• TABLE OF CONTENTS
HIDE
 Front Cover
 Title Page
 Table of Contents
 Executive summary
 Introduction
 Background of project and HARP
 Establishment of HARP contract
 Outputs
 Issues and recommendations
 Evaluation team itinerary
 List of people met by team
 Reference documents
 People attending preliminary report...
 Acronyms used in text
 Resumen ejecutivo
 Metodologia de investigacion






Title: Evaluation of Honduras Agricultural Research Project
CITATION PAGE IMAGE ZOOMABLE PAGE TEXT
Full Citation
STANDARD VIEW MARC VIEW
Permanent Link: http://ufdc.ufl.edu/UF00053841/00001
 Material Information
Title: Evaluation of Honduras Agricultural Research Project
Physical Description: v. : ; 28 cm.
Language: English
Creator: Farming Systems Support Project
Farming Systems Support Project
University of Florida -- Institute of Food and Agricultural Sciences. -- International Programs
United States -- Agency for International Development. -- Office of Agriculture
United States -- Agency for International Development. -- Office of Multi-Sectoral Development
Honduras Agricultural Research Project
Consortium for International Development
New Mexico State University
Publisher: International Programs, Institute of Food and Agricultural Sciences, University of Florida
Office of Agriculture and Office of Multisectoral Development, Bureau for Science and Technology, Agency for International Development
Place of Publication: Gainesville Fla
Washington D.C
Publication Date: 1984-
Frequency: annual
 Subjects
Subject: Agricultural systems -- Periodicals -- Honduras   ( lcsh )
Farm management -- Periodicals -- Honduras   ( lcsh )
Agriculture -- Periodicals -- Honduras   ( lcsh )
 Notes
Statement of Responsibility: Farming Systems Support Project (FSSP).
Dates or Sequential Designation: 1984-
General Note: Title from cover.
General Note: "Contract with the Consortium for International Development and ... New Mexico State University ... 522-0139-C-00-2059"--P.v.
Funding: Florida Historical Agriculture and Rural Life
 Record Information
Bibliographic ID: UF00053841
Volume ID: VID00001
Source Institution: Marston Science Library, George A. Smathers Libraries, University of Florida
Holding Location: Florida Agricultural Experiment Station, Florida Cooperative Extension Service, Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, and the Engineering and Industrial Experiment Station; Institute for Food and Agricultural Services (IFAS), University of Florida
Rights Management: All rights reserved, Board of Trustees of the University of Florida
Resource Identifier: aleph - 001938060
oclc - 53295443
notis - AKB4194
lccn - 2003229213

Table of Contents
    Front Cover
        Front Cover
    Title Page
        Page i
        Page ii
    Table of Contents
        Page iii
        Page iv
    Executive summary
        Page v
        Page vi
        Page vii
        Page viii
    Introduction
        Page 5
        Objective of the evaluation
            Page 5
        Evaluation team methodology
            Page 6
        key issues to be addressed
            Page 6
            Page 7
            Page 8
    Background of project and HARP
        Page 9
        Pre-project activities
            Page 9
        Beginning of the project
            Page 9
        The 1981 project evaluation
            Page 10
            Page 11
            Page 12
    Establishment of HARP contract
        Page 13
        RFTP
            Page 13
            Page 14
        Restriction to Yoro valley
            Page 15
        HARP contract
            Page 15
        Inclusion of CURLA responsibilities
            Page 15
        Subsequent changes in leadership and scope
            Page 16
        Hierarchical ambiguity
            Page 16
            Page 17
        Impact on work plans
            Page 18
        Team formation
            Page 19
        Research methodology
            Page 20
            Page 21
            Page 22
        Administration
            Page 23
            Page 24
    Outputs
        Page 25
        Entomology
            Page 25
            Page 26
            Page 27
        Agricultural economics
            Page 28
            Page 29
            Page 30
            Page 31
        Weed control
            Page 32
            Page 33
            Page 34
        Soil fertility
            Page 35
            Page 36
            Page 37
            Page 38
        CURLA
            Page 39
        Dissemination
            Page 40
            Page 41
            Page 42
    Issues and recommendations
        Page 43
        Commitment and coordination
            Page 43
        Scope of work
            Page 44
        Financial security and planning
            Page 45
        Research methodology
            Page 46
            Page 47
        USAID involvement in agricultural research
            Page 48
        Reports
            Page 49
        Secondary recommendations
            Page 50
    Evaluation team itinerary
        Page 51
        Page 52
    List of people met by team
        Page 53
        Page 54
    Reference documents
        Page 55
        Page 56
        Page 57
        Page 58
    People attending preliminary report meetings
        Page 59
        Page 60
    Acronyms used in text
        Page 61
        Page 62
    Resumen ejecutivo
        Page 63
        Page 64
        Page 65
        Page 66
    Metodologia de investigacion
        Page 67
        Page 68
        Page 69
Full Text





Of'.
d9 A


Farming Systems Support Project


International Programs
Institute of Food and
Agricultural Sciences
University of Florida
Gainesville, Florida 32611


Office of Agriculture and
Office of Multisectoral Development
Bureau for Science and Technology
Agency for International Development
Washington, D.C. 20523


I -


)V6
Ota















EVALUATION OF


HONDURAS AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH PROJECT

CID/NMSU CONTRACT 522-0139-C-00-2059












Evaluation Team Members:
Dr. Art Hansen (anthropologist), University of Florida
Dr. Mason E. Marvel (vegetable crops specialist), Ayudamos
Dr. Vernon B. Cardwell (agronomist), University of
Minnesota
Dr. Gustavo Arcia (agricultural economist),.Research
Triangle Institute















Evaluation Sponsored by
Farming Systems Support Project
March 1984












TABLE OF CONTENTS


Page
Executive Summary (see appendix F for Spanish summary) v


I. Introduction
Objective of the Evaluation 5
Evaluation Team Methodology 6
Key Issues to be Addressed 6

II. Background of Project and HARP
Pre-Project Activities 9
Beginning of the Project 9
The 1981 Project Evaluation 10

III. Establishment of HARP Contract
RFTP 13
Restriction to Yoro Valley 15
HARP Contract 15
Inclusion of CURLA .Responsibilities 15
Subsequent Changes in Leadership and Scope 16
Hierarchical Ambiguity 16
Impact on Work Plans 18
Team Formation 19
Research Methodology 20
Administration 23

IV. Outputs
Entomology 25
Agricultural Economics 28
Weed Control 31
Soil Fertility 35
CURLA 39
Dissemination 40

V. Issues and Recommendations
Commitment and Coordination 43
Scope of Work 44
Financial Security and Planning 45
Research Methodology 46
USAID Involvement in Agricultural Research 49
Reports 49
Secondary Recommendations 50

VI. Appendices
A Evaluation Team Itinerary 51
B List of People Met by Team 53
C Reference Documents 55
D People Attending Preliminary Report
Meetings 59
E Acronyms Used in the Text 61
F Resumen Ejecutivo 63
G Metodologia de Investigacion 67












EXECUTIVE SUMMARY


The stated purpose of the Agricultural Research Project
(No. 522-0139) is to assist the Government of Honduras (GOH)
to expand its agricultural research service within the
Ministry of Natural Resources (MRN), making it more
responsive to the technological needs of small and medium
size independent and agrarian reform farmers. The Project
began in October 1978 as a host country contract with direct
funding to the GOH National Program for Agricultural
Research (PNIA, now DIA). Momentum for the Project faltered
by the end of 1980 because of political and economic
conditions in Honduras.

In October 1982 another phase of the Project began with
the signing of a technical assistance (TA) Contract with the
Consortium for International Development and its lead
institution, New Mexico State University' (CID/NMSU). The 18
month Contract (522-0139-C-00-2059) was funded by unused
Project funds and provided four TA people for 18 months each
and additional short term TA support.

This evaluation is the first for the HARP (Honduras
Agricultural Research Project) but the third of four
scheduled for the overarching Project. The other two
evaluations were in February 1980 and April 1981, while this
one occurs almost three years later in January 1984.

Briefly, the objectives of this evaluation are to:
1) Assess the achievements and weaknesses of the
present Contract;
2) Place these achievements and weaknesses in the
context of the Project and the current host
country situation;
3) Determine if the Contract should be extended for
six months; and
4) Recommend any corrective measures for the remainder
of the Contract.

The six Contract-specific problems which have arisen
during 1983-1984, and the evaluation team recommendations
for resolving them, are listed below.

Problem 1: Commitment and Coordination
Original flaws in Contract design and understanding of
how expatriate technical assistance personnel could fit into
the present DIA, including the flaw of designing a farming
systems research (FSR) support project to last only 18 or 24
months, have caused on-going problems. Corresponding
confusion about the organizational placement of HARP in
relation to DIA, USAID, and NMSU has contributed to a
feeling among Hondurans that HARP is not part of the
Ministry. This has been a concern from the beginning of the













Contract.


Recommendation 1. Agreement be reached among DIA, the
MRN Regional Director, USAID, and HARP personnel on (a) the
scope of work for the remainder of the HARP contract (to
July, 1984); (b) salaries for Honduran HARP personnel; (c)
relationships among, and lines of authority between, DIA,
HARP and the MRN regional director; and (d) a possible
Contract extension of six months.

Problem 2: Confusion over scope of work.
At least three changes in the project's scope of work
have occurred, all initiated either by USAID or DIA. HARP
has had little choice but to accept such changes or leave.

Recommendation 2. During the final six months of the
Contract, HARP should (a) drastically cut back on direct
field research; (b) concentrate on analysis of existing
data; (c) stress technical support for Honduran researchers;
and (d) emphasize training.

Problem 3: Financial. security and planning.
Uncertainty about the salaries of Honduran HARP
personnel has consistently been an important financial
issue. Other financial uncertainties have adversely
affected HARP training efforts and the discussed six-month
Contract extension.

Recommendation 3. If agreements have not been reached,
and'sufficient USAID funding for training and for the
extension assured in writing before the end of February.
1984, HARP should terminate at the end of its scheduled 18
months.

Problem 4: Research methodology.
There has been a recurrent and consistent problem of
methodological arguments about divergent definitions of
"farming systems research" and "on farm research". Another
problem has been disagreements over the extent of leadership
HARP expatriates should provide. These problems have
contributed to the organizational confusion and to a
structural opposition between the Honduran and the NMSU
staffs of HARP.

Recommendation 4. The HARP team should schedule
regular weekly meetings in which the only topic of
discussion is research methodology. As a team HARP should
examine its 1983 experiences, as well as other relevant
Honduras information, to identify methodological problems.
The Honduran HARP personnel should act as discussion
leaders, with expatriate counterparts listening to learn
what the Hondurans consider the most important
methodological constraints in the Honduran context. Six
specific discussion topics are outlined in the body of the
evaluation report (section V, Issues and Recommendations).














Problem 5: USAID involvement in agricultural research.
USAID is involved in a number of existing and proposed
projects in the general area of agricultural research and
development. There is no obvious program unifying these
projects nor clarifying their relationship with FSR.

Recommendation 5: USAID should commission an
evaluation of its agricultural research and development
efforts. The evaluation team believes that a major
component of these efforts should be continued support for
FSR. Thus it is important to have FSSP participation in
this broad evaluation. GOH commitment, Honduran
professional leadership, and relationships between any
proposed institute and FSR are all issues which must be
considered.

Problem 6: Report writing, intended audience, and
Project visitors.
Quarterly reports from HARP have been.delayed,
fragmented and a source of dissatisfaction for MRN because
they seem to identify HARP as solely a CID/NMSU endeavor.
The flow of TDY consultants and other visitors to and from
HARP, San Pedro Sula and CURLA puzzles and irritates many
Hondurans. They wonder'about the source of funding for such
activities and the amount of time such visits take away from
research priorities.

Recommendation. 6. (a) Harp should refocus its
attention on the quarterly and annual reports which are
required by the Contract to be in Spanish. These reports
need to be more rapidly distributed to both USAID and DIA.
(b) All project sponsors, including DIA, USAID, CID/NMSU
and all HARP personnel, need to all be properly identified
on all reports and all cover pages. All sponsors need to
approve changes in scopes of work. (c) The HARP quarterly
reports should include the quarterly reports of all HARP
personnel. (d) All short term (TDY) personnel should leave
behind draft reports in Spanish before leaving Honduras.
They should also have a personal meeting with the HARP COP
and the DIA Director (at his discretion). Final reports
should also be in Spanish and should arrive in Honduras
within one month of departure. (e) DIA and MRN Regional
Director should be informed in advance of all CID or NMSU
administrative or technical people who will be visiting
Honduras and HARP. This will minimize misunderstanding as
well as emphasize that HARP time and vehicles are
accountable to both USAID and DIA/MRN.

Additional specific evaluation team recommendations are
listed in the body of the report, especially in the Outputs
section (IV) and the Issues and Recommendations section (V).









Page 5


I. INTRODUCTION


The purpose of the Agricultural Research Project
(number 522-0139, hereafter called the Project) is to assist
the Government of Honduras to expand its agricultural
research service within the Ministry of Natural Resources
(Ministerio de Recursos Naturales or MRN) and make it more
responsive to the technological needs of small and medium
size independent and agrarian reform -farmers. Grant funds
for a total of $1,900,000 were made available starting in
1978 to provide technical assistance and supplemental
logistical support. The National Agricultural Research
Program (Programa Nacional de Investigaciones Agricolas or
PNIA) had been largely oriented toward on-station and single
commodity research before 1977. At that time it began a
modest experiment in multidisciplinary farm-based research
in order to seek a more effective approach to understanding
farmer problems and to utilizing their on-station research
capabilities to help solve those problems. The USAID
Project was developed to strengthen and extend this new PNIA
approach. The Project was signed in October 1978.

*In October 1982 USAID and the Consortium for
International Development (CID) signed an Agricultural
Research Contract (number 522-0139-C-00-2059-00, hereafter
called the Contract) for the purpose of continuing the work
of the original Project. New Mexico State University (NMSU)
is the lead institution for CID in the Contract. A total of
$1,085,099 of grant funds remained from the original Project
.budget, and this was the basis for the USAID financial
support.for the Contract. Although envisioned in the
Request for Technical Proposals as a two year involvement,
the final Contract was for eighteen months (January 1983 -
July 1984). The work funded by this Contract is entitled
the Honduras Agricultural Research Project (HARP). The term
Project will be used in this evaluation only to refer to the
overarching Project that began in 1978, while HARP will be
used to refer to the present more limited work covered by
the Contractd

In September 1983 PNIA was renamed the Department of
Agricultural Research (Departmento de Investigaciones
Agricolas or DIA). This report will use only DIA (not PNIA)
in references.


Objective of the Evaluation


This evaluation is the first for the Contract but the
third of four scheduled for the Project. The first
evaluation was in February 1980, nineteen months after the
Project began and approximately midway through the









Page 5


I. INTRODUCTION


The purpose of the Agricultural Research Project
(number 522-0139, hereafter called the Project) is to assist
the Government of Honduras to expand its agricultural
research service within the Ministry of Natural Resources
(Ministerio de Recursos Naturales or MRN) and make it more
responsive to the technological needs of small and medium
size independent and agrarian reform -farmers. Grant funds
for a total of $1,900,000 were made available starting in
1978 to provide technical assistance and supplemental
logistical support. The National Agricultural Research
Program (Programa Nacional de Investigaciones Agricolas or
PNIA) had been largely oriented toward on-station and single
commodity research before 1977. At that time it began a
modest experiment in multidisciplinary farm-based research
in order to seek a more effective approach to understanding
farmer problems and to utilizing their on-station research
capabilities to help solve those problems. The USAID
Project was developed to strengthen and extend this new PNIA
approach. The Project was signed in October 1978.

*In October 1982 USAID and the Consortium for
International Development (CID) signed an Agricultural
Research Contract (number 522-0139-C-00-2059-00, hereafter
called the Contract) for the purpose of continuing the work
of the original Project. New Mexico State University (NMSU)
is the lead institution for CID in the Contract. A total of
$1,085,099 of grant funds remained from the original Project
.budget, and this was the basis for the USAID financial
support.for the Contract. Although envisioned in the
Request for Technical Proposals as a two year involvement,
the final Contract was for eighteen months (January 1983 -
July 1984). The work funded by this Contract is entitled
the Honduras Agricultural Research Project (HARP). The term
Project will be used in this evaluation only to refer to the
overarching Project that began in 1978, while HARP will be
used to refer to the present more limited work covered by
the Contractd

In September 1983 PNIA was renamed the Department of
Agricultural Research (Departmento de Investigaciones
Agricolas or DIA). This report will use only DIA (not PNIA)
in references.


Objective of the Evaluation


This evaluation is the first for the Contract but the
third of four scheduled for the Project. The first
evaluation was in February 1980, nineteen months after the
Project began and approximately midway through the








Page 6


anticipated life of the Project. The second evaluation
occurred fouteen months later in April 1981. This
evaluation takes place in January 1984, almost three years
after the preceding evaluation and only one year after the
Contract technical assistance team arrived in Honduras.

The objective of this evaluation is to assess the
achievements and weaknesses of HARP and the present
Contract, place them in perspective of the Project and the
current situation in Honduras, recommend whether the
Contract should be extended for another six months to
complete the originally scheduled two years, and recommend
corrective measures in order to more effectively utilize the
remaining time and funding.


Evaluation Team Methodology


A four person team was assembled by the USAID-funded
Farming Systems Support Project (FSSP) to conduct this
evaluation. The team spent one day at the University of
Florida, the lead institution for FSSP, being briefed on the
Project before leaving for Honduras, and the team spent
approximately one week in Honduras. An itenerary for the
team is included as Appendix A. In Tegucigalpa the team was
briefed by.USAID/Honduras and officials from DIA and in San
Pedro Sula by HARP. The team also met with research and
extension staff, farmers and administrators in Region 2
(Comayagua), Region 3 (San Pedro, Guaymas and Yoro), and
Region 4 (La Ceiba and La Masica). A list of individuals
and agencies contacted appears as Appendix B. Background
documents were acquired at all these briefings, and a list
of these appears as Appendix C.

A preliminary report was presented twice in San Pedro
Sula to representatives of MRN (including the leadership of
DIA), USAID/Honduras, the entire HARP team, and other
interested agencies (see Appendix D). Their suggestions and
comments have been incorporated into the final report
wherever appropriate.


Key Issues to be Addressed


Some of the problems encountered in 1983-1984 by HARP
are not new and were listed in the earlier evaluations.
(Refer to those documents for details.) These problems
include:
1) coordination difficulties when a national research
program is administered through decentralized
regional directorates, which control most of the
research budget;
2) personnel crises and rapid turnover of personnel








Page 6


anticipated life of the Project. The second evaluation
occurred fouteen months later in April 1981. This
evaluation takes place in January 1984, almost three years
after the preceding evaluation and only one year after the
Contract technical assistance team arrived in Honduras.

The objective of this evaluation is to assess the
achievements and weaknesses of HARP and the present
Contract, place them in perspective of the Project and the
current situation in Honduras, recommend whether the
Contract should be extended for another six months to
complete the originally scheduled two years, and recommend
corrective measures in order to more effectively utilize the
remaining time and funding.


Evaluation Team Methodology


A four person team was assembled by the USAID-funded
Farming Systems Support Project (FSSP) to conduct this
evaluation. The team spent one day at the University of
Florida, the lead institution for FSSP, being briefed on the
Project before leaving for Honduras, and the team spent
approximately one week in Honduras. An itenerary for the
team is included as Appendix A. In Tegucigalpa the team was
briefed by.USAID/Honduras and officials from DIA and in San
Pedro Sula by HARP. The team also met with research and
extension staff, farmers and administrators in Region 2
(Comayagua), Region 3 (San Pedro, Guaymas and Yoro), and
Region 4 (La Ceiba and La Masica). A list of individuals
and agencies contacted appears as Appendix B. Background
documents were acquired at all these briefings, and a list
of these appears as Appendix C.

A preliminary report was presented twice in San Pedro
Sula to representatives of MRN (including the leadership of
DIA), USAID/Honduras, the entire HARP team, and other
interested agencies (see Appendix D). Their suggestions and
comments have been incorporated into the final report
wherever appropriate.


Key Issues to be Addressed


Some of the problems encountered in 1983-1984 by HARP
are not new and were listed in the earlier evaluations.
(Refer to those documents for details.) These problems
include:
1) coordination difficulties when a national research
program is administered through decentralized
regional directorates, which control most of the
research budget;
2) personnel crises and rapid turnover of personnel









Page 7


because research personnel receive low salaries and
often encounter delays in reimbursement for travel
expenses;
3) frictions between Honduran and foreign technicians;
and
4) planning deficiencies caused by personnel turnover
and fiscal uncertainty.

Other problems have been generated as a result of the
present Contract. These received more attention in this
evaluation and are the bases for our recommendations. They
include:
1) original flaws in Contract design and understanding
of how expatriate technical assistance personnel
would/could fit into the present DIA, including the
flaw of designing a farming systems research (FSR)
support project for only 18 or 24 months;
2) confusion concerning the organizational placement of
HARP in relation to DIA, USAID, and NMSU, which has
contributed to a feeling among the Hondurans inside
and outside HARP that it is not part of the
Ministry;
3) confusion concerning the mandate and goals for HARP,
which was complicated by the inclusion of
responsibilities for the University Center (Centro
Universitario Regional para el Litoral Atlantico or
CURLA) near La Ceiba;
4) divergent definitions of "farming systems research"
and "on farm research" and methodological arguments
which have contributed to the organizational
confusion and contributed to a structural opposition
between Honduran professionals and the NMSU staff of
HARP;
5) planning difficulties due to the .ambiguous
availability of other USAID funds for 'counterpart
salaries, to support increased in-service training,
and to extent HARP for six more months through
December 1984; and
6) divergent opinions on the focus of HARP (technical
support, research and training activities) during
the few (5 or 11 depending on the extension)
remaining months of the Contract.










Page 9


II. BACKGROUND OF PROJECT AND HARP

Pre-Project Activities


On-farm, systems-oriented, multidisciplinary research
began in Honduras in 1977, almost two years before this
Project was initiated. A Honduran plant pathologist
returned from postgraduate training to work in PNIA (now
DIA) and attracted to Honduras several colleagues in other
disciplines who had graduated with him. They had conducted
coordinated dissertation research in Mexico with CIMMYT as
an experiment in multidisciplinary agricultural education,
and in Honduras they established a new approach to
agricultural research. Together with other highly qualified
technicians they formed a multidisciplinary team and the
foundation of the Project.

There were difficulties at the beginning, some of which
continue until the present day. The creation and staffing
of a Central Unit for Technical Support.(Unidad Nacional de
Apoyo Tecnico or UNAT) was one issue. Another was
opposition to the new approach by research staff who were
familiar'with and identified with the earlier mode of
research. These researchers utilized another mode of
on-farm trials which were single commodity oriented,
utilized.complex designs similar to those used on research
stations, and were intended to test ecological adaptability
only (usually focusing on varietal selection). This
reflected an earlier mode of research at CIMMYT and showed
how conflicts among national researchers may reflect changes
in what they were taught by outsiders. It also expresses
the continuing strong influence in Honduras of CIMMYT and
other regional or international research centers.


Beginning of the Project


A report entitled Agricultural Research in Honduras was
prepared in January 1978 by DIA staff with collaboration
from IADS. This report identified four basic factors or
elements of strategy that needed attention in order to
strenghten DIA and increase ,DIA's impact on farmers' yields
and national production. The four were:

1 ~farmer-focused, integrated multidisciplinary
approach to research and technology transfer;
2).a strong national experiment station network;
3) manpower development; and
4) closer linkages with domestic and external
institutions.

This report was the foundation for designing the
Project which was approved in August 1978. The Project










Page 9


II. BACKGROUND OF PROJECT AND HARP

Pre-Project Activities


On-farm, systems-oriented, multidisciplinary research
began in Honduras in 1977, almost two years before this
Project was initiated. A Honduran plant pathologist
returned from postgraduate training to work in PNIA (now
DIA) and attracted to Honduras several colleagues in other
disciplines who had graduated with him. They had conducted
coordinated dissertation research in Mexico with CIMMYT as
an experiment in multidisciplinary agricultural education,
and in Honduras they established a new approach to
agricultural research. Together with other highly qualified
technicians they formed a multidisciplinary team and the
foundation of the Project.

There were difficulties at the beginning, some of which
continue until the present day. The creation and staffing
of a Central Unit for Technical Support.(Unidad Nacional de
Apoyo Tecnico or UNAT) was one issue. Another was
opposition to the new approach by research staff who were
familiar'with and identified with the earlier mode of
research. These researchers utilized another mode of
on-farm trials which were single commodity oriented,
utilized.complex designs similar to those used on research
stations, and were intended to test ecological adaptability
only (usually focusing on varietal selection). This
reflected an earlier mode of research at CIMMYT and showed
how conflicts among national researchers may reflect changes
in what they were taught by outsiders. It also expresses
the continuing strong influence in Honduras of CIMMYT and
other regional or international research centers.


Beginning of the Project


A report entitled Agricultural Research in Honduras was
prepared in January 1978 by DIA staff with collaboration
from IADS. This report identified four basic factors or
elements of strategy that needed attention in order to
strenghten DIA and increase ,DIA's impact on farmers' yields
and national production. The four were:

1 ~farmer-focused, integrated multidisciplinary
approach to research and technology transfer;
2).a strong national experiment station network;
3) manpower development; and
4) closer linkages with domestic and external
institutions.

This report was the foundation for designing the
Project which was approved in August 1978. The Project










Page 9


II. BACKGROUND OF PROJECT AND HARP

Pre-Project Activities


On-farm, systems-oriented, multidisciplinary research
began in Honduras in 1977, almost two years before this
Project was initiated. A Honduran plant pathologist
returned from postgraduate training to work in PNIA (now
DIA) and attracted to Honduras several colleagues in other
disciplines who had graduated with him. They had conducted
coordinated dissertation research in Mexico with CIMMYT as
an experiment in multidisciplinary agricultural education,
and in Honduras they established a new approach to
agricultural research. Together with other highly qualified
technicians they formed a multidisciplinary team and the
foundation of the Project.

There were difficulties at the beginning, some of which
continue until the present day. The creation and staffing
of a Central Unit for Technical Support.(Unidad Nacional de
Apoyo Tecnico or UNAT) was one issue. Another was
opposition to the new approach by research staff who were
familiar'with and identified with the earlier mode of
research. These researchers utilized another mode of
on-farm trials which were single commodity oriented,
utilized.complex designs similar to those used on research
stations, and were intended to test ecological adaptability
only (usually focusing on varietal selection). This
reflected an earlier mode of research at CIMMYT and showed
how conflicts among national researchers may reflect changes
in what they were taught by outsiders. It also expresses
the continuing strong influence in Honduras of CIMMYT and
other regional or international research centers.


Beginning of the Project


A report entitled Agricultural Research in Honduras was
prepared in January 1978 by DIA staff with collaboration
from IADS. This report identified four basic factors or
elements of strategy that needed attention in order to
strenghten DIA and increase ,DIA's impact on farmers' yields
and national production. The four were:

1 ~farmer-focused, integrated multidisciplinary
approach to research and technology transfer;
2).a strong national experiment station network;
3) manpower development; and
4) closer linkages with domestic and external
institutions.

This report was the foundation for designing the
Project which was approved in August 1978. The Project









Page 10


focused on institutionalizing the approach noted in the
above paragraph and developing a long-term national research
strategy, while other donors were to focus on strengthening
the agricultural research stations, including infrastructure
and long-term training. The specific objective of the
Project was to establish multidisciplinary, on-farm,
systems-oriented research teams in all seven regions of
Honduras, with some assistance also being provided to a
small farmer technologies program. USAID funds were
primarily for long and short-term technical assistance with
smaller funding being.provided for participant and
in-service training, vehicles and equipment, etc. The
Honduran government funds supported counterpart personnel,
etc.

During 1979 and 1980 the Project-was quite successful,
and the DIA developed in many ways. Several important
documents describe
organizational and functional changes in DIA and directions
in which the research establishment was heading: Documento
Basico (1979), Guia Metodologica para Conduccion de Ensayos
de Finca (1979), and Funcionamiento del Programa Nacional de
Investigation Agropecuaria y su Integracion en un Sistema
Tecnologico (1980).- This last report continues to be used
as a fundamental statement of where agricultural research
should be heading in Honduras. The first evaluation of the
Project was also conducted in early 1980 (February) when the
Project was seen to be continuing quite successfully.


The 1981 Project Evaluation


This picture had changed by the end of 1980. The
Honduran and expatriate professionals who had been key
personnel in the introduction of the new mode of research
had left or were leaving, and they were not being replaced
by people with the same commitment. Political and economic
developments in Honduras made it difficult to continue;
there were drastic cuts in DIA's budget for operating
expenses; and there was little indication thatthe national
government supported the research program.

The April 1981 evaluation addressed these issues while
recognizing the significant progress that had been made in
several areas by the DIA with its Project (and other)
support. Five major recommendations were made by the
evaluation team.

The five recommendations were based on the assumption
that the Government of Honduras (GOH) was committed to
allocate enough resources to MRN to enable it to conduct
effective agricultural research. Sufficient resources would
allow DIA to increase the number of direct hire contracted
professional positions to at least 70. GOH commitment would








Page 11


also be demonstrated by developing and approving a longer
term plan of action for DIA and by signing personnel
contracts. The evaluation team pointed out that decisions
on their recommendations had to be made then (1981) in order
to maintain the momentum of the research in progress. The
five recommendations were as follows:

1) Project funds should be used to provide logistical
support to on-farm researchers. These Project funds would
complement, not replace, DIA commitments. Therefore, the
upper limit of logistical support would be the amount
committed by DIA.

2) Project funds should also be used to contract
long-term technical assistance personnel for UNAT. UNAT
needed to be reorganized.- At least six disciplines should
be represented, including plant pathology, entomology,
agricultural economics, biometrics, soil management and weed
control. Honduran technicians should receive preference in
filling these positions, but expatriates should be hired if
Hondurans were not available. The salaries for Honduran and
non-Honduran personnel should be comparable, based of course
on training and experience. This technical.assistance
needed to be supported so Project funds should complement
(not exceed) GOH contributions for logistical support, and
vehicles and equipment needed to be procured. These UNAT
technicians should prepare an in-service training program,
and Project funds should be used to cover the entire cost of
the training program.

3) Some laboratory equipment should be purchased for
plant breeders. The rice and maize breeders at Guaymas
Research Station were noted as an example since their lack
of equipment impeded their work. Short-term technical
assistance would be needed to identify the equipment needed.


4) Short-term technical assistance personnel should be
hired to assist DIA in developing new computer programs and
in acquiring appropriate computer equipment. The plant
breeders at San Pedro Sula were already using a
microcomputer but needed some technical assistance. In
addition, computer facilities should be established in
Region 2 (Comayagua), and this also required technical
assistance.

5) DIA should be required by MRN to prepare better
plans by the end of August 1981, and long-term technical
assistance personnel should be brought in to design a
planning system and help prepare long-, medium- and
short-term plans. It was noted that the easiest way to get
that technical assistance might be through subcontracting an
international center such as CATIE, CIMMYT or CIAT.

The second recommendation was emphasized above because









Page 12


it was the basis for the present HARP Contract. Long-term
technical assistance was needed for a strengthened and
reorganized UNAT. Those technical advisors needed Project
funding for their salaries, logistical support, equipment
and vehicles as well as for an intensive in-service training
program.

It is significant that the recommendation specifically
noted the preference that well-qualified Hondurans be hired
as the technical assistance personnel. If there was to be a
mix of Hondurans and expatriates then salaries should be
comparable, based on training and experience. These
guidelines were included because there was a documented
history of DIA reluctance to contract expatriate advisors.

The documented problem in dealing with expatriate
advisors helps explain some of HARP's difficulties during
1983. The evaluation noted that the reluctance stemmed from
administrative problems which make planning for and
supervising technical assistance difficult and from a sense
of jealousy over the disparity in salaries between
expatriates and national employees. Two advisors, noted the
evaluation, left the Project prior to completion of their
contracts and cited administrative problems, poor management
of their work, and personal conflicts with Honduran
counterparts as the reasons for early termination. A third
advisor's work was delayed in starting for months because
the DIA administration was unable to coordinate his field
work.

The evaluation noted that Honduran government employees
and contractors were paid little and sporadically, and that
this accounted for their jealousy. Until conditions were
such that a reasonable number of well-qualified Honduran
research professionals felt secure in their own long-term
commitments to the research program, the evaluation team
thought that research planning and results would be largely
ineffective.

Fundamentally, the evaluation pointed to the degree of
commitment by GOH to the. MNR and DIA. Commitment translates
into adequate and stable funding. That funding improves
professional salaries, permits long-term planning, lowers
the turnover of personnel and facilitates the interaction of
Honduran and expatriate advisors, The evaluation team did
not find the commitment.









Page 13


III. ESTABLISHMENT OF HARP CONTRACT


HARP was designed and implemented in a series of
ill-coordinated stages. The first stage was the 1981
evaluation described above. The second stage was the USAID
Request for Technical Assistance (RFTP) and the CID/NMSU
response. The third stage was a change in scope initiated
by DIA. The fourth stage was the Contract itself. The
fifth stage was a USAID-initiated change in scope after the
CID/NMSU team arrived in Honduras, and the sixth stage was a
subsequent series of DIA-initiated changes in scope of work.

RFTP
The RFTP was issued by USAID in March 1982, a year
after the 1981 evaluation. The RFTP clearly saw this
Contract as a continuation of the Project and a response to
needs pointed out in the 1981 evaluation. Four long term
(two years each) and four short-term (two months each)
technical assistance advisors were needed. The long term
advisors were being contracted as part of the UNAT, which
was to be reorganized. Individual members of UNAT,
including Hondurans, would be placed in specific regions
where their skills were most needed, but all members would
meet regularly as a unit (UNAT) to deal with problems on a
national level, plan for the training needs of DIA
personnel, and advise the DIA director on program
requirements.

Long Term Advisors Short Term Areas
1. Weed Control Specialist 1. Research Station Management
2. Agricultural Economist 2. Statistics
3. Entomologist 3. Communications
4. Soil Fertility Specialist 4. Germplasm Conservation

These long-term advisors were not specifically
identified as the core of UNAT since the RFTP noted that
Hondurans (of whatever professional level) would also be
part of UNAT, but a significant change had occurred between
the 1981 evaluation and the 1982 RFTP. The evaluation
expressed a preference that Hondurans be hired for UNAT
using Project funds. This was expressed clearly in the
evaluation summary which condensed the second recommendation
to read as follows:
to reorganize the Technical Support Unit of
the Project, utilizing A.I.D. grant funds to
contract highly-qualified Honduran
personnel."

The RFTP was not requesting Honduran professionals and was,
due to the usual RFTP distribution and response channels,
essentially stating that these four key professionals were to be
expatriates. Four expatriate professionals as a Contract team
with its Chief of Party, supporting funds and short term









Page 13


III. ESTABLISHMENT OF HARP CONTRACT


HARP was designed and implemented in a series of
ill-coordinated stages. The first stage was the 1981
evaluation described above. The second stage was the USAID
Request for Technical Assistance (RFTP) and the CID/NMSU
response. The third stage was a change in scope initiated
by DIA. The fourth stage was the Contract itself. The
fifth stage was a USAID-initiated change in scope after the
CID/NMSU team arrived in Honduras, and the sixth stage was a
subsequent series of DIA-initiated changes in scope of work.

RFTP
The RFTP was issued by USAID in March 1982, a year
after the 1981 evaluation. The RFTP clearly saw this
Contract as a continuation of the Project and a response to
needs pointed out in the 1981 evaluation. Four long term
(two years each) and four short-term (two months each)
technical assistance advisors were needed. The long term
advisors were being contracted as part of the UNAT, which
was to be reorganized. Individual members of UNAT,
including Hondurans, would be placed in specific regions
where their skills were most needed, but all members would
meet regularly as a unit (UNAT) to deal with problems on a
national level, plan for the training needs of DIA
personnel, and advise the DIA director on program
requirements.

Long Term Advisors Short Term Areas
1. Weed Control Specialist 1. Research Station Management
2. Agricultural Economist 2. Statistics
3. Entomologist 3. Communications
4. Soil Fertility Specialist 4. Germplasm Conservation

These long-term advisors were not specifically
identified as the core of UNAT since the RFTP noted that
Hondurans (of whatever professional level) would also be
part of UNAT, but a significant change had occurred between
the 1981 evaluation and the 1982 RFTP. The evaluation
expressed a preference that Hondurans be hired for UNAT
using Project funds. This was expressed clearly in the
evaluation summary which condensed the second recommendation
to read as follows:
to reorganize the Technical Support Unit of
the Project, utilizing A.I.D. grant funds to
contract highly-qualified Honduran
personnel."

The RFTP was not requesting Honduran professionals and was,
due to the usual RFTP distribution and response channels,
essentially stating that these four key professionals were to be
expatriates. Four expatriate professionals as a Contract team
with its Chief of Party, supporting funds and short term









Pace 14


advisors, will, in most cases, form an independent'-unit. That'
unit negotiates with other units but is not easily incorporated
or digested unless the other unit is well- organized and very
dynamic.' UNAT itself was no longer a functioning unit and needed
organization and staffing, so UNAT was not going to digest the
Contract team. The most probable structural outcome would be
that the Contract team would be the core and effective leadership
of UNAT, and Honduran professionals in UNAT would come to be
counterparts or secondary.

This probable outcome is not clearly recognized in the RFTP
which implies that Contract advisors were to form part of a
larger (Honduran and expatriate) multidisciplinary UNAT.
Leadership of UNAT, whether Honduran or expatriate, was never
mentioned. DIA itself suffers from a lack of funding, planning
and staffing continuity, as noted in the 1981 evaluation, so
another question is whether DIA itself could .easily digest the
Contract team. In any event the RFTP set up a large,
independent, expatriate unit within DIA. DIA leadership
apparently objected to the change from Honduran to expatriate
technical advisors so the change was obviously initiated by
USAID. It is not clear in 1984 whether it was appreciated in
1981-1982 that the personnel change meant a change in UNAT
leadership (Honduran to expatriate) and continuing structural
conflicts.

Another shortcoming in the RFTP is its short life (two
years) The Project was seen as a longer-term response-. The
.1981 evaluation again reiterated needs for long-term planning and
long-term stability and training for Honduran personnel. Instead
of addressing these fundamental long-term issues, the RFTP
utilized unused Project funds in a short-term response to a need
specified in the evaluation for technical assistance. USAID
perceived this two-year contract as part of a longer-term effort
(the Project) beginning in 1978. Although this is formally true,
the RFTP called for a new administrative institution which needed
to hire new people as advisors, who then needed to acquaint
themselves with the Honduran environment and their co-workers
before starting serious work. As individuals, and as a
multidisciplinary team, the new expatriates and the Hondurans who
welcome them must take some time learning about and adjusting to
each other and formulating work plans.

Two years is too short for effective technical assistance
work of this kind, especially when the combined UNAT is supposed
to be planning and advising about farming systems research, an
evolving approach to smallholder research and extension. When
technical advisors have clear, discrete, technically-specific
tasks to perform, they may be able to accomplish this in a short
time. More time is needed when these advisors are involved in
institution-building and multidisciplinary team activities which
involve group planning and leadership.

CID/NMSU was one of the U.S.A. institutions which responded
to the RFTP, and in mid-1982 they were selected by USAID and the








Page 15


Honduran government to administer the Contract. This part of the
process operated smoothly.

Restriction to Yoro Valley

Another important shift occurred even before the Contract
was signed. DIA requested that the expatriate team focus or
restrict their activities to the Yoro Valley in Region 3 (San
Pedro). -Instead of operating at a national level as advisors and
trainers, the CID/NMSU team and their Honduran counterparts were
to be a regional (or valley) multidisciplinary team. The reasons
for this change are not clear. The perceived importance of
developing the Yoro Valley may have been primary; dissatisfaction
with the expatriate nature of the team may have been important.
In any event, this was only the first of several DIA-initiated
changes, which reflects the practical impact of the absence of
good, long-term planning. This change was not reflected in the
Contract.

At some time in 1982 another change occurred, although this
is also not recorded in the Contract. The usual dynamics of
technical assistance projects operated' in changing the
residential locations of the expatriate advisors so that they all
lived in Sa-n Pedro Sula. Contract advisors were expected in the.
RFTP to work part or-most of the time as individual specialists
supporting designated DIA technical programs, and only part of
the time (on a regular basis) as members of an integrated UNAT
team. One of the advisors was to live in San Pedro Sula, two in
either San Pedro or La Ceiba, and one in either San Pedro or.
Danli. Expatriates who are contracted together from a single
sponsoring organization usually prefer to live.together, if it is
at all possible. In this way they provide each other mutual
support, both professionally and personally, and increase their
ease of access to .contracted resources. The formation of a team
as a unit (whether Honduran or expatriate) is much easier with
common residence, as is the administration of the Contract.

HARP Contract

The major change in the Contract, which was signed in
October 1982, was a reduction in time to 18 months due to
insufficient USAID funding. Although there was apparently a
strong indication at that time that more funds would become
available later to extend the Contract to the original 24 months,
this was an early indication.of the continuing funding
difficulties encountered by HARP. If two years is too short, 18
months is a ridiculously short time for such assistance.


Inclusion of CURLA Responsibilities

Upon arrival in Honduras in January 1983 the CID/NMSU staff
was confronted with another USAID-instituted change. They were
to devote ten percent of their time to technical support and
teaching at the Centro Universitario Regional del Litoral








Page 15


Honduran government to administer the Contract. This part of the
process operated smoothly.

Restriction to Yoro Valley

Another important shift occurred even before the Contract
was signed. DIA requested that the expatriate team focus or
restrict their activities to the Yoro Valley in Region 3 (San
Pedro). -Instead of operating at a national level as advisors and
trainers, the CID/NMSU team and their Honduran counterparts were
to be a regional (or valley) multidisciplinary team. The reasons
for this change are not clear. The perceived importance of
developing the Yoro Valley may have been primary; dissatisfaction
with the expatriate nature of the team may have been important.
In any event, this was only the first of several DIA-initiated
changes, which reflects the practical impact of the absence of
good, long-term planning. This change was not reflected in the
Contract.

At some time in 1982 another change occurred, although this
is also not recorded in the Contract. The usual dynamics of
technical assistance projects operated' in changing the
residential locations of the expatriate advisors so that they all
lived in Sa-n Pedro Sula. Contract advisors were expected in the.
RFTP to work part or-most of the time as individual specialists
supporting designated DIA technical programs, and only part of
the time (on a regular basis) as members of an integrated UNAT
team. One of the advisors was to live in San Pedro Sula, two in
either San Pedro or La Ceiba, and one in either San Pedro or.
Danli. Expatriates who are contracted together from a single
sponsoring organization usually prefer to live.together, if it is
at all possible. In this way they provide each other mutual
support, both professionally and personally, and increase their
ease of access to .contracted resources. The formation of a team
as a unit (whether Honduran or expatriate) is much easier with
common residence, as is the administration of the Contract.

HARP Contract

The major change in the Contract, which was signed in
October 1982, was a reduction in time to 18 months due to
insufficient USAID funding. Although there was apparently a
strong indication at that time that more funds would become
available later to extend the Contract to the original 24 months,
this was an early indication.of the continuing funding
difficulties encountered by HARP. If two years is too short, 18
months is a ridiculously short time for such assistance.


Inclusion of CURLA Responsibilities

Upon arrival in Honduras in January 1983 the CID/NMSU staff
was confronted with another USAID-instituted change. They were
to devote ten percent of their time to technical support and
teaching at the Centro Universitario Regional del Litoral








Page 15


Honduran government to administer the Contract. This part of the
process operated smoothly.

Restriction to Yoro Valley

Another important shift occurred even before the Contract
was signed. DIA requested that the expatriate team focus or
restrict their activities to the Yoro Valley in Region 3 (San
Pedro). -Instead of operating at a national level as advisors and
trainers, the CID/NMSU team and their Honduran counterparts were
to be a regional (or valley) multidisciplinary team. The reasons
for this change are not clear. The perceived importance of
developing the Yoro Valley may have been primary; dissatisfaction
with the expatriate nature of the team may have been important.
In any event, this was only the first of several DIA-initiated
changes, which reflects the practical impact of the absence of
good, long-term planning. This change was not reflected in the
Contract.

At some time in 1982 another change occurred, although this
is also not recorded in the Contract. The usual dynamics of
technical assistance projects operated' in changing the
residential locations of the expatriate advisors so that they all
lived in Sa-n Pedro Sula. Contract advisors were expected in the.
RFTP to work part or-most of the time as individual specialists
supporting designated DIA technical programs, and only part of
the time (on a regular basis) as members of an integrated UNAT
team. One of the advisors was to live in San Pedro Sula, two in
either San Pedro or La Ceiba, and one in either San Pedro or.
Danli. Expatriates who are contracted together from a single
sponsoring organization usually prefer to live.together, if it is
at all possible. In this way they provide each other mutual
support, both professionally and personally, and increase their
ease of access to .contracted resources. The formation of a team
as a unit (whether Honduran or expatriate) is much easier with
common residence, as is the administration of the Contract.

HARP Contract

The major change in the Contract, which was signed in
October 1982, was a reduction in time to 18 months due to
insufficient USAID funding. Although there was apparently a
strong indication at that time that more funds would become
available later to extend the Contract to the original 24 months,
this was an early indication.of the continuing funding
difficulties encountered by HARP. If two years is too short, 18
months is a ridiculously short time for such assistance.


Inclusion of CURLA Responsibilities

Upon arrival in Honduras in January 1983 the CID/NMSU staff
was confronted with another USAID-instituted change. They were
to devote ten percent of their time to technical support and
teaching at the Centro Universitario Regional del Litoral










Paqe 16


Atlantico (CURLA) in La Ceiba (Region 4). There is no indication
that this change was discussed with or agreed to by DIA.

This change was significant in two ways. One, the
hierarchical position of HARP was totally confused. If HARP was
a joint USAID-MRN endeavor, then how could HARP be assigned by
USAID to work outside of MRN? CURLA falls under another
Ministry. How could USAID unilaterally change the mandate of
UNAT (or a major component of it)? What power or authority does
DIA have here? The second point concerns time and energy. A
too-short contract was intentionally cut even more by assigning
10 per cent of staff time to other responsibilities. It commonly
occurs that available technical personnel are asked to add on
other tasks. These requests need to be balanced against the
priorities assigned to existing program responsibilities and the
availability of surplus time. Who was safeguarding' DIA and HARP
priorities?

Subsequent Changes in Leadership and Scope

During the first months of 1983 the CID/NMSU staff were
orienting themselves. The Honduran staff, now defined as
one-on-one counterparts to the CID/NMSU staff, were being hired
and were moving .to San Pedro. The DIA director resigned to take
the counterpart position of agricultural economist, and after a
few weeks of interim leadership a new director took office in
April. (He continued in office during the evaluation). The
former DIA director became the Assistant Chief of Party for HARP
and head of the Honduran team.

Several changes in-the HARP scope-of-work also occurred
during these early months. First, the scope was changed back to
the original national level in which HARP personnel would provide
technical support to existing multidisciplinary teams in Olancho,
Danli, Choluteca and La Ceiba, as well as working directly in the
Yoro Valley and CURLA. Then the scope was restricted once again
to a focus on several sites in two northern regions (3 and 4).
The sites were: Yoro Valley, Cuyamel, La Masica, the Guaymas
Agricultural Research Station and CURLA. This has been amended
subsequently to include some responsibility for a national
training program.


Hierarchical Ambiguity

This Contract has suffered through. too many changes of
direction. The reasons for these changes are not clear but many
of the consequences are. One major consequence is that many
Hondurans remain confused about the goals and status of HARP.
The evaluation team was asked by DIA and MRN officials at
national, regional and local levels to explain to them how HARP
related to DIA. Any clear mandate and status were lost in the
shuffling of HARP from part of UNAT, national level, to regional
and CURLA responsibilities, and back and forth again.










Paqe 16


Atlantico (CURLA) in La Ceiba (Region 4). There is no indication
that this change was discussed with or agreed to by DIA.

This change was significant in two ways. One, the
hierarchical position of HARP was totally confused. If HARP was
a joint USAID-MRN endeavor, then how could HARP be assigned by
USAID to work outside of MRN? CURLA falls under another
Ministry. How could USAID unilaterally change the mandate of
UNAT (or a major component of it)? What power or authority does
DIA have here? The second point concerns time and energy. A
too-short contract was intentionally cut even more by assigning
10 per cent of staff time to other responsibilities. It commonly
occurs that available technical personnel are asked to add on
other tasks. These requests need to be balanced against the
priorities assigned to existing program responsibilities and the
availability of surplus time. Who was safeguarding' DIA and HARP
priorities?

Subsequent Changes in Leadership and Scope

During the first months of 1983 the CID/NMSU staff were
orienting themselves. The Honduran staff, now defined as
one-on-one counterparts to the CID/NMSU staff, were being hired
and were moving .to San Pedro. The DIA director resigned to take
the counterpart position of agricultural economist, and after a
few weeks of interim leadership a new director took office in
April. (He continued in office during the evaluation). The
former DIA director became the Assistant Chief of Party for HARP
and head of the Honduran team.

Several changes in-the HARP scope-of-work also occurred
during these early months. First, the scope was changed back to
the original national level in which HARP personnel would provide
technical support to existing multidisciplinary teams in Olancho,
Danli, Choluteca and La Ceiba, as well as working directly in the
Yoro Valley and CURLA. Then the scope was restricted once again
to a focus on several sites in two northern regions (3 and 4).
The sites were: Yoro Valley, Cuyamel, La Masica, the Guaymas
Agricultural Research Station and CURLA. This has been amended
subsequently to include some responsibility for a national
training program.


Hierarchical Ambiguity

This Contract has suffered through. too many changes of
direction. The reasons for these changes are not clear but many
of the consequences are. One major consequence is that many
Hondurans remain confused about the goals and status of HARP.
The evaluation team was asked by DIA and MRN officials at
national, regional and local levels to explain to them how HARP
related to DIA. Any clear mandate and status were lost in the
shuffling of HARP from part of UNAT, national level, to regional
and CURLA responsibilities, and back and forth again.








Page 17


SThe 1981 evaluation was congruent with the original Project.
Those five recommendations in 1981 grew from the understanding
that Hondurans were evolving a bet-ter method of
smallholder-oriented agricultural research, and it made sense for
USAID to support and encourage that evolution. Major technical,
economic and sociopolitical problem areas were also identified,
and it was recognized that long term institution-building
solutions were needed, and that critical commitments from GOH
were net-- for any significant progress.

That recognition was lost by the time the RFTP was written.
The stress on GOH commitment was absent, as was the stress on
Honduran professional leadership. Subsequent changes recognize
this. The real thrust of the Project was to institutionalize
better methods of agricultural research. To institutionalize
methods means to make them part of the normal, ongoing routine.
Part of that process was institutionalizing UNAT, making that
specialized technical support and training unit part of the
regular DIA bureaucracy so that it continued as part of MRN after
Project assistance ended. Honduran technical leadership and GOH
funding commitmentsare essential for institutionalization to
succeed.

The HARP Contract deviates from that primary Project
direction. The Contract provides short term (18 months)
expatriate technical assistance with Honduran counterparts to
expatriate technical leadership. Other USAID contracts or
possible projects, such as the autonomous research institute, may
continue part of the Project emphases, but this Contract does
not. The clear connection between UNAT and the HARP Contract
team of seven or eight professionals .has been lost. None of the
HARP professionals occupy regular DIA. line positions. There are
no institutionalized positions so no one is really counterparting
anyone. Counterparting refers to the situation where one person
has a regular position and is advised by someone. In HARP no one
has a regular position: all are paid, directly or indirectly, by
USAID, and none have established DIA jobs.

UNAT does not really exist except on paper, so there is no
obvious bureaucratic home for HARP. Although HARP works and is
housed in region 3 (San Pedro Sula) it does not answer to the
authority of the MRN Regional Director. Although HARP is
apparently an MRN group it works semi-autonomously, publishes
reports that do not credit MRN or DIA as a sponsor, deals with
non-MRN institutions such as CURLA, and even has a strong
international connection through NMSU's multiple relationships
with Honduras.

Closely related to the issue of hierarchical position is the
issue of coordination. As far as the MRN Regional Director for
San Pedro Sula is concerned, HARP was sent to the region with no
advance notice and no additional budgetary provisions for
counterparts and office space. Moreover, in terms of
coordination, the Director feels that despite the good personal
relations that he has with HARP staff, and in particular with the










Pace 18


Chief of Party, a great deal of HARP activities have been
coordinated at the national level without prior consultation with
the Regional Office. This is considered a problem since the
Regional Office is, after all, in charge of implementing
activities in the area. Again, the answer to this problem lies
in the proper definition of where HARP fits and to whom it is
responsible.

This.is complicated even more by NMSU's control over the
HARP Contract. NMSU has established a strong long term interest
in Honduras and expects a great deal of local assistance from
CID/NMSU HARP personnel (especially the Chief of Party) in
facilitating that interest, particularly by hosting and
transporting delegations from NMSU when they visit Honduras.
Administrative directions from NMSU also delayed the proper
transmission of quarterly reports in Spanish to DIA. The reports
had to be written first in English and cleared by the NMSU
Project Director before they could be translated and released in
Honduras.

This'absence of clear lines of command, jurisdiction and
mandate almost always results in dissatisfaction and frustration.
Bureaucratic superiors at national and regional levels are
frustrated since they cannot direct resources they supposedly
control. Observers at all levels attribute responsibilities and
resources to such a Contract team (whether or not they actually
are true) and criticize the team if these expectations are not
met. The net result of this undefined activity has been an
expressed dissatisfaction on the part of MRN, the primary client
of HARP, with the work done by HARP thus far. It is clear that,
even in the short run, the issue of HARP's position within DIA
and relative to the regions must be resolved.


Impact on Work Plans

The series of design changes has had a detrimental impact on
the HARP team's work in Honduras. First of all, the changes
delayed and consequently fragmented the drafting of work plans.
Second, the formation of an integrated team of Hondurans and
expatriates was delayed and impeded. Third, the question of
research methodology and assignment of leadership responsibility
for modifying the accepted methods was never settled. Fourth,
the work of administering the Contract was made more frustrating
and time-consuming with a consequent diversion of the scarce time
of technical assistance personnel away from technical duties
towards administrative duties.

One of the first responsibilities of any technical
assistance person is to draft and receive approval of work plans.
These plans set out the purpose of assistance and a schedule of
events. Approval of these by all of the sponsors and superiors
clarifies what duties are expected and serves as a guideline for
all involved. HARP team members originally tried to prepare a
work plan for the life of the Contract (18 or 24 months), but the









Page 19


plan was not accepted. Pressed by time because the team wanted
to get trials in the ground, the team decided to submit more
limited work plans that only covered the first (primera) cropping
season of 1983. The primera plan was accepted, and work began.
The next work plan only.covered the second (postrera) cropping
season, and now the team is finishing the preparation of a work
plan to carry them through the expected end of Contract in 1984.

The HARP team's desire to get to work is understandable and
commendable. All of the team members are energetic and concerned
about working in the field. They were pressed by time since the
Contract was too short, the comprehensive work plan had been
rejected, and the time to plant for primera was approaching, so
they compromised by preparing a work plan limited to the primera
season. That was a mistake.

Without faulting the team members' energy and desire to get
working, that was the time to wait until all of the sponsors and
team members agreed on a comprehensive plan. The sponsors
(USAID, DIA and CID/NMSU) should have insisted that they reach
some agreement about what the HARP team was supposed to do.in
Honduras during the 18 months of the Contract. Accepting
piecemeal plans (season by season) postponed indefinitely the
need for sponsors and team to reach some agreement on the purpose
and utility of this Contract.

The Project is an institution-building one. The 1981
evaluation recognized one of the major faults of DIA was in
planning. Planning problems are apparent in the several
DIA-initiated shifts of direction for the Contract and in the
failure to coordinate better with the MRN Regional Director
before the HARP team arrived in San Pedro. The Contract
cooperated in a planning failure when short-term work plans were
prepared and used as the basis for beginning field work.
Questions of purpose, leadership and lines of authority should
have been settled then. The issue of whether or not HARP was
UNAT needed to be determined since this affected allocation of
time to research, technical support, training and planning.


Team Formation

NMSU is to be commended for rapidly fielding a technically
well-qualified team, three of whom were noted in .the original
CID/NMSU response to RFTP. The Contract was signed in October
1982, and the CID/NMSU team arrived in January 1983. Honduran
team members were then hired in early 1983 so that the complement
of eight professionals (two in each of four technical
specialties) was filled in reasonably good' time.

Team formation, the melding of these eight individuals into
a coordinated team, has not gone as smoothly as team hiring. In
general, team members express mutual respect for each other's
technical competence, and there is easy interaction among
members. The problems appear to stem from the general ambiguity









Paae 20


about HARP's purpose and function, financial difficulties
encountered by Honduran team members, and disagreements about
research methodology.

Some disagreement and discord are to be expected in any team
of eight professionals, but they are more easily managed
(sometimes'more successfully than others) if the team has an
understood and agreed purpose and work plan. The ill-coordinated
design and implementation of this Contract, including the failure
to reach an agreement on an 18-month work plan, hampered team
formation and left too much room for individual interpretations
and disagreements, particularly concerning HARP's role in
modifying customary patterns of research.

Money for salaries and travel reimbursements for all HARP
personnel comes from USAID. The CID/NMSU personnel receive their
monies directly from NMSU which receives it from USAID. The
Honduran personnel receive their monies directly from DIA which
receives it from MRN which receives it from the Finance Ministry
which receives it from USAID. CID/NMSU personnel have had no
problems in getting paid, whereas Honduran personnel have faced
consistent delays of several months in receiving their salaries,
have never received any reimbursement for travel expenses, and
were informed in late January 1984 there was no more money for
their salaries. The USAID Honduras Mission assured the
evaluation team that sufficient funds had been transferred to GOH
and that any.problems were internal to GOH.

These financial concerns preoccupy the Hondurans in HARP,
require a lot of administrative attention by the Hondurans and by
the Chief of Party, and inhibit or preclude the Hondurans'
willingness to incur travel costs. Not only does this
differential willingness to travel separate the team but the
differential treatment given to Hondurans and non-Hondurans
creates and accentuates a division along nationalistic lines.
This is an old problem noted in the 1981 evaluation, and it
reflects a continuing lack of commitment to DIA by GOH. The
Contract cannot support a team that is separated between
expatriates who receive salaries and Hondurans who do not. This
is diametrically opposed to the major purpose and thrust of the
Project that gave rise to this Contract.


Research Methodology

Honduras and Hondurans have been pioneers in establishing
and developing a research methodology that is now being called
farming systems research (FSR). The basic purpose of this new
approach is to make research more productive in actually changing
farmers' production practices. Its basic idea is that research
that remains on stations, because it does not work for farmers,
is an expensive luxury that many countries cannot afford.

The original Project was to support Honduras' pioneering
efforts in developing this more effective research methodology,








Page 21


and anyone who worked in DIA (then PNIA) before 1977 may attest
to the changes that have occurred since then. This Contract was
to continue the evolution of a more effective set of methods by
providing technical support to existing regional teams, by
upgrading the technical levels of D-IA staff through in-service
training, and by participating in planning.

Although there is now a growing literature about FSR and a
growing consensus about how to define it, the pioneers
scientistss and programs) were working before that. Their work
emphasized moving trials away from research stations and onto
farmers' fields because stations were special environments, and
treatments and varieties that worked best on stations may not
have been the best on farmers' fields. The pioneering work also
emphasized basic food crops because cultivation of these crops
was the primary concern of most farmers; this meant a change from
the earlier stress on export crops. Pioneers in FSR were
concerned that farmers adopt research recommendations. For
adoption to occur the recommended technologies had to be
appropriate and profitable in some sense. In order to improve
their understanding of what was appropriate, these pioneers
emphasized multidisciplinary cooperation among technical and
social scientists and increased communication among researchers,
extensionists and farmers.

These general concerns and emphases in pioneering FSR
situations were constrained by practical institutional issues.
How could changes be made in existing national (and
international) research units? As in any institutional process,
theoretical and practical proposals for changes were adapted to
the particular country, locality and/or agency. This
evolutionary process of changing research methodology proceeded
further and faster in some countries than in others, and the
emerging research institutions varied from one country to
another.

Honduras was one of the pioneering countries in the 1970s in
evolving its indigenous form of FSR, and the DIA focus reflects
that pioneering work: on-farm (not just on-station),
multidisciplinary research on basic grains using farmer surveys
(sondeos) as guidelines. As in any field of research, scientists
are always searching for better methods. For example, the Enlace
Tecnologico (Technological Coordination) program from Olancho has
been recommended for adoption throughout the country because MRN
thinks this will improve its work. In Honduras as in all other
countries, agricultural and social scientists are aware that
their established methods may need improving, but everyone
working in Honduras must recognize the major changes that have
already occurred in the last decade.

Honduran citizens have taken some of the leadership
positions in initiating and directing these changes in research
methodology. In Honduras as in all countries, however, there are
great practical advantages to admixing expatriate and national
scientific talents. In the U.S.A., a country noted for its










Pace 22


agricultural sciences and universities, there are also many
expatriate scientists at work, and their talents and
contributions are appreciated.

The questions and disagreements concerning HARP and FSR
appear to center on the degree of leadership that CID/NMSU staff
are supposed to exercise and on whether and how much the existing
DIA methodology needs to be revised. The existing Honduran
methodology will be called Pioneering FSR (or PFSR) in.this
report to distinguish it from the FSR methodology described in
current literature.

The CID/NMSU team obviously believes that it was contracted
by USAID and DIA to provide technical leadership as well as
support, and the CID/NMSU agricultural economist (rather than the
team as a whole) was primarily responsible for providing that
leadership. At the same time that team believes that there are
serious weaknesses in PFSR (which HARP reports refer to as
on-farm research or OFR), and it should be replaced by FSR.
These beliefs are well documented in work plans and quarterly
reports.

Any DIA position on this issue is not documented in reports
but only in actions. Obviously there is a strong resistance on
the part of Hondurans in DIA, including at least the majority of
those employed by HARP, to CID/NMSU assuming the leadership in
implementing FSR and modifying PFSR. There appears .to be a
similarly strong resistance to any modification of PFSR but this
is not as clear (note the Enlace modification) and is muddled by
the leadership controversy.

Once again the planning failure by USAID, DIA and CID/NMSU
to clarify the design and mandate of HARP in the beginning
continues to confuse the operation of this Contract. The
Contract does not specify any leadership in defining or
instituting FSR; it requests support and guidance from CID/NMSU
professionals as part of a larger UNAT. Although in fact HARP is
UNAT, and CID/NMSU leads HARP, another fact is that DIA has
consistently attempted to.maintain and assert Honduran
leadership. It is quite possible that DIA-initiated changes in
the scope of work for HARP were designed to thwart what DIA
leadership saw as undesirable CID/NMSU leadership.

These professional disagreements over methodology have been
personified by the agricultural economists since the CID/NMSU
economist was the one responsible for initiating FSR and the
Honduran economist headed the Honduran team (and was previously
the National Director of DIA). These disagreements over PFSR-FSR
were primarily responsible for the USAID decision not to renew
the Honduran economists' work contract when it expired at the end
of December 1983, and the dissatisfaction over this PFSR-FSR
issue apparently led to the departure from Honduras of the
CID/NMSU economist at approximately the same time.


The disagreements are more fundamental than simply








Page 23


personality conflicts (though they may have been a factor) as
demonstrated by the fact that the disagreement and opposition of
Honduran and CID/NMSU team members continues even. though the two
original economists have departed.


Administration

Even in the best of circumstances the Chief of Party (COP)
has to.devote a lot of time to administrative duties. These
responsibilities bleed time and energy away from the technical
assignments that provide the terms of reference under which the
COP is recruited and hired. In this case additional
complications, confusions and distance from the capital city
greatly expanded the administrative tasks.

Although the COP was supposed to function as an
entomologist, he estimates that 75 percent of his time has been
spent on administration, and approximately 50 percent of the
CID/NMSU economist's time was similarly occupied. The evaluation
team did not estimate the amount of time spent by the Assistant
COP (the Honduran agricultural economist) or other team members
on HARP. administrative matters.

The administration of this Contract has been made more
difficult and time-consuming by the series of changes in Contract
design and scope of work, by the continuing disagreements over
research methodology, and by the other continuing problems of
Honduran salaries and reimbursements, etc., referred to earlier
in this report. Additional administrative burdens have been
placed upon the COP in this Contract because of an extensive flow
of visitors from NMSU to Honduras. This is a complex issue
because NMSU's large scale involvement in Honduras, particularly
with HARP and with CURLA, works to the benefit of Honduras in
many ways. Focusing specifically upon administrative
responsibilities of CID/NMSU HARP personnel, however, the
extensive flow of visitors means there is a diversion of scarce
time away from their specific HARP technical responsibilities.

This final comment is general and not meant to apply
specifically to this Contract. Any evaluation has to take into
account the necessary preoccupation with administration. It is
surprising that USAID contracts do not recognize the essential
importance of administration and automatically provide for
administrative assistance or specifically set out terms of
reference for the COP. This Contract, like many others, only
requests technical people for technical work as if COP
responsibilities were inconsequential. In many instances this
results in a COP assuming that the technical work is what counts
and trying to minimize administrative tasks. In other instances
this results in a technically qualified COP who does not really
have the necessary administrative skills or experience.









Page 25


IV. OUTPUTS


Outputs are reported here first by individual
discipline, (through p.38) then for CURLA (p.39) and under a
general category called "Dissemination" (pp. 40-41). The
Contract states individual responsibilities but none for the
team as a unit or for FSR. This is covered to some extent
by requesting that the final report of the Contract
delineate accomplishments in terms of the objectives of the
Project.


Entomology


1. HARP personnel who are involved with this activity
are:
Dr. Charles Ward, Ph.D. (CID Entomologist) and
Ing. Norberto Urbina, M.S. (Honduran Entomologist).

2. Specific responsibilities are stated in the
USAID/CID Contract as:
(a) Evaluate with DIA personnel on a national
basis the pests that reduce crop production
and establish methods for their control.
(b) Plan, program, and carry out with DIA research
activities designed to provide pest control
recommendations.
(c) Analyze and publish research results.
(d) Train DIA personnel in entomological research.
(e) Participate in meetings, workshops, and
seminars that benefit the program.

3. CURLA activities were added to those specific
responsibilities mandated in the Contract. The folsing
additional activities in entomology-were added by USAID
request:
(a) Assist with the formation of an insect
reference collection with the participation of
one or two taxonomists.
(b) Cooperate in the design of research on the
identification of the principal parasites.of
Spodoptera frugiperda (FAW) and Heliothis zea
(CEW) and the effect of weed control on
parasite populations.
(c) Help plan cooperative research projects
between MRN and CURLA.
(d) Help establish a cooperative agreement between
the Ministry Department of Plant Protection
and the entomology section of CURLA.
(e) Assist with the revision and amplification of
the entomology equipment list being ordered
through USAID.









Page 25


IV. OUTPUTS


Outputs are reported here first by individual
discipline, (through p.38) then for CURLA (p.39) and under a
general category called "Dissemination" (pp. 40-41). The
Contract states individual responsibilities but none for the
team as a unit or for FSR. This is covered to some extent
by requesting that the final report of the Contract
delineate accomplishments in terms of the objectives of the
Project.


Entomology


1. HARP personnel who are involved with this activity
are:
Dr. Charles Ward, Ph.D. (CID Entomologist) and
Ing. Norberto Urbina, M.S. (Honduran Entomologist).

2. Specific responsibilities are stated in the
USAID/CID Contract as:
(a) Evaluate with DIA personnel on a national
basis the pests that reduce crop production
and establish methods for their control.
(b) Plan, program, and carry out with DIA research
activities designed to provide pest control
recommendations.
(c) Analyze and publish research results.
(d) Train DIA personnel in entomological research.
(e) Participate in meetings, workshops, and
seminars that benefit the program.

3. CURLA activities were added to those specific
responsibilities mandated in the Contract. The folsing
additional activities in entomology-were added by USAID
request:
(a) Assist with the formation of an insect
reference collection with the participation of
one or two taxonomists.
(b) Cooperate in the design of research on the
identification of the principal parasites.of
Spodoptera frugiperda (FAW) and Heliothis zea
(CEW) and the effect of weed control on
parasite populations.
(c) Help plan cooperative research projects
between MRN and CURLA.
(d) Help establish a cooperative agreement between
the Ministry Department of Plant Protection
and the entomology section of CURLA.
(e) Assist with the revision and amplification of
the entomology equipment list being ordered
through USAID.









Paae 26


4. Locations of research, teaching, and extension:
(a) Guaymas Experiment Station
(b) Yoro Valley
(c) Cuyamel
(d) La Masica
(e) La Ceiba
(f) CURLA

5. Scope of activities carried out:
(a) Guaymas Experiment Station
Initial work was begun with monitoring for Fall
Army Worm (FAW) and Corn Ear Worm (CEW) with pheromone traps
and developing monitoring techniques for the major pests on
corn and rice. Helped in developing a reference collection
of .identified pests afd beneficial arthropods. Began to
develop economic threshold data and control measures on
major pests where these data were not available. Cooperated
in evaluation of entomological aspects of FSR.
Entomological research reported as being started at this
experiment station included three rice experiments.
Pheromone traps were installed to collect population data on
FAW and CEW.

(b) Yoro Valley
On-farm tests in the primera season in Yoro only
involved three soil insect control experiments in corn, one
bean slug insect control experiment, two bean unreplicated
trials, and surveys to determine insects present on corn and
beans and to design experiments to test control measures.
Pheromone traps were set up for FAW and CEW.
Corn plantings continued to be monitored during
the second planting period to determine pests in the field
and post harvest losses to determine the need for research
on corn drying and metal bin storage. Major pests of beans
were determined to be slugs, leaf hoppers, white flies, and
bean weevils.

(c) Cuyamel
In Cuyamel problems of stored grain pests in
seed rice caused plant stand problems in the field. Soil
pests were also.reported. A survey was initiated to
determine pests involved. Pheromone traps for FAW and CEW
were set up. Late'season pests were stem borers, either the
white rice stem borer or the sugar cane borer.

(d) La Masica
This area produces mostly rice and corn. Pest
problems appear to be the same as in Cuyamel, so no
experiments were conducted there during the early season.
Pheromone traps for FAW and CEW were placed.

(e) CURLA
Several activities were initiated with CURLA
entomologists during the first quarter to identify their
needs. These activities included the items listed in the








Page 27


work plan.
(1) Assisted in developing a new equipment list
of materials needed for an entomological museum. Arranged
for an Insect Taxonomist to come for one month to.help
organize the initial stages of the museum.
(2) A field study and plots were planted to
study principal parasites on FAW and CEW and to study
effects of weeds in corn on parasite populations.
(3) Planned cooperative studies with MRN on-farm
research and Sanidad, including preliminary surveys for
other parasites of FAW and CEW as well as pheromone trapping
studies of regional levels of these pests.
(4) Set up and conducted a graduate student
study to determine the efficiency of pheromone traps to
predict larv4l populations of FAW and CEW which included a
literature search and acquisition of supplies.
(5) Assisted in the purchase of the insect and
book collection of the late Dr. Mankins for a 10-20 year
loan to the Smithsonian Institution for safe keeping.

(f) Training
An Integrated Pest Management Short Course was
held in September 5-9, 1983 in Comayagua,.organized jointly
by DIA and DEA (extension) for MRN research and extension
workers: 19 people attended.

6. Summary and Evaluation:
HARP has taken on a very ambitious program in
entomological research and extension and has begun work on
several lines of research in several areas of the country.
This was attempted in spite of the limited duration of this
contract. The NMSU/HARP Chief of Party was also the only
Ph.D. entomologist and was chiefly responsible for the
entomological research. His best estimate is that 75
percent of his time has been utilized in administration and
an additional 10 percent in CURLA activities, which leaves
only 15 percent of his time to devote to HARP research. The
Honduran counterpart is a well-trained, experienced research
worker with a M.S. degree who is capable of doing good
research with proper support.
..The plan was to have ten field experiments and four
pheromone trap monitoring locations. Because of demands on
the Chief of Party's time for other activities during the
period and a lack of materials and adequate help, fewer
experiments should have been started. Only four of the ten
planned experiments were actually conducted. Of the four
pheromone trap sites only three were successfully conducted.
Soil insect control experiments on corn were successful with
90 percent stand increase in test treatments. This
information should be extended to farmers.

7. Recommendations:
(a) More time should be devoted to field research
by both entomologists.
(b) Experiments should be simpler, easier to









Pace 28


manage, executed to give quick and applicable
results with focus on the most serious pest
problems.
(c) More time must be spent on training Honduran
workers to leave a competent staff in MRN and
to minimize mistakes and failures at the farm
level.
(d) Survey and identification of other pests and
their importance and control, i.e., viruses,
fungal and bacterial diseases, nematodes,
rodents and birds.



Agricultural Economics


1. HARP personnel who are involved with this activity
are:

Dr. Wilmer Harper, Ph.D.* (CID Agricultural Economist)
Ing. Antonio Silva, M.S. (Honduran. Agricultural
Economist)
Dr. Michael Bertelsen, Ph.D. (CID Agricultural Economist)

Both Dr. Harper and Ing. Silva left HARP at the end of
December 1983, and only Dr. Bertelsen was in this section during
the time of the evaluation. Rapid personnel turnover has been a
continuing constraint to DIA effectiveness and is regrettable in
any technical assistance contract.

2. Specific responsibilities are stated in the USAID/CID
Contract as:

.(a) Identify research priorities through the economic
analysis of selected regions.
(b) Cooperate with and train DIA researchers. in relevant
economic methods.
(c) Develop, in cooperation with DIA personnel, a
methodology for the testing of new technologies.
(d) Evaluate and publish the potential economic impact of
promising technologies.
(e) Develop training programs for DIA personnel.
(f) Participate in meetings, workshops, and seminars
which may benefit the program.

3. The CID/NMSU economist anticipated other activities as
noted in the Technical Proposal that CID/NMSU sent in response to
the RFTP and in 1983 work plans:

(a) Develop and administer one or more surveys which
would provide the basis for HARP FSR activities.
(b) Collect detailed farm records.

4. The following CURLA activities were added to those










Page 29


Contract responsibilities for the CID/NMSU economist:

(a) Assist in establishing computer facilities,
organizing a computer and statistics center,
and training staff to operate computers.
(b) Assist in analyzing and revising agricultural
economics curriculum.
(c) Participate in economic analysis of faculty
and student research results.
(d) Present lectures and seminars to students.

5. Other general backstopping or support activities for HARP
(considered by the evauation team to be administrative
duties) were noted in 1983 work plans:

(a) Install, maintain and service HARP microcomputer
and word processing facilities.
(b) Prepare data analysis programs for use on the HARP
microcomputer.
(c) Train research staff, the administrative assistant
and office secretaries in using appropriate computer
programs.

6. Scope of Activities carried out in 1983:

(a) First quarter
(1) Get to know Honduran personnel.
(.2) Initiate design of computer facilities at CURLA.
(3) Initiate collection of secondary data.

(b) Second quarter
(1) Select computer hardware and software for CURLA.
(2) Set up some of the computer equipment at CURLA
and HARP.
(3) Evaluate CURLA's curriculum for agricultural
economics.
(4) Assist team members in definition of work plan.

(c) Third quarter
(1) Examine previous sondeos (farming systems rapid
surveys).
(2) Write paper on Agricultural Systems Policy.
(3) Provide technical assistance to CURLA.

(d) Fourth quarter,
(1) Assist in the development and use of surveys for
Guaymas, Progreso and La Masica.
(2) Continue activities in CURLA.
(3) Initiate record keeping operations in 12 farms.
(4) Initiate computer analysis of field data.

7. Summary and Evaluation:
As envisioned by the DIA Director, the Contract scope was
feasible even for the short life of the Contract if all efforts
were focused on a small group of people, namely the regional










Paap 30

research directors in the area covered by the Contract and the
HARP Honduran professional counterparts. Consistent with the
assessment of previous evaluations of this Project, the above
tasks proved to be too ambitious given the relative scarcity of
counterpart funds and the difficulties in integrating and
administering a team of expatriate and Honduran professionals.
These difficulties seemed most apparent in the field of
economics. In addition, there has been a dilution of effort
because of administrative and CURLA duties that were unforeseen
in the original Contract.

USAID requested that HARP help CURLA establish its data
management system, revise the agricultural economics curriculum
and give short courses in agricultural economics. All these
activities, USAID estimated, would only take 10 percent of the
economist's time. Work at CURLA is very attractive to HARP
CID/NMSU staff for a number of reasons, among which is the direct
long-term involvement of NMSU. Since MRN had substantial
difficulties in assembling a counterpart team, communications and
hierarchies were not well-established between HARP and MRN, and
the FSR effort was curtailed.' The CID/NMSU economist became more
involved in administrative matters and in CURLA related work,
substantially reducing the time allocated to field work. It is
unfortunate that the disagreements over FSR led-to that time
going into CURLA and HARP administration rather than into
identification and evaluation of promising technologies.

The HARP team did an excellent job of setting up the
microcomputer facilities at CURLA. Setting up a data processing
system is a time consuming operation which requires dedication
and constant supervision. This task undoubtedly took much more
than the 10 percent of time allocated by HARP to this activity.
As a consequence, activities related to MRN research were
significantly curtailed, creating a feeling among some DIA
personnel and the Regional Director that the MRN budget for HARP
support funding was being utilized to support CURLA'S activities.
This feeling was aggravated by the fact that the Regional
Director in San Pedro Sula did not participate at all in the
conception of the project nor in the selection of the expatriate
team. In essence, CURLA-related activities were interpreted by
some as a "free ride" for another institution on MRN money.

Agricultural economics is considered to be one of the most
important components of technology design. As part of the
technical assistance package, DIA requested specific assistance
in this field in order to train field technicians in the economic
assessment of their on-farm results. The scope of work outlined
in the RFTP, however, did not specify very clearly as to the
complexity of the methods to be taught, leaving the decision to
the HARP team. The results obtained during the past year, as
reported in HARP quarterly reports, indicate that most of the
efforts in agricultural economics went to the generation of a
farm registry sheet, the implementation of a microcomputer.system








Page 31


and microcomputer training at CURLA, and in administrative
duties.

The economics of small farms is very complex since it deals
with the proper identification of the required incentives for
technology adoption by the small farmer. This identification
process includes the proper assessment of institutional
constraints, such as credit markets and price controls, as well
as the costs and benefits of suggested alternative technologies,
and the socioeconomic forces influencing the decision process of
the farmer.

Assessment is time consuming, even though it may be
shortened by the utilization of information which may be provided
by local research and development teams (Agencias de Desarrollo)
or by a few cooperating farmers, but this process is essential.
Only after the set of incentives and constraints is identified
can one make assumptions about the types of technology which will
be of interest to farmers.

Judging from HARP reports it is evident that some effort has
been made to identify the above set of incentives. This effort,
however, has been concentrated in the design and implementation
of farm records as related to production, with little or no
information being gathered with respect to the set of
constraints.

In the. long run, agricultural economics research should be
redirected toward a systematic collection of data aimed to create
a typical farm for each recommendation domain. This may serve as
a model for the ex-an.te evaluation and testing of new
technologies, the ex-ante assessment of different farm policies,
and the analysis of different farming alternatives. This typical
farm should include a financial portrait of the farm, why and
how, as well as the'sources of potential failure, such as price
or yield variation, credit requirements, and managerial ability
of the farmer.

The Contract ends in a few months. In the short time
remaining, the economist should concentrate on the economic
analysis of existing data, partial budgeting of alternative
technologies to identify the best potential recommendations, and
training DIA staff in the collection and analysis of economic
data from agronomic trials.

Presently, most of the items listed in the Contract scope of
work have not been properly addressed. Unless the economic
analysis of field trials is used for training and is integrated
with Sondeo data for comprehensive analysis, the scope of work
will remain unfulfilled.











anpr .2
*


Weed Control


1. HARP personnel who are involved with this activity are:
Dr. Dinesh Sharma, Ph.D. (CID Weed Scientist)
Ing. Mario Bustamante, M.S. (Honduran Weed Scientist).

2. Specific responsibilities are stated in the USAID/CID
Contract as:
(a) Collaborate with DIA in carrying out practical
field agricultural research.
(b) In cooperation with DIA technical personnel,
review, analyze and orient DIA's weed control
research program.
(c) Provide support to on-farm research teams on
weed control.
(d) Help identify program equipment and personnel
requirements.
(e) Carry out with DIA technical personnel an
evaluation of the most severe weed species
and their area of distribution, and establish
appropriate control measures.
(f) Analyze and publish research results.
(g) Train DIA personnel in weed control.
(h) Participate in meetings, seminars, and workshops
that benefit the program.

3. Specific responsibilities added in the 1983 plan of work
(primera) are:
Activities at CURLA will be limited to providing technical
guidance to a student doing his thesis on weed control in corn,
helping establish a herbarium, and teaching (when and if needed)
specific topics in weed control.

4. Specific responsibilities added in the 1983 plan of work
(postrera) are:
Work initiated on the collection of weeds in different
areas in Honduras will be continued with the specimens identified
and stored at CURLA. Efforts will be made to persuade the
Phytotechnica Department to acquire or build cabinets for proper
storage of the specimens.

5. Location of research, extension, and teaching:
(a) Yoro area Three different experiments were
conducted with .a total of nine locations during
the primera season, and four different experiments
at two locations each during the postrera season.
(b) Cuyamel area Six different experiments were
conducted with a total of 18 different locations
during the primera season, and three experiments
at one location each during the postrera season.
(c) La Masica area Four experiments at two locations
each during the primera season, and six experiments
were conducted with a total of 14 locations during








Page 3-3


the postrera season.
(d) Guaymas/Omomita experiment station Three
experiments and a total of four locations during
the primera season, and two experiments and a total
of three locations during the postrera season.
(e) CURLA One experiment was conducted plus
consultation with faculty and students about weed
control experiments and weed species collection.

6. Scope of activities carried out:
(a) Experiment station tests
The weed control team was the only component of the
HARP team conducting field trials at the Guaymas and
Omonita stations. This was by mutual agreement with
the MRN staff at the station. The tests involved
studies on rice and corn and comparing chemicals,
rates of chemicals or volumes of chemicals or water.
(b) On-farm research tests
The majority of the more than 68 experiments focused
on chemical methods of weed control. However,
several experiments examined combinations of chemicals
plus minimum tillage, rotations, or cultural methods
using a green manure crop (Musa sp). These
experiments did not appear to be any different than
the experiments that were being conducted on the
experiment stations.

(c) Extension/research training of MRN staff
Five formal training activities occurred including:
(1) Trip to three regions (Danli, Chouluteca and
Olancho).
(2) A weed control course conducted in San Pedr-o
Sula with 38 extension and research staff from
the third region on July 5-7.
.(3) An FSR philosophy discussion with extension
and research staff of MRN on September 9.
(4) A training session on weed control on September
27.
(5) The aspects of weed control in a general
session on bean production was covered during
November 21-25.

(d) Publications useful to the MRN staff
One extension publication was prepared by Dr. Sharma
entitled "Como prevenir la diseminacion de caminadora
Rottboellia exaltata (L) a otras areas en Honduras."

(e) CURLA
The weed science staff worked with the head of the
plant science department in providing assistance to a
student working on weed control in corn for his
thesis. Assisted the plant science head in design
and conduct of an experiment. Visited Escuela
Agricola Pan Americana (EAP) and the University of
Honduras at Tegucigalpa where large plant collections










Page 34


are maintained. Weed collections planned for CURLA
will be restricted to principal weeds of grain crops.
Sharma estimated he devoted 10 percent of his time to
CURLA.

7. Summary and evaluation of fulfillment of specific
responsibilities:
There is ample evidence of a high level of respect for the
HARP weed scientists and the recognition of weed control as a major
constraint in crop production. The major desire of the Honduran MRN
and CURLA staff visited was for even more contact and assistance
from the HARP team.

Due to the very large number of experiments established and the
lack of adequate supervision or understanding by some of the farmers
upon whose land the plots were established, many of the tests were
lost. The MRN staff at 'Yoro and La Masica were larger and better
able to handle.the number of experiments than was the case at
Cuyamel where only one researcher and one extension person were
located for most of the year.
(a) There appears to be a close working relationship
with DIA in carrying out practical field research.
(b) The cooperative review, analysis, and orientation
of DIA research can only begin as results of research
data become available. Very little DIA-conducted weed
control research exists because of the limited number
of staff trained in weed science, especially in
chemical control.
(c) There is evidence of technical as well as logistical
support by the HARP team of on-farm weed research
conducted by MRN staff.
(d). Some work has been done to identify appropriate
equipment for field application of herbicides but
there is no visible evidence of identifying program
personnel need,.
(a) There have been excellent efforts made toward
identifying the most serious weed species. One
publication has been prepared for publication as a
Honduran extension bulletin. There are at least two
or three other weeds requiring similar treatment.
(f) The availability of field research results seems to
be limited at this point.
(g) Training of DIA personnel has occurred but, given the
complexity of chemical weed control and the limited
background of many of the DIA staff, greater emphasis
should be placed on this component of the HARP team.
(h) Good evidence exists that the HARP weed control team
members have been active participants and have made
major contributions to the on-farm research program
of DIA.
(i) The interaction at CURLA with faculty and students
has been good. Failure to conduct classroom training
is not the fault of the HARP weed control team.









Page 35



8. Recommendations:
(a) Based on the HARP team's field experience in yield
losses due to weeds, a calculation should be made to
further justify to the MRN the need for more staffing
in the weed science area. Efforts should be made by
the HARP team to identify personnel needs in the weed
science area.
(b) Commitments to CURLA should be kept to a minimum.
except as an effort to enhance the capacity of the
CURLA staff to conduct weed research and to prepare
students with an understanding of FSR or on-farm
research.
(c) HARP weed research team members should consider
planning simple "planned demonstrations" that will
be useful to the extension personnel for farmer
field days and farmer experience with new treatments.
These planned demonstrations should utilize only one
or two treatments on the farmer's field and should
involve eight to ten farmers. The HARP team has ample
evidence available to select an herbicide treatment
to apply to corn, rice, or beans, or a treatment for
the control of Musa sp which will represent minimal
risk to the farmer. Plots should be large enough so
that bordered areas can be harvested for yield.



Soil Fertility


1. Harp personnel who are involved with this activity are:
Mr. James G. Walker, M.S. (CID Soil scientist)
Ing. Lidia de Ramos, M.S. (Honduran Soil Scientist).

2. Specific responsibilities are stated in. the USAID/CID
Contract as:
(a) With cooperation of DIA personnel, identify, design
or adapt a system for the evaluation of soil
fertility.
(b) Coordinate laboratory, greenhouse, and field soil
fertility research and correlation of the results.
(c) Design, plan, and carry out a soil fertility program
that permits a constant flow of information from the
laboratory and research station to the farmer.
(d) Focus soil fertility research on maximizing economic
returns rather than maximizing agronomic output.

3. Specific responsibilities added in the 1983 plan of work
(primera) are:
(a) All locations of soil fertility trials have the
common objectives of calibrating the field responses
of the crop with the nutrient level found in the soil,
as determined by laboratory analyses of soil samples
taken from each location.










Pager 36


(b) Meetings with CURLA administration and soils
department staff determined that they should receive
assistance in the following areas from the soil
fertility specialists on the HARP team:
(1) Collaboration in soil calibration analysis using
pot experiments.
(2) Assistance with the purchase of new equipment for
the laboratory.
(3) Cooperation in field experiments with soil
department staff.
(4) Contribution to new methods of analysis for soils
according to the equipment that will be received.
(5) Assistance with special studies: forage legumes,
soil acidity problems, and other soil chemistry
problems.

4. Specific responsibilities added in the 1983 plan of work
(postrera) are:
Sondeos conducted by DIA (including HARP) and DEA staff have-
shown the need for fertility studies on beans following corn in the
Yoro area and on the ratoon crop of rice in the Cuyamel and La
Masica regions. Information is needed regarding:
(a) The effect of residual fertilizers in the soil on the
postrera bean crop.
(b) The effect of N, P, K, and plant densities on the
postrera bean crop.
(c) The effect on yield of the ratoon rice crop of
various rates of applied nitrogen fertilizer.

5. Location of research, extension, and teaching:
(a) Yoro area three different tests a't a total of ten
test locations during the primera season, and two
tests at four locations during the postrera.
(b) Cuyamel area two tests involving seven different
locations during the primera season, and two tests
at two locations during the postrera season.
(c) La Masica area -'two tests involving four locations
during the primera, and four tests involving six
locations during the postrera.
(d) La Ceiba CURLA. No -field tests but consulted on
greenhouse and laboratory work and involved in
laboratory teaching.

6. Scope of activities carried out:
(a) Experiment station tests:
No tests were conducted on experiment station sites.
(b) On-farm research tests:
The majority of the fertility trials were simple
factorial (2x3 or 2x4) experiments designed to
explore N x P x K; variety x N x plant density; or
N x variety x weed control interactions. A secondary
set of trials was designed to evaluate fertilizer
residual value for the postrera cropping season.
(c) Extension/research training of MRN staff:
Formal training or workshops included the following








Page 37.


three in September:
(1) September 9 FSR philosophy and 'Enlace'
relation.
(2) September 19-20 soil conservation at Yoro;
18 people attended.
(3) September 26-29 soil fertility at Comayagua;
18 MRN research and extension staff attended
from throughout Honduras.
(4) Various quarterly reports and staff comment
refer to frequent informal training sessions
as a part of daily activities occurring in
conjunction with project work.
(d) CURLA activities
(1) Assistance has been given in the revision of
the soil laboratory equipment list being ordered
by another USAID project for CURLA.
(2) Consulted with three soil department staff
members on proposed soil research projects.
(3) Assisted students in conducting calibration
trials for P and K extraction.
(4) Assisted a faculty member in using the DRIS
method for evaluation of soil fertility.
(5) Approximately 25 percent of Ing. Lidia de Romas'
time and approximately 10-15 percent of Mr.
Walker's time was devoted to CURLA.

7. Summary and evaluation of fulfillment of specific
responsibilities:
(a) per USAID/CID contract objectives:
(1) No evidence of activity or plans directed
toward identifying, designing or adapting a
system for the evaluation of soil fertility
that is easily identifiable, easy to manage
and practical. This is a major undertaking
and could easily take half of the staff members'
time.
(2) In terms of coordinating laboratory, greenhouse
and field soil fertility research and
correlating results, no data are available due
to data processing problems but the level of
work is adequate and on track. Work of .Ing.
Ramos has focused on greenhouse and laboratory
work.
(3) The design, planning, and conduct of research on
soil fertility is at an appropriate level for
the establishment of benchmark data. The number
and complexity of the experiments is greater
than needed for a short-term program without
planning for continuation of the research
beyond the duration of the HARP Contract.
There is limited information generated by these
complex experiments that can be used directly
by small farmers.
(4) Fertility levels used in the trials reviewed
were at the level where one expects economic









SPage 38


returns rather than maximum agronomic returns.

(b) 1983 plan of work (primera) objectives:.
(1) Calibrating all field responses with laboratory
soil nutrient analyses is very desirable, but
must be viewed as a long-term project requiring
well beyond the time frame of the HARP contract
for completion.
(2) The responsibilities set forth for the soil
fertility specialist at CURLA seem to have been
started and/or are in various phases of
completion with the exception of the special
studies.

(c) 1983 plan of work (postrera) objectives:
(1) Evaluating residual fertilizer effect left
from the primera crop forthe postrera crop was
started but results were not available at this
time. This is again a long-term project because
the benefits are subject to seasonal and
environmental variability which require multiple
seasons to adequately evaluate.
(2) Trials to evaluate the effect of N, P, K and
plant density on potrera beans and N rates on
ratoon rice were established but data are
unavailable at this time.

(d) Evidence has been presented that cooperation of the
HARP soil fertility group and the DIA staff in the
Yoro and La Masica areas was very good. The staff
at La Masica were very complementary about the
*interaction with the HARP staff although they
indicated a need for more contact, especially at the
administrative level. The MRN field staff felt they
could ask for assistance when needed.

Work at Cuyamel was the least successful and can probably be
related to the low level of DIA and extension staffing. Throughout
most of the first year of activity only one researcher and one
extension person were there.

8. Recommendations:
(a) Activities initiated in 1983 were very ambitious.
HARP research efforts are associated with activities
that commonly are a part of long-term projects. A
start must be made, but plans should be made to aid
DIA in completing calibrating soils in the project
area over an extended period to permit fertilizer
recommendations to be based on soil analysis.
(b) Efforts should be made to get data processed and
summarized as quickly as possible to be shared with
MRN staff and administrators.
(c) Assist the MRN staff in establishing a procedure of
publishing an annual summary of all soil fertility
tests for broader information sharing among









Page 39


researchers and extension personnel, and as a means
to preserve results for others to find and use in
the future.
(d) Many of the plots with 2x3 or 2x4 factorial designs
were too complex to be useful to the Honduran
extension staff for farmer field days. Thus some
attempt should be made to coordinate some simplified
one or two factor experiments (demonstrations) in
the general area of the multiple factor studies.
(e) Develop MRN capacity to assume activities initiated
by HARP so that these activities do not cease upon
termination of Contract.
(f) Maintain a strong MRN training component in planned
activities.



CURLA


1. HARP personnel who are involved with CURLA include:
Dr. Charles R. Ward (CID Entomologist)
Dr. Wilmer M. Harper (CID Agricultural Economist)
Dr. Dinesh Sharma (CID Weed Scientist)
Mr. James G. Walker (CID Soil Fertility Specialist).
Ing. Lidia de iamos (Honduran Soil Fertility Specialist).

Short term personnel brought in to work with CURLA include:
Dr. Melchor Ortiz (CID Statistician)
Dr. James Zimmerman (CID Entomologist).
Dr. Austin Haws (CID Experiment Station Management
Specialist).

2. General responsibilities:
The 1983 Plan of Work (Primera) states that "at the request
of USAID/Honduras HARP allocated ten percent of its total time to
activities at CURLA. Activities will be conducted with the
departments associated with the respective professional specialties
of the HARP team. In addition, HARP will facilitate NMSU's BIFAD
(Board for Food and Agricultural Development) activities at CURLA."
The 1983 Plan of Work (Postrera) further states that "HARP will
continue to foster the development of the computer and data analysis
facility which was initiated at CURLA under HARP/NMSU/USAID auspices
during the 1983 primera time."
Specific responsibilities assigned to the individual HARP
Team members have been previously stated in the sections on
individual disciplinary activities.

3. Evaluation of CURLA related activities:
(a) Time commitment of HARP staff time has apparently
exceeded the original agreed upon 10 percent.
(b) Facilitating the NMSU/BIFAD activities has involved
a substantial amount of HARP management time with
substantial benefit to CURLA and NMSU but with a
negative short-term impact on the MRN program









Paoe 40

related activities. There is d potential long-term
benefit to MRN associated with the influx of better
trained personnel coming out of CURLA in the future.
(c) Participation of HARP team members has been unequal.
Only one of the Honduran professionals has been
actively involved at CURLA. Among the CID team
members greatest involvement has been by the
agricultural economist, followed by the soil
fertility specialist and the weed.control specialist.
The entomologist could have spent more time but team
leader duties prevented more time allocation. In
total the HARP team spent an estimated 15 percent of
their time at CURLA.
(d) A benefit of the association with CURLA has been the
assistance of the CURLA staff in the conduct of some
workshops prepared for the MRN staff.

4. Recommendations:
(a) HARP should work toward integration of the research
effort of CURLA staff with the basic research needs
of MRN, i.e., foster a collaborative and
complementary relationship between CURLA and MRN.
(b) HARP should focus on faculty development seminars
and workshops which will increase the CURLA research
capabilities.
(c) The CURLA faculty should be invited to participate
in MRN training workshops and short courses.
(d) The HARP staff should provide formal training for
the CURLA faculty on FSR and/or on-farm research
methodology and philosophy.
(e) HARP should minimize direct instruction to students,
not because this is undesirable but because of the
time demands.



Dissemination


1. General responsibilities and personnel involvement:
All personnel in HARP (and in the DIA and DEA staff) have a
responsibility to assist in dissemination of research results from
research (DIA) to DEA agents in the field and ultimately to the end
users (farmers). This is identified as steps or phases (7) and (8)
of the FSR activities in the technical plans of work for HARP as.
follows:
(7) Extension of appropriate techniques and technology
throughout the target area; and
(8) Diffusion of technology which-has been demonstrated to
farmers to be appropriate and acceptable to the recommendation
domain within the target area.

2. Summary and Evaluation:
Because of the short duration of the HARP Contract these two
phases cannot be activated and have been deleted from the HARP plan








Page 41


of work. It is recommended by HARP that phases (7) and (8) be
carried out by the permanent MRN research and extension staff
working in the target area. This is important but not sufficient.
This plan loses sight of the constant dissemination of research
results and techniques in all FSR experiments through informal
discussions, farmer participation, neighbor observation and the
"ripple effect". This may be. the most effective means of
dissemination of well-executed on-farm research and is a major
argument for increasing farmer active participation in on-farm
research.
However, this does not preclude the necessity for keeping good
records, collating and analyzing results, and publishing them in a
form that can be readily used and understood by farmers. Problems
of research results not being available from previous years is a
severe constraint to increased farmer utilization of research
findings.

3. Recommendations:
(a) A mechanism must be developed for following up
at the end of this Contract so that all data are
collected, analyzed, put into proper form and
published.
(b) There should be a regional and national summary
of all research data annually, at the completion
of an experiment and at the termination or transfer
of a research worker who was responsible for an
experiment or field of research.
(c) Field days and seminars should continue to be an
integral part of all FSR and extension programs.










Page 43


V. ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS


Commitment and Coordination

Recommendations are usually based on the assumption that the
sponsors are committed to allocate sufficient resources in order
to accomplish the goals of the project or contract. In this
case, however, the evaluation team is not convinced that GOH and
USAID have made serious commitments to this Contract nor that GOH
has made a serious commitment to DIA or the Project in general.

One way to express commitment is through adequate and stable
funding. GOH has never apparently made nor carried through this
financial commitment to the Project or the Contract. The
.Contract proofs for this lie in delayed and sporadic salary
payments, travel reimbursements, etc. For the Project the reader
is referred to the 1981 evaluation. Although USAID has committed
adequate funding to the Project, the Contract has suffered
through uncertain funding for training programs and for a
possible extension from 18 to the originally scheduled 24 months.

Another way to express commitment is through the dedication
of adequate time and attention by planners and administrators.
The failure by USAID and GOH to coordinate and clarify .the scope
and direction of work by HARP has been evident throughout this
report. The sponsors have not taken the time to plan and
coordinate together. Regular meetings have not been held in
which appropriate USAID, DIA, other MRN and HARP personnel could
effect this coordination and clear up some of.the confusion. A
major continuing problem has been delays and non-arrival of
salaries and reimbursements for Honduran personnel. The sponsors
have not solved this problem, and part of the reason is the lack
of time and attention given to it. The insignificance of this
Contract to USAID was also demonstrated by the lack of.
participation in the evaluation, including the absence of the
Project Officer from the meetings in San Pedro Sula at which the
preliminary report of the evaluation team was presented.

The evaluation team has no magic solution for this lack of
commitment, but plans for the remaining months of this Contract
must recognize the lack of past commitment and the probable
absence of such commitment in the future. The Project and
Contract were designed to build and strengthen Honduran
agricultural research institutions. This effort is doomed
without GOH commitment, DIA leadership, and the participation and
leadership of Honduran scientists.

Recommendation No. 1: Meetings be scheduled immediately in
which DIA leadership, the MRN. Regional Director for Region 3 (San
Pedro Sula), the USAID Project Officer and/or Agricultural
Development Officer, the HARP COP and the HARP Assistant COP
(head of the Honduran component) meet together to reach some
agreement on the following issues:










Page 43


V. ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS


Commitment and Coordination

Recommendations are usually based on the assumption that the
sponsors are committed to allocate sufficient resources in order
to accomplish the goals of the project or contract. In this
case, however, the evaluation team is not convinced that GOH and
USAID have made serious commitments to this Contract nor that GOH
has made a serious commitment to DIA or the Project in general.

One way to express commitment is through adequate and stable
funding. GOH has never apparently made nor carried through this
financial commitment to the Project or the Contract. The
.Contract proofs for this lie in delayed and sporadic salary
payments, travel reimbursements, etc. For the Project the reader
is referred to the 1981 evaluation. Although USAID has committed
adequate funding to the Project, the Contract has suffered
through uncertain funding for training programs and for a
possible extension from 18 to the originally scheduled 24 months.

Another way to express commitment is through the dedication
of adequate time and attention by planners and administrators.
The failure by USAID and GOH to coordinate and clarify .the scope
and direction of work by HARP has been evident throughout this
report. The sponsors have not taken the time to plan and
coordinate together. Regular meetings have not been held in
which appropriate USAID, DIA, other MRN and HARP personnel could
effect this coordination and clear up some of.the confusion. A
major continuing problem has been delays and non-arrival of
salaries and reimbursements for Honduran personnel. The sponsors
have not solved this problem, and part of the reason is the lack
of time and attention given to it. The insignificance of this
Contract to USAID was also demonstrated by the lack of.
participation in the evaluation, including the absence of the
Project Officer from the meetings in San Pedro Sula at which the
preliminary report of the evaluation team was presented.

The evaluation team has no magic solution for this lack of
commitment, but plans for the remaining months of this Contract
must recognize the lack of past commitment and the probable
absence of such commitment in the future. The Project and
Contract were designed to build and strengthen Honduran
agricultural research institutions. This effort is doomed
without GOH commitment, DIA leadership, and the participation and
leadership of Honduran scientists.

Recommendation No. 1: Meetings be scheduled immediately in
which DIA leadership, the MRN. Regional Director for Region 3 (San
Pedro Sula), the USAID Project Officer and/or Agricultural
Development Officer, the HARP COP and the HARP Assistant COP
(head of the Honduran component) meet together to reach some
agreement on the following issues:











Paqe 44


(a) Scope and plan of work for the remaining
months of the Harp Contract which expires in
July 1984.
(b) Salaries for Hondurans members of HARP.
(c) Relationship and lines of authority among
DIA, the Regional Director and HARP.
(d) Possible extension of the Contract for
another six months past July, including
scope and plan of work for those added
months.
Any decision reached in these meetings should be put in writing
(Spanish) and distributed to all of the participants. These
immediate meetings are, for all intents and purposes, emergency
meetings to discuss and settle issues that are of immediate
critical importance. As these issues are resolved, temporarily
or permanently, these emergency meetings should evolve into
regularly scheduled meetings every two weeks or so to discuss
normal business in a coordinated way.

Scope of Work

The evaluation team has made observations and
recommendations throughout this report concerning the scope and
plan of work for HARP, but MRN, USAID and HARP officials must
make decisions. How much training? What kinds of technical
work? More research in the field? These decisions are for the
short-term, immediate future. What -is possible to accomplish in
a few months, and what are the highest priorities?

Recommendation No. 2: In the few remaining months, with or
without an extension, HARP should radically cut back on its
direct involvement in field research and concentrate on analysis
of existing data, technical support for Honduran researchers, and
training. Training may take the form of short courses as well as
one-on-one or small group backstopping and trouble shooting in
which HARP members provide real in-service training to other
researchers as they grapple with design, monitoring and analysis
problems that come up in their ongoing research. In this way
technical support and training merge. Analysis of existing data
would focus on identifying research priorities, providing data
sets for later research to build upon, recommending alternative
technoigies that might be used in farmer-managed trials, and
working through a trial-based dialogue about research
methodologies.

Agricultural research and science in general are based on a
process in which problems are identified, questions asked,
tentative hypothesis generated, tests designed and conducted to
prove or disprove hypotheses, data collected and analyzed,
analyses and data disseminated, and so on in a continuing cycle.
Merely designing and conducting tests is not research or science.
Analysis is the hardest work, and that includes deciding which
problems to study and which questions to ask, as well as deciding
the meaning and significance of data collected.








Page 45


DIA and HARP are not conducting nor advancing research if
their staffs merely generate trials and collect data. CID/NMSU.
staff discovered a major problem at the start of their work.
Previous researchers had shifted to other jobs and not left
behind adequate records of their data and analyses. This
behavior means that the earlier 'research was wasted; it did not
benefit DIA, Honduras or the farmers. HARP staff should address
this problem by assuring that their own research is analyzed,
documented and disseminated, and by assisting other DIA
researchers through training and technical support to analyze,
document and disseminate their research.

Financial Security and Planning

The most important financial issue is Honduran salaries.
This priority is sometimes overlooked by CID/NMSU staff whose
salaries are assured, but the Project and UNAT are based on
Honduran and expatriate participation. Continued uncertainty
over salaries and over tenure (reference to the departure already
of one Honduran) tends to minimize if not eliminate Honduran
participation and leadership in HARP. More important is the
continued constraint to Honduran research careers and longer term
planning, noted earlier in the 1981 evaluation, and the continued
frustration. of Project institution-building efforts.

HARP training efforts have also been constrained by
uncertain funding. Although in 1983, USAID apparently promised
more funding for training, that has'not materialized. Any
collaborative agreement that HARP might contemplate in the.area
of training in its final months will be frustrated if USAID does
not have or release the funding. This issue needs to be
considered in the meetings with DIA and USAID and a budgetary
request for training submitted and approved. If the necessary
funding is somewhere between the Finance Ministry and MRN, that
needs to be clarified and the money released.

A third financial issue concerns the possible extension of
the Contract for an additional six months (through January 1985),
but this issue comes after an agreement has been reached on the
scope and plan of work through July, on Honduran salaries and
training funds. Any planned extension must be based upon a clear
statement of the work to be accomplished. That cannot be done
until there is an agreement upon the work to be done during the
remaining months of the original Contract and until there are
enough funds to adequately work during that period. On the other
hand, HARP administrators and professional employees are in an
untenable situation when they do not know whether the Contract
terminates in July or runs until January.

Recommendation No. 3: If agreements have not been reached
and sufficient USAID funding for training and for the extension
assured in writing before the end of February 1984, HARP should
terminate at the end .of its scheduled 18 months.

A consistent criticism of agricultural research in Honduras







Paae 46


has been the weakness in planning. The continued uncertainty of
HARP funding provides a USAID-inspired case study of the
relationship between uncertain funding and poor planning. Since
there may be no funding past July, everyone should be closing
down, wrapping up and getting ready to hand over their data,
analyses and programs. Honduran professionals and some of the
CID/NMSU staff will be seeking new jobs at the termination of
this Contract. Since the termination may be in July they (as
rational people) should be searching for new employment and
diverting some of their attention from the present. Given the
uncertainty, no one in HARP should be wasting their time planning
for the August 1984-January 1985 period because they should be
hard at work finishing what they started.

Research Methodology

Research methodology (PFSR-FSR) has been a divisive topic in
HARP but there is no need for that to continue. Some of the
early problems have been resolved or may be resolved as a result
of this evaluation. The present members of the HARP team all
know each other (with the exception of the recently arrived
CID/NMSU economist), and all of the CID/NMSU team are well
acquainted with many aspects of Honduran agriculture and
institutions.

HARP has an important opportunity now to examine as -a team,
Hondurans and expatriates together, the basic features of PFSR
and to propose to DIA ways in which DIA scientists may experiment
with alternative methods. The few remaining months of the
Contract are too few for HARP itself to really test these ways.
The basic assumptions for HARP should be:
(a) PFSR represents a Honduran methodology
that has evolved and been accepted as a
better way to conduct research than the
methods that were customary in the early
1970s.
(b) Any methodological modifications to PRSR
that are proposed by HARP should represent
solutions to problems encountered by Honduran
DIA professionals or by expatriates working
in Honduras.
(c) Any methodology may be improved, and any
methodology that evolved under one set of
conditions may not be appropriate in another
environment or at a later date.
(d) Other countries and programs may have worked
out research methods and reached conclusions
that will allow DIA to skip ahead and save
time and effort.
(e) Programs and analyses coming from other
countries or conditions should be treated
as hypotheses to be tested and should
neither be adopted nor rejected without
critical examination.










Page .47


Recommendation No. 4: The HARP team should schedule regular
weekly meetings lasting several hours in which the single topic
is research methodology. As a team HARP should examine its
experiences in 1983 and other relevant Honduras information to
find if there are methodological problems, concerns or
suggestions. Honduran members of HARP should lead the
discussion, and expatriates should listen to the Hondurans to
learn what they consider to be important methodological
constraints or problems in the Honduran context.

The discussions should be firmly based on actual experience.
What is the purpose of PFSR in Honduras? What hypotheses are
being tested? How appropriate are these? How does rapid
personnel turnover affect research? Is the trial sequence
appropriate in all situations? How may research reach better
conclusions quicker? What have HARP personnel learned from each
other about better research? What are the major problems
encountered and how might they be avoided or solved? What may be
learned from CATIE, CIMMYT, ICTA, CIAT, FSSP, etc.? What would
work or not work in Honduras, and why?

One purpose of these weekly meetings (special meetings or
assignments may become appropriate as the dialogue continues) is
to provide suggestions to the DIA Director and to other DIA.
research professionals about methodological alternatives.
Another purpose is to better capacitate the Honduran members of
HARP as methodologists and self-aware researchers. These
professionals were selected for HARP in recognition of their
professional achievements, and they will continue to play
leadership roles in Honduras.

The evaluation team suggested several specific topics that
could be examined in these HARP discussions.

1. Present joint survey activities combine research,
extension and other programs under the leadership of the planning
unit to produce information that may be used by everyone
(caracterizacion multiproposito). This enlace is commendable,
but does research need much more information about farming
systems than it gets from these joint surveys? If more
information is needed, what types of information; and how could
it most effectively be obtained (farm records, interviews, formal
surveys, trials, etc.)?

2. National and international programs have different
mandates and resources. How may DIA most effectively utilize
international programs such as CATIE, CIMMYT, CIAT, CIP, etc.?
Often these IARCs provide data from trials conducted in Honduras
or in ecologically similar areas. Could DIA use this data to
speed its series of trials?

3. Farmers combine many enterprises, often including
off-farm employment and business, to earn a living and satisfy
their family's needs and desires. Basic grains and beans are
fundamental enterprises and deserve a major share of DIA's










Paae 48


attention. Sometimes.minor crops, livestock, processing or
marketing activities that are already part of local farming
systems may provide more leverage for DIA in its attempts to
increase rural living standards. A minor crop, for instance, for
which there is a large unsatisfied demand in Honduras or in other
countries may be an opportunity where a small research input may
have a large multiplier effect on cash income. How could DIA
maintain its important concentration on basic grains and beans
while allocating some resources to specific minor enterprises
with high potential? Can UNAT members now identify some of these
enterprises? This is not a request to add more trials to the
present number but to identify priorities. The number of trials
at present seems excessive.

4. What would be gained by increased farmer participation
in research? Are farmers now as involved as they should be? How
is information about farmer preferences and farmer perceptions of
various treatments fed back into the research process? How may
DIA predict whether farmers will adopt or reject specific
recommendations? What are some specific examples of.rejection,
and why did it happen?

5.. DIA has established in PFSR a sequence of trials. It
starts with many treatments, complex design, on station and
controlled entirely by researchers. As more knowledge is
accumulated, the better treatments are moved off station and
tested under conditions more similar to those under which the
ultimate clients (Honduran farmers) will be facing. The number
of treatments is fewer; designs are simpler; farmer management is
increased and DIA control decreased; and the treatments are
exposed to a broader range of environmental variables. How is
this process working? What are some examples of the use of
simpler design? How did they work? Are there some treatments or
other alternative technologies identified in previous DIA or IARC
research that seem promising enough to move into more
farmer-managed trials? The evaluation team thinks there would be
important benefits if HARP established or recorded some
well-documented trials and trial sequences for use in training.

6. If HARP desires FSSP assistance in training, HARP first
needs to clarify the topics for which training is desired and for
which there is a consensus. Training and technical support
should reinforce and extend the areas in which there is consensus
rather than contribute to any disagreements. For which areas and
topics is there a consensus that training is needed?

USAID Involvement in Agricultural Research

This evaluation concentrated on the specific HARP Contract
with some reference to the entire Project. USAID is also
involved with other projects such as Mejores Alimentos-and
appropriate technology in Comayagua and is well advanced toward
participating in an autonomous research foundation. These
disparate projects are not obviously parts of a coherent single
program, and it is not easy to see how any of these advance FSR.









Page 49


Recommendation No. 5: USAID should commission an evaluation
of its agricultural research and development efforts. A major
component of these efforts should continue to be support for FSR,
so it is important to have FSSP participation in this broad
evaluation. GOH commitment and Honduran professional leadership
are issues that must be addressed, as well as any relationship
between an institute and FSR.

Reports

Quarterly reports from HARP have been delayed, fragmented
and a source of dissatisfaction for MRN because they seem to
identify HARP as solely a CID/NMSU endeavor. In addition, the
constant flow of TDY consultants, NMSU/BIFAD-funded and other
visitors to and from HARP, San Pedro Sula and CURLA puzzles and
irritates many Hondurans. They are unsure whether funds.
committed by USAID to MRN and DIA are being used to support other
agencies, and they are sure that scarce resources in the form of
HARP time are being diverted. The sixth recommendation is rather
'long in order to cover all of the essential points.

Recommendation No. 6:
(a) Quarterly and annual reports are required by
Contract to be in Spanish. These reports need to be more rapidly
distributed to USAID and DIA. .There are no Contract requirements
for reports in English or for monthly reports; these are
voluntary, much less important, and should not be allowed to
interfere with required reporting and actual work.

(b) HARP is a joint DIA/USAID/CID/NMSU activity, and
all these sponsors need to be properly identified on all reports
and all cover pages. All sponsors need to approve any changes in
scope or plan of work, and any changes should always be placed in
writing and circulated to all sponsors and team members.

(c) HARP is a team of seven (was eight) professionals.
The HARP quarterly reports should include everybody's quarterly
reports. If DIA has specific requirements for Honduran members
of HARP their quarterly reports may reflect that but they must be
included in HARP reports.

(d) All short term (TDY) personnel need to hand in
preliminary reports before they leave Honduras, and they should
have a personal meeting with the HARP COP and the DIA Director
(at his discretion) before leaving. Final reports should be in
Spanish and in Honduras within one month of departure. No report
has yet been received from the TDY person for research station
management, and that is long overdue.

(e) DIA and the MRN Regional Director should be
informed in advance of all CID or NMSU administrative or
technical people who will be visiting Honduras and HARP. If the
visitors are on another mission and not directly connected with
HARP it would nonetheless be polite and correct form for them to










Paqe 50


leave a brief note with DIA before they.leave noting their trip,
itinerary, any contributions they made to HARP and their
appreciation of MRN hospitality if received. This will minimize
misunderstanding as well as emphasize that HARP time, vehicles,
etc. are accountable to MRN (DIA) as well as to USAID.


Secondary Recommendations

1; As individuals and professionals all eight members of
HARP during 1983 appear to have been hard working, well qualified
and concerned about their work. The team suffered from design
changes, financial problems, its position in the social and
hierarchical structure, and professional differences of opinion,
not from personal incompetence nor lack of desire. HARP team
members should be commended for their work output under these
trying circumstances.

2. There is little socioeconomic input into UNAT. This
input should be strenghtened, perhaps by collaborative research
with social science faculty at CURLA or other universities.

3. Although.the evaluation team was asked to assess the
Mejores Alimentos project, the team was not given any micro
economic analyses concerning prices, costs, markets, etc. for
tomato production. These analyses are critical to any
assessment.








Page 51


APPENDIX A

EVALUATION TEAM ITINERARY

23-31 JANUARY 1984


1/22 Sunday Evaluation team arrived in Gainesville, Florida.
1/23 Monday Morning: Formal team briefing by.Dr. Dan Gait (FSSP)
at G001 McCarty Hall, University of Florida. Informal
briefing continues. Dan Galt was present to answer
questions and help locate additional documentation.
1/24 Tuesday 7:30-9:15 am: Flight from Gainesville to Miami on Air
Florida 391.
1:00-3:05 pm: Flight from Miami to Tegucigalpa on Air
Florida 129.
Flight was delayed one hour setting back afternoon
meeting. Team was met at Tegucigalpa airport by USAID
representatives and taken to hotel. Change in hotels
further delayed meeting with USAID.
4:30-5:30 pm. USAID briefing at embassy by Bryan
Rudert (Project Officer), Mario Contreras (Technical
Support Officer), Gordon Straub (Project Officer),
and Orlando Hernandez (Evaluation Officer). Clarified
scope of evaluation.
Evening: Supper with several USAID and HARP staff.
Met CID evaluation team of Merle Niehaus (NMSU) and
Bill Shaner (CSU).
1/25 Wednesday Morning: DIA briefing at MRN by Adan Bonilla, (DIA
Director) Gerardo Reyes (DIA Assistant Director) and
Antonio Silva (DIA UNAT).
Afternoon: Drive to Comayagua and visit appropriate
technology project (Gwyn Williams) and Mejores
Alimentos. From Comayagua to San Pedro Sula and check
into hotel. Evaluation team is accompanied by Mario
Contreras for USAID.
1/26 Thursday Morning: HARP briefing by entire HARP team at MRN
Regional headquarters.
Afternoon: Some of evaluation team interview Roberto
Larios (MRN Project Director) and Francisca de Escoto
(Research-Extension Liaison for Region). Others visit
Guaymas Research Station and Cuyamel area. Contreras
returned to Tegucigalpa.
1/27 Friday All day: Part of team travels to Yoro Valley and
others go to La Ceiba and CURLA to visit field sites
and interview MRN (DIA and DEA) staff and farmers.
1/28 Saturday All day: Report writing. Final checks with HARP and
MRN officials to clarify some points and receive
documentation.
1/29 Sunday All day: Report writing. Consultations with HARP
COP and CID evaluation team.
1/30 Monday Morning and part of Afternoon: Oral presentation in
Spanish of preliminary evaluation report and MRN
Regional headquarters. Appendix C includes list of
those attending. No one attended from USAID; Gerardo








Paqe 52


1/31 Tuesday













2/2 Thursday


Reyes represented DIA.
Rest of day: Report writing and modification to
include points raised during days' discussions.
Morning: Half of evaluation team left Honduras.
Team leader and one other remained and made another
presentation of the (modified) preliminary draft of
evaluation report. This time USAID was represented
by Mario Contreras; DIA Director Adan Bonilla also
attended (Appendix C includes full list of those
attending). Copies of modified preliminary report
in English were distributed at beginning of meeting
to HARP COP, USAID representative, Adan Bonilla and
Roberto Larios. Oral presentation was in Spanish.
Afternoon: Visit to United Brands research center
(near San Pedro) which is proposed headquarters for
new autonomous research institute. Rest of evaluation
team left Honduras.
Team leader met with FSSP staff .for debriefing and
presentation of modified preliminary report, G001
McCarty Hall, University of Florida. Present were
Chris Andrew, Pete Hildebrand, Eugenio Martinez,
Dan Galt, Steve Kearl and Jim Dean.








Page 53


APPENDIX B

LIST OF PEOPLE MET BY TEAM

USAID Gordon Straub Project Officer
Dr. Mario Contreras Technical Officer, HARP Project
Bryan Rudert Project Officer
Orlando Hernandez Evaluation Officer

DIA-Tegucigalpa Ing. Adan Bonilla Director
Ing. Antonio Silva UNAT, former member of HARP
Ing. Gerardo Reyes Assistant Director


. HARP Team


Dr. Charles Ward COP, Entomologist
Ing. Norberto Enrique Urbina Assistant COP, Entomologist
Dr. Dennis Sharma Weed Control Specialist
Ing. Mario Bustamante Weed Control Specialist
Dr. Michael Bertelsen Agricultural Economist
James Walker Soil Fertility Specialist
Ing. Ligia Ramos Soil Fertility Specialist


NMSU TDY Dr. Melchor Ortiz Statistician

CID Evaluation Team Dr..W.W. Shaner Professor, Colorado State
University
Dr. M. Niehaus Chair, Department of Agronomy, NMSU

FSSP Dr. Dan Gait Agricultural Economist

Region 2 (San Pedro) Guillermo Alvatado Regional Planning
Director
Hector Fernandez Regional DIA Chief
Enrique Cano Regional DEA Chief
Ing. Roberto Larios Mejia- Regional MRN Director
Ing. Francisca de Escoto Regional MRN Research/
Extension Liaison


Comayagua
Yoro


.Gwyn Williams Project Leader, UDA/Comayagua
Ing. Oswaldo Paz Director, Sub-Region 1, Region 2
Ing. Ramon Medina Head of Research, Sub-Region 1
and Region 2


La Ceiba Ivette Rico de Ponce Direccion Litoral Atlantico

CURLA Ing. Jorge Soto Director
Ing. Freddy Starkman Teaching Coordinator
Mario R. Alvarado

Guaymas Experimental Station Ing. M. T. Palao Experiment
Station Director
Ing. Julio Romero -. Principal Plant Breeder (Maize)
Ing. Victor Mendez Assistant to Principal Corn
Breeder
Ing. Armando Borgas in charge of Weed Control Research









Page 54


Ing. Jose A. Badia in charge of production
Ing. Aaron Aquilis in charge of Yula research
Ing. Alfredo Escoto in charge of National Rice Program
Agr. Eddy Soleman Rice Program

Cuyamel Ing. Leopoldo Crivelli on-farm research coordinator
Agr. Amberto Dominguez extension agent
Orlando Benjamin Alvarado CURLA student doing senior
paper on soil fertility

La Masica Menelio Madariaga
Ing. German A. Flores Enlace Tecnologico
Gustavo Batiz MRN Assistant Director, Litoral Atlantico
Region










Page 55


APPENDIX C

REFERENCE DOCUr-LNTS

1. HARP PUBLICATIONS


A. Work Plans (all in English)
1. 4/18/83 (Draft), 1 January 1933 to 31 December 1984
2. Primera (1983A), 1 January 1983 to 31 October 1983, #83-20
3. Postera (1983B),
4. 1984 Plan, 1 January 1984 to 31 December 1984, #8-3-

B. Quarterly and Annual Reports (English and Spanish)
1. First, 1 Jan 8.3 to 31 March 1983, 483-4
2. Second, 1 April 1983 to 30 June 1983, #83-5
3. Third, 1 July 1983 to 30 Sept 1983, #83-19
4. Informe Trimestral, 1 March 1983 to 30 June 1983.
Antonio Silva
5. Informe Trimestral, July to September 1983,
Antonio Silva
6. Informe de Actividades, March to June 1983,
Norberto E. Urbina
7. Informe Trimestral, 1 July to 30 September 1983
Norberto E. Urbina
8. Informe Trimestral, April to June 1983, Mario
Bustamante
9. Informe Trimestral, July to September 1983, Mario
Bustamante
10. Informed. de Actividades del Trimestre, March to
June 1983, Ligia Ramos
11. Informe Trimestral, July to September, Ligia Ramos
12. First Annual, 1 Jan 1983 to 31 Dec 1983, #83-

C. TDY Reports
1. Computer Science, Melchor Ortiz, June 22-July 10, 1983,
#83-11
2. Experimental Statistics, Melchor Ortiz, January 6-14,
1983, #83-3
3. CURLA Entomology Collection, James Zimmerman, July 2-29,
1983, #83-14
4. (Plant Pathology) Orientation and Inspection Visit to
Honduras and HARP, J.A. Booth, July 25-29, 1983, #83-

D. Special Studies
1. Paspalum conjugatum: A Literature Search, Charles G. Dean,
June 13, 1983, #83-8
2. Panenecum maximum;Panicum purpurascens: A Literature
Search, Charles G. Dean, June 13, 1983, #83-9
3. Sistemas de production para arroz y maiz en Cuyamel:
problems y perspectives de investigation, September 1983
4. Resultado de tres encuestas realizadas en el valle de Yoro
durante 1982, December 1983
5. Agricultural Policy Paper Number 1: Policy for Agricultural








Page 56


Research, Wilmer Harper
6. Como Prevenir la Diseminacion de Caminadora (Rottboellia
exaltada) a Otras Areas en Honduras, September 1983

2. SAID PUBLICATIONS

A. Project
1. PID Agricultural Research Project, Ministry of Natural
Resources, Honduras, August 1978
2. PP Agricultural Research Project, Ministry of Natural Resources
Honduras
3. PP Honduras Agricultural Sector .II Program 522-0150
4. Agriculture Sector Assessment for Honduras, August 1978
5. Project Evaluation Summary, August 1980
6. Evaluation of-USAID Honduras Agricultural Research Project NO.
522-0139 with the National Agricultural Research Program (PNIA), March
1981

B. Contract
1. Request for Technical Proposals (AID-PAN-82-6) Agricultural
Research Project Ministry of Natural Resources National Agricultural
Research Program, March 15, 1982
2. Cost Reimbursement Contract for Agricultural Research. in
Honduras, October 1982

C. CDSS
1. Country Development Strategy Statement: FY 1981 Honduras,
January 1979
2. Country Development Strategy Statement: FY 1981 Central America
Region


3. CID PUBLICATIONS

Proposal RFTP AID-PAN-82-6, May 11, 1982


4. GOH PUBLICATIONS

A. DIA
1. Presupuesto y Plan Operativo, Ano 1984, Noviembre 1983
2. Agricultural Research in Honduras, 1978
3. Funcionamiento del Programa Nacional de Investigacion
Agropecuaria y su Integracion en un Sistema Tecnologico, May 1981
4. Memoranda concerning "Enlace Tecnologico", 1983
5. E1 Desarrollo de la Investigacion Agricola en el Sector Publico
de Honduras, Robert Waugh, April 1981
6. Propuesta de Reestructuracion del Programa Nacional de
Investigation Agropecuaria, Noviembre 1980

B. Direccion Agricola Regional del Norte, Programa Nacional de
Extension Agropecuaria
1983 Caracterizacion del Area de Influencia de Agencia de Extension
de Cuyamel, Cortes









Page 57


5. MISCELLANEOUS SOURCES

Byerlee, Derek, Larry Harrington and Donald L. Winklemann, 1982,
"Farming Systems Research: Issues in research strategy and technology
design", In American Journal of Agricultural Economics:64:5
(December):897-904

Contreras, Mario Ruben, et.al., 1977, "An Interdisciplinary
Approach to International Agricultural Training: The Cornell-CIMMYT
Graduate Student Team Report", Cornell International Agriculture
Memeograph

De Walt, Billie R.'and Kathleen M. De Walt, June 1982, A Farming
Systems Approach Report No. 1: Cropping Systems in Perspire, Southern
Honduras, INTSORMIL

Galt, Daniel, et.al., 1982, Farming Systems Research (FSR) in
Honduras, 1977-81: a Case Study, Working Paper No. 1, MSU International
Development Papers, Michigan State University

Safilios-Rothschild, Constantina, 1983, "Women and the Agrarian
Refom in Honduras", in Land Reform: Land Settlement and Cooperatives,
FAO, Rome 15-24

Safilios-Rothschild, Constantina, September 1983, The Impact of
Agrarian Reform on Men and Women in Honduras

Whyte, William F., Participatory Approaches to Agricultural
Research and Developmemt: A State-of-the-Art Paper, Rural Development
Committee ARE No. 1, Cornell University









Page 59


APPENDIX D

PEOPLE ATTENDING PRELIMINARY REPORT MEETINGS

1. MONDAY, 30 JANUARY 1984

6 HARP team members (Ing. de Ramos was absent.)
4 FSSP Evaluation team members
2 CID Evaluation team members
Ing. Gerardo A. Reyes, DIA Assistant National Director
Ing. Roberto Larios Mejia, Regional MRN Director
Guillermo Alvarado., Regional Planning Director
Ing. Francisca de Escoto, Regional MRN Research/Extension
Liaison
Hector Fernandez, Regional DIA Chief
Enrique Cano, Regional DEA Chief
Dr. Melchor Ortiz, NMSU TDY Statistician

19 people.registered themselves as attending; more people attended.

2. TUESDAY, 31 JANUARY 1984

6 HARP team members (Ing. de Ramos was absent.)
2 FSSP evaluation team members (Hansen and Marvel)
Dr. Mario Contreras, USAID Technical Support Officer
Ing. Adan Bonilla Contreras, DIA National Director
Ing. Gerardo A. Reyes, DIA Assistant National Director
Ing. Antonio Silva, UNAT Agricultural Economist
Ing. Roberto Larios Mejia, Regional MRN Director
Ing. Francisca de Escoto, Regional Research/Extension Liaison
Hector Fernandez, Regional DIA Chief
N. Reyes Di-scua, DIA agent

16 people registered themselves as attending; more people attended.









Page 61


APPENDIX E

ACRONYMS USED IN THE TEXT

Govenmental Agencies

BIFAD Board for International Food and Agricultural
Development
CATIE Centro Agronomico Tropical de Investigacion y
Ensenanza
CIAT Centro Internacional de Agricultura Tropical
CID Consortium for International Development
CIMMYT Centro Internacional para el Mejoramiento de
Maize y Trigo
CIP Centro Intern-aciona. de la Papa
COP Chief of Party
CURLA Regional University Center for the Atlantic
Coast
DEA Department of Agricultural Extension
DIA Department of Agricultural Research
EAP Escuela Agricola Panamericana
FSSP Farming Systems Support Project
GOH Government of Honduras
HARP Honduras Agricultural Research Project
IADS International Agricultural Development
Service
IARC International Agricultural Research Center
ICTA Instituto de Ciencia y Tecnologia Agricola
MRN Ministry of Natural Resources
NMSU New Mexico State University
PID Project Identification Document
PNIA National Agricultural Research Program
(now DIA)
PP Project Paper
RFTP Request for Technical Proposals
TDY Temporary Duty (short term)
UNAT National Unit for Technical Support
USAID United States Agency for International
Development

Research Methodologies

FSR Farming Systems Research
OFR On-farm research (also called PFSR)
PFSR Pioneering Farming Systems Research (also
called OFR)

Pests

CEW Corn Ear Worm
FAW Fall Army Worm









Page 63


APPENDIX F

RESUME EJECUTIVO


El proposito principal del Proyecto de Investigacion
Agricola (Ndm. 522-0139) es ayudar al Gobierno de Honduras
(GOH) a expandir sus servicios de investigaci6n agrfcola
dentro del Ministerio de Recursos Naturales (MRN),
respondiendo mejor a las necesidades tecnologicas de los
agricultores independientes pequefios y medianos, y de los
agricultores de la reform agraria. El proyecto se inicio
en octubre de 1978 como un contrato a un pals sede con
fondos director al Programa Nacional de Investigacion
Agricola del Gobierno de Honduras (PNIA, ahora DIA). El
impetu del proyecto se debilito' al finalizar el ano 1980 por
razones pollticas y economics en Honduras.

En octubre de 1982 otra fase del proyecto empezdo con la
firma de un contrato de asistencia tecnica (TA) con el
Consorcio para el Desarrollo Internacional y su principal
institucid'n, la Universidad de Nuevo Mexico, (CID/NMSU). El
Contrato (522-0139-C-00-2059) de 18 meses fue financiado con
los fondos sin usar del proyecto y trajo consigo cuatro
asistentes tecnicos, cada uno por-18 meses, y apoyo
adicional de asistencia ticnica temporera.

Esta evaluacion es la primera para el HARP (Proyecto de
Investigation Agrfcola de Honduras) pero la tercera de
cuatro programadas para este proyecto madre. Las otras. dos
evaluaciones fueron hechas en febrero de 1980 y en abril de
1981, y esta se llevo a efecto casi tres anos ma's tarde, en
enero de 1984.

Brevemente enumeraremos los objetivos de esta
evaluacion:
1. Senalar los logros y debilidades del present
contrato.
2. Colocar estos logros y debilidades en el context
del proyecto y la present situacion del pals sede.
3. Determinar si el contrato debe ser extendido por
otros seis meses.
4. Recomendar cualquier media cor.rectiva para el
tiempo que queda de Contrato.

Los seis problems especificos del Contrato que han
surgido durante 1983-1984 y las recomendaciones para
resolverlos hechas por el grupo que evalud el Contrato, son
los siguientes:

Problema 1. Encomienda y Coordinacion.
Fallos originales en el disefo e interpretation del
Contrato de como el personal de asistencia t4cnica
extranjera encajarfa en DIA, incluyendo el fall de disenar
un proyecto de ayuda a la investigacidn de sistemas










Page 64


agricolas (FSR) de solo 18 a 24 meses de duracion, ha
causado problems interminables. La correspondiente
confusion de como HARP encajaria en la parte organizadora en
relacion con DIA, USAID, y NMSU ha contribuido a crear un
sentir entire los hondurenos de que HARP no es parte del
Ministerio. Esta ha sido una preocupacion desde el inicio
del Contrato.

Recomendacion 1. Llegar a un acuerdo entire DIA, el
Director Regional del MRN, USAID, y el personal de HARP en
(a) la encomienda de trabajo para el resto del contrato con
HARP (hasta julio de 1984); (b) salaries para el personal
hondureno de HARP; (c) las relaciones y los limits de
autoridad entire el DIA, HARP y el Director Regional del MRN;
(d) y si possible extender el Contrato por seis meses mas.

Problema 2. Confusion en el plan de trabajo.
Por lo menos tres cambios han habido en la distribucidn
de trabajo en este Proyecto, todos hechos bien por el USAID
o el DIA. HARP no ha tenido nada que ver en esto solo
aceptar esos cambios o retirarse.

Recomendacion 2. Durante los ultimos seis meses del
Contrato HARP debe Ta) quitarse drasticamente de toda
investigation direct en el campo; (b) concentrarse en
analizar los datos existentes; (c) darle todo el apoyo
tecnico a los investigadores hondureios; y (d) enfatizar
sobre el entrenamiento.

Problema 3: Seguridad financiera y planeamiento.
Un hecho financiero important ha sido la consistent
incertidumbre sobre los salaries del personal hondureno de
HARP. HARP ha sido afectado en sus entrenamientos y en
lograr la extension del Contrato por otros seis meses por
otros problems financieros.

Recomendacion 3. Si no se ha llegado a un acuerdo, y
no se ha puesto por escrito que el USAID tiene suficientes
fondos para el entrenamiento y extension antes de finalizar
febrero de 1984, HARP debe terminar al cumplirse sus 18
meses de existencia.

Problema 4: Metodologia de Investigacion.
Existe un problema de arguments metodoldgicos
recurrente y consistent sobre diferentes definiciones de lo
que es investigationn de sistemas agrfcolas" e
investigationn en la finca". Otro de los problems es el
desacuerdo que hay sobre que tiempo debe durar el liderazgo
extranjero que HARP debe proveer. Estos problems han
contribuido a la falta de organizacion y a una estructura de
oposicion entire los empleados hondurenos y los del NMSU de
HARP.

Recomendacion 4. El grupo de HARP debe programar
reunions regulars semanales donde el unico to'pico de








Page 65'


discussion sea la "Metodologia de Investigacidn". Como grupo
HARP debe examiner sus experiencias de 1983, asi como
cualquier-otra information pertinente sobre Honduras, para
identificar los problems metodol6gicos. El personal
hondureno de HARP debe ser el que lleve la voz cantante con
los companeros extranjeros escuchando para aprender lo que
los hondurenos consideran los mas importantes apremios
metodologicos en el context hondureio. Los t6picos
especificos de discusi6n estan sefalados en la evaluacion.
(Vease seccion V, Hechos y Recomendaciones).

Problema 5: Participacion en la Investigacidn Agricola
del SAID.
USAID esta envuelto en un sin numero de proyectos
existentes y propuestos en el area general de la
investigation y desarrollo agrfcola. No hay obviamente
ningun program que una estos proyectos o clarifiquen su
relaci6n con el FSR.

Recomendacion 5. USAID debe pedir una evaluacion de
sus esfuerzos en la investigaci6n y desarrollo agricola. El
grupo que evalua este proyecto consider que un mayor
component de estos esfuerzos debe ser el constant apoyo al
FSR. Por eso es la importancia de la participation del FSSP
en esta amplia evaluacion. Las encomiendas del GOH, el
liderazgo hondureno professional y las relaciones entire el
propuesto institute y el FSR son hechos que se deben
considerar.

SProblema 6: El Informe escrito, las audiencias y los
visitantes del Proyecto.
Los informes trimestrales de HARP han sido demorados,
fragmentados y causa de insatisfaccidn para el MRN porque
creen que identifica a HARP solamente como un experiment
del CID/NMSU. El-flujo de consultores (TDY) y visitantes
para y de HARP, San Pedro Sula y CURLA confunden e irritan a
muchos hondurenos. Se preguntan de donde provienen los
fondos para estas actividades y la cantidad de tiempo que
dichas visits le roban de sus prioridades que es la
investigation.

Recomendacion 6: (a) HARP debe reenfocar su atencion
en sus informed anuales y trimestrales que el Contrato
require que se hagan en espajol. Estos informes necesitan
ser distribuidos mas ra'pidamente tanto al USAID como al DIA.
(b) Todos los patrocinadores del proyecto, incluyendo a
DIA, USAID, CID/NMSU y a todo el personal de HARP, necesitan
estar propiamente identificados en todos los informed y en
las cubiertas de estos. Todos los patrocinadores deben
aprobar los cambios en cuanto al plan de trabajo. (c) El
informed trimestral de HARP debe incluir todos los informes
trimestrales de todo el personal de HARP. (d) Todo personal
temporero debe dejar una copia de su informed en espanol
antes de salir de Honduras. Tambien deben tener una reunion
personal con el HARP COP y el Director del DIA (a su









Page 66


discresid"n). Los informes finales deben ser en espanol y
deben estar en Honduras antes de un mes de su partida. (e)
DIA y el Director Regional del MRN deben ser informados con
tiempo suficiente de todas las personas, tanto
administrativas o tecnicas, que visitaran a Honduras y a
HARP. Esto reducirfa las ideas erroneas y enfatizaria en
cuanto a que el tiempo y los vehiculos de HARP pueden ser
usados tanto por el USAID como por el DIA/MRN.

Otras recomendaciones especificas estan detalladas en
este informed, especialmemte en la Seccio'n IV Productos
(Outputs) y en la Seccion V Hechos y Recomendaciones
(Issues and Recommendations).










Page 67



Metodologia de Investigacion

Honduras y los hondurenos estan entire los pioneros en
establecer y desarrollar una metodologia de investigation
que es ahora conocida con el nombre de investigaci'n de
sistemas agricolas (FSR). El prop6sito bdsico de este nuevo
acercamiento es hacer la investigaci6n mas productive
cambiando las practices de produccion de los agricultores.
La idea basica es que la investigacidn que se queda eh la
estacion no sirve para los agricultores y esto es un lujo
que no pueden afrontar muchos pauses.

El proyecto original era de apoyo a los esfuerzos
pioneros de Honduras en desarrollar una metodologia de
investigaci6n mas efectiva, y cualquiera que haya trabajado
en DIA (entonces PNIA) antes del ano 1977 puede atestiguar
sobre los cambios que han ocurrido desde entonces. Este
contrato era para continuar de un modo mas efectivo la
evolucion de una series de me'todos proveyendoles apoyo
tecnico a los ya existentes grupos regionales, mejorando los
niveles tecnicos de los empleados del DIA a traves de
entrenamientos en el trabajo y participando en su
planeamiento.

Aunque ahora hay much mas literature sobre el FSR y un
creciente consenso de opinions sobre c6mo definirlo, los
pioneros (los cientificos y los programs) estaban
trabajando desde much -antes. Estos trabajos enfatizaban la
necesidad de hacer pruebas en las fincas y no en estaciones
experimentales de investigation, porque su ambiente es
especial y los tratamientos y las variedades que resultan
mejor en las estaciones puede que no sean las mejores en las
fincas. Este trabajo pionero tambien enfatizo el cultivo de
granos basicos porque estas cosechas son la principal
preocupacion de los agricultores; esto significaba un cambio
pues antes la preocupacion principal era la produccidn para
exportacidn. Los pioneros del FSR estaban preocupados de
que los agricultores no adoptaran las recomendaciones de la
investigation. Para que se adoptaran las tecnicas
recomendadas estas tenfan que ser apropiadas y beneficiosas
en algun sentido. Para lograr que entendieran que era lo
apropiado, estos pioneros enfatizaron en una cooperation
multidisciplinaria entire te'cnicos y cientificos sociales y
en aumentar la comunicacion entire investigadores,
cientificos y agricultores.

Estos intereses y enfasis generals en las situaciones
pioneras del FSR fueron restringuidos por hechos practices
ya establecidos. Como se podian hacer cambios en las ya
existentes unidades de investigation tanto nacionales como
internacionales? Como en cualquier procedimiento ya
instituido, los propuestos cambios teoricos y practices
fueron adoptados por un determinado pafs, localidad y/o
agencia. Este process evolutivo de cambiar las metodologias








Page 68


de investigation se adaptan mejor y mas rapido en algunos
pauses que en otros.y las instituciones para la
investigation que van surgiendo varian de un pals a otro.

Honduras fue unos de los pauses pioneros en los aios 70
en evolucionar su sistema indigena de FSR, y el enfoque del
DIA refleja este trabajo pionero: en la finca (no solamente
en la estacion), usando sondeos como gulas para las
investigaciones multidisciplinarias para saber cuales eran
los granos basicos. Como en cualquier campo de
investigacidn, los cientificos siempre estan buscando
mejores metodos, por ej. el program "Enlace Tecnologico" de
Olancho ha sido recomendado para su adopcio'n a travds de
todo el pals porque eL MRN piensa que este va a trabajar
mejor. En Honduras, como en cualquier otro pals, los
agronomos y cientificos sociales estan conscientes de que
estos metodos establecidos pueden necesitar mejoras, pero
todo el que trabaja en Honduras reconoce los cambios tan
grandes que han ocurrido en esta ultima decada.

Los ciudadanos hondurenos han torado el liderazgo en
iniciar y dirigir algunos de estos cambios en la metodologfa
de investigation. En Honduras, como en todo pals, sin
embargo, se logran grandes ventajas pra'cticas uniendo los
talents cientificos nacionales con los extranjeros. En los
E.U.A., un pais notorio por sus ciencias agrfcolas y sus
universidades, hay tambien muchos cientfficos extranjeros
trabajando, y se aprecian sus talents y contribuciones.

Las preguntas y desacuerdos concernientes al HARP y al
FSR parecen basarse en el grado de liderazgo que los
empleados del CID/NMSU estan dispuestos a ejercer y a cuando
y cuanto la existente metodologia del DIA necesita ser
revisada. La actual metodologia hondurena la llamaremos
Pioneering FSR (PFSR) en este informed para distinguirlo de
la metodologia del FSR descrita en literature actual.

El grupo del CID/NMSU obviamente cree que fueron
contratados por el USAID y el DIA para proveer liderazgo
tecnico y apoyo, y que el economist agronomo del CID/NMSU
(mas que el grupo en sf) era el principal responsible de
proveer ese liderazgo. Al mismo tiempo el grupo crefa que
habian series debilidades en el PFSR (el cual el informed del
HARP lo refiere como investigacidn al nivel de finca u OFR),
y que se debfa reemplazar por el FSR. Estas creencias estan
bien documentadas en los planes de trabajo y en los informes
trimestrales.

Cualquiera de estas posiciones del DIA sobre este
particular no aparecen en los informes pero sf en las
acciones. Obviamente hay una fuerte resistencia de parte de
los hondurenos en el DIA, incluyendo por lo menos a la
mayoria de los empleados del HARP, de que el CID/NMSU asuma
el liderazgo en implementar el FSR y en mpdificar el PFSR.
Tambien parece haber una fuerte resistencia, similar a la









Page 69


anterior, para cualquier modificacio"n del PFSR pero esto no
esta claro (refi4rase al Enlace modificado) y se hace
confuso por la controversial por el liderazgo.

Una vez mas el fracaso por parte del USAID, DIA y
CID/NMSU de aclarar desde el comienzo del HARP su diseno y
mandate sigue confundiendo la operacidn de este contrato.
El contrato no especifica ningun liderazgo ni definiendo ni
estableciendo el FSR, pide el apoyo y gula de los
profesionales del CID/NMSU como parte de una mayor UNAT.
Aunque de hecho el HARP es UNAT y el CID/NMSU dirige a HARP,
otra cosa es que el DIA consistentemente ha tratado de
mantener y sostener el liderazgo hondureio. Es muy possible
que el DIA inicie cambios en la encomienda de trabajo del
HARP los cuales fueron diseFados para impedir lo que los
dirigentes del DIA vieron como un liderazgo indeseable del
CID/NMSU.

Estos desacuerdos profesiohales sobre la metodologa .
han sido personificados por los economists agronomos desde
que el economist del CID/NMSU era el responsible de iniciar
el FSR y el economist hondureno encabezaba el grupo
hondureno (y anteriormente era el Director Nacional del
DIA). Estos desacuerdos sobre el PFSR-FSR fueron los
principles responsables de que-el USAID. decidiera no
renovar el contrato de trabajo al economist hondureno
cuando expired' a fines de diciembre de 1983, y el descontento
sobre este hecho aparentemente fue el causante de la partida
de Honduras del economist del CID/NMSU mas o menos al mismo
tiempo.

Estos desacuerdos son mas fundamentals que simple
conflicts personales (aunque estos pueden haber sido un
factor) como lo ha demostrado el hecho de que los
desacuerdos y contrariedades entire los grupos hondurenos y
del CID/NMSU continuan a pesar de la partida de los dos
primeros economists.




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