Table of Contents
 Acronyms used in the text
 Background of project and HARP
 Establishment of HARP contract
 Issues and recommendations
 Appendix A
 Appendix B
 Appendix C

Evaluation of Honduras Agricultural Research Project
Full Citation
Permanent Link: http://ufdc.ufl.edu/UF00053841/00002
 Material Information
Title: Evaluation of Honduras Agricultural Research Project
Physical Description: v. : ; 28 cm.
Language: English
Creator: Farming Systems Support Project
Hansen, Art
Marvel, Mason E.
Cardwell, Vernon B.
Arcia, Guztavo
Publisher: International Programs, Institute of Food and Agricultural Sciences, University of Florida
Office of Agriculture and Office of Multisectoral Development, Bureau for Science and Technology, Agency for International Development
Place of Publication: Gainesville Fla
Washington D.C
Publication Date: 1984
Frequency: annual
Subjects / Keywords: Agricultural systems -- Periodicals -- Honduras   ( lcsh )
Farm management -- Periodicals -- Honduras   ( lcsh )
Agriculture -- Periodicals -- Honduras   ( lcsh )
Dates or Sequential Designation: 1984-
General Note: Title from cover.
General Note: "Contract with the Consortium for International Development and ... New Mexico State University ... 522-0139-C-00-2059"--P.v.
Funding: Florida Historical Agriculture and Rural Life
Statement of Responsibility: Farming Systems Support Project (FSSP).
 Record Information
Source Institution: Marston Science Library, George A. Smathers Libraries, University of Florida
Holding Location: Florida Agricultural Experiment Station, Florida Cooperative Extension Service, Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, and the Engineering and Industrial Experiment Station; Institute for Food and Agricultural Services (IFAS), University of Florida
Rights Management: All rights reserved, Board of Trustees of the University of Florida
Resource Identifier: aleph - 001938060
oclc - 53295443
notis - AKB4194
lccn - 2003229213
System ID: UF00053841:00002

Table of Contents
        Page i
        Page ii
    Table of Contents
        Page iii
    Acronyms used in the text
        Page iv
        Page 1
        Page 2
        Page 3
    Background of project and HARP
        Page 4
        Page 5
        Page 6
        Page 7
    Establishment of HARP contract
        Page 8
        Page 9
        Page 10
        Page 11
        Page 12
        Page 13
        Page 14
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        Page 32
        Page 33
        Page 34
        Page 35
        Page 36
        Page 37
        Page 38
    Issues and recommendations
        Page 39
        Page 40
        Page 41
        Page 42
        Page 43
        Page 44
        Page 45
        Page 46
    Appendix A
        Page 47
        Page 48
        Page 49
    Appendix B
        Page 50
        Page 51
        Page 52
        Page 53
        Page 54
        Page 55
    Appendix C
        Page 56
Full Text



CID/NMSU CONTRACT 522-0139-C-00-2059

Evaluation Sponsored by
Farming Systems Support Project

Evaluation Team Members:
Dr. Art Hansen (anthropologist), University of Florida
Dr. Mason E. Marvel vegetablee crops specialist), Ayudamos
Dr. Vernon B. Cardwell (agronomist), University of Minnesota
Dr. Gustavo Arcia (agricultural economist), Research
Triangle Institute



CID/NMSU CONTRACT 522-0139-C-00-2059

Evaluation Sponsored by
Farming Systems Support Project

Evaluation Team Members:
Dr. Art Hansen (anthropologist), University of Florida
Dr. Mason E. Marvel vegetablee crops specialist), Ayudamos
Dr. Vernon B. Cardwell (agronomist), University of Minnesota
Dr. Gustavo Arcia (agricultural economist), Research
Triangle Institute


Acronyms .Used in the Text

I. Introduction
Objective of the Evaluation 1
Evaluation Team Methodology 2
Key Issues to be Addressed 2

II. Background of Project and HARP
Pre-Project Activities 4
Beginning of the Project 4
The 1981 Project Evaluation 5

III. Establishment of HARP Contract
Restriction to Yoro Valley 10
HARP Contract 10
Inclusion of CURLA Responsibilities 10
Subsequent Changes in Leadership and Scope 11
Hierarchical Ambiguity 11
Impact on Work Plans 13
Team Formation 14
Research Methodology 15
Administration 18

IV. Outputs
Entomology 19
Agricultural Economics 23
Weed Control 27
Soil Fertility 31
Dissemination 38

V. Issues and Recommendations
Commitment and Coordination 39
Scope of Work 40
Financial Security and Planning 41
Research Methodology 42
USAID Involvement in Agricultural Research 45
Reports 45
Secondary Recommendations 46

A 47
B 50
C 56


Govenmental Agencies

BIFAD Board for International Food and Agricultural
CATIE Centro Agronomico Tropical de Investigacion y
CIAT Centro Internacional de Agricultura Tropical
CID Consortium for International Development
CIMMYT Centro Internacional para el Mejoramiento de
Maize y Trigo
CIP Centro Internacional de la Papa
COP Chief of Party
CURLA Regional University Center for the Atlantic
DEA Department of Agricultural Extension
DIA Department of Agricultural Research
EAP Escuela Agricola Panamericana
FSSP Farming Systems Support Project
GOH Government of Honduras
HARP Honduras Agricultural Research Project
IADS International Agricultural Development
IARC International Agricultural Research Center
ICTA Instituto de Ciencia y Tecnologia Agricola
MRN Ministry of Natural Resources
NMSU New Mexico State University
PID Project Identification Document
PNIA National Agricultural Research Program
(now DIA)
PP Project Paper
RFTP Request for Technical Proposals
TDY Temporary Duty (short term)
UNAT National Unit for Technical Support
USAID United States Agency for International

Research Methodologies

FSR Farming Systems Research
OFR On-farm research (also called PFSR)
PFSR Pioneering Farming Systems Research (also


CEW Corn Ear Worm
FAW Fall Army Worm


The purpose of the Agricultural Research Project
(number 522-0139, hereafter called the Project) is to assist
the Government of Honduras to expand its agricultural
research service within the Ministry of Natural Resources
(Ministerio de Recursos Naturales or MRN) and make it more
responsive to the technological needs of small and medium
size independent and agrarian reform farmers. Grant funds
for a total of $1,900,000 were made available starting in
1978 to provide technical assistance and supplemental
logistical support. The National Agricultural Research
Program (Programa Nacional de Investigaciones Agricolas or
PNIA) had been largely oriented toward on-station and single
commodity research before 1977. At that time it began a
modest experiment in multidisciplinary farm-based research
in order to seek a more effective approach to understanding
farmer problems and to utilizing their on-station research
capabilities to help solve those problems. The USAID
Project was developed to strengthen and extend this new PNIA
approach. The Project was signed in October 1978.

In October 1982 USAID and the Consortium for
International Development (CID) signed an Agricultural
Research Contract (number 522-0139-C-00-2059-00, herafter
called the Contract) for the purpose of continuing the work
of the original Project. New Mexico State University (NMSU)
is the lead institution for CID in the Contract. A total of
$1,085,099 of grant funds remained from the original Project
budget, and this was the basis for the USAID financial
support for the Contract. Although envisioned in the
Request for Technical Proposals as a two year involvement,
the final Contract was for eighteen months (January 1983 -
July 1984). The work funded by this Contract is entitled
the Honduras Agricultural Research Project (HARP). The term
Project will be used in this evaluation only to refer to the
overarching Project that began in 1978, while HARP will be
used to refer to the present more limited work covered by
the Contract.

In September 1983 PNIA was renamed the Department of
Agricultural Research (Departmento de Investigaciones
Agricolas or DIA). This report will use only DIA (not PNIA)
in references.

Objective of the Evaluation

This evaluation is the first for the Contract but the
third of four scheduled for the Project. The first
evaluation was in February 1980, nineteen months after the
Project began and approximately midway through the

Page 2

anticipated life of the Project. The second evaluation
occurred fourteen months later in April 1981. This
evaluation takes place in January 1984, almost three years
after the preceding evaluation and only one year after the
Contract technical assistance team arrived in Honduras.

The objective of this evaluation is to assess the
achievements and weaknesses of HARP and the present
Contract, place them in perspective of the Project and the
current situation in Honduras, recommend whether the
Contract should be extended for another six months to
complete the originally scheduled two years, and recommend
corrective measures in order to more effectively utilize the
remaining time and funding.

Evaluation Team Methodology

A four person team was assembled by the USAID-funded
Farming Systems Support Project (FSSP) to conduct this
evaluation. The team spent one day at the University of
Florida, the lead institution for FSSP, being briefed on the
Project before leaving for Honduras, and the team spent
approximately one week in Honduras. An itenerary for the
team is included as Appendix A. In Tegucigalpa the team was
briefed by USAID/Honduras and officials from DIA and in San
Pdero Sula by HARP. The team also met with research and
extension staff, farmers and administrators in Region 2
(Comayagua), Region 3 (San Pedro, Guaymas and Yoro), and
Region 4 (La Ceiba and La Masica). A list of individuals and
agencies contacted appears as Appendix B. Background
documents were acquired at all these briefings, and a list
of these appears as Appendix C.

A preliminary report was presented twice in San Pdero
Sula to representatives of MRN (including the leadership of
DIA), USAID/Honduras, the entire HARP team, and other
interested agencies (see Appendix D). Their suggestions and
comments have been incorporated into the final report
wherever appropriate.

Key Issues to be Addressed

Some of the problems encountered in 1983-1984 by HARP
are not new and were listed in the earlier evaluations.
(Refer to those documents for details.) These problems
1) coordination difficulties when a national research
program is administered through decentralized
regional directorates, which control most of the
research budget;
2) personnel crises and rapid turnover of personnel

Page 3

because research personnel receive low salaries and
often encounter delays in reimbursements for travel
3) frictions between Honduran and expatriate
technicians; and
4) planning deficiencies caused by personnel turnover
and fiscal uncertainty.

Other problems have been generated as a result of the
present Contract. These received more attention in this
evaluation and are the bases for our recommendations. They
1) original flaws in Contract design and understanding
of how expatriate technical assistance personnel
would/could fit into the present DIA, including the
flaw of designing a farming systems research (FSR)
support project for only 18 or 24 months;
2) confusion concerning the organizational placement of
HARP in relation to DIA, USAID, and NMSU, which has
contributed to a feeling among the Hondurans inside
and outside HARP that it is not part of the
3) confusion concerning the mandate and goals for HARP,
which was complicated by the inclusion of
responsibilities for the University Center (Centro
Universitario Regional para el Litoral Atlantico or
CURLA) near La Ceiba;
4) divergent definitions of "farming systems research"
and "on farm research" and methodological arguments
which have contributed to the organizational
confusion and contributed to a structural opposition
between Honduran professionals and the NMSU staff of
5) planning difficulties due to the ambiguous
availability of other USAID funds for counterpart
salaries, to support increased in-service training,
and to extend HARP for six more months through
December 1984; and
6) divergent opinions on the focus of HARP (technical
support, research and training activities) during
the few (5 or 11 depending on the extension)
remaining months of the Contract.

Page 4


Pre-Project Activities

On-farm, systems-oriented, multidisciplinary research
began in Honduras in 1977, almost two years before this
Project was initiated. A Honduran plant pathologist
returned from postgraduate training to work in PNIA (now
DIA) and attracted to Honduras several colleagues in other
disciplines who had graduated with him. They had conducted
coordinated dissertation research in Mexico with CIMMYT as
an experiment in multidisciplinary agricultural education,
and in Honduras they established a new approach to
agricultural research. Together with other highly qualified
technicians they formed a multidiciplinary team and the
foundation of the Project.

There were difficulties at the beginning, some of which
continue until the present day. The creation and staffing of
a Central Unit for Technical Support (Unidad Nacional de
Apoyo Tecnico or UNAT) was one issue. Another was
opposition to the new approach by research staff who were
familiar with and identified with the earlier mode of
research. These researchers utilized another mode of on-farm
trials which were single commodity oriented, utilized
complex designs similar to those used on research stations,
and were intended to test ecological adaptability only
(usually focusing on varietal selection). This reflected an
earlier mode of research at CIMMYT and showed how conflicts
among national researchers may reflect historic in what they
were taught by outsiders. It also expresses the continuing
strong influence in Honduras of CIMMYT and other regional or
international research centers.

Beginning of the Project

A report entitled Agricultural Research in Honduras was
prepared in January 1978 by DIA staff with collaboration
from IADS. This report identified four basic factors or
elements of strategy that needed attention in order to
strengthen DIA and increase DIA's impact on farmers' yields
and national -production. The four were:
1) a farmer-focused, integrated multidisciplinary
approach to research and technology transfer;
2) a strong national experiment station network;
3) manpower development; and
4) closer linkages with domestic and external

Page 5

This report was the foundation for designing the
Project which was approved in August 1978. The Project
focused on institutionalizing the approach noted in the
above paragraph and developing a long-term national research
strategy, while other donors were to focus on strengthening
the agricultural research stations, including infrastructure
and long-term training. The specific objective of the
Project was to establish multidisciplinary, on-farm,
systems-oriented research teams in all seven regions of
Honduras, with some assistance also being provided to a
small farmer technologies program. USAID funds were
primarily for long and short-term technical assistance with
smaller funding being provided for participant and
in-service training, vehicles and equipment, etc. The
Honduran government funds supported counterpart personnel,

During 1979 and 1980 the Project was quite successful,
and the DIA developed in many ways. Several important
documents describe organizational and functional changes in
DIA and directions in which the research establishment was
heading: Documento Basico (1979), Guia Metodologica para
Conduccion de Ensayos de Finca (1979), and Funcionamieto del
Program Nacional de Investigacion Agropecuaria y su
Integracion en un Sistema Tecnologico (1980). This last
report continues to be used as a fundamental statement of
where agricultural research should be heading in Honduras.
The first evaluation of the Project was also conducted in
early 1980 (February) when the Project was seen to be
continuing quite successfully.

The 1981 Project Evaluation

This picture had changed by the end of 1980. The
Honduran and expatriate professionals who had been key
personnel in the introduction of the new mode of research
had left or were leaving, and they were not being replaced
by people with the same commitment. Political and economic
developments in Honduras made it difficult to continue;
there were drastic cuts in DIA's budget for operating
expenses; and there was little indication that the national
government supported the research program.

The April 1981 evaluation addressed these issues while
recogizing the significant progress that had been made in
several areas by the DIA with its Project (and other)
support. Five major recommendations were made by the
evaluation team.

The five recommendations were based on the assumption
that the Government of Honduras (GOH) was committed to
allocate enough resources to MRN to enable it to conduct

Page 6

effective agricultural research. Sufficient resources would
allow DIA to increase the number of direct hire contracted
professional positions to at least 78. GOH commitment would
also be demonstrated by developing and approving a longer
term plan of action for DIA and by signing personnel
contracts. The evaluation team pointed out that decisions
on their recommendations had to be made then (1981) in order
to maintain the momentum of the research in progress. The
five recommendations were as follows:

1) Project funds should be used to provide logistical
support to on-farm researchers. These Project funds would
complement not replace DIA commitments. Therefore, the
upper limit of logistical support would be the amount
committed by DIA.

2) Project funds should also be used to contract
long-term technical assistance personnel for UNAT. UNAT
needed to be reorganized. At least six disciplines should
be represented, including plant pathology, entomology,
agricultural economics, biometrics, soil management and weed
control. Honduran technicians should receive preference in
filling these positions, but expatriates should be hired if
Hondurans were not available. The salaries for Honduran and
non-Honduran personnel should be comparable, based of course
on training and experience. This technical assistance
needed to be supported so Project funds should complement
(not exceed) GOH contributions for logistical support, and
vehicles and equipment needed to be procured. These UNAT
technicians should prepare an in-service training program,
and Project funds should be used to cover the entire cost of
the training program.

3) Some laboratory equipment should be purchased for
plant breeders. The rice and maize breeders at Guaymas
Research Station were noted as an example since their lack
of equipment impeded their work.' Short term technical
assistance would be needed to identify the equipment needed.

4) Short-term technical assistance personnel should be
hired to assist DIA in developing new computer programs and
in acquiring appropriate computer equipment. The plant
breeders at San Pedro Sula were already using a
microcomputer but needed some technical assistance. In
addition, computer facilities should be established in
Region 2 (Comayagua), and this also required technical

5) DIA should be required by MRN to prepare better
plans by the end of August 1981, and long-term technical
assistance personnel should be brought in to design a
planning system and help prepare long, medium and short term
plans. It was noted that the easiest way to get that
technical assistance might be through subcontracting an
international center such as CATIE, CIMMYT or CIAT.

Page 7

The second recommendation was emphasized above because
it was the basis for the present HARP Contract. Long term
technical assistance was needed for a strengthened and
reorganized UNAT'. Those technical advisors needed Project
funding for their salaries, logisical support, equipment and
vehicles as well as for an intensive in-service training

It is significant that the recommendation specifically
noted the preference that well-qualified Hondurans be hired
as the technical assistance personnel. If there was to be a
mix of Hondurans and expatriates then salaries should be
comparable, based on training and experience. These
guidelines were included because there was a documented
history of DIA reluctance to contract expatriate advisors.

The documented problem in dealing with expatriate
advisors helps explain some of HARP's difficulties during
1983. The evaluation noted that the reluctance stemmed from
administrative problems which make planning for and
supervising technical assistance difficult and from a sense
of jealousy over the disparity in salaries between
expatriates and national employees. Two advisors, noted the
evaluation, left the Project prior to completion of their
contracts and cited administrative problems, poor management
of their work, and personal conflicts with Honduran
counterparts as the reasons for early termination. A third
advisor's work was delayed in starting for months because
the DIA administration was unable to coordinate his field

The evaluation noted that Honduran government employees
and contractors were paid little and sporadically, and that
this lay behind their jealousy. Until conditions were such
that a reasonable number of well-qualified Honduran research
professionals felt secure in their own long term commitments
to the research program, the evaluation team thought that
research planning and results would be largely ineffective.

Fundamentally the evaluation pointed to the degree of
commitment by GOH to the MNR and DIA. Commitment translates
into adequate and stable funding. That funding improves
professional salaries, permits long term planning, lowers
the turnover of personnel and facilitates the interaction of
Honduran and expatriate advisors. The evaluation team did
not find that commitment.

Page 8


HARP was designed and implemented in a series of
ill-coordinated stages. The first stage was the 1981
evaluation described above. The second stage was the USAID
Request for Technical Assistance (RFTP) and the CID/NMSU
response. The third stage was a change in scope initiated
by DIA. The fourth stage was the Contract itself. The
fifth stage was a USAID-initiated change in scope after the
CID/NMSU team arrived in Honduras, and the sixth stage was a
subsequent series of DIA-initiated changes in scope of work.

The RFTP was issued by USAID in March 1982, a year
after the 1981 evaluation. The RFTP clearly saw this
Contract as a continuation of the Project and a response to
needs pointed out in the 1981 evaluation. Four long term
(two years each) technical assistance advisors were needed
and four short term (two months each). The long term
advisors were being contracted as part of the UNAT which was
to be reorganized. Individual members of UNAT, including
Hondurans, would be placed in specific regions where their
skills were most needed, but all members would meet
regularly as a unit (UNAT) to deal with problems on a
national level, plan for the training needs of DIA
personnel, and advise the DIA director on program

Long Term Advisors Short Term Areas
1. Weed Control Specialist 1. Research Station Management
2. Agricultural Economist 2. Statistics
3. Entomologist 3. Communications
4. Soil Fertility Specialist 4. Germplasm Conservation

These long term advisors were not specifically
identified as the core of UNAT since the RFTP noted that
Hondurans (of whatever professional level) would also be
part of UNAT, but a significant change had occurred between
the 1981 evaluation and the 1982 RFTP. The evaluation
expressed a preference that Hondurans be hired for UNAT
using Project funds. This was expressed clearly in the
evaluation summary which condensed the second recommendation
to read as follows:
to reorganize the Technical Support Unit of
the Project, utilizing A.I.D. grant funds to
contract highly-qualified Honduran

The RFTP was not requesting Honduran professionals and was,
due to the usual RFTP distribution and response channels,
essentially stating that these four key professionals were to be
expatriates. Four expatriate professionals as a Contract team

Page 9

with its Chief of Party and supporting funds and short term
advisors will, in most cases, form an independent unit. That
unit negotiates with other units but is not easily incorporated
or digested unless the other unit is well organized and very
dynamic. UNAT itself was no longer a functioning unit and needed
organization and staffing, so UNAT was not going to digest the
Contract team. The most probable structural outcome would be
that the Contract team would be the core and effective leadership
of UNAT, and Honduran professionals in UNAT would come to be
counterparts or secondary.

This probable outcome is not clearly recognized in the RFTP
which implies that Contract advisors were to form part of a
larger (Honduran and expatriate) multidisciplinary UNAT.
Leadership of UNAT, whether Honduran or expatriate, was never
mentioned. DIA itself suffers from a lack of funding, planning
and staffing continuity, as noted in the 1981 evaluation, so
another question is whether DIA itself could easily digest the
Contract team. In any event the RFTP set up a large,
independent, expatriate unit within DIA. DIA leadership
apparently objected to the change from Honduran to expatriate
technical advisors so the change was obviously initiated by
USAID. It is not clear in 1984 whether it was appreciated in
1981-1982 that the personnel change meant a change in UNAT
leadership (Honduran to expatriate) and continuing structural

Another shortcoming in the RFTP is its short life (two
years). The Project was seen as a longer term response. The 1981
evaluation again reiterated needs for long term planning and long
term stability and training for Honduran personnel. Instead of
addressing these fundamental long term issues the RFTP utilized
unused Project funds in a short term response to a specified need
in the evaluation for technical assistance. USAID perceived this
two year contract as part of a longer term effort (the Project)
beginning in 1978. Although this is formally true, the RFTP
called for a new administrative institution which needed to hire
new people as advisors who then needed to acquaint themselves
with the Honduran environment and their co-workers before
starting serious work. As individuals and as a multidisciplinary
team the new expatriates and the Hondurans who welcome them must
take some time learning about and adjusting to each other and
formulating work plans.

Two years are too short for effective technical assistance
work of this kind, especially when the combined UNAT is supposed
to be planning and advising about farming systems research, an
evolving approach to smallholder research and extension. When
technical advisors have clear, discrete, technically specific
tasks to perform, they may be able to accomplish this in a short
time. More time is needed when these advisors are involved in
institution-building and multidisciplinary team activities which
involve group planning and leadership.

CID/NMSU was one of the U.S.A. institutions which responded

Page 10

to the RFTP, and in mid 1982 they were selected by USAID and the
Honduran government to administer the Contract. This part of the
process operated smoothly.

Restriction to Yoro Valley

Another important shift occurred even before the Contract
was signed. DIA requested that the expatriate team focus or
restrict their activities to the Yoro Valley in Region 3 (San
Pedro). Instead of operating at a national level as advisors and
trainers, the CID/NMSU team and their Honduran counterparts were
to be a regional (or valley) multidisciplinary team. The reasons
for this change are not clear. The perceived importance of
developing the Yoro Valley may have been primary; dissatisfaction
with the expatriate nature of the team may have been important.
In any event, this was only the first of several DIA-initiated
changes, which reflects the practical impact of the absence of
good long term planning. This change was not reflected in the

At some time in 1982 another change occurred, although this
is also not recorded in the Contract. The usual dynamics of
technical assistance projects operated in changing the
residential locations of the expatriate advisors so that they all
lived in San Pedro Sula. Contract advisors were expected in the
RFTP to work part or most of the time as individual specialists
supporting designated DIA technical programs and only part of the
time (on a regular basis) as members of an integrated UNAT team.
One of the advisors was to live in San Pedro Sula, two in either
San Pedro or La Ceiba, and one in either San Pedro or Danli.
Expatriates who are contracted together from a single sponsoring
organization usually prefer to live together, if it is all
possible. In this way they provide each other mutual support,
both professionally and personally, and increase their ease of
access to contracted resources. The formation of a team as a
unit (whether Honduran or expatriate) is much easier with common
residence, as is the administration of the Contract.

HARP Contract

The major change in the Contract, which was signed in
October 1982, was a reduction in time to 18 months due to
insufficient USAID funding. Although there was apparently a
strong indication at that time that more funds would become
available later to extend the Contract to the original 24 months,
this was an early indication of the continuing funding
difficulties encountered by HARP. If two years are too short, 18
months is a ridiculously short time for such assistance.

Inclusion of CURLA Responsibilities

Upon arrival in Honduras in January 1983 the CID/NMSU staff
was confronted with another USAID-instituted change. They were
to devote ten percent of their time to technical support and

Page 11

teaching at the Centro Universitario Regional del Litoral
Atlantico (CURLA) in La Ceiba (Region 4). There is no indication
that this change was discussed with or agreed to by DIA.

This change was significant in two ways. One, the
hierarchical position of HARP was totally confused. If HARP were
a joint USAID-MRN endeavor, then how could HARP be assigned by
USAID to work outside of MRN? CURLA falls under another
Ministry. How could USAID unilaterally change the mandate of
UNAT (or a major component of it)? What power or authority does
DIA have here? The second point concerns time and energy. A too
short contract was intentionally cut even more by assigning 10%
of staff time to other responsibilities. It commonly occurs that
available technical personnel are asked to add on other tasks.
These requests need to be balanced against the priorities
assigned to existing program responsibilities and the
availability of surplus time. Who was safeguarding DIA and HARP

Subsequent Changes in Leadership and Scope

During the first months of 1983 the CID/NMSU staff were
orienting themselves. The Honduran staff, now defined as
one-on-one counterparts to the CID/NMSU staff, were being hired
and were moving to San Pedro. The DIA director resigned to take
the counterpart position of agricultural economist, and after a
few weeks of interim leadership a new director took office in
April. (He continued in office during the evaluation.) The
former DIA director became the Assistant Chief of Party for HARP
and head of the Honduran team.

Several changes in the HARP scope of work also occurred
during these early months. First, the scope was changed back to
the original national level in which HARP personnel would provide
technical support to existing multidisciplinary teams in Olancho,
Danli, Choluteca and La Ceiba, as well as working directly in the
Yoro Valley and CURLA. Then the scope was restricted once again
to a focus on several sites in two northern regions (3 and 4).
The sites were: Yoro Valley, Cuyamel, La Masica, the Guaymas
Agricultural Research Station and CURLA. This has been amended
subsequently to include some responsibility for a national
training program.

Hierarchical Ambiguity

This Contract has suffered through too many changes of
direction. The reasons for these changes are not clear but many
of the consequences are. One major consequence is that many
Hondurans remain confused about the goals and status of HARP.
The evaluation team was asked by DIA and MRN officials at
national, regional and local levels to explain to them how HARP
related to DIA. Any clear mandate and status were lost in the
shuffling of HARP from part of UNAT, national level, to regional
and CURLA responsibilities, and back and forth again.

Page 12

The .1981 evaluation was congruent with the original Project.
Those five recommendations in 1981 grew from the understanding
that Hondurans were evolving a better method of
smallholder-oriented agricultural research, and it made sense for
USAID to support and encourage that evolution. Major technical,
economic and sociopolitical problem areas were also identified,
and it was recognized that long term institution-building
solutions were needed, and that critical commitments from GOH
were needed for any significant progress.

That recognition was lost by the time the RFTP was written.
The stress on GOH commitment was absent, as was the stress on
Honduran professional leadership. Subsequent changes recognize
this. The real thrust of the Project was to institutionalize
better methods of agricultural research. To institutionalize
methods means to make them part of the normal, ongoing routine.
Part of that process was institutionalizing UNAT, making that
specialized technical support and training unit part.of the
regular DIA bureaucracy so that it continued as part of MRN after
Project assistance ended. Honduran technical leadership and GOH
funding commitments are essential for institutionalization to

The HARP Contract deviates from that primary Project
direction. The Contract provides short term (18 months)
expatriate technical assistance with Honduran counterparts to
expatriate technical leadership. Other USAID contracts or
possible projects, such as the autonomous research institute, may
continue part of the Project emphases, but this Contract does
not. The clear connection between UNAT and the HARP Contract
team of seven or eight professionals has been lost. None of the
HARP professionals occupy regular DIA line positions. There are
no institutionalized positions so no one is really counterparting
anyone. Counterparting refers to the situation where one person
has a regular position and is advised by someone. In HARP no one
has a regular position: all are paid, directly or indirectly, by
USAID, and none have established DIA jobs.

UNAT does not really exist except on paper, so there is no
obvious bureaucratic home for HARP. Although HARP works and is
housed in region 3 (San Pedro Sula) it does not answer to the
authority of the MRN Regional Director. Although HARP is
apparently an MRN group it works semi-autonomously, publishes
reports that do not credit MRN or DIA as a sponsor, deals with
non-MRN institutions such as CURLA, and even has a strong
international connection through NMSU's multiple relationships
with Honduras.

Closely related to the issue of hierarchical position is the
issue of coordination. As far as the MRN Regional Director for
San Pedro Sula is concerned, HARP was sent to the region with no
advance notice and no additional budgetary provisions for
counterparts and office space. Moreover, in terms of
coordination, the Director feels that despite the good personal

Page 13

relations that he has with HARP staff, and in particular with the
Chief of Party, a great deal of HARP activities have been
coordinated at the national level without prior consultation with
the Regional Office. This is considered a problem since the
Regional Office is, after all, in charge of implementing-
activities in the area. Again, the answer to this problem lies
in the proper definition of where HARP fits and to whom it is

This is complicated even more by NMSU's control over the
HARP Contract. NMSU has established a strong long term interest
in Honduras and expects a great deal of local assistance from
CID/NMSU HARP personnel (especially the Chief of Party) in
facilitating that interest, particularly by hosting and
transporting delegations from NMSU when they visit Honduras.
Administrative directions from NMSU also delayed the proper
transmission of quarterly reports in Spanish to DIA. The reports
had to be written first in English and cleared by the NMSU
Project Director before they could be translated and released in

This absence of clear lines of command jurisdiction and
mandate almost always results in dissatisfaction and frustration.
Bureaucratic superiors at national and regional levels are
frustrated since they cannot direct resources they supposedly
control. Observers at all levels attribute responsibilities and
resources to such a Contract team (whether or not they actually
are true) and criticize the team if these expectations are not
met. The net result of this undefined activity has been an
expressed dissatisfaction on the part of MRN, the primary client
of HARP, with the work done by HARP thus far. It is clear that,
even in the short run, the issue of HARP's position within DIA
and relative to the regions must be resolved.

Impact on Work Plans

The series of design changes has had a detrimental impact on
the HARP team's work in Honduras. First of all, the changes
delayed and consequently fragmented the drafting of work plans.
Second, the formation of an integrated team of Hondurans and
expatriates was delayed and impeded. Third, the question of
research methodology and assignment of leadership responsibility
for modifying the accepted methods was never settled. Fourth,
the work of administering the Contract was made more frustrating
and time-consuming with a consequent diversion of the scarce time
of technical assistance personnel away from technical duties
towards administrative duties.

One of the first responsibilities of any technical
assistance person is to draft and receive approval of work plans.
These plans set out the purpose of assistance and a schedule of
events. Approval of these by all of the sponsors and superiors
clarifies what duties are expected and serves as a guideline for
all involved. HARP team members originally tried to prepare a

Page 14

work plan for the life of the Contract (18 or 24 months), but the
plan was not accepted. Pressed by time because the team wanted
to get trials in the ground, the team decided to submit more
limited work plans that only covered the first (primera) cropping
season of 1983. The primera plan was accepted, and work began.
The next work plan only covered the second (postrera) cropping
season, and now the team is finishing the preparation of a work
plan to carry them through the expected end of Contract in 1984.

The HARP team's desire to get to work is understandable and
commendable. All of the team members are energetic and concerned
about working in the field. They were pressed by time since the
Contract was too short, the comprehensive work plan had been
rejected, and the time to plant for primera was approaching, so
they compromised by preparing a work plan limited to the primera
season. That was a mistake.

Without faulting the team members' energy and desire to get
working, that was the time to wait until all of the sponsors and
team members agreed on a comprehensive plan. The sponsors
(USAID, DIA and CID/NMSU) should have insisted that they reach
some agreement about what the HARP team was supposed to do in
Honduras during the 18 months of the Contract. Accepting
piecemeal plans (season by season) postponed indefinitely the
need for sponsors and team to reach some agreement on the purpose
and utility of this Contract.

The Project is an institution-building one. The 1981
evaluation recognized one of the major faults of DIA was in
planning. Planning problems are apparent in the several
DIA-initiated shifts of direction for the Contract and in the
failure to coordinate better with the MRN Regional Director
before the HARP team arrived in San Pedro. The Contract
cooperated in a planning failure when short term work plans were
prepared and used as the basis for beginning field work.
Questions of purpose, leadership and lines of authority should
been settled then. The issue of whether or not HARP was UNAT
needed to be determined since this affected allocation of time to
research, technical support, training and planning.

Team Formation

NMSU is to be commended for rapidly fielding a technically
well-qualified team, three of whom were noted in the original
CID/NMSU response to RFTP. The Contract was signed in October
1982, and the CID/NMSU team arrived in January 1983. Honduran
team members were then hired in early 1983 so that the complement
of eight professionals (two in each of four technical
specialties) was filled in reasonably good time.

Team formation, the melding of.these eight individuals into a
coordinated team, has not gone as smoothly as team hiring. In
general, team members express mutual respect for each other's
technical competence, and there is easy interaction among
members. The problems appear to stem from the general ambiguity

Page 15

about HARP's purpose and function, financial difficulties
encountered by Honduran team members, and disagreements about.
research methodology.

Some disagreement and discord are to be expected in any team
of eight professionals, but they are more easily managed
(sometimes more successfully than others) if the team has an
understood and agreed purpose and work plan. The ill coordinated
design and implementation of this Contract, including the failure
to reach an agreement on an 18 month work plan, hampered team
formation and left too much room for individual interpretations
and disagreements, particularly concerning HARP's role in
modifying customary patterns of research.

Money for salaries and travel reimbursements for all HARP
personnel comes from USAID. The CID/NMSU personnel receive their
monies directly from NMSU which receives it from USAID. The
Honduran personnel receive their monies directly from DIA which
receives it from MRN which receives it from the Finance Ministry
which receives it from USAID. CID/NMSU personnel have had no
problems in getting paid, whereas Honduran personnel have faced
consistent delays of several months in receiving their salaries,
have never received any reimbursement for travel expenses, and
were informed in late January 1984 there was no more money for
their salaries. The USAID Honduras Mission assured the
evaluation team that sufficient funds had been transferred to GOH
and that any problems were internal to GOH.

These financial concerns preoccupy the Hondurans in HARP,
require a lot of administrative attention by the Hondurans and by
the Chief of Party, and inhibit or preclude the Hondurans'
willingness to incur travel costs. Not only does this
differential willingness to travel separate the team but the
differential treatment given to Hondurans and non-Hondurans
creates and accentuates a division along nationalistic lines.
This is an old problem noted in the 1981 evaluation, and it
reflects a continuing lack of commitment to DIA by GOH. The
Contract cannot support a team that is separated between
expatriates who receive salaries and Hondurans who do not. This
is diametrically opposed to the major purpose and thrust of the
Project that gave rise to this Contract.

Research Methodology

Honduras and Hondurans have been pioneers in establishing
and developing a research methodology that is now being called
farming systems research (FSR). The basic purpose of this new
approach is to make research more productive in actually changing
farmers' production practices. Its basic idea is that research
that remains on stations because it does not work for farmers is
an expensive luxury that many countries cannot afford.

The original Project was to support Honduras' pioneering
efforts in developing this more effective research methodology,

Page 16

and anyone who worked in DIA (then PNIA) before 1977 may attest
to the changes that have occurred since then. This Contract was
to continue the evolution of a more effective set of methods by
providing technical support to existing regional teams, by
upgrading the technical levels of DIA staff through in-service
training, and by participating in planning.

Although there is now a.growing literature about FSR and a
growing consensus about how to define it, the pioneers
(scientists and programs) were working before that. Their work
emphasized moving trials away from research stations and onto
farmers' fields because stations were special environments, and
treatments and varieties that worked best on stations may not
have been the best on farmers' fields. The pioneering work also
emphasized basic food crops because cultivation of these crops
was the primary concern of most farmers; this meant a change from
the earlier stress on export crops. Pioneers in FSR were
concerned that farmers adopt research recommendations. For
adoption to occur the recommended technologies had to be
appropriate and profitable in some sense. In order to improve
their understanding of what was appropriate, these pioneers
emphasized multidisciplinary cooperation among technical and
social scientists and increased communication among researchers,
extensionists and farmers.

These general concerns and emphases in pioneering FSR
situations were constrained by practical institutional issues.
How could changes be made in existing national (and
international) research units? As in any institutional process,
theoretical and practical proposals for changes were adapted to
the particular country, locality and/or agency. This
evolutionary process of changing research methodology preceded
further and faster in some countries than in others, and the
emerging research institutions varied from one country to

Honduras was one of the pioneering countries in the 1970s in
evolving its indigenous form of FSR, and the DIA focus reflects
that pioneering work: on-farm (not just on-station),
multidisciplinary research on basic grains using farmer surveys
(sondeos) as guidelines. As in any field of research, scientists
are always searching for better methods. For example, the Enlace
Tecnologico (Technological Coordination) program from Olancho has
been recommended for adoption throughout the country because MRN
thinks this will improve its work. In Honduras as in all other
countries, agricultural and social scientists are aware that
their established methods may need improving, but everyone
working in Honduras must recognize the major changes that have
already occurred in the last decade.

Honduran citizens have taken some of the leadership
positions in initiating and directing these changes in research
methodology. In Honduras as in all countries, however, there are
great practical advantages to admixing expatriate and national
scientific talents. In the U.S.A., a country noted for its

Page 17

agricultural sciences and universities, there are also many
expatriate scientists at work, and their talents and
contributions are appreciated.

The questions and disagreements concerning HARP and FSR
appear to center on the degree of leadership that CID/NMSU staff
are supposed to exercise and on whether and how much the existing
DIA methodology needs to be revised. The existing Honduran
methodology will be called Pioneering FSR (or PFSR) in this
report to distinguish it from the FSR methodology described in
current literature.

The CID/NMSU team obviously believes that it was contracted
by USAID and DIA to provide technical leadership as well as
support, and the CID/NMSU agricultural economist (rather than the
team as a whole) was primarily responsible for providing that
leadership. At the same time that team believes that there are
serious weaknesses in PFSR (which HARP reports refer to as
on-farm research or OFR), and it should be replaced by FSR.
These beliefs are well documented in work plans and quarterly

Any DIA position on this issue is not documented in reports
but only in actions. Obviously there is a strong resistance on
the part of Hondurans in DIA, including at least the majority of
those employed by HARP, to CID/NMSU assuming the leadership in
implementing FSR and modifying PFSR. There appears to be a
similarly strong resistance to any modification of PFSR but this
is not as clear (note the Enlace modification) and is muddled by
the leadership controversy.

Once again the planning failure by USAID, DIA and CID/NMSU
to clarify the design and mandate of -HARP in the beginning
continues to confuse the operation of this Contract. The
Contract does not specify any leadership in defining or
instituting FSR; it requests support and guidance from CID/NMSU
professionals as part of a larger UNAT. Although in fact HARP is
UNAT, and CID/NMSU leads HARP, another fact is that DIA has
consistently attempted to maintain and assert Honduran
leadership. It is quite possible that DIA-initiated changes in
the scope of work for HARP were designed to thwart what DIA
leadership saw as undesirable CID/NMSU leadership.

These professional disagreements over methodology have been
personified by the agricultural economists since the CID/NMSU
economist was the one responsible for initiating FSR and the
Honduran economist headed the Honduran team (and was previously
the National Director of DIA). These disagreements over PFSR-FSR
were primarily responsible for the USAID decision not to renew
the Honduran economists' work contract when it expired at the end
of December 1983, and the dissatisfaction over this PFSR-FSR
issue apparently led to the departure from Honduras of the
CID/NMSU economist at approximately the same time.

The disagreements are more fundamental than simply

Page 18

personality conflicts (though they may have been a factor) as
demonstrated by the fact that the disagreement and opposition of
Honduran and CID/NMSU team members continue even though the two
original economists have departed.


Even in the best of circumstances the Chief of Party (COP)
has to devote a lot of time to administrative duties. These
responsibilities bleed time and energy away from the technical
assignments that provide the terms of reference under which the
COP is recruited and hired. In this case additional
complications, confusions and distance from the capital city
greatly expanded the administrative tasks.

Although the COP was supposed to function as an
entomologist, he estimates that 75 percent of his time has been
spent on administration, and approximately 50 percent of the
CID/NMSU economist' time was similarly occupied. The evaluation
team did not estimate the amount of time spent by the Assistant
COP (the Honduran agricultural economist) or other team members
on HARP administrative matters.

The administration of this Contract has been made more
difficult and time-consuming by the series of changes in Contract
design and scope of work, by the continuing disagreements over
research methodology, and by the other continuing problems of
Honduran salaries and reimbursements, etc., referred to earlier
in this report. Additional administrative burdens have been
placed upon the COP in this Contract because of an extensive flow
of visitors from NMSU to Honduras. This is a complex issue
because NMSU's large scale involvement in Honduras, particularly
with HARP and with CURLA, works to the benefit of Honduras in
many ways. Focusing specifically upon administrative
responsibilities of CID/NMSU HARP personnel, however, the
flow of visitors means there is a diversion of scarce time away
from their specific HARP technical responsibilities.

This final comment is general and not meant to apply
specifically to this Contract. Any evaluation has to take into
account the necessary preoccupation with administration. It is
surprising that USAID contracts do not recognize the essential
importance of administration and automatically provide for
administrative assistance or specifically set out terms of
reference for the COP. This Contract like many others only
requests technical people for technical work as if COP
responsibilities were inconsequential. In many instances this
results in a COP assuming that the technical work is what counts
and trying to minimize administrative tasks. In other instances
this results in a technically qualified COP who does not really
have the necessary administrative skills or experience.

Page 19


Outputs are reported by individual discipline as well
as for CURLA and dissemination separately. The Contract
states individual responsibilities but none for the team as
a unit nor for RSR. This is covered to some extent by
requesting that the final report of the Contract delineate
accomplishments in terms of the objectives of the Project.


1. HARP personnel who are involved with this activity
Dr. Charles Ward, Ph.D. (CID Entomologist) and
Ing. Norberto Urbina, M.S. (Honduran Entomologist).

2. Specific responsibilities are stated in the
USAID/CID Contract as:
(a) Evaluate with DIA personnel on a national
basis the pests that reduce crop production
and establish methods for their control.
(b) Plan, program, and carry out with DIA research
activities designed to provide pest control
(c) Analyze and publish research results.
(d) Train DIA personnel in entomological research.
(e) Participate in meetings, workshops, and
seminars that benefit the program.

3. CURLA activities were added to those specific
responsibilities mandated in the Contract. The following
additional activities in entomology were added by USAID
(a) Assist with the formation of an insect
reference collection with the participation of
one or two taxonomists.
(b) Cooperate in the design of research on the
identification of the principal parasites of
Spodoptera frugiperda (FAW) and Heliothis zea
(CEW) and the effect of weed control on
parasite populations.
(c) Help plan cooperative research projects
between MRN and CURLA.
(d) Help establish a cooperative agreement between
the Ministry Department of Plant Protection
and the entomology section of CURLA.
(e) Assist with the revision and amplification of
the entomology equipment list being ordered
through USAID.

4. Locations of research, teaching, and extension:
(a) Guaymas Experiment Station

Page 20

(b) Yoro Valley
(c) Cuyamel
(d) La Masica
(e) La Ceiba

5. Scope of activities carried out:
(a) Guaymas Experiment Station
Initial work was begun with monitoring for Fall
Army Worm (FAW) and Corn Ear Worm (CEW) with pheromone traps
and developing monitoring techniques for the major pests on
corn and rice. Helped ip developing a reference collection
of identified pests and beneficial arthropods. Began to
develop economic threshold data and control measures on
major pests where these data were not available. Cooperated
in evaluation of entomological aspects of FSR.
Entomological research reported as being started at this
experiment station included 3 rice experiments. Pheromone
traps were installed to collect population data on FAW and

(b) Yoro Valley
On-farm tests in the primera season in Yoro only
involved 3 soil insect control experiments in corn, 1 bean
slug insect control experiment, 2 bean unreplicated trials,
and surveys to determine insects present on corn and beans
and to design experiments to test control measures.
Pheromone traps were set up for FAW and CEW.
Corn plantings continued to be monitored during
the second planting period to determine pests in the field
and post harvest losses to determine the need for research
on corn drying and metal bin storage. Major pests of beans
were determined to be slugs, leaf hoppers, white flies, and
bean weevils.

(c) Cuyamel
In Cuyamel problems of stored grain pests in
seed rice caused plant stand problems in the field. Soil
pests were also reported. A survey was initiated to
determine pests involved. Pheromone traps for FAW and CEW
were set up. Late season pests were stem borers, either the
white rice stem borer or the sugar cane borer.

(d) La Masica
This area produces mostly rice and corn. Pest
problems appear to be the same as in Cuyamel, so no
experiments were conducted there during the early season.
Pheromone traps for FAW and CEW were placed.

Several activities were initiated with CURLA
entomologists during the first quarter to identify their
needs. These activities included the items listed in the
work plan.
(1) Assisted in developing a new equipment list

Page 21

of materials needed for an entomological museum. Arranged
for an-Insect Taxonomist to come for one month to help
organize the initial stages of the museum.
(2) A field study and plots were planted to
study. principall parasites on Fall Army Worm (FAW) and Corn
Ear Worm (CEW) and to study effects of weeds in corn on
parasi.te populations.
(3) Planned cooperative studies with MRN on-farm
research and Sanidad, including preliminary surveys for
othezparasites of FAW and CEW as well as pheromone trapping
studi g of regional levels of these pests.
(4) Set up and conducted a graduate student
study -to determine the efficiency of pheromone traps to
predict larval populations of FAW and CEW which included a
literature search and acquisition of supplies.
(5) Assisted in the purchase of the insect and
book collection of the late Dr. Mankins for a 10-20 year
loan to. the Smithsonian Institute for safe keeping.

(f) Training
An Integrated Pest Management short course was
held in September 5-9, 1983 in Comayagua, organized jointly
by DIA and DEA (extension) for MRN research and extension
workg&5: 19 people attended.

6-, Summary and Evaluation:
HARP has taken on a very ambitious program in
,en-toew-ogical research and extension and has begun work on
seveal- lines of research in several areas of the country.
This- was attempted in spite of the limited duration of this
contract. The NMSU/HARP Chief of Party was also the only
Ph.D.1*ntomologist and was chiefly responsible for the
entomological research. His best estimate is that 75
percent of his time has been utilized in administration and
an additional 10% in CURLA activities, which leaves only 15
percent of his time to devote to HARP research. The
Honduran counterpart is a well trained, experienced research
worker.-with a M.S. degree who is capable of doing good
reseicqh with proper support.
The plan was to have ten field experiments and four
pheroitrQne trap monitoring locations. Because of demands on
the QCbief of Party's time for other activities during the
period .and a lack of materials and adequate help, fewer
experiments should have been started. Only four of the ten
planneA experiments were actually conducted. Of the four
phermo.ne trap sites only three were successfully conducted.
Soil insect control experiments on corn were successful with
90 percent stand increase in test treatments. This
information should be extended to farmers.

7. Recommendations:
(a) More time should be devoted to field research
by both entomologists.
(b) Experiments should be simpler, easier to
manage, executed to give quick and applicable

Page 22

results with focus on the most serious pest
(c) More time must be spent on training Honduran
workers to leave a competent staff in MRN and
to minimize mistakes and failures at the farm
(d) Survey and identification of other pests and
their importance and control, i.e., viruses,
fungal and bacterial diseases, nematodes,
rodents and birds.

Page 23

Agricultural economics

1. HARP personnel who are involved with this activity

Dr. Wilmer.Harper, Ph.D. (CID Agricultural Economist)
Ing. Antonio Silva, M.S. (Honduran Agricultural Economist)
Dr. Michael Bertelsen, Ph.D. (CID Agricultural Economist)

Both Dr. Harper and Ing. Silva left HARP at the end of December
1983, and only Dr. Bertelsen was in this section during the time of
the evaluation. Rapid personnel turnover has been a continuing
constraint to DIA effectiveness and is regrettable in any technical
assistance contract.

2. Specific responsibilities are stated in the USAID/CID
Contract as:

(a) Identify research priorities through the economic
analysis of selected regions;
(b) Cooperate with and train DIA researchers in relevant
economic methods;
(c) Develop, in cooperation with DIA personnel, a methodology
for the testing of new technologies;
(d) Evaluate and publish the potential economic impact of
promising technologies;
(e) Develop training programs for DIA personnel; and
(f) Participate in meetings, workshops, and seminars which
may benefit the program.

3. The CID/NMSU economist anticipated other activities as noted
in the Technical Proposal that CID/NMSU sent in response to
the RFTP and in 1983 work plans:

(a) develop and administer one or more surveys which would
provide the basis for HARP FSR activities; and
(b) collect detailed farm records.

4. The following CURLA activities were added to those Contract
responsibilities for the CID/NMSU economist:

(a) assist in establishing computer facilities, organizing a
computer and statistics center, and training staff to
operate computers;
(b) Assist in analyzing and revising agricultural economics
(c) participate in economic analysis of faculty and student
research results; and
(d) present lectures and seminars to students.

5. Other general backstopping or support activities for HARP
(considered by the evauation team to be administrative

Page 24

duties) were noted in 1983 work plans:

(a) install, maintain and service HARP microcomputer and
word processing facilities;
(b) prepare data analysis programs for use on the HARP
microcomputer; and
(c) train research staff, the administrative assistant and
office secretaries in using appropriate computer

6. Scope of Activities carried out in 1983:

(a) First quarter
(1) Get to know Honduran personnel.
(2) Initiate design of computer facilities at CURLA.
(3) Initiate collection of secondary data.

(b) Second quarter
(1) Select computer hardware and software for CURLA.
(2) Set up some of the computer equipment at CURLA
and HARP.
(3) Evaluate CURLA's curriculum for agricultural
(4) Assist team members in definition of work plan.

(c) Third quarter
(1) Examine previous sondeos (farming systems rapid
(2) Write paper on Agricultural Systems Policy.
(3) Provide technical assistance to CURLA.

(d) Fourth quarter
(1) Assist in the development and use of surveys for
Guaymas, Progreso and La Masica.
(2) Continue activities in CURLA.
(3) Initiate record keeping operations in 12 farms.
(4) Initiate computer analysis of field data.

7. Summary and Evaluation:
As envisioned by the DIA Director, the Contract scope was
feasible even for the short life of the Contract if all efforts were
focused on a small group of people, namely the regional research
directors in the area covered by the Contract and the HARP Honduran
professional counterparts. Consistent with the assessment of previous
evaluations of this Project, the above tasks proved to be too
ambitious given the relative scarcity of counterpart funds and the
difficulties in integrating and administering a team of expatriate and
Honduran professionals. These difficulties seemed most apparent in
the field of economics. In addition, there has been a dilution of
effort because of administrative and CURLA duties that were unforeseen
in the original Contract.

USAID requested that HARP help CURLA establish its data
management system, revise the agricultural economics curriculum and
give short courses in agricultural economics. All these activities,

Page 25

USAID estimated, would only take 10% of the economist's time. Work at
CURLA is very attractive to HARP CID/NMSU staff for a number of
reasons, among which is the direct long term involvement of NMSU.
Since MRN had substantial difficulties in assembling a counterpart
team, communications and hierarchies were not well established between
HARP and MRN, and the FSR effort was curtailed, the CID/NMSU economist
became more involved in administrative matters and in CURLA related
work, substantially reducing the time allocated to field work. It is
unfortunate that the disagreements over FSR led to that time going
into CURLA and HARP administration rather than into identification and
evaluation of promising technologies.

The HARP team did an excellent job of setting up the
microcomputer facilities at CURLA. Setting up a data processing system
is a time consuming operation which requires dedication and constant
supervision. This task undoubtedly took much more than the 10% of time
allocated by HARP to this activity. As a consequence, activities
related to MRN research were significantly curtailed, creating a
feeling among some DIA personnel and the Regional Director that the
MRN budget for HARP support funding was being utilized to support
CURLA'S activities. This feeling was aggravated by the fact that the
Regional Director in San Pedro Sula did not participate at all in the
conception of the project nor in the selection of the expatriate team.
In essence, CURLA related activities were interpreted by some as a
free ride for another institution on MRN money.

Agricultural economics is considered to be one of the most
important components of technology design. As part of the technical
assistance package, DIA requested specific assistance in this field in
order to train field technicians in the economic assessment of their
on-farm results. The scope of work outlined in the RFTP, however, did
not specify very clearly as to the complexity of the methods to be
taught, leaving the decision to the HARP team. The results obtained
during the past year, as reported in HARP quarterly reports, indicate
that most of the efforts in agricultural economics went to the
generation of a farm registry sheet, the implementation of a
microcomputer system and microcomputer training at CURLA, and in
administrative duties.

The economics of small farms is very complex since it deals with
the proper identification of the required incentives for technology
adoption by the small farmer. This identification process includes the
proper assessment of institutional constraints, such as credit markets
and price controls, as well as the costs and benefits of suggested
alternative technologies, and the socioeconomic forces influencing the
decision process of the farmer.

Assessment is time consuming, even though it may be shortened by
the utilization of information which may be provided by local research
and development teams (Agencias de Desarrollo) or by a few cooperating
farmers, but this process is essential. Only after the set of
incentives and constraints is identified can one make assumptions
about the types of technology which will be of interest to farmers.

Judging from HARP reports it is evident that some effort has been

Page 26

made to identify the above set of incentives. This effort, however,
has been concentrated in the design and implementation of farm records
as related to production, with little or no information being gathered
with respect to the set of constraints.

In the long run, agricultural economics research should be
redirected toward a systematic collection of data aimed to create a
typical farm for each recommendation domain. This may serve as a
model for the ex-ante evaluation and testing of new technologies, the
ex-ante assessment of different farm policies, and the analysis of
different farming alternatives. This typical farm should include a
financial portrait of the farm, why and how, as well as the sources of
potential failure, such as price or yield variation, credit
requirements, and managerial ability of the farmer.

The Contract ends in a few months. In the short time remaining,
the economist should concentrate on the economic analysis of existing
data, partial budgeting of alternative technologies to identify the
best potential recommendations, and on training DIA staff in the
collection and analysis of economic data from agronomic trials.

Presently, most of the items listed in the Contract scope of work
have not been properly addressed. Unless the economic analysis of
field trials is used for training and is integrated with Sondeo data
for comprehensive analysis, the scope of work will remain unfulfilled.

Page 27

Weed Control

1. HARP personnel who are involved with this activity
Dr. Dinesh Sharma, Ph.D. (CID Weed Scientist) and
Ing. Mario Bustamante, M.S. (Honduran Weed

2. Specific responsibilities are stated in the
USAID/CID Contract as:
(a) Collaborate with DIA in carrying out practical
field agricultural research.
(b) In cooperation with DIA technical personnel,
review, analyze and orient DIA's weed control
research program.
(c) Provide support to on-farm research teams on
weed control.
(d) Help identify program equipment and personnel
(e) Carry out with DIA technical personnel an
evaluation of the most severe weed species and
their area of distribution, and establish
appropriate control measures.
(f) Analyze and publish research results.
(g) Train DIA personnel in weed control.
(h) Participate in meetings, seminars, and
workshops that benefit the program.

3. Specific responsibilities added in the 1983 plan of
work (primera) are:
Activities at CURLA will be limited to
providing technical guidance to a student
doing his thesis on weed control in corn,
helping establish a herbarium, and teaching
(when and if needed) specific topics in weed

4. Specific responsibilities added in the 1983 plan of
work (postrera) are:
Work initiated on the collection of weeds
in different areas in Honduras will be
continued with the specimens identified and
stored at CURLA. Efforts will be made to
persuade the Phytotechnica Department to
acquire or build cabinets for proper storage of
the specimens.

5. Location of research, extension, and teaching:
(a) Yoro area Three different experiments were
conducted with a total of nine locations
during the primera season, and four different
experiments at two locations each during the

Page 28

postrera season.
(b) Cuyamel area Six different experiments were
conducted with a total of 18 different
locations during the primera season, and three
experiments at one location each during the
postrera season.
(c) La Masica area Four experiments at two
locations each during the primera season, and
six experiments were conducted with a total of
14 locations during the postrera season..
(d) Guaymas/Omomita experiment station Three
experiments and a total of four locations
during the primera season, and two experiments
and a total of three locations during the
postrera season.
(e) CURLA One experiment was conducted plus
consultation with faculty and students about
weed control experiments and weed species

6. Scope of activities carried out:
(a) Experiment station tests
The weed control team was the only component of
the HARP team conducting field trials at the Guaymas
and Omonita stations. This was by mutual agreement
with the MRN staff at the station. The tests
involved studies on rice and corn and comparing
chemicals, rates of chemicals or volumes of
chemicals or water.

(b) On-farm research tests
The majority of the more than 68 experiments
focused on chemical methods of weed control.
However, several experiments examined combinations
of chemicals plus minimum tillage, rotations, or
cultural methods using a green manure crop (Musa
sp). These experiments did not appear to be any
different than the experiments that were being
conducted on the experiment stations.

(c) Extension/research training of MRN staff
Four formal training activities occurred
(1) trip to three regions (Danli, Chouluteca
and Olancho);
(2) a weed control course conducted in San
Pedro Sula with 38 extension and research
staff from the third region on July 5-7;
(3) an FSR philosophy discussion with
extension and research staff of MRN on
September 9;
(4) a training session on weed control on
September 27; and
(5) the aspects of weed control in a general
session on bean production was covered

Page 29

during November 21-25.

(d) Publications useful to the MRN staff
One extension publication was prepared by Dr.
Sharma entitled Como prevenir la diseminacion de
caminadora Rottboellia exaltata (L) a otras areas en

The weed science staff worked with the head of
the plant science department in providing assistance
to a student working on weed control in corn for his
thesis. Assisted the plant science head in design
and conduct of an experiment. Visited Escuela
Agricola Pan Americana (EAP) and the University of
Honuras at Tegucigalpa where large plant collections
are maintained. Weed collections planned for CURLA
will be restricted to principal weeds of grain
crops. Sharma estimated he devoted 10% of his time

7. Summary and evaluation of fulfillment of specific
There is ample evidence of a high level of
respect for the HARP weed scientists and the
recognition of weed control as a major constraint in
crop production. The major desire of the Honduran
MRN and CURLA staff visited was for even more
contact and assistance from the HARP team.
Due to the very large number of experiments
established and the lack of adequate supervision or
understanding by some of the farmers upon whose land
the plots were established, many of the tests were
lost. The MRN staff at Yoro and La Masica were
larger and better able to handle the number of
experiments than was the case at Cuyamel where only
one researcher and one extension person were located
for most of the year.
(a) There appears to be a close working
relationship with DIA in carrying out
practical field research.
(b) The cooperative review, analysis, and
orientation of DIA research can only begin as
results of research data become available.
Very little DIA-conducted weed control
research exists because of the limited number
of staff trained in weed science, especially
in chemical control.
(c) There is evidence of technical as well as
logistical support by the HARP team of on-farm
weed research conducted by MRN staff.
(d) Some work has been done to identify
appropriate equipment for field application of
herbicides but no visible evidence of
identifying program personnel needs.

Page 30

(e) There has been excellent efforts made toward
identifying the most serious weed species.
One publication has been prepared for
publication as a Honduran extension bulletin.
There are at least two or three other weeds
requiring similar treatment.
(f) The availability of field research results
seems to be limited at this point.
(g) Training of DIA personnel has occurred but,
given the complexity of chemical weed control
and the limited background of many of the DIA
staff, greater emphasis should be placed on
this component of the HARP team.
(h) Good evidence exists that the HARP weed
control team members have been active
participants and have made major contributions
to the on-farm research program of DIA.
(i) The interaction at CURLA with faculty and
students has been good. Failure to conduct
classroom training is not the fault of the
HARP weed control team.

8. Recommendations:
(a) Based on the HARP team's field experience in
yield losses due to weeds a calculation should
be made to further justify to the MRN the need
for more staffing in the weed science area.
Efforts should be made by the HARP team to
identify personnel needs in the weed science
(b) Commitments to CURLA should be kept to a
minimum except as an effort to enhance the
capacity of the CURLA staff to conduct weed
research and to prepare students with an
understanding of FSR or on-farm research.
(c) HARP weed research team members should
consider planning simple "planned
demonstrations" that will be useful to the
extension personnel for farmer field days and
farmer experience with new treatments. These
planned demonstrations should utilize only one
or two treatments on the farmer's field and
should involve eight to ten farmers. The HARP
team has ample evidence available to select an
herbicide treatment to apply to corn, rice, or
beans, or a treatment for the control of Musa
sp which will represent minmal risk to the
farmer. Plots should be large enough so that
bordered areas can be harvested for yield.

Page 31

Soil Fertility

1. Harp personnel who are involved with this activity
Mr. James G. Walker, M.S. (CID Soil scientist) and
Ing. Lidia de Ramos, M.S. (Honduran Soil Scientist).

2. Specific responsibilities are stated in the
USAID/CID Contract as:
(a) With cooperation of DIA personnel, identify
design or adapt a system for the evaluation of
soil fertility.
(b) Coordinate laboratory, greenhouse, and field
soil fertility research and correlation of the
(c) Design, plan, and carry out a soil fertility
program that permits a constant flow of
information from the laboratory and research
station to the farmer.
(d) Focus soil fertility research on maximizing
economic returns rather than maximizing
agronomic output.

3. Specific responsibilities added in the 1983 plan of
work (primera) are:
(a) All locations of soil fertility trials have
the common objectives of calibrating the field
responses of the crop with the nutrient level
found in the soil, as determined by laboratory
analyses of soil samples taken from each
(b) Meetings with CURLA administration and soils
department staff determined that they should
recieve assistance in the following areas from
the soil fertility specialists on the HARP
(1) Collaboration in soil calibration analysis
using pot experiments;
(2) Assistance with the purchase of new
equipment for the laboratory;
(3) Cooperation in field experiments with soil
department staff;
(4) Contribution to new methods of analysis
for soils according to the equipment that
will be received;
(5) Assistance with special studies: forage
legumes, soil acidity problems, and other
soil chemistry problems.

4. Specific responsibilities added in the 1983 plan of
work (postrera) are:

Page 32

Sondeos conducted by DIA (including HARP) and
DEA staff have shown the need for fertility studies
on beans following corn in the Yoro area and on the
ratoon crop of rice in the Cuyamel and La Masica
regions. Information is needed regarding:
(a) the effect of residual fertilizers in the soil
on the postrera bean crop;
(b) the effect of N, P, K, and plant densities on
the postrera bean crop; and
(c) the effect on yield of the ratoon rice crop of
various rates of applied nitrogen fertilizer.

5. Location of research, extension, and teaching:
(a) Yoro area three different tests at a total
of ten test locations during the primera
season, and two tests at four locations during
the postrera.
(b) Cuyamel area two tests involving seven
different locations during the primera season,
and two tests at two locations during the
postrera season.
(c) La Masica area two tests involving four
locations during the primera, and four tests
involving six locations during the postrera.
(d) La Ceiba CURLA. No field tests but consulted
on greenhouse and laboratory work and involved
in laboratory teaching.

6. Scope of activities carried out:
(a) Experiment station tests:
No tests were conducted on experiment station
(b) On-farm research tests:
The majority of the fertility trials were
simple factorial (2x3 or 2x4) experiments
designed to explore N x P x K; variety x N x
plant density; or N x variety x weed control
interactions. A secondary set of trials was
designed to evaluate fertilizer residual value
for the postrera cropping season.
(c) Extension/research training of MRN staff:
Formal training or workshops included the
following three in September:
(1) September 9 FSR philosophy and 'Enlace'
(2) September 19-20 soil conservation at
Yoro; 18 people attended.
(3) September 26-29 soil fertility at
Comayagua; 18 MRN research and extension
staff attended from throughout Honduras.
(4) Various quarterly reports and staff
comment refer to frequent informal
training sessions as a part of daily
activities occurring in conjunction with
project work.

Page 33

(d) CURLA activities
(1) Assistance has been given in the revision
of the soil laboratory equipment list
being ordered by another USAID project for
(2) Consulted with three soil department staff
members on proposed soil research
(3) Assisted students in conducting
calibration trials for P and K extraction.
(4) Assisted a faculty member in using the
DRIS method for evaluation of soil
(5) Appoximately 25 percent of Ing. Lidia de
Romas' time was devoted to CURLA, and
approximately 10-15% of Mr. Walker's time.

7. Summary and evaluation of fulfillment of specific
(a) per USAID/CID contract objectives:
(1) No evidence of activity or plans directed
toward identifying, designing or adapting
a system for the evaluation of soil
fertility that is easily identifiable,easy
to manage and practical. This is a major
undertaking and could easily take half of
the staff members' time.
(2) In terms of coordinating laboratory,
greenhouse and field soil fertility
research and correlating results, no data
from this are available due to data
processing problems but the level of work
is adequate and on track. Work of Ing.
Ramos has focused on greenhouse and
laboratory work.
(3) The design, planning, and conduct of
research on soil fertility is at an
appropriate level for the establishment of
benchmark data. The number and complexity
of the experiments is greater than needed
for a short term program without planning
for continuation of the research beyond
the duration of the HARP Contract. There
is limited information generated by these
complex experiments that can be used
directly by small farmers.
(4) Fertility levels used in the trials
reviewed were at the level where one
expects economic returns rather than
maximum agronomic returns.

(b) 1983 plan of work (primera) objectives:
(1) Calibrating all field responses with
laboratory soil nutrient analyses is very
desirable, but must be viewed as a long

Page 34

term project requiring well beyond the
time frame of the HARP contract for
(2) The responsibilities set forth for the
soil fertility specialist at CURLA seem to
have been started and/or are in various
phases of completion with the exception of
the special studies.

(c) 1983 plan of work (postrera) objectives:
(1) Evaluating residual fertilizer effect left
from the primera crop for the postrera
crop was started but results were not
available at this time. This is again a
long term project because the benefits are
subject to seasonal environmental
variability which require multiple seasons
to adequately evaluate.
(2) Trials to evaluate the effect of N, P, K
and plant density potrera beans and N
rates on ratoon rice were established but
data are unavailable at this time.

(d) Evidence has been presented that cooperation
of the HARP soil fertility group and the DIA
staff in the Yoro and La Masica areas was very
good. The staff at La Masica were very
complementary about the interaction with the
HARP staff although they indicated a need for
more contact, especially at the administrative
level. The MRN field staff felt they could
ask for assistance when needed.
Work at Cuyamel was the least successful
and can probably be related to the low level
of DIA and extension staffing. Throughout
most of the first year of activity only one
researcher and one extension person were

8. Recommendations:
(a) Activities initiated in 1983 were very
ambitious. HARP research efforts are
associated with activities that commonly are a
part of long term projects. A start must be
made, but plans should be made to aid DIA in
completing calibrating soils in the project
area over an extended period to permit
fertilizer recommendations to be based on soil
(b) Efforts should be made to get data processed
and summarized as quickly as possible to be
shared with MRN staff and administrators.
(c) Assist the MRN staff in establishing a
procedure of publishing an annual summary of
all soil fertility tests for broader

Page 35

information sharing among researchers and
extension personnel and as a means to preserve
results for others to find and use in the
(d) Many of the plots with 2x3 or 2x4 factorial
designs were too complex to be useful to the
Honduran extension staff for farmer field
days. Thus some attempt should be made to
coordinate some simplified one or two factor
experiments (demonstrations) in the general
area of the multiple factor studies.
(e) Develop MRN capacity to assume activities
initiated by HARP so that these activities do
not cease upon termination of Contract.
(f) Maintain a strong MRN training component in
planned activities.

Page 36


1. HARP personnel who are involved with CURLA include:
Dr. Charles R. Ward (CID Entomologist)
Dr. Wilmer M. Harper (CID Agricultural Economist)
Dr. Dinesh Sharma (CID Weed Scientist)
Mr. James G. Walker (CID Soil Fertility Specialist)
Ing. Lidia de Ramos (Honduran Soil Fertility

Short term personnel brought in to'work with CURLA
Dr. Melchor Ortiz (CID Statistician)
Dr. James Zimmerman (CID Entomologist).
Dr. Austin Haws (CID Experiment Station Management

2. General responsibilities:
The 1983 Plan of Work (Primera) states that "at the
request of USAID/Honduras HARP allocated ten percent of its
total time to activities at CURLA. Activities will be
conducted with the departments associated with the
respective professional specialties of the HARP team. In
addition, HARP will facilitate NMSU's BIFAD (Board for Food
and Agricultural Development) activities at CURLA." The
1983 Plan of Work (Postrera) further states that "HARP will
continue to foster the development of the computer and data
analysis facility which was initiated at CURLA under
HARP/NMSU/USAID auspices during the 1983 primera time."
Specific responsibilities assigned to the individual
HARP Team members have been previously stated in the
sections on individual disciplinary activities.

3. Evaluation of CURLA related activities:
(a) Time commitment of HARP staff time has
apparently exceeded the original agreed upon
(b) Facilitating the NMSU/BIFAD activities has
involved a substantial amount of HARP
management time with substantial benefit to
CURLA and NMSU but with a negative short term
impact on the MRN program related activities.
There is a potential long term benefit to MRN
associated with the influx of better trained
personnel coming out of CURLA in the future.
(c) Participation of HARP team members has been
unequal. Only one of the Honduran
professionals has been actively involved at
CURLA. Among the CID team members greatest
involvement has been by the agricultural
economist, followed by the soil fertility

Page 37

specialist and the weed control specialist.
The entomologist could have spent more time
but team leader duties prevented more time
allocation. In total the HARP team spent an
estimated 15 percent of their time at CU.RLA.
(d) A benefit of the association with CURLA has
been the assistance of the CURLA staff in the
conduct of some workshops prepared for the MRN

4. Recommendations:
(a) HARP should work toward integration of the
research effort of CURLA staff with the basic
research needs of MRN, i.e., foster a
collaborative and complementary relationship
between CURLA and MRN.
(b) HARP should focus on faculty development
seminars and workshops which will increase the
CURLA research capabilities.
(c) The CURLA faculty should be invited to
participate in MRN training workshops and
short courses.
(d) The HARP staff should provide formal training
for the CURLA faculty on FSR and/or on-farm
research methodology and philosophy.
(e) HARP should minimize direct instruction to
students, not because this is undesirable but
because of the time demands.

Page 38


1. General responsibilities and personnel involvement:
All personnel in HARP (and in the DIA and DEA staff)
have a responsibility to assist in dissemination of research
results from research (DIA) to DEA agents in the field and
ultimately to the end users (farmers). This is identified
as steps or phases (7) and (8) of the FSR activities in the
technical plans of work for HARP as follows:
(7) Extension of appropriate techniques and technology
throughout the target area; and
(8) Diffusion of technology which has been
demonstrated to farmers to be appropriate and
acceptable to the recommendation domain within the
target area.

2. Summary and Evaluation:
Because of the short duration of the HARP Contract
these two phases cannot be activated and have been deleted
from the HARP plan of work. It is recommended by HARP that
phases (7) and (8) be carried out by the permanent MRN
research and extension staff working in the target area.
This is important but not sufficient.
This plan loses sight of the constant dissemination of
research results and techniques in all FSR experiments
through informal discussions, farmer participation, neighbor
observation and the "ripple effect". This may be the most
effective means of dissemination of well executed on-farm
research and is a major argument for increasing farmer
active participation in on-farm research.
However, this does not preclude the necessity for
keeping good records, collating and analyzing results, and
publishing them in a form that can be readily used and
understood by farmers. Problems of research results not
being available from previous years is a severe constraint
to increased farmer utilization of research findings.

3. Recommendations:
(a) A mechanism must be developed for following up
at the end of this Contract so that all data are collected,
analyzed, put into proper form and published.
(b) There should be a regional and national summary
of all research data annually, at the completion of an
experiment and at the termination or transfer of a research
worker who was responsible for an experiment or field of
(c) Field days and seminars should continue to be an
integral part of all FSR and extension programs.

Page 39


Commitment and Coordination

Recommendations are usually based on the assumption
that the sponsors are committed to allocate sufficient
resources in order to accomplish the goals of the project or
contract. In this case, however, the evaluation team is not
convinced that GOH and USAID have made serious commitments
to this Contract nor that GOH has made a serious commitment
to DIA or the Project in general.

One way to express commitment is through adequate and
stable funding. GOH has never apparently made nor carried
through this financial commitment to the Project or the
Contract. The proofs for this Contract lie in delayed and
sporadic salary payments, travel reimbursements, etc. For
the Project the reader is referred to the 1981 evaluation.
Although USAID has committed adequate funding to the
Project, the Contract has suffered through uncertain funding
for training programs and for a possible extension from 18
to the originally scheduled 24 months.

Another way to express commitment is through the
dedication of adequate time and attention by planners and
administrators. The failure by USAID and GOH to coordinate
and clarify the scope and direction of work by HARP has been
evident throughout this report. The sponsors have not taken
the time to plan and coordinate together. Regular meetings
have not been held in which appropriate USAID, DIA, other
MRN and HARP personnel could effect this coordination and
clear up some of the confusion. A major continuing problem
has been delays and non-arrival of salaries and
reimbursements for Honduran personnel. The sponsors have
not solved this problem, and part of the reason is the lack
of time and attention given to it. The insignificance of
this Contract to USAID was also demonstrated by the lack of
participation in the evaluation, including the absence of
the Project Officer from the meetings in San Pedro at which
the preliminary report of the evaluation team was presented.

The evaluation team has no magic solution for this lack
of commitment, but plans for the remaining months of this
Contract must recognize the lack of past commitment and the
probable absence of such commitment in the future. The
Project and Contract were designed to build and strengthen
Honduran agricultural research institutions. This effort is
doomed without GOH commitment, DIA leadership, and the
participation and leadership of Honduran scientists.

Recommendation No. 1: Meetings be scheduled
immediately in which DIA leadership, the MRN Regional
Director for Region 3 (San Pedro), the USAID Project Officer
and/or Agricultural Development Officer, the HARP COP and

Page 40

the HARP Assistant COP (head of the Honduran component) meet
together to reach some agreement on the following issues:
(a) scope and plan of work for the remaining
months of the Harp Contract which expires in
July 198.4.
(b) salaries for Hondurans members of HARP.
(c) relationship and lines of authority among
DIA, the Regional Director and HARP.
(d) possible extension of the Contract for
another six months past July, including
scope and plan of work for those added
Any decision reached in these meetigs should be put in
writing (Spanish) and distribu-ted to all of the
participants. These immediate meetings are, for all intents
and purposes, emergency meetings to discuss and settle
issues that are of immediate critical importance. As these
issues are resolved, temporarily or permanently, these
emergency meetings should evolve into regularly scheduled
meetings every two weeks or so to discuss normal business in
a coordinated way.

Scope of Work

The evaluation team has made observations and
recommendations throughout this report concerning the scope
and plan of work for HARP, but MRN, USAID and HARP officials
must make decisions. How much training? What kinds of
technical work? More research in the field? These
decisions are for the short term immediate future. What is
possible to accomplish in a few months, and what are the
highest priorities?

Recommendation No. 2: In the few remaining months with
or without an extension HARP should radically cut back on
its direct involvement in field research and concentrate on
analysis of existing data, technical support for Honduran
researchers, and training. Training may take the form of
short courses as well as one-on-one or small group
backstopping and trouble shooting in which HARP members
provide real in-service training to other researchers as
they grapple with design, monitoring and analysis problems
that come up in their ongoing research. In this way
technical support and training merge. Analysis of existing
data would focus on identifying research priorities,
providing data sets for later research to build upon,
recommending alternative technologies that might be used in
farmer-managed trials, and working through a trial-based
dialogue about research methodologies.

Agricultural research and science in general are based
on a process in which problems are identified, questions
asked, tentative hypothesis generated, tests designed and
run to disprove or not, data collected and analyzed,
analyses and data disseminated, and so on in a continuing

Page 41

cycle. Merely designing and running tests is not research
nor science. Analysis is the hardest work, and that
includes deciding which problems to study and which
questions to ask as well as deciding the meaning and
significance of data collected.

DIA and HARP are not conducting nor advancing research
if their staffs merely generate trials and collect data.
CID/NMSU staff discovered a major problem at the start of
their work. Previous researchers had shifted to other jobs
and not left behind them adequate records of their data and
analyses. This behavior means that the earlier research was
wasted; it did not benefit DIA, Honduras nor the farmers.
HARP staff should address this problem by assuring that
their own research is analyzed, documented and disseminated
and by assisting other DIA researchers through training and
technical support to analyze, document and disseminate their

Financial Security and Planning

The most important financial issue is Honduran
salaries. This priority is sometimes overlooked by CID/NMSU
staff whose salaries are assured, but the Project and UNAT
are based on Honduran and expatriate participation.
Continued uncertainty over salaries and over tenure
(reference to the departure already of one Honduran) tends
to minimize if not eliminate Honduran participation and
leadership in HARP. More important is the continued
constraint to Honduran research careers and longer term
planning, noted earlier in the 1981 evaluation, and the
continued frustration of Project institution-building

HARP training efforts have also been constrained by
uncertain funding. Although USAID in 1983 apparently
promised more funding for training, that has not
materialized. Any collaborative agreement that HARP should
concentrate on training in its final months will be
frustrated if USAID does not have or release the funding.
This issue needs to be considered in the meetings with DIA
and USAID and a budgetary request for training submitted and
approved. If the necessary funding is somewhere between the
Finance Ministry and MRN, that needs to be clarified and the
money released.

A third financial issue concerns the possible extension
of the Contract for an additional six months (through
January 1985), but this issue comes after an agreement has
been reached on the scope and plan of work through July and
on Honduran salaries and training funds. Any planned
extension must be based upon a clear statement of the work
to be accomplished. That cannot be done until there is an
agreement upon the work to be done during the remaining
months of the original Contract and until there are enough

Page 42

funds to adequately work during that period. On the other
hand, HARP administrators and professional employees are in
an untenable situation when they do not know whether the
Contract terminates in July or runs until January.

Recommendation No. 3: If agreements have not been
reached and sufficient USAID funding for training and for
the extension assured in writing before the end of February
1984, HARP should terminate at the end of its scheduled 18

A consistent criticism of agricultural research in
Honduras has been the weakness in planning. The continued
uncertainty of HARP funding provides a USAID-inspired case
study of the relationship between uncertain funding and poor
planning. Since there may be no funding past July, everyone
should be closing down, wrapping up and getting ready to
hand over their data, analyses and programs. Honduran
professionals and some of the CID/NMSU staff will be seeking
new jobs at the termination of this Contract. Since the
termination may be in July they (as rational people) should
be searching for new employment and diverting some of their
attention from the present. Given the uncertainty no one in
HARP should be wasting their time planning for the August
1984-January 1985 period because they should be hard at work
finishing what they started.

Research Methodology

Research methodology (PFSR-FSR) has been a divisive
topic in HARP but there is no need for that to continue.
Some of the early problems have been resolved or may be
resolved as a result of this evaluation. The present
members of the HARP team all know each other (with the
exception of the recently arrived CID/NMSU economist), and
all of the CID/NMSU team are well acquainted with many
aspects of Honduran agriculture and institutions.

HARP has an important opportunity now to examine as a
team, Hondurans and expatriates together, the basic features
of PFSR and to propose to DIA ways in which DIA scientists
may experiment with alternative methods. The few remaining
months of the Contract are too few for HARP itself to really
test these ways. The basic assumptions for HARP should be:
(a) PFSR represents a Honduran methodology
that has evolved and been accepted as a
better way to conduct research than the
methods that were customary in the early
(b) Any methodological modifications to PRSR
that are proposed by HARP should represent
solutions to problems encountered by Honduran
DIA professionals or by expatriates working
in Honduras.
(c) Any methodology may be improved, and any

Page 43

methodology that evolved under one set of
conditions may not be appropriate in another
environment or at a later date.
(d) Other countries and programs may have worked
out research methods and reached conclusions
that will allow DIA to skip ahead and save
time and effort.
(e) Programs and analyses coming from other
countries or conditions should be treated
as hypotheses to be tested and should
neither be adopted nor rejected without
critical examination.

Recommendation No. 4: The HARP team should schedule
regular weekly meetings lasting several hours in which the
single topic is research methodology. As a team HARP should
examine its experiences in 1983 and other relevant Honduras
information to find if there are methodological problems,
concerns or suggestions. Honduran members of HARP should
lead the discussion, and expatriates should listen to the
Hondurans to learn what they consider to be important
methodological constraints or problems in the Honduran

The discussions should be firmly based on actual
experience. What is the purpose of PFSR in Honduras? What
hypotheses are being tested? How appropriate are these?
How does rapid personnel turnover affect research? Is the
trial sequence appropriate in all situations? How may
research reach better conclusions quicker? What have HARP
personnel learned from each other about better research?
What are the major problems encountered and how might they
be avoided or solved? What may be learned from CATIE,
CIMMYT, ICTA, CIAT, FSSP, etc.? What would work or not work
in Honduras, and why?

One purpose of these weekly meetings (special meetings
or assignments may become appropriate as the dialogue
continues) is to provide suggestions to the DIA Director and
to other DIA research professionals about methodological
alternatives. Another purpose is to better capacitate the
Honduran members of HARP as methodologists and self-aware
researchers. These professionals were selected for HARP in
recognition of their professional achievements, and they
will continue to play leadership roles in Honduras.

The evaluation team suggested several specific topics
that could be examined in these HARP discussions.

1. Present joint survey activities combine research,
extension and other programs under the leadership of the
planning unit to produce information that may be used by
everyone (caracterizacion multiproposito). This enlace is
commendable, but does research need much more information
about farming systems than it gets from these joint surveys?

Page 44

If more information is needed, what types of information,
and how could it most effectively be obtained (farm records,
interviews, formal surveys, trials, etc.)?

2.. National and international programs have different
mandates and resources. How may DIA most effectively
utilize international programs such as CATIE, CIMMYT, CIAT,
CIP, etc.? Often these IARCs provide data from trials
conducted in Honduras or in ecologically similar areas.
Could DIA use this data to speed its series of trials?

3. Farmers combine many enterprises, often including
off-farm employment and business, to earn a living and
satisfy their families' needs and desires. Basic grains and
beans are fundamental enterprises and deserve a major share
of DIA's attention. Sometimes minor crops, livestock,
processing or marketing activities that are already part of
local farming systems may provide more leverage for DIA in
its attempts to increase rural living standards. A minor
crop, for instance, for which there is a large unsatisfied
demand in Honduras or in other countries may be an
opportunity where a small research input may have a large
multiplier effect on cash income. How could DIA maintain
its important concentration on basic grains and beans while
allocating some resources to specific minor enterprises with
high potential? Can UNAT members now identify some of these
enterprises? This is not a request to add more trials to
the present number but to identify priorities. The number
of trials at present seems excessive.

4. What would be gained by increased farmer
participation in research? Are farmers now as involved as
they should be? How is information about farmer preferences
and farmer perceptions of various treatments fed back into
the research process? How may DIA predict whether farmers
will adopt or reject specific recommendations? What are
some specific examples of rejection, and why did it happen?

5. DIA has established in PFSR a sequence of trials.
It starts with many treatments, complex design, on station
and controlled entirely by researchers. As more knowledge
is accumulated the better treatments are moved off station
and tested under conditions more similar to those under
which the ultimate clients (Honduran farmers) will be
facing. The number of treatments is fewer; designs are
simpler; farmer management is increased and DIA control
decreased; and the treatments are exposed to a broader range
of environmental variables. How is this process working?
What are some examples of the use of simpler design? How
did they work? Are there some treatments or other
alternative technologies identified in previous DIA or IARC
research that seem promising enough to move into more
farmer-managed trials? The evaluation team thinks there
would be important benefits if HARP established or recorded

Page 45

some well-documented trials and trial sequences for use in

6. If HARP desires FSSP assistance in training, HARP
first needs to clarify the topics for which training is
desired and for which there is a consensus. Training and
technical support should reinforce and extend the areas in
which there is consensus rather than contribute to any
disagreements. For which areas and topics is there a
consensus that training is needed?

USAID Involvement in Agricultural Research

This evaluation- concentrated on the specific HARP
Contract with 'some reference to the entire Project. USAID
is also involved with other projects such as Mejores
Alimentos and appropriate technology in Comayagua and is
well advanced toward participating in an autonomous research
foundation. These disparate projects are not obviously
parts of a coherent single program, and it is not easy to
see how any of these advance FSR.

Recommendation No. 5: USAID should commission an
evaluation of its agricultural research and development
efforts. A major component of these efforts should continue
to be support for FSR, so it is important to have FSSP
participation in this broad evaluation. GOH commitment and
Honduran professional leadership are issues that must be
addressed, as well as any relationship between an institute
and FSR.


Quarterly reports from HARP has been delayed,
fragmented and a source of dissatisfaction for MRN because
they seem to identify HARP as solely a CID/NMSU endeavor.
In addition, the constant flow of TDY consultants, NMSU
BIFAD-funded and other visitors to and from HARP, San Pedro
and CURLA puzzles and irritates many Hondurans. They are
unsure whether funds committed by USAID to MRN and DIA are
being used to support other agencies, and they are sure that
scarce resources in the form of HARP time are being
diverted. The sixth recommendation is rather long in order
to cover all of the essential points.

Recommendation No. 6:
(a) Quarterly and annual reports are required by
Contract to be in Spanish. These reports need to be more
rapidly distributed to USAID and DIA. There are no Contract
requirements for reports in English or for monthly reports;
these are voluntary, much less important, and should not be
allowed to interfere with required reporting and actual

(b) HARP is a joint DIA/USAID/CID/NMSU activity,

Page 46

and these sponsors need to all be properly identified on all
reports and all cover pages. All sponsors need to approve
any changes in scope or plan of work, and any changes should
always be placed in writing and circulated to all sponsors
and team members.

(c) HARP is a team of seven (was eight)
professionals. The HARP quarterly reports should include
everybody's quarterly reports. If DIA has specific
requirements for Honduran members of HARP their quarterly
reports may reflect that but they must be included in HARP

(d) All short term (TDY) personnel need to hand
in preliminary reports before they leave Honduras, and they
should have a personal meeting with the HARP COP and the DIA
Director (at his discretion) before leaving. Final reports
should be in Spanish and in Honduras within one month of
departure. No. report has yet been received from the TDY
person for research station management, and that is long

(e) DIA and the MRN Regional Director should be
informed in advance of all CID or NMSU administrative or
technical people who will be visiting Honduras and HARP. If
the visitors are on another mission and not directly
connected with HARP it would nonetheless be polite and
correct form for them to leave a brief note with DIA before
they leave noting their trip, itinerary, any contributions
they made to HARP and their appreciation of MRN hospitality
if received. This will minimize misunderstanding as well as
emphasize that HARP time, vehicles, etc. are accountable to
MRN (DIA) as well as to USAID.

Secondary Recommendations

1. As individuals and professionals all eight members
of HARP during 1983 appear to have been hard working, well
qualified and concerned about their work. The team suffered
from design changes, financial problems, its position in the
social and hierarchical structure, and professional
differences of opinion, not from personal incompetence nor
lack of desire. HARP team members should be commended for
their work output under these trying circumstances.

2. There is little socioeconomic input into UNAT.
This input should be strenghtened, perhaps by collaborative
research with social science faculty at CURLA or other

3. Although the evaluation team was asked to assess
the Mejores Alimentos project, the team was not given any
*micro economic analyses concerning prices, costs, markets,
etc. for tomato production. These analyses are critical to
any assessment.

Page 47



23-31 JANUARY 1984

1/22 Sunday
1/23 Monday

1/24 Tuesday

1/25 Wednesday

1/26 Thursday

1/27 Friday

1/28 Saturday

1/29 Sunday

1/30 Monday

Evaluation team arrived in Gainesville, Florida.
Morning: Formal team briefing by Dr. Dan Galt (FSSP)
at G001 McCarty Hall, University of Florida. Informal
briefing continues. Dan Galt was present to answer
questions and help locate additional documentation.
7:30-9:15 am: Flight from Gainesville to Miami on Air
Florida 391.
1:00-3:05 pm: Flight from Miami to Tegucigalpa on Air
Florida 129.
Flight was delayed one hour setting back afternoon
meeting. Team was met at Tegucigalpa airport by USAID
representatives and taken to hotel. Change in hotels
further delayed meeting with USAID.
4:30-5:30 pm. USAID briefing at embassy by Bryan
Rudert (Project Officer), Mario Contreras (Technical
Support Officer), Gordon Straub (Project Officer),
and Orlando Hernandez (Evaluation Officer). Clarified
scope of evaluation.
Evening: Supper with several USAID and HARP staff.
Met CID evaluation team of Merle Niehaus (NMSU) and
Bill Shaner (CSU).
Morning: DIA briefing at MRN by Adan Bonilla, (DIA
Director) Gerardo Reyes (DIA Assistant Director) and
Antonio Silva (DIA UNAT).
Afternoon: Drive to Comayagua and visit appropriate
technology project (Gwyn Williams) and Mejores
Alimentos. From Comayagua to San Pedro Sula and check
into hotel. Evaluation team is accompanied by Mario
Contreras for USAID.
Morning: HARP briefing by entire HARP team at MRN
Regional headquarters.
Afternoon: Some of evaluation team interview Roberto
Larios (MRN Project Director) and Francisca de Escoto
(Research-Extension Liaison for Region). Others visit
Guaymas Research Station and Cuyamel area. Contreras
returned to Tegucigalpa.
All day: Part of team travels to Yoro Valley and
others go to La Ceiba and CURLA to visit field sites
and interview MRN (DIA and DEA) staff and farmers.
All day: Report writing. Final checks with HARP and
MRN officials to clarify some points and receive
All day: Report writing. Consultations with HARP
COP and CID evaluation team.
Morning and part of Afternoon: Oral presentation in
Spanish of preliminary evaluation report and MRN

Page 48

1/31 Tuesday

2/2 Thursday


Regional headquarters. Appendix C includes list of
those attending. No one attended from USAID; Gerardo
Reyes represented DIA.
Rest of day: Report writing and modification to
include points raised during days' discussions.
Morning: Half of evaluation team left Honduras.
Team leader and one other remained and made another
presentation of the (modified) preliminary draft of
evaluation report. This time USAID was represented
by Mario Contreras; DIA Director Adan Bonilla also
attended (Appendix C includes full list of those
attending). Copies of modified preliminary report
in English were distributed at beginning of meeting
to HARP COP, USAID representative, Adan Bonilla and
Roberto Larios. Oral presentation was in Spanish.
Afternoon: Visit to United Brands research center
(near San Pedro) which is proposed headquarters for
new autonomous research institute. Rest of evaluation
team left Honduras.
Team leader met with FSSP staff for debriefing and
presentation of modified preliminary report, G001
McCarty Hall, University of Florida. Present were
Chris Andrew, Pete Hildebrand, Eugenio Martinez,
Dan Galt, Steve Kearl and Jim Dean.


Gordon Straub Project Officer
Dr. Mario Contreras Technical Officer, HARP Project
Bryan Rudert Project Officer
Orlando Hernandez Evaluation Officer

DIA-Tegucigalpa Ing. Adan Bonilla Director
Ing. Antonio Silva UNAT, former member of HARP
Ing. Gerardo Reyes Assistant Director


Dr. Charles Ward COP, Entomologist
Ing. Norberto Enrique Urbina Assistant COP, Entomologist
Dr. Dennis Sharma Weed Control Specialist
Ing. Mario Bustamante Weed Control Specialist
Dr. Michael Bertelsen Agricultural Economist
James Walker Soil Fertility Specialist
Ing. Ligia Ramos Soil Fertility Specialist

NMSU TDY Dr. Melchor Ortiz Statistician

CID Evaluation Team Dr. W.W. Shaner Professor, Colorado State
Dr. M. Niehaus Chair, Department of Agronomy, NMSU

FSSP Dr. Dan Galt Agricultural Economist

Region 2 (San Pedro) Guillermo Alvarado Regional Planning

Page 49

Hector Fernandez Regional DIA Chief
Enrique Cano Regional DEA Chief
Ing. Roberto Larios Mejia Regional MRN Director
Ing. Francisca de Escoto Regional MRN Research/
Extension Liaison

Comayagua Gwyn Williams Project Leader, UDA/Comayagua

Yoro Ing. Oswaldo Paz Director, Sub-Region 1, Region 2
Ing. Ramon Medina Head of Research, Sub-Region 1
and Region 2

La Ceiba Ive'tte Rico de Ponce Direccion Litoral Atlantico

CURLA Ing. Jorge Soto Director
Ing. Freddy Starkman Teaching Coordinator
Mario R. Alvarado

Guaymas Experimental Station Ing. M. T. Palao Experiment
Station Director
Ing. Julio Romero Principal Plant Breeder (Maize)
Ing. Victor Mendez Assistant to Principal Corn
Ing. Armando Borgas in charge of Weed Control Research
Ing. Jose A. Badia in charge of production
Ing. Aaron Aquilis in charge of Yula research
Ing. Alfredo Escoto in charge of National Rice Program
Agr. Eddy Soleman Rice Program

Cuyamel Ing. Leopoldo Crivelli on-farm research coordinator
Agr. Amberto Dominguez extension agent
Orlando Benjamin Alvarado CURLA student doing senior
paper on soil fertility

La Masica Menelio Madariaga
Ing. German A. Flores Enlace Tecnologico
Gustavo Batiz MRN Assistant Director, Litoral Atlantico

Page 50




A. Work Plans (all in English)
1. 4/18/83 (Draft), 1 January 1983 to 31 December 1984
2. Primera (1983A), 1 January 1983 to 31 October 1983, #83-20
3. Postera (1983B),
4. 1984 Plan, 1 January 1984 to 31 December 1984, #83-

B. Quarterly and Annual Reports (English and Spanish)
1. First, 1 Jan 83 to 31 March 1983, #83-4
2. Second, 1 April 1983 to 30 June 1983, #83-5
3. Third, 1 July 1983 to 30 Sept 1983, #83-19
4. Informe Trimestral, 1 March 1983 to 30 June 1983.
Antonio Silva
5. Informe Trimestral, July to September 1983,
Antonio Silva
6. Informe de Actividades, March to June 1983,
Norberto E. Urbina
7. Informe Trimestral, 1 July to 30 September 1983
Norberto E. Urbina
8. Informe Trimestral, April to June 1983, Mario
9. Informe Trimestral, July to September 1983, Mario
10. Informe de Actividades del Trimestre, March to
June 1983, Ligia Ramos
11. Informe Trimestral, July to September, Ligia Ramos
12. First Annual, 1 Jan 1983 to 31 Dec 1983, #83-

C. TDY Reports
1. Computer Science, Melchor Ortiz, June 22-July 10, 1983,
2. Experimental Statistics, Melchor Ortiz, January 6-14,
1983, #83-3
3. CURLA Entomology Collection, James Zimmerman, July 2-29,
1983, #83-14
4. (Plant Pathology) Orientation and Inspection Visit to
Honduras and HARP, J.A. Booth, July 25-29, 1983, #83-

D. Special Studies
1. Paspalum conjugatum: A Literature Search, Charles G. Dean,
June 13, 1983, #83-8
2. Panenecum maximum;Panicum purpurascens: A Literature
Search, Charles G. Dean, June 13, 1983, #83-9
3. Sistemas de production para arroz y maiz en Cuyamel:
problems y perspectives de investigation, September 1983
4. Resultado de tres encuestas realizadas en el valle de Yoro
durante 1982, December 1983
5. Agricultural Policy Paper Number 1: Policy for Agricultural
Research, Wilmer Harper

Page 51

6. Como Prevenir la Diseminacion de Caminadora (Rottboellia
exaltada) a Otras Areas en Honduras, September 1983

Page 52


A. Project
1. PID Agricultural Research Project, Ministry of Natural
Resources, Honduras, August 1978
2. PP Agricultural Research Project, Ministry of Natural Resources
3. PP Honduras Agricultural Sector II Program 522-0150
4. Agriculture Sector Assessment for Honduras, August 1978
5. Project Evaluation Summary, August 1980
6. Evaluation of USAID Honduras Agricultural Research Project No.
522-0139 with the National Agricultural Research Program (PNIA), March

B. Contract
1. Request for Technical Proposals (AID-PAN-82-6) Agricultural
Research Project Ministry of Natural Resources National Agricultural
Research Program, March 15, 1982
2. Cost Reimbursement Contract for Agricultural Research in
Honduras, October 1982

1. Country Development Strategy Statement: FY 1981 Honduras,
January 1979
2. Country Development Strategy Statement: FY 1981 Central America

Page 53


Proposal RFTP AID-PAN-82-6, May 11, 1982

Page 54


1. Presupuesto y Plan Operativo, Ano 1984, Noviembre 1983
2. Agricultural Research in Honduras, 1978
3. Funcionamiento del Programa Nacional de Investigacion
Agropecuaria y su Integracion en un Sistema Tecnologico, May 1981
4. Memoranda concerning "Enlace Tecnologico", 1983
5. El Desarrollo de la Investigacion Agricola en el Sector Publico
de Honduras, Robert Waugh, April 1981
6. Propuesta de Reestructuracion del Programa Nacional de
Investigation Agropecuaria, Noviembre 1980

B. Direccion Agricola Regional del Norte, Programa Nacional de
Extension Agropecuaria
1983 Caracterizacion del Area de Influencia de Agencia de Extension
de Cuyamel, Cortes

Page 55


Byerlee, Derek, Larry Harrington and Donald L. Winklemann, 1982,
"Farming Systems Research: Issues in research strategy and technology
design", In American Journal of Agricultural Economics:64:5

Contreras, Mario Ruben, et.al., 1977, "An Interdisciplinary
Approach to International Agricultural Training: The Cornell-CIMMYT
Graduate Student Team Report", Cornell International Agriculture

De Walt, Billie R. and Kathleen M. De Walt, June 1982, A Farming
Systems Approach Report No. 1: Cropping Systems in Perspire, Southern

Galt, Daniel, et.al., 1982, Farming Systems Research (FSR) in
Honduras, 1977-81: a Case Study, Working Paper No. 1, MSU International
Development Papers, Michigan State University

Safilios-Rothschild, Constantina, 1983, "Women and the Agrarian
Refom in Honduras", in Land Reform: Land Settlement and Cooperatives,
FAO, Rome 15-24

Safilios-Rothschild, Constantina, September 1983, The Impact of
Agrarian Reform on Men and Women in Honduras

Whyte, William F., Participatory Approaches to Agricultural
Research and Developmemt: A State-of-the-Art Paper, Rural Development
Committee ARE No. 1, Cornell University

Page 56



1. MONDAY, 30 JANUARY 1984

6 HARP team members (Ing. de Ramos was absent.)
4 FSSP Evaluation team members
2 CID Evaluation team members
Ing. Gerardo A. Reyes, DIA Assistant National Director
Ing. Roberto Larios Mejia, Regional MRN Director
Guillermo Alvarado, Regional Planning Director
Ing. Francisca de Escoto, Regional MRN Research/Extension
Hector Fernandez, Regional DIA Chief
Enrique Cano, Regional DEA Chief
Dr. Melchor Ortiz, NMSU TDY Statistician

19 people registered themselves as attending; more people attended.


6 HARP team members (Ing. de Ramos was absent.)
2 FSSP evaluation team members (Hansen and Marvel)
Dr. Mario Contreras, USAID Technical Support Officer
Ing. Adan Bonilla Contreras, DIA National Director
Ing. Gerardo A. Reyes, DIA Assistant National Director
Ing. Antonio Silva, UNAT Agricultural Economist
Ing. Roberto Larios Mejia, Regional MRN Director
Ing. Francisca de Escoto, Regional Research/Extension Liaison
Hector Fernandez, Regional DIA Chief
N. Reyes Discua, DIA agent

16 people registered themselves as attending; more people attended.

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