Front Cover
 Title Page
 Table of Contents
 Project data sheet
 Map of South Korea
 Project setting
 The project
 Project impacts: Findings...
 Lessons learned
 A.I.D. evaluation publications
 Back Cover

Group Title: Project impact evaluation - U.S. Agency for International Development - no. 27
Title: Korean agricultural research
Full Citation
Permanent Link: http://ufdc.ufl.edu/UF00053903/00001
 Material Information
Title: Korean agricultural research the integration of research and extension
Series Title: Project impact evaluation
Physical Description: 1 v. (various pagings) : ill., 1 map ; 28 cm.
Language: English
Creator: Steinberg, David I., 1928-
United States -- Agency for International Development. -- Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination
United States -- Agency for International Development. -- Bureau for Development Support
Publisher: U.S. Agency for International Development
Place of Publication: Washington D.C.?
Publication Date: [1982]
Subject: Agriculture -- Research -- Korea (South)   ( lcsh )
Genre: federal government publication   ( marcgt )
bibliography   ( marcgt )
non-fiction   ( marcgt )
Bibliography: Bibliography: p. K-1 - K-3.
Statement of Responsibility: by David I. Steinberg ... et al..
General Note: "Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination."
General Note: "Bureau for Development Support."
General Note: "January 1982."
General Note: "PN-AAJ-606"--Cover.
Funding: Electronic resources created as part of a prototype UF Institutional Repository and Faculty Papers project by the University of Florida.
 Record Information
Bibliographic ID: UF00053903
Volume ID: VID00001
Source Institution: University of Florida
Holding Location: University of Florida
Rights Management: All rights reserved by the source institution and holding location.
Resource Identifier: aleph - 001262868
oclc - 08214552
notis - AGB3486

Table of Contents
    Front Cover
        Front Cover
    Title Page
        Title Page 1
        Title Page 2
    Table of Contents
        Page i
        Page ii
        Page iii
        Page iv
        Page v
    Project data sheet
        Page vi
        Page vii
        Page viii
    Map of South Korea
        Page ix
    Project setting
        Page 1
    The project
        Page 2
        Page 3
    Project impacts: Findings and analysis
        The project's role in the agricultural research system
            Page 4
            Page 5
            Page 6
        Experimental and farm results
            Page 7
            Page 8
            Page 9
        Guidance: The link between research and the farm
            Page 10
            Page 11
        The Korean farm
            Page 12
            Page 13
            Page 14
        Social factors in Korean agricultural development
            Page 15
        Macroeconomic implications of improved technology
            Page 16
            Page 17
        Sustaining and replicating agricultural research
            Page 18
        Page 18
        Page 19
    Lessons learned
        Page 20
        Page 21
        Page 22
        Page 23
        Appendix A: Methodology
            Page A 1
            Page A 2
            Page A 3
        Appendix B: The team's itinerary
            Page B 1
            Page B 2
        Appendix C: The Korea experience in increased rice production, by Robert I. Jackson
            Page C 1
            Page C 2
            Page C 3
            Page C 4
            Page C 5
            Page C 6
            Page C 7
            Page C 8
            Page C 9
        Appendix D: Research on selected food crops, by Robert I. Jackson
            Page D 1
            Page D 2
            Page D 3
            Page D 4
        Appendix E: Profitability, costs, and revenue of five crops, by Kwan S. Kim
            Page E 1
            Page E 2
            Page E 3
            Page E 4
            Page E 5
            Page E 6
        Appendix F: Social returns to agricultural research and extension, by Kwan S. Kim
            Page F 1
            Page F 2
            Page F 3
            Page F 4
            Page F 5
            Page F 6
            Page F 7
        Appendix G: Research and extension: The integration of inquiry and guidance, by David I. Steinberg
            Page G 1
            Page G 2
            Page G 3
            Page G 4
            Page G 5
            Page G 6
            Page G 7
            Page G 8
        Appendix H: Agriculture in Cheju Province, by Robert I. Jackson and Kwan S. Kim
            Page H 1
            Page H 2
        Appendix I: Project-specific data
            Page I 1
            Page I 2
            Page I 3
            Page I 4
            Page I 5
            Page I 6
            Page I 7
            Page I 8
            Page I 9
            Page I 10
            Page I 11
            Page I 12
            Page I 13
            Page I 14
            Page I 15
            Page I 16
            Page I 17
        Appendix J: Socioeconomic statistics
            Page J 1
            Page J 2
            Page J 3
            Page J 4
            Page J 5
            Page J 6
            Page J 7
        Appendix K: Bibliography
            Page K 1
            Page K 2
            Page K 3
        Appendix L: Photographs
            Page L 1
            Page L 2
            Page L 3
            Page L 4
            Page L 5
        Appendix M: Notes on the authors
            Page M 1
            Page M 2
    A.I.D. evaluation publications
        Page AID 1
        Page AID 2
        Page AID 3
    Back Cover
        Back Cover
Full Text

A.I.D. Project Impact Evaluation No. 27

Korean Agricultural Research:
The Integration of Research and Extension

U.S. Agency for International Development (AID)






David I. Steinberg, Team Leader
(Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination)

Robert I. Jackson
(Bureau for Development Support)

Kwan S. Kim
(Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination)

Song, Hae-kyun
(Seoul National University)

U.S. Agency for International Development

January 1982

The views and interpretations expressed in this report are those of the
authors and should not be attributed to the Agency for International


A complete list of reports issued in the A.I.D. Evaluation Publication
series is included in the last three pages of this document, together with
information for ordering reports.


Summary . .

Preface . .

Project Data Sheet .

Glossary . .


dp . . . . . .I

I. Project Setting . . . . .

II. The Project . . . . . .

II. Project Impacts: Findings and Analysis . .

A. The Project's Role in the Agricultural Research
System . . . .

B. Experimental and Farm Results . . .

C. Guidance: The Link between Research and the Farm .

D. The Korean Farm . . . . .

E. Social Factors in Korean Agricultural Development

F. Macroeconomic Implications of Improved Technology

G. Sustaining and Replicating Agricultural Research

IV. Conclusions .. . . .. .

V. Lessons Learned . . . . .


A. Methodology
B. The Team's Itinerary
C. The Korea Experience in Increased Rice Production
by Robert I. Jackson
D. Research on Selected Food Crops
by Robert I. Jackson
E. Profitability, Costs, and Revenue of Five Crops
by Kwan S. Kim



. . ii

. vi

. . vii















F. Social Returns to Agricultural Research and Extension
by Kwan S. Kim
G. Research and Extension: The Integration of Inquiry and
by David I. Steinberg
H. Agriculture in Cheju Province
by Robert I. Jackson and Kwan S. Kim
I. Project-Specific Data
J. Socioeconomic Statistics
K. Bibliography
L. Photographs
M. Notes on the Authors



A profound change occurred in the early 1970s that transformed the
Korean Government's rural development strategy. From one emphasizing
industrial exports, the costs of which were largely borne by the Korean
farmers, the strategy evolved into one devoted to improving rural Korean
life. The genesis of this approach was both political and economic: a
hardening of PL 480 terms and the results of the 1971 election that amply
demonstrated that government support had eroded in the countryside. The
Korean government responded with a rice pricing policy advantageous to the
farmers, the strengthening of the extension service, the formation of the
Sae-maul ("New Village") Movement, and a rapid increase in rural

The origins of AID's support to agricultural research are found in the
Korean Agricultural Sector Survey (1972) and succeeding documents that
advocated a strengthening of research as a primary need. The project,
proposed in 1973 and implemented in 1974, provided $5 million for a
tripartite program to strengthen the capacity of the Office of Rural
Development of the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries. It included
training of Korean researchers overseas, equipment (including a computer
and library materials), and both resident and short-term expatriate
advisory services. At the close of the project in 1980, 21 Ph.D. students
and 17 M.S. students were trained overseas, while an additional 94 received
short-term training and 106 participated in observation tours.

Although there were problems with the English language competence of
prospective students, the training aspects of the project were universally
regarded as the most successful part of the program. Of notable, but
secondary, importance was the provision of equipment and supplies,
especially the computer and the library materials. Lagging far behind was
the value of resident expatriate assistance, which was of marginal use to
the project but was more significant in terms of relieving the AID Mission
from continuous monitoring of the project than in providing help to the
Koreans. Of greater importance was shorter-term foreign technical advice.

The inchoate goal, from a Korean perspective, was probably rice self-
sufficiency--a strategic, political, and economic objective. The project
purposes, however, were specified in considerable detail outlining exact
yield increases on agricultural experimental stations over a ten-year
period in the areas of rice, barley, wheat, and soybeans as well as
generalized improvement in potato production and in the cropping systems.
Specific increases were also proposed for farm fields for the same time.
Since the decade of crop improvement is to end in 1984, this evaluation
must be somewhat circumscribed.

The project paper suffered from spurious specificity regarding
experimental station crop increases. Before the project began,
experimental yields were higher than those indicated in the paper, often
by considerable amounts. The research breakthroughs that the project

anticipated were generally made prior to the project. Farmer yields may
well reach their objectives by 1984, but the AID project was only a
beneficial increment to Korean agricultural research. It supplemented an
existing, competent system, but offered little that was innovative.

The concentration on rice led to a lack of emphasis on other crops, an
inattention caused by national concerns as well as social and economic
factors the project ignored. Although there have been increases in crop
yields, hectarage of the other crops has consistently been falling, even
before the project began. Thus, national targets will not be met even if a
relatively few farmers benefit. The choice of some of the crops covered by
the project such as wheat, soybeans and potatoes seems questionable, as
does the emphasis on increased fertilizer responsiveness.

Critical to a developmentally effective agricultural research program
is the transference of experimental results to the farmers. Through a
widespread extension service, a farmer training program that includes
almost all families annually, demonstration plots, and the Sae-maul
Movement, Korea has developed an authoritarian but effective means of
disseminating research results.

Thus, beginning in 1972 the spread of the high-yielding varieties of
rice was pushed with alacrity by the Korean bureaucracy in response to a
national command structure. The effort was effective, making Korea self-
sufficient in rice by 1975. Yet there were two inherent problems in this
comprehensive effort: these varieties were sensitive to cold, and new
races of the fungal disease called blast normally develop after a few years
if large areas are planted to a single variety.

The crisis developed first in 1979 with a drop in production caused by
blast followed by a disastrous 1980 crop due to cold temperatures. The
rice crop fell by one-third, creating a crisis of confidence in the
government and in the guidance service.

Ironically, the failures of 1979 and 1980 can be attributed to the
strengths of the Korean guidance service. Thus its weakness is based on
the omnipresent bureaucratic hierarchy that, in contrast to most developing
societies, can transform research into production. In singleminded pursuit
of its political goals, it neglected elemental precautions that might have
avoided the problems of the last two years.

Agricultural research was an appropriate intervention for AID at the
time. It assisted a well-established, agricultural research network, but
did not materially transform it. It created no new institutions.

Agricultural research will continue in Korea but replication abroad
will be difficult. Any successful adaptive agricultural research project
will be dependent upon a positive pricing policy, an effective extension
service, rural infrastructure, and continuous contact with international
research centers, among other factors. Political will is required for its
success, but too strong an emphasis on political objectives can undercut
its effectiveness.


Although agricultural research has a long history in Korea, the
recent introduction of the high-yielding varieties of rice and im-
proved strains of other crops, combined with extensive attention to
improved cultivation techniques, pervasive extension services, and
better rural infrastructure have helped transform rural Korea with-
in a decade. By any standard, this was a remarkable achievement.

The agricultural research project, for which the United States
Government provided $5 million, was but a modest contribution to
Korea's agricultural research capacity, and thus even a more modest
contribution to its rural development. As this report demonstrates,
agricultural research was one critical element in the change of rural
Korea, but not the only causal factor.

The Korean agricultural research project was chosen for an impact
evaluation because it seemed to provide lessons relevant for other
nations, and because it was a blend of technical assistance, training,
and equipment. The impact evaluation team was composed of three AID
staff assisted by a Korean rural specialist. During the course of about
one month in Korea, the team travelled some 2,700 kilometers and
visited all provinces in the nation. No sampling technique for a
project nationwide in scope can be scientific within the format of a
rapid rural appraisal. The team, however, made a conscious effort to
visit remote regions and poorer villages to determine whether the
research results were reaching relatively isolated farmers. These site
visits were spontaneously selected. Appendices A and B provide notes on
the methodology and the team's itinerary.

The team wishes to thank the officials of the Office of Rural
Development, both in its headquarters in Suwon and in the provinces,
for their assistance and the sharing of their voluminous data. Our
thanks also go to the farmers and their wives who often took time from
their transplanting to talk with us. The team would also like to
thank the U.S. Embassy for making available a vehicle and driver and
for other logistical support.


Project Title: Korea-Agricultural Research Project

AID Project Number: DLC/P-2014

AID Loan Number: 489-H-088

Borrower: The Government of the Republic of Korea. The project was
implemented by the Office of Rural Development of the
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries.

Loan Amount: Total $5.0 million

Korean Contribution $3.124 million in won
Total Project Costs: $8.124 million

Terms: Forty years repayment from the date of the first disbursement,
including a 10-year grace period. Interest rate of 2 percent
per annum for 10 years after the first disbursement and at a
rate of 3 percent per annum thereafter.

Terminal Date for Request for Reimbursement and for Disbursement:

July 28, 1980

Purpose: To assist in a program of multidisciplinary research directed
toward varietal improvement of certain basic food and feed
crops and of cropping systems.

Accomplishments: Training of 38 scholars to the Ph.D. or M.S. degree
level, 94 short-term trainees and 106 participants
for observation and conferences; purchase and installa-
tion of 946 pieces of equipment and the provision
of 10 long-term experts and 73 consultants.

Evaluation: An interim evaluation was conducted in
June 1978.

Audit: An audit was conducted in May 1980.










hectare (ha)








metric ton (MT)






Agricultural Development Corporation,
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries

Asian Vegetable Research and Development Center

unit of measure, approximately equal to one hectare

International Wheat and Maize Center, Mexico.

a unit of volume, equal to 80 kg of milled rice or
54 kg of paddy.

county; 140 throughout the country

county chief, appointed by the Ministry of Home Affairs

2.45 acres

High Protein, High Lysine Observation

High-yielding varieties

International Bred Wheat Screening Nursery

International Soybean Institute

International Rice Research Institute

International Winter and Spring Wheat
Screening Nursery

International Winter Wheat Performance Nursery

2,205 pounds

million metric ton

township, a part of a gun.

township head; appointed on the authority of the

National Agricultural Cooperative Federation

Office of Rural Development, Ministry of Agriculture
and Fisheries





R & E

Sae-maul Movement


GLOSSARY (cont.)

unhusked rice; also, irrigated land on which rice is

ProJincial Office of Rural Development

un.i of land measure; 36 sq. feet, 3,000 pyong equal
one chongbo or hectare

research and extension

"New Village Movement," or "New Community Movement;"
a government-controlled rural development activity.

a unit of volume, equal to one gama

Exchange rates: In June 1981 won 685 equalled U.S. $1.00

Note: Unless otherwise noted, all figures are for milled rice and
pearled barley.




E a s t e r n






e0 1

J apan

SNational Capital
- Major Roads
0 25 50 75 Miles
0 25 50 75 Kilometers

o .P

.* .o

<:5 0



The year 1980 was disastrous for Korean rice agriculture. An
abnormally cold summer prevented the maturing of rice, the main
staple grown ubiquitously on every available plot of even marginally
irrigated land. The Korean economy went into shock as rural pro-
duction and incomes suffered when rice production declined by one-
third. Already beset with political turmoil after the assassination
of President Park Chung-hee in 1979 and the Kwangju riots of May 1980,
hit by a major slump in exports because of a worldwide recession, and
suffering from heightened import requirements and inflation caused by
oil price increases, there was a crisis of political legitimacy--for
legitimacy for the past two decades in Korea was a product of
continuous economic growth.

The economy as a whole declined in 1980. Real GNP was down by
5.7 percent, thus temporarily reversing the nation's spectacular ad-
vances that had pushed growth over 10 percent annually. Agriculture,
however, was even more severely affected; rural income dropped by 24
percent. Much of the rural progress that had been a product of a
deliberate change in national development strategy beginning in the
early 1970s was in question. It was based on an incentive price
support policy that provided Korean farmers with over two times the
world market price for rice. Particularly adversely affected were
the high-yielding rice varieties.

These rice varieties, known as Tongil ("unification"), were de-
veloped from a series of crosses between the indica varieties from
Southeast Asia and the local and more traditional, but improved,
japonica strains. From their introduction in the early 1970s and the
release of the first variety to the farmers in 1972, they were known
to be more susceptible to cold weather and temporarily more resistant
to blast, a fungal disease. They promised, and delivered, substanti-
ally higher yields under greatly improved methods of cultivation,
water control, increased fertilizer, pesticides, and herbicides.

As a result of the release of these new varieties and as a
consequence of the vigorous encouragement by government of their
cultivation, which in the early period of their expansion even in-
cluded air freighting of seed from the Philippines, Korea became
self-sufficient in rice in 1975. It was the first time since the
Second World War that this long-sought objective had been reached.
Rice self-sufficiency was an objective that was central to the Korean
administration: it was strategic, for it furthered Korean autonomy
and demonstrated to North Korea that South Korea was progressing;
it was economic, for it saved almost $200 million annually in foreign
exchange; and it was political, for it was dramatic evidence indicating
that President Park, who had almost lost the 1971 election because
of significant deterioration of his support in rural areas due to a

national policy of urban-based industrial exports and rural neglect, was
rebuilding his rural base. Rice was a political hallmark of rural success.

Rice self-sufficiency was not a product of the new varieties alone.
In place was an extensive irrigation system, an effective credit, pro-
curement and pricing mechanism, improved rural transportation trans-
forming local and regional markets into a national one, and a vigorous
"guidance" system (extension service) that reached to the most remote
areas. 1/ The story of the growth of rice production is one of both
new seed strains generated by adaptive agricultural research coordina-
ted with a guidance network and a farmer training program that reached
almost every farm household and that markedly improved yields of even
the traditional varieties of rice. How this change occurred is the
subject of this report. The AID-supported agricultural research was
designed to assist this growth, but the questions must be asked: how
great was its contribution, and could a differently designed project
or one operating in a less stringent political, and thus administrative,
environment have prevented the failure of 1980?


The costs of the halting progress of Korean development in the
1950s and its acceleration in the 1960s were borne by the Korean
farmer. For much of this period, the costs of production of both of
the staples of the Korean diet, rice and barley, were above the govern-
ment purchase prices. Korean agriculture was stifled by few incentives
to produce beyond farmer needs. It could be characterized as a sophis-
ticated but repressed sector that in some areas bordered on subsistence.
Although infrastructure (such as irrigation) and adaptive research had
begun under Japanese colonial rule, and even had a Korean guidance and
credit system been in place, poor internal transportation and the dis-
incentive of large amounts of PL 480 grain effectively retarded govern-
ment interest in adjusting upward the rice prices. The potential poli-
tical power of the urban consumer was greater than that of the rural
population. In 1971, Korea was 82.5 percent and 91.8 percent self-
sufficient in rice and barley respectively, and it only produced 10.7
percent of its wheat consumption. In 1971, rural household income was
$1,150, less than $200 per capital.

The election of 1971, which dramatically demonstrated the erosion
of government support in rural areas and a hardening of PL 480 terms,

S/See Appendix G, "Research and Extension: The Integration of Inquiry
and Guidance," by David I. Steinberg; and Korea Irrigation, AID
Project Impact Evaluation No. 12, 1980.


prompted a massive governmental effort to improve the rural-urban terms
of trade. The Sae-maul (New Village) Movement was formed, and rice
support prices increased. Rural infrastructure construction was hurried.
Rural roads and national highways were built and paved, and irrigation
expanded. 2/ Fertilizer consumption grew, rising from 308,494 metric
tons (MT) in 1961 to 605,137 in 1971, and 886,206 MT in 1975. Mechanization
increased. In 1961 there were 12 power tillers in Korea, but by 1971 there
were 16,842, and in 1979, 239,909 were in operation.

It was in the context of this growing concern with the rural
sector that AID began its support to agricultural research. The
genesis of this project was the Korean Agricultural Sector Survey carried
out by Michigan State University with AID support. As its highest
priority, it recommended efforts to improve agricultural research in
rice, barley, wheat, soybeans, and forages.

The study identified the problems facing Korea as a lack of concentra-
tion on key research priorities and a shortage of resources to meet
these needs. It further characterized the national agricultural research
system as relatively unfocused, poorly equipped, short of highly trained
personnel, but relatively well-housed with sufficient land for research,
well-balanced disciplinary skills, although suffering from a shortage of
operating funds.

The study was followed by the publication in 1972 of "Investment
Priorities in the Korean Agricultural Sector," also by Michigan State
University. That study anticipated cumulative returns to agri-
cultural research to reach 30 times an annual investment of $2 million
by 1975, and 160 times its yearly costs by 1980. After a visit by an
external specialist and negotiations with Korean authorities, an AID
Intensive Review Request was cabled to Washington on July 13, 1973,
outlining the project. A project paper proposing a $5 million loan
was approved by AID's Development Loan Committee on December 5, 1973;
authorized December 11 of the same year; and signed by the Korean
Government on January 28, 1974. On February 21, Korean Presidential
Ordinance #54 announced the agreement and authorized Korean funds
($3,125,000 in won) for the project. By September 8, 1974 the first
expatriate Co-Director was appointed, and on November 14 a service
contract was signed with the International Institute for Education
covering support for the project and the funding of participants.

The objectives of the project focused on the five areas: rice,
barley/wheat, soybeans, white potatoes, and cropping systems. Im-
provement in research was predicated on forming multidisciplinary teams
that were to establish research priorities within each area of concern.

- For an extensive discussion of this phenomenon see Korea Irrigation,
AID Project Impact Evaluation Report No. 12, 1980, especially Appen-
dix F, "Korean Agricultural Pricing Policies" and Appendix G, "Change,
Local Government, and Rural Participation in Korean Rural Development."

Very specific yield targets were established both for the experimental
stations and the farms (See Table 1). Crop improvement goals were
also stated in the project paper (See Appendices C & D).

The project was conceived as having three components: foreign
advisory services, both long and short-term; short and long-term
training, the latter including 19 M.S. and 13 Ph.D. trainees; and
equipment, covering field, experimental, and library commodities in-
cluding books and journals. About 46 percent of the $5.0 million
loan was for technical assistance, 24 percent for training, and 30
percent for commodities.

The terminal date of disbursement was set for July 28, 1979, but
was later extended to September 30, 1981. Seven trainees remained
abroad after 1980 to complete their training.

Table I. Project Paper Baseline Data and Targets

Putative Target
Yields Yields Putative Target
Crop 1972-73 1983 Yields Yields
Experiment Experiment 1972-73 1983
Stations Stations Farms Farms

Rice 4.79 6.0 3.25 4.5
Barley 2.79 3.6 2.04 3.5
Wheat 4.30 5.2 2.24 4.0
Soybeans 1.98 3.2 0.8 1.3
Potatoes No yield targets specified.


A. The Project's Role in the Agricultural Research System

Korea has a long history of agricultural research. The earliest
official agricultural demonstration station was established in 1906,
and experimental improvements in rice were conducted throughout the
Japanese colonial period. Critical to the development of an agri-
cultural research system was the 1962 reorganization that established
the Office of Rural Development (ORD) with AID support, and began
the process of organizing branch offices in selected guns (counties).
By 1975, ORD offices were in every county throughout the country. The
guidance system thus had spread widely in rural areas before project
implementation was initiated and was completed shortly after it was
approved. The research establishment was effective, but limited in the
scope of its activities, before the project began. The project did not
alter or institutionally reform the existing structure, for it was already
well organized.

The project, therefore, supplemented an established and effective
research program. It provided, however, an impetus to an expanded program
within a national policy framework that fostered the effective use of
research. This project did not establish collaborative links between ORD
and the Korean academic community; these had been inaugurated by
presidential decree in 1971. The project did, however, begin the concept
of multidisciplinary teams to work on the five priority areas of research.
This was in part an innovation, although the teams have worked more to
mobilize talent as needed rather than as a continuous, integrated
multidisciplinary effort. The concept was not without problems, however,
since in a hierarchical society such as Korea, rank and status control
discussion and dissent, and position often seems more important than
substance. The multidisciplinary teams became operational during the life
of the project and although these early problems are now less acute, it is
doubtful at this writing that the teams are as cohesive as they were at the
time they were established.

There was universal agreement among Korean academicians and ad-
ministrators and on the AID evaluation team that the most successful
aspect of the project was the training component. Although Korea
had a corps of skilled manpower, it was spread very thinly, and the
project significantly enhanced the capacity of ORD to engage in re-

After approval of the project, the training component was expanded,
and resident expatriate assistance truncated. In the end, 21 Ph.D. and
17 M.S. students were trained under the project, and an additional 94
received short-term training; a total of 106 participated in obser-
vation tours and conferences.

There were two major problems connected with the training and sub-
sequent employment of trainees. The first was the adequacy of English
language skills prior to overseas training. In spite of later Peace
Corps assistance, the level of English caused delays in sending out
trainees, thus requiring an extension of the terminal date of disburse-
ment of the loan. ORD had responsibility for placing trainees at U.S.
institutions, which created minor delays, while the International In-
stitute of Education administered the participants' allowances.

Of more significance for the future are the changes in wage
differentials between the ORD and the academic community. In the 1960s,
academicians' salaries were low relative to those of civil servants.
Partly in an effort to prevent student demonstrations, academic salaries
were gradually raised and supplemented with research bonuses and other
emoluments so that there is a highly relevant difference today between
academic and ORD salaries. To retain trainees, a three-year commitment to
ORD was required for each long-term participant, and to date one trainee
has refunded the costs of the training to take an academic position. As
the three-year commitment comes to an end, pressures to leave are building
up and there may be an exodus of skilled manpower from ORD to the
universities. Although those who leave may not be completely lost to ORD,


as joint appointments are possible, the enhanced social prestige of
academicians--an important factor in Korea--as well as the hard work and
overtime requirements of ORD together with the salary issue may cause
problems for the future. The ORD hopes to obtain parastatal status like
the Korea Development Institute, thus freeing them from civil service
salary levels. If the salary issue is resolved and the staff retained,
the team believes the training aspect of the program has overall been

Of secondary importance in the view of both the team and the Koreans
at ORD was the provision of commodities, including equipment, a
computer, and library materials. All AID-provided commodities seem
well housed and used. There have been major additions to the equipment,
much of it of Japanese origin. At the time when the loan was given, there
was much less equipment and there is agreement that it was an important
component of the project. The Korean government has allocated funds for
spare parts and replacement equipment and supplies.

The computer deserves special comment for it is the sole instrument
of its type in ORD and was both a major expense ($247,000) and innova-
tion. It is essential to sophisticated research and has been inten-
sively used. The library facilities, especially the foreign journals,
are a heavy capital expense relative to their use, since only the
more senior researchers in Suwon can take advantage of their availa-
bility because of the limited English and Japanese language competence
of the more junior staff. Journals were, however, a necessary component
of the project. ORD should make more effort to acquaint the staff of the
experimental stations outside Suwon with their contents, as there is now
no system for doing so.

Lagging far behind in priority terms, in the unanimous opinions of
the team and of the Koreans, was the value of expatriate technical
assistance. Shorter-term, nonresident advisors were deemed an overall
advantage, but long-term resident expatriates proved to be less useful.
Some could not work in the fields of their specialization as priorities
shifted; others could accomplish little in a two-year tour. None
were well acquainted with Korea on their arrival. Language proved a
problem at Korean meetings that the Americans attended. The inescapable
conclusion is that although the resident foreigners probably provided
some degree of generalized professional, administrative, and even emo-
tional support to ORD's Bureau of Research, it was more necessary to the
AID Mission than to the Koreans for it placed the continuous burden
of monitoring on the expatriate staff, not on the Mission. The AID
Mission did, however, supervise the project, and staff attended the
important joint Korean-American steering committee meetings.

Overall, the project did increase the capacity of the Korean Govern-
ment to conduct agricultural research by providing better trained staff
and more equipment. It built no new institutions and provided only
marginal innovations, but neither was considered an aspect of project
purposes or goals. The project did enhance Korea's institutional capacity.


B. Experimental and Farm Results

The inchoate goal of the project from a Korean vantage point seems
to have been rice self-sufficiency. The project purpose however, was
confined to increasing the yields of specified crops both on the experi-
mental stations and on farmers' fields and to improving the cropping
system. These objectives were stated over a ten-year period--a period
not due to end until 1984.3/ Yet there are now some definitive
conclusions that can be drawn from the existing results.

The targets set for the project were often spurious and simplistic,
as were the baseline data. Yield increases on experimental plots and
on the farms were based on general averages, but these average yields
from experiment station plots were practically meaningless. For each
crop (rice and barley, for example) many, sometimes dozens, of se-
lections, strains, or varieties were tested for yield performance.
Thus, experiment station average yields did not do justice to the
complexity of the problem. On the other hand, Korea's agricultural
statistics, those garnered from the farmers, were complete and detailed
These reliable data could be used to make valid judgments on farm
productivity targets used in the project paper.

The project also took no note of pricing, labor and other require-
ments, other crops such as vegetables, or social attitudes toward con-
sumption that affected production and productivity. More important,
there were no project targets for national production nor for self-suffi-
ciency in food, both of which were important aspects of national policy
that affected what varieties would be stressed by the extension service.

Further, by the time the project started significant increases in
yields had already been achieved. What was more important than yield
breakthroughs (which did not occur although they were specifically called
for in the project paper) was the need for continuous adaptive research
on other issues, such as resistance to cold, lodging, diseases, and
insects, as well as for a shortening of the growing period which would
allow for more doublecropping throughout a larger area of the country.
These other issues were mentioned, but more attention was paid to pro-
duction increases with its obvious political impact.

Rice production was to climb from 4.79 to 6.0 metric tons per
hectare (MT/ha) on experimental stations and from 3.25 to 4.5 MT/ha on
farms from 1973 to 1983. Yet experimental station results of the new
strains of rice (Tongil indica-japonica) already were 5.06 MT in 1970,
three years before the project started.4/ On a national average, the new

3 The Project Paper was prepared in 1973, so the decade was supposed to
end in 1983. Since the project began in 1974, the ten-year period
should terminate in 1984.

/Office of Rural Development, The Effectiveness of Tongil Rice Diffusion
in Korea, Suwon: 1975, p. 9.

varieties yields were 5.03 MT in 1975 (before the project could have had
any impact), 5.53 MT in 1977 and 4.86 MT in 1978. At the Yeongnam
Experimental Station, yields were 3.90 for the traditional varieties in
1968 and 4.68 in 1973. The high yielding varieties at the same station were
were 4.69 MT in 1974 and 5.08 MT in 1975. At the Honam Station in 1980,
Tongil yields were 5.43 and other new varieties 4.39 MT/ha while japonica
production was 4.74 MT.

Over the same ten-year period, barley experimental yields were to rise
from 2.79 to 3.6 MT/ha and farm yields from 2.04 to 3.5 MT/ha. Barley
production, however, at the Yeongnam Station was already 3.3 MT in 1972 and
3.5 MT in 1979 and 1980. The station's goal is 4.0 MT in 1981. The Honam
Experimental Station reported yields for 1979 and 1980 between 3.15 and
3.95 MT/ha.

Wheat yields were to rise from 4.30 to 5.2 MT/ha on experimental farms
and farm yields from 2.24 to 4.0 MT. At the Yeongnam Station crop yields
before the project were again higher. They were 4.8 MT in 1971 and 4.5 in
both 1979 and 1980. Their goal for 1981 is 5.5 MT.

Soybean increases on experimental plots were to increase from 1.98 MT
to 3.2 MT/ha over ten years; farm production was to grow from 0.8 to 1.3 MT
over the same period. At Miryang, soybean production was already 2.4 MT in
1974 (before the project began), and 2.3 MT in 1979 and 1980. Their target
for 1981 is 3.5 MT/ha.

Overall, for all crops for which specific targets were set,
experimental crop yields were well above the project baseline yields before
the project began or prior to the time the project could have had any
effect. Staff at Miryang indicated that yields on all crops have
essentially remained relatively constant, having achieved heightened
production by the early 1970s before the project. Concentration after that
date was placed on reducing the factor of risk including an earlier
maturity date and more resistance to disease and lodging.

If the project were based on too low a data base for experimental
stations, what has happened to farmers' yields during this period and what
is the prognosis for attaining target levels of production? The question
is critical, but the answers are complex, for there were climatic and other
conditions that intervened.

The project erred by failing to take into account other elements that
have affected total yields. Critical factors were the high support price
for rice that increased farm income appreciably and the growing demand for
winter vegetables that often proved more lucrative than rice. Important as
well were the lower price support for barley relative to inflation, the
government's reluctance to purchase more of it, a shortage of labor that
has become more acute in recent years, and social factors that make
consumption of barley and potatoes less desirable than rice if farm
families have higher income.5/ One farmer said, "Why should we eat
potatoes when we can afford to eat rice?"

5/See Appendix E, "Profitability, Costs and Revenue of Five Crops" by Kwan
S. Kim.


Over the past decade there has been a highly significant drop in
hectarage under cultivation of the crops aforementioned. The area planted
in barley declined from 730,000 ha in 1970 to 473,000 in 1979; area in
wheat from 97,000 to 13,000 ha over the same period; the area in soybeans
from 295,000 to 207,000 ha; and the area in potatoes from 54,111 to 34,000
ha. Thus, even with increases in yields per hectare, aggregate production,
and consequently national objectives, are not being met. For example:

-- Barley production in the decade beginning in 1970 basically
remained constant [1,591 million metric tons (MMT) in 1970,
1,508 MMT in 1979], although per hectare yields rose from 2.18
to 3.19 MT.

-- Wheat production dropped from 219,000 to 42,000 MT over the
same decade, while yields increased one-third (from 2.26 to
3.21 MT/ha).

-- Soybean production rose slightly from 232,000 to 257,000 MT
and yields rose from .79 to 1.3 MT/ha.

-- Potato production dropped from 605,000 to 356,000 MT but yields
also dropped from 11.31 to 10.58 MT/ha between 1970 and 1979.

With good weather and a continuing research program, it is possible that
the targets may be obtained on all crops ten years after the initiation of
the project, if government policy were to emphasize all crops. This seems
unlikely, however, in the case of wheat, potatoes, and soybeans. Even if
per hectare targets are reached, it is unlikely that any aggregate
increases can be expected. Thus, individual farmers may well benefit but
the nation as a whole may find its goals unfulfilled.

Rice represents a special case. The modern technological package on
which Tongil depends and the sophisticated management required in
cultivation has had a salutary effect on the traditional varieties as well
as the higher-yielding ones. Thus Tongil production per hectare increased
from 3.86 MT in 1972 to 4.63 in 1979 but the traditional varieties also
rose from 3.32 to 4.37 over the same period. Given the private market
premium for the traditional varieties and their greater resistance to cold
and blast now, it may be as economic to grow the improved japonica as the
newer Tongil varieties.6/

Other questions must be asked of the project design, the most
important of which is whether the choice of subjects for research was the
most appropriate. Rice obviously was critical both from a national and
farmer viewpoint. Barley seemed necessary even though trends indicated
that although it was a government priority, it was unlikely to remain one
of the farmers'. Wheat, at any time given land use in Korea, was highly
questionable. Soybeans were of less importance and potatoes were
unimportant in terms of national needs. Researchers at ORD indicate that

-See Appendix E, "Profitability, Costs and Revenue of Five Crops" by Kwan
S. Kim and Appendix C, "The Korean Experience in Increased Rice
Production" by Robert I. Jackson. The figures are taken from Table C-2.


livestock mechanization, agricultural economics, and horticultural crops
have precedence in research priorities. The exclusion of vegetables in
production, nutritional, and equity terms was a shared error. The Asian
Vegetable Research and Development Center (AVRDC) supported research on a
very limited scale, both monetarily and as to the number of vegetable
crops, during the life of the AID project. This, however, was no reason
to exclude such an important field.

The goal of making grains more responsive to higher fertilizer usage
is a curious one given the oil crisis of 1973, the increase in petroleum
imports, and the higher prices of fertilizer. Thought should be given to
increasing production with less fertilizer, rather than creating an ever-
expanding demand for imported petroleum.

It has proven impossible to establish a clear and direct link between
the research carried out under the project and improved yields. There was
no breakthrough. No doubt the project assisted the research effort and
indirectly contributed to improved strains and probably will continue to do
so as the trainees return or become more effective. The overall judgment
that must be made, however, at least at this time prior to the end of the
decade of planned growth in 1984, is that the agricultural research project
was a beneficial but not a critical component of the well-established
Korean research system.

C. Guidance: The Link between Research and the Farm

The developmental success of agricultural research is dependent
upon the effectiveness of the spread of appropriate research results to
the farmer. The Korean example links the research system both at the
center and the periphery to an ubiquitous extension service known in
Korean as a guidance system. 7/

Both research and guidance fall within the purview of the Director
General of the Office of Rural Development. Thus, there is coordina-
tion at the administrative center at the top of the bureaucratic struc-
ture. This coordination also extends to the rural areas. Each
province and gun (county) has a branch office of rural development and
guidance workers are located in the lowest administrative unit, the
myon, which forms a subdivision of a county. In 1981, there are a total
of 7,980 guidance workers in Korea, of whom 7,648 are deployed at the
gun and myon levels, 226 at the provincial level, and only 106 at

Each guidance officer (the vast majority is male) is responsible for
monitoring the production and cultivation techniques of from 6 to 12
villages depending on the terrain and population. He is in constant
contact with the villagers, sometimes, according to a few farmers, too
often. In some areas during critical periods such as transplanting or
during emergencies such as drought, his visits may be daily, advising

For a more detailed discussion, see Appendix G, "Research and Extension:
The Integration of Inquiry and Guidance," by David I. Steinberg.


farmers and reporting to the government on conditions. Even in a most
remote, mountainous village inhabited by former swidden (slash and burn)
farmers, the guidance worker visited the area once a month. It is probably
safe to say that only isolated farmhouses escape their attention.

These workers are graduates of agricultural high schools where,
through joint appointments, provincial office of rural development staff
and teachers have close communication and the curriculum is geared to the
practical needs of the rural areas. These men are overworked, visiting
farmers seven days a week without any respite during the growing season.
There is an attrition rate of 2 percent because of relatively low pay ($176
per month starting salary) and hard work, but this is remarkably low
considering the demands the state places on them.

The guidance system is supplemented by an effective and equally wide-
spread training program, carried out annually during the winter months. It
first trains the trainers who then train the farmers. No farm family
remains untouched by the system. Training includes instruction in improved
cultivation techniques, crop management and human nutritional programs.
The effort is coordinated with the Sae-maul Movement, the administrative
organization of which reaches to the gun but which is also active in
virtually every village through village leaders.

Guidance and training are further augmented by a series of demon-
stration plots with emphasis placed on rice. There are two plots for
rice in every village that graphically illustrate to the farmer the
expected results from growing various varieties of rice with improved
techniques. The farmers have been quick to make the transition to the
new varieties once they realize their potential benefits. For ex-
ample, in North Kyongsang Province planting of the Tongil varieties
rose from 16.2 percent of hectarage in 1970 (for seed) to 69.6 per-
cent in 1978. Due to blast disease in 1979, the percentage dropped
to 62.4 percent in 1979 and to 48.4 percent in 1980. Because of the
disastrous harvest due to cold weather that year, the farmers in 1981
will plant perhaps two-thirds of their crop with traditional varieties
which are more resistant to cold and now blast as well. This illus-
trates that although the guidance officer may cajole and persuade,
he cannot dictate.

It is rare in any nation to see such a comprehensive and complete
system that has the institutional capacity to transform research into
production. Without it, an agricultural research program could not be
as effective so quickly. This transition from research to production
was further assisted by the growth of a rural road network that allowed
the guidance worker easy access to the villages and enabled the
farmers to have wider exposure to the outside world and to become a
part of a national food market.

If research was stressed and guidance spread the research re-
sults, then what happened on the farm? Aggregate data are not suffi-
cient to explain the condition of the individual farmer whose unique
situation is described below.


D. The Korean Farm

Effective land reforms after the Japanese occupation and in the
early period of the Korean Republic were a salient factor in improv-
ing rural equity in Korea. Korean farmer households, decreasing as
a percentage of the total population from 51.6 percent in 1968 to
28.9 percent in 1979, may not legally own more than three hectares of
farm land (excluding upland orchards). Some 29.8 percent of farm
families cultivate land under 0.5 ha, and 35.3 percent between one-
half and one hectare, 25.7 percent between one and two hectares; and
only 5.4 percent over two hectares. The consequences of relatively
equitable land distribution are that agricultural research and rural
development programs, if they reach the farm as they do in Korea, are
important factors in rural equity.

The growth of electrification of rural areas greatly contributed
both to improved production and increases in the standard of living.
Except perhaps for small, isolated islands and a few scattered farm-
houses, farm families have access to electricity (some 83 percent have
television sets). Even in villages that were traditionally composed of
swidden farmers, some could afford the 3,000 won monthly electric charges.

The pervasive use of plastic to retain moisture and retard weeds
on upland crops such as peppers, to protect against cold on rice seed-
lings, and to grow winter vegetables in the extensive plastic green-
houses have destroyed the traditional aesthetic scene of the Korean
landscape (creating a problem for those who paint in the traditional
oriental style), but without question it has improved farm income
and helped transform the rural economy.

The rural economic structure, however, is dependent on rice. It
provides more than half of the farm household income. Although the
area of irrigated paddy has generally remained constant, the area de-
voted to the higher yielding varieties of Tongil has risen nationally
from 15.9 percent of the rice area in 1972 to a high of 76.2 percent
in 1978. With this increase came a steady rise in production per
hectare from 3.86 MT to a high of 5.53 MT in 1977.

An increasing national market orientation by the farmer couDled
with an intensive campaign by guidance workers prompted this shift. It
was accompanied by improvements in cultivation techniques and techno-
logical innovations that also spurred the increased yields of the
traditional varieties of rice. This remarkable shift was predicated
on two factors beyond the farmers' control but at least in part with-
in the purview of agricultural research: the Tongil varieties in
their earlier years were resistant to blast disease and the normally
warm weather prevented cold from undercutting production increases.

It is common that new varieties of rice are resistant to blast
for a number of years,but it is equally apparent that new races of
blast develop, especially when vast contiguous areas are planted to
the same strain. This occurred in 1979, causing a drop both in


aggregate production of Tongil from 4,516/MMT in 1978 to 3,449/MMT in 1979
and with a per hectare production drop from 4.86 to 4.63 over the same
time. The extreme cold of 1980 devastated the Tongil crop cutting
production and yields by one-third, lowering farm income, and creating a
crisis of credibility between the farmer and the guidance worker, as well
as the government, which had advocated Tongil production. Thus in 1981,
although figures are not yet firm, the proportion of traditional varieties
of rice cultivated are likely to be about two-thirds to only one-third of
Tongil. Because cultivation techniques have improved, traditional varietal
yields are expected to be high.

Increasing farm income from rice has led to a decrease in other crops
included in this project and an overall decline in the land utilization
ratio--the land double-cropped. In 1970, it was 1.42, but in 1979 it was
1.30, indicating that farmers regard winter crops such as barley and wheat
as uneconomic and that they would prefer, acting economically, to put a
much smaller amount of land under winter cultivation in vegetables. "We
only grow barley," as many farmers remarked, "because there is nothing else
to do in winter." This lack of enthusiasm for barley, in spite of
government policy pronouncements, is only balanced by the special
production of two-row barley in the South under contract with brewing
companies that use it for malt.

Increases in use of pesticides and herbicides, which annually now cost
the farmer more than fertilizer, are reflective of the shortage of labor.
Whatever their potential deleterious environmental effects, they contribute
to a national short-term economic goal. Fertilizer use, however, declined
considerably in 1980 (to 828,000 MT from a high of 916,000 MT in 1978),
again reflecting increased costs in relation to returns.

The economic consequences of the improved varieties are apparent.
Until 1977, real income had risen--due to a strong government price support,
shift in favor of Tongil, and the improved technological package and
cultivation techniques that have spilled over not only to traditional rice
but to other crops as well. Farm income rose reducing the economic
disparity between the urban industrial class and the farmer. The
profitability of rice was correlated with size of area cultivated,
increased productivity, and the purchase price of rice. Increases of
income, although partially attributed to vegetable crops, were mostly a
product of Tongil cultivation.

Since 1977, however, the margin of profitability of Tongil has
declined rapidly. Yield differentials between Tongil and the traditional
varieties were more than 30 percent in 1977, but only 15 percent in 1980.
The higher market price for the traditional strains, and their better
resistance to cold and blast made them equally profitable, at least in
some areas. Because of the poor performance in 1980, many farmers will
opt for risk aversion and thus grow the older, more reliable, varieties.

Wheat and barley provide a different perspective. If the value of
farmers' unpaid labor and equipment are included, the costs of production


are above the market value. Considerable barley is still grown because
the winter opportunity costs for farm labor in some areas are minimal.

White potatoes and soybeans, however, were marginally profitable
in 1977, but demand has declined as they compete on the same land
with vegetable crops such as red peppers, onions, green onions, and
cucumbers, for which prices are higher.

The effects of improved agricultural technology on the farm have
been important. The Tongil strains require 20 to 30 percent more la-
bor. Thus there is an increased demand for labor at a time when
there have been massive population flows, especially of the most
productive men and women, to urban areas. Labor costs have increased
for both sexes, although disparities between them exist, and in some
areas farm labor is the least attractive alternative. For example,
in a fishing and farming village, male workers could earn daily only
6,000 won for farm work, but 10,000 won on the fishing boats.

In sum, there has been a substitution of mechanization for labor.
The mechanization hierarchy change is first to tillers (there were
289,000 in Korea in 1980) since the most expensive farm cost involves
cattle and male workers (female tiller operators are being trained by
ORD, a welcome change). The second change is to the mechanical trans-
planter, a less cost-effective measure as transplanting mainly involves
females at lower wages. The shortage of transplanting labor was apparent
during the evaluation, as even the military was mobilized to assist in
this process. The last change is to binders and small combines. As
the farm population moves to urban areas, theree will be an increasing
demand for mechanization, which will become ever more important and
will require increasing attention.

Agricultural research has contributed positively to rural equity.
It has provided far greater benefits for the farmers than for the
urban population, and thus, in a sense, represents a subsidy of the
rural population by the nation as a whole. 8/ It has helped both
smaller and larger landholders. The government's interest in rural
equity, both a political and an economic need, is expressed in rice
purchase price subsidies that have improved the rural-urban terms of
trade. In some regions, due to poor yields of the high-yielding
varieties, price support alone was not adequate to raise rural income.
Thus in Kwangwon Province, for example, rural incomes rose in the past
three years in current terms. In real terms, however, accounting
for inflation, they declined. The government has helped the small
holders (those with less than one-half hectare of paddy) by giving them
priority in rice purchases, especially in 1980. In 1981, because of a
current drought, the central government allocated $20 million to subsi-
dize farmers. It also provided mobile water pumps and planted addi-
tional, later seed beds of rice, the seedlings from which will be dis-
tributed free to small farmers if their current ones cannot be trans-
planted because of water shortages. The government's concern with
equity as an economic good and a political necessity seems real and

- See Appendix E, "Profitability, Costs and Revenue of Five Crops," by
Kwan S. Kim.


E. Social Factors in Korean Agricultural Development

The milieu of the Korean farm village is dualistic. It is marked
by increasing rationalization of farming patterns while retaining
time-honored consumption preferences. There is new physical mobility,
but traditional hierarchical family relationships are still evident.
Increased female employment in urban areas has not yet broken sex dis-
crimination in farm labor wages. Modern education is perceived to be
a positive goal, but much of what is taught is Confucian in content.
The farmer is cajoled by the government to grow certain crops and to
donate labor for village projects; but he may remain autonomous if he
feels his interests are threatened. Some of these changes have occurr-
ed as a result of increased agricultural production, a byproduct, in
part, of agricultural research.

There has been a major migration to urban areas, for the mecca of
the city is not only a call to the possibility of greater income; it
is also an escape from the monotony of village life and the stratifica-
tion of both the family and the village age and power structure. This
results in an aging of farmers. Farm families' sizes have also de-
clined from an average of 6.17 in 1975 to 5.03 persons in 1979. The
farm population under thirteen has declined by 1.3 million during this
period. More important for current labor needs on the farm, is the
drop in younger and middle-age workers between 1975 and 1979, the 14 to
19 year cohort declined from 1.9 million to 1.6 million and the 20 to
49 year group, from 4.2 million to 3.5 million, approximately equally
among both men and women. Labor has become increasingly scarce. Among
new Sae-maul-constructed houses, one can occasionally see a more traditional
one abandoned, now perhaps used for storage or animals.

The implications of these changes are important. Government figures
indicate about a 7 percent rate of tenancy; yet informal estimates indicate
that it may be higher and indeed is growing. Informal tenancy or working
for wages on land owned by those who have migrated, at least temporarily,
to urban areas has placed pressure on mechanization and the use of
herbicides, thus reducing labor demands for weeding. Since Tongil rice
requires more labor, and as barley for food is not profitable under present
circumstances but especially if cash is required to hire labor, there is
tension between the demands of national policy for higher yields of staple
grains and the national need for industrialized export production.

The increased demand for education, financed mainly by the consumer as
the government has invested less in education than in most developing
countries, has also contributed to mobility. The better educated the boy
or girl, the greater the likelihood of migration, for that is the goal. In
a Confucian society, education is not only an inherent good; it is the
social security of the family and the opportunity to escape to the
unrestricted anonymity of urban life. Increased education also reduces
family farm labor as children remain in school longer. So effective
research resulting in higher incomes increased off-farm migration.


The Sae-maul Movement has had a strong command element to its
diffusion to the villages. The distinction between taxation and voluntary
donations to Sae-maul projects, such as a village road or water system, and
between corvee labor and voluntary work is indistinct at best. Yet out of
this mandated structure has come greater village cooperation and perhaps as
well a sense of village pride that might continue to some degree should the
Sae-maul Movement end.

Perhaps most evident and of lasting importance is a shift in attitudes.
Korea has become a nation of farmers, no longer one of peasants. The rural
economy has been transformed from one of subsistence to market-oriented
production. Barter has given way to cash and micro-regional labor markets
have been turned into one national labor force. These changes are
generally positive, but they represent a more complex environment in which
the Korean Government will have a continuing and an even more pervasive
role that it will have tomanage with increasing care.

F. Macroeconomic Implications of Improved Technology

Although the impact of agricultural research can mostly be measured at
the farm level, its economy-wide effect is generally indirect in nature,
and more difficult to evaluate.

A readily measurable effect of the development of improved varieties
of rice in Korea, excluding the past three successive years of extremely
adverse weather, includes the government's saving of foreign exchange
through the reduction in rice imports. Before 1975, the year Korea
became self-sufficient in rice, imports of rice amounted to almost
$200 million (in current dollars) per year.

The improved varietal development may also have important indirect
effects on employment and growth in the economy. In Korea, the process
leading to these indirect effects must be understood in conjunction
with government pricing and purchase policy. Around the time of the
adoption of the improved rice varieties in the early 1970s, the govern-
ment instituted a package program of farm income support consisting
of farm producer price and fertilizer subsidies, as well as of sub-
sidies of other materials and supplies and procurement quotas for
rice and barley. These new policies clearly differed from the agri-
cultural policies in the 1950s and 1960s. In the 1960s, there was a
deliberate attempt to keep grain purchase prices and wages low. The
idea was to stimulate industrial expansion through enhanced profit
margins. Thus, industrial expansion was brought about at the expense
of the agricultural sector and at great cost to the farmers.

During the 1970s, the important role played by agricultural re-
search, along with the development of agricultural infrastructure and
the increased use of agricultural inputs, was to increase per hectare
yields of rice. Together with new government pricing and purchase
policies, it contributed to substantial increases in food production
and farm income.


Growth in the rural sector can contribute to industrial output and
employment growth. As real incomes in the farm sector increase, there will
be greater demand for, and production of, industrial goods (farm machinery,
farm inputs and consumer goods) and employment. This will lead to further
expansion of industries supplying intermediate inputs required for the
production in the initially expanded industries. This process can be seen
to continue indefinitely in a diminishing and involuted sequence.

The magnitude of this indirect effect on output and employment
growth depends on the structure of inter-industrial links within the
economy. The Korean economy has a well-integrated inter-industrial
structure. As such, the linkage effect on overall growth is sub-
stantial. These sequential impacts of new farm technology and govern-
ment agricultural policy in a macroeconomic setting during the 1970s
in Korea can be summarized in the diagram below:

Government Pricing
Purchase Policy Increased
-Urban Demand

Agricultural Higher Yields Increased Rural Growth in the
Research and in Agriculture Income Industrial
Complementary Sector

Recently the government's agricultural income support policy has been
increasingly subjected to criticism within the Korean Government and by
donors. Apart from the argument of economic inefficiency resulting from
the existing discrepancy between world market and farm support prices,
there have been concerns about growing government deficits on account of
the income support policy. According to the Economic Planning Board, in
recent years the annual deficit amounted to as much as $150 million. The
accumulated total deficit in the grain management account is expected to
be $1.7 billion by the end of 1981, of which about 39 percent was caused
by barley purchases.

Since these deficits have been drawn from the government general
account in the form of increased currency supply, the effect of farm
subsidy has obviously been inflationary. More importantly, during the
last two successive years of economic stagnation the government was
beginning to have increasing problems in financing the deficits, financing
that runs counter to the government stabilization policy. Already there
is some evidence that in recent years the terms of trade between farm
products and purchased commodities have turned against the farmers.

An important lesson from the Korean case is that the Green Revolution
could not have been successful without the vigorous enforcement of a
government income support program. In the absence of the immediate
prospects for a more favorable land-labor ratio or for the adoption of


highly mechanized farming methods, there is going to be the continued need
for a government price support policy to attain self-sufficiency in rice
and barley. Thus, this growing tension between attaining the goal of
national self-sufficiency and that of economic efficiency will likely
continue for many years.

G. Sustaining and Replicating Agricultural Research

Sustaining the agricultural research system in Korea will be sub-
ject to three basic stresses if economic conditions internally and
abroad continue to cause concern to the Korean leadership. First, Govern-
ment budgets are controlled by the Economic Planning Board (EPB) under
the Deputy Prime Minister. A few economic rationalists in the EPB
view rice and other grain production as uneconomic, for it is apparent
Korea could import at least double the rice it produces for the same
cost. More politically sophisticated views have prevailed and the
rice support price, which politically would be difficult to lower, may
keep rising, though more slowly than inflation, thus creating the illusion
or support without its actuality. Agricultural research budgets, the
second stress, as well as civil service research salaries (the third
stress) may not rise fast enough to prevent some exodus to academia.
There is little doubt, however, that in spite of these potential
problems the agricultural research program is well-established and
will continue. AID did not create it and AID did not dramatically
affect it, but AID did assist its growth.

The agricultural research program does not need to be replicated
in Korea. It already pervades the society. The question of replica-
bility abroad poses different issues. Any agricultural research pro-
ject should either be predicated upon, or have as components of the
project, a variety of other elements without which it will either fail
or prove to be an interesting, but essentially sterile, experiment.
Most important is an effective extension service, but without pricing
policies encouraging farmers, some rural infrastructure and communi-
cations, farm credit, and an overarching national policy encouraging
agricultural research and its use, such a program is unlikely to
succeed. It is fair to say that a similar project initiated in Korea
in the mid-1950s probably would have failed. The Korean agricultural
research model will be difficult to replicate in the Third World.


The Office of Rural Development is the nexus of agricultural change
in Korea. An efficient and pervasive governmental organization, it
gains much of its effectiveness through its capacity to plan and exe-
cute agricultural research, its dissemination of experimental findings
through a ubiquitous guidance (extension) system, training, cooperation
with the Sae-maul Movement, and its links in both research and train-
ing to the academic community at all levels. Its organizational coor-
dination of research and extension at the top of the bureaucracy gives
it the capacity to guide rural change.


highly mechanized farming methods, there is going to be the continued need
for a government price support policy to attain self-sufficiency in rice
and barley. Thus, this growing tension between attaining the goal of
national self-sufficiency and that of economic efficiency will likely
continue for many years.

G. Sustaining and Replicating Agricultural Research

Sustaining the agricultural research system in Korea will be sub-
ject to three basic stresses if economic conditions internally and
abroad continue to cause concern to the Korean leadership. First, Govern-
ment budgets are controlled by the Economic Planning Board (EPB) under
the Deputy Prime Minister. A few economic rationalists in the EPB
view rice and other grain production as uneconomic, for it is apparent
Korea could import at least double the rice it produces for the same
cost. More politically sophisticated views have prevailed and the
rice support price, which politically would be difficult to lower, may
keep rising, though more slowly than inflation, thus creating the illusion
or support without its actuality. Agricultural research budgets, the
second stress, as well as civil service research salaries (the third
stress) may not rise fast enough to prevent some exodus to academia.
There is little doubt, however, that in spite of these potential
problems the agricultural research program is well-established and
will continue. AID did not create it and AID did not dramatically
affect it, but AID did assist its growth.

The agricultural research program does not need to be replicated
in Korea. It already pervades the society. The question of replica-
bility abroad poses different issues. Any agricultural research pro-
ject should either be predicated upon, or have as components of the
project, a variety of other elements without which it will either fail
or prove to be an interesting, but essentially sterile, experiment.
Most important is an effective extension service, but without pricing
policies encouraging farmers, some rural infrastructure and communi-
cations, farm credit, and an overarching national policy encouraging
agricultural research and its use, such a program is unlikely to
succeed. It is fair to say that a similar project initiated in Korea
in the mid-1950s probably would have failed. The Korean agricultural
research model will be difficult to replicate in the Third World.


The Office of Rural Development is the nexus of agricultural change
in Korea. An efficient and pervasive governmental organization, it
gains much of its effectiveness through its capacity to plan and exe-
cute agricultural research, its dissemination of experimental findings
through a ubiquitous guidance (extension) system, training, cooperation
with the Sae-maul Movement, and its links in both research and train-
ing to the academic community at all levels. Its organizational coor-
dination of research and extension at the top of the bureaucracy gives
it the capacity to guide rural change.


The agricultural research project ended in 1980. Its targets of
increases in agricultural yields are to be achieved by 1984. Seven
trainees sent abroad under the project are still overseas; those who have
returned have done so only recently and cannot be expected to have made a
major contribution at the time of this report. This evaluation is thus
circumscribed by these factors.

Agricultural research was an appropriate intervention for AID.
The project materially assisted in the development of the institution-
al infrastructure of the Office of Rural Development which was al-
ready well-established. It provided, however, only limited benefits.
The most important benefits were: first, training; and secondly, equip-
ment, including a computer and library materials. Resident expatriate
technical assistance was of marginal utility, although short-term
expert advice was more important. The project provided little that
was innovative. The multidisciplinary research team concept was only
a modest improvement on the existing structure. Assistance in fos-
tering agricultural research could have resulted from a simple train-
ing and equipment project, with short-term advisory services as re-

If the project was more complex than necessary, the project paper
was simplistic in its design and somewhat misleading in its data. In
spite of a comparatively comprehensive data base, it underestimated
existing yields in the experimental stations and the farms. It called
for breakthroughs on research resulting in higher yields, but the ma-
jor innovations occurred prior to the project. The reliance on average
experimental yields was a convenient, but spurious, concept.

The areas of project concentration were rice, barley, wheat, soy-
beans, white potatoes, and cropping systems. Rice was a critical and
appropriate concern, being paramount in national policy terms. In
spite of inconsistencies in government grain support prices, barley
was also important. Cropping systems were another critical area, but
little was done in this field. Concentration on soybeans might have
been useful, but here again little was accomplished. Potatoes and
wheat research was minor, both because of extensive imports of wheat
and the marginal value of potatoes in the Korean diet. Given
already apparent trends in Korean migration, labor supply, and cropping
patterns, attention should have focused on vegetable production and
mechanization as well as rice, barley and cropping systems. Even in
those priority areas, the contributions of this research project to
Korean agricultural growth are necessarily blurred. The project was
useful, indeed overall beneficial, but certainly not critical.

Trends showing a decline in barley, wheat, potato and soybean
hectarage were apparent before the project began. Although project goals
may be reached in some of these crops by 1984, statistically aggre-
gate yields are likely to continue to drop. Thus, national goals
will probably not be met although a relatively small number of in-
dividual farmers may benefit. Rice production may reach its targets
by that date, but if this is accomplished it is likely that it will


be attained with only a modest contribution from the project itself.
Project targets calling for heightened crop responsiveness to fertilizer
consumption seem inappropriate in light of the petroleum crisis of 1973 and
the increase in prices and Korean import requirements. Rather, increased
yields with less fertilizer or attention to green manure crops might have
been a more logical goal.

The responsiveness of the Office of Rural Development to national and
thus political goals of heightened rice production was both its strength
and weakness. It moved with alacrity against the advice of some
researchers, to expand the Tongil varieties to satisfy bureaucratic
requirements in the Korean hierarchical political culture. The choice of
the name "Tongil" ("unification") is indicative of its political importance.
It reacted too quickly, however, especially in light of the knowledge that
cold weather can potentially damage Tongil rice and new races of blast
fungus normally develop after a few years if a single strain is spread too
extensively. It would have been more prudent to release Tongil gradually,
supplementing it with other new and traditional varieties whose production
also could be increased because of technological innovations and improved
cultivation. This approach in the long-term might have been more
successful, but the command system of the Korean Government demanding
short-term gains and statistical manipulation to reach a political objective
was given priority over longer-term research and production needs.

It might have been possible to avoid the decrease in rice production
in 1979 due to blast and to mitigate the disastrous fall in rice yields in
1980 had the researchers been able to control dissemination and diversify
production. Thus, the strengths of the Korean agricultural research and
guidance system, its integration and political importance, proved also to
be its elemental weakness.


The Korean experience in rural development may be close to unique for
there are few, if any, countries that are able to mobilize the variety
and quality of resources that are required for the rural sector to
prosper and agricultural research projects to succeed. Yet if Korea
cannot be readily emulated and its agricultural research and rural
development model exported, as are so many Korean manufactured pro-
ducts, there are generalizations that can be drawn from the Korean

A. A successful agricultural research program requires a
major national commitment.

This commitment not only takes the form of allocation of public
resources for the support of the project; it also includes that in-
distinct quality that is sometimes referred to as political will. A
successful adaptive research program requires an understanding that
such research is a matter of high national policy. Thus it requires
normally more than single-line support by a ministry of agriculture,
but should involve other relevant cabinet level officials. The corol-
lary to this lesson is:


B. Too great an emphasis on achievement of targets and too strong
a command structure can lead to indiscriminate concentration on
shorter term results.

This can, as in the Korean case, lead to discounting the long-term
effects, such as pollution, too rapid dissemination of new varieties, or
other major problems. Attempting indiscriminately to attain unrealistic
targets can lead to inappropriate use of personnel and resources. It
can result in manipulation of statistics. Thus the relationship be-
tween placing priority on agriculture and its adaptive research pro-
gram must be carefully balanced with its longer range implications.

C. Agricultural pricing and procurement policies must provide suffi-
cient motivation to the farmers for the incorporation of experi-
mental research results onto farmers' fields.

A successful research and experimental program will not succeed
if national pricing and procurement policies discourage farmers from
reaping the benefits of higher yields or improved strains. The Korean
experience has shown that even traditional farmers are often econo-
mically rational and are willing to adopt new technologies if they
are assured of opportunities for increased incomes while minimizing

D. An agricultural research program can only be effective if it is

Adaptive research requires a continuous testing, breeding and
training program, without which short-term gains may dissolve. There
are no single, one-shot, solutions to agricultural research, no matter
how successful any single intervention may be.

E. There must be administrative integration of agricultural research
and extension.

Separate administrative structures, even within the same ministry,
will likely result in poor coordination between research and extension,
thus obviating the usefulness of the project. The Korea case demon-
strates the need for integration both at the top of the command struc-
ture and in rural areas.

F. Agricultural research, extension and agricultural education should
be coordinated or integrated.

Too often agricultural education, which provides the basic train-
ing for extension staff and government personnel, has no formal adminis-
trative coordination at any level with the future employment of grad-
uates. Responsibilities are often split between a ministry of agri-
culture and a ministry of education. In the Korea case, effective
coordination exists between the Office of Rural Development at the
center and the College of Agriculture, Seoul National University.
Indeed it occurs at provincial agricultural high schools (training


future extension workers) and the provincial or gun agricultural ex-
tension and research workers, both in curriculum and staffing. It
has proven effective.

G. The government must have the fiscal and administrative capacity
to deliver services and commodities in support of the rural

The Korean government spends some $20 million a year on extension
service salaries alone, exclusive of administration and research. It
also allocates considerable resources, through the National Agricul-
tural Cooperative Federation and the Agricultural Development Corpora-
tion, for the delivery of commodities, subsidized credit, and the
development of rural infrastructure. Agricultural research will not
succeed unless there is a major national fiscal commitment coupled
with administrative services and support.

H. PL 480 can be a deterrent to improved agricultural pricing policies
and thus retard an effective agricultural research program.

Heavy emphasis on PL 480 commodity support, as in Korea in the
1950s and 1960s, can slow national reform of pricing and procurement
policies, thus inhibiting an effective agricultural research effort.
It also diminishes farmer incentives for increased production.

I. Training is a critical element of an agricultural research program.

In Korea, there was universal regard that training was the most
critical element of the project. A training program built into an
agricultural research project is a necessary component essential to
the production of most agricultural research results. It must be
complemented by a commitment to employ effectively those trained with
adequate professional and personal incentives.

J. Adoption of the high-yielding varieties (HYV) leads to both positive
and negative impacts on the economy.

The production of HYV is generally accompanied by increased costs of
inputs and in some cases, soil impoverishment. The increases in
production are generally associated with greater demands in soil
nutrients. Resources must be directed not only toward improving yields
but also to decreasing susceptibility to disease and insects. Potential
adverse environmental conditions should also be anticipated and

K. Technical assistance should be carefully reviewed before it is
included in the project.

Short-term, highly specialized technical assistance was regarded as
useful in Korea, but long-term resident technical assistance proved less
effective. In the Korean case, the institutional structure already


existed and long-term expatriates were not an essential component of the
project. Careful consideration should be given to the need for such
resident assistance on the basis of the institutional capacity of the local
research system and the level of indigenous available trained personnel.
Expatriate technicians should not automatically be included on agricultural
research projects, no matter how much this may ease an internal AID
administrative burden.

L. Continuing contacts are essential with the international agricultural
research centers.

National adaptive research requires the interchange of plant materials
and personnel with the international agricultural centers and foreign
universities. Without such contacts, progress will be slowed.

M. The success of the Sino-centric societies in the field of agriculture
and overall development should be studied to determine the possible
causative effects of such a cultural milieu.

The remarkable achievements of Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and China in
agriculture, their success in other economic areas (including Singapore
and Hong Kong), the economic acumen of the overseas Chinese in Southeast
Asia and the Chinese, Japanese and Korean communities in the United States
may be a result of a particular cultural context that in some manner
encourages economic development and farmer entrepreneurship. Although this
conclusion may be regarded as speculative, the success of all of these
cultures should prompt inquiry into the causes of such progress. If there
are universalistic solutions to development problems, as donors predict,
there may be culturally specific ones as well.



The technique for the rapid rural appraisal of a nationally focused
project must, by its nature, differ from one that is site-specific in scope.
Given this approach, the problem of a statistically reliable sampling of a
national project cannot be solved within the time and funds available. A
number of site visits that differ by region, province, accessibility, cli-
matic conditions, crop mix, and socioeconomic status of inhabitants, yield
fascinating but anecdotal information; a valid sampling technique is not

The problem is further complicated because sole focus on the project
objectives raises more issues than it solves. The project suffered from
spurious specificity: objectives of specific crop yields per hectare on
experimental farms. This objective was inappropriate, because for all
crops there is such diversity of testing of dozens or even hundreds of
varieties that an "average" yield, however defined (and this was never
done), is meaningless. In some cases (wheat and barley) the research
objective on improved yields on these crops was not really paramount. It
had basically been improved before the project began. What was more impor-
tant was the breeding and testing of early maturing strains combined with
resistance to lodging, wetness, and disease.

Whatever the project objectives in agricultural research, whether
institution-building or yield improvement, the critical methodological,
intellectual, and practical problems are in making the link between pro-
duction in a research setting in the laboratory or on the experimental farm
and that which is taking place in the farmers' fields. In Korea, the
transformation of research results into practical farm production and
increases in income is a product of the "guidance" system, the extension
service. Both research and guidance are functions of the Office of Rural
Development. Although the project only marginally mentioned average farm
yields, the inescapable conclusion from early project information available
in Washington was that this issue should be central to the evaluation, and
therefore considerable time should be spent in determining the effectiveness
of the guidance system.

The team thus determined that the evaluation should consist of gathering
four levels of data recording the sequence from national policy to the farm

-- National information on crops, yields, incomes and expenditures
together with relevant data on macroeconomic statistics related
to agriculture; grain pricing and procurement policies, employment,
imports and exports, etc.;

-- Experimental station crop and research results at the key stations
throughout the country engaged in efforts related to the loan;


-- Provincial level agricultural data together,with an analysis of the
extension (guidance) service and its effectiveness in transforming
experimental and demonstration results into farm yields; and,

-- Village and farm level data.

The team visited central research and experimental facilities at Suwon
for several days collecting national data, interviewing trainees, and
inspecting equipment purchased under the AID loan. Two short field trips
were first arranged, and then a nationwide safari covering over 2,300 kilo-
meters (km). A separate two-day trip was taken to review development on
the island province of Cheju. The team covered some 2,700 km in total.
All key crop experimental stations were visited: Chunchon, Kangwon Province
for cold water tolerance rice research; The Honam Research Station, Iri,
South Chungchon Province for rice, barley, and wheat; The Yeongnam Research
Station, Miryang, South Kyongsang Province for the same crops; the Yeongduk
Experimental Station in North Kyongsang Province for rice; and the Alpine
Research Station in Chinbu, Kangwon Province (800 meters high) for cold air
temperature tolerance for rice.

In addition, extensive discussions took place with Provincial Office
of Rural Development staff in Kwangju, South Cholla Province; Taegu, North
Kyongsang Province; Chunchon, Kangwon Province and Cheju City, Cheju Province.
A visit to the gun (county) office in Heongsong, Kangwon Province, provided
detailed information at that level. Officials were also interviewed at the
myon (district) level, between the gun and village levels.

The selection of villages to be visited was arbitrary, but a reasonably
representative sample was obtained based on province, cropping systems and
employment, ostensible wealth and poverty, and remoteness. Only one village
visit was suggested by gun officials, reportedly a wealthy village near
Kyongju, North Kyongsang Province. A few villages were chosen because of
their accessibility to main roads, but more were picked because they seemed
poor and remote, often requiring tortuous travel along tracks far from the
paved or major dirt roads.

The team was determined to find out whether the guidance service reached
the most isolated villages. Toward this end, it spent one day in the remote
mountain reaches of a sparsely inhabited region of Kangwon Province in an
inaccessible area that barely allowed wheeled vehicular travel, on a track with
precipitous drops of hundreds of feet without guard rails. Farmers who only
fifteen years ago had been swidden cultivators were interviewed, some of
whom now had television sets; even in this area the guidance officers visited
once a month. In other villages they came almost too often--sometimes daily--
according to some villagers.

In South Kyongsang Province, a remote valley was spontaneously selected
by the team in an area that was obviously poor. Proceeding to a virtually
inaccessible village isolated at the head of the valley, the last inhabitants
in that area at the end of the dirt track, the team found two guidance workers,
a man and a woman, working in the village. The latter was assisting in a day care

center for pre-school children. To all outward appearances this village
was poor, but there was a higher level of income than might have been
expected. Although rice production levels were low, due to the cultivation
of persimmon and chestnut trees, incomes were quite good. Conversely, in
some villages that gave the outward appearance of wealth based on improved
and modernized Sae-maul housing, income did not seem as high. In all
cases, the villages had some type of Sae-maul Movement activity along both
productive and social lines (see Appendix G). The team talked with perhaps
one hundred farmers and their wives, although greater attention was paid to
the farmers as their wives were interviewed in more detail in the 1980 AID
Impact Evaluation Report No. 12, Korea Irrigation (quod vide).

The team interviewed farmers who mainly grew rice, those who double-
cropped with barley or other crops, some who grew tobacco or potatoes or
soybeans, those small farmers who had less than one-half hectare of land
and some who had up to three hectares, and a few villagers who both farmed
and fished.

The team consisted of David I. Steinberg, AID team leader, with a long
record of involvement in Korea studies; Dr. Robert Jackson, of the AID
Development Support Bureau's Office of Agriculture and an agronomist; and
Dr. Kwan S. Kim, Professor of Economics at Notre Dame University and an
employee of AID. This group was ably assisted by Dr. Song Hae-kyun, an
Agricultural Education Specialist of the College of Agriculture, Seoul
National University,who is also a consultant to the Office of Rural Develop-
ment. For short biographies see Appendix M, "Notes on the Authors."

Interviews were conducted in Korean, and extensive use was made of
locally available Korean language sources (see Bibliography, Appendix K).
No official of the guidance service accompanied the team nor did they
suggest (with one exception noted above) site visits.



May 21 evening: Arrival in Seoul.

May 22 morning: Visit to Embassy, arrange logistics for study.

afternoon: Courtesy call to the Office of Rural Development, Suwon,
Kyonggi Province.

May 23 Field Visit to Kwangju gun, Kyonggi Province, to interview farmers.

May 24 Field Visit to Yangju gun, Kyonggi Province, to interview farmers.

May 25 Field Visit to Office of Rural Development, Suwon, Kyonggi Province.

May 26 It It I t

May 27 "i ii If

May 28 Field Visit to Chunchon, Kangwon Province, Cold Water Tolerance
Experimental Station; Provincial Office of Rural Development, Kangwon
Province; Heong Song gun, Kangwon Province, to interview farmers.

May 29 Field Trip to Iri, North Cholla Province, Honam Crop Experimental
Station, to interview farmers.

May 30 Provincial Office of Rural Development, Kwangju, South Cholla
Province, and Mokpo, to interview farmers.

May 31 Chungmu, South Kyongsang Province, and Pusan, to interview farmers.

June 1 Miryang Crop Experimental Station, South Kyongsang Province, to
interview farmers.

June 2 Taegu, North Kyongsang Province, Office of Rural Development, to
Kyongju, North Kyongsang Province, to interview farmers.

June 3 Kyongju, North Kyongju, North Kyongsang Province, to interview

June 4 Yeongduk Crop Experimental Station, North Kyongsang Province, to
interview farmers in mountainous areas.

June 5 Samchoek, Kangwon Province, to interview farmers in farming and
fishing village.

June 6 Kangnung, and Chinbu Alpine Crop Experiment Station, Kangwon Province.

June 7
to 13 Seoul--Report Drafting


June 14 Cheju Province (by plane). Visit Provincial Office of Rural Devel-
opment, and interview farmers.

June 15 Cheju Province, to interview farmers.

June 16 Debriefing, Office of Rural Development.

June 17 Debriefing, U.S. Embassy.

June 18 Departure from Korea.





Korea's shift from rice-importing to self-sufficiency in a relatively
short time during the early 1970s is an exceptional achievement. It is
unfortunate that cold weather and rice blast late in that decade have
decreased rice production to a level where the country must again import
rice. The story of this rapid increase in production is remarkable and
could come about only in a country like Korea where the infrastructure is
well established, and where there was a relatively vast amount of technical
information available for increasing production. The recent decline in
production is no doubt closely linked to the desire to increase rice
production in the shortest possible time span.

A. Background

Korea's recent agriculture policy has been to become and remain self-
sufficient in staple food production, particularly in rice. Self-sufficiency
reduces the drain of foreign exchange for food imports and lessens the
dependence on food coming from surplus-producing countries. As rice is the
most important food in Korea, a greater effort has been given to this crop
than to some of the other food crops, such as barley, wheat, soybeans and

The apparent solution to the ever-increasing demand for food, coupled
with the limited area of arable land, is increased productivity. One method
of increasing productivity is through improved agricultural technology,
the basis for which is research. It was agreed that an AID-financed loan
to Korea to assist in financing training of scientists, purchase of equip-
ment and supplies, and providing qualified foreign scientists would enhance
the research system. The project identified five crops with which to work,
of which rice was one.

More specifically, the project identified the following targets for rice:

-- Select and develop strains that will increase the present crop
experiment station yield of 4.79 metric tons per hectare (MT/ha)
to 6.0 by the end of 1983, and actual farm production yields from
the present average (1972) of 3.25 MT/ha to an estimated 4.5 MT/ha
within the same period.

-- Develop new strains which will possess the following characteristics:

-- a growth and maturity period shorter by ten to 15 days, and at
the same time be responsive to higher fertilization levels;

-- improved grain quality standards, including higher protein and
lower amylose content, and kernel shapes more acceptable to
the consumers.

-- tolerance for cold temperatures, especially in the seedling
stage and during the ripening period, and shorter maturing;

-- resistance to blast disease, bacterial leaf blight, virus
stripe disease, brown leaf hopper, green leaf hopper, rice
stem borer and other insects and diseases.

Probably one of the most important dates in Korea's agricultural
history was 1965, when the first cross was made leading to the release of
the japonica-indica hybrid to farmers in 1972 to produce seed. The primary
purpose for making this cross was to introduce genes resistant to rice
blast from the indica rice and to retain the other desirable characteristics
of the commonly grown japonicas. It was realized by rice breeders, however,
that this wide cross could result in poor grain quality (taste), low seed
set (fertility) and also low grain yield. Indica rice grew very tall, so
it was susceptible to lodging, and it did not mature under natural
conditions in Korea. During the selection process in the early generations,
lines were selected for the earlier maturing and shorter plant height
characteristics similar to the japonica type grown in Korea. After careful
observations and selections for 12 generations, the variety Tongil was
widely disseminated to farmers in 1974. Close cooperation and collaboration
between the Office of Rural Development (ORD) and the International Rice
Research Institute (IRRI) made it possible to grow two generations of rice
each calendar year in the tropical IRRI climate.

The cultivation of the Tongill/ variety and subsequently released
varieties proved that Korea could attain rice self-sufficiency for three or
four years (see Table C-1, p. C-7). Due to unforeseen circumstances, these
japonica-indica hybrids have been somewhat disappointing during the 1978-
1980 seasons, as colder conditions than normal prevailed and the rice blast
disease became much more severe.

Korea has been virtually unique in its rice program in that few, if
any, countries have developed such a complete technical, informational and
economic package to instruct and encourage farmers to change many of their
traditional practices. The Korean experience is so different and so
comprehensive that it is worthy of description. No facet was left
uncovered in this comprehensive program.

The complete package associated with the introduction of Tongil rice
changed the traditional farming technology. The expansion of Tongil rice
intensified and speeded a comprehensive well-organized and effective
agricultural extension service. Along with the concentrated expansion of
the new rice strain, joint planning and encouragement of the farmers were
attained through concentrated administrative support by the government.
The resulting increased production of Tongil brought about several changes
in the consumption patterns of farm households. Changes in farming
technology and socioeconomic conditions were brought about with the
relatively rapid increase in the areas cultivated with Tongil.

1For the sake of brevity, Tongil is used throughout this paper to include
it and all subsequently released japonica-indica varieties.


B. Improvements in Farming Technology

The most obvious benefit from the cultivation of Tongil was the
increase in productivity for the three years after its introduction. The
area planted to rice remained practically constant during these years, and
the total production significantly increased by about one-third (See
Table C-2, p. C-7).

Undoubtedly, the adoption of the new cultural practices was just as
important, if not more so, in attaining self-sufficiency in rice as the
planting of Tongil. This improved technology has been used more recently
in the cultivation of the traditionally grown rice and has resulted in a
very significant increase in productivity.

-- Farmers became aware of the advantage of high quality seed with
the introduction of Tongil. This seed was produced by ORD, which
took the necessary steps to ensure that the rice was purer and
higher in germination than that usually planted by farmers. In
addition to accelerating the selection program of growing alter-
nate generations at IRRI and in Korea, seed was multiplied in the
Philippines and flown to Korea for distribution to selected farmers.
This seed multiplication program shortened the program by one year
and Korea became self-sufficient in rice one year earlier. The
Philippine seed was planted on farms throughout the country as
demonstration trials. The extension workers were provided
opportunities to observe the adaptability of Tongil under various local
conditions and at the same time were able to hold training sessions
on cultural practices at the demonstration sites. These trials were
also used as multiplication plots and seed was harvested for the
following year for distribution to an increased number of farmers.

-- Tongil requires earlier planting in the seed beds than the tradi-
tional varieties at times when the temperatures are lower. To
protect it from the cold weather at sowing required the use of
improved beds covered with plastic (See Tables C-3 and C-4, p. C-8).

-- Virgin soil, lime and silicate fertilizers were more frequently
applied by farmers planting Tongil. They also did a better job of
preparing their fields by plowing more times prior to transplanting
the rice seedlings (See Table C-5, p. C-8).

-- An advantage of Tongil is its ability to withstand heavier rates
of fertilizer application without lodging and thus be more pro-
ductive. Tongil farmers' soils were tested and rates of fertilizer
determined for optimum yields. The method of applying fertilizer
was changed; in addition to the basal application at the time of
transplanting, the number of applications of top dressing was
increased from about two times with the traditional varieties to
three times with Tongil. The fertilizers were applied with more
systematic methods.


-- The Tongil farmers used larger quantities and more applications of
agricultural chemicals to control diseases and insects than those
planting the traditional varieties.

-- The total area of application of herbicides for weed control was
increased and at the same time manual weed control decreased.

-- The farmers' methods of irrigation have been changed from the
continuously flooded condition to that of intermittent irrigation.

-- Improvement in harvesting and drying was an important lesson for
farmers to learn. Formerly, they stored the harvested grain
without properly drying it in order to save time for barley plan-
ting. This method yielded lower quality and quantity of rice.
Tongil shatters quite readily and must be threshed soon after
harvesting. The farmers had to change their method and this
shortened storage time in bundles reduced the shattering losses
and increased the quality.

-- Farmers planting Tongil have shifted their dates of sowing, trans-
planting and harvesting, making them all earlier than those for
the farmers growing traditional rice (See Table C-3). This makes
it possible to increase barley production as more rice fields can
be planted with barley as a second or winter crop. However, rather
than increase the area planted to barley, the Tongil rice farmers
have increased the area of land planted to cash crops such as
vegetables because of the greater economic benefits from vegetables
compared to barley.

C. The Role of the Extension Service

The Extension Service played a critical part in the rapid and broad
dissemination of information regarding the Tongil variety and the necessary
technical knowledge associated with its production. Farmers' meetings,
radio broadcasts, and use of the village amplifier systems and TV sets were
all important means of training farmers to shift to Tongil (See Table C-6, p. C-9).

Farmers were offered technical farm training sessions during the winter
months so that they were able to improve their farm management techniques.
These training programs were basic to bringing the national average pro-
ductivity of Tongil to nearly that of the experimental plots.

The group farming or cooperative farming program made it easier for
the extension workers to perform more efficiently and effectively through
group contacts rather than through individuals. The group worked together,
all using the improved variety and cultural techniques to attain higher


D. Economic Benefits Associated with Tongil

The assets of those farmers planting Tongil increased more than those
who continued planting traditional rice without any changes in technology.
Their farm size, number of farm buildings, power tillers, power sprayers
and mechanically driven threshers have all increased more rapidly than
those of the non-cultivators of Tongil. Even their holdings of farm
livestock have increased.

Prior to the introduction of Tongil, the government purchased a
limited quantity of rice shortly after harvest for storage and to stabilize
the price. Since the government's purchasing price was lower than that of
the free market, farmers refused to sell their rice at the time of harvest.
However, with the introduction of Tongil, the farmers sold their rice to
the government soon after threshing and it was able to meet its goal.

E. Cooperation with IRRI

At the end of 1968, a cooperative agreement between IRRI and Korea
(ORD) was signed. This provided for training Korean scientists at IRRI,
five the first and subsequent few years. Koreans were to be trained in
several of the agricultural disciplines, including breeding, soil
chemistry, soil microbiology, weed control, disease and insect control, and
rice quality. Along with training, it was agreed to continue the coopera-
tive varietal improvement program. One 6f the targets of this program was
to increase the number of generations of hybrids in the breeding program
to two each year by growing a summer crop in Korea and the second one during
the winter months in the Philippines at IRRI. This combination led to a
cooperative training and research program.

In a similar manner to the varietal improvement program, seeds of any
newly released varieties were increased in the Philippines during the
Korean winter months. This enabled the ORD to accelerate its dissemination
of new varieties to the farmers. From the release of Tongil to present,
several hundred tons of rice seed have been multiplied at IRRI and air-
freighted to Korea for distribution to farmers.

Much credit is given to IRRI for the strategy involving a three-way
cross between indica and japonica types to produce high-yielding varieties
(HYV). Tongil was the first HYV released in Korea.

In close collaboration with the Korean agricultural universities and
IRRI, ORD made excellent use of their facilities and technical information
in developing the new HYVs. This has had a very unifying effect between
IRRI and Korea.

F. Project Targets

Average yields from rice grown on experiment station plots provide
little, if any, meaningful data. There are many strains, selections and/
or varieties cultivated under various conditions. Thus to make a valid
comparison of the experimental yields at several stations, or even one


for that matter, is very nebulous. The project target to increase "experi-
ment station yields of 4.79 MT/ha to 6.0 MT/ha by the end of 1983" is very
misleading. It is interesting to note that ORD reported yields of Tongil
at experiment stations of 6.24 MT/ha in 1970, higher than the initial
figure and even greater than that projected for 1983.

On the other hand, to make a comparison of actual farm production
yields with those stated in the project paper is much more valid, espec-
ially in Korea where massive agricultural statistics are readily available
(See Table C-2). Before the loan was made to Korea, the improved variety,
Tongil, yielded 3.86 MT/ha in 1972, about 0.6 MT/ha greater than that noted
in the project for that year. Every year from 1972 through 1979, the
national average or farm production yields have surpassed the project goal
for 1983.

During the team's discussion and observations, only three character-
istics other than yield, were found to be of much concern. Resistance to
blast, tolerance to cold, and shorter maturity were all cited as major
constraints still to be overcome, yet several others are noted in the
original project. There is still a taste preference for the traditional
or japonica rice.


Table C-1 Rice Production and Imports

(1000 MT)











(1000 MT)Y








Self Sufficiency










Table C-2 Area, Production and Productivity of Rice

Area (1000 ha)
Year Traditional Tons

1970 1,203















S Production(1000 MT)
,il Traditional Tongil























Traditional Tongil


3,32 3,86

3,69 4,73

3,51 5,03

3,96 4,79

4,23 5,53

4,35 4,86

4,37 4,63

Percent Area
With Tongil








of Agriculture and Forestry Statistics, 1980










Source: Yearbook


Table C-3 Changes in Dates of Farm Operations


Rice Scwa in nursery

Rice transplanted

Rice harvested

Barley sown

Table C-4 Adaption of P








Table C-5 Application o









May 3

June 19

October 21

October 28

plastic Covered Seed Beds

Plastic Covered
Seed Beds (%)







f Silicate Fertilizer

Amount (1000 MT)








April 19

June 6




Table C-6 Radio and TV Farm Programs
Year Radio TV

1970 508 5

1973 1,341 58

1974 1,123 46

1975 1,103 77

1976 1,410 64

1977 1,186 82





A. Purposes and Targets

One of the purposes of the AID-financed loan for agricultural
research in Korea was to assist in varietal improvement of the five
major food crops: rice, barley, wheat, soybeans and white potatoes.
In addition to research on varietal improvement, the development of
improved cropping systems was part of the project as well.

Specific targets were established for each of the crops, both for
yield increases on the experiment station and on farmers' fields for
the crops covered in the project with the exception of potatoes.
Improved varieties of potatoes resistant to viruses, insect control
measures, and methods of processing and marketing were stated as pro-
ject targets. The targets for rice are presented in Appendix C.

Aims included the development of new varieties and strains of
soybeans capable of increasing present (1973) yields from 1.98 MT/ha
to a target level of 3.2 MT/ha, and increasing farmers' yields from
0.8 to 1.3 MT/ha by the end of 1983. These improved soybeans were
to be more responsive to higher plant populations per unit area of
land, resistant to lodging and at the same time responsive to higher
rates of fertilizer, higher in protein and oil content, shorter in
maturity, and resistant to the economically important pests. Re-
search on cultural practices was also an item for consideration.

New strains of barley were to be selected and developed so that
the experiment station yield of 2.79 MT/ha was to be increased to
3.6 MT/ha and farmers' yields increased from 2.04 MT/ha to 3.0 MT/ha
within a ten-year period. A variety 10 to 15 days shorter in maturity,
more resistant to cold temperatures, more responsive to higher rates
of fertilizer without lodging, resistant to common barley insects and
diseases, and tolerant to waterlogged paddy soils was to be developed.

Similar characteristics for wheat were stated in the project
paper. Experiment station yields were to be increased from 4.3 MT/ha
to 5.2 MT/ha, and on-farm yields from 2.24 to 4.0 MT/ha. The new
varieties were to incorporate the following characteristics: growing
period reduced from 20 to 15 days, improved milling qualities, higher
protein, better baking quality, resistance to diseases and insects
and tolerance to cold and more poorly drained paddy soils.

There were also five main targets for cropping systems, but as
the team saw little evidence of any research results from this
component of the project, no other comments will be made.

B. Rice

Research on rice has undoubtedly made the greatest contribution
to the Korean agricultural economy through the development and release

of the japonica-indica (Tongil) hybrids and the technological package
to accompany these hybrids. This package has also been applied to the
cultivation of the traditional varieties and their productivity has
increased to a level comparable with the hybrids (see Appendix C,
Table 2).

C. Wheat

Wheat has probably received more than its share of research ef-
fort if wheat production and import statistics are used as a basis
for judgment. Production and area cultivated has steadily declined
over the past ten years but imports have increased; thus, overall the
demand for wheat has waxed. This may be partly due to the shift in
farm population to the urban centers and dietary changes. The
productivity of wheat has increased and this can be largely attributed
to the successful research program.

More specifically, the wheat scientists have been conducting re-
search on the following characteristics:

-- Earliness
-- Erect plant types
-- Dwarfness
-- High yield
-- Good grain quality plumpness and protein content
-- Drought tolerance
-- Resistance to sprouting in the head
-- Disease resistance including scab, powdery mildew, stem rust
-- Winter hardiness
-- Tolerance to wet paddy soils

It is clearly evident from this list of characteristics that the
wheat research carried out is in conformity with that stated in the
project paper.

One of the most commendable aspects of the wheat improvement
program is the close cooperation between the International Wheat and
Maize Center in Mexico (CIMMYT) and U.S. universities. AID finan-
cially supports the research on wheat at CIMMYT, Oregon State Univer-
sity and until recently the University of Nebraska.

Oregon State University has provided materials for the Inter-
national Winter Spring Wheat Screening Nursery (IWSWSN) since 1973.
Two nurseries have been sent by the University of Nebraska, the Inter-
national Winter Wheat Performance Nursery (IWWPN) and the High Protein,
High Lysine Observation Nursery (HPON). The IWWPN has been grown each
year since 1968. CIMMYT has provided the International Bred Wheat
Screening Nursery (IBWSN) since 1974.

D. Barley

The area cultivated with barley has steadily declined during the
last decade. The production has remained relatively constant, with


the exception of 1977 when the crop was severely damaged by a typhoon.
Most important, the productivity has significantly increased during
this period and is due largely to the efforts and results of the
barley research workers. It suffices to say that they are conducting
similar research on barley to that on wheat to overcome the constraints
related to barley production.

Nearly all of the farmers growing barley were unhappy with the
Government's pricing policy. Should this be changed, undoubtedly
barley production would increase markedly. Those farmers growing
two-row barley for malting and under contract with the two Korean
breweries expressed their interest and financial benefit in barley

Cooperative international barley nurseries have been provided by
CIMMYT and Montana State University.

E. Soybeans and White Potatoes

The area cultivated and production of soybeans and white potatoes
have decreased during the past decade. Productivity of soybeans has
increased and that for potatoes remained relatively static. The farm-
ers interviewed expressed extremely little interest in either of these
two crops.

The ORD has cooperated with CIP on potato research and the University
of Illinois (INTSOY) on soybeans. All of these institutions receive
financial support from AID.

F. Conclusions

If the project were to be redesigned at this writing, the inclu-
sion of soybeans and white potatoes as crops to be developed by this
project would be very questionable. There is a relatively strong
research component on wheat, but the fact that the cultivated area
has shrunk to such a great extent makes it difficult to justify sup-
port to research on wheat at this time. There is such an increase
in the use of mechanically powered farm equipment, due to the im-
proved cultivation methods and shortage of farm labor resulting from
urban migration, that farm mechanization would receive a very high
priority for inclusion. Farmers have learned that it is more econom-
ically advantageous for them to grow some of the vegetables under
plastic during the winter months and in the open fields during the
summer season than it is to cultivate wheat and barley. Research on
vegetables should also receive high priority if the project were being
designed at this time. It should be noted that the AVRDC cooperated
with the ORD in research on a limited number of vegetables and pro-
vided only minimal financial support during the life of the AID project.

Table D-1. Area, Production and Productivity of Selected Crops

A.. 1innn 000


Area I "L
l Wn r e u^d .,uyuedii E

Productivity (MT/ha)

Darley WheaL oy emns a oeI Z _

1970 730 97 295 54 1,591 219 232 605 2.18 2.26 .79 11.31

1972 710 63 282 43 1,600 149 224 459 2.25 2.38 .79 10.62

1974 704 36 286 41 1,388 74 319 447 1.97 2.03 1.11 10.86

1975 711 44 274 52 1,700 97 311 660 2.39 2.22 1.13 12.80

1976 711 37 247 49 1,759 82 295 569 2.47 2.22 1.19 11.76

1977 516 27 251 50 814* 45 319 558 1.58 1.68 1.27 11.30

1978 554 17 247 39 1,348 36 293 304 2.43 2.09 1.19 7.82

1979 473 13 207 34 1,508 42 257 356 3.19 3.21 1.24 10.58

Source: Yearbook of


* Decrease due to excessive flooding from typhoon


Agriculture and Forestry Statistics,

;; I

production tro )

aariev w nea L 3ov ue iuru rv LaLVt~S

Wheat So beans P s

S n*t, r nb P T rt-n t t d

Rarl ev

Tr --,1 -- r .TIl n -





A. Introduction

After the adoption of the high-yielding varieties (HYV) of rice
and other crops in the early 1970s, the switch from the traditional
varieties (TV) to the HYV has been rapid. In the case of rice, the
use of the HYV has in general resulted in higher yields of output,
but this technological change has been accompanied by increasing use
of fertilizers, chemicals, and implementation of government purchase
and support prices of major crops. During the last two years, the
cold weather conditions and blast diseases have severely affected
yields in rice output, particularly those in the HYV. The fact that
the HYV (Tongil) require heavier inputs, as compared with the TV, and
that their yields were more susceptible to cold weather and blast
disease is significant in determining the yearly relative profitability
of the HYV over the TV and therefore the farmer incentive in crop
selection. As a rule, the analysis of farm income accounts is essen-
tial to an understanding of the reason for the adoption of new tech-
nologies by farmers.

Profitability from crop production for a farm household depends
on such factors as per hectare yield of output, per hectare use of in-
puts, consumer and government purchase prices of grains, and government
subsidized prices of fertilizers and chemicals. The attached tables
show calculations of the financial costs and returns for 1977 and 1980
from the production of the five crops funded by AID for agricultural
research. The year 1977 recorded a highest yield per hectare in the
production of the HYV of rice, and 1980 was a poor harvest year for the
HYV because of the cold weather and diseases.

Figures in the tables are based on national sample surveys car-
ried out by the Office of Rural Development. They refer to average
farm household production costs and revenue. The term "economic
profit" is defined as the residual of farm household income received
from farming activities after subtracting all expenditures incurred for
inputs including any unpaid return to family-owned resources (land,
labor, or capital). "Operating profit" is calculated as the residual
from the farm income after paying out all costs of inputs which exclude
any unpaid return to family-provided resources. In several villages
we visited, there were very few opportunities for farmers to engage in
off-farm or alternative economic activities other than farming. Under
these circumstances, the concept of "operating profit" provides a more
appropriate measure of the incentive for production.

B. Summary: Salient Features of Farm Household Income

1. Profitability of HYV and TV

The hight-yielding rice varieties used relatively more ferti-
lizers, chemicals and labor input. They outyielded the TV by a greater
margin. In 1977 economic profits from the HYV were 33 to 60 percent


higher, depending on whether rice was cultivated in a mono-culture
or sequentially cropped system. The same profit margin declined, on
average, to about 15 percent in 1980, which reflected the uneven in-
cidence of cold weather and disease problems. Although the culti-
vation of the HYV has generally resulted in greater profits on both
"operational and economic" accounts, there have been substantial
variations in the profit margin from region to region.

The calculations in the tables assumed a uniform government pur-
chase price for all varieties of rice. In interviews with several
farmers we found that they could frequently obtain as much as 15 or
20 percent higher prices for the traditional varieties (japonica) on
the free market: many consumers still seem to prefer japonica to
Tongil rice in spite of the fact that there is virtually no difference
in the taste, especially when rice is freshly cooked. Thus, if we
assume that the price of the japonica was 15 percent higher in 1980,
profitability can be shown as no higher for Tongil rice than for the
TV. In other words, per hectare yield in the HYV had to be at least
15 percent higher in order to be economically profitable.

2. Effect of HtV on the Labor Market

The cultivation of the HYV was relatively more labor-intensive.
This may be explained by the fact that Tongil varieties require more
intensive cultural care and a longer gestation period. For 1980,
output yield per man hour was about 3.3 kg per 10a (one-tenth of a
hectare) in both varieties. As more of the rice area is cultivated
with the HYV there will be a growing demand for labor in rural Korea.
Effective labor is already in scarce supply in Korea. The
dissemination of the high-yield farming technology is likely to
accelerate the process of "tractorization" in Korean agriculture.

3. White Potatoes, Barley, Wheat, and Soybeans

Another crop that has continued to yield positive "economic profits"
is white potatoes. Despite the profitability in potatoes, there has
been a declining trend in the planted area and the total production
since 1975. The profit rate from the cultivation of white potatoes
is not only low relative to that from the more widely-demanded vege-
tables and fruits, but also many Koreans consider white potatoes as
an "inferior" good. Their consumption increases only when other major
staple food supplies decline. Also, since the consumption of potatoes
is small relative to that of other foods, the potato market may be
considered as volatile with prices highly sensitive to changes in de-
mands for other foods.

For other crops, our calculations show that barley and wheat for
both 1977 and 1980 incurred net losses in economic profit if unpaid
returns to farm owners' resources are included in the production costs.
However, "operating profits" become positive if only the actual paid-
out costs are taken into account. In particular, barley is tradition-
ally a second important staple food (next to rice) in the Korean diet.


Unlike the case of rice, however, there has been no adequate govern-
ment price support for barley at least at a level that could ensure
a comfortable profit margin to the farmers. For example, according
to a recently announced pricing scheme for 1981, the margin between
the government purchase price and the production cost of barley (ex-
cluding the implicit costs) was 2,531 won per bag. This implies an
"operating profit" rate of some 9 percent in barley production. Con-
sequently, barley has been grown only as a marginally important,
winter-crop revenue source by farmers whose "opportunity" incomes
during the idle season are insignificant. Like white potatoes, barley
is an inferior good; as farmers' real incomes rise, its consumption
tends to decrease as consumers substitute rice for barley. Thus,
over the years, the Government of Korea has accumulated sizeable quan-
tities of barley in storage. The barley-growers have generally been
apprehensive of the possibility of sudden reductions in the govern-
ment purchase of barley. The government's purchase decision is, as
a rule, announced at the time of the harvest.

Soybeans yielded positive profits in 1977, but resulted in negative
"economic profit" in 1980. Like white potatoes, the area planted in
soybeans has somewhat declined since 1977.

4. Government Policies

It must be emphasized that in addition to per hectare yields and
related production conditions, another major determinant of profit-
ability in crop production is the government's pricing and purchase
policies. The Korean Government instituted in 1969 a two-tier pricing
system consisting of government purchase prices at the farm gate and
selling prices to urban dwellers for rice and barley. The consumer
price has since averaged twice that of imported rice. In an effort
to subsidize farm producers, the government has also kept the purchase
price of rice far above the consumer cost. As a result, in each year
since 1968, the government has incurred deficits in the general account
by issuing overdrafts on the central bank, which has of course added
to the inflationary pressure in the economy. In the case of barley,
the Government, in spite of relatively unattractive farm gate prices
offered the farmers, has also provided a substantial subsidy to the
growers by keeping consumer prices low. The economic implication of
farm pricing policies in Korea is significant. If the social profit-
ability of rice (and barley, of course) is to be calculated in terms
of its accounting prices (international market prices), it would be
unprofitable to grow rice and barley from the society's point of view.
It is clear, however, that the farm price support policy in Korea seeks
achievement of the political objective of self-sufficiency, and not
that of achieving resource-allocation efficiency.

A related issue concerning the farm support policy is the timing
of the government's decisions for purchase quota and prices. The
decisions are as a rule announced around the time of the grain har-
vest for the produce that has already been harvested or is going to
be harvested. The uncertainty and risk caused by the government delay
in action has additionally lowered the farmer incentives to grow
barley as a winter crop.

Table E-l.

Farm Household Account Per 10a Land
for AID-Supported Crops 1977

(Unit: Won/lO a)

Total Operating Economic
Gross Operating Production Profit Profit
Item Revenue Cost Cost Amount Rate Amount Rate

1. HYV Rice
(Single-cropping) 194,037 52,294 94,588 141,743 73.0 99,449 51.3

2. HYV Rice
(Double-cropping) 180,213 50,308 91,874 129,905 72.1 88,339 49.0

3. TV Rice
(Single-cropping) 155,454 47,410 89,388 108,044 69.5 66,066 42.5

4. TV Rice
(Double-cropping) 139,183 44,742 85,729 94,441 67.9 53,454 38.4 M
5. Upland Rice
(Double-cropping) 81,016 31,741 64,319 49,275 60.8 16,697 20.6

6. Upland Barley 56,455 29,096 68,867 27,359 48.5 12,412 -

7. Paddy Barley 58,247 28,241 78,220 30,006 51.5 19,973

8. Upland Naked Barley 57,455 30,448 70,040 27,007 47.0 12,585

9. Paddy Naked Barley 61,013 30,862 81,090 30,151 49.4 20,077

10. Upland Wheat 34,787 24,195 64,248 10,592 30.4 29,461

11. Paddy Wheat 34,128 23,701 73,061 10,427 30.6 38,933 -

12. Soybeans 50,876 12,662 47,196 38,214 75.1 3,680 7.2

13. White Potatoes (Upland) 147,290 35,702 70,990 111,588 75.8 76,300 51.8

14. White Potatoes (Paddy) 144,517 34.978 78,755 109,539 75.8 65,762 45.5

Source: Office of Rural Development

Table E-2.

Average Rice Production
Per 10a Land (1980)

Costs and Revenue

(Value Unit: Won)


Gross Revenue

446.4 kg 396.3 kg








A. Operating Expenses


Organic Fertilizer

Inorganic Fertilizer




5 kg 4.9 kg 1,727

877 kg 833.5 kg 7,981


446.4 kg 396.3 kg 11,294

71,058 66,665


Hired Labor

Total for A

B. Implicit Expenses

36.8 hrs. 29.8 hrs.

Own labor 98.4 hrs. 88.9 hrs.

Operating Capital Services

Fixed Capital Services


C. Total Expenses
Economic Profit
Operating Profit
Value Added
Profit Rate a/
Operating Profit Rate b/
Notes: ai Economic Profit as a percent of gross revenue
b/ Operating Profit as a percent of gross revenue
Source: Office of Rural Development






















Table E-3.

Farm Household Income Account Per 10a Land
for AID-Supported Crops 1980

Operating Economic
Profit Profit
Quantity Crop OperatingProductioA) Amount Rate Amount Rate
Item (kg) Revenue Cost Cost (Won) (Won)

(Upland) 276.5 103,249 47,403
(Paddy) 291 109,607 52,352

Naked Barley
(Upland) 312.9 114,205 55,205
(Paddy) 317 115,722 54,246

(Upland) 331.9 91,303 41,382
(Paddy) 333 91,638 46,218

(Mono-culture) 144.5 82,445 26,636
(Double-cropping)134.9 76,966 24,706


1,188.3 254,060 97,611

1,243.8 214,092 66,482

129,788 55,846 54.1 -26,539
139,889 57,255 52.2 -30,282

129,735 59,000 51.7 -15,530
137,577 61,476 53.1 -21,855

122,063 49,921 54.7 -30,760
129,235 45,420 49.6 -37,597

96,794 55,809 67.7 -14,349
91,030 52,260 67.9 -14,064

182,289 156,449 61.6 71,771 28.2

145,263 147,610 68.9 68,829 32.1

a All input expenditures excluding unpaid returns to family owned
b All expenditures including unpaid returns to family owned resources.

Source: Office of Rural Development





I. Introduction

Scientific information generated by agricultural research is a
public good once it is disseminated for application. No consumer can
be excluded from benefiting from the application of research output,
and there is no market pricing mechanism for the output. The absence
of a pricing mechanism implies that private-sector firms tend to under-
invest in agricultural research from society's point of view since the
benefits of research cannot be entirely internalized by the firms. As
a consequence, there is a need for public support of agricultural re-
search. Since agricultural research would compete with alternative
uses for public funds, it is important for decision makers to obtain
information on the returns to agricultural investment.

This appendix reviews and provides a critique of the previous
work on social returns to agricultural research and extension (R&E)
in Korea. In an important study on Tongil rice, K. H. Park presented
an analysis of socioeconomic returns on agricultural research and ex-
tension expenditures in Korea.1/ This work is significant because it
deals with an ex post evaluation of agricultural research on Tongil
rice. It provides the only estimate of social returns to Tongil rice

There was an earlier attempt in 1972 to evaluate returns on agri-
cultural research expenditures in Korea using computer-simulation
models by Michigan State University's Korean Agricultural Sector Study
(KASS) team. Although actual expenditures on research for the improved
varieties of rice (Tongil) were incurred starting as early as 1962,
the expanded extension program to disseminate the research results
began in 1972. The KASS Team's report provided an ex ante analysis of
research project impact and, from the benefit of hindsight, was use-
ful only as background information to a project feasibility analysis.

II. Park's Analysis

The main objective of this study was to estimate the ex post rate
of return on the Korean Government's agricultural research and exten-
sion expenditures, utilizing the national, annual data series for the
period 1962-1977 that were provided by the Office of Rural Development.
The original data were expressed in current won and two types of data
adjustments were made. First, the expenditure and revenue figures were
adjusted for inflation. Second, as his calculations were to be derived
from the vantage point of 1977, it was necessary to convert to present
values as of 1977 all past and future streams of expenditures and

1/ K. H. Park, "Analysis of Socioeconomic Consequences of the Green
Revolution," Government of Korea Office of Rural Development, 1977.

incomes using an appropriate discount rate (0.05 in Park's study).

Briefly, the model used for estimating the rate of return was
originally developed by Z. Griliches in which:

Social Rate of Return = Perpetual flow of returns (PFR)
Cumulated R&E expenditures up to 1977 (CREE)=

Interest income on cumulated past returns (ICPR) + Future annual return (FAR)
Cumulated R&E expenditures (CREE).2/

The term CREE represents a sum of past R&E annual expenditures, where
each past year's real expenditures are converted to the present value
of 1977.

In a similar manner, cumulated past returns can be calculated as a
sum of previous annual returns from R&E investments. ICPR simply ex-
presses future interest income on these cumulated past returns. FAR
represents the projected yearly return in a perpetual stream of future
returns from CREE. Under the assumption of perfect foresight, yearly
future return is assumed as equal to the 1977 return. PFR thus consist
of two sources, ICPR and FAR.

The annual returns from R&E expenditures for developing and dis-
seminating Tongil rice were calculated by estimating hypothetical los-
ses in income, which would occur had the new varieties not been intro-
duced on the farm fields. For this, the author employed a supply and
demand framework as shown in Figure 1. He then assumed perfect
elasticities in rice supply, i.e., that rice can be produced in Korea
at a constant cost at OP in the diagram. Introduction of the new tech-
nology could then be seen as a shifting downward of the supply schedule
from SS to S'S'. Then the hypothetical losses in income without the
introduction of the improved varieties can be shown equal to the net
losses in the consumer surplus identified by the shaded area.PBBP'.
The consequences of dynamic changes in the proportion of the area
cultivated for Tongil rice were carefully worked out in a formula
used for calculating net losses in income. Based on an estimate given
in the KASS study, he assumed a rice demand elasticity of -0.4 for Korea.3/

The economic (social) rate of return on R&E expenditures for Tongil
rice was calculated by the author at 1200 percent. That is, from the
vantage point of 1977, each one won worth of investment in Tongil rice
development generated 12 won worth of return from the society's point
of view. Although other studies show that the economic rate of return

2/ Z. Griliches, "Research Costs and Social Returns: Hybrid Corn And
Related Innovation," Journal of Political Economy, October 1958.

3/ See Park, K. H., ibid, pp 26-40.


The Rice Market in Korea (per H. Park)

Figure 1.

1. wii; .i'


from agricultural research is, as a rule, high for developed countries
(1300 percent for the U.S.A. in Professor Griliches' estimation), Park's
estimate comes as a surprise for a developing country like Korea.

III. Critique

The major deficiency in Park's analysis is that the estimate is
based on a hypothetical model that employs a set of highly questionable
assumptions. Among such assumptions are:

-- Perfect Supply Elasticity--In reality, rice cultivation in
Korea can be expanded only with a neavy infrastructure invest-
ment. The constant cost assumption in rice production for Korea
is utterly unrealistic.

-- Equal Input Requirements--As compared with the traditional varie-
ties, the Tongil varieties require heavier inputs including labor
hours. Operating expenses per hectare have been higher for the
production of the HYV. Thus not only the difference in per hec-
tare yields but also in per hectare input uses should have
been taken into account in Park's analysis. Obviously, his re-
sults are overstated.

-- Closed Economy--There are no imports of rice in his model. Be-
fore Korea attained self-sufficiency in 1975, it had been im-
porting 10 to 15 percent of its domestic demand for rice. As
will be shown below, the introduction of rice imports drastically
changes the model structure.

-- Uniform Pricing--The actual pricing mechanism for rice is far
more complex than depicted in his analysis. This is examined
in the following discussion.

IV. An Alternative Framework

The consumer-surplus approach in Park's analysis is too simplistic
and unrealistic to be of much interest. In the following, an alternative
framework is offered to describe the rice market situation in Korea.4/
In Figure 2 the demand and supply curves are shown by D and S. Point A
represents market equilibrium in a closed economy situation. The effect
of the improved varieties is displayed as causing a downward shift of the
supply curve from S to S'. Distance OG represents an initial equilibrium
price which for simplicity is assumed as equal to the government's selling
price to consumers (In equilibrium the selling price should converge to a
free market price). Government purchase price from farmers is indicated

_V This model is adapted from the Akino and Hayami model with appropriate
modifications to reflect the Korean situation (M. Akino, and Y. Hayami,
"Efficiency and Equity in Economic Development," American Journal of
Agricultural Economics 57 (1975): 1-10)

Figure 2. The Rice Market in Korea (a suggested framework)


A/ S



W -9 T


by OP, which is assumed lower than the selling price (The Government hand-
ling costs of rice storage and transaction are not included in this dia-
gram. It is possible to show the situation of government deficits on rice
accounts). Note that the world market price is OW, which is located below
government purchase price OP.

In the initial situation covering the period before 1975, the year
Korea reached self-sufficiency in rice, imports of rice are indicated by
quantity BC with a foreign exchange cost equal to the area of BHJC;
domestic production is shown by quantity OB. The effect of introducing
Tongil rice, plus effecting changes in other agricultural production con-
ditions can be seen as resulting in self-sufficiency in rice. The net
effect of this is shown in the diagram. There is no change in consumer
surplus and the increase in producer surplus equals the area OKFE. The
incidence of research benefits is shown to fall more on producers than on
consumers. This finding contrasts with Park's analysis in which the bene-
fits exclusively fall on consumers. Indeed, the available data indicate
that the market price of rice has risen at a rate faster than that of
government purchase price. There is no evidence for a drastic decrease
in the consumer rice price following increased domestic yields in rice.

More importantly, the real benefits of R&E expenditures did not
lie so much in benefiting producers or consumers as in saving the cost of
foreign exchange used for imports of rice. Our analysis clearly shows
this. As a result of attaining self-sufficiency, the import saving is
equal to BC in quantity and to the area BHJC in dollars.

To summarize, although our analysis is qualitative in nature, there
are two important findings that emerge from it:

-- Producers (farmers), as compared with urban consumers, benefited
more from the adoption of the improved agricultural technology.
The critical factor contributing to this has been government
pricing policy.

-- The previous estimate of economic returns from rice research
is unreliable. It failed to recognize the gains in producer
surplus, and overestimated consumer gains. Moreover, it total-
ly overlooked, perhaps, a much larger benefit in foreign exchange
savings. Because the previous study ignored the differences in
input uses between the two varieties, the estimate of the econ-
omic return on rice research in Korea is likely overstated.

V. Further Suggestions

Among other things, one important caveat in the preceding model must
be noted. That is, our analysis has failed to separate net effects of R&E
investment from those of other factors that collectively or independently
cause a shift downward of the supply curve (see Figure 1). Clearly, some
factors such as fertilizer and chemicals are complementary in input

requirements. Others such as improved irrigation systems or mechanized
farming methods may well be considered as substitutable. There is a
need for a more rigorous analysis to understand the true effects of agri-
cultural research. In this regard, the consumer-producer surplus approach
is ill-equipped to deal with the complex agricultural production and market-
ing system in Korea. The results of an analysis using this approach would
be sensitive to different specification of supply and demand functions and
the nature of the supply function shifts. There are virtually no reliable
estimates of agricultural demand and supply elasticities for Korea. It is
suggested, therefore, that in the case of Korean agriculture the production
function approach would be more appropriate for measuring the net benefits
from agricultural research.,/ The clear advantage of this approach is that
it provides a method of statistically isolating the influences of research
programs from these other factors expected to affect observed yields. It
also provides an estimate of the marginal return to research investment,
which is a more useful indicator to decision-makers concerned with the
merits of agricultural research projects.6/

5/ For a pioneering article on this topic, see Z. Griliches' "Research
Expenditures, Education, and the Aggregate Agricultural Production
Function." American Economic Review 54: 96-174, 1969. For
a review of cited developments, see World Bank Staff Papers Nos.
360 and 361, 1979.

6/ The time-constraints prevented this team from delving into the calcu-
lations of rates of return to research investment. However, basic
data required for an aggregate analysis on social returns seem avail-
able for Korea.




A. Introduction

Critical to the development of a national research system is the con-
tinuous adaptation and creation of new plant strains suitable to a particu-
lar environment. Equally important is the capacity of a nation to translate
research results into production, consumption, and income for the population.
The Korean case represents a remarkably successful melding of research and
extension. It is, however, based on a system so goal-oriented at every
bureaucratic level that,.not surprisingly, the attainment of targets becomes
both a matter of pride and bureaucratic survival. Bureaucratic enthusiasm
is sometimes transformed into involuted pressure to achieve--goals are
created that the system itself cannot safely reach, each level striving
to achieve targets that are sometimes unrealistic, resulting in costly
errors at local and even national levels. It can lead to manipulation
of statistics as the bureaucracy yields to the temptation of always
indicating progress, higher yields, or larger exports. Only when dire,
usually external, factors intervene can a decline be shown.

B. Administrative Centralism

Centralism is the hallmark of the Korean bureaucracy. The power of the
Seoul administration is felt through an integrated system of regional and
local pressure points having their nexus in the capital. The main bureau-
cratic mechanism of central control of the periphery is the Ministry of Home
Affairs. It not only commands the police throughout the nation but, as
there are no elected local officials, appoints the governors of the nine
provinces, the 147 gun (county) chiefs and the more than 1,300 myon (district)
heads. Its responsibility includes the Sae-maul Movement, which is ubi-
quitous. Real power throughout Korea rests with that Ministry; it is the
central focus for the rural population in the gun. The gun capital, the
primary market town of the area, is the head of both administration and
market activity. The gun chief is the coordinator of all development
programs (except education) and is held personally responsible for all
activities within that area. This personalized power and responsibility
is so pervasive that the under-achievement of targets within the gun or
even the occurrence of a national disaster such as a forest fire (which he
is supposed to prevent) can cause his summary expulsion. Someone personally
must bear responsibility for error or failure in Korea; it is at the heart
of the political and bureaucratic culture and profoundly affects policy and

The gun chief coordinates the work of most agencies (except education,
the military, and the judiciary) within his territory. He is thus in
intimate contact with all other ministries with local programs in his gun.
These other ministries have their own hierarchical command structures down
to the myon in some cases, but at the gun level close cooperation with the


gunsu, or county chief, is a requirement.

C. The Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries

Of primary importance in rural Korea is the Ministry of Agriculture and
Fisheries (formerly the Ministry of Agricultural and Forestry). It has
three main divisions that have impacts on the lives of farmers: the Office
of Rural Development (ORD), the Agricultural Development Corporation (ADC),
and the National Agricultural Cooperative Federation (NACF). The ADC is
concerned with the development of irrigation systems, dams, and land
reclamation. The National Agricultural Cooperative Federation is a govern-
mental mechanism, misnamed a cooperative, for the provision of agricultural
credit and other requirements such as seed, fertilizer, pesticides, and
herbicides, as well as agricultural machinery. It is also the government
arm for the purchase of crops at standard, centrally set prices and
quantities. The NACF thus implements government policy on grain pricing
and procurement but it is the Office of Rural Development (ORD) that
encourages, trains, and provides the farmers with the means by which national
targets can be achieved.

The Office of Rural Development has three major functions: basic
and adaptive agricultural research designed to assist in achieving nation-
ally set production targets for priority crops; training, a program of such
magnitude that there is hardly a farm family left untouched annually by
this effort; and "extension." In Korean, the term "extension" is more aptly
translated as "guidance," which describes both the philosophy of the system
and its actual operation.

The integration of research and guidance is perhaps not unique among
developing countries, although it certainly is rare to the degree practiced
in Korea. What may be unique, however, is an integration of both research
and guidance with education.

Fifteen years ago, Seoul National University's College of Agriculture,
under the Ministry of Education and the Office of Rural Development
under the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry had no working relationships,
although located only a few hundred yards apart. Today, however, some staff
at each institution hold joint appointments. The AID-supported agricultural
research project did not initiate such relationships but did help strengthen
them and bring into the research scene professors from other agricultural

As interesting and effective, but perhaps as rare, is the integration
of the agricultural high school at the gun level into the agricultural
guidance system. There, teachers also hold joint appointments at the gun
rural development office and training classes in the high schools use
the same materials and machinery as those used by the extension workers.
These extension workers train farmers in the schools during vacation periods.
Students from the agricultural high schools usually join the guidance
service, thus completing the link where they may once again come under
the supervision of their former teachers. This results in effective means


for overcoming the inherent rivalries of two ministries, as both strive to
contribute to achieving national goals.

Borrowing from the Ministry of Home Affairs bureaucratic model, the
Office of Rural Development, with its headquarters in Suwon, Kyonggi
Province, has provincial Offices of Rural Development that report both to
the governor of the province and centrally to the Director General of ORD,
who has the rank of Vice Minister. At the gun level, the county office of
rural development reports hierarchically to the provincial ORD and
laterally to the gun chief. Below the gun at the myon, there are also
offices of the rural development administration with primary responsibility
for guidance at that level. Supplementing this system is a series of
regional and crop or problem-specific research stations that were in part
the subject of the AID loan and of this inquiry. They report to the ORD's
Bureau of Research. The Office of Rural Development has three operational
bureaus: research; guidance, including a farmers' training program at the
national, provincial, and gun levels; and technical dissemination, involved
in the production of literature, slides, radio and other mass communications
materials in simple language that the farmers can understand. The use of
complex Chinese characters, which are not introduced into the educational
system until the seventh grade, is avoided.

Bureaucratic record keeping has traditionally been a major element of
Confucian-oriented administrations. Korea is no exception; the Office of
Rural Development illustrates the rule. Each year the government sets
targets of national concern. Although formulated nationally, they take
into account provincial and regional capabilities and potential. This
year, for example, the major goal in agriculture is the production of 38
million sok of rice (5.4 million metric tons). This overall goal is trans-
lated into action plans to achieve targets that are specified in great
detail, first at the provincial level, then at the gun, myon, and indeed at
the village levels well.

D. The Provincial Level

The Provincial Office of Rural Development in each province prepares
annually a detailed plan that specifies production targets by crop and by
crop variety or strain, uses of fertilizer and other requirements, and
the training that will be required of both trainers and farmers. The
provincial office helps carry out those aspects of the Sae-maul Movement
that are concerned with production and training. It helps organize the
Sae-maul Youth Organization, which was formerly called 4-H Clubs but
which has expanded its age cohort from 13 to 24 to a present maximum age
level of 29 years. It specifies the number of times national, provincial,
or gun radio programs (broadcast daily for 45 minutes) will exhort the farm
population to plant, transplant, protect its crops from insects or diseases,
as well as when to harvest. This is supplemented by an amplifier system
located in every village that warns the population of weather changes that
could effect production and how to take advantage, for example, of anti-
cipated, unusually warm weather or how to protect crops from cold.
The report specifies how many times pesticides or herbicides should be


applied based on crop and regional variations in altitude and climate.
This document becomes the bible of provincial agricultural development
for the year. It is normally from 70 to 80 pages in length and is remark-
able for its comprehensiveness and thoroughness, taking into account each
geographic and climatic variation within the province. Budgets are included
for each category of activity. This material is annually supplemented by
a provincial agricultural statistical yearbook and a separate report that
provides complete data for the province as a whole and for each gun within
the province. Within the province, each gun prepares a similar plan, outlin-
ing in even greater detail the potential and projected achievements of the
county. These printed plans are usually about 70 pages in length, speci-
fying down to the won the projected costs of lunch for those who will be

E. The Village Level

The village does not prepare a printed plan, but in most villages the
Sae-maul Movement develops a flip-chart version which is the equivalent of
the provincial or gun program. It contains a listing of the number of
households, population, and stratification by income, land holdings (paddy
and upland), and farm animals. It contains statistics on water, sewage,
telephones, tillers, mechanical transplanters, and other important pro-
duction or social components of village life. The charts list past village
improvement projects, and sets targets for new ones. It cajoles the
population to improve the village in various ways, from keeping it clean to
closing toilet lids. It sets labor requirements for the year for normal
village maintenance as well as new projects. The charts estimate costs of
projects, and the sources of such income, which has generally fallen more
heavily on the villagers themselves. It is, in effect, an appointed village
government that uses social pressure to achieve its impressive goals. Lacking
a judicial base to tax and set corvee labor requirements, it nevertheless
functions as the arm of central authority bringing the village into line
with national priorities and acting to speed village change. The Movement
is also used as a form of mass mobilization to urge the villages to vote as
the government wants. It may not dictate, but its command of the purse
strings gives it considerable power.

From the capital to the village, Korea is a nation of planning and
flip charts. The importance of planning, however, should not detract
from the pervasiveness of implementation. Even if the goals of planning
sometimes cannot be met through difficulties such as poor weather or
disease, the rigor of the implementation process is a strength that few
societies, including socialist ones, have yet to equal. In Korea there is
thus massive participation in the development process, however passive or
controlled in nature. Alternative centers of power or programs and the
questioning of national goals are never overtly or institutionally
encouraged. Although farmers may and do grumble they recognize that,
overall, their standard of living has generally improved over the past

F. An Illustration : Kangwon Province

To place this abstracted version of provincial and gun planning and
implementation in perspective, it is instructive to examine the detailed
plans for a single province and gun within that province for 1981.

Kangwon Province is the mountainous area of northeast Korea, with three
distinct climatic (and thus agricultural) zones. The slogan and goal of the
province for 1981 is "to build the welfare of the rural areas through the
green revolution." The policy for the province includes increasing rice
yields and safeguarding production through dissemination of new agricul-
tural techniques; spreading innovative cultivation techniques for upland
crops; development of specialized production sericulturee, livestock, etc.),
as well as cash crops; improving cooperative mechanized farming; expanding
the Sae-maul Youth Movement; and making rural life more scientific.

The province is composed of 2,240 villages for which there are 664 rural
guidance workers and 27 researchers. There are 119,167 farm households in
the province, or 32 percent of the total provincial households, with a
population of 614, 343. About 91,157 (63 percent) of farmland is in paddy,
and 56,630 hectares in upland (non-irrigated). The majority of the budget
for the Provincial Office of Rural Development is derived from the province
itself (51 percent), with 46 percent from the national account and an
additional 3 percent from the sale of crop production by the office itself.
Although rice hectarage has essentially remained constant since 1977, per
hectare production has varied from 4.41 metric tons (MT) in 1977 to 4.16 MT
in 1978, 3.65 MT in 1979, and a massive decrease in production to a low of
1.97 MT in 1980 because of cold weather. There is an anticipated production
of 3.93 MT in 1981. The Tongil varieties of rice (high-yielding varieties)
dropped from 40 percent of use to only 17 percent in 1981 because farmers
fear the cold weather to which Tongil is susceptible.

The province recommends varieties of rice and other crops by region
and altitude, as well as the density of planting and fertilizer requirements.
It specifies that pesticides should be applied about eight times, depending
on crop and variety. It promotes demonstration plots in addition to
experimental research. There are two such plots for rice in every village,
the government guaranteeing income to the farmer if the demonstration plot
fails. In addition there are 40 demonstration plots for soybeans, ten for
potatoes, and five for barley and wheat. These demonstration plots provide
a continuing and accessible example to all farmers of what their production
might be if they follow the recommendations of the guidance workers. This
system clearly demonstrates the national priority attached to rice production
as both an economic and political goal.

The plan also calls for the use of 4 million man days of farmer
assistance through the military and youth organizations in order to assist
in timely planting, transplanting, and harvesting. This is critical in a
province plagued by rural labor shortages, and is also the impetus for
increased mechanization, for in the colder climate double cropping is only


possible with a rapid turnaround of harvesting winter barley or vegetables
and the transplanting of rice. A delay of even a few days could mean the
failure of maturation of the critical rice crop.

The Kangwon Provincial Office of Rural Development is attempting to
raise farm household income to 3.3 million won ($4,500) in 1981. It
achieved its objectives of 1.9 million won in 1978 and 2.4 million won in
1979, but fell short of its goal, reaching only 2.5 million won in 1980.
These figures in current prices indicate some progress, but in constant won,
accounting for inflation, the standard of living has dropped over the past
several years.

The training program is very widespread, and at least one member of
every farm family receives training each year. Thus, during the non-
productive winter months, 3,200 leaders are trained, who in turn train the
farmers, most for three days. Stress is on production, but other subjects
are also covered. For example, there are 3,676 women's clubs in the
province, and about 20,000 women will be trained this year in increased use
of barley in cooking (thus using up the barley production and saving rice),
and 17,270 in home economics, including the use of home appliances and better
clothing. There are 166 "nutrition improvement halls" that will help train
wives to preserve 50,000 units of foodstuffs. Two mobile nutritional vans
(supplied to each province by UNICEF) will visit 100 villages. There are 333
child care centers in the province and seven villages will be selected for
new child nutritional programs. There are in addition 1,933 youth groups
with 29,850 members and an additional 110 youth organizations for the 4,540
leader members of the Sae-maul Youth Movement.

The detail is exhaustive. In Heong Sung gun in Kangwon Province, their
plan specifies in detail the socioeconomic status of the 10,101 agricultural
households (69 percent of all households in the gun) in 587 natural villages
(112 legal villages--an unusual ratio because of the mountainous terrain).
Since 61 percent of the land in the gun is upland, this poses special
problems of production. The relative poverty of the population is reflected
in land holdings: 19 percent own less than 0.5 hectares; 31 percent between
0.5 and 1.0 hectares, and 25 percent between 1.0 and 1.5 hectares. Only
10 percent have over two hectares.

The plan specifies that radio will be used 48 times a year in improving
agricultural production, and that the 152 village amplifier systems will
broadcast a total of 604 times each month. Some 65,000 publications will also
be distributed. There is a potential membership of 4,200 persons in the 13 to
29 age group eligible to join the Sae-maul program, of whom 1,293 are members.
They plan to increase membership to 4,000 in 1981.

G. Summary

A successful agricultural research project is dependent on effective
demonstration of research results. Three criteria for the successful
integration of agricultural research and dissemination through extension
thus exist in Korea:


-- Integration of research and guidance at the top of the hierarchy,
thus allowing joint planning of research projects and dissemina-
tion of research results based on national needs;

-- High level concern for both research and extension at the sub-
cabinet level; and

-- Effective coordination at the village through the county adminis-

The integrative aspects of the Korean agricultural research and extension
program can thus be considered a model developmental system fostering a
remarkable level of implementation.

It is this strength, however, that leads to an elemental weakness in
the Korean system. Although such a system could theoretically be con-
sidered potentially productive in any national bureaucracy, in the Korean
context it has worked effectively because of the strong hierarchical
nature of Korean society that drives compliance with objectives set from
above. Thus each level of the bureaucracy responds with a virtual frenzy
of activity to achieve the targets, and quite often they are successful.
The drive for implementation, however, has demonstrably resulted in short-
term effectiveness but with much less assurance of longer-range continued
success. Massive spraying of pesticides and herbicides has dramatically
increased yields, but the longer-range effects of pollution and disease
are now being increasingly noted in the Korean press. It may be that such
revelations have specified non-priority crops, such as fruits, either
because they are more apparent or because they do not conflict with
governmental priorities.

The introduction of the Tongil high yielding varieties of rice was
massively encouraged throughout the country, and hundreds of tons of
seed were airlifted to Korea from the Philippines for this purpose. Yet
rice blast (fungus) has been known to be a problem with the new varieties
of rice after a few years of cultivation, and early project documentation
mentioned the susceptibility of Tongil to cold. In an effort to raise
production these potential damages, if not overlooked,were not sufficiently
anticipated by the bureaucracy, although key researchers warned against
them. It was the overdependence on Tongil rice and its effective distri-
bution through the guidance system that brought about both Korean self-
sufficiency in rice and the highest per hectare rice yields in the world,
as well as the crop disaster of 1980 due to cold weather. Better overall
results might have been achieved had the government been less insistant
on its political goal of rice self-sufficiency (Korea had the foreign
exchange to import twice the amount grown with the same funds it paid to
farmers), followed more prudent dissemination policies, and concerned
itself with a continuing, effective, adaptive research program.

President Chun Doo-whan in May 1981 called for self-sufficiency in
food production. This goal is a political objective that under present
circumstances cannot be met. Even with self-sufficiency in rice and an


upturn in barley hectarage, wheat imports are still so enormous that this
goal is impossible without massive, probably forced, changes in dietary
patterns. At the same time President Chun called for the-elimination of
false statistics--those based on what the leadership wants to hear. But a
bureaucracy that is predicated on a command system will have great
difficulty in responding to both exhortations at the same time, for in the
Korean context they are in conflict. It is likely that, as the political
imperatives take precedence, agricultural research and guidance will be
pushed to the utmost level to achieve targets and that statistics at the
national level will be manipulated to prove compliance and success.

The Korean agricultural research system has thus been remarkably
effective. It does contain an "Achilles Heel"--one that is not a product
of its agricultural program, but rather of its political culture.



The isolated island of Cheju is slightly larger than Oahu in area, and
located some 50 miles off the southern-most tip of the mainland. Volcanic
in origin, Cheju was until recently the poorest province of Korea. It
remained a distinctive subculture of Korean society, with a separate,
essentially unintelligible, dialect of Korean and a society more matriarchal
in practice than the mainland. A site for exiles from the court as well as
outcasts and criminals, it was wracked by a peasant and communist rebellion
in 1948 that significantly lowered the male population ratio and fostered
continued poverty.

The normalization of relations with Japan gave Cheju an early oppor-
tunity for change. Japanese regarded Cheju as an island retreat close to
home as well as inexpensive, and Cheju residents in Japan returned often
with significant funds for local investment.

Fishing still remains as the mainstay of the island's economy. In
recent years, there has been a growing emphasis on both the tourist and live-
stock industries. As a result, the relative importance of farming activi-
ties has recently somewhat declined.

The island's climate is warmer than that of the mainland. The yearly
average temperature is 15.80C with the monthly average varying between
7.5 C and 28.6 C. The island has the highest precipitation in Korea, which
averages about 2000 mm per year. The climate is suitable for growing citrus
fruit, particularly on both the northern and southern coasts, and for cul-
tivating pineapples on the southern coast. The total area of the island is
1,825,000 hectares (ha) out of which the cultivated area covers 53,162 ha,
accounting for only 2.7 percent of the total area. Because of its volcanic
origin, the cultivable area is mostly limited to the coastal belt around
the island. Paddy fields cover less than 2 percent of the cultivated land
with the remaining in upland fields.

Cultivated area per capital of the farming population in Cheju was 0.22 ha
in 1979, which is slightly above the national average of 0.2 ha. Because of
the climatic condition, the land utilization ratio on the island is 146 percent,
exceeding that of the mainland by about 16 percent. Many farmers also
engage in off-farm activities (fishing, livestock, or tourism). Per hectare
yields in many crops are also higher relative to those on the mainland. These
factors have contributed to increased farm income in Cheju at a rate faster
than that on the mainland in recent years.

Both white and sweet potatoes are important cash crops. Cheju is the
only province in Korea in which white potato production is increasing, due
mainly to the export market found on the mainland, particularly during the
winter months. In 1979 there were about 1,000 ha of white potatoes
and 12,000 of sweet potatoes. The productivities of these two crops were

11 and 23 tons per hectare respectively. Sweet potatoes are generally
planted after barley or rape and harvested in the fall when they are sliced
and dried prior to export to the mainland where the slices are used as a
source of starch in the production of alcohol for beverages.

Vegetable production includes an estimated 1,900 tons of cucumbers,
3,000 tons of sweet melons and watermelons, 35,000 tons of Chinese cabbage,
1,300 tons of cabbage, and 7,400 tons of garlic. Thus, vegetable crops are
important to the island's economy and people's diet.

The crop husbandry carried out on the island appears to be very
intensive and well carried out. The fields are relatively small and walled
in by volcanic rocks cleared from the fields. Herbicides are used to a
very limited extent, chiefly in the citrus orchards. The use of fused
phosphate was introduced to the farmers during the period 1973 to 1975;
this had a very marked effect on the increase in productivity of the crops.
This plant nutritional element has undoubtedly done more for Cheju's
agricultural production than any other single or combined factors.

One of the striking differences between Cheju Island and the mainland
is the relatively small area devoted to paddy rice cultivation, less than
900 ha each year. Rice production is practically inconsequential to the
agricultural economy. Paddy fields have not been developed due to the
porous nature of the soils that cannot retain water.

Another contrast between the island and mainland is the flourishing
cash crop economy. In both areas, rice is the chief food but very little
of it is produced in Cheju. Barley is the most important crop; 17,000 ha
are grown as a winter crop. Two-thirds is naked barley for food and the
remaining one-third is two-row for malt, which is grown under contract with
the two breweries on the mainland. The productivity of each barley crop is
about the same, 2.8 tons per hectare. Imported rice is mixed with the
pearled barley to form the basic diet of the people.

Rape is the most important cash crop, as about three-fourths of
Korea's production, or 21,000 tons, is from Cheju. The productivity is
2.3 tons per hectare, nearly equal to barley. The seed is exported to the
mainland where it is pressed for oil, one of the important edible oils in
Korea. Thus, because rape seed demands a higher price than barley, its
gross revenue is about 300 percent more per bag.

The areas cultivated with soybeans has remained practically constant
over the past decade at a level of slightly less than 10,000 ha and a
productivity of 1.0 ton per hectare, about 25 percent lower than the
national average. Some of the soybeans are consumed locally as bean
sprouts, but the majority of the crop is shipped to the mainland for
pressing into oil.

In short, the farmers on the island appear better off compared with
their counterparts on the mainland. Among other reasons, increased per
hectare yields in the mid-1970s can be singled out as the most significant
contributing factor. Higher yields were realized not so much through
implementation of agricultural results as by judicious uses of fertilizers.
Thus, the situation in Cheju is unique and distinct from that in the
mainland Korea.



Table I-1. Chronology of the Korea Agriculture Research Project


Nov. 11, 1972

May 17, 1973

Sept. 3, 1973

Dec. 5,








Sept. 8, 1974

Nov. 14, 1974

Jun. 5, 1975

Sept. 5, 1975

Feb.6, 1976

Apr. 19, 1977

Nov. 7, 1977





Completion of Korean Agricultural Sector Survey by
Michigan State University recommending an expanded
program of agricultural research.

Koren Government submitted a proposal of $7 million
to AID for agricultural research for the period

After consultation, Korean proposal revised to $5 million
for the period 1974-1978.

Office of Rural Development submitted a project work
plan to AID.

Project paper submitted by Korea Mission to AID

Project approved by AID Washington.

Signing of US-ROK Loan Agreement.

Korean announcement of the Agreement.
(Presidential Ordinance #54)

Appointment of the Korean Director and U.S. Co-Director
of the project. (Co-Director Dr. Omer J. Kelley).

Service Contract with the Institute of International
Education (IIE) for Administrative Support in Placing
Trainees, Advisors, and Procurement.

1st Steering Committee Meeting held to determine
interdisciplinary research priorities.

2nd Steering Committee Meeting held.

3rd Steering Committee Meeting held.

4th Steering Committee Meeting held.

Terminal Date of Disbursement Authority (TDDA) and
Terminal Date of Disbursement (TDD) extended
TDDA : Jan. 28, 1978 -- Jan. 28, 1979
TDD : July 28, 1979 -- Sept. 30, 1980

5th Steering Committee Meeting held.

Arrival of project evaluation group of 3 persons from
AID Washington.

Table 1-2. Total Research Under AID Loan

FI4 1 A


Wheat &






Wheat &




c.i- P^C^ 1


T t-amo











7 5n0




















9. QRn















8 A;



00 Won)

... ,. .. r .















Items BudgetI













8- 000





















Sub-Tota x, 50 46 00 463

Total 129 144.205 170 68,168 1110 ..191.120] 83 87,647 53 1522793 1345 343,933

'C1 r



ls Itm Budge




. --



. '




RluldP t

Table 1-3. Rice Yield of Leading Varieties and Breeding Lines

S(1971-'80 Regional Yield Trials)
No. of Varieties Yield (MT/ha)
Leading Breeding Leading Breeding Yield
Year Location Variety Line Variety Line Index

1971* Suwon 2 5 3.44 3.41 99

Iri 2 2 3.51 3.64 104

Milyang 2 2 3.05 3.08 101

Ave. 3.33 3.37 101

1974 Suwon 2 11 4.28 3.88 91

Iri 3 5 2.74 4.03 147

Milyang 4 3 1.84 3.93 213

Ave. 2.95 3.95 133

1977 Suwon 6 7 5.00 5.13 103

Iri 7 5 4.44 4.27 96

Milyang 7 3 3.80 4.21 111

Ave. 4.41 4.54 103

1980 Suwon 6 5 4.66 4.64 100

Iri 4 3 4.71 4.86 103

Milyang 3 5 4.17 3.83 92

Ave. 4.51 4.44 98

*These 1971 yield data
Korean publications.

are lower than that for

Tongil as

stated in other

Table 1-4. Barley Yield of Leading Variety/Breeding Line

No. of Var./Line Yield (MT/ha) No. of Resistant Var./Line
Yield Cold Tolerance Lodging Resistance
Leading Breeding Leading Breeding Index Leading Breeding Leading Breeding
S-;ar Location Variety Line Variety Line (%) Variety Line Variety Line

1971 Suwon 3 12 3.42 3.25 95 3 10 1 6

Iri -

Milyang 4 9 4.88 5.00 102 3 8 1 6

Ave. 4.15 4.13 100

1974 Suwon 3 12 3.54 3.68 104 2 5 1 8

Iri 3 12 3.30 3.47 105 1 5 1 5

Milyang 3 13 4.57 4.93 108 1 5 1 5

Ave. 3.80 4.03 106

1977 Suwon 3 8 3.84 3.89 101 1 4 2 8

Iri 3 8 4.59 4.13 90 1 4 2 3

Milyang 3 9 3.81 4.09 107 6 2 4

Ave. 4.08 4.04 99









3. 87









v. I _______I____ 3

Table 1-5. Wheat Yield of Leading Variety and Breeding Line

No. of Var./Line Yield (MT/ha) __No. of Resistant Var./Line
Yield Cold Tolerance Lodging Resistance
Leading Breeding Leading Breeding Index Leading Breeding Leading Breeding
Year Location Variety Line Variety Line Variety Line Variety Line

1971 Suwon 3 10 2.64 2.80 106 3 9 1 4

Iri 3 14 4.28 4.04 94 2 9 1 8

Milyang 3 14 4.20 3.89 93 2 9 3

Ave. 3.71 3.58 96

1974 Suwon 3 11 3.70 4.37 118 3 7 1 5

Iri 3 12 4.43 3.88 88 2 7 1 9

Milyang 3 13 3.75 4.25 113 2 7 1 6

Ave. _3.96 4.17 105

1977 Suwon 3 7 3.96 2.37 60 3 3 1 4

Iri 3 7 4.52 4.40 97 2 4 1 7

Milyang 3 7 4.31 4.50 104 2 6 1 6

Ave. 4.26 3.76 88

1980 Suwon 3 13 5.36 3.38 63 3 5 1 8

Iri 3 11 4.10 4.33 106 3 9 1 6

Milyang 3 14 4.43 4.48 101 3 12 1 7

Ave. ___4.63 4.06 88

Table 1-6. Soybeans (The Results of Regional Yield Trials)

No. of Entries
Released Breeding
Year Location Cultivar Line

1971 Suwon 3 14

Yuseong 2 10

Kwangju 2 11







1.99( 98)


Degree of SMV Resistance*
Released Cultivar Breeding Line

3 13 1 -

1974 Suwon 4 9 2.24 2.16( 96) 3 1 5 4

Yuseong 3 6 2.23 2.56(115)

Kwangju 2 9 3.18 3.08( 97)

1977 Suwon 2 16 2.65 2.64(100) 2 3 13

Yuseong 2 9 3.12 3.12(100)

Kwangju 2 10 2.54 2.82(111)

1980 Suwon 2 15 2.08 2.08( 95) 1 1 13 2

Yuseong 3 13 2.08 1.87( 90)

Kwangju 2 15 1.81 1.76( 97)

* 1971: SMV, 1974-1980: SMV-N ( ) Y

field index (%)

Table 1-7. Potato Yield of Leading Varieties and Breeding Lines

No. of Virus Resistant
No. of Varieties Yield (MT/ha) Varieties / Lines
Leading Breeding Leading Breeding Yield Leading Breeding
Year Location Variety Line Variety Line Index Variety Line

1974 Kangnung 1 10 30.15 31.56 105 1 4

Suwon 1 10 34.99 28.21 82 1 5

Kwangju 1 10 23.37 24.07 103 1

Ave. 29.50 27.95 95 --

1977 Kangnung 1 9 36.60 40.95 112 1 1

Buchon 1 9 14.87 16.25 109 1 3

Kwangju 1 9 21.10 20.17 96 1 3

Ave. 24.19 25.79 107 -

1979 Suwon 2 13.10 12.23 93 2 3

Kwangju 2 3 16.92 10.92 65 2 3

Chilgok 2 3 10.68 9.30 87 2 3

Ave. 13.57 10.82 80 -

Table 1-8. Name and Present Position of Participants Trained Under CIRC Project

Name University Present Position Field

1. Ph.D Course

Lee, Seung Chan
Hong, Byung Hee
Cho, Eui Kyoo
Chang, Suk Hwan
Lee, Young In *
Lee, Yong Kook
Kwun, Soon Kuk
Kim, Yong Wook
Kim, Soon Chul
Jung, Young Sang
Kang, Yong Gir
Lee, Moon Hong -
Woo, Ki Dae
Mok, Il Jin *
Chung, Moo Nam *
Seo, Wan Soo
Cho, Jeong Tae *
No, Yong Duk *
Eun, Moo Young
Moon, Hun Pal *
Lee, Yong Seok

University of Louisiana
Washington State University
University of Illinois
Cornell University
University of Illinois
Kansas State University

Ohio State
Ohio State

of Missouri

of Arkansas
of Minnesota
of Missouri
of Wisconsin
of Missouri
State University
of Wisconsin
of Louisiana
of California
of Vermont

Agriculture Sciences Institute
Wheat & Barley Research Institute
Agriculture Sciences Institute
Int'l. Cooperation Division, ORD
Agriculture Mechanization Inst.
t "I
Professor, Seoul National Univ.
Crops Experiment Station
Yeongnam Crops Experiment Station
Agriculture Sciences Institute
Crops Experiment Station
Agriculture Sciences Institute
i "i
Horticulture Experiment Station
Wheat and Barley Research Inst.
Farm Management Bureau, ORD
Horticulture Experiment Station
Crops Experiment Station
Honam Crops Experiment Station
Crops Experiment Station
(Deceased in 1980)

Rice Insect
Wheat Breeding
Soybean Insect
Biological Statistics
Soybean Insect
Farm Machinery
Land Development
Soybean Physiology
Weed Control
Soil Mangement
Potato Insect
Potato Breeding
Agricultural Economics
ii "i
Rice Physiology
oi "I
Rice Breeding
Soil Chemistry

* 7 persons are still studying in the U..S.

Total 21 persons

Table I-8 (continued)

Name University Present Position Field

2. M.S. Course

Choi, Eui Kyoo
Seong, Jae Mo
Jung, Pil Kyun
Jung, Dong Hee
Kim, Jang Kyu
Hwang, Young Hyun
Park, Chang Seo
Chun, Jong Eun
Jeong, Gil Woong
Han, Young II
Kwak, Tae Soon
Han, Hwang Gi
Cho, Wang Soo
Sung, Lak Choon
Lee, Seok Soon
Choi, Byung Hwan
Oh, Nam Hwan

University of Illinois
University of Washington
University of Alkansas
The University of Iowa
University of Wisconsin
University of New Mexico
University of Washington
University of Illinois
University of Wisconsin
University of Oregon
University of Colorado
University of Missouri
University of New Hampshire
University of Oregon
University of Kansas

Agriculture Sciences Institute

Wheat & Barley Research Inst.
Agriculture Sciences Institute
Crops Experiment Station
Agriculture Sciences Institute
Jeonbuk Province, ORD
Dankuk University
Alpine Experiment Station
Crops Experiment Station
Kangwon Province, ORD
Agriculture Sciences Institute
Crops Experiment Station
Professor, Yeongnam University
Studying towards Ph.D
ii i1

Soybean Disease
Wheat Disease
Soil Physics
Soil Chemistry
Botanical Pathology
Soybean Pathology
Soil Physics
Wheat Breeding
Soybean Breeding
Potato Disease
Rice Breeding
Insect Control
Cropping Rotation
Rice Physiology
Wheat Breeding

Total 17 persons

3. Short-term Training


2 persons

Han, Byung Hee
Kang, Eung Hee


Alpine Experiment Station
11 It 1

5 persons

Park, Kun Yong
Huh, Han Soon
An, Soo Bong
Lee, Jae Chang
Park, Jung Yun

Crops Experiment Station
Research Bureau, ORD
Crops Experiment Station
Chungnam National University
Agriculture Sciences Institute



Table 1-8 (continued)

Name Present Position Field

12 persons

Oh, Yang Ho
Han, Wook Dong
Chung, Young Sang
Kim, Ho II
Chu, Yeon Dae
Cho, Jeong Ik
Yun, Sang Bog
Kang, Yang Soon
No, Nong Ju
Kim, Kang Kwon
Kim, Sun Kyung
Mun, Myung Gui

Honam Crops Experiment Station
Research Bureau, ORD
Agriculture Sciences Institute
Crops Experiment Station
Gyeongbuk Province, ORD
Agriculture Sciences Institute
Crop Improvement Research Center, ORD
Yeongnam Crops Experiment Station
Research Bureau, ORD
Horticulture Experiment Station
Research Bureau, ORD
Crops Experiment Station

Tropical Agriculture
It to
Seed Improvement
Checking AID Project (CIRC)
Library Information

46 persons

Kim, Kwang Ho
Jang, Chang Moon
Kim, Sung Pil
Lee, Dong Chang
Moon, Yun Ho
Lee, Jin Sook
Song, Yung Nam
Lee, Bong IHo
Oh, Yun Seop
Han, Weon Sik
Kim, Jae Hyuk
Kim, Kil Woong
Han, Dae Seong
Yuh, Han Joon
Yuh, In Soo
Lee, Eun Sup
Seong, Il Jang

Crops Experiment Station
Agriculture Sciences Institute
Crop Improvement Research Center, ORD
Crops Experiment Station
Yeongnam Crops Experiment Station
Crop Improvement Research Center, ORD
Kangwon National University
Yeongnam Crops Experiment Station
Honam Crops Experiment Station
Farm Management Bureau, ORD
Secretary, Deputy Director-General, ORD
Geyongbuk National University
Kangweon National University
Geyongnam Province, ORD
Wheat and Barley Research Institute
I, If to
Horticulture Experiment Station

Rice Breeding

Crops Analysis
Analysis Method

Weed Control



Table 1-8 (continued)

Name Present Position Field

1978 (Cont'd)

Jeong, Kun Sik
Cho, In Sang
Ryu, Kyung Han
Hong, Eun Hee
Cha, Kwang Ro

Cho, Kyu Sun
Kim, Hwee Cheon
Chang, Seong Kun
Song, Yu Han
Oh, Hyung Youl
Han, Sang Chan
Maeng, Don Jae
Yun, Seong Ho
Kim, Kyu Weon
Kim, Byung Hyun
Hee, Sang Seok
Ryu, Jae Gi
Lee, In Jae
Choi, Bock Hyun
Shin, Kwan Chul
So, Jae Sun
An, Wan Sik
Yun, Eui Byung
Seo, Deuk Yong
Chung, Tal Young
Park, Young Sun
Ha, Yong Woong
Ko, II Woong
Lee, Soon Hyung

Crops Experiment Station
Agriculture Sciences Institute
Research Bureau, ORD
Crops Experiment Station
Wando Gun Rural Guidance Office, Junnam
I It iI t
Horticulture Experiment Station
Kangwon Province, ORD
Retirement from ORD
Agriculture Sciences Institute
It 11 if
Wheat and Barley Research Institute
Crops Experiment Station
Crops Experiment Station
Gyeongnam Province, ORD
Technical Dissemination Bureau, ORD
Agriculture Sciences Institute
International Cooperation Division, ORD
Jeonnam National University
Agriculture Sciences Institute
Crops Improvement Research Institute, ORD
Wheat and Barley Research Institute
i t o1
Yeongnam Crops Experiment Station
Wheat and Barley Research Institute
Research Bureau, ORD
Wheat and Barley Research Institute
Rural Guidance Bureau, ORD
Agriculture Sciences Institute

Research Management

Agriculture Information
Iot o
Seed Improvement
io t!
Weed Control
Plant Protection
it 11
Farm Management
Cropping System
Plant Protection
I 11I
Wheat Breeding
11 Ii

Agriculture Research
In the U.S.

Table 1-8 (continued)

Name Present Position Field

29 persons

Oh, Sung Do
Bae, Dong Ho
Cho, Kwang Ho
Park, Chang Sik
Yun, Jin Young
Chang, Hak Gil
Kun, Seok Dong
Lee, Myung Hoon
Kang, Kwang Hee
Kwon, Weon Dal
Kim, Seung Jae
Han, Sang Soo
Lee, Chong Woo
Han, Eui Dong
Baek, Hyun Jun
Lee, Han Kyu
Kim, Hee Kyung
Lee, Chong Hoon
Hwang, Nam Youl
Hwang, Chang Hyun
Choi, Yong Chul
Kim, Ho Young
Kim, Seung Chul
Jeong, Hong Do
Lee, Byung Yong
Moon, Hui Sook
Choi, Jin Kyu
Kim, Bock Jin
Oh, Joong Youl

Total 94 persons

Jeonbuk National University
Livestock Experiment Station
Farm Management Bureau, ORD
Chungnam National University
Horticulture Experiment Station
Wheat and Barley Research Institute
Crops Experiment Station
Farm Management Bureau, ORD
Crops Experiment Station
Chungbug National University
Farm Management Bureau, ORD
Research Bureau, ORD
Gyeonggi Province, ORD
Chungbug Province, ORD
Sericulture Experiment Station
Jeonnam Province, ORD
Rural Guidance Bureau, ORD
Crops Experiment Station
Jeonbug Province, ORD
Agriculture Sciences Institute
t o it
Yeongnam Crops Experiment Station
Agriculture Sciences Institute
Technical Dissemination Bureau, ORD
Farm Mechinery Institute
Rural Guidance Bureau, ORD
Horticulture Experiment Station
Agriculture Sciences Institute
Gyeongbug Province, ORD

Livestock Management
Grass Development
Wheat Breeding
Upland Crops
Farm Management
FMG Analysis
FMG Analysis
Upland Crops
Weed Control
Rural Nutrition
Soil Analysis
Rice Insect
Rice Disease
Rice Breeding
Disease Control
Rice Disease
Food Processing
Vegetable Breeding


Tabl 1-8 (cont inued)

Name Present Position Field

4, Participation to


2 persons

Han, Sung Kum
Lee, Yong Kook


International Meetings and Observation

Farm Machinery Research Institute
IV i oi

Farm Machinery
It 1I

8 persons

Chung, Bong Joe
Lee, Hong Seok
Choi, Hyun Ok
Ham, Yong Soo
Lee, Chang Koo
Huh, Moon Iee
Chung, Kun Sik
Lee, Eun Woong

Seoul National University
Crops Experiment Station
i II i
Veterinary Research Institute
Seoul National University
Crops Experiment Station
Seoul National University




14 persons

Lee, Chong Hoon
Kim, Kil Woong
Shin, Dong Wan
Chung, Bong Koo
Chung, Hoo Sup
Lee, Yong Seok
Park, Cheon Seo
Choi, Hlyun Ok
Park, Tae Kyung
Kim, Dong Soo
Park, Seok Hong
Chung, Bong Joe
Park, Jong Soo
Kim, Soon Kwon

Crops Experiment Station
of of II
Farm Management Bureau, ORD
Agriculture Sciences Institute
Seoul National University
Agriculture Sciences Institute
Crops Experiment Station
Yeongnam Crops Experiment Station
Research Bureau, ORD
Honam Crops Experiment Station
Agriculture Sciences Institute (Deceased)
I1 tI of
Crops Experiment Station

Weed Control
It If

AID Project

Weed Control


Table 1-8 (continued)

Present Position

14 persons

Park, Ki Hyuk
Ham, Young II
Kim, Young Sang
Bae, Seong Ho
Min, Kyung Soo
Kim, Soon Kwon
Lim, Moo Sang
Chang, Kwon Youl
Park, Chong Moon
Hong, Soon Bum
Park, Tae Kyung
Han, Ki Hak
Shin, Dong Wan
Kim, Soon Kwon


44 persons

Ji, Sul Ha

Chung, Jae Hyuk
Lee, Chong Seok
Kim, Duk Lae
Kim, Yeon Jin
Lee, Hong Lae
Koo, Young Seo
An, Chang Soo
Um, Tae Young
Lee, Tae Seung
Yang, Byung Hee
Jin, Kyung Youl
Kim, Chong Ho
Park, Kun Yong

Yeonsi University
Alpine Experiment Station
Wheat and Barley Research Institute

it t 11i
Crops Experiment Station
it to to

Gyeong Sang University
Governor, Kangwon Province
Horticulture Experiment Station
it it II
Agriculture Sciences Institute
Farm Management Bureau, ORD
Crops Experiment Station

Livestock Bureau, Ministry of Agriculture
and Fisheries
Technical Dissemination Bureau, ORD
Horticulture Experiment Station
Kangwon Province, ORD
Chungnam Province, ORD
Gyeongnam Province, ORD
Jeonbug Province, ORD
Gyeonggi Province, ORD
Tongyoung Gun, ORD
Jeonbug Province, ORD
It ii it
Gyeongbug Province, ORD
Crops Experiment Station
Research Bureau, ORD

Title 12

Weed Control



Grass Development


S t






Table 1-8 (continued)

Name Present Position Field

1979 (Cont'd)

Ryu, Kyung 1Ho
Kim, Dal Joong
Song, Chun Jong
Lee, Yong Seok
Choi, Choong Hak
Huh, Il Bum
Yuh, Hae Un
Kang, Yong Sik
Cho, Kwang Hoon
Park, No Kyung
Yuh, Young Pyo
Hwang, Pil Saeng
Kim, Young Hwui
Lee, Weon Woo
Koo, Kang Hui
Lee, Dong Woo
Jeong, In Myung
Park, Gun Ho
Lee, Kwang Suk
Ryu, Chang Jae
Hong, Chul Sun
Chung, Joong Rae
Han, Mak Maan
Lee, Soo Kwan
So, Jae Don
Ryu, Un Ha
Shin, Gun Sik
Cha, Kwang Ro
Yun, In Hwa
Ryu, Chang Hyun

Prime Minister's Office Observation
Chungnam Province, ORD "
Jeonnam Province, ORD "
(Deceased) "
Rural Nutrition Institute, ORD "
Rural Guidance Bureau, ORD "
Technical Dissemination Bureau, ORD "
Jeonnam Younglewang Gun, ORD "
Gyeonggi Province, ORD
Chungnam Province, ORD
Jeonnam Province, ORD
Gyeongnam Province, ORD
Jeju Province, ORD "
Kangwon Province, ORD
Research Bureau, ORD
Kangwon Province, ORD
Chungbug Province, ORD
Jeonbug Province, ORD
Gyeongbuk Province, ORD
Horticulture Experiment Station
Research Bureau, ORD "
International Cooperation Division, ORD
Research Bureau, ORD "
Yeongnam Crops Experiment Station
Honam Crops Experiment Station
Farm Management Bureau, ORD
Information Division, ORD
Wandogun Rural Guidance Office, Jeonnam Province "
Farm Machinery Research Institute "
Agriculture Sciences Institute "

Table 1-8 (continued)

Name Present Position Field

24 persons

Han, Weon Sik
Kang, Hee Young
Choi, Duk Hwan
Huh, Han Soon
Shim, Sang Woo
Lee, Duk Yong
Park, Nam Jong
Lee, Cheon Ho

Lee, Hyun Soon
Lee, Sung Hee
Ryu, Dong Seok
Kim, Myung Ii
La, Joon Soo

Choi, Eui Soon
Kim, Seong Hwui
Ko, Tae Chong
Choi, Eul Ho
Hong, Yu Ki
Park, Joong Soo
Lee, Kyong Hwee
Park, Suk Hong
Lee, Soo Kwan
Chang, Seok Hwan
Lee, Seok Soon

Farm Management Bureau, ORD
Chunam Province, ORD
Rural Guidance Bureau, ORD
Research Bureau, ORD
Rural Guidance Bureau, ORD
Technical Information Division, ORD
Agriculture Machinery Research Institute
Icheongun Rural Guidance Office, Gyeonggi
Kangwon Province, ORD
Chungbug Province, ORD
Gyeonggi Province, ORD
Jeonbug Province, ORD
Boesunggun Rural Guidance Office,
Jeonnam Province
Gyeongbuk Province, ORD
Gyeongnam Province, ORD
Jeju Province, ORD
Pusan City, ORD
Gyeonggi Province, ORD
Agriculture Sciences Institute
Technical Dissemination Bureau, ORD
Honam Experiment Station
Yeongnam Experiment Station
International Cooperation Division, ORD
Yeongnam University








Total 106 persons



Table 1-9. Current Status and Utilization of Equipment Procurred
by Crop Improvement Research Center Project. (Items
by Institutes)

Different Number of Amount
Institutes Items Items

Crops Experiment Station
Honam Crops Experiment Station
Yeongnam Crops Experiment Station
Wheat & Barley Research Institute
Agricultural Sciences Institute
Horticultural Experiment Station
Farm Machinery Research Institute
Alpine Experiment Station

Jeju Experiment Station
Computer Room
Central Laboratory
Provincial Office of Rural Development





946 1,679,465.70




Table J-l. Major Indicators of Korean Agriculture

Item Unit '62 '65 '70 '75 '78 '79

1. Land utilization
Total land (A) 1000ha
land (B) "
B/A %
Paddy l000ha
Upland "
Forest "
Others "
Farm size/household ha
Paddy "
Upland "
Utilization ratio of
cultivated land %

9,843 9,843 9,848 9,881 9,895 9,897







143.5 147.1 142.1 140.4 134.5 130.9

2. Population
Total popula-
Farm popula-

(A) 1000

tion (B)
B/A %
No.of total
household (A) 1000


No.of farm

3. Economic indicator
price (A)
(current price

B/A %
G.N.P.per capital $
Export mil.$
Import "
Balance of trade "
Wholesale price
index %

Consumer price
Farm household
income (A)
Urban worker's




26,513 28,705 31,435 34,681

15,097 15,812
56.9 55.1

14,422 13,244
45.9 38.2

4,589 4,844 5,856 6,757

S 2,649 2,507
% 57.7 51.8

bil.won 355.5 805.7



2,483 2,379
42.4 35.2

37,019 37,605

11,528 10,883
31.1 28.9

7,256 7,539

2,224 2,162
30.7 28.7

2,684.09,792.9 22,917.629,553.7

611.7 1,994 .
22.9 20.7
243 574
882 5,003
1,804 6,674
*922 *1,671

16.1 28.8 42.0 100.0

13.9 27.5 49.1 100.0

67.9 112.2 255.8 872.9

96.6 112.6 381.2 859.3
70.3 99.6 67.1 101.6



136.5 162.1

145.3 171.9

1,884.2 2,227.5

1,916.3 2,629.6
98.3 84.7

Table J-1 (continued)



'65 '70

4. Agricultural indicator

A. Consumption per household

Living expenditure won
Food expenditure "
Engel's coefficients%
Living expenditure won
Food expenditure %
Engel;s coefficients%

B. Income per household



Farm household
income (A
Agri. income
income (B
*Japan (B/A)

) 1000won 67.9
S 54.0


112.2 255.8 872.9 1,884.2 2,227.5
88.8 194.0 714.8 1,355.7 1,531.3






C. Trade condition between
agriculture & non-agriculture

Index No. of price % 10.1
of farm products
received by farmer
Index No. of price % 13.3
of farm supplies
paid by farmer
Parity ratio % 75.9
Rural wage rate won/man-day 120

19.7 39.5 100.0

25.1 44.1 100.0


89.6 100.0
579 1,469

Item Unit '65 '70 '75 '78 '79

D. Food consumption (man/year)

Japan ('78)

Grain & potatoes
Crops Total

kg 121.8
" 36.8
" 13.8
S 0.9
i" 4.4
S 3.8























Table J-1 (continued)

Item Unit '65 '70 '75 '78 '79

E. Proportion domestically
supplied crops

Total % 93.9 80.5 73.0 72.6 59.9
Rice 100.7 93.1 94.6 103.8 86.0
Barley 106.0 106.3 92.0 119.9 117.0
Soybeans 100.0 86.1 85.8 59.3 43.4

Item Unit '62 '65 '70 '75 '78 '79
F. No. of farm machine owned

Power tiller each
Tractor "
machine "
Planting machine "
Binder "
Combine "
Dryer "
Power sprayer "
Mist & duster "
Power pump "
Power thresher "

G. Land improvement &

Irrigated paddy
field 1
% to total
paddy field
paddy field
% to total
paddy field
Farm land expan-
sion & develop-








1,111 11,884









44,092 134,073
7 22

85,722 194,780 235,909
564 1,601 2,035





1,122 1,153
86 87

251,098 310,137 323,007
42 53 55

ha 12,961 37,220 2,953

8,440 3,891 3,218

Table J-2. Production, Cultivated Area, and Imports of Main Food Crops

Year Items Unit Rice Barley Wheat Soybean Potato





























Table J-3. Grain Marketing, Prices and Inflation Rates

Items Unit 1977 1978 1979 1980
Rice (milled rice)

Gov't purchase price
Gov't selling price
to Coop. middle-man.etc.
Consumer's price urban
Purchased amount

Barley (pearled barley)

Gov't purchase price
Gov't selling price
Consumer's price
Purchased amount


Gov't purchase price
Gov't selling price
Consumer's price
Purchased amount


Gov't purchase price
Gov't selling price
Purchased amount

won/kg 325
--- 280.3

M/T 1,403






Inflation Rate

Consumer's price index
Index number of prices of
farm products
Index number of prices of
farm inputs




























Table J-4. National Agriculture Inputs and Credit

Items 1977 1978 1979 1980

Seed Paddy 1,039 2,035
(M/T) Barley 106 1,144 712 447
(Supplied by Seed Soybean 130 299 508 465
Supply Office under Potato 4,513 898 3,414 884
Ministry of Agric. Corn 249 412
& Fisheries)

Fertilizer (1,000 M/T) 780 916 914 910

Herbicide (M/T) 3,721 4,581 5,304 6,350

Chemicals (M/T) Fungicide 4,987 6,085 7,903 10,789
Insecticide 14,647 15,761 11,207 11,973

Agric. Credit Funds* 356.8 519.9 633.8
(billion won)

* Interest rates Are subsided at 12 percent. If not repaid the same year.
interest rates are 24 percent.

Table J-5. Dissemination of Rice HYV

Cultivat- HYV Yield per ha Increase in
Year ed Area Area HYV Ordinary Increment A/B Nat'l. Production
(A) (B) average Amount Value







billion won

2,884 858




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