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 Introduction
 Historical developments
 Characteristics of Tanzanian livestock...
 Methodolgy
 Results of survey
 The individual vs group parado...
 Summary and conclusions
 Reference






Title: Economic and anthropological limitations to regional development in African livestock industries ; paper presented at the Society for Applied Anthropo
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 Material Information
Title: Economic and anthropological limitations to regional development in African livestock industries ; paper presented at the Society for Applied Anthropo
Physical Description: Book
Language: English
Creator: Sullivan, G. M.
Farris, D. E.
Publisher: Texas A & M University
Publication Date: 1978
 Subjects
Subject: Farming   ( lcsh )
Africa   ( lcsh )
Agriculture   ( lcsh )
Farm life   ( lcsh )
Spatial Coverage: Africa
 Notes
General Note: Paper presented at the Society for Applied Anthropology Annual Meeting, Merida, Mexico, April 7, 1978.
Funding: Electronic resources created as part of a prototype UF Institutional Repository and Faculty Papers project by the University of Florida.
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Bibliographic ID: UF00054668
Volume ID: VID00001
Source Institution: University of Florida
Holding Location: University of Florida
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Table of Contents
    Introduction
        Page 1
    Historical developments
        Page 1
        Page 2
        Page 3
    Characteristics of Tanzanian livestock herd
        Page 4
    Methodolgy
        Page 5
        Page 6
        Page 7
        Page 8
    Results of survey
        Page 9
        Page 10
        Page 11
        Page 12
    The individual vs group paradox
        Page 13
        Page 14
        Page 15
    Summary and conclusions
        Page 16
    Reference
        Page 17
Full Text







ECONOMY AND ANTHROPOLOGICAL LIMITATIONS TO
REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICAN LIVESTOCK INDUSTRIES*
G. M. Sullivan and D. E. Farris**


INTRODUCTION

The major livestock producing regions in Africa are found in countries

which also have the lowest per capital income on the African continent. The

livestock industries in the Entente nations of the Sahel,-Ethiopia, Tan-

zania, and Kenya have not been able to commercialize this large resource

potential to stimulate general development and improved nutritional levels

for the indigeneous population. Limitations on development of the indus-

try are similar for each country as they are embedded in the traditional

economic and social customs of raising livestock.

These countries produced only 10 to 15 kilograms of meat per head of

cattle inventory in 1972 compared to 31 in South Africa and 87 in the United

States [1]. Number of head slaughtered as a percent of cattle inventory was

5 to 15 as compared to 20.6 in South Africa and 34.2 percent in the U.S.A.

This demonstrates the extremely low productivity of herds in the less de-

veloped countries (Table 1).

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS

In the past, indigeneous livestock production systems in Africa have

been balanced between the ecological conditions and tribal customs. Live-

stock herders before the advent-of colonial settlement of Africa enjoyed



Paper presented at the Society for Applied Anthropology Annual Meeting,
Merida, Mexico, April 7, 1978.

** Research Assistant and Professor respectively, Dept. of Ag. Econ., Texas
A&M University, College Station, TX 77843.











ECONOMY AND ANTHROPOLOGICAL LIMITATIONS TO
REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICAN LIVESTOCK INDUSTRIES*
G. M. Sullivan and D. E. Farris**


INTRODUCTION

The major livestock producing regions in Africa are found in countries

which also have the lowest per capital income on the African continent. The

livestock industries in the Entente nations of the Sahel,-Ethiopia, Tan-

zania, and Kenya have not been able to commercialize this large resource

potential to stimulate general development and improved nutritional levels

for the indigeneous population. Limitations on development of the indus-

try are similar for each country as they are embedded in the traditional

economic and social customs of raising livestock.

These countries produced only 10 to 15 kilograms of meat per head of

cattle inventory in 1972 compared to 31 in South Africa and 87 in the United

States [1]. Number of head slaughtered as a percent of cattle inventory was

5 to 15 as compared to 20.6 in South Africa and 34.2 percent in the U.S.A.

This demonstrates the extremely low productivity of herds in the less de-

veloped countries (Table 1).

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS

In the past, indigeneous livestock production systems in Africa have

been balanced between the ecological conditions and tribal customs. Live-

stock herders before the advent-of colonial settlement of Africa enjoyed



Paper presented at the Society for Applied Anthropology Annual Meeting,
Merida, Mexico, April 7, 1978.

** Research Assistant and Professor respectively, Dept. of Ag. Econ., Texas
A&M University, College Station, TX 77843.















Table 1. Meat production and head slaughtered per head of cattle inven-
tory by African countries, 1972.


Country


Ethiopia

Sudan

Tanzania

Nigeria

Kenya

Mali

Chad

Niger

South Africa

U.S.A.


Cattle Inventory
(herd)

26,450,000

14,700,000

13,400,000

11,405,000

9,200,000

5,000,000

4,600,000

4,000,000

12,400,000

117,862,000


Meat Prod.
Indigenous
Cattle
(kg/hd of Inv.)

10.9

13.2

9.6

15.3

15.1

12.0

9.8.

12.5

31.0

87.1


Source: Calculated from FAO, Production Yearbook, 1972, Volume 26, Rome.


Slaughter
to
Inventory
(%)

9.5

7.4

9.2

14.8

10.3

8.1

6.0

5.1

20.6

34.2














free access to large grazing areas with minimal restrictions on movement.

Livestock populations fluctuated with the availability of water and forages

as well as with the outbreak of diseases. Rangelands under tribal law were

common property for all members of the tribe and communal grazing was an

appropriate management system.

With British, French, and Portuguese establishment of colonies in 1800's,

large uncontrolled grazing lands were divided by political boundaries. Grad-

ually, tribal wars were quelled and colonial governments restricted livestock

movements and administered livestock improvement programs. Sedentary life-

styles for herders were encouraged with emphasis placed on agricultural pro-

duction. With livestock development programs and especially water develop-

ment, herd sizes increased and fluctuation in climate had less effect on

livestock numbers.

With increased stocking rates, constraints on available resources have

now become evident. During the drought of 1968 to 1974 in the Sub-Saharan

nations of Africa, large numbers of livestock were decimated and famine was

severe. Some of the previous advances in regional development in these areas

was nullified. Communal grazing in the traditional sense was never able to

facilitate adoption of new technology so that stocking pressures were in-

creasing while productivity was declining because some of the supportive

institutions and conditions had been changed. Rangelands deteriorated.

Many authors have noted the problems of low productivity, the social

customs, and the economic motives for individuals to increase the size of

their herds and overstock the range under communal grazing. Such diverse















studies as anthropologist Goldschmidt's writing concerning the tribal pas-

torialists in Uganda [2] and Agricultural Economists Simpson who studied

Common Property Range conditions on the Papago Indian Reservation in Ari-

zone [5] observed many problems similar to those observed by the authors

in Tanzania [6]. There is abundant evidence that significant improvement

in productivity cannot be achieved without some form of effective management

of stocking rates. Where this problem is solved in the same areas signi-

ficant improvement in the herds can be seen. The solution to this problem

is not easy because it is imbedded in the social and economic systems, but

some form of control of stocking rates is essential to progress and develop-

ment.

This paper sets out to describe what is the interaction between micro-

production level decisions by producers and macro governmental policies

which have caused conflicts to arise within the traditional system. Tan-

zania presents an appropriate case study since this country has the third

largest livestock herd in Africa and the majority of its cattle are being

managed under an uncontrolled communal grazing system.


CHARACTERISTICS OF TANZANIAN LIVESTOCK HERD


Tanzania has approximately 13 million cattle, 4.5 million goats, and

2.5 million sheep raised on natural pastures. This is a livestock inventory

almost the size of Texas' livestock inventory, but output per head in the

U.S. exceeds the Tanzanian livestock by a about eight times (Table 1).

From survey data collected in 1975 a typical livestock herd is illustrated














in Table 2. The herd is primarily a dairy herd with milk the most valued

product from the herd with females comprising over 60% of the herd [6].

Livestock producers on the average kept sheep and goats besides cattle, and

these animals were .utilized more for family meat consumption.

In Table 3, disposal and utilization of each species of the average

herd indicates that offtake rates for small ruminants is higher than for

cattle. A reason for the higher percent offtake is due to the mortality rate.

Animals which die in the herd are still consumed which provides meat for

family consumption. This partially explains why some unproductive animals,

especially old cows, are retained in the herd. Since communal grazing does

not encourage culling unproductive stock they still have a value for their

meat even when they die and the added cost to herdsmen for maintenance is

viewed as being essentially zero.


METHODOLOGY


Limitations to regional development where livestock are raised under

communal grazing are hypothesized to stem from two sources: (1) micro-economic

and anthropological factors endogeneous to communal grazing system; (2) macro

government policies and anthropological factors which are exogeneous to the

system. These two become sources for conflict with the present institution

of communal grazing. For successful implementation of-livestock programs

for increasing regional development is important to determine the nature of

the conflict between these two causes.

Micro considerations are those which are embodied within the family and

tribal customs. These represent the traditional management practices which













Table 2. Composition of the Average Traditional Livestock Herd, Tanzania

1975./


Average Percentage with
Herd Respect to Species.
(hd) (%)


Total Cattle: 27.3 100

Total Cows: 11.1 41

Total Calves: 5.2 19

Total Heifers: 5.0 18

Total Steers: 2.4 9

Total Bulls: 3.6 13

Total Goats: 13.7 100

Total Females + 2 yrs.: 6.9 50

Total Sheep: 9.1 100

Total Females + 2 yrs.: 4.7 52





/ 729 respondents in sample


Source: TAMU/USAID Livestock Survey [6].















Table 3. Estimated Herd Offtake and Disposals, Livestock Zone, Tanzania
1975.


Inventory (hd.)

Sold=/(hd.)

Trades (hd.)

Slaughtered and Eaten (hd.)

Died and Eaten (hd.)

Total Offtake (hd.)

Percent Offtake (%)

Percent Commercial (%)

Dowry and Gifts (hd.)

Died and Buried (hd.)

Total Disposal (hd.)


Cattle


27.3

3.6

.34

.63

3.46

8.03

29.4

14.4

1.99

3.54

13.56


Goats


Sheep


13.7

1.47

.38

1.33

1.63

4.81

35.1

13.5

.51

1.33

6.65


9.1

.83

.08

1.52

1.42

3.85

43.3

10.0

.09

1.56

5.50


! All data based on 792 herds


SIncludes small amount slaughtered and sold.

Source: TAMU/USAID Livestock Survey. [6]















we considered had evolved without external influences. The economic value

placed on the herd by the individual herdsman and the social organization

of family and tribal customs ard the inherent controls on the producer.

Imposed upon this organization has been a fragmenting of existing insti-

tution with colonial and missionary influence which are exogeneous to the

traditional system. External impact on what was once a stable communal sys-

tem has lead to instability by government's involvement especially in deter-

mining market prices for livestock. The scenario is set with conflict aris-

ing between micro endogeneous variables and the imposed impact of external

macro variables.

Key to regional development for Tanzania and other African livestock

nations is whether productivity and commercialization of traditional herds can

be increased. Methods must be devised to determine whether livestock pro-

grams,, which have these as their goal result in adoption of improved tech-

nology. Examination of the conflicts which limit regional development focus

on five ecologial zones in Tanzania. Eco-zone 5 is the only area which does

not have communal grazing whereby it becomes possible to compare differences

between these areas.

Approaches to analyses have been developed and results documented in pre-

vious research [4,71. An adoption quotient index, a "perceived" traditional

and commercial value by each producer based on types -of cattle kept in herd,

and finally, a measure of productivity, expressed as an annual value of the

output from herds in Tanzanian shilling, are used to understand the limita-

tions that communal grazing places on regional developments.














An additional hypothesis is: Communal grazing systems with no control

of stocking rates do not create necessary incentives for technology adop-

tion and the higher productivity found only in Eco-zone 5 does not have

communal grazing. A marginal cost-price relationship will be examined

graphically to illustrate a producer's rationale for adoption technology

and choosing stocking rates.


RESULTS OF SURVEY

From survey data collected in 1975 in Tanzania, livestock producers

are found to be rational in economic decisions when managing their livestock

with respect to adoption of technology and commercialization of their

herd [7]. Results of the adoption quotient scale, which has a scale of 0

to 100 with 100 indicating complete adoption of all "recommended" improved

practices, show a skewed distribution of livestock producers to the lower

end of scale (Figure la.) [7]. The overall average score for the total

sample is 28. When a producer perceives a traditional value based on the

by-products in a given year from a cow, and a commercial value based on

government market prices for commercial stock in herd; Figure Ib indicates

that traditional value for the herd perceived by producers is higher.

Figure Ic shows that the net advantage in traditional value over commercial

value for 792 herds is on an average the value of six cows, approximately

Tshs. 1400. This supports the data in Table 2 where females comprise close

to 60 percent of the herd, and a greater value is placed on the expected

value of the by-products from the females for family subsistence.












DISTRIBUTIONS OF ADOPTION SCORES, TRADITIONAL VALUES, COMMERCIAL VALUES, AND
NET DIFFERENCE BETWEEN TRADITIONAL AND COMMERCIAL VALUES FOR 792 LIVESTOCK
OWNERS IN TANZANIA, 1975


0 10 .20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90'100 0 500

ADOPTION SCORE


200-





100.


1500 2500 3500
TRADITIONAL VALUE
COMMERCIAL 'VALUE


4500T
Tsh.
(T.V.)t
(C.V.)&


(T.V.-C.V.)


(T.V. C.V.)


FIGURE 1.














Even though adoption scores on the average are low and herds are not

commercially oriented for the total sample, statistically significant differ-

ences in adoption scores is found between Eco-zone 5 and the other zones.

Zone 5, with an adoption score of 50, has private ownership of property

whereas the other four zones have communal grazing and lower scores (Table 4).

Regional development is also higher in Zone 5 with gross domestic product per

capital higher than the other zones [3]. Correlated with this finding is

higher annual productivity of the herds at, Tsh. 569 per head. This implies

that the livestock industry is playing an important role in development in

this area (Table 4) [4]. Differences in rainfall did not appear to explain

differences in herd productivity or adoption scores although differences in

rainfall should explain differences in production per hectare, communal graz-

ing tends to negate the impact of higher rainfall on herd productivity.

Several important explanations are given for these differences between

areas. Eco-Zone 5 with private ownership of grazing land implies greater

incentive for improved management and commercial orientation. This area

has had a longer exposure to European education and culture which has in-

fluenced the social organization of the people. Higher levels of educa-

tion have transformed life styles where the economy is more highly developed.

Government pricing policies have been less detrimental to livestock de-

velopment in this area because of the strong urban demand for livestock

by-products. Level of technology adoption is higher because incentives

are clearly evident with higher market prices for livestock. This areas'














Table 4. Relationahip Between Productivity and
stock Ecological Zones in Tanzania.


Annual Average a
Zone Rainfall Productivity--
(mm) (Tsh/herd)


1 700-1200 353.09

2 600- 800 346.66

3 200- 600 458.32-/

4 400-1200 419.49

5 >1600 568.71-/


Adoption Scores for Live-



Approximate Adoption
Location Score



Mwanza 21

Singida 25

Dodoma 30

Tarime 35

Arushaid 50c/


Source: TAMU/USAID Survey by Personal Interview. [4]

/ Annual value of herd output.

Zones 3 and 5 had productivity significantly different from Zones 1 and 2.

SZone 5 had adoption scores significantly different from the other zones.

Arumeru District.














proximity to a large urban market with available consumption items has en-

couraged commercialization of its herds.

Moving further into the interior of the country away from the influence

of the urban center (Eco-zone 1 and 2) the traditional livestock system is

the norm, with low average adoption scores of 21 and 25 and low productivity

Tsh. 353 and 346 respectively. The influence of missionary and European

settlements in these areas was less because of remoteness and less favor-

able climate. The social organization typified by the traditional family

and tribal allegiance has been relatively unchanged.

A macro policy toward the livestock industry in fixing the live price

for cattle with no spatial, seasonal, or quality differences'has a greater

effect on creating disincentives for individuals to adopt new technology and

become more commercially oriented. Demand for livestock and by-products

is not as high in the four eco-zones as in Eco-zone 5 so level of pro-

ductivity is lower. A combination of the lack of social and cultural change

with the present traditional, communal grazing system explains why these

areas have had less impact on regional development. The constraints on

development of livestock herds in these areas given these limitations can

be understood by examining how the individual producer makes decisions

under an uncontrolled communal grazing system.


THE INDIVIDUAL vs GROUP PARADOX

A standard paradox in economics is the conflict of interest between

the actions of individuals and the group. The self-interest of the















individuals is not necessarily in harmony with the interest of the in-

dustry to which he belongs. This-principle is strikingly evident in

communal grazing systems, where the individual herdsman does not recognize

his independent action of reducing his stocking rate as having any impact

on range conditions. This can be illustrated by Fi-gure 2 using standard

economic marginal concepts.

Under uncontrolled communal grazing there will be no economic or social

cost recognized by the individual herdsman to increasing the size of his

herd. On the contrary, there are good economic and social reasons for him

to maintain as large a herd as possible. If there is no grazing fee or

animal unit tax he is inclined to maintain unproductive cattle as a bank,

for prestige and for family security against starvation.

In Tanzania each herdsman views grazing land as a free good that can

improve his well-being if he has livestock to use it; as each herdsman pur-

sues his self interest the stocking rate reaches the existing level of S"

in Figure 2a and village herd output is at level B. On the other hand the

economic optimum stocking rate is at S and village herd output is at A

where little or no technology is used. Marginal costs and price relation-

ships associated with this situation is illustrated in Figure 2b.

With the adoption of technology, costs per unit may rise in the short

run. Despite some increase in village herd output, the individuals have

every incentive to increase herd size and create an overstocking problem in-

dicated at S" and yields village herd output B'. As a matter of fact, with

overstocking the effects of improved technology could be wiped out. In the










Figure 2.


Herdsmen and Village View of Economic Optimum Stocking Rates
Under Communal Grazing


Output per
Village herd Figures 2a. Village herd output


.erd.
(-nerd)


I I f





'. I 1


16


survey of Tanzanian herdsmen there appeared to be little incentive to adopt

even simple technology that was understood by many herdsmen. Range im-

provement was non-existant except where government bore the expense. The

legal authority is now available for villages in Tanzania to control stock-

ing rates, but to date there has been little use of- the authority. Until

the leadership and professionals in Africa devise some programs to change

the economic and social institutions blocking the transition to modern

livestock production and marketing, the contribution of livestock to re-

gional development will be far below its potential.


SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The practice of communal grazing of livestock is widespread in much of

Africa and where grazing land .is free and stocking rates are uncontrolled,

productivity is extremely low. Valuable food production resources are

wasted because these societies have not developed economic and social in-

stitutions to aid in achieving economic optimum stocking rates. There are

a variety of methods to control stocking rates even under communal grazing

conditions and this is one of the important development challenges where

there has been little progress to date. It is the thesis of this paper that

the problem is well recognized but the solution requires group action and

changes in political, social and.economic institutions to solve it.





r ., t


17


REFERENCES


1. Food and Agricultural Organization, Production Yearbook, Rome, 1972,
Volume 26.

2. Goldschmidt, Walter, "A National Livestock Bank: An Institutional Device
for Rationalizing the Economy of Tribal Pastoralists: IDR, 1975/2
Univ. of California, Los Angeles.

3. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Tanzania Agricul-
tural and Rural Development Sector Study, Washington, D. C., Vol. I,
II, III, December, 1974.

4. Njukia, James, "Productivity Analysis and Technology Adoption for Live-
stock in Tanzania, "Unpublished Master's Thesis, Texas A&M University,
December, 1977.

5. Simpson, James R. "Costs and Returns in a Study of Common Property Range
Improvement:, Journal of Range Management, Vol. 24, No. 4, July, 1971.

6. Sullivan, G. M. and Farris, D. E. "Survey of Traditional Livestock Sector",
Tanzania Livestock-Meat Subsector, Vol, II, October, 1976.

7. Sullivan, G. M. and Farris, D. E., Yetley, M. J., and Njukia, W. J.;
"A Socio-Economic Analysis of Technology Adoption in an African Live-
stock Industry, Zeitschrift fur austandische Landuirtschaft (Quarterly
Journal of International Agriculture); Berlin, 1978, No. 2.




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