A.I.D. Project Impact Evaluation Report No. 57
Bolivia: Integrated Rural Development
in a Colonization Setting
U.S. Agency for International Development (A.I.D.)
BOLIVIA: INTEGRATED RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN A COLONIZATION SETTING
AID PROJECT IMPACT EVALUATION REPORT NO. 57
Richard Ray Solem, Team Leader (AID/Washington) Richard J. Greene, Attorney/Social Scientist (Consultant)
David W. Hess, Anthropologist (USAID/Peru)
Carol Bradford Ward, Demographer (AID/Washington) Peter Leigh Taylor, Social Scientist (Consultant)
U.S. Agency for International Development January 1985
The views and interpretations expressed in this report are those of the authors and should not be attributed to the Agency for International Development.
A.I.D. EVALUATION PUBLICATIONS
-A complete list of reports issued in the A.I.D. Evaluation Publication series is included in the back of this document, together with information for ordering reports.
It's not easy here. It's hot and the mosquitoes are bad. But I want to stay. I feel better now because I work for myself.
San Julian settler
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Preface. . .. .. .. .................................. ** ... .v i
Acknowledgments......... ........... .... . .... *. ......... * *
Sma y ofBli.......... ............. . .. .. .. .. ..... 0.x
Blsa..Nationa..Awakening...... ... .... .. .. .. o .. .. .... xi1
Proec AnataySheetf...g.....t...enti.n.............. i
A.p Physoicial Infrastructure..................... ... .... .4
I. ~ 3 Buldng aonedt..u...p......................1
B. EtlemiePerns....... ... ... ... . .... ... ..
C. Sericesl.Awakening....................... .......8 .
. CadaOm unity eeom....... ...... ..... .... .92
III. Analysis of ProgramInpatsvenions..............3
A. Econoic Impat.uctur .. ... .. ... .. .......... .. 14
. Seducametiontn........................ o....... 6
. Sencse ofWelBen... ................ . ... .. .. .... 18
4. Futr Expetation . ... ... ... ... .. .....1.8
C. Ecniomenta Impacts........ .. .. o ... .. .. .. o .. ..... 140
Appendices to the Report Page
TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued) A. Logical Frameworks (1974 and 1979 projects) ....... A-1
B. Project Interventions.............................. B-i
IV. essns eared...............................21A description of the two AID project interventions
IV. essns earnd .............................. 21(a 1974 loan, primarily for road construction, and
A. Lssos fo Inegrted ura Devlopent........21the 1979 follow-up grant, primarily for technical CesontinurInrty d ofra Commtmet.....................21 services) and an analysis of them at the Input/Output
2. Pogramit Adaptabiit............................21 level. This appendix is of interest to project de3. Motivation..................................... 21sinradmnge.
4. Close Program Monitoring ....................... 22 C. Project Impacts....................................C-1
5. Participation ...................................22
6. Comprehensiveness of Scope ..................... 22 A discussion of the impacts of project interventions
7. Proximity....................................... 22 at the Purpose/Goal level. These are viewed first
8. Self-Help....................................... 22 from the perspective of the settler/farmer, and sub9. Self-Capitalization .............................23 sequently from a national perspective. This appendix
10. Flexibility of Implementing Organizations ...23 is of special interest to project designers and evalB. Resettlement Lessons ................................23 utr.Cnutteapni uln o eetv
1. Assessment of Resource Potential ............... 23 reading of economic, social, or environmental ques2. Settlement Mode (spontaneous vs. directed)..23 tions.
3. Basic Physical Infrastructure .................. 24
4. Pioneering Stage ................................24 D. Special Development Issues .........................D-1
5. The Dependency Syndrome.. .......................24
6. Turnover........................................ 24 A brief review of the project from the perspective of
7. Consolidation and Growth ....................... 25 several broad development concerns, project replicability, and sustainability. This appendix is primarily of interest to project designers and evaluators.
E. Lessons Learned.................................... E-1
A distillation of the entire project experience into guidance for future efforts. To better enable selective reading, lessons are divided between those applying to integrated rural development and those applying to resettlement. These lessons are of interest to project designers, managers, evaluators, and policy-makers alike.
F. Supplements........................................ F-1
1. Evaluation Methodology
2. List of Contacts
4. Settler Profiles
5. Memorandum to USAID Regarding Future Interventions
-viii- -ixPREFACE ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
A 3-week evaluation cannot do justice to a project that The team would like to thank USAID/Bolivia for providing
has been going on for nearly 10 years and has involved so many invaluable support while we were in-country: John Rifenbark,
participants and program variations. To really understand what the Project Manager, and Henry Bassford, the Mission Director,
has happened in the lives of the settlers of Chane-Piray and for the important background information they provided, and the
San Julian would require living among them for an extended motor pool for supplying a car and driver for the field visits.
period, observing their economic activities first-hand, and sharing their hardships and hopes for the future during long, Thanks are also due to Harry Peacock, Javier Balivian, and
evening-time conversations. Since this was not possible, im- others at the Foundation for Integral Development (FIDES) for
pressions from travels through the two settlement zones and arranging meetings, food, and lodging while we were in the setbrief conversations with several score settlers and a dozen tlement zone, contracting air transport for a project overproject and public officials had to suffice. flight, and answering endless questions; and to Melvin Pozo and
From tWillie Lawrence-Jones at the Center for Tropical Agricultural
the start, it was apparent that we would have diffi- Research (CIAT) for their coaching on technical problems and
culty separating integrated rural development (IRD) and settle- issues.
ment issues. This project, unlike the usual IRD project, did not involve reinforcing or supplementing existing infrastruc- Finally, we must thank the settlers of Chane-Piray and San
tures. At project inception most of the Chane-Piray and San Julian. Their willingness to speak openly and honestly with
Julian project areas were virgin forest. Thus, in reading this our exotic little party of foreigners made all the difference
report, it must be borne in mind that the integrated rural in our work. Without this first-hand contact we could not have
development is taking place within the broader context of new- appreciated the settlement experience as we learned to. If our
lands settlement. impact evaluation "rings true" anywhere, it is in the quotes
from settlers sprinkled throughout the main text and Appendix The water is further "muddied" because the two projects F-4, Settler Profiles.
evaluated (a 1974 infrastructure loan and a 1979 technical services grant) are carried out in two distinct settlement zones, one (Chane-Piray) which had already experienced considerable activity at project inception and the other (San Julian) which was just being opened to settlement. This difference in stage of settlement life cycle appears to have had a major effect on relative responsiveness to project innovations since in most of the older Chane-Piray zone, systems for community organization and farming were already established.
Our mandate from the Office of Evaluation was to evaluate these projects within the context of integrated rural development and determine what lessons may be applied to other IRD projects. This was our first priority. It soon became clear, however, that USAID/Bolivia had its own agenda--to determine whether further additional support to the project activity is warranted after scheduled completion in 1983. Within the time available, we did our best to address this concern as well, and our response to USAID is attached as Appendix F-5.
-x- -xiSUMMARY the social/political structure of the Spanish ancestry
lowlanders and (b) replacement of virgin hardwood Two AID projects aimed at promoting new-lands settlement forests with crop and pastureland.
in the subtropical lowlands of eastern Bolivia were evaluated. Special Development Issues. The projects were reThe first project, a 1974 loan of $9,700,000, was aimed primar- viewed from the perspective of certain broad developily at providing basic physical infrastructure--penetration ment concerns:
roads, w6lls, and settlement patterns. The second project, a 1979 grant of $1,482,000, focused on providing technical assis- Replicability. The basic design is a good one and
tance to settler families and communities--orientation during bears repeating.
the first months, and cooperative and community development activities, agricultural extension, etc., over a longer period. Sustainability. High marks are earned in communProject activities were carried out at tity and cooperative development and low marks on
b rjcyciiisweecridota two sites separated maintenance of infrastructure.
by 250 kilometers--some 5 hours of travel time on existing roads. Chane-Piray, where initial settlement began in the Lessons Learned. A number of significant lessons were
early 1960s, covers an area of some 4,000 square kilometers drawn from the project experience, primarily relating
between the Chane and Piray Rivers. The San Julian zone, which to the very successful work with community and cooperis 5,000 square kilometers in size, experienced initial settle- native development and agricultural systems. For the
ment in 1972 but as late as 1979 was still largely unpopulated, sake of selective reading these are broken into lessons related to IRD and lessons related to resettleImplementation of the two projects was the shared respon- ment.
sibility of several Bolivian entities. The AID counterpart agency in the Bolivian Government was the National Colonization Institute (INC). INC carried out the road construction through a contract with a private Bolivian general contractor. INC provided for well drilling and certain technical services with its own staff. AID's implementing agent for the bulk of technical services was the Foundation for Integral Development (FIDES), a private Bolivian foundation made up of several church-related development and missionary groups who had long been working with lowland settlers. Project evaluators looked at activities from the two projects and the two settlement zones jointly because they were inextricably mixed. Conclusions were drawn from several perspectives:
Interventions. Analysis of inputs and outputs resulted in low marks for physical infrastructure work supervised or carried out by INC, and very high marks
for technical services carried out by FIDES.
Impacts. Economic and social impacts at the microlevel, though far from fully realized, appear to be
mixed in Chane-Piray and very positive in San Julian.
The difference is attributable to the greater and
earlier influence of FIDES in the San Julian zone. At
the macro-level, economic, social, and environmental impacts are also substantial and generally positive.
Still unknown, however, are the long-term impacts of (a) merging primarily highland Indian settlers into
-xii- -xiiiOXFAM Oxford Famine Relief Committee
GLOSSARY PCC Consolidation of Colonization Project
Altiplano Highlands plateau PIR Leftist Revolutionary Party
Barbecho Secondary growth on previously POR Worker's Revolutionary Party
cleared land Valles Highland valleys contiguous to,highBrecha Casarabe Main road in San Julian which con- land plateau
nects the central nucleos USAID- United States Agency for InternationCamba Slang term describing descendants of al Development
the 16th century Spanish settlers in the eastern lowlands of Bolivia Campesino Rural inhabitant
CIAT Center for the Investigation of Tropical Agriculture
CIU United Churches Committee
CORDECRUZ Regional Development Corporation for
FIDES Foundation for Integral Development
GOB Government of Bolivia
IDB Inter-American Development Bank
INC National Institute of Colonization
Interior Rural Bolivian highlands
Kolla Slang term describing immigrants from
the Bolivian highlands
Latifundia Feudal landholding system
MNR National Revolutionary Movement
NADEPA Associated Nucleos for Agricultural
and Livestock Production
Nucleo Colony of 40 families with a central
OP Orientation Program
Oriente Eastern Bolivian lowlands
PROJECT DATA SHEET
Project Authorization/ Funding ($000) Implementing Responsible AID
Project Number Completion Dates AID Other Agency Mission Officials
Land Institute of
Development 511-T-050 FY 1975-1981 9,700 5,607 Colonization Alex Gary
Consolidation in the Foundation
Bolivian for Integral
Sub-Tropics 511-0514 FY 1979-1984 1,482 604 Development John Rifenbark
77'777 :77 .....
R io Mamore ...
CL w m
(I I. THE CONTEXT
A. Early Pioneers
When tillage begins, other acts follow. The farmers, therefore, are the founders of civilization.
LA Daniel Webster
The first settlers to attempt farming in Bolivia's eastern lowlands (the Oriente) were Spanish colonizers who came up from Paraguay in 1559. Supported by a Jesuit mission, they established the settlement of Santa Cruz de la Sierra. Their descendants, who came to be called Cambas, created the agricultural economy that characterized -the region until midway through the 20th century.
Life for the Camba settlers was difficult. Cut off from markets and transportation arteries, their farming and ranching activities were subsistence oriented. Lacking the sedentary sodoowo labor force available in the highlands (Indians in the Oriente
were hunters and gatherers), Camba settlers elected to use resource-management techniques that treated land as a free good ML % and labor and capital as scarce goods. Survival was thus accomplished, but growth was minimal.
B. National Awakening
For centuries there has been no Bolivian culture. We have been Aymara, Quechua, or Spanish. Only now, here in the Oriente, are we developing a Bolivian identTy.
San Julian settler
By the dawn of the 20th century a tiny but tough regional enclave had developed in the Santa Cruz Department. Cut off as they were from the rest of Bolivia, both physically and culturally, a strong current of separatism existed among Camba leaders. Had international events not intervened, this drive for regional autonomy might well have resulted in political division.
The outbreak of hostilities between Bolivia and Paraguay EXISTING (the Chaco War of 1934-1936) finally called national attention
PAVED ROADS_ to the Oriente. Ox cart trails, which had previously been the
OTHER ROADS region's only link to highland population centers, were reROAD UNDR CNSTRCTIO .........placed by roads suitable for motorized transportation. SolROADS UNDERGONSRUCTION. dies followed, most of them highland Indians conscripted from
PROPOSED UNDER LOAN
, IMPROVE TESTING ROAD
NEW ROAD mmmmm
-2- -3communities where they had been held in virtual slavery by the Although settlement of the Bolivian Oriente by highland
prevailing latifundia farming system. Indians had been an intermittent government policy since the
Chaco War, with irregular efforts throughout the latter
Bolivia's highland army did not fare well in the tropics 1930s and 1940s, after the 1952 revolution it commanded serious
where the war was fought. The mud, heat, and mosquitoes took a attention. Programs to direct settlement to designated areas
heavy toll. To make matters worse, Paraguay's tough, well- through various incentives (free land, roads, wells, and setadapted army of Guarani Indians fought tenaciously on their tler stipends) were implemented. The vast majority of program
home ground. The result was a string of military setbacks for participants were highland Indians, better known by their Camba
Bolivia culminating in the loss of a large piece of her national domain. hosts as Kollas.
He comes looking for work, for economic
The war had a positive side, however. It drew national betterment, not just land.
attention to the Oriente, and opened roads to the region. It FIDES official
also caused a regional economic boom as the presence of the national army created a market for Camba agricultural production. Many of these new settlers were farmers who viewed the
government grant of 10- to 50-hectare land parcels as an opThe Bolivian soldiers--Quechua and Aymara Indians accus- portunity to secure their own and their children's future.
tomed to serfdom on crowded barren farms in the highlands--were Others, however e er onan ther c h e fure.
perplexed. As fighting men they were being told they were Otes oee, were businessmen "at heart" who, for lack of
Borl e edn s w i h tin theyrights and reonsbeili e t o f at i e opportunity, had labored in agricultural pursuits. For them Bolivians, with the rights and responsibilities of national the free land was viewed as a stepping-stone to preferred opcitizenship. As farmers, they were intrigued by vast, unoccu- portunities in the service sector. A period of pioneering was
pied lands stretching as far as the eye could see. The seeds simply the price of a better future.
for change in the Oriente were planted during the Chaco War. simpl the rictof cbe te fr.
This, then, was the context for AID's integrated rural
C. Land-and Opportunity development/resettlement programs in the Bolivian Oriente:
vast areas of rich, alluvial soils blanketed by impenetrable
forest and criss-crossed by rivers which were at times raging
torrents and at times gentle trickles, combined with highly
The land is so fertile that if you throw a motivated migrants from the totally alien climate and ecology
seed to the ground, it takes root; if you of the high Andean planes.
discard an orange, a tree appears.
In 1952 Bolivia's feudal landholding system, the latifun- II. ANALYSIS OF PROGRAM INTERVENTIONS
dia, collapsed. No longer would land be concentrated in the
hands of a relatively few "Spanish" landlords. No longer could Stated objectives in the two AID projects evaluated (Subthese feudal masters demand Indian labor without compensation. tropical Lands Development, 1974; and Colonization ConsolidaLand reform, and the attendant social revolution, was underway. tion, 1979) were roughly the same: to increase food production
and improve living standards among small farmers. The projects
The twin phenomena of exposure to the rich, unoccupied were also similar in that they directed resources toward the
lowlands as soldiers, followed by destruction of the bonds of same two settlement areas, the 4,000 square-mile Chane-Piray
the latifundia system, had an unsettling effect on that and the 5,200 square-mile San Julian zones of Santa Cruz Degeneration of Indians which experienced both. Their eyes were apartment (see project area map). They were very different,
opened, and then they were freed. It was a dynamic time for however, in the resource mix employed (inputs), and the immedipeople for whom change had always been measured in centuries, ate results (outputs) realized.
For most, freedom meant an opportunity to lay claim to Although the 1974 AID project contained a wide range of
that hectare of barren land they had been farming as tenants, integrated rural development (IRD) activities, the bulk of its
For others, it meant an opportunity to move to town, where op- funds were slated for physical infrastructure investments:
portunities seemed greater. For a few it meant a complete access roads to open new areas for settlement, and deep wells
break with the past--a chance to carve a new life out of the to provide settlers with safe drinking water. The 1979 projwilderness. ect, on 'the other hand, which covered an area that already had
-4- -5roads and wells, was able to concentrate its resources on so- 1. Roads
cial and technical services in support of the settlement process.
When I first vent into Cuatro Ojitos we had
Physical infrastructure activities under the 1974 project no road. Because there was no road, our
were implemented primarily through Bolivia's National Coloniza- crops had no value.
tion Institute (INC), a national government agency with head- Chane-Piray settler
quarters in La Paz. Road construction was contracted for from I
a Bolivian general contracting firm working under general su- Construction and maintenance of access roads were at once
pervision by INC and the USAID. Wells were established by INC the greatest expense and the greatest disappointment of AID's
staff directly. Social and technical services under the 1979 IRD efforts in Chane-Piray and San Julian. Costing roughly
project were contracted from the Foundation for Integral Devel- $8.5 million (some 75 percent of the funds expended in the 1974
opment (FIDES), a Bolivian foundation established by several project), the intended output was to have been 180 kilometers
church-related organizations which had long been involved in of all-weather access roads and 800 kilometers of perpendicular
resettlement support. trails in Cha'ne-Piray and San Julian. The result was half that
Investment in physical infrastructure, especially roads,
required relatively large amounts of money over a short period. The Bolivian general contractor responsible for building
The work was completed with little or no involvement of the both roads went out of business before completing the work.
target populace. Because the work preceded the settlers, their The roadwork done prior to this failure ranged from all-weather
tendency was to take it for granted, as though it had always quality in places to very much below standard in others. A
been there. Alternatively, activities under the 1979 project road, like a chain, is only as strong as its weakest link. The
(e.g., community and cooperative development and agricultural below-standard portions have thus rendered both the Chane-Piray
extension) involved sucdh close collaboration with the settlers and San Julian roads unusable during the rainy season.
themselves that success or failure in this area was as much a
result of the means by which services were delivered as the Road maintenance has also been a problem. The government
nature of the services themselves. entity for road maintenance in the settlement zones is the
National Colonization Institute (INC), and INC has not perSpecific project activities in the Chane-Piray and San formed this chore adequately. From tine to time the settlers
Julian IRD program fall into three broad categories: (1) phy- have organized themselves to deal with road repair problems.
sical infrastructure, (2) settlement designs, and (3) a range Especially troublesome low or soft spots have been filled by
of complementary services. The analysis that follows provides settlers, and rustic bridges have been constructed where
a brief review of the activities in each category. needed. In general, though, the problem of road maintenance
can only be solved through use of heavy equipment and importation of gravel--both tactics well beyond the means of the setA. Physical Infrastructure tlers.
Access and water are fundamental. Every- 2. Wells
thing else we do depends upon specific circumstances which change from place to place
and time to time. In Yapacani, people went into the forest
FIDES official with water on their backs, worked till it
was gone, them came out for more. Farm
The projects evaluated provided for a range of outputs development was impossible under those conwhich can be characterized as physical infrastructure. Roads ditions.
to open up the areas targeted for settlement, deep wells to FIDES official
provide healthful drinking water, and certain rudimentary
buildings and equipment were viewed as basic, minimal infra- Efforts to provide good well water were generally successstructure requirements for settler survival. ful. Except for a few communities where, after repeated borings, drillers settled for water which was bad tasting and
Slightly diarrhetic due to high mineral content, the settlement
-6- -7areas enjoy the use of well-located, functional wells. Main- One of the greatest successes of the two projects evalutenance is handled by the settlers themselves and is good and ated cost virtually nothing. This was the settlement design,
timely, except where they are obliged to turn to outsiders for the nucleo pattern. The nucleo is such a great improvement
spare parts. over the earlier, "piano key" settlement design that many farmers abandoned already established "piano key" parcels to start anew in nucleos. Illustration 1 below shows the differences
3. Buildings and Equipment between these two settlement patterns.
Two agricultural resource centers were to be built, one in Illustration 1. "Piano Key" and Nucleo Settlement Designs
each zone. Construction was contracted to INC. The ChanePiray Center was completed and taken over by the Center for Tropical Agricultural Research (CIAT), a Santa Cruz-based public/private research organization. This center is a big success. The San J3ulian center was never completed nor staffed "Piano Key" Nucleo,
consistently by INC, and thus the building is falling into dis- ZN
repair. Amenities Amenities
located at and farm
A sanitary post provided under the loan was largely con- one end of homes lopleted and is in use. A mobile health unit has not worked out. colony. cated in
It is not currently in operation and most of its equipment has .Farm homes central
bee soln.located on circle.
At the nucleo (colony of 40 families with a central well) tracts.
sites themselves, the project provided for two shelters each, one for settlers to sleep under until hones could be built and the other to keep the food dry. Basic building and farming equipment was also provided. These investments were very modest, but had substantial pay-offs5.
Looking at physical infrastructure investments overall, it ISchool Water Penetration Road-.
seems that these projects were well conceived. The roads planned were appropriate, and failure of the contractor to con- '.Penetration Road
plete them and of INC to maintain them were not predictable. The wells planned were well designed and, in fact, are substantially completed (one per village instead of the planned two each). Finally, the buildings and equipment planned were,Inbt cae thara loaedfrevopntfa
by and large, well chosen. Failure of the INC to complete the I c na communityes teeqa Theoasic amrdenities, a oel an
San Julian agricultural service center, and to operate it or school areuit als equal. Th ebai somenrofound aifferences
the Chane-Piray Center, could not have been predicted. Because shoeve r loeul hr r om rfuddfeecs
of the poor road quality and staffing problems, the mobile hwvr
health unit functioned for only a short time. However, struc- I h paoky eteetdsg h amrms
ture an equpmet a thenuceo iteswer wel chsenandchoose between living on his land or living near the well. In
well utilized. the nucleo the farmer has it both ways. Because farmers in
"Piano key" 'settlements make different decisions, some opting B. SttleentPattrnsto Stay on the land, others to live in town, development of B. Sttleent attens community organizations and spirit is curtailed. Likewise, the
process of secondary industry development is retarded. Running a shop, renting a draft animal, or threshing your neighbor's When we laid out the settlements *piano- rice are all easier "sidelines" to develop when the entire popkey" fashion, with a parcel every 200 uaelvswti huigdsac foeaohr
meters, everyone was on the road, but itlc ie ihnsotngdsac foeaohr
was a long walk to town.
A final, more subtle advantage of the nucleo settlement uncommon dedication to the task of making the settler's life
design often expressed by settlers is the security it provides. more bearable, of increasing his chances for success. in the
Migration from one's place of birth in the highlands to remote, final analysis, it was these characteristics that made the
alien jungle surroundings is a traumatic event. Proximity to difference, that enabled FIDES's employees to determine from
fellow pioneers means a lot in such circumstances. The perils day to day what needed doing and how to do it, and gave them
of snake bite, fever, and even loneliness are much mitigated the determination to stick with a task until success was
when one has a close neighbor. achieved.
Project services in the consolidation program can be broC. Services ken down into three general categories: (1) settler orientation, (2) community development, and (3) agricultural support.
How did you know what the people needed?
By living with them, listening to them. I. Settler Orientation
The most significant feature of the two AID projects, par- During the first night we huddled together
ticularly of the 1979 settlement consolidation program, was the like sheep under our shelter. I don't know
quality and appropriateness of the economic and social services If it was to keep warm, or because we were
provided to the settlers. Physical Infrastructure investments afraid.
were well chosen but implemented with mixed results. The 'nu- San Julian settler
cleo settlement design, though a radical departure from tradition, was so well received by settlers that implementation went The FIDES orientation program for new settlers began with the
very well. The greatest challenge, however, was development inception of each community. Fear of the alien environment was
and delivery of an appropriate package of settler services, much reduced by the presence of experienced, sympathetic FIDES
This task required unusual sensitivity, dedication, and talent staff, some of them settlers themselves from nearby communion a sustained basis throughout the life of the project. How tiei,. Panic at not knowing how to cope with tasks as familiar
this was accomplished merits close attention. as building homes with different materials, and farming with
different crops, was quickly alleviated through the instruction Much depended on a mystique--a social com- of FIDES extension agents. The heavy toll of sickness was
promise with the campesino that came from reduced through reliance on the advice of health promoters conreligious roots. We understood that salva- cerning local foods, mosquito control, and parasite infestation had to be reflected in all aspects of tions.
life, not just the spirit.
2. Community Development
FIDES was the principal implementing agent for the 1979
consolidation project. Working in cooperation with INC, FIDES
helped to design project interventions and implement all but It Is Important that the campesino do
the physical infrastructure components. things with his own hands. Paternalism
Though FIDES was newly established in 1979, its directors olmaehidpnet. FIDES official
and staff brought with them experience in new-lands settlement
in Bolivia's Oriente going back to the early 1960s. Some had The basic theme in FIDES's approach to settler services
been Methodist and Catholic missionaries in the settlement was self-help. Project services were not provided for the setzones. Others were development specialists associated with the tlers, but rather developed with them. Even decisions on which
Mennonite Church. Among then were both Bolivians and North services would be required were made by the settlers.
The FIDES staff operated, in effect, as methodologists.
What all FIDES leaders "brought to the table" in 1979 was They helped settlers determine the range of choices available
long experience on the front lines of new-lands settlement, and how to choose among them. Rarely, however, did FIDES make
vivid memories of the hardship and suffering entailed, and unilateral decisions.
A participatory approach to decision-making was encouraged development work, to look on it as nonsubstantive and "do
from the first day of each settlement's orientation. Building gooder" in nature. We feel this is a critical misreading of
upon century-old traditions of social organization in the high- the situation. More than anything else, it is the ability of
land communities, FIDES encouraged settlers to work together settler communities to solve their own problems which will
toward the common good. Everything from cooking to home con- facilitate the achievement of the long-term viability of the
struction to land clearing was done jointly. Survival through new-lands settlement program.
cooperation and self-help was the theme. FIDES staff, which
had the know-how and the rudimentary "grubstakes" of equipment3.ArcluaSuot and food, made themselves available to the settlers. These3.ArcluaSpot
services were transitory, however, and in a few short months
settlers would be on their own. It was thus imperative thatSetrsae hetmdfomllie.
the settlers learn to organize for the struggle.Setrsaehetndfom llie.
Floods often destroy crops In the fields.
FIDES's technique for ensuring that progress initiated Wet roads and high rivers sometimes prevent
during orientation would continue into the future was to timely marketing. Government price fixing
encourage development of formal settler organizations with can eliminate profits. Soaring Inflation
responsibility to provide for critical functions. Wherever makes planning and purchase of new inputs
possible, such organizations were to require no sustained out- difficult. The best form of strategy is
side support. one that provides Insurance against these
threats. Broad diversification, with a
Health committees were formed to provide guidance in the subsistence base, is the key to long-term
areas of sanitation and treatment of illness. In some of the survival.
nucleos, these committees appointed a health promoter who FDSofca
served as a combination pharmacist/nurse. in return for the
health promoter's time dispensing medicine and advising on The settlers who claimed parcels of virgin forest in San
health problems, the health promoter would receive a profiton Julian came from a variety of backgrounds. Some were cambas
drug sales and/or be freed from traditional community labor who had lived their entire lives in the lowlands, if not as
obligations. While the promoter was in training other settlers farmers then as hunters or tradesmen. Others were "ostepmiwould labor on his/her farm--an extension into a new field of grants," highlanders who had long since moved to the Or Iente
traditional Indian labor-exchange customs. and worked here and there as laborers, often on farms. Many,
however, had had no prior experience with life in the lowlands. Cooperatives were organized to deal jointly with economic All of these people would require technical support if they
problems beyond the ability of individual farmers. Consumer were to succeed as agricultural pioneers, so a strong program
cooperatives helped with group buying, thus greatly cutting the of practical, no-frills agricultural extension was developed as
time and expense of acquiring supplies from the distant cities. a key part of FIDES's portfolio of services.
In some cases, marketing cooperatives have been organized to
strengthen the settler's hand in sale of his produce. Like- The crux of FIDES's agricultural support effort was a
wise, agricultural credit cooperatives have been tried, albeit strategy that encouraged insurance against the harmful effects
with mixed success due to the disruptive impact of Bolivia's of elements outside the settlers' control--weather, market acsoaring inflation. cess, crop prices, and availability of inputs. The strategy
was manifested in a farm development plan which, while offering FinalyFIDS aso~ecouage setlerorgniztio tono quick road to wealth, minimized farmer risk and dependence.
deal with broader problems, problems which depended uponThsfrdelomnpancnbcaatridasefcpgovernment services. Thus even the growth of political organi- taliiing.
zations has been more rapid than usual at San Julian. The
Federation of San Julian colonists has been particularly active The first step in FIDES's farm development plan is to enin lobbying the government to repair or upgrade the zone's courage farmers to plant several hectares of annual crops for
road, t maitai watr wlls eve todealwit theprolemsale- -This matched the settlers' natural tendency. Kolla setof road destruction caused by overweight logging trucks. tes atclry r uiesoine n att go
crops they can sell.
The evaluation team noted a tendency on the part of USAID/
Bolivia staff to downplay the importance of FIDES's community
-12- -13The second step is to establish a subsistence base in case Because of their strong commercial orientation, in most
the annual crop is flooded, there is no market-access due to instances settlers put all their energies into a single cash
impassable roads, or the price is so low that it cannot be sold crop. If it grew and they could get it to market and sell it
profitably (farm-gate prices are extremely volatile in Boli- at the right price, they prospered. If any of those circumvia). This base can be established through cultivation of gar- stances failed to materialize, they failed. with no subsisden and orchard crops adjacent to the settler's hone. With the tence crops to fall back on, they were then forced to abandon
tremendous range of crops grown in the lowlands, settlers with- their parcels and seek employment elsewhere.
in a nucleo could thus ensure year-round availability of a wide
variety of foodstuffs, even when the cash crops were unprof it- When things worked out, however, such farmers did very
able. well indeed. Profits were then typically invested in labor to
clear, plant, and harvest additional hectares of the same crop.
The third step in the farm development plan is to plant With several successful years in a row, such farmers might genimproved pasture on soils exhausted after 2 to 3 years dedi- erate enough revenue to buy tractors, mostly on credit, and
cated to annual crops. Pasture has more value than the natural increase their plots and yields even faster.
secondary forest regrowth because it feeds nutrients to the
soil faster and it can be eaten by livestock. Planting of per- The problem with this system is that the exclusively cashennial trees and pasture are virtually cash-free ways of in- crop farmer is like the proverbial gambler who, when playing
creasing the value of a farm parcel over time. blackjack, puts all of his winnings back on the table every
time. He can increase his assets very fast if he is lucky, but
The fourth step is to introduce livestock. Proceeds from when his luck turns he loses everything. Chane-Piray has had
the sale of annual crops might be kept in a sock or in the bank very few big successes among its original settlers and a great
earning interest, but the best alternative is to invest it in a many failures. San Julian, on the other hand, is developing
chicken, pig, or cow. The advantage of owning livestock in more consistently, with economic failure being the exception.
Bolivia is that it is aWhedge against the twin hazards of
flooding and inflation--it "floats" on both. At the same time, FIDES's approach to promoting its agricultural services
it is highly liquid. If cash is needed for an emergency, or to had been accomplished through (1) the operation of a small nurbuy seed, it is an easy matter to sell a pig. sery where experiments are carried out and agricultural inputs
are marketed, (2) the services of several very modestly salaThe fifth step in FIDES's farm development plan is only ried agricultural extensionists who actually live and work
beginning to be achieved by a handful of the San Julian farm- among the settlers, and (3) the development of a network of
ers. This is the introduction of animal traction. Mechanized unpaid model farmers who receive particular attention on their
plowing requires less human labor than hand cultivation, thus own farms in~return for taking the lead in trying out new prodallowing cultivation of increased acreage. Likewise, it ap- ucts and techniques. Simple, low budget, and practical, it has
pears to increase yields. With pasture available, the cost of laid a solid footing for sustained agricultural development in
maintaining draft animals is minimal. The step into mechaniza- the San Julian settlement zone.
tion based on animal traction can thus be made naturally, with
minimal risk. The amount of money needed to buy draft animals
or a small plow is not so great as to require credit. it can III. ANALYSIS OF PROGRAM IMPACTS
be generated through the sale of a good crop, or other livestock.
The acid test of project effectiveness is whether it
With a tractor I can plant 50 hectares, but achieves the desired results. What were the impacts, who felt
where will I get the labor to weed and bar- them, and how have they changed things?
vest 50 hectares?
Chane-Piray settler To get a feel for how to approach this, the evaluation
team turned first to the 1974 and 1979 Project Papers. Both
To really understand the significance of FIDES's self- projects shared similar objectives: to improve the quality of
capitalizing farm development model, one must contrast it with life of project participants (the settlers) and to increase
the strategy generally opted for in earlier settlements, in- agricultural output from the project areas. The remainder of
cluding Chane-Piray. this section deals with these two subjects from the perspective
of economic, social, and environmental impacts.
-14- -15A. Economic Impacts The evaluation team noted that many farms in Chane-Piray
are now mechanized. Some concentration of land-holdings has
also taken place as the mechanized farmers sought economies of
Chane-Piray is an area which includes a number of differ- scale. Conversations with settlers in the region indicate that
ent settlements developed without much planning over several the successful farmers are usually second-generation settlers-decades. Although AID's 1974 project provided for interven- people who arrived with some capital and expertise and bought
tions similar to those introduced in San Julian (basic infra- out their pioneer predecessors. Development officials in the
structure and settler services), their effect there was less area indicated that most of the tractors and harvesters obprofound. Farm development habits were already well developed served in the fields were financed by high-leverage equipment
in Chane-Piray, and AID's technical advisors (the same people loans offered at very concessionary (in light of inflation,
who later formed FIDES) did not stay around long enough to generally negative) rates. Despite such arrangements, it was
change them. There was no consolidation project (as there noted that over 50 percent of such loans are in default, and
would be in 1979) to provide support beyond the pioneering that the need to pay cash fot spare parts is taking an increasstage. Left to their own instincts, settlers in the AID- ingly heavy toll on such farmers.
supported communities of Chane-Piray chose the same high-risk/
high-gain farm development strategy as their predecessors from In the San Julianisettlement zone, AID "got in on the
earlier settlements. ground floor," and developments there reflect this fact. All
San Julian communitieslenjoyed the same basic infrastructure
The result is that the economic impact of resettlement on investments, the same nucleo settlement design, and for the
individual families in Chane-Piray has been very uneven. Farm- most part they benefitedfrom the same orientation program at
ers "rolled the dice," often putting all their hopes on a sin- the pioneering stage. When one adds to that the additional 5
gle cash crop, and the result was success for a few and failure years of technical support not available in Chane-Piray
for the great majority. (through AID's 1979 consolidation program), it seems safe to
attribute critical differences in economic impacts at ChaneThe influence of exogenous variables is simply too great Piray and San Julian to the greater AID involvement in San
for monocultural, cash-oriented farming systems. If-the rains Julian.
don't wash out the crop, preventing harvest, they may wash out
the road, preventing marketing. When the farmer does make it For the most part, San Julian farmers have abandoned the
to market, a risk exists that his crop will have little value high-risk/high-gain cash-crop orientation prevalant in Chanedue to oversupply or government price intervention. If he is Piray and other settlement areas. San Julian developed the
paid in cash, he risks erosion of his capital due to the 100+ less risky, pore economically and environmentally sound stratepercent inflation. gy of self-capitalization (see "Agricultural Support," Section
The evaluation team noted that a great many of the farms
in Chane-Piray appear to be caught in the "barbecho crises.- The economic impact of this farm development strategy on
This is the phenomenon wherein the farmer cuts and burns sever- individual project beneficiaries has been profound. Farmers
al hectares, plants it for 2 to 3 years until declining crop everywhere were confident and talked of growth. Even in nuyields and increasing weed infestation make it uncultivable, cleos 17 and 20, where serious floods had destroyed crops only
then moves to new acreage, letting the former parcel return to several months prior to the team's visit, there was no evidence
secondary forest growth, or barbecho. One can exit from this of parcel abandonment or settler disillusion. Indeed, in sevcycle through cash-crop farming only with an unusual run of eral nucleos, female settlers bragged of the abundance and
variety of fruits, vegetables, and livestock. No doubt the
luck. flood wreaked havoc with savings, but it had not interfered
A good crop sold at the right time, with proceeds rein- with the ability of settlers and communities to carry on.
vested in labor to clear and plant more land (one man cannot
farm more than 3 hectares by hand), provides a start to exiting With the earliest farms in San Julian barely 11 years old,
the "barbecho crises." Two or three good years in a row might and the average age perhaps 4 years, none has yet reached ecogive the farmer the resources to hire large equipment to "ma- nomic maturity through self-capitalization. Many have made
chine-clear" a parcel of land and make a down-payment on a impressive progress, however. Small orchards are common. Pastractor for machine cultivation. Several more years of good ture development has been slower than hoped (due to difficulty
luck might enable him to pay off the tractor loan, but the need in determining appropriate grass varieties for the area and
for hard currency for spare parts still remains. The odds obtaining seeds) but is also progressing. About 20 farmers
against so much good fortune are high.
-16- -17invested in animal traction. Most farmers still have fewer processing and marketing businesses should emerge. As disposthan 10 of their 50 hectares cleared, so prospects for future able incomes rise, there should be a marked effect in the nearimprovement exist if the land is developed properly. by cities of Montero and Santa Cruz. More time is needed to
see how great these secondary impacts will be.
From a micro-economic perspective, it was apparent to the
evaluation team that although resettlement proved remunerative for many families in both Chane-Piray and San Julian, there B. Social Impacts
were two critical differences:
Ultimate beneficiaries in Chane-Piray are often not The evaluation team also noted some very significant sothe intended beneficiaries. Better capitalized sec- cial impacts of resettlement on the lives of settler families.
ond-generation farmers have replaced the original pio- During 3 days of interviewing in San Julian, families were
neers. queried regarding health and education concerns, overall sense
of well-being, and future expectations. The cause-effect linkThe rate of success in developing farms from a pio- age between project interventions and these social impacts is
neering stage to one of consolidation and growth is less clear than in the case of economic impacts, so they are
several times greater in San Julian than in other offered with appropriate disclaimers.
Bolivian settlement zones.
Chane-Piray represents the normal development pattern for 1. Health
Bolivian settlements. Changes in that pattern in the San Julian zone are felt to be due to the greater extent and influence of AID'S interventions.there. Health issues are a major concern throughout San Julian.
Making the adjustment from life in the semiarid altiplano to
From a macro-economic perspective th4 impact of resettle- life in the tropical rainforest is jolting. Snakesicks, and
ment efforts in Chane-Piray and San Julian is just beginning to mosquitoes are all new threats. Each year many men and women
be felt. A stated goal of both the 1974 and 1979 projects was are killed during tree-felling and forest-burning operations.
to increase agricultural production in the Bolivian Oriente. Death during childbirth is still very common.
In 1974, much of the Chane-Piray zone and virtually all of San Julian were uninhabited virgin forest, so clearly there was To the extent possible with support and guidance from
nowhere to go but up. Although there had long been exploita- project personnel, the settlers in San Julian have organized to
tion of tropical hardwoods, particularly mahogany, in both combat health perils. Health committees have been organized in
areas, the difficulties of access made even that a fairly mar- each community. These committees have selected fellow settlers
ginal income producer. as health promoters who, in exchange for profits from drug
sales and other compensation from the community, provide rudiWith the opening of the areas to settlement, the change mentary health care and purchase and dispense drugs.
has been dramatic. The road from the Chane-Piray settlement
zone into the Santa Cruz market center is lined with produce This self-help system, although very rudimentary, fills
laden trucks during harvest times. San Julian, younger and the health care void that existed in the wilderness. There is
less-developed agriculturally, likewise carries on a lively no formal health care facility in the San Julian zone. The
commerce with the nearby Montero and Santa Cruz market center. nearest rudimentary hospital is in Montero which, depending
upon road and river conditions, is anywhere from a day's to a
Long-run impact, however, is likely to be far greater. In week's journey away.
San Julian, for example, fully 80 percent of the land available for cultivation has not even been touched. Because basic sub- Interestingly enough, the settlers' greatest complaint in
sistence needs are met by the first several hectares under cul- the area of health care is the unreliability of the roads.
tivation, it is clear that the proportionate contribution to They resent the loss of so many lives because hospitals cannot
the overall economy will be greater from later farm growth. be reached in a reasonable time period, and it frustrates them
that the road access problem is beyond their ability to solve. Likewise, growth of secondary industries is only beginning
to be felt in San Julian. As production rises, agricultural
This confidence in prospects for growth cannot be over2. Education stated. The feeling seemed to be one of inevitability--that
time and energy were sure to be rewarded. One of the settlers captured it in a phrase when he said concerning an earlier setThe San Julian settlers also give high priority to the tlement effort, "I lost two years in Yapacani." Time seems to
education of their children, and in this area the news is uni- count for something in San Julian.
formly good. Settlers organized to construct schools at the very outset of each nucleo's development; A deal was struck No doubt ownership of 50 hectares of land, most of it not
between the settlers political federation and the national even cleared yet, has much to do with the prevailing sense of
government that with a community-built school in place, the optimism. The evaluation team also believes, however, that
government would supply a teacher. FIDES'S success in selling the self-capitalization farm development model, in which dependence upon outside influences is
This quid pro quo has worked fairly well. An adequate minimized, has contributed greatly to settlers' feelings that
school building was seen in every third nucleo (children from they can accomplish whatever they are willing to work for.
lateral nucleos attend school in the central nucleo), and attendance appeared to be high. For education beyond sixth One cloud hanging over future expectations is the continugrade, children must be sent to boarding-school in Montero. ing concern over the settlers' land ownership rights. Settlers
Because the great majority of settler families are very young, enjoy a "right to use" their 50-hectare parcels, but they do
lack of secondary schools has not yet imposed a general hard- not have title. This "right to use" has been considered sufship. ficient claim to enable sale of a parcel when a settler has
elected to raise money in this way. It has not prevented reoccupation by another party in the event of abandonment, however;
3. Sense of Well-Being nor have Bolivian banks felt free to claim ownership of farms
pledged as collateral for defaulted loans.
Interviews revealed that San Julian's settlers are gener- It is clear that if a farmer wishes to gain formal title
ally happy and secure. The evaluation team met no one who re- to his settlement parcel, he may do so. Some have. The probgretted the move and no one who felt "worse-off" for having lem is that the red tape and related expenses are so great that
made a break with an earlier life. This is not to say that few have felt it worth doing.
there were no complaints. Settlers took every opportunity to complain about road access and express frustration at their Settlets in Chane-Piray and San Julian would feel better
inability to deal with it. They also complained of lack of if they had clear titles to their settlement parcels, but the
adequate government support for farm extension and well main- evaluation team found no one who was "losing sleep" over the
tenance (responsibilities of INC); Interwoven in all the com- issue.
plaints, however, was a sense of "By golly, we're going to do something about this!" San Julian's settlers are not passive people who submit to whatever life deals them. Rather, they 5. Political context
are a confident, take-charge group who feel, and indeed are, in control of their own lives.
A major social change resulting from the Chane-Piray and San Julian resettlement efforts (as well as other settlement
4. Future Expectations activities not supported by AID) is the impact on the demography as well as the social and political life in the Santa Cruz Department. Prior to .the advent of resettlement programs,
Queries as to where settlers expected to be in 1 year, 5 there were very few Kollas in the region. With the lure of
years, and 10 years elicited interesting responses. Many had free land, there has been a major influx of Quechua- and Aytrouble dealing with a long time horizon, but all expected to mara-speaking highlanders, bringing'with them their traditions
be doing better over the next several years. Their feelings of social organization, a penchant for commerce, and boundless
were generally couched in terms of farm development: bringing energy and ambition.
more hectarage and new fruit tree's into cultivation and production, or acquiring more livestock. For the native Camba, agriculture and ranching are wellregarded pursuits that one might follow for the pure enjoyment
- 20- -21of them. They know how to enjoy rural life, and self-reliance Mv LESSONS LEARNED
and individuality are dominant traits.
The new migrants, the Kollas, have a different perspec- AID's two IRD projects In the Chane-Piray and San Julian
tive. Businessmen at heart, they often view farming as an en- settlement areas provide numerous valuable development interprise like any other. Everything else being equal, many sights. The opportunity project technicians had to learn from
would choose to engage in commerce. often, where farming is experiences in the older Chane-Piray settlement area and thereelected, it is only because of the opportunity for free land, by make adjustments in the inputs and strategies implemented in
San Julian was helpful. The presence of many of the same projSo far, the Camba power structure is intact in the Santa ect advisors (FIDES staff) during the life of both projects and
Cruz Department.. The influx of highlanders is viewed with un- for many years previously also contributes to the importance of
ease, but no direct threat is yet felt. The gradual reconcili- the project as a laboratory for learning.
ation of these two distinct racial and cultural groups could well have a major impact on the political and social destiny of Because both the 1974 and 1979 projects were billed as
all Bolivia. integrated rural development programs, most of the lessons
learned carry an iRD focus. Both projects were also resettlement programs, however, so lessons that are unique to the reC. Environmental Impacts settlement experience are discussed separately.
The ecological disruption caused by converting virgin A. Lessons for Integrated Rural-Development
hardwood forest to farmland and settler communities is substantial. It greatly increases the likelihood of water-related soil erosion and depletion of nutrients essential for plant I. Continuity of commitment
growth. It affects wildlife as their natural habitat is destroyed. By definition, land clearing eliminates the hardwood forest--a resource that is incompatible with cultivated crops. Long-term, continuity Of program activities, personnel, and
implementing agencies is critical to the effectiveness of IRD
A basic premise in both AID projects was that such ecolog- programs. Only with a long-term organizational commitment can
ical disruption is justifiable if the end result is development lasting social and economic impacts be reasonably expected.
of a viable agricultural base that will enable Bolivian farmers to earn a better living while helping the nation to feed itself. It is toward this objective that agricultural advice has 2. Program Adaptability
Based upon experience to date, it appears that the objec- The ability to adapt individual elements of an IRD program
tive of establishing permanent farms is viable. Problems with is critical to long-term success. Because IRD tends to be conwater-related soil erosion have not been severe because the prehensive in scope, it is almost certain that changes affectterrin s lveland ths fr, potshav ben sall Dele-ing individual program elements will occur. Demographic, sotion of soil nutrients is combatted through rotating fields ilecnmpotcandnvrmnaleeomnscn
over a 10- to 20-year cycle where permanent slash and burn ag- have a major effect on the needs of program participants and
riculture is practiced, and rotating over a several-year cycle their ability to function successfully. The implementing agent
where appropriate forage crops are identified. The impact on in an IRD program must have the capacity to assess these
wildlife is still of little concern because (1) little food was changes and their probable impacts and to adjust activities and
being garnered there anyway, and (2) the overall stock of vir- emphases accordingly.
gin forest in Bolivia is enormous, so there is alternative habitat for displaced animals. 3. Motivation
Motivation in IRD projects must be directed toward success with overall program objectives, not with individual program
elements. Over time some activities may diminish in importance while others increase. IRD implementers must be willing to g. Self-Capitalization
recognize this and adjust accordingly.
Rapid farm capitalization through the use of subsidized
4. _CloseProgramMonitorin credit may lead to rapid production gains, but it is likely to
be uneconomic (from the perspective of national resource allocation) and risky (from the perspective of long-run farm viaIRD is a dynamic process in which linkages between outputs bility). If development of a viable farm economy is a program
and purposes are subject to change. Close program monitoring aim, then a farm growth model that operates within normal ecois required so that quick identification of changing benefici- nomic constraints is preferable.
ary needs and appropriate suggestions for input/output adjustments can be made.
10. Flexibility of Implementing Organizations
Institutions charged with implementing IRD should have the
ability to adapt strategies and resource allocations to suit The best IRD program is "of, by, and for" the beneficiary changing circumstances. Decentralized decision-making and the
population. By involving them from inception to close, imple- ability to respond to feedback from field personnel are posimenting agencies can ensure the high level of communication tive attributes. Front-office orientation and institutional
essential to program responsiveness and applicability, rigidity are detrimental to IRD.
6. Comprehensiveness of Scope B. Resettlement Lessons
IRD implementers must share the broad perspective of the 1. Assessment of Resource Potential
beneficiary population. They must identify all elements necessary to goal achievement, invest the bulk of funds in priority' Assmn o e-ad eteetsol obyn uc
areas, then stand ready to assist in resolution of other con- resessrennaissancew-ands identficatonhofl siegor odsic
straints wherever possible. rsuc eonisneadietfcto fstsfrras
wells, and. communities. Where possible it should also include experimental farming so that a preview of environmental re7. Proimitysponse can be seen. Lack of foreknowledge concerning farming
7. Proimitysystems can prove very expensive.
Proximity of implementing agency personnel to program
beneficiaries greatly facilitates IRD by improving two-way dia- 2. Settlement Mode (spontaneous vs. directed)
logue. The best way to appreciate a farmer's problems is to spen tim wit hi on he frm.In Chane-Piray and San Julian, experience was gained with a wide range of settlement modes. The purely spontaneous
8. Slf-Hllpsettlements in which settlers moved in with no support were
8. Sel-Helpcheapest in terms of dollar cost per family, but devastatingly expensive in terms of failure rate. The highly directed setLongter suces of n ID pogrm i coningnt ponthetlement efforts, in which settlers were "sold" on migration and
ability of beneficiaries to eventually stand on their own feet. giexp enerand likewise surd igh faietluen rlate. Motvaio
This suggests development of support systems (e.g., extension, eensed tonb lckeig. Thfed ost sucsfasr obtied. Mtroughoa
credit, and training systems) which are no more elaborate or see ob akn.Tems sceswsotie hog
exeniv tanneesarand which are largely under the con- combination of self-selection and provision of essential supexpensif than bnecsarys tesls.Port services (e.g.,r water and roads). Both the human and retrolof he eneiciaiestheseles.source elements must be present for resettlement to work.
-24- -253. Basic Physical Infrastructure 7. Consolidation and Growth
Certain physical resources are essential to survival: consolidation and growth of new-lands settlements cannot
water, over the very short term; access, over the medium term; be accomplished through quick infusions of capital and subsiand viable community lay-outs, over the long term. If these dized credit. To be real and sustainable, change must be an
elements are not provided, successful new-lands settlement is outgrowth of the settlers' own efforts and based on their own
not possible. resources. They must know how to organize for the task, and
they must have a viable strategy for accomplishing it.
4. Pioneering Stage
The first year in the life of a settler family is a daily test of survival. Water to drink, food to eat until a crop can be harvested, tools for farming, a roof to keep the rain off while sleeping--all these elements are critical and none can be taken for granted. In San Julian these elements were provided by the IRD program until the settlers' first crop could be harvested and sold. Without such support the program would have been limited to settlers with sufficient capital to selffinance the transition period.
5. The Dependency Syndrome
Although certain services are essential if settlers are to survive in their new environment, such support should not engender a habit of depending upon others to solve one's problems. By electing support services which are as simple and affordable as possible, and involving settlers in their performance through self-help, the dangers of dependency can be minimized.
A commonly accepted notion in resettlement is that turnover of a settler's parcel is bad--that it reflects failure of the resettlement program. However, it is apparel' from the Chane-Piray and San Julian experience that this has not been the case there. Turnover of a settler's parcel is as likely to be viewed as the culmination of a successful effort as of a failure. it is really a question of settler perspective.
SUB-TROPICAL LANDS DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (1974 LOAN) Program or Sector Goals
Increase the productivity and income of small farmers whose opportunities are severely limited in the Bolivian highlands. Increase production of food crops.
Establish a pattern for new lands development in the Bolivian Oriente through small farmer settlement. Project Purpose
Assist migrant small farmers to increase their productivity and income in *zhe lowland settlements. Outputs
all-weather penetration roads in the Chane-Piray and San Julian colonization zones
lateral dry weather trails in both zones one agricultural service center constructed and operating in Potable water wells in each new community health post constructed and operating in each zone and mobile health unit provided and put into operation orientation of settlers at each new community distribution of land to settlers abd subsequent attainment of legal titles to settler parcels settlement and 'clearing of land by settlers and commencement of agricultural production
extension and research services in operation CONSOLIDATION PROJECT (1979 GRANT)
limitation of cooperative and credit programs completion of a land resource study to determine the suitabil- or sector Goal
ity of other areas for settlement
Increase per capita incomes and raise standard of living among
settlers in the Bolivian lowlands.
land Project Purposes
equipment, materials, and contract services for construction of Develop and test models for consolidation of colonization areas
roads, trails, and agricultural and health centers for wider application in the Bolivian lowlands.
well drilling equipment and services Increase agricultural productivity in the San Julian
mobile health unit colonization area.
technical assistance for Outputs
- extension services
- research diversified family farm systems established
- orientation $
- co-op organization consumer cooperatives established
- credit administration credit committees formed
marketing organization established
training programs conducted investigations and reports conducted
coordinator of research on colonization general researchers
interdisciplinary extension teams technical backstopping personnel technical consultants
consumer co-op store clerks extension team equipment and supplies radio programming
A. Sub-Tropical Lands Development Project
Interventions under AID's 1974 loan for Sub-Tropical Lands Development ranged from provision of roads, wells, and other physical-infrastructure elements, which absorbed the lion's share of project funds, to activities to advertise settlement opportunities and orient new communities. During orientation settlers were provided "know-how" appropriate to the settlement zone in such subjects as nutrition, sanitation, building construction, basic agricultural practices, and small farmer organization. They were also given guidance and support in development of community solidarity and group decision-making processes.
The specific outputs and amounts planned to be spent and actually spent in these pursuits are shown in Table B-1.
The amount allocated to a given intervention was not necessarily proportionate to its significance. The planned cost of penetration roads, for instance, was over $4,000,000 in AID funds, while the orientation program was to cost only $150,000. Although the evaluation team found that the project designers were right in considering roads essential, it also found that the orientation program made a contribution to the success of the project which was disproportionate to its cost. It was a major factor in reducing the serious health, nutrition, and agricultural production problems encountered in previous unguided colonization efforts. It is also credited with laying San Julian's strong base of social and organizational structures which have provided an important psychological and emergency support system while increasing the settlers' ability to deal with longer range problems and opportunities.
B. Consolidation Project
Interventions under the Consolidation Project are presented in Table B-2.
Also as a result of these outputs, an average of 2.5 additional hectares were to be put under production by each farmer. This target was more than doubled.
Table B-1. Planned and Actual Outputs and Expenditures, Table B-2. Planned and Actual Interventions Under
Chane-Piray and San Julian the 1979 Consolidated Project
Quantity Expenditures Quantity
Planned Actual Planned Actual Intervention Planned Actual
Chane-Piray Model Farms 2481
Penetration Road 80 km 43 km $ 2,681,730 Undetermined Consumer Cooperative 40 39
Agricultural Service Credit Committees 50 42 2
Center 1 1 272,000 Undetermined MreigOgnztos7
Administrative (30%) 318,000 Undetermined cuss(ie yarclua
and crop agents and hone and
San Julian family credit and marketing
Penetration Road 100 km 32 km 4,223,400 Undetermined dv ss
The model farmer concept was changed due to jealousies Access Trails 800 km 180 km 1,574,000 Undetermined aroused by designating farmers for preferential services. At
Agricultural Service present, interested and capable farmers are assisted on a
Center 1 1* 272,000 Undetermined less formal basis. The number of such farmers exceeds 24.
Deep Wells 200 40 325,000 Undetermined 2Figures as of July 1982, based on 44 settled nucleos.
Sanitary Post and 3 Only one central marketing organization was established as of
Mobile Health Unit 19,0 neemnd1982. Some 39 farmers from one nucleo used it the first
Resource Study, Survey,4
and Delineation of 4Rather than giving formal courses, FIDES extensionists live
Plots, Community in the colonization zone and are in constant dialogue with
Blocks, and Access farmers. The effects of this approach are easily equivalent
Trails 410,000 Undetermined to the targeted 920 courses.
Information and as15,0 ndtrie Planned and actual expenditures for inputs to the 1979
Orietaton rogams150,00 ndeermnedConsolidation Project are presented in Table B-3.
Credit 500,000 Undetermined
Administrative (65%) 675,000 Undetermined
*Construction was never completed, and the building is falling into disrepair.
Table B-3. Planned and Actual Expenditures for Inputs
to the 1979 Consolidation Project San Julian
Category Planned Actual
Personnel $560,374 $331,022
Operating Costs 348,026 107,198
Commodities 144,500 153, 388 0 S Ramon
Construction 56,036 56,476
Capital Fund 225,000 204,328
Risk Sharing 1,666
Total $1,480,936 $956,485
II. INPUT/OUTPUT ANALYSIS .C Haqrts
A. Infrastructure Vergel
Before discussing the road construction process in the
evaluated project, it is worthwhile to understand the Fotin Libertad
importance of this intervention. The distance from the nearest 4..
significant market (Montero, population 40,000) to the closest of the San Julian settlements (nucleo 1) is 140 kilometers Key to NucleoS
(ki). The most distant nucleo lies some 195 km away. The K3 Founded in 1972
major market in the area, Santa Cruz, lies 50 km beyond Mon-'ffB Founded in 1973 tero. Founded in 1974
Julin zne as resonaly ellmaitaied gave sufac ~Founded in 1975
The first 50 km of the road from Montero into the San C3 Founded in 1976
Julian zone has a reasonably well-maintained gravel surface 0 Founded in 1977
permitting speeds of up to 50 km per hour in the dry season Founded in1978
[ Founded in 1978
with perhaps two slow-downs per kilometer for large pot holes. Settlements on the Brecha are arranged in rows of three
At km 65, vehicles are ferried across the Rio Grande river, across, with the middle one being along the road and the others
This natural barrier varies in width from about 20 meters at at 5 km to either side.
the end of the dry season to perhaps 600 meters during peak
rains. During the dry season the river is shallow and barges At km 70 from the German road, between nucle s 44 and 47,
are pushed across the channel by hand. During the rainy season a 2- or 3-km segment of the Brecha is submerged in up to a
the same barges are propelled by outboard motor. meter and a half of water after a heavy rain. The frustration
of the settlers with these conditions was communicated to the
t o th e n a e s ot e t t l e m du r i n t r a v e eh e o a nd bo nt e r e v a l u a t i o n t e a m a t n u c l e o 4 7 w h e r e w e w e r e d e t a i n e d b y a d o z e n to the nearest etean ride ther s n al d settlers who had strung a heavy cable across the road and,
hours during the wet season provided there is no special delay thinking we were from one of the organizations concerned with
smet me e ncountre ds road maintenance, politely but firmly led us to the community
sometimes encountered. The 50 km road from Santa Cruz to center to discuss the problem. The main burden of their comMontero is of well-maintained asphalt and can be traversed at plaint was that villagers were dying because it was impossible
high speeds. to get them to health care providers during rainy season.
At km 107 the road from Montero into San Julian divides, Other, less obvious consequences of the lack of an adewith the fork going into the heart of San Julian called the quate road are cultural isolation, difficulty in getting
Brecha Casarabe (Brecha). Fifty of the San Julian settlements teachers for the village schools, and expense in getting agri(nucleos) are encountered after the road forks, and nine prior cultural inputs and consumer goods in and equipment (e.g.,
to the fork along what is called the German road. pumps and chainsaws) out for repair. At present, access to
The e i extension services is not a problem because they are supplied
i s a e u p h e m i s m f rthe s 1 t o2e1 /2s f e t m a e e c t e s w t h o w hb y t h e h i g h l y m o t i v a t e d F I D E S e x t e n s i o n i s t s w h o l i v e i n t h e
theroa ispitedreqirig vhices o sow ownto e o colonization zdne. However, when funding for the projects
is a euphemism for the 1 to 2 1/2 feet deep cavities with wihclnzto ~e oeewe udn o h rjc ns
the road is pitted, requiring vehicles to slow down to a 5- or and if the Bolivian Government becomes responsible for exten10-mile an hour average speed even during the dry season, and sion services, they may well diminish sharply or even come to a
which are altogether impassable during the rainy season. The halt. Government extensionists normally live outside the zone
struns crs tely eand, lacking funds for transport, are likely to be infrequent
strung across the road at the same weak point. At the end of visitors.
the dry season it takes 6 hours to negotiate by truck the 87 km
of the Brecha from the German road to the last nucleo, number The sources of the road problem were (1) failure of the
51. In a period of light rains it can take up to 12 hours, Goverqment of Bolivia (GOB) and AID to supervise construction
provided the road is not closed at some point and the vehicle and enforce contract standards, (2) withdrawal of GOB funding,
does not get stuck. After prolonged heavy rains during the and (3) failure to provide for maintenance. These problems are
rainy season, the road is impassable. not unique to the colonization zone or to Bolivia. However,
the situation in the colonization zone does suggest a solution.
The effect of such transportation difficulties on market- The settlers have attempted, with limited success, to impose
ing of settler produce cannot be overstated. Truckers do not timber extraction fees on the loggers whose heavy loads (5
want to enter the area at any price, and those who are caught metric tons per truck is typical) cause rapid deterioration and
there at the beginning of the rains pay a heavy penalty. The high maintenance requirements. With government backing the
roads may be impassable for months at a time, so both produce settlers might extract some assistance from these loggers in
and truck time are lost. road maintenance.
This difficulty with road transport also exacts a toll on it is conceivable that road maintenance could be better
human life due to the frequent difficulty or impossibility of handled at a local government level. Central government pertransporting injured or sick persons, or women experiencing formance in road maintenance in most of Latin America has been
childbirth complications, to appropriate health providers. The notoriously deficient. Moreover, George Lodge found in studies
problems are even worse for the lateral settlements connected in Panama in the late 1960s and early 1970s that local
to the Brecha by 5-km, dry-weather trails, although these are, governments were able to construct bridges much more cheaply
in some cases, actually in better shape than the Brecha since than the central government. The San Julian settlers are
they receive less use. probably less sophisticated than Panamanian local government
officials but perhaps they could, with the help of FIDES, learn
The INC, which is in charge of well drilling, puts off
to manage road maintenance. Each nucleo might be made the settlers with the excuse that it lacks time and resources
responsible for maintenance of the road to the center of the to put in the wells. However, a large stockpile of well pipe
next nucleo toward the German road, with penalties for failure was observed at the INC office, and the team encountered no one
of mantennce.who knew where the time and money budgeted for drilling are invested.
Approximately 70 percent of the required maintenance couldThvilgraerspnbefo terowpupmnebe done by the settlers themselves using the indigenous minka h ilgr r epnil o hi w upmitn
system of community labor. Mechanical equipment and skilled ance, having been taught the main procedures in the orientation
lao ol required for the other 30 percent. This input program. The INC has been supplying parts, although it is not
could be managed by the settlers with administrative supportreuedtdos.Teetlshaebcmdpnetonhi and ongr rage rainng.source of supply and, because it is not always reliable, the pumps are sometimes down for long periods. One nucleo's pump
one interesting possibility for improving and maintaining was down for over a year due to INC failure to supply the
the roads would be to require loggers to bring gravel on their needed part. This is a typical example of the sort of depentrucks on their way to the logging sites. The trucks currently dency problem which can easily develop in resettlement, as well
run empty on the way in. Such an in-kind "toll" might be easi- as other rural development projects. It is a strong argument
er t imosetha a mnetry ax.for not giving the beneficiaries anything they can get for themselves, except perhaps on an explicitly temporary basis.
Well Irilling and parts supply might be better handled by
2. Access Trails a settler organization such as a co-op. Such an organization
could be more easily controlled and would be more responsive.
The access trails at San Julian were constructed by the
Instituto Nacional de Colonizacion (INC). They were bulldozed This is also a good example of the sort of problem arising
without drainage or bridges, and are subject to flooding, hay- in the course of a project which requires redesign, and of the
ing been planned as dry season roads. However, they are needed need for follow-on and continuity to bring the settlers to the
all year round and so used, with some difficulty. Better ele- point where they can maintain and, it is hoped, expand their
vation and drainage might have been worth the investment, gains.
Since these trails are only 5 km (each) in length, they do not pose so severe a transportation barrier as the penetration 4. Buildings and Equipment
Two agricultural resource centers were to be constructed
3. wells under the project, one in each of the two colonization zones.
Construction was under contract with the INC. The Chane-Piray
No surface sources of water safe for human consumption are center was completed and taken over by the Center for Tropical
fon ntecolonization zone. Therefore, a well drilling Agricultural Research (CIAT), a quasi-governmental Bolivian
frondm ins thecesr.B a fcnrsi eti al organization. The center in San Julian was never completed.
Chame-Piray settlement efforts farmers went into the forestTh INwacmnhoisupedtgartepeiessnt
with 20 kilos of water on their backs, worked 2 days, then went being paid and is spending his time trying to earn a living
back for more, elsewhere.
The original project design provided for two wells per The sanitary post provided for under the loan was nearly
nucleo. only one nucleo has a second well, this because the completed and is in use. A mobile health unit was also purwater in its first well was not potable. Several communities chased. It is now immobile and most of its equipment has been
have none, which represents a serious health threat as they stolen. This would seem to say something about the advisabilimust get their water from ditches or swamps. In those nucleos ty of providing sophisticated equipment in such an environment
which have enjoyed the greatest population growth, the well iswihudelongaqatmcaissfreuiyadmitin constant use. This requires villagers to wait for water, nance.
and it also results in well siltation from overuse during the dry season.
minimal facilities, consisting of corrugated roofs on than equal value. Parcels are generally distributed by "drawpoles, were provided to receive the settlers in the nucleos and ing lots," with rumors of influence being brought to bear in
lodge them during orientation. It was up to the settlers to rare cases. The fact remains, however, that the parcels are
provide walls if they wished. Materials were also provided for inherently unequal because of differences in land quality and
self-help construction of a storage building for food provided location, and the project does not try to compensateforathis
for the first 4 months of settlement and for a co-op. The by varying plot size. Any parcels foundtohv les ha 70
handling of these structures is typical of the project's empha- percent usable land can be exchanged for others but, beyond
sis on self-help. Responsibility for school construction also this, any attempt at achieving equality of holdings was viewed
rests with the communities. Self-help construction lowers *as too difficult.
project costs while accustoming settlers to taking responsibility for their own needs rather than depending on outsiders. The evaluation team considers this an important feature of the B. Settlement Patterns
project with potential long-term payoffs of great consequence.
A number of things were done in the San Julian area to
5. _Land _DistributionandPreparation promote cohesion and cooperation among the settlers. Some of
5. Lnd Dstrbutin an Prparaionthese were direct, e.g., organization of co-ops and health committees. Others were indirect or structural, e.g., settlement
Two hectares of land were cleared by INC at the center of the settlers in villages rather than strung-out on individof each nucleo to facilitate settlement. The settlers, in ual farmsteads along a road. It is impossible, without a
another example of how the project is structured for self- lengthyPand expensive research effort, to determine the effect
reliance, clear another hectare on each parcel by communal of the structural inputs. However, a reasoned judgment is poslabor during orientation. This occurs before parcels are allo- sible. The following features of the project seem likely to
cated so that the settlers don't know whether they are working have promoted cohesion among the settlers:
on their own parcel or somebody else's. (in one case, where
parcels were allocated before clearing, it did not go well.)
The purpose of this system was to get the clearing process off --Land holdings in San Julian radiate from a center in a
to a fast start. Subsequent clearing may be mechanized or by pie-shaped pattern, rather than being spread out along
hand, and individual or communal, depending on the means and ara paoky aho.Tutestlr a
preference of the individual settlers. It is often necessary live near their land while still livinginavlge
to cearthe amegrond tice --A 2-hectare area at the center of the pie is cleared
Parcls n Sa Juian re 0 hctars pr faily Infor a village site and two dormitory sheds are conother resettlement projects, e.g., the Inter-American Devel- trsTese faciitide eoraodge cooration among
opment Bank-sponsored Yapacani and Chane-Piray, 20-hectare thetlers byes brcininge eveoroegethooeradingthen
parcels proved to be too small. The 50-hectare size permitsthse lrsbbinngvry etoterdigte
fallowing of land, including planting in leguminous pasture, to all-important first several months of each community.
--A well is placed in the center for the village area,
Because few of the Chane-Piray and San Julian settlers yet thus promoting centralization even as it provides for
have titles to their land, due to the complexity and cost of testlmn' aewtrnes
bureaucratic procedures, only the improvements are sold. FIDES has hired a lawyer to work on this problem and will probably --Villages are arranged in blocks of mine (three rows
get a grant from the Inter-American Foundation for titling. adtreclmsoine oadtecnrlvl
Though community approval is not legally required for sale, lgradltrfclte n evcs uha
such approval is encouraged by FIDES as a requirement. AnyscolhatPssnd trerehneedio
purchaser of whom the community disapproves is thus in for a the central village.
Soil analysis of the zone was conducted before settlement. Although the time and resources available to the impact
Howeerequlityof andvale isa poblm, incethesimlerevaluation team did not allow a scientific investigation of the
course was chosen of distributing parcels of equal size rather cua oncinbtenteemaue n h mato h
technology. Sometimes this was done for an entire village, and
project, they seem to have been influential. Discussion with sometimes on an individual basis.
and observation of settlers in the project area tended to confirm this. A number of the problems faced by the settlers A November 1978 evaluation of San Julian by Michael
could be more successfully confronted by group action and mutu- Nelson, a regional development specialist/economist, is worth
al support than on an individual basis: clearing land in the quoting with regard to the effect of the orientation.
village area and constructing houses; providing orientation in
subjects such as agricultural technology, nutrition, and
health; providing primary health care systems; organizing to The evolution of the various nucleos over the past
obtain credit' purchase inputs, and market produce; receiving 3-4 years suggests that colonists, many of whom had
extension-type education; and obtaining the psychological bene- little knowledge of tropical agriculture and no
fits of a sense of security from being with other people in the capital resources, have made a faster start and
new and difficult environment. retained greater momentum than that demonstrated by
similar people in projects such as Yapacani where
It is reasonable to suppose that these measures had an considerably higher per capita investments have been
effect on the relatively low turnover rate experienced by the made. This accelerated rate of development must, in
San Julian project. The settlers to whom we spoke felt that large measure, be attributed to the orientation
the nucleo settlement pattern was superior to the "piano key" activity. One may alsospeculate that as the colonpattern not only in promoting cohesion but in facilitating ists hand marketing opportunities and receive the
necessarycredit and extension services to exploit them, the dynamics for community organization set in train
Another probable effect of the nucleo pattern was to re- during the initial 4 Months may yield a multiplier
duce abandonment and accelerate the adoption of new agricul- effect in terms of higher levels of production,
tural, health, and nutrition practices by the settlers, and of capital accumulation and on-farm employment as well
economically beneficial settler organization. Both of these as linked investment and employment in non-farm
effects seem likely to have improved the efficiency of the activities in some of the central nucleos.
The nature and extent of these potential multiplier
One problem with the pie-shaped settlement patterns is effects and the extent to which they may be attribthat the several parcels bordering on the penetration road and uted to orientation will remain in the realm of
lateral trails enjoy far greater accessibility than the others. crystal ball gazing for some time. Nevertheless,
This creates some jealousy among settlers. However, FIDES. is there would appear to be sufficient reason to expect
of the opinion that this disadvantage is outweighed by the a relationship between orientation and accelerated
overall advantages of the nucleo settlement pattern. development to justify examination of the 4-5 year
experiment over a longer period in search of lessons
which may be applied in similar controlled or even
C. Materials and Services in spontaneous situations.
The nucleos which received follow-up extension services
1. orientation soon after the orientation did better according to FIDES than
those where follow-up was delayed. FIDES believes that soliAnother novel project feature which contributed to reduced darity was lost, bad habits were formed, and skepticism grew
abandonment and increased benefits was the orientation program. where there was a time gap. This seems very plausible.
Drawing on experienced settlers, the orientation program provided new settlers with information about agriculture, health,
and nutrition which would help them adapt to their new environ- 2. Promotion
ment. The settlers interviewed were unanimous in praising this input. The only complaint about it was that the initial orientation should have been followed up with similar orientation at Some reorientationo" was done with prospective settlers,
subsequent stages of settlement. In fact, the project did but this was discontinued because of FIDES's principal adviprovide ongoing extension services in home and cooperative sor's concern that it aroused excessive expectations. At
extension and health education as well as in agricultural
present all settlers seeking participation in the project do so done some testing, for instance of the coffee variety being
on their own initiative, and there is more demand than the GOB propagated by the nursery.
can rspon to.Information on care of the plants is provided to the purchasers by FIDES extensionists. A close record is kept of
3. MaeilSpot where plants go so that FIDES can go back for budwood and to
Materialmonitor settler successes and problems. This also provides
feedback as to whether particular varieties are difficult for
Settlers are provided with food for the first 4 months, the settlers to manage.
seed for a first crop and, later, after the health committee
and co-op are formed, a start-up fund for the pharmacy (to be In 1982, 9,384 plants were sold by the nursery: 5,612
replenished from sales) and a stock of agricultural inputs as a orange trees, 2,487 tangerine trees, 602 fig trees, 574 coconut
starter for the cooperative. There have been problems with trees, and 109 others.
converting these start-up stocks into viable revolving funds
because of the rapid pace of inflation and failure to peg sales
proceeds to replacement costs, especially for agricultural 5. Annuals
input purchases involving credit. This problem will be discussed in more detail in the section on cooperatives below.p The fact remains that an innovative sort of grubstake is in- FIDES has purchased improved seed varieties through the
volved here. The supplies are put into a cooperative purchas- AID-financed certified seed program and put them into the seting system with the economies of scale, lower markups, and tler co-ops for sale on consignment. Garden seeds are emphainstitutionalization of supply inherent in such an arrangement. sized, to promote better nutrition, but other improved varieties which are not readily available from commercial sources
(e.g., past ure legumes) are also provided.
To encourage the settlers to plant perennials such as
citrus fruits, the project maintains a nursery in the San
Julian area which breeds, sells and, to a lesser extent, tests Livestock are provided to settlers in cooperation with the
plants. Currently available are oranges, tangerines, figs, Heifer Project. The involvement of Heifer International, along
pineapples, cacao, coffee, mango, coconut, papaya, and chini- with CIAT, illustrates another principle of FIDES's operations.
moya. The purpose of this program is to improve the settlers' They like to involve other organizations wherever possible.
nutrition and provide possible additional sources of income. Lvsoki ie ostlr ne otatwih
The plants are sold, rather than given, to the settlers-- requires formation of a livestock committee, with community and
another example of the project's effort to combat dependency outside representatives, to which the recipient must turn over
and make input flows self-financing as much as possible. The progeny from the animals, giving the first heifer in the case
plants are advertised through roadside displays, extensionists, of cattle. The recipient must have 1 hectare under pasture, a
model farmers, word of mouth, and volunteer salesmen. shelter and a water source, and must take a course in animal
care (e.g., nutrition, disease control, deticking, and pasture
The nursery tries to capitalize on existing technology, cultivation). Afterwards the recipient is obliged to care for
using proven varieties. The project does test some new varie- the animal in-accordance with the training received. If he
ties and is negotiating an agreement with the Bolivian quasi- does not do so, and repayment is threatened, the livestock
governmental agriculture research organization, CIAT, to in- committee can, under the contract, take the animal away. Livespect the plants periodically and provide technical advice, stock paid into the committee is distributed on the sane condiThe purpose of this aspect of the program is as much to get' tions as the original animals.
CIAT involved in the San Julian area and give it access to a
nursery for study of perennials (since turnover of personnel The training and experience in animal husbandry received
and funding changes make it difficult for it to maintain a by the settlers as a result of this program is considered as
nursery) as to test new varieties per se. CIAT, however, has important by FIDES as the distribution of animals, if not more
so. Not only is the participating farmer educated, but other
armers, particularly the members of the livestock committee, in the field. Knowledge of Quecha is also an important plus.
earn from his example. o ucai loa motn ls
Co-op and home extensionists are chosen in a similar manner.
Once theperson is chosen, his technical strengths and
weaknesses are looked at more closely to see where he needs
support and training and what he can do best.
FDSis also conducting a small experimental/demons tra-suprantaingndwthecnobs.
FIDES i als ondctngal traction, full-scale mechan The selection process is much more rigorous and cogent
zion project in the use of anim al on s le me than that usually applied by government extension programs,
zationwhich are more likely to select on the basis of personal or it present levels of know-how. The participating farmers are family coections, acade eco o the indicatron of
equired to select their animals and pay for them in advance technical expertise. In the opinion of the evaluation team
(experience has demonstrated that farmers don't pay if the hiinindpedhe e xtesion
animals die, and won't care for them as well if they are pur- this is an important element in the success of the project and
chased on credit). Credit is provided for stump removal, har- a strong argument in favor of hiring independent extension
chasd O crdit. Crditis rovdedagents through a project management agency that knows its nesses, a plow, a cultivator, barbed wire, agricultural inputs cents trobgh intmaely.
and, sometimes, a horsecart. So far, only limited progress has clients, problems intimately.
been made with animal traction. Some of the farmers who have T
tried it are enthusiastic and some less so. Its use has grown There is a question, of course, Of sustainability. What
slowly. Eight farmers started with the program in the demon- happens to such an extension service after the project termistration phase. Four of these dropped out and some 15 others nates? FIDES is interested in experimenting with a system
wherein the extensionists would contract with groups of sethave since joined. tiers for help with specific combinations of crops, while providing seed and other inputs on credit. Payment would be a
modest base salary and a percentage of the crop. This system
8. Farming Systems has several interesting features: the credit gives the farmer
an incentive to try it, and the profit-sharing element reduces
Animal traction is part of one of two farming systems the farmer's risk while providing an incentive to the extenbeing propagated by the project, one emphasizing annual crops syonist to furnish good service. In FIDES's opinion such a
and animal traction and the other emphasizing livestock. Both system is most likely to work with extensionists who have alinvolve cultivation of perennials and fallowing of land with a ready helped the farmer under the project and demonstrated
their ability to increase farmer income.
cover of pasture, often leguminous.
9. Extension Services
Three kinds of extension services are provided under the Credit has been supplied through cooperatives for home
project, agricultural (providing mainly agronomic advice), use items, such as knitting wool, pots and pans, and basic
cooperative (focusing on organization), and home (dealing with consumption items, as well as for agricultural inputs. Loans
family nutrition, health, and secondary employment). The ex- are secured by the signatures of the majority of the members of
tensionists live in the nucleus and are often settlers them- the nucleo credit committee which must approve the loan, thus
spreading both the risk and pressure for timely repayment. The
selves. credit programs are in trouble both at the FIDES and local
In hiring an agricultural extensionist FIDES looks for levels, however, due to rapid inflation. FIDES lent money to
individuals with at least basic technical-level training in the cooperatives with long repayment periods, with the result
agriculture as well as some field experience. The basic cri- that the money was worth much less when repaid than it had been
tenion is whether the individual appears trainable. This is when lent. The
considered more important than knowledge per se, though the tw, as a result, have greatly reduced their credit programs.
usually go together. Next, FIDES looks for attitude--does the
candidate respect the farmers? One way the FIDES interviewers FIDES is preparing to mount an education campaign to deal
get at this is by asking the candidate what he learned working with this problem and is considering the possibility of loans
in which the debt is indexed to the price of a product such as
rice. FIDES'S hypothesis is that this will make the adjustment 12. Repair Services
for inflation more readily acceptable to the borrowers, as
their debt stays the same in kilos, rather than increasing
radically in monetary terms. FIDES is attempting to encourage establishment of a general repair service in the colonization zone by locating a
An interesting consequence of credit for land clearing is suitable mechanic and providing him credit. This innovative
that the co-op must subsequently lend the same farmer money to intervention is typical of the flexibility, adaptability, and
hire labor for weeding and harvesting or else he can't effec- comprehensiveness FIDES has brought to the project, and has
lively farm all the land cleared and the loan is jeopardized. been possible only because of the length and continuity of
Given the limited amount of money available to the co-ops, this FIDES's involvement.
results in a few farmers getting a disproportionate share of
the credit. D. Organization
11. Health 1. Health Committees
Primary health services in 16 or more of the San Julian
nucleos are supplied by two to three "promoters" trained, sup- As already noted, health committees promoted by FIDES
ported technically, and provided with an initial supply of exist in each nucleo. These committees select a health promoter, establish his/her compensation, and handle or oversee
drugs by FIDES. the drug fund. Such committees were originally organized durThe promoters receive 6 months of weekly classes conducted ing the orientation period, but most became inactive due to
by the same FIDES nurse who subsequently supervises their decapitalization of the drug fund, lack of supervision, and a
work. Their compensation is fixed by a Nucleo Health high rate of turnover of committee members and promoters.
Committee. Some derive a profit from the sale of drugs, some
have been compensated by other members of the nucleo providing In April 1982 FIDES contracted a full time eath
labor on their farms while they were in training, some are in nucleo 38. She encouraged the reorganization of health
compensated by being freed of community labor obligations, and committees and drug funds, and a health post stocking a wide
some are entirely volunteers. It is significant that here, as variety of drugs was established outside nucleo 38.
in other contexts, FIDES sought to create a system that was
self-inaning.Once again, FIDES endeavored to Place basic responsibility self-financing. for maintaining and managing services on the shoulders of the
Twenty-seven of the nucleos share three paramedics (one in settlers, so as to encourage development of a sustainable,
the center of each block of nine nucleos) receiving small sala- self-reliant system.
ries from the GOB. These nucleos, however, are also closest to
the German road and have relatively ready access to health
services at the National Institute of Colonization and at Mon- 2. Model Farms
tero and Santa Cruz.
The drugs are sold by the promoters and new supplies are Originally, extension efforts were focused on model farmpurchased from the FIDES pharmacy from the proceeds of such ers selected by one community. The system was dropped, howsales. This caused a decapitalization similar to that experi- ever, as the model farmers tended to become isolated from the
enced by the co-ops, until the GOB began to subsidize and thus rest of the community due to the special attention and access
stabilize drug prices. Drug funds accumulated from sales range to credit they were getting. Some of these model farmers also
from 2,000 to 30,000 pesos, approximately U.S.$10-$140 at the acquired an attitude that they were owed something. Though
official rate of exchange, and U.S.$2-$35 at the free market FIDES extensionists still give special attention to innovative
rate as of October 15, 1983. and effective farmers, they are no longer singled out as
B- 20 B- 21
1982, began to organize a marketing function at the zonal
3. cooperatives level. It is too soon to say how effective this effort is
going to be. As of June 1983, 35 settlers, all in one nucleo, marketed rice through their cooperative at a profit of over
cooperatives formed in the project have five divisions, $1,000. The cooperative management team wishes to use this
created at different times: consumer, agricultural input, fund for advances on the purchase of more produce. However,
savings and loan, home input, and marketing. We have already cooperative members initially preferred to see the profits
discussed the decapitalization these cooperatives have suffered distributed. This issue has not yet been resolved. More techdue to lending policies which do not compensate adequately for nical assistance will be required to make the marketing operathe very rapid inflation experienced in Bolivia in recent tion viable.
The only other readily available measure of cooperative 5. Community Decision-Making
progress is membership. With approximately 3,000 farmers in the Sam Julian settlement zone as of September 1983, membership in the savings and loan (S&L) division of the cooperatives, FIDES seet economic ef ficiency on the one hand, and equity
which parallels general membership, has progressed as follows: and group process on the other, as being sometimes in conflict.
FIDES feels that there are times when economic efficiency must January 1980 524 prevail over group process. At the same time, they feel there
January 1979 311 is a need to develop group decision-making ability, for reasons
January 1981 598 of equity and because there are so many issues and problems in
July 1982 703 the colonization zone which can most effectively be addressed
Jun 183889 by group action. To promote group decision-making, the orienJune1983tation program confronts the settlers with the need to make decisions from the beginning. They start with short-term immeThere is considerable, though not complete, overlap between S&L diate needs such as how to prepare breakfast, using the food
membership and other memberships. provided by the orientation program, and progressing to more
complex and future-oriented decisions such as how to lay out
There are three levels to the cooperative system: nucleof the village and how parcels will be distributed. In subsequent
cenral(oe fr achnie nclos) and the general San Julian phases of the settlement consolidation process, existing, repCo-op for the whole colonization zone, only the last halel resentative community organizations, such as the health, livepersonality. The central cooperatives have warehouses and set stock, and credit committees, are encouraged and used by FIDES
policies on such matters as dues charged the nucleos and sales as much as possible. The settlers are consulted by FIDES on
to nonmembers. The nucleos also set dues for their own men- all important decisions.
The home-input division of the cooperatives has been par- II OCUIN
ticularly noteworthy for its effect in promoting the participa- ~ I OCUIN
tion of women. The following significant generalizations can be made
about the above project interventions:
4. Marketing -- The interventions evolved from project experience
rather than following a fixed "blueprint."
There are two problems stemming from the colonization
zone' s distance from its markets, Montero (140 to 195 kin) and --The project administrators took an unusually broad
Santa Cruz (190 to 245 kin), and the poor state of roads in the, view of beneficiary needs, one embracing all obstacles
zone. First, middlemen cannot be relied upon to appear when to achievement of project goals, rather than limiting
produce is available for sale or to offer affordable prices tesle onro ehia betvs
when they do. Second, since the settlers sell small amounts of produce and therefore have little opportunity to learn how to, market effectively, individual sales are both inefficient and ineffective. Therefore, the San Julian Cooperative, in late
-- Heavy emphasis was placed on developing the benefici- APPENDIX C
aries' capacity to meet their own needs and avoid
dependency. PROJECT IMPACTS
-- Host government inputs proved unreliable. I. INTRODUCTION
-- Roads and wells proved very important, but physical
infrastructure was otherwise successfully kept at a
min u re wThere are some who say that the idea of colonizing the minimum, lowland is a mistake. Farmers come to the Oriente with no
-- The physical layout of the settlements had an impor- capital or experience in tropical agriculture. The majority
tant influence on the outcome of the project. end up as subsistence farmers who are able to manage only a few
hectares per year. A few lucky farmers do well, mechanize, buy
Much stress was placed on community organization. up surrounding farms, and monopolize all resources. The income
Capability to respond to future problems was thus inequity that has prevailed in the highlands is only transplanted to the lowlands. A few prosper while the majority sufdeve loped. far.
The importance of these intervention characteristics is
apparent. They have been made possible by the nature of the The environment is destroyed as farmers abandon parcels
i eng agent and the commitment of its personnel, by the that are no longer fertile, leaving land covered with barbecho
amount of time they were in-country, and by the flexibility (secondary growth). The social traditions developed over centhey were allowed. The significance of the interventions and turies in the highlands are lost in the move to the Oriente.
the underlying conditions which made them possible will be Individualism prevails as social organization breaks down. The
explored more fully in Appendix E, Lessons Learned. original goals Of colonization are never realized.
While some of these points may be valid, interviews with settlers in San Julian indicate that most people were glad they had come to the Oriente and they planned to stay. Might the experience of the people in the San Julian and Chane-Piray areas have been different than that of the majority of spontaneous or government-directed settlers?
The San Julian and Chane-Piray consolidation project did much to make the transition from the highlands to the lowlands an easier one. As mentioned above, the majority of settlers prefer life in the Oriente to the alternative in the Interior. Settler turnover in these zones has been quite low compared with that in the spontaneous settlement areas.
In the sections below, the impacts of AID's interventions in Chane-Piray and San Julian are discussed. Treated first are economic and social impacts at the micro-level, and these are followed by discussion of economic, social, and environmental impacts at the macro-level.
II. MICRO-LEVEL IMPACTS on barbecho, where production is characterized by higher labor
costs, increased weed and insect problems, and falling yields.
In San Julian, on the other hand, the "chaqueado" still predomA. Economic Impacts inates, in which high forest is cut and burned and the rich but
thin virgin soil exploited. Production costs are lower, weeds
and insect infestation are minimal, and yields are favorable.
1. Stages of Development Because of the general scarcity of data the evaluation
team found it difficult to make a comparative assessment of
The question of whether the new-lands settlement in which economic impacts over an extended period of time in the two
AID has been involved in Chane-Piray and San Julian has been areas. This would have given a more concrete sense of the "beecoomialy stifactory at the farm level must address sever- fore and after" situations. An effort is made here to present
al issues within the context of a dynamic and variable process* the be t e aiabof certi k e ee re
enmica l y sn(98 dvl astlmetsae rmwr the bestipicture available of certain key economic issues reMichael Nelson (1978) developed a settlement stage framework lating to agricultural production. Section 2 below provides a
consisting of the following three steps: comparative description of farm production and income in ChanePiray and San Julian. Section 3 discusses the production technologies available to the farmers and highlights the reasons
-- pioneer for the choices they make as well as some of the short- and
-- Growth long-term problems they subsequently encounter. Section 4
The pioneer stage is characterized by new settlement and clear- deals with the efforts of the farmers and FIDES, within the
Tn ohe o r stge isT h aatern i ed o n w s tt me n st h a d e la- panorama laid out in the first two sections, to work out altering of the forest. The consolidation stage involves the devel- native farming systems that will allow a more stable, secure,
opment of the community and its infrastructure. A phase of and productive existence for the small farmer.
growth should then follow. This framework has been used in the
planning and implementation of the"AID projects in Chane-Piray
and San Julian. The goal of both projects has been to acceler-P ate development by reducing the time required to pass through
the preliminary stages, facilitating the growth of stable, productive economic activities. Rains, soils, and other production-related ecological cond c t v e g e o o t a c t i v tie s d i t i o n s c h a n g e e v e r y 2 5 k i l o m e t e r s ( k m ) i n t h e t w o a r e a s I n
Although both areas have been settled by highland migrant San Julian alone, four ecological regions exist. The types of
fame-rathy aren ignificany oderethn in several ways- crops cultivated vary accordingly. Following is a brief deCmenr, settemn in ch lder9 tha San Julian settle- scription of the two areas contrasting their land use, yield,
ment, since it began in the mid-1960s- Sani Julian settlementprdcin adpoft
began in 1972, grew slowly until 1975, and from 1976 to 1980
experienced a tremendous increase in new settlements. ChanePiray has been settled by spontaneous settlers, who originally a. Chane-Piray
entered the area when it was opened up by a Gulf Oil Company
exploration trail. San Julian, on the other hand, has been a
semi-directed effort from the beginning and has received out- Most of the settlers in Chane-Piray are small commercial
side support ranging from the original settlement design to farmers producing rice and corn as their principal crops.
ongoing technical extension services. The differences in However, in the southern part of the region, there are a sigsettlement age and degree of technical guidance have had a nificant number of larger commercial farmers, producing cane,
significant impact on the types of economic problems encoun- rice, cornI and soybeans. In the wetter northern area where
tered and the way in which they are addressed in each case. ce cultiva n s oiate re n dth rn are here
cane cultivation is not appropriate, rice and corn are the maPerhaps the most dramatic difference between these two jor crops. Yucca, soybean, plantain, and vegetables are also
areas, in terms of agricultural production, is that Chane-Piray raised.
finds itself in the midst of the "barbecho crisis." Barbecho Individual farm plots total 120,000 hectares (ha) with
refe torne -eared and cultivated land that has been left farm sizes officially ranging from 10 to 50 ha, based on the
toeert rec ec or As very little varying size of initial government land grants. The size of
virgin forest remains in the area, cultivation must take place the initial plot is not particularly meaningful, however,
because of the tendency to buy up extra land or to control Marketing. Although a significant proportion of the anseveral plots through family members. Larger operators have nual crops produced in the area is destined for family contended to follow the earlier pioneers, often buying up and sumption or seed, more rice is marketed than in San Julian.
consolidating lands first cultivated by the earlier arrivals. Maxwell and Pozo reported that the respondents sold an average
A significant land rental market also exists. of 4.3 tons of rice. Seventy-eight percent marketed up to 9.9
tons. Fourteen percent sold none. Most of the maize produced
never reached the market as 64 percent of the respondents marLand Use. Accurate, up-to-date information on farm pro- keted no corn.
duction in Chane-Piray is difficult to find. The Maxwell and
Pozo survey provides useful information although its survey
sample was small. Few respondents in that area were cultivat- Gross Crop Income. In recent years agricultural prices
ing all their land. The majority, 70 percent, were working have fluctuated tremendously, reflecting the high inflation
less than 20 percent of the lands available to them. Most of characterizing the national economic crisis and the adverse
the rest still worked well under half their land. Fifty-three weather conditions, such as drought and flooding, in different
percent of the total lands worked were planted with rice, 11 areas of Bolivia. For example, in the 1982 rice harvest, a
percent with corn, 5 percent with plantain, and 3 percent with fanega (177 kg) of rice began with a price of $b2,000 (Bolivian
yucca. Relatively little land was dedicated to permanent pesos). In September of 1983, only a year later, it sold at
crops, such as coffee, cacao, and citrus trees. Seventy-two over $b24,000, or a twelvefold increase. Consequently, it is
percent of the Chane-Piray respondents reported no permanent very difficult to evaluate the present state of agricultural
crops although 24 percent did have up to 2.5 ha in permanent prices and their impact on production.
crop production. A similar situation was found in the establishment of pastures: 63 percent had no pasture and only 8
percent had more than 10 ha of pasture. I Farm Profit and Family Income. Average farm profits in
Chane-Piray are higher than in San Julian. Eighty-six percent
The small amount of virgin forest still available in of those in the Maxwell aqd Pozo survey reported a farm profit
Chane-Piray severely limits the options of the farmers., Sixty- of up to U.S.$1,600 ($b25 = U.S.$1.00 in 1979). Twenty-five
five percent of the respondents had no virgin forest left. percent reported between U.S.$200.00 and U.S.$800.00, and 24
Most of the farmers find themselves with the greater part of percent reported a profit of up to U.S.$200.00. The average
their lands in barbecho, reclaimed by secondary growth. Thir- profit was U.S.$855.00. Nonagricultural income was shown to be
ty-five percent of the survey respondents indicated that over relatively insignificant as 80 percent received no such income.
80 percent of their lands was in barbecho. The rest had up to Only 7 percent earned over U.S.$400.00 in nonagricultural in80 percent in barbecho with none having less than 20 percent. come, while 13 percent earned up to U.S.$400.00.
Yields. A 1980 CORDECRUZ report on the 220,000 ha area b. San Julian
around San Pedro found rice yields in barbecho lands to be between 1,400 and 2,120 kilograms per hectare (kg/ha). Pure
maize stand yields were 1,840-2,070 kg/ha. Maize planted in The San Julian settlers, unlike those in Chane-Piray, have
alternative rows with rice yielded 320-415 kg/ha. Rice worked only recently begun to break out of subsistence into commercial
with machines yielded 2,120-3,000 kg/ha and pure maize, 2,300- cropping. The principal crops are rice and maize, with the
2,760 kg/ha. latter concentrated in the more southern areas where rainfall
is less. Yucca, potatoes, green peppers, onions, and other
vegetable crops are produced throughout the zone. There are
Farm Production. on the average, individual farm produc- still relatively few large commercial farm enterprises. Due to
tion is higher in Chane-Piray than in San Julian. The Maxwell the government policy, the size of individual farm plots is aland Pozo survey found that 89 percent of the respondents pro- most uniformly 50 ha. As in Chane-Piray, individual families
duced up to 9.7 tons of rice annually with an average of 5.6 often control several plots through family members. Some land
tons. An average of 2.3 tons of corn was produced by farmers rental also exists.
in the same area. Twenty-two percent produced over 2.5 tons.
Land Use. The Maxwell and Pozo study in 1979 included interviews with 54 settlers in southern San Julian in nucleos 3,
4, and 5. Although this implies a bias in the sample because 2.3 tons. In regard to corn production, 47 percent produced
of different climatic conditions, greater access through the less than 5 ton; 41 percent produced between .55 and 2.5 tons.
German highway to markets and inputs, and older areas of settlement, the results can indicate certain patterns that are
meaningful for the zone as a whole. Mr .. conditions and inadequate market information discourage more commercially oriented production.
Maxwell and Pozo found that 92 percent (as opposed to 70 Fewer colonists in San Julian than in Chane-Piray marketed rice
percent in Chane-Piray) of the respondents worked less than 20 although 45 percent did market up to 1.9 tons; 21 percent sold
percent of their total available land. This reflects the fact between 2.1 and 3.9 tons, and the average sold was 1.3 tons.
that San Julian is a newer settlement. A wider survey of the Proportionately more of the San Julian corn production reached
area also carried out in 1979 indicated that the average set- the market than in Chane-Piray; 47 percent sold at least some
tler had 2.1 ha in annual crops (Wing). Many more settlers in corn. The average corn marketed was 0.5 ton.
San Julian have perennials than in Chane-Piray. Permanent
crops have been consistently promoted by development agencies
in San Julian since its settlement. Maxwell and Pozo found Farm Profit and Family Income. The Maxwell and Pozo surthat 60 percent of their respondents had up to 2.5 ha of perma- vey showed that the average farm profit in the older nucleos
nent crops. The amount of land converted to pasture is not so was U.S.$548 ($b.25 = U.S.$l), a good deal lower than that of
encouraging, however. Maxwell and Pozo found that 87 percent Chane-Piray. Ninety-eight percent of the respondents earned a
had no pastures established. Only 13 percent had up to 2.5 ha. total farm profit of less than U.S.$l,600. However, proportionately more were found in the middle, with 45 percent earnunlike in Chane-Piray, the settlers in San Julian have ing between U.S.$200 and U.S.$800. Twenty-four percent earned
less of their lands in barbecho. This is mainly a function of less than U.S.$200. In his 1978 survey including the newer
the age of the settlement: the areas of earliest settlement in colonies, Wing found an annual on-farm gross income of U.S.$317
the zone, which are represented in the Maxwell and Pozo survey ($b20 = U.S.$1).
sample, show the most barbecho. Fifty-one percent of their
respondents stated that up to 20 percent of their lands was in Unlike in Chane-Piray, nonagricultural income plays a more
secondary growth although half of the farms had no barbecho. significant role in the generation of resources. Many San
Wing found that the average farm had 0.3 ha in fallow and sec- Julian settlers who were formerly wage laborers continue to
ondary growth, relatively less because his sample included new- leave the zone during the off-season to search for off-farm
er nucleos along the Brecha Casarabe. The greatest part of the work. Maxwell and Pozo found that although 56 percent had resettlers' land remains as unexploited virginforest. All of ceived no such income, 32 percent earned up to U.S.$200 in this
the farmers in the Maxwell and Pozo San Julian sample reported manner. Eight percent earned between U.S.$201 and U.S.$800.
having over 80 percent virgin forest, an average per settler The farmers in San Julian had a total family income only
family of 46 ha. slightly-lower than those in Chane-Piray.
Yields. FIDES personnel indicate that rice-yields tend to
be 1,417-2,120 kg/ha. Corn yields are 2,760-3,220 kg/ha with San Julian
as much as 4,600 kg/ha reported with the use of improved corn Total Income (U.S.$) Respondents (%)
varieties. These yields were as good or better than those reported in Chane-Piray. Obviously, yields vary over time because of weather conditions, input availability, labor supply, 0-250 16
and other variable factors. 251-500 24
Farm Production. Information on individual farm produc- ($b20 = U.S.$l)
tion in San Julian is scarce. Individual farm production in
San Julian is somewhat lower on average than in Chane-Piray, Source: Maxwell and Pozo, 1979: Table 137.
again a situation related to its more recent settlement. The
Maxwell and Pozo survey showed that 98 percent of the respon- Farm production in Chane-Piray and San Julian is still
dents produced under 9.7 tons of rice in 1979. The average was basically subsistence dominated, although there are significant
signs of consolidation and, to some extent, growth stages, as
seen in the increasingly market-oriented production and the di- only catalyze a process of area development if the settler
versification of agriculture. The San Julian farmers are pro- family has the incentive and the opportunity to produce."
ducing slightly less than the farmers in Chane-Piray, although (Scudder, 1981:10)
their yields are as good or better. While less rice was marketed from San Julian than from Chane-Piray, more corn came
from San Julian. Farm incomes in San Julian were only a little Slash and burn cultivation involves the progressive cutlower than in Chane-Piray, and income earned from outside ting down and burning of virgin forest, followed by the plantsources was higher. What is significant is that farmers in a ing of subsistence and commercial crops, usually on a small
new settlement with less cleared land and less capital are do- scale. The overwhelming majority of settlers in San Julian use
ing nearly as well as those in a settlement begun many years the slash and burn production method as do three-quarters of
earlier. all farmers in Chane-Piray. The choice of this method does not
necessarily imply the absence of technical knowledge on the
part of the farmer. Maxwell, Stutley, and Bojanic (1982),
3. Production Technology commenting on farm development in the San Pedro area of
Chane-Piray, observed that the small farmer manages a complex
business with a high degree of rationality. Slash and burn
Traditionally, the small farmer chooses the slash and burn cultivation, in order to be a successful production strategy,
system; it is a rational choice, involving considerable knowl- requires an intimate understanding of the management of limited
edge and management skills. It maximizes labor, the most capital and labor resources.
available production factor, and minimizes dependence on outside inputs. However, it involves great risk taking, does not Curtis, in his 1979 evaluation of the first phase of this
encourage the transition to commercial farnTing, and tends to project, observes that there are two patterns of slash and burn
lead to the barbecho crisis. Section a below explores the agriculture. The first is a purely migratory pattern where
basis for using slash and burn and some of the short- and long- land is cleared and farmed until yields begin to fall off.
term problems associated with it. These used plots, usually about 3 ha, are then abandoned for
new virgin forest where the fauer repeats the process. The
Mechanization, for the small farmer, often seems to be an second pattern is a more stable one in which a plot is cleared,
attractive alternative to the traditional system. It replaces exploited for 2 or 3 years, then left fallow while the farmer
hand labor, allowing a significant increase in the area culti- moves on. Eventually, he returns to cultivate the original
vated. It can increase yields under proper conditions. How- land which has regained some fertility over time.
ever, it basically implies a heavy credit investment, increases
dependence on outside inputs, and requires an effective main- Slash and burn cultivation is a land-extensive, labortenance and repair component. It also involves more intensive intensive operation, requiring little capital investment. In
tillage with potential adverse environmental impacts. Mechani- Santa Cruz, land is not the limiting factor. Large entreprezation is discussed in Section b. neurs have exploited great expanses of land in this fashion although success still depends on investment in large quantities
Finally, Section c deals with animal traction as an alter- of labor. The land worked by the small farmer is usually limnative or a supplement to traditional hand labor and mechaniza- ited to the 2 to 5 ha he can clear and keep clear with Just his
tion. It can reduce the small farmer's risks and increase his and his family's labor. There is little dependence on off-farm
capacity to work the land. Its investment costs are lower than inputs that require capital investment since the average small
with mechanization. Dependency on outside inputs is decreased farmer begins with little other than hand tools and seeds.
and local multiplier effects are significant. On the other
hand, significant initial-capital and labor investments are Slash and burn production, then, emphasizes the maximizanecessary. Pastures must be established and considerable tion of the most available factor of production: labor.
skills must be mastered to manage and maintain the system. Castro (1978) estimates that the system requires a labor input
of 41-51:persondays/ha of which 20-30 persondays are for land
clearing, 6 persondays for burning, and 15 persondays for
a. Slash and Burn Cultivation planting. Given the resources available to the average farm
family, he calculated that the system requires 227 persondays
per year, 199 of which are family labor and 28 are hired labor.
iThe settler family, not the land or the water resources,
is the main resource, and the mew lands settlement can
Slash and burn agriculture has its disadvantages, however. TbeC1 rdtoa ls n unMdl
First of all, it is physically dangerous. In San Julian, for example, by mid-October of the 1983 land clearing season, 12 deaths had been reported from accidents, most involving falling trees. Another disadvantage of the system is that it is usual- Years
ly not self-capitalizing. In order to maintain and increase its profitability, generated capital must be reinvested in labor. As the amount of cultivated land exceeds that which the 50 Hlectares 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
farmer can handle without hired labor, his risk increases dramatically. The system does not facilitate the escape from subsistence to commercial farming, which requires extremely shrewd Annual Crops 1 2 4 6 11 15 15 15 15 12
management and considerable risk taking. Because of its high
risk, those who make a "success" of slash and burn agriculture New Clearing 1 1 3 3 7 8 7 8 7 5
tend to be those who seize upon the right moment to sell out and invest in nonfarm ventures, such as a truck or small res- Barbecho 0 0 1 2 4 8 15 23 30 38
Uncleared Forest 49 48 45 42 35 27 20 12 5 0
Perhaps the major disadvantage of slash and burn agricul-1. are cutvesln 2yasbfoemig
ture in Santa Cruz, and that which makes it untenable in the sumto :1.Freclivesan2yasbfreoig
long term, is that it tends to lead the farmer-into the bar- on to new forest
becho crisis. The farmer tends to farm newly cleared land only 2. FavoraI~le market conditions
1 or 2 years. He avoids working in barbecha because of the 3. Reinvestment of returns in production expanhigher level of insect infestation and the competition with s ion
weeds. Expensive inputs are then required which make produc- 4. Maximum cultivation of 15 ha a year because
tion costs much higher. Soil fertility and yields are lower of labor constraints at harvest
since the layer of topsoil is relatively thin. Maize, for example, tends to yield an average of 3,220 kg the first year, drops below 2,760 kg the second year, and to less than 1,840 kg This. model is a suggestion of what is possible given the
in the third year. The small traditional farmer's answer to small farmer's goals. The actual progression varies widely as
this is to move to more fertile areas, leaving his old lands to does the point at which virgin forest is exhausted.
be consolidated by large, mechanized farmers or cattle operators.
Table C-i shows a reasonably successful slash and burn experience from the producer's point of view. It assumes that in the third and fourth year, the farmer is able to find and use Mechanization often offers an attractive alternative" to
increasing amounts of hired labor. Three major ideas are sug- traditional hand labor. A replacement for the time-consuming,
gusted in this model. backbreaking hand labor carries a great deal of -appeal for the
traditional farmer in Santa Cruz. Mechanization implies the
--The farmer is making a profit each year which is rein- use of capital to replace labor in two ways: through the use
vested in the next year's expansion of production, of tractors in land preparation and through the purchase of
-- Tis s a"gae o rolete" hic ca se th famerinputs such as herbicides and insecticides. The use of machinThisis "gme f rulete" hic ca se th famerery allows an increase in farmed area and can also allow a more back to zero in the case of crop failure in even one intensive working of the land. It may also be used selectiveyear, minus a significant proportion of his nonrenew- ly, in conjunction with traditional hand labor or animal tracable resource, virgin forest. tion.
--The farmer may confront the barbecho crisis in the The acquisition of farm machinery implies a heavy credit
ninth year, forcing him to abandon his land for new repayment and the purchaser often suffers a severe cash flow
forest or to find an alternative production strategy, problem. The investment in machinery may be justified, how-
C-1 2 C-i13
ever, especially if money is borrowed at fixed rates, given the labor. Corn yields increased from about 1,950 kg/ha with hand
highy iflaionry ituaionin oliia.labor to 2,520 kg/ha with machinery. Again, this yield inhighy iflaionry ituaionin oliia.crease depends on the presence of the machinery inputs at the
Mechanization for the small farmer has other complica- proper time.
tions. Machine clearing is not as desirable since it tends to
destroy the valuable top soil. Also, in order to introduce
farm machinery, tree stumps must be removed from the land. Ecological impact. The impact of motorized machinery on
Mechanization increases dependence on outsiders for critical the sois is much more adverse than that of traditional hand
inputs while increasing the farmer's risks. It requires con- labor or animal traction. Machine clearing, unless done skillsiderable foreign exchange for the purchase of machines and fully and conscientiously, can remove the thin top layer of
replacement parts, and fuel costs are high and continue to fertile soil. Its use in cultivation implies heavy tillage
rise. It requires the existence of repair facilities and well- that further damages the land, as opposed to the no tillage of
trained personnel. Machinery breakdown at critical moments in the traditional system and the minimum tillage of animal tracthe production cycle, especially given the limitations on work- tion. Heavy reliance on mechanization and intensive, prolonged
ing days imposed by seasonal rains, can be disastrous for the cultivation will require the introduction of fertilizers to
smal farer.maintain the fertility of the tropical soils, an expensive insmal farer.put tied to foreign-exchange.
In order to be economically feasible, the machinery must
be used effectively and continuously. Castro estimates that
120 ha a year would have to be plowed and harrowed by one trac- C. Animal Traction
tor in order to break even. However, the question of economic
feasibility is an extremely complicated one which depends on
many factors. If used strategically and effectively by a large The development of animal traction as a technological alfarmer or a group of smaller farmers, it can be a favorable ternative to traditional hand labor and motorized mechanization
alternative or supplement to traditional hand labor or animal has been going on in Santa Cruz for over 20 years. The Mennotraction. nite colonists in several areas use animal traction and are a
valuable source of experience and expertise as well as of basic
Farm machinery is often used on a contract basis by indi- equipment. Also, several development agencies have been studyviduals or groups of small farmers. it may be used at critical ing and experimenting with animal traction over the same period
production times such as land clearing to substitute for large of time, including the Mennonite Central Committee, the Mennoquantities of scarce labor. However, for the hirer, the nite Economic Development Association, the Methodist Church, La
machinery must be available at the opportune moment or its Merced Cooperative, and the Foundation for Integral Development
utility is lost and the reliance on its input becomes a serious (FIDES). They found that animal traction, while not by any
liability. The contract machinery pool also raises crucial ad- means a "cure-all,- is a feasible technology, as either a subministrative issues, such as who gets priority and when. stitute for or a supplement to traditional hand labor and moif the cultivated area is increased through the introduc- trzdmcaiain
tion of machinery used solely for land clearing, hand labor One of the most significant obstacles in the use of animal
must be able to keep pace during later critical production per- traction is the prejudice of many people who consider it to be
iods. For example, if 15 ha are cleared by machines and a second-rate technology. It is often difficult to overcome
planted, sufficient labor must be found to work intensively the preference for a 'more advanced" technology even when it
during the short weeding season. Likewise, sufficient labor myntb h oteooial eeiil
must be available to harvest the larger crop. many farmers in myntb h oteooial eeiil
this situation have been forced to abandon unharvested crops in
the iels bcaue o hied abo shrtaes.Adv2Rtat~e of Animal Traction Over Traditional Hand Labor.
Animal trcincan significantly reduce the risks of the small
farmer. It allows him to capitalize, thereby reducing operaYield. The introduction of machinery may cause an in- tional expenses for a given crop. Unlike the traditional hand
crease in crop yields. It has been observed in Chane-Piray labor system, with animal traction he does not have all of his
that yields can be higher on fields in barbecho when they are capital riding on the success of one year's crop.
worked with machinery. CORDECRUZ found that rice yields were
2,600 kg/ha with machinery as opposed to 1,760 kg/ha with hand
C-14 C-1 5
Animal traction can increase the farmer's capacity to work parts shortage. Farmers are more insulated from the input marhis land, thereby facilitating his emergence from subsistence ket, and the availability of services at the proper moment is
farming to commercial farming. A farmer using animal traction virtually assured. The local multiplier effects of animal
in heavy soil without tractor support can work 4 to 5 ha. In traction are higher than with motorized mechanization since the
sandy soil, he can work 5 to 10 ha. creation of an internal network of supportive components is enTotal family labor may be used more effectively and the couraged. Draft animals can be bred, veterinary services depeaks in labor demand at critical production periods may be veloped, and implements built and repaired in the area. Animal
leveled out. Castro estimates that the total number of person- traction can also be combined with the use of mechanization for
days per hectare required with animal traction is reduced from the initial land clearing which is a prerequisite to the intro40 to 29. The labor demand is distributed more evenly because duction of horse-drawn equipment. Tractor support in this case
the women and children participate in the ongoing maintenance can increase the area that can be worked effectively.
of animals and pastures. The return to family labor may be
increased because it uses the family's resources more effi- Disadvantages of An9imal Traction. Although the initial
ciently. Table C-2 shows how labor costs can be loweredcotofailtrtonreesthnhtofmhnryte significantly with the use of animal traction. Fixed costs, costest iml tradsctonieaeles cpta tat of ahiery, the
howevr, ae hiher.the small farmer, the equipment itself is relatively expensive and may require him to work winter as well as summer crops.
Table C-2. Comparative Costs of Traditional and Another major obstacle is the strong investment in the land
Animal Traction Systems 'preparation necessary before introducing animal traction. The
(in Bolivian pesos) returns from the removal of tree stumps necessary before introducing equipment are questioned by technical people in the
field. Although stump removal allows a higher yield on plowed
land and facilitates winter cropping, the rate of return depends on several other variable factors, such as soil, weed
Traditional System Animal Traction control, insect damage, and efficient system management.
OthrVribe e OthrVriber Fxe The establishment of pastures is also costly. Improved,
LaoCaralrixd Lbooaiblpie seeds are often difficult to obtain and require considerable
CrpCosts Costs Costs Costs Costs Costs labor input over an extended period of time. The establishment
of pastures also requires a shift in exploitation strategies tc
Corn 2,200 1,255 540 825 1,525 1,540 one involving a more long-term commitment to the land. For
Rice 3,050 1,370 540 1,410 1,270 1,540 many subsistence farmers, time and money invested in pastures
is "wasted" considering the heavy demand made on their labor
resources by their annual crops. The difficulties involved in
Source: Castro, 1978:28 establishing pastures have been a major impediment to the viability of animal traction in Chane-Piray and San Julian.
Adatgsof Animal Traction Over Mechanization. The Another serious obstacle to the use of animal traction is
Advan~utageo nmltato sls ~mgn otesi that good draft animals are difficult to obtain in eastern
mianu tinteo nmairciovslesdmgigtetesi Bolivia, as are harnesses and cultivating equipment. An adetha th inensvetillage of mechanization. The foreign ex- quate supply of replacement parts and other hardware must also
change costs of animal traction, unlike those of motorized be available. Repair facilities, including blacksmithing, are
mechanization, are very low and fuel costs are zero. Invest- imperative in order to avoid the same kind of maintenance prob
ment costs per hectare are lower. Animal traction teams are lems that are encountered with motorized mechanization. The
more economically viable with as little as 4 to 7 ha under cul- farmer must learn how to select, train, and care for his draft
tivation and with a capacity of up to 12 ha. A 35-horsepower animals. He must also learn the appropriate tillage technique
tractor, on the other hand, is not economically viable with related to the unique production conditions on his own land.
less than 40 ha under cultivation. The cash costs of operating .He must possess an adequate knowledge of agronomic procedures
the teams are a small fraction of the cash costs of mechaniza- such as the appropriate plant population, seed varieties, and
tion. Animal traction makes the farmer less dependent on out- crop rotation in relation to the type of tillage being carried
side sources for critical inputs and decreases the risks of a out. The first experience in animal traction in the Cuatro
Ojitos area in the 1960s demonstrated that unless these materi- The 1979 survey found that 16 percent of the respondents
als and technical inputs are available, the application of had undertaken stump removal and shifted to partial mechanizaanimal traction technology is not usually replicable beyond a tion. Seven percent of the total respondents had livestock
few model farms. operations. Farms classified as permanent cropping operations
made up 5 percent of the total.
4. Diversified Family Farm Systems Maxwell, Stutley, and Bojanic have found that the farmers
with livestock are faring better than those without. Although
all farmers face seasonal gash and labor problems, those with
Farmers in both Chane-Piray and San Julian are pursuing diverse sources of income are able to manage their cash flow
basically identical production strategies involving annual more successfully. These researchers point out that alternacr6ps and the traditional slash and burn system. However, the tive strategies based on minimum tillage, livestock, and perolder Chane-Piray area has not seen a timely development of al- manent crops show promise.
ternative strategies more appropriate for long-term economic
stability. It now finds itself in the midst of the barbecho
crisis. Its options for an escape from its dead end in a man- b. San Julian
ner favorable to the small farmer's situation are limited. In
San Julian, however, there is still time to develop appropriate The main thrust of AID-supported technical agricultural
technolgies and farming systems that could enable~the small assistance in San Julian has been toward the development and
farmer to have a more compatible long-term relationship to his promotion of a diversified farming model. This model should
environment and a more stable, improved standard of living, establish the small farm as a stable, self-capitalizing, comThe following two sections discuss how the farmers in the two mercial enterprise that will allow the farmer to avoid the
areas are coping with their problems and limitations. At great greatest problems posed by secondary jungle growth.
social and economic cost, farmers in Chane-Piray have on their
own found several responses to the dilemmas posed by the tradi- The diversified farming model promoted in San Julian has
tional system. In San Julian, an alternative farm system is two main variations: an emphasis on annual cropping or an embeing promoted that should allow the problems of the tradition- phasis on livestock, primarily cattle. Each proposes a multial system to be addressed before the barbecho crisis is ple crop sequence involving both annual and permanent crops,
reached. A model of a farm in San Julian is presented to il- the elimination of barbecho with leguminous plants that serve
lustrate what farmers are doing to avoid the problems encoun- both as cover and forage, the introduction of livestock, and
tered in Chane-Piray. the use of animal traction. The concepts of graduality, capitalization, and diversification are stressed in both cases.
a. Chane-Piray. The model is a gradually evolving one which moves the
farmer from traditional slash and burn cultivation through
stages of increasing complexity, eventually leading to a highly
Maxwell, Stutley, and Bojanic (1982) observe that about integrated system. This should allow the incremental develop1,500 farms in the San Pedro area have begun to develop a more ment of managerial skills and technology and reduce risks
diversified, stable agriculture with greater capital and higher through a balanced growth of the debt load. The farm operation
income. Three major "avenues of escape" from the barbecho is expanded, although forest cover is removed at a slower rate
crisis have been observed: than in the traditional system. The barbecho cycle is broken
as incremental stump removal and leguminous overcropping allow
-- Stump removal and partial mechanization (plowing) with the introduction of animal traction equipment and the beginning
either a tractor hired for land preparations or the of livestock production.
use of hand labor
The model is designed to be largely self-capitalizing.
-- Cattle operations Net worth is built up through cleared land, simple infrastructure, animal traction equipment, and the natural increase of
-- Permanent cropping (small-scale) herds and permanent crops. The use of timber sales to generate
development capital has been suggested. A relatively low proportion of purchased inputs is required since many inputs, such
c-i18 C-i 9
as those for livestock production, are produced on-farm. Cred- Figure C-2. Diversified Farm Mod el, Years 5-7
it needs are kept as low as possible in relation to gross income and net worth.
The diversification of the model spreads out the marketUBA
and physical risks involved in production. Income is less vul- AREAN() () () (5 6 7 8
nerable to crop failure and price drops. Cash flow and labor ARA() () ()C5 6 7 8
requirements are better distributed. Also, dependence on out- NCE
side sources for material and financial inputs is reduced as the integrated system becomes established.
The model described below is not intended to be a strict() 1ha hoe grdn sml aias
and rigid plan for introducing changes; it should, instead, (2) 2 ha: pement asure nial
demonstrate the relationships among integrated components of (3) 2 ha: perennial pantsr
the system. The farmer's progress through the model varies de- (4) 2 ha: woodnnot (unlared)
pending on a wide range of internal and exogenous factors. (4) 5 ha: annualops iunclerotaio
(6) 5 ha: asuar s on rotation oa mx
Figure C-1 shows that some innovation is introduced in the (7) 2 ha: woodstrso oainpo mx
first year with the establishment of perennial plants. How-(7 2ha od t
ever, it is in the second year that more extensive innovation (8) 5 ha: corn/perennial plants, cleared by slash and burn,
begins. By the second or third year, the farmer has 1 ha onwihn stm reoa
which he has his house,' garden, and small animals and 4 ha ofInrdcino cate n/r
annual crops produced after slash and burn clearing and some introduction of anale tactonwtufcetcei
.perennial plants.Inrdcino anmltatowtsuf iet rdt
Figue C1. Dverifie Fam MoelYear2-3in the ninth to eleventh years, the model takes one of two Figue Ci. Dverifie Fam MoelYear2-3diverging paths, toward an emphasis on annual cropping worked with animal traction or toward an emphasis on cattle production (see Figures C-3 and C-4). In the annual cropping variation, URBANthe 5 ha previously in rotated annual crops are put into pasARBAN() 3 ture. The next 5 ha are in annual crops, worked with animal
ARCE traction and tractor support. Beyond the woodlot, 10 ha are in
leguminous pastures and cover and are in the process of natural stump decay. Five ha of perennial plants, 10 ha of cover crops, and 5 ha in annual crops follow.
(1) 1 ha: home, garden, small animals
(2) 2 ha: slash and burn annual crops in 2nd year The cattle production variation of the model has 10 ha of
(3) 3 ha: slash and burn annual crops and perennial plants in psue u nbhn h is odofloe ya di
1st yeartional 2 ha of uncleared forest. Five hectares of annual crops, 5 *ha of calf pasture, and 5 ha of a leguminous overcrop Figue C2 sows hatby he ffthto he svenh yarfollow. After that, an additional 5 ha of perennial plants or
permanent pastures have been established in areas previously pasture are established, then 10 ha of pasture. Approximately
cultivated with annual crops. The farmer has 2 ha of permanent 1 ha is used for fence rows.
plants, a 2-ha uncleared woodlot, 5 ha in annual crops on land The us e of model farm families in San Julian has proved
both with and without stumps, 5 ha of uncleared forest, and an useful in demonstrating the feasibility of the innovations
additional 5 ha with tree stumps and planted in corn and peren- described in the previous section. However, FIDES learned that
nial plants. With sufficient credit, the farmer introduces incorporating self -identification into the model family selecanimal traction or cattle at this stage. tion process was most effective. Of the eight model families
selected by community vote in nucleo 17, four proved to be effective, self-motivated, diversified farmers. Following that
C- 20 C- 21
experience, additional model farm families were identified and The introduction of permanent plants such as citrus, cofsupported more informally rather than being set publicly apart fee, and cacao trees was well received. Through a concentrated
from their peers. and extended effort, about 10 thousand citrus trees of several
varieties were sold to settlers in 35 communities. Coffee and cacao seeds were distributed among groups of settlers in severFigure C-3. DiversifiedFarm Model, Years 9-11: al communities to be germinated and then transplanted on the
Annual Cropping Emphasis farms. Some 20,000 plants were distributed in this fashion.
.Half of the plants raised were returned to FIDES to be sold to other settlers. FIDES estimates that there were 2,100 ha of
permanent plants in all of San Julian in 1983, including those URBANfrom other sources. Acquisition of these new plants with the
AREA (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) settlers' own resources was felt to be an important prerequi'0 site expression of commitment to their incorporation into diNUCLEOversified farming. Just recently, 500 fruit and nut plants of
45 varieties were imported from Brazil to be field tested and
made available to the settlers.
(1) 1 ha: home, garden, small animals
(2) 2 ha: permanent pasture The promotion of winter ciops such as beans and improved
(3) 2 ha: perennial plants corn was emphasized. Although settlers were open to experi(4) 2 ha: woodlot menting with winter crops such as beans,. the lack of an ade(5) 5 ha: pasture (with stump removal in rotation program) quate and timely market was a major problem. The trials of
(6) 5 ha: annual crops under animal traction with tractor improved corn showed better yields than traditional corn, alsupport though the number of farmers who could purchase improved corn
(7) 2 ha: woodlot seed through the cooperative was limited because of supply
(8) 10 ha: pasture and cover (stumps are being removed) problems. It also has been observed that a need exists for
(9) 5 ha: perennials (no stump removal) educating farmers to distinguish the quality of annual crop
(10) 10 ha: cover (stumps to be removed) varieties since farmers are often unaware of the true grade of
(11) 5 ha: annual crops with perennials their products.
The establishment of pastures has been a slow process.
Figure C-4. Diversified Farm Model, Years 9-11: The high co *sts in time and labor as well as the problem of
Cattle Emphasis obtaining improved pastures have been the major limiting factors. The amount of improved pastures in the area is growing, however. Most nucleos are reported to have at least some pastures which can be used for multiplication purposes. FIDES esURBANtimates that 1,200 ha of pastures have been established along AREA -:a (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) the Rio Grande-Los Angeles road.
Sixteen head of cattle have been introduced in three
nucleos through a FIDES dairy cattle program. Cattle committees have been formed in each participating community to admin(1) 1 ha: home, garden, small animals ister the distribution of the animals. Two new calves have
(2) 2 ha: permanent pasture been born and are to be returned to the appropriate committee
(3) 2 ha: perennial plants to be delivered to another farmer. Each beneficiary must have
(4) 2 ha: woodlot at least 1 ha of pasture, a water source, and a basic livestock
(5) 10 ha: pasture (with stump removal in rotation program) shelter.
(6) 2 ha: woodlot
(7) 5 ha: annual crops The promotion of animal traction appears to be most effec(8) 5 ha: calf pasture tive when theory and on-farm demonstrations are combined with
(9) 5 ha: cover crop (legume) rotation the availability of the necessary material inputs in the area.
(10) 5 ha: perennials or pasture The equipment has been made available as consignment articles
(11) 10 ha: pasture through the settlers' cooperative. The incorporation of
(12) 1 ha: fence rows
farmers already using the equipment on their land as part of The evaluation team felt that in San Julian there is the
the demonstrations is most convincing to the interested farmer tine, the knowledge, the capability, and the will to avert the
who has doubts about his ability to learn the necessary skills. most negative consequences of an unself-conscious development
The xisenc ofa rpairfaclit wihinthe reais he nlyprocess. Based on the information provided in the previous
Theu exitenceto a eairle fality iti the araliheat ifsuhe onl sections, it is safe to say that the San Julian settlers are
fainpty not yetavalbeatouhteesalshetofsc. faring better than their counterparts in Chane-Piray fared at
the same stage of development. The AID-supported interventions
Pehp h important lesson learned on the promotion over the years have played an important role in San Julian's
Pfdierhs he famst rmteFIE osldtinPoeti relative success. Although the predominant production strategy
ofn dunive sife fharmigsfrme adDopt onolheiatongroect inde continues largely along traditional lines, there is, to a sigSanllutiane is ve t at wdsa adoprntion tof the taintgrae mode nificant degree, an awareness on the part of the settlers of
cannot take place until all of the components involved are tene o iesfcto fatvte n oeelgt
available and in place in the area. Even the demonstration of ened strategies tha+ take into account both their own long-term
the innovative concepts through model farmers is not sufficient interests and those of the environment that gives them susteunless interested farmers can translate their interest into a nance.
concrete commitment in action. The components for a diversified farming enterprise are now in place in the San Julian B. Social Impacts
zone with the exception of the new animal traction repair
facility. Permanent plants, various winter crops, improved
pastures, dairy cattle, animal traction equipment, and agricul- 1. Response Capability
tural inputs are available to farmers interested in diversifying their operations. FIDES personnel in the area who have
experience in other colonization zones state that for the first Testlr'bscnesaemtwe hyfrtarv
tine in the last 20 years, all of these components are present inThe lowl 'bieds. Duigahrentto pherin the sanrv
ainaavailableion setlers.loigfra lentv otai Julian project, settlers are 13rovided with enough to eat and a
tionl poducionmethds.roof over their heads. For the first critical months, these
provisions are absolutely necessary for survival. As the
FIDES's understanding of the issues described above and months and Years pass, however, the settlers are obliged to
its responses to them were developed through many years of fend for themselves. FIDES can provide services, advice, and
experience. Technical assistance activities have been based on support to the community, but how it responds to the services
a profound familiarity with the options open to the small provided depends upon individual settler initiative. Throughfarmer. They have been dedicated to helping the settler estab- out the Consolidation Project emphasis has been placed on
lish a stable, productive farm so that his options, whether avoiding dependency on outside agencies. The orientation prothey be to remain permanently on his parcel or to use it as a gram stresses independent problem-solving. If the settlers in
more effective stepping stone in his efforts toward a better San Julian are going to survive, they must have the ability to
life, will be less limited by factors outside his control. work together to achieve goals.
The main agricultural development problem faced in Chane- Response capability has many facets. It can mean the
Piray is the barbecho crisis. There, it seems that the dire ability to organize to assert one's needs, either as a group or
predictions of colonization's critics alluded to earlier are through-an effective representative. It can mean the ability
becoming realized. A stable land tenure has not been estab- to solve problems whether they are technical or organizational.
lished by most small farmer settlers. Some lucky settlers have It has a motivational aspect involving a willingness to help
done well, but the process tends toward one of consolidation of others and an optimistic belief that situations are improvable.
small farms, extensive mechanization or introduction of large The response capability of the settlers in San Julian appears
cattle operations, and monopolization of most of the resources to be well developed. Some examples are provided below of how
by a few. Depending on the perspective, this situation may or the community responded t6 various obstacles.
may not be all negative. But from the point of view of those
promoting a more equitable access to resources and opportunities and a wider distribution of the benefits of new-lands
settlement, the present scenario and future prospects of ChanePiray are not as satisfactory as could be hoped.
C- 24 C- 25
a. MrkeingProramC. Flood Emergency Response
up until 1982, the San Julian Multipurpose Cooperative bad In May 1983, San Julian experienced the worst flood ever
four sections, including branches for savings and loans, con- witnessed in the area. Over 1,000 families were forced to
sumer goods, agricultural inputs, and home inputs. In 1983, a evacuate their homes and lost their crops because of the rising
new component was formed to market crops on a community level, water. The main road was only passable by canoe, and maney of
Cooperative members joined together to take all of the funds the homeless families began to suffer from exposure.Th
available and combine then with two small outside loans. nucleos responded by forming emergency committees to request
Thirty-five to thirty-eight cooperative members in one NADEPA outside help. These committees were able to evaluate the flood
participated. A cooperative member was then appointed as the situation from within, decide who needed the most help, and
buyer and used the money to buy rice from other farmers. The then distribute the aid when it arrived. Communities not so
cooperative then contracted to have the rice processed and sold seriously affected by the flood donated local foodstuffs to
at a profit. Before this, each individual farmer had sold his, those in need in other nucleos.
rice to an intermediary for a price 5 to 10 percent lower than
he had received from his cooperative. With the establishment Other outside agencies responded to the crisis as well.
of the cooperative marketing component, the intermediary is An Air Force helicopter made 15 flights from Santa Cruz to
avoided, and the cooperative benefits as does the individual nucleo 38 because the Rio Grande was impassable. Food and supfarmer. The idea for the cooperative marketing component was plies were flown in and the seriously ill were evacuated.
generated by the settlers themselves, with no outside assist- Radio communication between the FIDES basecamp and three of the
ance. The settlers showed the ability to organize from within interior nucleos was maintained four times a day. The FIDES
to respond to a situation that had previously been beyond their extension agents worked directly with the victims of the flood,
individual control. helping to distribute supplies as they became available. The
extensionists collected information from the emergency committees *to radio back to the basecamp. As more and more drugs
and supplies came in from outside sources, the San Julian Coopb. The Road erative lent its unsold wagons and carts for use in transporting these supplies. Emergency health committees were formed by
From the start, the road has been a continual headache for each nuclear to distribute them. After some discussion, they
everyone. The NADEPAS located further up the Brecha Casarabe decided to sell the drugs for a nominal fee to begin a rotating
have even more at stake because their contact to the outside fund to be used to replace the drug supplies.
can easily be cut of f completely. Although the floods are over, the colonists will feel the
For xamlebefre te etrace o NDEPAV, her wa results of the disaster for i long time because entire harvests
extremely bad stretch Of road that was often under water for were destroyed. The community, however, showed a well-develmuch of the year. The settlers in that NADEPA made several oped respo 'nse capability as they banded together in this emerattempts to obtain help from outside sources, but without suc- gency situation.
cess. Finally, they decided that they would have to rely on
their own resources. The rainy season had already begun, so
there was no time to lose. The settlers decided that each d. Mobilization to obtain Outside Services
nucleo in the affected area would send 10 men each day to work
on the road. The section had to be drained completely and the
roadbed built up. They dug out the mud, sometimes with their In several cases, the colonists were able to organize
bare hands, and carted it away on their backs. Dry earth was politically and approach the Bolivian Government and other outthen brought to fill the resulting hole. After a week and a si .de sources for services. A few examples follow.
half, others began to join in the effort. The National Institute of Colonization (INC) lent a truck and FIDES provided
fuel. A lumber truck operator lent some of his equipment. Schools. Schools have always been a high priority for the
Before the rainy season had really gotten underway, that sec- colonists in San Julian. It is very important to the parents
tion of the road was in good repair. The initiative demon- that their children be able to read and write. A few years
strated by the settlers shows an ability to tackle problems on after some of the first nucleos were formed, the community
their own without any dependence on the outside.
C- 26 C- 27
organized to do something about the lack of educational facili- available men in the community standing by. They insisted that
ties. First, they built schools in the central nuc.Ieos so that the team come to their meighl oha hi reacs
no child would have to walk more than 5 kilometers. Then the Anakadmafhurfloedin a l the meai their grev aled.
committees elected representatives and sent them to the minis- And thear tea f tried t lo we explaenin thatweoudd nmo tanke
try of Education. They stated that they had many children th tem rid oexlntatw cuddo omre hn
requiring education and that the schools were already built. pass along the flucleors complaints regarding road conditions.
The Ministry responded and provided approximately 14 teachers The People in nucleo 47 sensed that the traveling team may have
in the San Julian region. Although the quality of education is had access to money or power, and quickly mobilized forces to
poor and there are still not enough schools to accommodate express their desires to the outsiders.
everyone, rapid progress has been made in a relatively shortAl ofteave xmpsilurtehw heSnJin
time.settlers have made great strides in taking control of their lives and solving their own problems. They have made substanThe Federation of San Julian. In January 1982, the col- tial progress in a short time considering their diversity of
oniss bnde toethr fo th fist imein azon-wie Aso-backgrounds and relatively humble origins. This ability to orciation of Agricultural Producers, whose main concern was togaiet sov prb ms san nagbl bu ipratprt f
improve the road. Although it lasted only a few months, later this project's impact. W
in the year a more stable, zone-wide organization was founded calling itself the Federation of San Julian Colonists. This
federation is taking an active political role in expressing the 2. Sense of Well-Being
needs of the settlers to outsiders.
The edeatio ha no bee unritial f te Cosolda-It is extremely difficult to measure objectively the senis~e
tion Project. Both FIDES and INC have received many com- o elbigfl ystlr.Hwvr h emblee
plaints, with the road'again cited as the number one problem. that it could begin to get some indication in talking with varThe Federation even went so far as to take over the INC head- ious colonists while on the project site. If the settlers
quarters for a day, early in 1983. They claimed that the INC think they are well off, especially compared to their life in
had ot oneitsjoband emadedan nvetigaivecomisson.the Interior, then they Probably are. Informal interviews with
hai otn isoe ht job anF e adedio anl ionvetigaetiv fucomiion farmers and their families from a number of nucleos are the
cohesive unit, able to express the hopes and fears of the peo- bsho b e nd rtataionervie tewn was lconctetrogh I
ple of San Julian. There are some problems, however, whichshudb noe tat llierew gwsCnuc dtruh
include the desire by some in the Federation to absorb the co- open-ended questions. The team emphasized application for
opertiv, mkin it ineffct, poitial nsttuton.future project knowledge in explaining the motive for questionWhile this would not be desirable from the point of view of the ding Terlostag fousetlement, n od on the settlet ro es
Consolidation Project, FIDES has continued to be supportive of fuurgeaexpectaios.o eteet n ecno h etes
and to work with the Federation. ftr xettos
Health. Health, like education, was not really a compo- a. Adapting to a New Life
nent of the original project. With the exception of what was
offered in the orientation program, the colonists received lit-Mayo th SnJuinstlr hve ef hmswee
tle outside support. The oldest nucleos (NADEPAS I, II, and thiMamiliesthe SnJlid fosetueris. e have mvwedrom
III) organized and went to the Ministry of Health demandingthi fa les av lvdfo cnur s.T yhvem ed rm
services. The Ministry of Health has been paying full-time highland and high valley systems to the semi-tropical lowlands.
salaries to 3 health workers in these NADEPAS for over 3 years. The adjustments are many and the first year is especially difficult. If they survive that first year and decide to stay,
how do they feel at that Point? Have they a sense of control
Outside valatin Tems.Thetea whih pepaed hisover their lives? Are their roles different in the Oriente
re outtsideed Evaluio t tm. Teta whc prpctared norrtis than they were in the highlands, and if so, are they adjusting?
frort traled0,a thughout the project area Uponouereur
fr cableo 50,the acteoeds o the projeca t aea, we) ncllounte Very often, during the first phases of colonization, the
cabl stetced cros te rad (t ncle 47 an al ofthewomen are left behind while the men go on ahead to evaluate the unfamiliar territory. Among a sample Of settlers (Hess, 1979)
arriving during 1976-1977, 40 percent of the married colonists however, it appeared that the women were Coping well with their
went through the orientation program without their spouses. new roles in the lowlands.
Sometimes the man works for a season and then returns; sometimes he stays for a year or more setting up a farm before he comes back for the rest of the family. In the same sample of Table C-3. Women's Labor Contribution, San Julian
settlers, 78 percent of the men had worked between I and 20 years in the Oriente prior to settling in Santa Cruz. Thus, the husband usually has a better idea of what this move will entail than does his wife. often the wives arrive at the colony long after their husbands have gone through the orienta- Adjusted Cumulative
tion program (husbands are sometimes reluctant to bring them to No. of Frequency Frequency
the area before some sort of house is ready), so the women miss Type of Labor Cases M M
not only what they might have learned in the orientation program about gardens and the preparation of new foods but also Housework, Child Raising,
those first months of working together to start a new life. Cooking Cleaning 3 4.8 4.8
The first year of resettlement is particularly difficult All of the Above Plus
on the women. They must begin housekeeping in a completely Raising Animals 12 19.4 24.2
different setting. The climate is hot and muggy, and unfamiliar insects and illnesses abound. The old familiar foods are All of the Above Plus
difficult to find, and they do not know how to prepare the new Tending a Vegetable Garden 19 30.6 54.8
foods available. They have left their extended family back in the interior and have not had time to develop new social net- All of the Above Plus
works. They do not usually have the livestock which they cared working in most Major
for daily in the highlands. Food is scarce because there has Tasks in the Chaco 28 45.2 100.0
not yet been a harvest.
Total: 62 100.0 100.0
The second year, however, is a little easier. They grow accustomed to the heat and the need to wear fewer clothes. Fruits and vegetables are more plentiful than in the interior Source: Hess, 1979.
as the gardens and papaya and banana trees flourish. Houses are built, looking very similar to the houses in the interior except that they have grass roofs. Others in the nucleo live The addition of community and home extensionists (females)
close by and have experienced the same difficulties. As health and a home inputs section to the cooperative contributed to
posts are set up in more communities, health care is more ac- raising the morale of the women in the San Julian area. Skills
cessible. The old life in the interior no longer looks so workshops were held to teach women how to knit and embroider.
good. Thread, needles, and yarn were now available close to home.
The extensionists encourage membership in the cooperatives and The roles of women in San Julian are similar to those they offer courses in math, budgets, and bookkeeping--skills that
had in the interior, with a few exceptions.. A survey in 1978 the women almost universally lack. The ultimate goal is to
of 62 women showed that almost half of the women raise child- provide the necessary training in the skills that the women
ren, cook, tend a vegetable garden, care for livestock, and will need to sustain the program and the home inputs section of
work in the fields (see Table C-3). One activity that is no the cooperative. Local directorates of women in each community
longer available to the women is the marketing of their veg- have been formed, with one woman responsible for selling the
etables. Since nearly every family has its own garden, small- merchandise and keeping the books.
scale marketing of vegetables has become obsolete. How much the women miss this function is difficult to say. More impor- In general, the women in San Julian seemed to be fairly
tant is the question of money handling within the family since content. They have plenty to eat and they see their children
the women no longer earn their own. The women talked to infor- growing. They are concerned about health care and education
mally by the woman on the evaluation team said that their hus- for their sons and daughters. The well could be closer to the
bands let them handle the family finances (although some had stories of women whose lives were not so simple). In general,
C- 30 C- 31
house and there is never enough money, but that was true in the 3. Health
interior as well. They have adjusted to life in the Oriente.
The men are less patient than the women. They want more If one truly wanted ~o assess the project impact on health
to happen sooner. Their expectations have been sufficiently over time, one would need1a survey, both before and after the
raised to make them optimistic about the future, but reality is project, or a. complete or nearly complete vital statistics regalways reminding them that the future is not yet here. The istration. Given the lack of baseline or current data on morroad is bad; there is not enough credit available; they have bidity and mortality in the San Julian region, it is difficult
seen a lot of empty promises. Nonetheless, all of the men to draw any conclusions based on hard evidence. The lack of
spoken to expressed the opinion that they were better off than data makes it impossible to discern a drop or rise in the norbefore. None was interested in returning to the Interior. tality rate over time.
An 8-day study carried out in 1982 by a medical team f rom
b. Future Expectations North Carolina shows that intestinal parasites, anemia, and
gastrointestinal disorders were the most common health problems
in the San Julian area, Of the 1,329 people (self-selected)
oThe successful adjustment of each colonist would seen by the team, only 89 (7 percent) were considered to be
seem to- depend on the degree to which he is self- healthy. Fifty-five percent of the children under 5 years old
consciously future oriented. He mDust be optimistic, had intestinal parasites. The team concluded that most of the
which most are, and he must be patient, which many problems could be eliminated with improved sanitation, general
are mot.0 (Thompson, 1973:18). hygiene, and improved nutrition. Their study indicates a need
for general education of the community on preventive medicine
and a well-balanced diet. What has the project done to address
it is evident that many farmers hold favorable expecta- these recommendations?
tions for the future. 'Much time is spent removing stumps from
their fields and planting pastures as investments for the years
to come. These long-run investments have no short-run payoff. a. -Nutrition Training
Many farmers are putting in perennial crops such as coffee,
cacao, and citrus trees. Continuous expansion of fields also
demonstrates an optimism on the part of the settlers. Home in- The project has hired home and community extensionists to
provements are common, and more than one two-story house al- visit women in their hones, teaching then specifically about
ready has been built in the San Julian area. The colonists balanced diets, food preparation, and the special needs of
continue to invest in animals including cattle, goats, sheep, children. Foods specific to the area were introduced, includpigs, ducks, and chickens. Animal traction has been introduced ing soybeans, papayas, bananas, and yucca. Gardens were
in several nucieos with plans for expansion. Two years ago started in several communities. The impact of this general
only four families in San Julian had horses; now 17 families education on the community is dificult to ascertain in the
have horses they can use for transportation and tillage. Five short run, however. Based on brief informal interviews by the
more credit applications for horse-drawn equipment are about to evaluation team with various women in the nucleos, it became
be approved. Some colonists are attending a course offered at clear that the women felt that they had much more food to eat
the Center for Training in Utilization of Animal Traction in and a greater variety in the Oriente than they had in the
Santa Cruz. The topics covered include animal health, black- Interior. They pointed with pride to the piles of vegetables
smithing, harness repair, agricultural economics, and the agro- in their kitchens and to the papaya and banana trees growing
nomics of tillage practices. Many of the farmers with whom the outside.
team talked expressed the desire to buy a truck or a tractor in
the future. They often had short-run plans for the growth of
their farm, as though time were a precious commodity. Such b. Preventive Medicine
capital investments confirm what the settlers said initially:
they are content with their lives in the Oriente and plan to
stay.The health promoters in each nucieo have had training in both curative and preventive medicine. The promoters are to
emphasize to others in the nucleos the importance of washing
one's hands, using latrines, and drinking water only from safe
C- 32 C-33
wells. Unfortunately, according to the nurse in NADEPAS V and III. Macro-Level Impacts
VI, preventive medicine usually takes a backseat to curative medicine. Preventive medicine is not considered to be as interesting as curative medicine, which can save lives. Since A. Economic Impact
the settlers are so much more interested in curative medicine, it is emphasized at the beginning of the training of the village health promoters. After the curative aspect has attracted 1. Direct Primary Production
them to the classes, the preventive aspect is covered as well but with a lower priority.
A greater emphasis on preventive medicine throughout the nucleos, although difficult to enforce, is in order. The latrines that were built during the orientation program are Information on the total agricultural production in the
standing unused. While the short-run harm is minimal, the Chane-Piray area is difficult to find. However, a 1980 CORDElong-run implications are unhealthy. CRUZ report on an agricultural and livestock production project
in the San Pedro area gives some figures which, within limits, can provide an indication of overall production. Most of the c. Immunizations area north of Chane Independencia is made up of small farmers
who cultivate rice and maize. CORDECRUZ counted 1,537 landowners in the area and 461 nonlandowners. The average plot in INC has launched several campaigns to immunize children the area was cultivated with 3 ha of rice, 1 ha of summer corn,
against diseases. The project nurse also provides the service, and 1 ha of winter corn (CORDECRUZ, 1980). Assuming that most
The ratio of children immunized against common diseases was of the 461 nonlandowners would rent land, there would be apthought to be a crude measure of how much impact the health proximately 2,000 small farm producers cultivating a total of
services had had on the community. Some rough figures were ob- 6,000 ha of rice and 4,000 ha of summer and winter corn.
tained from the INC, although the data is far from complete. Among children up to 4 years of age, 90 percent are immunized It is possible to get some rough production estimates by
against polio and measles. Eighty percent of the children 5 to assuming an average barbecho rice yield of 1.9 tons per hectare
14 years old are vaccinated against yellow fever. No other in 1980. Total rice production would have been about 7,647
statistics were available at the time of the evaluation, so tons. Based on the findings of Maxwell and Pozo that farmers
many questions are left unanswered. in the area marketed an average of 65 percent of their rice
crop, about 5,000 tons would have been sold. Assuming an average barbecho maize yield of 1.6 tons per hectare, total producIs Health Care Better Than it Was in the Past? Given the tion would have been about 6,300 tons in 1980. Maxwell and
lack of data, it is difficult to say whether health care is Pozo found that farmers sold 26 percent of their corn crop, or
better than in the Interior. It was very encouraging to the 1,636 tons. Both the rice and corn figures are probably low
evaluation team, however, that the settlers placed an important because machinery input by some producers is not taken into acemphasis on health. The health committee members and local count.
health promoters are drawn from within each nucleo. The settlers perceive the importance of good health facilities and expect such services. They see good health as one of their b. San Julian
"rights" and are demanding their due. Since health involves not only the availability of services but also the use of those services, the settlers in San Julian appear to be on the right CORDECRUZ figures on San Julian production show that 5,886
track. However, improvements in the road to facilitate access tons of unthreshed rice were produced in 1980/81, of which
to health services and the addition of some new facilities are 3,820 were marketed (see Table C-4). CORDECRUZ estimates for
still needed.' An effective health care system in San Julian is 1980/81 corn production show 6,745 tons produced, of which
only in the beginning stages. 4,745 were marketed. While no production figures are available
for 1983, FIDES estimates that 8,666 ha of rice and 4,393 ha of corn were being cultivated.
4 %No 2. Indirect Primary Production
o a 0
0 r- ON U D
C0 a. Timber
The impact on timber production of the AID interventions SW in Chane-Piray and San Julian is difficult to assess. Timber
exploitation was carried out by the lumber companies before the S oooo improvement of the Chane-Piray road or the construction of the
ar -o 0 0 % DHW iBrecha Casarabe in San Julian. It is clear that the improve. M O ..%. ment of the physical infrastructure in both areas has faciliS % H 4 (n k tated lumber exploitation and has reduced related transport
( costs. For example, the lands settlement advisors' report in
rC 1979 indicates that 100 truck loads of mahogany wood left the
0co. San Julian zone in the period between August and October.
. D co In contrast to the early years in San Julian, the settlers
,a e have gained more control over timber exploitation in their
lands and are now paid for the wood taken out. The lumber 4, Q U sales have been a substantial source of capital for the setc tlers, and the lumber season, April to October, is a time of
o increased economic activity in the colonies. However, the most
: 4 0 valuable wood, such as mahogany, has already been almost en_ o tirely exhausted. The value of timber production can therefore
S Vbe expected to decline in the next few years.
V a M C4 M % (tributed significantly to the roads' rapid deterioration. LitV M 0 .. tle contribution has been made by truck owners and operators to
Sthe repair and maintenance of the road network. In the past
o0 M years, more effective dialogue has been taking place among the
N -4 timber companies, the government, and the settlers concerning
Road maintenance, although nothing has yet been translated into
> H Santa Cruz from the Beni via the Brecha Casarabe, the number of
Cattle drivers has decreased in recent years. Most cattle
a transport is now done by trucks or the animals are butchered
and flown directly to the cities, principally La Paz. IsU
0 Z 0
00 r c,. M 4,
E-4 tr ns or is Co done0' by tr c s o he A i a s ar u c e e
0 0 $ $ 4 0
No Vo~ rU V 0Z
3. Indirect Secondary Production farmers. Relatively few nonfarm entrepreneurs have yet established service industries in the zone.
B. Social Impacts
Detailed information on secondary industries in the ChanePiray area is limited. The large, older settlements such as
San Pedro have developed grain-processing facilities, stores, .1. National Impact
restaurants, and other basic services. Much of the agricultural production goes to rice mills and collection centers in Min- The Government of Bolivia has two main reasons for encoureros. Miners also has a sugar mill. aging migration from the Interior to the Oriente. First, the
Chaco War in 1931-1935, when Bolivia lost land to Paraguay,
b. San Julian made clear the importance of integratir the lowlands with the
rest of Bolivia. Second, even after the 1952 revolution and
resultant land reform, many farmers in the highlands did not
Since San Julian is a younger colonization area than have enough land to support their families. Population presChane-Piray, one would suppose that it would have fewer second- sure continued, and the need for an escape valve became apparary industries. Because of the lack of available information ent.
on secondary industries in Chane-Piray, it is difficult to make The Chaco War, while humiliating, did have a few positive
a comparison between the two areas. It is possible, however,
that the relative isolation of and limited access to San Julian results. In order to get supplies and troops into the region,
would cause certain services to have developed faster. The a system of roads had to be developed. Farming was encouraged
following is a partial list of secondary industries observed in in the area to raise food for the soldiers. The agricultural
the San Julian zone: potential of the area became apparent as did the need, mentioned earlier, to integrate this vast untouched region with
the rest of Bolivia. Before 1954, the Oriente had carried on
Secondary Industries in San Julian most of its business with the surrounding countries of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay. The roads built and the industries
-- General stores developed have helped Bolivia as a whole. The agricultural
-- Small restaurants output of the region has risen substantially, and there is ev-- Entertainment ery indication that this trend will continue. The colonization
-- Bicycle repair that ensued in the decades following contributed much to the
-- Chainsaw repair social and economic integration of the lowlands and the high-- Tinsmith lands.
-- Tailor Looking toward the future, the need for an escape valve
-- Soap-maker for the overpopulated Interior can only become greater. The
-- Sugarcane processing major cities already have a higher population than can be sus-- Weaving tained due to the high rate of urbanization and low rate of in-- Hunting (meat, skins) dustrialization. Small plots of land are being divided into
-- Health services (paid independent workers) even smaller ones as the generations pass. Even subsistence
-- Boat handler (river crossing) farming becomes impossible, and the Oriente becomes an attrac-- Charcoal-making tive alternative. The movement of population to the Oriente
-- Brickmaking should be seen in perspective, however. Outmigration to
-- Adobe brickmaking neighboring South American countries has relieved about the
-- Palm leaf cutters, gatherers same amount of pressure in the rural areas. Rural-urban
migration has absorbed by far the largest part of the excess
rural population. The Oriente as an escape valve should be
It is significant that most of these secondary industries viewed as only one alternative to relieving the over-populated
are carried out by colonists who still identify themselves as Interior.
C- 38 C- 39
.2. .local Impact t ime? How will the changes taking place in the Oriente affect
the environment as a whole in the years to come?
The population of Santa Cruz had been fairly isolated from The slash and burn method for clearing fields, adopted by
the rest of Bolivia for many years. The Cambas (the population most of the farmers in the San Julian area, is an appropriate
in the area for generations) had developed precise ways of doing technology. Farmers can clear relatively large amounts of land
things and a unique way of life. The invasion of thousands of (3-4 ha) in a fairly short time. No machines are required and
Kollas (highlanders) was not a welcome sight. The racial tension fertile layer of ash and decomposing roots is left behind. The
between these two groups of people is very evident in Santa Cruz equipment required is minimal (an ax and a machete) and everybo
today. can help in the clearing process, including the women. Given t
limited resources of the settlers in San Julian, it has been th
A large statue of Christ with arms outstretched dominates a only alternative available. The slash and burn process is
central circle in Santa Cruz. The Cambas say that he is pro- actually less harmful in relation to both soil erosion and loss
claiming "no more Kallaslm The two races are learning to co- of soil quality than mechanized clearing, as it leaves the top
exist, however, and the overall flavor of Santa Cruz is turning layer of soil less disturbed.
into a mix of the two cultures. As the two groups learn to work
together, there may be a lessening of the tensions that these The problems come when, 2 or 3 years later, the land becom
groups have felt for centuries. unfertile or is taken over by weeds. The farmer abandons that
Eachecoomi grop i th Deprtmnt f Sata ruzhasland and moves on to repeat the process on the next 3 or 4 ha. Eac eonoicgrop n te epatmnt f ant Cuz asits Since the settler in San Julian receives 50 ha, this can contin
own particular interests which sometimes, but not always, for more than a decade. The secondary growth (barbecha) that
conflict with those of other groups. The new settlers consider takes over the farmer's field is even less desirable for the
the loggers to be a negative economic and social element. In farmer than the trees and bushes originally found in the area.
turn, colonization is generally viewed unfavorably by the lumber in the past few years, the settlers have been encouraged by FID
interests, who complain of the destruction of timber resources by to plant grass and legumes in the fallow areas. This was
slash and burn agricultural methods. Normal timber exploitation, suggested because grass inhibits weed growth while legumes
they state, allows the trees to return. Also, the loggers feel restore depleted nitrogen compounds to the s61l. In addition,
threatened by what they see as an increasing encroachment on these fields can then be used as pasture. How often pastures a
their forest reserves. The frequent tension between colonization actually being planted, however, is difficult to determine. At
and the lumber interests is not solely a conflict of economic the moment, several studies are in progress to test the longinterests. Profound social and cultural differences between the range capabilities of the soil. The initial project design may
highland-born settlers and the businessmen from Santa Cruz also not have provided enough land per farmer to allow for the plot
enter into play. Cattlemen have little use for the small-time rotation necessary to let the land regain its nutrients. There
farmer except to buy up previously cleared land as pasture. City are still many unanswered questions about these tropical soils
businessmen are disdainful of the Kolla farmers, although many and the most appropriate agricultural techniques.
secondary industries have developed as the two groups are
learning to cooperate. Any major population shift requires
adjustment on the part of both the immigrant group and the
existing population, and this process is slowly happening in
C. Environmental Impacts
Any Colonization process, where thousands of people move
into land previously untouched, is going to have environmental
consequences. The long-term impacts are very difficult to
project, and much remains to be seen of even the short-term impacts. Are the farming techniques used appropriate for the environment? Can the soil sustain agriculture for long periods of
C-4 0 D-1
of time? How will the changes taking place in the Oriente af- APPENDIX D
fect the environment as a whole in the years to come?SPCA ELOMINTSUS
The slash and burn method for clearing fields, adopted by most of the farmers in the San Julian area, is an appropriate technology. Farmers can clear relatively large amounts of land I. -SUSTAINABILITY
(3-4 ha) in a fairly short time. No machines are required and a fertile layer of ash and decomposing roots is left behind. The equipment required is minimal (an ax and a machete) and A. Physical Infrastructure
everybody can help in the clearing process, including the women. Given the limited resources of the settlers in San Julian, it has been the only alternative available. The slash Two important types of physical infrastructure, roads and
and burn process is actually less harmful in relation to both wells, must be maintained if the gains achieved by the project
soil erosion and loss of soil quality than mechanized clearing, are to be sustained.
as i levesthetop aye ofsoi les ditured.The settlers are currently doing a reasonably good job of
The problems come when, 2 or 3 years later, the land maintaining their own wells and pu ~s, having been taught the
becomes unfertile or is taken over by weed:;. The farmer aban- appropriate procedures during the rientation program. Occadons that land and moves on to repeat the process on the next 3 sionally it is necessary to seek outside repair assistance,
or 4 ha. Since the settler in San Julian receives 50 ha, this which can be difficult. FIDES is encouraging the establishment
can continue for more than a decade. The secondary growth of a private repair service within the colonization zone
(barbecho) that takes over the farmer's field is even less de- (through provision of credit and modest organizational assistsirable for the farmer than the trees and bushes originally ance) to deal with this problem as well as provide other repair
found in the area. in the past few years, the settlers have services. There have also been some delays in repairs due to
been encouraged by FIDES to plant grass and legumes in the fal- settler dependence on the National Institute of Colonization
low areas. This was suggested because grass inhibits weed (INC) for supply of parts. This arrangement is neither necesgrowth while legumes restore depleted nitrogen compounds to the sary nor desirable.
soil. In addition, these fields can then be used as pasture. How of ten pastures are actually being planted, however, is dif- A more serious problem is the tendency of wells in the
ficult to determine. At the moment, several studies are in more heavily populated nucleos to be overused, with the result
progress to test the long-range capabilities of the soil. The that water pressure becomes low during the dry season. This
initial project design may not have provided enough land per causes the sides of the well below the tubing to crumble and
farmer to allow for the plot rotation necessary to let the land the water to become heavily silted. The best answer to this is
regain its nutrients. There are still many unanswered ques- more wells. At present, the settlers are dependent on the INC
tions about these tropical soils and the most appropriate agri- for new wells, but the Foundation for Integral Development
cultural techniques. (FIDES) has considered the possibility of developing settler
capacity to perform, or at least to oversee, well-drilling operations. This could be done cooperatively or through individual enterprise. Given the uncertain nature of INC services, it would seem to be desirable to develop such a system in any subsequent phase of the project.
Roads present still a thornier problem. The prospects for effective government maintenance are not encouraging. Since roads are a major item in holding onto and advancing the gains made by the settlers, failure of maintenance could have a very negative effect on sustainability. Settlers have shown an ability and willingness to do considerable hand labor on roads. In one area, 300 settlers from 14 nucieos worked for over two weeks to raise a 100-meter long stretch of road above flood level. This sort of effort will not solve the whole problem, however. Another possibility would be to give the settlers
D- 2 D- 3
power to charge tolls for road use or require in-kind contributions, e.g., loads of gravel from logging trucks which come C. -Environmental Impacts
into the zone empty. Developing settler capacity to manage a
system combining self-help with contract repair and maintenance
seems within the realm of possibility. Though it would be a Topography and soil composition in the San Julian area d
major undertaking, the alternatives seem even less promising. not appear to be the type for which loss of cover will lead t
serious erosion or irreversible damage to the soil structure.
However, top soils are thin, and a complex and delicate ecolo
B. Agricultural Production and Productivity ical system is being displaced. Experience with this environ
ment is not sufficient to guarantee that economically serious
damage will not occur.
Sustaining or increasing agricultural production and productivity will require several elements: appropriate vanie- FIDES has been sensitive to environmental hazards in its
ties, maintenance of land productivity, credit, availability of response to the "barbecho risis and to the problem of decli
necessary inputs, transport, and markets. The first of these ing fertility of soils undir cul ti vation. Nevertheless, it i
will be discussed here. The rest, which have implications important that the consequences of the far-reaching environbeyond agriculture, are discussed in subsequent sections. mental changes introduced by the project be monitored for a
number of years to come.
Farmer ability to maintain or increase overall production
and productivity in a changing market will depend on the availability of appropriate, tested varieties arnd technology and the D. Credit and Inputs
existence of a system for transferring information to the farmer. A considerable store of suitable varieties and technologies relating to perennials is available in Brazil and other Credit and the supply of inputs for agriculture and recountries. These are being studied and tested for local adapt- lated productive activities are currently managed in the San
ability by the Center for the Investigation of Tropical Agri- Julian zone through a system of cooperatives. There are two
culture (CIAT) and by FIDES in its nursery. There is reason- closely related threats to the sustainability of the cooperaable ground for expecting these efforts to continue. The FIDES tive credit programs, both relating to inflation. Although t
nursery should be sustainable from sales, though perhaps not cooperatives charge 36 percent interest, this is often not
immediately, and CIAT funding sources for study of alternative enough to cover inflation as well as management expenses and
farm systems seem reliable for the foreseeable future. Im- reasonable profit. The cooperatives are therefore being deca
proved seeds for annual crops are available through the AID- italized, even where they do not provide credit, because thei
funded seed certification program, prices are not high enough to cover replacement costs. The
problem is aggravated by delays in purchasing replacement
Extension presents a more complicated issue. FIDES cur- goods. Cooperative members so far have resisted paying a hig
rently has am excellent extension program, but it is not clear er interest rate, so the general cooperative is planning an
how it will survive the end of FIDES's involvement in the proj- education campaign. one alternative being considered is inect, whenever that occurs. The Government of Bolivia (GOB) kind loans providing goods on credit (instead of cash) and
cannot be depended on to pick up the extension system intact or stating repayment in goods (e.g., kilograms of corn, or the
replace it with services of satisfactory quality. FIDES has an cash equivalent at the time of repayment).
ingenious, though admittedly experimental, idea for financing
the continued services. They propose to introduce contracts
for the provision of credit, inputs, and technical advice re- E. Marketing
lated to specific new crop systems in exchange for a modest
payment plus a percentage of the profit from the harvest.
Extensionists for this program would be carefully selected. If the settlers are to improve on their gains or, indeed
The credit element would act as an initial inducement for farm- maintain them, they will need to market their crops effective
ers to give it a try. This plan seems worth attempting as an ly. There are two aspects to this: (1) transporting their
alternative to reliance upon government programs. goods to market, which will be discussed in the next section,
and (2) obtaining a fair price. Some prices, e.g., of sugarcane, are fixed by the government and therefore depend on the
settlers' ability to influence government decision-making rat
er than on marketing skills.
D- 4 D- 5
As indicated earlier, because individual marketing is certain community labor obligations. On several occasions
inefficient in the colonization zone, the San Julian coopera- settlers have additionally compensated their health promoters
tives began this year to introduce a marketing operation. (especially for time spent in training) by working their land
While it is too soon to say how well this will function, it can for them. However, once again it is too soon to say whether
be said that it is vital to the sustainability of development the system will be sustainable, and more technical assistance,
in San Julian. If the settlers cannot obtain reasonable prices including further training for the promoters, will probably be
for their produce, their income and production levels will ncsay
remain low and many may leave the zone. Further technical ncsay
assistance is clearly needed.
H. Response Capability
Most projects define their goals in terms of increased
Teeare two tasotwell-being of their beneficiaries without addressing the quesThretanpotproblems: (1) the condition of tion of the sustainability of such changes. Where suchaink-s
the roads, and (2) the availability of transport at reasonable provements are dependent on exogenous factors suchasmre,
prices. The two are obviously related. Where roads are poor, government pricing plcera odtos nltoo
tasotis less available and prices necessarily higher. As weather conditions they are fragile indeed, Steady availabili
indicated earlier, road construction and maintenance is a "sine ty of outside services to respond to such changes can rarely,
qua non" for the continued success of the settlement. If the if ever, be relied on.
roads are not improved and maintained, marketing opportunities cpbilty to act on new threats
will be restricted and settler profits on sales reduced. Needed, therefore, is acaa y
School teachers and extensionists will be harder to obtain, to their well-being, i.e., a response capability. If the marDifficulties of settlers in reaching services (e.g., health ket for one or more crops goes bad, for instance, settlers may
care, machinery repair, and government offices) and in obtain- need to seek out and even pay for extension services. This
ing supplies will continue to impede growth. The medical ser- requires confidence that alternatives are available, confidenc
vice problem is a particularly serious one. When flooded roads to strike out on new and unfamiliar paths, judgment as to what
prevent timely evacuation of the sick or injured, they often type of services are likely to be effective, and technical
die. All of these problems not only affect the quality of life ability to apply any new technology thus identified.
in the colonization zone, but likewise the willingness of settlers to stay.FIE artanuuuldgefseethdvlomt
Experience suggests thteternu~wl oeinto the of a response capability among the settlers. They have left a
zonetrpeeuswllmv many decisions as possible to settlers themselves, and have
zoein sufficient numbers to assure adequate and reasonably structured technical assistance activities so as to present
priced transport if the roads can be maintained in reasonably challenges. Settlers have made decisions about distribution c
good shape. land parcels, selection of appropriate farming systems, coinnun
ity development institutions, and vehicles for well and road
G. Health maintenance.
It is too soon to say whether the settlers' response
Whether the settlers will be able to maintain ad dvnecapability has developed to a point where they can sustain or
health gains ovrteln u eed nter ality an e advance the gains achieved so far, although their remarkable
willingness to pay for their own health srie, Otderecovery from the major flood earlier this year bodes well.
sources cantb one nt otnesrie.OtieAlthough the flood wiped out all food supplies, inundated
cantIeconedoEtSoniu to provide subsidies, houses, and disrupted planting, the settlers cleaned up and gc
FEShas taken a promising approach to making primary health right back into production. As a result, food supplies were
care available to the colonists through self-financing. Health ample just four months later when the evaluation team paid it
promoters are selected from the ranks of the settlers them- visit.
selves, trained, and provided with an initial stock of medicines. Promoters are not salaried under the FIDES system.
Rather, they mark up the cost of drugs to provide for both
replenishment and a small profit, and they also are freed of
II. REPLICABILITY main road are developing as urban centers, some being as important commercially as the official central nucleos, evidence is
that the planned centers are all evolving as meaningful busiIt can readily be seen that many of the successful or ness centers. The cooperative, operating through central
promising features of this project are not culture or environ- stores in such central nucleus, seems to be of an appropriate
ment specific. The settlement pattern employed, the means of size for management. The Federation of Colonists uses the
identifying settlers, the orientation process, the use of a official nine-nucleo clusters as political units, and they
locally based private voluntary organization for implementa- appear to have legitimacy in the minds of settlers. It is
tion, and the duration of project inputs (the 1974 loan was impossible to distinguish cause from effect, though, because
followed by the 1979 grant) are all characteristics that lend from the beginning of the orientation program these nucleos
themselves to replication in other settings, have taken on central functions.
A. Settlement Pattern B. identification of Settlers
The nucleo settlement pattern pioneered in San Julian is The established rules for registration and entry as a San
credited with accelerating the process of community develop- Julian settler state that prospective settlers must present
ment; By providing for the physical proximity of settler themselves and register in the national office in La Paz or one
households, social and economic interaction was made possible of the regional offices in Tarija, Cochabamba, Santa Cruz,
from the beginning, despite transportation difficulties. The Montero, or in San Julian.
clustering of nucleos to enable development of an "urban" center for every set of nine nucleos is intended to rationalize Resettlement rules have been modified for the San Julian
location of social and economic services, project-in two ways. First, settlement has to be in groups of
40 families (or as close as possible to that number), and all
The former pattern in Bolivia, the "piano-key," in which settlers should enter their nucleo and begin the orientation
parcels were allotted to settlers in contiguous rectangular program in these 40-household groups. The decision to emphalots, each with 250 meters of road frontage, was inefficient size selections of these kinds of groups was based on a theory
and ineffective. With the settlers strung along over such that orientation and formation of viable communities would thus
great distances, service delivery and community formation were be enhanced.
Second, groups were favored over individuals, particularly
The impact of the nucleo pattern is twofold. In the first groups with preexisting social organization and with social
months or years of settlement, there is built-in physical prox- ties to settlers already established in San Julian. The presimity to provide material support. For some, the support pro- ent communities include those in which most settlers are from
vides a heightened sense of security. Social interchange the same basic area of origin and those in which settlers are
opportunities are enhanced. Over the longer run, the greater heterogeneous as to area of origin but have lived together in
access to water and services (e.g., schools, medical posts, and communities in the lowland prior to moving to San Julian.
agricultural extension) enables many efficiencies in development. Once the settlers were selected, the process of assigning
them to a nucleo was usually also the product of conscious
One major difficulty with the nucleo pattern is that the decisions. Two major judgmental factors were at work in placemajority of each farmer's land lies at the greatest distance ment decisions. First, the amount and kind of resources, capifrom the center of the community, and thus to existing roads. tal, and experience of the group affected where they would be
Perimeter roads around nucleus, and paths into fields which are placed. This was important because the more favored groups
shared by several settlers, are two possible solutions. Over- were usually located in less favorable places and vice versa.
all, though, the transport problem did not outweigh the posi- In the case of a group of more experienced farmers who moved to
tive impact of the nucleo settlement pattern. San Julian along with a group of their former employees, the
employers were placed in a lateral nucleo and the former emThe provision for central nucleos has also had a positive ployees in a nucleo on the maim access road. The second judgimpact. Though it is true that most nucleos on San Julian's mental factor related to the placement of groups so as to avoid
regional enclaves of groups from the same areas of origin.
This was based on experience in other northern Santa Cruz set- orientation program established an appropriate set of activitlements where this was judged to be detrimental. Apparently, ties adapted to the changed needs of settlers who were already
homogeneity was viewed as positive at the intra-nucleo level established and ready to diversify and increase production and
and negative at the inter-nucleo level, productivity.
The impact of identification and location policy is difficult to delineate. The evaluation team is of the opinion that D. Use of Private Voluntary Organizations
the requirement that groups settle together in sufficient numbers to provide needed labor and to build social support networks is valid. We also believe that the selection of groups The use of private voluntary organizations (PVO) rather
with preexisting relations must have accelerated community than host-government personnel in the field and at the adminis
establishment. It is less apparent that there is a difference trative level poses some venerable questions not dissimilar to
in quality and duration of community formation processes be- those posed by the Servicios Cooperativos which implemented
tween groups homogeneous as to areas of origin and those which AID's Latin America programs up to the mid-1960s. The Serviare heterogeneous but with some experience in living and work- cios were joint AID-host government services established to
ing together. We have no evidence about the impact of location administer AID programs. They were staffed by select personne
policy and would not presume to hypothesize, given the complex- paid at higher than average salaries and free from normal govity of the subject. ernment lines of authority, appointment, and promotion processes. Even supplies, equipment, support services, and operat
ing funds for Servicios were generally superior to what was
C. Orientation available to regular host government personnel.
Though the servicios were efficient in their implementaThe detailed elements of both programs have been discussed tion of AID programs, they had several drawbacks. First, they
previously. Their impact has generally been to compress the aroused jealousy and animosity on the part of other host govtime needed for the pioneer period, i.e., the time of estab- ernment officials, which in addition to being a problem in
fishing social support and economic production in order to itself, interfered with necessary support from the government.
enable subsequent consolidation of gains and later long-term Second, when projects were implemented through the servicios,
settlement growth. The investment in sustaining resource regular government agencies failed to grow in their capacity t
yields, the development of marketing and product processing administer projects, and the potential benefit of their more
infrastructure and input services, and the stabilization of the effective participation in non-AID projects was lost. A repopulation and its social organizations have all been the ob- lated problem was that opportunities were lost to prepare host
ject of consolidation work. government agencies to carry on development programs after the
termination of external assistance.
The orientation program was a phase of guided settlement
which aided settlers in the first difficult period of confront- The original concept was that servicio personnel would be
ing all the challenges involved in organizing themselves and integrated into the regular government service. However, this
utilizing the resources available to them. The practical edu- did not work out very well due to jealousies, differences in
cation and training offered was, in our judgment, crucial to pay scales, and the greater difficulties of operating within
the foundation of the nucleos in San Julian. The agricultural the government.
and other technical information transferred and the material
support supplied were crucial in assisting the new settlers in The same drawbacks apply to use of PVOs as implementing
beginning production and building shelters. The social promo- agents, particularly where they hire their own field personnel
tion and the reliance on participatory, democratic decision- as in the case of FIDES extensionists. On the other hand, the
making provided firm bases for cooperative and political organ- problems which led to the creation of the servicios still exis
izations, which presently appear strong and viable. The food and still undermine implementation of AID and other projects.
subsidy, in our opinion, was justified as it lowered human
costs and kept the settlers in good physical condition for the Generally, it is our opinion that the drawbacks of sepahard work they had to undertake. The inclusion of activities rate project administration should not deter us from employing
for women was important in order to provide them with useful it, though we would be selective about where it is employed.
roles in an overwhelmingly new and different situation. The There is an especially good case for its use in rural development where a particularly flexible response and unusually
committed field personnel are required. The use of PVOs, which APPENDIX E
came to the fore after the era of the Servicios, provides for many of the benefits of independent project administration LESSONS LEARNED
without necessitating development of new institutions.
E. Duration of Project Inputs
Most of the activities assessed in this evaluation of
The use of follow-on projects to develop a sustainable resettlement efforts in Chane-Piray and San Julian are common
problem-solving capability on the part of small farmers can to integrated rural development (IRD) programs worldwide. As
result in a disproportionate share of scarce resources being such, it is appropriate that many of the lessons learned shar
allocated to a particular group of farmers at the expense of an IRD focus.
others who are equally needy. On the other hand, without follow-through, the gains made by the first group may be lost. At the same time, however, some of the specific program
They may thus be no better off after a few years than they were activities are unique to resettlement--not necessarily an IRD
originally, phenomenon. People are being moved from one part of Bolivia
another, from communities established for hundreds of years t The evaluation team concludes that it is better to carry lands never before occupied by people, and expected to create
one group of beneficiaries to the point of a clearly sustain- viable agricultural economy almost overnight. This aspect of
able ability to improve their conditions than to try to provide the program goes well beyond classic integrated rural develop
a little for all. This at least broadens the economic base, ment, and merits special attention.
including the tax base, for further development, creates confidence in the possibility of effective response to generally Given the dual nature of activities reviewed by the impa
intractable rural problems, diminishes the possibility and the evaluation team, a breakout of lessons learned into two sepaneed for future government assistance to the beneficiaries, and rate categories is appropriate. The following discussion,
could more effectively produce the much sought after but elu- therefore, looks first at lessons with general integrated rur
sive demonstration effect, inspiring emulation by other farm- development implications and second at lessons unique to rese
The argument against this approach would be that almost Note that comparisons between Chane-Piray and San Julian
any project permanently improves the condition of farmers, are made only with respect to resettlement activities. This
increases problem-solving ability and confidence, and has a because no IRD program was ever implemented in Chane-Piray.
demonstration effect. The evaluation team is not so sure of Valuable insights can be gained from this contrast of resettl
that. It would seem to us at least desirable to further eval- ment activities, however.
,jate and perhaps experiment with the follow-on approach.
II. INTEGRATED RURAL DEVELOPMENT LESSONS
In the following discussion of lessons one might draw fr
San Julian's experience with IRD, no effort is made to establish a hierarchical or chronological sequence. Rather, what listed is a series of characteristics considered to be desirable in IRD implementing agencies, personnel, or the programs themselves.
just finishing the orientation program when activities under
A. C ntin ity of C mmit entthe consolidation program were introduced.
". ..familiar people with 'goodwill" in the B. Program Adaptability
community were there to explain and assist."
Long-term continuity of program activities, personnel, and.renaio prsnl.,eredfm
implementing agencies is critical to the effectiveness of IRD the sretts ofensoappln such ler essfons
programs. Only with an organizational commitment of 5 to 10th se lrofnapyig uc lsos
years' duration can lasting social and economic impacts be i usqetporm.
reasonably expected. Ability to adapt individual elements Of an IRD program is
An iporantaspct o suh cntiuityis he eedforcritical to long-term success. Because IRD tends to be ,6omprean importante pasec of assach c ont u i telnee fahor hensive in scope, it is almost certain that changes affecting
Eahccessivethavose onssstancage to occur innti e pfsion program elements will occur. Demographic, social, economic,
Econ, o rot involvtes conmesant be change. As ameteses Political, and environmental developments can have a major
cgrow focr exmpe the fmut es probites cfhane Aseespen effect on the needs of program participants--on their ability
cages ccurg, sod toy must thactviie p o thedeelpmn to function successfully. The implementing agent in an IRD
program must have the capacity to assess those changes and
This is not to suggest that there should be no consistent their probable impacts, and-to adjust program activities and
program, but rather that the need for a long-tern commitment to emphases accordingly.
logical and timely implementation must be recognized. Each In the San Julian IRD program such adaptability has been
phase has its time, and none occurs in isolation. There is no present from the inception. The orientation program ne
substitute for continuity of project personnel to ensure that settlers, perhaps the most important and sucsflporame
the transition from one phase to the next is accomplished in an elmnwauotnoulcdutecncn e fu andlegh.
ordely ad tmelyfashon.Lessons learned from earlier sessions, changing funding levels, In te Sn Jlia resttlmen ara, ontiuit ofperon-ecological conditions in the nucleos, varying farmer experience
nel and activities has been an important aid to broad, fairlyle ls an th dgreo hmgniyadqu iyofoc l
even development with a minimum of settler failures. From the relations among each community's settlers--all these aspects
outset of the program the key players have remained on the job. influenced the final plan for a new settlement's orientation
As te srvies rovdedin he oienatin pasegav wa program. What night have been a rigid, highly structured operAsw tsevicies proded ihte n oination phase aveay teol ation was, in fact, the contrary. Each orientation was taiwith "goodwill" in the community were there to explain and lrdt h pcfcneso h niiulnce n t
assist. There was a sense of growth and change, but never one residents. While the settlers learned from the collective
of aandnmet. or xamleat te ed o eah ncle's ri-wisdom and experience of the orientation staff, the orientation oftabanonment.clogremple, wat hel eund of hech setleson personnel likewise learned from the settlers, often applying
were given "certificates of settlement," project personnel were sc esn nsbeun rgas
transferred to new functions elsewhere in San Julian, and ori-Ths pitofapablywspr en
entation properties (buildings) were transferred to the commun- Ti sprto adtbltyws rentthroughout the IRD
program. A good example is seen in the area of health care.
ity. At the time the IRD program was designed, it was anticipated
Unfortunately, in the nucleus settled prior to AID's 1978 that an unrelated AID project for rural health delivery would
consolidation project, too long a gap existed between the first serve the San Julian area. Because of this expectation, no
orientation program and the beginning of the follow-up support provisions were made for health services under the IRD program.
activities. The result was a period of instability and slowedUnotael, he xpcdbnfis rmAI' rul
growth. This was noted in a 1978 evaluation report, and wasUnot aelhe xpc dbnfisrmAI'ru l
often repeated to members of this evaluation team by settlers health delivery project did not materialize. FIDES knew that
and FIDES staff. In fact, the FIDES advisor felt that the sm ido elhsrie a rtcl ialwe
greatest interest and success in initiating work under the pressed by the settlers themselves, FIDES took action. Several
consolidation program was experienced in nucleos which were auxiliary nurses were employed as health extensionists, health
E- 4 E- 5
committees formed during the orientation programs were reacti- success--at improvement in the lives of the farm families them
vated (many had never stopped functioning), training was pro- selves. Whatever it takes to ensure settler success, that is
vided for health promoters in each nucleo, and consumer cooper- what FIDES staff has tried to deliver.
atives were encouraged to establish pharmacies in the nucleo.
All this was done by FIDES at a very low cost, but with high
settler participation. it worked because the need was per- D. Close Program Monitoring
ceived by all and the adaptation was recognized as a commonsens adustentto chngig raliy. ... it is not possible to judge the success
of one's actions without continual collecC. Motivation to f..dt.
Close program monitoring through systematic collection an
"It is that enthusiasm and willingness to analysis of information is also important in IRD programs.
take risks that comes with close identifi- Because of the comprehensiveness of activities, it is not poscation with ... program goals.0 sible. to judge the success of one's actions without continual
collection of both qualitative and quantitative data. Useful
in IRD programs a highly motivated implementing agent is data may be directly related to project activities (e.g., hecessential because the task is so difficult and so ambiguous. tares planted) or they may be indirectly related (e.g., growth
If the job is to build a road, dig a well, or revise school of secondary industries). The important thing is that the data
books, it is easy to define success and failure. The imple- have something to do with overall perceptions of success.
menting agent in such circumstances needs little motivation
beyond the very normal desire either to succeed or to avoid when collected, such data must be analyzed and discussed
failure. by program managers. The implications of such data for future
program direction must be ascertained, and decisions regarding
What happens, however, when there is no clear relationship program adaptations should be made accordingly.
between a program's specific activities and overall success or
failure? How do you keep an implementing agent working hard Throughout the life of the San Julian IRD program, FIDES
when he or she really cannot be held accountable? It is impos- has given strong emphasis to collection and analysis of inforsible to ensure implementing agent motivation in an IRD context nation--to learning from its experience. The tremendous adapbecause the linkages between individual activities and overall tability evidenced in the San Julian program bears witness to
success are so tenuous. An implementing agent might do a this. Much of the success noted by the evaluation team is a
firstm-rate job of carrying out discrete program elements de- result of FIDES's policy of close program monitoring.
tailed in the original design, yet fail to adapt to some change
in circumstances and thus doom overall succeeds. In such a
case, the implementation night be both above reproach and, at E. Participation
the same time, grossly negligent.
The motivation needed in IRD is thus hard to define. It *The program should be of, by, and for the
is that enthusiasm and willingness to take risks that comes beneficiary."with close identification with overall program goals. It is
that conviction of the importance of one's work that enables Participation of target beneficiaries in program design,
one to change program elements in mid-stream, knowing that one implementation, monitoring, evaluation, and modification is a
will not be thanked for doing so, but will surely be blamed if very useful process in IRD programs. As changes occur in the
the choice proves to be wrong, overall program environment, whether from program impacts
(e.g., better yielding rice varieties), or as a result of exogIn the San Julian lED program, AID has been blessed with a enous forces (e.g., price policies or weather), the needs of
highly motivated implementing agent. FIDES staff, from the top the beneficiary group likewise change. No one is better able
down, closely identify with the plight of the settlers and to take note of these changes and their effects than the benetheir families. They are not motivated toward success at de- ficiary.
livening individual program components, but rather at overall
E- 6 IE- 7
The best IRD program is one in which the target benefi- The principal difference between a standard, singleciary is really an active participant in the entire process. objective project and IRD is scope. In a single-objective
The program should be of, by, and for the beneficiary. If project one might assess the plight of would-be farmers in the
possible, the beneficiaries, or someone they can identify as Bolivian Oriente and opt to develop a high-yielding rice vanitheir agent, should be involved from the very inception of the ety appropriate to local conditions, or to build an access
program, thus creating identification with program activities road. The other elements necessary to development of successand goals. ful farms would be assumed to be achievable without assistance
In IRD programs, on the other hand, the project planner endeav
In San Julian, the implementing agent, FIDES, did an out- ors to identify all potential constraints to development and
standing job of eliminating any distance between itself and the deal with them to the extent resources permit.
target beneficiary population. Indeed, during the time that
the evaluation team spent on-site, it was often difficult to It is clear from the San Julian experience that a wellsee any distinction. The transition from the Project Manager designed IRD program must determine priorities for investing
to FIDES directors to base camp staff to salaried extensionists its scarce financial and technical resources, but at the same
to cooperative employees, health promoters, model farmers, and time it cannot ignore nonprogram areas. From the outset, FIDE
federation representatives occurred so gradually, with so much focused its efforts in San Julian on settler orientation, whic
overlap, that one got the distinct impression that all consid- enabled them to lay a framework for social organization, proered themselves to be part of the same process. There is no mote lowland construction technology, and teach farming tech"us and then" in the San Julian IRD program, and the result is niques. During orientation, FIDES also encouraged development
an extraordinarily participatory effort. of cooperatives, health committees, home economics programs,
and other low-cost programs with prospects for long-term conti
Examples of such participation range from the work of muity. Using this approach meant that although the formal
structured groups such as nucleo and NADEPA committees to un- orientation program for each nucleo lasted only several months
structured meetings with individual settlers. It cam likewise its impacts continued. FIDES was thus able to maintain inflube seen in the growth of strong and democratic settler organi- ence at a very low cost by advising settler committees, broker
zations with broader economic (San Julian Multi-Purpose Coop- ing settler requests for government services, etc.
erative) and political (Special Federation of San Julian Colonists) objectives. The farmers in the San Julian settlement The comprehensive approach FIDES developed during orienta
area clearly do not view themselves as passive beneficiaries of tion carried over into subsequent stages of the IRD program.
a government-sponsored program. Rather they see themselves as Its primary focus and investment have been in discrete outputs
part of an important national process, the settlement of the such as farm systems development (through introduction of peOriente, in which they are the key players around whom the rennials, improved pastures, and animal traction), training fo
program evolves and from whom it must take its direction, cooperative administrators, and experiments with agricultural
credit. At the same time, however, FIDES's staff has recogIRD programs are difficult to accomplish in the best of nized that there are many important constraints to success
circumstances. In an environment where there is a distance beyond the scope of the IRD program and has labored to assist
between implementing agent and target beneficiaries there are in these areas by playing the role of broker. Examples includ
certain to be misunderstandings, with resultant misdirected or work to facilitate involvement of the Center for Tropical Agri
inappropriately utilized resources. For IRD programs to have cultural Research (CIAT) and the Regional Development Corporareasonable prospects of success, all players must be partici- tion for Santa Cruz (CORDECRUZ) in agricultural production
pants, and responsibility for planning and execution must be experiments, the Heifer Project International in dairy cattle
shared in accordance with each party's ability to contribute, promotion, the Mennonite Central Committee in promotion of
animal traction, and CORDECRUZ and the Inter-American Development Bank (1DB) in improvement of the road system.
F. Comprehensiveness of Scope
Acceptance of responsibility is the key. In IRD programs
the project planners/implementers cannot have tunnel vision.
"Acceptance of responsibility is the key. They must take into cognizance all of the elements necessary t
In IRD programs, the project planners! ultimate goal achievement, invest the bulk of money and time i
implementers cannot have tunnel vision," resolving the highest priority activities within their resourc
capability, and then stand ready to assist in resolution of
other constraints wherever possible.
G Proximity because in most lesser developed countries, reliance on indefinite access to subsidized credit, agricultural extension, and
road maintenance is risky. Financial resources are generally
*If one wants to understand the need for a scarce, and program continuity is the exception. If the beneworkable transportation system, there is no ficiaries of an IRD program wish to consolidate their gains
substitute for being at the far end of a they must labor from the outset to fill the void themselves
dirt road when the rainy season begins." when critical government services dwindle.
Proximity of implementing agency personnel to program In the San Julian IRD program, the implementing agency was
participants can be a tremendous aid to successful IRD pro- quick to recognize the need to create independence from extergrams. It enables regular contact and development of easy nal assistance. A major emphasis during its settler orientadialogue on a personal level. Likewise it increases the like- tion program was organization to solve problems through selflihood that program personnel will be able to see the benefi- help. Settler groups were consulted on decisions ranging from
ciaries' problems first hand, and thus better understand their what to serve in the community kitchens to issues regarding
perspective. If one wants to understand the need for a work- land clearing, health promotion, and cooperative development.
able transportation system, there is no substitute for being at Literally from the first day in the field, the settlers themthe far end of a dirt road when the rainy season begins. If selves were making the decisions necessary for survival over
one cannot appreciate the need for better health care, the best the short runt and in the process laying the groundwork for
way to learn is to become sick or be injured in an area where long-run success.
it is lacking. It is no accident that settlers in San Julian have organIn San Julian, FIDES's personnel policies have been acute- ized to build schools and community centers in every nucleo
ly sensitive to the need for proximity between implementing without benefit of outside funds. Nor is it a coincidence that
agency staff and program participants. The most senior advi- San Julian settlers enjoy a self-financing system of health
sors are familiar figures to the settlers. Although extension- promoters (farmers who provide health services in return for
ists theoretically operate from base camp areas (within the help from other settlers with their farm work), cooperatives to
settlement zone, but not within any community), in reality most aid in group buying and marketing, and political federations to
spend half or more of their time traveling to and from the press for their fair share of government services. The setvarious communities. Because of the poor quality of transport tlers of San Julian are largely Quechua and Aymara Indians who
within the zone, more often than not this has meant staying the have a long tradition of social organization, and, from the
night under the same primitive conditions experienced by set- outset, FIDES worked to nurture this inherent ability until it
tlers. blossomed as never before.
Because of the proximity of its personnel to the San Juli- When the recent floods devastated entire communities in
an settlers, FIDES has always had intimate knowledge of the San Julian and government assistance was inadequate to prevent
settlers' problems and needs. In an area such as San Julian, tragedy, the communities that were less affected organized to
where physical comforts are few, the price of such proximity is provide relief to hard-hit communities. When the roads were
high. With all the attendant difficulties in IRD, however, it rendered impassable, and government failed to provide maintemay well be necessary to success. nance, the settlers organized to repair the worst sections
H. Self-Help The ability to organize to solve one's own problems is
critical in IRD because the intensity of government investment
in such programs generally cannot be sustained over time. For
"...beneficiaries ... must labor from the this reason program emphasis on organizational development is
outset to fill the void themselves when viewed as essential to long-term success.
critical government services dwindle.*
Long-term success of an IRD program is likely to be contingent on the ability of the participant community to eventually stand on its own feet, without outside support. This is
Immediately thereafter, farmers are urged to plant a hec
tare or so in various food crops for their own consumption-normally perennial fruit trees and annual vegetables. With
"There is minimal dependence upon outsiders this base, farmers need never be driven from their land due to
and maximum insurance against failure." failure of the commercial crop, inability to get it to market,
or erosion of the market price.
Closely related to self-help, yet sufficiently distinct to
merit separate discussion, is the importance of avoiding de- The next step in the FIDES model is development of pasture
pendency on external sources to finance long-term farm develop- on land no longer suitable for annual crops. After pasture is
established comes purchase of livestock. In San Julian, livement costs. stock is better than cash because it is inflation proof as wel
A critical aspect of many IRD programs is credit for agri- as highly liquid. Investment in livestock provides still anocultural development--generally subsidized credit. Where such their layer of protection against adversity.
credit is employed for activities which only occur once, after
which there is no need for subsidy, it might be justified in The final step in the FIDES self-capitalization farm detheory. Beyond such special cases, however, subsidized credit velopment model is conversion to animal traction. With pastur
raises serious questions as to long-term economic viability of established, investment in an animal (and plow) is not beyond
the means of a small farmer. The bulk of maintenance (animal
care and plow repair) can be done within the nucleo, usually i
In San Julian the AID contractor took a hard line, arguing exchange for labor.
that no subsidized credit is healthy, that it creates misallocation of resources while encouraging dependency. After care- The result of following the FIDES self-capitalization
ful review of developments and the way FIDES worked to develop model is a safe and relatively sure (albeit slow) way to devel
nonsubsidy solutions, the evaluation team is persuaded that the opment of a stable family farm business. There is minimal
dependence on outsiders and maximum insurance against failure.
In the opinion of the evaluation team, the FIDES self-capitali
The FIDES model might be characterized as self-capitaliza- zation model merits close scrutiny by advocates of IRD as a
tion. Although the approach was taken with everything from low-cost, low-risk alternative to some of the flashier program
consumer cooperatives to the system of health promoters, it is that have been promoted in recent years.
best evidenced in the prevailing model for farm development.
San Julian farmers are virtually all eager to clear their J. Flexibility of Implementing Organizations
land with bulldozers; buy tractors for planting, weeding, and
harvesting; and grow one or two cash crops. They are aware
that the relatively more prosperous Mennonite settlers in the 'It Is very difficult for a politically
area have done so, albeit primarily with cash, and they would based agency whose policies and budget
like to follow suit. If they could arrange highly subsidized emanate from a far-away capital city to
credit (actually at negative interest rates, given Bolivian react to local circumstances."
inflation), as has been made available to some farmers in the
Chane-Piray area, many would do so. In all probability, given Because of the broad scope of IRD programs, the realitiesthe poor quality of the San Julian road and the instability of with which they deal and the needs of program participants are
prices in Bolivia, the result would be the same: high rates of likely to be in a constant state of flux. This requires that
loan default and resultant farm turnover. IRD programs be able to adapt to circumstances, to shift empha
ses, even directions, in mid-course. In Section II.B above,
In the face of this natural inclination of settlers to Program Adaptability, this phenomenon is briefly reviewed.
gamble on instant success with their farms, FIDES has counseled a more conservative approach. Farmers have been urged first to From an institutional perspective, this need for program
ensure subsistence. The first step in this process is to clear adaptability has serious implications. The problem, it seems,
several hectares and plant a food crop for sale, generally rice is that not all institutions are equally able to make midprogram adjustments, to know when an adaptation is appropriate
or corn. and to make it in a timely fashion.
E-1 2 E-13
in San Julian there are several different types of enti- background. As such, they are likely to put a premium on reties working to aid the development process. A brief look at search skills and to favor good researchers with better career
them may help to illustrate the point. opportunities. Long-term posting in a remote area, where one's
associations are limited to simple farmers, is unlikely to
The National Colonization institute (INC) is the primary enhance such a career.
Bolivian Government entity in the settlement zone. Despite
having a broad mandate for IRD/resettlenent and a substantial The entity that seems least encumbered by institutional
staff, it has not been effective. Though it employs many dedi- rigidities, and most able to adapt to the changing circumcated, hard-working people, the frequency of turnover among stances characteristic of IRD, is the private voluntary organihigher level employees (with subsequent government changes) has zation (PVO). In PVOs, many of the characteristics viewed as
been highly disruptive. This makes it hard to sustain activi- critical to successful implementation of IRD programs are relaties over time. tively commonplace.
Likewise INC suffers from "front office syndrome." For PVOs tend to be flexible with regard to organizational
civil servants a long-term post in a remote jungle station is structure and programs. This is a function of small size and
not conducive to upward mobility--far better to be near the the tendency to decentralize decision-making. PVOs tend to be
boss. The great majority of INC personnel in the Santa Cruz staffed by people with humanitarian motivations, thus rendering
department is located in the city of Santa Cruz itself. Only them more willing than most to work long hours for low pay
two employees were known to be in the San Julian zone at the under adverse circumstances (such as in San Julian). This is a
time of the project evaluation, and trips there by other INC two-edged sword because while seeking such individuals a sacriemployees are infrequent. f ice occasionally is made in technical skills. In the case of
FIDES, however, the evaluation team felt that project personnel
Perhaps the greatest problem of main-line government or- were highly competent.
ganizations like INC, however, is what might be characterized
as institutional rigidity. It is very difficult for a politi- PVO personnel tend to be willing to make long-term commitcally based agency whose policies and budget emanate from a ments. They are not on career paths which limit the amount of
far-away capital city to react to local circumstances. Such time they can safely stay in a certain position. Rather, each
agencies are not set up that way. Policies and programs are jbi nedi tef(h uaiainmtvto)
developed at the top and projected downward; responsiveness is jbi nedi tef(h uaiainmtvto)
to pressures from the top, not the bottom. Finally, PVO personnel are often well-versed in participatory involvement of program beneficiaries. This is a natural
A second development assistance entity working in the San result of working within essentially horizontal organizations
Julian area is the Santa Cruz-based Center for Tropical Agri- where decisions are made through group dynamics. It is a rare
cultural Research (CIAT). It has performed some very useful PVO in which orders come from "on high" and are followed in
studies, primarily in the area of farm economics and farming "lockstep" fashion. When one's employees are all working for
systems, and also does some extension work. less money than they could earn elsewhere, one learns to lead
through example and to give assignments through persuasion.
CIAT may be the most effective agricultural research and Community development techniques come naturally to most PVO
extension organization in Bolivia. it has a capable Bolivian personnel because they live them in their own organizations.
staff which, because it is not associated with national-level
political institutions, has enjoyed substantial technical sup- The evaluation team noted that PVOs have not been widely
port from several foreign governments including Great Britain used in IRD, that the scope and expense of such programs have
and Japan. generally been felt to require administration by large, mainline government agencies. Maybe that is why IRD has so seldom
To cast a primarily technical agency such as CIAT in the succeeded, Perhaps a serious look should be given to the PVO
role of implementing agent for an IRD program would be a mis- alternative.
take, however. Effective IRD involves a broad range of responsibilities well beyond farm systems research and extension. A
CIAT-type organization would also be hampered by some of the
"front office syndrome" problems faced by INC, albeit for different reasons. Leaders in an agricultural research organization are almost certain to come from an agricultural research
III. _-ResettementLesson The lesson indicated, however, is one which was learned
the hard way in the San Julian and Chane-Piray settlement
In th olwn icsino esn ere rmtezones. it is very costly in economic, social, and even politiSan Ju faoestlemnt expersience af resogh charnolfogical cal terms to assess an area's agricultural potential through
San ulin rsetlemnt xpeienc, arouh cronlogcalse-the process of settlement; it is far better to carry out such quence is imposed. This is done solely to provide reader per- studies in advance, and to locate roads, wells, and settlements
spective. No indication of relative importance is intended, in light of knowledge thus gained.
A. Assessment of Resource Potential B. Selection of Settlers
"It is very costly .., to assess .., agricul- "etesi uhisacsral a o
tural potential through the process of paSetle ric-h isace ely had notbid
settlement; it is far better to carry out paid tohei ie-hoey hadmunties.e" bid
such studies in advance...."gs oterhm omnte.
Assessment oreoreptnilibai toewadsThe history of resettlement in the Chane-Piray and San
settlement Unfo rt e suchtia asesms a diffecltnd Julian areas provides an invaluable text on what does and does
stmeonsumingely andh aemnsaedfiut not work with regard to settler selection. Among the various
tm-osmnadcostly, and thus aetoo often overlooked communities involved over the past 20 years virtually every
or done inadequately. selection technique one might think of has been tried at least
Access to new lands is often the problem. How can oneone
survey a rain forest when there are no roads? It is tempting
to settle for preliminary reconnaissance, then pull out and 1. Purely Spontaneous Settlement
await the road._______________Another problem is duration. A reliable assessment of the At one end of the spectrum, the Chane-Piray settlement
agricultural potential of a new area requires much more than zone has seen many purely spontaneous settlers. These people
soil samples. one should also monitor rainfall (both amount have tended to be highly motivated, already living in the area,
and timing), drainage, and seasonal climatic variations. A and usually working as farm laborers. These people were physifull year's observation can be very instructive, but 5 years is cally tough and already adapted to the climate, agriculture,
much better. Floods and frosts can critically affect the and general conditions of the lowlands; if anyone could hope tc
viability of an agricultural enterprise even where they occur cope with the challenge of spontaneous settlement (cut a path
only at Several year intervals.inotewlensslcastlcteaercerth
Neither itoe wdldetress, selc awite lupoate waro ca thelcsNihrthe Chane-Piray nor the San Julian settlement tor), these people could.
zones were adequately assessed for agricultural potential prior
to settlement. Both are alluvial plains with cultivable soils, Unfortunately, in most cases the task was too difficult
but both also possess areas with serious drainage problems, even for these hearty souls. Without agronomic backstopping,
Spontaneous settlers in parts of the Chane-Piray area (in San the wrong crops were often selected, or they were planted wher
Pedro, for example) failed to take note of this. As a result, heavy rains would destroy then. Without deep wells, wateryears of effort by many gallant pioneer families were wasted in rltddsae okahaytl. Wtotalwahrra
ares ubjcttoflodigwith parts of some communities even- access, mothers died in childbirth, and crops spoiled before
tually abandoned altogether. they could be taken to markets.
In San Julian, the bad effects of starting up without an Economists have argued that from a benefit-cost perspecadequate resource study were partially offset by very rapid tive the most effective resettlement in Bolivia's lowlands has
after-the-fact assessment during each nucleo's orientation occurred through spontaneous settlements. The evaluation team
program. In this way farmers with expected drainage or frost questions this. A closer look is needed at (1) the long-run
problems were steered away from crops that would be most vul- economic cost due to inefficient settlement patterns and (2)
nerable to such impacts. the short-run social cost from human suffering and loss of lif
even among the very fittest of the migratory population. When What are the keys to San Julian's success in settler
such factors are taken into consideration, it is felt that selection?
spontaneous settlement, without any public direction or sup- The common denominator of all San Julian settlers is oport, will be judged a costly and inefficient process. The Whn enomnt was can uin the is orientation. When recruitment was carried out in the highlands,
orientation began there. A fair picture of the difficulties of
2. _ighlyDireted,_Subsidized Settlement beginning life anew in the lowlands was given, expectations
were not inflated, and hardships were not minimized. Would-be
settlers who emerged from these recruitment meetings were, in
At the other end of the spectrum, the Chane-Piray settle- many respects, self-selected. They had as good a picture as
mnt zone has been affected by highly structured, paternalistic one could have of the challenges faced, and they resolved to
settlement schemes. These have involved features such as set- pay the price.
tler recruitment within the highland communities, turnkey delivery of essential community services, transportation of By relying on a mix of self-selected step-migrants and
settlers to the site, and even stipends to help hold them to well-oriented highlanders, the San Julian program was off to a
the land. Each of these concepts has much to say for it, and good start with the most important resource in resettlement:
all of them together make a nice package. Despite this, how- well-motivated settlers with realistic expectations. The conever, long-term success with highly subsidized resettlement tinuing challenge was to determine appropriate support systems
efforts has not been good. Something has been missing. to increase the likelihood of success for an essentially capIn the view of the evaluation team, the missing element able populace.
has been human motivation. By going to the highland communities to recruit, often attracting entire family groups, and C. Basic Physical Infrastructure
shouldering the cost qf the transfer, the settlement promoters
made it too easy. Settlers in such instances really had not
paid the price--they had not "burned bridges" to their home *Except where mere subsistence is the goal
communities. It was too easy to maintain contact, and to re- a farm enterprise without access to markets
turn. Therefore, when the going got rough in the lowlands, is not viable."
they had a place to return to and, all too often, did so.
Certain physical resources are essential to survival:
3. Spontaneous Settlement With Swater, over the very short term; access, over the medium term
_Sp o n t a n e o u sSe t t l e m e n t_ _it hSu p p o r t a n d v i a b l e c o m m u n i t i e s o v e r t h e l o n g t e r m I f t h e s e e l e m e n t
are not provided, development of successful new-lands settleThe ate setlemntsments is not possible. The later settlements in the Chane-Piray and San Julian
zones benefited from earlier mistakes in settler selection.
The need for high settler motivation, and the link between that I. _ate
and self-selection, was noted. Also noted was the need for
so long as it did not engender dependency. It
was in light of this rich experience in the Chane-Piray and The length of time that human settlement activities can
earlier settlement zones that the formula for settler selection survive without potable water is very brief indeed. Yet, so
and support in San Julian was developed. great was the motivation and courage of pioneers in some of
In San Julian early settlement zones that they entered the forest with wat
I ste migrvariety settler types. Many on their backs. These people walked 5 to 10 kilometers, setwho had previously farmed or labored on lected land, and went to work. Every few days they withdrew
farms elsewhere in the lowlands. They heard about the IRD replenish water supplies and rest, then returned to the fray
program and, without outside help, gained admission. Others in Others attempted to live on often polluted "standing water"
San Julian were recruited directly, often through churches in closer to home, thus saving the time and energy of the ardu
their highland communities. Some came in community groups; walk through the forest.
others alone. Somehow, despite this diversity of selection techniques, San Julian has enjoyed far more stable than average Settlements without ready access to safe drinking wate
settlement--far less abandonment due to economic failure. did not flourish. The struggle for survival in a primitive
E- 18 E-19
environment is too great to bear the additional burden of ina- sra wlynly rudtecutyie nohr n
lyecrtica to rseattflent vnate. thee prnineaeri stage. sees uniform-size parcels spread out along access roads, "piano
ly citial o rsettemet, venat he ponerin stge.key" fashion. In the most recent settlements at Chane-Piray
and in San Julian, one sees nUcieo-patterned settlements with
2. Access each community located in a rectangular shaped center, with all
farm plots emanating outward like slices of a pie.
Access is a critical element over the medium term. Wheth- The nucleo settlement pattern that was eventually develer it is by water, rail, or road is poalunm rtt.What oped in Chane-Piray, and later implemented throughout Sani
is critical is that it be available perolyunimpran t. tb Julian, has been very successful. By bringing the settlers
affordable,.errud adta tb together in close proximity, it has greatly facilitated community development and group organization.
During the pioneering stage easy access is a luxury. AInaule comit th scerfld cmuiycne,
long struggle in reaching one's objective might even be a use- schol a n wllar closeit for evceroe hen comn iy haser
ful screening device in settler selection. If the settler scol thdellthe families ao r oe with n shut n distance Ifas
family is not up to a hard journey, it may not be up to the frmube wantsothoen famle rea sre orhi seotu itrsing dsac.I
other challenges of new-lands settlement. fre at ooe ealsoeo e parc hehn
business, there is no question about where to do it. The focal
As the farm enterprise develops, however, what might have point of every settlement is established at the very outset, so
seemed a luxury becomes a necessity. Except where mere subsis- community development is much accelerated.
tence is the goal, a farm enterprise without access to marketsTh onyra dawckttence stlmtmdei
is not viable. In terms of farm produce, access to markets thTthe pie-shaledrafa plo wth the farmthomenat the pint
generally implies either land or water transportation which is ofa the slieshmend h farmer hpalo g wit aym om walk toit
usabe yer-rond.furthermost fields. This is troublesome, but construction of
Few farm outputs can be economically transported by human storage sheds at mid-points in his parcel can somewhat amelioor animal power alone. In Bolivia, cattle (which can be rate the inconvenience. All in all, the trade-off between
herded) and cocaine (which commands a very high price) would be rapid community development and somewhat inefficient farm laythe only exceptions. outs is considered to be worth making.
Likewise few farm outputs can be economically stored until D meit upr ed
the roads or rivers are passable. Storage facilities are gen- D meit u~r ed
erally too costly, and losses from insects, rodents, humidity,
etc. are high. Access to markets must be available year-round Tefrt higFDSddwstenoae
or, n ralit, tere s n accss.community organization for performance of critical tasks.*
In new-lands settlement there are several fairly distinct
stages of development, and the needs of settlers during these
For long-term stabilization and growth to occur in new- various stages differ. Nelson, in his 1975 book titled Stages
lands settlement, a network of community facilities and sup- of Development, refers to three stages in the new-lands settleporting industries must develop. If this is left to occur ment process: pioneering, consolidation, and growth. The
naturally, it nay take a long time, and the eventual outcome evaluation team feels that there are certain immediate support
may be inefficient. If it is directed from the Outset, con- needs associated with the pioneering stage that are common to
munity development can be greatly facilitated, cutting the' time all resettlement programs and thus worthy of discussing in the
and cost involved, context of lessons learned.
In the Chane-Piray settlement zone a variety of community The first thing that a settler needs when he reaches a new
growth patterns can be observed. In some of the spontaneous area is a stable supply of water and food to tide him over
settlement areas one sees parcels as small as 10 hectares until he can provide for himself. In the case of food, this
requirement is likely to last for at least 6 months. One
E- 20 E- 21
cannot clear land, plant, and harvest a crop in much less than Another critical effect of this process which proved to be
6 months, very important at late stages is that settlers learned to work
together to solve mutual problems. Today's network of cooperaNeeded next are certain basic farm implements and produc- tiVes, health promoters, and settler federations all find their
tion inputs. An ax, a machete, and a hoe are certainly essen- roots in the early FIDES orientation programs.
tial. Likewise essential is seed appropriate for the new environment. Without these ingredients, farm work Is not possible.E.TeDpndcySdrm
Finally, settlers must provide for shelter early on. A
few days or weeks outdoors may not be a problem, but before too
long a roof and walls are going to seem essential. This im- "The danger is that in providing for
plies the need for tools and supplies for construction. settlers' needs at the beginning. ...the
provider... .may create.. .a sense of depenIn the Chane-Piray settlement zone settlers dealt with dency--a habit of reliance on others to
these immediate support needs in a variety of ways, and the solve their problems."
short-run success of settlement efforts was highly variable.
From this experience much was learned. These lessons were Up to this point, all of the resettlement lessons disapplied by the implementing agent in the San Julian project, cussed have focused on types of support which must be given to
and the rate of short-run settler survival improved markedly. settlers if they are to have a reasonable prospect for survival. our discussion has recognized that there are facilities
The AID-contracted implementing agent in San Julian, (wells and roads) and services (settlement designs and mewFIDES, gathered these essential short-run support elements into lands orientation) which are beyond the means of settlers to
a single package referred to as the orientation program. Gem- provide for themselves--which must come from government.
erally lasting about fQur months, the objective of orientation
was to get settlers started toward self-sufficiency at the These needs are a reality. Experience in the Chan 'e-Piray
least cost, in the least time, with the least dependency, and San Julian settlement zones bears emphatic witness to this.
Responsible resettlement planners and policy-makers cannot disSome work was simply done for the settlers. Development regard these truths.
of a well, road access, and a preestablished settlement plan
(the nucleo system) was a "sine qua non." Likewise FIDES ar- just below the surface, however, is a more subtle'reality
ranged for presettlement clearing of the 2 hectares of land at which seems to contradict the former. By digging just a little
the center of the proposed community, and construction of a deeper into the Chane-Piray and San Julian experiences we can
community sleeping shed where settlers could keep dry until see an insidious danger in providing the very services contheir own homes were built, and another shed where the food sidered essential for survival.
coul be ept ry.The danger is that in providing for settlers' needs at the The first thing FIDES did was to encourage community or- beginning of a new-lands settlement program the provider (inganization for performance of critical tasks. Land clearing plementing Agent) may create in the minds of the settlers a
was done jointly so that all could learn how together. Like- sense of dependency--a habit of reliance on others to solve
wise, house construction was a community enterprise. EVen their problems. if this is done--if the settlers find themcooking and eating were communitywide activities during the selves turning to a paternalistic benefactor to solve their
months of the orientation program. The jobs of establishing problems for them, to tell them what to do--then long-term
basic facilities for survival and planting the first crop were viability of the settlement community is jeopardized.
given top priority, and all settlers were encouraged to work
cooperatively toward those goals. So what can governments that want to sponsor new-lands
settlement programs do? Spontaneous settlement, without supThe impact of the FIDES approach to immediate support port, is viewed as wasteful of human and economic resources.
needs is impressive. Settler abandonment during the critical Directed settlement, wherein key needs of the settlers are proearly months was low, and progress toward self-sufficiency was vided by the government, risks creating a perpetually dependent
greatly accelerated. Where some of the earlier directed set- population.
tlements required outside food support for years, in San Julian
settlers were on their own within months.
The lesson which emerges from the the Chane-Piray and San government entities in the settlement zone are likewise viewed
Julian experiences is that there is a middle ground. it is as service entities--there to be used as needed. The bosses
possible to provide essential services without creating an are the settlers themselves, and the future of San Julian is in
undue sense of dependency. The key is in the manner in which their hands.
services are provided.
FIDES commenced work in the San Julian program already F. Turnover
wise to the dangers of paternalism. They worked from the outset to avoid the dependency syndrome. The technique was decep- Turnover of a settler's parcel cam
tively simple. FIDES simply refused to act like a "patron." any things, only one of which is
Settlers were told that if they wanted action, they would have failure.y
to take it themselves because FIDES would not do it for them.
The pattern was set during orientation. New settlers Were A commonly accepted notion in resettlement literature is
thrown together in an alien environment. They had several that turnover of a settler's parcel is bad, that it reflects
months' supply of food, some tools, a shelter to sleep under, failure of the resettlement program. Often the word abandonand a few FlES advisors, some of them temporarily contracted ment is used, suggesting that things were so bad that one simveteran settlers from previously established communities. ply walked away.,
Instead of telling the settlers what to do, FIDES advisors Apparent from the Chane-Piray and San Julian experience i
gave general guidelines and recommended self-help. The set- that this notion is far too simplistic. Turnover of a settlers themselves organized the work committees and proceeded tlers parcel can suggest a great many things, only one of
through all of the tasks required to build the community, which is failure. In fact, sale of a farm in the settlement
Initial decisions were simple. Who should build the walls zones studied is as likely to be viewed as the culmination of
around the dormitory? Who should cook? Who should get started successful effort as of a failure. It is really a question of
clearing fields? FIDES advisors stayed out of this decision- perspective.
making process. Their job was simple. Once the settlers had
decided who would do the various tasks, FIDES personnel would The government's view of new-lands settlement is general
show them how--teach them the ways of survival in the lowlands, straightforward. The primary objective might be to increase
the productivity of a region. A secondary objective, which
As communities worked their way through the most immediate supports the first, might be to establish a stable family farm
tasks they were encouraged to look to longer term organization, system. A third, also complementary, objective might be to
Committees were elected to deal with health problems. Consumer relieve overpopulation elsewhere by shifting people to the new
cooperatives were formed to organize the difficult task of area.
bringing in supplies from outside. Sometimes marketing cooperatives were organized. Before long even political federations From the government's perspective, therefore, turnover
were established to give the settlers a louder voice with gov- might be a mixture of good and bad. If a viable agricultural
e Troug en s parcel is abandoned due to economic failure, and no one reThkg rou gho the process FIDES personnel places the unsuccessful farmer, that is clearly bad from all
pattern of they were influential, because the perspectives. Alternatively, if it is sold, say to a farmer
background, orgaizaton deel etughou s the same with more capital who desires to farm it more intensively, per
hat, of organization developed throughout San Julian. By haps with tractors, the result might be viewed as mixed. On
working so quietly, however, they avoided creating a sense, and the one hand it could lead to increased productivity--a happy
result. On the other, it might contribute to concentration o
land among fewer individuals, thus raising farm stability and
It is the settlers themselves who "call the shots" in San equity questions.
Julian. They do it through their various nucleo, NADEPA, and
zonewide committees, cooperatives, and federations. FIDES is Also relevant is how the proceeds of sales are applied.
looked upon as a reliable ally, an organization that provided When the settler uses his sales proceeds to invest in a more
invaluable assistance at the beginning through the orientation profitable activity in the same area (e.g., milling rice or
program, and which provides continuing services in certain operating a truck), the result will benefit the overall progr
areas, primarily agricultural extension. Other more permanent goals. When he takes the money back to the highlands or to
E- 24 E- 25
town, to spend on consumption, little has been accomplished sustainable, consolidation and growth of new-lands settlements
from an economic development perspective, must be an outgrowth of the settlers' own efforts and from
their own resources. They must know how to organize to do the
The settlers' views of mew-lands settlement are as varied task, and 'they must have a viable strategy for accomplishing
as the settlers themselves. Each defines success in his own it.
terms, and what he does with his land parcel is a function of
his agenda and no one else's.
A lot of parcel turnover in the Chane-Piray and San Julian 1 raiain
settlement zones was that of "pioneer types." These are people
who thrive on "hacking a home out of the wilderness." They are The first element essential to consolidation and growth o
good at the demanding tasks of pioneering, and when such tasks new-lands settlements is settler organization. The problems
are completed they become bored. Some of these people have which must be resolved are beyond the means of individuals, an
pioneered two or three parcels in a decade. They take advan- .,patrons" are generally unreliable. The only safe way is
tage of the opportunity for free land, perform the tasks re- through group self-help.
quired to create a farm from the wilderness, then sell to a
more serious farmer (often someone with the capital to make In San Julian, impressive progress has been made through
good. use of the resource) and move on. Given the options group organization. Every nucleo in the zone has a well-built
available to Bolivian campesinos, pioneering can be a rela- school 'and a teacher. The schools were built by the settlers,
tively lucrative way to earn a living, and the teachers are there because the settlers' political
federation demanded them.
Another common cause of parcel turnover in the Chane-Piray
and San Julian areas is the desire to enter a different busi- Similarly, the settlers have used their organizational.
ness. Many of the settlers, it seems, really do not view them- abilities to deal with health, sanitation, marketing, credit,
selves as farmers. Rather, they Are businessmen. Land settle- and other concerns. Even the transportation system has been
ment, for them, is a way to create a capital base to enable affected by settler organization. Bridges have been built
growth toward a more interesting objective. By pioneering where needed, sometimes with outside support, sometimes withtheir 50-hectare parcel and creating a farm from wilderness, out. Stretches of low roadbed have been elevated. When lumber
they hope to establish a capital base faster than they might trucks began to take a heavy toll on the road, settlers organthrough other means, ized to charge tolls to replenish their maintenance funds.
These businessmen-settlers are often the people who invest The farmers in the San Julian settlement zone are a force
the profits from a good crop into inventory for a small store to be reckoned with. They do not suffer quietly hardship or
or a truck, rather than buying livestock or hiring labor to government unresponsiveness to what they perceive as essential
clear more land. When they are sufficiently established in services (e.g., the road). They get together and talk about
their preferred activity, these settlers are amenable to sell it, and if it is something they can manage through group actio
or lease their land to neighbors whose primary objective is to (e.g., a bridge), they handle it themselves. If it is bigger
farm. than that, they elect representatives to go to the proper authorities and speak for all of them. If even that fails, they
have been known to block public roads. Settler organization i
G. Consolidation and Growth well developed in San Julian, and it has been invaluable in
enabling the region to consolidate and grow economically.
OTo be real and sustainable, consolidation
and growth of mew-lands settlements must be 2. Strategy
an outgrowth of the settlers' own efforts
and from their own resources."
The second element essential to consolidation and growth
Consolidation and growth of new-lands settlements is a .of new-lands settlements is a viable strategy. In this, there
difficult, time-consuming process. Heavy capital investment is much to learn from the Chane-Piray and San Julian settlement
can make it somewhat less difficult and somewhat less slow, but zones because approaches taken have been very different, with
it will not make the process simple and fast. To be real and contrasting results.
E-26 E- 27
In Chane-Piray the strategy elected by most farmers was to ready, additional earnings are invested in livestock, and evenmaximize short-run profits and, if successful, to capitalize as tually animal traction. Farm animals are a wonderful form of
rapidly as possible through the use of subsidized credit. This investment in San Julian because they "float" on the twim hazstrategy was normally played out through planting of a single ards of floods and inflation. If a farmer needs cash to buy
cash crop. In its most extreme form, every meter that could be seeds, or for a medical emergency, he cam easily sell a pig.
cleared would be planted to an annual crop for which there was Until the point of sale, no matter what the weather or the rate
expected to be a good market. If the crop was good and the of inflation, the pig will retain its value.
market materialized, proceeds would be invested in more clearing and planting of the same crop. If the crop was bad or the The 'results of this growth model are mostly positive.
market poor (agricultural prices in Bolivia are extremely vola- Economic failure is minimized. Growth, though slow, is steady
tile), the farmer had no safety net, He would be obliged to and risk free. The resultant increase in farm net worth ties
take employment elsewhere, often abandoning his farm and dreams farmers to the land, thug encouraging long-run stability.
of quick riches.
The San Julian growth model has not been in use long The end result of this strategy in Chane-Piray is inter- enough for the evaluation team to say anything definitive about
esting. After 20 years of resettlement activity, the zone has it. At least another 5 years of operations are required.
a well-developed agricultural base, with both primary and sec- Working against it is the farmers' impatience to mechanize.
ondary industries in abundance. Looking deeper, however, one Working for it is the low failure rate of its practitioners.
notes that very few of the original settlers are in place, and This final, important lesson from the Chane-Piray and San
farms tend to be either mechanized, in unimproved pasture, or Julian resettlement experiences is yet to be completely rein total disuse (in barbecha). From the perspective of the vealed.
settlers themselves, there have been a few winners and a great. many losers. Even the winners, the mechanized farmers, raise questions. Statistics from the Inter-American Development Bank indicate that over half of the machinery loans, made at concessional rates, are actually in default. How real is the progress in the Chane-Piray settlement zone?
In San Julian the strategy being promoted by the implementing agent, and apparently being adopted by a substantial portion of the farmers, is what FIDES calls "self-capitalization." It is an approach which emphasizes low risk and minimum dependence on outside forces.
The first step in the self-capitalization growth model is to establish a subsistence base. It recognizes the vicissitudes of weather (particularly rainfall), agricultural prices, and the access road, and argues for construction of a "safetynet." immediately after land is cleared and planted with an annual cash crop, additional space is devoted to garden crops and perennials. If the worst happens, at least there will be food. The evaluation team noted that with all the different varieties of garden and tree crops planted in each farmer's subsistence plot, collectively the farmers in each San Julian community possessed a tremendous variety of produce.
The next step in the growth model, after "staying powet is assured through development of the "safety-net," is to grau ually capitalize the farm through small investments. When a crop is sold, the farmer is encouraged to invest in more perennials or to plant improved pasture. As improved pasture is
APPENDIX F SUPPLEMENTS
1. Evaluation Methodology
2. List of Contacts
4. Settler Profiles
5. Memorandum to USAID Regarding Future Interventions
1 Evaluation Methodology We asked all interviewees what they liked and didn't like
about what had been done in the colony, and what it meant to
them in terms of production, income, and other measures of
Due to difficulties in obtaining hard data, many of this well-being. The results of these interviews are reflected in
evaluation's observations concerning impact and causality are the impact section.
judgmental. Little recent information was available, for instance, on farm production and income. With drastic and uneven As to analysis of data gathered by others, in the absence
price changes due to the effects of inflation even the Center o nlsv urn noeadpouto aaw rwwa
for the Investigation of Tropical Agriculture (CIAT), the most inferences we could from partial or less recent data and from
reliable agricultural research organization in the project data gathered by others in similar areas, correcting all such
area, has given up efforts to gather price information, data judgmentally for temporal and geographic differences.
Data-gathering problems were compounded by the difficulty Although these methods were less rigorous than those we
of reaching farmers at the colonization sites. Few were in would have preferred had time and circumstances permitted, a
their houses during the day and, with each farmer owning 50 marked tendency toward agreement among the various information
hectares of land, much of it only partially cleared jungle, sources, as well as the consistency of the responses with what
reaching people in the fields was not possible. Night inter- one would have expected from other indicators, was reassuring.
views were also a problem due to lack of electricity and poor The farmers were unanimous in saying life was better in the
road onditons.settlement zone than in their previous situation, for example. Even those affiliated with the leftist Federation of
Finally, there was the problem imposed by geography-- Colonists, who had hard words about FIDES, were positive in
visiting a representative sample of 50 villages of 40 families this respect. All farmers also agreed that FIDES's orientatio
ecsraouovrsome 1,000 square kilometers. program was extremely valuable, that the pie-shaped settlement
each spead ut verpattern was preferable to the "piano key," and that road condi
What the team did accomplish was to visit 8 of the 12 tions are a serious problem. The men tended to be significant
villages along San Julian's principal penetration road, and one ly more critical than the women, who focused more on household
of the lateral villages at the end of a side trail. We also concerns and were almost universally of the opinion that nutri
drove the entire length of the Chane-Piray penetration road, tion is better in the zone then in their previous situation.
although only a few interviews were accomplished in that set- We found substantial differences of opinion on certain technitlemnt zne.cal issues (e.g., animal traction versus mechanization) which tlemnt zne.are discussed in the impact section.
The ages of the settlements increased with distance from
the beginning of the road. We thus gained a temporal as well The ma .jor part of the time spent on the evaluation went
as geographic distribution by visiting San Julian's nucleos 11, into studying the San Julian area. The Chane-Piray area was
14, 17, 35, 38, 44, 47, and 50 on the main road, and nucleo 45 studied in less depth and mostly for comparison with San
on a lateral road, and by speaking to settlers from nucleos 12, Julian. On the whole, Chane-Piray was settled earlier than Sa
15, and 16, as well, when we encountered them on the main road. Julian and might, in theory, have provided a longer term perNucleo 11 is the oldest at 10 years of age, and the 1 year-old spective on the impact of colonization interventions. The
nuclo 5 thenewst.problem, however is that Chane-Piray was not really one projec nuclo 5 thenewst.but several, i.e., a number of different technical assistance
Our sample was not structured in any way. We simply in- efforts, with a variety of objectives which only toward the end
terviewed the persons we could find, ranging from two to eight of AID's 1974 project began to resemble the San Julian model.
per village. Levels of education among the colonists ranged Chane-Piray, in effect, served as a laboratory for development
from illiterate to university level. We interviewed farmers Of the- San Julian design. Thus the problems and successes of
who seemed relatively prosperous and others who were barely the various Chane-Piray communities tell us little about what
"getting by." While the male members of the team interviewed to expect in the future at San Julian and are useful mainly for
the farmers themselves, the female team member spoke to their comparison. In addition, as a matter of pure logistics, the
wives and, occasionally, children. We also found ourselves diversity and geographic dispersal of communities in Chanesought out by some of the more politicized settlers, some of Piray made it impractical to examine them in any depth in the
whom were supportive of the AID project effort and a few of time available.
whom were critical.
The evaluation team, therefore, decided that most could be
learned by concentrating on the relatively homogeneous San 2. List of Principal Contacts
Julian experience. Thus the Project Interventions and Lessons Learned appendices (Appendices B and E) of the evaluation report deal primarily with San Julian, turning to Chane-Piray Humberto Castedo L. Harry Peacock
only for the sake of comparisons. Director Project Advisor
Camara Nacional Forestal Fundacion Integral de
Ing. Melvin Pozo
Jefe Depto. Investigaciones Calvin Miller
Centro de Investigacion Agricultural Economist
Agricola Tropical (CIAT) Mennonite Economic
Development Associates William Lawrence-Jones Agricultural Economist Javier Ballivian
British Mission to CIAT Project Administrator
Dr. Oscar Tonelli Justiniano Jefe Unidad Programas Rurales Jaime Bravo
y Agropecuarios Health Planner
Rolando Paz F.
Director, CIAT Jose Guevara
Marcellno Limachi FIDES
Federacion de Colonizadores Chane-Piray Gloria Virhuez
Director, Heiffer Project of Dardo Chavez
Bolivia Medical Doctor
Montero Rural Health Clinic Henry Sanabria
Anthropologist Juan Terrazas, Director
Univ. of Wisconsin-Madison INC, Santa Cruz
"The FIDES basecamp
and experimental nursery
is on the Breacha Casarabe Southeast of nucleo 11."
a"Open sleeping areas and S*, mosquito nets are adjustments
to the new climate in the
"Each nucleo has a central area for houses and community activities. Each individual plot then fans out like wedges of the pie. Note two other "Food and shelter Is
beginning nucleos in the supplied for the first o LAL
background." months during the"-
orientation program." -
- "A successful San Julian "The road has been a continual
settler builds a two-story "" headache for everyone involved
house." with the project. Here a logging
-- .- T" truck is hopelessly stuck in the
"The well in the center of
each nucleo is a popular "A farmer burning his field in
gathering place." preparation for planting."
4. Settler Profiles
Colonist: Toribio Garcia Origin: Valle Grande, Santa
Community: Nucleo 2 Year of settlement: 1972
Toribio Garcia, 38, was one of the first spontaneous settlers in San Julian in the mid-1960s. He and his first wife, Marcelina, rented land near the Rio Grande until the 1968 floods left their property under a meter and a half of water. That year they moved to what was then Area 3 near San Ramon close to what would soon be the San Julian colonization zone. In 1972 when the first nucleos were surveyed and organized, they moved into nucleo 2 and participated in the first Committee of United Churches (CIU) orientation program.
"Women collect water
from the central well in Although from Valle Grande and neither a Camba nor a
plasticeontainersfor Kolia, Garcia gained influence and respect among his fellow
plasti containr fr settlers, who were mostly Cambas. He served as president of
home use." the community and of the NADEPA and was active in the consumer
cooperative from its inception.
Garcia has a fifth-grade formal education. His considerable abilities are self-taught. From 1972-1980 he worked in various capacities with the CIU. For several years, he was responsible for organizing the construction of the orientation program buildings in new nucleos and for recruiting orientation workers, usually selected from lowlanders living in the area, although some highlanders with much experience in rural Santa Cruz were also hired. The CIU sent him to a training course in small motor mechanics and maintenance, and he was placed in charge of the chainsaw program. Throughout the orientation program and the consolidation project he has served as an informal advisor to program staff.
Garcia's prestige in the zone has grown in recent years through his role in cooperative activities. In 1980 the first zone-level cooperative structure was created to link the then separate cooperative activities in each NADEPA. Garcia served ( '' as treasurer on the first Board of Administration. With the
consolidation of the consumer, savings and loan, agricultural inputs, and home inputs activities in mid-1982, he became the first president of the new multiactive cooperative. In this role he has become an influential spokesman for the settlement community, both in contacts with the government and with outside agencies including AID, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the World Bank.
"The men work together .During his years of involvement with the orientation proto roof a neighbor's gram and with the cooperative, Garcia has continued to work his
house." Z. -V~ ,-''
farm and has cleared about 25 hectares. He has to hire some any new program should require meaningful financial contribulabor but his prestige in the community allows him to find tions from the people or it won't be taken seriously.
exchange labor partners easily. He was one of the first settlers to establish permanent pastures for cattle raising, and "People complain about the gringos who come and introduce
presently has 12 hectares of pasture and 12 head of battle. themselves into the situation and want to run things. They say
This year he planted 2 hectares of rice. why do we always have to have foreigners telling us what to do?
There's truth in that. But fine, I say to them, then you do
In 1979 his first wife died of Chagas disease, leaving him the work they do. But no one answers and nothing happens. The
with five children. He has since remarried and has two small problem is that the work we're talking about is difficult,
children from the new marriage. The oldest two children live takes a lot of time, and is not rewarding economically.
in Santa Cruz with their grandmother and attend school there. There's no money to pay what its worth."
In 1983, Garcia requested that the cooperative allow him When asked why, in addition to the rigors of survival as a
to step down from his leadership role, citing health and eco- settler, he has year afte year taken on being a community and
nomic problems. The General Assembly resolved to try to lessen cooperative leader with all the conflicts and sacrifices it
his load but reminded him that he was needed. A new president implies, Garcfa was silent a moment. Finally, he leaned over
was elected and Garcia became vice president. and said, "I like it." Then, perhaps realizing further explanation was necessary' he continued, "People recognize what I do.
Garcia credits the CIU's orientation program for much of If I make a mistake, they let me know. But when I go into a
the rapid development in the zone. "The nucleo design helps us community, people talk to me. They tell me what they're thinkorganize, like when we in nucleo 2 convinced the government to ing and what their problems are. Also, people give me work
provide salaries for a school teacher and a health worker in because they believe I'll do my best. And, I like to help.
the community. Without the CIU's work in promoting coopera- Don't be mistaken. It has to be for a good cause. If it's
tivism, the development of the cooperative would have been much not, I won't move my motorcycle...."
The agricultural inputs section subsidized by FIDES has
become the economic mainstay of the cooperative, he says. It Colonist: Maximo Surubi Origin: Chiquitos
helped make it possible for the new consolidated cooperative to Community: Nucleo 39 Year of settlement: 1979
survive its first difficult year. Much of the expansion in
personnel and services was made possible through the earnings Maximo Surubi is about 40 years old and has been a sponfrom the section. "We've become dependent on that borrowed taneous settler in two areas and most recently, a semi-directed
money. If it's taken out, the section will fold and we'll be colonist in San Julian. He is a Guarani Indian, originally
in trouble. We'll have to reduce our activities drastically. from an area 160 km to the northeast of San Julian. Surubi is
The members haven't contributed enough of their own resources one of a group of Guaranis who form a relatively mobile but
to keep the section going by itself. We're hoping that the new closely knit community. They first settled in Yapacani about
marketing section's profits will reduce that dependency. The 20 years ago, then moved to the Hardeman Colony in 1968. Surumembers are interested in marketing their products together to bi arrived in San Julian with a number of other Guaranis who
get better prices." made the move from Hardeman Colony. They learned of San Julian
from CIU personnel who were involved in both zones. About 15
Garcia says that the biggest problem facing the coopera- of the original families in his group remain.
tive and the zone in general is mobilizing available human
resources. "It's not that we don't have capable people. It's Surubi and his wife have had seven children, five of whom
getting them to participate. Many times, if I don't carry are still living.
people to cooperative meetings on my motorcycle, they don't
show up." Nucleo 39 is somewhat unique in the zone. Half of the
colonists in the orientation program were Kollas and half were
Commenting on technical assistance programs in the zone, Cambas. Surubi feels that they are basically a united communGarcia observed that they often do not demand enough from the ity despite the cultural differences. "KolIa, Camba, it really
people in terms of their time and resources. "If people don't doesn't make much difference to us." Others disagree, pointing
have their own money tied up in it, they don't take an active to conflicts that have occurred.
interest in participating." Garcia continually stresses that
Surubi was trained as a health promoter in Hardeman Colony donated largely by FIDES as part of the relief aid be distribby people who later formed part of the CIU. He received addi- uted without charge. After a long discussion, the settlers
tional training from the CIU orientation program in San Julian. NADEPA-level Emergency Committee determined that the drugs
His is one of the few nucleos which has had a working health should be sold at cost to create a rotating fund to allow repromoter without interruption since the orientation program. stocking. Although the decision was made by the settlers'
"It's really not any credit to the community," he says bluntly. representatives, much of the resentment remaining in nucleo 39
"They're given me little support." His fellow community mem- has been directed at FIDES which was the channel for relief
bears have been reluctant to contribute funds to keep a pharma- aid.
ceutical and medical supply fund going, especially since the
inflation and devaluation accelerated. "I like being a health Surubi learned soap making in Hardeman Colony and, through
promoter. I have learned some skills and feel obligated to use FIDES's Small Industries Program, received a U.S.$75.00 loan t
them, especially when there is no other alternative here for begin production in his nucleo. "People here waste money on
sick people. I work with my own money and earn a little from packaged soap when home-made soap is less expensive and is
the mark-up I put on my costs." stronger," he said. Although his first stock was wellreceived, subsequent ones were slow to sell. There were com"My biggest problem is that when someone cones to me and plaints about the quality of his soap. Part of his equipment
is sick and has no money, what can I do? I can't say no be- was later burned in an accident. Surubi is optimistic about
cause I feel it wouldn't be right and also because they don't turning the business around and paying off his debt, but the
let me anyway. My neighbors make life difficult if they say I venture has not been a success.
refuse to help them in their need. Because I can't refuse
them, it's hard to keep a rotating fund going." Surubi plans to remain in nucleo 39 despite the problems.
Surubi began buying from the FIDES pharmacy because the "Besides, I'm too old to keep moving around." The biggest
obstacles he identifies are the serious health problem and the
medical supplies were less expensive there and it eliminated poor condition of the road, especially the lateral road conthe need to travel to Montero to make purchases. "Still, necting his village to nucleo 38. During much of the year, a
though, people object, saying that the prices are too high and long stretch is submerged under a meter of water.
that I'm making a big profit." His neighbors have complained
that he gives credit only to fellow Cambas, which he denies.
"Last year I finally gave them a month to resolve the
situation. They had to create a drug fund and elect other Colonist: Richardo Fernandez Origin: Tarija
promoters so they could be trained in the FIDES program. I Community: Nucleo 23 Year of settlement: 1978
would give advice to the new promoters but I wanted to step
down. I was tired of the continual conflict." New promoters Richardo Fernandez is a portly fellow in his thirties witi
were elected and trained but the community continues to call on the easy-going manner said to be characteristic of men from
Surubi, and he continues to feel exploited. Tarija. He has a wife and two children who live with him in
Surubi has cleared about 5 hectares si nce settling and nucleo 23 although their farm is in the adjacent lateral
nucleo 22. He came to San Julian alone and later met his wife
produce mostly for home consumption. He usually markets some there.
products to generate cash. The last two years have been difficult for production because of the timing and overall quantity "When we first arrived," he said with a wave of his hand,
of rain. He cleared 1 hectare last year but the early rains "this was all jungle. There were two sheds, one for the bache
prevented a proper burn and the final rice yield was very low. lots and one for the married couples. Now look at it."
The 1983 floods in May and June hit the community hard. The
community has been demoralized even though it has always been Nucleo 23 is the most "urbanized" community on the Brecha
subject to severe flooding. Few settlers have burned and casarabe and may be said to be a small town. Estimates vary
planted for the 1984 rice harvest. "They haven't even planted with the season, but there are said to be between 125 and 175
yucca," one women in nucleo 38 commented. "They're buying rice households resident in the village. There are a variety of
from the other nucleos instead of planting their own." small businesses ranging from restaurants to general stores to
bicycle repair to a billiard parlor. The billiard parlor is
During the flood emergency Surubi was a spokesman for a operated by Fernandez's father together with a small cantina
vociferous minority in nucleo 39 which demanded that the drugs and larger general store.
F-1 2 F-1 3
Fernandez has cleared 8 hectares of his 50-hectare plot. Colonist: Eduardo Yucra Origin: Potosi
This year he has cleared an additional hectare and has planted Community: Nucleo 14 Year of settlement: 1977
a total of two and a half with rice and corn. He and his wife
also cultivate a small garden of 2,000 square meters with let- Eduardo Yucra is a heavy-set, broad-faced fellow whose
tuce, tomato, green peppers, and other green vegetables. He deliberateness of movement and speech have earned him the nicksells many of these vegetables within the community to the name of "Slow but 'Sure" from his neighbors and co-workers. His
numerous small restaurants. father was a tin miner in Potosi. During the revolution of
1949, his father dressed as a campesino and fled with his wife
Much of the labor required to work Fernandez's land is to her home village to escape the repression aimed at the rehired. He usually has little problem finding laborers. bellious *mining sector. It was in the rural village of Paco
Nucleo 23 is a center of economic and recreational activities, Chico, department of Potosi, that Yucra was born 33 years ago.
and attracts seasonal workers. Weather rather than labor has
been the most important limiting factor in production, particu- "Potosi for me is nothing more than the memory of faillarly because of its impact in getting his *produce to market. ures. Sad memories: my poverty, discomfort in my home.... I
could never find work, never earn income unless it was in minWhen questioned about the role of the CIU in helping them ing. But to be a miner is to die young..... I had only one piece
get started, Fernandez responded that the "short orientation of luck, I married my wife there. That's the only good thing
program was helpful in the first adaptation to the local condi- Potosi gave me, joking aside."
tions. "Many had never worked in the lowlands before," he
explained, "although some had been farmhands in other places. Yucra worked a year with a Catholic work/study program in
It was a little different for me because in Tarija we don't La Paz, through which he received a year of university credit.
have the high forest or the rains and mosquitoes. But there In 1977 he came to San Julian with a group of idealistic
the heat is so intense one can only work in the early morning friends: two priests, four teachers, a miner, and two stuand late afternoon. Here one can work all day." He commented dents. Their goal was to form the nucleus of an ideal Catholic
on the CIU food aid, stating that many settlers felt it should community. Five became settlers in nucleo 14. Four began to
have been continued longer. work for the CIU as promoters. "Being only humans, we failed
in the attempt. There are only two of us left, both settlers."
Fernandez received a U.S.$95.00 loan through the FIDES
Small Industries Program for a sandal-making business, which he During his first year and a half in San Julian, Yucra was
used to buy the raw materials. Business is good, he said, a leader in his nucleo, served as president of the NADEPA, and
Because of the central location of his shop, settlers and sea- helped reorganize the Federation of Colonists, a zone-wide
sonal workers traveling up the Brecha have purchased his san- representative body. He requested from the community a twodals. He works in his shop on the main road about four days a year absence to return to Potosi to finish his studies in busiweek. During peak agricultural production periods he closes ness administration, which was granted. Shortly after his
his business to work full time in the fields. return to Potosi, the Pereda coup took place and the university
was closed for over a year. During this time, he met and
Fernandez requested a second loan for a larger amount from married his wife. After another year of study continually
FIDES for an expansion in production, but his application was interrupted by political turmoil, he received word from his
denied. "FIDES said its program was supposed to help start up neighbors in San Julian to return to nucleo 14 or lose his
businesses, and I should look elsewhere for more money. The land.
problem is that the bank application procedures are too long,
and I have to travel back and forth too much. Their interest Back in San Julian he found work with the FIDES Consolis too high even if they would be interested in such a small idation Project as an extensionist in cooperatives and was
business." assigned to work with the newer communities in NADEPA V. Yucra
remained active in his community's affairs and served as presiFernandez and his father would like to expand their enter- dent of the local development committee.
prises and make enough money to move to the German highway
where there is more demand. "Given the economic situation, Yucra considers himself first and foremost a settler but
though, it is best to remain close to the land, which produces farms only as a supplement to his salary from the project. In
regardless of inflation," Fernandez concluded.,. 1983 he sowed 1 hectare of rice and has a 1,000 square meter
garden with tomatoes, onions, lettuce, and other greens. Of
his 50-hectare plot, Yucra has only worked 4 hectares and is
now cultivating in barbecho. He has some citrus trees around Committee (which became inactive after the devaluation), a
his adobe, tin-roofed house, a sow with piglets, and forms part health committee, and an emergency committee formed during the
of a group which purchased coffee seeds from FIDES. The seed- floods. The settlers have built a health post and have conlings will be transplanted to each member's fields in December. structed a large meeting house for the NADEPA.
Yucra's wife Delfina arrived in 1982 from Potosi for the "in comparison with the spontaneous colonies, we're in a
first time. The first months were difficult. The heat, the paradise. I went to one spontaneous colony not long ago. The
mosquitoes, the lack of mobility, and the isolation weighed ability to organize is deficient. The president did all the
heavily. Although she has become accustomed to most of the planning and gave all theforders. He monopolized all the acdiscomforts, she would like to return to the interior because tivities."
of the apparently permanent health problems and the lack of
education for the three children. Yucra shares his wife's Yucra plans to leave to finish his university studies in
concerns but says he could never return to the city indef in- the near future butlwill return to San Julian. "Although the
itely. "San Julian is my home now. We should work to improve parasites and the mbsquitoes-still bother me, I'm happier here.
it." With the project, I've realized that there's a whole pile of
things we can do, small industries. We have enough raw materiAbout the work of the CIU, Yucra said, "The CIU gave im- als and human resources. We only lack the capital."
portent support at all levels. The CIU promoters in the communities helped organize, solve problems, plan, and coordinate. Also, the food aid was indispensable."
Colonist: Cresencio Torrelio Origin: Oruro
The first years were hard. The community was heterogene- Community! Nucleo 35 Year of settlement: 1979
ous. Most of the settlers were young and had escaped home to
look for adventure. They'd never had to live as adults in a Cresencio Torrelio is about 40 years old. He and his wife
community with community obligations. They had never farmed on have five children, from 1 to 15 years of age. He arrived in
their own, but had most recently been farmhands or part-time San Julian with several others from Oruro and they participated
workers in another Santa Cruz colonization zone. in the orientation program. From the beginning, nucleo 34 had
In regard to the FIDES project, Yucra believes that it is
planting "roots" in the zone. "We may not see the results of The original site for the nucleo had been identified as
some things for a long time, like the work with the women or prone to flooding. Rather than wait an indefinite period for
with cooperatives. But the concrete things one can see, such another nucleo to be readied, the new arrivals decided to setas the citrus plants, the coffee and cacao, and the improve- tle regardless of warnings. During rainy seasons, much of the
ments in the San Benito road done with PAIC [Food for the Hun- cleared urban area fills with water. A wooden platform has
gry] funds." been built leading to the community pump, which appears to be
on a small island surrounded by a lake.
As both a FIDES extensionist and a settler, Yucra's dual
position in the community is at times an uncomfortable one. The community itself has always had internal problems
Certain interests in the zone object to FIDES for political stemming largely from divisive religious differences. At least
reasons. Some agencies have felt threatened by "competition" five evangelical protestant sects are represented. Although
with FIDES or disagree with its philosophy. One group cam- leaders are regularly elected*, the nucleo is fragmented and
paigned actively against diversified farming and especially usually unable to mobilize as a community. Most of its settagainst animal traction, insisting it was a second-rate tech- lers "follow their own paths." Many stay long enough to prenology designed to inhibit the small farmer's development, pare their land, plant, and weed. They then return to the
"Now," Yucra comments, "that same group is giving short courses highlands, rather than suffer the discomfort and isolation of
that emphasize animal traction as an intermediate step before the rainy season. They return for the harvest, then leave
mechanization." Yucra, like the other extension agents, bears again to look for other work.
the brunt of criticism in the field for real or perceived failures to keep promises. But, he says, "it's worthwhile." Torrelio, nonetheless, showed a more permanent commitment
to the community and the zone. His wife and children arrived
The people's ability to organize has developed. In the year following the orientation program. They constructed a
nucleo 14 there is a mother's club, a soccer club, a Pro-Water house on the main road and installed a general store, the
largest and best stocked in the community. They made several up a refreshment stand outside the market. One of the extenimprovements on the house, adding two small rooms and a tin sionists who knew him commented, "It's not the same as having
roof. They bought pigs and chickens and a pair of goats. your own land and making things grow, but in this crazy economic situation, he's probably making more money than he was."
The FIDES agricultural extensionist in the area commented
that Torrelio was the person in the nucleo most interested in
new techniques and crop varieties. Torrelio cleared and installed a seedbed on his farm for pastures which were said to
thrive in lower wetlands. He had cleared 5 hectares and last Colonist: Vicente Chumacero Origin: Potosi
year cultivated 2 hectares of rice. The family had a garden Community: Nucleo 38 Year of settlement: 1979
with tomatoes, green peppers, carrots, and other vegetables.
He occasionally would butcher a pig and sell the meat in sur- Vicente Chumacero, 28, and his wife, Rosario, 21, have the
rounding communities. reputation in their community of being hard-working and ambitious to a fault. Vicente and Rosario both have lived in
When Torrelio spent one rainy season in nucleo 35, he nucleo 38 since its inception with the orientation program.
disliked the experience intensely. The road between nucleos 32 Vicente was single when he arrived. Rosario lived with her
and 35 flooded every year, making passage possible only in a widowed mother. Both Rosario and her mother are settlers with
small dugout canoe. The mosquitoes, the rain, and the heat 50 hectares each. The relaxation of the INC policy against
were intolerable. "It's too isolated and uncomfortable here in giving land to women is uncommon but not unheard of.
the rainy season," he once said. "Besides, most everyone in the nucleo leaves and the place is abandoned. It's not good to Vicente and Rogario married two years ago and have two
be up here so alone. If I or one of my family get sick, children, a one year old and a newborn.
there's nothing to be done, no one to turn to." During subsequent rainy seasons, he traveled with his family back to Vicente's father was a miner in Potosi and was killed in
Oruro, returning to San Julian for the harvest. an accident. His mother died of tuberculosis several years
later. Although the family had numerous relatives to help
Torrelio served as vice president of his NADEPA and was Vicente and his brothers and sisters, he preferred to leave
instrumental in forming the Association of Producers of San Potosi and mining. He worked in the lowlands in the sugar
Julian, a forerunner of the present political body, the Special harvests and as a farmhand in Yapacani before arriving in San
Federation of Colonists of San Julian. He also played a key Julian.
role in organizing a large-scale intercommunity work project to
repair the flood-prone road between nucleos 32 and 35. Although Rosario has her own land, her only brother old
enough to work in the fields is needed to work their mother's
Torrelio was concerned about the isolation of the com- land. Hired labor is difficult to find, especially since the
munity, not only for health reasons, but for the education of communities closer to the German highway absorb much of the
his children. Although the nucleo had been assigned various workers that arrive in the zone. Since Rosario married
teachers, the quality of instruction was usually poor. "One Vicente, he and his two brothers work both plots together.
teacher who was teaching my son to read and write spelled Bolivia, 'Volivia'," he said ruefully. Rosario runs a store, which, although only one of several
in the nucleo, is the best and most consistently stocked. Its
Last year the inflation hit his trading operations hard. prices however, are also the highest in the village and tend to
Prices changed daily in the cities and he was unable to adjust rise in times of scarcity. Their neighbors complain of the
his costs properly because of the lack of price information, prices, but Rosario responds that they do not have to buy if
When he did adjust prices his neighbors accused him of specu- they object. Vicente usually adds nothing to this debate, but
rating. The store became severely decapitalized. That year dedicates himself to the fields.
most of his pigs sickened and died of milk sickness. His wife
felt more and more dissatisfied with their situation. The The family is determined toproduce as much as it can and
children were getting older and needed better schooling, save as much money as quickly as possible. Last year Vicente
and Rosario cultivated 15 hectares of rice. This year they
Following the marketing of the 1982 rice crops, Torrelio have planted an additional 15 hectares. They hope to expand
dismantled his house, the tin roof, and the improvements on his their production even more next year if they can be assured of
land. He moved his family to Montero where he and his wife set sufficient hired labor to supplement their own efforts. Aside
from a few tomatoes the family has no garden. They use their Mamani left his home and traveled to Santa Cruz where he
own purchased stores for variety in their diet. worked two years as a farmhand in San Pedro in the Chane-Piray
zone. He wanted to have his own land rather than work on anThe community recognizes that the couple are hard working other man's property. The land there, he said is too low and
and cause no problems, but complains that they fail to fulfill of poor quality. The Institute of Colonization (INC) announced
their community obligations. Although Vicente contributes the that land was available in San Julian. Mamani, along with a
required minimum of community labor, he refuses to participate group of fellow laborers, signed up in the INC office in San
on committees or to be elected as a leader. "I have no time to Pedro.
spare from my fields to sit and talk in meetings," he says.
"It's all the same." Vicente declined to serve on the health After settling in nucleo 17 in 1977, the entire group
committee when asked to do so. "My family and I have no health participated in the orientation program, although most were
problems," he stated. "Besides, we have a health promoter and already familiar with lowland agriculture. Mamani commented
the FIDES nurse lives here. What we need is a doctor, not that it is hotter in the lowlands and harder to work, whereas
another committee." in the interior the air is "pure." But production is better
here, he said.
Rosario is a member of the cooperative's Home Inputs section and has purchased materials from the local sale. She is Mamani had bad luck with the distribution of the farm
reluctant, however, to participate actively in the management plots after orientation. The CIU staff left it to the settlers
of the local outlet although she has the skills and experience to determine a method for fair distribution of the plots.
to make a valuable contribution. She attends the meetings only Mamani said several settlers had campaigned quietly and sucbecause it is required to be eligible to make purchases. cessfully so that the division would be made "as the clock
rotates," with each pie-shaped plot corresponding to the order
Aside from Rosario's participation in the Home Inputs Of colonists on the offic4"al settlement list. This procedure
section, the family has had little involvement in FIDES activi- left a few men with the cdoicest lands. "I ended up with a low
ties. Vicente is little interested in diversified farming and clay-heavy plot."
although he did purchase 100 cacao plants. Basically, he does
not intend to remain indefinitely on his plot or in the commun- The new settlers had a hard time settling down, according
ity. In keeping with his reluctance to become involved in com- to Mamani. "We wer4 all farmhands and were used to moving
munity affairs, he has kept out of political activities. He around a lot, looking for work during slow times. Most of us
has not participated in the various debates regarding FIDES's were single." Mamani married a woman from Sucre three years
activities. ago. Most of the others have also married since settling.
Vicente and Rosario plan to earn and save enough money to Mamani was selected by his community in 1981 to be one of
move to the German highway to set up a store and a small res- the eight model diversified farmers in the FIDES program. He
taurant. Eventually, they would like to move to Montero and is one of the four still active in the program. He received,
purchase a truck. on credit, a complete set of animal traction equipment, two
horses, a backpack sprayer, a chainsaw, and other production
credits as well as intensive technical backup.
Colonist: Apolonesio Mamani Origin: La Paz "Two years ago, everyone had a bad year. Most of the
Community: Nucleo 17 Year of settlement: 1977 settlers in nucleo 17 left to look for outside work. I stayed
and worked with the FIDES program. It wasn't easy. I'd never
Apolonesio Mamani, 27, was born and raised in a small worked with horses before and wasn't sure I could do it. I
village on the edge of Lake Titicaca, near the Peruvian border. didn't make as much money as the others. But now they've spent
His father was a farmer, although fishing was an important it all and are worse off than before, and I'm better off."
economic activity. The family has worked with animal traction
using oxen "since my grandfather's time," he said with a grin. Mamani presently has 5 hectares in production, 3 under
The family had a plot of land of about 5 hectares, a consider- plow with animal traction and 2 hectares he works by hand. He
able size for the area. His uncle and aunt were colonists in cultivates rice, corn, cotton, and garden crops, including
Caranavi, near the Alto Beni. "They used to take me there, tomatoes, onions, lettuce, cabbage, and carrots. Last year 4
where I learned what the lowlands were like." hectares of those he worked were rented, since his own land is
poor. His rice yield was very low, since the land did not burn
properly. He only sold 190 kg of rice. The rest he reserved 5. Memorandum to USAID Regarding Future Interventions
for his family's consumption and for seed. His cotton crop, although small, was the only real source of profit. He also hires out his horse and wagon team for transport in the communities.
DATE: October 19, 1983
Mamani has 200 citrus trees which he bought from FIDES
with cash. The trees flowered this year and will produce fruit REPLY TO
next year. He plans to use his horse and wagon to sell the ATTN OF:. Richard R. Solem, Team Leader
fruit in the area.
SUBJECT: Bolivia Colonization Because of the unfavorable weather and economic conditions
during the last two years, Mamani has made little progress in TO: Mr. Henry H. Bassford, D
paying off his debt with FIDES. However, one reason he has been able to absorb his losses has been his diversification. "I'm mostly self-sufficient," he says cheerfully. "The only food articles I have to buy are things like cooking oil, salt, This is to thank you for Mission support to the AID/
and flour." Washington Impact Evaluation Team, and to convey a copy
of our report in rough draft. There will be much reThe biggest problems he has, he says, are the ones they drafting and "fine-tuning" en route to a final version,
all face, that of health and the road. "Many times we can't so if Mission personnel wish to read the draft for
get our produce out. The garden crops spoil quickly.." inaccuracies, insentivities, commissions, etc. we will
welcome any resultant comments and/or corrections. "It's not easy here," he continues. "It's hot and the
mosquitoes are bad. But I want to stay. I feel better now You indicated during our entry briefing that feedback
because I work for myself." from the team regarding certain input/output issues
(eg. mechanization versus animal traction and human resource management versus agricultural systems development), we elected to provide the reactions you requested via separate memorandum, also attached.
Mission interest and support these past three weeks is much appreciated John Rifenbark's orientation and backstopping efforts enabled us to get right down to work, and the use of Mission vehicle and driver for field work/was invaluable.
Please don't hesitate to call me in AID/Washington with suggestions regarding the impact evaluation, or if additional feedback concerning input/output issues is desired.
cc: DP:RLeon de Vivero
INPUT/OUTPUT ISSUES "stages to of development" and the position of the San Julian and Chang Piray
SAN JULIAN AND CHANE PIRAY PROJECTS projects along that continum.
In 1974 the Chang Piray colonization area already represented a mix of farms at both the "Pioneer" and the "Consolidation" stages. Most of the San Julian colonization area, on the other hand, was still virgin forest without human settlements. SLMMARY
By the beginning of the "consolidation" project in 1979 the Chang Piray colonization area had made some additional progress along Nelson's"stages to development" A long term commitment to San Julian is required to ensure passage from the continuum, but still could be characterized as a mixture of "pioneering" farms
consolidation to a growth stage of development-at least another five years. (due to heavy turnover) and "consolidation" farms. San Julian, on the other hand,
still had half of its designated area without any settlement at all, and the farms Future project interventions should include additional road improvements already established were so new that "consolidation" was only beginning for a few
(ollaboration with BID and CORDECRUZ is suggested), continued social services, of them.
and increased emphasis on specific agricultural and livestock raising problems
in the Oriente. In 1983, at the close of the USAID's "consolidation" project, we see Chang Piray
still moving along the continuum but very unevenly. Farm turnover continues to be Implementation of any future project should be through FIDES working in conjunc- high, which means that pioneering is just beginning for many of the new farmers.
tion with CIAT perhaps putting CIAT on a retainer to FIDES. The project Another disturbir.g factor is that although virtually all virgin forest has been
should be developed through a six month participatory design process involving cleared, the total acreage in production for many of the farms is no greater than
FIDES, CIAT and San Julian campesino groups, it might have been after two years work, i.e. the farmers are caught in the slash
and burn "barbecho crisis" wherein they plant up to three hectares of annuals, cultivate them two to three years with declining yields, then burn off another area DISCUSSION to re eat the cycle. They have no capitalization through development of crops,
r. :ure and livestock, or destumpiv for more permanent animal or machine tilled
Lon. Tern.. Commitment
-is is not to say that Chang Piray is a failure. There are man, farms in this area Michael Nelson, in his 1973 book titled The Development of Ironical Lands, descri es are in Nelson's 'consolidation' stage and others that seem embarked on the
three stages to development of successful colonies: Z!rovth" stage. .-here is amzle evidence of well established, permanent agriculture
Zhan. Piray, and there has likewise been much growth of related industries. The
1. The "Pioneer Stage" (5 to 10 years), during which settlers mzwv :n:c an areZ ,rozlem, if there' is one, is that such development has Lee, extremely uneven and,
and establish basic life support systems such as water, food, shelter and due to high farm turnover, at a very high cost.
access to consumption goods, markets and credit.
Development in San Julian, as of 1983, is more uniform. Though there has been turn2. The "Consolidation Stage" (5 to 10 years) during which community organization, over, very little has been the result of economic failure or natural disasters.
educational and health services, transport improvements, and permanent housing This stability, combined with an aggressive program of agricultural and community
are established and better use is made of landholdings and credit. develop-.ent services, has led to a general trend toward rapid capitalization-actually faster than anticipated in the Nelson model.
3. The "Growth Stage", during which farms are capitalized, permanent agricultural
systems are established, related agro-industries are developed, credit become Although farm incomes are not high, primarily due to road related marketing problems,
generally available, and supply and marketing systems are firmly grounded. the San Julian farmers have tended to clear an additional several hectares each year
and, more important, to diversify their acreage through development of tree crops, At the time that USAID/Bolivia made its first project intervention (the 1974 loan pasture and livestock. Thus, despite marginal incomes, the farmers' net worths,
for roads and wells), the Michael Nelson study was alluded to. Subsequently, and thus the likelihood of sustained agriculture and economic growth, are steadily
during the course of the 1978 studies which led to AID's second project interven- increasing.
tion (the 1979 grant for "consolidation" services), it was again alluded to. Given that we are once more at a watershed, with the "consolidation" project Thia cursor" review of progress against the backdrop of Nelson's "stages of growth"
drawing to a conclusion, it seems appropriate to again reflect on Nelson's is offered to roint out that if AID wishes to assure that the Chang Piray and San
Indicated, it seems, is development of a closer linkage between CIAT and FIDES in
Julian colonies take hold, a longer period of commitment is required. The importance the San Julian colonization area. The organizations are much more complementary
of sustained support is graphically apparent in a comparison of development in the than they are competitive. With such collaboration the San Julian farmers could
two areas. In Chang Piray, where colonization efforts have been under way for be assured of the best agronomic information and advice available, even as FIDES
twenty years, but public sector support has been "hit or miss," coming from many would be drawn more closely to established Santa Cruz development institutions.
directions and as many entities, the growth pattern is extremely uneven. In San
Julian, where almost from the beginning development has been carefully guided and
nurtured by AID's integrated rural development program, the pattern of growth is
relatively even and consistent. Imolementation
Indicated, it seems, is a commitment for continued interventions over a longer The San Julian project has made great strides in a few short years, and the intensive,
period of time; at least another five years, perhaps for ten. Focusing on San Julian sensitive, and ever adaptable technical assistance program run by FIDES seems to be
alone (the project you requested feedback on), the following are areas viewed as the cause. It would seem unwise, therefore, to start a new with a different organizaappropriate for continued investment. tion.
The needs of the San Julian project over the next few years will continue to evolve,
however. Given continued success, they should increasingly require assistance
Project Interventions related to agronomic and farming systems problems. This would suggest a strengthening of FIDES's ability to be responsive in this area, i.e. the CIAT linkage.
Road improvement is the major concern of farmers in San Julian, extensionists at
FIDES and economists at CIAT. All agree that until all-weather access can be Suggested is a follow-on project aimed at nurturing the San Julian colony from the
provided, efficient marketing of produce cannot develop. Without easy market access, "consolidation" stage of development (virtually all of San Julian can be said to be
the colonists are unlikely to develop sustained farm growth. at the beginning of this stage) to the "growth" stage. It should be a two phase
other concern frequently dressed by the colonists is the health hazard o rai program, beginning as soon as the USAID can mobiilize funds, with hase one being Another concern frequently expressed by the colonists is the health hazard o rainy a six month participatory design effort (involving collaboration be:wee-. FIDE, season issolation. Eve-'- year each community suffers avoidable tragedies because CIAT and the San Julian colonists themselves) and the next phase beins ir leentacion
they can't get sick or injured residents tc medical facilities in Montero. of the project itself.
The BID, CORDECRUZ and FIDES are presently discussing a possible collaboration for The participatory design phase is viewed as useful because it will give everyone a
upgrading of the San Julian access road and lateral extensions. A commitment trom stake in the outcome, even while it will allow for mutual education. lot :
AIl for a portion of the total cost would be timl*y. "sticky" issues could thus be "ha-=ered out". Soze examples:
Social organization has been a very innortant factor in AID's success to date in 1. Agricultural credit programs are popular with the colonists because the
the San Julian project. FIDES' work to promote cooperatives, health conc-ittees and interest rates are usually negative in real terms, given olivia's high
community mobilization continues to be effective, and given its low cost it would rate ofrinflation. This has the unfortunate effect of ensuring the lenders
seem a wise investment for the future. Although the organization/promotion work demise through decapitalization. If agricultural credit is tc be sus-tained
itself may seem ambiguous, its fruits, in terms of well maintained community over the long rum, a means must be developed to cre-ide for inflatiem-;roof
facilities (wells, schools, etc.), generally good health, quick notilization for loans (e.g. "in kind" credit, or "floating rare" credit).
emergencies (eg. last years flood) and effectiveness in oatininz government
services (school and health personnel) are easy to see and appreciate. 2. Virtually all farmers want to mechanize. They associate tractors with
wealth, without having a good understanding of all the complications that
Agricultural technology is a concern you expressed in. our Serte.ber 29 meeting and, go with them. CIAT has done some useful studies of mechanization of small
after spending several weeks in the Santa Cruz colonization areas, we learned that rain forest farms. An extended dialogue between uCIA, FIDES and the
it is widely shared. FIDES has accumulated a great deal of knowledge about the art colonists would help to ensure a better treatment of mechanization in a
of the possible in rain forest agriculture by being on-site with their experimental future project design.
farm as well as with the colonists themselves. CIAT, orn the other hand, has likewise learned a great deal, primarily through surveys of activities in the Chand The participatory design phase might be funded via a small OPG to TIDES, which would
Piray area, analysis of these surveys, and work or their owo experimental farm at in turn "retain" services from CIAT. If such arraneent works during the design
Saavedra. period, it might be indicated during implementation.
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Case of the Potosi Region in Bolivia. Regional and Rural
Development Division, Office of Multisectoral Development,
Accion Cultural Loyda (ACLO) (1978). Miotacion en Chuguisaca. Bureau for Science and Technology. Washington, D.C.:
Sucre, Bolivia: ACLO. U.S. Agency for International Development.
Agency for International Development (1978). Audit Report. FIDES (1979). "Colonization Consolidation in the Bolivian SubAID Mission to Bolivia, Sub-Tropical Lands Development, Tropics: San Julian-Chane-Pirai." Proposal presented by
Office of the Auditor General. Washington, D.C.: U.S. the Fundacion Integral de Desarrollo (FIDES). Santa Cruz,
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Austin, Allan (1978). Evaluation Report on the Sub-Tropical
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cialist prepared for the U.S. Agency for International (1969). Land Reform and Social Revolution in Bolivia.
Development. Washington, D.C. New York: Praeger Publishers.
Barnett, Stanley A. and Nat Engel (1982). Effective Institu- Henkel, Ray (1978). "The Move to the Oriente: Colonization
tion Building. A Guide for Project Designers and Project and Environmental Impact." A paper prepared for the ConManagers Based on Lessons Learned from the AID Portfolio. ference on Modern Day Bolivia, Arizona State University.
AID Program Evaluation, Bureau for Program and Policy Tempe, Arizona.
Coordination. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Agency for International Development. Hess, David (1978). "Adaptation to a New Environment: Pioneer
Migration in San Julian." Paper prepared for the 77th
Castro, Robert J. (1978). San Julian and Chane-Piray Coloniza- Annual Meeting of the American Anthropological Association. Project Evaluation Report. tion. Los Angeles, California.
Centro de Comunicacion Social (CENCOS) (1976). Acercamiento a Hess, David (1979). "Pioneering in San Julian: A Study of
la Vida de los Colonizadores de Alto Beni. La Paz, Boli- Adaptive Strategy Formation by Migrant Farmers in Eastern
via: CENCOS. Bolivia." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Pittsburgh. Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
Centro de Investigacion Agricola Tropical (CIAT) (1980). Second General Report, 1979. Technical Cooperation Mission Instituto Interamericano de Ciencias Agricolas (IICA) (19 ).
of the Overseas Development Administration. Santa Cruz, Seminario Sobre Proyectos de Desarrollo Rural Integrado.
Bolivia: Mision Britanica en Agricultural Tropical. Serie Informes de Conferencias, Cursos y Reuniones No.
Corporacion Regional de Desarrollo de Santa Cruz (CORDECRUZ)
(1980). Proyecto de Desarrollo Agropecuario del Norte, Kranz, Massaret (1980). History of U.S. Economic Assistance to
San Pedro. (I Fase), Anexos (9-17). Bolivia, 1942-1980. Purchase Order AID/OTR-147-80-31.
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Agency for International DevelopCrossley, J. Colin (1977). "Spatial Variations in Bolivian ment.
Agricultural Marketing Behavior in Areas of Recent Colonization." Report to the Social Sciences Research Council, Ladman, Jerry (Principal Investigator) (1983). "Resumen del
United Kingdom. Reporte de los Mercados Financieros Rurales Bolivianos,
Proyecto de Investigacion." Presented at a meeting on
Curtis, Ronald (1978). Overview of Project Evaluation Study: Credito para Pequenos Agricultores y Mobilizacion de AhorSub-Tropical Lands Development Project. Report prepared ros en Bolivia. Cochabamba, Bolivia.
for the U.S. Agency for International Development. Washington, D.C.
Land Tenwe Center Library (1977). Colonization and settlement: Rondinelly, Dennis A. and Hugh Evans (1982). Integrated Re_________ Training and Methods Series No. 8, Sup- RnnelHgEvs(18) Ite rtd e
A Bibliography. Training and Methods Series N. 8, Sup- gional Development Planning: Linking Urban Centers and
plement 3. Madison, Wisconsin: Land Tenwe Center Libra- Rural Areas in Bolivia.
Royder, Thomas C. and E. Boyd Wemeroren (1973). El Impacto de Lawrence-Jones, W., J. Leslie, M. Pozo, and J. Serrate (1983). las Carreteras de Acceso en la Colonization Espontanea.
A Farm Survey in Murillo with Special Reference to Pig Logan, Utah: Utah State University.
Management. The Results of a Survey in the Colonization
Area North of Santa Cruz, Bolivia. Working Paper No. Scudder, Thayer (1981). The Development Potential of New Lands
36. Santa Cruz, Bolivia: Centro de Investigacion Agri- Settlement in the Tropics and Subtropics: A Global Statecola Tropical (CIAT). of-the-Art Evaluation with Specific Emphasis in Policy
Implications. Binghamton, New York: Institute for DevelLocatelli, Eduardo (1978). Evaluation of the Colonization opmrent Anthropology.
Project in San Julian. Report prepared for the U.S. Agency for International Development. Washington, D.C. Steer, Juan S. (1978). Evaluation del Proyecto de Desarrollo
de Tierras Sub-Tropicales. Report prepared for the Agency Malloy, James M. and Richard S. Thorn, eds. (1971). Beyond the for International Development. Washington, D.C.
Revolution. Bolivia Since 1952. Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: University of Pittsburgh Press. Stevens, Charles (1979). Proyecto de Consolidacion de San
Julian, Analisis de Ingenieria. Report prepared for the Maxwell, Simon (1980). Differentiation in the Colonies of Agency for International Development. Washington, D.C.
Santa Cruz: Causes and Effects. Working Paper No. 13.
Unidad de Economia, PRODAC. Stutley, Charles (1981). "Caracteristicas de un Modelo de
Finca en Barvecho en la Zona Central del Area Norte de Maxwell, Simon, Charles Stutley, and Alan Bojanic (1982). Colonizacion." Documento Interno de CIAT/BTAM. Santa
Report on a Case Study Programme in San Pedro. Working Cruz, Bolivia: Centro de Investigacion Agricola Tropical
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Taylor, Peter Leigh (1983). The San Julian Multipurpose CoopMaxwell, Simon and Melvin Pozo (1981). Farm Systems in the erative: An Experience in Adaptation Through ParticipaColonization Crescent of Santa Cruz, Bolivia: Results of tion. Santa Cruz, Bolivia: Fundacion Integral de Desara Survey. Working Paper No. 22. Santa Cruz, Bolivia: rollo (FIDES).
Centro de Investigacion Agricola Tropical (CIAT).
Thompson, Stephen I. (1973). Pioneer Colonization: A CrossMcCann, Gasvan and Alan Bojanic (1982). Economic Analysis of Cultural View. Addison-Wesley Module in Anthropology No.
Cocoa Models Proposed for Chane-Pirai Area, Santa Cruz. 33. Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing
Working Paper No. 26. Santa Cruz, Bolivia: Centro de Company, Inc.
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Wessel, Kelso Lee (1968). "An Economic Assessment of Pioneer Nash, June (1978). Women in Development: Dependency and Ex- Settlement in the Bolivia Low Lands." Unpublished Ph.D.
ploitation. Land Tenure Center Reprint No. 133. Madison, dissertation, Cornell University. Ithica, New York.
Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin, Madison.
Wiggins, Steve (1976). Colonizacion en Bolivia. Accion CulNelson, Michael (1978). Evaluation. Chane-Pirai and San Juli- tural Loyola, Iglesia Metodista. Sucre, Bolivia.
an Colonization Projects. Report of Regional Development
Peacock, Harry (1979). Final Report of the Resettlement Advisor of Project Chane-Pirai-San Julian. Report prepared
for the Agency for International Development. Washington,
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No. 53: Area Development in Liberia: Toward Integration
and Participation (July 1984) PN-AAL-038
No. 57: Bolivia Integrated Rural Development in a Colonization
Setting (January 1985)
No. 9: The Impact of Irrigation on Development: Issues for a
Comprehensive Evaluation Study (October 1980) PN-AAJ-208
No. 4: Philippine Small Scale Irrigation (May 1980) PN-AAH-74 No. 12: Korean Irrigation (December 1980) PN-AAH-975 No. 29: Sederhana: Indonesia Small-Scale Irrigation (February
No. 31: Sudan: The Rahad Irrigation Project (March 1982)
No. 35: The On-Farm Water Management Project in Pakistan (June
No. 42: Bangladesh Small-Scale Irrigation (April 1983)
No. 43: Egypt: The Egyptian American Rural Improvement
Service, A Point Four Project, 1952-63 (April 1983)
No. SO: On-Farm Water Management In Aegean Turkey, 1968-1974
(December 1983) PN-AAL-029
No. 54: PERU: Improved Water and Land Use in the Sierra,
(December 1984) PN-AAL-040
IRRIGATION (con't) PRIVATE SECTOR
Program Evaluation Report: Discussion Papers:
No. 8: Irrigation And AID's Experience: A Consideration Based No. 14: Private Sector: Ideas and Opportunities: A Review o
On Evaluations (August 1983) PN-AAL-019 Basic Concepts and Selected Experience (June 1982)
Special Studies: No. 16: The Private Sector, The Public Sector, And Donor
No. 7: The Vicos Experiment: A Study Of The Impacts Of The Assistance In Economic Development: An Interpretive Essay
Cornell-Peru Project In A Highland Community (April 1982) (March 1983) PN-AAL-007
PN-AAJ-616 No. 18: Free Zones In Developing Countries: Expanding
No. 18: The Helmand Valley Project In Afghanistan (December Opportunities for the Private Sector (November 1983)
1983) PN-AAL-028 PN-AAL-024
No. 20: A Comparative Analysis of Policies and Other Factors Which Affect the Role of the Private Sector in Economic
LIVESTOCK DEVELOPMENT Development (December 1983) PN-AAL-031
Discussion Paper: Impact Evaluation:
No. 6: The Sociology of Pastoralism and African Livestock No. 41: Impact Evaluation of Housing Guaranty Programs In
DeVelopment (May 1979) PN-AAG-922 Panama (March 1983) PN-AAL-008
Program Evaluation Report: Special Studies:
No. 4: The Workshop on Pastoralism and African Livestock No. 4: The Social Impact of Agribusiness: A Case Study of
Development (June 1980) PN-AAH-238 ALCOSA in Guatemala (July 1981) PN-AAJ-172
No. 6: The Economic Development of Korea: Sui Generis or Generic? (January 1982) PN-AAJ-177
LOCAL GOVERNMENT No. 9: Private Sector: Costa Rica (March 1983) PN-AAL-005
No. 10: Private Sector: The Tortoise Walk: Public Policy An Discussion Paper Private Activity In The Economic Development of Cameroon
No. 17: AID Assistance To Local Government: Experience (March 1983) PN-AAL-004
And Issues (November 1983) PN-AAL-026 No. 11: The Private Sector And The Economic Development Of
Malawi (March 1983) PN-AAL-006
Special Study: No. 12: Ventures In The Informal Sector, And How They Worked
No. 17: Local Government Trends and Performance: Assessment Out In Brazil (March 1983) PN-AAL-009
of AID's Involvement in Latin America November 1983 No. 14: The Private Sector: The Regulation Of Rural Markets
(PN-AAL-023) In Africa (June 1983) PN-AAL-014
No. 15: The Private Sector: Ethnicity, Individual Initiative And Economic Growth In An African Plural Society: The
POPULATION/FAMILY PLANNING Bamileke of Cameroon (June 1983) PN-AAL-016
No. 16: Private Sector Evaluation: The Dominican Republic Discussion Paper: (June 1983) PN-AAL-018
No. 5: Study of Family Planning Program Effectiveness (April No. 19: Capitalizing Workers: The Impact of Employee Stock
1979) PN-AAG-672 Ownership Plans in Selected Developing Countries
(January 1984) PN-AAL-033
Program Evaluation Reports:
No. 1: Family Planning Program Effectiveness: Report of a
Workshop (December 1979) PRIVATE VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS
No. 2: A.I.D.'s Role in Indonesian Family Planning: A Case
Study with General Lessons for Foreign Assistance (December Discussion Paper:
1979) PN-AAH-425 No. 12: Turning Private Voluntary Organizations Into
No. 3: Third Evaluation of the Thailand National Family Development Agencies; Questions for Evaluation (April
Planning Program (February 1980) PN-AAH-006 1982) PN-AAJ-612
PRIVATE VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS (con't) CROSS REFERENCE LIST BY SECTOR
No. 12: Ventures In the Informal Sector, And How They Worked SMALL-SCALE ENTERPRISE (con't)
Out In Brazil (March 1983) PN-AAL-009
No. 13: The Evaluation of Small Enterprise Programs And PROGRAM DESIGN AND & EVALUATION METHODOLOGY Projects: Issues in Business And Community Development
Reports: (June 1983) PN-AAL-013
No. 1: Manager's Guide to Data Collection (November 1979)
No. 2: Selection and Justification Procedures for Rural WATER
Roads Improvement Projects (January 1984) PN-AAL-032
No. 4: Policy Directions for Rural Water Supply in Developing ROADS Countries (April 1979) PN-AAG-691
Discussion Papers: Impact Evaluations:
No. 2: New Directions Rural Roads (March 1979) PN-AGG-670 No. 3: The Potable Water Project in Rural Thailand (May 1980)
No. 7: Socio-Economic and Environmental Impacts of Low-Volume PN-AAH-850
Rural Roads -- A Review of the Literature (Febrauary 1980) No. 5:. Kenya Rural Water Supply: Program, Progress, Prospect
PN-AAJ-135 (June 1980) PN-AAH-724
No. 10: Tunisia: CARE Water Projects (October 1980) Impact Evaluations: PN-AAJ-207
No. 1: Colombia: Small Farmer Market Access (December 1979) No. 20: Korean Potable Water System Project: Lessons from
PN-AAH-768 Experience (May 1981) PN-AAJ-170
No. 6: Impact of Rural Roads in Liberia (June 1980) PN-AAH-750 No. 24: Peru: CARE OPG Water Health Services Project (Octobe
No. 7: Effectiveness and Impact of the CARE/Sierra Leone 1981) PN-AAJ-176
Rural Penetration Roads Projects (June 1980) PN-AAH-751 No. 32: Panama: Rural Water (May 1982) PN-AAJ-609
No. 11: Jamaica Feeder Roads: An Evaluation .(November 1980)
PN-AAJ-199 Program Evaluation Report:
No. 13: Rural Roads in Thailand (December 1980) PN-AAH-970 No. 7: Community Water Supply in Developing Countries:
No. 17: Honduras Rural Roads: Old Directions and New (January Lessons from Experience (September 1982) PN-AAJ-624
No. 18: Philippines Rural Roads I and II (March 1981) Special Studies:
PN-AAH-973 No. 2: Water Supply and Diarrhea: Guatemala Revisited (Augus
No. 26: Kenya: Rural Roads (January 1982) PN-AAH-972 1980) PN-AAH-747
No. 3: Rural Water Projects in Tanzania: Technical, Social, Program Evaluation Report: and Administrative Issues (November 1980) PN-AAH-974
No. 5: Rural Roads Evaluation Summary Report (March 1982)
WOMEN IN DEVELOPMENT
SMALL-SCALE ENTERPRISE Discussion Paper:
No. 8: Assessing the Impact of Development Projects on Women Impact Evaluation: (May 1980) PN-AAJ-725
No. 40: Assisting Small Business In Francophone Africa -- The
Entente Fund African Enterprises Program (December 1982)
cannot clear land, plant, and harvest a crop in much less than Another critical effect of this process which proved to be
6 months, very important at late stages is that settlers learned to work
together to solve mutual problems. Today's network of cooperaNeeded next are certain basic farm implements and produc- ties, health promoters, and settler federations all find their
tion inputs. An ax, a machete, and a hoe are certainly essen- roots in the early FIDES orientation programs.
tial. Likewise essential is seed appropriate for the new environment. Without these ingredients, farm work is not possible.
Finally, settlers must provide for shelter early on. A
few days or weeks outdoors may not be a problem, but before too danger is that in providing for
long a roof and walls are going to seem essential. This im- settlers' needs at the beginning ...the
plies the need for tools and supplies for construction. settier ne e at et.e.ba senn eno...the
rder...-ay ai freae sens ohersenIn the Chane-Piray settlement zone settlers dealt with povide r hay create e a n ofhe enthese immediate support needs in a variety of ways, and the de hi orlic nt s
short-run success of settlement efforts was highly variable.
From this experience much was learned. These lessons were Up to this point, all of the resettlement lessons disapplied by the implementing agent in the San Julian project, cussed have focused on types of support which must be given to
and the rate of short-run settler survival improved markedly. settlers if they are to have a reasonable prospect for survival. Our discussion has recognized that there are facilities
The AID-contracted implementing agent in San Julian, (wells and roads) and services (settlement designs and newFIDES, gathered these essential short-run Support elements into lands orientation) which are beyond the means of settlers to
a single package referred to as the orientation program. Gen- provide for themselves--which must come from government.
erally lasting about fQur months, the objective of orientation
was to get settlers started toward self-sufficiency at the These needs are a reality. Experience in the Chane-Piray
least cost, in the least time, with the least dependency. and San Julian settlement zones bears emphatic witness to this.
Responsible resettlement planners and policy-makers cannot dis
Some work was simply done for the settlers. Development regard these truths.
of a well, road access, and a preestablished settlement plan
(the nucleo system) was a "sine qua non." Likewise FIDES ar- Just below the surface, however, is a more subtle reality
ranged for presettlement clearing of the 2 hectares of land at which seems to contradict the former. By digging just a little
the center of the proposed community, and construction of a deeper into the Chane-Piray and San Julian experiences we can
community sleeping shed where settlers could keep dry until see an insidious danger in providing the very services contheir own homes were built, and another shed where the food sidered essential for survival.
could be kept dry. The danger is that in providing for settlers' needs at the
The first thing FIDES did was to encourage community or- beginning of a new-lands settlement program the provider (imganization for performance of critical tasks. Land clearing pleneting agent) may create in the minds of the settlers a
was done jointly so that all could learn how together. Like- sense of dependency--a habit of reliance on others to solve
wise, house construction was a communityenterprise. EVen their problems. If this is done--if the settlers find themcooking and eating were communitywide activities during the selves turning to a paternalistic benefactor to solve their
months of the orientation program. The jobs of establishing problems for them, to tell then what to do--then long-term
basic facilities for survival and planting the first crop were viability of the settlement community is jeopardized.
given top priority, and all settlers were encouraged to work that want to sponsor
cooperatively toward those goals. So what can governments
settlement programs do? Spontaneous settlement, without supThe impact of the FIDES approach to immediate support port, is viewed as wasteful of human and economic resources.
needs is impressive. Settler abandonment during the critical Directed settlement, wherein key needs of the settlers are pro
low, and progress toward self-sufficiency was vided by the government, risks creating a perpetually dependent
early months was lwanprgestwrsefufiecyaspopulation. greatly accelerated. Where some of the earlier directed settlements required outside food support for years, in San Julian
settlers were on their own within months.