was then appointed as the
buyer and used the money to buy rice from other farmers. The
cooperative then contracted to have the rice processed and sold
at a profit. Before this, each individual farmer had sold his,
rice to an intermediary for a price 5 to 10 percent lower than
he had received from his cooperative. With the establishment
of the cooperative marketing component, the intermediary is
avoided, and the cooperative benefits as does the individual
farmer. The idea for the cooperative marketing component was
generated by the settlers themselves, with no outside assist-
ance. The settlers showed the ability to organize from within
to respond to a situation that had previously been beyond their
individual control.


b. The Road


From the start, the road has been a continual headache for
everyone. The NADEPAs located further up the Brecha Casarabe
have even more at stake because their contact to the outside
can easily be cut off completely.

For example, before the entrance to NADEPA V, there was an
extremely bad stretch of road that was often under water for
much of the year. The settlers in that NADEPA made several
attempts to obtain help from outside sources, but without suc-
cess. Finally, they decided that they would have to rely on
their own resources. The rainy season had already begun, so
there was no time to lose. The settlers decided that each
nucleo in the affected area would send 10 men each day to work
on the road. The section had to be drained completely and the
roadbed built up. They dug out the mud, sometimes with their
bare hands, and carted it away on their backs. Dry earth was
then brought to fill the resulting hole. After a week and a
half, others began to join in the effort. The National Insti-
tute of Colonization (INC) lent a truck and FIDES provided
fuel. A lumber truck operator lent some of his equipment.
Before the rainy season had really gotten underway, that sec-
tion of the road was in good repair. The initiative demon-
strated by the settlers shows an ability to tackle problems on
their own without any dependence on the outside.


In May 1983, San Julian experienced the worst flood ever
witnessed in the area. Over 1,000 families were forced to
evacuate their homes and lost their crops because of the rising
water. The main road was only passable by canoe, and many of
the homeless families began to suffer from exposure. The
nucleos responded by forming emergency committees to request
outside help. These committees were able to evaluate the flood
situation from within, decide who needed the most help, and
then distribute the aid when it arrived. Communities not so
seriously affected by the flood donated local foodstuffs to
those in need in other nucleos.

Other outside agencies responded to the crisis as well.
An Air Force helicopter made 15 flights from Santa Cruz to
nucleo 38 because the Rio Grande was impassable. Food and sup-
plies were flown in and the seriously ill were evacuated.
Radio communication between the FIDES basecamp and three of the
interior nucleos was maintained four times a day. The FIDES
extension agents worked directly with the victims of the flood,
helping to distribute supplies as they became available. The
extensionists collected information from the emergency com-
mittees to radio back to the basecamp. As more and more drugs
and supplies came in from outside sources, the San Julian Coop-
erative lent its unsold wagons and carts for use in transport-
ing these supplies. Emergency health committees were formed by
each nucleo to distribute them. After some discussion, they
decided to sell the drugs for a nominal fee to begin a rotating
fund to be used to replace the drug supplies.

Although the floods are over, the colonists will feel the
results of the disaster for A long time because entire harvests
were destroyed. The community, however, showed a well-devel-
oped response capability as they banded together in this emer-
gency situation.


d. Mobilization to Obtain Outside Services


In several cases, the colonists were able to organize
politically and approach the Bolivian Government and other out-
side sources for services. A few examples follow.


Schools. Schools have always been a high priority for the
colonists in San Julian. It is very important to the parents
that their children be able to read and write. A few years
after some of the first nucleos were formed, the community


C-25









C-26


C-27


organized to do something about the lack of educational facili-
ties. First, they built schools in the central nucleos so that
no child would have to walk more than 5 kilometers. Then the
committees elected representatives and sent them to the Minis-
try of Education. They stated that they had many children
requiring education and that the schools were already built.
The Ministry responded and provided approximately 14 teachers
in the San Julian region. Although the quality of education is
poor and there are still not enough schools to accommodate
everyone, rapid progress has been made in a relatively short
time.


The Federation of San Julian. In January 1982, the col-
onists banded together for the first time in a zone-wide Asso-
ciation of Agricultural Producers, whose main concern was to
improve the road. Although it lasted only a few months, later
in the year a more stable, zone-wide organization was founded
calling itself the Federation of San Julian Colonists. This
federation is taking an active political role in expressing the
needs of the settlers to outsiders.

The Federation has not been uncritical of the Consolida-
tion Project. Both FIDES and INC have received many com-
plaints, with the road again cited as the number one problem.
The Federation even went so far as to take over the INC head-
quarters for a day, early in 1983. They claimed that the INC
had not done its job and demanded an investigative commission.
It is hoped that the Federation will continue to function as a
cohesive unit, able to express the hopes and fears of the peo-
ple of San Julian. There are some problems, however, which
include the desire by some in the Federation to absorb the co-
operative, making it, in effect, a political institution.
While this would not be desirable from the point of view of the
Consolidation Project, FIDES has continued to be supportive of
and to work with the Federation.


Health. Health, like education, was not really a compo-
nent of the original project. With the exception of what was
offered in the orientation program, the colonists received lit-
tle outside support. The oldest nucleos (NADEPAS I, II, and
III) organized and went to the Ministry of Health demanding
services. The Ministry of Health has been paying full-time
salaries to 3 health workers in these NADEPAS for over 3 years.


Outside Evaluation Teams. The team which prepared this
report traveled throughout the project area. Upon our return
from nucleo 50, at the end of the project area, we encountered
a cable stretched across the road (at nucleo 47) and all of the


available men in the community standing by. They insisted that
the team come to their meeting hall to hear their grievances.
An awkward half hour followed as the men in the nucleo talked
and the team tried to explain that we could do no more than
pass along the nucleo's complaints regarding road conditions.
The people in nucleo 47 sensed that the traveling team may have
had access to money or power, and quickly mobilized forces to
express their desires to the outsiders.

All of the above examples illustrate how the San Julian
settlers have made great strides in taking control of their
lives and solving their own problems. They have made substan-
tial progress in a short time considering their diversity of
backgrounds and relatively humble origins. This ability to or-
ganize to solve problems is an intangible but important part of
this project's impact. o


2. Sense of Well-Being


It is extremely difficult to measure objectively the sense
of well-being felt by settlers. However, the team believed
that it could begin to get some indication in talking with var-
ious colonists while on the project site. If the settlers
think they are well off, especially compared to their life in
the Interior, then they probably are. Informal interviews with
farmers and their families from a number of nucleos are the
basis of the information provided in the following section. It
should be noted that all interviewing was conducted through
open-ended questions. The team emphasized application for
future project knowledge in explaining the motive for question-
ing. The following focuses first on the adjustment process
during early stages of settlement, and second, on the settlers'
future expectations.


a. Adapting to a New Life


Many of the San Julian settlers have left homes where
their families have lived for centuries. They have moved from
highland and high valley systems to the semi-tropical lowlands.
The adjustments are many and the first year is especially dif-
ficult. If they survive that first year and decide to stay,
how do they feel at that point? Have they a sense of control
over their lives? Are their roles different in the Oriente
than they were in the highlands, and if so, are they adjusting?

Very often, during the first phases of colonization, the
women are left behind while the men go on ahead to evaluate the
unfamiliar territory. Among a sample of settlers (Hess, 1979)








C-29


arriving during 1976-1977, 40 percent of the married colonists
went through the orientation program without their spouses.
Sometimes the man works for a season and then returns; some-
times he stays for a year or more setting up a farm before he
comes back for the rest of the family. In the same sample of
settlers, 78 percent of the men had worked between 1 and 20
years in the Oriente prior to settling in Santa Cruz. Thus,
the husband usually has a better idea of what this move will
entail than does his wife. Often the wives arrive at the
colony long after their husbands have gone through the orienta-
tion program (husbands are sometimes reluctant to bring them to
the area before some sort of house is ready), so the women miss
not only what they might have learned in the orientation pro-
gram about gardens and the preparation of new foods but also
those first months of working together to start a new life.

The first year of resettlement is particularly difficult
on the women. They must begin housekeeping in a completely
different setting. The climate is hot and muggy, and unfamili-
ar insects and illnesses abound. The old familiar foods are
difficult to find, and they do not know how to prepare the new
foods available. They have left their extended family back in
the Interior and have not had time to develop new social net-
works. They do not usually have the livestock which they cared
for daily in the highlands. Food is scarce because there has
not yet been a harvest.

The second year, however, is a little easier. They grow
accustomed to the heat and the need to wear fewer clothes.
Fruits and vegetables are more plentiful than in the Interior
as the gardens and papaya and banana trees flourish. Houses
are built, looking very similar to the houses in the Interior
except that they have grass roofs. Others in the nucleo live
close by and have experienced the same difficulties. As health
posts are set up in more communities, health care is more ac-
cessible. The old life in the Interior no longer looks so
good.

The roles of women in San Julian are similar to those they
had in the Interior, with a few exceptions. A survey in 1978
of 62 women showed that almost half of the women raise child-
ren, cook, tend a vegetable garden, care for livestock, and
work in the fields (see Table C-3). One activity that is no
longer available to the women is the marketing of their veg-
etables. Since nearly every family has its own garden, small-
scale marketing of vegetables has become obsolete. How much
the women miss this function is difficult to say. More impor-
tant is the question of money handling within the family since
the women no longer earn their own. The women talked to infor-
mally by the woman on the evaluation team said that their hus-
bands let them handle the family finances (although some had
stories of women whose lives were not so simple). In general,


however, it appeared that the women were coping well with their
new roles in the lowlands.


Table C-3. Women's Labor Contribution, San Julian



Adjusted Cumulative
No. of Frequency Frequency
Type of Labor Cases (%) (%)

Housework, Child Raising,
Cooking, Cleaning 3 4.8 4.8

All of the Above Plus
Raising Animals 12 19.4 24.2

All of the Above Plus
Tending a Vegetable Garden 19 30.6 54.8

All of the Above Plus
Working in Most Major
Tasks in the Chaco 28 45.2 100.0

Total: 62 100.0 100.0


Source: Hess, 1979.


The addition of community and home extensionists (females)
and a home inputs section to the cooperative contributed to
raising the morale of the women in the San Julian area. Skills
workshops were held to teach women how to knit and embroider.
Thread, needles, and yarn were now available close to home.
The extensionists encourage membership in the cooperatives and
offer courses in math, budgets, and bookkeeping--skills that
the women almost universally lack. The ultimate goal is to
provide the necessary training in the skills that the women
will need to sustain the program and the home inputs section of
the cooperative. Local directorates of women in each community
have been formed, with one woman responsible for selling the
merchandise and keeping the books.

In general, the women in San Julian seemed to be fairly
content. They have plenty to eat and they see their children
growing. They are concerned about health care and education
for their sons and daughters. The well could be closer to the


C-28









C-30


house and there is never enough money, but that was true in the
Interior as well. They have adjusted to life in the Oriente.

The men are less patient than the women. They want more
to happen sooner. Their expectations have been sufficiently
raised to make them optimistic about the future, but reality is
always reminding them that the future is not yet here. The
road is bad; there is not enough credit available; they have
seen a lot of empty promises. Nonetheless, all of the men
spoken to expressed the opinion that they were better off than
before. None was interested in returning to the Interior.


b. Future Expectations


"The successful adjustment of each colonist would
seem to" depend on the degree to which he is self-
consciously future oriented. He must be optimistic,
which most are, and he must be patient, which many
are not." (Thompson, 1973:18).


It is evident that many farmers hold favorable expecta-
tions for the future. 'Much time is spent removing stumps from
their fields and planting pastures as investments for the years
to come. These long-run investments have no short-run payoff.
Many farmers are putting in perennial crops such as coffee,
cacao, and citrus trees. Continuous expansion of fields also
demonstrates an optimism on the part of the settlers. Home im-
provements are common, and more than one two-story house al-
ready has been built in the San Julian area. The colonists
continue to invest in animals including cattle, goats, sheep,
pigs, ducks, and chickens. Animal traction has been introduced
in several nucleos with plans for expansion. Two years ago
only four families in San Julian had horses; now 17 families
have horses they can use for transportation and tillage. Five
more credit applications for horse-drawn equipment are about to
be approved. Some colonists are attending a course offered at
the Center for Training in Utilization of Animal Traction in
Santa Cruz. The topics covered include animal health, black-
smithing, harness repair, agricultural economics, and the agro-
nomics of tillage practices. Many of the farmers with whom the
team talked expressed the desire to buy a truck or a tractor in
the future. They often had short-run plans for the growth of
their farm, as though time were a precious commodity. Such
capital investments confirm what the settlers said initially:
they are content with their lives in the oriented and plan to
stay.


3. Health


If one truly wanted jo assess the project impact on health
over time, one would need a survey, both before and after the
project, or a.complete or nearly complete vital statistics reg-
istration. Given the lack of baseline or current data on mor-
bidity and mortality in the San Julian region, it is difficult
to draw any conclusions based on hard evidence. The lack of
data makes it impossible to discern a drop or rise in the mor-
tality rate over time.

An 8-day study carried out in 1982 by a medical team from
North Carolina shows that intestinal parasites, anemia, and
gastrointestinal disorders were the most common health problems
in the San Julian area. Of the 1,329 people (self-selected)
seen by the team, only 89 (7 percent) were considered to be
healthy. Fifty-five percent of the children under 5 years old
had intestinal parasites. The team concluded that most of the
problems could be eliminated with improved sanitation, general
hygiene, and improved nutrition. Their study indicates a need
for general education of the community on preventive medicine
and a well-balanced diet. What has the project done to address
these recommendations?


a. Nutrition Training


The project has hired home and community extensionists to
visit women in their homes, teaching them specifically about
balanced diets, food preparation, and the special needs of
children. Foods specific to the area were introduced, includ-
ing soybeans, papayas, bananas, and yucca. Gardens were
started in several communities. The impact of this general
education on the community is difficult to ascertain in the
short run, however. Based on brief informal interviews by the
evaluation team with various women in the nucleos, it became
clear that the women felt that they had much more food to eat
and a greater variety in the Oriente than they had in the
Interior. They pointed with pride to the piles of vegetables
in their kitchens and to the papaya and banana trees growing
outside.


b. Preventive Medicine


The health promoters in each nucleo have had training in
both curative and preventive medicine. The promoters are to
emphasize to others in the nucleos the importance of washing
one's hands, using latrines, and drinking water only from safe


C-31








C-33


wells. Unfortunately, according to the nurse in NADEPAS V and
VI, preventive medicine usually takes a backseat to curative
medicine. Preventive medicine is not considered to be as in-
teresting as curative medicine, which can save lives. Since
the settlers are so much more interested in curative medicine,
it is emphasized at the beginning of the training of the vil-
lage health promoters. After the curative aspect has attracted
them to the classes, the preventive aspect is covered as well
but with a lower priority.

A greater emphasis on preventive medicine throughout the
nucleos, although difficult to enforce, is in order. The
latrines that were built during the orientation program are
standing unused. While the short-run harm is minimal, the
long-run implications are unhealthy.


c. Immunizations


INC has launched several campaigns to immunize children
against diseases. The project nurse also provides the service.
The ratio of children immunized against common diseases was
thought to be a crude measure of how much impact the health
services had had on the community. Some rough figures were ob-
tained from the INC, although the data is far from complete.
Among children up to 4 years of age, 90 percent are immunized
against polio and measles. Eighty percent of the children 5 to
14 years old are vaccinated against yellow fever. No other
statistics were available at the time of the evaluation, so
many questions are left unanswered.


Is Health Care Better Than it Was in the Past? Given the
lack of data, it is difficult to say whether health care is
better than in the Interior. It was very encouraging to the
evaluation team, however, that the settlers placed an important
emphasis on health. The health committee members and local
health promoters are drawn from within each nucleo. The set-
tlers perceive the importance of good health facilities and ex-
pect such services. They see good health as one of their
"rights" and are demanding their due. Since health involves
not only the availability of services but also the use of those
services, the settlers in San Julian appear to be on the right
track. However, improvements in the road to facilitate access
to health services and the addition of some new facilities are
still needed." An effective health care system in San Julian is
only in the beginning stages.


III. Macro-Level Impacts


A. Economic Impact


1. Direct Primary Production


a. Chane-Piray


Information on the total agricultural production in the
Chane-Piray area is difficult to find. However, a 1980 CORDE-
CRUZ report on an agricultural and livestock production project
in the San Pedro area gives some figures which, within limits,
can provide an indication of overall production. Most of the
area north of Chane Independencia is made up of small farmers
who cultivate rice and maize. CORDECRUZ counted 1,537 land-
owners in the area and 461 nonlandowners. The average plot in
the area was cultivated with 3 ha of rice, 1 ha of summer corn,
and 1 ha of winter corn (CORDECRUZ, 1980). Assuming that most
of the 461 nonlandowners would rent land, there would be ap-
proximately 2,000 small farm producers cultivating a total of
6,000 ha of rice and 4,000 ha of summer and winter corn.

It is possible to get some rough production estimates by
assuming an average barbecho rice yield of 1.9 tons per hectare
in 1980. Total rice production would have been about 7,647
tons. Based on the findings of Maxwell and Pozo that farmers
in the area marketed an average of 65 percent of their rice
crop, about 5,000 tons would have been sold. Assuming an aver-
age barbecho maize yield of 1.6 tons per hectare, total produc-
tion would have been about 6,300 tons in 1980. Maxwell and
Pozo found that farmers sold 26 percent of their corn crop, or
1,636 tons. Both the rice and corn figures are probably low
because machinery input by some producers is not taken into ac-
count.


b. San Julian


CORDECRUZ figures on San Julian production show that 5,886
tons of unthreshed rice were produced in 1980/81, of which
3,820 were marketed (see Table C-4). CORDECRUZ estimates for
1980/81 corn production show 6,745 tons produced, of which
4,745 were marketed. While no production figures are available
for 1983, FIDES estimates that 8,666 ha of rice and 4,393 ha of
corn were being cultivated.


C-32










C-35


u
0
U








a
**-i u


'0
.c5
us










.-A 14
41
S



S
C:



u




14
oir





0-
U










*i-i u

c,
'0
S




00)






fa
to c
S
--


N~ N InO

N D H









N 0o0









r- M in In
en N co V
to in r- H-
aDa 0



















mco N











ooooN
00 d. r Co


0.,
.,I
V
0.,



0 m
... m-


W W
00~
p41



e:H



*10


(a0
>1 C4 r


14 0
0%4
u

0u

I""
J o^
a o

Og-



*-4 CO
V" a



EA2-
XI
m1S
&< a


0
U









0)

OS
us



















-.4 $4
4J
0
U












..4 .
iC!




-4


C-34


tn in a% 0
0o






















in










rn NW iM
r- N In f

H-


00 r- r-
-o co H- 4


W m%
> --





I R
4 0
An U
ra W
01 3

0 U

(U u u14 H 0)
S o m H> 01 9 E 0)
0 X.5HS, > 3 0
N 41'in410 in 1

01 In5z M


2. Indirect Primary Production


a. Timber



The impact on timber production of the AID interventions
in Chane-Piray and San Julian is difficult to assess. Timber
exploitation was carried out by the lumber companies before the
improvement of the Chane-Piray road or the construction of the
Brecha Casarabe in San Julian. It is clear that the improve-
ment of the physical infrastructure in both areas has facili-
tated lumber exploitation and has reduced related transport
costs. For example, the lands settlement advisors' report in
1979 indicates that 100 truck loads of mahogany wood left the
San Julian zone in the period between August and October.

In contrast to the early years in San Julian, the settlers
have gained more control over timber exploitation in their
lands and are now paid for the wood taken out. The lumber
sales have been a substantial source of capital for the set-
tlers, and the lumber season, April to October, is a time of
increased economic activity in the colonies. However, the most
valuable wood, such as mahogany, has already been almost en-
tirely exhausted. The value of timber production can therefore
be expected to decline in the next few years.

The use of the roads by the heavy lumber trucks has con-
tributed significantly to the roads' rapid deterioration. Lit-
tle contribution has been made by truck owners and operators to
the repair and maintenance of the road network. In the past
years, more effective dialogue has been taking place among the
timber companies, the government, and the settlers concerning
road maintenance, although nothing has yet been translated into
action.



b. Cattle


Although occasional herds of cattle are brought down to
Santa Cruz from the Beni via the Brecha Casarabe, the number of
cattle drivers has decreased in recent years. Most cattle
transport is now done by trucks or the animals are butchered
and flown directly to the cities, principally La Paz.


c cr
$4 % 4.-
- U-4

o 0, o
V) Z Z


Z








C-36


C-37


3. Indirect Secondary Production


farmers. Relatively few nonfarm entrepreneurs have yet estab-
lished service industries in the zone.


a. Chane-Piray


B. Social Impacts


Detailed information on secondary industries in the Chane-
Piray area is limited. The large, older settlements such as
San Pedro have developed grain-processing facilities, stores,
restaurants, and other basic services. Much of the agricultur-
al production goes to rice mills and collection centers in Min-
eros. Mineros also has a sugar mill.


b. San Julian


Since San Julian is a younger colonization area than
Chane-Piray, one would suppose that it would have fewer second-
ary industries. Because of the lack of available information
on secondary industries in Chane-Piray, it is difficult to make
a comparison between the two areas. It is possible, however,
that the relative isolation of and limited access to San Julian
would cause certain services to have developed faster. The
following is a partial list of secondary industries observed in
the San Julian zone:


Secondary Industries in San Julian


General stores
Small restaurants
Entertainment
Bicycle repair
Chainsaw repair
Tinsmith
Shoemaker
Tailor
Soap-maker
Sugarcane processing
Weaving
Hunting (meat, skins)
Health services (paid independent workers)
Boat handler (river crossing)
Charcoal-making
Brickmaking
Adobe brickmaking
Palm leaf cutters, gatherers


It is significant that most of these secondary industries
are carried out by colonists who still identify themselves as


1. National Impact


The Government of Bolivia has two main reasons for encour-
aging migration from the Interior to the Oriente. First, the
Chaco War in 1931-1935, when Bolivia lost land to Paraguay,
made clear the importance of integrating the lowlands with the
rest of Bolivia. Second, even after the 1952 revolution and
resultant land reform, many farmers in the highlands did not
have enough land to support their families. Population pres-
sure continued, and the need for an escape valve became appar-
ent.

The Chaco War, while humiliating, did have a few positive
results. In order to get supplies and troops into the region,
a system of roads had to be developed. Farming was encouraged
in the area to raise food for the soldiers. The agricultural
potential of the area became apparent as did the need, men-
tioned earlier, to integrate this vast untouched region with
the rest of Bolivia. Before 1954, the oriented had carried on
most of its business with the surrounding countries of Argen-
tina, Brazil, and Paraguay. The roads built and the industries
developed have helped Bolivia as a whole. The agricultural
output of the region has risen substantially, and there is ev-
ery indication that this trend will continue. The colonization
that ensued in the decades following contributed much to the
social and economic integration of the lowlands and the high-
lands.

Looking toward the future, the need for an escape valve
for the overpopulated Interior can only become greater. The
major cities already have a higher population than can be sus-
tained due to the high rate of urbanization and low rate of in-
dustrialization. Small plots of land are being divided into
even smaller ones as the generations pass. Even subsistence
farming becomes impossible, and the Oriente becomes an attrac-
tive alternative. The movement of population to the Oriente
should be seen in perspective, however. Outmigration to
neighboring South American countries has relieved about the
same amount of pressure in the rural areas. Rural-urban
migration has absorbed by far the largest part of the excess
rural population. The Oriente as an escape valve should be
viewed as only one alternative to relieving the over-populated
Interior.








C-39


2. Local Impact


The population of Santa Cruz had been fairly isolated from
the rest of Bolivia for many years. The Cambas (the population
in the area for generations) had developed precise ways of doing
things and a unique way of life. The invasion of thousands of
Kollas highlanderss) was not a welcome sight. The racial tension
between these two groups of people is very evident in Santa Cruz
today.

A large statue of Christ with arms outstretched dominates a
central circle in Santa Cruz. The Cambas say that he is pro-
claiming "no more Kollasl" The two races are learning to co-
exist, however, and the overall flavor of Santa Cruz is turning
into a mix of the two cultures. As the two groups learn to work
together, there may be a lessening of the tensions that these
groups have felt for centuries.

Each economic group in the Department of Santa Cruz has its
own particular interests which sometimes, but not always,
conflict with those of other groups. The new settlers consider
the loggers to be a negative economic and social element. In
turn, colonization is generally viewed unfavorably by the lumber
interests, who complain of the destruction of timber resources by
slash and burn agricultural methods. Normal timber exploitation,
they state, allows the trees to return. Also, the loggers feel
threatened by what they see as an increasing encroachment on
their forest reserves. The frequent tension between colonization
and the lumber interests is not solely a conflict of economic
interests. Profound social and cultural differences between the
highland-born settlers and the businessmen from Santa Cruz also
enter into play. Cattlemen have little use for the small-time
farmer except to buy up previously cleared land as pasture. City
businessmen are disdainful of the Kolla farmers, although many
secondary industries have developed as the two groups are
learning to cooperate. Any major population shift requires
adjustment on the part of both the immigrant group and the
existing population, and this process is slowly happening in
Santa Cruz.


C. Environmental Impacts


Any colonization process, where thousands of people move
into land previously untouched, is going to have environmental
consequences. The long-term impacts are very difficult to
project, and much remains to be seen of even the short-term im-
pacts. Are the farming techniques used appropriate for the en-
vironment? Can the soil sustain agriculture for long periods of


time? How will the changes taking place in the Oriente affect
the environment as a whole in the years to come?

The slash and burn method for clearing fields, adopted by
most of the farmers in the San Julian area, is an appropriate
technology. Farmers can clear relatively large amounts of land
(3-4 ha) in a fairly short time. No machines are required and
fertile layer of ash and decomposing roots is left behind. The
equipment required is minimal (an ax and a machete) and everybo
can help in the clearing process, including the women. Given t
limited resources of the settlers in San Julian, it has been th
only alternative available. The slash and burn process is
actually less harmful in relation to both soil erosion and loss
of soil quality than mechanized clearing, as it leaves the top
layer of soil less disturbed.

The problems come when, 2 or 3 years later, the land become
unfertile or is taken over by weeds. The farmer abandons that
land and moves on to repeat the process on the next 3 or 4 ha.
Since the settler in San Julian receives 50 ha, this can contain
for more than a decade. The secondary growth (barbecho) that
takes over the farmer's field is even less desirable for the
farmer than the trees and bushes originally found in the area.
In the past few years, the settlers have been encouraged by FID
to plant grass and legumes in the fallow areas. This was
suggested because grass inhibits weed growth while legumes
restore depleted nitrogen compounds to the s6il. In addition,
these fields can then be used as pasture. How often pastures a
actually being planted, however, is difficult to determine. At
the moment, several studies are in progress to test the long-
range capabilities of the soil. The initial project design may
not have provided enough land per farmer to allow for the plot
rotation necessary to let the land regain its nutrients. There
are still many unanswered questions about these tropical soils
and the most appropriate agricultural techniques.


C-38









C-40


of time? How will the changes taking place in the Oriente af-
fect the environment as a whole in the years to come?

The slash and burn method for clearing fields, adopted by
most of the farmers in the San Julian area, is an appropriate
technology. Farmers can clear relatively large amounts of land
(3-4 ha) in a fairly short time. No machines are required and
a fertile layer of ash and decomposing roots is left behind.
The equipment required is minimal (an ax and a machete) and
everybody can help in the clearing process, including the
women. Given the limited resources of the settlers in San
Julian, it has been the only alternative available. The slash
and burn process is actually less harmful in relation to both
soil erosion and loss of soil quality than mechanized clearing,
as it leaves the top layer of soil less disturbed.

The problems come when, 2 or 3 years later, the land
becomes unfertile or is taken over by weed:;. The farmer aban-
dons that land and moves on to repeat the process on the next 3
or 4 ha. Since the settler in San Julian receives 50 ha, this
can continue for more than a decade. The secondary growth
(barbecho) that takes over the farmer's field is even less de-
sirable for the farmer than the trees and bushes originally
found in the area. In the past few years, the settlers have
been encouraged by FIDES to plant grass and legumes in the fal-
low areas. This was suggested because grass inhibits weed
growth while legumes restore depleted nitrogen compounds to the
soil. In addition, these fields can then be used as pasture.
How often pastures are actually being planted, however, is dif-
ficult to determine. At the moment, several studies are in
progress to test the long-range capabilities of the soil. The
initial project design may not have provided enough land per
farmer to allow for the plot rotation necessary to let the land
regain its nutrients. There are still many unanswered ques-
tions about these tropical soils and the most appropriate agri-
cultural techniques.


APPENDIX D

SPECIAL DEVELOPMENT ISSUES


I. SUSTAINABILITY


A. Physical Infrastructure


Two important types of physical infrastructure, roads and
wells, must be maintained if the gains achieved by the project
are to be sustained.

The settlers are currently doing a reasonably good job of
maintaining their own wells and pumps, having been taught the
appropriate procedures during the orientation program. Occa-
sionally it is necessary to seek outside repair assistance,
which can be difficult. FIDES is encouraging the establishment
of a private repair service within the colonization zone
(through provision of credit and modest organizational assist-
ance) to deal with this problem as well as provide other repair
services. There have also been some delays in repairs due to
settler dependence on the National Institute of Colonization
(INC) for supply of parts. This arrangement is neither neces-
sary nor desirable.

A more serious problem is the tendency of wells in the
more heavily populated nucleos to be overused, with the result
that water pressure becomes low during the dry season. This
causes the sides of the well below the tubing to crumble and
the water to become heavily silted. The best answer to this is
more wells. At present, the settlers are dependent on the INC
for new wells, but the Foundation for Integral Development
(FIDES) has considered the possibility of developing settler
capacity to perform, or at least to oversee, well-drilling
operations. This could be done cooperatively or through indi-
vidual enterprise. Given the uncertain nature of INC services,
it would seem to be desirable to develop such a system in any
subsequent phase of the project.

Roads present still a thornier problem. The prospects for
effective government maintenance are not encouraging. Since
roads are a major item in holding onto and advancing the gains
made by the settlers, failure of maintenance could have a very
negative effect on sustainability. Settlers have shown an
ability and willingness to do considerable hand labor on roads.
In one area, 300 settlers from 14 nucleos worked for over two
weeks to raise a 100-meter long stretch of road above flood
level. This sort of effort will not solve the whole problem,
however. Another possibility would be to give the settlers








D-3


power to charge tolls for road use or require in-kind contribu-
tions, e.g., loads of gravel from logging trucks which come
into the zone empty. Developing settler capacity to manage a
system combining self-help with contract repair and maintenance
seems within the realm of possibility. Though it would be a
major undertaking, the alternatives seem even less promising.


B. Agricultural Production and Productivity


Sustaining or increasing agricultural production and pro-
ductivity will require several elements: appropriate varie-
ties, maintenance of land productivity, credit, availability of
necessary inputs, transport, and markets. The first of these
will be discussed here. The rest, which have implications
beyond agriculture, are discussed in subsequent sections.

Farmer ability to maintain or increase overall production
and productivity in a changing market will depend on the avail-
ability of appropriate, tested varieties and technology and the
existence of a system for transferring information to the farm-
er. A considerable store of suitable varieties and technolo-
gies relating to perennials is available in Brazil and other
countries. These are being studied and tested for local adapt-
ability by the Center for the Investigation of Tropical Agri-
culture (CIAT) and by FIDES in its nursery. There is reason-
able ground for expecting these efforts to continue. The FIDES
nursery should be sustainable from sales, though perhaps not
immediately, and CIAT funding sources for study of alternative
farm systems seem reliable for the foreseeable future. Im-
proved seeds for annual crops are available through the AID-
funded seed certification program.

Extension presents a more complicated issue. FIDES cur-
rently has an excellent extension program, but it is not clear
how it will survive the end of FIDES's involvement in the proj-
ect, whenever that occurs. The Government of Bolivia (GOB)
cannot be depended on to pick up the extension system intact or
replace it with services of satisfactory quality. FIDES has an
ingenious, though admittedly experimental, idea for financing
the continued services. They propose to introduce contracts
for the provision of credit, inputs, and technical advice re-
lated to specific new crop systems in exchange for a modest
payment plus a percentage of the profit from the harvest.
Extensionists for this program would be carefully selected.
The credit element would act as an initial inducement for farm-
ers to give it a try. This plan seems worth attempting as an
alternative to reliance upon government programs.


C. Environmental Impacts


Topography and soil composition in the San Julian area d
not appear to be the type for which loss of cover will lead t
serious erosion or irreversible damage to the soil structure.
However, top soils are thin, and a complex and delicate ecolo
ical system is being displaced. Experience with this environ
ment is not sufficient to guarantee that economically serious
damage will not occur.

FIDES has been sensitive to environmental hazards in its
response to the "barbecho crisis" and to the problem of decli
ing fertility of soils under cultivation. Nevertheless, it i
important that the consequences of the far-reaching environ-
mental changes introduced by the project be monitored for a
number of years to come.


D. Credit and Inputs


Credit and the supply of inputs for agriculture and re-
lated productive activities are currently managed in the San
Julian zone through a system of cooperatives. There are two
closely related threats to the sustainability of the coopera-
tive credit programs, both relating to inflation. Although t
cooperatives charge 36 percent interest, this is often not
enough to cover inflation as well as management expenses and
reasonable profit. The cooperatives are therefore being deca
italized, even where they do not provide credit, because thei
prices are not high enough to cover replacement costs. The
problem is aggravated by delays in purchasing replacement
goods. Cooperative members so far have resisted paying a hig
er interest rate, so the general cooperative is planning an
education campaign. One alternative being considered is in-
kind loans providing goods on credit (instead of cash) and
stating repayment in goods (e.g., kilograms of corn, or the
cash equivalent at the time of repayment).


E. Marketing


If the settlers are to improve on their gains or, indeed
maintain them, they will need to market their crops effective
ly. There are two aspects to this: (1) transporting their
goods to market, which will be discussed in the next section,
and (2) obtaining a fair price. Some prices, e.g., of sugar-
cane, are fixed by the government and therefore depend on the
settlers' ability to influence government decision-making rat
er than on marketing skills.










As indicated earlier, because individual marketing is
inefficient in the colonization zone, the San Julian coopera-
tives began this year to introduce a marketing operation.
While it is too soon to say how well this will function, it can
be said that it is vital to the sustainability of development
in San Julian. If the settlers cannot obtain reasonable prices
for their produce, their income and production levels will
remain low and many may leave the zone. Further technical
assistance is clearly needed.


F. Transport


There are two transport problems: (1) the condition of
the roads, and (2) the availability of transport at reasonable
prices. The two are obviously related. Where roads are poor,
transport is less available and prices necessarily higher. As
indicated earlier, road construction and maintenance is a "sine
qua non" for the continued success of the settlement. If the
roads are not improved and maintained, marketing opportunities
will be restricted and settler profits on sales reduced.
School teachers and extensionists will be harder to obtain.
Difficulties of settlers in reaching services (e.g., health
care, machinery repair, and government offices) and in obtain-
ing supplies will continue to impede growth. The medical ser-
vice problem is a particularly serious one. When flooded roads
prevent timely evacuation of the sick or injured, they often
die. All of these problems not only affect the quality of life
in the colonization zone, but likewise the willingness of set-
tlers to stay.

Experience suggests that entrepreneurs will move into the
zone in sufficient numbers to assure adequate and reasonably
priced transport if the roads can be maintained in reasonably
good shape.


G. Health


Whether the settlers will be able to maintain and advance
health gains over the long run depends on their ability and
willingness to pay for their own health services. Outside
sources cannot be counted on to continue to provide subsidies.
FIDES has taken a promising approach to making primary health
care available to the colonists through self-financing. Health
promoters are selected from the ranks of the settlers them-
selves, trained, and provided with an initial stock of medi-
cines. Promoters are not salaried under the FIDES system.
Rather, they mark up the cost of drugs to provide for both
replenishment and a small profit, and they also are freed of


certain community labor obligations. On several occasions
settlers have additionally compensated their health promoters
(especially for time spent in training) by working their land
for them. However, once again it is too soon to say whether
the system will be sustainable, and more technical assistance,
including further training for the promoters, will probably be
necessary.


H. Response Capability


Most projects define their goals in terms of increased
well-being of their Beneficiaries without addressing the ques-
tion of the sustainability of such changes. Where such im-
provements are dependent on exogenous factors such as markets,
government pricing policies, road conditions, inflation, or
weather conditions they are fragile indeed. Steady availabili
ty of outside services to respond to such changes can rarely,
if ever, be relied on.

Needed, therefore, is a capability to act on new threats
to their well-being, i.e., a response capability. If the mar-
ket for one or more crops goes bad, for instance, settlers may
need to seek out and even pay for extension services. This
requires confidence that alternatives are available, confidence
to strike out on new and unfamiliar paths, judgment as to what
type of services are likely to be effective, and technical
ability to apply any new technology thus identified.

FIDES has, to an unusual degree, fostered the development
of a response capability among the settlers. They have left a
many decisions as possible to settlers themselves, and have
structured technical assistance activities so as to present
challenges. Settlers have made decisions about distribution o
land parcels, selection of appropriate farming systems, common
ity development institutions, and vehicles for well and road
maintenance.

It is too soon to say whether the settlers' response
capability has developed to a point where they can sustain or
advance the gains achieved so far, although their remarkable
recovery from the major flood earlier this year bodes well.
Although the flood wiped out all food supplies, inundated
houses, and disrupted planting, the settlers cleaned up and go
right back into production. As a result, food supplies were
ample just four months later when the evaluation team paid its
visit.












II. REPLICABILITY


It can readily be seen that many of the successful or
promising features of this project are not culture or environ-
ment specific. The settlement pattern employed, the means of
identifying settlers, the orientation process, the use of a
locally based private voluntary organization for implementa-
tion, and the duration of project inputs (the 1974 loan was
followed by the 1979 grant) are all characteristics that lend
themselves to replication in other settings.


A. Settlement Pattern


The nucleo settlement pattern pioneered in San Julian is
credited with accelerating the process of community develop-
ment; By providing for the physical proximity of settler
households, social and economic interaction was made possible
from the beginning, despite transportation difficulties. The
clustering of nucleos to enable development of an "urban" cen-
ter for every set of nine nucleos is intended to rationalize
location of social and economic services.

The former pattern in Bolivia, the "piano-key," in which
parcels were allotted to settlers in contiguous rectangular
lots, each with 250 meters of road frontage, was inefficient
and ineffective. With the settlers strung along over such
great distances, service delivery and community formation were
retarded.

The impact of the nucleo pattern is twofold. In the first
months or years of settlement, there is built-in physical prox-
imity to provide material support. For some, the support pro-
vides a heightened sense of security. Social interchange
opportunities are enhanced. Over the longer run, the greater
access to water and services (e.g., schools, medical posts, and
agricultural extension) enables many efficiencies in develop-
ment.

One major difficulty with the nucleo pattern is that the
majority of each farmer's land lies at the greatest distance
from the center of the community, and thus to existing roads.
Perimeter roads around nucleos, and paths into fields which are
shared by several settlers, are two possible solutions. Over-
all, though, the transport problem did not outweigh the posi-
tive impact of the nucleo settlement pattern.

The provision for central nucleos has also had a positive
impact. Though it is true that most nucleos on San Julian's


main road are developing as urban centers, some being as impor-
tant commercially as the official central nucleos, evidence is
that the planned centers are all evolving as meaningful busi-
ness centers. The cooperative, operating through central
stores in such central nucleos, seems to be of an appropriate
size for management. The Federation of Colonists uses the
official nine-nucleo clusters as political units, and they
appear to have legitimacy in the minds of settlers. It is
impossible to distinguish cause from effect, though, because
from the beginning of the orientation program these nucleos
have taken on central functions.


B. Identification of Settlers


The established rules for registration and entry as a San
Julian settler state that prospective settlers must present
themselves and register in the national office in La Paz or one
of the regional offices in Tarija, Cochabamba, Santa Cruz,
Montero, or in San Julian.

Resettlement rules have been modified for the San Julian
project in two ways. First, settlement has to be in groups of
40 families (or as close as possible to that number), and all
settlers should enter their nucleo and begin the orientation
program in these 40-household groups. The decision to empha-
size selections of these kinds of groups was based on a theory
that orientation and formation of viable communities would thus
be enhanced.

Second, groups were favored over individuals, particularly
groups with preexisting social organization and with social
ties to settlers already established in San Julian. The pres-
ent communities include those in which most settlers are from
the same basic area of origin and those in which settlers are
heterogeneous as to area of origin but have lived together in
communities in the lowland prior to moving to San Julian.

Once the settlers were selected, the process of assigning
them to a nucleo was usually also the product of conscious
decisions. Two major judgmental factors were at work in place-
ment decisions. First, the amount and kind of resources, capi-
tal, and experience of the group affected where they would be
placed. This was important because the more favored groups
were usually located in less favorable places and vice versa.
In the case of a group of more experienced farmers who moved to
San Julian along with a group of their former employees, the
employers were placed in a lateral nucleo and the former em-
ployees in a nucleo on the main access road. The second judg-
mental factor related to the placement of groups so as to avoid
regional enclaves of groups from the same areas of origin.












This was based on experience in other northern Santa Cruz set-
tlements where this was judged to be detrimental. Apparently,
homogeneity was viewed as positive at the intra-nucleo level
and negative at the inter-nucleo level.

The impact of identification and location policy is diffi-
cult to delineate. The evaluation team is of the opinion that
the requirement that groups settle together in sufficient num-
bers to provide needed labor and to build social support net-
works is valid. We also believe that the selection of groups
with preexisting relations must have accelerated community
establishment. It is less apparent that there is a difference
in quality and duration of community formation processes be-
tween groups homogeneous as to areas of origin and those which
are heterogeneous but with some experience in living and work-
ing together. We have no evidence about the impact of location
policy and would not presume to hypothesize, given the complex-
ity of the subject.


C. Orientation


The detailed elements of both programs have been discussed
previously. Their impact has generally been to compress the
time needed for the pioneer period, i.e., the time of estab-
lishing social support and economic production in order to
enable subsequent consolidation of gains and later long-term
settlement growth. The investment in sustaining resource
yields, the development of marketing and product processing
infrastructure and input services, and the stabilization of the
population and its social organizations have all been the ob-
ject of consolidation work.

The orientation program was a phase of guided settlement
which aided settlers in the first difficult period of confront-
ing all the challenges involved in organizing themselves and
utilizing the resources available to them. The practical edu-
cation and training offered was, in our judgment, crucial to
the foundation of the nucleos in San Julian. The agricultural
and other technical information transferred and the material
support supplied were crucial in assisting the new settlers in
beginning production and building shelters. The social promo-
tion and the reliance on participatory, democratic decision-
making provided firm bases for cooperative and political organ-
izations, which presently appear strong and viable. The food
subsidy, in our opinion, was justified as it lowered human
costs and kept the settlers in good physical condition for the
hard work they had to undertake. The inclusion of activities
for women was important in order to provide them with useful
roles in an overwhelmingly new and different situation. The


orientation program established an appropriate set of activi-
ties adapted to the changed needs of settlers who were already
established and ready to diversify and increase production and
productivity.


D. Use of Private Voluntary Organizations


The use of private voluntary organizations (PVO) rather
than host-government personnel in the field and at the adminis
trative level poses some venerable questions not dissimilar to
those posed by the servicios Cooperativos which implemented
AID's Latin America programs up to the mid-1960s. The Servi-
cios were joint AID-host government services established to
administer AID programs. They were staffed by select personnel
paid at higher than average salaries and free from normal gov-
ernment lines of authority, appointment, and promotion proc-
esses. Even supplies, equipment, support services, and operate
ing funds for Servicios were generally superior to what was
available to regular host government personnel.

Though the servicios were efficient in their implementa-
tion of AID programs, they had several drawbacks. First, they
aroused jealousy and animosity on the part of other host gov-
ernment officials, which in addition to being a problem in
itself, interfered with necessary support from the government.
Second, when projects were implemented through the servicios,
regular government agencies failed to grow in their capacity t
administer projects, and the potential benefit of their more
effective participation in non-AID projects was lost. A re-
lated problem was that opportunities were lost to prepare host
government agencies to carry on development programs after the
termination of external assistance.

The original concept was that servicio personnel would be
integrated into the regular government service. However, this
did not work out very well due to jealousies, differences in
pay scales, and the greater difficulties of operating within
the government.

The same drawbacks apply to use of PVOs as implementing
agents, particularly where they hire their own field personnel
as in the case of FIDES extensionists. On the other hand, the
problems which led to the creation of the servicios still exis
and still undermine implementation of AID and other projects.

Generally, it is our opinion that the drawbacks of sepa-
rate project administration should not deter us from employing
it, though we would be selective about where it is employed.
There is an especially good case for its use in rural develop-
ment where a particularly flexible response and unusually









D-10


committed field personnel are required. The use of PVOs, which
came to the fore after the era of the servicios, provides for
many of the benefits of independent project administration
without necessitating development of new institutions.


APPENDIX E

LESSONS LEARNED


I. INTRODUCTION


E. Duration of Project Inputs


The use of follow-on projects to develop a sustainable
problem-solving capability on the part of small farmers can
result in a disproportionate share of scarce resources being
allocated to a particular group of farmers at the expense of
others who are equally needy. On the other hand, without fol-
low-through, the gains made by the first group may be lost.
They may thus be no better off after a few years than they were
originally.

The evaluation team concludes that it is better to carry
one group of beneficiaries to the point of a clearly sustain-
able ability to improve their conditions than to try to provide
a little for all. This at least broadens the economic base,
including the tax base, for further development, creates confi-
dence in the possibility of effective response to generally
intractable rural problems, diminishes the possibility and the
need for future government assistance to the beneficiaries, and
could more effectively produce the much sought after but elu-
sive demonstration effect, inspiring emulation by other farm-
ers,

The argument against this approach would be that almost
any project permanently improves the condition of farmers,
increases problem-solving ability and confidence, and has a
demonstration effect. The evaluation team is not so sure of
that. It would seem to us at least desirable to further eval-
'jate and perhaps experiment with the follow-on approach.


Most of the activities assessed in this evaluation of
resettlement efforts in Chane-Piray and San Julian are common
to integrated rural development (IRD) programs worldwide. As
such, it is appropriate that many of the lessons learned shar
an IRD focus.

At the same time, however, some of the specific program
activities are unique to resettlement--not necessarily an IRD
phenomenon. People are being moved from one part of Bolivia
another, from communities established for hundreds of years t
lands never before occupied by people, and expected to create
viable agricultural economy almost overnight. This aspect of
the program goes well beyond classic integrated rural develop
ment, and merits special attention.

Given the dual nature of activities reviewed by the impa
evaluation team, a breakout of lessons learned into two sepa-
rate categories is appropriate. The following discussion,
therefore, looks first at lessons with general integrated rur
development implications and second at lessons unique to rese
tlement.

Note that comparisons between Chane-Piray and San Julian
are made only with respect to resettlement activities. This
because no IRD program was ever implemented in Chane-Piray.
Valuable insights can be gained from this contrast of resettl
ment activities, however.


II. INTEGRATED RURAL DEVELOPMENT LESSONS


In the following discussion of lessons one might draw fr
San Julian's experience with IRD, no effort is made to estab-
lish a hierarchical or chronological sequence. Rather, what
listed is a series of characteristics considered to be desir-
able in IRD implementing agencies, personnel, or the programs
themselves.












A. Continuity of Commitment


"...familiar people with "goodwill" in the
community were there to explain and assist."

Long-term continuity of program activities, personnel, and
implementing agencies is critical to the effectiveness of IRD
programs. Only with an organizational commitment of 5 to 10
years' duration can lasting social and economic impacts be
reasonably expected.

An important aspect of such continuity is the need for
each successive phase of assistance to occur in timely fashion.
Economic growth involves constant change. As farm enterprises
grow, for example, the farmers' problems change. As these
changes occur, so too must the activities of the development
agency change, and they must change promptly.

This is not to suggest that there should be no consistent
program, but rather that the need for a long-term commitment to
logical and timely implementation must be recognized. Each
phase has its time, and none occurs in isolation. There is no
substitute for continuity of project personnel to ensure that
the transition from one phase to the next is accomplished in an
orderly and timely fashion.

In the San Julian resettlement area, continuity of person-
nel and activities has been an important aid to broad, fairly
even development with a minimum of settler failures. From the
outset of the program the key players have remained on the job.
As the services provided in the orientation phase gave way to
new activities under the consolidation phase, familiar people
with "goodwill" in the community were there to explain and
assist. There was a sense of growth and change, but never one
of abandonment. For example, at the end of each nucleo's ori-
entation, a closing ceremony was held during which settlers
were given "certificates of settlement," project personnel were
transferred to new functions elsewhere in San Julian, and ori-
entation properties (buildings) were transferred to the commun-
ity.

Unfortunately, in the nucleos settled prior to AID's 1978
consolidation project, too long a gap existed between the first
orientation program and the beginning of the follow-up support
activities. The result was a period of instability and slowed
growth. This was noted in a 1978 evaluation report, and was
often repeated to members of this evaluation team by settlers
and FIDES staff. In fact, the FIDES advisor felt that the
greatest interest and success in initiating work under the
consolidation program was experienced in nucleos which were


just finishing the orientation program when activities under
the consolidation program were introduced.


B. Program Adaptability


"...orientation personnel... learned from
the settlers, often applying such lessons
in subsequent programs."

Ability to adapt individual elements of an IRD program is
critical to long-term success. Because IRD tends to be compre-
hensive in scope, it is almost certain that changes affecting
program elements will occur. Demographic, social, economic,
political, and environmental developments can have a major
effect on the needs of program participants--on their ability
to function successfully. The implementing agent in an IRD
program must have the capacity to assess those changes and
their probable impacts, and-to adjust program activities and
emphases accordingly.

In the San Julian IRD program such adaptability has been
present from the inception. The orientation program for new
settlers, perhaps the most important and successful program
element, was continuously adjusted in content and length.
Lessons learned from earlier sessions, changing funding levels,
ecological conditions in the nucleos, varying farmer experience
levels, and the degree of homogeneity and quality of social
relations among each community's settlers--all these aspects
influenced the final plan for a new settlement's orientation
program. What might have been a rigid, highly structured oper-
ation was, in fact, the contrary. Each orientation was tai-
lored to the specific needs of the individual nucleo and its
residents. While the settlers learned from the collective
wisdom and experience of the orientation staff, the orientation
personnel likewise learned from the settlers, often applying
such lessons in subsequent programs.

This spirit of adaptability was present throughout the IRD
program. A good example is seen in the area of health care.
At the time the IRD program was designed, it was anticipated
that an unrelated AID project for rural health delivery would
serve the San Julian area. Because of this expectation, no
provisions were made for health services under the IRD program.

Unfortunately, the expected benefits from AID's rural
health delivery project did not materialize. FIDES knew that
some kind of health services was critical. Finally, when
pressed by the settlers themselves, FIDES took action. Several
auxiliary nurses were employed as health extensionists, health











committees formed during the orientation programs were reacti-
vated (many had never stopped functioning), training was pro-
vided for health promoters in each nucleo, and consumer cooper-
atives were encouraged to establish pharmacies in the nucleo.
All this was done by FIDES at a very low cost, but with high
settler participation. It worked because the need was per-
ceived by all and the adaptation was recognized as a common-
sense adjustment to a changing reality.


C. Motivation


"It is that enthusiasm and willingness to
take risks that comes with close identifi-
cation with...program goals."

In IRD programs a highly motivated implementing agent is
essential because the task is so difficult and so ambiguous.
If the job is to build a road, dig a well, or revise school
books, it is easy to define success and failure. The imple-
menting agent in such circumstances needs little motivation
beyond the very normal desire either to succeed or to avoid
failure.

What happens, however, when there is no clear relationship
between a program's specific activities and overall success or
failure? How do you keep an implementing agent working hard
when he or she really cannot be held accountable? It is impos-
sible to ensure implementing agent motivation in an IRD context
because the linkages between individual activities and overall
success are so tenuous. An implementing agent might do a
first-rate job of carrying out discrete program elements de-
tailed in the original design, yet fail to adapt to some change
in circumstances and thus doom overall succeeds. In such a
case, the implementation might be both above reproach and, at
the same time, grossly negligent.

The motivation needed in IRD is thus hard to define. It
is that enthusiasm and willingness to take risks that comes
with close identification with overall program goals. It is
that conviction of the importance of one's work that enables
one to change program elements in mid-stream, knowing that one
will not be thanked for doing so, but will surely be blamed if
the choice proves to be wrong.

In the San Julian IRD program, AID has been blessed with a
highly motivated implementing agent. FIDES staff, from the top
down, closely identify with the plight of the settlers and
their families. They are not motivated toward success at de-
livering individual program components, but rather at overall


success--at improvement in the lives of the farm families them
selves. Whatever it takes to ensure settler success, that is
what FIDES staff has tried to deliver.


D. Close Program Monitoring


"...it is not possible to judge the success
of one's actions without continual collec-
tion of...data."

Close program monitoring through systematic collection an
analysis of information is also important in IRD programs.
Because of the comprehensiveness of activities, it is not pos-
sible to judge the success of one's actions without continual
collection of both qualitative and quantitative data. Useful
data may be directly related to project activities (e.g., hec-
tares planted) or they may be indirectly related (e.g., growth
of secondary industries). The important thing is that the data
have something to do with overall perceptions of success.

When collected, such data must be analyzed and discussed
by program managers. The implications of such data for future
program direction must be ascertained, and decisions regarding
program adaptations should be made accordingly.

Throughout the life of the San Julian IRD program, FIDES
has given strong emphasis to collection and analysis of infor-
mation--to learning from its experience. The tremendous adap-
tability evidenced in the San Julian program bears witness to
this. Much of the success noted by the evaluation team is a
result of FIDES's policy of close program monitoring.


E. Participation


"The program should be of, by, and for the
beneficiary."

Participation of target beneficiaries in program design,
implementation, monitoring, evaluation, and modification is a
very useful process in IRD programs. As changes occur in the
overall program environment, whether from program impacts
(e.g., better yielding rice varieties), or as a result of exog-
enous forces (e.g., price policies or weather), the needs of
the beneficiary group likewise change. No one is better able
to take note of these changes and their effects than the bene-
ficiary.








E-6


The best IRD program is one in which the target benefi-
ciary is really an active participant in the entire process.
The program should be of, by, and for the beneficiary. If
possible, the beneficiaries, or someone they can identify as
their agent, should be involved from the very inception of the
program, thus creating identification with program activities
and goals.

In San Julian, the implementing agent, FIDES, did an out-
standing job of eliminating any distance between itself and the
target beneficiary population. Indeed, during the time that
the evaluation team spent on-site, it was often difficult to
see any distinction. The transition from the Project Manager
to FIDES directors to base camp staff to salaried extensionists
to cooperative employees, health promoters, model farmers, and
federation representatives occurred so gradually, with so much
overlap, that one got the distinct impression that all consid-
ered themselves to be part of the same process. There is no
"us and them" in the San Julian IRD program, and the result is
an extraordinarily participatory effort.

Examples of such participation range from the work of
structured groups such as nucleo and NADEPA committees to un-
structured meetings with individual settlers. It can likewise
be seen in the growth of strong and democratic settler organi-
zations with broader economic (San Julian Multi-Purpose Coop-
erative) and political (Special Federation of San Julian Colo-
nists) objectives. The farmers in the San Julian settlement
area clearly do not view themselves as passive beneficiaries of
a government-sponsored program. Rather they see themselves as
part of an important national process, the settlement of the
oriente, in which they are the key players around whom the
program evolves and from whom it must take its direction.

IRD programs are difficult to accomplish in the best of
circumstances. In an environment where there is a distance
between implementing agent and target beneficiaries there are
certain to be misunderstandings, with resultant misdirected or
inappropriately utilized resources. For IRD programs to have
reasonable prospects of success, all players must be partici-
pants, and responsibility for planning and execution must be
shared in accordance with each party's ability to contribute.


F. Comprehensiveness of Scope


"Acceptance of responsibility is the key.
In IRD programs, the project planners/
implementers cannot have tunnel vision."


The principal difference between a standard, single-
objective project and IRD is scope. -In a single-objective
project one might assess the plight of would-be farmers in the
Bolivian Oriente and opt to develop a high-yielding rice vari-
ety appropriate to local conditions, or to build an access
road. The other elements necessary to development of success-
ful farms would be assumed to be achievable without assistance
In IRD programs, on the other hand, the project planner endeav
ors to identify all potential constraints to development and
deal with them to the extent resources permit.

It is clear from the San Julian experience that a well-
designed IRD program must determine priorities for investing
its scarce financial and technical resources, but at the same
time it cannot ignore nonprogram areas. From the outset, FIDE
focused its efforts in San Julian on settler orientation, which
enabled them to lay a framework for social organization, pro-
mote lowland construction technology, and teach farming tech-
niques. During orientation, FIDES also encouraged development
of cooperatives, health committees, home economics programs,
and other low-cost programs with prospects for long-term conti
nuity. Using this approach meant that although the formal
orientation program for each nucleo lasted only several months
its impacts continued. FIDES was thus able to maintain influ-
ence at a very low cost by advising settler committees, broker
ing settler requests for government services, etc.

The comprehensive approach FIDES developed during orienta
tion carried over into subsequent stages of the IRD program.
Its primary focus and investment have been in discrete outputs
such as farm systems development (through introduction of pe-
rennials, improved pastures, and animal traction), training fo
cooperative administrators, and experiments with agricultural
credit. At the same time, however, FIDES's staff has recog-
nized that there are many important constraints to success
beyond the scope of the IRD program and has labored to assist
in these areas by playing the role of broker. Examples include
work to facilitate involvement of the Center for Tropical Agri
cultural Research (CIAT) and the Regional Development Corpora-
tion for Santa Cruz (CORDECRUZ) in agricultural production
experiments, the Heifer Project International in dairy cattle
promotion, the Mennonite Central Committee in promotion of
animal traction, and CORDECRUZ and the Inter-American Develop-
ment Bank (IDB) in improvement of the road system.

Acceptance of responsibility is the key. In IRD programs
the project planners/implementers cannot have tunnel vision.
They must take into cognizance all of the elements necessary t
ultimate goal achievement, invest the bulk of money and time i
resolving the highest priority activities within their resource
capability, and then stand ready to assist in resolution of
other constraints wherever possible.











G. Proximity


"If one wants to understand the need for a
workable transportation system, there is no
substitute for being at the far end of a
dirt road when the rainy season begins."

Proximity of implementing agency personnel to program
participants can be a tremendous aid to successful IRD pro-
grams. It enables regular contact and development of easy
dialogue on a personal level. Likewise it increases the like-
lihood that program personnel will be able to see the benefi-
ciaries' problems first hand, and thus better understand their
perspective. If one wants to understand the need for a work-
able transportation system, there is no substitute for being at
the far end of a dirt road when the rainy season begins. If
one cannot appreciate the need for better health care, the best
way to learn is to become sick or be injured in an area where
it is lacking.

In San Julian, FIDES's personnel policies have been acute-
ly sensitive to the need for proximity between implementing
agency staff and program participants. The most senior advi-
sors are familiar figures to the settlers. Although extension-
ists theoretically operate from base camp areas (within the
settlement zone, but not within any community), in reality most
spend half or more of their time traveling to and from the
various communities. Because of the poor quality of transport
within the zone, more often than not this has meant staying the
night under the same primitive conditions experienced by set-
tlers.

Because of the proximity of its personnel to the San Juli-
an settlers, FIDES has always had intimate knowledge of the
settlers' problems and needs. In an area such as San Julian,
where physical comforts are few, the price of such proximity is
high. With all the attendant difficulties in IRD, however, it
may well be necessary to success.


H. Self-Help


"...beneficiaries...must labor from the
outset to fill the void themselves when
critical government services dwindle."

Long-term success of an IRD program is likely to be con-
tingent on the ability of the participant community to eventu-
ally stand on its own feet, without outside support. This is


because in most lesser developed countries, reliance on indefi-
nite access to subsidized credit, agricultural extension, and
road maintenance is risky. Financial resources are generally
scarce, and program continuity is the exception. If the bene-
ficiaries of an IRD program wish to consolidate their gains
they must labor from the outset to fill the void themselves
when critical government services dwindle.

In the San Julian IRD program, the implementing agency was
quick to recognize the need to create independence from exter-
nal assistance. A major emphasis during its settler orienta-
tion program was organization to solve problems through self-
help. Settler groups were consulted on decisions ranging from
what to serve in the community kitchens to issues regarding
land clearing, health promotion, and cooperative development.
Literally from the first day in the field, the settlers them-
selves were making the decisions necessary for survival over
the short run, and in the process laying the groundwork for
long-run success.

It is no accident that settlers in San Julian have organ-
ized to build schools and community centers in every nucleo
without benefit of outside funds. Nor is it a coincidence that
San Julian settlers enjoy a self-financing system of health
promoters (farmers who provide health services in return for
help from other settlers with their farm work), cooperatives to
aid in group buying and marketing, and political federations to
press for their fair share of government services. The set-
tlers of San Julian are largely Quechua and Aymara Indians who
have a long tradition of social organization, and, from the
outset, FIDES worked to nurture this inherent ability until it
blossomed as never before.

When the recent floods devastated entire communities in
San Julian and government assistance was inadequate to prevent
tragedy, the communities that were less affected organized to
provide relief to hard-hit communities. When the roads were
rendered impassable, and government failed to provide mainte-
nance, the settlers organized to repair the worst sections
themselves.

The ability to organize to solve one's own problems is
critical in IRD because the intensity of government investment
in such programs generally cannot be sustained over time. For
this reason program emphasis on organizational development is
viewed as essential to long-term success.








E-10


I. Self-Capitalization


"There is minimal dependence upon outsiders
and maximum insurance against failure."

Closely related to self-help, yet sufficiently distinct to
merit separate discussion, is the importance of avoiding de-
pendency on external sources to finance long-term farm develop-
ment costs.

A critical aspect of many IRD programs is credit for agri-
cultural development--generally subsidized credit. Where such
credit is employed for activities which only occur once, after
which there is no need for subsidy, it might be justified in
theory. Beyond such special cases, however, subsidized credit
raises serious questions as to long-term economic viability of
borrower operations.

In San Julian the AID contractor took a hard line, arguing
that no subsidized credit is healthy, that it creates misallo-
cation of resources while encouraging dependency. After care-
ful review of developments and the way FIDES worked to develop
nonsubsidy solutions, the evaluation team is persuaded that the
latter is a preferable approach.

The FIDES model might be characterized as self-capitaliza-
tion. Although the approach was taken with everything from
consumer cooperatives to the system of health promoters, it is
best evidenced in the prevailing model for farm development.

San Julian farmers are virtually all eager to clear their
land with bulldozers; buy tractors for planting, weeding, and
harvesting; and grow one or two cash crops. They are aware
that the relatively more prosperous Mennonite settlers in the
area have done so, albeit primarily with cash, and they would
like to follow suit. If they could arrange highly subsidized
credit (actually at negative interest rates, given Bolivian
inflation), as has been made available to some farmers in the
Chane-Piray area, many would do so. In all probability, given
the poor quality of the San Julian road and the instability of
prices in Bolivia, the result would be the same: high rates of
loan default and resultant farm turnover.

In the face of this natural inclination of settlers to
gamble on instant success with their farms, FIDES has counseled
a more conservative approach. Farmers have been urged first to
ensure subsistence. The first step in this process is to clear
several hectares and plant a food crop for sale, generally rice
or corn.


Immediately thereafter, farmers are urged to plant a hec-
tare or so in various food crops for their own consumption--
normally perennial fruit trees and annual vegetables. With
this base, farmers need never be driven from their land due to
failure of the commercial crop, inability to get it to market,
or erosion of the market price.

The next step in the FIDES model is development of pastur
on land no longer suitable for annual crops. After pasture is
established comes purchase of livestock. In San Julian, live-
stock is better than cash because it is inflation proof as wel
as highly liquid. Investment in livestock provides still ano-
ther layer of protection against adversity.

The final step in the FIDES self-capitalization farm de-
velopment model is conversion to animal traction. With pastur
established, investment in an animal (and plow) is not beyond
the means of a small farmer. The bulk of maintenance (animal
care and plow repair) can be done within the nucleo, usually i
exchange for labor.

The result of following the FIDES self-capitalization
model is a safe and relatively sure (albeit slow) way to devel
opment of a stable family farm business. There is minimal
dependence on outsiders and maximum insurance against failure.
In the opinion of the evaluation team, the FIDES self-capitali
nation model merits close scrutiny by advocates of IRD as a
low-cost, low-risk alternative to some of the flashier program
that have been promoted in recent years.


J. Flexibility of Implementing Organizations


"It is very difficult for a politically
based agency whose policies and budget
emanate from a far-away capital city to
react to local circumstances."

Because of the broad scope of IRD programs, the realities-
with which they deal and the needs of program participants are
likely to be in a constant state of flux. This requires that
IRD programs be able to adapt to circumstances, to shift empha
ses, even directions, in mid-course. In Section II.B above,
Program Adaptability, this phenomenon is briefly reviewed.

From an institutional perspective, this need for program
adaptability has serious implications. The problem, it seems,
is that not all institutions are equally able to make mid-
program adjustments, to know when an adaptation is appropriate
and to make it in a timely fashion.


E-11








E-12


In San Julian there are several different types of enti-
ties working to aid the development process. A brief look at
them may help to illustrate the point.

The National Colonization Institute (INC) is the primary
Bolivian Government entity in the settlement zone. Despite
having a broad mandate for IRD/resettlement and a substantial
staff, it has not been effective. Though it employs many dedi-
cated, hard-working people, the frequency of turnover among
higher level employees (with subsequent government changes) has
been highly disruptive. This makes it hard to sustain activi-
ties over time.

Likewise INC suffers from "front office syndrome." For
civil servants a long-term post in a remote jungle station is
not conducive to upward mobility--far better to be near the
boss. The great majority of INC personnel in the Santa Cruz
department is located in the city of Santa Cruz itself. Only
two employees were known to be in the San Julian zone at the
time of the project evaluation, and trips there by other INC
employees are infrequent.


Perhaps the greatest problem
ganizations like INC, however, is
as institutional rigidity. It is
cally based agency whose policies
far-away capital city to react to
agencies are not set up that way.
developed at the top and projected
to pressures from the top, not the


of main-line government or-
what might be characterized
very difficult for a politi-
and budget emanate from a
local circumstances. Such
Policies and programs are
Downward; responsiveness is
* bottom.


A second development assistance entity working in the San
Julian area is the Santa Cruz-based Center for Tropical Agri-
cultural Research (CIAT). It has performed some very useful
studies, primarily in the area of farm economics and farming
systems, and also does some extension work.

CIAT may be the most effective agricultural research and
extension organization in Bolivia. It has a capable Bolivian
staff which, because it is not associated with national-level
political institutions, has enjoyed substantial technical sup-
port from several foreign governments including Great Britain
and Japan.

To cast a primarily technical agency such as CIAT in the
role of implementing agent for an IRD program would be a mis-
take, however. Effective IRD involves a broad range of respon-
sibilities well beyond farm systems research and extension. A
CIAT-type organization would also be hampered by some of the
"front office syndrome" problems faced by INC, albeit for dif-
ferent reasons. Leaders in an agricultural research organiza-
tion are almost certain to come from an agricultural research


background. As such, they are likely to put a premium on re-
search skills and to favor good researchers with better career
opportunities. Long-term posting in a remote area, where one's
associations are limited to simple farmers, is unlikely to
enhance such a career.

The entity that seems least encumbered by institutional
rigidities, and most able to adapt to the changing circum-
stances characteristic of IRD, is the private voluntary organi-
zation (PVO). In PVOs, many of the characteristics viewed as
critical to successful implementation of IRD programs are rela-
tively commonplace.

PVOs tend to be flexible with regard to organizational
structure and programs. This is a function of small size and
the tendency to decentralize decision-making. PVOs tend to be
staffed by people with humanitarian motivations, thus rendering
them more willing than most to work long hours for low pay
under adverse circumstances (such as in San Julian). This is a
two-edged sword because while seeking such individuals a sacri-
fice occasionally is made in technical skills. In the case of
FIDES, however, the evaluation team felt that project personnel
were highly competent.

PVO personnel tend to be willing to make long-term commit-
ments. They are not on career paths which limit the amount of
time they can safely stay in a certain position. Rather, each

job is an end in itself (the humanitarian motivation).

Finally, PVO personnel are often well-versed in participa-
tory involvement of program beneficiaries. This is a natural
result of working within essentially horizontal organizations
where decisions are made through group dynamics. It is a rare
PVO in which orders come from "on high" and are followed in
"lockstep" fashion. When one's employees are all working for
less money than they could earn elsewhere, one learns to lead
through example and to give assignments through persuasion.
Community development techniques come naturally to most PVO
personnel because they live them in their own organizations.

The evaluation team noted that PVOs have not been widely
used in IRD, that the scope and expense of such programs have
generally been felt to require administration by large, main-
line government agencies. Maybe that is why IRD has so seldom
succeeded. Perhaps a serious look should be given to the PVO
alternative.


E-13




University of Florida Home Page
© 2004 - 2010 University of Florida George A. Smathers Libraries.
All rights reserved.

Acceptable Use, Copyright, and Disclaimer Statement
Last updated October 10, 2010 - - mvs