Front Cover
 Title Page
 A.I.D. evaluation publications
 Table of Contents
 Project data sheet
 Project setting
 Project description
 Project impacts
 Findings: A summary
 Lessons learned
 List of contacts
 A.I.D. Evaluation publications
 Back Cover

Group Title: Project impact evaluation ;, no. 33
Title: Food grain technology
Full Citation
Permanent Link: http://ufdc.ufl.edu/UF00053863/00001
 Material Information
Title: Food grain technology agricultural research in Nepal
Series Title: Project impact evaluation
Physical Description: 1 v. (various pagings) : maps ; 28 cm.
Language: English
Creator: Simmons, Emmy Bartz
United States -- Agency for International Development
Publisher: U.S. Agency for International Development
Place of Publication: Washington D.C.?
Publication Date: [1982]
Subject: Agriculture -- Research -- Nepal   ( lcsh )
Genre: federal government publication   ( marcgt )
bibliography   ( marcgt )
non-fiction   ( marcgt )
Bibliography: Bibliography: p. 23-25.
Statement of Responsibility: by Emmy B. Simmons ... et al..
General Note: "May 1982."
General Note: "PN-AAJ-614"--Cover.
 Record Information
Bibliographic ID: UF00053863
Volume ID: VID00001
Source Institution: University of Florida
Rights Management: All rights reserved by the source institution and holding location.
Resource Identifier: aleph - 001264359
oclc - 08700129
notis - AGB4978

Table of Contents
    Front Cover
        Front Cover
    Title Page
        Title Page
    A.I.D. evaluation publications
        Page i
    Table of Contents
        Page ii
        Page iii
        Page iv
        Page v
        Page vi
        Page vii
        Page viii
    Project data sheet
        Page ix
        Page x
        Page xi
    Project setting
        Page 1
        Page 2
    Project description
        Page 3
        Page 4
        Page 5
        Page 6
    Project impacts
        Page 7
        Establishing national research capacity
            Page 8
            Page 9
            Page 10
            Page 11
            Page 12
        Introduction of new technologies
            Page 13
            Page 14
            Page 15
        Developing Nepal
            Page 16
            Page 17
        Improving household productivity and welfare
            Page 18
            Page 19
    Findings: A summary
        Page 20
    Lessons learned
        Page 21
        Page 22
        Page 23
        Page 24
        Page 25
    List of contacts
        Page 26
        Page 27
        Page 28
        Page 29
        Page A 1
        Appendix A: Methodology
            Page A 1
            Page A 2
            Page A 3
        Appendix B: Farming systems of the Tarai farmers (Joseph Beausoleil)
            Page B 1
            Page B 2
            Page B 3
            Page B 4
            Page B 5
            Page B 6
            Page B 7
            Page B 8
            Page B 9
            Page B 10
            Page B 11
            Page B 12
            Page B 13
        Appendix C: Population pressure and agricultural change in the Tarai (Gregory Heist and Josette Murphy)
            Page C 1
            Page C 2
            Page C 3
            Page C 4
            Page C 5
            Page C 6
            Page C 7
            Page C 8
            Page C 9
            Page C 10
        Appendix D: Research and risk (Gary Ender)
            Page D 1
            Page D 2
            Page D 3
            Page D 4
            Page D 5
            Page D 6
        Appendix E: Ten years later in Shripur (Gary Ender)
            Page E 1
            Page E 2
            Page E 3
            Page E 4
            Page E 5
        Appendix F: Statistical summary
            Page F 1
            Page F 2
            Page F 3
            Page F 4
    A.I.D. Evaluation publications
        Page G 1
        Page G 2
        Page G 3
    Back Cover
        Page G 4
Full Text
0f. 373

/A.I.D. Project Impact Evaluation No. 33
Food Grain Technology:
Agricultural Research In Nepal

\JZ7 W7/9P
_ _/_/ 1-7- II/__

May 1982

U.S. Agency for International Development (AID)







Emmy B. Simmons, Team Leader
(Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination)

Joseph W. Beausoleil
(Bureau for Science and Technology)

Gary Ender
(U.S. Department of Agriculture)

Gregory Heist
(Cornell University)

Josette Murphy
(Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination)

.U.S. Agency for International Development

May 1982

The views and interpretations in this report are those of the
authors and should not be attributed to the Agency for International


A complete list of reports issued in the A.I.D. Evaluation Publication
series is included in the last three pages of this document, together with
information for ordering reports.



Foreword ................................ .................. iii

Summary.................................................. iv

Preface........ ... ....................... ......... vi

Acknowledgements.................... .............. ........ viii

Project Data Sheet........................................ ix

Glossary................................................. x

Maps ..................................................... xi

I. Project Setting .................................. 1

II. Project Description.............................. 3

III. Project Impacts................................... 7
A. Establishing National Research Capacity...... 8
B. Introducing New Agricultural Technologies.... 13
C. Developing Nepal ............................ 16
D. Improving Household Productivity and Welfare. 18

IV. Findings: A Summary....... .................... .. 20

V. Lessons Learned.................................... 21

References ............................................... 23

List of Contacts ........................................ 26


A. Methodology
B. Farming Systems of the Tarai Farmers
by Joseph Beausoleil
C. Population Pressure and Agricultural Change
In the Tarai
by Gregory Heist and Josette Murphy
D. Research and Risk
by Gary Ender
E. Ten Years Later in Shripur
by Gary Ender
F. Statistical Summary



In October 1979, the Administrator of the Agency for
International Development (AID) initiated an Agency-wide ex-post
evaluation system focusing on the impact of AID-funded
projects. These impact evaluations are concentrated in
particular substantive areas as determined by AID's senior
executives. The evaluations are to be performed largely by
Agency personnel and result in a series of studies that, by
virtue of their comparability in scope, will ensure cumulative
findings of use to the Agency and the larger development
community. This study, Food Grain Technology: Agricultural
Research in Nepal, was conducted in January 1982 as part of this
effort. A final evaluation report will summarize and analyze
the results of all the studies in this sector and relate them to
program, policy and design requirements.


In 1957, the U.S. Operations Mission initiated support for a
broad-ranging agricultural development effort in Nepal. This
project continued without pause for seventeen years, largely in
pursuit of the objective of increasing Nepal's foodgrain
production capacity by enabling and encouraging Nepali farmers
to apply the techniques of scientific agriculture. While the
U.S. financial and technical assistance was continuous, the
emphasis, the pace, and the amount of Nepali involvement were
altered considerably during the course of project
implementation. The project began as a "General Agriculture"
initiative and gradually evolved to its concluding emphasis on
the development and dissemination of "Food Grain

The project successfully contributed to the establishment
of agricultural research and extension systems by training
almost 600 Nepalis to the B.S., M.S., and Ph.D. levels and by
constructing facilities for research at five stations in the
Tarai -- at Nepalganj, Bhairawa, Parwanipur, Janakpur, and
Rampur. With the assistance of the extension service, improved
wheat, rice, and maize varieties tested on the research stations
were spread to farmers across the Tarai. Solme of the selected
improved varieties proved widely adapted to Nepal's enormous
range of agroecological conditions and spread into the Hill and
Mountain farms as well. Other parts of the "technology
packages" -- which included recommendations for fertilizer, time
of planting, spacing, and irrigation -- were not so widely

In trying to assess more precisely the differences that
could be attributed to the implementation of the Food Grain
Technology project, we first examined statistical fact sheets
and research reports. We then talked with agricultural leaders
(many of whom had apparently taken advantage of training
opportunities offered under the project) and with agricultural
producers. We took a long view in these dialogues, trying to
comprehend the pattern of changes which had occurred in the
agricultural sector over the past two decades. While looking at
reports of experimental trials and at growing fields of wheat
and mustard, we discussed not only.what had happened, but what
might not have occurred had the project never been implemented.

Our examination provides both a sense of solid
accomplishment and a basis for some disquieting fears. On the
positive side, we found that:

a functioning research system has been developed;

farmers are immensely aware of the need for and
problems with krishi bikash -- agricultural
development; and

extension and research services can, at times, work
together in complementary, mutually-reinforcing
activities which result in new varieties and knowledge
in the countryside.

On the negative since, we found that:

researchers and farmers are not in complete agreement
on which agricultural problems need to be addressed ,
nor are the channels for communication as open as they
might be;

the "green revolution" as it has occurred in Nepal has
not yet resulted in long-term security and economic
independence as expected but has contributed to
economic and environmental destabilization; and

the productivity of farmers, extension workers,
researchers, and those agencies charged with input
supply distribution is far from optimal.

Thus, researchers articulate the need to continue the
search for new varieties which are higher yielding, more disease
resistant, and produce grain with acceptable qualities of
taste. Farmers agree that variety development is important,
although they emphasize other criteria for variety selection as
well. Farmers also recommend that increasing reliability of
water and fertilizer supplies is more important for handling
their problems of deteriorating soil fertility and declining
farm sizes, of low yields and high risks. The role of
agricultural research and extension is not in question; at stake
are the issues of research priorities and their relevance to
farmers' resources and constraints.

The fact that farmers have adopted components of technology
packages at all may reflect less the persuasive rhetoric of
research and extension than the farmers' response to the
increasing pressure of population and to their families'
requirements for food and cash. Nevertheless, without the
technology packages, it is unlikely that Nepal's farmers would
be as productive as they are today.


Asked to reminisce about changes which have occurred over
time in Nepal's agricultural sector, one official recalled that

...in the old days (the early 1960's), extension was ahead
of research. Extension agents relied on Indian news and
seeds. But farmers were ahead of extension! This is no
longer the picture. Research is coming in at a par with

Left unspoken was the possibility that farmers are still ahead
of both research and extension. And not included in his summary
was another major set of actors in the agricultural scene --
those who distribute improved seeds, fertilizers, pesticides,
and irrigation water. It was a natural oversight. For in the
"old days," with no improved production inputs to distribute,
few roads and trucks to transport them, and few irrigation
systems extending beyond a village's boundaries, the roles which
these actors now play were not yet written.

As we set out on this evaluation of the impacts of U.S.
assistance in the development of Nepal's agricultural research
and extension institutions, we only superficially appreciated
just how far "modern agriculture" in Nepal had come in 25
years. But we travelled the Tarai from Bhairawa to Biratnagar
for two weeks, questioning nearly 1UO farmers, visiting
demonstration plots in farmers' fields and research station
experiments laid out in neat randomized blocks, and touching
base with cooperative managers, extension staff, and rice
retailers, with Agricultural Input Corporation managers and
panchayat level assistants in extension.

We have tried to identify and understand patterns of change
associated with U.S. support for:

the growth and function of the agricultural research

the evolution and effectiveness of the agricultural
support system -- extension services, the supply of
inputs, and to limited extent, storage and markets; and

the increasing productivity and welfare of Nepali
farmers, particularly in the Tarai.


Emphasis has been placed on the research system's growth and
functions for three reasons:

1. U.S. assistance to Nepal in the 1960's is generally
agreed to have laid the foundation upon which
subsequent research development, including that
supported by other donors, has been based.

2. American assistance to the research system has been
continuous since 1957.

3. Experience elsewhere has shown that the development of
improved technologies through agricultural research may
well be a precondition to progress in other areas.



The team owes a debt of gratitude to the many present and
former officials of His Majesty's Government who took time to
share their views on the development of agricultural research
and agriculture in Nepal. Station directors were pressed to
prepare budgets and plans before the Summer Crops Workshop which
was held in Parwanipur during the last week of our visit.
District Agricultural Development Officers were rushed with
fertilizer projections and training seminars. We are also
grateful to the AID Mission in Nepal. Thanks are particularly
due to William Nance, Program Officer, for his warm welcome and
unflagging support, and to the AID drivers and mechanics who
enabled us to talk to farmers across the Tarai. Both Rabi
Adhikari and Surya Dunghel must also be cited for their
excellent work in translating thousands of questions and
responses for those of us whose Nepali (and Hindi and Bhojpuri)
was less than adequate.

It is, of course,,the farmers to whoia we owe most of the
insight which we gained into farming conditions in Nepal. They
gave most generously of their time and hospitality.


1. Country: Nepal

2. Project Title: Food Grain Technology (also known as General
Agriculture, Food Grain Production)

3. A.I.D. Project No.: 367-11-110-054; 367-0054

4. Project Implementation:
a. Project Authorized -- 1957
b. Final Obligation -- 1974
c. Final Input Delivery -- 1978

5. Project completion Final Disbursement: FY 1978

6. Project Funding: U.S. $4,206,000
U.S.-owned local currency:
Approximately $10 million equivalent
Cooperating country contribution:
Approximately $5 million equivalent

7. Evaluations: Project Appraisal Reports, 1972 and 1974

8. Responsible Mission Officials During Life of Project:

a. Mission Directors: John S. Benz, William C. Ide
b. Project Officers: Raymond E. Fort, Dale G. Strong,
Philip D. Smith

9. Host Country Exchange Rates:

a. Name of Currency: Rupee
b. Exchange Rate at Time of Project: Rs. 10.26 =$1


ADB ....................

ADO ....................

AIC ....................





Krishi bikash...........





PCV.......... .........

Sajha .................



Asian Development Bank

Agricultural Development Officer

Agricultural Inputs Corporation, the
government monopoly for fertilizer,
seeds, and other inputs

Agricultural Projects Services Center

His Majesty's Government of Nepal

The Integrated Cereals Project, an
AID-supported project for agricultural

Junior Technician; Junior Technical
Assistant (extension agents)

Agricultural development in Nepali

A grain measure, one maund = 82.2 lbs.

Small seed/fertilizer packets for
demonstration and testing purposes

Nitrogen, phosphorus, and potassium; the
components of inorganic fertilizer

The smallest political division; each
district is divided into a number of

Peace Corps Volunteer


Same as Tarai, different spelling

U.S. Agency for International



Map 1 Geographic Regions

Map 2 Development Regions and
Agricultural Research Stations and Farms

@National Capital
o Major Cities and Towns
() Agricultural Research Stations
S() Agricultural Research Farms

Far Western Region

...t Kathmandu )
S /
)Rampur (Khumaltar /
Central Region Eastern Region
@Parwanipur ~
() T-.t.... @Tarahara


Shortly after World War II, the power of the Rana family
autocracy which had.ruled Nepal for a hundred years began to
erode. With the end of that regime in 1951, the first steps
were taken to bring the nation into the 20th century. Regular
contacts with the ideas, economies, and people of the rest of
the world were initiated. The United States and India played,
by all accounts, major roles in shaping these contacts. They
offered both financial and technical assistance in education,
health, and industrial development as well as in agriculture and

Because of the proximity of the Tarai to India and the
already existing family and cultural ties between people on both
sides of the border, India's assistance has largely been
focused on this region or in linking this region (and thus all
of India) with the capital in the Kathmandu valley. Road
construction and irrigation development along the major rivers
which flow from Nepal through India have been important elements
in Indian programs. The U.S. program recognized that the
majority of Nepali people lived in the Hills, that hilly to
mountainous region, heavily dissected by rivers, which lies
between the rugged Himalayas and the flat plains of the Tarai
(Maps 1 and 3). But the underutilized potential of fertile
lands in the malaria-ridden Tarai and perhaps the greater ease
of communication there also led the U.S. agricultural assistance
program to a certain concentration of efforts in the Tarai.
Together, India and the U.S. provided more than three-fourths of
the foreign aid which Nepal accepted between 1951 and 1970.

A fact sheet about the U.S. program from 1952 to 1969
summarized that "the purpose of American aid is to assist Nepal
in its programs for economic and social progress. The United
States' aim is that Nepal be able to carry out its own
development, without outside assistance." This objective echoed
those of the new Nepali government, which expressed commitment
to economic growth and to improving the quality of people's

In the early 1950's, the economy was overwhelmingly
agrarian. Expectations for development were centered on
improving the productivity and income of the farming sector;
the challenge of fulfilling those expectations was immense.
Although population growth was slower than it is today, the
effects of overcrowding on good agricultural land in the Hills
were already apparent. An FAO survey of farms in the Kathmandu
valley showed that, in 1953, the average family of seven tilled
a holding of only 1 to 1.5 acres. There was considerable
unsettled land in the Tarai, but endemic malaria hindered

resettlement and expansion of cultivation there. Those who
farmed in the Tarai in spite of the mosquitoes had the benefits
of larger farms but the disadvantages of heavy taxation and poor
transportation. One author's impression was that, "The little
left to the Tarai peasant after rent and debt payments was
hardly enough to avert starvation. A bad harvest in these
circumstances was disastrous" (14, p. 10).

It was not until 1956 that the Tribhuwan Rajpath,
constructed by India, linked Kathmandu with the Indian border
near Birganj. Other motorable roads between destinations in
Nepal simply did not exist. The difficulties of transportation
are important to keep in mind. They account in part for the
limited monetization and trade in the agricultural economy and
for the evolution of cropping systems which emphasized food
self-sufficiency rather than the optimum exploitation of
potential inherent in the soil and water conditions.

The environment for rapid agricultural development in the
1950's was not auspicious. It was in this environment, however,
that the foreign assistance for development had to work. The
first program in Nepal to receive American support was a village
development training center opened in Kathmandu in 1952. The
isolationism and feudal policies of the former Rana regime meant
that few Nepalis had a strongly developed sense of what the
government of Nepal could do for them. But Paul Rose, the first
U.S. Operations Mission Director, underscored the widely-held
assumption that the village development project would begin to
bring about

...an organized effective means of distributing increased
services to the people and a channel through which people
may pass their judgement about problems and solutions to the
central government. (Quoted in 14, p. 32).

Initially, the U.S. support to this and other projects
consisted largely of providing the advice needed to get them off
the ground. Apparently, however, neither the villagers nor the
central government were as responsive as had been envisioned, so
the U.S. assistance program became, for a time, more directly
involved in providing the management and technical skills for
development projects. In the latter part of the decade, the
U.S. approach shifted once again -- from "straightforward
administration of projects to the use of projects as a means to
develop government institutions capable of carrying out even
larger programs on their own" (14, p. 70). Nationwide impacts
were desired and there were limited numbers of skilled Americans
willing to work in a Nepal which required one to travel
circuitously through India in order to reach another Tarai town
or to trek for several days up river valleys or over mountains
to reach even a major Hill town.

- 3 -

More food, foreign exchange, and productive employment for
the vast majority of the labor force were necessary to achieve
increases in both national and individual welfare. All provided
compelling reasons for continued U.S. involvement -- and growing
Government of Nepal involvement -- in agriculture. The fairly
successful combination of a resettlement and a malaria
eradication program carried out in 1955-58 in the Rapti valley
(now called the Chitwan District -- and the site of the national
maize research program headquarters) provided some
encouragement. The long term project which is the subject of
this evaluation was thus begun in 1957.


The project envisioned in 1957 was, in many ways, not the
project which concluded in 1974. In the seventeen years of
project implementation, the emphasis, the pace, and the level of
Nepali involvement in the project shifted considerably.

Project No. 367-11-110-054 as originally conceived had
several components, among them, training, extension, research,
and construction. Readily available documentation is somewhat
fragmentary but it appears that initially extension, training,
and construction received priority -- probably in that order.
The training of professional Nepali agriculturalists to B.S. and
more advanced levels and the fielding of large numbers of local
extension agents was consistent with the earlier-stated
intentions of the U.S. assistance program to work with and
through the Government of Nepal and to have a nationwide
impact. In retrospect, however, the construction program
indicated an implicit "Tarai first" strategy. The research
stations receiving construction funds were all in the Tarai,
within 20 miles of the Indian border (Map 2).

The project was first named "General Agriculture," aptly
reflecting its broad sectorwide objectives. In 1968, it had
already been extended two years past its intended completion
date and renamed the "Food Grain Production" project. By 1968,
nearly $4 million had been allocated to the project's various
components; 106 persons had gone to the U.S. and 51 to "third"
countries -- mostly to India -- for training in agriculture and
natural resources. Several American advisors had been
associated with the project, mostly working with various
divisions in the Ministry of Agriculture. The advisors'
end-of-tour reports provide interesting contemporary assessments
of project emphasis and progress.

One of these advisors, Donald J. Carter, working as the
Project Coordinator for the Agricultural Extension and Training

- 4 -

component of the project, wrote in 1965 that

... convincing 2 million farm families of the merits of
modern scientific agricultural techniques (and training them
how to adopt them successfully) is no easy task...It
requires a considerable amount of time...By profiting from
experience in the USA and other countries it is hoped to
speed up this process in Nepal; even though the problem is
aggravated by illiteracy, poor transportation and
communications, etc.....

Carter also reported that "it appears Nepal is ready for 'take
off' with an extension program that will make a real impact on
production." The AID Mission disagreed:

[Carter] ...has painted a somewhat overly rosy picture of
this activity. In very general terms USAID does not
consider this project to have been a success...we have not
managed to adapt the agricultural extension techniques so
successful in some parts of the United States to local

Further, the Mission Director at the time felt that

...there [was] doubt that either the Agriculture Department
or the Government of Nepal as a whole place sufficient
emphasis upon extension. Government... contributions,
nominal in the past, must be increased and involvement and
support extended to policy levels...

It appears from such comments that there was a mid-1960's
shift within the project from an emphasis on extension to one
stressing the development of Nepali research capacity. A 1969
project appraisal report summarized:

...The early agricultural activities concentrated mainly on
extension-type efforts in which the farmers were exhorted to
work harder and to do better almost exclusively within the
framework of their existing technology...

Glen Johnson's arrival in 1967 as an Agronomy Advisor to the
Department of Agricultural Education and Research seems to
highlight the shift in project emphasis toward research and the
development of improved agricultural technologies. In his
end-of-tour report, Johnson notes that upon arrival, he "was
indeed surprised to find 69 persons engaged in agricultural
research that were holding B.S., M.S., or Ph.D. degrees."
Although Johnson professed to be "disappointed to find HMG/N and
USAID/N trying to conduct basic agricultural research on nine
farms and stations without the basic, essential equipment..." he

5 -

cited with some pleasure progress made in the Nepal Agriculture
Research Program

... based on introductions and varietal trials
which have come into Nepal regularly since 1967... over 150
new varieties of paddy, maize, and wheat and over 800
varieties of sorghum and soybeans were put on trial in

Thus when Raymond Fort took up a position as the Chief of
the Food and Agriculture Division in USAID/Nepal in October
1969, his priorities were clear:

"A. To establish research competence in the field of
agricultural production;
B. to improve the operation of the Extension Service;
C. to investigate ways of improving the market operations
of farmers;
D. to assist the Ministry of Agriculture and National
Planning Officials to develop plans, policy, and
strategy for agricultural development; and
E. to serve when asked as a resource person on Panchayat
Development (local self-government) matters."

Between 1970 and 1974, project activity seems to have been
most intense. About 15 direct-hire AID employees and four
contractors were posted to the various research stations and
organizations in Kathmandu to assist in developing agricultural
research capabilities. In 1971, the project name was altered
again -- this time emphasizing the technology development rather
than production targets -- to "Food Grain Technology." The
project completion date was firmly set at 1974. Annual Project
Agreements on budgets, experiments, and staffing for each
station were worked out in painstaking detail by the AID Mission
and the Ministry of Food and Agriculture in Kathmandu. While
there was obvious frustration that the careful plans were never
completely carried out due to fiscal and staffing problems both
in AID and in the Government of Nepal, they appear to have
started the process of program budgeting for the research system.

The program during this period was geared largely toward
adaptive research, that is, bringing improved varieties of
selected foodgrains (rice, wheat, maize) into Nepal, planting
them out at research farms, screening them for yield and disease
resistance, and systematically selecting, multiplying, and
releasing promising lines. Fertilizer trials were conducted to
test various levels of nitrogen, phosphorus, and potassium.
Some work on optimum planting dates, plant spacing, and weed
control was also carried out. While most of the effort was
expended on-station, farmers' field trials were apparently
conducted in some areas, drawing on the outreach capabilities of

- 6 -

the extension service. One collection of 1200 local rice
varieties was made in 1970/71. On-farm storage improvements,
paddy milling and marketing assessments, nutritional quality
analysis, and some economic studies were other research-related
activities supported under the Food Grain Technology project at
one time or another.

While not all varieties identified in the adaptive
research process proved to be popular with farmers, the process
resulted in the selection of wheat varieties, particularly
RR-21, and rice varieties, particularly Masuli, which are
well-suited to the Tarai and to cropping systems there. Both
wheat and rice varieties were officially released just before
the end of the Food Grain Technology project. The design of the
technology "packages" which include the improved seeds enhanced
the role of extension services and input delivery systems
although it also, as will be discussed below, made their
shortcomings more apparent.

The extension aspects of the Food Grain Technology project
continued to involve training, the fielding of agents, and the
implementation of a program of demonstrations and field trials
on farmers' fields. Again, a certain amount of advisory
assistance was provided to the Ministry offices in Kathmandu.

By 1974, when the Food Grain Technology project was ended
and the current Integrated Cereals Project (ICP) began, the U.S.
had provided financial, technical and commodity assistance to
Nepal valued at nearly $16 million under project number
367-0054. The Government of Nepal had gradually assumed a
slightly greater share of the costs associated with the growing
agricultural establishment. Almost 600 Nepalis had been sent
for degree-level or short-term training under the project. In
later years, increasing numbers of the degree candidates went to
Indian agricultural universities. Since these universities were
less expensive than their U.S. counterparts, this permitted
greater numbers of students to attend. A follow-up study on
training prepared by the AID Mission in 1974 estimated that 80
percent of the agriculture and natural resource returnees were
employed in positions directly utilizing their training,
although another evaluation report indicates that "directly"
might be an overstatement. This latter report includes an
example: "50% of the agricultural engineers trained as part of
this project are not working as ag engineers at this time. They
are working in ag facilities, but not necessarily as ag

- 7 -


Sitting in an armchair perusing foodgrain production
statistics for Nepal, one could only conclude that the efforts
to transform agriculture through research and extension have
been in vain. Food and Ayriculture Organization (FAO) indices
for food production in Nepal were 92 in 1956, 100 in 1969-71,
and 110 in 1978. The repeatedly targeted three percent annual
increases in output have never been achieved. Population
growth, on the other hand, has occurred. Increased investments
in research and extension have thus been associated with an

...average annual growth rate of agricultural production in
Nepal ...[of] 0.4 percent in the last decade [the 1970's] as
against more than two percent rate of growth in population.
This paradoxical input-output relation in food production in
Nepal has been a matter of serious concern (35).

The FAO indices for per capital food production underscore the
concern; they declined from a level of 120 in 1956 to 91 in
1978. Paddy yields were two metric tons per hectare in 1964/65;
in 1978/79, after years of research, new varieties, and more
than triple the amount of fertilizer imports, paddy yields were
1.85 metric tons per hectare (41, p. 108). The poor production
record is also apparently somewhat of a mystery to researchers
themselves, who feel that known technology could boost
production significantly. As one said, "These farmers have to
be convinced. I don't know why they aren't."

Inaccurate production statistics, bad weather, stubbornly
traditional farmers, declining soil fertility, adverse changes
in climate, unrecorded sales to India and any number of other
explanations can -- and have been -- considered. With little
direct evidence to support any of them, however, the evaluation
team saw no alternative but to get out of the armchair and talk
with those ultimately responsible, the farmers themselves. With
their voices and opinions echoing in our minds, we also talked
with researchers, extension agents, and those who distribute
fertilizer, seeds, and credit. By hearing about plans and
problems from all corners of the sector, we began to understand
the realities behind the production numbers. Only at that point
did we feel ready to assess the impacts of the project.

Although the emphases of the Food Grain Technology project
had evolved during the course of implementation, its broad
objectives were to:

establish a national research organization capable of
adapting and generating new technologies;

- 8 -

introduce these new agricultural technologies,
including improved seed varieties and chemical
fertilizers, to farmers, by building an extension

develop Nepal's capacity as a nation to sustain and
expand agricultural production, not only through
research and extension, but by fostering the growth of
a profitable, surplus-producing, agricultural sector;

improve the productivity and welfare of farming

These intentions directed our inquiries and our search for the
"differences" which could be attributed to the fact that this
project had taken place.

A. Establishing National Research Capacity

One crop coordinator characterized the development of
Nepal's research capacity as analogous to the development of
rural transport in the country. "First," he said, "we had a
completely top-down approach -- the helicopter. Then, STOL
(short take-off and landing) strips made it possible to visit
more regularly. Roads followed, so more people could at least
get closer. And now we're beginning to see feeder roads -- and
coming a bit closer to the grass roots."

Just recently, the Department of Agriculture endorsed the
view that researchers should be in touch with farmers' problems
by issuing a guideline that 40 percent of research staff time
should be spent off-station, on farmers' fields. Given the lean
staffing situation in most stations and the number of tasks
besides research that many are expected to do (such as serving
as subject matter specialists for extension training, producing
seed, and assembling minikits), this dictum is likely to be
difficult if not impossible to meet. Nevertheless, it reflects
a healthy development in attitude for the future orientation of
the research system if the effects of research station
capabilities must ultimately be visible in farmers' fields.

The Food Grain Technology project can take some credit for
helping to develop this attitude. The project offered some
concrete contributions to its realization, namely: the
development of research stations away from Kathmandu, training
for a large enough group of agricultural scientists that not all
could be absorbed by Kathmandu's bureaucracy, and the concept of
farmers' field trials.

- 9 -

The project's resources helped in the process of building
the necessary working environments for research outside of
Kathmandu. Physical facilities and equipment at the Bhairawa,
Rampur, Parwanipur, Janakpur, and Nepalganj stations (Map 2) owe
a great deal to the construction funds and commodities supplied
under the Food Grain Technology project and its successor, the
Integrated Cereals Project. Comparison of staff lists for 1970
and 1980 for some of the stations supported under the projects
indicate that the training efforts facilitated substantial
increases in numbers of trained scientists and needed additions
of new research skills.

In 1970, 96 of the 114 college graduates with B.S., M.S.,
and Ph.D. degrees in agriculture were posted to Kathmandu. In
1980, 355 of the 625 persons identified as degree-holding,
high-level agricultural manpower in government positions were,
according to an APROSC study, posted outside of Kathmandu. As
the crop coordinator indicated, research scientists may not yet
be completely aware of farmers' constraints, but they are at
least physically in the same vicinity.

The research foundation is impressive, particularly when one
considers how rapidly it was built. But it is important, in
terms of assessing impact and drawing lessons for the future, to
look beyond the bricks, mortarboards, and irrigated experimental
plots, and to consider the research system's performance.

Were the choice of sites and the definition of the initial
research task as adaptive research, for example, appropriate?
Or, given the low level of infrastructure and staff availability
which existed at the start of the project, would not a
concentration of effort in one or two stations have had the
effect of assembling a critical mass of research talent earlier,
possibly avoiding the shortages of staff and resources which are
still cited as major constraints to performance at many
stations? Or, given that the majority of project support went
to stations in the Tarai, and that the research emphasis is
biased toward Tarai crops, how valid is a.claim that a
"national" research capacity has been created? Or, given the
resources allocated, how could the relevance of the stations'
efforts to farmers' problems have been improved and how much
impact could they have had on farmers' utilization of improved
agricultural technology? There are no objective answers to
these questions, of course, but the Nepal experience is
instructive. Three issues are explored briefly here.

Concentration or Dispersal?

As noted earlier, the research effort in Nepal has been
dispersed among several stations. Yet, on balance, the
development of several research stations in agroecologically

- 10 -

similar areas of the Tarai has probably been beneficial in terms
of impact. Transportation constraints precluded rapid
communication between research stations and farmers' fields on a
regular basis even over fairly short distances until the basic
road networks were developed. Even now, vehicle running
expenses and monsoon flooding constrain the amount of
researcher-extension agent-farmer contact. If the knowledge
about improved technologies is supposed to get out as rapidly as
possible, then it makes sense, under these conditions, to have
the site at which such knowledge is generated as close to users
as possible. This was especially true when the research
function was primarily adaptive and consisted of planting out
varieties from elsewhere and selecting desirable varieties for
local conditions. A good agronomist under this research plan
could adequately play an important research role. Moreover, if
another agronomist at another station were doing similar trials,
the benefits of dispersed verification and extension probably
outweighed the costs of the duplicated efforts.

Researchers now seem to be moving toward more applied
research, however. The research program is being modified to
address particular local problems, such as weeds, soil
fertility, and cold tolerance, and to the breeding of new
varieties incorporating local materials. There may be a growing
rationale for more specialization among stations and personnel
and for the concentration of complementary research skills at
single sites.

To date, the nmulti-station commodity improvement programs
and the national Summer and Winter Crops Workshops seem to have
been able to bring about needed focus and professional
interchange and to avoid duplication of experiments. The
commodity improvement program mechanism permits researchers
posted at different stations to work collaboratively on
experiments focused on a particular crop -- varietal selection,
plant nutrition, disease resistance, etc. The Rice Crop
Improvement Program, for example, is headquartered at
Parwanipur; the director of the RCIP also serves as the director
of that research station. The Wheat and Maize Crop Improvement
Programs are headquartered at Bhairawa and Rampur, respectively,
again under the leadership of the station directors. In the
early 1970's, each of these and other commodities was the
subject of an annual seminar at which results were reported,
problems discussed, and, apparently, a plan for the next year's
trials communicated. In the late 1970's, it was decided that
meetings on each separate commodity were too time-consuming for
participants and the Summer and Winter Crops Workshops were
instituted to accomplish the same purposes as the commodity
seminars. The Commodity Improvement Programs continue to
prepare annual reports and, within the structure of the
Workshops, to serve as focal points for

- 11 -

coordinating and guiding research. The dispersed stations are
thus tangibly linked into a functioning network for research
which seems both effective and appropriate for the crop research

This discussion does not, however, take into account
possible duplication of functions among agencies conducting
research other than on crops. Ramesh Sharma has noted, in his
useful study of agricultural research in Nepal, that the
division and possible duplication of effort is very likely.
There are sixteen agencies in four different ministries
conducting agricultural research, including research on
livestock, agro-economics, and non-food commodities (tobacco,
for example). Sharma concludes, "Where there is a large number
of diverse organizations without a central level unit to guide
overall research, overlapping and duplication of work is a
distinct possibility. Interviews conducted with various
researchers in Nepal confirmed this assertion" (35, p. 7).
While the Government of Nepal recently rejected a proposal to
consolidate research coordination under a special unit, one
attempt to avoid possible duplication should be mentioned.
The recent conversion of the Janakpur station to livestock
research and the consolidation of crop research activities in
the nearby farm at Hardinath, for example, seem to represent a
sensible reorientation of research priorities and illustrate
governmental willingness to undertake moves to reduce possible
duplication. But this is clearly an aspect of institutional
performance which will continue to need attention.

Tarai Bias or a National System?

Even the casual observer of research reports, bringing only
a nodding acquaintance with Nepal's agroecology to bear, can
detect the Tarai bias of the foodgrain research effort. The
reports emphasize yield potentials for new varieties of rice,
wheat, and maize, recommendations for the use of fertilizer, and
optimal planting dates. They contain assumptions on timely
water delivery. All imply that Hill farmers will have less to
learn from researchers than Tarai farmers. Although
transportation of improved agricultural inputs to the Hills is
subsidized, both the difficulties of transporting seeds and
fertilizers up mountain trails and Hill farmers' lack of
financial resources and incentives to buy the new inputs
effectively limit their distribution and use. While many
farmers in the Tarai may not have effective access to the
technologies recommended by researchers for reasons of
purchasing power, information, or supplies, at least their
access is better.

Neither Hill farmers nor producers in the Tarai may find
improved varieties of crops they feel are appropriate to their

- 12 -

conditions, but Tarai farmers stand a better chance. Ramesh
Snarma attempted a quantitative assessment of relative resource
allocations to research by crop. Over 80 percent of the millet
is grown in the Hills, yet research efforts on millet and pulses
were, by his calculations on their importance in terms of area
and value, "grossly underinvested. In absolute terms paddy has
claimed the largest crop research budget." Over 80 percent of
paddy is grown in the Tarai. Sharma goes on to say, however,
that even paddy "...is relatively underinvested in research in
spite of its predominant importance in terms of cultivated area,
production value, and source of foreign exchange" (35, p. 28).
Comparing research budget and manpower allocations to a
consumption criterion as well, Sharma concludes that only maize
and wheat research seem to be adequately staffed and funded. He
points out that "maize is a staple crop in the Hills and has a
large production potential..." and suggests that "...relatively
higher levels of resource allocation for this crop should
continue." He does not, however, question the present focus of
most maize research in the Tarai.

The irrigation bias of the improved agricultural technology
developed by the Tarai research stations is understandable from
a research management perspective; no researcher would
voluntarily risk losing the results of a whole crop cycle to
water stress or drought when irrigation facilities are
available, thanks in part to the Food Grain Technology project.
Farmers do face such risks, however. As one farmer put it, "I
know I should irrigate on the 21st day, but what am I to do if
there is no water in the canal?" Estimates of irrigation
coverage even in the Tarai run only between ten and fifteen
percent, and are lower in the Hills. Some measure of water
control may be available during the monsoon to a slightly higher
proportion of the farmers in both areas. Even if major
development work in irrigation systems were concentrated in the
Tarai, however, coverage will still not be total. Thus, for the
future, the Tarai bias in research could well widen the gap
between yields on the stations and yields in farmers' fields --
unless more options for rainfed conditions are examined.

Improved Relevance and Impact?

Both commodity emphasis and assumptions about irrigation
indicate divergences between farmers' interests and researchers'
concerns. Other researcher-farmer communication gaps can also
be noted. These are well-articulated by farmers: "What we need
is not a better variety that requires even more fertilizer, but
a good variety that requires less fertilizer." Farmers share an
interest with researchers in high output, but as one
demonstration farmer in Parsa District said, "The JT'si/ think
the demonstration is good because the yields are going higher.
What they don't see is that my costs are going higher, too."

l/ Junior Technicians, or senior extension agents.

- 13 -

Given the riskiness of the farming environment in the Tarai and
the meager assets of the farming households, the high-input new
technology packages for rice and wheat were exactly what the
farmers could not use. After experimentation with them, those
farmers who had enough land and water generally fit new
technologies in as small parts of their cropping system. Wheat
fit in most easily because it often replaced fallow and could
grow using the residual soil moisture from the monsoon. Those
farmers with irrigation facilities took advantage of the
production opportunities in the early season by using improved
short-season rice varieties. While many farmers tried some
fertilizer, virtually no farmers used the recommended amount --
because it represented a much too risky investment. 1/

Still other farmers noted increasing problems with
livestock. Animals for plowing are essential, their manure is
useful for fertilizer and increasingly necessary for cooking
fuel, but grazing area has been severely reduced -- partly by
reduction of forest areas in the Tarai, but mainly by the more
intensive cropping of cultivable land. Animal-minding in many
villages has become a full-time job but even then, many farmers
noted decreases in herd size due to lack of fodder. It is
encouraging to note that forage production is receiving some
attention at a few of the stations, although, as Appendix C
explains, the farmers may be forced to find a solution before
the researchers do because of the seriousness of the shortage in
some areas.

In sum, there is ample evidence that Nepal's agricultural
research capacity has been developed. It should also be clear
that room for improved performance and impact remains. We turn
then to consider the roles of other institutions in
disseminating the research results.

B. Introduction of New Technologies

It is generally taken as axiomatic that research and
extension have to work in tandem if levels of farm output are to
be significantly increased through the use of improved (i.e.,
scientifically based) agricultural technologies. Less often
included as an explicit corollary to this axiom is the fact that
the new technologies generally require new resources from off
the farm; hence, the critical roles of those who supply these
resources --fertilizers, seeds, pesticides, water, and credit --
and the transport system are overlooked. The view that farmers
could do better with their current resources -- a view which
apparently was part of the early conceptualization of this

1/ See Appendix D for a more detailed discussion of risk.

- 14

project -- has a few die-hard adherents in Nepal as elsewhere.
They point to cases of poor management and assert that proper
extension instruction alone could increase these farmers'
output. But, by and large, the process of technology
development, extension, and adoption is accepted to include the
notion of inputs from outside the farm. This implies a certain
amount of marketed output and exchange outside of the
household. Changes in other sectors of the economy have also
reinforced a trend toward greater monetization and trade.

As one progressive Tarai farmer put it, "Before we didn't
have to educate our children, we didn't have to follow clothing
fashions, we didn't have to go to Birganj." Now, his cropping
pattern includes sugarcane for sale 40 kilometers away at the
sugar mill in Birganj; his son was home on vacation, having just
completed his School Leaving Certificate; and the farmer himself
was wearing a heavy-knit, factory-made sweater over his kamij
and dhoti against the January cold. We interviewed him in the
office of the sajha (cooperative) manager, who was occupied with
tidying up the books from the last cycle of sales of wheat seed
and fertilizer. The delivery of these inputs from the
Agricultural Inputs Corporation (AIC) store in Birganj had been
late,-/ and many farmers -- including our progressive
respondent -- had made decisions to reduce their risk. They
decided to use less fertilizer or none at all this season
because they knew they had missed the optimal planting date and
were going to have lower yields anyway.

Researchers identifying improved seed varieties and
providing foundation seed have to rely on the extension service,
the cooperative or other means of communication to get the
information on using these varieties out to farmers. Farmers
may find the information helpful, but often perceive both
themselves and the extension service as helpless to act on the
advice. There are a lot of "if's" involved in the successful
completion of the adoption cycle: if the rains come on time,
or, for example, if the electricity is available to run the pump
and the canals are not silted up, irrigation water may be
available; if the AIC manages its farmer seed multiplication and
storage system well, the seeds may germinate as expected; if the
donors provide the right types of fertilizers or there are
adequate foreign exchange reserves to get fertilizer imports
moving and the AIC handles the imports in a timely way, it may
be possible for the cooperatives to get their supplies on time;
if the farmer holds a title deed or a tenancy deed to his land
to get credit at the Agricultural Development Bank or has enough
cash to buy without credit, then it might be possible to
purchase available inputs; etc., etc.

1/ This is significant because the publicly-owned AIC has a
monopoly on fertilizer sales.

- 15 -

Only if all such conditions are met is it even reasonable to
expect the full impact of the research potential to be
realized. There may be a few isolated cases where the system
works as intended, but for the majority of Tarai farmers it does
not. Interviews indicated that that the chances for fulfilling
all the "if" conditions were low for most farmers. They were
not, therefore, overly optimistic about achieving significant
increases in yields in the near future. They were, quite
rationally, experimenting, expanding area planted to new
varieties, and hedging their bets as they saw fit. They were
planting wheat on part of what was once fallow and linseed on
the rest -- wheat to make money and linseed for home consumption
as the cost of edible oils had recently risen. They were
growing local maize for home use because it stored well, but
producing improved maize for the market; they were using AIC-
or extension-supplied seed on one plot and personally-imported
improved seed from India on the adjacent one; they were planting
the short-season rice (IR-8) early when they could get water and
still finding time for a monsoon crop of the longer-season
Masuli rice variety; they were putting fertilizer on wheat and
only compost or nothing on rice; and they were planting jute or
mustard with ample fertilizer so that the non-fertilized rice
crop following would do well on the residual. From their
perspective, they were, in most cases, farming as best they
could, given their constraints.

The aggregate statistics do not, therefore, demonstrate the
yield potential of the new technologies being used. Only data
regarding adoption of and area planted to improved wheat
varieties indicate effective introduction of new technologies.
Area planted to wheat has more than tripled -- from 100,000
hectares in 1964/65 to nearly 400,000 hectares in the late
1970's. Virtually all production is of new varieties simply
because so little wheat was traditionally grown. Comparable
data for rice show continued reliance on traditional varieties
of that crop and a much slower expansion in area planted (40, p.
72). But many farmers believe that they are ahead of where they
would have been without them, although they also realize that
with certain changes -- more irrigated land, lower tenancy
rents, timely fertilizer, etc. -- they could produce more.

Virtually everywhere we visited in the Tarai, farmers were
aware of the new varieties and many, if not all, farmers have
grown them in the last five years. They are also aware that
high applications of fertilizer are recommended and they are
knowledgeable about the sowing date advice. Some farmers had
learned such information from other farmers in the community,
some from observations made outside the village, others from
extension-sponsored demonstrations and/or minikits, and still

- 16 -

others from radio programs. Few farmers had ever visited a
research station to see trials there, although by chance we
encountered one farmer who had actually attended a ten-day
course at the Janakpur station in 1970 or 1971. He now made it
a practice to stop in regularly to see what was going on, but it
should be noted that he had exceptionally easy access to the
station. Near Rampur, too, farmers mentioned going to the
research station to get fresh seeds. In general, therefore,
farmers were convinced that modern science-based agriculture did
offer some possibilities for improved yields. The gap between
potential and actual productivity has persisted because farmers
do not -- or cannot -- act upon their convictions.

C. Developing Nepal

The question which logically follows the previous discussion
is: If the potential yield benefits of the new technologies are
not being realized now, is the research process likely to be
able to develop new technologies which will at least permit
current yield levels to be sustained or to increase at the rate
of population growth? A related question is: Will farmers be
able to take advantage of such technologies to permit the
agricultural sector to be able to contribute a surplus to the
national economy? These future-oriented questions can be
answered in part only by looking at the past and the present.

As we have noted in the previous section, improved
agricultural technologies generally imply farmers' use of
resources from outside their farms. As we discuss at some
length in Appendix C, farmers' own resources of land, animals,
and water are coming under increasing pressure of population
and, under current conditions of technology adoption, the fields
are being more rapidly depleted of plant nutrients than in the
past. As we also noted above, the "if" conditions which need to
be met if intensified production is to be sustainable are most
often not fulfilled. Farmers are adopting only parts of
technology packages. The high-technology bias of the research
results to date has thus contributed, albeit unwittingly, to a
probable decline in the soil fertility of the Tarai. Farmer
after farmer noted the phenomenon in interviews, emphasizing
that continuous cultivation of plots had always affected
fertility adversely but that, with more intense cultivation --
two or three rather than one grain crop a year, the process had
accelerated. The request of the farmer for a good variety which
uses fewer inputs comes echoing back.

From scattered conversations with researchers and
discussions in various workshop reports, it would appear that
some researchers are listening. The skills to take action at
the experimental level also seem to be there. Leguminous fodder

- 17 -

research such as that being done at Tarahara and Janakpur is
only a short distance removed from work with green manuring.
The long-term fertility trials being conducted simultaneously at
several stations are well-conceived and should prove extremely
useful in coming to grips with the long-term problems farmers
are already beginning to see and deal with. The analyses of
nutrient flows and farmers' use of compost in the cropping
systems work carried out under the Integrated Cereals project is
insightful. Evidence of a commitment by research leadership to
define these long-term problems as research priorities is,
however, not yet visible.

Going off the station should help research scientists to
understand farmers' problems. But it will be up to them to come
up with the solutions and the process is not, given the
Integrated Cereals Project findings, likely to be easy. In one
report, ICP analysts concluded that,

...In general, increasing cropping intensity in Pumdi Bhumdi
[a cropping systems site near Pokhara] may not be as simple
a task as raising the yields of individual crops. Yields
can be increased by changing varieties and by supplying
moderate doses of fertilizer with little effect on the other
components of the farming system. Increased multi-cropping
(i.e., more crops per year), on the other hand, increases
the demand of scarce resources such as bullock power,
fodder, labor, and compost and/or other sources of plant
nutrients and therefore affects to a greater extent the
entire farming system." (12, p. 12)

In another report, they conceded that, while improving the whole
cropping pattern was the objective, "the formulation of an
'extension package' has proven to be difficult. Conventional
extension 'packages' are crop or commodity-focussed." (16).

Increasing the reliability of water and fertilizer supplies
were Tarai farmers' recommendations for handling the long-term
as well as short-term problems. Farmers whose returns are more
guaranteed are already willing to invest more in the way of
fertilizer inputs. Increasing irrigation coverage will increase
fertilizer demand even more. Acting on the farmers'
recommendations to expand irrigation coverage, however, will not
only cost the government money, especially where private
boreholes for irrigation are not feasible and only major river
basin development will do, but will also require the government
to find sufficient foreign exchange to cover the expanded
fertilizer imports. Nitrogen fertilizer must continue to be
imported, although apparently there are limited opportunities
for phosphorus production in Nepal. Where are the government
revenues to fund irrigation investments to come from; what
sector is to earn the foreign exchange? Since Nepal remains a

- 18 -

largely agrarian society, the answer is clear.

But past research efforts have not resulted in the expected
production of significant marketable surpluses of commodities.
Rice was anticipated to become a major earner of foreign
exchange, but export data for the 1970's show a poor record. A
growing agricultural sector could also have been expected to
result in an improved tax base. Recent changes in revenue
legislation, however, may have reduced the ability of the
government to capture surplus from current production in order
to make the necessary public investments, particularly in
irrigation, which will support future sectoral growth. There
seems to be little prospect of Nepal's agricultural economy
fostering its own growth. Continued infusions of foreign aid
will be needed to sustain levels of productivity already
achieved. Improved technologies in agriculture have not yet
fostered economic independence. Nepal has not developed the
capacity "to carry out its own development, without outside

D. Improving Household Productivity and Welfare

While most farmers in the Tarai are just keeping ahead of
their households' food and cash needs with the help of improved
varieties and small applications of chemical fertilizer, some
are finding farming very profitable. The question recurs: "If
some can benefit from modern agriculture, why can't others?"
When research and extension services launched under the Food
Grain Technology.project set out to promote a package of
improved technologies, the "trickle down" theory was in vogue.
Progressive and innovative farmers were to serve as models for
others to follow. Finding these model farmers was relatively
simple. Usually they were landed, wealthy, politically
powerful, had irrigation, and could afford to offer free housing
to the extension worker. The implied obligation and proximity
were important because if there were problems with the
experiment, the extension worker was often key to their
solution. Either he could draw on his own training or he could
serve as a direct link to those higher up in the research,
extension, or input supply systems.

This model was not, of course, perfect. But it helped to
spread the information about the new technology packages across
the Tarai. As the new ideas trickled down, however, the
packages came apart. Initially, some of the smaller farmers
took the whole package -- seeds, fertilizers, water, time of
planting, method of sowing, etc. -- but they soon realized that
all the conditions which were more or less guaranteed on the

- 19 -

model farm were far from secure on theirs. All the conditions,
the "if's" mentioned above, were necessary to their getting a
good return. The chances of fulfilling the conditions had to be
reassessed. So Nepali farmers, especially small farmers whose
tolerance for risk is very low, have grown increasingly
selective about the technology package. While this selectivity
has resulted in yields per hectare and incomes well below the
theoretical maximum for each crop technology, it is likely that
most farmers have achieved a balance between the old and the new
technologies. They have taken from the package what they felt
they could afford, or, more correctly perhaps, what they felt
they could not afford to do without.

The technology recommended by the Nepal research system
might be scale neutral in that it does not require mechanical
equipment or substantial quantities of inputs. But the
technology is apparently not neutral in application, partly
because the risk of adoption and the cash requirements are not
equally easy for small farmers, tenants, and large farmers to

Impressions are that income gaps in the rural Tarai have
widened, although this generalization masks considerable
shifting among groups within the overall distribution.
Retrospective questioning of farmers indicated that some
households are getting better off; others are gradually
declining. The only ones whose status has definitely worsened
are those who are at the bottom. Those fortunate enough to take
full advantage of the new technology have been able to improve
their households' welfare significantly, particularly by
diversifying their operations and putting their profits into
more land, rice mills, bazaar apartments, or other commercial
enterprises. Where roads or irrigation infrastructure have been
improved and because population pressure has intensified, the
price of land has risen substantially -- to four, five, or six
times the values of a decade ago -- while the price of rice, for
example, has only doubled. Purchasing land for farm expansion
is still possible, but many purchases come at the expense of
others' entire farms. Those in debt or those at the margin are
forced to leave and go elsewhere to work or to continue on in a
landless, somewhat precarious existence. Figures for the Tarai
show an increase in the percentage of small and marginal farmers
since 1970; survey data also indicate that 40 percent of farmers
are partly and wholly tenants, not all of them with secure
tenancy certificates (32).

The two major hopes for improved family welfare expressed by
smaller, poorer farming households at this time seem to be the
acquisition of more land and more education for their children.
As one farmer who owned one small piece of land, was a tenant on
another, and share-cropped on a third explained,

- 20 -

"Given my expenses, I have to farm as much land as
possible. So my landlord and I have come to an agreement
that I will pay him a share on all three crops, rather than
a fixed rate on one crop as required. It is a good piece of
land and I have good production there."

On the education side, the benefits for many rural youth are far
from clear. Completion of school, at least to tenth grade, does
not offer a great deal of opportunity as far as employment is
concerned. Jobs in the government and in the small number of
industries in the modern sector are difficult to find without


This examination of patterns of change associated with the
agricultural research and extension efforts supported by the
Food Grain Technology project provides both a sense of solid
accomplishment and a basis for some disquieting fears.

On the positive side, we noted the impressive establishment
of a functioning, decentralized but coordinated, research
system. Training investments have paid off with the presence of
substantial numbers of skilled staff in both research and
extension organizations. We found widespread recognition and
selective adoption of the improved agricultural technologies.
Krishi bikash is a part of many Tarai farmers' vocabularies,
reflected in the marked increases in cropping intensity which
wheat and early rice varieties have helped to make possible.
Research and extension services have worked together on
outreach, demonstrations, field trials, and popularization of
the new packages of improved technologies. Not all farmers have
had personal contact with the extension service or even know
where the research stations are, but through the process of
neighbor learning from neighbor, the language of improved
technologies has begun to be spoken with understanding.

On the more negative side, we found researchers and farmers
concerned with different problems, differently prioritized.
Researchers cannot understand why farmers will not adopt
packages which are demonstrably profitable and farmers cannot
understand how researchers can expect them to take so much
risk. The conditions which each farmer has to fulfill to be a
progressive adopter appear not to be recognized by many
researchers. The fact that farmers are adopting components of
the technology package at all may reflect less the persuasive
rhetoric of research and extension than the farmers' response to
the increasing pressure of population in the Tarai and to their
families' requirements for food and cash income. Farmers may

- 21 -

well be using the improved technologies to the point where they
are keeping up with their needs; only a minority seem to have
sufficient resources to use improved technologies to get ahead.
Many, if not most, Tarai farmers perceive the lack of assured
water supplies to be their major constraint to more productive
use of new technologies. One farmer, when asked to list what he
thought his greatest farming problems were, said, "Water first,
and then money." Pausing, he corrected himself, "No, if I had
water, then I would have money."

The potential for serious ecological deterioration
associated with the increasingly intensified cropping is
alarming. Population pressure on land, and the opportunity to
triple-crop land with a sequence of early rice, monsoon rice,
and wheat or with a rice, wheat, maize rotation have combined to
reduce the amount of land for grazing, the amount of manure for
fertilizer, and the amount of forest -- causing a substitution
of manure and straw for firewood in some places. The
combination ultimately adversely affects the fertility of the
soil. Just stabilizing this cycle will require major changes in
the coming decades.

In economic terms, the picture also looks somewhat bleak.
The reliable foodgrain production expected and needed to feed
Nepal's growing population is not yet a reality. Nor has an
exportable surplus been sustained. Instead, there is a sense of
holding one's own in many households in the Tarai. Among many
of the people we interviewed -- researchers, extension agents,
and farmers -- there is a sense of frustration at not
consistently being more productive. Needed resources whether
laboratory equipment, bicycles or fertilizer and water, are not
yet reliably available, and productivity suffers. Like its
farmers, Nepal may have to redouble efforts to stimulate
agricultural development, not because it can afford to -- but
because it can't afford not to.


1. Understanding the objectives, resources and constraints of
farmers is the key to establishing appropriate research

Establishing these priorities may not result in
"success" as defined in terms of large differences in
output or yield per hectare.

SAn understanding of the constraints, objectives, and
resources of farmers by the researchers, moreover, will
not necessarily allow them to remove all constraints or
allow farmers to tap unused resources.

- 22 -

The existence of constraints forces a choice in
research strategy. A strategy can take the persistence
of constraints into account or it can assume their

2. Off-station research is necessary to understand what farmers
can and want to do and can facilitate the research process.
But getting off the station does not guarantee that the
researchers will better understand the farmers' resources,
objectives, and constraints, or that researchers will
develop technologies more appropriate to the needs of

3. Coordinated, planned research efforts on a multi-year basis
offer some promise for achieving certain research results
which may otherwise never be addressed -- long-term soil
fertility, for example.

4. Long-term environmental considerations have to be part of
the research.

5. Top-down decision making on staff resources, programs, and
budgets, combined with the need to keep research in touch
with farmers, makes it imperative that information channels
within the research organization are as open as possible.

6. Maximum contact among researchers, extension staff and
farmers pays off.

7. Government intervention in the distribution of agricultural
inputs may be useful in the market promotion stage, but a
monopoly may not be appropriate when farmer demand is strong
and inputs cannot be produced by the farmers themselves.

8. System development and evidence of concrete results take
time. Foreign experience in extension and research may not
"speed things up" as expected.

- 23 -


1. Acharya, Meena, 1979. The Status of Women in Nepal. Volume 1,
part 1. Center for Economic Development and Administration,
Tribhuwan University, Kathmandu.

2. Agricultural Projects Services Centre (APROSC), May 1981.
"Evaluation Study of Agricultural Farms and Stations in Nepal"

3. APROSC, 1981. Nepal: Trained Manpower for the Agricultural
Sector, Vol. I and II.

4. Axinn, George H. and Nancy W. Axinn, 1981. Social Impact,
Economic Change and Development -- with Illustrations from Nepal.
Rotterdam University Press.

5. Calkins, Peter, 1976. Shiva's Trident: The Impact on Income
Employment, and Nutrition of Developing Horticulture in the
Trisuli Watershed, Nepal. Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell
University, Ithaca, NY.

6. Ender, Gary P., 1980. The Development of Road Transportation in
Nepal and its Relationship to Agricultural Development. Ph.D.
dissertation, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY.

7. Gurung, H. B., 1981. Food Systems and Society in Nepal: An
Overview. New Era.

8. Hagan, A. R., 1976. "The Agricultural Development of Nepal:
Analysis of the Agricultural Sector." Special Report 189,
International Series 11, Agricultural Experiment Station,
University of Missouri Columbia.

9. IADS/APROSC, 1981. Agreement and proposal for evaluation of
minikit performance in rice, maize, wheat soybeans.

10. S. N. Lohani, et al. Cropping System Research in Nepal. Field
Trials Report Winter Season, 1977/78.

11. Mallick, R. N., 1981. Rice in Nepal. Kala Prakashan, Kathmandu.

12. S.B. Mathema and M. G. Van Der Veen. "Parcel, Farm and
Community Level Variables Influencing Cropping Intensity: Pumdi
Bhumdi, Nepal," Cropping Systems Program Technical Report, HMG:
February, 1980.

- 24 -

13. Mellor, J. W. et. al, 1979. Report to the International Fund
for Agricultural Development of the Special Programming Mission
to Nepal.

14. Mihaly, E. B., 1965. Foreign Aid and Politics in Nepal: A Case
Study. Oxford University Press.

15. Nepal, HMG, USAID/IADS. Integrated Cereals Project, various

16. Nepal, HMG, Ministry of Food and Agriculture, Department of
Agriculture, Integrated Cereals Project, various reports.

17. Nepal, HMG, Ministry of Food and Agriculture, Department of
Agriculture, National Maize Development Program, 1980. "Maize
and Finger Millet: The Eighth Summer Crops Workshop."

18. Nepal, HMG, Ministry of Food, Agriculture, and Irrigation,
Department of Irrigation, Hydrology, and Meteorology, 1977.
Climatological Records of Nepal.

19. Nepal, HMG, Ministry of Food and Agriculture, 1981. Nepal's
Experience in Hill Agricultural Development. Proceedings of the
Seminar on Nepal's Experience in Hill Agricultural Development.
March 30 April 3, 1981. Kathmandu, Nepal.

20. Nepal, HMG. The Integrated Cereals Project Review Papers,
October 23 November 2, 1979.

21. Nepal, HMG. Wheat Reports. 8th Winter Crops Workshop,
September 4-5, 1980.

22. Nepal, HMG/USAID, 1974. Participant Directory, 1952 1973.

23. Nepal, HMG, Ministry of Food and Agriculture, Economic Analysis
and Planning Division. Agricultural Statistics of Nepal, 1972.

24. Nepal, HMG, Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Irrigation,
Department of Food and Agricultural Marketing Services,
AGricultural Statistics Division, 1977. Agricultural Statistics
of Nepal.

25. Nepal, HMG, Ministry of Food and Agriculture, Economic Analysis
and Planning Division, 1971. Farm Management Study in the
Selected Regions of Nepal, 1968-69.

26. Nepal, HMG, Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Irrigation. Food
and Agricultural Marketing Services Department, Economic
Analysis Division, 1978. Production Costs and Return (some
crops in selected districts).

- 25 -

27. Nepal, HMG. Annual Report, National Wheat Development Program,
various years.

28. Nepal, HMG. Barley Research Program, various years.

29. Nepal, HMG. National Rice Development Program.

30. Nepal, HMG. National Maize Development Program.

31. Nepal Rastra Bank, Quarterly Economic Bulletin, Volume 15, No.
3, Mid-April 1981.

32. Nepal Rastra Bank, 1980. Agricultural Credit Review Survey,

33. Nepal Rastra Bank, 1972. Agricultural Credit Survey, Nepal.

34. Pradhan, B. B., 1981. The Overlooked Link in Agricultural
Planning The Farmer.

35. Sharma, Ramesh P., May 1981. "Agricultural Research Resource
Allocation in Nepal." Unpublished report for APROSC.

36. USAID/Nepal, end-of-tour reports: Raymond E. Fort, Glen D.
Johnson, Thomas L. Wilson.

37. United States AID Mission to Nepal, 1981. Thirty Years of
American Assistance to Nepal.

38. USAID/Nepal, Various Project Agreements (Food Grain Technology).

39. Whiteman, P. T. S., February, 1980. "Agronomy Research in the
Hill Areas of Nepal", FAO Hill Farming Agronomist. Hill
Agricultural Development Project. A Terminal Report, Kathmandu,

40. World Bank, 1979. "Nepal: Agricultural Sector Review." Report
No. 2205-NEP.

41. World Bank, 1981. "Nepal: Policies and Prospects for
Accelerated Growth." Report No. 3577-NEP.

42. Wortman, Sterling, "Accelerating Nepal's Agricultural Progress",
A Report for the Secretary of Agriculture, His Majesty's
Government of Nepal. Kathmandu, Nepal, 1980.

- 26 -


Mr. B. R. Adhikary
Rice Agronomist/Breeder
Parwanipur Research Station, Birgunj

Mr. Abdul Sattar Ansari
JTA, Lohana
Danusa Panchayat

Lynn Bennett
UNICEF Project Officer

Achyut Nath Bhattarai
Deputy Director General for Extension and Training
Department of Agriculture, Kathmandu

Peter Burleigh
Deputy Chief of Mission
U.S. Embassy, Kathmandu

Mr. Permeswar Chaudhury
JT, Siripur
Parsa District

Carleton Coon
U.S. Embassy, Kathmandu

Mr. Devkota
Raghunath Village

T. R. Dhunguna
Asst. Agronomist
Bhairawa Research Station

R. H. Dongol
Asst. Plant Pathologist
Bharirawa Research Station

Dr. Wayne Freeman
IADS/Integrated Cropping Systems Project

- 27 -

L. K. Gautam
FAO Programme Officer

Mr. Narendra Giri
Farm Manager
Tarahara Research Station

G. C. Gokarna
Bhairawa Research Station

Mr. Birendra Prasad Gupta
Sajha Manager
Katahari, Morany Division

Narain Guruny
SECID/Resource Conservation Utilization Project

Mr. Koirala
Asst. Agronomist
Parwanipur Research Station, Birganj

Dr. Mathema
Director, Department of Agricultural Marketing Services

Mr. Misra
Asst. Agronomist
Janakpur Research Station

Mr. Misra
Soil Scientist
Tarahara Research Station

T. N. Mishra
Asst. Maize Breeder
Ramput Research Station

Dr. Upendra Mishra
Project Manager
Janakpur Research Station

M. P. Panth
Acting Wheat Improvement Program Coordinator
Bhairawa Research Station

- 28 -

Mr. Bishwanath Pokhrel
JT, Katahari
Morang District

T. P. Pokhrel
Farm Manager
Bhairawa Research Station

Mr. Amar Bahkta Poudyal
JT, Morang District

B. B. Pradhan

Dr. A. Pradhananga
Deputy Director General for Research
Department of Agriculture, Kathmandu

G. R. Rajbhandary
Maize Improvement Program Coordinator
Rampur Research Station

P. N. Rana
General Manager, Agriculture Inputs Corporation

Dr. B. B. Shahi
Rice Crop Improvement Program Coordinator
Parwanipur Research Station, Birganj

Mr. R. C. Sharma
Outreach Program Coordinator
Parwanipur Research Station, Birganj

Y. N. Sharma
Asst. District Agriculture Officer
Bhairawa Research Station

Mr. Shrestha
Seed Specialist, Botany Division

Mr. Singh
Plant Pathologist
Parwanipur Research Station, Birganj

Mr. B. P. Sinha
Regional Director
Eastern Region, Biratnagar

- 29 -

Dharma Suwal

Mr. B. K. Thapa
Farm Manager
Hardinath Research Farm

Mr. Uphadyaya
Agricultural Development Officer
Parsa District, Birgunj

Mr. Upretty
Site Coordinator, Lele
Integrated Cropping Systems Program

Dr. Marlin G. Van Der Veen
IADS/Integrated Cropping Systems Project

Dr. Ram Prasad Yadev
Director, APROSC

Mr. Ramchandra Prasad Yadev
JT, Raghunath Village Panchayat

S. P. Yadev
Agricultural Development Officer
Morany District, Biratnagar

Mr. Shree Narayan Yadev
JT, Siripur
Parsa District.



As is usual with impact evaluations, time moved by much too
rapidly. As one of our team members, an ex-PCV in Nepal,
protested, "We can't do this in American time; we have to get in
time with Nepal!" Nevertheless, the schedule was tiyhtly-packed.

One week was spent touching bases in Kathmandu, reading
documents, and making a field visit to Lele, the cropping
systems site in the Kathmandu valley. This "staging" week was
essential to absorb the project history and bring it up to date,
to meet with the senior officials who lead the government
participation in the agricultural sector -- the Deputy Directors
General of Research and of Extension, and the General Manager of
the Agricultural Inputs Corporation. A list of topics to be
investigated in the Tarai was also drawn up, partly on the basis
of issues which were developed in discussion. Our five-person
team then acquired two interpreters with excellent Peace Corps
language training background -- so they could understand the
three of us who did not speak Nepali -- and split into two

The Eastern Team focused on the environs of research
stations at Parwanipur, Tarahara, Janakpur, and Hardinath,
talking with researchers, farmers, extension agents, cooperative
managers, and shopkeepers. As agreed before leaving Kathmandu,
farmers were selected to represent different degrees of access
to roads and markets, sizes of holdings, tenure status, ages,
and possible contact or non-contact with extension agents.
Systematic interviews were done with about 25 of the people
visited; other conversations were informal.

The Western Team focused on the Bhairawa and Rampur
areas, talking with staff at the Institute of Agriculture and
Animal Sciences as well as the types of people interviewed by
Eastern Team. Both teams managed to apply similar amounts of
"Tarai make-up" -- the fine dust that floats up through every
crevice of the jeep to coat hair and clothes and faces -- by
travelling over the back roads and tracks of several districts.
In general, we felt satisfied that a representative, if not
statistically replicable, sample of interviews with nearly a
hundred farmers had been obtained in the two weeks in the field.

When some statistical indicators from this sample were
compared to other available information on farm households, we
found that we had managed to cover the spectrum of farm sizes



As is usual with impact evaluations, time moved by much too
rapidly. As one of our team members, an ex-PCV in Nepal,
protested, "We can't do this in American time; we have to get in
time with Nepal!" Nevertheless, the schedule was tiyhtly-packed.

One week was spent touching bases in Kathmandu, reading
documents, and making a field visit to Lele, the cropping
systems site in the Kathmandu valley. This "staging" week was
essential to absorb the project history and bring it up to date,
to meet with the senior officials who lead the government
participation in the agricultural sector -- the Deputy Directors
General of Research and of Extension, and the General Manager of
the Agricultural Inputs Corporation. A list of topics to be
investigated in the Tarai was also drawn up, partly on the basis
of issues which were developed in discussion. Our five-person
team then acquired two interpreters with excellent Peace Corps
language training background -- so they could understand the
three of us who did not speak Nepali -- and split into two

The Eastern Team focused on the environs of research
stations at Parwanipur, Tarahara, Janakpur, and Hardinath,
talking with researchers, farmers, extension agents, cooperative
managers, and shopkeepers. As agreed before leaving Kathmandu,
farmers were selected to represent different degrees of access
to roads and markets, sizes of holdings, tenure status, ages,
and possible contact or non-contact with extension agents.
Systematic interviews were done with about 25 of the people
visited; other conversations were informal.

The Western Team focused on the Bhairawa and Rampur
areas, talking with staff at the Institute of Agriculture and
Animal Sciences as well as the types of people interviewed by
Eastern Team. Both teams managed to apply similar amounts of
"Tarai make-up" -- the fine dust that floats up through every
crevice of the jeep to coat hair and clothes and faces -- by
travelling over the back roads and tracks of several districts.
In general, we felt satisfied that a representative, if not
statistically replicable, sample of interviews with nearly a
hundred farmers had been obtained in the two weeks in the field.

When some statistical indicators from this sample were
compared to other available information on farm households, we
found that we had managed to cover the spectrum of farm sizes


and had confirmed a positive relationship between farm size and
family size. We could group the farmers interviewed on the
basis of total farm size in categories roughly similar to those
used in the major agricultural credit survey done by the Nepal
Rastra Bank in 1979; average farm size and distribution of
households among categories were remarkably similar (Table 1).

Table 1.
Average Size of Farm and Farm Family

Farm size category Credit Survey Evaluation
Ha. Family n Ha. Family
Size Size

Large (over 5 ha.) 9.34 15.5 12 9.72 13.7
Medium (2.68 5 ha) 3.82 8.9 6 4.01 11.2
Small (0.67 2.68 ha) 1.85 6.7 21 1.70 7.8
Marginal(less than 0.67 ha) 0.54 5.4 6 0.53 6.2

We had managed to include progressive as well as
traditional farmers, owners as well as tenants, farmers who knew
what minikits were and were glad to show us their demonstration
plots as well as farmers who were completely unfamiliar with the
program and were more interested in getting a message to the
Agricultural Development Officer about their needs for a JT, and
farmers whose grandfathers and fathers had tilled the same soil
for decades before them as well as farmers who had recently
migrated from the Hills. We simply walked into villages and
talked with the first person met and we went to see special
farmers with the help of the Junior Technicians. We saw
beautifully functioning irrigation systems and canals that were
bone dry; we saw lush plantings of wheat as well as
demonstration plots of maize in which only two seeds had
germinated. Chance meetings with agricultural assistants and
with panchayat-level assistants working under the new "T and V"
program (a method of extension training and use of
paraprofessionals being tested under a World Bank-supported
project) were useful in helping to understand the roles and
skills of the professional extension service. Personnel from
the Agricultural Inputs Corporation and the cooperatives were
contacted at the district and village levels.

Reassembled in Kathmandu, the team looked through the
documents again with new eyes and tried to fit some last-minute


interviews into the hours of writing. Many impressions and
general observations could not be quantified; many questions
could still not be answered. Some were settled through debate
and others were simply shelved. Any remaining errors of
interpretation and judgement are, of course, the responsibility
of the team.

The team was composed of five persons with varying levels
of experience in Nepal and in agricultural research and
extension. Our two Nepali speakers had been Peace Corps
Volunteers in extension from 1969-72; both were able to revisit
panchayats in which they had been JTA's and to talk with farmers
with whom they had worked. Gary Ender, now an agricultural
economist with the U.S. Department of Agriculture, had also
returned to Nepal in the late 1970's for dissertation research
on the agricultural impacts of road development in Nepal.
Gregory Heist, now a graduate student in agronomy at Cornell
University, is looking forward to a career in international
agricultural research. Josette Murphy, currently an economic
anthropologist with AID's Office of Evaluation, is also the
coordinator for the series of impact evaluations on agricultural
research. Joseph Beausoleil, an agricultural economist with the
Office of Rural Development and Development Administration in
AID/Washington, had acquired some familiarity with Nepal's
farming sector in a previous short trip and brought to the
evaluation team a great deal of experience in agricultural
credit and cooperative programs in Latin America. As team
leader, Emmy Simmons, an agricultural economist in AID's Office
of Policy Development and Program Review, brought experience on
two other impact evaluations to bear. This enabled her to
remain calm while everyone else voiced doubts about the team's
ability to grasp the realities of twenty years of agricultural
development and agricultural research efforts in four weeks.

It is, indeed, likely that the team has failed to
comprehend fully the magnitude of the impacts which the
agricultural research and extension services have had and will
have on the agricultural sector in Nepal. It is also likely
that we have not understood completely what would have occurred
if the project had never taken place. We are particularly
sensitive about our inability to spend any time getting a
comparative view of agricultural change in the Hills where there
has apparently been little contact with either the research or
extension services. Nonetheless, we are persuaded that we have
captured the spirit of agricultural change in the Tarai in 1982.



Joseph W. Beausoleil

I. Interpreting Data

If one were to judge the Food Grain Technology project on the
basis of yields of rice, wheat, and maize, it would have to be
considered a dismal failure. Only wheat yields have shown an
increase over the past 20 years. Productivity of rice has remained
relatively stable while maize yields have decreased (Table B-l).

Table B-l. Average Yields for the Basic Grains
(in metric tons/hectare)

Years Rice (Paddy) Wheat Maize

1961-65 1.95 1.05 1.95
1966-70 1.95 1.27 1.90
1971-75 1.96 1.01 1.81
1976-80 1.82 1.15 1.59

SOURCE: FAO Production Yearbooks for 1972, 1974, 1976, 1978, and
1980. (These figures differ slightly from the World Bank
figures used elsewhere in this report. In either case,
the accuracy of the data is questionable.)

It would be unfair, however, to draw such a conclusion from
these kinds of data. Average yields say nothing about how much
variation exists nor do they explain why it exists. Rice yields for
individual farmers may vary from a high of six metric tons to a low
of less than a metric ton per hectare, for example -- around an
average of almost two metric tons per hectare. The variation may be
due to climatic conditions, natural resources, or the technology
used. It may also be due to a number of other factors, including
the socio-economic conditions of the farming household, its
objectives, the prices in the market, and the number of animals
owned. The following descriptions of four farming systems in the
Tarai attempt to provide a flavor of such factors as the basis for
better understanding of foodgrain yields and yield variations in
Nepal. A more quantitative analysis of costs and returns associated
with the adoption of rice and wheat technologies by such farmers is
presented in the next section.

II. Understanding Farmers in the Tarai

Differences in farming in the Tarai are strongly related to
farm size. Larger landholders, that is, those having five hectares
or more, often produce primarily for a market, have better access to


productive inputs, and can accept risk because they are able to
accumulate reserves. Smaller landholders produce primarily for home
consumption, have limited access to inputs, and, since they live
from year to year, cannot afford to take risks. However, even among
the smaller landholders, there are differences in the farming
situation. There are those who are basically subsistence farmers
but produce some marketable surplus; those who, with efficient use
of limited resources, can make ends meet; and those who do not have
sufficient land and so require outside income to survive.

The information used to compile what I here call "typical
farming situations" was obtained through hour-long, informal but
systematic, interviews with farmers. Of the 45 farmers interviewed,
12 had holdings of five bighas1/ or more and will be referred to
as "large" landholders. Of the remainder, six were "medium"
landholders, that is, having over four but less than eight bighas of
land, 21 were "small" landholders (over one but less than four
bighas), and six were "marginal" farmers, with less than one bigha
of land. In drawing what are essentially composite portraits -- or
snapshots -- of farmers in each group, I identified characteristics
of family structure, cropping patterns, animal ownership and use,
and information and input access.

To convey a sense of each typical farm as a system, special
attention is given to the interrelationships among crops and
livestock. The focal point of each snapshot, however, is the farmer
or decision-maker who allocates scarce resources to produce the
necessities for the family.

A. The Large Landholder

Our large farmer was born in the Tarai. He operates his twelve
hectare farm with his extended family. Since he is elderly, he has
recently left the day to day running of the farm to his eldest son.
His second son was educated and has moved to Kathmandu and three of
his daughters have married and moved away, leaving 18 family members
currently living on the farm. The sons who remain on the farm are
married and have 12 children, all of whom have been encouraged to
stay in school and follow their urban-dwelling uncle's example. In
addition to the family, there are several permanent hired hands
employed on the farm.

Rice was the principal crop until eleven years ago. Then the
farmer seriously began double-cropping with wheat. With irrigation,
he has no problem using an improved rice variety, although he still
grows about two hectares of local rice for home consumption. He
uses inorganic fertilizer when he is able to obtain it, but not at
the recommended levels. He thinks too much fertilizer may harm his

1/ One bigha = 0.67 hectares (ha).


soil although he knows he can get better yields using the
recommended levels. The fertilizer is usually purchased from the
cooperative on credit. He selects his seed from each harvest to
plant the following year and continually experiments with varieties
obtained from other farmers. Paddy yields have averaged 2.1 metric
tons (MT) per hectare for the improved variety and 1.9 MT/ha. for
the local variety. The local variety is stored for home consumption
at harvest. The 2.25 MT tons of milled rice grown is just about
enough for the family's needs.1/

Wheat now follows rice. Only one variety is grown, using seed
and fertilizer purchased with credit from the cooperative. Wheat is
not as labor-intensive as rice, but the costs of the purchased
inputs are much higher. A government production program encouraged
this farmer to get into wheat, and he will continue to grow it as
long as there are no marketing problems. Before he started
producing wheat, most of the land would be left fallow after the
rice harvest and used for grazing his cattle until rice planting

The farmer and his household had many more animals then than
now. What was over 5U head of cattle has been reduced to about lb.
There are two teams of oxen, one bull, three cows, and seven to
eight buffalos. There are also a few goats and a dozen chickens.
He makes good use of the manure, although the annual production is
only sufficient to apply to two hectares per year. He rotates this
application each year to the area that needs it the most. Part of
the manure, however, is used in the gobar gas generator (purchased
with a loan) and the sludge from this is used in the vegetable

The farmer also has a tractor, also purchased with a loan from
the Agricultural Development Bank, which is used for the initial
land preparation and for hauling. He still makes good use of the
bullock in preparing the land and for threshing the grain, however.
Having a bull and a female buffalo ensures that he can continually
replace his stock. He has more than enough straw for fodder and
greens are readily available along the irrigation ditches all year
long to supplement the animals' diet. The total digestible nutrient
in the 40 or more tons of straw produced is, in fact, more than
enough for his own herd, so the farmer often supplements the low
daily wages to his laborers at harvest time with straw.

While the farmer is generally dissatisfied with government
services, he does borrow through both the cooperative and the

1/ Converting this amount to a calorie basis and assuming a
requirement level of about 2350 calories per adult per day, it would
appear that about 80 percent of the calorie needs of this farming
household could be met from its own production.


bank. He has at times been delivered fertilizer that was damaged
and the wheat seed purchased in recent years has not been as good as
it used to be. He feels he knows more about farming than the JT's,
and certainly the JTA's, but admits that a friend who is a JT has
been helpful in obtaining inputs, particularly fertilizer, on time.

The large farmer has few immediate constraints to increased
production. He has access to information, credit, and inputs, but
he has few incentives to maximize his production. This will, of
course, change as the family grows. There are six grandsons and all
of them could decide to marry and raise their families on the farm.
But the grandchildren are being educated and, like their uncle, will
probably opt to leave the farm. This family has not felt the
population pressures, although the potential to do so is there in
the very near future.

B. The Medium Landholder

The medium-sized farmer migrated to the Tarai from the Hills
eleven years ago. There are currently nine people in his family,
including his wife, their oldest son (with a wife and baby), and
four other unmarried children. One son has finished secondary
school and is studying at the Institute for Agriculture and Animal
Sciences in Rampur. Only the youngest son living at home is
continuing in school; the other three children have left school to
work on the farm. The farmer originally bought five bighas (3.35
ha.) of land for five thousand rupees. Recently, he had to sell a
half-bigha to free himself from a debt and received six thousand
rupees for it.

A small part of this three-hectare farm is occupied with the
living quarters, stable, garden, and threshing floor. The remainder
of the land is intensively cultivated. Rice is the principal crop,
planted at the onset of the monsoon, and is followed by wheat,
mustard, and maize. Since the soil has good moisture retention
capacity, a third crop is sometimes planted after the mustard and
maize. Rice yields are good although inorganic fertilizers are not
used. The custom of this farmer is to use heavy composting on the
mustard (as it is their major cash crop) and then to use the same
area for preparing the rice seed bed. Half of the rice grown is a
local variety; the rest is improved. Seeds are generally saved from
year to year. The local variety yields approximately 1.5 IT/ha. (so
the total of 2.25 MT is said to be sufficient for home consumption)
and the improved variety yields almost 2 HT/ha. Last year's sale of
three metric tons of paddy provided more cash income than was earned
from the mustard sale. Mustard is planted immediately after the
rice harvest. About a hectare is allocated to this crop; last year,
about half of the mustard was retained for home consumption and half
was sold. The farmer feels that mustard yields have been going down
and attributes this to a weed in the mustard field, but he does not
know what to do about it.


Wheat is grown on another hectare. The yields have averaged a
little less than a metric ton per hectare. Sometimes the farmer
uses inorganic fertilizer; he is convinced of its value but does not
always have the extra cash to purchase it. He saves his seed or
buys new seed from other farmers or the cooperative. Last year he
sold 500 kg. of wheat and used the remainder for home consumption.
He attributes his low yields to the late planting of wheat, but
notes that his priority is to get the mustard crop in before turning
his attention to the wheat crop.

Some of his land lies fallow during the winter but he prepares
this for maize in the spring. If there is sufficient rain, he can
obtain as much as a metric ton per hectare. In the worst situation,
he may only get his seed back. Storing maize is a problem. The
traditional way of hanging the unhuskeu cobs upside down keeps the
maize dry but is not very effective against insects. He knows of no
better way to protect his stored maize, although he feels it was
better to keep some inside on the rafters where the smoke from the
stove seems to reduce insect damage. Most of the maize is consumed
in the home, although he will sell some if he needs cash. This
farmer also grows some winter maize, primarily for fodder. This is
necessary, he explains, because there is a lack of grazing land,
especially at the end of the dry season. He needs his bullocks to
prepare the land and realizes that manure is essential to maintain
soil fertility. The present cropping pattern provides sufficient
straw to maintain his 12 head of cattle, provided that greens can be
found to supplement the straw diet. The animals they keep
(including two goats and some chickens as well as the cattle)
provide them with milk and cash (from the occasional sale) as well
as the manure.

The farmer does not seek the advice of the JTA in spite of the
fact that he is unsure of fertilizer use, has a problem storing his
maize, does not know how to deal with the parasite weed in his
mustard, and is not properly feeding his livestock. He feels he
knows much more than the JTA and really does not need his advice.
Much of what he has heard from the JTA and from cooperative
personnel has not been correct in the past. He does use the
cooperative to purchase inputs, but he always uses cash. He
maintains some cash balance and always has reserves in some
foodgrain or an animal in case of emergencies.

C. The Small Landholder

The small farmer has one and two-thirds hectares of land. He
came down from the Hills with his family only five years ago. Of
the five children in his family, one, the oldest, is married and has
remained in the Hills. His younger children are all in school.
Both parents work extra hard so that their children can take
advantage of the opportunity to receive an education. This farmer is


a tenant with a Class II certificate, which means that his rent is
regulated by law at 11.5 maunds per bigha (or approximately one
metric ton of paddy for his farm) per year.

The major monsoon crop is rice, followed by a rotation of
mustard and wheat. Both local and improved varieties of rice are
grown. He prefers the local variety for home consumption but plants
an early-maturing improved variety on about half of his land to
allow him to get his mustard planted before the end of the rainy
season. Wheat is planted after the rice on the other half. His
yields of the local variety of rice average 1.7 MT/ha. and provide
almost enough rice, he reports, for his family's needs. The
improved variety yields slightly more. This year, he obtained about
2.1 MT/ha., half of which was used to pay his rent. The remainder
was stored it in his house, and sold when the price was right. The
farmer has been using an improved variety of wheat ever since he
began producing this crop. He borrows from the cooperative to
purchase seed and fertilizer each year and has paid his loans with
the sale of the grain. Last year, with a Rs. 400 loan, he produced
0.8 MT of wheat on two-thirds of a hectare. He sold 600 kg. at
harvest and immediately paid back his loan. Mustard is also a good
cash crop, as the price is high. He sold 200 kg. last year at the
farmgate for Rs. 650 per 100 kg. He saved a little of the mustard
for home consumption.

He prefers to use manure rather than inorganic fertilizer with
rice. He feels that his six adult animals produce sufficient
amounts to maintain soil fertility. He does use some purchased
fertilizer on the wheat if he is able to obtain it. He feels that
he gets better wheat yields when he does but has reservations about
using the full amount recommended. The straw from the rice, wheat,
and mustard is sufficient fodder for his animals if supplemented
with some greens. During the rainy season, this is not a problem.
During the dry season, however, the daughters have to go some
distance to collect leaves and grasses to mix with the straw.

The farmer never sees the JTA but he is not concerned. He has
learned from others and from his own experience. His family can
live satisfactorily with the resources it now has; they are able to
bear some adversity because in good years there is a surplus. The
children are healthy and able to attend school. If the new tenancy
laws by which this family is protected were not respected, however,
a family like his would be in a desperate situation.

D. The Marginal Farmer

The marginal farmer has less than a hectare of land. He has
been farming in the Tarai for only a few years, having returned to
Nepal after serving 10 years in the Indian army. With savings
accumulated during that time, he purchased a bigha of land (0.67
hectare) and resumed his career as a farmer rather than complete the


required 15 years of service for an army pension. He was originally
from the Hills but preferred to settle in the Tarai because he felt
that there were more opportunities here. His family is small; the
oldest of his three children is 12 and the youngest is a toddler.
lie does not plan to have any more children because he barely can
support those he has now.

Crowded together on one corner of his farm property are the
family's dwelling, the stable with two buffaloes and their calves,
and a small vegetable garden. To maximize the cropping area, the
farmer has built a loft over his stable to store straw. He has also
the good fortune of a shallow well which he dug for drinking water
and for use in his garden during the dry season.

Although lie learned farming in the Hills, he admits that lie has
a lot to learn about farming in the Tarai. He seeks help from other
farmers and once asked the JTA for advice. But he never sees the
JTA anymore and has learned to depend upon himself and his fellow
farmers to figure out his problems.

He rents oxen to prepare his land. This requires approximately
twenty days work for each crop and costs Rs. 10 per day. He prefers
to keep buffaloes rather than oxen because in addition to manure,
the buffaloes produce milk. He estimates that the sale of milk
compensates for the outlays for oxen rental and he still has the
calves to sell at the end of the year.

He grows both local and improved varieties of rice. Using a
local variety alone would not provide sufficient rice for his family
so he decided to use a nigher-yielding improved variety as well. He
uses whatever manure is available from his animals but no chemical
fertilizer. He saves his seed and originally obtained the improved
variety from a friend as a loan. He has never borrowed from the
cooperative and has no intention of doing so even though he has a
land title which would make him eligible for a loan. Last year's
paddy production was 1.2 MT, barely sufficient for his small family.

Except for a small plot for mustard seed, wheat follows rice.
He uses an improved variety which lie purchases from the
cooperative. No chemical fertilizers are used but whatever manure
that is available is worked into soil before seeding. His
production averages about 0.5 MT. The family consumes most of the
wheat but he has to sell some from time to time to obtain cash.
Gram or moong bean is planted in relay with the wheat and mustard if
there is a late rain. It is allowed to grow after the wheat and
mustard is harvested. If it does well, he harvests it. If not, he
feels that it is good to plow into the soil when le prepares the
land for the rice crop. He has a small vegetable garden which is
well cared for, thanks to his wife.


The straw from his rice and wheat provides only about 75 percent
of fodder for his buffaloes. There is a forest a few hours walk
from the farm where it is possible to graze the animals. This also
is a source of firewood. And although it is illegal to cut wood,
they do so. Without the forest, they would have to sell one of
their buffaloes and would have to use the dung of the remaining
animal for fuel. The result would be a complete disruption of their
farming system.

The farm operation is insufficient to provide for the family's
needs. The farmer or head of household supplements his farming by
occasional labor and his wife makes straw mats. Their attitudes are
that they have to do it themselves. They do not expect assistance
from the cooperative. In fact, they are fearful of borrowing
because of the uncertainties of farming. They know that the JTA has
given minikits to some of the farmers but they have never received

The marginal farmer and his family live in a very precarious
situation. They barely make ends meet. Any problem is a serious
problem that can set them back. With their limited resources, hard
work keeps them afloat, but it is impossible to advance.

II. The Impact of New Technology

These snapshots of four "typical" farmers' situations
illustrate the fact that new technology is only being adopted by
some of the farmers -- and then in selective ways. It is difficult,
if not impossible, to quantify precisely the impact of new
technology, given the paucity of longitudinal, quantitative
information on farming operations like these.

There is, however, enough information on the costs and returns
to the principal cropping enterprises which can be used to compare
in somewhat general terms the crop production situation as it is
today with what it would be if there were no new technology. The
actual situation can also be compared to what it could be if the
total packages of new technology were utilized.

Data presented in Table B-3 permit such a comparison for two
farming enterprises -- rice and wheat production. These two crops
were chosen because they are the major crops for many Tarai farmers
and because sufficient data were available. In making the
comparison, it is assumed that the other farm enterprises do not
change substantially if changes are made in the production modes tor
these two crops. Thus, the comparison between actual, traditional,
and recommended conditions is more valid than it would be if, for
example, two competing rainy season crops were involved.


An important source of quantitative information was the
Agricultural Credit Survey conducted by the Rastra Bank in 1978.
Data on actual cropping intensities, yields, and production costs
were taken from this report (and are summarized in Table B-2). The
production costs for rice and wheat using the complete technological
packages were taken from Rice in Nepal, by B. N. Mallick. The
farmgate price was estimated to be Rs. 17U per 10U kg. of paddy and
Rs. 144 per 100 kg. of wheat. Actual prices for paddy and wheat
obviously fluctuate during the year and from place to place, but
these price estimates reflect average prices for 1978.

Table B-2.

Basic Crop Data for Wheat and Rice
1978, Agricultural Credit Survey

Size of Farm
Large Medium Small Marginal

Cropping Intensity 152 136 144 166

Crop Yields (HT/ha.)
Paddy : Improved 2.1 2.0 2.3 1.9
Local 1.8 1.4 1.8 1.7

Wheat : Improved 1.5 1.2 1.1 1.0

Cost of Production (Rs./ha.)
Paddy : Improved 2154 1975 2174 1107
Local 1373* 1573* 1573 1185

Wheat : Improved 1780 1487 1487 1487

SOURCE: Agricultural Credit Survey, Nepal Rastra Bank, 1979.

* Estimated.

Table B-3 then contains estimates of net returns on a rice and
wheat farming operation using traditional, actual, and recommended
methods, much along the lines indicated in the snapshots of farms of
different sizes. Without improved technology (left column), the
assumption is made that farmers of all sizes would put their land
into traditional varieties of rice only. For the actual situation
(center column), the farmers are assumed to grow enough local or
unimproved rice for home consumption and to put the rest of their
land into improved rice for ultimate sale. They would follow rice
with wheat on a portion of their land and leave the rest fallow
until the next rainy season. The portions devoted to these crops
are assumed to vary in ways similar to those described as

Table B-3. Comparison of Returns Under Three bodes of Cropping: Traditional, Actual, and Reconmended

Farm Size
Crops (Varity)
Net Value

Rice (improved)
Rice (local)
Wheat (improved) 5/
Total Net Value

Rice (improved)
Rice (local)
Wheat (improved) 5/

Total Net Value

Rice (improved)
Rice (local)
Wheat (improved)
Total Net Value

Rice (improved)
Rice (local)
Wheat (improved)

Total Net Value




12 18,876

3 4,719


1.7 2,674


Agricultural Credit Survey, Rastra Bank, 1980
Ibid, includes cash outlays and imputed value
Ibid, average value including by-products of
Rice in Nepal, Malik, 1981. Total cost R.s.



36,720 17,844 1.8




5,202 2,528


2,023 1.194


of labor and othi
R.s. 170 for padd
2615 for rice and




10 21,540
2 3,146
3.5 5/ 6,230

1.5 2,963
1.5 2,360
0.9 5/ 1.338

0.8 1,739
0.9 1,416
0.6 5/ 892



er non cash
y and R.s.
R.s. 2865

Rastra Bank, op.cit. cropping intensity estimated at 129% for large, 131%
Estimate based on research station experiences.




332 969
474 1,156
521 576








12 31,380 61,200 29,820

12 34,380 51,840 17,460

3 7,845 15,300 7,455

3 8,595 12,960 4,365

1.7 4,446

1.7 4,871

0.7 1,831

0.7 2.006

8,670 4,224

7,344 2,473

3,570 1,739

3,024 1,018

144 for wheat
for wheat
for medium, 137% for small and 153% for marginal farmers


"representative" of each class above. For the recommended situation
(right column), farmers are expected to put all their land into
improved rice in the rainy season and into improved wheat in the dry
season, fully using all of the improved technology packages for each

When one compares the net returns of the farmers under actual
conditions to those expected using traditional methods, it is easy
to understand what most farmers in the Tarai feel that they are not
much better off (even though their gross yields could have risen by
2b-44 percent). The net value of their production is only slightly
higher now (3-15 percent) than before and yet they have to work much
harder with a second crop in the winter season. "Better off" can
thus have two meanings.

When one compares the actual net returns of the farmers to
those possible using the recommended packages, it is easy to
understand the frustration of the researchers who cannot understand
why the farmers do not adopt the new technologies. Costs would be
double or more than double, but returns would be similarly
increased. For understanding the farmers then, one has to return to
the conditions of farming in the Tarai. The new technologies are
mostly high input technologies. Timing of irrigation is essential;
yet over 80 percent of the Tarai farmers have no access to
irrigation. Farmers have learned that they cannot depend on the
Agricultural Inputs Corporation or the cooperative for reliable
delivery of seed and fertilizer. In only rare cases have soils been
tested; fertilizer recommendations can only be general, therefore,
and are not tailored to the farmers' conditions. Farmers have no
harvesting equipment and only rudimentary on-farm storage
facilities. In a word, the improved technology packages do not fit
the conditions of the farmers. They are unable to use most of it
and find it of little benefit.

There are some farmers who have yields above the average. They
are able to take advantage of the new high input technologies
because, like our large farmer, they have access to production
inputs. Indeed, this is the simplest explanation of why improved
technology is not being adopted. But even if the inputs were
available, there are many farmers who would still not adopt these
technologies. Their reasons go beyond the agronomic and include
economic, social, and even cultural considerations. From the
snapshots of the four farming systems above, it is evident that
there are many different reasons or even multiple reasons why
farmers do or do not adopt the higher-yielding improved varieties.

Most farmers expressed a preference for local rice varieties
for home consumption, for example. But some farmers whose
production is insufficient to meet family needs have adopted higher
yielding improved varieties to make up for the deficit. Others, who


produce enough for family needs, are using an improved variety that
is early maturing on the remaining land so that they can plant their
cash crop earlier and take advantage of the moisture still remaining
in the soil. One rice variety, Masuli, which is neither very high
yielding nor early maturing, has been adopted by many farmers
because of its superior cooking qualities.

Almost all of the Tarai farmers use an improved wheat variety,
but few use the total package of recommendations. Some feel that
too much fertilizer damages the soil and so apply only part of the
recommended dosage. Others fear that the rains will be insufficient
and the fertilizer wasted, and do not, therefore, use any. Most
cannot plant wheat as early as recommended because they are still
harvesting rice. Broadcasting is the preferred method of sowing
even though sowing in rows can save seed and does produce higher
yields. Sowing in rows is more time consuming and requires oxen.
Both oxen and extra labor are in great demand between rice
harvesting and land preparation for the second crop.

Not only must the new technology be an improvement over the
present technology, but it must fit the conditions of the farmers.
Most large commercial farmers have access to inputs and have no
problem adopting improved technology that requires them. Some small
subsistence farmers will not adopt early maturing rice varieties
which greatly improve the effectiveness of double cropping unless
the early maturing varieties produce a rice with the desired eating
or selling qualities. Only part of the improved wheat technology is
being adopted, i.e., the variety, and it is almost universally being
grown using the traditional farming practices.

IV. Implications for Research

There are many implications that can be drawn from the
experience of the Food Grain Technology Project in developing
improved technology for the farmers in the Tarai. First, a better
understanding of the farmers' situation would help to focus research
on the farmers' problems. Secondly, more research should be done
under farmers conditions. And thirdly, greater use of the farmers
should be made in multiplying and distributing improved seeds.

Most of the agricultural research conducted in Nepal has been
adaptive. Germplasm obtained from other countries or the
International Agricultural Research Centers (IARCs) has been tested
for its adaptability under Tarai conditions. The criteria used to
judge the adaptability were agronomic and yields were generally used
as the primary criterion. If the cultivar met the criterion, it was
recommended as an improved variety to the farmers.

This adaptive research process has not been very effective. To
improve the process, research should start with the farmer. By


understanding the farmers' objectives, their resources, and
constraints, research -:an focus its efforts on developing technology
that fits the farmers conditions.

It is also particularly important in Nepal to understand the
interrelationship of crops and animals. Specific crops or cropping
systems may be the focus of research, but it is essential that the
place of animals are considered in the research work particularly
regarding soil fertility, use of by-products, and land preparation.

Some research must, of course, be conducted on the stations, but
more emphasis must be given to on-farm research. This is needed
because the conditions of the farmers are radically different from
the conditions of the stations. Thus, to test a technology under
farmers' conditions, the farmers' fields are the most appropriate
laboratories. Since the farmer is the one who will ultimately
decide on the adoption of the technology, the farmers themselves
should be involved in the on-farm testing as active participants and
not merely hired hands. Also, it is necessary that the farmers and
fields selected for on-farm testing be representative of the farmers
and farms in the area. Otherwise, generalizing from the results of
the tests will be invalid.

The minikit program in Nepal is a good example of doing
research on farmers' fields with farmers' active participation.
Unfortunately, the program has been not carefully monitored and
little effort has been made to analyze these experiences. The
minikit program could be improved if more care were taken in
collecting pertinent data on these experiences and if researchers
conducted appropriate agronomic and economic analysis on them. The
JTA could be helpful in seeing that the reliable data are
collected. It should perhaps be noted that minikit recipients to
date may not be "representative" so current results may overestimate
the interest of all farmers in the program.

Inputs, particularly seeds, should be handled by the farmers
themselves. Once research has determined that a variety can be
released, the foundation seed should be made available to farmers in
much the same way that seeds are made available through the minikit
program. Seed multiplication will take place spontaneously just as
it does now on a limited scale with the minikit program. Farmers
who see good results of other farmers obtain seeds from them. And
this is true not only of the minikit program but also for any farmer
who sees good results of another farmer with a new variety. This
amounts to allowing the farmers to certify seed in their own way.
It may not be as technically correct as intended under the present
seed multiplication program but is a practical way to accomplish the
same end. There are some problems associated with farmers doing
their own seed multiplication (such as storage of wheat seed during
the rainy season), but simple appropriate technology could be worked
out to resolve these kinds of problems. These solutions are easier
than those that appear insurmountable under the present program.



Josette Murphy and Gregory Heist

I. The Tarai: Region of Rapid Change

....We came here 22 years ago. At the time, only a few
families were cultivating in the area. All the fields you
see here were jungle, so we just cleared the land we needed
for our fields. There has been no more land to clear for
years now, the new settlers buy land from us. There is no
grazing land left either. People don't have as many cattle
as before; how could we feed them? The forest on this side
is a national reserve; we can't take our cattle there
anymore. Until three years ago, that hill on the other side
of the river was covered with trees, but the government set
up a resettlement program and all the trees were cut off.
Before, I had 60 head of cattle; now I have three...

Throughout our interviews, we heard the same story of the
increase in population in the Tarai and its impact on the
traditional farming system. We have also observed the
widespread adoption of new farming technology. Farmers
mentioned the loss of the forest and its resources, their
efforts to increase food production by intensifying their
cropping system in spite of a decrease in size of their herds
and, therefore, in the quantity of manure or compost available.
They cited the problem of diminishing productivity of their land
at a time when their needs -- both for food and for cash -- are

The changes occurring since the 1960's have made farmers
receptive to any innovation that can lead to an increase in
production and income.

It was in this context of increased pressure to produce that
the research stations and extension service began to promote
packages of improved farming practices. In 1969, the revised
project agreement of the Food Grain Production project stated as
its strategy:

... a) to increase yields per acre of traditional food grain
crops through the use of new seeds, fertilizers, pesticides
and better farming practices, and b) to introduce new crops
in fallow land to enable farmers to get two or three crops
per year.

While such actions can indeed promise increased production, that
potential can be fully realized only if all supporting elements
-- irrigation, distribution of inputs, credit -- are available
in a timely fashion. They can also aggravate the imbalance


between the traditional farming system and the environment that
population pressure has already initiated.

II. The Environment of the Tarai.

The Tarai, the southern belt of Nepal, is part of the Indo-
Gangetic plain. It includes two-thirds of the total arable land
of the country (about 19,000 km2 out of 28,000 km2). Yet
for generations this semi-tropical plain remained sparsely
inhabited, mainly because of malaria.

After malaria was eradicated in the 1950's, the Tarai became
a privileged development zone, with programs for resettlement,
infrastructure (roads and irrigation,) and agricultural
development (including research, extension and input
distribution services).

Rice, maize, and wheat are the staple food crops of the
Tarai; oilseeds (especially mustard), jute, and sugarcane are
the main cash crops. The Tarai is the major production area in
the country for cereals (for example, in 1976/77, it produced 80
percent of the rice, 67 percent of the wheat, and 37 percent of
the maize grown in Nepal that season). The total foodgrain
production has remained fairly stable over the years 1969 to
1977 at about 2 million metric tons for rice and 0.24 million
metric tons for maize. Wheat production has increased from 0.12
million metric tons in 1969/70 to 0.24 in 1976/77, mostly
because of an increase in area cultivated.

Exports of rice increased in the 1960's but have steadily
decreased since then and now stand at less than the 1961/62
level (11, Table 1.7).

The Tarai farmers are cultivating more land per capital than
farmers in the Hills (0.30 ha per person versus 0.09 ha per
person) and have larger farms on the average (1.7 ha per family
versus 0.4 ha) (40, pp. 54,55).

III. Effects of Population Pressures on Land Holdings

The population of the Tarai increased from 2.9 million in
1952 to 4.3 million in 1971, and to 5.1 million in 1977. This
is due in part to natural increase (Nepal has a birthrate well
over 2 percent) but also to an influx of new settlers from the
Hills, from Sikkim and from other areas.

Indeed, as population pressure in the worsening environment
of the Hills is becoming ever more intolerable, the shift in
population from the Hills to the Tarai has been accelerating,
involving some 400,000 people in 1976 (40). Only 8 percent of
this immigration has been channeled through official


resettlement organizations. Seasonal migration has also
continued, as Hill people seek temporary employment in the Tarai.

The population increase and the increased demand for food
which it generates has led to two major changes in land use,
beginning in the 1960's: (1) an increase in area put under
cultivation and (2) a more intensive cropping of previously
existing fields. The effect of these two types of changes on
the environment and on the traditional farming system will be
described in this section, and the role of the farming
technology available in the 1970's on cropping intensification
will be discussed. Figure 1 illustrates the linkages which
underlie these changes.

Figure 1. Cause and Effect in Rural Change in Nepal

Risk Soil Quality Organic Inputs Manure and Straw

Fewer Less
Animals Firewood
Reliance on Less Fallow
New Technology t
Less Forest and
Communal Grazing Land

Increased Food Increased I P
Population Pressure
and Cash Needs Cropping Intensity

A. The Increase in Area Under Cultivation

During the first few years of population increase, newcomers
could still clear their fields from the jungle at will or, in a
minority of cases, could obtain land from the government in a
resettlement zone. For a nominal fee, many of the new settlers
later received title to the land they had cleared.

As more of the jungle was destroyed, the government created
a number of national forests and endeavored to preserve the
remaining jungle, so new settlers had to buy land from earlier
settlers or rent. Land which had previously been set aside for
grazing was also put under cultivation. In many cases, the
fields were also cultivated more intensively, with two and
sometimes three harvests on the same plot.


Whether these measures, taken under traditional cultivation
practices, were sufficient to maintain the total food production
per person at its previous level is difficult to say, but two
consequences were clearly felt by the farmers themselves over
the years: a decrease in the size of their herds, and a loss in
land productivity.

B. The Decrease in Size of Herds

Recent statistics for the entire country suggest a slight
increase in aggregate livestock population. Most of the farmers
we visited, however, told us of a decrease in individual family
herds in their neighborhood.

In the earlier, more extensive pattern of land use, cattle
(buffalos and oxen) could graze in the forest, on grazing land
(sometimes commonly owned by a group of farms), and on fallow
fields. As these sources of fodder diminished and apparently
were not compensated for by increased residues resulting from
the additional foodgrain crop production, many farmers had to
give up part of their herd, albeit all tried to keep at least
one pair of bullocks for plowing and a she-buffalo for milk.

A decrease in herd size means a decrease in the quantity of
manure available, a major drawback in a traditional farming
system which relies on compost for maintaining soil fertility
and texture. It also means a decrease in the availability of
milk and milk products (ghee) which have played an important
role in many families as the preferred source of animal protein
and a significant part of daily calorie intake, and also as
products which can readily be sold.

C. Deforestation

The forests were a source of fodder for the cattle, organic
matter for the fields, and firewood. The three uses are
linked. As more trees are cut, firewood becomes more difficult
to find within a reasonable distance of the home, and some
households turn to mixing manure with straw to make cooking
fuel. If less manure is also available for compost because of
dwindling herds (due in part to declining forest grazing
opportunities), the increased use for non-agricultural purposes
competes with the agricultural need for compost.

Forests also help protect hillsides and river banks from
erosion from the periodic flash floods; this is true in the
Tarai as well as in the Hills, although the damage is clearly
greater in the foothill areas. In addition, severe erosion in
the Hills is increasing the amount of silt reaching the rivers
and contributing to more frequent floods, which can be very
destructive. In one of the areas we visited, a flash flood


killed about 1,000 people on September 1, 1981, and took away
some cultivated land.

No trend in total amount of rainfall can be observed in the
data available, but the question has been raised of possible
change in the distribution of the precipitation within a rainy
season. It is also possible that the amount of water
effectively available to the crops is decreasing because of
changes in water absorption capacity of the soil and more
extensive run-off.

D. Decreasing Land Productivity

A number of older farmers have assured us that yields of
local varieties of cereals have been going down since their
first few years in the area, a problem they attributed to
repeated cultivation of the same plots over the years with
insufficient compost. As one farmer put it, "The farther you
walk with the same pair of shoes, the thinner the soles become."

The pressure on land use is exacerbated by an inheritance
system under which adult sons may demand their share of the
family land at any time. When they choose to do so, the land
must be divided equally between the father and all the sons. In
recent years, it has become more difficult for the sons to clear
additional land or to buy some to add to their inheritance. As
a result, holdings become smaller and the farmers must intensify
their cropping system.

Indeed, over the years, as the size of the households'
holdings decreased, either through sale or division among sons,
and as both the number of households and the number of people
per household may have increased, every plot has been cultivated
yearly as the farmers have sought to maximize the total output
of each plot. Further decreases in fallow periods have occurred
as farmers adopted crops which could be cultivated during the
dry season (especially wheat and maize). Thus the improved
varieties released by the research stations in the early 1970's
fulfilled a felt need of the farmers.

IV. Higher Socio-Economic Expectations

In general, Tarai households have more cash expenses than
previously, as the costs of production of improved varieties are
high (see Appendix B) and as more -- and more expensive --
material goods are felt to be necessary.

Many new needs are a response to the increasing availability
of manufactured goods and the desire to send children to school,
as people become more aware of the life style outside of the
villages. Radio Nepal plays a big role in informing people in


even remote villages of new farming techniques, of the benefits
of family planning and education, and more prosaically through
commercial advertising for consumption goods.

Several roads have been built, making it easier for farmers
to travel to nearby small towns and eventually to visit.
relatives back in the Hills. Increased transport facilities
also mean that manufactured goods and cloth have become more
readily available. As one farmer put it, "Before, when we had
some savings we buried the coins in the ground. Now we get on
the bus to take the money to the bank, but in any case we buy
more shirts and sweaters than before. Can you believe a hat
costs 15 to 16 rupees these days? So we have more things, but
no money left."

Education has also become an important cost in many families.
Primary education is now free until fifth grade, but a sixth
grader must pay 10 rupees per month, and the fee increases for
each year thereafter. Since most families are likely to have
several of their children in school at the same time, school
fees can represent a major expense for several years.

Off-farm employment may be available, for example, on nearby
road construction sites, or as laborers on neighboring farms.
However, the daily wages for farm labor (now officially 8
rupees, in fact ranging from 4 to 10) have not kept up with
inflation. For most households the only means to obtain cash is
to sell part of the farm production. Since food needs are at
least as high as before, the total crop production must be

V. Widespread Acceptance of New Technology

The increase is cropping intensity is not in doubt. Where
soil moisture or irrigation permit, farm land in the Tarai is
being constantly cropped. In contrast to cereal production in
the U.S., where often only.grain is harvested, in Nepal the
entire crop -- including the stalks and stubble -- is typically
harvested and removed from the field. By feeding crop residues
to cattle and returning manure to the soil, only some of the
nutrients removed will be recycled. The organic matter loss has
negative consequences which are already being realized.
Fertility drops,, texture is degraded, water holding and
absorbing capacity is reduced, and, ultimately, the land is more
susceptible to run-off and wind and water erosion.

The reported decline in animal numbers implies less manure
for each household's crop land. The past use of forests, fallow
land, and communal grazing land for feeding animals provided a
net import of nutrients to the crop land, assuming that the
manure was collected and applied. Considering also the


increasing practice of burning a straw-dung mix as a substitute
for firewood, the shortage of organic matter inputs to the soil
becomes apparent.

Of the negative consequences of reduced organic inputs,
the major problem, as perceived by farmers and domestic and
foreign scientists alike, is the short term critical consequence
of lowered soil fertility. Thus, the application of inorganic
fertilizer has been widely demonstrated, recommended, and
adopted. Only a dozen years ago, most Tarai farmers had neither
seen nor heard of chemical fertilizers. Considering also the
prevalent use of potentially high-yielding, high-nutrient
(particularly nitrogen)- responsive varieties, the rapid
adoption of inorganic fertilizer applications is not surprising.

Unfortunately, except in isolated cases, the use of
high-yielding varieties and fertilizers has not been accompanied
by dramatic gains in production. For a variety of reasons,
farmers rarely apply sufficient fertilizer to exploit the yield
potential of new varieties. Some of the reasons given are
sensible and expected; others reflect farmers' misperceptions
about inorganic fertilizers.

The recommended optimal dose for a particular crop is
typically determined for the whole nation rather than for
specific locations. This means that the recommendation may not
be particularly well-suited to a particular farmer's situation.
The recommendations for potassium and for phosphorus, for
example, seem to be unjustifiably high. Researchers cite the
long-term depletion of potassium in the soil and recommend
levels of K application designed to forestall such depletion,
but the short-term yield gains are difficult to see in a
farmer's field. By trial and error, however, many farmers have
discovered that, at least for the present, nitrogen is the
critical element limiting their yields; consequently, this is
often the only nutrient they apply. And they apply only the
amount that they think is economically appropriate for them --
given the availability of water, their time of planting, the
quality of the soil, the crop, etc. While a farmer may well be
aware of production benefits of higher fertilizer additions, a
lack of cash or fear of defaulting on loans (if they are
available) may also prevent him from applying an optimal
amount. In the case of drought, a small farmer does not want to
add excessive financial loss for chemical inputs to the already
burdensome loss of food.

Problems associated with chemical fertilizer use have been
widely publicized and led to widespread fears of "large dose"
applications. As high-yielding varieties, particularly with
high NPK additions, draw more rapidly on soil micronutrients, it
should not be surprising to hear of the occurrence of


micronutrient deficiencies. While such problems may be readily
diagnosed (by researchers, with appropriate training and
equipment), and corrected with little expense, the
less-scientific rumor that spreads among farmers is that
fertilizer ruins the soil. Cases of induced acidity due to
excessive nitrogen applications have also been reported and
publicized. The problem is often associated with the use --
rather than the abuse -- of chemical fertilizer. Farmers also
associate fertilizer use with "hardening" of soil and a
subsequent "dependence" on fertilizer of soils to which only
inorganic fertilizers were previously applied. The hardening
phenomenon is no minor problem for animal traction-based
agriculture, but, like the other fears and rumors about
inorganic fertilizer use, reflects farmers' misperceptions of
the phenomena. They typically perceive such adverse outcomes to
be the direct effects of fertilizer use rather than the result
of a lack of organic inputs.

Despite these fears, the use of at least some chemical
fertilizer is prevalent. There is an appreciation in some areas
that without the additions of fertilizer, the crop, particularly
wheat, may not be worth harvesting as yields will be so low.
Many farmers have now not only accepted, but have become
dependent on, appropriate maturity, high-yielding varieties and
purchased fertilizer inputs. Unfortunately, they have too often
been unable to realize the full potential benefits of either.

VI. Social and Economic Consequences

While many farmers are eking out a bare living with the help
of improved varieties and low applications of chemical
fertilizer, others are finding farming very profitable. The
question arises: "If some can benefit from modern agriculture,
why can't others?"

When extension and research set out to create a green
revolution, the "trickle down" theory was in vogue. The
reasoning went thus: If progressive, innovative farmers could
be identified and convinced of the merits of new varieties and
fertilizers, they would serve as models for others to follow.
Targeting adopters was relatively easy. Usually they were
landed, wealthy, politically powerful people who, for a variety
of reasons, were able to adopt the new technologies rather
readily. They typically had irrigation and sufficient land to
risk using some for experimentation. They could afford to offer
free housing (and sometimes food) to the extension worker
(JTA). This was important because if there were problems (e.g.,
insect pests) with the experiment, the JTA could either solve
the problems or, more importantly, provide a direct link to
higher level technicians or researchers who could come to the


rescue. After all, there would be no trickle down if the model
failed. Such farmers were often rapidly converted to the new
way -- continuing to plant new varieties and to apply liberal
doses of fertilizer -- because for them it was profitable.

Unfortunately for others, as the new ideas trickled down,
the package came apart. Initially some of the smaller farmers
took the whole package (if they could not afford fertilizer,
loans were provided) but they soon realized high production was
not as guaranteed as it may have appeared on the "model farm."
The hand in hand guidance of, and rescue by, the JTA typically
was lacking, and thus important advice such as timing of
irrigation or avoidance of flooding in wheat was not conveyed.
If inputs like irrigation or fertilizer were in short supply,
the small farmer was least likely to get them. If germination
of purchased seed was poor and the farmer complained, he found
little or no redress. One total or partial crop failure was
enough to put him into unenviable debt. In summary, smaller
farmers quickly realized that important technical advice,
adequate water, timely access to inputs and the ability to take
an occasional financial loss were important parts of the
package which they did not possess. So they took from the
package what they felt they could afford, or, more correctly,
what they felt they could not afford to do without, namely, new
high yield potential varieties and sufficient fertilizer to get
a crop, low-yielding though it might be.

While the green revolution technology per se might be scale
neutral, when considered in light of the foregoing discussion,
it obviously is not. It should also be apparent that the gap
between the haves and have-nots can widen. From observations
and interviews a decade ago and now, we believe the gap has

Those fortunate enough to take advantage of the new
technology have been able to improve their wealth, particularly
by diversifying and putting their profits into rice mills,
bazaar apartments or other commercial enterprises. The price of
land has skyrocketed, especially near the new roads, often more
than five fold in 10 years. In the past, when a family's land
was divided amongst the heirs, an attempt was usually made by
all to supplement their share by gradually purchasing more
land. With increasing population and finite land resources,
this can only be done by some, regrettably at the expense of

Seventy six percent of Tarai farmers in 1977 were considered
small or marginal compared with 70 percent in 1970. Forty
percent of Tarai farmers are tenants (40). For small farmers,
life is precarious. Not only does improvement seem unlikely,
but relatively small errors in judgment or management can put
one in debt and ultimately result in loss of cattle or land.


Alternative sources of income are few, and working as a landless
farm laborer is not enviable. While the price of consumer goods
has at least doubled in the past 10 years, laborers' wages have
risen roughly 50 percent. There is little doubt that this group
has become materially poorer. We observed a proliferation of
large, multi-variety home vegetable gardens which would appear
to bode well for human nutrition. Yet one farmer eloquently
told us he felt this vitamin gain was offset by dairy product
protein loss due to reduced animal populations.

While small landed farmers express appreciation for the
eradication of smallpox and malaria, an improved transportation
network and the availability of medical services and education,
they also express dismay at being unable to take full
advantage. Higher quality education and quality medical
attention are often beyond their means. The two major hopes for
improved family welfare, namely, acquisition of more land or
higher education for their children thus continue to remain
hopes. For many Nepalis, this "better life," to which they have
been exposed to and dream of, appears further and further out of
reach. Only a small minority are appreciably improving their



Gary Ender

In this appendix, the relevance of agricultural research in
Nepal is analyzed in the context of the riskiness of farming in
Nepal (i.e., the Tarai). The first section describes briefly
the recent historical trends (detailed in Appendix C) which have
transformed life and farming in Nepal. The next section details
the sources of riskiness in farming. The third section describes
how and why the high input technology most often generated by
agricultural research has or has not been feasible for farmers
to adopt. Finally, some conclusions are drawn as to the types
of technology which research should attempt to develop and how
this should be done.

I. Farming and Life Intensity

There are several reasons why life has become more intense
in Nepal. The most straightforward and the most important
factor causing intensification, however, is increasing
population. Its effects are seen in migration, in continuing
land fragmentation, and in local shortages of housing or land to
build houses. In one village a sajha office had to relocate to
another village because its landlord demanded the building back
for his family. In the same village, better-off villagers
bought houses from poorer villagers, who were then forced to
build new houses in a new location apart from the village. With
non-agricultural employment opportunities growing slowly,
population increasing relentlessly, and cultivated land growing
hardly at all, more and more food and fiber must be produced per
unit of land.

Increased cropping intensity in turn requires more planning,
better coordination of resources, and tighter timing of
operations. As the parts of the farming system become even more
interdependent, there are losses in flexibility. This in turn
makes farming risKier.

In the struggle to provide a good life for their children,
Nepali parents have begun to educate their children more. The
costs of education, more fashionable or simply better clothes,
and other consumer goods which have come to be perceived as
required at a decent standard of living have increased the
desired minimum income level. Since agriculture is the main
source of income, much of this need is again reflected in an
increased intensity of land use in farming.


To conclude this brief description of the farmer and his
changing environment, it should be noted that farmers, like most
of us, are risk-averse. Poor farmers, moreover, have little to
gamble with. Nevertheless, many middle-income and even poorly/
farmers in Nepal are now gambling to a considerable extent in
their farming.

II. Farming is a Risky Business

There are many reasons why farming is risky. The one which
come to one's mind first is the weather. In Nepal the riskiness
of the weather is manifested in the variability of the beginning
and end of the monsoon rains and the variability of total
rainfall and its distribution/

To mitigate the effects of variable rainfall one naturally
thinks of irrigation. In Nepal, however, only a small fraction
of the cultivated land is irrigated (10-15 percent in the
Tarai). Land classified as irrigated, moreover, is not likely
to have assured irrigation all year round. The struggle to
intensify cultivation sometimes leads to struggles between those
upstream and those downstream. This is also apparent at the
international level, between India and Nepal. The construction
of large canal projects has sometimes permantly disabled a
community irrigation system-without itself providing a reliable
source of water. In addition, rivers change their course,!/
leaving local channels dry.

Another natural factor which is important to Nepali farmers
is the incidence of pests and diseases. These may destroy or
reduce crops, as well as kill animals needed for traction and
manure. Biped and quadruped animals may also be hazardous to
standing crops.

In addition to natural factors, several market-related
factors play key roles in the process of cropping
intensification. On the input side, the first is the
availability of improved seed. A farmer who wants to buy seed
from AIC through his sajha may find that AIC did not make it

1/"Middle-Income" and "poor" are relative here; all of these
farmers are poor by world standards.

2/At Parwanipur, in the central Tarai, between 1971 and 1976
only, the rainfall in April varied between 4 and 165 mm; in
May, between 1 and 228 mm; in September, between UO and 475
mm; in October, between 28 and 240 mm; and the total annual
rainfall varied between 893 and 1940 mm.

3/Deforestation at key points of a river's course may
contribute significantly to this process.


Available on time or that the sajha did not or could not get the
seed to his village on time. The quality of local roads may be
a factor here. A farmer who saves his own wheat seed may have a
considerable amount of trouble preserving it through the warm,
humid monsoon season, and after a few years, wheat seed produced
in farmers' fields will usually lose its vigor. Quality is also
a major problem with seed supplied by AIC. Farmers using both
corn and wheat seed from AIC this year complained that it looked
fine on arrival but gave extremely poor germination.!/

The other major marketed input of the Green Revolution is,
of course, fertilizer. Here again, farmers have been unable to
obtain as much fertilizer of the types they want and on time
from AIC. Some are forced to buy phosphorus and potassium they
do not want, many sajhas are not functioning, and AIC often has
trouble obtaining even donated fertilizer (more than half the
total) on time. This year the sajhas went on strike (1), and
there is always the problem of a black market in fertilizer
because of strong demand in India.

Another set of problems the farmer must contend with is the
variability of government policies. Relevant policies include
the level of the fertilizer subsidy, the types of intervention
in domestic and international grain marketing, and land tenure
law enforcement. In the last ten years, Nepal's rice export
trade has changed from free trade to a monopoly by zonal rice
export companies to licensed private trade; some farmers believe
that the rice export companies had a significantly adverse
impact on their welfare.

The insecurity of land tenure that affects many small
farmers in Nepal is still another risky element in their
economic and physical environment. The effective power that
many landlords have over their tenants allows them to continue
to receive half of all crops when the law stipulates a fixed
rent on grain crop; this in turn renders the on-paper
profitability of many technologies unachievable, since in
addition the tenant must often pay for all the inputs himself.
A tenant frustrated by the inability to farm as productively as
he thinks possible would, however, be taking a very big risk by
doing legal battle with an economically more powerful landlord.

One way to increase the economic power of small farmers is
with additional and/or subsidized credit. While credit is not
itself a risky element in a farmer's environment, a farmer's
possibilities vis-a-vis credit are a reflection of the riskiness

1/The seed may have been "cooked" by the high temperature
....produced by molds or other organisms in storage.


of his investments. Thus a farmer who can and does get a
production loan faces the possibility of default if his crop
fails due to drought, floods, grazing, etc. There is no true
forgiveness (or insurance) in the credit system, although the
farmer who never repays and can therefore get no further credit
is sometimes said to have received a semi-deliberate transfer
payment. Cooperatives were tried and most of them failed ten to
fifteen years ago; the sajha system has reinstated cooperatives,
however, and those with outstanding debts can get loans upon
partial repayment. The ultimate threat against the farmer in
debt is to take his land; this seems to have almost never been
done, but it may yet be a significant worry to the small farmer
with little food security. To avoid going into debt to buy
inputs, some farmers save a small amount of cash. By investing
in some level of inputs with cash, the farmer achieves no
greater chance of success in production. He avoids the perils
of debt, moreover, only if he does not have to borrow to eat if
his crop fails.

It is clear that in general there are substantial risks
involved in farming in Nepal. Thus, to accurately imagine the
plight of a farm family in Nepal, one must consider together the
problems of minimal assets and the riskiness of the production

III.When Technology Talks, Who Listens?

With the Nepali farmer so precariously situated, one would
think that those setting the course of agricultural research
would have taken a long look at what the farmer was doing and
why, before designing any experiments. Unfortunately, only now
are those in control of research beginning to do this.

What has agricultural research produced, and why? Mostly it
has been improved technology in the form of new,
fertilizer-responsive varieties of rice, wheat, and corn. These
were extended with research station recommendations which called
for high levels of fertilizer application. These levels were
probably set to approximate maximum yield rather than maximum
return. In addition, the technology required irrigation, either
to make the fertilizer effective or to ensure adequate water
control in paddies.

Such an output was, unfortunately, logical from the system
which generated it. Agronomists and breeders predominated, soil
scientists were few, and agricultural economists, absent.
Western agricultural training at the Ph.D. level emphasized
maximum yield, and so did the international centers like IRRI.

The preoccupation with yield resulted in a lack of attention
to other plant characteristics. Many of these are extremely


important to farmers forced to tailor their crops and cropping
systems to a variety of needs and resource availabilities. Some
of these characteristics are: amount of straw, quality of straw
as thatch or fodder, grain quality and taste (and thus price),
and flexibility in planting/transplanting date. Thus farmers in
Nepal have typically grown a variety of crops (or several
varieties of rice) to reduce their risk, to make best use of
their resources, and to meet their needs. Yet agricultural
research in Nepal has generally aimed to develop one (or perhaps
two in the case of rice) best variety for each crop in each
geographical region (Tarai, Hills).

Given the riskiness of the farming environment and the
meager assets of farm households, the high input new technology
package was exactly what the farmers could not use. After
experimentation with it, those farmers who had enough irrigation
generally fit the new technology in as a small part of their
cropping system. Wheat fit in most easily because it often
replaced fallow. Those with sufficient water control took
advantage of high solar radiation in the early season by using
the improved rice varieties. Virtually no farmers used the
recommended dose of fertilizer, however, because it represented
a much too risky investment. Many farmers used no fertilizer.
Thus the new varieties were used with fortuitous benefit with a
level of fertilization at which they were undoubtedly never
tested by researchers. Indeed, early three-part demonstrations
done by extension workers in farmers' fields included the
following treatments: local variety-local method, local
variety-improved method, and improved variety-improved method.
Improved variety-local method as a possibility was anathema!

In the early 1970's, partly at the instigation of USAID/N,
research stations began to test potential new releases in
farmers' fields as the last stage of testing. As part of this
process the rice variety Masuli was released in 1973. In a
farmer's field trial, it was found to have the lowest yield of
ten new varieties tested and the best taste. This variety is
now ubiquitous in the Tarai. Farmers trade for or buy Masuli
seed from their neighbors because it fits into a niche in almost
every farmer's arming system. It has many desirable
characteristics, particularly flexibility in age of seedlings at
transplanting, good taste and price, and good quality thatch, in
addition to a yield higher than traditional varieties. It even
has the unusual property of being best tasting immediately after
harvest and declining in quality thereafter, thus complementing
almost perfectly the eating quality of other rices. If farmers
are to listen to researchers, the latter will have to start
telling them about many more Masuli's.


IV. Dialogue and Division of Labor

Research, extension, and farmers have come a long way in
Nepal, individually and as a team coalescing to improve
everyone's lot. Feedback among these actors has become
,significant as a result of previous frustrations and structured
/meetings. In the same way that all the parts of farming systems
in Nepal are carefully adjusted to work together, researchers,
extension workers, and farmers must eventually function as a
powerful organism with relevant goals and methods.

What farmers in Nepal need, to quote one farmer, is "not a
better variety that requires even more fertilizer, but a good
variety that requires less fertilizer." That is, farmers need
an optimum fertility package, not a maximum fertility package,
and it must be suited to their available labor, risk-taking
ability, taste, and several other important requirements and
resource availabilities. It should also be noted, however, that
most farmers are now convinced of the value of fertilizer.

To develop such packages in turn requires the intense
cooperation of research, extension, and farmers. In this
improved research system, there are likely to be at least three
significantly different roles for researchers to perform.
First, they should continue to do adaptive trials. In this way,
Nepal will continue to benefit from basic research done at
international centers and in other national research programs.
Before these varieties are released, all three actors should see
farmers' fields' results.

Second, research stations should be conduits for varieties
from both domestic and foreign sources that will be tested by
farmers (after only basic pest susceptibility screening) for a
wider range of characteristics. This mechanism will both
facilitate the rapid spread of acceptable varieties and promote
understanding of what characteristics farmers consider important.

Armed with all of the above information and experience,
researchers can begin to breed and select new varieties that are
truly relevant to the Nepali context. Some of the coordinated
commodity improvement programs in Nepal are entering this phase,
but the second role still needs promotion and strengthening.



Gary Ender

I arrived in Shripurl/ with my Peace Corps issue sleeping
bag, mosquito net, malaria pills, and water filter, and my radio
and tape recorder. We had bumped along the canal bank road many
miles in the AID advisor's jeep. I soon settled into a room in
the panchayat building. Within a year I had learned to speak
and understand Nepali passably and realized that I didn't need
my mosquito net, malaria pills, or water filter. The earthen
jug kept water cooler.

My job was Junior Technical Assistant JTA and while
virtually none in Shripur knew my name, nearly everyone knew
"JTA saheb." JTA's are the village-level agricultural extension
workers who are supposed to know something about everything from
cereal crops to fruit saplings to improved implements to baiting
rats to feeding pigs. In general the JTA is supposed to go
door-to-door with the message of krishi bikash -- agricultural
development -- but that was never really my style. I talked to
people in tea shops and markets and still managed to work in
cereals, fruits, plows, rats, pigs, and much more.
Demonstrations of new varieties of rice and wheat were required,
and these structured the time I didn't spend in farmer-friends'
homes or in tea shops and markets.

Shripur is a panchayat in the eastern Tarai about 15 miles
from its district center. After the east-west highway was
completed in the district, it was a two-hour walk and about two
hours on the bus to the district center. The people of Shripur
are a mixture of Hill and Tarai ethnic groups, probably a more
diverse population than in most Tarai panchayats. At the time I
was posted, PCV-JTA posts were selected partly on the basis of
irrigated land, so I was duly impressed by the flowing channels
of diverted river water. Like many Tarai areas, Shripur had its
former zamindars and other moderately large land owners, as well
as small land owners and tenants. There seemed to be very few
landless people who were not merchants or artisans.

My arrival in Shripur coincided approximately with the
denouement of the local cooperative society. It had managed to
bring in significant quantities of wheat seed anu fertilizer,
but many loans were not repaid, and the zamindar's
representative extracted large amounts from the till. This was
nothing new, as the zamindar had also started to clean out the

l/Village name is fictitious.


compulsory savings godown and the panchayat coffers. Because of
the efforts of the cooperative and my Nepali JTA counterpart,
however, improved wheat seed had entered Shripur. Now, even if
farmers were not interested in using fertilizer, they could at
least save the seed and share it with their neighbors. Improved
rice seed entered in the same way, and rice is even easier to

During my stay in Shripur, no agricultural revolution, green
or otherwise, occurred. Farmers expressed a variety of ideas
about fertilizer. They recognized the growth-enhancing effects
of nitrogen, and some teaspooned it around their cauliflowers.
Some came to believe that it ruined their soil or that after
once using it further use was required. A modest and gradually
increasing amount of wheat was grown, where irrigation was
possible in the winter, and a few farmers continued to use
fertilizer on it. Improved rice varieties from Taiwan and IRRI
found their niche in the early season, again where irrigation
was available. We had to do some spraying to keep the bugs down,
but the cooperative had purchased a sprayer which I could borrow,
and my regular trips to the district center to pick up mail
allowed me to replenish the local supply of insecticide.
Vegetable seeds were a big seller, and I used to collect some
"interest" from those who made sinki, dried fermented radish. I
built a pen and raised an American pig on local rations. This
project was a lot of fun and evoked moderate interest. One
ChhetriI/ decided to raise a pig similarly for profit.
Chhetris do not eat or touch pigs, but this farmer saw that by
keeping the pig penned and having a hired person to clean the
pen, he could turn a profit with no loss of status. There were
several pork-eating groups in the area and there were also those
among the Brahmins and Chhetris who would openly or
clandestinely eat bangur,/ as the American pig was called.

Many farmers got to hear my message in four years, but none
seemed to be totally convinced about krishi bikash and its
new-fangled ways. By the time I left, then, I could tell myself
that while the revolution had not started, the seeds had been
planted in good places, namely, in the minds of several farmers
who were likely to try the new ideas out. By then I knew that
most farmers were best convinced by other farmers. Whether or
when the revolution would come, though, I could not say.

Z/Member of the warrior caste.

!/A clever linguistic cross between sungur (pig, which is off
limits) and banel (wild boar, which anyone can eat).


Returning to Shripur ten years later was enjoyable only
because I got to spend time in the homes of my friends.
Otherwise it was quite saddening.

The winter fields were the first disappointing sight. There
was much more linseed planted than wheat. And quite a number of
fields had only rice stubble. Linseed was disappointing to see
because, as I soon found out, it only yielded 3 maunds per
bigha, whereas wheat would give 30. The price of mustard
(edible) oil had risen sharply after I left, but it still was
not ten times that of wheat. Linseed could be relayed into the
rice before harvest, rather than sown after plowing, so it saved
time. But I think the most important clue to the rationale for
this uneconomic crop choice was the comment that linseed was
supposed to give an assured yield (one farmer even told me that
livestock don't like to graze it), whereas improved wheat was
susceptible to insects, diseases, sterility, and lack of
fertility. Farmers knew that for wheat to do even reasonably
well, it needed nutrients from either compost (manure) or
fertilizer. Fertilizer was a cash cost and a risk, not to
mention available only irregularly in the village. (The sajha
(cooperative) had gone on strike at wheat planting time!) And
manure was getting harder to come by.

Grazing land had become scarce because small farmers needed
to plant more winter crops to feed their families. Roadside
ditches, riverbeds now cultivable because of canal works, and
other miscellaneous pieces of land were now plowed and planted.
More cultivated land and less available manure would lead to
lower soil fertility unless fertilizer were used. But I knew
from my previous experience that small farmers were those least
able to take the risk of using fertilizer. Many times this was
particularly difficult because they were tenants and the
landlord shared their output but not the cost of inputs.

Some of the tracts of rice stubble I saw I knew to belong to
large landlords, some of whom I learned had increased their
holdings since I had left. By leaving their land fallow, they
could protect its fertility. They might even gain if other
people's animals grazed and deposited manure on their fields
along with their own animals. In any case, they were not the
ones who needed the extra food. They could sit back and squeeze
their poorest tenants into selling any land they owned or making
a more beneficial tenancy arrangement.

Two other saddening situations became apparent to me as I
sat in a roadside tea shop near the home of my host. The first
was that I seemed to notice that many "bullock" carts were in
fact being pulled by male buffaloes. I asked my friend and he
confirmed this. He explained that the scarcity of grazing land


had led many farmers to stop raising cows. Cows had always
given less milk than she-buffaloes, but without a cow a farmer
cannot reproduce new bullocks, which are essential for good
draft power. Bullocks had become very expensive, so when their
bullocks got old, many farmers were traveling quite far to buy
buffaloes which could be had somewhat more cheaply than
bullocks. Perhaps as an economist I should rejoice that these
farmers had been brought into the monetized livestock economy.
I was sad, however, because I knew that poor people who were not
yet ready to enter that economy had been forced out of their
self-sufficient system of producing new bullocks.

Fewer cows and less grazing mean less manure, but more
people and more difficult access to the forest also mean less
firewood per family. My friend told me that his family only
made guita -- dung Duraflame "logs" -- for use in one month of
the monsoon, when their firewood ran out. But I could see that
poorer families had bigger stacks of guita's than his, drying in
the winter sun.

The second saddening event I observed concerned debt between
a large landlord and a tenant whose own land holding was getter
smaller. The tenant had been served with a court paper telling
him to appear in the district center on a certain date in the
matter of an old loan. According to him the loan dispute had
been settled; he had sold land to pay the debt, and he and the
landlord had signed an agreement that the debt was canceled. I
learned from my friends, though, that in the process of signing
papers this probably naive tenant had been duped into signing
some other papers which were his current source of anxiety.

As if their own problems were not enough, farmers in Shripur
were also suffering from a factor of international origin. The
major cash crop in Shripur is jute, and for the last several
years the price has been quite low. While I can pick up a
telephone in Washington and find out an expert's best guess on
the prospects for synthetic alternatives, a farmer in Nepal
clearly cannot. Moreover, previous years of low prices have
always eventually been followed by years of good prices, so the
farmer's intuitive notion may be to keep planting jute and hope
for a higher price. Here, too, there is an investment of
manure, hired labor, and other valuable resources which
represents a significant risk for all farmers.

One intervening factor which has begun to provide benefits
to farmers in Shripur is education. The results are still
mixed, however. It seems that farm households are sacrificing
more to invest in the education of their sons to a higher level
than before. In the case of my closest friend, his younger
brother studied far enough to become a teacher in the local high
school, which was running well without government support. The
brother's wife was also a teacher and they had no agricultural


income. My friend's eldest daughter had also studied enough to
be a teacher's assistant and was bringing home a modest salary.
This example is atypical, however. I met many farmers whose
sons had completed ten or so years of education and were engaged
solely in farming or in farming and a side business. Their
higher education is not likely to make them any more open to
modern farming or help them succeed in business; farmers are
already open to modern farming ideas, and education beyond
literacy and numeracy for a village merchant is probably of
little use. The government is still the main source of jobs for
which education is the main requirement. Many of these farmers'
sons will not have been able to complete quite enough education
to qualify. Even if they did, the fierce competition makes a
'source' (contact) a necessity.

On the more positive side in agriculture, there have been
indisputable benefits from the research and extension system.
Varieties like Masuli (rice) and RR-21 (wheat) are widely
dispersed in the Tarai. They have fit into the Tarai farming
system because they have a number of good characteristics, i.e.,
more than just high yield. Masuli has good eating quality,
brings a good price, and has ample flexibility in age at
transplanting. RR-21 has large, bold, white grain, and until
recently good rust resistance. IR-8, an old IRRI variety, gives
a very good yield in the early season. Although its eating
quality is poor, small farmers who have irrigation need to trade
quantity for quality.

Meals were always a part of a visit to one of my friends. I
ate more meals per day than I ever would nave in Kathmandu and
still ate fewer than my friends offered. I left Shripur, then,
with a full stomach and happy to have been reunited with people
who meant very much to me. The lingering doubt I could not
dispel was whether most of those in Shripur would have full
stomachs and happiness in the coming years.



Table F-1.

Area Under

Improved Varieties of
Nepal, 1964-80

Wheat and Rice

Wheat Rice
Year Total Area % Under Total Area % Under
('000 ha) Improved ('000 ha) Improved

1964/65 100 -- 1101 --
1965/66 118 3.7 1111 0.6
1966/67 126 9.0 1100 1.2
1967/68 192 14.4 1154 2.3
1968/69 208 26.1 1162 3.7
1969/70 226 33.8 1173 4.3
1970/71 228 43.1 1182 5.7
1971/72 239 48.5 1201 6.8
1972/73 259 65.7 1140 15.1
1973/74 274 75.5 1227 16.7
1974/75 291 84.8 1240 18.0
1975/76 329 71.0 1256 17.2
1976/77 348 73.0 1262 17.5
1977/78 366 78.4 1264 23.0
1978/79 356 85.4 1263 24.7
1979/80 367 85.7 1254 25.1
1980/81 (estimate) 381 83.5 1276 25.5

Source: Food and Agricultural Marketing Services, HMG/N.


Table F-2.

Area and Production of Major Crops
Nepal, 1964/65 1980/81

Years Paddy Maize Wheat Millet
'000 Ha. MT '000 Ha. MT '000 Ha. MT '000 Ha. MT

1964/65 1101 2201 437 -- 100 12b 24 26
1969/70 1173 2241 433 795 226 265 26 24
1970/71 1122 2304 445 833 228 193 27 25
1971/72 1204 2358 435 730 247 225 28 25
1972/73 1142 2010 446 822 259 312 27 25
1973/74 1227 2416 453 814 274 308 28 26
1974/75 1240 2452 458 827 291 331 28 26
1975/76 1256 2605 452 797 329 387 26 25
1976/77 1262 2386 645 797 348 362 25 21
1977/78 1264 2282 445 740 366 411 26 22
1978/79 1263 2339 454 743 374 454 26 22
1979/80 1254 2060 432 554 367 440 26 23
198/81 (Est.)1276 2464 457 743 381 482 26 23

Sugarcane Jute Oilseeds
'000 Ha. MT '000 Ha. MT '000 Ha. MT
1964/65 9 126 32 39 108 51
1969/70 13 216 52 49 103 57
1970/71 14 236 55 53 106 55
1971/72 15 245 60 59 111 57
1972/73 15 246 54 55 122 60
1973/74 16 267 33 40 114 54
1974/75 15 251 34 41 112 65
1975/76 15 253 33 41 113 68
1976/77 18 311 40 45 108 61
1977/78 23 387 47 56 133 78
1978/79 23 379 45 66 144 92
1979/80 23 384 57 68 118 63
1980/81 (Est.) 25 479 49 59 123 77

Source: Ministry of Finance, Economic Survey, various years.


Table F-3.
Indicators of Improved Technology Adoption, 1967
Selected Years, Three Selected Districts

- 80

All Nepal Bhairawa Rampur Parwanipur
(Rupandehi) (Chitwan) (Parsa)

1. HYV Seed Sales (MT)
1969/70 661 101 42 60
1972/73 --- 2083 186 107 255
1975/76 2328 48 184 182
1979/80 2919 76 126 314

2. Chemical Fertilizer Sales ('000 MT)

1969/70 15861 259 263 1996
1972/73 32555 1311 1362 3111
1975/76 31131 1683 1562 391
1979/80 50168 2059 2466 5373

3. Production ('000 MT)./
1969/70 2151 265 795 117 14 5 48 5 50 106 13 5
1972/73 2010 312 822 106 29 5 47 7 50 81 81 7
1975/76 2605 387 748 129 21 5 54 12 41 116 25 3
1979/80 2060 440 554 76 26 4 45 16 11 106 25 -

Sources: Agricultural Inputs Corporation as cited in the World Bank,
1979. Nepal Agricultural Sector Review, pp. 72 and 85, and
in World Bank, 1981. District data compiled from official
statistics by USAID/Nepal, 1980.

a/ Maize, paddy, and wheat seed combined. Wheat seeds are the most
important. The years represented were randomly selected.
/ Different mixes of fertilizers.
/ P = Paddy; W = Wheat; M = Maize


Table F-4.

Agricultural Sector Export Earnings
Nepal, 1968 1979
(Millions of Rupees)



Source: Nepal Rastra Bank,
No. 4, July, 1981,

nthPr b/




Quarterly Economic Bulletin, Vol. XV,
Table 37 and Vol. X, No. 2, Table 29.

a/ To countries other than India.
b/ "Other" includes food and live animals, tobacco and beverages,
crude materials and inedibles except fuels, animal and
vegetable oils and fats, and jute from the manufactured goods
category. All forestry has been excluded.

RiceP a/


R.ic. e a Ot h h/.


The following reports have been issued in the A.I.D. Evaluation Publication
series. Those documents with an identification code (e.g., PN-AAG-585) may be
ordered in microfiche and paper copy. Please direct inquiries regarding
orders to:

Editor of ARDA, S&T/DIU/DI
Bureau for Science and Technology
Agency for International Development
Washington, D.C. 20523


No. 1: Reaching the Rural Poor: Indigenous Health Practitioners
Are There Already (March 1979) PN-AAG-685
No. 2: New Directions Rural Roads (March 1979) PN-AGG-670
No. 3: Rural Electrification: Linkages and Justifications
(April 1979) PN-AAG-671
No. 4: Policy Directions for Rural Water Supply in Developing
Countries (April 1979) PN-AAG-691
No. 5: Study of Family Planning Program Effectiveness
(April 1979) PN-AAG-672
No. 6: The Sociology of Pastoralism and African Livestock
Development (May 1979) PN-AAG-922
No. 7: Socio-Economic and Environmental Impacts of Low-Volume
Rural Roads -- A Review of the Literature (February 1980)
No. 8: Assessing the Impact of Development Projects on Women
(May 1980) PN-AAH-725
No. 9: The Impact of Irrigation on Development: Issues for a
Comprehensive Evaluation Study (October 1980)
No. 10: A Review of Issues in Nutrition Program Evaluation
(July 1981) PN-AAJ-174
No. 11: Effective Institution Building: A Guide for Project Designers
and Project Managers Based on Lessons Learned from the AID
Portfolio (March, 1982) PN-AAJ-611
No. 12: Turning Private Voluntary Organizations Into Development Agencies
Questions for Evaluation (April 1982) PN-AAJ-612
No. 13: AID Experience in Agricultural Research: A Review of Project
Evaluations (May 1982) PN-AAJ-613



No. 1: Family Planning Program Effectiveness: Report of a
Workshop (December 1979)
No. 2: A.I.D.'s Role in Indonesian Family Planning: A Case
Study with General Lessons for Foreign Assistance
(December 1979) PN-AAH-425
No. 3: Third Evaluation of the Thailand National Family Planning
Program (February 1980) PN-AAH-006
No. 4: The Workshop on Pastoralism and African Livestock
Development (June 1980) PN-AAH-238
No. 5: Rural Roads Evaluation Summary Report (March 1982) PN-AAJ-607

- 1 -


No. 1: Colombia: Small Farmer Market Access (December 1979)
No. 2: Kitale Maize: The Limits of Success (May 1980)
No. 3: The Potable Water Project in Rural Thailand (May 1980)
No. 4: Philippine Small Scale Irrigation (May 1980) PN-AAH-749
No. 5: Kenya Rural Water Supply: Program, Progress, Prospects
(June 1980) PN-AAH-724
No. 6: Impact of Rural Roads in Liberia (June 1980) PN-AAH-750
No. 7: Effectiveness and Impact of the CARE/Sierra Leone Rural
Penetration Roads Projects (June 1980) PN-AAH-751
No. 8: Morocco: Food Aid and Nutrition Education (August 1980)
No. 9: Senegal: The Sine Saloum Rural Health Care Project
(October 1980) PN-AAJ-008
No. 10: Tunisia: CARE Water Projects (October 1980)
No. 11: Jamaica Feeder Roads: An Evaluation (November 1980)
No. 12: Korean Irrigation (December 1980)
No. 13: Rural Roads in Thailand (December 1980) PN-AAH-970
No. 14: Central America: Small Farmer Cropping Systems
(December 1980) PN-AAH-977
No. 15: The Philippines: Rural Electrification (December 1980)
No. 16: Bolivia: Rural Electrification (December 1980)
No. 17: Honduras Rural Roads: Old Directions and New
(January 1981) PN-AAH-971
No. 18: Philippines Rural Roads I and II (March 1981)
No. 19: U.S. Aid to Education in Nepal: A 20-Year Beginning
(May 1981) PN-AAJ-168
No. 20: Korean Potable Water System Project: Lessons from
Experience (May 1981) PN-AAJ-170
No. 21: Ecuador: Rural Electrification (June 1981) PN-AAH-979
No. 22: The Product is Progress: Rural Electrification in Costa Rica
(October 1981) PN-AAJ-175
No. 23: Northern Nigeria Teacher Educational Project (Sept. 1981)
No. 24: Peru: CARE OPG Water Health Services Project (October 1981)
No. 25: Thailand: Rural NonFormal Education The Mobile Trade
Training Schools (October 1981) PN-AAJ-171
No. 26: Kenya: Rural Roads (January 1982) PN-AAH-972
No. 27: Korean Agricultural Research: The Integration of Research and
Extension (January 1982) PN-AAJ-606
No. 28: Philippines: Bicol Integrated Area Development (January 1982)
No. 29: Sederhana: Indonesia Small-Scale Irrigation (February 1982)


No. 30: Guatemala: Development of ICTA and Its Impact on Agricultural
Research and Farm Productivity (February 1982). PN-AAJ-178
No. 31: Sudan: The Rahad Irrigation Project (March 1982) PN-AAJ-610
No. 32: Panama: Rural Water (May 1982) PN-AAJ-609
No. 33: Food Grain Technology: Agricultural Research In Nepal (May 1982)
No. 34: Agricultural Research In Northeastern Thailand (May 1982)


No. 1: The Socio-Economic Context of Fuelwood Use in Small
Rural Communities (August 1980) PN-AAH-747
No. 2: Water Supply and Diarrhea: Guatemala Revisited
(August 1980) PN-AAJ-007
No. 3: Rural Water Projects in Tanzania: Technical, Social, and
Administrative Issues (November 1980) PN-AAH-974
No. 4: The Social Impact of Agribusiness: A Case Study of ALCOSA in
Guatemala (July 1981) PN-AAJ-172
No. 5: Korean Elementary Middle School Pilot Project (October 1981)
No. 6: The Economic Development of Korea: Sui Generis or Generic?
(January 1982) PN-AAJ-177
No. 7: The Vicos Experiment: A Study of the Impacts of the Cornell-Peru
Project in a Highland Community (April 1982) PN-AAJ-616


Manager's Guide to Data Collection (November 1979) PN-AAH-434

Directory of Central Evaluation Authorities (April 1981)
(distribution restricted to official agencies)


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