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Korean agricultural research

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Korean agricultural research the integration of research and extension
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Project impact evaluation
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Steinberg, David I., 1928-
United States -- Agency for International Development. -- Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination
United States -- Agency for International Development. -- Bureau for Development Support
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[Washington D.C.?]
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U.S. Agency for International Development
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1 v. (various pagings) : ill., 1 map ; 28 cm.

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Agriculture -- Research -- Korea (South) ( lcsh )
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bibliography ( marcgt )
federal government publication ( marcgt )
non-fiction ( marcgt )

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Bibliography: p. [K-1] - K-3.
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"Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination."
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"Bureau for Development Support."
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"January 1982."
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"PN-AAJ-606"--Cover.
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Electronic resources created as part of a prototype UF Institutional Repository and Faculty Papers project by the University of Florida.
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by David I. Steinberg ... [et al.].

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Full Text
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A.I.D. Project Impact Evaluation No. 27 Korean Agricultural Research: The Integration of Research and Extension
Lii CDL_ ]7-7 l
'G[IzZ7 U0 0
January 1982
U.S. Agency for International Development (AID)
PN-AAJ-606




KOREAN AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH THE INTEGRATION OF RESEARCH AND EXTENSION
PROJECT IMPACT EVALUATION NO. 27
by
David I. Steinberg, Team Leader (Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination) Robert I. Jackson (Bureau for Development Support) Kwan S. Kim
(Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination) Song, Hae-kyun
(Seoul National University)
U.S. Agency for International Development
January 1982
The views and interpretations expressed in this report are those of the authors and should not be attributed to the Agency for International Development.




A.I.D. EVALUATION PUBLICATIONS
A complete list of reports issued in the A.I.D. Evaluation Publication series is included in the last three pages of this document, together with information for ordering reports.




i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Summary .
Preface v
Project Data Sheet vi
Glossary vii
Map ix
I. Project Setting 1
II. The Project 2
III. Project Impacts: Findings and Analysis . . . . 4
A. The Project's Role in the Agricultural Research
System 4
B. Experimental and Farm Results . . . . . 7
C. Guidance: The Link between Research and the Farm 10 D. The Korean Farm 12
E. Social Factors in Korean Agricultural Development 15 F. Macroeconomic Implications of Improved Technology 16 G. Sustaining and Replicating Agricultural Research 18 IV. Conclusions 18
V. Lessons Learned 20
APPENDICES
A. Methodology
B. The Team's Itinerary
C. The Korea Experience in Increased Rice Production
by Robert I. Jackson
D. Research on Selected Food Crops
by Robert I. Jackson
E. Profitability, Costs, and Revenue of Five Crops
by Kwan S. Kim




F. Social Returns to Agricultural Research and Extension
by Kwan S. Kim
G. Research and Extension: The Integration of Inquiry and
Guidance
by David I. Steinberg
H. Agriculture in Cheju Province
by Robert I. Jackson and Kwan S. Kim I. Project-Specific Data J. Socioeconomic Statistics K. Bibliography L. Photographs M. Notes on the Authors




SUMMARY
A profound change occurred in the early 1970s that transformed the Korean Government's rural development strategy. From one emphasizing industrial exports, the costs of which were largely borne by the Korean farmers, the strategy evolved into one devoted to improving rural Korean life. The genesis of this approach was both political and economic: a hardening of PL 480 terms and the results of the 1971 election that amply demonstrated that government support had eroded in the countryside. The Korean government responded with a rice pricing policy advantageous to the farmers, the strengthening of the extension service, the formation of the Sae-maul ("New Village") Movement, and a rapid increase in rural infrastructure.
The origins of AID's support to agricultural research are found in the Korean Agricultural Sector Survey (1972) and succeeding documents that advocated a strengthening of research as a primary need. The project, proposed in 1973 and implemented in 1974, provided $5 million for a tripartite program to strengthen the capacity of the Office of Rural Development of the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries. It included training of Korean researchers overseas, equipment (including a computer and library materials), and both resident and short-term expatriate advisory services. At the close of the project in 1980, 21 Ph.D. students and 17 M.S. students were trained overseas-, while an additional 94 received short-term training and 106 participated in observation tours.
Although there were problems with the English language competence of prospective students, the training aspects of the project were universally regarded as the most successful part of the program. Of notable, but secondary, importance was the provision of equipment and supplies, especially the computer and the library materials. Lagging far behind was the value of resident expatriate assistance, which was of marginal use to the project but was more significant in terms of relieving the AID Mission from continuous monitoring of the project than in providing help to the Koreans. Of greater importance was shorter-term foreign technical advice.
The inchoate goal, from a Korean perspective, was probably rice selfsufficiency--a strategic, political, and economic objective. The project purposes, however, were specified in considerable detail outlining exact yield increases on agricultural experimental stations over a ten-year period in the areas of rice, barley, wheat, and soybeans as well as generalized improvement in potato production and in the cropping systems. Specific increases were also proposed for farm fields for the same time. Since the decade of crop improvement is to end in 1984, this evaluation must be somewhat circumscribed.
The project paper suffered from spurious specificity regarding experimental station crop increases. Before the project began, experimental yields were higher than those indicated in the paper, often by considerable amounts. The research breakthroughs that the project




iv
anticipated were generally made prior to the project. Farmer yields may well reach their objectives by 1984, but the AID project was only a beneficial increment to Korean agricultural research. It supplemented an existing, competent system, but offered little that was innovative.
The concentration on rice led to a lack of emphasis on other crops, an inattention caused by national concerns as well as social and economic factors the project ignored. Although there have been increases in crop yields, hectarage of the other crops has consistently been falling, even before the project began. Thus, national targets will not be met even if a relatively few farmers benefit. The choice of some of the crops covered by the project such as wheat, soybeans and potatoes seems questionable, as does the emphasis on increased fertilizer responsiveness.
Critical to a developmentally effective agricultural research program is the transference of experimental results to the farmers. Through a widespread extension service, a farmer training program that includes almost all families annually, demonstration plots, and the Sae-maul Movement, Korea has developed an authoritarian but effective means of disseminating research results.
Thus, beginning in 1972 the spread of the high-yielding varieties of rice was pushed with alacrity by the Korean bureaucracy in response to a national command structure. The effort was effective, making Korea selfsufficient in rice by 1975. Yet there were two inherent problems in this comprehensive effort: these varieties were sensitive to cold, and new races of the fungal disease called blast normally develop after a few years if large areas are planted to a single variety.
The crisis developed first in 1979 with a drop in production caused by blast followed by a disastrous 1980 crop due to cold temperatures. The rice crop fell by one-third, creating a crisis of confidence in the government and in the guidance service.
Ironically, the failures of 1979 and 1980 can be attributed to the strengths of the Korean guidance service. Thus its weakness is based on the omnipresent bureaucratic hierarchy that, in contrast to most developing societies, can transform research into production. In single-minded pursuit of its political goals, it neglected elemental precautions that might have avoided the problems of the last two years.
Agricultural research was an appropriate intervention for AID at the time. It assisted a well-established, agricultural research network, but did not materially transform it. It created no new institutions.
Agricultural research will continue in Korea but replication abroad will be difficult. Any successful adaptive agricultural research project will be dependent upon a positive pricing policy, an effective extension service, rural infrastructure, and continuous contact with international research centers, among other factors. Political will is required for its success, but too strong an emphasis on political objectives can undercut its effectiveness.




v
PREFACE
Although agricultural research has a long history in Korea, the recent introduction of the high-yielding varieties of rice and improved strains of other crops, combined with extensive attention to improved cultivation techniques, pervasive extension services, and better rural infrastructure have helped transform rural Korea within a decade. By any standard, this was a remarkable achievement.
The agricultural research project, for which the United States Government provided $5 million, was but a modest contribution to Korea's agricultural research capacity, and thus even a more modest contribution to its rural development. As this report demonstrates, agricultural research was one critical element in the change of rural Korea, but not the only causal factor.
The Korean agricultural research project was chosen for an impact evaluation because it seemed to provide lessons relevant for other nations, and because it was a blend of technical assistance, training, and equipment. The impact evaluation team was composed of three AID staff assisted by a Korean rural specialist. During the course of about one month in Korea, the team travelled some 2,700 kilometers and visited all provinces in the nation. No sampling technique for a project nationwide in scope can be scientific within the format of a rapid rural appraisal. The team, however, made a conscious effort to visit remote regions and poorer villages to determine whether the research results were reaching relatively isolated farmers. These site visits were spontaneously selected. Appendices A and B provide notes on the methodology and the team's itinerary.
The team wishes to thank the officials of the Office of Rural Development, both in its headquarters in Suwon and in the provinces, for their assistance and the sharing of their voluminous data. Our thanks also go to the farmers and their wives who often took time from their transplanting to talk with us. The team would also like to thank the U.S. Embassy for making available a vehicle and driver and for other logistical support.




vi
PROJECT DATA SHEET
Project Title: Korea-Agricultural Research Project AID Project Number: DLC/P-2014 AID Loan Number: 489-H-088 Borrower: The Government of the Republic of Korea. The project was
implemented by the Office of Rural Development of the
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries. Loan Amount: Total $5.0 million
Korean Contribution $3.124 million in won
Total Project Costs: $8.124 million
Terms: Forty years repayment from the date of the first disbursement,
including a 10-year grace period. Interest rate of 2 percent
per annum for 10 years after the first disbursement and at a
rate of 3 percent per annum thereafter.
Terminal Date for Request for Reimbursement and for Disbursement:
July 28, 1980
Purpose: To assist in a program of multidisciplinary research directed
toward varietal improvement of certain basic food and feed
crops and of cropping systems.
Accomplishments: Training of 38 scholars to the Ph.D. or M.S. degree level, 94 short-term trainees and 106 participants for observation and conferences; purchase and installation of 946 pieces of equipment and the provision of 10 long-term experts and 73 consultants. Evaluation: An interim evaluation was conducted in June 1978.
Audit: An audit was conducted in May 1980.




vii
GLOSSARY
ADC Agricultural Development Corporation,
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries AVRDC Asian Vegetable Research and Development Center
chongbo unit of measure, approximately equaL to one hectare
CIMYT International Wheat and Maize Center, Mexico.
gama a unit of volume, equal to 80 kg of milled rice or
54 kg of paddy.
gun county; 140 throughout the country
gunsu county chief, appointed by the Ministry of Home Affairs
hectare (ha) 2.45 acres
HPON High Protein, High Lysine Observation
Nursery
HYV High-yielding varieties
IBWSN International Bred Wheat Screening Nursery
INTSOY International Soybean Institute
IRRI International Rice Research Institute
IWSWSN International Winter and Spring Wheat
Screening Nursery
IWWPN International Winter Wheat Performance Nursery
metric ton (MT) 2,205 pounds
MMT million metric ton
myon township, a part of a gun.
myonchang township head; appointed on the authority of the
governor.
NACF National Agricultural Cooperative Federation
ORD Office of Rural Development, Ministry of Agriculture
and Fisheries




viii
GLOSSARY (cont.)
paddy unhusked rice; also, irrigated land on which rice is
grown.
PORD Proincial Office of Rural Development
pyong uU.iL of land measure; 36 sq. feet, 3,000 pyong equal
one chongbo or hectare
R & E research and extension
Sae-maul Movement "New Village Movement," or "New Community Movement;"
a government-controlled rural development activity. sok a unit of volume, equal to one gama
Exchange rates: In June 1981 won 685 equalled U.S. $1.00 Note: Unless otherwise noted, all figures are for milled rice and
pearled barley.




ix
South Korea
National Capital
N h 0 Cities
- Major Roads
K o r e a 0 25 50 75 Miles
3rcation Li 0 25 O Y5 Kilometers
'7 Plaro-ho
Ch'Orwo-n
Munsan Ch'unch'on Kangnung
Parhan-ni Inch on Sed I Samch'ok
Woni (3-p, 15 Y ju
Suwon Ansong
Ch'ungju Ch'onane Ch'ongju Yongju E a s t e r n
Hamch'ang Andong S e a
Yongdok
Taejon Y e I I o w Kimch'on P'ohang
Iri
S e a Chonju Kyongju
Taegu
Z.zz I
Ulsan Miryang
Kwangju 11 Chinju Masan
Pusan Sunchon Sam Won I
Mokp'o osu
Yongdang C4 0
C::7
co a CZ7 0
4- 0
Japan




I. PROJECT SETTING
The year 1980 was disastrous for Korean rice agriculture. An abnormally cold summer prevented the maturing of rice, the main staple grown ubiquitously on every available plot of even marginally irrigated land. The Korean economy went into shock as rural production and incomes suffered when rice production declined by onethird. Already beset with political turmoil after the assassination of President Park Chung-hee in 1979 and the Kwangju riots of May 1980, hit by a major slump in exports because of a worldwide recession, and suffering from heightened import requirements and inflation caused by oil price increases, there was a crisis of political legitimacy--for legitimacy for the past two decades in Korea was a product of continuous economic growth.
The economy as a whole declined in 1980. Real GNP was down by
5.7 percent, thus temporarily reversing the nation's spectacular advances that had pushed growth over 10 percent annually. Agriculture, however, was even more severely affected; rural income dropped by 24 percent. Much of the rural progress that had been a product of a deliberate change in national development strategy beginning in the early 1970s was in question. It was based on an incentive price support policy that provided Korean farmers with over two times the world market price for rice. Particularly adversely affected were the high-yielding rice varieties.
These rice varieties, known as Tongil ("unification"), were developed from a series of crosses between the indica varieties from Southeast Asia and the local and more traditional, but improved, japonica strains. From their introduction in the early 1970s and the release of the first variety to the farmers in 1972, they were known to be more susceptible to cold weather and temporarily more resistant to blast, a fungal disease. They promised, and delivered, substantially higher yields under greatly improved methods of cultivation, water control, increased fertilizer, pesticides, and herbicides.
As a result of the release of these new varieties and as a consequence of the vigorous encouragement by government of their cultivation, which in the early period of their expansion even included air freighting of seed from the Philippines, Korea became self-sufficient in rice in 1975. It was the first time since the Second World War that this long-sought objective had been reached. Rice self-sufficiency was an objective that was central to the Korean administration: it was strategic, for it furthered Korean autonomy and demonstrated to North Korea that South Korea was progressing; it was economic, for it saved almost $200 million annually in foreign exchange; and it was political, for it was dramatic evidence indicating that President Park, who had almost lost the 1971 election because of significant deterioration of his support in rural areas due to a




-2
national policy of urban-based industrial exports and rural neglect, was rebuilding his rural base. Rice was a political hallmark of rural success.
Rice self-sufficiency was not a product of the new varieties alone. In place was an extensive irrigation system, an effective credit, procurement and pricing mechanism, improved rural transportation transforming local and regional markets into a national one, and a vigorous 11guidance" system (extension service) that reached to the most remote areas. l/ The story of the growth of rice production is one of both new see-d strains generated by adaptive agricultural research coordinated with a guidance network and a farmer training program that reached almost every farm household and that markedly improved yields of even the traditional varieties of rice. How this change occurred is the subject of this report. The AID-supported agricultural research was designed to assist this growth, but the questions must be asked: how great was its contribution, and could a differently designed project or one operating in a less stringent political, and thus administrative,
environment have prevented the failure of 1980?
II. THE PROJECT
The costs of the halting progress of Korean development in the 1950s and its acceleration in the 1960s were borne by the Korean farmer. For much of this period, the costs of production of both of the staples of the Korean diet, rice and barley, were above the government purchase prices. Korean agriculture was stifled by few incentives to produce beyond farmer needs. It could be characterized as a sophisticated but repressed sector that in some areas bordered on subsistence. Although infrastructure (such as irrigation) and adaptive research had begun under Japanese colonial rule, and even had a Korean guidance and credit system been in place, poor internal transportation and the disincentive of large amounts of PL 480 grain effectively retarded government interest in adjusting upward the rice prices. The potential political power of the urban consumer was greater than that of the rural population. In 1971, Korea was 82.5 percent and 91.8 percent selfsufficient in rice and barley respectively, and it only produced 10.7 percent of its wheat consumption. In 1971, rural household income was $1,150, less than $200 per capita.
The election of 1971, which dramatically demonstrated the erosion of government support in rural areas and a hardening of PL 480 terms,
I/ See Appendix G, "Research and Extension: The Integration of Inquiry
and Guidance," by David I. Steinberg; and Korea Irrigation, AID
Project Impact Evaluation No. 12, 1980.




-3
prompted a massive governmental effort to improve the rural-urban terms of trade. The Sae-maul (New Village) Movement was formed, and rice support prices increased. Rural infrastructure construction was hurried. Rural roads and national highways were built and paved, and irrigation expanded. 2/ Fertilizer consumption grew, rising from 308,494 metric tons (MT) in 1961 to 605,137 in 1971, and 886,206 MT in 1975. Mechanization increased. In 1961 there were 12 power tillers in Korea, but by 1971 there were 16,842, and in 1979, 239,909 were in operation.
It was in the context of this growing concern with the rural sector that AID began its support to agricultural research. The genesis of this project was the Korean Agricultural Sector Survey carried out by Michigan State University with AID support. As its highest priority, it recommended efforts to improve agricultural research in rice, barley, wheat, soybeans, and forages.
The study identified the problems facing Korea as a lack of concentration on key research priorities and a shortage of resources to meet these needs. It further characterized the national agricultural research system as relatively unfocused, poorly equipped, short of highly trained personnel, but relatively well-housed with sufficient land for research, well-balanced disciplinary skills, although suffering from a shortage of operating funds.
The study was followed by the publication in 1972 of "Investment Priorities in the Korean Agricultural Sector," also by Michigan State University. That study anticipated cumulative returns to agricultural research to reach 30 times an annual investment of $2 million by 1975, and 160 times its yearly costs by 1980. After a visit by an external specialist and negotiations with Korean authorities, an AID Intensive Review Request was cabled to Washington on July 13, 1973, outlining the project. A project paper proposing a $5 million loan
was approved by AID's Development Loan Committee on December 5, 1973; authorized December 11 of the same year; and signed by the Korean Government on January 28, 1974. On February 21, Korean Presidential Ordinance #54 announced the agreement and authorized Korean funds ($3,125,000 in won) for the project. By September 8, 1974 the first expatriate Co-Director was appointed, and on November 14 a service contract was signed with the International Institute for Education covering support for the project and the funding of participants.
The objectives of the project focused on the five areas: rice, barley/wheat, soybeans, white potatoes, and cropping systems. Improvement in research was predicated on forming multidisciplinary teams that were to establish research priorities within each area of concern.
!/For an extensive discussionof this phenomenon see Korea Irrigation,
AID Project Impact Evaluation Report No. 12, 1980, especially Appendix F, "Korean Agricultural Pricing Policies" and Appendix G, "Change,
Local Government, and Rural Participation in Korean Rural Development."




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Very specific yield targets were established both for the experimental stations and the farms (See Table 1). Crop improvement goals were also stated in the project paper (See Appendices C & D).
The project was conceived as having three components: foreign advisory services, both long and short-term; short and long-term training, the latter including 19 M.S. and 13 Ph.D. trainees; and equipment, covering field, experimental, and library commodities including books and journals. About 46 percent of the $5.0 million loan was for technical assistance, 24 percent for training, and 30 percent for commodities.
The terminal date of disbursement was set for July 28, 1979, but was later extended to September 30, 1981. Seven trainees remained abroad after 1980 to complete their training.
Table I. Project Paper Baseline Data and Targets
Putative Target
Yields Yields Putative Target
Crop 1972-73 1983 Yields Yields
Experiment Experiment 1972-73 1983
Stations Stations Farms Farms
Rice 4.79 6.0 3.25 4.5
Barley 2.79 3.6 2.04 3.5
Wheat 4.30 5* 2 2.24 4.0
Soybeans 1.98 3.2 1 0.8 1.3
Potatoes No yield targets I specified.
III. PROJECTS IMPACTS: FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS
A. The Project's Role in the Agricultural Research System
Korea has a long history of agricultural research. The earliest official agricultural demonstration station was established in 1906, and experimental improvements in rice were conducted throughout the Japanese colonial period. Critical to the development of an agricultural research system was the 1962 reorganization that established the Office of Rural Development (ORD) with AID support, and began
the process of organizing branch offices in selected guns (counties). By 1975, ORD offices were in every county throughout the country. The guidance system thus had spread widely in rural areas before project
implementation was initiated and was completed shortly after it was approved. The research establishment was effective, but limited in the scope of its activities, before the project began. The project did not alter or institutionally reform the existing structure, for it was already well organized.




-5
The project, therefore, supplemented an established and effective
research program. It provided, however, an impetus to an expanded program within a national policy framework that fostered ehe effective use of research. This project did not establish collaborative links between ORD and the Korean academic community; these had been inaugurated by presidential decree in 1971. The project did, however, begin the concept of multidisciplinary teams to work on the five priority areas of research. This was in part an innovation, although the teams have worked more to mobilize talent as needed rather than as a continuous, integrated multidisciplinary effort. The concept was not without problems, however, since in a hierarchical society such as Korea, rank and status control discussion and dissent, and position often seems more important than substance. The multidisciplinary teams became operational during the life of the project and although these early problems are now less acute, it is doubtful at this writing that the teams are as cohesive as they were at the time they were established.
There was universal agreement among Korean academicians and administrators and on the AID evaluation team that the most successful aspect of the project was the training component. Although Korea had a corps of skilled manpower, it was spread very thinly, and the project significantly enhanced the capacity of ORD to engage in research.
After approval of the project, the training component was expanded, and resident expatriate assistance truncated. In the end $ 21 Ph.D. and 17 M.S. students were trained under the project, and an additional 94 received short-term training; a total of 106 participated in observation tours and conferences.
There were two major problems connected with the training and subsequent employment of trainees. The first was the adequacy of English language skills prior to overseas training. In spite of later Peace Corps assistance, the level of English caused delays in sending out trainees, thus requiring an extension of the terminal date of disbursement of the loan. ORD had responsibility for placing trainees at U.S. institutions, which created minor delays, while the International Institute of Education administered the participants' allowances.
Of more significance for the future are the changes in wage
differentials between the ORD and the academic community. In the 1960s, academicians' salaries were low relative to those of civil servants. Partly in an effort to prevent student demonstrations, academic salaries were gradually raised and supplemented with research bonuses and other emoluments so that there is a highly relevant difference today between academic and ORD salaries. To retain trainees, a three-year commitment to ORD was required for each long-term participant, and to date one trainee has refunded the costs of the training to take an academic position. As the three-year commitment comes to an end, pressures to leave are building up and there may be an exodus of skilled manpower from ORD to the universities. Although those who leave may not be completely lost to ORD,




-6
as joint appointments are possible, the enhanced social prestige of academicians--an important factor in Korea--as well as the hard work and overtime requirements of ORD together with the salary issue may cause problems for the future. The ORD hopes to obtain parastatal status like the Korea Development Institute, thus freeing them from civil service salary levels. If the salary issue is resolved and the staff retained, the team believes the training aspect of the program has overall been successful.
Of secondary importance in the view of both the team and the Koreans at ORD was the provision of commodities, including equipment, a computer, and library materials. All AID-provided commodities seem well housed and used. There have been major additions to the equipment, much of it of Japanese origin. At the time when the loan was given, there was much less equipment and there is agreement that it was an important component of the project. The Korean government has allocated funds for spare parts and replacement equipment and supplies.
The computer deserves special comment for it is the sole instrument of its type in ORD and was both a major expense ($247,000) and innovation. It is essential to sophisticated research and has been intensively used. The library facilities, especially the foreign journals, are a heavy capital expense relative to their use, since only the more senior researchers in Suwon can take advantage of their availability because of the limited English and Japanese language competence of the more junior staff. Journals were, however, a necessary component of the project. ORD should make more effort to acquaint the staff of the experimental stations outside Suwon with their contents, as there is now no system for doing so.
Lagging far behind in priority terms, in the unanimous opinions of the team and of the Koreans, was the value of expatriate technical assistance. Shorter-term, nonresident advisors were deemed an overall advantage, but long-term resident expatriates proved to be less useful. Some could not work in the fields of their specialization as priorities shifted; others could accomplish little in a two-year tour. None were well acquainted with Korea on their arrival. Language proved a problem at Korean meetings that the Americans attended. The inescapable conclusion is that although the resident foreigners probably provided some degree of generalized professional, administrative, and even emotional support to ORD's Bureau of Research, it was more necessary to the AID Mission than to the Koreans for it placed the continuous burden of monitoring on the expatriate staff, not on the Mission. The AID Mission did, however, supervise the project, and staff attended the important joint Korean-American steering committee meetings.
Overall, the project did increase the capacity of the Korean Government to conduct agricultural research by providing better trained staff and more equipment. It built no new institutions and provided only marginal innovations, but neither was considered an aspect of project purposes or goals. The project did enhance Korea's institutional capacity.




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B. Experimental and Farm Results
The inchoate goal of the project from a Korean vantage point seems to have been rice self-sufficiency. The project purpose however, was confined to increasing the yields of specified crops both on the experimental stations and on farmers' fields and to improving the cropping system. These objectives were stated over a ten-year period--a period not due to end until 1984.3/ Yet there are now some definitive conclusions that can be drawn from the existing results.
The targets set for the project were often spurious and simplistic, as were the baseline data. Yield increases on experimental plots and on the farms were based on general averages, but these average yields from experiment station plots were practically meaningless. For each crop (rice and barley, for example) many, sometimes dozens, of selections, strains, or varieties were tested for yield performance. Thus, experiment station average yields did not do justice to the complexity of the problem. On the other hand, Korea's agricultural statistics, those garnered from the farmers, were complete and detailed These reliable data could be used to make valid judgments on farm productivity targets used in the project paper.
The project also took no note of pricing, labor and other requirements, other crops such as vegetables, or social attitudes toward consumption that affected production and productivity. More important, there were no project targets for national production nor for self-sufficiency in food, both of which were important aspects of national policy that affected what varieties would be stressed by the extension service.
Further, by the time the project started significant increases in yields had already been achieved. What was more important than yield breakthroughs (which did not occur although they were specifically called for in the project paper) was the need for continuous adaptive research on other issues, such as resistance to cold, lodging, diseases, and insects, as well as for a shortening of the growing period which would allow for more doublecropping through-out a larger area of the country. These other issues were mentioned, but inore attention was paid to prodiiction increases with its obvious politicALt impact.
Rice production was to climb from 4.79 to 6.0 metric tons per
hectare (MT/ha) on experimental stations and from 3.25 to 4.5 MT/ha on farms from 1973 to 1983. Yet experimental station results of the new strains of rice (Tongil indica-japonica) already were 5.06 MT in 1970, three years before the project started.4/ On a national average, the new
3/ The Project Paper was prepared in 1973, so the decade was supposed to end in 1983. Since the project began in 1974, the ten-year period should terminate in 1984.
4Office of Rural Development, The Effectiveness of Tongil Rice Diffusion in Korea, Suwon: 1975, p. 9.




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varieties yields were 5.03 MT in 1975 (before the project could have had any impact), 5.53 MT in 1977 and 4.86 MT in 1978. At the Yeongnam Experimental Station, yields were 3.90 for the traditional varieties in 1968 and 4.68 in 1973. The high yielding varieties at the same station were were 4.69 MT in 1974 and 5.08 MT in 1975. At the Honam Station in 1980, Tongil yields were 5.43 and other new varieties 4.39 MT/ha while japonica production was 4.74 MT.
Over the same ten-year period, barley experimental yields were to rise from 2.79 to 3.6 MT/ha and farm yields from 2.04 to 3.5 MT/ha. Barley production, however, at the Yeongnam Station was already 3.3 MT in 1972 and 3.5 MT in 1979 and 1980. The station's goal is 4.0 MT in 1981. The Honam Experimental Station reported yields for 1979 and 1980 between 3.15 and
3.95 MT/ha.
Wheat yields were to rise from 4.30 to 5.2 MT/ha on experimental farms and farm yields from 2.24 to 4.0 MT. At the Yeongnam Station crop yields before the project were again higher. They were 4.8 MT in 1971 and 4.5 in both 1979 and 1980. Their goal for 1981 is 5.5 MT.
Soybean increases on experimental plots were to increase from 1.98 MT to 3.2 MT/ha over ten years; farm production was to grow from 0.8 to 1.3 MT over the same period. At Miryang, soybean production was already 2.4 MT in 1974 (before the project began), and 2.3 MT in 1979 and 1980. Their target for 1981 is 3.5 MT/ha.
Overall, for all crops for which specific targets were set,
experimental crop yields were well above the project baseline yields before the project began or prior to the time the project could have had any effect. Staff at Miryang indicated that yields on all crops have essentially remained relatively constant, having achieved heightened production by the early 1970s before the project. Concentration after that date was placed on reducing the factor of risk including an earlier maturity date and more resistance to disease and lodging.
If the project were based on too low a data base for experimental
stations, what has happened to farmers' yields during this period and what is the prognosis for attaining target levels of production? The question is critical, but the answers are complex, for there were climatic and other conditions that intervened.
The project erred by failing to take into account other elements that have affected total yields. Critical factors were the high support price for rice that increased farm income appreciably and the growing demand for winter vegetables that often proved more lucrative than rice. Important as well were the lower price support for barley relative to inflation, the government's reluctance to purchase more of it, a shortage of labor that has become more acute in recent years, and social factors that make consumption of barley and potatoes less desirable than rice if farm families have higher income.5/ One farmer said, "Why should we eat potatoes when we can afford to eat rice?"
!/See Appendix E, "Profitability, Costs and Revenue of Five Crops" by Kwan
S. Kim.




-9
Over the past decade there has been a highly significant drop in
hectarage under cultivation of the crops aforementioned. The area planted in barley declined from 730,000 ha in 1970 to 473,000 in 1979; area in wheat from 97,000 to 13,000 ha over the same period; the area in soybeans from 295,000 to 207,000 ha; and the area in potatoes from 54,111 to 34,000 ha. Thus, even with increases in yields per hectare, aggregate production, and consequently national objectives, are not being met. For example:
-- Barley production in the decade beginning in 1970 basically
remained constant [1,591 million metric tons (MMT) in 1970,
1,508 NNT in 1979], although per hectare yields rose from 2.18
to 3.19 MT.
-Wheat production dropped from 219,000 to 42,000 MT over the
same decade, while yields increased one-third (from 2.26 to
3.21 MT/ha).
-Soybean production rose slightly from 232,000 to 257,000 MT
and yields rose from .79 to 1.3 MT/ha.
-Potato production dropped from 605,000 to 356,000 MT but yields
also dropped from 11.31 to 10.58 MT/ha between 1970 and 1979.
With good weather and a continuing research program, it is possible that the targets may be obtained on all crops ten years after the initiation of the project, if government policy were to emphasize all crops. This seems unlikely, however, in the case of wheat, potatoes, and soybeans. Even if per hectare targets are reached, it is unlikely that any aggregate increases can be expected. Thus, individual farmers may well benefit but the nation as a whole may find its goals unfulfilled.
Rice represents a special case. The modern technological package on which Tongil depends and the sophisticated management required in cultivation has had a salutary effect on the traditional varieties as well
as the higher-yielding ones. Thus Tongil production per hectare increased from 3.86 MT in 1972 to 4.63 in 1979 but the traditional varieties also rose from 3.32 to 4.37 over the same period. Given the private market premium for the traditional varieties and their greater resistance to cold and blast now, it may be as economic to grow the improved japonica as the newer Tongil varieties.6/
Other questions must be asked of the project design, the most
important of which is whether the choice of subjects for research was the most appropriate. Rice obviously was critical both from a national and farmer viewpoint. Barley seemed necessary even though trends indicated that although it was a government priority, it was unlikely to remain one of the farmers'. Wheat, at any time given land use in Korea, was highly questionable. Soybeans were of less importance and potatoes were unimportant in terms of national needs. Researchers at ORD indicate that
-See Appendix E, "Profitability, Costs and Revenue of Five Crops" by Kwan S. Kim and Appendix C, "The Korean Experience in Increased Rice
Production" by Robert I. Jackson. The figures are taken from Table C-2.




_10
livestock mechanization, agricultural economics, and horticultural crops have precedence in research priorities. The exclusion of vegetables in production, nutritional, and equity terms was a shared error. The Asian Vegetable Research and Development Center (AVRDC) supported research on a very limited scale, both monetarily and as to the number of vegetable crops, during the life of the AID project. This, however, was no reason to exclude such an important field.
The goal of making grains more responsive to higher fertilizer usage is a curious one given the oil crisis of 1973, the increase in petroleum imports, and the higher prices of fertilizer. Thought should be given to increasing production with less fertilizer, rather than creating an everexpanding demand for imported petroleum.
It has proven impossible to establish a clear and direct link between the research carried out under the project and improved yields. There was no breakthrough. No doubt the project assisted the research effort and indirectly contributed to improved strains and probably will continue to do so as the trainees return or become more effective. The overall judgment that must be made, however, at least at this time prior to the end of the decade of planned growth in 1984, is that the agricultural research project was a beneficial but not a critical component of the well-established Korean research system.
C. Guidance: The Link between Research and the Farm
The developmental success of agricultural research is dependent
upon the effectiveness of the spread of appropriate research results to the farmer. The Korean example links the research system both at the center and the periphery to an ubiquitous extension service known in Korean as a guidance system. 7/
Both research and guidance fall within the purview of the Director General of the Office of Rural Development. Thus, there is coordination at the administrative center at the top of the bureaucratic structure. This coordination also extends to the rural areas. Each province and gun (county) has a branch office of rural development and guidance workers are located in the lowest administrative unit, the myon, which forms a subdivision of a county. In 1981, there are a total of 7,980 guidance workers in Korea, of whom 7,648 are deployed at the gun and myon levels, 226 at the provincial level, and only 106 at headquarters.
Each guidance officer (the vast majority is male) is responsible for monitoring the production and cultivation techniques of from 6 to 12 villages depending on the terrain and population. He is in constant contact with the villagers, sometimes, according to a few farmers, too often. In some areas during critical periods such as transplanting or during emergencies such as drought, his visits may be daily, advising
For a more detailed discussion, see Appendix G, "Research and Extension:
The Integration of Inquiry and Guidance," by David I. Steinberg.




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farmers and reporting to the government on conditions. Even in a most remote, mountainous village inhabited by former swidden (slash and burn) farmers, the guidance worker visited the area once a month. It is probably safe to say that only isolated farmhouses escape their attention.
These workers are graduates of agricultural high schools where,
through joint appointments, provincial office of rural development staff and teachers have close communication and the curriculum is geared to the practical needs of the rural areas. These men are overworked, visiting farmers seven days a week without any respite during the growing season. There is an attrition rate of 2 percent because of relatively low pay ($176 per month starting salary) and hard work, but this is remarkably low considering the demands the state places on them.
The guidance system is supplemented by an effective and equally widespread training program, carried out annually during the winter months. It first trains the trainers who then train the farmers. No farm family remains untouched by the system. Training includes instruction in improved cultivation techniques, crop management and human nutritional programs. The effort is coordinated with the Sae-maul Movement, the administrative organization of which reaches to the gun but which is also active in virtually every village through village leaders.
Guidance and training are further augmented by a series of demonstration plots with emphasis placed on rice. There are two plots for rice in every village that graphically illustrate to the farmer the expected results from growing various varieties of rice with improved techniques. The farmers have been quick to make the transition to the new varieties once they realize their potential benefits. For example, in North Kyongsang Province planting of the Tongil varieties rose from 16.2 percent of hectarage in 1970 (for seed) to 69.6 percent in 1978. Due to blast disease in 1979, the percentage dropped to 62.4 percent in 1979 and to 48.4 percent in 1980. Because of the disastrous harvest due to cold weather that year, the farmers in 1981 will plant perhaps two-thirds of their crop with traditional varieties which are more resistant to cold and now blast as well. This illustrates that although the guidance officer may cajole and persuade, he cannot dictate.
It is rare in any nation to see such a comprehensive and complete system that has the institutional capacity to transform research into production. Without it, an agricultural research program could not be as effective so quickly. This transition from research to production was further assisted by the growth of a rural road network that allowed the guidance worker easy access to the villages and enabled the farmers to have wider exposure to the outside world and to become a part of a national food market.
If research was stressed and guidance spread the research results, then what happened on the farm? Aggregate data are not sufficient to explain the condition of the individual farmer whose unique situation is described below.




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D. The Korean Farm
Effective land reforms after the Japanese occupation and in the early period of the Korean Republic were a salient factor in improving rural equity in Korea. Korean farmer households, decreasing as a percentage of the total population from 51.6 percent in 1968 to 28.9 percent in 1979, may not legally own more than three hectares of farm land (excluding upland orchards). Some 29.8 percent of farm families cultivate land under 0.5 ha, and 35.3 percent between onehalf and one hectare, 25.7 percent between one and two hectares; and only 5.4 percent over two hectares. The consequences of relatively equitable land distribution are that agricultural research and rural development programs, if they reach the farm as they do in Korea, are important factors in rural equity.
The growth of electrification of rural areas greatly contributed both to improved production and increases in the standard of living. Except perhaps for small, isolated islands and a few scattered farmhouses, farm families have access to electricity (some 83 percent have television sets). Even in villages that were traditionally composed of swidden farmers, some could afford the 3,000 won monthly electric charges.
The pervasive use of plastic to retain moisture and retard weeds on upland crops such as peppers, to protect against cold on rice seedlings, and to grow winter vegetables in the extensive plastic greenhouses have destroyed the traditional aesthetic scene of the Korean landscape (creating a problem for those who paint in the traditional oriental style), but without question it has improved farm income and helped transform the rural economy.
The rural economic structure, however, is dependent on rice. It provides more than half of the farm household income. Although the area of irrigated paddy has generally remained constant, the area devoted to the higher yielding varieties of Tongil has risen nationally from 15.9 percent of the rice area in 1972 to a high of 76.2 percent in 1978. With this increase came a steady rise in production per hectare from 3.86 MT to a high of 5.53 11T in 1977.
An increasing national market orientation by the farmer couoled
with an intensive campaign by guidance workers prompted this shift. It was accompanied by improvements in cultivation techniques and technological innovations that also spurred the increased yields of the traditional varieties of rice. This remarkable shift was predicated on two factors beyond the farmers' control but at least in part within the purview of agricultural research: the Tongil varieties in their earlier years were resistant to blast disease and the normally warm weather prevented cold from undercutting production increases.
It is common that new varieties of rice are resistant to blast for a number of years,but it is equally apparent that new races of blast develop, especially when vast contiguous areas are planted to the same strain. This occurred in 1979, causing a drop both in




-13
aggregate production of Tongil from 4,516/MMT in 1978 to 3,449/NI4T in 1979 and with a per hectare production drop from 4.86 to 4.63 over the same time. The extreme cold of 1980 devastated the Tongil crop cutting production and yields by one-third, lowering farm income, and creating a crisis of credibility between the farmer and the guidance worker, as well as the government, which had advocated Tongil production. Thus in 1981, although figures are not yet firm, the proportion of traditional varieties of rice cultivated are likely to be about two-thirds to only one-third of Tongil. Because cultivation techniques have improved, traditional varietal yields are expected to be high.
Increasing farm income from rice has led to a decrease in other crops included in this project and an overall decline in the land utilization ratio--the land double-cropped. In 1970, it was 1.42, but in 1979 it was
1.30, indicating that farmers regard winter crops such as barley and wheat as uneconomic and that they would prefer, acting economically, to put a much smaller amount of land under winter cultivation in vegetables. "We only grow barley," as many farmers remarked, "because there is nothing else to do in winter." This lack of enthusiasm for barley, in spite of government policy pronouncements, is only balanced by the special production of two-row barley in the South under contract with brewing companies that use it for malt.
Increases in use of pesticides and herbicides, which annually now cost the farmer more than fertilizer, are reflective of the shortage of labor. Whatever their potential deleterious environmental effects, they contribute to a national short-term economic goal. Fertilizer use, however, declined considerably in 1980 (to 828,000 MT from a high of 916,000 MT in 1978), again reflecting increased costs in relation to returns.
The economic consequences of the improved varieties are apparent.
Until 1977, real income had risen--due to a strong government price support, shift in favor of Tongil, and the improved technological package and cultivation techniques that have spilled over not only to traditional rice but to other crops as well. Farm income rose reducing the economic disparity between the urban industrial class and the farmer. The profitability of rice was correlated with size of area cultivated, increased productivity, and the purchase price of rice. Increases of income, although partially attributed to vegetable crops, were mostly a product of Tongil cultivation.
Since 1977, however, the margin of profitability of Tongil has
declined rapidly. Yield differentials between Tongil and the traditional varieties were more than 30 percent in 1977, but only 15 percent in 1980. The higher market price for the traditional strains, and their better resistance to cold and blast made them equally profitable, at least in some areas. Because of the poor performance in 1980, many farmers will opt for risk aversion and thus grow the older, more reliable, varieties.
Wheat and barley provide a different perspective. If the value of
farmers' unpaid labor and equipment are included, the costs of production




-14
are above the market value. Considerable barley is still grown because the winter opportunity costs for farm labor in some areas are minimal.
White potatoes and soybeans, however, were marginally profitable in 1977, but demand has declined as they compete on the same land with vegetable crops such as red peppers, onions, green onions, and cucumbers, for which prices are higher.
The effects of improved agricultural technology on the farm have been important. The Tongil strains require 20 to 30 percent more labor. Thus there is an increased demand for labor at a time when there have been massive population flows, especially of the most productive men and women, to urban areas. Labor costs have increased for both sexes, although disparities between them exist, and in some areas farm labor is the least attractive alternative. For example, in a fishing and farming village, male workers could earn daily only 6,000 won for farm work, but 10,000 won on the fishing boats.
In sum, there has been a substitution of mechanization for labor. The mechanization hierarchy change is first to tillers (there were 289,000 in Korea in 1980) since the most expensive farm cost involves cattle and male workers (female tiller operators are being trained by ORD, a welcome change). The second change is to the mechanical transplanter, a less cost-effective measure as transplanting mainly involves females at lower wages. The shortage of t-ransplanting labor was apparent during the evaluation, as even the military was mobilized to assist in this process. The last change is to binders and small combines. As the farm population moves to urban areas, t1h2re will be an increasing demand for mechanization, which will become ever more important and will require increasing attention.
Agricultural research has contributed positively to rural equity. It has provided far greater benefits for the farmers than for the urban population, and thus, in a sense, represents a subsidy of the rural population by the nation as a whole. 8/ It has helped both smaller and larger landholders. The government's interest in rural equity, both a political and an economic need, is expressed in rice purchase price subsidies that have improved the rural-urban terms of trade. In some regions, due to poor yields of the high-yielding varieties, price support alone was not adequate to raise rural income. Thus in Kwangwon Province, for example, rural incomes rose in the Past three years in current terms. In real terms, however, accounting for inflation, they declined. The government has helped the small holders (those with less than one-half hectare of paddy) by giving them priority in rice purchases, especially in 1980. In 1981, because of a current drought, the central government allocated $20 million to subsiL dize farmers. It also provided mobile water pumps and planted additional, later seed beds of rice, the seedlings from which will be distributed free to small farmers if their current ones cannot be transplanted because of water shortages. The government's concern with equity as an economic good and a political necessity seems real and continuing.
8/ See Appendix E, "Profitability, Costs and Revenue of Five Crops," by
Kwan S. Kim.




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E. Social Factors in Korean Agricultural Development
The milieu of the Korean farm village is dualistic. It is marked by increasing rationalization of farming patterns while retaining time-honored consumption preferences. There is new physical mobility, but traditional hierarchical family relationships are still evi(lent. Increased female employment in urban areas has not yet broken sex discrimination in farm labor wages. Modern education is perceived to be a positive goal, but much of what is taught is Confucian in content. The farmer is cajoled by the government to grow certain crops and to donate labor for village projects; but he may remain autonomous if he feels his interests are threatened. Some of these changes have occurred as a result of increased agricultural production, a byproduct, in part, of agricultural research.
There has been a major migration to urban areas, for the mecca of the city is not only a call to the possibility of greater income; it is also an escape from the monotony of village life and the stratification of both the family and the village age and power structure. This results in an aging of farmers. Farm families' sizes have also declined from an average of 6.17 in 1975 to 5.03 persons in 1979. The farm population under thirteen has declined by 1.3 million during this period. More important for current labor needs on the farm, is the drop in younger and middle-age workers between 1975 and 1979, the 14 to 19 year cohort declined from 1.9 million to 1.6 million and the 20 to 49 year group, from 4.2 million to 3.5 million, approximately equally among both men and women. Labor has become increasingly scarce. Among new Sae-maul-constructed houses, one can occasionally see a more traditional one abandoned, now perhaps used for storage or animals.
The implications of these changes are important. Government figures
indicate about a 7 percent rate of tenancy; yet informal estimates indicate that it may be higher and indeed is growing. Informal tenancy or working for wages on land owned by those who have migrated, at least temporarily, to urban areas has placed pressure on mechanization and the use of herbicides, thus reducing labor demands for weeding. Since Tongil rice requires more labor, and as barley for food is not profitable under present circumstances but especially if cash is required to hire labor, there is tension between the demands of national policy for higher yields of staple grains and the national need for industrialized export production.
The increased demand for education, financed mainly by the consumer as the government has invested less in education than in most developing countries, has also contributed to mobility. The better educated the boy or girl, the greater the likelihood of migration, for that is the goal. In a Confucian society, education is not only an inherent good; it is the social security of the family and the opportunity to escape to the unrestricted anonymity of urban life. Increased education also reduces family farm labor as children remain in school longer. So effective research resulting in higher incomes increased off-farm migration.




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The Sae-maul Movement has had a strong command element to its
diffusion to the villages. The distinction between taxation and voluntary donations to Sae-maul projects, such as a village road or water system, and between corvee labor and voluntary work is indistinct at best. Yet out of this mandated structure has come greater village cooperation and perhaps as well a sense of village pride that might continue to some degree should the Sae-maul Movement end.
Perhaps most evident and of lasting importance is a shift in attitudes. Korea has become a nation of farmers, no longer one of peasants. The rural economy has been transformed from one of subsistance to market-oriented production. Barter has given way to cash and micro-regional labor markets have been turned into one national labor force. These changes are generally positive, but they represent a more complex environment in which the Korean Government will have a continuing and an even more pervasive role that it will have tomanage with increasing care.
F. Macroeconomic Implications of Improved Technology
Although the impact of agricultural research can mostly be measured at the farm level, its economy-wide effect is generally indirect in nature, and more difficult to evaluate.
A readily measurable effect of the development of improved varieties of rice in Korea, excluding the past three successive years of extremely adverse weather, includes the government's saving of foreign exchange through the reduction in rice imports. Before 1975, the year Korea became self-sufficient in rice, imports of rice amounted to almost $200 million (in current dollars) per year.
The improved varietal development may also have important indirect effects on employment and growth in the economy. In Korea, the process leading to these indirect effects must be understood in conjunction with government pricing and purchase policy. Around the time of the adoption of the improved rice varieties in the early 1970s, the government instituted a package program of farm income support consisting of farm producer price and fertilizer subsidies, as well as of subsidies of other materials and supplies and procurement quotas for rice and barley. These new policies clearly differed from the agricultural policies in the 1950s and 1960s. In the 1960s, there was a deliberate attempt to keep grain purchase prices and wages low. The idea was to stimulate industrial expansion through enhanced profit margins. Thus, industrial expansion was brought about at the expense of the agricultural sector and at great cost to the farmers.
During the 1970s, the important role played by agricultural research, along with the development of agricultural infrastructure and the increased use of agricultural inputs, was to increase per hectare yields of rice. Together with new government pricing and purchase policies, it contributed to substantial increases in food production and farm income.




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Growth in the rural sector can contribute to industrial output and
employment growth. As real incomes in the farm sector increase, there will be greater demand for, and production of, industrial goods (farm machinery, farm inputs and consumer goods) and employment. This will lead to further expansion of industries supplying intermediate inputs required for the production in the initially expanded industries. This process can be seen to continue indefinitely in a diminishing and involuted sequence.
The magnitude of this indirect effect on output and employment growth depends on the structure of inter-industrial links within the economy. The Korean economy has a well-integrated inter-industrial structure. As such, the linkage effect on overall growth is substantial. These sequential impacts of new farm technology and government agricultural policy in a macroeconomic setting during the 1970s in Korea can be summarized in the diagram below:
Government Pricing
Purchase Policy Increased
Urban Demand
Agricultural Higher Yields Increased Rura Growth i
Research and in Agricul tu r e Income Industri
Complementary Sector
Technological
Inputs J
Recently the goverment's agricultural income support policy has been increasingly subjected to criticism within the Korean Government and by donors. Apart from the argument of economic inefficiency resulting from the existing discrepancy between world market and farm support prices, there have been concerns about growing government deficits on account of the income support policy. According to the Economic Planning Board, in recent years the annual deficit amounted to as much as $150 million. The accumulated total deficit in the grain management account is expected to be $1.7 billion by the end of 1981, of which about 39 percent was caused by barley purchases.
Since these deficits have been drawn from the government general account in the form of increased currency supply, the effect of farm subsidy has obviously been inflationary. More importantly, during the last two successive years of economic stagnation the government was beginning to have increasing problems in financing the deficits, financing that runs counter to the government stabilization policy. Already there is some evidence that in recent years the terms of trade between farm products and purchased commodities have turned against the farmers.
An important lesson from the Korean case is that the Green Revolution could not have been successful without the vigorous enforcement of a government income support program. In the absence of the immediate prospects for a more favorable land-labor ratio or for the adoption of




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highly mechanized farming methods, there is going to be the continued need for a government price support policy to attain self-sufficiency in rice and barley. Thus, this growing tension between attaining the goal of national self-sufficiency and that of economic efficiency will likely continue for many years.
G. Sustaining and Replicating Agricultural Research
Sustaining the agricultural research system in Korea will be subject to three basic stresses if economic conditions internally and abroad continue to cause concern to the Korean leadership. First, Government budgets are controlled by the Economic Planning Board (EPB) under the Deputy Prime Minister. A few economic rationalists in the EPB view rice and other grain production as uneconomic, for it is apparent Korea could import at least double the rice it produces for the same cost. More politically sophisticated views have prevailed and the rice support price, which politically would be difficult to lower, may keep rising, though more slowly than inflation, thus creating the illusion ot support without its actuality. Agricultural research budgets, the second stress, as well as civil service research salaries (the third stress) may not rise fast enough to prevent some exodus to academia. There is little doubt, however, that in spite of these potential problems the agricultural research program is well-established and will continue. AID did not create it and AID did not dramatically affect it, but AID did assist its growth.
The agricultural research program does not need to be replicated in Korea. It already pervades the society. The question of replicability abroad poses different issues. Any agricultural research project should either be predicated upon, or have as components of the project, a variety of other elements without which it will either fail or prove to be an interesting, but essentially sterile, experiment. Most important is an effective extension service, but without pricing policies encouraging farmers, some rural infrastructure and communications, farm credit, and an overarching national policy encouraging agricultural research and its use, such a program is unlikely to succeed. It is fair to say that a similar project initiated in Korea in the mid-1950s probably would have failed. The Korean agricultural research model will be difficult to replicate in the Third World.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
The Office of Rural Development is the nexus of agricultural change in Korea. An efficient and pervasive governmental organization, it gains much of its effectiveness through its capacity to plan and execute agricultural research, its dissemination of experimental findings through a ubiquitous guidance (extension) system, training, cooperation with the Sae-maul Movement, and its links in both research and training to the academic community at all levels. Its organizational coordination of research and extension at the top of the bureaucracy gives it the capacity to guide rural change.




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The agricultural research project ended in 1980. Its targets of increases in agricultural yields are to be achieved by 1984. Seven trainees sent abroad under the project are still overseas; those who have returned have done so only recently and cannot be expected to have made a major contribution at the time of this report. This evaluation is thus circumscribed by these factors.
Agricultural research was an appropriate intervention for AID.
The project materially assisted in the development of the institutional infrastructure of the Office of Rural Development which was already well-established. It provided, however, only limited benefits.
The most important benefits were: first, training; and secondly, equipment, including a computer and library materials. Resident expatriate technical assistance was of marginal utility, although short-term expert advice was more important. The project provided little that was innovative. The multidisciplinary research team concept was only a modest improvement on the existing structure. Assistance in fostering agricultural research could have resulted from a simple training and equipment project, with short-term advisory services as required.
If the project was more complex than necessary, the project paper was simplistic in its design and somewhat misleading in its data. In spite of a comparatively comprehensive data base, it underestimated existing yields in the experimental stations and the farms. It called for breakthroughs on research resulting in higher yields, but the major innovations occurred prior to the project. The reliance on average experimental yields was a convenient, but spurious, concept.
The areas of project concentration were rice, barley, wheat, soybeans, white potatoes, and cropping systems. Rice was a critical and appropriate concern, being paramount in national policy terms. In spite of inconsistencies in government grain support prices, barley was also important. Cropping systems were another critical area, but little was done in this field. Concentration on soybeans might have been useful, but here again little was accomplished. Potatoes and
wheat research was minor, both because of extensive imports of wheat and the marginal value of potatoes in the Korean diet. Given already apparent trends in Korean migration, labor supply, and cropping patterns, attention should have focused on vegetable production and mechanization as well as rice, barley and cropping systems. Even in those priority areas, the contributions of this research project to Korean agricultural growth are necessarily blurred. The project was useful, indeed overall beneficial, but certainly not critical.
Trends showing a decline in barley, wheat, potato and soybean
hectarage were apparent before the project began. Although project goals may be reached in some of these crops by 1984, statistically aggregate yields are likely to continue to drop. Thus, national goals will probably not be met although a relatively small number of individual farmers may benefit. Rice production may reach its targets by that date, but if this is accomplished it is likely that it will




-20
be attained with only a modest contribution from the project itself. Project targets calling for heightened crop responsiveness to fertilizer consumption seem inappropriate in light of the petroleum crisis of 1973 and the increase in prices and Korean import requirements. Rather, increased yields with less fertilizer or attention to green manure crops might have been a more logical goal.
The responsiveness of the Office of Rural Development to national and thus political goals of heightened rice production was both its strength and weakness. It moved with alacrity against the advice of some researchers, to expand the Tongil varieties to satisfy bureaucratic requirements in the Korean hierarchical political culture. The choice of the name "Tongil" ("unification") is indicative of its political importance. It reacted too quickly, however, especially in light of the knowledge that cold weather can potentially damage Tongil rice and new races of blast fungus normally develop after a few years if a single strain is spread too extensively. It would have been more prudent to release Tongil gradually, supplementing it with other new and traditional varieties whose production also could be increased because of technological innovations and improved cultivation. This approach in the long-term might have been more successful, but the command system of the Korean Government demanding short-term gains and statistical manipulation to reach a political objective was given priority over longer-term research and production needs.
It might have been possible to avoid the decrease in rice production in 1979 due to blast and to mitigate the disastrous fall in rice yields in 1980 had the researchers been able to control dissemination and diversify production. Thus, the strengths of the Korean agricultural research and guidance system, its integration and political importance, proved also to be its elemental weakness.
V. LESSONS LEARNED
The Korean experience in rural development may be close to unique for there are few, if any, countries that are able to mobilize the variety and quality of resources that are required for the rural sector to prosper and agricultural research projects to succeed. Yet if Korea cannot be readily emulated and its agricultural research and rural development model exported, as are so many Korean manufactured products, there are generalizations that can be drawn from the Korean experience.
A. A successful agricultural research program requires a
major national commitment.
This commitment not only takes the form of allocation of public resources for the support of the project; it also includes that indistinct quality that is sometimes referred to as political will. A successful adaptive research program requires an understanding that such research is a matter of high national policy. Thus it requires normally more than single-line support by a ministry of agriculture, but should involve other relevant cabinet level officials. The corollary to this lesson is:




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B. Too great an emphasis on achievement of targets and too strong
a command structure can lead to indiscriminate concentration on
shorter term results.
This can, as in the Korean case, lead to discounting the long-term effects, such as pollution, too rapid dissemination of new varieties, or other major problems. Attempting indiscriminately to attain unrealistic targets can lead to inappropriate use of personnel and resources. It can result in manipulation of statistics. Thus the relationship between placing priority on agriculture and its adaptive research program must be carefully balanced with its longer range implications.
C. Agricultural pricing and procurementpolicies must provide sufficient motivation to the farmers for the incorporation of e2 perimental research results onto farmers' fields.
A successful research and experimental program will not succeed if national pricing and procurement policies discourage farmers from reaping the benefits of higher yields or improved strains. The Korean experience has shown that even traditional farmers are often economically rational and are willing to adopt new technologies if they are assured of opportunities for increased incomes while minimizing risks.
D. An agricultural research program can only be effective if it is
continuous.
Adaptive research requires a continuous testing, breeding and
training program, without which short-term gains may dissolve. There are no single, one-shot, solutions to agricultural research, no matter how successful any single intervention may be.
E. There must be administrative integration of agricultural research
and extension.
Separate administrative structures, even within the same ministry, will likely result in poor coordination between research and extension, thus obviating the usefulness of the project. The Korea case demonstrates the need for integration both at the top of the command structure and in rural areas.
F. Agricultural research, extension and agricultural education should
be coordinated or integrated.
Too often agricultural education, which provides the basic training for extension staff and government personnel, has no formal administrative coordination at any level with the future employment of graduates. Responsibilities are often split between a ministry of agriculture and a ministry of education. In the Korea case, effective coordination exists between the Office of Rural Development at the center and the College of Agriculture, Seoul National University. Indeed it occurs at provincial agricultural high schools (training




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future extension workers) and the provincial or gun agricultural extension and research workers, both in curriculum and staffing. It has proven effective.
G. The government must have the fiscal and administrative capacity
to deliver services and commodities in support of the rural
sector.
The Korean government spends some $20 million a year on extension service salaries alone, exclusive of administration and research. It also allocates considerable resources, through the National Agricultural Cooperative Federation and the Agricultural Development Corporation, for the delivery of commodities, subsidized credit, and the development of rural infrastructure. Agricultural research will not succeed unless there is a major national fiscal commitment coupled with administrative services and support.
H. PL 480 can be a deterrent to improved agricultural pricing policies
and thus retard an effective agricultural research program..
Heavy emphasis on PL 480 commodity support, as in Korea in the 1950s and 1960s, can slow national reform of pricing and procurement policies, thus inhibiting an effective agricultural research effort. It also diminishes farmer incentives for increased production.
I. Training is a critical element of an agricultural research program.
In Korea, there was universal regard that training was the most critical element of the project. A training program built into an agricultural research project is a necessary component essential to the production of most agricultural research results. It must be complemented by a commitment to employ effectively those trained with adequate professional and personal incentives.
J. Adoption of the high-yielding varieties (HYV) leads to both positive
and negative impacts on the economy.
The production of HYV is generally accompanied by increased costs of inputs and in some cases, soil impoverishment. The increases in production are generally associated with greater demands in soil nutrients. Resources must be directed not only toward improving yields but also to decreasing susceptibility to disease and insects. Potential adverse environmental conditions should also be anticipated and diminished.
K. Technical assistance should be carefully reviewed before it is
included in the proj
Short-term, highly specialized technical assistance was regarded as useful in Korea, but long-term resident technical assistance proved less effective. In the Korean case, the institutional structure already




-23
existed and long-term expatriates were not an essential component of the project. Careful consideration should be given to the need for such resident assistance on the basis of the institutional capacity of the local research system and the level of indigenous available trained personnel. Expatriate technicians should not automatically be included on agricultural research projects, no matter how much this may ease an internal AID administrative burden.
L. Continuing contacts are essential with the international agricultural
research centers.
National adaptive research requires the interchange of plant materials and personnel with the international agricultural centers and foreign universities. Without such contacts, progress will be slowed.
M. The success of the Sino-centric societies in the field of agriculture
and overall development should be studied to determine the possible
causative effects of such a cultural milieu.
The remarkable achievements of Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and China in agriculture, their success in other economic areas (including Singapore and Hong Kong), the economic acumen of the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia and the Chinese, Japanese and Korean communities in the United States may be a result of a particular cultural context that in some manner encourages economic development and farmer entrepreneurship. Although this conclusion may be regarded as speculative, the success of all of these cultures should prompt inquiry into the causes of such progress. If there are universalistic solutions to development problems, as donors predict, there may be culturally specific ones as well.




APPENDIX A
METHODOLOGY
The technique for the rapid rural appraisal of a nationally focused
project must, by its nature, differ from one that is site-specific in scope. Given this approach, the problem of a statistically reliable sampling of a national project cannot be solved within the time and funds available. A number of site visits that differ by region, province, accessibility, climatic conditions, crop mix, and socioeconomic status of inhabitants, yield fascinating but anecdotal information; a valid sampling technique is not possible.
The problem is further complicated because sole focus on the project objectives raises more issues than it solves. The project suffered from spurious specificity: objectives of specific crop yields per hectare on experimental farms. This objective was inappropriate, because for all
crops there is such diversityof testing of dozens or even hundreds of varieties that an "average" yield, however defined (and this was never done), is meaningless. In some cases (wheat and barley) the research objective on improved yields on these crops was not really paramount. It had basically been improved before the project began. What was more important was the breeding and testing of early maturing strains combined with resistance to lodging, wetness, and disease.
Whatever the project objectives in agricultural research, whether institution-building or yield improvement, the critical methodological, intellectual, and practical problems are in making the link between production in a research setting in the laboratory or on the experimental farm and that which is taking place in the farmers' fields. In Korea, the transformation of research results into practical farm production and increases in income is a product of the "guidance" system, the extension service. Both research and guidance are functions of the Office of Rural Development. Although the project only marginally mentioned average farm
yields, the inescapable conclusion from early project information available in Washington was that this issue should be central to the evaluation, and therefore considerable time should be spent in determining the effectiveness of the guidance system.
The team thus determined that the evaluation should consist of gathering four levels of data recording the sequence from national policy to the farm level:
National information on crops, yields, incomes and expenditures together with relevant data on macroeconomic statistics related
to agriculture; grain pricing and procurement policies, emDloyment,
imports and exports, etc.;
Experimental station crop and research results at the key stations
throughout the country engaged in efforts related to the loan;




A-2
-- Provincial level agricultural data together with an analysis of the
extension (guidance) service and its effectiveness in transforming
experimental and demonstration results into farm yields; and,
-- Village and farm level data.
The team visited central research and experimental facilities at Suwon for several days collecting national data, interviewing trainees, and inspecting equipment purchased under the AID loan. Two short field trips were first arranged, and then a nationwide safari covering over 2,300 kilometers (km). A separate two-day trip was taken to review development on the island province of Cheju. The team covered some 2,700 km in total. All key crop experimental stations were visited: Chunchon, Kangwon Province for cold water tolerance rice research; The Honam Research Station, Iri, South Chungchon Province for rice, barley, and wheat; The Yeongnam Research Station, Miryang, South Kyongsang Province for the same crops; the Yeongduk Experimental Station in North Kyongsang Province for rice; and the Alpine Research Station in Chinbu, Kangwon Province (800 meters high) for cold air temperature tolerance for rice.
In addition, extensive discussions took place with Provincial Office of Rural Development staff in Kwangju, South Cholla Province; Taegu, North Kyongsang Province; Chunchon, Kangwon Province and Cheju City, Cheju Province. A visit to the gun (county) office in Heongsong, Kangwon Province, provided detailed information at that level. Officials were also interviewed at the myon (district) level, between the gun and village levels.
The selection of villages to be visited was arbitrary, but a reasonably representative sample was obtained based on province, cropping systems and employment, ostensible wealth and poverty, and remoteness. Only one village visit was suggested by gun officials, reportedly a wealthy village near Kyongju, North Kyongsang Province. A few villages were chosen because of their accessibility to main roads, but more were picked because they seemed poor and remote, often requiring tortuous travel along tracks far from the paved or major dirt roads.
The team was determined to find out whether the guidance service reached the most isolated villages. Toward this end, it spent one day in the remote mountain reaches of a sparsely inhabited region of Kangwon Province in an inaccessible area that barely allowed wheeled vehicular travel, on a track with precipitous drops of hundreds of feet without guard rails. Farmers who only fifteen years ago had been swidden cultivators were interviewed, some of whom now had television sets; even in this area the guidance officers visited once a month. In other villages they came almost too often--sometimes daily-according to some villagers.
In South Kyongsang Province, a remote valley was spontaneously selected by the team in an area that was obviously poor. Proceeding to a virtually inaccessible village isolated at the head of the valley, the last inhabitants in that area at the end of the dirt track, the team found two guidance workers, a man and a woman, working in the village. The latter was assisting in a day care




A- 3
center for pre-school children. To all outward appearances this village was poor, but there was a higher level of income than might have been expected. Although rice production levels were low, due to the cultivation of persimmon and chestnut trees, incomes were quite good. Conversely, in some villages that gave the outward appearance of wealth based on improved and modernized Sae-maul housing, income did not seem as high. In all cases, the villages had some type of Sae-maul Movement activity along both productive and social lines (see Appendix G). The team talked with perhaps one hundred farmers and their wives, although greater attention was paid to the farmers as their wives were interviewed in more detail in the 1980 AID Impact Evaluation Report No. 12, Korea Irrigation (quod vide).
The team interviewed farmers who mainly grew rice, those who doublecropped with barley or other crops, some who grew tobacco or potatoes or soybeans, those small farmers who had less than one-half hectare of land and some who had up to three hectares, and a few villagers who both farmed and fished.
The team consisted of David I. Steinberg, AID team leader, with a long record of involvement in Korea studies; Dr. Robert Jackson, of the AID Development Support Bureau's Office of Agriculture and an agronomist; and Dr. Kwan S. Kim, Professor of Economics at Notre Dame University and an employee of AID. This group was ably assisted by Dr. Song Hae-kyun, an Agricultural Education Specialist of the College of Agriculture, Seoul National University,who is also a consultant to the Office of Rural Development. For short biographies see Appendix 14, "Notes on the Authors."
Interviews were conducted in Korean, and extensive use was made of locally available Korean language sources (see Bibliography, Appendix K). No official of the guidance service accompanied the team nor did they suggest (with one exception noted above) site visits.




APPENDIX B
THE TEAM'S ITINERARY
May 21 evening: Arrival in Seoul. May 22 morning: Visit to Embassy, arrange logistics for study.
afternoon: Courtesy call to the Office of Rural Development, Suwon, Kyonggi Province.
lMay 23 Field Visit to Kwangju gun, Kyonggi Province, to interview farmers. May 24 Field Visit to Yangju gun, Kyonggi Province, to interview farmers. May 25 Field Visit to Office of Rural Development, Suwon, Kyonggi Province. May 26 "i i i i I" i I it
May 27 "t i i i
May 28 Field Visit to Chunchon, Kangwon Province, Cold Water Tolerance
Experimental Station; Provincial Office of Rural Development, Kangwon
Province; Heong Song gun, Kangwon Province, to interview farmers. May 29 Field Trip to Iri, North Cholla Province, Honam Crop Experimental
Station, to interview farmers.
May 30 Provincial Office of Rural Development, Kwangju, South Cholla
Province, and Mokpo, to interview farmers.
May 31 Chungmu, South Kyongsang Province, and Pusan, to interview farmers. June 1 Miryang Crop Experimental Station, South Kyongsang Province, to
interview farmers.
June 2 Taegu, North Kyongsang Province, Office of Rural Development, to
Kyongju, North Kyongsang Province, to interview farmers.
June 3 Kyongju, North Kyongju, North Kyongsang Province, to interview
farmers.
June 4 Yeongduk Crop Experimental Station, North Kyongsang Province, to
interview farmers in mountainous areas.
June 5 Samchoek, Kangwon Province, to interview farmers in farming and
fishing village.
June 6 Kangnung, and Chinbu Alpine Crop Experiment Station, Kangwon Province. June 7
to 13 Seoul--Report Drafting




B-2
June 14 Cheju Province (by plane). Visit Provincial Office of Rural Development, and interview farmers.
June 15 Cheju Province, to interview farmers. June 16 Debriefing, Office of Rural Development. June 17 Debriefing, U.S. Embassy. June 18 Departure from Korea.




APPENDIX C
THE KOREAN EXPERIENCE IN INCREASED RICE PRODUCTION
by
ROBERT 1. JACKSON
Korea's shift from rice-importing to self-sufficiency in a relatively short time during the early 1970s is an exceptional achievement. It is unfortunate that cold weather and rice blast late in that decade have decreased rice production to a level where the country must again import rice. The story of this rapid increase in production is remarkable and could come about only in a country like Korea where the infrastructure is well established, and where there was a relatively vast amount of technical information available for increasing production. The recent decline in production is no doubt closely linked to the desire to increase rice production in the shortest possible time span.
A. Background
Korea's recent agriculture policy has been to become and remain selfsufficient in staple food production, particularly in rice. Self-sufficiency reduces the drain of foreign exchange for food imports and lessens the dependence on food coming from surplus-producing countries. As rice is the most important food in Korea, a greater effort has been given to this crop than to some of the other food crops, such as barley, wheat, soybeans and potatoes.
The apparent solution to the ever-increasing demand for food, coupled with the limited area of arable land, is increased productivity. One method of increasing productivity is through improved agricultural technology, the basis for which is research. It was agreed that an AID-financed loan to Korea to assist in financing training of scientists, purchase of equipment and supplies, and providing qualified foreign scientists would enhance the research system. The project identified five crops with which to work,
of which rice was one.
More specifically, the project identified the following targets for rice:
Select and develop strains that will increase the present crop
experiment station yield of 4.79 metric tons per hectare (MT/ha)
to 6.0 by the end of 1983, and actual farm production yields from the present average (1972) of 3.25 MT/ha to an estimated 4.5 MT/ha
within the same period.
Develop new strains which will possess the following characteristics:
a growth and maturity period shorter by ten to 15 days, and at
the same time be responsive to higher fertilization levels;
improved grain quality standards, including higher protein and
lower amylose content, and kernel shapes more acceptable to
the consumers.




C-2
-tolerance for cold temperatures, especially in the seedling
stage and during the ripening period, and shorter maturing;
and
-resistance to blast disease, bacterial leaf blight, virus
stripe disease, brown leaf hopper, green leaf hopper, rice
stem borer and other insects and diseases.
Probably one of the most important dates in Korea's agricultural
history was 1965, when the first cross was made leading to the release of the japonica.-indica hybrid to farmers in 1972 to produce seed. The primary purpose for making this cross was to introduce genes resistant to rice blast from the indica rice and to retain the other desirable characteristics of the commonly grown japonicas. It was realized by rice breeders, however,
that this wide cross could result in poor grain quality (taste), low seed set (fertility) and also low grain yield. Indica rice grew very tall, so it was susceptible to lodging, and it did not mature under natural conditions in Korea. During the selection process in the early generations, lines were selected for the earlier maturing and shorter plant height characteristics similar to the japonica type grown in Korea. After careful observations and selections for 12 generations, the variety Tongil was widely disseminated to farmers in 1974. Close cooperation and collaboration between the Office of Rural Development (ORD) and the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) made it possible to grow two generations of rice each calendar year in the tropical IRRI climate.
The cultivation of the TongiILl/ variety and subsequently released
varieties proved that Korea could attain rice self-sufficiency for three or four years (see Table C-i, p. C-7). Due to unforeseen circumstances, these japonica-indica hybrids have been somewhat disappointing during the 19781980 seasons, as colder conditions than normal prevailed and the rice blast disease became much more severe.
Korea has been virtually unique in its rice program in that few, if any, countries have developed such a complete technical, informational and economic package to instruct and encourage farmers to change many of their traditional practices. The Korean experience is so different and so comprehensive that it is worthy of description. No facet was left uncovered in this comprehensive program.
The complete package associated with the introduction of Tongil rice changed the traditional farming technology. The expansion of Tongil rice intensified and speeded a comprehensive well-organized and effective agricultural extension service. Along with the concentrated expansion of the new rice strain, joint planning and encouragement of the farmers were attained through concentrated administrative support by the government. The resulting increased production of Tongil brought about several changes in the consumption patterns of farm households. Changes in farming technology and socioeconomic conditions were brought about with the relatively rapid increase in the areas cultivated with Tongil.
-/ For the sake of brevity, Tongil is used throughout this paper to include
it and all subsequently released japonica-indica varieties.




C- 3
13. Improvements in Farming Technology
The most obvious benefit from the cultivation of Tongil was the
increase in productivity for the three years after its introduction. The area planted to rice remained practically constant during these years, and the total production significantly increased by about one-third (See
Table C-2, p. C-7).
Undoubtedly, the adoption of the new cultural practices was just as important, if not more so, in attaining self-sufficiency in rice as the planting of Tongil. This improved technology has been used more recently in the cultivation of the traditionally grown rice and has resulted in a very significant increase in productivity.
-Farmers became aware of the advantage of high quality seed with
the introduction of Tongil. This seed was produced by ORD, which
took the necessary steps to ensure that the rice was purer and
higher in germination than that usually planted by farmers. In addition to accelerating the selection program of growing alternate generations at IRRI and in Korea, seed was multiplied in the
Philippines and flown to Korea for distribution to selected farmers.
This seed multiplication program shortened the program by one year
and Korea became self-sufficient in rice one year earlier. The Philippine seed was planted on farms throughout the country as
demonstration trials. The extension workers were provided
opportunities to observe the adaptability of Tongil under various local
conditions and at the same time were able to hold training sessions
on cultural practices at the demonstration sites. These trials were
also used as multiplication plots and seed was harvested for the
following year for distribution to an increased number of farmers.
-Tongil requires earlier planting in the seed beds than the traditional varieties at times when the temperatures are lower. To protect it from the cold weather at sowing required the use of
improved beds covered with plastic (See Tables C-3 and C-4, p. C-8).
-Virgin soil, lime and silicate fertilizers were more frequently
applied by farmers planting Tongil. They also did a better job of
preparing their fields by plowing more times prior to transplanting
the rice seedlings (See Table G-5, p. C-8).
-An advantage of Tongil is its ability to withstand heavier rates
of fertilizer application without lodging and thus be more productive. Tongil farmers' soils were tested and rates of fertilizer
determined for optimum yields. The method of applying fertilizer was changed; in addition to the basal application at the time of
transplanting, the number of applications of top dressing was
increased from about two times with the traditional varieties to three times with Tongil. The fertilizers were applied with more
systematic methods.




C- 4
-The Tongil farmers used larger quantities and more applications of
agricultural chemicals to control diseases and insects than those
planting the traditional varieties.
-The total area of application of herbicides for weed control was
increased and at the same time manual weed control decreased.
-The farmers' methods of irrigation have been changed from the
continuously flooded condition to that of intermittent irrigation.
-Improvement in harvesting and drying was an important lesson for
farmers to learn. Formerly, they stored the harvested grain
without properly drying it in order to save time for barley planting. This method yielded lower quality and quantity of rice.
Tongil shatters quite readily and must be threshed soon after
harvesting. The farmers had to change their method and this
shortened storage time in bundles reduced the shattering losses
and increased the quality.
-Farmers planting Tongil have shifted their dates of sowing, transplanting and harvesting, making them all earlier than those for
the farmers growing traditional rice (See Table C-3). This makes it possible to increase barley production as more rice fields can
be planted with barley as a second or winter crop. However, rather
than increase the area planted to barley, the Tongil rice farmers
have increased the area of land planted to cash crops such as
vegetables because of the greater economic benefits from vegetables
compared to barley.
C. The Role of the Extension Service
The Extension Service played a critical part in the rapid and broad
dissemination of information regarding the Tongil variety and the necessary technical knowledge associated with its production. Farmers' meetings, radio broadcasts, and use of the village amplifier systems and TV sets were all important means of training farmers to shift to Tongil (See Table C-6, p. C-9).
Farmers were offered technical farm training sessions during the winter months so that they were able to improve their farm management techniques. These training programs were basic to bringing the national average productivity of Tongil to nearly that of the experimental plots.
The group farming or cooperative farming program made it easier for the extension workers to perform more efficiently and effectively through group contacts rather than through individuals. The group worked together, all using the improved variety and cultural techniques to attain higher yields.




C- 5
D. Economic Benefits Associated with Tongil
The assets of those farmers planting Tongil increased more than those who continued planting traditional rice without any changes in technology. Their farm size, number of farm buildings, power tillers, power sprayers and mechanically driven threshers have all increased more rapidly than those of the non-cultivators of Tongil. Even their holdings of farm livestock have increased.
Prior to the introduction of Tongil, the government purchased a
limited quantity of rice shortly after harvest for storage and to stabilize the price. Since the government's purchasing price was lower than that of the free market, farmers refused to sell their rice at the time of harvest. However, with the introduction of Tongil, the farmers sold their rice to the government soon after threshing and it was able to meet its goal.
E. Cooperation with IRRI
At the end of 1968, a cooperative agreement between IRRI and Korea (ORD) was signed. This provided for training Korean scientists at IRRI, five the first and subsequent few years. Koreans were to be trained in several of the agricultural disciplines, including breeding, soil chemistry, soil microbiology, weed control, disease and insect control, and rice quality. Along with training, it was agreed to continue the cooperative varietal improvement program. One 6f the targets of this program was to increase the number of generations of hybrids in the breeding program to two each year by growing a summer crop in Korea and the second one during the winter months in the Philippines at IRRI. This combination led to a cooperative training and research program.
In a similar manner to the varietal improvement program, seeds of any newly released varieties were increased in the Philippines during the Korean winter months. This enabled the ORD to accelerate its dissemination of new varieties to the farmers. From the release of Tongil to present, several hundred tons of rice seed have been multiplied at IRRI and airfreighted to Korea for distribution to farmers.
Much credit is given to IRRI for the strategy involving a three-way cross between indica and japonica types to produce high-yielding varieties (HYV). Tongil was the first HYV released in Korea.
In close collaboration with the Korean agricultural universities and IRRI, ORD made excellent use of their facilities and technical information in developing the new HYVs. This has had a very unifying effect between IRRI and Korea.
F. Project Targets
Average yields from rice grown on experiment station plots provide little, if any, meaningful data. There are many strains, selections and! or varieties cultivated under various conditions. Thus to make a valid comparison of the experimental yields at several stations, or even one




C- 6
for that matter, is very nebulous. The project target to increase "experiment station yields of 4.79 M4T/ha to 6.0 M4T/ha by the end of 1983" is very misleading. It is interesting to note that ORD reported yields of Tongil at experiment stations of 6.24 MT/ha in 1970, higher than the initial figure and even greater than that projected for 1983.
on the other hand, to make a comparison of actual farm production yields with those stated in the project paper is much more valid, especially in Korea where massive agricultural statistics are readily available (See Table C-2). Before the loan was made to Korea, the improved variety, Tongil, yielded 3.86 MT/ha in 1972, about 0.6 MT/ha greater than that noted in the project for that year. Every year from 1972 through 1979, the national average or farm production yields have surpassed the project goal for 1983.
During the team's discussion and observations, only three characteristics other than yield, were found to be of much concern. Resistance to blast, tolerance to cold, and shorter maturity were all cited as major constraints still to be overcome, yet several others are noted in the original project. There is still a taste preference for the traditional or japonica rice.




C-7
Table C-I Rice Production and Imports Self Sufficiency
Year Production I Rate
(1000 MT) (1000 XT) (Percent)
1970 4,090 541 93.1
1973 3,957 437 92.1
1974 4.211 206 90.8
1975 4,445 484 100.5
1976 5,215 157 102.9
1977 6,006 108.6
1978 5,797 103.8
1979 5,565 502 86.0
1980 3,550 580 88.8
Table C-2 Area, Production and Productivity of Rice Percent Area
Area (1000 ha) Production(1000 MT) Productivity(MTtha) Cultivated
Year Traditional Tongil Traditional Tongil Traditional Tongil With Tongil
1970 1,203 3,939 3,37
1972 1,010 187 3,234 723 3,32 3,86 15.9
1974 1,023 181 3,589 856 3,69 4,73 15.2
1975 923 274 3,248 1,380 3,51 5,03 22.9
1976 663 533 2,626 2,553 3,96 4,79 43.9
1977 548 660 2,317 3,648 4,23 5,53 54.6
1978 290 929 1,263 4,516 4,35 4,86 76.2
1979 480 744 2,097 3,449 4,37 4,63 60.8
Source: Yearbook of Agriculture and Forestry Statistics, 1980




C- 8
Table C-3 Changes in Dates of Farm Operations
Operation 1970 1974
Rice Scwt -in nursery May 3 April 19
Rice transplanted June 19 June 6
Rice harvested October 21 October 8
Barley sown October 28 October 18
Table C-4 Adaption of Plastic Covered Seed Beds Plastic Covered Year Seed Beds M%
1971 4
1973 27
1974 38
1975 56
1976 65
1977 81
Table C-5 -Application of Silicate Fertilizer Year Amount (1000 MT)
1970 13.1
1972 21.6
1974 80.0
1975 175.0
1976 267.0
1977 300.0




C-9
Table C-6 -Radio and TV Farm Programs Prgam
Year Radio TV
1970 508 5
1973 1,341 58
1974 1,123 46
1975 1,103 77
1976 1,410 64
1977 1,186 82




APPENDIX D
RESEARCH ON SELECTED FOOD CROPS
by
ROBERT 1. JACKSON
A. Purposes and Targets
One of the purposes of the AID-financed loan for agricultural research in Korea was to assist in varietal improvement of the five major food crops: rice, barley, wheat, soybeans and white potatoes. In addition to research on varietal improvement, the development of improved cropping systems was part of the project as well.
Specific targets were established for each of the crops, both for yield increases on the experiment station and on farmers' fields for the crops covered in the project with the exception of potatoes. Improved varieties of potatoes resistant to viruses, insect control measures, and methods of processing and marketing were stated as project targets. The targets for rice are presented in Appendix C.
Aims included the development of new varieties and strains of
soybeans capable of increasing present (1973) yields from 1.98 MT/ha to a target level of 3.2 MT/ha, and increasing farmers' yields from
0.8 to 1.3 MT/ha by the end of 1983. These improved soybeans were to be more responsive to higher plant populations per unit area of land, resistant to lodging and at the same time responsive to higher rates of fertilizer, higher in protein and oil content, shorter in maturity, and resistant to the economically important pests. Research on cultural practices was also an item for consideration.
New strains of barley were to be selected and developed so that the experiment station yield of 2.79 MT/ha was to be increased to
3.6 MT/ha and farmers' yields increased from 2.04 MT/ha to 3.0 MT/ha within a ten-year period. A variety 10 to 15 days shorter in maturity, more resistant to cold temperatures, more responsive to higher rates of fertilizer without lodging, resistant to common barley insects and diseases, and tolerant to waterlogged paddy soils was to be developed.
Similar characteristics for wheat were stated in the project
paper. Experiment station yields were to be increased from 4.3 MT/ha to 5.2 MT/ha, and on-farm yields from 2.24 to 4.0 MT/ha. The new varieties were to incorporate the following characteristics: growing period reduced from 20 to 15 days, improved milling qualities, higher protein, better baking quality, resistance to diseases and insects and tolerance to cold and more poorly drained paddy soils.
There were also five main targets for cropping systems, but as the team saw little evidence of any research results from this component of the project, no other comments will be made.
B. Rice
Research on rice has undoubtedly made the greatest contribution to the Korean agricultural economy through the development and release




D- 2
of the japonica-indica (Tongi 1) hybrids and the technological package to accompany these hybrids. This package has also been applied to the cultivation of the traditional varieties and their productivity has increased to a level comparable with the hybrids (see Appendix C, Table 2).
C. Wheat
Wheat has probably received more than its share of research effort if wheat production and import statistics are used as a basis for judgment. Production and area cultivated has steadily declined over the past ten years but imports have increased; thus, overall the demand for wheat has waxed. This may be partly due to the shift in farm population to the urban centers and dietary changes. The productivity of wheat has increased and this can be largely attributed to the successful research program.
More specifically, the wheat scientists have been conducting research on the following characteristics:
--Earliness
--Erect plant types
--Dwarfness
--High yield
-Good grain quality plumpness and protein content
-Drought tolerance
-Resistance to sprouting in the head
-Disease resistance including scab, powdery mildew, stem rust
--Winter hardiness
-Tolerance to wet paddy soils
It is clearly evident from this list of characteristics that the wheat research carried out is in conformity with that stated in the project paper.
One of the most commendable aspects of the wheat improvement
program is the close cooperation between the International Wheat and Maize Center in Mexico (CIMMYT) and U.S. universities. AID financially supports the research on wheat at CIMMYT, Oregon State University and until recently the University of Nebraska.
Oregon State University has provided materials for the International Winter Spring Wheat Screening Nursery (IWSWSN) since 1973. Two nurseries have been sent by the University of Nebraska, the International Winter Wheat Performance Nursery (IWWPN) and the High Protein, High Lysine Observation Nursery (HPON). The IWWPN has been grown each year since 1968. CIMMYT has provided the International Bred Wheat Screening Nursery (IBWSN) since 1974.
D. Barley
The area cultivated with barley has steadily declined during the last decade. The production has remained relatively constant, with




D-3
the exception of 1977 when the crop was severely damaged by a typhoon. Most important, the productivity has significantly increased during this period and is due largely to the efforts and results of the barley research workers. It suffices to say that they are conducting similar research on barley to that on wheat to overcome the constraints related to barley production.
Nearly all of the farmers growing barley were unhappy with the Government's pricing policy. Should this be changed, undoubtedly barley production would increase markedly. Those farmers growing two-row barley for malting and under contract with the two Korean breweries expressed their interest and financial benefit in barley cultivation.
Cooperative international barley nurseries have been provided by CIMMYT and Montana State University.
E. Soybeans and White Potatoes
The area cultivated and production of soybeans and white potatoes have decreased during the past decade. Productivity of soybeans has increased and that for potatoes remained relatively static. The farmers interviewed expressed extremely little interest in either of these two crops.
The ORD has cooperated with CIP on potato research and the University of Illinois (INTSOY) on soybeans. All of these institutions receive financial support from AID.
F. Conclusions
If the project were to be redesigned at this writing, the inclusion of soybeans and white potatoes as crops to be developed by this project would be very questionable. There is a relatively strong research component on wheat, but the fact that the cultivated area has shrunk to such a great extent makes it difficult to justify support to research on wheat at this time. There is such an increase in the use of mechanically powered farm equipment, due to the improved cultivation methods and shortage of farm labor resulting from urban migration, that farm mechanization would receive a very high priority for inclusion. Farmers have learned that it is more economically advantageous for them to grow some of the vegetables under plastic during the winter months and in the open fields during the summer season than it is to cultivate wheat and barley. Research on vegetables should also receive high priority if the project were being designed at this time. It should be noted that the AVRDC cooperated with the ORD in research on a limited number of vegetables and provided only minimal financial support during the life of the AID project.




Table D-1. Area, Production and Productivity of Selected Crops
Year -Area (1000 ha) Production (1000 ~QProductivity _(IT/ha)
Barley Wheat Soybeans Potatoes Barley Wheat Soybeans Potatoes Barley Wheat Soybeans Potatoes 1970 730 97 295 54_ 1,591 219 232 605 2.18 2.26 .79 11.31
1972 710 63 282 43 1,600 149 224 459 2.25 2.38 .79 10.62
1974 704 36 286 41 1,388 74 319 447 1.97 2.03 1.11 10.86
1975 711 44 274 52 1,700 97 311 660 2.39 2.22 1.13 12.80
1976 711 37 247 49 1,759 82 295 569 2.47 2.22 1.19 11.76
1977 516 27 251 50 814* 45 319 558 1.58 1.68 1.27 11.30
1978 554 17 247 39 1,348 36 293 304 2.43 2.09 1.19 7.82
1979 473 13 207 34 1,508 42 257 356 3.19 3.21 1.24 10.58
Source: Yearbook of Agriculture and Forestry Statistics, 1980.
*Decrease due to excessive flooding from typhoon




APPENDIX E
PROFITABILITY, COSTS AND REVENUE OF FIVE CROPS
by
KWAN S. KIM
A. Introduction
After the adoption of the bigh-yielding varieties (HYV) of rice and other crops in the early 1970s, the switch from the traditional varieties (TV) to the HYV has been rapid. In the case of rice, the use of the HYV has in general resulted in higher yields of output, but this technological change has been accompanied by increasing use of fertilizers, chemicals, and implementation of government purchase and support prices of major crops. During the last two years, the cold weather conditions and blast diseases have severely affected yields in rice output, particularly those in the IIYV. The fact that the HYV (Tongil) require heavier inputs, as compared with the TV, and that their yields were more susceptible to cold weather and blast disease is significant in determining the yearly relative profitability of the HYV over the TV and therefore the farmer incentive in crop selection. As a rule, the analysis of farm income accounts is essential to an understanding of the reason for the adoption of new technologies by farmers.
Profitability from crop production for a farm household depends on such factors as per hectare yield of output, per hectare use of inputs, consumer and government purchase prices of grains, and government subsidized prices of fertilizers and chemicals. The attached tables show calculations of the financial costs and returns for 1977 and 1980 from the production of the five crops funded by AID for agricultural research. The year 1977 recorded a highest yield per hectare in the production of the HYV of rice, and 1980 was a poor harvest year for the HYV because of the cold weather and diseases.
Figures in the tables are based on national sample surveys carried out by the Office of Rural Development. They refer to average farm household production costs and revenue. The term "economic profit" is defined as the residual of farm household income received from farming activities after subtracting all expenditures incurred for inputs including any unpaid return to family-owned resources (land, labor, or capital). "Operating profit" is calculated as the residual from the farm income after paying out all costs of inputs which exclude any unpaid return to family-provided resources. In several villages we visited, there were very few opportunities for farmers to engage in off-farm or alternative economic activities other than farming. Under these circumstances, the concept of "operating profit" provides a more appropriate measure of the incentive for production.
B. Summary: Salient Features of Farm Household Income
1. Profitability of HYV and TV
The hig-ti-yielding rice varieties used relatively more fertilizers, chemicals and labor input. They outyielded the TV by a greater margin. In 1977 economic profits from the HYV were 33 to 60 percent




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higher, depending on whether rice was cultivated in a mono-culture or sequentially cropped system. The same profit margin declined, on average, to about 15 percent in 1980, which reflected the uneven incidence of cold weather and disease problems. Although the cultivation of the HYV has generally resulted in greater profits on both "operational and economic" accounts, there have been substantial variations in the profit margin from region to region.
The calculations in the tables assumed a uniform government purchase price for all varieties of rice. In interviews with several farmers we found that they could frequently obtain as much as 15 or 20 percent higher prices for the traditional varieties (japonica) on the free market: many consumers still seem to prefer japonica to Tongil rice in spite of the fact that there is virtually no difference in the taste, especially when rice is freshly cooked. Thus, if we assume that the price of the japonica was 15 percent higher in 1980, profitability can be shown as no higher for Tongil rice than for the TV. In other words, per hectare yield in the HYV had to be at least 15 percent higher in order to be economically profitable.
2. Effect of ki!V on the Labor Market
The cultivation of the HYV was relatively more labor-intensive. This may be explained by the fact that Tongil varieties require more intensive cultural care and a longer gestation period. For 1980, output yield per man hour was about 3.3 kg per 10a (one-tenth of a hectare) in both varieties. As more of-the rice area is cultivated with the HYV there will be a growing demand for labor in rural Korea. Effective labor is already in scarce supply in Korea. The dissemination of the high-yield farming technology is likely to accelerate the process of "tractorization" in Korean agriculture.
3. White Potatoes, Barley. Wheat, and Soybeans
Another crop that has continued to yield positive "economic profits" is white potatoes. Despite the profitability in potatoes, there has been a declining trend in the planted area and the total production since 1975. The profit rate from the cultivation of white potatoes is not only low relative to that from the more widely-demanded vegetables and fruits, but also many Koreans consider white potatoes as an "inferior" good. Their consumption increases only when other major staple food supplies decline. Also, since the consumption of potatoes is small relative to that of other foods, the potato market may be considered as volatile with prices highly sensitive to changes in demands for other foods.
For other crops, our calculations show that barley and wheat for both 1977 and 1980 incurred net losses in economic profit if unpaid returns to farm owners' resources are included in the production costs. However, "operating profits" become positive if only the actual paidout costs are taken into account. In particular, barley is traditionally a second important staple food (next to rice) in the Korean diet.




E-3
Unlike the case of rice, however, there has been no adequate government price support for barley at least at a level that could ensure a comfortable profit margin to the farmers. For example, according to a recently announced pricing scheme for 1981, the margin between the government purchase price and the production cost of barley (excluding the implicit costs) was 2,531 won per bag. This implies an operating profit" rate of some 9 percent in barley production. Consequently, barley has been grown only as a marginally important, winter-crop revenue source by farmers whose "opportunity" incomes during the idle season are insignificant. Like white potatoes, barley is an inferior good; as farmers' real incomes rise, its consumption tends to decrease as consumers substitute rice for barley. Thus, over the years, the Government of Korea has accumulated sizeable quantities of barley in storage. The barley-growers have generally been apprehensive of the possibility of sudden reductions in the government purchase of barley. The government's purchase decision is, as a rule, announced at the time of the harvest.
Soybeans yielded positive profits in 1977, but resulted in negative "economic profit" in 1980. Like white potatoes, the area planted in soybeans has somewhat declined since 1977.
4. Government Policies
It must be emphasized that in addition to per hectare yields and related production conditions, another major determinant of profitability in crop production is the government's pricing and purchase policies. The Korean Government instituted in 1969 a two-tier pricing system consisting of government purchase prices at the farm gate and selling prices to urban dwellers for rice and barley. The consumer price has since averaged twice that of imported rice. In an effort to subsidize farm producers, the government has also kept the purchase price of rice far above the consumer cost. As a result, in each year since 1968, the government has incurred deficits in the general account by issuing overdrafts on the central bank, which has of course added to the inflationary pressure in the economy. In the case of barley, the Government, in spite of relatively unattractive farm gate prices offered the farmers, has also provided a substantial subsidy to the growers by keeping consumer prices low. The economic implication of farm pricing policies in Korea is significant. If the social profitability of rice (and barley, of course) is to be calculated in terms of its accounting prices (international market prices), it would be unprofitable to grow rice and barley from the society's point of view. It is clear, however, that the farm price support policy in Korea seeks achievement of the political objective of self-sufficiency, and not that of achieving resource-allocation efficiency.
A related issue concerning the farm support policy is the timing of the government's decisions for purchase quota and prices. The decisions are as a rule announced around the time of the grain barvest for the produce that has already been harvested or is going to be harvested. The uncertainty and risk caused by the government delay in action has additionally lowered the farmer incentives to grow barley as a winter crop.




Table E-1. Farm Household Account Per 10a Land
for AID-Supported Crops 1977
________________________ (Uit: Won/lO a)
Total Operating Economic
Gross Operating Production Profit Profit
I tern Revenue Cost Cost Amount Rate Amount Rate
1. HYV Rice
(Single-cropping) 194,037 52,294 94,588 141,743 73.0 99,449 51.3
2. HYV Rice
(Double-cropping) 180,213 50,308 91,874 129,905 72.1 88,339 49.0
3. TV Rice
(Single-cropping) 155,454 47,410 89,388 108,044 69.5 66,066 42.5
4. TV Rice
(Double-cropping) 139,183 44,742 85,729 94,441 67.9 53,454 38.4 M
41s
5. Upland Rice
(Double-cropping) 81,016 31,741 64,319 49,275 60.8 16,697 20.6
6. Upland Barley 56,455 29,096 68,867 27,359 48.5 12,412
7. Paddy Barley 58,247 28,241 78,220 30,006 51.5 19,973
8. Upland Naked Barley 57,455 30,448 70,040 27,007 47.0 12,585
9. Paddy Naked Barley 61,013 30,862 81,090 30,151 49.4 -20,077
10. Upland Wheat 34,787 24,195 64,248 10,592 30.4 -29,461
11. Paddy Wheat 34,128 23,701 73,061 10,427 30.6 -38,933
12. Soybeans 50,876 12,662 47,196 38,214 75.1 3,680 7.2
13. White Potatoes (Upland) 147,290 35,702 70,990 111,588 75.8 76,300 51.8
14. White Potatoes (Paddy) 144,517 34,978 78,755 109,539 75.8 65,762 45.5
Source: Office of Rural. Development




E-5
Table E-2. Average Rice Production Costs and Revenue Per 10a Land (1980)
(Value Unit: Won)
Item HYV TV HYV TV
Gross Revenue
Output 446.4 kg 396.3 kg 255,564 226,882
Byproduct 14,588 18,098
Total 270,152 244,980
Expenses
A. Operating Expenses
(Materials)
Seed 5 kg 4.9 kg 1,727 1,692
Organic Fertilizer 877 kg 833.5 kg 7,981 7,583
Inorganic Fertilizer 8,430 7,430
Chemicals 9,177 7,936
Milling 446.4 kg 396.3 kg 11,294 10,019
Others
Total 71,058 66,665
(Labor)
Hired Labor 36.8 hrs. 29.8 hrs. 21,094 16,810
Miscellaneous 657 822
Total for A 92,809 84,297
B. Implicit Expenses
Own labor 98.4 hrs. 88.9 hrs. 57,402 51,424
Operating Capital Services 2,085 1,873
Fixed Capital Services 2,567 2,567
Rent 27,681 27,681
Miscellaneous 1,151 1,589
C. Total Expenses 183,695 169,431
Economic Profit 86,457 75,549
Operating Profit 177,343 160,683
Value Added 199,094 178,315
Profit Rate a/ 32.0% 30.8%
Operating Profit Rate b/ 65.6% 65.5%
Notes: aj Economic Profit as a percent of gross revenue
_b/ Operating Profit as a percent of gross revenue Source: Office of Rural Development




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Table E-3. Farm Household Income Account Per 10a Land for AID-Supported Crops 1980
Operating Economic
Profit Profit
Quantity Crop OperatinProductio) Amount Rate Amount Rate Item (kg) Revenue Cost Cost (Won) (Won)
Barley
(Upland) 276.5 103,249 47,403 129,788 55,846 54.1 -26,539
(Paddy) 291 109,607 52,352 139,889 57,255 52.2 -30,282
Naked Barley
(Upland) 312.9 114,205 55,205 129,735 59,000 51.7 -15,530
(Paddy) 317 115,722 54,246 137,577 61,476 53.1 -21,855
Wheat
(Upland) 331.9 91,303 41,382 122,063 49,921 54.7 -30,760
(Paddy) 333 91,638 46,218 129,235 45,420 49.6 -37,597
Soybeans
(Mono-culture) 144.5 82,445 26,636 96,794 55,809 67.7 -14,349
(Double-cropping)134.9 76,966 24,706 91,030 52,260 67.9 -14,064
White
(Spring) 1,188.3 254,060 97,611 182,289 156,449 61.6 71,771 28.2
Potatoes
(Fall) 1,243.8 214,092 66,482 145,263 147,610 68.9 68,829 32.1
Notes:
a All input expenditures excluding unpaid returns to family owned
resources.
b All expenditures including unpaid returns to family owned resources.
Source: Office of Rural Development




APPENDIX F
SOCIAL RETURNS TO AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH AND EXTENSION
by
KWAN S. KIM
I. Introduction
Scientific information generated by agricultural research is a
public good once it is disseminated for application. No consumer can be excluded from benefiting from the application of research output,
and there is no market pricing mechanism for the output. The absence
of a pricing mechanism implies that private-sector firms tend to underinvest in agricultural research from society's point of view since the benefits of research cannot be entirely internalized by the firms. As
a consequence, there is a need for public support of agricultural research. Since agricultural research would compete with alternative
uses for public funds, it is important for decision makers to obtain
information on the returns to agricultural investment.
This appendix reviews and provides a critique of the previous
work on social returns to agricultural research and extension (R&E)
in Korea. In an important study on Tongil rice, K. H. Park presented an analysis of socioeconomic returns on agricultural research and ex-tension expenditures in Korea.1/ This work is significant because it
deals with an ex post evaluation of agricultural research on Tongil
rice. It prove ides the only estimate of social returns to Tongil rice
development.
There was an earlier attempt in 19i72 to evaluate returns on agricultural research expenditures in Korea using computer-simulation
models by Michigan State University's Korean Agricultural Sector Study
(KASS) team. Although actual expenditures on research for the improved
varieties of rice (Tongil) were incurred starting as early as 1962, the expanded extension program to disseminate the research results
began in 1972. The KASS Team's report provided an ex ante analysis of
research project impact and, from the benefit of hindsight, was useful only as background information to a project feasibility analysis.
II. Park's Analysis
The main objective of this study was to estimate the ex post rate
of return on the Korean Government' s agricultural research -and extension expenditures, utilizing the national, annual data series for the
period 1962-1977 that were provided by the Office of Rural Development.
The original data were expressed in current won and two types of data
adjustments were made. First, the expenditure and revenue figures were adjusted for inflation. Second, as his calculations were to be derived
from the vantage point of 1977, it was necessary to convert to present
values as of 1977 all past and future streams of expenditures and
1/ K. H. Park, "Analysis of Socioeconomic Consequences of the Green
Revolution," Government of Korea Office of Rural Development, 1977.




F-2
incomes using an appropriate discount rate (0.05 in Park's study).
Briefly, the model used for estimating the rate of return was originally developed by Z. Griliches in which:
Social Rate of Return = Perpetual flow of returns (PFR)
Cumulated R&E expenditures up to 1977 (CREE)=
Interest income on cumulated past returns (ICPR) + Future annual return (FAR)
Cumulated R&E expenditures (CREE).2/
The term CREE represents a sum of past R&E annual expenditures, where each past year's real expenditures are converted to the present value of 1977.
In a similar manner, cumulated past returns can be calculated as a sum of previous annual returns from R&E investments. ICPR simply expresses future interest income on these cumulated past returns. FAR represents the projected yearly return in a perpetual stream of future returns from CREE. Under the assumption of perfect foresight, yearly future return is assumed as equal to the 1977 return. PFR thus consist of two sources, ICPR and FAR.
The annual returns from R&E expenditures for developing and disseminating Tongil rice were calculated by estimating hypothetical losses in income, which would occur had the new varieties not been introduced on the farm fields. For this, the author employed a supply and demand framework as shown in Figure 1. He then assumed perfect elasticities in rice supply, i.e., that rice can be produced in Korea at a constant cost at OP in the diagram. Introduction of the new technology could then be seen as a shifting downward of the supply schedule from SS to S'S'. Then the hypothetical losses in income without the introduction of the improved varieties can be shown equal to the net losses in the consumer surplus identified by the shaded areaPBBP'. The consequences of dynamic changes in the proportion of the area cultivated for Tongil rice were carefully worked out in a formula used for calculating net losses in income. Based on an estimate given in the KASS study, he assumed a rice demand elasticity of -0.4 for Korea.3/
The economic (social) rate of return on R&E expenditures for Tongil rice was calculated by the author at 1200 percent. That is, from the vantage point of 1977, each one won worth of investment in Tongil rice development generated 12 won worth of return from the society's point of view. Although other studies show that the economic rate of return
2/ Z. Griliches, "Research Costs and Social Returns: Hybrid Corn And
Related Innovation," Journal of Political Economy, October 1958.
3/ See Park, K. H., ibid, pp 26-40.




F-3
Figure 1. The Rice Market in Korea (per H. Park)
1. W UTY!




F-4
from agricultural research is, as a rule, high for developed countries (1300 percent for the U.S.A. in Professor Griliches' estimation), Park's estimate comes as a surprise for a developing country like Korea.
III. Critique
The major deficiency in Park's analysis is that the estimate is
based on a hypothetical model that employs a set of highly questionable assumptions. Among such assumptions are:
-- Perfect Supply Elasticity--In reality, rice cultivation in
Korea can be expanded only with a neavy infrastructure investment. The constant cost assumiption in rice production for Korea
is utterly unrealistic.
-- Equal Input Requirements--As compared with the traditional varieties, the Tongil varieties require heavier inputs including labor
hours. Operating expenses per hectare have been higher for the production of the HYV. Thus not only the difference in per hectare yields but also in per hectare input uses should have
been taken into account in Park's analysis. Obviously, his results are overstated.
-- Closed Economy--There are no imports of rice in his model. Before Korea attained self-sufficiency in 1975, it had been importing 10 to 15 percent of its domestic demand for rice. As
will be shown below, the introduction of rice imports drastically
changes the model structure.
-- Uniform Pricing--The actual pricing mechanism for rice is far
more complex than depicted in his analysis. This is examined
in the following discussion.
IV. An Alternative Framework
The consumer-surplus approach in Park's analysis is too simplistic and unrealistic to be of much interest. In the following, an alternative framework is offered to describe the rice market situation in Korea.4/ In Figure 2 the demand and supply curves are shown by D and S. Point A represents market equilibrium in a closed economy situation. The effect of the improved varieties is displayed as causing a downward shift of the supply curve from S to S'. Distance OG represents an initial equilibrium price which for simplicity is assumed as equal to the government's selling price to consumers (In equilibrium the selling price should converge to a free market price). Government purchase price from farmers is indicated
V This model is adapted from the Akino and Hayami model with appropriate
modifications to reflect the Korean situation (M. Akino, and Y. Hayami,
"Efficiency and Equity in Economic Development," American Journal of
Agricultural Economics 57 (1975): 1-10)




F-5
Figure 2. The Rice Market in Korea (a suggested framework) rICE
D
S
w S
E
P K
WT
4 C QUANTITY




F-6
by OP, which is assumed lower than the selling price (The Government handling costs of rice storage and transaction are not included in this diagram. It is possible to show the situation of government deficits on rice accounts). Note that the world market price is OW, which is located below government purchase price OP.
In the initial situation covering the period before 1975, the year Korea reached self-sufficiency in rice, imports of rice are indicated by quantity BC with a foreign exchange cost equal to the area of BHJC; domestic production is shown by quantity OB. The effect of introducing Tongil rice, plus effecting changes in other agricultural production conditions can be seen as resulting in self-sufficiency in rice. The net effect of this is shown in the diagram. There is no change in consumer surplus and the increase in producer surplus equals the area OKFE. The incidence of research benefits is shown to fall more on producers than on consumers. This finding contrasts with Park's analysis in which the benefits exclusively fall on consumers. Indeed, the available data indicate that the market price of rice has risen at a rate faster than that of government purchase price. There is no evidence for a drastic decrease in the consumer rice price following increased domestic yields in rice.
More importantly, the real benefits of R&E expenditures did not
lie so much in benefiting producers or consumers as in saving the cost of foreign exchange used for imports of rice. Our analysis clearly shows this. As a result of attaining self-sufficiency, the import saving is equal to BC in quantity and to the area BHJC in dollars.
To summarize, although our analysis is qualitative in nature, there are two important findings that emerge from it:
Producers (farmers), as compared with urban consumers, benefited
more from the adoption of the improved agricultural technology.
The critical factor contributing to this has been government
pricing policy.
The previous estimate of economic returns from rice research is unreliable. It failed to recognize the gains in producer
surplus, and overestimated consumer gains. Moreover, it totally overlooked, perhaps, a much larger benefit in foreign exchange
savings. Because the previous study ignored the differences in input uses between the two varieties, the estimate of the economic return on rice research in Korea is likely overstated.
V. Further Suggestions
Among other things, one important caveat in the preceding model must be noted. That is, our analysis has failed to separate net effects of R&E investment from those of other factors that collectively or independently cause a shift downward of the supply curve (see Figure 1). Clearly, some factors such as fertilizer and chemicals are complementary in input




F-7
requirements. Others such as improved irrigation systems or mechanized farming methods may well be considered as substitutable. There is a need for a more rigorous analysis to understand the true effects of agricultural research. In this regard, the consumer-producer surplus approach is ill-equipped to deal with the complex agricultural production and marketing system in Korea. The results of an analysis using this approach would be sensitive to different specification of supply and demand functions and the nature of the supply function shifts. There are virtually no reliable estimates of agricultural demand and supply elasticities for Korea. It is suggested, therefore, that in the case of Korean agriculture the production function approach would be more appropriate for measuring the net benefits from agricultural research._,/ The clear advantage of this approach is that it provides a method of statistically isolating the influences of research programs from these other factors expected to affect observed yields. It also provides an estimate of the marginal return to research investment, which is a more useful indicator to decision-makers concerned with the merits of agricultural research projects._6/
5/ For a pioneering article on this topic, see Z. Griliches' "Research
Expenditures, Education, and the Aggregate Agricultural Production
Function." American Economic Review 54: 96-174, 1969. For
a review of cited developments, see World Bank Staff Papers Nos.
360 and 361, 1979.
6/ The time-constraints prevented this team from delving into the calculations of rates of return to research investment. However, basic
data required for an aggregate analysis on social returns seem available for Korea.




APPENDIX G
RESEARCH AND EXTENSION: THE INTEGRATION OF INQUIRY AND GUIDANCE
by
DAVID 1. STEINBERG
A. Introduction
Critical to the development of a national research system is the continuous adaptation and creation of new plant strains suitable to a particular environment. Equally important is the capacity of a nation to translate research results into production, consumption, and income for the population. The Korean case represents a remarkably successful melding of research and extension. It is, however, based on a system so goal-oriented at every bureaucratic level that,.not surprisingly, the attainment of targets becomes both a matter of pride and bureaucratic survival. Bureaucratic enthusiasm is sometimes transformed into involuted pressure to achieve--goals are created that the system itself cannot safely reach, each level striving to achieve targets that are sometimes unrealistic, resulting in costly errors at local and even national levels?. It can lead to manipulation of statistics as the bureaucracy yields to the temptation of always indicating progress, higher yields, or larger exports. Only when dire, usually external, factors intervene can a decline be shown.
B. Administrative Centralism
Centralism is the hallmark of the Korean bureaucracy. The power of the Seoul administration is felt through an integrated system of regional and local pressure points having their nexus in the capital. The main bureaucratic mechanism of central control of the periphery is the Ministry of Home Affairs. It not only commands the police throughout the nation but, as there are no elected local officials, appoints the governors of the nine provinces, the 147 gun (county) chiefs and the more than 1,300 myon (district) heads. Its responsibility includes the Sae-maul Movement, which is ubiquitous. Real power throughout Korea rests with that Ministry; it is the central focus for the rural population in the gun. The gun capital, the primary market town of the area, is the head of both administration and market activity. The gun chief is the coordinator of all development programs (except education) and is held personally responsible for all activities within that area. This personalized power and responsibility is so pervasive that the under-achievement of targets within the gun or even the occurrance of a national disaster such as a forest fire (which he is supposed to prevent) can cause his summary expulsion. Someone personally must bear responsibility for error or failure in Korea; it is at the heart of the political and bureaucratic culture and profoundly affects policy and performance.
The gun chief coordinates the work of most agencies (except education, the military, and the judiciary) within his territory. He is thus in intimate contact with all other ministries with local programs in his gun. These other ministries have their own hierarchical command structures down to the myon in some cases, but at the gun level close cooperation with the




G-2
gunsu, or county chief, is a requirement.
C. The Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries
Of primary importance in rural Korea is the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries (formerly the Ministry of Agricultural and Forestry). It has three main divisions that have impacts on the lives of farmers: the Office of Rural Development (ORD), the Agricultural Development Corporation (ADC), and the National Agricultural Cooperative Federation (NACF). The ADC is concerned with the development of irrigation systems, dams, and land reclamation. The National Agricultural Cooperative Federation is a governmental mechanism, misnamed a cooperative, for the provision of agricultural credit and other requirements such as seed, fertilizer, pesticides, and herbicides, as well as agricultural machinery. It is also the government arm for the purchase of crops at standard, centrally set prices and quantities. The NACF thus implements government policy on grain pricing and procurement but it is the Office of Rural Development (ORD) that encourages, trains, and provides the farmers with the means by which national targets can be achieved.
The Office of Rural Development has three major functions: basic
and adaptive agricultural research designed to assist in achieving nationally set production targets for priority crops; training, a program of such magnitude that there is hardly a farm family left untouched annually by this effort; and "extension." In Korean, the term "extension" is more aptly translated as "guidance," which describes both the philosophy of the system and its actual operation.
The integration of research and guidance is perhaps not unique among developing countries, although it certainly is rare to the degree practiced in Korea. What may be unique, however, is an integration of both research and guidance with education.
Fifteen years ago, Seoul National University's College of Agriculture, under the Ministry of Education and the Office of Rural Development under the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry had no working relationships, although located only a few hundred yards apart. Today, however, some staff at each institution hold joint appointments. The AID-supported agricult Ural research project did not initiate such relationships but did help strengthen them and bring into the research scene professors from other agricultural colleges.
As interesting and effective, but perhaps as rare, is the integration of the agricultural high school at the gun level into the agricultural guidance system. There, teachers also hold joint appointments at the gun rural development office and training classes in the high schools use the same materials and machinery as those used by the extension workers. These extension workers train farmers in the schools during vacation periods. Students from the agricultural high schools usually join the guidance service, thus completing the link where they may once again come under the supervision of their former teachers. This results in effective means




G- 3
for overcoming the inherent rivalries of two ministries, as both strive to contribute to achieving national goals.
Borrowing from the Ministry of Home Affairs bureaucratic model, the Office of Rural Development, with its headquarters in Suwon, Kyonggi Province, has provincial Offices of Rural Development that report both to the governor of the province and centrally to the Director General of ORD, who has the rank of Vice Minister. At the gun level, the county office of rural development reports hierarchically to the provincial ORD and laterally to the gun chief. Below the gun at the myon, there are also offices of the rural development administration with primary responsibility for guidance at that level. Supplementing this system is a series of regional and crop or problem-specific research stations that were in part the subject of the AID loan and of this inquiry. They report to the ORD's Bureau of Research. The Office of Rural Development has three operational bureaus: research; guidance, including a farmers' training program at the national, provincial, and gun levels; and technical dissemination, involved in the production of liter-ature, slides, radio and other mass communications materials in simple language that the farmers can understand. The use of complex Chinese characters, which are not introduced into the educational system until the seventh grade, is avoided.
Bureaucratic record keeping has traditionally been a major element of Confucian-oriented administrations. Korea is no exception; the Office of Rural Development illustrates the rule. Each year the government sets targets of national concern. Although formulated nationally, they take into account provincial and regional capabilities and potential. This year, for example, the major goal in agriculture is the production of 38 million sok of rice (5.4 million metric tons). This overall goal is translated into action plans to achieve targets that are specified in great detail, first at the provincial level, then at the gun, myn and indeed at the village level as well.
D. The Provincial Level
The Provincial Office of Rural Development in each province prepares annually a detailed plan that specifies production targets by crop and by crop variety or strain, uses of fertilizer and other requirements, and the training that will be required of both trainers and farmers. The provincial office helps carry out those aspects of the Sae-maul Movement that are concerned with production and training. It helps organize the Sae-maul Youth Organization, which was formerly called 4-H Clubs but which has expanded its age cohort from 13 to 24 to a present maximum age level of 29 years. It specifies the number of times national, provincial, or gun radio programs (broadcast daily for 45 minutes) will exhort the farm population to plant, transplant, protect its crops from insects or diseases, as well as when to harvest. This is supplemented by an amplifier system located in every village that warns the population of weather changes that could effect production and how to take advantage, for example, of anticipated, unusually warm weather or how to protect crops from cold. The report specifies how many times pesticides or herbicides should be




G-4
applied based on crop and regional variations in altitude and climate. This document becomes the bible of provincial agricultural development for the year. It is normally from 70 to 80 pages in length and is remarkable for its comprehensiveness and thoroughness, taking into account each geographic and climatic variation within the province. Budgets are included for each category of activity. This material is annually supplemented by a provincial agricultural statistical yearbook and a separate report that provides complete data for the province as a whole and for each gun within the province. Within the province, each gun prepares a similar plan, outlining in even greater detail the potential and projected achievements of the county. These printed plans are usually about 70 pages in length, specifying down to the won the projected costs of lunch for those who will be trained.
E. The Village Level
The village does not prepare a printed plan, but in most villages the Sae-maul Movement develops a flip-chart version which is the equivalent of the provincial or gun program. It contains a listing of the number of households, population, and stratification by income, land holdings (paddy and upland), and farm animals. It contains statistics on water, sewage, telephones, tillers, mechanical transplanters, and other important production or social components of village life. The charts list past village improvement projects, and sets targets for new ones. It cajoles the population to improve the village in various ways, from keeping it clean to closing toilet lids. It sets labor requirements for the year for normal village maintenance as well as new projects. The charts estimate costs of projects, and the sources of such income, which has generally fallen more heavily on the villagers themselves. It is, in effect, an appointed village government that uses social pressure to achieve its impressive goals. Lacking a judicial base to tax and set corvee labor requirements, it nevertheless functions as the arm of central authority bringing the village into line with national priorities and acting to speed village change. The Movement is also used as a form of mass mobilization to urge the villages to vote as the government wants. It may not dictate, but its command of the purse strings zives it considerable power.
From the capital to the village, Korea is a nation of planning and flip charts. The importance of planning, however, should not detract from the pervasiveness of implementation. Even if the goals of planning sometimes cannot be met through difficulties such as poor weather or disease, the rigor of the implementation process is a strength that few societies, including socialist ones, have yet to equal. In Korea there is thus massive participation in the development process, however passive or controlled in nature. Alternative centers of power or programs and the questioning of national goals are never overtly or institutionally encouraged. Although farmers may and do grumble they recognize that, overall, their standard of living has generally improved over the past decade.




G-5
F. An Illustration : Kangwon Province
To place this abstracted version of provincial and gun planning and implementation in perspective, it is instructive to examine the detailed plans for a single province and gun within that province for 1981.
Kangwon Province is the mountainous area of northeast Korea, with three distinct climatic (and thus agricultural) zones. The slogan and goal of the province for 1981 is "to build the welfare of the rural areas through the green revolution." The policy for the province includes increasing rice yields and safeguarding production through dissemination of new agricultural techniques; spreading innovative cultivation techniques for upland crops; development of specialized production (sericulture, livestock, etc.), as well as cash crops; improving cooperative mechanized farming; expanding the Sae-maul Youth Movement; and making rural life more scientific.
The province is composed of 2,240 villages for which there are 664 rural guidance workers and 27 researchers. There are 119,167 farm households in the province, or 32 percent of the total provincial households, with a population of 614, 343. About 91,157 (63 percent) of farmland is in paddy, and 56,630 hectares in upland (non-irrigated). The majority of the budget for the Provincial Office of Rural Development is derived from the province itself (51 percent), with 46 percent from the national account and an additional 3 percent from the sale of crop production by the office itself.
Although rice hectarage has essentially remained constant since 1977, per hectare production has varied from 4.41 metric tons (MT) in 1977 to 4.16 MT in 1978, 3.65 MT in 1979, and a massive decrease in production to a low of
1.97 MT in 1980 because of cold weather. There is an anticipated production of 3.93 MT in 1981. The Tongil varieties of rice (high-yielding varieties) dropped from 40 percent of use to only 17 percent in 1981 because farmers fear the cold weather to which Tongil is susceptible.
The province recommends varieties of rice and other crops by region
and altitude, as well as the density of planting and fertilizer requirements. It specifies that pesticides should be applied about eight times, depending on crop and variety. It promotes demonstration plots in addition to experimental research. There are two such plots for rice in every village, the government guaranteeing income to the farmer if the demonstration plot fails. In addition there are 40 demonstration plots for soybeans, ten for potatoes, and five for barley and wheat. These demonstration plots provide a continuing and accessible example to all farmers of what their production might be if they follow the recommendations of the guidance workers. This system clearly demonstrates the national priority attached to rice production as both an economic and political goal.
The plan also calls for the use of 4 million man days of farmer
assistance through the military and youth organizations in order to assist in timely planting, transplanting, and harvesting. This is critical in a province plagued by rural labor shortages, and is also the impetus for increased mechanization, for in the colder climate double cropping is only




G-6
possible with a rapid turnaround of harvesting winter barley or vegetables and the transplanting of rice. A delay of even a few days could mean the failure of maturation of the critical rice crop.
The Kangwon Provincial Office of Rural Development is attempting to raise farm household income to 3.3 million won ($4,500) in 1981. It achieved its objectives of 1.9 million won in 1978 and 2.4 million won in 1979, but fell short of its goal, reaching only 2.5 million won in 1980. These figures in current prices indicate some progress, but in constant won, accounting for inflation, the standard of living has dropped over the past several years.
The training program is very widespread, and at least one member of every farm family receives training each year. Thus, during the nonproductive winter months, 3,200 leaders are trained, who in turn train the farmers, most for three days. Stress is on production, but other subjects are also covered. For example, there are 3,676 women' s clubs in the province, and about 20,000 women will be trained this year in increased use of barley in cooking (thus using up the barley production and saving rice), and 17,270 in home economics, including the use of home appliances and better clothing. There are 166 "nutrition improvement halls" that will help train wives to preserve 50,000 units of foodstuffs. Two mobile nutritional vans (supplied to each province by UNICEF) will visit 100 villages. There are 333 child care centers in the province and seven villages will be selected for new child nutritional programs. There are in addition 1,933 youth groups with 29,850 members and an additional 110 youth organizations for the 4,540 leader members of the Sae-maul Youth Movement.
The detail is exhaustive. In Heong Sung gun in Kangwon Province, their plan specifies in detail the socioeconomic status of the 10,101 agricultural households (69 percent of all households in the gun) in 587 natural villages (112 legal villages--an unusual ratio because of the mountainous terrain). Since 61 percent of the land in the gun is upland, this poses special problems of production. The relative poverty of the population is reflected in land holdings: 19 percent own less than 0.5 hectares; 31 percent between
0.5 and 1.0 hectares, and 25 percent between 1.0 and 1.5 hectares. Only 10 percent have over two hectares.
The plan specifies that radio will be used 48 times a year in improving agricultural production, and that the 152 village amplifier systems will broadcast a total of 604 times each month. Some 65,000 publications will also be distributed. There is a potential membership of 4,200 persons in the 13 to 29 age group eligible to join the Sae-maul program, of whom 1,293 are members. They plan to increase membership to 4,000 in 1981.
G. Summary
A successful agricultural research project is dependent on effective demonstration of research results. Three criteria for the successful integration of agricultural research and dissemination through extension thus exist in Korea:




G- 7
-Integration of research and guidance at the top of the hierarchy,
thus allowing joint planning of research projects and dissemination of research results based on national needs;
-High level concern for both research and extension at the subcabinet level; and
-Effective coordination at the village through the county administration.
The integrative aspects of the Korean agricultural research and extension program can thus be considered a model developmental system fostering a remarkable level of implementation.
It is this strength, however, that leads to an elemental weakness in the Korean system. Although such a system could theoretically be considered potentially productive in any national bureaucracy, in the Korean context it has worked effectively because of the strong hierarchical nature of Korean society that drives compliance with objectives set from above. Thus each level of the bureaucracy responds with a virtual frenzy of activity to achieve the targets, and quite often they are successful. The drive for implementation, however, has demonstrably resulted in shortterm effectiveness but with much less assurance of longer-range continued success. Massive spraying of pesticides and herbicides has dramatically increased yields, but the longer-range effects of pollution and disease are now being increasingly noted in the Korean press. It may be that such revelations have specified non-priority crops, such as fruits, either because they are more apparent or because they do not conflict with governmental priorities.
The introduction of the Tongil high yielding varieties of rice was massively encouraged throughout the country, and hundreds of tons of seed were airlifted to Korea from the Philippines for this purpose. Yet rice blast (fungus) has been known to be a problem with the new varieties of rice after a few years of cultivation, and early project documentation mentioned the susceptibility of Tongil to cold. In an effort to raise
production these potential damages, if not overlooked,were not sufficiently anticipated by the bureaucracy, although key researchers warned against them. It was the overdependence on Tongil rice and its effective distribution through the guidance system that brought about both Korean selfsufficiency in rice and the highest per hectare rice yields in the world, as well as the crop disaster of 1980 due to cold weather. Better overall results might have been achieved had the government been less insistant on its political goal of rice self-sufficiency (Korea had the foreign exchange to import twice the amount grown with the same funds it paid to farmers), followed more prudent dissemination policies, and concerned itself with a continuing, effective, adaptive research program.
President Chun Doo-whan in May 1981 called for self-sufficiency in food production. This goal is a political objective that under present circumstances cannot be met. Even with self-sufficiency in rice and an




G-8
upturn in barley hectarage, wheat imports are still so enormous that this goal is impossible without massive, probably forced, changes in dietary patterns. At the same time President Chun called for the-elimination of false statistics--those based on what the leadership wants to hear. But a bureaucracy that is predicated on a command system will have great difficulty in responding to both exhortations at the same time, for in the Korean context they are in conflict. It is likely that, as the political imperatives take precedence, agricultural research and guidance will be pushed to the utmost level to achieve targets and that statistics at the national level will be manipulated to prove compliance and success.
The Korean agricultural research system has thus been remarkably
effective. It does contain an "Achilles Heel"--one that is not a product of its agricultural program, but rather of its political culture.




APPENDIX H
AGRICULTURE IN CHEJU PROVINCE
The isolated island of Cheju is slightly larger than Oahu in area, and located some 50 miles off the southern-most tip of the mainland. Volcanic in origin, Cheju was until recently the poorest province of Korea. It remained a distinctive subculture of Korean society, with a separate, essentially unintelligible, dialect of Korean and a society more matriarchal in practice than the mainland. A site for exiles from the court as well as outcasts and criminals, it was wracked by a peasant and communist rebellion in 1948 that significantly lowered the male population ratio and fostered continued poverty.
The normalization of relations with Japan gave Cheju an early opportunity for change. Japanese regarded Cheju as an island retreat close to home as well as inexpensive, and Cheju residents in Japan returned often with significant funds for local investment.
Fishing still remains as the mainstay of the island's economy. In
recent years, there has been a growing emphasis on both the tourist and livestock industries. As a result, the relative importance of farming activities has recently somewhat declined.
The island's climate is warmer than that of the mainland. The yearly average temperature is 15.8 0 C with the monthly average varying between
7.5 0 C and 28.60C. The island has the highest Irecipitation in Korea, which averages about 2000 mm per year. The climate is suitable for growing citrus fruit, particularly on both the northern and southern coasts, and for cultivating pineapples on the southern coast. The total area of the island is 1,825,000 hectares (ha) out of which the cultivated area covers 53,162 ha, accounting for only 2.7 percent of the total area. Because of its volcanic origin, the cultivable area is mostly limited to the coastal belt around the island. Paddy fields cover less than 2 percent of the cultivated land with the remaining in upland fields.
Cultivated area per capita of the farming population in Cheju was 0.22 ha in 1979, which is slightly above the national average of 0.2 ha. Because of the climatic condition, the land utilization ratio on the island is 146 percent, exceeding that of the mainland by about 16 percent. Many farmers also engage in off-farm activities (fishing, livestock, or tourism). Per hectare yields in many crops are also higher relative to those on the mainland. These factors have contributed to increased farm income in Cheju at a rate faster than that on the mainland in recent years.
Both white and sweet potatoes are important cash crops. Cheju is the only province in Korea in which white potato production is increasing, due mainly to the export market found on the mainland, particularly during the winter months. In 1979 there were about 1,000 ha of white potatoes and 12,000 of sweet potatoes. The productivities of these two crops were




H-2
11 and 23 tons per hectare respectively. Sweet potatoes are generally planted after barley or rape and harvested in the fall when they are sliced and dried prior to export to the mainland where the slices are used as a source of starch in the production of alcohol for beverages.
Vegetable production includes an estimated 1,900 tons of cucumbers,
3,000 tons of sweet melons and watermelons, 35,000 tons of Chinese cabbage, 1,300 tons of cabbage, and 7,400 tons of garlic. Thus, vegetable crops are important to the island's economy and people's diet.
The crop husbandry carried out on the island appears to be very
intensive and well carried out. The fields are relatively small and walled in by volcanic rocks cleared from the fields. Herbicides are used to a very limited extent, chiefly in the citrus orchards. The use of fused phosphate was introduced to the farmers during the period 1973 to 1975; this had a very marked effect on the increase in productivity of the crops. This plant nutritional element has undoubtedly done more for Cheju's agricultural production than any other single or combined factors.
One of the striking differences between Cheju Island and the mainland is the relatively small area devoted to paddy rice cultivation, less than 900 ha each year. Rice production is practically inconsequential to the agricultural economy. Paddy fields have not been developed due to the porous nature of the soils that cannot retain water.
Another contrast between the island and mainland is the flourishing cash crop economy. In both areas, rice is the chief food but very little of it is produced in Cheju. Barley is the most important crop; 17,000 ha are grown as a winter crop. Two-thirds is naked barley for food and the remaining one-third is two-row for malt, which is grown under contract with the two breweries on the mainland. The productivity of each barley crop is about the same, 2..8 tons per hectare. Imported rice is mixed withthe pearled barley to form the basic diet of the people.
Rape is the most important cash crop, as about three-fourths of
Korea's production, or 21,000 tons, is from Cheju. The productivity is
2.3 tons per hectare, nearly equal to barley. The seed is exported to the mainland where it is pressed for oil, one of the important edible oils in Korea. Thus, because rape seed demands a higher price than barley, its gross revenue is about 300 percent more per bag.
The areas cultivated with soybeans has remained practically constant over the past decade at a level of slightly less than 10,000 ha and a productivity of 1.0 ton per hectare, about 25 percent lower than the national average. Some of the soybeans are consumed locally as bean sprouts, but the majority of the crop is shipped to the mainland for pressing into oil.
In short, the farmers on the island appear better off compared with their counterparts on the mainland. Among other reasons, increased per hectare yields in the mid-1970s can be singled out as the most significant contributing factor. Higher yields were realized not so much through implementation of agricultural results as by judicious uses of fertilizers. Thus, the situation in Cheju is unique and distinct from that in the mainland Korea.




APPENDIX I
PROJECT--SPECIFIC DATA
Table I-i. Chronology of the Korea Agriculture Research Project
1972 Completion of Korean Agricultural Sector Survey by
Michigan State University recommending an expanded program of agricultural research. Nov. 11, 1972 Kore= Government submitted a proposal of $7 million
to AID for agricultural research for the period 1974-1977.
May 17, 1973 After consultation, Korean proposal revised to $5 million
for the period 1974-1978.
Sept. 3, 1973 Office of Rural Development submitted a project work
plan to AID.
Dec. 5, 1973 Project paper submitted by Korea Mission to AID
Washington.
Dec. 5, 1973 Project approved by AID Washington.
Jan. 28, 1974 Signing of US-ROK Loan Agreement.
Feb. 21, 1974 Korean announcement of the Agreement.
(Presidential Ordinance #54) Sept. 8, 1974 Appointment of the Korean Director and U.S. Co-Director
of the project. (Co-Director Dr. Omer J. Kelley). Nov. 14, 1974 Service Contract with the Institute of International
Education (IIE) for Administrative Support in Placing Trainees, Advisors, and Procurement. Jun. 5, 1975 1st Steering Committee Meeting held to determine
interdisciplinary research priorities. Sept. 5, 1975 2nd Steering Committee Meeting held.
Feb.6, 1976 3rd Steering Committee Meeting held.
Apr. 19, 1977 4th Steering Committee Meeting held.
Nov. 7, 1977 Terminal Date of Disbursement Authority (TDDA) and
Terminal Date of Disbursement (TDD) extended TDDA : Jan. 28, 1978 -- Jan. 28, 1979 TDD : July 28, 1979 --- Sept. 30, 1980 Feb. 1, 1978 5th Steering Committee Meeting held.
Jun. 6, 1978 Arrival of project evaluation group of 3 persons from
AID Washington.




Table 1-2. Total Research Under AID Loan
(Unit: 1000 Won)
'74 '75 '76 '17 '78 Total
Clas' Field Items Budge't Items Budget Items Budget Items. Budget Items Budget Items Budget
Rice 3 10,500 17 17,099 15 16,050 12 20,746 9 8,532 56 '72,943
14
0 Wheat &
(U Barley 5 15,500 12 14,024 30 16,958 15 11,270 3 7,500 65 65,258
Soybean 3 3,249 11 10,174 24 17,755 17 14,672 7 6,000 62 51,850
0 Potato 1 4,448 10 9,642 16 11,500 13 9,470 11 8,500 51 43,560
0 Cropping
System 1 3,000 13 12,244 17 20,392 17 17,984 15 14,241 63 67,861
Sub-Total 13 36,697 63 63,183 102 82,655 74 74,142 45 44,793 297 301,470
Rice 1 1,400 1 2,000 2 2,875 1 2,100 5 8,375
SWheat &
Barley 1 600 2 2,220 1 830 2 1,700 6 5,350
Soybean 1 500 1 580 2 1,440 1 600 5 3,120
41
U Potato 2 1,299 1 500 1 600 1 570 1 800 6 3,769
= Cropping
8 System 14 6,209 3 1,985 3 3,065 3 7,790 3 2,800 26 21,849
Sub-Total 16 7,508 7 4,985-1 8 8,465 9 13,505 8 8,000 48 42,463
Total 1 29 44,205 70 68,168 110 91,120 83 87647 53 52793- 345 343,933




1-3
Table 1-3. Rice Yield of Leading Varieties and Breeding Lines
(1971-'80 Regional Yield Trials)
No. of Varieties Yield (MT/ha)
Leading Breeding Leading Breeding Yield
Year Location Variety Line Variety Line Index
1971* Suwon 2 5 3.44 3.41 99
Iri 2 2 3.51 3.64 104
Milyang 2 2 3.05 3.08 101
Ave. 3.33 3.37 101
1974 Suwon 2 11 4.28 3.88 91
Iri 3 5 2.74 4.03 147
Milyang 4 3 1.84 3.93 213
Ave. 2.95 3.95 133
1977 Suwon 6 7 5.00 5.13 103
Iri 7 5 4.44 4.27 96
Milyang 7 3 3.80 4.21 111
Ave. 4.41 4.54 103
1980 Suwon 6 5 4.66 4.64 100
Iri 4 3 4.71 4.86 103
Milyang 3 5 4.17 3.83 92
Ave. 4.51 4.44 98
*These 1971 yield data are lower than that for Tongil as stated in other Korean publications.




Table 1-4. Barley Yield of Leading Variety/Breeding Line
No. of Var./Line Yield (MT/ha) No. of Resistant Var./Line
Yield Cold Tolerance Lodging Resistance
Leading Breeding Leading Breeding Index Leading Breeding Leading Breeding lear Location Variety Line Variety Line (%) Variety Line Variety Line
1971 Suwon 3 12 3.42 3.25 95 3 10 1 6
Iri
Milyang 4 9 4.88 5.00 102 3 8 1 6
Ave. 4.15 4.13 100
1974 Suwon 3 12 3.54 3.68 104 2 5 1 8
Iri 3 12 3.30 3.47 105 1 5 1 5
Milyang 3 13 4.57 4.93 108 1 5 1 5
Ave. 3.80 4.03 106
1977 Suwon 3 8 3.84 3.89 101 1 4 2 8
Iri 3 8 4.59 4.13 90 1 4 2 3
Milyang 3 9 3.81 4.09 107 6 2 4
Ave. 4.08 4.04 99
1980 Suwon 3 11 3.42 3.63 106 7 2 9
Iri 2 11 4.00 2.64 66 7 2 9
Milyang 3 12 4.18 4.44 106 11 2 9
Ave. 3.87 3.57 92 II




Table 1-5. Wheat Yield of Leading Variety and Breeding Line
No. of Var./Line Yield (MT/ha) No. of Resistant Var./Line
Yield Cold Tolerance Lodging Resistance
Leading Breeding Leading Breeding Index Leading Breeding Leading Breeding Year Location Variety Line Variety Line Variety Line Variety Line
1971 Suwon 3 10 2.64 2.80 106 3 9 1 4
Iri 3 14 4.28 4.04 94 2 9 1 8
Milyang 3 14 4.20 3.89 93 2 9 3
Ave. 3.71 3.58 96 _1974 Suwon 3 11 3.70 4.37 118 3 7 1 5
Iri 3 12 4.43 3.88 88 2 7 1 9
Milyang 3 13 3.75 4.25 113 2 7 1 6
Ave. 3.96 4.17 105
1977 Suwon 3 7 3.96 2.37 60 3 3 1 4
Iri 3 7 4.52 4.40 97 2 4 1 7
Milyang 3 7 4.31 4.50 104 2 6 1 6
Ave. 4.26 3.76 88
1980 Suwon 3 13 5.36 3.38 63 3 5 1 8
Iri 3 11 4.10 4.33 106 3 9 1 6
Milyang 3 14 4.43 4.48 101 3 12 1 7
Ave. 4.63 4.06 88




Table 1-6. Soybeans (The Results of Regional Yield Trials)
No. of Entries Yield (MT/ha) Degree of SMV Resistance*
Released Breeding Released Breeding Released Cultivar Breeding Line
Year Location Cultivar Line Cultivar Line R M S R M S
1971 Suwon 3 14 1.78 1.90(107) 3 13 1
Yuseong 2 10 2.04 1.99( 98)
Kwangju 2 11 2.41 2.77(115)
1974 Suwon 4 9 2.24 2.16( 96) 3 1 5 4
Yuseong 3 6 2.23 2.56(115)
Kwangju 2 9 3.18 3.08(97)
1977 Suwon 2 16 2.65 2.64(100) 2 3 13
Yuseong 2 9 3.12 3.12(100)
Kwangju 2 10 2.54 2.82(111)
1980 Suwon 2 15 2.08 2.08( 95) 1 1 13 2
Yuseong 3 13 2.08 1.87( 90)
KwangJu 2 15 1.81 1. 76( 97)
* 1971: SMV, 1974-1980: SMV-N ( ) Yield index (%)




Table 1-7. Potato Yield of Leading Varieties and Breeding Lines
No. of Virus Resistant
No. of Varieties Yield (MT/ha) Varieties / Lines
Leading Breeding Leading Breeding Yield Leading Breeding
Year Location Variety Line Variety Line Index Variety Line
1974 Kangnung 1 10 30.15 31.56 105 1 4
Suwon 1 10 34.99 28.21 82 1 5
Kwangju 1 10 23.37 24.07 103 1
Ave. 29.50 27.95 95
1977 Kangnung 1 9 36.60 40.95 112 1 1
Buchon 1 9 14.87 16.25 109 1 3
Kwangju 1 9 21.10 20.17 96 1 3
Ave. 24.19 25.79 107
1979 Suwon 2 13.10 12.23 93 2 3
Kwangju 2 3 16.92 10.92 65 2 3
Chilgok 2 3 10.68 9.30 87 2 3
Ave. 13.57 10.82 80 -




Table 1-8. Name and Present Position of Participants Trained Under CIRC Project
Attended
Name University Present Position Field
1. Ph.D Course
Lee, Seung Chan University of Louisiana Agriculture Sciences Institute Rice Insect
Hong, Byung Hee Washington State University Wheat & Barley Research Institute Wheat Breeding Cho, Eui Kyoo University of Illinois Agriculture Sciences Institute Soybean Insect
Chang, Suk Hwan Cornell University Int'l. Cooperation Division, ORD Biological Statistics
Lee, Young In University of Illinois Agriculture Mechanization Inst. Soybean Insect
Lee, Yong Kook Kansas State University Farm Machinery
Kwun, Soon Kuk Ohio State University Professor, Seoul National Univ. Land Development
Kim, Yong Wook University of Missouri Crops Experiment Station Soybean Physiology
Kim, Soon Chul IRRI Yeongnam Crops Experiment Station Weed Control
Jung, Young Sang Ohio State University Agriculture Sciences Institute Soil Mangement 01
Kang, Yong Gir University of Arkansas Crops Experiment Station Rice
Lee, Moon Hong University of Minnesota Agriculture Sciences Institute Potato Insect
Woo, Ki Dae University of Missouri Insectology
Mok, Ii Jin University of Wisconsin Horticulture Experiment Station Potato Breeding
Chung, Moo Nam University of Missouri Wheat and Barley Research Inst. Agricultural Economics
Seo, Wan Soo Farm Management Bureau, ORD "
Cho, Jeong Tae* Washington State University Horticulture Experiment Station Potato No, Yong Duk University of Wisconsin Crops Experiment Station Rice Physiology
Eun, Moo Young University of Louisiana Honam Crops Experiment Station "
Moon, Hun Pal University of California Crops Experiment Station Rice Breeding
Lee, Yong Seok University of Vermont (Deceased in 1980) Soil Chemistry
Total 21 persons
* 7 persons are still studying in the U..S.




Table 1-8 (continued)
Attended
Name University Present Position Field
2. M.S. Course
Choi, Eui Kyoo University of Illinois Agriculture Sciences Institute Soybean Disease
Seong, Jae Mo University of Washington Wheat Disease
Jung, Pil Kyun University of Alkansas Soil Physics
Jung, Dong Hee The University of Iowa Wheat & Barley Research Inst. Soil Chemistry
Kim, Jang Kyu IRRI Agriculture Sciences Institute Botanical Pathology
Hwang, Young Hyun University of Wisconsin Crops Experiment Station Soybean Pathology
Park, Chang Seo University of New Mexico Agriculture Sciences Institute Soil Physics Chun, Jong Eun University of Washington Jeonbuk Province, ORD Wheat Breeding
Jeong, Gil Woong University of Illinois Dankuk University Soybean Breeding
Han, Young Ii University of Wisconsin Alpine Experiment Station Potato Disease
Kwak, Tae Soon IRRI Crops Experiment Station Rice Breeding
Han, Hwang Gi University of Oregon Kangwon Province, ORD Wheat
Cho, Wang Soo University of Colorado Agriculture Sciences Institute Insect Control
Sung, Lak Choon University of Missouri Crops Experiment Station Cropping Rotation
Lee, Seok Soon University of New Hampshire Professor, Yeongnam University Rice Physiology
Choi, Byung Hwan University of Oregon Studying towards Ph.D Wheat
Oh, Nam Hwan University of Kansas if Wheat Breeding
Total 17 persons
3. Short-term Training
1974 2 persons
Han, Byung Hee Alpine Experiment Station Potato
Kang, Eung Hee "
1976 5 persons
Park, Kun Yong Crops Experiment Station Soybean
Huh, Han Soon Research Bureau, ORD Wheat
An, Soo Bong Crops Experiment Station Rice
Lee, Jae Chang Chungnam National University Cropping
Park, Jung Yun Agriculture Sciences Institute Wheat




Table 1-8 (continued)
Name Present Position Field
1977 12 persons
Oh, Yang Ho Honam Crops Experiment Station Wheat
Han, Wook Dong Research Bureau, ORD Tropical Agriculture
Chung, Young Sang Agriculture Sciences Institute "
Kim, Ho II Crops Experiment Station Soybean
Chu, Yeon Dae Gyeongbuk Province, ORD Seed Improvement
Cho, Jeong Ik Agriculture Sciences Institute Rice
Yun, Sang Bog Crop Improvement Research Center, ORD Checking AID Project (CIRC)
Kang, Yang Soon Yeongnam Crops Experiment Station Nitrogen
No, Nong Ju Research Bureau, ORD Library Information
Kim, Kang Kwon Horticulture Experiment Station Potato
Kim, Sun Kyung Research Bureau, ORD "
Mun, Myung Gui Crops Experiment Station Corn
1978 46 persons
Kim, Kwang Ho Crops Experiment Station Rice Breeding
Jang, Chang Moon Agriculture Sciences Institute Wheat
Kim, Sung Pil Crop Improvement Research Center, ORD "
Lee, Dong Chang Crops Experiment Station
Moon, Yun Ho Yeongnam Crops Experiment Station Crops Analysis
Lee, Jin Sook Crop Improvement Research Center, ORD Analysis Method
Song, Yung Nam Kangwon National University Wheat
Lee, Bong lHo Yeongnam Crops Experiment Station Barley
Oh, Yun Seop Honam Crops Experiment Station "
Han, Weon Sik Farm Management Bureau, ORD Computer
Kim, Jae Hyuk Secretary, Deputy Director-General, ORD Wheat
Kim, Kil Woong Geyongbuk National University Weed Control
Han, Dae Seong Kangweon National University Rice
Yuh, Han Joon Geyongnam Province, ORD "
Yuh, In Soo Wheat and Barley Research Institute Wheat
Lee, Eun Sup Soybean
Seong, Il Jang Horticulture Experiment Station Potato




Table 1-8 (continued)
Name Present Position Field
1978 (Cont'd)
Jeong, Kun Sik Crops Experiment Station Rice
Cho, In Sang Agriculture Sciences Institute Soil
Ryu, Kyung Han Research Bureau, ORD Research Management
Hong, Eun Hee Crops Experiment Station Soybean
Cha, Kwang Ro Wando Gun Rural Guidance Office, Junnam
Province Agriculture Information
Cho, Kyu Sun of o
Kim, Hwee Cheon Horticulture Experiment Station Seed Improvement
Chang, Seong Kun Kangwon Province, ORD o
Song, Yu Han Retirement from ORD Computer
Oh, Hyung Youl Agriculture Sciences Institute Soil
Han, Sang Chan Insect
Maeng, Don Jae Wheat and Barley Research Institute Wheat
Yun, Seong Ho Crops Experiment Station Weed Control
Kim, Kyu Weon Crops Experiment Station Rice
Kim, Byung Hyun Gyeongnam Province, ORD Soil
Hee, Sang Seok Technical Dissemination Bureau, ORD Plant Protection
Ryu, Jae Gi Agriculture Sciences Institute "
Lee, In Jae International Cooperation Division, ORD Farm Management
Choi, Bock Hyun Jeonnam National University Cropping System
Shin, Kwan Chul Agriculture Sciences Institute Plant Protection
So, Jae Sun Crops Improvement Research Institute, ORD "
An, Wan Sik Wheat and Barley Research Institute Wheat Breeding
Yun, Eui Byung ""
Seo, Deuk Yong Yeongnam Crops Experiment Station "
Chung, Tal Young Wheat and Barley Research Institute Barley
Park, Young Sun Research Bureau, ORD Agriculture Research
Ha, Yong Woong Wheat and Barley Research Institute Wheat
Ko, 11 Woong Rural Guidance Bureau, ORD In the U.S.
Lee, Soon Hyung Agriculture Sciences Institute SEM Use




Table 1-8 (continued)
Name Present Position Field
1979 29 persons
Oh, Sung Do Jeonbuk National University Horticulture
Bae, Dong Ho Livestock Experiment Station Livestock
Cho, Kwang Ho Farm Management Bureau, ORD Livestock Management
Park, Chang Sik Chungnam National University Grass Development
Yun, Jin Young Horticulture Experiment Station Horticulture
Chang, Hak Gil Wheat and Barley Research Institute Wheat
Kun, Seok Dong Crops Experiment Station Wheat Breeding
Lee, Myung Hoon Farm Management Bureau, ORD Computer
Kang, Kwang Hee Crops Experiment Station Upland Crops
Kwon, Weon Dal Chungbug National University Farm Management
Kim, Seung Jae Farm Management Bureau, ORD FMG Analysis
Han, Sang Soo Research Bureau, ORD FMG Analysis
Lee, Chong Woo Gyeonggi Province, ORD Upland Crops
Han, Eui Dong Chungbug Province, ORD Soybean
Baek, Hyun Jun Sericulture Experiment Station Sericulture
Lee, Han Kyu Jeonnam Province, ORD Weed Control
Kim, Hee Kyung Rural Guidance Bureau, ORD Rural Nutrition
Lee, Chong Hoon Crops Experiment Station Rice
Hwang, Nam Youl Jeonbug Province, ORD Soil Analysis
Hwang, Chang Hyun Agriculture Sciences Institute Rice Insect
Choi, Yong Chul Rice Disease
Kim, Ho Young Yeongnam Crops Experiment Station Rice Breeding
Kim, Seung Chul Agriculture Sciences Institute Disease Control
Jeong, Hong Do Technical Dissemination Bureau, ORD Rice Disease
Lee, Byung Yong Farm Mechinery Institute Food Processing
Moon, Hui Sook Rural Guidance Bureau, ORD Nutrition
Choi, Jin Kyu Horticulture Experiment Station Vegetable
Kim, Bock Jin Agriculture Sciences Institute Pollution
Oh, Joong Youl Gyeongbug Province, ORD Vegetable Breeding
Total 94 persons




Tab Ie 1-8 (conti nued)
Name Present Position Field
4, Participation to International Meetings and Observation
1975 2 persons
Han, Sung Kum Farm Machinery Research Institute Farm Machinery
Lee, Yong Kook "
1976 8 persons
Chung, Bong Joe (Deceased) Soybean
Lee, Hong Seok Seoul National University "
Choi, Hyun Ok Crops Experiment Station Observation
Ham, Yong Soo it
Lee, Chang Koo Veterinary Research Institute "
Huh, Moon Ree Seoul National University Rice
Chung, Kun Sik Crops Experiment Station "
Lee, Eun Woong Seoul National University "
1977 14 persons
Lee, Chong Hoon Crops Experiment Station Weed Control
Kim, Kil Woong "
Shin, Dong Wan Farm Management Bureau, ORD AID Project
Chung, Bong Koo Agriculture Sciences Institute Disease
Chung, Hoo Sup Seoul National University "
Lee, Yong Seok (Deceased) Analysis
Park, Cheon Seo Agriculture Sciences Institute Soil
Choi, 11yun Ok Crops Experiment Station Rice
Park, Tae Kyung Yeongnam Crops Experiment Station "
Kim, Dong Soo Research Bureau, ORD
Park, Seok Hong Honam Crops Experiment Station
Chung, Bong Joe Agriculture Sciences Institute (Deceased)
Park, Jong Soo to
Kim, Soon Kwon Crops Experiment Station Weed Control




Table 1-8 (continued)
Name Present Position Field
1978 14 persons
Park, Ki Hyuk Yeonsi University Title 12
Ham, Young Ii Alpine Experiment Station Potato
Kim, Young Sang Wheat and Barley Research Institute Wheat
Bae, Seong Ho "
Min, Kyung Soo "
Kim, Soon Kwon Crops Experiment Station Weed Control
Lim, Moo Sang Rice
Chang, Kwon Youl Gyeong Sang University Agriculture
Park, Chong Moon Governor, Kangwon Province Observation
Hong, Soon Bum Horticulture Experiment Station "
Park, Tae Kyung "
Han, Ki Hak Agriculture Sciences Institute "
Shin, Dong Wan Farm Management Bureau, ORD
Kim, Soon Kwon Crops Experiment Station Agriculture
1979 44 persons
Ji, Sul Ha Livestock Bureau, Ministry of Agriculture Livestock
and Fisheries
Chung, Jae Hyuk Technical Dissemination Bureau, ORD Grass Development
Lee, Chong Seok Horticulture Experiment Station Observation
Kim, Duk Lae Kangwon Province, ORD
Kim, Yeon Jin Chungnam Province, ORD "
Lee, Hong Lae Gyeongnam Province, ORD "
Koo, Young Seo Jeonbug Province, ORD "
An, Chang Soo Gyeonggi Province, ORD "
Um, Tae Young Tongyoung Gun, ORD "
Lee, Tae Seung Jeonbug Province, ORD "
Yang, Byung Hee "
Jin, Kyung Youl Gyeongbug Province, ORD) "
Kim, Chong Ho Crops Experiment Station "
Park, Kun Yong Research Bureau, ORD Soybean




Table 1-8 (continued)
Name Present Position Field
1979 (Cont'd)
Ryu, Kyung Io Prime Minister's Office Observation
Kim, Dal Joong Chungnam Province, ORD "
Song, Chun Jong Jeonnam Province, ORD "
Lee, Yong Seok (Deceased) "
Choi, Choong Hak Rural Nutrition Institute, ORD "
Huh, Il Bum Rural Guidance Bureau, ORD "
Yuh, lHae Un Technical Dissemination Bureau, ORD "
Kang, Yong Sik Jeonnam Younglewang Gun, ORD "
Cho, Kwang Hoon Gyeonggi Province, ORD "
Park, No Kyung Chungnam Province, ORD "
Yuh, Young Pyo Jeonnam Province, ORD "
Hwang, Pil Saeng Gyeongnam Province, ORD "
Kim, Young Hwui Jeju Province, ORD "
Lee, Weon Woo Kangwon Province, ORD "
Koo, Kang Hui Research Bureau, ORD "
Lee, Dong Woo Kangwon Province, ORD "
Jeong, In Myung Chungbug Province, ORD "
Park, Gun Ho Jeonbug Province, ORD "
Lee, Kwang Suk Gyeongbuk Province, ORD "
Ryu, Chang Jae Horticulture Experiment Station "
Hong, Chul Sun Research Bureau, ORD "
Chung, Joong Rae International Cooperation Division, ORD "
Han, Mak Maan Research Bureau, ORD "
Lee, Soo Kwan Yeongnam Crops Experiment Station "
So, Jae Don Honam Crops Experiment Station "
Ryu, Un Ha Farm Management Bureau, ORD "
Shin, Gun Sik Information Division, ORD "
Cha, Kwang Ro Wandogun Rural Guidance Office, Jeonnam Province "
Yun, In Hwa Farm Machinery Research Institute "
Ryu, Chang Hyun Agriculture Sciences Institute "




Table I-8 (continued)
Name Present Position Field
1980 24 persons
Han, Weon Sik Farm Management Bureau, ORD Computer
Kang, Hee Young Chunam Province, ORD Observation
Choi, Duk Hwan Rural Guidance Bureau, ORD "
Huh, Han Soon Research Bureau, ORD "
Shim, Sang Woo Rural Guidance Bureau, ORD "
Lee, Duk Yong Technical Information Division, ORD "
Park, Nam Jong Agriculture Machinery Research Institute "
Lee, Cheon Ho Icheongun Rural Guidance Office, Gyeonggi "
Province
Lee, Hyun Soon Kangwon Province, ORD "
Lee, Sung Hee Chungbug Province, ORD "
Ryu, Dong Seok Gyeonggi Province, ORD "
Kim, Myung Ii Jeonbug Province, ORD "
La, Joon Soo Boesunggun Rural Guidance Office, "
Jeonnam Province
Choi, Eui Soon Gyeongbuk Province, ORD "
Kim, Seong Hwui Gyeongnam Province, ORD "
Ko, Tae Chong Jeju Province, ORD "
Choi, Eul Ho Pusan City, ORD "
Hong, Yu Ki Gyeonggi Province, ORD "
Park, Joong Soo Agriculture Sciences Institute "
Lee, Kyong Hwee Technical Dissemination Bureau, ORD "
Park, Suk Hong Honam Experiment Station "
Lee, Soo Kwan Yeongnam Experiment Station "
Chang, Seok Hwan International Cooperation Division, ORD "
Lee, Seok Soon Yeongnam University "
Total 106 persons




1- 17
Table 1-9. Current Status and Utilization of Equipment Procurred
by Crop Improvement Research Center Project. (Items
by Institutes)
Total
Different Number of Amount
Institutes Items Items
Crops Experiment Station 135 195 186,166.22
Honam Crops Experiment Station 48 59 58,485.49
Yeongnam Crops Experiment Station 53 75 61,512.00
Wheat & Barley Research Institute 50 73 141,498.36
Agricultural Sciences Institute 49 96 170,650.64
Horticultural Experiment Station 15 20 17,055.09
Farm Machinery Research Institute 14 16 133,725.02
Alpine Experiment Station 16 27 22,306.25
Jeju Experiment Station 4 4 7,527.00
Computer Room 2 15 247,657.00
Central Laboratory 112 320 417,200.54
Library 16 19 65,815.31
Provincial Office of Rural Development 4 27 149,866.77
Total 518 946 1,679,465.70




APPENDIX J
SOCIOECONOMIC STATISTICS
Table J-l. Major Indicators of Korean Agriculture
Item Unit '62 '65 '70 '75 '78 '79
1. Land utilization
Total land (A) lO00ha 9,843 9,843 9,848 9,881 9,895 9,897
Cultivated
land (B) 2,063 2,256 2,298 2,240 2,222 2,207
B/A 21.0 22.9 23.3 22.7 22.5 22.3
Paddy 1000ha 1,223 1,286 1,273 1,277 1,312 1,311
Upland 840 970 1,025 963 910 896
Forest 6,695 6,614 6,611 6,635 6,578 6,608
Others 1,086 973 939 1,006 1,095 1,082
Farm size/household ha 0.84 0.91 0.86 0.94 0.99 1.02
Paddy 0.50 0.52 0.48 0.54 0.59 0.60
Upland 0.34 0.39 0.38 0.40 0.40 0.42
Utilization ratio of
cultivated land % 143.5 147.1 142.1 140.4 134.5 130.9
2. Population
Total population (A) 1000 26,513 28,705 31,435 34,681 37,019 37,605
Farm popula- person
tion (B) 15,097 15,812 14,422 13,244 11,528 10,883
B/A 56.9 55.1 45.9 38.2 31.1 28.9
No.of total
household (A) 1000 4,589 4,844 5,856 6,757 7,256 7,539
house-hold
No.of farm 2,649 2,507 2,483 2,379 2,224 2,162
Household (B)
B/A % 57.7 51.8 42.4 35.2 30.7 28.7
3. Economic indicator
G.N.P.(current
price (A) bil.won 355.5 805.7 2,684.09,792.9 22,917.629,553.7
Agri.products
(current price
(B) 118.5 265.9 611.7 1,994.4 4,236A 5,141.0
B/A % 33.3 33.0 22.9 20.7 18.5 17.4
G.N.P.per capita $ 86 105 243 574 1,279 1,624
Export mil.$ 55 175 882 5,003 12,500 15,056
Import 390 416 1,804 6,674 1:3,200 20,339
Balance of trade *335 *241 *922 *1,671 *700 *5,283
Wholesale price
index % 16.1 28.8 42.0 100.0 136.5 162.1
Consumer price
index 13.9 27.5 49.1 100.0 145.3 171.9
Farm household
income (A) 1000won 67.9 112.2 255.8 872.9 1,884.2 2,227.5
Urban worker's
income (B) 96.6 112.6 381.2 859.3 1,916.3 2,629.6
A/B % 70.3 99.6 67.1 101.6 98.3 84.7




J- 2
Table J-1 (continued)
Item Unit '62 '65 '70 '75 '78 '79
4. Agricultural indicator
A. Consumption per household
Urban-household
Living expenditure won 68,880 117,360 359,400 755,520 1,488,600 2,021,316 Food expenditure it 34,680 66,600 145,440 333,960 594,240 737,232
Engel's coefficients% 50.3 56.7 40.7 44.2 39.9 36.5
Farm-household
Living expenditure won 55,740 100,492 207,766 616,280 1,320,508 1,662,168 Food expenditure % 31,150 53,373 95,445 291,508 505,253 628,788
Engel;s coefficients% 55.9 53.1 45.9 47.3 38.3 37.8
B. Income per household
Farm household
income (A) 1000 won 67.9 112.2 255.8 872.9 1,884.2 2,227.5
Agri. income it 54.0 88.8 194.0 714.8 1,355.7 1,531.3
Non-ag ri.
income (B) if 13.9 23.4 61.8 158.1 528.5 696.2
B/A % 20.5 20.9 24.2 18.1 28.0 31.3
*Japan (B/A) % 52.8 56.3 68.1 71.1 76.2
C. Trade condition between
agriculture & non-agriculture
Index No. of price % 10.1 19.7 39.5 100.0 188.5 209.1
of farm products
received by farmer
Index No. of price % 13.3 25.1 44.1 100.0 190.1 216.2
of farm supplies
paid by farmer
Parity ratio % 75.9 78.5 89.6 100.0 99.3 96.7
Rural wage rate won/a-y 120 221 579 1,469 3,393 5,140
Item Unit '65 '70 '75 '78 '79
D. Food consumption (man/year) Japan ('78)
Grain & potatoes
Rice kg 121.8 136.4 123.6 134.7 135.6 '81.6
Barley it 36.8 37.3 36.3 18.1 14.1 0.7
Wheat it 13.8 26.1 29.5 30.5 30.6 31.7
Corn It 0.9 1.1 2.4 2.8 2.9
Soybeans it 4.4 5.3 6.4 7.0 7.2
Potatoes "v 7.3 10.2 7.1 6.3 6.3
Others T1 3.8 3.0 2.0 2.1 2.1 11.1
Crops Total 188.8 219.4 207.3 201.5 198.8 125.1




J-3
Table J-1 (continued)
Item unit '65 '70 '75 '78 '79
E. Proportion domestically
supplied crops
Total %93.9 80.5 73.0 72.6 59.9
Rice to 100.7 93.1 94.6 103.8 86.0
Barley it 106.0 106.3 92.0 119.9 117.0
Soybeans if 100.0 86.1 85.8 59.3 43.4
Item Unit '62 '65 '70 '75 '78 '79
F. No. of farm machine owned
Power tiller each 93 1,111 11,884 85,722 194,780 235,909
Tractor "--61 564 1,601 2,035
Transplanting
machine "--- 16 531 2,416
Planting machine "146 303 630 953 4,468 3,773
Binder "- 89 3,703 12,030
Combine "---56 134 505
Dryer "---694 962 1,143
Power sprayer "714 7,579 45,008 32,956 66,342 83,588
Mist & duster "- 104,742 169,652 207,473
Power pump 12,292 26,029 54,078 65,993 180,660 187,608
Power thresher 8,022 18,909 41,038 127,105 185,947 203,081
G. Land improvement &
expansion
Irrigated paddy
field 1OO0ha 682 701 1,021 1,065 1,122 1,153
% to total %55 56 80 84 86 87
paddy field
Consolidated
paddy field ha 38,138 44,092 134,073 251,098 310,137 323,007
% to total %6 7 22 42 53 55
paddy field
Farm land expansion & development ha 12,961 37,220 2,953 8,440 3,891 3,218




J-4
Table J-2. Production, Cultivated Area, and Imports of Main Food Crops
Milled
Year Items Unit Rice Barley Wheat Soybean Potato
1977
Production 1000M/T 6,006 862 44.7 318.7 558
Area 100ha 1,230 545.6 26.5 250.6 50
Yield kg/ha 4,880 1,580 1,680 1,270 11,300
Import 1000M/T 322 1,979 151
1978
Production 100OM/T 5,797 1,388 35.7 292.8 304
Area 1000ha 1,230 575.4 17.1 246.9 30
Yield kg/ha 4,710 2,410 2,090 1,190 7,820
Import 100OM/T 1,587 223
1979
Production 100OM/T 5,565 1,555.5 42.0 257.1 356
Area 1000ha 1,233 489.1 13.1 207.3 34
Yield kg/ha 4,510 3,180 3,210 1,240 10,580
Import 100OM/T 520 1,652 422
1980
Production 100OM/T 3,557 905.9 92.0 216.3 446
Area 1000ha 1,233 360.4 27.7 188.4 37
Yield kg/ha 288 2,510 330.0 1,150 11,930
Import 100OM/T 576 2,000 576 -




J-5
Table J-3. Grain Marketing, Prices and Inflation Rates
Items Unit 1977 1978 1979 1980
Rice (milled rice)
Gov't purchase price won/kg 325 375 457.5 572.5
Gov't selling price 280.3 331.3 400 550
to Coop. middle-man.etc.
Consumer's price urban 310.5 364.1 472.3 616.4
Purchased amount M/T 1,403 1,355 1,301 532.8
Barley (pearled barley)
Gov't purchase price won/kg 202.6 241.8 287.6 345.4
Gov't selling price 132.3 132.3 180 230
Consumer's price 152.1 152.1 197.9 252.3
Purchased amount M/T 189 484 560 483
Soybean
Gov't purchase price won/kg 325.1 375.1 431.3 540
Gov't selling price 266.7 266.7 266.7
Consumer's price 350.3 414.9 465.4 729.7
Purchased amount M/T 1.6 1.8 4.8 0.04
Corn
Gov't purchase price won/kg 146 168.5 177 204
Gov't selling price 133 170.8 202.2 231.7
Purchased amount M/T 25.5 32.5 55.9 62.6
Inflation Rate
Consumer's price index 100 114 135 174
Index number of prices of 100 130 145 176
farm products
Index number of prices of 100 130 148 184
farm inputs




J-6
Table J-4. National Agriculture Inputs and Credit
Items 1977 1978 1979 1980
Seed Paddy 1,039 2,035
(M/T) Barley 106 1,144 712 447
(Supplied by Seed Soybean 130 299 508 465
Supply Office under Potato 4,513 898 3,414 884
Ministry of Agric. Corn 249 412
& Fisheries)
Fertilizer (1,000 M/T) 780 916 914 910
Herbicide (M/T) 3,721 4,581 5,304 6,350
Chemicals (M/T) Fungicide 4,987 6,085 7,903 10,789
Insecticide 14,647 15,761 11,207 11,973
Agric. Credit Funds* 356.8 519.9 633.8
(billion won)
* Interest rates Are subsided at 12 percent. If not repaid the same year.
interest rates are 24 percent.
Table J-5. Dissemination of Rice HYV
Cultivat- HYV Yield per ha Increase in
Year ed Area Area HYV Ordinary Increment A/B Nat'l. Production
(A) (B) average Amount Value
1,000ha 1,000ha M/T M/T M/T % M/T 1,00OM/T billion won
1972 1,191 188 3.96 3.21 0.65 123 3.34 122 15.1
1973 1,182 121 4.81 3.50 1.31 137 3.58 159 22.6
1974 1,204 181 4.73 3.53 1.20 134 3.71 217 42.8
1975 1,218 274 5.03 3.51 1.52 143 3.86 417 101.5
1976 1,215 533 4.79 3.96 0.83 121 4.33 443 128.3
1977 1,230 660 5.53 4.23 1.30 131 4.99 858 281.7
1978 1,230 929 4.86 4.35 0.51 112 4.74 474 177.7
1979 1,233 744 4.63 4.37 0.26 106 4.53 194 88.5
Total 2,884 858




j-7
Table J-6. Budget for Research and Extension Work of
Office of Rural Development by Year
unit: 1,000
Local Fund
Year National Fund Provincial Total 1,000$ won/$
Research Extension & County *
1962 136,323 187,275 323,598 2,489 130
1963 177,923 212,751 390,674 3,005 130
1964 184,448 282,606 247,409 714,463 2.803 255
1965 324,748 283,895 305,100 913,743 3,372 271
1966 528,832 227,815 457,987 1,214,634 4,499 270
1967 509,571 311,700 625,426 1,446,697 5,280 274
1968 620,375 437,745 672,698 1,730,818 6,160 281
1969 914,237 538,919 1,140,927 2,594,083 8,533 304
1970 1,012,485 568,966 1,208,332 2,789,783 8,828 316
1971 1,381,973 797,420 1,897,400 4,076,793 110,930 373
1972 1,469,610 1,011,238 2,107,654 4,588,502 11,500 399
1973 1,321,294 1,032,938 22-138,950 4,493,182 11,289 398
1974 1,474,419 1,602,213 2,754,709 5,831,341 12,048 484
1975 2,279,655 2,525,916 3,147,050 7,979,621 16,489 484
1976 2,972,902 3,563,581 4,042,487 10,578,970 21,857 484
1977 3,106,374 1,948,954 5,649,819 10,705,147 22,118 484
1978 3,430,731 2,386,793 7,920,676 13,738,200 28,385 484
1979 4,300,799 2,633,042 8,263,689 15,197,530 31,400 484
1980 5,239,735 3,061,089 11,527,000 19,827,824 30,088 659
TOTAL 31,386,434 23,614,856 54,134,313 109,135,603 241,070
At county, level all funds are for extension; at the provincial level
a small amount is funded.




Full Text

PAGE 1

KOREAN AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH THE INTEGRATION OF RESEARCH AND EXTENSION PROJECT IMPACT EVALUATION NO. 27 by David I. Steinberg, Team Leader (Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination) Robert I. Jackson (Bureau for Development Support) Kwan S. Kim (Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination) Song, Hae-kyun (Seoul National University) U.S. Agency for International Development January 1982 The views and interpretations expressed in this report are those of the authors and should not be attributed to the Agency for International Development.



PAGE 1

_10 livestock mechanization, agricultural economics, and horticultural crops have precedence in research priorities. The exclusion of vegetables in production, nutritional, and equity terms was a shared error. The Asian Vegetable Research and Development Center (AVRDC) supported research on a very limited scale, both monetarily and as to the number of vegetable crops, during the life of the AID project. This, however, was no reason to exclude such an important field. The goal of making grains more responsive to higher fertilizer usage is a curious one given the oil crisis of 1973, the increase in petroleum imports, and the higher prices of fertilizer. Thought should be given to increasing production with less fertilizer, rather than creating an everexpanding demand for imported petroleum. It has proven impossible to establish a clear and direct link between the research carried out under the project and improved yields. There was no breakthrough. No doubt the project assisted the research effort and indirectly contributed to improved strains and probably will continue to do so as the trainees return or become more effective. The overall judgment that must be made, however, at least at this time prior to the end of the decade of planned growth in 1984, is that the agricultural research project was a beneficial but not a critical component of the well-established Korean research system. C. Guidance: The Link between Research and the Farm The developmental success of agricultural research is dependent upon the effectiveness of the spread of appropriate research results to the farmer. The Korean example links the research system both at the center and the periphery to an ubiquitous extension service known in Korean as a guidance system. 7/ Both research and guidance fall within the purview of the Director General of the Office of Rural Development. Thus, there is coordination at the administrative center at the top of the bureaucratic structure. This coordination also extends to the rural areas. Each province and gun (county) has a branch office of rural development and guidance workers are located in the lowest administrative unit, the myon, which forms a subdivision of a county. In 1981, there are a total of 7,980 guidance workers in Korea, of whom 7,648 are deployed at the gun and myon levels, 226 at the provincial level, and only 106 at headquarters. Each guidance officer (the vast majority is male) is responsible for monitoring the production and cultivation techniques of from 6 to 12 villages depending on the terrain and population. He is in constant contact with the villagers, sometimes, according to a few farmers, too often. In some areas during critical periods such as transplanting or during emergencies such as drought, his visits may be daily, advising For a more detailed discussion, see Appendix G, "Research and Extension: The Integration of Inquiry and Guidance," by David I. Steinberg.



PAGE 1

G-4 applied based on crop and regional variations in altitude and climate. This document becomes the bible of provincial agricultural development for the year. It is normally from 70 to 80 pages in length and is remarkable for its comprehensiveness and thoroughness, taking into account each geographic and climatic variation within the province. Budgets are included for each category of activity. This material is annually supplemented by a provincial agricultural statistical yearbook and a separate report that provides complete data for the province as a whole and for each gun within the province. Within the province, each gun prepares a similar plan, outlining in even greater detail the potential and projected achievements of the county. These printed plans are usually about 70 pages in length, specifying down to the won the projected costs of lunch for those who will be trained. E. The Village Level The village does not prepare a printed plan, but in most villages the Sae-maul Movement develops a flip-chart version which is the equivalent of the provincial or gun program. It contains a listing of the number of households, population, and stratification by income, land holdings (paddy and upland), and farm animals. It contains statistics on water, sewage, telephones, tillers, mechanical transplanters, and other important production or social components of village life. The charts list past village improvement projects, and sets targets for new ones. It cajoles the population to improve the village in various ways, from keeping it clean to closing toilet lids. It sets labor requirements for the year for normal village maintenance as well as new projects. The charts estimate costs of projects, and the sources of such income, which has generally fallen more heavily on the villagers themselves. It is, in effect, an appointed village government that uses social pressure to achieve its impressive goals. Lacking a judicial base to tax and set corvee labor requirements, it nevertheless functions as the arm of central authority bringing the village into line with national priorities and acting to speed village change. The Movement is also used as a form of mass mobilization to urge the villages to vote as the government wants. It may not dictate, but its command of the purse strings zives it considerable power. From the capital to the village, Korea is a nation of planning and flip charts. The importance of planning, however, should not detract from the pervasiveness of implementation. Even if the goals of planning sometimes cannot be met through difficulties such as poor weather or disease, the rigor of the implementation process is a strength that few societies, including socialist ones, have yet to equal. In Korea there is thus massive participation in the development process, however passive or controlled in nature. Alternative centers of power or programs and the questioning of national goals are never overtly or institutionally encouraged. Although farmers may and do grumble they recognize that, overall, their standard of living has generally improved over the past decade.



PAGE 1

-11 farmers and reporting to the government on conditions. Even in a most remote, mountainous village inhabited by former swidden (slash and burn) farmers, the guidance worker visited the area once a month. It is probably safe to say that only isolated farmhouses escape their attention. These workers are graduates of agricultural high schools where, through joint appointments, provincial office of rural development staff and teachers have close communication and the curriculum is geared to the practical needs of the rural areas. These men are overworked, visiting farmers seven days a week without any respite during the growing season. There is an attrition rate of 2 percent because of relatively low pay ($176 per month starting salary) and hard work, but this is remarkably low considering the demands the state places on them. The guidance system is supplemented by an effective and equally widespread training program, carried out annually during the winter months. It first trains the trainers who then train the farmers. No farm family remains untouched by the system. Training includes instruction in improved cultivation techniques, crop management and human nutritional programs. The effort is coordinated with the Sae-maul Movement, the administrative organization of which reaches to the gun but which is also active in virtually every village through village leaders. Guidance and training are further augmented by a series of demonstration plots with emphasis placed on rice. There are two plots for rice in every village that graphically illustrate to the farmer the expected results from growing various varieties of rice with improved techniques. The farmers have been quick to make the transition to the new varieties once they realize their potential benefits. For example, in North Kyongsang Province planting of the Tongil varieties rose from 16.2 percent of hectarage in 1970 (for seed) to 69.6 percent in 1978. Due to blast disease in 1979, the percentage dropped to 62.4 percent in 1979 and to 48.4 percent in 1980. Because of the disastrous harvest due to cold weather that year, the farmers in 1981 will plant perhaps two-thirds of their crop with traditional varieties which are more resistant to cold and now blast as well. This illustrates that although the guidance officer may cajole and persuade, he cannot dictate. It is rare in any nation to see such a comprehensive and complete system that has the institutional capacity to transform research into production. Without it, an agricultural research program could not be as effective so quickly. This transition from research to production was further assisted by the growth of a rural road network that allowed the guidance worker easy access to the villages and enabled the farmers to have wider exposure to the outside world and to become a part of a national food market. If research was stressed and guidance spread the research results, then what happened on the farm? Aggregate data are not sufficient to explain the condition of the individual farmer whose unique situation is described below.



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F-7 requirements. Others such as improved irrigation systems or mechanized farming methods may well be considered as substitutable. There is a need for a more rigorous analysis to understand the true effects of agricultural research. In this regard, the consumer-producer surplus approach is ill-equipped to deal with the complex agricultural production and marketing system in Korea. The results of an analysis using this approach would be sensitive to different specification of supply and demand functions and the nature of the supply function shifts. There are virtually no reliable estimates of agricultural demand and supply elasticities for Korea. It is suggested, therefore, that in the case of Korean agriculture the production function approach would be more appropriate for measuring the net benefits from agricultural research._,/ The clear advantage of this approach is that it provides a method of statistically isolating the influences of research programs from these other factors expected to affect observed yields. It also provides an estimate of the marginal return to research investment, which is a more useful indicator to decision-makers concerned with the merits of agricultural research projects._6/ 5/ For a pioneering article on this topic, see Z. Griliches' "Research Expenditures, Education, and the Aggregate Agricultural Production Function." American Economic Review 54: 96-174, 1969. For a review of cited developments, see World Bank Staff Papers Nos. 360 and 361, 1979. 6/ The time-constraints prevented this team from delving into the calculations of rates of return to research investment. However, basic data required for an aggregate analysis on social returns seem available for Korea.



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-8 varieties yields were 5.03 MT in 1975 (before the project could have had any impact), 5.53 MT in 1977 and 4.86 MT in 1978. At the Yeongnam Experimental Station, yields were 3.90 for the traditional varieties in 1968 and 4.68 in 1973. The high yielding varieties at the same station were were 4.69 MT in 1974 and 5.08 MT in 1975. At the Honam Station in 1980, Tongil yields were 5.43 and other new varieties 4.39 MT/ha while japonica production was 4.74 MT. Over the same ten-year period, barley experimental yields were to rise from 2.79 to 3.6 MT/ha and farm yields from 2.04 to 3.5 MT/ha. Barley production, however, at the Yeongnam Station was already 3.3 MT in 1972 and 3.5 MT in 1979 and 1980. The station's goal is 4.0 MT in 1981. The Honam Experimental Station reported yields for 1979 and 1980 between 3.15 and 3.95 MT/ha. Wheat yields were to rise from 4.30 to 5.2 MT/ha on experimental farms and farm yields from 2.24 to 4.0 MT. At the Yeongnam Station crop yields before the project were again higher. They were 4.8 MT in 1971 and 4.5 in both 1979 and 1980. Their goal for 1981 is 5.5 MT. Soybean increases on experimental plots were to increase from 1.98 MT to 3.2 MT/ha over ten years; farm production was to grow from 0.8 to 1.3 MT over the same period. At Miryang, soybean production was already 2.4 MT in 1974 (before the project began), and 2.3 MT in 1979 and 1980. Their target for 1981 is 3.5 MT/ha. Overall, for all crops for which specific targets were set, experimental crop yields were well above the project baseline yields before the project began or prior to the time the project could have had any effect. Staff at Miryang indicated that yields on all crops have essentially remained relatively constant, having achieved heightened production by the early 1970s before the project. Concentration after that date was placed on reducing the factor of risk including an earlier maturity date and more resistance to disease and lodging. If the project were based on too low a data base for experimental stations, what has happened to farmers' yields during this period and what is the prognosis for attaining target levels of production? The question is critical, but the answers are complex, for there were climatic and other conditions that intervened. The project erred by failing to take into account other elements that have affected total yields. Critical factors were the high support price for rice that increased farm income appreciably and the growing demand for winter vegetables that often proved more lucrative than rice. Important as well were the lower price support for barley relative to inflation, the government's reluctance to purchase more of it, a shortage of labor that has become more acute in recent years, and social factors that make consumption of barley and potatoes less desirable than rice if farm families have higher income.5/ One farmer said, "Why should we eat potatoes when we can afford to eat rice?" !/See Appendix E, "Profitability, Costs and Revenue of Five Crops" by Kwan S. Kim.



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-13 aggregate production of Tongil from 4,516/MMT in 1978 to 3,449/NI4T in 1979 and with a per hectare production drop from 4.86 to 4.63 over the same time. The extreme cold of 1980 devastated the Tongil crop cutting production and yields by one-third, lowering farm income, and creating a crisis of credibility between the farmer and the guidance worker, as well as the government, which had advocated Tongil production. Thus in 1981, although figures are not yet firm, the proportion of traditional varieties of rice cultivated are likely to be about two-thirds to only one-third of Tongil. Because cultivation techniques have improved, traditional varietal yields are expected to be high. Increasing farm income from rice has led to a decrease in other crops included in this project and an overall decline in the land utilization ratio--the land double-cropped. In 1970, it was 1.42, but in 1979 it was 1.30, indicating that farmers regard winter crops such as barley and wheat as uneconomic and that they would prefer, acting economically, to put a much smaller amount of land under winter cultivation in vegetables. "We only grow barley," as many farmers remarked, "because there is nothing else to do in winter." This lack of enthusiasm for barley, in spite of government policy pronouncements, is only balanced by the special production of two-row barley in the South under contract with brewing companies that use it for malt. Increases in use of pesticides and herbicides, which annually now cost the farmer more than fertilizer, are reflective of the shortage of labor. Whatever their potential deleterious environmental effects, they contribute to a national short-term economic goal. Fertilizer use, however, declined considerably in 1980 (to 828,000 MT from a high of 916,000 MT in 1978), again reflecting increased costs in relation to returns. The economic consequences of the improved varieties are apparent. Until 1977, real income had risen--due to a strong government price support, shift in favor of Tongil, and the improved technological package and cultivation techniques that have spilled over not only to traditional rice but to other crops as well. Farm income rose reducing the economic disparity between the urban industrial class and the farmer. The profitability of rice was correlated with size of area cultivated, increased productivity, and the purchase price of rice. Increases of income, although partially attributed to vegetable crops, were mostly a product of Tongil cultivation. Since 1977, however, the margin of profitability of Tongil has declined rapidly. Yield differentials between Tongil and the traditional varieties were more than 30 percent in 1977, but only 15 percent in 1980. The higher market price for the traditional strains, and their better resistance to cold and blast made them equally profitable, at least in some areas. Because of the poor performance in 1980, many farmers will opt for risk aversion and thus grow the older, more reliable, varieties. Wheat and barley provide a different perspective. If the value of farmers' unpaid labor and equipment are included, the costs of production



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APPENDIX E PROFITABILITY, COSTS AND REVENUE OF FIVE CROPS by KWAN S. KIM A. Introduction After the adoption of the bigh-yielding varieties (HYV) of rice and other crops in the early 1970s, the switch from the traditional varieties (TV) to the HYV has been rapid. In the case of rice, the use of the HYV has in general resulted in higher yields of output, but this technological change has been accompanied by increasing use of fertilizers, chemicals, and implementation of government purchase and support prices of major crops. During the last two years, the cold weather conditions and blast diseases have severely affected yields in rice output, particularly those in the IIYV. The fact that the HYV (Tongil) require heavier inputs, as compared with the TV, and that their yields were more susceptible to cold weather and blast disease is significant in determining the yearly relative profitability of the HYV over the TV and therefore the farmer incentive in crop selection. As a rule, the analysis of farm income accounts is essential to an understanding of the reason for the adoption of new technologies by farmers. Profitability from crop production for a farm household depends on such factors as per hectare yield of output, per hectare use of inputs, consumer and government purchase prices of grains, and government subsidized prices of fertilizers and chemicals. The attached tables show calculations of the financial costs and returns for 1977 and 1980 from the production of the five crops funded by AID for agricultural research. The year 1977 recorded a highest yield per hectare in the production of the HYV of rice, and 1980 was a poor harvest year for the HYV because of the cold weather and diseases. Figures in the tables are based on national sample surveys carried out by the Office of Rural Development. They refer to average farm household production costs and revenue. The term "economic profit" is defined as the residual of farm household income received from farming activities after subtracting all expenditures incurred for inputs including any unpaid return to family-owned resources (land, labor, or capital). "Operating profit" is calculated as the residual from the farm income after paying out all costs of inputs which exclude any unpaid return to family-provided resources. In several villages we visited, there were very few opportunities for farmers to engage in off-farm or alternative economic activities other than farming. Under these circumstances, the concept of "operating profit" provides a more appropriate measure of the incentive for production. B. Summary: Salient Features of Farm Household Income 1. Profitability of HYV and TV The hig-ti-yielding rice varieties used relatively more fertilizers, chemicals and labor input. They outyielded the TV by a greater margin. In 1977 economic profits from the HYV were 33 to 60 percent



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I. PROJECT SETTING The year 1980 was disastrous for Korean rice agriculture. An abnormally cold summer prevented the maturing of rice, the main staple grown ubiquitously on every available plot of even marginally irrigated land. The Korean economy went into shock as rural production and incomes suffered when rice production declined by onethird. Already beset with political turmoil after the assassination of President Park Chung-hee in 1979 and the Kwangju riots of May 1980, hit by a major slump in exports because of a worldwide recession, and suffering from heightened import requirements and inflation caused by oil price increases, there was a crisis of political legitimacy--for legitimacy for the past two decades in Korea was a product of continuous economic growth. The economy as a whole declined in 1980. Real GNP was down by 5.7 percent, thus temporarily reversing the nation's spectacular advances that had pushed growth over 10 percent annually. Agriculture, however, was even more severely affected; rural income dropped by 24 percent. Much of the rural progress that had been a product of a deliberate change in national development strategy beginning in the early 1970s was in question. It was based on an incentive price support policy that provided Korean farmers with over two times the world market price for rice. Particularly adversely affected were the high-yielding rice varieties. These rice varieties, known as Tongil ("unification"), were developed from a series of crosses between the indica varieties from Southeast Asia and the local and more traditional, but improved, japonica strains. From their introduction in the early 1970s and the release of the first variety to the farmers in 1972, they were known to be more susceptible to cold weather and temporarily more resistant to blast, a fungal disease. They promised, and delivered, substantially higher yields under greatly improved methods of cultivation, water control, increased fertilizer, pesticides, and herbicides. As a result of the release of these new varieties and as a consequence of the vigorous encouragement by government of their cultivation, which in the early period of their expansion even included air freighting of seed from the Philippines, Korea became self-sufficient in rice in 1975. It was the first time since the Second World War that this long-sought objective had been reached. Rice self-sufficiency was an objective that was central to the Korean administration: it was strategic, for it furthered Korean autonomy and demonstrated to North Korea that South Korea was progressing; it was economic, for it saved almost $200 million annually in foreign exchange; and it was political, for it was dramatic evidence indicating that President Park, who had almost lost the 1971 election because of significant deterioration of his support in rural areas due to a



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vi PROJECT DATA SHEET Project Title: Korea-Agricultural Research Project AID Project Number: DLC/P-2014 AID Loan Number: 489-H-088 Borrower: The Government of the Republic of Korea. The project was implemented by the Office of Rural Development of the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries. Loan Amount: Total $5.0 million Korean Contribution $3.124 million in won Total Project Costs: $8.124 million Terms: Forty years repayment from the date of the first disbursement, including a 10-year grace period. Interest rate of 2 percent per annum for 10 years after the first disbursement and at a rate of 3 percent per annum thereafter. Terminal Date for Request for Reimbursement and for Disbursement: July 28, 1980 Purpose: To assist in a program of multidisciplinary research directed toward varietal improvement of certain basic food and feed crops and of cropping systems. Accomplishments: Training of 38 scholars to the Ph.D. or M.S. degree level, 94 short-term trainees and 106 participants for observation and conferences; purchase and installation of 946 pieces of equipment and the provision of 10 long-term experts and 73 consultants. Evaluation: An interim evaluation was conducted in June 1978. Audit: An audit was conducted in May 1980.



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-7 B. Experimental and Farm Results The inchoate goal of the project from a Korean vantage point seems to have been rice self-sufficiency. The project purpose however, was confined to increasing the yields of specified crops both on the experimental stations and on farmers' fields and to improving the cropping system. These objectives were stated over a ten-year period--a period not due to end until 1984.3/ Yet there are now some definitive conclusions that can be drawn from the existing results. The targets set for the project were often spurious and simplistic, as were the baseline data. Yield increases on experimental plots and on the farms were based on general averages, but these average yields from experiment station plots were practically meaningless. For each crop (rice and barley, for example) many, sometimes dozens, of selections, strains, or varieties were tested for yield performance. Thus, experiment station average yields did not do justice to the complexity of the problem. On the other hand, Korea's agricultural statistics, those garnered from the farmers, were complete and detailed These reliable data could be used to make valid judgments on farm productivity targets used in the project paper. The project also took no note of pricing, labor and other requirements, other crops such as vegetables, or social attitudes toward consumption that affected production and productivity. More important, there were no project targets for national production nor for self-sufficiency in food, both of which were important aspects of national policy that affected what varieties would be stressed by the extension service. Further, by the time the project started significant increases in yields had already been achieved. What was more important than yield breakthroughs (which did not occur although they were specifically called for in the project paper) was the need for continuous adaptive research on other issues, such as resistance to cold, lodging, diseases, and insects, as well as for a shortening of the growing period which would allow for more doublecropping through-out a larger area of the country. These other issues were mentioned, but inore attention was paid to prodiiction increases with its obvious politicALt impact. Rice production was to climb from 4.79 to 6.0 metric tons per hectare (MT/ha) on experimental stations and from 3.25 to 4.5 MT/ha on farms from 1973 to 1983. Yet experimental station results of the new strains of rice (Tongil indica-japonica) already were 5.06 MT in 1970, three years before the project started.4/ On a national average, the new 3/ The Project Paper was prepared in 1973, so the decade was supposed to end in 1983. Since the project began in 1974, the ten-year period should terminate in 1984. 4Office of Rural Development, The Effectiveness of Tongil Rice Diffusion in Korea, Suwon: 1975, p. 9.



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-22 future extension workers) and the provincial or gun agricultural extension and research workers, both in curriculum and staffing. It has proven effective. G. The government must have the fiscal and administrative capacity to deliver services and commodities in support of the rural sector. The Korean government spends some $20 million a year on extension service salaries alone, exclusive of administration and research. It also allocates considerable resources, through the National Agricultural Cooperative Federation and the Agricultural Development Corporation, for the delivery of commodities, subsidized credit, and the development of rural infrastructure. Agricultural research will not succeed unless there is a major national fiscal commitment coupled with administrative services and support. H. PL 480 can be a deterrent to improved agricultural pricing policies and thus retard an effective agricultural research program.. Heavy emphasis on PL 480 commodity support, as in Korea in the 1950s and 1960s, can slow national reform of pricing and procurement policies, thus inhibiting an effective agricultural research effort. It also diminishes farmer incentives for increased production. I. Training is a critical element of an agricultural research program. In Korea, there was universal regard that training was the most critical element of the project. A training program built into an agricultural research project is a necessary component essential to the production of most agricultural research results. It must be complemented by a commitment to employ effectively those trained with adequate professional and personal incentives. J. Adoption of the high-yielding varieties (HYV) leads to both positive and negative impacts on the economy. The production of HYV is generally accompanied by increased costs of inputs and in some cases, soil impoverishment. The increases in production are generally associated with greater demands in soil nutrients. Resources must be directed not only toward improving yields but also to decreasing susceptibility to disease and insects. Potential adverse environmental conditions should also be anticipated and diminished. K. Technical assistance should be carefully reviewed before it is included in the proj Short-term, highly specialized technical assistance was regarded as useful in Korea, but long-term resident technical assistance proved less effective. In the Korean case, the institutional structure already



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G7 -Integration of research and guidance at the top of the hierarchy, thus allowing joint planning of research projects and dissemination of research results based on national needs; -High level concern for both research and extension at the subcabinet level; and -Effective coordination at the village through the county administration. The integrative aspects of the Korean agricultural research and extension program can thus be considered a model developmental system fostering a remarkable level of implementation. It is this strength, however, that leads to an elemental weakness in the Korean system. Although such a system could theoretically be considered potentially productive in any national bureaucracy, in the Korean context it has worked effectively because of the strong hierarchical nature of Korean society that drives compliance with objectives set from above. Thus each level of the bureaucracy responds with a virtual frenzy of activity to achieve the targets, and quite often they are successful. The drive for implementation, however, has demonstrably resulted in shortterm effectiveness but with much less assurance of longer-range continued success. Massive spraying of pesticides and herbicides has dramatically increased yields, but the longer-range effects of pollution and disease are now being increasingly noted in the Korean press. It may be that such revelations have specified non-priority crops, such as fruits, either because they are more apparent or because they do not conflict with governmental priorities. The introduction of the Tongil high yielding varieties of rice was massively encouraged throughout the country, and hundreds of tons of seed were airlifted to Korea from the Philippines for this purpose. Yet rice blast (fungus) has been known to be a problem with the new varieties of rice after a few years of cultivation, and early project documentation mentioned the susceptibility of Tongil to cold. In an effort to raise production these potential damages, if not overlooked,were not sufficiently anticipated by the bureaucracy, although key researchers warned against them. It was the overdependence on Tongil rice and its effective distribution through the guidance system that brought about both Korean selfsufficiency in rice and the highest per hectare rice yields in the world, as well as the crop disaster of 1980 due to cold weather. Better overall results might have been achieved had the government been less insistant on its political goal of rice self-sufficiency (Korea had the foreign exchange to import twice the amount grown with the same funds it paid to farmers), followed more prudent dissemination policies, and concerned itself with a continuing, effective, adaptive research program. President Chun Doo-whan in May 1981 called for self-sufficiency in food production. This goal is a political objective that under present circumstances cannot be met. Even with self-sufficiency in rice and an



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-14 are above the market value. Considerable barley is still grown because the winter opportunity costs for farm labor in some areas are minimal. White potatoes and soybeans, however, were marginally profitable in 1977, but demand has declined as they compete on the same land with vegetable crops such as red peppers, onions, green onions, and cucumbers, for which prices are higher. The effects of improved agricultural technology on the farm have been important. The Tongil strains require 20 to 30 percent more labor. Thus there is an increased demand for labor at a time when there have been massive population flows, especially of the most productive men and women, to urban areas. Labor costs have increased for both sexes, although disparities between them exist, and in some areas farm labor is the least attractive alternative. For example, in a fishing and farming village, male workers could earn daily only 6,000 won for farm work, but 10,000 won on the fishing boats. In sum, there has been a substitution of mechanization for labor. The mechanization hierarchy change is first to tillers (there were 289,000 in Korea in 1980) since the most expensive farm cost involves cattle and male workers (female tiller operators are being trained by ORD, a welcome change). The second change is to the mechanical transplanter, a less cost-effective measure as transplanting mainly involves females at lower wages. The shortage of t-ransplanting labor was apparent during the evaluation, as even the military was mobilized to assist in this process. The last change is to binders and small combines. As the farm population moves to urban areas, t1h2re will be an increasing demand for mechanization, which will become ever more important and will require increasing attention. Agricultural research has contributed positively to rural equity. It has provided far greater benefits for the farmers than for the urban population, and thus, in a sense, represents a subsidy of the rural population by the nation as a whole. 8/ It has helped both smaller and larger landholders. The government's interest in rural equity, both a political and an economic need, is expressed in rice purchase price subsidies that have improved the rural-urban terms of trade. In some regions, due to poor yields of the high-yielding varieties, price support alone was not adequate to raise rural income. Thus in Kwangwon Province, for example, rural incomes rose in the Past three years in current terms. In real terms, however, accounting for inflation, they declined. The government has helped the small holders (those with less than one-half hectare of paddy) by giving them priority in rice purchases, especially in 1980. In 1981, because of a current drought, the central government allocated $20 million to subsiL dize farmers. It also provided mobile water pumps and planted additional, later seed beds of rice, the seedlings from which will be distributed free to small farmers if their current ones cannot be transplanted because of water shortages. The government's concern with equity as an economic good and a political necessity seems real and continuing. 8/ See Appendix E, "Profitability, Costs and Revenue of Five Crops," by Kwan S. Kim.



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C-9 Table C-6 -Radio and TV Farm Programs Prgam Year Radio TV 1970 508 5 1973 1,341 58 1974 1,123 46 1975 1,103 77 1976 1,410 64 1977 1,186 82



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APPENDIX I PROJECT--SPECIFIC DATA Table I-i. Chronology of the Korea Agriculture Research Project 1972 Completion of Korean Agricultural Sector Survey by Michigan State University recommending an expanded program of agricultural research. Nov. 11, 1972 Kore= Government submitted a proposal of $7 million to AID for agricultural research for the period 1974-1977. May 17, 1973 After consultation, Korean proposal revised to $5 million for the period 1974-1978. Sept. 3, 1973 Office of Rural Development submitted a project work plan to AID. Dec. 5, 1973 Project paper submitted by Korea Mission to AID Washington. Dec. 5, 1973 Project approved by AID Washington. Jan. 28, 1974 Signing of US-ROK Loan Agreement. Feb. 21, 1974 Korean announcement of the Agreement. (Presidential Ordinance #54) Sept. 8, 1974 Appointment of the Korean Director and U.S. Co-Director of the project. (Co-Director Dr. Omer J. Kelley). Nov. 14, 1974 Service Contract with the Institute of International Education (IIE) for Administrative Support in Placing Trainees, Advisors, and Procurement. Jun. 5, 1975 1st Steering Committee Meeting held to determine interdisciplinary research priorities. Sept. 5, 1975 2nd Steering Committee Meeting held. Feb.6, 1976 3rd Steering Committee Meeting held. Apr. 19, 1977 4th Steering Committee Meeting held. Nov. 7, 1977 Terminal Date of Disbursement Authority (TDDA) and Terminal Date of Disbursement (TDD) extended TDDA : Jan. 28, 1978 -Jan. 28, 1979 TDD : July 28, 1979 --Sept. 30, 1980 Feb. 1, 1978 5th Steering Committee Meeting held. Jun. 6, 1978 Arrival of project evaluation group of 3 persons from AID Washington.



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-3 prompted a massive governmental effort to improve the rural-urban terms of trade. The Sae-maul (New Village) Movement was formed, and rice support prices increased. Rural infrastructure construction was hurried. Rural roads and national highways were built and paved, and irrigation expanded. 2/ Fertilizer consumption grew, rising from 308,494 metric tons (MT) in 1961 to 605,137 in 1971, and 886,206 MT in 1975. Mechanization increased. In 1961 there were 12 power tillers in Korea, but by 1971 there were 16,842, and in 1979, 239,909 were in operation. It was in the context of this growing concern with the rural sector that AID began its support to agricultural research. The genesis of this project was the Korean Agricultural Sector Survey carried out by Michigan State University with AID support. As its highest priority, it recommended efforts to improve agricultural research in rice, barley, wheat, soybeans, and forages. The study identified the problems facing Korea as a lack of concentration on key research priorities and a shortage of resources to meet these needs. It further characterized the national agricultural research system as relatively unfocused, poorly equipped, short of highly trained personnel, but relatively well-housed with sufficient land for research, well-balanced disciplinary skills, although suffering from a shortage of operating funds. The study was followed by the publication in 1972 of "Investment Priorities in the Korean Agricultural Sector," also by Michigan State University. That study anticipated cumulative returns to agricultural research to reach 30 times an annual investment of $2 million by 1975, and 160 times its yearly costs by 1980. After a visit by an external specialist and negotiations with Korean authorities, an AID Intensive Review Request was cabled to Washington on July 13, 1973, outlining the project. A project paper proposing a $5 million loan was approved by AID's Development Loan Committee on December 5, 1973; authorized December 11 of the same year; and signed by the Korean Government on January 28, 1974. On February 21, Korean Presidential Ordinance #54 announced the agreement and authorized Korean funds ($3,125,000 in won) for the project. By September 8, 1974 the first expatriate Co-Director was appointed, and on November 14 a service contract was signed with the International Institute for Education covering support for the project and the funding of participants. The objectives of the project focused on the five areas: rice, barley/wheat, soybeans, white potatoes, and cropping systems. Improvement in research was predicated on forming multidisciplinary teams that were to establish research priorities within each area of concern. !/For an extensive discussionof this phenomenon see Korea Irrigation, AID Project Impact Evaluation Report No. 12, 1980, especially Appendix F, "Korean Agricultural Pricing Policies" and Appendix G, "Change, Local Government, and Rural Participation in Korean Rural Development."



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v PREFACE Although agricultural research has a long history in Korea, the recent introduction of the high-yielding varieties of rice and improved strains of other crops, combined with extensive attention to improved cultivation techniques, pervasive extension services, and better rural infrastructure have helped transform rural Korea within a decade. By any standard, this was a remarkable achievement. The agricultural research project, for which the United States Government provided $5 million, was but a modest contribution to Korea's agricultural research capacity, and thus even a more modest contribution to its rural development. As this report demonstrates, agricultural research was one critical element in the change of rural Korea, but not the only causal factor. The Korean agricultural research project was chosen for an impact evaluation because it seemed to provide lessons relevant for other nations, and because it was a blend of technical assistance, training, and equipment. The impact evaluation team was composed of three AID staff assisted by a Korean rural specialist. During the course of about one month in Korea, the team travelled some 2,700 kilometers and visited all provinces in the nation. No sampling technique for a project nationwide in scope can be scientific within the format of a rapid rural appraisal. The team, however, made a conscious effort to visit remote regions and poorer villages to determine whether the research results were reaching relatively isolated farmers. These site visits were spontaneously selected. Appendices A and B provide notes on the methodology and the team's itinerary. The team wishes to thank the officials of the Office of Rural Development, both in its headquarters in Suwon and in the provinces, for their assistance and the sharing of their voluminous data. Our thanks also go to the farmers and their wives who often took time from their transplanting to talk with us. The team would also like to thank the U.S. Embassy for making available a vehicle and driver and for other logistical support.



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A-2 -Provincial level agricultural data together with an analysis of the extension (guidance) service and its effectiveness in transforming experimental and demonstration results into farm yields; and, -Village and farm level data. The team visited central research and experimental facilities at Suwon for several days collecting national data, interviewing trainees, and inspecting equipment purchased under the AID loan. Two short field trips were first arranged, and then a nationwide safari covering over 2,300 kilometers (km). A separate two-day trip was taken to review development on the island province of Cheju. The team covered some 2,700 km in total. All key crop experimental stations were visited: Chunchon, Kangwon Province for cold water tolerance rice research; The Honam Research Station, Iri, South Chungchon Province for rice, barley, and wheat; The Yeongnam Research Station, Miryang, South Kyongsang Province for the same crops; the Yeongduk Experimental Station in North Kyongsang Province for rice; and the Alpine Research Station in Chinbu, Kangwon Province (800 meters high) for cold air temperature tolerance for rice. In addition, extensive discussions took place with Provincial Office of Rural Development staff in Kwangju, South Cholla Province; Taegu, North Kyongsang Province; Chunchon, Kangwon Province and Cheju City, Cheju Province. A visit to the gun (county) office in Heongsong, Kangwon Province, provided detailed information at that level. Officials were also interviewed at the myon (district) level, between the gun and village levels. The selection of villages to be visited was arbitrary, but a reasonably representative sample was obtained based on province, cropping systems and employment, ostensible wealth and poverty, and remoteness. Only one village visit was suggested by gun officials, reportedly a wealthy village near Kyongju, North Kyongsang Province. A few villages were chosen because of their accessibility to main roads, but more were picked because they seemed poor and remote, often requiring tortuous travel along tracks far from the paved or major dirt roads. The team was determined to find out whether the guidance service reached the most isolated villages. Toward this end, it spent one day in the remote mountain reaches of a sparsely inhabited region of Kangwon Province in an inaccessible area that barely allowed wheeled vehicular travel, on a track with precipitous drops of hundreds of feet without guard rails. Farmers who only fifteen years ago had been swidden cultivators were interviewed, some of whom now had television sets; even in this area the guidance officers visited once a month. In other villages they came almost too often--sometimes daily-according to some villagers. In South Kyongsang Province, a remote valley was spontaneously selected by the team in an area that was obviously poor. Proceeding to a virtually inaccessible village isolated at the head of the valley, the last inhabitants in that area at the end of the dirt track, the team found two guidance workers, a man and a woman, working in the village. The latter was assisting in a day care



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vii GLOSSARY ADC Agricultural Development Corporation, Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries AVRDC Asian Vegetable Research and Development Center chongbo unit of measure, approximately equaL to one hectare CIMYT International Wheat and Maize Center, Mexico. gama a unit of volume, equal to 80 kg of milled rice or 54 kg of paddy. gun county; 140 throughout the country gunsu county chief, appointed by the Ministry of Home Affairs hectare (ha) 2.45 acres HPON High Protein, High Lysine Observation Nursery HYV High-yielding varieties IBWSN International Bred Wheat Screening Nursery INTSOY International Soybean Institute IRRI International Rice Research Institute IWSWSN International Winter and Spring Wheat Screening Nursery IWWPN International Winter Wheat Performance Nursery metric ton (MT) 2,205 pounds MMT million metric ton myon township, a part of a gun. myonchang township head; appointed on the authority of the governor. NACF National Agricultural Cooperative Federation ORD Office of Rural Development, Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries



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viii GLOSSARY (cont.) paddy unhusked rice; also, irrigated land on which rice is grown. PORD Proincial Office of Rural Development pyong uU.iL of land measure; 36 sq. feet, 3,000 pyong equal one chongbo or hectare R & E research and extension Sae-maul Movement "New Village Movement," or "New Community Movement;" a government-controlled rural development activity. sok a unit of volume, equal to one gama Exchange rates: In June 1981 -won 685 equalled U.S. $1.00 Note: Unless otherwise noted, all figures are for milled rice and pearled barley.



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A3 center for pre-school children. To all outward appearances this village was poor, but there was a higher level of income than might have been expected. Although rice production levels were low, due to the cultivation of persimmon and chestnut trees, incomes were quite good. Conversely, in some villages that gave the outward appearance of wealth based on improved and modernized Sae-maul housing, income did not seem as high. In all cases, the villages had some type of Sae-maul Movement activity along both productive and social lines (see Appendix G). The team talked with perhaps one hundred farmers and their wives, although greater attention was paid to the farmers as their wives were interviewed in more detail in the 1980 AID Impact Evaluation Report No. 12, Korea Irrigation (quod vide). The team interviewed farmers who mainly grew rice, those who doublecropped with barley or other crops, some who grew tobacco or potatoes or soybeans, those small farmers who had less than one-half hectare of land and some who had up to three hectares, and a few villagers who both farmed and fished. The team consisted of David I. Steinberg, AID team leader, with a long record of involvement in Korea studies; Dr. Robert Jackson, of the AID Development Support Bureau's Office of Agriculture and an agronomist; and Dr. Kwan S. Kim, Professor of Economics at Notre Dame University and an employee of AID. This group was ably assisted by Dr. Song Hae-kyun, an Agricultural Education Specialist of the College of Agriculture, Seoul National University,who is also a consultant to the Office of Rural Development. For short biographies see Appendix 14, "Notes on the Authors." Interviews were conducted in Korean, and extensive use was made of locally available Korean language sources (see Bibliography, Appendix K). No official of the guidance service accompanied the team nor did they suggest (with one exception noted above) site visits.



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G3 for overcoming the inherent rivalries of two ministries, as both strive to contribute to achieving national goals. Borrowing from the Ministry of Home Affairs bureaucratic model, the Office of Rural Development, with its headquarters in Suwon, Kyonggi Province, has provincial Offices of Rural Development that report both to the governor of the province and centrally to the Director General of ORD, who has the rank of Vice Minister. At the gun level, the county office of rural development reports hierarchically to the provincial ORD and laterally to the gun chief. Below the gun at the myon, there are also offices of the rural development administration with primary responsibility for guidance at that level. Supplementing this system is a series of regional and crop or problem-specific research stations that were in part the subject of the AID loan and of this inquiry. They report to the ORD's Bureau of Research. The Office of Rural Development has three operational bureaus: research; guidance, including a farmers' training program at the national, provincial, and gun levels; and technical dissemination, involved in the production of liter-ature, slides, radio and other mass communications materials in simple language that the farmers can understand. The use of complex Chinese characters, which are not introduced into the educational system until the seventh grade, is avoided. Bureaucratic record keeping has traditionally been a major element of Confucian-oriented administrations. Korea is no exception; the Office of Rural Development illustrates the rule. Each year the government sets targets of national concern. Although formulated nationally, they take into account provincial and regional capabilities and potential. This year, for example, the major goal in agriculture is the production of 38 million sok of rice (5.4 million metric tons). This overall goal is translated into action plans to achieve targets that are specified in great detail, first at the provincial level, then at the gun, myn and indeed at the village level as well. D. The Provincial Level The Provincial Office of Rural Development in each province prepares annually a detailed plan that specifies production targets by crop and by crop variety or strain, uses of fertilizer and other requirements, and the training that will be required of both trainers and farmers. The provincial office helps carry out those aspects of the Sae-maul Movement that are concerned with production and training. It helps organize the Sae-maul Youth Organization, which was formerly called 4-H Clubs but which has expanded its age cohort from 13 to 24 to a present maximum age level of 29 years. It specifies the number of times national, provincial, or gun radio programs (broadcast daily for 45 minutes) will exhort the farm population to plant, transplant, protect its crops from insects or diseases, as well as when to harvest. This is supplemented by an amplifier system located in every village that warns the population of weather changes that could effect production and how to take advantage, for example, of anticipated, unusually warm weather or how to protect crops from cold. The report specifies how many times pesticides or herbicides should be



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C6 for that matter, is very nebulous. The project target to increase "experiment station yields of 4.79 M4T/ha to 6.0 M4T/ha by the end of 1983" is very misleading. It is interesting to note that ORD reported yields of Tongil at experiment stations of 6.24 MT/ha in 1970, higher than the initial figure and even greater than that projected for 1983. on the other hand, to make a comparison of actual farm production yields with those stated in the project paper is much more valid, especially in Korea where massive agricultural statistics are readily available (See Table C-2). Before the loan was made to Korea, the improved variety, Tongil, yielded 3.86 MT/ha in 1972, about 0.6 MT/ha greater than that noted in the project for that year. Every year from 1972 through 1979, the national average or farm production yields have surpassed the project goal for 1983. During the team's discussion and observations, only three characteristics other than yield, were found to be of much concern. Resistance to blast, tolerance to cold, and shorter maturity were all cited as major constraints still to be overcome, yet several others are noted in the original project. There is still a taste preference for the traditional or japonica rice.



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Women are trained to operate tillers. Taegu Office of Rural Development, North Kyongsang Province. Farmers bunch rice seedlings before transplanting. Kyonggyi Province. The IRI Research Station.



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Table 1-4. Barley Yield of Leading Variety/Breeding Line No. of Var./Line Yield (MT/ha) No. of Resistant Var./Line Yield Cold Tolerance Lodging Resistance Leading Breeding Leading Breeding Index Leading Breeding Leading Breeding lear Location Variety Line Variety Line (%) Variety Line Variety Line 1971 Suwon 3 12 3.42 3.25 95 3 10 1 6 Iri -------Milyang 4 9 4.88 5.00 102 3 8 1 6 Ave. --4.15 4.13 100 1974 Suwon 3 12 3.54 3.68 104 2 5 1 8 Iri 3 12 3.30 3.47 105 1 5 1 5 Milyang 3 13 4.57 4.93 108 1 5 1 5 Ave. --3.80 4.03 106 1977 Suwon 3 8 3.84 3.89 101 1 4 2 8 Iri 3 8 4.59 4.13 90 1 4 2 3 Milyang 3 9 3.81 4.09 107 -6 2 4 Ave. --4.08 4.04 99 1980 Suwon 3 11 3.42 3.63 106 -7 2 9 Iri 2 11 4.00 2.64 66 -7 2 9 Milyang 3 12 4.18 4.44 106 -11 2 9 Ave. --3.87 3.57 92 -II



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J2 Table J-1 (continued) Item Unit '62 '65 '70 '75 '78 '79 4. Agricultural indicator A. Consumption per household Urban-household Living expenditure won 68,880 117,360 359,400 755,520 1,488,600 2,021,316 Food expenditure it 34,680 66,600 145,440 333,960 594,240 737,232 Engel's coefficients% 50.3 56.7 40.7 44.2 39.9 36.5 Farm-household Living expenditure won 55,740 100,492 207,766 616,280 1,320,508 1,662,168 Food expenditure % 31,150 53,373 95,445 291,508 505,253 628,788 Engel;s coefficients% 55.9 53.1 45.9 47.3 38.3 37.8 B. Income per household Farm household income (A) 1000 won 67.9 112.2 255.8 872.9 1,884.2 2,227.5 Agri. income it 54.0 88.8 194.0 714.8 1,355.7 1,531.3 Non-ag ri. income (B) if 13.9 23.4 61.8 158.1 528.5 696.2 B/A % 20.5 20.9 24.2 18.1 28.0 31.3 *Japan (B/A) % 52.8 56.3 68.1 71.1 76.2 C. Trade condition between agriculture & non-agriculture Index No. of price % 10.1 19.7 39.5 100.0 188.5 209.1 of farm products received by farmer Index No. of price % 13.3 25.1 44.1 100.0 190.1 216.2 of farm supplies paid by farmer Parity ratio % 75.9 78.5 89.6 100.0 99.3 96.7 Rural wage rate won/a-y 120 221 579 1,469 3,393 5,140 Item Unit '65 '70 '75 '78 '79 D. Food consumption (man/year) Japan ('78) Grain & potatoes Rice kg 121.8 136.4 123.6 134.7 135.6 '81.6 Barley it 36.8 37.3 36.3 18.1 14.1 0.7 Wheat it 13.8 26.1 29.5 30.5 30.6 31.7 Corn It 0.9 1.1 2.4 2.8 2.9 Soybeans it 4.4 5.3 6.4 7.0 7.2 Potatoes "v 7.3 10.2 7.1 6.3 6.3 Others T1 3.8 3.0 2.0 2.1 2.1 11.1 Crops Total 188.8 219.4 207.3 201.5 198.8 125.1



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-2 No. 3: The Potable Water Project in Rural Thailand (May 1980) PN-AAH-850 No. 4: Philippine Small Scale Irrigation (May 1980) PN-AAH-749 No. 5: Kenya Rural Water Supply: Program, Progress, Prospects (June 1980) PN-AAH-724 No. 6: Impact of Rural Roads in Lfberia (June 1980) PN-AAH-750 No. 7: Effectiveness and Impact of the CARE/Sierra Leone Rural Penetration Roads Projects (June 1980) PN-AAH-751 No. 8: Morocco: Food Aid and Nutrition Education (August 1980) PN-AAH-851 No. 9: Senegal: The Sine Saloum Rural Health Care Project (October 1980) PN-AAJ-008 No. 10: Tunisia: CARE Water Projects (October 1980) No. 11: Jamaica Feeder Roads: An Evaluation (November 1980) No. 12: Korean Irrigation (December 1980) No. 13: Rural Roads in Thailand (December 1980) PN-AAH-970 No. 14: Central America: Small Farmer Cropping Systems (December 1980) PN-AAH-977 No. 15: The Philippines: Rural Electrification (December 1980) PN-AAH-975 No. 16: Bolivia: Rural Electrification (December 1980) PN-AAH-978 No. 17: Honduras Rural Roads: Old Directions and New (January 1981) PN-AAHI-971 No. 18: Philippines Rural Roads I and II (March 1981) PN-AAH-973 No. 19: U.S. Aid to Education in Nepal: A 20-Year Beginning (May 1981) PN-AAJ-168 No. 20: Korean Potable Water System Project: Lessons from Experience (May 1981) PN-AAJ-170 No. 21: Ecuador: Rural Electrification (June 1981) PN-AAH-979 No. 22: The Product is Progress: Rural Electrification in Costa Rica (October 1981) PN-AAJ-175 No. 23: Northern Nigeria Teacher Educational Project (Sept. 1981) PN-AAJ-1 73 No. 24: Peru: CARE OPG Water Health Services Project (October 1981) PN-AAJ-176 No. 25: Thailand: Rural NonFormal Education -The Mobile Trade Training Schools (October 1981) PN-AAJ-171 No. 26: Kenya: Rural Roads (January 1982) PN-AAH-972 No. 27: Korean Agricultural Research: The Integration of Research and Extension (January 1982) PN-AAJ-606 No. 28: Philippines: Bicol Integrated Area Development (January 1982) PN-AAJ-1 79 No. 29: Sederhana: Indonesia Small-Scale Irrigation (February 1982) PN-AAJ-608 SPECIAL STUDIES No. 1: The Socio-Economic Context of Fuelwood Use in Small Rural Communities (August 1980) PN-AAH-747 No. 2: Water Supply and Diarrhea: Guatemala Revisited (August 1980) PN-AAJ-007 No. 3: Rural Water Projects in Tanzania: Technical, Social, And Administrative Issues (November 1980) PN-AAH-974



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A.I.D. EVALUATION PUBLICATIONS A complete list of reports issued in the A.I.D. Evaluation Publication series is included in the last three pages of this document, together with information for ordering reports.



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J-3 Table J-1 (continued) Item unit '65 '70 '75 '78 '79 E. Proportion domestically supplied crops Total %93.9 80.5 73.0 72.6 59.9 Rice to 100.7 93.1 94.6 103.8 86.0 Barley it 106.0 106.3 92.0 119.9 117.0 Soybeans if 100.0 86.1 85.8 59.3 43.4 Item Unit '62 '65 '70 '75 '78 '79 F. No. of farm machine owned Power tiller each 93 1,111 11,884 85,722 194,780 235,909 Tractor "--61 564 1,601 2,035 Transplanting machine "--16 531 2,416 Planting machine "146 303 630 953 4,468 3,773 Binder "--89 3,703 12,030 Combine "---56 134 505 Dryer "---694 962 1,143 Power sprayer "714 7,579 45,008 32,956 66,342 83,588 Mist & duster "--104,742 169,652 207,473 Power pump 12,292 26,029 54,078 65,993 180,660 187,608 Power thresher 8,022 18,909 41,038 127,105 185,947 203,081 G. Land improvement & expansion Irrigated paddy field 1OO0ha 682 701 1,021 1,065 1,122 1,153 % to total %55 56 80 84 86 87 paddy field Consolidated paddy field ha 38,138 44,092 134,073 251,098 310,137 323,007 % to total %6 7 22 42 53 55 paddy field Farm land expansion & development ha 12,961 37,220 2,953 8,440 3,891 3,218



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J-5 Table J-3. Grain Marketing, Prices and Inflation Rates Items Unit 1977 1978 1979 1980 Rice (milled rice) Gov't purchase price won/kg 325 375 457.5 572.5 Gov't selling price 280.3 331.3 400 550 to Coop. middle-man.etc. Consumer's price -urban 310.5 364.1 472.3 616.4 Purchased amount M/T 1,403 1,355 1,301 532.8 Barley (pearled barley) Gov't purchase price won/kg 202.6 241.8 287.6 345.4 Gov't selling price 132.3 132.3 180 230 Consumer's price 152.1 152.1 197.9 252.3 Purchased amount M/T 189 484 560 483 Soybean Gov't purchase price won/kg 325.1 375.1 431.3 540 Gov't selling price 266.7 266.7 266.7 Consumer's price 350.3 414.9 465.4 729.7 Purchased amount M/T 1.6 1.8 4.8 0.04 Corn Gov't purchase price won/kg 146 168.5 177 204 Gov't selling price 133 170.8 202.2 231.7 Purchased amount M/T 25.5 32.5 55.9 62.6 Inflation Rate Consumer's price index 100 114 135 174 Index number of prices of 100 130 145 176 farm products Index number of prices of 100 130 148 184 farm inputs



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Table 1-8 (continued) Name Present Position Field 1979 29 persons Oh, Sung Do Jeonbuk National University Horticulture Bae, Dong Ho Livestock Experiment Station Livestock Cho, Kwang Ho Farm Management Bureau, ORD Livestock Management Park, Chang Sik Chungnam National University Grass Development Yun, Jin Young Horticulture Experiment Station Horticulture Chang, Hak Gil Wheat and Barley Research Institute Wheat Kun, Seok Dong Crops Experiment Station Wheat Breeding Lee, Myung Hoon Farm Management Bureau, ORD Computer Kang, Kwang Hee Crops Experiment Station Upland Crops Kwon, Weon Dal Chungbug National University Farm Management Kim, Seung Jae Farm Management Bureau, ORD FMG Analysis Han, Sang Soo Research Bureau, ORD FMG Analysis Lee, Chong Woo Gyeonggi Province, ORD Upland Crops Han, Eui Dong Chungbug Province, ORD Soybean Baek, Hyun Jun Sericulture Experiment Station Sericulture Lee, Han Kyu Jeonnam Province, ORD Weed Control Kim, Hee Kyung Rural Guidance Bureau, ORD Rural Nutrition Lee, Chong Hoon Crops Experiment Station Rice Hwang, Nam Youl Jeonbug Province, ORD Soil Analysis Hwang, Chang Hyun Agriculture Sciences Institute Rice Insect Choi, Yong Chul " Rice Disease Kim, Ho Young Yeongnam Crops Experiment Station Rice Breeding Kim, Seung Chul Agriculture Sciences Institute Disease Control Jeong, Hong Do Technical Dissemination Bureau, ORD Rice Disease Lee, Byung Yong Farm Mechinery Institute Food Processing Moon, Hui Sook Rural Guidance Bureau, ORD Nutrition Choi, Jin Kyu Horticulture Experiment Station Vegetable Kim, Bock Jin Agriculture Sciences Institute Pollution Oh, Joong Youl Gyeongbug Province, ORD Vegetable Breeding Total 94 persons



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C8 Table C-3 -Changes in Dates of Farm Operations Operation 1970 1974 Rice Scwt -in nursery May 3 April 19 Rice transplanted June 19 June 6 Rice harvested October 21 October 8 Barley sown October 28 October 18 Table C-4 -Adaption of Plastic Covered Seed Beds Plastic Covered Year Seed Beds M% 1971 4 1973 27 1974 38 1975 56 1976 65 1977 81 Table C-5 -Application of Silicate Fertilizer Year Amount (1000 MT) 1970 13.1 1972 21.6 1974 80.0 1975 175.0 1976 267.0 1977 300.0



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-15 E. Social Factors in Korean Agricultural Development The milieu of the Korean farm village is dualistic. It is marked by increasing rationalization of farming patterns while retaining time-honored consumption preferences. There is new physical mobility, but traditional hierarchical family relationships are still evi(lent. Increased female employment in urban areas has not yet broken sex discrimination in farm labor wages. Modern education is perceived to be a positive goal, but much of what is taught is Confucian in content. The farmer is cajoled by the government to grow certain crops and to donate labor for village projects; but he may remain autonomous if he feels his interests are threatened. Some of these changes have occurred as a result of increased agricultural production, a byproduct, in part, of agricultural research. There has been a major migration to urban areas, for the mecca of the city is not only a call to the possibility of greater income; it is also an escape from the monotony of village life and the stratification of both the family and the village age and power structure. This results in an aging of farmers. Farm families' sizes have also declined from an average of 6.17 in 1975 to 5.03 persons in 1979. The farm population under thirteen has declined by 1.3 million during this period. More important for current labor needs on the farm, is the drop in younger and middle-age workers between 1975 and 1979, the 14 to 19 year cohort declined from 1.9 million to 1.6 million and the 20 to 49 year group, from 4.2 million to 3.5 million, approximately equally among both men and women. Labor has become increasingly scarce. Among new Sae-maul-constructed houses, one can occasionally see a more traditional one abandoned, now perhaps used for storage or animals. The implications of these changes are important. Government figures indicate about a 7 percent rate of tenancy; yet informal estimates indicate that it may be higher and indeed is growing. Informal tenancy or working for wages on land owned by those who have migrated, at least temporarily, to urban areas has placed pressure on mechanization and the use of herbicides, thus reducing labor demands for weeding. Since Tongil rice requires more labor, and as barley for food is not profitable under present circumstances but especially if cash is required to hire labor, there is tension between the demands of national policy for higher yields of staple grains and the national need for industrialized export production. The increased demand for education, financed mainly by the consumer as the government has invested less in education than in most developing countries, has also contributed to mobility. The better educated the boy or girl, the greater the likelihood of migration, for that is the goal. In a Confucian society, education is not only an inherent good; it is the social security of the family and the opportunity to escape to the unrestricted anonymity of urban life. Increased education also reduces family farm labor as children remain in school longer. So effective research resulting in higher incomes increased off-farm migration.



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E-6 Table E-3. Farm Household Income Account Per 10a Land for AID-Supported Crops -1980 Operating Economic Profit Profit Quantity Crop OperatinProductio) Amount Rate Amount Rate Item (kg) Revenue Cost Cost (Won) (Won) Barley (Upland) 276.5 103,249 47,403 129,788 55,846 54.1 -26,539 (Paddy) 291 109,607 52,352 139,889 57,255 52.2 -30,282 Naked Barley (Upland) 312.9 114,205 55,205 129,735 59,000 51.7 -15,530 (Paddy) 317 115,722 54,246 137,577 61,476 53.1 -21,855 Wheat (Upland) 331.9 91,303 41,382 122,063 49,921 54.7 -30,760 (Paddy) 333 91,638 46,218 129,235 45,420 49.6 -37,597 Soybeans (Mono-culture) 144.5 82,445 26,636 96,794 55,809 67.7 -14,349 (Double-cropping)134.9 76,966 24,706 91,030 52,260 67.9 -14,064 White (Spring) 1,188.3 254,060 97,611 182,289 156,449 61.6 71,771 28.2 Potatoes (Fall) 1,243.8 214,092 66,482 145,263 147,610 68.9 68,829 32.1 Notes: a -All input expenditures excluding unpaid returns to family owned resources. b -All expenditures including unpaid returns to family owned resources. Source: Office of Rural Development



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K--3 Griliches, Z. 1958. "Research Costs and Social Returns, Hybrid Corn and Related Inoain" Journal of Political Economy, 66: 419-431. -------1964. "Research Expenditures, Education, and the Aggregate Agriculture Production Function." American Economic Review, 57: 96-174. Hong, Dong Shik. The Educational Impact of Farmer Training Programs, Unpublished Master of Education Thesis, Seoul National University, 1973. IRRI "Economic Consequences of the New Rice Technology", 1978 Los Banos, Philippines. Michigan State University, "Korean Agricultural Sector Analysis and Recommended Development Strategies, 1971-1985", 1972. Michigan State University, "Investment Priorities in the Korean Agriculture Sector", 1972. Shin, Dong Wan. Effects of Farming Technology Development on the Farm Household Economics, Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Hokkaido University, Japan, 1981, Song, Hae Kyun. "Consciousness of the Rural Youths," The Journal of Korean Agricultural Education, 11(1), 1979. Wallace, T.D. 1962. "Measures of Social Costs of Agricultural Programs," Journal of Farm Economics 44: 589-594. World Bank. "Investment in International Agricultural Research: Some Economic Dimensions," Staff Working Paper No. 361, 1979. --------"Costs and Benefits of Agricultural Research: The State of the Art." World Bank Staff Working Paper No. 360, 1979.



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F-4 from agricultural research is, as a rule, high for developed countries (1300 percent for the U.S.A. in Professor Griliches' estimation), Park's estimate comes as a surprise for a developing country like Korea. III. Critique The major deficiency in Park's analysis is that the estimate is based on a hypothetical model that employs a set of highly questionable assumptions. Among such assumptions are: -Perfect Supply Elasticity--In reality, rice cultivation in Korea can be expanded only with a neavy infrastructure investment. The constant cost assumiption in rice production for Korea is utterly unrealistic. -Equal Input Requirements--As compared with the traditional varieties, the Tongil varieties require heavier inputs including labor hours. Operating expenses per hectare have been higher for the production of the HYV. Thus not only the difference in per hectare yields but also in per hectare input uses should have been taken into account in Park's analysis. Obviously, his results are overstated. -Closed Economy--There are no imports of rice in his model. Before Korea attained self-sufficiency in 1975, it had been importing 10 to 15 percent of its domestic demand for rice. As will be shown below, the introduction of rice imports drastically changes the model structure. -Uniform Pricing--The actual pricing mechanism for rice is far more complex than depicted in his analysis. This is examined in the following discussion. IV. An Alternative Framework The consumer-surplus approach in Park's analysis is too simplistic and unrealistic to be of much interest. In the following, an alternative framework is offered to describe the rice market situation in Korea.4/ In Figure 2 the demand and supply curves are shown by D and S. Point A represents market equilibrium in a closed economy situation. The effect of the improved varieties is displayed as causing a downward shift of the supply curve from S to S'. Distance OG represents an initial equilibrium price which for simplicity is assumed as equal to the government's selling price to consumers (In equilibrium the selling price should converge to a free market price). Government purchase price from farmers is indicated V This model is adapted from the Akino and Hayami model with appropriate modifications to reflect the Korean situation (M. Akino, and Y. Hayami, "Efficiency and Equity in Economic Development," American Journal of Agricultural Economics 57 (1975): 1-10)



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C4 -The Tongil farmers used larger quantities and more applications of agricultural chemicals to control diseases and insects than those planting the traditional varieties. -The total area of application of herbicides for weed control was increased and at the same time manual weed control decreased. -The farmers' methods of irrigation have been changed from the continuously flooded condition to that of intermittent irrigation. -Improvement in harvesting and drying was an important lesson for farmers to learn. Formerly, they stored the harvested grain without properly drying it in order to save time for barley planting. This method yielded lower quality and quantity of rice. Tongil shatters quite readily and must be threshed soon after harvesting. The farmers had to change their method and this shortened storage time in bundles reduced the shattering losses and increased the quality. -Farmers planting Tongil have shifted their dates of sowing, transplanting and harvesting, making them all earlier than those for the farmers growing traditional rice (See Table C-3). This makes it possible to increase barley production as more rice fields can be planted with barley as a second or winter crop. However, rather than increase the area planted to barley, the Tongil rice farmers have increased the area of land planted to cash crops such as vegetables because of the greater economic benefits from vegetables compared to barley. C. The Role of the Extension Service The Extension Service played a critical part in the rapid and broad dissemination of information regarding the Tongil variety and the necessary technical knowledge associated with its production. Farmers' meetings, radio broadcasts, and use of the village amplifier systems and TV sets were all important means of training farmers to shift to Tongil (See Table C-6, p. C-9). Farmers were offered technical farm training sessions during the winter months so that they were able to improve their farm management techniques. These training programs were basic to bringing the national average productivity of Tongil to nearly that of the experimental plots. The group farming or cooperative farming program made it easier for the extension workers to perform more efficiently and effectively through group contacts rather than through individuals. The group worked together, all using the improved variety and cultural techniques to attain higher yields.



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Table D-1. Area, Production and Productivity of Selected Crops Year -Area (1000 ha) Production (1000 ~QProductivity _(IT/ha) Barley Wheat Soybeans Potatoes Barley Wheat Soybeans Potatoes Barley Wheat Soybeans Potatoes 1970 730 97 295 54_ 1,591 219 232 605 2.18 2.26 .79 11.31 1972 710 63 282 43 1,600 149 224 459 2.25 2.38 .79 10.62 1974 704 36 286 41 1,388 74 319 447 1.97 2.03 1.11 10.86 1975 711 44 274 52 1,700 97 311 660 2.39 2.22 1.13 12.80 1976 711 37 247 49 1,759 82 295 569 2.47 2.22 1.19 11.76 1977 516 27 251 50 814* 45 319 558 1.58 1.68 1.27 11.30 1978 554 17 247 39 1,348 36 293 304 2.43 2.09 1.19 7.82 1979 473 13 207 34 1,508 42 257 356 3.19 3.21 1.24 10.58 Source: Yearbook of Agriculture and Forestry Statistics, 1980. *Decrease due to excessive flooding from typhoon



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APPENDIX D RESEARCH ON SELECTED FOOD CROPS by ROBERT 1. JACKSON A. Purposes and Targets One of the purposes of the AID-financed loan for agricultural research in Korea was to assist in varietal improvement of the five major food crops: rice, barley, wheat, soybeans and white potatoes. In addition to research on varietal improvement, the development of improved cropping systems was part of the project as well. Specific targets were established for each of the crops, both for yield increases on the experiment station and on farmers' fields for the crops covered in the project with the exception of potatoes. Improved varieties of potatoes resistant to viruses, insect control measures, and methods of processing and marketing were stated as project targets. The targets for rice are presented in Appendix C. Aims included the development of new varieties and strains of soybeans capable of increasing present (1973) yields from 1.98 MT/ha to a target level of 3.2 MT/ha, and increasing farmers' yields from 0.8 to 1.3 MT/ha by the end of 1983. These improved soybeans were to be more responsive to higher plant populations per unit area of land, resistant to lodging and at the same time responsive to higher rates of fertilizer, higher in protein and oil content, shorter in maturity, and resistant to the economically important pests. Research on cultural practices was also an item for consideration. New strains of barley were to be selected and developed so that the experiment station yield of 2.79 MT/ha was to be increased to 3.6 MT/ha and farmers' yields increased from 2.04 MT/ha to 3.0 MT/ha within a ten-year period. A variety 10 to 15 days shorter in maturity, more resistant to cold temperatures, more responsive to higher rates of fertilizer without lodging, resistant to common barley insects and diseases, and tolerant to waterlogged paddy soils was to be developed. Similar characteristics for wheat were stated in the project paper. Experiment station yields were to be increased from 4.3 MT/ha to 5.2 MT/ha, and on-farm yields from 2.24 to 4.0 MT/ha. The new varieties were to incorporate the following characteristics: growing period reduced from 20 to 15 days, improved milling qualities, higher protein, better baking quality, resistance to diseases and insects and tolerance to cold and more poorly drained paddy soils. There were also five main targets for cropping systems, but as the team saw little evidence of any research results from this component of the project, no other comments will be made. B. Rice Research on rice has undoubtedly made the greatest contribution to the Korean agricultural economy through the development and release



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Team inspects tongil rice in the ....laboratory. IRI Research Station. 7z 77 The new Crop Experimental Station, Yeongduk, North Kyongsang Province. Drying grain in the yard of a small home. Note the television aerial.



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-12 D. The Korean Farm Effective land reforms after the Japanese occupation and in the early period of the Korean Republic were a salient factor in improving rural equity in Korea. Korean farmer households, decreasing as a percentage of the total population from 51.6 percent in 1968 to 28.9 percent in 1979, may not legally own more than three hectares of farm land (excluding upland orchards). Some 29.8 percent of farm families cultivate land under 0.5 ha, and 35.3 percent between onehalf and one hectare, 25.7 percent between one and two hectares; and only 5.4 percent over two hectares. The consequences of relatively equitable land distribution are that agricultural research and rural development programs, if they reach the farm as they do in Korea, are important factors in rural equity. The growth of electrification of rural areas greatly contributed both to improved production and increases in the standard of living. Except perhaps for small, isolated islands and a few scattered farmhouses, farm families have access to electricity (some 83 percent have television sets). Even in villages that were traditionally composed of swidden farmers, some could afford the 3,000 won monthly electric charges. The pervasive use of plastic to retain moisture and retard weeds on upland crops such as peppers, to protect against cold on rice seedlings, and to grow winter vegetables in the extensive plastic greenhouses have destroyed the traditional aesthetic scene of the Korean landscape (creating a problem for those who paint in the traditional oriental style), but without question it has improved farm income and helped transform the rural economy. The rural economic structure, however, is dependent on rice. It provides more than half of the farm household income. Although the area of irrigated paddy has generally remained constant, the area devoted to the higher yielding varieties of Tongil has risen nationally from 15.9 percent of the rice area in 1972 to a high of 76.2 percent in 1978. With this increase came a steady rise in production per hectare from 3.86 MT to a high of 5.53 11T in 1977. An increasing national market orientation by the farmer couoled with an intensive campaign by guidance workers prompted this shift. It was accompanied by improvements in cultivation techniques and technological innovations that also spurred the increased yields of the traditional varieties of rice. This remarkable shift was predicated on two factors beyond the farmers' control but at least in part within the purview of agricultural research: the Tongil varieties in their earlier years were resistant to blast disease and the normally warm weather prevented cold from undercutting production increases. It is common that new varieties of rice are resistant to blast for a number of years,but it is equally apparent that new races of blast develop, especially when vast contiguous areas are planted to the same strain. This occurred in 1979, causing a drop both in



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_19 The agricultural research project ended in 1980. Its targets of increases in agricultural yields are to be achieved by 1984. Seven trainees sent abroad under the project are still overseas; those who have returned have done so only recently and cannot be expected to have made a major contribution at the time of this report. This evaluation is thus circumscribed by these factors. Agricultural research was an appropriate intervention for AID. The project materially assisted in the development of the institutional infrastructure of the Office of Rural Development which was already well-established. It provided, however, only limited benefits. The most important benefits were: first, training; and secondly, equipment, including a computer and library materials. Resident expatriate technical assistance was of marginal utility, although short-term expert advice was more important. The project provided little that was innovative. The multidisciplinary research team concept was only a modest improvement on the existing structure. Assistance in fostering agricultural research could have resulted from a simple training and equipment project, with short-term advisory services as required. If the project was more complex than necessary, the project paper was simplistic in its design and somewhat misleading in its data. In spite of a comparatively comprehensive data base, it underestimated existing yields in the experimental stations and the farms. It called for breakthroughs on research resulting in higher yields, but the major innovations occurred prior to the project. The reliance on average experimental yields was a convenient, but spurious, concept. The areas of project concentration were rice, barley, wheat, soybeans, white potatoes, and cropping systems. Rice was a critical and appropriate concern, being paramount in national policy terms. In spite of inconsistencies in government grain support prices, barley was also important. Cropping systems were another critical area, but little was done in this field. Concentration on soybeans might have been useful, but here again little was accomplished. Potatoes and wheat research was minor, both because of extensive imports of wheat and the marginal value of potatoes in the Korean diet. Given already apparent trends in Korean migration, labor supply, and cropping patterns, attention should have focused on vegetable production and mechanization as well as rice, barley and cropping systems. Even in those priority areas, the contributions of this research project to Korean agricultural growth are necessarily blurred. The project was useful, indeed overall beneficial, but certainly not critical. Trends showing a decline in barley, wheat, potato and soybean hectarage were apparent before the project began. Although project goals may be reached in some of these crops by 1984, statistically aggregate yields are likely to continue to drop. Thus, national goals will probably not be met although a relatively small number of individual farmers may benefit. Rice production may reach its targets by that date, but if this is accomplished it is likely that it will



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APPENDIX C THE KOREAN EXPERIENCE IN INCREASED RICE PRODUCTION by ROBERT 1. JACKSON Korea's shift from rice-importing to self-sufficiency in a relatively short time during the early 1970s is an exceptional achievement. It is unfortunate that cold weather and rice blast late in that decade have decreased rice production to a level where the country must again import rice. The story of this rapid increase in production is remarkable and could come about only in a country like Korea where the infrastructure is well established, and where there was a relatively vast amount of technical information available for increasing production. The recent decline in production is no doubt closely linked to the desire to increase rice production in the shortest possible time span. A. Background Korea's recent agriculture policy has been to become and remain selfsufficient in staple food production, particularly in rice. Self-sufficiency reduces the drain of foreign exchange for food imports and lessens the dependence on food coming from surplus-producing countries. As rice is the most important food in Korea, a greater effort has been given to this crop than to some of the other food crops, such as barley, wheat, soybeans and potatoes. The apparent solution to the ever-increasing demand for food, coupled with the limited area of arable land, is increased productivity. One method of increasing productivity is through improved agricultural technology, the basis for which is research. It was agreed that an AID-financed loan to Korea to assist in financing training of scientists, purchase of equipment and supplies, and providing qualified foreign scientists would enhance the research system. The project identified five crops with which to work, of which rice was one. More specifically, the project identified the following targets for rice: Select and develop strains that will increase the present crop experiment station yield of 4.79 metric tons per hectare (MT/ha) to 6.0 by the end of 1983, and actual farm production yields from the present average (1972) of 3.25 MT/ha to an estimated 4.5 MT/ha within the same period. Develop new strains which will possess the following characteristics: a growth and maturity period shorter by ten to 15 days, and at the same time be responsive to higher fertilization levels; improved grain quality standards, including higher protein and lower amylose content, and kernel shapes more acceptable to the consumers.



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Table 1-6. Soybeans (The Results of Regional Yield Trials) No. of Entries Yield (MT/ha) Degree of SMV Resistance* Released Breeding Released Breeding Released Cultivar Breeding Line Year Location Cultivar Line Cultivar Line R M S R M S 1971 Suwon 3 14 1.78 1.90(107) 3 --13 1 Yuseong 2 10 2.04 1.99( 98) Kwangju 2 11 2.41 2.77(115) 1974 Suwon 4 9 2.24 2.16( 96) -3 1 -5 4 Yuseong 3 6 2.23 2.56(115) Kwangju 2 9 3.18 3.08(97) 1977 Suwon 2 16 2.65 2.64(100) --2 3 -13 Yuseong 2 9 3.12 3.12(100) Kwangju 2 10 2.54 2.82(111) 1980 Suwon 2 15 2.08 2.08( 95) 1 -1 13 -2 Yuseong 3 13 2.08 1.87( 90) KwangJu 2 15 1.81 1. 76( 97) 1971: SMV, 1974-1980: SMV-N ( ) Yield index (%)



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B-2 June 14 Cheju Province (by plane). Visit Provincial Office of Rural Development, and interview farmers. June 15 Cheju Province, to interview farmers. June 16 Debriefing, Office of Rural Development. June 17 Debriefing, U.S. Embassy. June 18 Departure from Korea.



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-9 Over the past decade there has been a highly significant drop in hectarage under cultivation of the crops aforementioned. The area planted in barley declined from 730,000 ha in 1970 to 473,000 in 1979; area in wheat from 97,000 to 13,000 ha over the same period; the area in soybeans from 295,000 to 207,000 ha; and the area in potatoes from 54,111 to 34,000 ha. Thus, even with increases in yields per hectare, aggregate production, and consequently national objectives, are not being met. For example: -Barley production in the decade beginning in 1970 basically remained constant [1,591 million metric tons (MMT) in 1970, 1,508 NNT in 1979], although per hectare yields rose from 2.18 to 3.19 MT. -Wheat production dropped from 219,000 to 42,000 MT over the same decade, while yields increased one-third (from 2.26 to 3.21 MT/ha). -Soybean production rose slightly from 232,000 to 257,000 MT and yields rose from .79 to 1.3 MT/ha. -Potato production dropped from 605,000 to 356,000 MT but yields also dropped from 11.31 to 10.58 MT/ha between 1970 and 1979. With good weather and a continuing research program, it is possible that the targets may be obtained on all crops ten years after the initiation of the project, if government policy were to emphasize all crops. This seems unlikely, however, in the case of wheat, potatoes, and soybeans. Even if per hectare targets are reached, it is unlikely that any aggregate increases can be expected. Thus, individual farmers may well benefit but the nation as a whole may find its goals unfulfilled. Rice represents a special case. The modern technological package on which Tongil depends and the sophisticated management required in cultivation has had a salutary effect on the traditional varieties as well as the higher-yielding ones. Thus Tongil production per hectare increased from 3.86 MT in 1972 to 4.63 in 1979 but the traditional varieties also rose from 3.32 to 4.37 over the same period. Given the private market premium for the traditional varieties and their greater resistance to cold and blast now, it may be as economic to grow the improved japonica as the newer Tongil varieties.6/ Other questions must be asked of the project design, the most important of which is whether the choice of subjects for research was the most appropriate. Rice obviously was critical both from a national and farmer viewpoint. Barley seemed necessary even though trends indicated that although it was a government priority, it was unlikely to remain one of the farmers'. Wheat, at any time given land use in Korea, was highly questionable. Soybeans were of less importance and potatoes were unimportant in terms of national needs. Researchers at ORD indicate that -See Appendix E, "Profitability, Costs and Revenue of Five Crops" by Kwan S. Kim and Appendix C, "The Korean Experience in Increased Rice Production" by Robert I. Jackson. The figures are taken from Table C-2.



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H-2 11 and 23 tons per hectare respectively. Sweet potatoes are generally planted after barley or rape and harvested in the fall when they are sliced and dried prior to export to the mainland where the slices are used as a source of starch in the production of alcohol for beverages. Vegetable production includes an estimated 1,900 tons of cucumbers, 3,000 tons of sweet melons and watermelons, 35,000 tons of Chinese cabbage, 1,300 tons of cabbage, and 7,400 tons of garlic. Thus, vegetable crops are important to the island's economy and people's diet. The crop husbandry carried out on the island appears to be very intensive and well carried out. The fields are relatively small and walled in by volcanic rocks cleared from the fields. Herbicides are used to a very limited extent, chiefly in the citrus orchards. The use of fused phosphate was introduced to the farmers during the period 1973 to 1975; this had a very marked effect on the increase in productivity of the crops. This plant nutritional element has undoubtedly done more for Cheju's agricultural production than any other single or combined factors. One of the striking differences between Cheju Island and the mainland is the relatively small area devoted to paddy rice cultivation, less than 900 ha each year. Rice production is practically inconsequential to the agricultural economy. Paddy fields have not been developed due to the porous nature of the soils that cannot retain water. Another contrast between the island and mainland is the flourishing cash crop economy. In both areas, rice is the chief food but very little of it is produced in Cheju. Barley is the most important crop; 17,000 ha are grown as a winter crop. Two-thirds is naked barley for food and the remaining one-third is two-row for malt, which is grown under contract with the two breweries on the mainland. The productivity of each barley crop is about the same, 2..8 tons per hectare. Imported rice is mixed withthe pearled barley to form the basic diet of the people. Rape is the most important cash crop, as about three-fourths of Korea's production, or 21,000 tons, is from Cheju. The productivity is 2.3 tons per hectare, nearly equal to barley. The seed is exported to the mainland where it is pressed for oil, one of the important edible oils in Korea. Thus, because rape seed demands a higher price than barley, its gross revenue is about 300 percent more per bag. The areas cultivated with soybeans has remained practically constant over the past decade at a level of slightly less than 10,000 ha and a productivity of 1.0 ton per hectare, about 25 percent lower than the national average. Some of the soybeans are consumed locally as bean sprouts, but the majority of the crop is shipped to the mainland for pressing into oil. In short, the farmers on the island appear better off compared with their counterparts on the mainland. Among other reasons, increased per hectare yields in the mid-1970s can be singled out as the most significant contributing factor. Higher yields were realized not so much through implementation of agricultural results as by judicious uses of fertilizers. Thus, the situation in Cheju is unique and distinct from that in the mainland Korea.



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G-8 upturn in barley hectarage, wheat imports are still so enormous that this goal is impossible without massive, probably forced, changes in dietary patterns. At the same time President Chun called for the-elimination of false statistics--those based on what the leadership wants to hear. But a bureaucracy that is predicated on a command system will have great difficulty in responding to both exhortations at the same time, for in the Korean context they are in conflict. It is likely that, as the political imperatives take precedence, agricultural research and guidance will be pushed to the utmost level to achieve targets and that statistics at the national level will be manipulated to prove compliance and success. The Korean agricultural research system has thus been remarkably effective. It does contain an "Achilles Heel"--one that is not a product of its agricultural program, but rather of its political culture.



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APPENDIX H AGRICULTURE IN CHEJU PROVINCE The isolated island of Cheju is slightly larger than Oahu in area, and located some 50 miles off the southern-most tip of the mainland. Volcanic in origin, Cheju was until recently the poorest province of Korea. It remained a distinctive subculture of Korean society, with a separate, essentially unintelligible, dialect of Korean and a society more matriarchal in practice than the mainland. A site for exiles from the court as well as outcasts and criminals, it was wracked by a peasant and communist rebellion in 1948 that significantly lowered the male population ratio and fostered continued poverty. The normalization of relations with Japan gave Cheju an early opportunity for change. Japanese regarded Cheju as an island retreat close to home as well as inexpensive, and Cheju residents in Japan returned often with significant funds for local investment. Fishing still remains as the mainstay of the island's economy. In recent years, there has been a growing emphasis on both the tourist and livestock industries. As a result, the relative importance of farming activities has recently somewhat declined. The island's climate is warmer than that of the mainland. The yearly average temperature is 15.8 0 C with the monthly average varying between 7.5 0 C and 28.60C. The island has the highest Irecipitation in Korea, which averages about 2000 mm per year. The climate is suitable for growing citrus fruit, particularly on both the northern and southern coasts, and for cultivating pineapples on the southern coast. The total area of the island is 1,825,000 hectares (ha) out of which the cultivated area covers 53,162 ha, accounting for only 2.7 percent of the total area. Because of its volcanic origin, the cultivable area is mostly limited to the coastal belt around the island. Paddy fields cover less than 2 percent of the cultivated land with the remaining in upland fields. Cultivated area per capita of the farming population in Cheju was 0.22 ha in 1979, which is slightly above the national average of 0.2 ha. Because of the climatic condition, the land utilization ratio on the island is 146 percent, exceeding that of the mainland by about 16 percent. Many farmers also engage in off-farm activities (fishing, livestock, or tourism). Per hectare yields in many crops are also higher relative to those on the mainland. These factors have contributed to increased farm income in Cheju at a rate faster than that on the mainland in recent years. Both white and sweet potatoes are important cash crops. Cheju is the only province in Korea in which white potato production is increasing, due mainly to the export market found on the mainland, particularly during the winter months. In 1979 there were about 1,000 ha of white potatoes and 12,000 of sweet potatoes. The productivities of these two crops were



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Women having luncheon in the field as they rest between transplanting sessions, South Kyongsang Province. Research Facilities at Miryang. i Farmer prepares field for transplanting with a mechanical transplanter, South Cholla Province.



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D-3 the exception of 1977 when the crop was severely damaged by a typhoon. Most important, the productivity has significantly increased during this period and is due largely to the efforts and results of the barley research workers. It suffices to say that they are conducting similar research on barley to that on wheat to overcome the constraints related to barley production. Nearly all of the farmers growing barley were unhappy with the Government's pricing policy. Should this be changed, undoubtedly barley production would increase markedly. Those farmers growing two-row barley for malting and under contract with the two Korean breweries expressed their interest and financial benefit in barley cultivation. Cooperative international barley nurseries have been provided by CIMMYT and Montana State University. E. Soybeans and White Potatoes The area cultivated and production of soybeans and white potatoes have decreased during the past decade. Productivity of soybeans has increased and that for potatoes remained relatively static. The farmers interviewed expressed extremely little interest in either of these two crops. The ORD has cooperated with CIP on potato research and the University of Illinois (INTSOY) on soybeans. All of these institutions receive financial support from AID. F. Conclusions If the project were to be redesigned at this writing, the inclusion of soybeans and white potatoes as crops to be developed by this project would be very questionable. There is a relatively strong research component on wheat, but the fact that the cultivated area has shrunk to such a great extent makes it difficult to justify support to research on wheat at this time. There is such an increase in the use of mechanically powered farm equipment, due to the improved cultivation methods and shortage of farm labor resulting from urban migration, that farm mechanization would receive a very high priority for inclusion. Farmers have learned that it is more economically advantageous for them to grow some of the vegetables under plastic during the winter months and in the open fields during the summer season than it is to cultivate wheat and barley. Research on vegetables should also receive high priority if the project were being designed at this time. It should be noted that the AVRDC cooperated with the ORD in research on a limited number of vegetables and provided only minimal financial support during the life of the AID project.



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C-2 -tolerance for cold temperatures, especially in the seedling stage and during the ripening period, and shorter maturing; and -resistance to blast disease, bacterial leaf blight, virus stripe disease, brown leaf hopper, green leaf hopper, rice stem borer and other insects and diseases. Probably one of the most important dates in Korea's agricultural history was 1965, when the first cross was made leading to the release of the japonica.-indica hybrid to farmers in 1972 to produce seed. The primary purpose for making this cross was to introduce genes resistant to rice blast from the indica rice and to retain the other desirable characteristics of the commonly grown japonicas. It was realized by rice breeders, however, that this wide cross could result in poor grain quality (taste), low seed set (fertility) and also low grain yield. Indica rice grew very tall, so it was susceptible to lodging, and it did not mature under natural conditions in Korea. During the selection process in the early generations, lines were selected for the earlier maturing and shorter plant height characteristics similar to the japonica type grown in Korea. After careful observations and selections for 12 generations, the variety Tongil was widely disseminated to farmers in 1974. Close cooperation and collaboration between the Office of Rural Development (ORD) and the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) made it possible to grow two generations of rice each calendar year in the tropical IRRI climate. The cultivation of the TongiILl/ variety and subsequently released varieties proved that Korea could attain rice self-sufficiency for three or four years (see Table C-i, p. C-7). Due to unforeseen circumstances, these japonica-indica hybrids have been somewhat disappointing during the 19781980 seasons, as colder conditions than normal prevailed and the rice blast disease became much more severe. Korea has been virtually unique in its rice program in that few, if any, countries have developed such a complete technical, informational and economic package to instruct and encourage farmers to change many of their traditional practices. The Korean experience is so different and so comprehensive that it is worthy of description. No facet was left uncovered in this comprehensive program. The complete package associated with the introduction of Tongil rice changed the traditional farming technology. The expansion of Tongil rice intensified and speeded a comprehensive well-organized and effective agricultural extension service. Along with the concentrated expansion of the new rice strain, joint planning and encouragement of the farmers were attained through concentrated administrative support by the government. The resulting increased production of Tongil brought about several changes in the consumption patterns of farm households. Changes in farming technology and socioeconomic conditions were brought about with the relatively rapid increase in the areas cultivated with Tongil. -/ For the sake of brevity, Tongil is used throughout this paper to include it and all subsequently released japonica-indica varieties.



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-21 B. Too great an emphasis on achievement of targets and too strong a command structure can lead to indiscriminate concentration on shorter term results. This can, as in the Korean case, lead to discounting the long-term effects, such as pollution, too rapid dissemination of new varieties, or other major problems. Attempting indiscriminately to attain unrealistic targets can lead to inappropriate use of personnel and resources. It can result in manipulation of statistics. Thus the relationship between placing priority on agriculture and its adaptive research program must be carefully balanced with its longer range implications. C. Agricultural pricing and procurementpolicies must provide sufficient motivation to the farmers for the incorporation of e2 perimental research results onto farmers' fields. A successful research and experimental program will not succeed if national pricing and procurement policies discourage farmers from reaping the benefits of higher yields or improved strains. The Korean experience has shown that even traditional farmers are often economically rational and are willing to adopt new technologies if they are assured of opportunities for increased incomes while minimizing risks. D. An agricultural research program can only be effective if it is continuous. Adaptive research requires a continuous testing, breeding and training program, without which short-term gains may dissolve. There are no single, one-shot, solutions to agricultural research, no matter how successful any single intervention may be. E. There must be administrative integration of agricultural research and extension. Separate administrative structures, even within the same ministry, will likely result in poor coordination between research and extension, thus obviating the usefulness of the project. The Korea case demonstrates the need for integration both at the top of the command structure and in rural areas. F. Agricultural research, extension and agricultural education should be coordinated or integrated. Too often agricultural education, which provides the basic training for extension staff and government personnel, has no formal administrative coordination at any level with the future employment of graduates. Responsibilities are often split between a ministry of agriculture and a ministry of education. In the Korea case, effective coordination exists between the Office of Rural Development at the center and the College of Agriculture, Seoul National University. Indeed it occurs at provincial agricultural high schools (training



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iv anticipated were generally made prior to the project. Farmer yields may well reach their objectives by 1984, but the AID project was only a beneficial increment to Korean agricultural research. It supplemented an existing, competent system, but offered little that was innovative. The concentration on rice led to a lack of emphasis on other crops, an inattention caused by national concerns as well as social and economic factors the project ignored. Although there have been increases in crop yields, hectarage of the other crops has consistently been falling, even before the project began. Thus, national targets will not be met even if a relatively few farmers benefit. The choice of some of the crops covered by the project such as wheat, soybeans and potatoes seems questionable, as does the emphasis on increased fertilizer responsiveness. Critical to a developmentally effective agricultural research program is the transference of experimental results to the farmers. Through a widespread extension service, a farmer training program that includes almost all families annually, demonstration plots, and the Sae-maul Movement, Korea has developed an authoritarian but effective means of disseminating research results. Thus, beginning in 1972 the spread of the high-yielding varieties of rice was pushed with alacrity by the Korean bureaucracy in response to a national command structure. The effort was effective, making Korea selfsufficient in rice by 1975. Yet there were two inherent problems in this comprehensive effort: these varieties were sensitive to cold, and new races of the fungal disease called blast normally develop after a few years if large areas are planted to a single variety. The crisis developed first in 1979 with a drop in production caused by blast followed by a disastrous 1980 crop due to cold temperatures. The rice crop fell by one-third, creating a crisis of confidence in the government and in the guidance service. Ironically, the failures of 1979 and 1980 can be attributed to the strengths of the Korean guidance service. Thus its weakness is based on the omnipresent bureaucratic hierarchy that, in contrast to most developing societies, can transform research into production. In single-minded pursuit of its political goals, it neglected elemental precautions that might have avoided the problems of the last two years. Agricultural research was an appropriate intervention for AID at the time. It assisted a well-established, agricultural research network, but did not materially transform it. It created no new institutions. Agricultural research will continue in Korea but replication abroad will be difficult. Any successful adaptive agricultural research project will be dependent upon a positive pricing policy, an effective extension service, rural infrastructure, and continuous contact with international research centers, among other factors. Political will is required for its success, but too strong an emphasis on political objectives can undercut its effectiveness.



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Table E-1. Farm Household Account Per 10a Land for AID-Supported Crops -1977 ________________________ (Uit: Won/lO a) Total Operating Economic Gross Operating Production Profit Profit I tern Revenue Cost Cost Amount Rate Amount Rate 1. HYV Rice (Single-cropping) 194,037 52,294 94,588 141,743 73.0 99,449 51.3 2. HYV Rice (Double-cropping) 180,213 50,308 91,874 129,905 72.1 88,339 49.0 3. TV Rice (Single-cropping) 155,454 47,410 89,388 108,044 69.5 66,066 42.5 4. TV Rice (Double-cropping) 139,183 44,742 85,729 94,441 67.9 53,454 38.4 M 41s 5. Upland Rice (Double-cropping) 81,016 31,741 64,319 49,275 60.8 16,697 20.6 6. Upland Barley 56,455 29,096 68,867 27,359 48.5 -12,412 7. Paddy Barley 58,247 28,241 78,220 30,006 51.5 -19,973 8. Upland Naked Barley 57,455 30,448 70,040 27,007 47.0 -12,585 9. Paddy Naked Barley 61,013 30,862 81,090 30,151 49.4 -20,077 10. Upland Wheat 34,787 24,195 64,248 10,592 30.4 -29,461 11. Paddy Wheat 34,128 23,701 73,061 10,427 30.6 -38,933 12. Soybeans 50,876 12,662 47,196 38,214 75.1 3,680 7.2 13. White Potatoes (Upland) 147,290 35,702 70,990 111,588 75.8 76,300 51.8 14. White Potatoes (Paddy) 144,517 34,978 78,755 109,539 75.8 65,762 45.5 Source: Office of Rural. Development



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F-5 Figure 2. The Rice Market in Korea (a suggested framework) rICE D S w S E P K WT 4 C QUANTITY



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Table 1-5. Wheat Yield of Leading Variety and Breeding Line No. of Var./Line Yield (MT/ha) No. of Resistant Var./Line Yield Cold Tolerance Lodging Resistance Leading Breeding Leading Breeding Index Leading Breeding Leading Breeding Year Location Variety Line Variety Line Variety Line Variety Line 1971 Suwon 3 10 2.64 2.80 106 3 9 1 4 Iri 3 14 4.28 4.04 94 2 9 1 8 Milyang 3 14 4.20 3.89 93 2 9 -3 Ave. 3.71 3.58 96 __ 1974 Suwon 3 11 3.70 4.37 118 3 7 1 5 Iri 3 12 4.43 3.88 88 2 7 1 9 Milyang 3 13 3.75 4.25 113 2 7 1 6 Ave. 3.96 4.17 105 1977 Suwon 3 7 3.96 2.37 60 3 3 1 4 Iri 3 7 4.52 4.40 97 2 4 1 7 Milyang 3 7 4.31 4.50 104 2 6 1 6 Ave. 4.26 3.76 88 1980 Suwon 3 13 5.36 3.38 63 3 5 1 8 Iri 3 11 4.10 4.33 106 3 9 1 6 Milyang 3 14 4.43 4.48 101 3 12 1 7 Ave. 4.63 4.06 88



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F. Social Returns to Agricultural Research and Extension by Kwan S. Kim G. Research and Extension: The Integration of Inquiry and Guidance by David I. Steinberg H. Agriculture in Cheju Province by Robert I. Jackson and Kwan S. Kim I. Project-Specific Data J. Socioeconomic Statistics K. Bibliography L. Photographs M. Notes on the Authors



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-20 be attained with only a modest contribution from the project itself. Project targets calling for heightened crop responsiveness to fertilizer consumption seem inappropriate in light of the petroleum crisis of 1973 and the increase in prices and Korean import requirements. Rather, increased yields with less fertilizer or attention to green manure crops might have been a more logical goal. The responsiveness of the Office of Rural Development to national and thus political goals of heightened rice production was both its strength and weakness. It moved with alacrity against the advice of some researchers, to expand the Tongil varieties to satisfy bureaucratic requirements in the Korean hierarchical political culture. The choice of the name "Tongil" ("unification") is indicative of its political importance. It reacted too quickly, however, especially in light of the knowledge that cold weather can potentially damage Tongil rice and new races of blast fungus normally develop after a few years if a single strain is spread too extensively. It would have been more prudent to release Tongil gradually, supplementing it with other new and traditional varieties whose production also could be increased because of technological innovations and improved cultivation. This approach in the long-term might have been more successful, but the command system of the Korean Government demanding short-term gains and statistical manipulation to reach a political objective was given priority over longer-term research and production needs. It might have been possible to avoid the decrease in rice production in 1979 due to blast and to mitigate the disastrous fall in rice yields in 1980 had the researchers been able to control dissemination and diversify production. Thus, the strengths of the Korean agricultural research and guidance system, its integration and political importance, proved also to be its elemental weakness. V. LESSONS LEARNED The Korean experience in rural development may be close to unique for there are few, if any, countries that are able to mobilize the variety and quality of resources that are required for the rural sector to prosper and agricultural research projects to succeed. Yet if Korea cannot be readily emulated and its agricultural research and rural development model exported, as are so many Korean manufactured products, there are generalizations that can be drawn from the Korean experience. A. A successful agricultural research program requires a major national commitment. This commitment not only takes the form of allocation of public resources for the support of the project; it also includes that indistinct quality that is sometimes referred to as political will. A successful adaptive research program requires an understanding that such research is a matter of high national policy. Thus it requires normally more than single-line support by a ministry of agriculture, but should involve other relevant cabinet level officials. The corollary to this lesson is:



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Table 1-8. Name and Present Position of Participants Trained Under CIRC Project Attended Name University Present Position Field 1. Ph.D Course Lee, Seung Chan University of Louisiana Agriculture Sciences Institute Rice Insect Hong, Byung Hee Washington State University Wheat & Barley Research Institute Wheat Breeding Cho, Eui Kyoo University of Illinois Agriculture Sciences Institute Soybean Insect Chang, Suk Hwan Cornell University Int'l. Cooperation Division, ORD Biological Statistics Lee, Young In University of Illinois Agriculture Mechanization Inst. Soybean Insect Lee, Yong Kook Kansas State University " Farm Machinery Kwun, Soon Kuk Ohio State University Professor, Seoul National Univ. Land Development Kim, Yong Wook University of Missouri Crops Experiment Station Soybean Physiology Kim, Soon Chul IRRI Yeongnam Crops Experiment Station Weed Control Jung, Young Sang Ohio State University Agriculture Sciences Institute Soil Mangement 01 Kang, Yong Gir University of Arkansas Crops Experiment Station Rice Lee, Moon Hong University of Minnesota Agriculture Sciences Institute Potato Insect Woo, Ki Dae University of Missouri " Insectology Mok, Ii Jin University of Wisconsin Horticulture Experiment Station Potato Breeding Chung, Moo Nam University of Missouri Wheat and Barley Research Inst. Agricultural Economics Seo, Wan Soo " Farm Management Bureau, ORD Cho, Jeong Tae* Washington State University Horticulture Experiment Station Potato No, Yong Duk University of Wisconsin Crops Experiment Station Rice Physiology Eun, Moo Young University of Louisiana Honam Crops Experiment Station " Moon, Hun Pal University of California Crops Experiment Station Rice Breeding Lee, Yong Seok University of Vermont (Deceased in 1980) Soil Chemistry Total 21 persons 7 persons are still studying in the U..S.



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-4 Very specific yield targets were established both for the experimental stations and the farms (See Table 1). Crop improvement goals were also stated in the project paper (See Appendices C & D). The project was conceived as having three components: foreign advisory services, both long and short-term; short and long-term training, the latter including 19 M.S. and 13 Ph.D. trainees; and equipment, covering field, experimental, and library commodities including books and journals. About 46 percent of the $5.0 million loan was for technical assistance, 24 percent for training, and 30 percent for commodities. The terminal date of disbursement was set for July 28, 1979, but was later extended to September 30, 1981. Seven trainees remained abroad after 1980 to complete their training. Table I. Project Paper Baseline Data and Targets Putative Target Yields Yields Putative Target Crop 1972-73 1983 Yields Yields Experiment Experiment 1972-73 1983 Stations Stations Farms Farms Rice 4.79 6.0 3.25 4.5 Barley 2.79 3.6 2.04 3.5 Wheat 4.30 5* 2 2.24 4.0 Soybeans 1.98 3.2 1 0.8 1.3 Potatoes No yield targets I specified. III. PROJECTS IMPACTS: FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS A. The Project's Role in the Agricultural Research System Korea has a long history of agricultural research. The earliest official agricultural demonstration station was established in 1906, and experimental improvements in rice were conducted throughout the Japanese colonial period. Critical to the development of an agricultural research system was the 1962 reorganization that established the Office of Rural Development (ORD) with AID support, and began the process of organizing branch offices in selected guns (counties). By 1975, ORD offices were in every county throughout the country. The guidance system thus had spread widely in rural areas before project implementation was initiated and was completed shortly after it was approved. The research establishment was effective, but limited in the scope of its activities, before the project began. The project did not alter or institutionally reform the existing structure, for it was already well organized.



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j-7 Table J-6. Budget for Research and Extension Work of Office of Rural Development by Year unit: 1,000 Local Fund Year National Fund Provincial Total 1,000$ won/$ Research Extension & County 1962 136,323 187,275 323,598 2,489 130 1963 177,923 212,751 -390,674 3,005 130 1964 184,448 282,606 247,409 714,463 2.803 255 1965 324,748 283,895 305,100 913,743 3,372 271 1966 528,832 227,815 457,987 1,214,634 4,499 270 1967 509,571 311,700 625,426 1,446,697 5,280 274 1968 620,375 437,745 672,698 1,730,818 6,160 281 1969 914,237 538,919 1,140,927 2,594,083 8,533 304 1970 1,012,485 568,966 1,208,332 2,789,783 8,828 316 1971 1,381,973 797,420 1,897,400 4,076,793 110,930 373 1972 1,469,610 1,011,238 2,107,654 4,588,502 11,500 399 1973 1,321,294 1,032,938 22-138,950 4,493,182 11,289 398 1974 1,474,419 1,602,213 2,754,709 5,831,341 12,048 484 1975 2,279,655 2,525,916 3,147,050 7,979,621 16,489 484 1976 2,972,902 3,563,581 4,042,487 10,578,970 21,857 484 1977 3,106,374 1,948,954 5,649,819 10,705,147 22,118 484 1978 3,430,731 2,386,793 7,920,676 13,738,200 28,385 484 1979 4,300,799 2,633,042 8,263,689 15,197,530 31,400 484 1980 5,239,735 3,061,089 11,527,000 19,827,824 30,088 659 TOTAL 31,386,434 23,614,856 54,134,313 109,135,603 241,070 At county, level all funds are for extension; at the provincial level a small amount is funded.



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K-2 Aqua, Ronald. Local Institutions and Rural Development in South Korea. Ithaca: Cornell University. Special Series on Rural Local Government, Center for International Studies, 1974. Ban, Sung Hwan; Moon,Pal Yong; Perkins, Dwight M. Rural Development Studies in the Modernization of the Republic of Korea. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980. Brown, Gilbert T. Korean Pricing Policies and Economic Development in the 1960s. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973. Coombs, Philip H. Attacking Rural Poverty. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977. Evenson, R.E., and Y. KisLev, 1975. Agricultural Research and Productivity. New Haven: Yale University Press. Hopkins, Raymond FPuchala, Donald J, and Talbot, Ross B. Food, Politics, and Agricultural Development: Case Studies in the Public Policy of Rural Modernization. Boulder: Westview Press, 1979. Kim, In Hwan. The Green Revolution in Korea. Seoul: Seoul Association for Potash Research, 1978. Kuznets, Paul W. Economic Growth and Structure in the Republic of Korea. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977.. Mosher, A.T. Getting Agriculture Moving. New York: The.Agricultural Development Council Inc., 1966. The Rockefeller Foundation. Changing Roles of Women in Industrial Societies. New York: The Rockfeller Foundation, 1977. Wade, L.L, and Kim, B.S. Economic Development of South Korea, The Political Economy of Success. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1978. C. Monographs and Articles Akino, M and Y. Hayami, "Efficiency and Equity in Public Research: Rice Breeding in Japan's Economic Development", American Journal of Agricultural Economics. 57: (1975): 1-10. Barker, R., and Y. Hayami. 1976. "Price Support Versus Input Subsidy for Food Self-Sufficiency in Developing Countries," American Journal of Agricultural Economics. 58: 617-628



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E-3 Unlike the case of rice, however, there has been no adequate government price support for barley at least at a level that could ensure a comfortable profit margin to the farmers. For example, according to a recently announced pricing scheme for 1981, the margin between the government purchase price and the production cost of barley (excluding the implicit costs) was 2,531 won per bag. This implies an operating profit" rate of some 9 percent in barley production. Consequently, barley has been grown only as a marginally important, winter-crop revenue source by farmers whose "opportunity" incomes during the idle season are insignificant. Like white potatoes, barley is an inferior good; as farmers' real incomes rise, its consumption tends to decrease as consumers substitute rice for barley. Thus, over the years, the Government of Korea has accumulated sizeable quantities of barley in storage. The barley-growers have generally been apprehensive of the possibility of sudden reductions in the government purchase of barley. The government's purchase decision is, as a rule, announced at the time of the harvest. Soybeans yielded positive profits in 1977, but resulted in negative "economic profit" in 1980. Like white potatoes, the area planted in soybeans has somewhat declined since 1977. 4. Government Policies It must be emphasized that in addition to per hectare yields and related production conditions, another major determinant of profitability in crop production is the government's pricing and purchase policies. The Korean Government instituted in 1969 a two-tier pricing system consisting of government purchase prices at the farm gate and selling prices to urban dwellers for rice and barley. The consumer price has since averaged twice that of imported rice. In an effort to subsidize farm producers, the government has also kept the purchase price of rice far above the consumer cost. As a result, in each year since 1968, the government has incurred deficits in the general account by issuing overdrafts on the central bank, which has of course added to the inflationary pressure in the economy. In the case of barley, the Government, in spite of relatively unattractive farm gate prices offered the farmers, has also provided a substantial subsidy to the growers by keeping consumer prices low. The economic implication of farm pricing policies in Korea is significant. If the social profitability of rice (and barley, of course) is to be calculated in terms of its accounting prices (international market prices), it would be unprofitable to grow rice and barley from the society's point of view. It is clear, however, that the farm price support policy in Korea seeks achievement of the political objective of self-sufficiency, and not that of achieving resource-allocation efficiency. A related issue concerning the farm support policy is the timing of the government's decisions for purchase quota and prices. The decisions are as a rule announced around the time of the grain barvest for the produce that has already been harvested or is going to be harvested. The uncertainty and risk caused by the government delay in action has additionally lowered the farmer incentives to grow barley as a winter crop.



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APPENDIX B THE TEAM'S ITINERARY May 21 evening: Arrival in Seoul. May 22 morning: Visit to Embassy, arrange logistics for study. afternoon: Courtesy call to the Office of Rural Development, Suwon, Kyonggi Province. lMay 23 Field Visit to Kwangju gun, Kyonggi Province, to interview farmers. May 24 Field Visit to Yangju gun, Kyonggi Province, to interview farmers. May 25 Field Visit to Office of Rural Development, Suwon, Kyonggi Province. May 26 "i i i i I" i I it May 27 " " "t i i i May 28 Field Visit to Chunchon, Kangwon Province, Cold Water Tolerance Experimental Station; Provincial Office of Rural Development, Kangwon Province; Heong Song gun, Kangwon Province, to interview farmers. May 29 Field Trip to Iri, North Cholla Province, Honam Crop Experimental Station, to interview farmers. May 30 Provincial Office of Rural Development, Kwangju, South Cholla Province, and Mokpo, to interview farmers. May 31 Chungmu, South Kyongsang Province, and Pusan, to interview farmers. June 1 Miryang Crop Experimental Station, South Kyongsang Province, to interview farmers. June 2 Taegu, North Kyongsang Province, Office of Rural Development, to Kyongju, North Kyongsang Province, to interview farmers. June 3 Kyongju, North Kyongju, North Kyongsang Province, to interview farmers. June 4 Yeongduk Crop Experimental Station, North Kyongsang Province, to interview farmers in mountainous areas. June 5 Samchoek, Kangwon Province, to interview farmers in farming and fishing village. June 6 Kangnung, and Chinbu Alpine Crop Experiment Station, Kangwon Province. June 7 to 13 Seoul--Report Drafting



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-5 The project, therefore, supplemented an established and effective research program. It provided, however, an impetus to an expanded program within a national policy framework that fostered ehe effective use of research. This project did not establish collaborative links between ORD and the Korean academic community; these had been inaugurated by presidential decree in 1971. The project did, however, begin the concept of multidisciplinary teams to work on the five priority areas of research. This was in part an innovation, although the teams have worked more to mobilize talent as needed rather than as a continuous, integrated multidisciplinary effort. The concept was not without problems, however, since in a hierarchical society such as Korea, rank and status control discussion and dissent, and position often seems more important than substance. The multidisciplinary teams became operational during the life of the project and although these early problems are now less acute, it is doubtful at this writing that the teams are as cohesive as they were at the time they were established. There was universal agreement among Korean academicians and administrators and on the AID evaluation team that the most successful aspect of the project was the training component. Although Korea had a corps of skilled manpower, it was spread very thinly, and the project significantly enhanced the capacity of ORD to engage in research. After approval of the project, the training component was expanded, and resident expatriate assistance truncated. In the end $ 21 Ph.D. and 17 M.S. students were trained under the project, and an additional 94 received short-term training; a total of 106 participated in observation tours and conferences. There were two major problems connected with the training and subsequent employment of trainees. The first was the adequacy of English language skills prior to overseas training. In spite of later Peace Corps assistance, the level of English caused delays in sending out trainees, thus requiring an extension of the terminal date of disbursement of the loan. ORD had responsibility for placing trainees at U.S. institutions, which created minor delays, while the International Institute of Education administered the participants' allowances. Of more significance for the future are the changes in wage differentials between the ORD and the academic community. In the 1960s, academicians' salaries were low relative to those of civil servants. Partly in an effort to prevent student demonstrations, academic salaries were gradually raised and supplemented with research bonuses and other emoluments so that there is a highly relevant difference today between academic and ORD salaries. To retain trainees, a three-year commitment to ORD was required for each long-term participant, and to date one trainee has refunded the costs of the training to take an academic position. As the three-year commitment comes to an end, pressures to leave are building up and there may be an exodus of skilled manpower from ORD to the universities. Although those who leave may not be completely lost to ORD,



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APPENDIX A METHODOLOGY The technique for the rapid rural appraisal of a nationally focused project must, by its nature, differ from one that is site-specific in scope. Given this approach, the problem of a statistically reliable sampling of a national project cannot be solved within the time and funds available. A number of site visits that differ by region, province, accessibility, climatic conditions, crop mix, and socioeconomic status of inhabitants, yield fascinating but anecdotal information; a valid sampling technique is not possible. The problem is further complicated because sole focus on the project objectives raises more issues than it solves. The project suffered from spurious specificity: objectives of specific crop yields per hectare on experimental farms. This objective was inappropriate, because for all crops there is such diversityof testing of dozens or even hundreds of varieties that an "average" yield, however defined (and this was never done), is meaningless. In some cases (wheat and barley) the research objective on improved yields on these crops was not really paramount. It had basically been improved before the project began. What was more important was the breeding and testing of early maturing strains combined with resistance to lodging, wetness, and disease. Whatever the project objectives in agricultural research, whether institution-building or yield improvement, the critical methodological, intellectual, and practical problems are in making the link between production in a research setting in the laboratory or on the experimental farm and that which is taking place in the farmers' fields. In Korea, the transformation of research results into practical farm production and increases in income is a product of the "guidance" system, the extension service. Both research and guidance are functions of the Office of Rural Development. Although the project only marginally mentioned average farm yields, the inescapable conclusion from early project information available in Washington was that this issue should be central to the evaluation, and therefore considerable time should be spent in determining the effectiveness of the guidance system. The team thus determined that the evaluation should consist of gathering four levels of data recording the sequence from national policy to the farm level: National information on crops, yields, incomes and expenditures together with relevant data on macroeconomic statistics related to agriculture; grain pricing and procurement policies, emDloyment, imports and exports, etc.; Experimental station crop and research results at the key stations throughout the country engaged in efforts related to the loan;



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J-6 Table J-4. National Agriculture Inputs and Credit Items 1977 1978 1979 1980 Seed Paddy --1,039 2,035 (M/T) Barley 106 1,144 712 447 (Supplied by Seed Soybean 130 299 508 465 Supply Office under Potato 4,513 898 3,414 884 Ministry of Agric. Corn --249 412 & Fisheries) Fertilizer (1,000 M/T) 780 916 914 910 Herbicide (M/T) 3,721 4,581 5,304 6,350 Chemicals (M/T) Fungicide 4,987 6,085 7,903 10,789 Insecticide 14,647 15,761 11,207 11,973 Agric. Credit Funds* 356.8 519.9 633.8 (billion won) Interest rates Are subsided at 12 percent. If not repaid the same year. interest rates are 24 percent. Table J-5. Dissemination of Rice HYV CultivatHYV Yield per ha Increase in Year ed Area Area HYV Ordinary Increment A/B Nat'l. Production (A) (B) average Amount Value 1,000ha 1,000ha M/T M/T M/T % M/T 1,00OM/T billion won 1972 1,191 188 3.96 3.21 0.65 123 3.34 122 15.1 1973 1,182 121 4.81 3.50 1.31 137 3.58 159 22.6 1974 1,204 181 4.73 3.53 1.20 134 3.71 217 42.8 1975 1,218 274 5.03 3.51 1.52 143 3.86 417 101.5 1976 1,215 533 4.79 3.96 0.83 121 4.33 443 128.3 1977 1,230 660 5.53 4.23 1.30 131 4.99 858 281.7 1978 1,230 929 4.86 4.35 0.51 112 4.74 474 177.7 1979 1,233 744 4.63 4.37 0.26 106 4.53 194 88.5 Total 2,884 858



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117 Table 1-9. Current Status and Utilization of Equipment Procurred by Crop Improvement Research Center Project. (Items by Institutes) Total Different Number of Amount Institutes Items Items Crops Experiment Station 135 195 186,166.22 Honam Crops Experiment Station 48 59 58,485.49 Yeongnam Crops Experiment Station 53 75 61,512.00 Wheat & Barley Research Institute 50 73 141,498.36 Agricultural Sciences Institute 49 96 170,650.64 Horticultural Experiment Station 15 20 17,055.09 Farm Machinery Research Institute 14 16 133,725.02 Alpine Experiment Station 16 27 22,306.25 Jeju Experiment Station 4 4 7,527.00 Computer Room 2 15 247,657.00 Central Laboratory 112 320 417,200.54 Library 16 19 65,815.31 Provincial Office of Rural Development 4 27 149,866.77 Total 518 946 1,679,465.70



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0~/ 37/ A.I.D. Project Impact Evaluation No. 27 Korean Agricultural Research: The Integration of Research and Extension Lii CDL_ ]7-7 l 'G[IzZ7 U0 0 January 1982 U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) PN-AAJ-606



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F-3 Figure 1. The Rice Market in Korea (per H. Park) 1. W UTY!



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C3 13. Improvements in Farming Technology The most obvious benefit from the cultivation of Tongil was the increase in productivity for the three years after its introduction. The area planted to rice remained practically constant during these years, and the total production significantly increased by about one-third (See Table C-2, p. C-7). Undoubtedly, the adoption of the new cultural practices was just as important, if not more so, in attaining self-sufficiency in rice as the planting of Tongil. This improved technology has been used more recently in the cultivation of the traditionally grown rice and has resulted in a very significant increase in productivity. -Farmers became aware of the advantage of high quality seed with the introduction of Tongil. This seed was produced by ORD, which took the necessary steps to ensure that the rice was purer and higher in germination than that usually planted by farmers. In addition to accelerating the selection program of growing alternate generations at IRRI and in Korea, seed was multiplied in the Philippines and flown to Korea for distribution to selected farmers. This seed multiplication program shortened the program by one year and Korea became self-sufficient in rice one year earlier. The Philippine seed was planted on farms throughout the country as demonstration trials. The extension workers were provided opportunities to observe the adaptability of Tongil under various local conditions and at the same time were able to hold training sessions on cultural practices at the demonstration sites. These trials were also used as multiplication plots and seed was harvested for the following year for distribution to an increased number of farmers. -Tongil requires earlier planting in the seed beds than the traditional varieties at times when the temperatures are lower. To protect it from the cold weather at sowing required the use of improved beds covered with plastic (See Tables C-3 and C-4, p. C-8). -Virgin soil, lime and silicate fertilizers were more frequently applied by farmers planting Tongil. They also did a better job of preparing their fields by plowing more times prior to transplanting the rice seedlings (See Table G-5, p. C-8). -An advantage of Tongil is its ability to withstand heavier rates of fertilizer application without lodging and thus be more productive. Tongil farmers' soils were tested and rates of fertilizer determined for optimum yields. The method of applying fertilizer was changed; in addition to the basal application at the time of transplanting, the number of applications of top dressing was increased from about two times with the traditional varieties to three times with Tongil. The fertilizers were applied with more systematic methods.



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APPENDIX M NOTES ON THE AUTHORS Kwan S. Kim Dr. Kim is currently a visiting economist with the Office of Economic Affairs, Bureau of Program and Policy Coordination, AID, on leave under the Intergovernmental Personnel Act from the University of Notre Dame where he is an Associate Professor of Economics. He is a graduate of Seoul National University and received his M.A. in Political Science and his Ph.D in Economics from the University of Minnesota. He was a Rockefeller Foundation visiting professor at the University of Nairobi and the University of Dar es Salaam, each on a two-year tour. He has been awarded numerous research grants for economic studies of various developing countries, has presented papers to professional societies, and has published monographs and numerous articles in professional journals. Recently, he edited Papers on the Political Economy of Tanzania. Robert I. Jackson Dr. Jackson is a senior agronomist with AID's Bureau for Science and Technology, Office of Agriculture. He has served overseas for more than 25 years. His first assignment was to Indonesia as a hybrid corn and rice breeder, followed by Sudan as an agronomist working on seed production/processing and the production of kenaf, sorghum and peanuts. He then went to Ghana as the Food and Agriculture Officer. From there he returned to Indonesia as the Representative/Team Leader for the International Rice Research institute. ,Dr. Jackson was educated at the University of Chicago and Cornell University. He has published technical articles on corn, rice, kenaf, and seed production. Song Hae-kyun Dr. Song Hae-kyun is Chairman and Professor of the Department of Agricultural and Extension Education, College of Agriculture, Seoul National University, and is concurrently a Senior Rural Guidance Officer with the Office of Rural Development. After graduating from Chungbuk National University, he received his M.S. degree in Agricultural Education from Oklahoma State University and his Ph.D in the same subject from the University of Illinois. He is also a member of the Educational Policy Advisory Board of the Ministry of Education as well as Director of the Agricultural Textbook Research and Development Board. Dr. Song is President of the Society of Korea Agricultural Education and is the author and editor of a number of works in Korean. David I. Steinberg Mr. Steinberg is with the Office of Evaluation, Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination, AID, and was formerly Director of the Office of Technical Support, Asia and Near East Bureaus. Educated at Dartmouth College and Lingnan University (Canton), he has an M.A. from Harvard



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F-2 incomes using an appropriate discount rate (0.05 in Park's study). Briefly, the model used for estimating the rate of return was originally developed by Z. Griliches in which: Social Rate of Return = Perpetual flow of returns (PFR) Cumulated R&E expenditures up to 1977 (CREE)= Interest income on cumulated past returns (ICPR) + Future annual return (FAR) Cumulated R&E expenditures (CREE).2/ The term CREE represents a sum of past R&E annual expenditures, where each past year's real expenditures are converted to the present value of 1977. In a similar manner, cumulated past returns can be calculated as a sum of previous annual returns from R&E investments. ICPR simply expresses future interest income on these cumulated past returns. FAR represents the projected yearly return in a perpetual stream of future returns from CREE. Under the assumption of perfect foresight, yearly future return is assumed as equal to the 1977 return. PFR thus consist of two sources, ICPR and FAR. The annual returns from R&E expenditures for developing and disseminating Tongil rice were calculated by estimating hypothetical losses in income, which would occur had the new varieties not been introduced on the farm fields. For this, the author employed a supply and demand framework as shown in Figure 1. He then assumed perfect elasticities in rice supply, i.e., that rice can be produced in Korea at a constant cost at OP in the diagram. Introduction of the new technology could then be seen as a shifting downward of the supply schedule from SS to S'S'. Then the hypothetical losses in income without the introduction of the improved varieties can be shown equal to the net losses in the consumer surplus identified by the shaded areaPBBP'. The consequences of dynamic changes in the proportion of the area cultivated for Tongil rice were carefully worked out in a formula used for calculating net losses in income. Based on an estimate given in the KASS study, he assumed a rice demand elasticity of -0.4 for Korea.3/ The economic (social) rate of return on R&E expenditures for Tongil rice was calculated by the author at 1200 percent. That is, from the vantage point of 1977, each one won worth of investment in Tongil rice development generated 12 won worth of return from the society's point of view. Although other studies show that the economic rate of return 2/ Z. Griliches, "Research Costs and Social Returns: Hybrid Corn And Related Innovation," Journal of Political Economy, October 1958. 3/ See Park, K. H., ibid, pp 26-40.



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C5 D. Economic Benefits Associated with Tongil The assets of those farmers planting Tongil increased more than those who continued planting traditional rice without any changes in technology. Their farm size, number of farm buildings, power tillers, power sprayers and mechanically driven threshers have all increased more rapidly than those of the non-cultivators of Tongil. Even their holdings of farm livestock have increased. Prior to the introduction of Tongil, the government purchased a limited quantity of rice shortly after harvest for storage and to stabilize the price. Since the government's purchasing price was lower than that of the free market, farmers refused to sell their rice at the time of harvest. However, with the introduction of Tongil, the farmers sold their rice to the government soon after threshing and it was able to meet its goal. E. Cooperation with IRRI At the end of 1968, a cooperative agreement between IRRI and Korea (ORD) was signed. This provided for training Korean scientists at IRRI, five the first and subsequent few years. Koreans were to be trained in several of the agricultural disciplines, including breeding, soil chemistry, soil microbiology, weed control, disease and insect control, and rice quality. Along with training, it was agreed to continue the cooperative varietal improvement program. One 6f the targets of this program was to increase the number of generations of hybrids in the breeding program to two each year by growing a summer crop in Korea and the second one during the winter months in the Philippines at IRRI. This combination led to a cooperative training and research program. In a similar manner to the varietal improvement program, seeds of any newly released varieties were increased in the Philippines during the Korean winter months. This enabled the ORD to accelerate its dissemination of new varieties to the farmers. From the release of Tongil to present, several hundred tons of rice seed have been multiplied at IRRI and airfreighted to Korea for distribution to farmers. Much credit is given to IRRI for the strategy involving a three-way cross between indica and japonica types to produce high-yielding varieties (HYV). Tongil was the first HYV released in Korea. In close collaboration with the Korean agricultural universities and IRRI, ORD made excellent use of their facilities and technical information in developing the new HYVs. This has had a very unifying effect between IRRI and Korea. F. Project Targets Average yields from rice grown on experiment station plots provide little, if any, meaningful data. There are many strains, selections and! or varieties cultivated under various conditions. Thus to make a valid comparison of the experimental yields at several stations, or even one



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Table 1-8 (continued) Attended Name University Present Position Field 2. M.S. Course Choi, Eui Kyoo University of Illinois Agriculture Sciences Institute Soybean Disease Seong, Jae Mo University of Washington " Wheat Disease Jung, Pil Kyun University of Alkansas Soil Physics Jung, Dong Hee The University of Iowa Wheat & Barley Research Inst. Soil Chemistry Kim, Jang Kyu IRRI Agriculture Sciences Institute Botanical Pathology Hwang, Young Hyun University of Wisconsin Crops Experiment Station Soybean Pathology Park, Chang Seo University of New Mexico Agriculture Sciences Institute Soil Physics Chun, Jong Eun University of Washington Jeonbuk Province, ORD Wheat Breeding Jeong, Gil Woong University of Illinois Dankuk University Soybean Breeding Han, Young Ii University of Wisconsin Alpine Experiment Station Potato Disease Kwak, Tae Soon IRRI Crops Experiment Station Rice Breeding Han, Hwang Gi University of Oregon Kangwon Province, ORD Wheat Cho, Wang Soo University of Colorado Agriculture Sciences Institute Insect Control Sung, Lak Choon University of Missouri Crops Experiment Station Cropping Rotation Lee, Seok Soon University of New Hampshire Professor, Yeongnam University Rice Physiology Choi, Byung Hwan University of Oregon Studying towards Ph.D Wheat Oh, Nam Hwan University of Kansas if Wheat Breeding Total 17 persons 3. Short-term Training 1974 2 persons Han, Byung Hee Alpine Experiment Station Potato Kang, Eung Hee " " 1976 5 persons Park, Kun Yong Crops Experiment Station Soybean Huh, Han Soon Research Bureau, ORD Wheat An, Soo Bong Crops Experiment Station Rice Lee, Jae Chang Chungnam National University Cropping Park, Jung Yun Agriculture Sciences Institute Wheat



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Colo



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J-4 Table J-2. Production, Cultivated Area, and Imports of Main Food Crops Milled Year Items Unit Rice Barley Wheat Soybean Potato 1977 Production 1000M/T 6,006 862 44.7 318.7 558 Area 100ha 1,230 545.6 26.5 250.6 50 Yield kg/ha 4,880 1,580 1,680 1,270 11,300 Import 1000M/T -322 1,979 151 1978 Production 100OM/T 5,797 1,388 35.7 292.8 304 Area 1000ha 1,230 575.4 17.1 246.9 30 Yield kg/ha 4,710 2,410 2,090 1,190 7,820 Import 100OM/T -1,587 223 1979 Production 100OM/T 5,565 1,555.5 42.0 257.1 356 Area 1000ha 1,233 489.1 13.1 207.3 34 Yield kg/ha 4,510 3,180 3,210 1,240 10,580 Import 100OM/T 520 -1,652 422 1980 Production 100OM/T 3,557 905.9 92.0 216.3 446 Area 1000ha 1,233 360.4 27.7 188.4 37 Yield kg/ha 288 2,510 330.0 1,150 11,930 Import 100OM/T 576 -2,000 576



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Table 1-8 (continued) Name Present Position Field 1977 12 persons Oh, Yang Ho Honam Crops Experiment Station Wheat Han, Wook Dong Research Bureau, ORD Tropical Agriculture Chung, Young Sang Agriculture Sciences Institute " Kim, Ho II Crops Experiment Station Soybean Chu, Yeon Dae Gyeongbuk Province, ORD Seed Improvement Cho, Jeong Ik Agriculture Sciences Institute Rice Yun, Sang Bog Crop Improvement Research Center, ORD Checking AID Project (CIRC) Kang, Yang Soon Yeongnam Crops Experiment Station Nitrogen No, Nong Ju Research Bureau, ORD Library Information Kim, Kang Kwon Horticulture Experiment Station Potato Kim, Sun Kyung Research Bureau, ORD Mun, Myung Gui Crops Experiment Station Corn 1978 46 persons Kim, Kwang Ho Crops Experiment Station Rice Breeding Jang, Chang Moon Agriculture Sciences Institute Wheat Kim, Sung Pil Crop Improvement Research Center, ORD Lee, Dong Chang Crops Experiment Station Moon, Yun Ho Yeongnam Crops Experiment Station Crops Analysis Lee, Jin Sook Crop Improvement Research Center, ORD Analysis Method Song, Yung Nam Kangwon National University Wheat Lee, Bong lHo Yeongnam Crops Experiment Station Barley Oh, Yun Seop Honam Crops Experiment Station Han, Weon Sik Farm Management Bureau, ORD Computer Kim, Jae Hyuk Secretary, Deputy Director-General, ORD Wheat Kim, Kil Woong Geyongbuk National University Weed Control Han, Dae Seong Kangweon National University Rice Yuh, Han Joon Geyongnam Province, ORD Yuh, In Soo Wheat and Barley Research Institute Wheat Lee, Eun Sup " Soybean Seong, Il Jang Horticulture Experiment Station Potato



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Table 1-8 (continued) Name Present Position Field 1979 (Cont'd) Ryu, Kyung Io Prime Minister's Office Observation Kim, Dal Joong Chungnam Province, ORD Song, Chun Jong Jeonnam Province, ORD Lee, Yong Seok (Deceased) Choi, Choong Hak Rural Nutrition Institute, ORD Huh, Il Bum Rural Guidance Bureau, ORD Yuh, lHae Un Technical Dissemination Bureau, ORD Kang, Yong Sik Jeonnam Younglewang Gun, ORD Cho, Kwang Hoon Gyeonggi Province, ORD Park, No Kyung Chungnam Province, ORD Yuh, Young Pyo Jeonnam Province, ORD Hwang, Pil Saeng Gyeongnam Province, ORD Kim, Young Hwui Jeju Province, ORD Lee, Weon Woo Kangwon Province, ORD Koo, Kang Hui Research Bureau, ORD Lee, Dong Woo Kangwon Province, ORD Jeong, In Myung Chungbug Province, ORD Park, Gun Ho Jeonbug Province, ORD Lee, Kwang Suk Gyeongbuk Province, ORD Ryu, Chang Jae Horticulture Experiment Station Hong, Chul Sun Research Bureau, ORD Chung, Joong Rae International Cooperation Division, ORD Han, Mak Maan Research Bureau, ORD Lee, Soo Kwan Yeongnam Crops Experiment Station So, Jae Don Honam Crops Experiment Station Ryu, Un Ha Farm Management Bureau, ORD Shin, Gun Sik Information Division, ORD Cha, Kwang Ro Wandogun Rural Guidance Office, Jeonnam Province Yun, In Hwa Farm Machinery Research Institute Ryu, Chang Hyun Agriculture Sciences Institute



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APPENDIX K BIBLIOGRAPHY (Excluding A.I.D. Sources) A. Government of the Republic of Korea Publications ORD, "Annual Research Report." Wheat and Barley Research Institute, December 1979 "Rural Development Program in Korea," 1981. "Wheat and Barley Research Institute." -"Guide the Honam Crops Experiment Station." "A.I.D. Loan. A Comprehensive Report on Crop Improvement Research," July 1979 --Agricultural Mechanization Research Institute. A Survey a Power Tiller Utilization in Korea, August 1980, -"Introducing The Horticultural Experiment Station" "Outline of the Institute of Agricultural Sciences" --Horticultural Experiment Station, "Vegetables in Korea" "Agricultural Research in Korea", 1969 --Park, Ki-hyeok,"Analysis of the Socioeconomic Consequences of Green Revolution in Korea",1977 (In Korean) -Crop Experimental Station, "1981 Important Work Plan." (In Korean). -Yoengnam Crop Experiment Station, "Research Outline for 1981." "Agricultural Research in Korea", 1970 "Income Accounts of Agriculture and Forestry", 1981 --"The Effectiveness of the Tongil Rice Diffusion in Korea", 1975 Shin Dong-wan, "The Korean Experience of the Agricultural Extension Work with Emphasis on Rice Production", 1981 B. Books Adelman, Irma, and Robinson, Sherman. Income Distribution Policy in Developing Countries. A Case Study of Korea. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1978.



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PHOTOGRAPHS The rice seedings on the upper left have already suffered damage from cold. Experimental station. Chunchon, Kangwon Province. 3A, Outside a school, the local authorities prepare a new rice seedbed with plastic protection in case the first crop fails because of drought. Plastic is used to conserve moisture and lessen weeding requirements for upland crops, such as pepper. Kangwon Province.



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1-3 Table 1-3. Rice Yield of Leading Varieties and Breeding Lines (1971-'80 Regional Yield Trials) No. of Varieties Yield (MT/ha) Leading Breeding Leading Breeding Yield Year Location Variety Line Variety Line Index 1971* Suwon 2 5 3.44 3.41 99 Iri 2 2 3.51 3.64 104 Milyang 2 2 3.05 3.08 101 Ave. --3.33 3.37 101 1974 Suwon 2 11 4.28 3.88 91 Iri 3 5 2.74 4.03 147 Milyang 4 3 1.84 3.93 213 Ave. --2.95 3.95 133 1977 Suwon 6 7 5.00 5.13 103 Iri 7 5 4.44 4.27 96 Milyang 7 3 3.80 4.21 111 Ave. --4.41 4.54 103 1980 Suwon 6 5 4.66 4.64 100 Iri 4 3 4.71 4.86 103 Milyang 3 5 4.17 3.83 92 Ave. --4.51 4.44 98 *These 1971 yield data are lower than that for Tongil as stated in other Korean publications.



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G-5 F. An Illustration : Kangwon Province To place this abstracted version of provincial and gun planning and implementation in perspective, it is instructive to examine the detailed plans for a single province and gun within that province for 1981. Kangwon Province is the mountainous area of northeast Korea, with three distinct climatic (and thus agricultural) zones. The slogan and goal of the province for 1981 is "to build the welfare of the rural areas through the green revolution." The policy for the province includes increasing rice yields and safeguarding production through dissemination of new agricultural techniques; spreading innovative cultivation techniques for upland crops; development of specialized production (sericulture, livestock, etc.), as well as cash crops; improving cooperative mechanized farming; expanding the Sae-maul Youth Movement; and making rural life more scientific. The province is composed of 2,240 villages for which there are 664 rural guidance workers and 27 researchers. There are 119,167 farm households in the province, or 32 percent of the total provincial households, with a population of 614, 343. About 91,157 (63 percent) of farmland is in paddy, and 56,630 hectares in upland (non-irrigated). The majority of the budget for the Provincial Office of Rural Development is derived from the province itself (51 percent), with 46 percent from the national account and an additional 3 percent from the sale of crop production by the office itself. Although rice hectarage has essentially remained constant since 1977, per hectare production has varied from 4.41 metric tons (MT) in 1977 to 4.16 MT in 1978, 3.65 MT in 1979, and a massive decrease in production to a low of 1.97 MT in 1980 because of cold weather. There is an anticipated production of 3.93 MT in 1981. The Tongil varieties of rice (high-yielding varieties) dropped from 40 percent of use to only 17 percent in 1981 because farmers fear the cold weather to which Tongil is susceptible. The province recommends varieties of rice and other crops by region and altitude, as well as the density of planting and fertilizer requirements. It specifies that pesticides should be applied about eight times, depending on crop and variety. It promotes demonstration plots in addition to experimental research. There are two such plots for rice in every village, the government guaranteeing income to the farmer if the demonstration plot fails. In addition there are 40 demonstration plots for soybeans, ten for potatoes, and five for barley and wheat. These demonstration plots provide a continuing and accessible example to all farmers of what their production might be if they follow the recommendations of the guidance workers. This system clearly demonstrates the national priority attached to rice production as both an economic and political goal. The plan also calls for the use of 4 million man days of farmer assistance through the military and youth organizations in order to assist in timely planting, transplanting, and harvesting. This is critical in a province plagued by rural labor shortages, and is also the impetus for increased mechanization, for in the colder climate double cropping is only



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C-7 Table C-I -Rice Production and Imports Self Sufficiency Year Production I Rate (1000 MT) (1000 XT) (Percent) 1970 4,090 541 93.1 1973 3,957 437 92.1 1974 4.211 206 90.8 1975 4,445 484 100.5 1976 5,215 157 102.9 1977 6,006 -108.6 1978 5,797 -103.8 1979 5,565 502 86.0 1980 3,550 580 88.8 Table C-2 -Area, Production and Productivity of Rice Percent Area Area (1000 ha) Production(1000 MT) Productivity(MTtha) Cultivated Year Traditional Tongil Traditional Tongil Traditional Tongil With Tongil 1970 1,203 -3,939 -3,37 1972 1,010 187 3,234 723 3,32 3,86 15.9 1974 1,023 181 3,589 856 3,69 4,73 15.2 1975 923 274 3,248 1,380 3,51 5,03 22.9 1976 663 533 2,626 2,553 3,96 4,79 43.9 1977 548 660 2,317 3,648 4,23 5,53 54.6 1978 290 929 1,263 4,516 4,35 4,86 76.2 1979 480 744 2,097 3,449 4,37 4,63 60.8 Source: Yearbook of Agriculture and Forestry Statistics, 1980



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A Mechnical transplanter in use. South Cholla Province. A farmer leads his cow to his field, while holding his plow. Note rice seedlings on background awaiting transplanting. An extension worker operates a day care center in a Sae-Maul village hall. South Kyongsang Province.



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G-2 gunsu, or county chief, is a requirement. C. The Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries Of primary importance in rural Korea is the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries (formerly the Ministry of Agricultural and Forestry). It has three main divisions that have impacts on the lives of farmers: the Office of Rural Development (ORD), the Agricultural Development Corporation (ADC), and the National Agricultural Cooperative Federation (NACF). The ADC is concerned with the development of irrigation systems, dams, and land reclamation. The National Agricultural Cooperative Federation is a governmental mechanism, misnamed a cooperative, for the provision of agricultural credit and other requirements such as seed, fertilizer, pesticides, and herbicides, as well as agricultural machinery. It is also the government arm for the purchase of crops at standard, centrally set prices and quantities. The NACF thus implements government policy on grain pricing and procurement but it is the Office of Rural Development (ORD) that encourages, trains, and provides the farmers with the means by which national targets can be achieved. The Office of Rural Development has three major functions: basic and adaptive agricultural research designed to assist in achieving nationally set production targets for priority crops; training, a program of such magnitude that there is hardly a farm family left untouched annually by this effort; and "extension." In Korean, the term "extension" is more aptly translated as "guidance," which describes both the philosophy of the system and its actual operation. The integration of research and guidance is perhaps not unique among developing countries, although it certainly is rare to the degree practiced in Korea. What may be unique, however, is an integration of both research and guidance with education. Fifteen years ago, Seoul National University's College of Agriculture, under the Ministry of Education and the Office of Rural Development under the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry had no working relationships, although located only a few hundred yards apart. Today, however, some staff at each institution hold joint appointments. The AID-supported agricult Ural research project did not initiate such relationships but did help strengthen them and bring into the research scene professors from other agricultural colleges. As interesting and effective, but perhaps as rare, is the integration of the agricultural high school at the gun level into the agricultural guidance system. There, teachers also hold joint appointments at the gun rural development office and training classes in the high schools use the same materials and machinery as those used by the extension workers. These extension workers train farmers in the schools during vacation periods. Students from the agricultural high schools usually join the guidance service, thus completing the link where they may once again come under the supervision of their former teachers. This results in effective means



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M2 University in Chinese Studies, and did further graduate work at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London. Mr. Steinberg has written extensively on Korea and Burma. He is the author of Korea: Nexus of East Asia, and translator of In this Earth and In that Wind: This is Korea. His volumes, Burma's Road Toward Development: Growth and Ideology Under Military Rule, and Burma: Profile of a Southeast Asian Socialist Nation will appear in 1981. For five years he was Representative of The Asia Foundation in Korea.



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Table 1-8 (continued) Name Present Position Field 1978 (Cont'd) Jeong, Kun Sik Crops Experiment Station Rice Cho, In Sang Agriculture Sciences Institute Soil Ryu, Kyung Han Research Bureau, ORD Research Management Hong, Eun Hee Crops Experiment Station Soybean Cha, Kwang Ro Wando Gun Rural Guidance Office, Junnam Province Agriculture Information Cho, Kyu Sun of o Kim, Hwee Cheon Horticulture Experiment Station Seed Improvement Chang, Seong Kun Kangwon Province, ORD o Song, Yu Han Retirement from ORD Computer Oh, Hyung Youl Agriculture Sciences Institute Soil Han, Sang Chan " Insect Maeng, Don Jae Wheat and Barley Research Institute Wheat Yun, Seong Ho Crops Experiment Station Weed Control Kim, Kyu Weon Crops Experiment Station Rice Kim, Byung Hyun Gyeongnam Province, ORD Soil Hee, Sang Seok Technical Dissemination Bureau, ORD Plant Protection Ryu, Jae Gi Agriculture Sciences Institute " Lee, In Jae International Cooperation Division, ORD Farm Management Choi, Bock Hyun Jeonnam National University Cropping System Shin, Kwan Chul Agriculture Sciences Institute Plant Protection So, Jae Sun Crops Improvement Research Institute, ORD " An, Wan Sik Wheat and Barley Research Institute Wheat Breeding Yun, Eui Byung "" Seo, Deuk Yong Yeongnam Crops Experiment Station " Chung, Tal Young Wheat and Barley Research Institute Barley Park, Young Sun Research Bureau, ORD Agriculture Research Ha, Yong Woong Wheat and Barley Research Institute Wheat Ko, 11 Woong Rural Guidance Bureau, ORD In the U.S. Lee, Soon Hyung Agriculture Sciences Institute SEM Use



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F-6 by OP, which is assumed lower than the selling price (The Government handling costs of rice storage and transaction are not included in this diagram. It is possible to show the situation of government deficits on rice accounts). Note that the world market price is OW, which is located below government purchase price OP. In the initial situation covering the period before 1975, the year Korea reached self-sufficiency in rice, imports of rice are indicated by quantity BC with a foreign exchange cost equal to the area of BHJC; domestic production is shown by quantity OB. The effect of introducing Tongil rice, plus effecting changes in other agricultural production conditions can be seen as resulting in self-sufficiency in rice. The net effect of this is shown in the diagram. There is no change in consumer surplus and the increase in producer surplus equals the area OKFE. The incidence of research benefits is shown to fall more on producers than on consumers. This finding contrasts with Park's analysis in which the benefits exclusively fall on consumers. Indeed, the available data indicate that the market price of rice has risen at a rate faster than that of government purchase price. There is no evidence for a drastic decrease in the consumer rice price following increased domestic yields in rice. More importantly, the real benefits of R&E expenditures did not lie so much in benefiting producers or consumers as in saving the cost of foreign exchange used for imports of rice. Our analysis clearly shows this. As a result of attaining self-sufficiency, the import saving is equal to BC in quantity and to the area BHJC in dollars. To summarize, although our analysis is qualitative in nature, there are two important findings that emerge from it: Producers (farmers), as compared with urban consumers, benefited more from the adoption of the improved agricultural technology. The critical factor contributing to this has been government pricing policy. The previous estimate of economic returns from rice research is unreliable. It failed to recognize the gains in producer surplus, and overestimated consumer gains. Moreover, it totally overlooked, perhaps, a much larger benefit in foreign exchange savings. Because the previous study ignored the differences in input uses between the two varieties, the estimate of the economic return on rice research in Korea is likely overstated. V. Further Suggestions Among other things, one important caveat in the preceding model must be noted. That is, our analysis has failed to separate net effects of R&E investment from those of other factors that collectively or independently cause a shift downward of the supply curve (see Figure 1). Clearly, some factors such as fertilizer and chemicals are complementary in input



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G-6 possible with a rapid turnaround of harvesting winter barley or vegetables and the transplanting of rice. A delay of even a few days could mean the failure of maturation of the critical rice crop. The Kangwon Provincial Office of Rural Development is attempting to raise farm household income to 3.3 million won ($4,500) in 1981. It achieved its objectives of 1.9 million won in 1978 and 2.4 million won in 1979, but fell short of its goal, reaching only 2.5 million won in 1980. These figures in current prices indicate some progress, but in constant won, accounting for inflation, the standard of living has dropped over the past several years. The training program is very widespread, and at least one member of every farm family receives training each year. Thus, during the nonproductive winter months, 3,200 leaders are trained, who in turn train the farmers, most for three days. Stress is on production, but other subjects are also covered. For example, there are 3,676 women' s clubs in the province, and about 20,000 women will be trained this year in increased use of barley in cooking (thus using up the barley production and saving rice), and 17,270 in home economics, including the use of home appliances and better clothing. There are 166 "nutrition improvement halls" that will help train wives to preserve 50,000 units of foodstuffs. Two mobile nutritional vans (supplied to each province by UNICEF) will visit 100 villages. There are 333 child care centers in the province and seven villages will be selected for new child nutritional programs. There are in addition 1,933 youth groups with 29,850 members and an additional 110 youth organizations for the 4,540 leader members of the Sae-maul Youth Movement. The detail is exhaustive. In Heong Sung gun in Kangwon Province, their plan specifies in detail the socioeconomic status of the 10,101 agricultural households (69 percent of all households in the gun) in 587 natural villages (112 legal villages--an unusual ratio because of the mountainous terrain). Since 61 percent of the land in the gun is upland, this poses special problems of production. The relative poverty of the population is reflected in land holdings: 19 percent own less than 0.5 hectares; 31 percent between 0.5 and 1.0 hectares, and 25 percent between 1.0 and 1.5 hectares. Only 10 percent have over two hectares. The plan specifies that radio will be used 48 times a year in improving agricultural production, and that the 152 village amplifier systems will broadcast a total of 604 times each month. Some 65,000 publications will also be distributed. There is a potential membership of 4,200 persons in the 13 to 29 age group eligible to join the Sae-maul program, of whom 1,293 are members. They plan to increase membership to 4,000 in 1981. G. Summary A successful agricultural research project is dependent on effective demonstration of research results. Three criteria for the successful integration of agricultural research and dissemination through extension thus exist in Korea:



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-18 highly mechanized farming methods, there is going to be the continued need for a government price support policy to attain self-sufficiency in rice and barley. Thus, this growing tension between attaining the goal of national self-sufficiency and that of economic efficiency will likely continue for many years. G. Sustaining and Replicating Agricultural Research Sustaining the agricultural research system in Korea will be subject to three basic stresses if economic conditions internally and abroad continue to cause concern to the Korean leadership. First, Government budgets are controlled by the Economic Planning Board (EPB) under the Deputy Prime Minister. A few economic rationalists in the EPB view rice and other grain production as uneconomic, for it is apparent Korea could import at least double the rice it produces for the same cost. More politically sophisticated views have prevailed and the rice support price, which politically would be difficult to lower, may keep rising, though more slowly than inflation, thus creating the illusion ot support without its actuality. Agricultural research budgets, the second stress, as well as civil service research salaries (the third stress) may not rise fast enough to prevent some exodus to academia. There is little doubt, however, that in spite of these potential problems the agricultural research program is well-established and will continue. AID did not create it and AID did not dramatically affect it, but AID did assist its growth. The agricultural research program does not need to be replicated in Korea. It already pervades the society. The question of replicability abroad poses different issues. Any agricultural research project should either be predicated upon, or have as components of the project, a variety of other elements without which it will either fail or prove to be an interesting, but essentially sterile, experiment. Most important is an effective extension service, but without pricing policies encouraging farmers, some rural infrastructure and communications, farm credit, and an overarching national policy encouraging agricultural research and its use, such a program is unlikely to succeed. It is fair to say that a similar project initiated in Korea in the mid-1950s probably would have failed. The Korean agricultural research model will be difficult to replicate in the Third World. IV. CONCLUSIONS The Office of Rural Development is the nexus of agricultural change in Korea. An efficient and pervasive governmental organization, it gains much of its effectiveness through its capacity to plan and execute agricultural research, its dissemination of experimental findings through a ubiquitous guidance (extension) system, training, cooperation with the Sae-maul Movement, and its links in both research and training to the academic community at all levels. Its organizational coordination of research and extension at the top of the bureaucracy gives it the capacity to guide rural change.



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ix South Korea National Capital N h 0 Cities -Major Roads K o r e a 0 25 50 75 Miles 3rcation Li 0 25 O Y5 Kilometers '7 Plaro-ho Ch'Orwo-n Munsan Ch'unch'on Kangnung Parhan-ni Inch on Sed I Samch'ok Woni (3-p, 15 Y ju Suwon Ansong Ch'ungju Ch'onane Ch'ongju Yongju E a s t e r n Hamch'ang Andong S e a Yongdok Taejon Y e I I o w Kimch'on P'ohang Iri S e a Chonju Kyongju Taegu Z.zz I Ulsan Miryang Kwangju 11 Chinju Masan Pusan Sunchon Sam Won I Mokp'o osu Yongdang C4 0 C::7 co a CZ7 0 40 Japan



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Table 1-8 (continued) Name Present Position Field 1978 14 persons Park, Ki Hyuk Yeonsi University Title 12 Ham, Young Ii Alpine Experiment Station Potato Kim, Young Sang Wheat and Barley Research Institute Wheat Bae, Seong Ho " " Min, Kyung Soo " Kim, Soon Kwon Crops Experiment Station Weed Control Lim, Moo Sang " Rice Chang, Kwon Youl Gyeong Sang University Agriculture Park, Chong Moon Governor, Kangwon Province Observation Hong, Soon Bum Horticulture Experiment Station Park, Tae Kyung " " Han, Ki Hak Agriculture Sciences Institute Shin, Dong Wan Farm Management Bureau, ORD Kim, Soon Kwon Crops Experiment Station Agriculture 1979 44 persons Ji, Sul Ha Livestock Bureau, Ministry of Agriculture Livestock and Fisheries Chung, Jae Hyuk Technical Dissemination Bureau, ORD Grass Development Lee, Chong Seok Horticulture Experiment Station Observation Kim, Duk Lae Kangwon Province, ORD Kim, Yeon Jin Chungnam Province, ORD Lee, Hong Lae Gyeongnam Province, ORD Koo, Young Seo Jeonbug Province, ORD An, Chang Soo Gyeonggi Province, ORD Um, Tae Young Tongyoung Gun, ORD Lee, Tae Seung Jeonbug Province, ORD Yang, Byung Hee " " Jin, Kyung Youl Gyeongbug Province, ORD) Kim, Chong Ho Crops Experiment Station Park, Kun Yong Research Bureau, ORD Soybean



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-6 as joint appointments are possible, the enhanced social prestige of academicians--an important factor in Korea--as well as the hard work and overtime requirements of ORD together with the salary issue may cause problems for the future. The ORD hopes to obtain parastatal status like the Korea Development Institute, thus freeing them from civil service salary levels. If the salary issue is resolved and the staff retained, the team believes the training aspect of the program has overall been successful. Of secondary importance in the view of both the team and the Koreans at ORD was the provision of commodities, including equipment, a computer, and library materials. All AID-provided commodities seem well housed and used. There have been major additions to the equipment, much of it of Japanese origin. At the time when the loan was given, there was much less equipment and there is agreement that it was an important component of the project. The Korean government has allocated funds for spare parts and replacement equipment and supplies. The computer deserves special comment for it is the sole instrument of its type in ORD and was both a major expense ($247,000) and innovation. It is essential to sophisticated research and has been intensively used. The library facilities, especially the foreign journals, are a heavy capital expense relative to their use, since only the more senior researchers in Suwon can take advantage of their availability because of the limited English and Japanese language competence of the more junior staff. Journals were, however, a necessary component of the project. ORD should make more effort to acquaint the staff of the experimental stations outside Suwon with their contents, as there is now no system for doing so. Lagging far behind in priority terms, in the unanimous opinions of the team and of the Koreans, was the value of expatriate technical assistance. Shorter-term, nonresident advisors were deemed an overall advantage, but long-term resident expatriates proved to be less useful. Some could not work in the fields of their specialization as priorities shifted; others could accomplish little in a two-year tour. None were well acquainted with Korea on their arrival. Language proved a problem at Korean meetings that the Americans attended. The inescapable conclusion is that although the resident foreigners probably provided some degree of generalized professional, administrative, and even emotional support to ORD's Bureau of Research, it was more necessary to the AID Mission than to the Koreans for it placed the continuous burden of monitoring on the expatriate staff, not on the Mission. The AID Mission did, however, supervise the project, and staff attended the important joint Korean-American steering committee meetings. Overall, the project did increase the capacity of the Korean Government to conduct agricultural research by providing better trained staff and more equipment. It built no new institutions and provided only marginal innovations, but neither was considered an aspect of project purposes or goals. The project did enhance Korea's institutional capacity.



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Table I-8 (continued) Name Present Position Field 1980 24 persons Han, Weon Sik Farm Management Bureau, ORD Computer Kang, Hee Young Chunam Province, ORD Observation Choi, Duk Hwan Rural Guidance Bureau, ORD Huh, Han Soon Research Bureau, ORD Shim, Sang Woo Rural Guidance Bureau, ORD Lee, Duk Yong Technical Information Division, ORD Park, Nam Jong Agriculture Machinery Research Institute Lee, Cheon Ho Icheongun Rural Guidance Office, Gyeonggi Province Lee, Hyun Soon Kangwon Province, ORD Lee, Sung Hee Chungbug Province, ORD Ryu, Dong Seok Gyeonggi Province, ORD Kim, Myung Ii Jeonbug Province, ORD La, Joon Soo Boesunggun Rural Guidance Office, Jeonnam Province Choi, Eui Soon Gyeongbuk Province, ORD Kim, Seong Hwui Gyeongnam Province, ORD Ko, Tae Chong Jeju Province, ORD Choi, Eul Ho Pusan City, ORD Hong, Yu Ki Gyeonggi Province, ORD Park, Joong Soo Agriculture Sciences Institute Lee, Kyong Hwee Technical Dissemination Bureau, ORD Park, Suk Hong Honam Experiment Station Lee, Soo Kwan Yeongnam Experiment Station Chang, Seok Hwan International Cooperation Division, ORD Lee, Seok Soon Yeongnam University Total 106 persons



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APPENDIX G RESEARCH AND EXTENSION: THE INTEGRATION OF INQUIRY AND GUIDANCE by DAVID 1. STEINBERG A. Introduction Critical to the development of a national research system is the continuous adaptation and creation of new plant strains suitable to a particular environment. Equally important is the capacity of a nation to translate research results into production, consumption, and income for the population. The Korean case represents a remarkably successful melding of research and extension. It is, however, based on a system so goal-oriented at every bureaucratic level that,.not surprisingly, the attainment of targets becomes both a matter of pride and bureaucratic survival. Bureaucratic enthusiasm is sometimes transformed into involuted pressure to achieve--goals are created that the system itself cannot safely reach, each level striving to achieve targets that are sometimes unrealistic, resulting in costly errors at local and even national levels?. It can lead to manipulation of statistics as the bureaucracy yields to the temptation of always indicating progress, higher yields, or larger exports. Only when dire, usually external, factors intervene can a decline be shown. B. Administrative Centralism Centralism is the hallmark of the Korean bureaucracy. The power of the Seoul administration is felt through an integrated system of regional and local pressure points having their nexus in the capital. The main bureaucratic mechanism of central control of the periphery is the Ministry of Home Affairs. It not only commands the police throughout the nation but, as there are no elected local officials, appoints the governors of the nine provinces, the 147 gun (county) chiefs and the more than 1,300 myon (district) heads. Its responsibility includes the Sae-maul Movement, which is ubiquitous. Real power throughout Korea rests with that Ministry; it is the central focus for the rural population in the gun. The gun capital, the primary market town of the area, is the head of both administration and market activity. The gun chief is the coordinator of all development programs (except education) and is held personally responsible for all activities within that area. This personalized power and responsibility is so pervasive that the under-achievement of targets within the gun or even the occurrance of a national disaster such as a forest fire (which he is supposed to prevent) can cause his summary expulsion. Someone personally must bear responsibility for error or failure in Korea; it is at the heart of the political and bureaucratic culture and profoundly affects policy and performance. The gun chief coordinates the work of most agencies (except education, the military, and the judiciary) within his territory. He is thus in intimate contact with all other ministries with local programs in his gun. These other ministries have their own hierarchical command structures down to the myon in some cases, but at the gun level close cooperation with the



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Table 1-2. Total Research Under AID Loan (Unit: 1000 Won) '74 '75 '76 '17 '78 Total Clas' Field Items Budge't Items Budget Items Budget Items. Budget Items Budget Items Budget Rice 3 10,500 17 17,099 15 16,050 12 20,746 9 8,532 56 '72,943 14 0 Wheat & (U Barley 5 15,500 12 14,024 30 16,958 15 11,270 3 7,500 65 65,258 Soybean 3 3,249 11 10,174 24 17,755 17 14,672 7 6,000 62 51,850 0 Potato 1 4,448 10 9,642 16 11,500 13 9,470 11 8,500 51 43,560 0 Cropping System 1 3,000 13 12,244 17 20,392 17 17,984 15 14,241 63 67,861 Sub-Total 13 36,697 63 63,183 102 82,655 74 74,142 45 44,793 297 301,470 Rice --1 1,400 1 2,000 2 2,875 1 2,100 5 8,375 SWheat & Barley --1 600 2 2,220 1 830 2 1,700 6 5,350 Soybean --1 500 1 580 2 1,440 1 600 5 3,120 41 U Potato 2 1,299 1 500 1 600 1 570 1 800 6 3,769 = Cropping 8 System 14 6,209 3 1,985 3 3,065 3 7,790 3 2,800 26 21,849 Sub-Total 16 7,508 7 4,985-1 8 8,465 9 13,505 8 8,000 48 42,463 Total 1 29 44,205 70 68,168 110 91,120 83 87647 53 52793345 343,933



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-17 Growth in the rural sector can contribute to industrial output and employment growth. As real incomes in the farm sector increase, there will be greater demand for, and production of, industrial goods (farm machinery, farm inputs and consumer goods) and employment. This will lead to further expansion of industries supplying intermediate inputs required for the production in the initially expanded industries. This process can be seen to continue indefinitely in a diminishing and involuted sequence. The magnitude of this indirect effect on output and employment growth depends on the structure of inter-industrial links within the economy. The Korean economy has a well-integrated inter-industrial structure. As such, the linkage effect on overall growth is substantial. These sequential impacts of new farm technology and government agricultural policy in a macroeconomic setting during the 1970s in Korea can be summarized in the diagram below: Government Pricing Purchase Policy Increased Urban Demand Agricultural Higher Yields Increased Rura Growth i Research and in Agricul tu r e Income Industri Complementary Sector Technological Inputs J Recently the goverment's agricultural income support policy has been increasingly subjected to criticism within the Korean Government and by donors. Apart from the argument of economic inefficiency resulting from the existing discrepancy between world market and farm support prices, there have been concerns about growing government deficits on account of the income support policy. According to the Economic Planning Board, in recent years the annual deficit amounted to as much as $150 million. The accumulated total deficit in the grain management account is expected to be $1.7 billion by the end of 1981, of which about 39 percent was caused by barley purchases. Since these deficits have been drawn from the government general account in the form of increased currency supply, the effect of farm subsidy has obviously been inflationary. More importantly, during the last two successive years of economic stagnation the government was beginning to have increasing problems in financing the deficits, financing that runs counter to the government stabilization policy. Already there is some evidence that in recent years the terms of trade between farm products and purchased commodities have turned against the farmers. An important lesson from the Korean case is that the Green Revolution could not have been successful without the vigorous enforcement of a government income support program. In the absence of the immediate prospects for a more favorable land-labor ratio or for the adoption of



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Table 1-7. Potato Yield of Leading Varieties and Breeding Lines No. of Virus Resistant No. of Varieties Yield (MT/ha) Varieties / Lines Leading Breeding Leading Breeding Yield Leading Breeding Year Location Variety Line Variety Line Index Variety Line 1974 Kangnung 1 10 30.15 31.56 105 1 4 Suwon 1 10 34.99 28.21 82 1 5 Kwangju 1 10 23.37 24.07 103 1 Ave. --29.50 27.95 95 1977 Kangnung 1 9 36.60 40.95 112 1 1 Buchon 1 9 14.87 16.25 109 1 3 Kwangju 1 9 21.10 20.17 96 1 3 Ave. --24.19 25.79 107 1979 Suwon 2 13.10 12.23 93 2 3 Kwangju 2 3 16.92 10.92 65 2 3 Chilgok 2 3 10.68 9.30 87 2 3 Ave. --13.57 10.82 80



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-3 No. 4: The Social Impact of Agribusiness: A Case Study of ALCOSA in Guatemala (July 1981) PN-AAJ-172 No. 5: Korean Elementary -Middle School Pilot Project (October 1981) PN-AAJ-169 No. 6: The Economic Development of Korea: Sui Generis or Generic? (January 1982) PN-AAJ-177 PROGRAM DESIGN AND EVALUATION METHODS Manager's Guide to Data Collection (November 1979) PN-AAH-434 Directory of Central Evaluation Authorities (April 1981) (distribution restricted to official agencies)



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A.I.D. EVALUATION PUBLICATIONS The following reports have been issued in the A.I.D. Evaluation Publication series. Those documents with an identification code (e.g., PN-AAG-585) may be ordered in microfiche and paper copy. Please direct inquiries regarding orders to: Editor of ARDA, S&T/DIU/DI Bureau for Science and Technology Agency for International Development Washington, D.C. 20523 U.S.A. PROGRAM EVALUATION DISCUSSION PAPERS No. 1: Reaching the Rural Poor: Indigenous Health Practitioners Are There Already (March 1979) PN-AAG--685 No. 2: New Directions Rural Roads (March 1979) PN-AGG-670 No. 3: Rural Electrification: Linkages and Justifications (April 1979) PN-AAG-671 No. 4: Policy Directions for Rural Water Supply in Developing Countries (April 1979) PN-AAG-691 No. 5: Study of Family Planning Program Effectiveness (April 1979) PN-AAG-672 No. 6: The Sociology of Pastoralism and African Livestock Development (May 1979) PN-AAG--922 No. 7: Socio-Economic and Environmental Impacts of Low-Volume Rural Roads -A Review of the Literature (February 1980) PN-AAJ-1 35 No. 8: Assessing the Impact of Development Projects on Women (May 1980) PN-AAH-725 No. 9: The Impact of Irrigation on Development: Issues for a Comprehensive Evaluation Study (October 1980) No. 10: A Review of Issues in Nutrition Program Evaluation (July 1981) PN-AAJ-174 EVALUATION REPORTS PROGRAM EVALUATIONS: No. 1: Family Planning Program Effectiveness: Report of a Workshop (December 1979) No. 2: A.I.D.'s Role in Indonesian Family Planning: A Case Study with General Lessons for Foreign Assistance (December 1979) PN-AAH-425 No. 3: Third Evaluation of the Thailand National Family Planning Program (February 1980) PN-AAH-006 No. 4: The Workshop on Pastoralism and African Livestock Development (June 1980) PN-AAH-238 PROJECT IMPACT EVALUATIONS No. 1: Colombia: Small Farmer Market Access (December 1979) PN-AAH-7 68 No. 2: Kitale Maize: The Limits of Success (May 1980) PN-AAH-7 23



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SUMMARY A profound change occurred in the early 1970s that transformed the Korean Government's rural development strategy. From one emphasizing industrial exports, the costs of which were largely borne by the Korean farmers, the strategy evolved into one devoted to improving rural Korean life. The genesis of this approach was both political and economic: a hardening of PL 480 terms and the results of the 1971 election that amply demonstrated that government support had eroded in the countryside. The Korean government responded with a rice pricing policy advantageous to the farmers, the strengthening of the extension service, the formation of the Sae-maul ("New Village") Movement, and a rapid increase in rural infrastructure. The origins of AID's support to agricultural research are found in the Korean Agricultural Sector Survey (1972) and succeeding documents that advocated a strengthening of research as a primary need. The project, proposed in 1973 and implemented in 1974, provided $5 million for a tripartite program to strengthen the capacity of the Office of Rural Development of the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries. It included training of Korean researchers overseas, equipment (including a computer and library materials), and both resident and short-term expatriate advisory services. At the close of the project in 1980, 21 Ph.D. students and 17 M.S. students were trained overseas-, while an additional 94 received short-term training and 106 participated in observation tours. Although there were problems with the English language competence of prospective students, the training aspects of the project were universally regarded as the most successful part of the program. Of notable, but secondary, importance was the provision of equipment and supplies, especially the computer and the library materials. Lagging far behind was the value of resident expatriate assistance, which was of marginal use to the project but was more significant in terms of relieving the AID Mission from continuous monitoring of the project than in providing help to the Koreans. Of greater importance was shorter-term foreign technical advice. The inchoate goal, from a Korean perspective, was probably rice selfsufficiency--a strategic, political, and economic objective. The project purposes, however, were specified in considerable detail outlining exact yield increases on agricultural experimental stations over a ten-year period in the areas of rice, barley, wheat, and soybeans as well as generalized improvement in potato production and in the cropping systems. Specific increases were also proposed for farm fields for the same time. Since the decade of crop improvement is to end in 1984, this evaluation must be somewhat circumscribed. The project paper suffered from spurious specificity regarding experimental station crop increases. Before the project began, experimental yields were higher than those indicated in the paper, often by considerable amounts. The research breakthroughs that the project



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APPENDIX J SOCIOECONOMIC STATISTICS Table J-l. Major Indicators of Korean Agriculture Item Unit '62 '65 '70 '75 '78 '79 1. Land utilization Total land (A) lO00ha 9,843 9,843 9,848 9,881 9,895 9,897 Cultivated land (B) 2,063 2,256 2,298 2,240 2,222 2,207 B/A 21.0 22.9 23.3 22.7 22.5 22.3 Paddy 1000ha 1,223 1,286 1,273 1,277 1,312 1,311 Upland 840 970 1,025 963 910 896 Forest 6,695 6,614 6,611 6,635 6,578 6,608 Others 1,086 973 939 1,006 1,095 1,082 Farm size/household ha 0.84 0.91 0.86 0.94 0.99 1.02 Paddy 0.50 0.52 0.48 0.54 0.59 0.60 Upland 0.34 0.39 0.38 0.40 0.40 0.42 Utilization ratio of cultivated land % 143.5 147.1 142.1 140.4 134.5 130.9 2. Population Total population (A) 1000 26,513 28,705 31,435 34,681 37,019 37,605 Farm populaperson tion (B) 15,097 15,812 14,422 13,244 11,528 10,883 B/A 56.9 55.1 45.9 38.2 31.1 28.9 No.of total household (A) 1000 4,589 4,844 5,856 6,757 7,256 7,539 house-hold No.of farm 2,649 2,507 2,483 2,379 2,224 2,162 Household (B) B/A % 57.7 51.8 42.4 35.2 30.7 28.7 3. Economic indicator G.N.P.(current price (A) bil.won 355.5 805.7 2,684.09,792.9 22,917.629,553.7 Agri.products (current price (B) 118.5 265.9 611.7 1,994.4 4,236A 5,141.0 B/A % 33.3 33.0 22.9 20.7 18.5 17.4 G.N.P.per capita $ 86 105 243 574 1,279 1,624 Export mil.$ 55 175 882 5,003 12,500 15,056 Import 390 416 1,804 6,674 1:3,200 20,339 Balance of trade *335 *241 *922 *1,671 *700 *5,283 Wholesale price index % 16.1 28.8 42.0 100.0 136.5 162.1 Consumer price index 13.9 27.5 49.1 100.0 145.3 171.9 Farm household income (A) 1000won 67.9 112.2 255.8 872.9 1,884.2 2,227.5 Urban worker's income (B) 96.6 112.6 381.2 859.3 1,916.3 2,629.6 A/B % 70.3 99.6 67.1 101.6 98.3 84.7



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-2 national policy of urban-based industrial exports and rural neglect, was rebuilding his rural base. Rice was a political hallmark of rural success. Rice self-sufficiency was not a product of the new varieties alone. In place was an extensive irrigation system, an effective credit, procurement and pricing mechanism, improved rural transportation transforming local and regional markets into a national one, and a vigorous 11guidance" system (extension service) that reached to the most remote areas. l/ The story of the growth of rice production is one of both new see-d strains generated by adaptive agricultural research coordinated with a guidance network and a farmer training program that reached almost every farm household and that markedly improved yields of even the traditional varieties of rice. How this change occurred is the subject of this report. The AID-supported agricultural research was designed to assist this growth, but the questions must be asked: how great was its contribution, and could a differently designed project or one operating in a less stringent political, and thus administrative, environment have prevented the failure of 1980? II. THE PROJECT The costs of the halting progress of Korean development in the 1950s and its acceleration in the 1960s were borne by the Korean farmer. For much of this period, the costs of production of both of the staples of the Korean diet, rice and barley, were above the government purchase prices. Korean agriculture was stifled by few incentives to produce beyond farmer needs. It could be characterized as a sophisticated but repressed sector that in some areas bordered on subsistence. Although infrastructure (such as irrigation) and adaptive research had begun under Japanese colonial rule, and even had a Korean guidance and credit system been in place, poor internal transportation and the disincentive of large amounts of PL 480 grain effectively retarded government interest in adjusting upward the rice prices. The potential political power of the urban consumer was greater than that of the rural population. In 1971, Korea was 82.5 percent and 91.8 percent selfsufficient in rice and barley respectively, and it only produced 10.7 percent of its wheat consumption. In 1971, rural household income was $1,150, less than $200 per capita. The election of 1971, which dramatically demonstrated the erosion of government support in rural areas and a hardening of PL 480 terms, I/ See Appendix G, "Research and Extension: The Integration of Inquiry and Guidance," by David I. Steinberg; and Korea Irrigation, AID Project Impact Evaluation No. 12, 1980.



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APPENDIX F SOCIAL RETURNS TO AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH AND EXTENSION by KWAN S. KIM I. Introduction Scientific information generated by agricultural research is a public good once it is disseminated for application. No consumer can be excluded from benefiting from the application of research output, and there is no market pricing mechanism for the output. The absence of a pricing mechanism implies that private-sector firms tend to underinvest in agricultural research from society's point of view since the benefits of research cannot be entirely internalized by the firms. As a consequence, there is a need for public support of agricultural research. Since agricultural research would compete with alternative uses for public funds, it is important for decision makers to obtain information on the returns to agricultural investment. This appendix reviews and provides a critique of the previous work on social returns to agricultural research and extension (R&E) in Korea. In an important study on Tongil rice, K. H. Park presented an analysis of socioeconomic returns on agricultural research and ex-tension expenditures in Korea.1/ This work is significant because it deals with an ex post evaluation of agricultural research on Tongil rice. It prove ides the only estimate of social returns to Tongil rice development. There was an earlier attempt in 19i72 to evaluate returns on agricultural research expenditures in Korea using computer-simulation models by Michigan State University's Korean Agricultural Sector Study (KASS) team. Although actual expenditures on research for the improved varieties of rice (Tongil) were incurred starting as early as 1962, the expanded extension program to disseminate the research results began in 1972. The KASS Team's report provided an ex ante analysis of research project impact and, from the benefit of hindsight, was useful only as background information to a project feasibility analysis. II. Park's Analysis The main objective of this study was to estimate the ex post rate of return on the Korean Government' s agricultural research -and extension expenditures, utilizing the national, annual data series for the period 1962-1977 that were provided by the Office of Rural Development. The original data were expressed in current won and two types of data adjustments were made. First, the expenditure and revenue figures were adjusted for inflation. Second, as his calculations were to be derived from the vantage point of 1977, it was necessary to convert to present values as of 1977 all past and future streams of expenditures and 1/ K. H. Park, "Analysis of Socioeconomic Consequences of the Green Revolution," Government of Korea Office of Rural Development, 1977.



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D2 of the japonica-indica (Tongi 1) hybrids and the technological package to accompany these hybrids. This package has also been applied to the cultivation of the traditional varieties and their productivity has increased to a level comparable with the hybrids (see Appendix C, Table 2). C. Wheat Wheat has probably received more than its share of research effort if wheat production and import statistics are used as a basis for judgment. Production and area cultivated has steadily declined over the past ten years but imports have increased; thus, overall the demand for wheat has waxed. This may be partly due to the shift in farm population to the urban centers and dietary changes. The productivity of wheat has increased and this can be largely attributed to the successful research program. More specifically, the wheat scientists have been conducting research on the following characteristics: --Earliness --Erect plant types --Dwarfness --High yield -Good grain quality -plumpness and protein content -Drought tolerance -Resistance to sprouting in the head -Disease resistance including scab, powdery mildew, stem rust --Winter hardiness -Tolerance to wet paddy soils It is clearly evident from this list of characteristics that the wheat research carried out is in conformity with that stated in the project paper. One of the most commendable aspects of the wheat improvement program is the close cooperation between the International Wheat and Maize Center in Mexico (CIMMYT) and U.S. universities. AID financially supports the research on wheat at CIMMYT, Oregon State University and until recently the University of Nebraska. Oregon State University has provided materials for the International Winter Spring Wheat Screening Nursery (IWSWSN) since 1973. Two nurseries have been sent by the University of Nebraska, the International Winter Wheat Performance Nursery (IWWPN) and the High Protein, High Lysine Observation Nursery (HPON). The IWWPN has been grown each year since 1968. CIMMYT has provided the International Bred Wheat Screening Nursery (IBWSN) since 1974. D. Barley The area cultivated with barley has steadily declined during the last decade. The production has remained relatively constant, with



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i TABLE OF CONTENTS Summary ........................... Preface ...........................v Project Data Sheet .....................vi Glossary ..........................vii Map ............................ix I. Project Setting ....................1 II. The Project ......................2 III. Project Impacts: Findings and Analysis ........4 A. The Project's Role in the Agricultural Research System ......................4 B. Experimental and Farm Results ...........7 C. Guidance: The Link between Research and the Farm .10 D. The Korean Farm ..................12 E. Social Factors in Korean Agricultural Development 15 F. Macroeconomic Implications of Improved Technology 16 G. Sustaining and Replicating Agricultural Research 18 IV. Conclusions 18 V. Lessons Learned 20 APPENDICES A. Methodology B. The Team's Itinerary C. The Korea Experience in Increased Rice Production by Robert I. Jackson D. Research on Selected Food Crops by Robert I. Jackson E. Profitability, Costs, and Revenue of Five Crops by Kwan S. Kim



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-16 The Sae-maul Movement has had a strong command element to its diffusion to the villages. The distinction between taxation and voluntary donations to Sae-maul projects, such as a village road or water system, and between corvee labor and voluntary work is indistinct at best. Yet out of this mandated structure has come greater village cooperation and perhaps as well a sense of village pride that might continue to some degree should the Sae-maul Movement end. Perhaps most evident and of lasting importance is a shift in attitudes. Korea has become a nation of farmers, no longer one of peasants. The rural economy has been transformed from one of subsistance to market-oriented production. Barter has given way to cash and micro-regional labor markets have been turned into one national labor force. These changes are generally positive, but they represent a more complex environment in which the Korean Government will have a continuing and an even more pervasive role that it will have tomanage with increasing care. F. Macroeconomic Implications of Improved Technology Although the impact of agricultural research can mostly be measured at the farm level, its economy-wide effect is generally indirect in nature, and more difficult to evaluate. A readily measurable effect of the development of improved varieties of rice in Korea, excluding the past three successive years of extremely adverse weather, includes the government's saving of foreign exchange through the reduction in rice imports. Before 1975, the year Korea became self-sufficient in rice, imports of rice amounted to almost $200 million (in current dollars) per year. The improved varietal development may also have important indirect effects on employment and growth in the economy. In Korea, the process leading to these indirect effects must be understood in conjunction with government pricing and purchase policy. Around the time of the adoption of the improved rice varieties in the early 1970s, the government instituted a package program of farm income support consisting of farm producer price and fertilizer subsidies, as well as of subsidies of other materials and supplies and procurement quotas for rice and barley. These new policies clearly differed from the agricultural policies in the 1950s and 1960s. In the 1960s, there was a deliberate attempt to keep grain purchase prices and wages low. The idea was to stimulate industrial expansion through enhanced profit margins. Thus, industrial expansion was brought about at the expense of the agricultural sector and at great cost to the farmers. During the 1970s, the important role played by agricultural research, along with the development of agricultural infrastructure and the increased use of agricultural inputs, was to increase per hectare yields of rice. Together with new government pricing and purchase policies, it contributed to substantial increases in food production and farm income.



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-23 existed and long-term expatriates were not an essential component of the project. Careful consideration should be given to the need for such resident assistance on the basis of the institutional capacity of the local research system and the level of indigenous available trained personnel. Expatriate technicians should not automatically be included on agricultural research projects, no matter how much this may ease an internal AID administrative burden. L. Continuing contacts are essential with the international agricultural research centers. National adaptive research requires the interchange of plant materials and personnel with the international agricultural centers and foreign universities. Without such contacts, progress will be slowed. M. The success of the Sino-centric societies in the field of agriculture and overall development should be studied to determine the possible causative effects of such a cultural milieu. The remarkable achievements of Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and China in agriculture, their success in other economic areas (including Singapore and Hong Kong), the economic acumen of the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia and the Chinese, Japanese and Korean communities in the United States may be a result of a particular cultural context that in some manner encourages economic development and farmer entrepreneurship. Although this conclusion may be regarded as speculative, the success of all of these cultures should prompt inquiry into the causes of such progress. If there are universalistic solutions to development problems, as donors predict, there may be culturally specific ones as well.



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E-2 higher, depending on whether rice was cultivated in a mono-culture or sequentially cropped system. The same profit margin declined, on average, to about 15 percent in 1980, which reflected the uneven incidence of cold weather and disease problems. Although the cultivation of the HYV has generally resulted in greater profits on both "operational and economic" accounts, there have been substantial variations in the profit margin from region to region. The calculations in the tables assumed a uniform government purchase price for all varieties of rice. In interviews with several farmers we found that they could frequently obtain as much as 15 or 20 percent higher prices for the traditional varieties (japonica) on the free market: many consumers still seem to prefer japonica to Tongil rice in spite of the fact that there is virtually no difference in the taste, especially when rice is freshly cooked. Thus, if we assume that the price of the japonica was 15 percent higher in 1980, profitability can be shown as no higher for Tongil rice than for the TV. In other words, per hectare yield in the HYV had to be at least 15 percent higher in order to be economically profitable. 2. Effect of ki!V on the Labor Market The cultivation of the HYV was relatively more labor-intensive. This may be explained by the fact that Tongil varieties require more intensive cultural care and a longer gestation period. For 1980, output yield per man hour was about 3.3 kg per 10a (one-tenth of a hectare) in both varieties. As more of-the rice area is cultivated with the HYV there will be a growing demand for labor in rural Korea. Effective labor is already in scarce supply in Korea. The dissemination of the high-yield farming technology is likely to accelerate the process of "tractorization" in Korean agriculture. 3. White Potatoes, Barley. Wheat, and Soybeans Another crop that has continued to yield positive "economic profits" is white potatoes. Despite the profitability in potatoes, there has been a declining trend in the planted area and the total production since 1975. The profit rate from the cultivation of white potatoes is not only low relative to that from the more widely-demanded vegetables and fruits, but also many Koreans consider white potatoes as an "inferior" good. Their consumption increases only when other major staple food supplies decline. Also, since the consumption of potatoes is small relative to that of other foods, the potato market may be considered as volatile with prices highly sensitive to changes in demands for other foods. For other crops, our calculations show that barley and wheat for both 1977 and 1980 incurred net losses in economic profit if unpaid returns to farm owners' resources are included in the production costs. However, "operating profits" become positive if only the actual paidout costs are taken into account. In particular, barley is traditionally a second important staple food (next to rice) in the Korean diet.



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E-5 Table E-2. Average Rice Production Costs and Revenue Per 10a Land (1980) (Value Unit: Won) Item HYV TV HYV TV Gross Revenue Output 446.4 kg 396.3 kg 255,564 226,882 Byproduct 14,588 18,098 Total 270,152 244,980 Expenses A. Operating Expenses (Materials) Seed 5 kg 4.9 kg 1,727 1,692 Organic Fertilizer 877 kg 833.5 kg 7,981 7,583 Inorganic Fertilizer 8,430 7,430 Chemicals 9,177 7,936 Milling 446.4 kg 396.3 kg 11,294 10,019 Others Total 71,058 66,665 (Labor) Hired Labor 36.8 hrs. 29.8 hrs. 21,094 16,810 Miscellaneous 657 822 Total for A 92,809 84,297 B. Implicit Expenses Own labor 98.4 hrs. 88.9 hrs. 57,402 51,424 Operating Capital Services 2,085 1,873 Fixed Capital Services 2,567 2,567 Rent 27,681 27,681 Miscellaneous 1,151 1,589 C. Total Expenses 183,695 169,431 Economic Profit 86,457 75,549 Operating Profit 177,343 160,683 Value Added 199,094 178,315 Profit Rate a/ 32.0% 30.8% Operating Profit Rate b/ 65.6% 65.5% Notes: aj Economic Profit as a percent of gross revenue _b/ Operating Profit as a percent of gross revenue Source: Office of Rural Development



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Tab Ie 1-8 (conti nued) Name Present Position Field 4, Participation to International Meetings and Observation 1975 2 persons Han, Sung Kum Farm Machinery Research Institute Farm Machinery Lee, Yong Kook " " 1976 8 persons Chung, Bong Joe (Deceased) Soybean Lee, Hong Seok Seoul National University Choi, Hyun Ok Crops Experiment Station Observation Ham, Yong Soo " it Lee, Chang Koo Veterinary Research Institute Huh, Moon Ree Seoul National University Rice Chung, Kun Sik Crops Experiment Station Lee, Eun Woong Seoul National University 1977 14 persons Lee, Chong Hoon Crops Experiment Station Weed Control Kim, Kil Woong " " Shin, Dong Wan Farm Management Bureau, ORD AID Project Chung, Bong Koo Agriculture Sciences Institute Disease Chung, Hoo Sup Seoul National University Lee, Yong Seok (Deceased) Analysis Park, Cheon Seo Agriculture Sciences Institute Soil Choi, 11yun Ok Crops Experiment Station Rice Park, Tae Kyung Yeongnam Crops Experiment Station Kim, Dong Soo Research Bureau, ORD Park, Seok Hong Honam Crops Experiment Station Chung, Bong Joe Agriculture Sciences Institute (Deceased) Park, Jong Soo to Kim, Soon Kwon Crops Experiment Station Weed Control